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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/10694-0.txt b/10694-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b796a84 --- /dev/null +++ b/10694-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8289 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10694 *** + +SEA-POWER AND OTHER STUDIES + +BY ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN BRIDGE, G.C.B. + + + +PREFACE + +The essays collected in this volume are republished in the hope +that they may be of some use to those who are interested in naval +history. The aim has been to direct attention to certain historical +occurrences and conditions which the author ventures to think +have been often misunderstood. An endeavour has been made to +show the continuity of the operation of sea-power throughout +history, and the importance of recognising this at the present +day. + +In some cases specially relating to our navy at different periods +a revision of the more commonly accepted conclusions--formed, +it is believed, on imperfect knowledge--is asked for. + +It is also hoped that the intimate connection between naval history +in the strict sense and military history in the strict sense has +been made apparent, and likewise the fact that both are in reality +branches of the general history of a nation and not something +altogether distinct from and outside it. + +In a collection of essays on kindred subjects some repetitions +are inevitable, but it is believed that they will be found present +only to a moderate extent in the following pages. + +My nephew, Mr. J. S. C. Bridge, has very kindly seen the book +through the press. + +_June_ 1910. + + + + +CONTENTS + + I. SEA-POWER. + II. THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. + III. WAR AND ITS CHIEF LESSONS. + IV. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT + SERVICE. + V. FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT THE PRESS-GANG. + VI. PROJECTED INVASIONS OF THE BRITISH ISLES. + VII. OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND. +VIII. QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HER SEAMEN. + IX. NELSON: THE CENTENARY OF TRAFALGAR. + X. THE SHARE OF THE FLEET IN THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. + XI. NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR. + XII. THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF A FLEET. + INDEX. + + + + +Ten of the essays included in this volume first appeared in the +_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_, the _Times_, the _Morning_Post_, the +_National_Review_, the _Nineteenth_Century_and_After_, the +_Cornhill_Magazine_, and the _Naval_Annual_. The proprietors of +those publications have courteously given me permission to +republish them here. + +Special mention must be made of my obligation to the proprietors +of the _Encyclopoedia_Britannica_ for allowing me to reproduce +the essays on 'Sea-Power' and 'The Command of the Sea.' They are +the owners of the copyright of both essays, and their courtesy +to me is the more marked because they are about to republish them +themselves in the forthcoming edition of the _Encyclopoedia_. + +The paper on 'Naval Strategy and Tactics at the Time of Trafalgar' +was read at the Institute of Naval Architects, and that on 'The +Supply and Communications of a Fleet' at the Hong-Kong United +Service Institution. + + + + +I + +SEA-POWER[1] + +[Footnote 1: Written in 1899. (_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_.)] + +Sea-power is a term used to indicate two distinct, though cognate +things. The affinity of these two and the indiscriminate manner +in which the term has been applied to each have tended to obscure +its real significance. The obscurity has been deepened by the +frequency with which the term has been confounded with the old +phrase, 'Sovereignty of the sea,' and the still current expression, +'Command of the sea.' A discussion--etymological, or even +archæological in character--of the term must be undertaken as +an introduction to the explanation of its now generally accepted +meaning. It is one of those compound words in which a Teutonic +and a Latin (or Romance) element are combined, and which are +easily formed and become widely current when the sea is concerned. +Of such are 'sea-coast,' 'sea-forces' (the 'land- and sea-forces' +used to be a common designation of what we now call the 'Army +and Navy'), 'sea-service,' 'sea-serpent,' and 'sea-officer' (now +superseded by 'naval officer'). The term in one form is as old +as the fifteenth century. Edward III, in commemoration of the +naval victory of Sluys, coined gold 'nobles' which bore on one +side his effigy 'crowned, standing in a large ship, holding in +one hand a sword and in the other a shield.' An anonymous poet, +who wrote in the reign of Henry VI, says of this coin: + + For four things our noble showeth to me, + King, ship, and sword, and _power_of_the_sea_. + +Even in its present form the term is not of very recent date. +Grote [2] speaks of 'the conversion of Athens from a land-power +into a sea-power.' In a lecture published in 1883, but probably +delivered earlier, the late Sir J. R. Seeley says that 'commerce +was swept out of the Mediterranean by the besom of the Turkish +sea-power.'[3] The term also occurs in vol. xviii. of the +'Encyclopædia Britannica,' published in 1885. At p. 574 of that +volume (art. Persia) we are told that Themistocles was 'the founder +of the Attic sea-power.' The sense in which the term is used differs +in these extracts. In the first it means what we generally call +a 'naval power'--that is to say, a state having a considerable +navy in contradistinction to a 'military power,' a state with a +considerable army but only a relatively small navy. In the last +two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength +of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now +generally, and is likely to be exclusively, attached to the term +owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by +Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy in a series of +remarkable works.[4] The double use of the term is common in +German, though in that language both parts of the compound now +in use are Teutonic. One instance out of many may be cited from +the historian Adolf Holm.[5] He says[6] that Athens, being in +possession of a good naval port, could become '_eine_bedeutende_ +_Seemacht_,' i.e. an important naval power. He also says[7] that +Gelon of Syracuse, besides a large army (_Heer_), had '_eine_ +_bedeutende_Seemacht_,' meaning a considerable navy. The term, +in the first of the two senses, is old in German, as appears +from the following, extracted from Zedler's 'Grosses Universal +Lexicon,' vol. xxxvi:[8] 'Seemachten, Seepotenzen, Latin. _summae_ +_potestates_mari_potentes_.' 'Seepotenzen' is probably quite +obsolete now. It is interesting as showing that German no more +abhors Teuto-Latin or Teuto-Romance compounds than English. We may +note, as a proof of the indeterminate meaning of the expression +until his own epoch-making works had appeared, that Mahan himself +in his earliest book used it in both senses. He says,[9] 'The +Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea-power.' He alludes[10] +to the development of a nation as a 'sea-power,' and[11] to the +inferiority of the Confederate States 'as a sea-power.' Also,[12] +he remarks of the war of the Spanish Succession that 'before +it England was one of the sea-powers, after it she was _the_ +sea-power without any second.' In all these passages, as appears +from the use of the indefinite article, what is meant is a naval +power, or a state in possession of a strong navy. The other meaning +of the term forms the general subject of his writings above +enumerated. In his earlier works Mahan writes 'sea power' as +two words; but in a published letter of the 19th February 1897, +he joins them with a hyphen, and defends this formation of the +term and the sense in which he uses it. We may regard him as +the virtual inventor of the term in its more diffused meaning, +for--even if it had been employed by earlier writers in that +sense--it is he beyond all question who has given it general +currency. He has made it impossible for anyone to treat of sea-power +without frequent reference to his writings and conclusions. + +[Footnote 2: _Hist._of_Greece_, v. p. 67, published in 1849, but +with preface dated 1848.] + +[Footnote 3: _Expansion_of_England_, p. 89.] + +[Footnote 4: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, published 1890; +_Influence_of_Sea-power_on_the_French_Revolution_and_Empire_, +2 vols. 1892; _Nelson:_the_Embodiment_of_the_Sea-power_of_Great_ +_Britain_, 2 vols. 1897.] + +[Footnote 5: _Griechische_Geschichte_. Berlin, 1889.] + +[Footnote 6: _Ibid_. ii. p. 37.] + +[Footnote 7: _Ibid_. ii. p. 91.] + +[Footnote 8: Leipzig und Halle, 1743.] + +[Footnote 9: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, p. 35.] + +[Footnote 10: _Ibid_. p. 42.] + +[Footnote 11: _Ibid_. p. 43.] + +[Footnote 12: _Ibid_. p. 225.] + +There is something more than mere literary interest in the fact that +the term in another language was used more than two thousand years +ago. Before Mahan no historian--not even one of those who specially +devoted themselves to the narration of naval occurrences--had +evinced a more correct appreciation of the general principles +of naval warfare than Thucydides. He alludes several times to +the importance of getting command of the sea. This country would +have been saved some disasters and been less often in peril had +British writers--taken as guides by the public--possessed the same +grasp of the true principles of defence as Thucydides exhibited. +One passage in his history is worth quoting. Brief as it is, it +shows that on the subject of sea-power he was a predecessor of +Mahan. In a speech in favour of prosecuting the war, which he +puts into the mouth of Pericles, these words occur:-- _oi_meu_ +_gar_ouch_exousiu_allaeu_autilabeiu_amachei_aemiu_de_esti_ +_gae_pollae_kai_eu_uaesois_kai_kat_aepeirou_mega_gar_ +_to_tes_thalassaes_kratos_. The last part of this extract, +though often translated 'command of the sea,' or 'dominion of +the sea,' really has the wider meaning of sea-power, the 'power +of the sea' of the old English poet above quoted. This wider +meaning should be attached to certain passages in Herodotus,[13] +which have been generally interpreted 'commanding the sea,' or +by the mere titular and honorific 'having the dominion of the +sea.' One editor of Herodotus, Ch. F. Baehr, did, however, see +exactly what was meant, for, with reference to the allusion to +Polycrates, he says, _classe_maximum_valuit_. This is perhaps as +exact a definition of sea-power as could be given in a sentence. + +[Footnote 13: _Herodotus_, iii. 122 in two places; v.83.] + +It is, however, impossible to give a definition which would be at +the same time succinct and satisfactory. To say that 'sea-power' +means the sum-total of the various elements that go to make up +the naval strength of a state would be in reality to beg the +question. Mahan lays down the 'principal conditions affecting +the sea-power of nations,' but he does not attempt to give a +concise definition of it. Yet no one who has studied his works +will find it difficult to understand what it indicates. + +Our present task is to put readers in possession of the means +of doing this. The best, indeed--as Mahan has made us see--the +only effective way of attaining this object is to treat the matter +historically. Whatever date we may agree to assign to the formation +of the term itself, the idea--as we have seen--is as old as history. +It is not intended to give a condensed history of sea-power, but +rather an analysis of the idea and what it contains, illustrating +this analysis with examples from history ancient and modern. It +is important to know that it is not something which originated +in the middle of the seventeenth century, and having seriously +affected history in the eighteenth, ceased to have weight till +Captain Mahan appeared to comment on it in the last decade of +the nineteenth. With a few masterly touches Mahan, in his brief +allusion to the second Punic war, has illustrated its importance +in the struggle between Rome and Carthage. What has to be shown +is that the principles which he has laid down in that case, and +in cases much more modern, are true and have been true always and +everywhere. Until this is perceived there is much history which +cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to our welfare as a +maritime people that we should understand it thoroughly. Our +failure to understand it has more than once brought us, if not +to the verge of destruction, at any rate within a short distance +of serious disaster. + + +SEA-POWER IN ANCIENT TIMES + +The high antiquity of decisive naval campaigns is amongst the most +interesting features of international conflicts. Notwithstanding +the much greater frequency of land wars, the course of history +has been profoundly changed more often by contests on the water. +That this has not received the notice it deserved is true, and +Mahan tells us why. 'Historians generally,' he says, 'have been +unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither +special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining +influence of maritime strength on great issues has consequently been +overlooked.' Moralising on that which might have been is admittedly +a sterile process; but it is sometimes necessary to point, if +only by way of illustration, to a possible alternative. As in +modern times the fate of India and the fate of North America were +determined by sea-power, so also at a very remote epoch sea-power +decided whether or not Hellenic colonisation was to take root in, +and Hellenic culture to dominate, Central and Northern Italy as +it dominated Southern Italy, where traces of it are extant to this +day. A moment's consideration will enable us to see how different +the history of the world would have been had a Hellenised city +grown and prospered on the Seven Hills. Before the Tarquins were +driven out of Rome a Phocoean fleet was encountered (537 B.C.) off +Corsica by a combined force of Etruscans and Phoenicians, and +was so handled that the Phocoeans abandoned the island and settled +on the coast of Lucania.[14] The enterprise of their navigators +had built up for the Phoenician cities and their great off-shoot +Carthage, a sea-power which enabled them to gain the practical +sovereignty of the sea to the west of Sardinia and Sicily. The +control of these waters was the object of prolonged and memorable +struggles, for on it--as the result showed--depended the empire of +the world. From very remote times the consolidation and expansion, +from within outwards, of great continental states have had serious +consequences for mankind when they were accompanied by the +acquisition of a coast-line and the absorption of a maritime +population. We shall find that the process loses none of its +importance in recent years. 'The ancient empires,' says the historian +of Greece, Ernst Curtius, 'as long as no foreign elements had +intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water.' When +the condition, which Curtius notices in parenthesis, arose, the +'horror' disappeared. There is something highly significant in +the uniformity of the efforts of Assyria, Egypt, Babylon, and +Persia to get possession of the maritime resources of Phoenicia. +Our own immediate posterity will, perhaps, have to reckon with +the results of similar efforts in our own day. It is this which +gives a living interest to even the very ancient history of +sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical importance +to us now. We shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena connected +with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods. +Looked at in this light, the great conflicts of former ages are +full of useful, indeed necessary, instruction. + +[Footnote 14: Mommsen, _Hist._Rome_, English trans., i. p. 153.] + +In the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations +of the East against Europe--the Persian wars--sea-power was the +governing factor. Until Persia had expanded to the shores of the +Levant the European Greeks had little to fear from the ambition +of the great king. The conquest of Egypt by Cambyses had shown how +formidable that ambition could be when supported by an efficient +navy. With the aid of the naval forces of the Phoenician cities +the Persian invasion of Greece was rendered comparatively easy. +It was the naval contingents from Phoenicia which crushed the +Ionian revolt. The expedition of Mardonius, and still more that +of Datis and Artaphernes, had indicated the danger threatening +Greece when the master of a great army was likewise the master +of a great navy. Their defeat at Marathon was not likely to, +and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the Persians from +further attempts at aggression. As the advance of Cambyses into +Egypt had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of Xerxes +into Greece. By the good fortune sometimes vouch-safed to a people +which, owing to its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a +wise policy, scarcely deserves it, there appeared at Athens an +influential citizen who understood all that was meant by the +term sea-power. Themistocles saw more clearly than any of his +contemporaries that, to enable Athens to play a leading part in +the Hellenic world, she needed above all things a strong navy. +'He had already in his eye the battle-field of the future.' He +felt sure that the Persians would come back, and come with such +forces that resistance in the open field would be out of the +question. One scene of action remained--the sea. Persuaded by him +the Athenians increased their navy, so that of the 271 vessels +comprising the Greek fleet at Artemisium, 147 had been provided +by Athens, which also sent a large reinforcement after the first +action. Though no one has ever surpassed Themistocles in the +faculty of correctly estimating the importance of sea-power, +it was understood by Xerxes as clearly as by him that the issue +of the war depended upon naval operations. The arrangements made +under the Persian monarch's direction, and his very personal +movements, show that this was his view. He felt, and probably +expressed the feeling, exactly as--in the war of Arnerican +Independence--Washington did in the words, 'whatever efforts are +made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in +the present contest.' The decisive event was the naval action of +Salamis. To have made certain of success, the Persians should have +first obtained a command of the Ægean, as complete for all practical +purposes as the French and English had of the sea generally in +the war against Russia of 1854-56. The Persian sea-power was not +equal to the task. The fleet of the great king was numerically +stronger than that of the Greek allies; but it has been proved +many times that naval efficiency does not depend on numerical +superiority alone. The choice sections of the Persian fleet were +the contingents of the Ionians and Phoenicians. The former were +half-hearted or disaffected; whilst the latter were, at best, not +superior in skill, experience, and valour to the Greek sailors. At +Salamis Greece was saved not only from the ambition and vengeance +of Xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an +Oriental conqueror. Persia did not succeed against the Greeks, +not because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power, +artificially built up, was inferior to that which was a natural +element of the vitality of her foes. Ionia was lost and Greece +in the end enslaved, because the quarrels of Greeks with Greeks +led to the ruin of their naval states. + +The Peloponnesian was largely a naval war. The confidence of +the Athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its +outbreak. The immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in +time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the +conflict between Corinth and Corcyra of increasing the sea-power of +Athens. Hitherto the Athenian naval predominance had been virtually +confined to the Ægean Sea. The Corcyræan envoy, who pleaded for +help at Athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the +Athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important +situation 'with respect to the western regions towards which the +views of the Athenians had for some time been directed.'[15] +It was the 'weapon of her sea-power,' to adopt Mahan's phrase, +that enabled Athens to maintain the great conflict in which she +was engaged. Repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages +of disease amongst her people, and the rising disaffection of +her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance +on the water. The scale of the subsequent Syracusan expedition +showed how vigorous Athens still was down to the interruption +of the war by the peace of Nicias. The great expedition just +mentioned over-taxed her strength. Its failure brought about +the ruin of the state. It was held by contemporaries, and has +been held in our own day, that the Athenian defeat at Syracuse +was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the +force in Sicily properly supplied and reinforced. This explanation +of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. +The friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer +it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the +administration. After the despatch of the supporting expedition +under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, no further great reinforcement, +as Nicias admitted, was possible. The weakness of Athens was in +the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and +held high commands. A people which remembered the administration of +a Pericles, and yet allowed a Cleon or an Alcibiades to direct its +naval and military policy, courted defeat. Nicias, notwithstanding +the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of +a commander--firm resolution. He dared not face the obloquy +consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular +hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be +converted into an overwhelming disaster. 'The complete ruin of +Athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending +and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic +had been her rally, that [a year after Syracuse] she was found +again carrying on a terrible struggle.'[16] Nevertheless her +sea-power had indeed been ruined at Syracuse. Now she could wage +war only 'with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system.' +Even before Arginusæ it was seen that 'superiority of nautical +skill had passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies.'[17] + +[Footnote 15: Thirwall, _Hist._Greece_, iii. p. 96.] + +[Footnote 16: Grote, _Hist._Greece_, v. p. 354.] + +[Footnote 17: _Ibid._ p. 503.] + +The great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest between +Rome and Carthage was a sustained effort on the part of one to +gain and of the other to keep the control of the Western +Mediterranean. So completely had that control been exercised +by Carthage, that she had anticipated the Spanish commercial +policy in America. The Romans were precluded by treaties from +trading with the Carthaginian territories in Hispania, Africa, +and Sardinia. Rome, as Mommsen tells us, 'was from the first a +maritime city and, in the period of its vigour, never was so +foolish or so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect +its war marine and to desire to be a mere continental power.' It +may be that it was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion +that first prompted a trial of strength with Carthage. The vision +of universal empire could hardly as yet have formed itself in the +imagination of a single Roman. The area of Phoenician maritime +commerce was vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer +vulnerable points to the cupidity of rivals. It is probable that +the modern estimate of the sea-power of Carthage is much exaggerated. +It was great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great +when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge +it. Mommsen holds that, in the fourth and fifth centuries after +the foundation of Rome, 'the two main competitors for the dominion +of the Western waters' were Carthage and Syracuse. 'Carthage,' +he says, 'had the preponderance, and Syracuse sank more and more +into a second-rate naval power. The maritime importance of the +Etruscans was wholly gone.... Rome itself was not exempt from +the same fate; its own waters were likewise commanded by foreign +fleets.' The Romans were for a long time too much occupied at +home to take much interest in Mediterranean matters. The position +of the Carthaginians in the western basin of the Mediterranean +was very like that of the Portuguese long afterwards in India. +The latter kept within reach of the sea; 'nor did their rule ever +extend a day's march from their ships.'[18] 'The Carthaginians +in Spain,' says Mommsen, 'made no effort to acquire the interior +from the warlike native nations; they were content with the +possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell +and other fisheries.' Allowance being made for the numbers of the +classes engaged in administration, commerce, and supervision, +it is nearly certain that Carthage could not furnish the crews +required by both a great war-navy and a great mercantile marine. +No one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of Carthage +were composed largely of alien mercenaries. We have several examples +from which we can infer a parallel, if not an identical, condition +of her maritime resources. How, then, was the great Carthaginian +carrying-trade provided for? The experience of more than one +country will enable us to answer this question. The ocean trade +of those off-shoots or dependencies of the United Kingdom, viz. +the United States, Australasia, and India, is largely or chiefly +conducted by shipping of the old country. So that of Carthage was +largely conducted by old Phoenicians. These may have obtained a +'Carthaginian Register,' or the contemporary equivalent; but they +could not all have been purely Carthaginian or Liby-Phoenician. +This must have been the case even more with the war-navy. British +India for a considerable time possessed a real and indeed highly +efficient navy; but it was officered entirely and manned almost +entirely by men from the 'old country.' Moreover, it was small. The +wealth of India would have sufficed to furnish a larger material +element; but, as the country could not supply the _personnel_, +it would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of India +apart from that of England. As soon as the Romans chose to make +the most of their natural resources the maritime predominance +of Carthage was doomed. The artificial basis of the latter's +sea-power would not enable it to hold out against serious and +persistent assaults. Unless this is perceived it is impossible to +understand the story of the Punic wars. Judged by every visible +sign of strength, Carthage, the richer, the more enterprising, +ethnically the more predominant amongst her neighbours, and +apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the great +struggle with Rome which, by the conditions of the case, was to be +waged largely on the water. Yet those who had watched the struggles +of the Punic city with the Sicilian Greeks, and especially that +with Agathocles, must have seen reason to cherish doubts concerning +her naval strength. It was an anticipation of the case of Spain in +the age of Philip II. As the great Elizabethan seamen discerned +the defects of the Spanish naval establishment, so men at Rome +discerned those of the Carthaginian. Dates in connection with +this are of great significance. A comprehensive measure, with the +object of 'rescuing their marine from its condition of impotence,' +was taken by the Romans in the year 267 B.C. Four _quoestores_ +_classici_--in modern naval English we may perhaps call them +port-admirals--were nominated, and one was stationed at each +of four ports. The objects of the Roman Senate, so Mommsen tells +us, were very obvious. They were 'to recover their independence +by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of Tarentum, to +close the Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and to +emancipate themselves from Carthaginian supremacy.' Four years +afterwards the first Punic war began. It was, and had to be, +largely a naval contest. The Romans waged it with varying fortune, +but in the end triumphed by means of their sea-power. 'The sea +was the place where all great destinies were decided.'[19] The +victory of Catulus over the Carthaginian fleet off the Ægatian +Islands decided the war and left to the Romans the possession +of Sicily and the power of possessing themselves of Sardinia +and Corsica. It would be an interesting and perhaps not a barren +investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother +states of Phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of Alexander +the Great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the +Carthaginian defences. One thing was certain. Carthage had now +met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater +than her own. That rival also contained citizens who understood +the true importance of sea-power. 'With a statesmanlike sagacity +from which succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the +leading men of the Roman Commonwealth perceived that all their +coast-fortifications and coast-garrisons would prove inadequate +unless the war-marine of the state were again placed on a footing +that should command respect.'[20] It is a gloomy reflection that +the leading men of our own great maritime country could not see +this in 1860. A thorough comprehension of the events of the first +Punic war enables us to solve what, until Mahan wrote, had been +one of the standing enigmas of history, viz. Hannibal's invasion +of Italy by land instead of by sea in the second Punic war. Mahan's +masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts +as to the reason of Hannibal's action.[21] The naval predominance +in the western basin of the Mediterranean acquired by Rome had +never been lost. Though modern historians, even those belonging +to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the +Carthaginians knew well enough that the Romans were too strong +for them on the sea. Though other forces co-operated to bring +about the defeat of Carthage in the second Punic war, the Roman +navy, as Mahan demonstrates, was the most important. As a navy, he +tells us in words like those already quoted, 'acts on an element +strange to most writers, as its members have been from time +immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, +neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense +determining influence on the history of that era, and consequently +upon the history of the world, has been overlooked.' + +[Footnote 18: R. S. Whiteway, _Rise_of_the_Portuguese_Power_ +_in_India_ p. 12. Westminster, 1899.] + +[Footnote 19: J. H. Burton, _Hist._of_Scotland_, 1873, vol. i. +p. 318.] + +[Footnote 20: Mommsen, i. p. 427.] + +[Footnote 21: _Inf._on_Hist._, pp. 13-21.] + +The attainment of all but universal dominion by Rome was now +only a question of time. 'The annihilation of the Carthaginian +fleet had made the Romans masters of the sea.'[22] A lodgment +had already been gained in Illyricum, and countries farther east +were before long to be reduced to submission. A glance at the +map will show that to effect this the command of the eastern +basin of the Mediterranean, like that of the western, must be +secured by the Romans. The old historic navies of the Greek and +Phoenician states had declined. One considerable naval force +there was which, though it could not have prevented, was strong +enough to have delayed the Roman progress eastwards. This force +belonged to Rhodes, which in the years immediately following +the close of the second Punic war reached its highest point as +a naval power.[23] Far from trying to obstruct the advance of +the Romans the Rhodian fleet helped it. Hannibal, in his exile, +saw the necessity of being strong on the sea if the East was to +be saved from the grasp of his hereditary foe; but the resources +of Antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation of Hannibal, were +insufficient. In a later and more often-quoted struggle between +East and West--that which was decided at Actium--sea-power was +again seen to 'have the casting vote.' When the whole of the +Mediterranean coasts became part of a single state the importance +of the navy was naturally diminished; but in the struggles within +the declining empire it rose again at times. The contest of the +Vandal Genseric with Majorian and the African expedition of +Belisarius--not to mention others--were largely influenced by +the naval operations.[24] + +[Footnote 22: Schmitz, _Hist._Rome_, p. 256.] + +[Footnote 23: C. Torr, _Rhodes_in_Ancient_Times_, p. 40.] + +[Footnote 24: Gibbon, _Dec._and_Fall_, chaps. xxxvi. xli] + + +SEA-POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES + +A decisive event, the Mohammedan conquest of Northern Africa +from Egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how +great a part sea-power played in effecting it. Purely land +expeditions, or expeditions but slightly supported from the sea, +had ended in failure. The emperor at Constantinople still had at +his disposal a fleet capable of keeping open the communications +with his African province. It took the Saracens half a century +(647-698 A.D.) to win 'their way along the coast of Africa as +far as the Pillars of Hercules';[25] and, as Gibbon tells us, +it was not till the Commander of the Faithful had prepared a +great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the +Saracenic dominion was definitely established. It has been generally +assumed that the Arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his +death, spread the faith of Mohammed over vast regions, belonged +to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has +been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support +in prosecuting their conquests. In parts of Arabia, however, +maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the +Mohammedan empire had extended outwards from Mecca and Medina +till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences +to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above +mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. 'With the +conquest of Syria and Egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come +into the Saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of +a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for +meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. Great +attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet.'[26] +At first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the Phoenician +towns where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later +the crews were recruited from Syria, Egypt, and the coasts of +Asia Minor. Ships were built at most of the Syrian and Egyptian +ports, and also at Obolla and Bushire on the Persian Gulf,' whilst +the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and +encouraged. The sea-power thus created was largely artificial. +It drooped--as in similar cases--when the special encouragement +was withdrawn. 'In the days of Arabian energy,' says Hallam, +'Constantinople was twice, in 668 and 716, attacked by great +naval armaments.' The same authority believes that the abandonment +of such maritime enterprises by the Saracens may be attributed to +the removal of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. The removal +indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean +Sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. 'The +Greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the +sea,' with the result that in the middle of the tenth century +their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the +first successors of Heraclius. Not only was the fall of the empire, +by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, +but also much that had been lost was regained. 'At the close of +the tenth century the emperors of Constantinople possessed the +best and greatest part' of Southern Italy, part of Sicily, the +whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, +with some parts of Syria and Armenia.[27] + +[Footnote 25: Hallam, _Mid._Ages_, chap. vi.] + +[Footnote 26: Ameer Ali, Syed, _Short_Hist._Saracens_, p. 442] + +[Footnote 27: Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap. li.] + +Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its +own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial +creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when +it encounters a rival power of natural growth. How was it possible +for the Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even +the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? +How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist +for more than three-quarters of a century? Why did the Crusades +more and more become maritime expeditions? The answer to these +questions is to be found in the decline of the Mohammedan naval +defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of +the West. Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese transported crusading +forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the +Christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even +the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration +of conditions. This is evident when we look at the efforts of +the Christians to regain the lost kingdom. Saladin 'forgot that +the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, +and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx +from beyond the sea.'[28] Not only were the Crusaders helped by +the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received +reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the +'arrival of _Malik_Ankiltar_ (Richard Coeur de Lion) with twenty +shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.' + +[Footnote 28: Ameer Ali, Syed, pp. 359, 360.] + +Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the +importance of the naval states of Italy. That they had been able +to act effectively in the Levant may have been in some measure +due to the weakening of the Mohammedans by the disintegration +of the Seljukian power, the movements of the Moguls, and the +confusion consequent on the rise of the Ottomans. However that +may have been, the naval strength of those Italian states was +great absolutely as well as relatively. Sismondi, speaking of +Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, towards the end of the eleventh century, +says 'these three cities had more vessels on the Mediterranean +than the whole of Christendom besides.'[29] Dealing with a period +two centuries later, he declares it 'difficult to comprehend +how two simple cities could put to sea such prodigious fleets +as those of Pisa and Genoa.' The difficulty disappears when we +have Mahan's explanation. The maritime republics of Italy--like +Athens and Rhodes in ancient, Catalonia in mediæval, and England +and the Netherlands in more modern times--were 'peculiarly well +fitted, by situation and resources, for the control of the sea by +both war and commerce.' As far as the western Mediterranean was +concerned, Genoa and Pisa had given early proofs of their maritime +energy, and fixed themselves, in succession to the Saracens, in +the Balearic Isles, Sardinia, and Corsica. Sea-power was the +Themistoclean instrument with which they made a small state into +a great one. + +[Footnote 29: _Ital._Republics_, English ed., p. 29.] + +A fertile source of dispute between states is the acquisition +of territory beyond sea. As others have done before and since, +the maritime republics of Italy quarrelled over this. Sea-power +seemed, like Saturn, to devour its own children. In 1284, in a +great sea-fight off Meloria, the Pisans were defeated by the +Genoese with heavy loss, which, as Sismondi states, 'ruined the +maritime power' of the former. From that time Genoa, transferring +her activity to the Levant, became the rival of Venice, The fleets +of the two cities in 1298 met near Cyprus in an encounter, said +to be accidental, that began 'a terrible war which for seven +years stained the Mediterranean with blood and consumed immense +wealth.' In the next century the two republics, 'irritated by +commercial quarrels'--like the English and Dutch afterwards--were +again at war in the Levant. Sometimes one side, sometimes the +other was victorious; but the contest was exhausting to both, +and especially to Venice. Within a quarter of a century they +were at war again. Hostilities lasted till the Genoese met with +the crushing defeat of Chioggia. 'From this time,' says Hallam, +'Genoa never commanded the ocean with such navies as before; her +commerce gradually went into decay; and the fifteenth century, +the most splendid in the annals of Venice, is till recent times +the most ignominious in those of Genoa.' Venice seemed now to +have no naval rival, and had no fear that anyone could forbid +the ceremony in which the Doge, standing in the bows of the +_Bucentaur_, cast a ring into the Adriatic with the words, +_Desponsamus_te,_Mare,_in_signum_veri_perpetuique_dominii_. +The result of the combats at Chioggia, though fatal to it in +the long-run, did not at once destroy the naval importance of +Genoa. A remarkable characteristic of sea-power is the delusive +manner in which it appears to revive after a great defeat. The +Persian navy occasionally made a brave show afterwards; but in +reality it had received at Salamis a mortal wound. Athens seemed +strong enough on the sea after the catastrophe of Syracuse; but, +as already stated, her naval power had been given there a check +from which it never completely recovered. The navy of Carthage +had had similar experience; and, in later ages, the power of +the Turks was broken at Lepanto and that of Spain at Gravelines +notwithstanding deceptive appearances afterwards. Venice was +soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. The Turkish naval +historian, Haji Khalifeh,[30] tells us that, 'After the taking of +Constantinople, when they [the Ottomans] spread their conquests +over land and sea, it became necessary to build ships and make +armaments in order to subdue the fortresses and castles on the +Rumelian and Anatolian shores, and in the islands of the +Mediterranean.' Mohammed II established a great naval arsenal at +Constantinople. In 1470 the Turks, 'for the first time, equipped +a fleet with which they drove that of the Venetians out of the +Grecian seas.'[31] The Turkish wars of Venice lasted a long time. +In that which ended in 1503 the decline of the Venetians' naval +power was obvious. 'The Mussulmans had made progress in naval +discipline; the Venetian fleet could no longer cope with theirs.' +Henceforward it was as an allied contingent of other navies that +that of Venice was regarded as important. Dyer[32] quotes a striking +passage from a letter of Æneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II, +in which the writer affirms that, if the Venetians are defeated, +Christendom will not control the sea any longer; for neither the +Catalans nor the Genoese, without the Venetians, are equal to +the Turks. + +[Footnote 30: _Maritime_Wars_of_the_Turks_, Mitchell's trans., +p. 12.] + +[Footnote 31: Sismondi, p. 256.] + +[Footnote 32: _Hist._Europe_, i. p. 85.] + + +SEA-POWER IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES + +The last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule +that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older +maritime populations becomes a serious menace to its neighbours. +Even in the fifteenth century Mohammed II had made an attack on +Southern Italy; but his sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. +Suleymân the Magnificent directed the Ottoman forces towards +the West. With admirable strategic insight he conquered Rhodes, +and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on +his flank. 'The centenary of the conquest of Constantinople was +past, and the Turk had developed a great naval power besides +annexing Egypt and Syria.'[33] The Turkish fleets, under such +leaders as Khair-ad-din (Barbarossa), Piale, and Dragut, seemed +to command the Mediterranean including its western basin; but the +repulse at Malta in 1565 was a serious check, and the defeat at +Lepanto in 1571 virtually put an end to the prospect of Turkish +maritime dominion. The predominance of Portugal in the Indian +Ocean in the early part of the sixteenth century had seriously +diminished the Ottoman resources. The wealth derived from the trade +in that ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, had supplied +the Mohammedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to +contend with success against the Christians in Europe. 'The main +artery had been cut when the Portuguese took up the challenge +of the Mohammedan merchants of Calicut, and swept their ships +from the ocean.'[34] The sea-power of Portugal wisely employed +had exercised a great, though unperceived, influence. Though +enfeebled and diminishing, the Turkish navy was still able to act +with some effect in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the +sea-power of the Turks ceased to count as a factor of importance +in the relations between great states. + +[Footnote 33: Seeley, _British_Policy_, i. p. 143.] + +[Footnote 34: Whiteway, p. 2.] + +In the meantime the state which had a leading share in winning +the victory of Lepanto had been growing up in the West. Before +the union of its crown with that of Castile and the formation of +the Spanish monarchy, Aragon had been expanding till it reached +the sea. It was united with Catalonia in the twelfth century, and +it conquered Valencia in the thirteenth. Its long line of coast +opened the way to an extensive and flourishing commerce; and an +enterprising navy indemnified the nation for the scantiness of its +territory at home by the important foreign conquests of Sardinia, +Sicily, Naples, and the Balearic Isles. Amongst the maritime states +of the Mediterranean Catalonia had been conspicuous. She was to +the Iberian Peninsula much what Phoenicia had been to Syria. The +Catalan navy had disputed the empire of the Mediterranean with +the fleets of Pisa and Genoa. The incorporation of Catalonia +with Aragon added greatly to the strength of that kingdom. The +Aragonese kings were wise enough to understand and liberal enough +to foster the maritime interests of their new possessions.[35] +Their French and Italian neighbours were to feel, before long, the +effect of this policy; and when the Spanish monarchy had been +consolidated, it was felt not only by them, but by others also. +The more Spanish dominion was extended in Italy, the more were the +naval resources at the command of Spain augmented. Genoa became +'Spain's water-gate to Italy.... Henceforth the Spanish crown +found in the Dorias its admirals; their squadron was permanently +hired to the kings of Spain.' Spanish supremacy at sea was +established at the expense of France.[36] The acquisition of a +vast domain in the New World had greatly developed the maritime +activity of Castile, and Spain was as formidable on the ocean as +in the Mediterranean. After Portugal had been annexed the naval +vessels of that country were added to the Spanish, and the great +port of Lisbon became available as a place of equipment and as an +additional base of operations for oceanic campaigns. The fusion +of Spain and Portugal, says Seeley, 'produced a single state of +unlimited maritime dominion.... Henceforth the whole New World +belonged exclusively to Spain.' The story of the tremendous +catastrophe--the defeat of the Armada--by which the decline of +this dominion was heralded is well known. It is memorable, not +only because of the harm it did to Spain, but also because it +revealed the rise of another claimant to maritime pre-eminence--the +English nation. The effects of the catastrophe were not at once +visible. Spain still continued to look like the greatest power +in the world; and, though the English seamen were seen to be +something better than adventurous pirates--a character suggested +by some of their recent exploits--few could have comprehended +that they were engaged in building up what was to be a sea-power +greater than any known to history. + +[Footnote 35: Prescott, _Ferdinand_and_Isabella_, Introd. sects. +i. ii.] + +[Footnote 36: G. W. Prothero, in M. Hume's _Spain_, 1479-1788, +p. 65.] + +They were carrying forward, not beginning the building of this. +'England,' says Sir J. K. Laughton, 'had always believed in her +naval power, had always claimed the sovereignty of the Narrow +Seas; and more than two hundred years before Elizabeth came to the +throne, Edward III had testified to his sense of its importance +by ordering a gold coinage bearing a device showing the armed +strength and sovereignty of England based on the sea.'[37] It is +impossible to make intelligible the course of the many wars which +the English waged with the French in the Middle Ages unless the +true naval position of the former is rightly appreciated. Why were +Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt--not to mention other combats--fought, +not on English, but on continental soil? Why during the so-called +'Hundred Years' War' was England in reality the invader and not +the invaded? We of the present generation are at last aware of the +significance of naval defence, and know that, if properly utilised, +it is the best security against invasion that a sea-surrounded +state can enjoy. It is not, however, commonly remembered that +the same condition of security existed and was properly valued +in mediæval times. The battle of Sluys in 1340 rendered invasion +of England as impracticable as did that of La Hogue in 1692, +that of Quiberon Bay in 1759, and that of Trafalgar in 1805; and +it permitted, as did those battles, the transport of troops to +the continent to support our allies in wars which, had we not +been strong at sea, would have been waged on the soil of our own +country. Our early continental wars, therefore, are proofs of the +long-established efficiency of our naval defences. Notwithstanding +the greater attention paid, within the last dozen years or so, +to naval affairs, it is doubtful if the country generally even +yet recognises the extent to which its security depends upon a +good fleet as fully as our ancestors did nearly seven centuries +ago. The narrative of our pre-Elizabethan campaigns is interesting +merely as a story; and, when told--as for instance D. Hannay +has told it in the introductory chapters of his 'Short History +of the Royal Navy'--it will be found instructive and worthy of +careful study at the present day. Each of the principal events +in our early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of +the idea conveyed by the term 'sea-power,' and of the accuracy +with which its meaning was apprehended at the time. To take a +very early case, we may cite the defeat of Eustace the Monk by +Hubert de Burgh in 1217. Reinforcements and supplies had been +collected at Calais for conveyance to the army of Prince Louis +of France and the rebel barons who had been defeated at Lincoln. +The reinforcements tried to cross the Channel under the escort of +a fleet commanded by Eustace. Hubert de Burgh, who had stoutly +held Dover for King John, and was faithful to the young Henry +III, heard of the enemy's movements. 'If these people land,' +said he, 'England is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.' He +reasoned in almost the same words as Raleigh about four centuries +afterwards, and undoubtedly 'had grasped the true principles of +the defence of England.' He put to sea and defeated his opponent. +The fleet on which Prince Louis and the rebellious barons had +counted was destroyed; and with it their enterprise. 'No more +admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by +Englishmen on water.'[38] As introductory to a long series of +naval operations undertaken with a like object, it has deserved +detailed mention here. + +[Footnote 37: _Armada_, Introd. (Navy Records Society).] + +[Footnote 38: Hannay, p. 7.] + +The sixteenth century was marked by a decided advance in both +the development and the application of sea-power. Previously +its operation had been confined to the Mediterranean or to coast +waters outside it. Spanish or Basque seamen--by their proceedings +in the English Channel--had proved the practicability of, rather +than been engaged in, ocean warfare. The English, who withstood +them, were accustomed to seas so rough, to seasons so uncertain, +and to weather so boisterous, that the ocean had few terrors for +them. All that was wanting was a sufficient inducement to seek +distant fields of action and a development of the naval art that +would permit them to be reached. The discovery of the New World +supplied the first; the consequently increased length of voyages +and of absence from the coast led to the second. The world had +been moving onwards in other things as well as in navigation. +Intercommunication was becoming more and more frequent. What was +done by one people was soon known to others. It is a mistake to +suppose that, because the English had been behindhand in the +exploration of remote regions, they were wanting in maritime +enterprise. The career of the Cabots would of itself suffice to +render such a supposition doubtful. The English had two good +reasons for postponing voyages to and settlement in far-off lands. +They had their hands full nearer home; and they thoroughly, and as +it were by instinct, understood the conditions on which permanent +expansion must rest. They wanted to make sure of the line of +communication first. To effect this a sea-going marine of both +war and commerce and, for further expansion, stations on the +way were essential. The chart of the world furnishes evidence of +the wisdom and the thoroughness of their procedure. Taught by the +experience of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, when unimpeded by +the political circumstances of the time, and provided with suitable +equipment, the English displayed their energy in distant seas. It +now became simply a question of the efficiency of sea-power. If +this was not a quality of that of the English, then their efforts +were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their +country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest +of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious. The +principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a +characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in +connection with the exploring or colonising activity of most +other great nations even down to our own time. They were really +unofficial speculations in which, if the Government took part at +all, it was for the sake of the profit expected and almost, if +not exactly, like any private adventurer. The participation of +the Government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth +while to note. It conveyed a hint--and quite consciously--to all +whom it might concern that the speculations were 'under-written' +by the whole sea-power of England. The forces of more than one state +had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of +enemies in the Mediterranean or in the Narrow Seas. They had +been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications +across not very extensive areas of water. In the sixteenth century +they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether +carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms. This, +naturally enough, led to collisions. The contention waxed hot, +and was virtually decided when the Armada shaped course to the +northward after the fight off Gravelines. + +The expeditions against the Spanish Indies and, still more, those +against Philip II's peninsular territory, had helped to define +the limitations of sea-power. It became evident, and it was made +still more evident in the next century, that for a great country +to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone. It must also have +an adequate and properly organised mobile army. Notwithstanding +the number of times that this lesson has been repeated, we have +been slow to learn it. It is doubtful if we have learned it even +yet. English seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; +for they have always demanded--at any rate for upwards of three +centuries--that expeditions against foreign territory over-sea +should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops. On the +other hand, the necessity of organising the army of a maritime +insular state, and of training it with the object of rendering +effective aid in operations of the kind in question, has rarely +been perceived and acted upon by others. The result has been a +long series of inglorious or disastrous affairs like the West +Indies voyage of 1595-96, the Cadiz expedition of 1625, and that +to the Ile de Ré of 1627. Additions might be made to the list. +The failures of joint expeditions have often been explained by +alleging differences or quarrels between the naval and the military +commanders. This way of explaining them, however, is nothing but +the inveterate critical method of the streets by which cause +is taken for effect and effect for cause. The differences and +quarrels arose, no doubt; but they generally sprang out of the +recriminations consequent on, not producing, the want of success. +Another manifestation of the way in which sea-power works was first +observed in the seventeenth century. It suggested the adoption +of, and furnished the instrument for carrying out a distinct +maritime policy. What was practically a standing navy had come +into existence. As regards England this phenomenon was now of +respectable age. Long voyages and cruises of several ships in +company had been frequent during the latter half of the sixteenth +century and the early part of the seventeenth. Even the grandfathers +of the men who sailed with Blake and Penn in 1652 could not have +known a time when ships had never crossed the ocean, and squadrons +kept together for months had never cruised. However imperfect +it may have been, a system of provisioning ships and supplying +them with stores, and of preserving discipline amongst their +crews, had been developed, and had proved fairly satisfactory. +The Parliament and the Protector in turn found it necessary to +keep a considerable number of ships in commission, and make them +cruise and operate in company. It was not till well on in the +reign of Queen Victoria that the man-of-war's man was finally +differentiated from the merchant seaman; but two centuries before +some of the distinctive marks of the former had already begun to +be noticeable. There were seamen in the time of the Commonwealth +who rarely, perhaps some who never, served afloat except in a +man-of-war. Some of the interesting naval families which were +settled at Portsmouth and the eastern ports, and which--from +father to son--helped to recruit the ranks of our bluejackets +till a date later than that of the launch of the first ironclad, +could carry back their professional genealogy to at least the +days of Charles II, when, in all probability, it did not first +start. Though landsmen continued even after the civil war to be +given naval appointments, and though a permanent corps, through +the ranks of which everyone must pass, had not been formally +established, a body of real naval officers--men who could handle +their ships, supervise the working of the armament, and exercise +military command--had been formed. A navy, accordingly, was now +a weapon of undoubted keenness, capable of very effective use +by anyone who knew how to wield it. Having tasted the sweets +of intercourse with the Indies, whether in the occupation of +Portugal or of Spain, both English and Dutch were desirous of +getting a larger share of them. English maritime commerce had +increased and needed naval protection. If England was to maintain +the international position to which, as no one denied, she was +entitled, that commerce must be permitted to expand. The minds +of men in western Europe, moreover, were set upon obtaining for +their country territories in the New World, the amenities of +which were now known. From the reign of James I the Dutch had +shown great jealousy of English maritime enterprise. Where it was +possible, as in the East Indian Archipelago, they had destroyed +it. Their naval resources were great enough to let them hold +English shipping at their mercy, unless a vigorous effort were +made to protect it. The Dutch conducted the carrying trade of +a great part of the world, and the monopoly of this they were +resolved to keep, while the English were resolved to share in +it. The exclusion of the English from every trade-route, except +such as ran by their own coast or crossed the Narrow Seas, seemed +a by no means impossible contingency. There seemed also to be +but one way of preventing it, viz. by war. The supposed +unfriendliness of the Dutch, or at least of an important party +amongst them, to the regicide Government in England helped to +force the conflict. The Navigation Act of 1651 was passed and +regarded as a covert declaration of hostilities. So the first +Dutch war began. It established our claim to compete for the +position of a great maritime commercial power. + +The rise of the sea-power of the Dutch, and the magnitude which +it attained in a short time and in the most adverse circumstances, +have no parallel in history. The case of Athens was different, +because the Athenian power had not so much been unconsciously +developed out of a great maritime trade, as based on a military +marine deliberately and persistently fostered during many years. +Thirlwall believes that it was Solon who 'laid the foundations +of the Attic navy,'[39] a century before Salamis. The great +achievement of Themistocles was to convince his fellow-citizens +that their navy ought to be increased. Perhaps the nearest parallel +with the power of the Dutch was presented by that of Rhodes, which +rested largely on a carrying trade. The Rhodian undertakings, +however, were by comparison small and restricted in extent. Motley +declares of the Seven United Provinces that they 'commanded the +ocean,'[40] and that it would be difficult to exaggerate the +naval power of the young Commonwealth. Even in the days of Spain's +greatness English seamen positively declined to admit that she +was stronger than England on the sea; and the story of the Armada +justified their view. Our first two Dutch wars were, therefore, +contests between the two foremost naval states of the world for +what was primarily a maritime object. The identity of the cause +of the first and of the second war will be discerned by anyone +who compares what has been said about the circumstances leading +to the former, with Monk's remark as to the latter. He said that +the English wanted a larger share of the trade enjoyed by the +Dutch. It was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age +that the Dutch should try to prevent, by force, this want from +being satisfied. Anything like free and open competition was +repugnant to the general feeling. The high road to both individual +wealth and national prosperity was believed to lie in securing a +monopoly. Merchants or manufacturers who called for the abolition +of monopolies granted to particular courtiers and favourites had +not the smallest intention, on gaining their object, of throwing +open to the enterprise of all what had been monopolised. It was to +be kept for the exclusive benefit of some privileged or chartered +company. It was the same in greater affairs. As Mahan says, 'To +secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of the benefits +of sea commerce every effort was made to exclude others, either +by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory +regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.' The +apparent wealth of Spain was believed to be due to the rigorous +manner in which foreigners were excluded from trading with the +Spanish over-sea territories. The skill and enterprise of the +Dutch having enabled them to force themselves into this trade, +they were determined to keep it to themselves. The Dutch East India +Company was a powerful body, and largely dictated the maritime +policy of the country. We have thus come to an interesting point +in the historical consideration of sea-power. The Elizabethan +conflict with Spain had practically settled the question whether +or not the expanding nations were to be allowed to extend their +activities to territories in the New World. The first two Dutch +wars were to settle the question whether or not the ocean trade +of the world was to be open to any people qualified to engage +in it. We can see how largely these were maritime questions, +how much depended on the solution found for them, and how plain +it was that they must be settled by naval means. + +[Footnote 39: _Hist._Greece_, ii. p. 52.] + +[Footnote 40: _United_Netherlands_, ii. p. 132.] + +Mahan's great survey of sea-power opens in 1660, midway between +the first and second Dutch wars. 'The sailing-ship era, with its +distinctive features,' he tells us, 'had fairly begun.' The art +of war by sea, in its more important details, had been settled +by the first war. From the beginning of the second the general +features of ship design, the classification of ships, the armament +of ships, and the handling of fleets, were to remain without +essential alteration until the date of Navarino. Even the tactical +methods, except where improved on occasions by individual genius, +altered little. The great thing was to bring the whole broadside +force to bear on an enemy. Whether this was to be impartially +distributed throughout the hostile line or concentrated on one +part of it depended on the character of particular admirals. +It would have been strange if a period so long and so rich in +incidents had afforded no materials for forming a judgment on +the real significance of sea-power. The text, so to speak, chosen +by Mahan is that, notwithstanding the changes wrought in naval +_matériel_ during the last half-century, we can find in the history +of the past instructive illustrations of the general principles +of maritime war. These illustrations will prove of value not +only 'in those wider operations which embrace a whole theatre of +war,' but also, if rightly applied, 'in the tactical use of the +ships and weapons' of our own day. By a remarkable coincidence +the same doctrine was being preached at the same time and quite +independently by the late Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb in his work +on 'Naval Warfare.' As a prelude to the second Dutch war we find +a repetition of a process which had been adopted somewhat earlier. +That was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory. Until +the seventeenth century had well begun, naval, or combined naval +and military, operations against the distant possessions of an +enemy had been practically restricted to raiding or plundering +attacks on commercial centres. The Portuguese territory in South +America having come under Spanish dominion in consequence of the +annexation of Portugal to Spain, the Dutch--as the power of the +latter country declined--attempted to reduce part of that territory +into permanent possession. This improvement on the practice of +Drake and others was soon seen to be a game at which more than +one could play. An expedition sent by Cromwell to the West Indies +seized the Spanish island of Jamaica, which has remained in the +hands of its conquerors to this day. In 1664 an English force +occupied the Dutch North American settlements on the Hudson. Though +the dispossessed rulers were not quite in a position to throw stones +at sinners, this was rather a raid than an operation of recognised +warfare, because it preceded the formal outbreak of hostilities. +The conquered territory remained in English hands for more than +a century, and thus testified to the efficacy of a sea-power +which Europe had scarcely begun to recognise. Neither the second +nor the third Dutch war can be counted amongst the occurrences to +which Englishmen may look back with unalloyed satisfaction; but +they, unquestionably, disclosed some interesting manifestations +of sea-power. Much indignation has been expressed concerning the +corruption and inefficiency of the English Government of the +day, and its failure to take proper measures for keeping up the +navy as it should have been kept up. Some, perhaps a good deal, of +this indignation was deserved; but it would have been nearly as +well deserved by every other government of the day. Even in those +homes of political virtue where the administrative machinery was +worked by or in the interest of speculating capitalists and +privileged companies, the accumulating evidence of late years +has proved that everything was not considered to be, and as a +matter of fact was not, exactly as it ought to have been. Charles +II and his brother, the Duke of York, have been held up to obloquy +because they thought that the coast of England could be defended +against a naval enemy better by fortifications than by a good +fleet and, as Pepys noted, were 'not ashamed of it.' The truth +is that neither the king nor the duke believed in the power of +a navy to ward off attack from an island. This may have been +due to want of intellectual capacity; but it would be going a +long way to put it down to personal wickedness. They have had +many imitators, some in our own day. The huge forts which stud +the coast of the United Kingdom, and have been erected within +the memory of the present generation, are monuments, likely to +last for many years, of the inability of people, whom no one +could accuse of being vicious, to rate sea-power at its proper +value. It is much more likely that it was owing to a reluctance +to study questions of naval defence as industriously as they +deserved, and to that moral timidity which so often tempts even +men of proved physical courage to undertake the impossible task +of making themselves absolutely safe against hostile efforts +at every point. + +Charles II has also been charged with indifference to the interests +of his country, or worse, because during a great naval war he +adopted the plan of trying to weaken the enemy by destroying +his commerce. The king 'took a fatal resolution of laying up +his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise.' +It is expressly related that this was not Charles's own idea, +but that it was urged upon him by advisers whose opinion probably +seemed at the time as well worth listening to as that of others. +Anyhow, if the king erred, as he undoubtedly did, he erred in +good company. Fourteen hundred years earlier the statesmen who +conducted the great war against Carthage, and whose astuteness +has been the theme of innumerable panegyrics since, took the same +'fatal resolution.' In the midst of the great struggle they 'did +away with the fleet. At the most they encouraged privateering; and +with that view placed the war-vessels of the State at the disposal +of captains who were ready to undertake a corsair warfare on +their own account.'[41] In much later times this method has had +many and respectable defenders. Mahan's works are, in a sense, a +formal warning to his fellow-citizens not to adopt it. In France, +within the last years of the nineteenth century, it found, and +appears still to find, adherents enough to form a school. The +reappearance of belief in demonstrated impossibilities is a +recognised incident in human history; but it is usually confined +to the emotional or the vulgar. It is serious and filled with +menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer +the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence. The +third Dutch war may not have settled directly the position of +England in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country +above all other maritime states,--in the position, in fact, which +Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the British Empire, whichever +name may be given it, has retained up to the present. It also +manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power. +The United Provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest +monarchies in the world, France and England, were not destroyed. +Indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in +the State system of Europe. The Republic 'owed this astonishing +result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its +sea-power.' The effort, however, had undermined its strength +and helped forward its decline. + +[Footnote 41: Mommsen, ii. p. 52.] + +The war which was ended by the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 presents +two features of exceptional interest: one was the havoc wrought on +English commerce by the enemy; the other was Torrington's conduct +at and after the engagement off Beachy Head. Mahan discusses +the former with his usual lucidity. At no time has war against +commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results +than during this period. We suffered 'infinitely more than in +any former war.' Many of our merchants were ruined; and it is +affirmed that the English shipping was reduced to the necessity +of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags. The explanation is +that Louis XIV made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. Our +navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could +be spared to protect our maritime trade. This is only another way +of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the +navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose +the enemy's main force. Notwithstanding our losses we were on +the winning side in the conflict. Much misery and ruin had been +caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war. + +Torrington's proceedings in July 1690 were at the time the subject +of much angry debate. The debate, still meriting the epithet +angry, has been renewed within the last few years. The matter +has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of +a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those +who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who +ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown +away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible. Arthur +Herbert, Earl of Torrington--the later peerage is a viscounty held +by the Byng family--was in command of the allied English and Dutch +fleet in the Channel. 'The disparity of force,' says Mahan, 'was +still in favour of France in 1690, but it was not so great as +the year before.' We can measure the ability of the then English +Government for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its +wisdom, it had still further weakened our fleet by dividing it +(Vice-Admiral Killigrew having been sent to the Mediterranean with +a squadron), and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to +take the necessary steps to repair this error. The Government +having omitted, as even British Governments sometimes do, to +gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements +of the enemy, Torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a +considerably superior French fleet under Tourville, one of the +greatest of French sea-officers. Of late years the intentions of +the French have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that +in England at the time Tourville's movements were believed to +be preliminary to invasion. Whether Tourville deliberately meant +his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost +certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise his +victory would have been without any valuable result. Torrington +saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could, +though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing +serious harm. Though personally not a believer in the imminence of +invasion, the English admiral knew that 'most men were in fear that +the French would invade.' His own view was, 'that whilst we had a +fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.' Of late +years controversy has raged round this phrase, 'a fleet in being,' +and the strategic principle which it expresses. Most seamen were +at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with +Torrington. This might be supposed enough to settle the question. +It has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval +strategy. It was made at the time a matter of party politics. +This is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it +should be discussed. Both as a strategist and as a tactician +Torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. The +only English admirals who can be placed above him are Hawke and +Nelson. He paid the penalty of his pre-eminence: he could not +make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages +of his proceedings. Mahan, who is specially qualified to do him +full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a +consideration of Torrington's case, evidently because he had +no sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment. +The admiral's character had been taken away already by Macaulay, +who did have ample evidence before him. William III, with all his +fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal +to that of Napoleon; and Napoleon, in naval strategy, was often +wrong. William III understood that subject even less than the +French emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable +of understanding it. Consequently Torrington's action has been +put down to jealousy of the Dutch. There have been people who +accused Nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of +Caracciolo! The explanation of Torrington's conduct is this:-- +He had a fleet so much weaker than Tourville's that he could +not fight a general action with the latter without a practical +certainty of getting a crushing defeat. Such a result would have +laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says Mahan, +'if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of William's +throne in England.' Given certain movements of the French fleet, +Torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward +and join his force with that under Killigrew, which would make +him strong enough to hazard a battle. This proved impracticable. +There was then one course left. To retire before the French, +but not to keep far from them. He knew that, though not strong +enough to engage their whole otherwise unemployed fleet with any +hope of success, he would be quite strong enough to fight and +most likely beat it, when a part of it was trying either to deal +with our ships to the westward or to cover the disembarkation of +an invading army. He, therefore, proposed to keep his fleet 'in +being' in order to fall on the enemy when the latter would have +two affairs at the same time on his hands. The late Vice-Admiral +Colomb rose to a greater height than was usual even with him in +his criticism of this campaign. What Torrington did was merely +to reproduce on the sea what has been noticed dozens of times on +shore, viz. the menace by the flanking enemy. In land warfare +this is held to give exceptional opportunities for the display of +good generalship, but, to quote Mahan over again, a navy 'acts +on an element strange to most writers, its members have been +from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of +their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood.' +Whilst Torrington has had the support of seamen, his opponents +have been landsmen. For the crime of being a good strategist he +was brought before a court-martial, but acquitted. His sovereign, +who had been given the crowns of three kingdoms to defend our laws, +showed his respect for them by flouting a legally constituted +tribunal and disregarding its solemn finding. The admiral who +had saved his country was forced into retirement. Still, the +principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the bottom of all sound +strategy. + +Admiral Colomb has pointed out a great change of plan in the +later naval campaigns of the seventeenth century. Improvements +in naval architecture, in the methods of preserving food, and +in the arrangements for keeping the crews healthy, permitted +fleets to be employed at a distance from their home ports for +long continuous periods. The Dutch, when allies of the Spaniards, +kept a fleet in the Mediterranean for many months. The great De +Ruyter was mortally wounded in one of the battles there fought. +In the war of the Spanish Succession the Anglo-Dutch fleet found +its principal scene of action eastward of Gibraltar. This, as +it were, set the fashion for future wars. It became a kind of +tacitly accepted rule that the operation of British sea-power +was to be felt in the enemy's rather than in our own waters. The +hostile coast was regarded strategically as the British frontier, +and the sea was looked upon as territory which the enemy must +be prevented from invading. Acceptance of this principle led +in time to the so-called 'blockades' of Brest and Toulon. The +name was misleading. As Nelson took care to explain, there was +no desire to keep the enemy's fleet in; what was desired was to +be near enough to attack it if it came out. The wisdom of the +plan is undoubted. The hostile navy could be more easily watched +and more easily followed if it put to sea. To carry out this +plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency +than that of the enemy was necessary to us. With the exception +of that of American Independence, which will therefore require +special notice, our subsequent great wars were conducted in +accordance with the rule. + + +SEA-POWER IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND EARLY PART OF THE NINETEENTH +CENTURY + +In the early part of the eighteenth century there was a remarkable +manifestation of sea-power in the Baltic. Peter the Great, having +created an efficient army, drove the Swedes from the coast provinces +south of the Gulf of Finland. Like the earlier monarchies of which +we have spoken, Russia, in the Baltic at least, now became a naval +state. A large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy +established. It was a purely artificial creation, and showed +the merits and defects of its character. At first, and when under +the eye of its creator, it was strong; when Peter was no more it +dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh. +It enabled Peter the Great to conquer the neighbouring portion +of Finland, to secure his coast territories, and to dominate +the Baltic. In this he was assisted by the exhaustion of Sweden +consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible, +the position of a _quasi_ great power which she had held since +the days of Gustavus Adolphus. Sweden had been further weakened, +especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with Denmark, +which prevented all hope of Scandinavian predominance in the +Baltic, the control of which sea has in our own days passed into +the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy--the +modern German empire. + +The war of the Spanish Succession left Great Britain a Mediterranean +power, a position which, in spite of twice losing Minorca, she +still holds. In the war of the Austrian Succession, 'France was +forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and England +saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to +use it to the best advantage.'[42] This shows, as we shall find +that a later war showed more plainly, that even the Government +of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting +its naval affairs wisely. The Seven Years' war included some +brilliant displays of the efficacy of sea-power. It was this +which put the British in possession of Canada, decided which +European race was to rule in India, and led to a British occupation +of Havannah in one hemisphere and of Manila in the other. In +the same war we learned how, by a feeble use of sea-power, a +valuable possession like Minorca may be lost. At the same time +our maritime trade and the general prosperity of the kingdom +increased enormously. The result of the conflict made plain to +all the paramount importance of having in the principal posts +in the Government men capable of understanding what war is and +how it ought to be conducted. + +[Footnote 42: Mahan, _Inf._on_Hist._ p. 280.] + +This lesson, as the sequel demonstrated, had not been learned +when Great Britain became involved in a war with the insurgent +colonies in North America. Mahan's comment is striking: 'The +magnificence of sea-power and its value had perhaps been more +clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway and consequent exaltation +of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, +is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea-power +meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a +strife which endangered not only its most valuable colonies, but +even its own shores.'[43] We were, in fact, drawing too largely +on the _prestige_ acquired during the Seven Years' war; and we +were governed by men who did not understand the first principles +of naval warfare, and would not listen to those who did. They +quite ignored the teaching of the then comparatively recent wars +which has been alluded to already--that we should look upon the +enemy's coast as our frontier. A century and a half earlier the +Dutchman Grotius had written-- + + Quæ meta Britannis + Litora sunt aliis. + +[Footnote 43: _Influence_on_Hist._ p. 338.] + +Though ordinary prudence would have suggested ample preparation, +British ministers allowed their country to remain unprepared. +Instead of concentrating their efforts on the main objective, +they frittered away force in attempts to relieve two beleaguered +garrisons under the pretext of yielding to popular pressure, which +is the official term for acting on the advice of irresponsible +and uninstructed busybodies. 'Depuis le début de la crise,' says +Captain Chevalier, 'les ministres de la Grande Bretagne s'étaient +montrés inférieurs à leur tâche.' An impressive result of this was +the repeated appearance of powerful and indeed numerically superior +hostile fleets in the English Channel. The war--notwithstanding +that, perhaps because, land operations constituted an important +part of it, and in the end settled the issue--was essentially +oceanic. Captain Mahan says it was 'purely maritime.' It may +be true that, whatever the belligerent result, the political +result, as regards the _status_ of the insurgent colonies, would +have been the same. It is in the highest degree probable, indeed +it closely approaches to certainty, that a proper use of the +British sea-power would have prevented independence from being +conquered, as it were, at the point of the bayonet. There can be no +surprise in store for the student acquainted with the vagaries of +strategists who are influenced in war by political in preference +to military requirements. Still, it is difficult to repress an +emotion of astonishment on finding that a British Government +intentionally permitted De Grasse's fleet and the French army +in its convoy to cross the Atlantic unmolested, for fear of +postponing for a time the revictualling of the garrison beleaguered +at Gibraltar. Washington's opinion as to the importance of the +naval factor has been quoted already; and Mahan does not put +the case too strongly when he declares that the success of the +Americans was due to 'sea-power being in the hands of the French +and its improper distribution by the English authorities.' Our +navy, misdirected as it was, made a good fight of it, never allowed +itself to be decisively beaten in a considerable battle, and won +at least one great victory. At the point of contact with the +enemy, however, it was not in general so conspicuously successful +as it was in the Seven Years' war, or as it was to be in the +great conflict with the French republic and empire. The truth +is that its opponent, the French navy, was never so thoroughly +a sea-going force as it was in the war of American Independence; +and never so closely approached our own in real sea-experience +as it did during that period. We met antagonists who were very +nearly, but, fortunately for us, not quite as familiar with the +sea as we were ourselves; and we never found it so hard to beat +them, or even to avoid being beaten by them. An Englishman would, +naturally enough, start at the conclusion confronting him, if he +were to speculate as to the result of more than one battle had +the great Suffren's captains and crews been quite up to the level +of those commanded by stout old Sir Edward Hughes. Suffren, it +should be said, before going to the East Indies, had 'thirty-eight +years of almost uninterrupted sea-service.'[44] A glance at a +chart of the world, with the scenes of the general actions of +the war dotted on it, will show how notably oceanic the campaigns +were. The hostile fleets met over and over again on the far side +of the Atlantic and in distant Indian seas. The French navy had +penetrated into the ocean as readily and as far as we could do +ourselves. Besides this, it should be remembered that it was +not until the 12th April 1782. when Rodney in one hemisphere and +Suffren in the other showed them the way, that our officers were +able to escape from the fetters imposed on them by the _Fighting_ +_Instructions_,--a fact worth remembering in days in which it is +sometimes proposed, by establishing schools of naval tactics +on shore, to revive the pedantry which made a decisive success +in battle nearly impossible. + +[Footnote 44: Laughton, _Studies_in_Naval_Hist._ p. 103.] + +The mighty conflict which raged between Great Britain on one side +and France and her allies on the other, with little intermission, +for more than twenty years, presents a different aspect from that +of the war last mentioned. The victories which the British fleet +was to gain were generally to be overwhelming; if not, they were +looked upon as almost defeats. Whether the fleet opposed to ours +was, or was not, the more numerous, the result was generally the +same--our enemy was beaten. That there was a reason for this which +can be discovered is certain. A great deal has been made of the +disorganisation in the French navy consequent on the confusion of +the Revolution. That there was disorganisation is undoubted; that +it did impair discipline and, consequently, general efficiency will +not be disputed; but that it was considerable enough to account by +itself for the French naval defeats is altogether inadmissible. +Revolutionary disorder had invaded the land-forces to a greater +degree than it had invaded the sea-forces. The supersession, +flight, or guillotining of army officers had been beyond measure +more frequent than was the case with the naval officers. In spite +of all this the French armies were on the whole--even in the +early days of the Revolution--extraordinarily successful. In +1792 'the most formidable invasion that ever threatened France,' +as Alison calls it, was repelled, though the invaders were the +highly disciplined and veteran armies of Prussia and Austria. +It was nearly two years later that the French and English fleets +came into serious conflict. The first great battle, which we +call 'The Glorious First of June,' though a tactical victory +for us, was a strategical defeat. Villaret-Joyeuse manoeuvred so +as to cover the arrival in France of a fleet of merchant vessels +carrying sorely needed supplies of food, and in this he was +completely successful. His plan involved the probability, almost +the necessity, of fighting a general action which he was not at +all sure of winning. He was beaten, it is true; but the French +made so good a fight of it that their defeat was not nearly so +disastrous as the later defeats of the Nile or Trafalgar, and--at +the most--not more disastrous than that of Dominica. Yet no one +even alleges that there was disorder or disorganisation in the +French fleet at the date of anyone of those affairs. Indeed, +if the French navy was really disorganised in 1794, it would +have been better for France--judging from the events of 1798 and +1805--if the disorganisation had been allowed to continue. In +point of organisation the British Navy was inferior, and in point +of discipline not much superior to the French at the earliest +date; at the later dates, and especially at the latest, owing +to the all-pervading energy of Napoleon, the British was far +behind its rival in organisation, in 'science,' and in every +branch of training that can be imparted without going to sea. +We had the immense advantage of counting amongst our officers +some very able men. Nelson, of course, stands so high that he +holds a place entirely by himself. The other British chiefs, +good as they were, were not conspicuously superior to the Hawkes +and Rodneys of an earlier day. Howe was a great commander, but +he did little more than just appear on the scene in the war. +Almost the same may be said of Hood, of whom Nelson wrote, 'He +is the greatest sea-officer I ever knew.'[45] There must have +been something, therefore, beyond the meritorious qualities of +our principal officers which helped us so consistently to victory. +The many triumphs won could not have been due in every case to +the individual superiority of the British admiral or captain to +his opponent. There must have been bad as well as good amongst +the hundreds on our lists; and we cannot suppose that Providence +had so arranged it that in every action in which a British officer +of inferior ability commanded a still inferior French commander +was opposed to him. The explanation of our nearly unbroken success +is, that the British was a thoroughly sea-going navy, and became +more and more so every month; whilst the French, since the close +of the American war, had lost to a great extent its sea-going +character and, because we shut it up in its ports, became less +and less sea-going as hostilities continued. The war had been +for us, in the words of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, 'a continuous +course of victory won mainly by seamanship.' Our navy, as regards +sea-experience, especially of the officers, was immensely superior +to the French. This enabled the British Government to carry into +execution sound strategic plans, in accordance with which the coasts +of France and its dependent or allied countries were regarded as +the English frontier to be watched or patrolled by our fleets. + +[Footnote 45: Laughton, _Nelson's_Lett._and_Desp._ p. 71.] + +Before the long European war had been brought to a formal ending +we received some rude rebuffs from another opponent of unsuspected +vigour. In the quarrel with the United States, the so-called +'War of 1812,' the great sea-power of the British in the end +asserted its influence, and our antagonists suffered much more +severely, even absolutely, than ourselves. At the same time we +might have learned, for the Americans did their best to teach us, +that over-confidence in numerical strength and narrow professional +self-satisfaction are nearly sure to lead to reverses in war, and +not unlikely to end in grave disasters. We had now to meet the +_élite_ of one of the finest communities of seamen ever known. +Even in 1776 the Americans had a great maritime commerce, which, +as Mahan informs us, 'had come to be the wonder of the statesmen +of the mother country.' In the six-and-thirty years which had +elapsed since then this commerce had further increased. There +was no finer nursery of seamen than the then states of the American +Union. Roosevelt says that 'there was no better seaman in the +world' than the American, who 'had been bred to his work from +infancy.' A large proportion of the population 'was engaged in +sea-going pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a +resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them.'[46] +Having little or no naval protection, the American seaman had +to defend himself in many circumstances, and was compelled to +familiarise himself with the use of arms. The men who passed +through this practical, and therefore supremely excellent, training +school were numerous. Very many had been trained in English +men-of-war, and some in French ships. The state navy which they +were called on to man was small; and therefore its _personnel_, +though without any regular or avowed selection, was virtually +and in the highest sense a picked body. The lesson of the war +of 1812 should be learned by Englishmen of the present day, when +a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical +superiority, in the mere possession of heavier _matériel_, and +in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, which +confidence, as experience has shown, is too often the forerunner +of misfortune. It is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimise +the American successes. Certainly they have been exaggerated by +Americans and even by ourselves. To take the frigate actions +alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention, +we see that the captures in action amounted to three on each +side, the proportionate loss to our opponents, considering the +smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than ours. +We also see that no British frigate was taken after the first +seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years, and that +no British frigate succumbed except to admittedly superior force. +Attempts have been made to spread a belief that our reverses +were due to nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of our +enemy's ships. It is now established that the superiority in +these details, which the Americans certainly enjoyed, was not +great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories. +Of course, if superiority in mere _matériel_, beyond a certain +well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants, +his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged +that size of ship or calibre of guns--greater within reasonable +limits than we had--necessarily led to the defeat of British +ships by the French or Spaniards. In the words of Admiral Jurien +de la Gravière, 'The ships of the United States constantly fought +with the chances in their favour.' All this is indisputable. +Nevertheless we ought to see to it that in any future war our +sea-power, great as it may be, does not receive shocks like those +that it unquestionably did receive in 1812. + +[Footnote 46: _Naval_War_of_1812_, 3rd ed. pp. 29, 30.] + + +SEA-POWER IN RECENT TIMES + +We have now come to the end of the days of the naval wars of +old time. The subsequent period has been illustrated repeatedly +by manifestations of sea-power, often of great interest and +importance, though rarely understood or even discerned by the +nations which they more particularly concerned. The British +sea-power, notwithstanding the first year of the war of 1812, +had come out of the great European conflict unshaken and indeed +more preeminent than ever. The words used, half a century before +by a writer in the great French 'Encyclopédie,' seemed more exact +than when first written. '_L'empire_des_mers_,' he says, is, +'le plus avantageux de tous les empires; les Phoeniciens le +possédoient autre fois et c'est aux Anglois que cette gloire +appartient aujourd'hui sur toutes les puissances maritimes.'[47] +Vast out-lying territories had been acquired or were more firmly +held, and the communications of all the over-sea dominions of the +British Crown were secured against all possibility of serious +menace for many years to come. Our sea-power was so ubiquitous +and all-pervading that, like the atmosphere, we rarely thought +of it and rarely remembered its necessity or its existence. It +was not till recently that the greater part of the nation--for +there were many, and still are some exceptions--perceived that +it was the medium apart from which the British Empire could no +more live than it could have grown up. Forty years after the +fall of Napoleon we found ourselves again at war with a great +power. We had as our ally the owner of the greatest navy in the +world except our own. Our foe, as regards his naval forces, came +the next in order. Yet so overwhelming was the strength of Great +Britain and France on the sea that Russia never attempted to +employ her navy against them. Not to mention other expeditions, +considerable enough in themselves, military operations on the +largest scale were undertaken, carried on for many months, and +brought to a successful termination on a scene so remote that +it was two thousand miles from the country of one, and three +thousand from that of the other partner in the alliance. 'The +stream of supplies and reinforcements, which in terms of modern +war is called "communications,", was kept free from even the threat +of molestation, not by visible measures, but by the undisputed +efficacy of a real, though imperceptible sea-power. At the close +of the Russian war we encountered, and unhappily for us in +influential positions, men who, undismayed by the consequences +of mimicking in free England the cast-iron methods of the Great +Frederick, began to measure British requirements by standards +borrowed from abroad and altogether inapplicable to British +conditions. Because other countries wisely abstained from relying +on that which they did not possess, or had only imperfectly and +with elaborate art created, the mistress of the seas was led to +proclaim her disbelief in the very force that had made and kept +her dominion, and urged to defend herself with fortifications by +advisers who, like Charles II and the Duke of York two centuries +before, were 'not ashamed of it.' It was long before the peril +into which this brought the empire was perceived; but at last, +and in no small degree owing to the teachings of Mahan, the people +themselves took the matter in hand and insisted that a great +maritime empire should have adequate means of defending all that +made its existence possible. + +[Footnote 47: _Encyclopédie_, 7th Jan. 1765, art. 'Thalassarchie.'] + +In forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the +efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the American Secession +war. If ever there were hostilities in which, to the unobservant +or short-sighted, naval operations might at first glance seem +destined to count for little, they were these. The sequel, however, +made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors +of the success of the victorious side. The belligerents, the +Northern or Federal States and the Southern or Confederate States, +had a common land frontier of great length. The capital of each +section was within easy distance of this frontier, and the two +were not far apart. In wealth, population, and resources the +Federals were enormously superior. They alone possessed a navy, +though at first it was a small one. The one advantage on the +Confederate side was the large proportion of military officers +which belonged to it and their fine training as soldiers. In +_physique_ as well as in _morale_ the army of one side differed +little from that of the other; perhaps the Federal army was slightly +superior in the first, and the Confederate, as being recruited +from a dominant white race, in the second. Outnumbered, less well +equipped, and more scantily supplied, the Confederates nevertheless +kept up the war, with many brilliant successes on land, for four +years. Had they been able to maintain their trade with neutral +states they could have carried on the war longer, and--not +improbably--have succeeded in the end. The Federal navy, which was +largely increased, took away all chance of this. It established +effective blockades of the Confederate ports, and severed their +communications with the outside world. Indispensable articles of +equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, +became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished +antagonists. By dominating the rivers the Federals cut the +Confederacy asunder; and by the power they possessed of moving troops +by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated +the occupation of important points. Meanwhile the Confederates +could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant +vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of +the war remained absolutely unaffected. The great numbers of +men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles +of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree, +was notably uncommon on both sides, and the varying fortunes of +the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting +to the ordinary observer than the naval. It is not surprising, +therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years +before the American people could be made to see the great part +taken by the navy in the restoration of the Union; and what the +Americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations. + +In several great wars in Europe waged since France and England +made peace with Russia sea-power manifested itself but little. +In the Russo-Turkish war the great naval superiority of the Turks +in the Black Sea, where the Russians at the time had no fleet, +governed the plans, if not the course, of the campaigns. The +water being denied to them, the Russians were compelled to execute +their plan of invading Turkey by land. An advance to the Bosphorus +through the northern part of Asia Minor was impracticable without +help from a navy on the right flank. Consequently the only route +was a land one across the Danube and the Balkans. The advantages, +though not fully utilised, which the enforcement of this line of +advance put into the hands of the Turks, and the difficulties +and losses which it caused the Russians, exhibited in a striking +manner what sea-power can effect even when its operation is scarcely +observable. + +This was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. The +civil war in Chili between Congressists and Balmacedists is specially +interesting, because it throws into sharp relief the predominant +influence, when a non-maritime enemy is to be attacked, of a navy +followed up by an adequate land-force. At the beginning of the +dispute the Balmacedists, or President's party, had practically +all the army, and the Congressists, or Opposition party, nearly +all the Chilian navy. Unable to remain in the principal province +of the republic, and expelled from the waters of Valparaiso by the +Balmacedist garrisons of the forts--the only and doubtful service +which those works rendered to their own side--the Congressists +went off with the ships to the northern provinces, where they +counted many adherents. There they formed an army, and having +money at command, and open sea communications, they were able +to import equipment from abroad, and eventually to transport +their land-force, secured from molestation on the voyage by the +sea-power at their disposal, to the neighbourhood of Valparaiso, +where it was landed and triumphantly ended the campaign. + +It will have been noticed that, in its main outlines, this story +repeated that of many earlier campaigns. It was itself repeated, +as regards its general features, by the story of the war between +China and Japan in 1894-95. 'Every aspect of the war,' says Colomb, +'is interesting to this country, as Japan is to China in a position +similar to that which the British Islands occupy to the European +continent.'[48] It was additionally interesting because the sea-power +of Japan was a novelty. Though a novelty, it was well known by +English naval men to be superior in all essentials to that of +China, a novelty itself. As is the rule when two belligerents +are contending for something beyond a purely maritime object, +the final decision was to be on land. Korea was the principal +theatre of the land war; and, as far as access to it by sea was +concerned, the chief bases of the two sides were about the same +distance from it. It was possible for the Chinese to march there +by land. The Japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged +to cross the water. It will be seen at once that not only the +success of the Japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility +of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power. +The Japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea. Their +navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in +Korea, and for another which was landed in the Chinese province +of Shantung. The Chinese land-forces were defeated. The navy of +japan, being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister +service supplied or reinforced as required. It was, however, not +the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the Chinese +efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. What the navy +did was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power, +may be expected of a navy. It made the transport of the army +across the sea possible; and enabled it to do what of itself +the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance +of the enemy. + +[Footnote 48: _Naval_Warfare_, 3rd ed. p. 436.] + +The issue of the Spanish-American war, at least as regards the mere +defeat of Spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. That Spain, +even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to +the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the United States +must have been evident even to Spaniards. Be that as it may, an +early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and +however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished +examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. Mahan says of +it that, 'while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of +its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad +analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that +unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto +this day.'[49] The Spaniards were defeated by the superiority +of the American sea-power. 'A million of the best soldiers,' says +Mahan, 'would have been powerless in face of hostile control of +the sea.' That control was obtained and kept by the United States +navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops--and +their subsequent reinforcement and supply--to Spanish territory, +which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army +on shore. That it was the navy which made this final conquest +possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident +by the action of the United States Government, which stopped a +military expedition on the point of starting for Cuba until the +sea was cleared of all Spanish naval force worth attention. + +[Footnote 49: _Lessons_of_the_War_with_Spain_, p. 16.] + +The events of the long period which we have been considering +will have shown how sea-power operates, and what it effects. +What is in it will have appeared from this narrative more clearly +than would have been possible from any mere definition. Like +many other things, sea-power is composed of several elements. To +reach the highest degree of efficacy it should be based upon a +population naturally maritime, and on an ocean commerce naturally +developed rather than artificially enticed to extend itself. Its +outward and visible sign is a navy, strong in the discipline, +skill, and courage of a numerous _personnel_ habituated to the +sea, in the number and quality of its ships, in the excellence +of its _matériel_, and in the efficiency, scale, security, and +geographical position of its arsenals and bases. History has +demonstrated that sea-power thus conditioned can gain any purely +maritime object, can protect the trade and the communications of a +widely extended empire, and whilst so doing can ward off from its +shores a formidable invader. There are, however, limitations to be +noted. Left to itself its operation is confined to the water, or at +any rate to the inner edge of a narrow zone of coast. It prepares +the way for the advance of an army, the work of which it is not +intended, and is unable to perform. Behind it, in the territory +of which it guards the shores, there must be a land-force adjusted +in organisation, equipment, and numbers to the circumstances +of the country. The possession of a navy does not permit a +sea-surrounded state to dispense with all fixed defences or +fortification; but it does render it unnecessary and indeed absurd +that they should be abundant or gigantic. The danger which always +impends over the sea-power of any country is that, after being +long unused, it may lose touch of the sea. The revolution in +the constructive arts during the last half-century, which has +also been a period of but little-interrupted naval peace, and +the universal adoption of mechanical appliances, both for +ship-propulsion and for many minor services--mere _matériel_ +being thereby raised in the general estimation far above really +more important matters--makes the danger mentioned more menacing +in the present age than it has ever been before. + + + + +II + +THE COMMAND OF THE SEA[50] + +[Footnote 50: Written in 1899. (_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_.)] + +This phrase, a technical term of naval warfare, indicates a definite +strategical condition. The term has been substituted occasionally, +but less frequently of late years, for the much older 'Dominion +of the sea' or 'Sovereignty of the sea,' a legal term expressing +a claim, if not a right. It has also been sometimes treated as +though it were identical with the rhetorical expression 'Empire +of the sea.' Mahan, instead of it, uses the term 'Control of +the sea,' which has the merit of precision, and is not likely +to be misunderstood or mixed up with a form of words meaning +something different. The expression 'Command of the sea,' however, +in its proper and strategic sense, is so firmly fixed in the +language that it would be a hopeless task to try to expel it; +and as, no doubt, writers will continue to use it, it must be +explained and illustrated. Not only does it differ in meaning +from 'Dominion or Sovereignty of the sea,' it is not even truly +derived therefrom, as can be briefly shown. 'It has become an +uncontested principle of modern international law that the sea, +as a general rule, cannot be subjected to appropriation.'[51] +This, however, is quite modern. We ourselves did not admit the +principle till 1805; the Russians did not admit it till 1824; +and the Americans, and then only tacitly, not till 1894. Most +European nations at some time or other have claimed and have +exercised rights over some part of the sea, though far outside +the now well-recognised 'three miles' limit.' Venice claimed +the Adriatic, and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating +its northern waters. Genoa and France each claimed portions of +the western Mediterranean. Denmark and Sweden claimed to share +the Baltic between them. Spain claimed dominion over the Pacific +and the Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal over the Indian Ocean and +all the Atlantic south of Morocco.[52] The claim which has made +the greatest noise in the world is that once maintained by the +kings of England to the seas surrounding the British Isles. Like +other institutions, the English sovereignty of the sea was, and +was admitted to be, beneficent for a long period. Then came the +time when it ought to have been abandoned as obsolete; but it was +not, and so it led to war. The general conviction of the maritime +nations was that the Lord of the Sea would provide for the police +of the waters over which he exercised dominion. In rude ages when +men, like the ancients, readily 'turned themselves to piracy,' +this was of immense importance to trade; and, far from the right +of dominion being disputed by foreigners, it was insisted upon by +them and declared to carry with it certain duties. In 1299, not +only English merchants, but also 'the maritime people of Genoa, +Catalonia, Spain, Germany, Zealand, Holland, Frisia, Denmark, +Norway, and several other places of the empire' declared that the +kings of England had from time immemorial been in 'peaceable +possession of the sovereign lordship of the sea of England,' +and had done what was 'needful for the maintenance of peace, +right, and equity between people of all sorts, whether subjects +of another kingdom or not, who pass through those seas.'[53] The +English sovereignty was not exercised as giving authority to +exact toll. All that was demanded in return for keeping the sea +safe for peaceful traffic was a salute, enforced no doubt as a +formal admission of the right which permitted the (on the whole, +at any rate) effective police of the waters to be maintained. +The Dutch in the seventeenth century objected to the demand for +this salute. It was insisted upon. War ensued; but in the end +the Dutch acknowledged by solemn treaties their obligation to +render the salute. The time for exacting it, however, was really +past. S. R. Gardiner[54] maintains that though the 'question of +the flag' was the occasion, it was not the cause of the war. +There was not much, if any, piracy in the English Channel which +the King of England was specially called upon to suppress, and +if there had been the merchant vessels of the age were generally +able to defend themselves, while if they were not their governments +possessed force enough to give them the necessary protection. +We gave up our claim to exact the salute in 1805. + +[Footnote 51: W. E. Hall, _Treatise_on_International_Law_, +4th ed. 1895, p. 146.] + +[Footnote 52: Hall, pp. 48, 49.] + +[Footnote 53: J. K. Laughton, 'Sovereignty of the Sea,' _Fortnightly_ +_Review_, August 1866.] + +[Footnote 54: _The_First_Dutch_War_ (Navy Records Society), 1899.] + +The necessity of the foregoing short account of the 'Sovereignty +or Dominion of the Seas' will be apparent as soon as we come +to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series +of struggles, for the command of the sea. Gaining this was the +result of our wars with the Dutch in the seventeenth century. +At the time of the first Dutch war, 1652-54, and probably of +the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen, +believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our +part to retain, and on that of the Dutch to put an end to, the +English sovereignty or dominion. The obstinacy of the Dutch in +objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the English +flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most Englishmen, and +probably of most Dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which +other reasons may have rendered inevitable. The remarkable thing +about the Dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the +possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea. We came +out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the +greatest, naval power. It is this which prompted Vice-Admiral P. +H. Colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such +as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior +purpose,' &c. An explanation that would make all these terms +intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. It +will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts +to gain which, as Colomb tells us, the Anglo-Dutch wars were +the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the +nation whose power on the sea is paramount. It exists and may +be visible in time of peace. The command which, as said above, +expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in +time of war. It can easily be seen that the former is essential to +an empire like the British, the parts of which are bound together +by maritime communications. Inability to keep these communications +open can have only one result, viz. the loss of the parts with +which communication cannot be maintained. Experience of war as +well as reason will have made it evident that inability to keep +open sea-communications cannot be limited to any single line, +because the inability must be due either to incapacity in the +direction of hostilities or insufficiency of force. If we have +not force enough to keep open all the communications of our widely +extended empire, or if--having force enough--we are too foolish +to employ it properly, we do not hold the command of the sea, +and the empire must fall if seriously attacked. + +The strategic command of the sea in a particular war or campaign +has equal concern for all maritime belligerents. Before seeing +what it is, it will be well to learn on high authority what it is +not. Mahan says that command, or, to use his own term, 'control +of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single +ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross +more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents +upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded +harbours. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions +are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however +great the inequality of naval strength.'[55] The Anglo-French +command of the sea in 1854-56, complete as it was, did not enable +the allies to intercept the Russian ships in the North-Western +Pacific, nor did that held by the Federals in the American civil +war put an early stop to the cruises of the Confederate vessels. +What the term really does imply is the power possessed from the +first, or gained during hostilities, by one belligerent of carrying +out considerable over-sea expeditions at will. In the Russian +war just mentioned the allies had such overwhelmingly superior +sea-power that the Russians abandoned to them without a struggle +the command of the sea; and the more recent landing in South +Africa, more than six thousand miles away, of a large British army +without even a threat of interruption on the voyage is another +instance of unchallenged command. In wars between great powers +and also between secondary powers, if nearly equally matched, +this absence of challenge is rare. The rule is that the command +of the sea has to be won after hostilities begin. To win it the +enemy's naval force must be neutralised. It must be driven into +his ports and there blockaded or 'masked,' and thus rendered +virtually innocuous; or it must be defeated and destroyed. The +latter is the preferable, because the more effective, plan. As +was perceptible in the Spanish-American war of 1898, as long +as one belligerent's fleet is intact or at large, the other is +reluctant to carry out any considerable expedition over-sea. In +fact, the command of the sea has not been secured whilst the +enemy continues to have a 'fleet in being.'[56] + +[Footnote 55: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, 1890, p. 4.] + +[Footnote 56: See _ante_, Sea-Power, p. 50.] + +In 1782 a greatly superior Franco-Spanish fleet was covering +the siege of Gibraltar. Had this fleet succeeded in preventing +the revictualling of the fortress the garrison would have been +starved into surrender. A British fleet under Lord Howe, though +much weaker in numbers, had not been defeated and was still at +large. Howe, in spite of the odds against him, managed to get his +supply-ships in to the anchorage and to fight a partial action, in +which he did the allies as much damage as he received. There has +never been a display of higher tactical skill than this operation +of Howe's, though, it may be said, he owes his fame much more +to his less meritorious performance on the first of June. The +revictualling of Gibraltar surpassed even Suffren's feat of the +capture of Trincomalee in the same year. In 1798 the French, +assuming that a temporary superiority in the Mediterranean had +given them a free hand on the water, sent a great expedition to +Egypt. Though the army which was carried succeeded in landing +there, the covering fleet was destroyed by Nelson at the Nile, +and the army itself was eventually forced to surrender. The French +had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor +operations, you cannot separate the command of the Mediterranean +or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general. +Local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty +raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel; +but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring +considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything +likely to have an important influence on the course of the war. +If Great Britain has not naval force enough to retain command +of the Mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough +to retain command of the English Channel. It can be easily shown +why it should be so. In war danger comes less from conditions of +locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. Taking up a weak +position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of +his power, but it does not constitute it.[57] A maritime enemy's +power to hurt resides in his fleet. If that can be neutralised +his power disappears. It is in the highest degree improbable +that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into +fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in +which the enemy may try to do us mischief. The most promising +plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when +he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat +him. The proper station of the British fleet in war should, +accordingly, be the nearest possible point to the enemy's force. +This was the fundamental principle of Nelson's strategy, and it +is as valid now as ever it was. If we succeed in getting into +close proximity to the hostile fleet with an adequate force of +our own, our foe cannot obtain command of the sea, or of any +part of it, whether that part be the Mediterranean or the English +Channel, at any rate until he has defeated us. If he is strong +enough to defeat our fleet he obtains the command of the sea +in general; and it is for him to decide whether he shall show +the effectiveness of that command in the Mediterranean or in +the Channel. + +[Footnote 57: In his _History_of_Scotland_ (1873). J. H. M. Burton, +speaking of the Orkney and Shetland isles in the Viking times, +says (vol. i. p. 320): 'Those who occupied them were protected, +not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete +command over the North Sea held by the fleets that found shelter +in the fiords and firths.'] + +In the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular +area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or +at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements. +When the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought +not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a +small hostile expedition may slip across, say the Channel, throw +shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home +again unmolested. Its action would have no sort of influence on +the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless. It +would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were +repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated +system of 'cross-raiding,' discarded centuries ago, not at all +for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war +could be more effectually waged in other ways. The nation in +command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal +submission of an already defeated enemy, as Russia did when at +war with Sweden in 1719; but in such a case the other side cannot +retaliate. Temporary command of local waters will also permit of +operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks; +but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the +time available. If the duration of the temporary command is +insufficient the operation must fail. It must fail even if the +earlier steps have been taken successfully. Temporary command +of the Baltic in war might enable a German force to occupy an +Aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into +permanent command, Germany could make no use of the acquisition, +which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former +possessors. The command of the English Channel, which Napoleon +wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only +temporary. It is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened +in Egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite +independently of the proceedings of Villeneuve, he hesitated to +risk a second battle of the Nile and the loss of a second army. +It may have been this which justified his later statement that he +did not really mean to invade England. In any case, the English +practice of fixing the station of their fleet wherever that of +the enemy's was, would have seriously shortened the duration +of his command of the Channel, even if it had allowed it to be +won at all. Moreover, attempts to carry out a great operation +of war against time as well as against the efforts of the enemy +to prevent it are in the highest degree perilous. + +In war the British Navy has three prominent duties to discharge. It +has to protect our maritime trade, to keep open the communications +between the different parts of the empire, and to prevent invasion. +If we command the sea these duties will be discharged effectually. +As long as we command the sea the career of hostile cruisers +sent to prey on our commerce will be precarious, because command +of the sea carries with it the necessity of possessing an ample +cruiser force. As long as the condition mentioned is satisfied +our ocean communications will be kept open, because an inferior +enemy, who cannot obtain the command required, will be too much +occupied in seeing to his own safety to be able to interfere +seriously with that of any part of our empire. This being so, +it is evident that the greater operation of invasion cannot be +attempted, much less carried to a successful termination, by the +side which cannot make head against the opposing fleet. Command of +the sea is the indispensable preliminary condition of a successful +military expedition sent across the water. It enables the nation +which possesses it to attack its foes where it pleases and where +they seem to be most vulnerable. At the same time it gives to its +possessor security against serious counter-attacks, and affords +to his maritime commerce the most efficient protection that can +be devised. It is, in fact, the main object of naval warfare. + + + + +III + +WAR AND ITS CHIEF LESSONS[58] + +[Footnote 58: Written in 1900. (_Naval_Annual_, 1901.)] + +Had the expression 'real war' been introduced into the title of +this chapter, its introduction would have been justifiable. The +sources--if not of our knowledge of combat, at least of the views +which are sure to prevail when we come to actual fighting--are to +be found in two well-defined, dissimilar, and widely separated +areas. Within one are included the records of war; within the +other, remembrance of the exercises and manoeuvres of a time of +peace. The future belligerent will almost of a certainty have taken +a practical part in the latter, whilst it is probable that he will +have had no personal experience of the former. The longer the time +elapsed since hostilities were in progress, the more probable and +more general does this absence of experience become. The fighting +man--that is to say, the man set apart, paid, and trained so as +to be ready to fight when called upon--is of the same nature as +the rest of his species. This is a truism; but it is necessary to +insist upon it, because professional, and especially professorial, +strategists and tacticians almost invariably ignore it. That which +we have seen and know has not only more, but very much more, +influence upon the minds of nearly all of us than that of which +we have only heard, and, most likely, heard but imperfectly. The +result is that, when peace is interrupted and the fighting man--on +both sea and land--is confronted with the problems of practical +belligerency, he brings to his attempts at their solution an +intellectual equipment drawn, not from knowledge of real war, +but from the less trustworthy arsenal of the recollections of +his peace training. + +When peace, especially a long peace, ends, the methods which it +has introduced are the first enemies which the organised defenders +of a country have to overcome. There is plenty of evidence to prove +that--except, of course, in unequal conflicts between highly +organised, civilised states and savage or semi-barbarian +tribes--success in war is directly proportionate to the extent +of the preliminary victory over the predominance of impressions +derived from the habits and exercises of an armed force during +peace. That the cogency of this evidence is not invariably recognised +is to be attributed to insufficient attention to history and to +disinclination to apply its lessons properly. A primary object +of the _Naval_Annual_--indeed, the chief reason for its +publication--being to assist in advancing the efficiency of the +British Navy, its pages are eminently the place for a review +of the historical examples of the often-recurring inability of +systems established in peace to stand the test of war. Hostilities +on land being more frequent, and much more frequently written +about, than those by sea, the history of the former as well as +of the latter must be examined. The two classes of warfare have +much in common. The principles of their strategy are identical; +and, as regards some of their main features, so are those of +the tactics followed in each. Consequently the history of land +warfare has its lessons for those who desire to achieve success +in warfare on the sea. + +That this has often been lost sight of is largely due to a +misapprehension of the meaning of terms. The two words 'military' +and 'army' have been given, in English, a narrower signification +than they ought, and than they used, to have. Both terms have +been gradually restricted in their use, and made to apply only +to the land service. This has been unfortunate; because records +of occurrences and discussions, capable of imparting much valuable +instruction to naval officers, have been passed over by them +as inapplicable to their own calling. It may have been noticed +that Captain Mahan uses the word 'military' in its right sense +as indicating the members, and the most important class of +operations, of both land- and sea-forces. The French, through +whom the word has come to us from the Latin, use it in the same +sense as Mahan. _Un_militaire_ is a member of either a land +army or a navy. The 'Naval _and_ Military Intelligence' of the +English press is given under the heading 'Nouvelles Militaires' +in the French. Our word 'army' also came to us direct from the +French, who still apply it equally to both services--_armée_de_ +_terre,_armée_de_mer_. It is a participle, and means 'armed,' +the word 'force' being understood. The kindred words _armada_ in +Spanish and Portuguese, and _armata_ in Italian--equally derived +from the Latin--are used to indicate a fleet or navy, another +name being given to a land army. The word 'army' was generally +applied to a fleet in former days by the English, as will be +seen on reference to the Navy Records Society's volumes on the +defeat of the Spanish Armada. + +This short etymological discussion is not inappropriate here, +for it shows why we should not neglect authorities on the history +and conduct of war merely because they do not state specially +that they are dealing with the naval branch of it. + +A very slight knowledge of history is quite enough to make us +acquainted with the frequent recurrence of defeats and disasters +inflicted on armed forces by antagonists whose power to do so +had not been previously suspected. It has been the same on the +sea as on the land, though--owing to more copious records--we +may have a larger list of events on the latter. It will not be +denied that it is of immense importance to us to inquire how this +happened, and ascertain how--for the future--it may be rendered +highly improbable in our own case. A brief enumeration of the more +striking instances will make it plain that the events in question +have been confined to no particular age and to no particular +country. + +It may be said that the more elaborately organised and trained +in peace time an armed force happened to be, the more unexpected +always, and generally the more disastrous, was its downfall. +Examples of this are to be found in the earliest campaigns of +which we have anything like detailed accounts, and they continue +to reappear down to very recent times. In the elaborate nature +of its organisation and training there probably never has been +an army surpassing that led by Xerxes into Greece twenty-four +centuries ago. Something like eight years had been devoted to +its preparation. The minute account of its review by Xerxes on +the shores of the Hellespont proves that, however inefficient +the semi-civilised contingents accompanying it may have been, +the regular Persian army appeared, in discipline, equipment, +and drill, to have come up to the highest standard of the most +intense 'pipeclay' epoch. In numbers alone its superiority was +considerable to the last, and down to the very eve of Platæa its +commander openly displayed his contempt for his enemy. Yet no +defeat could be more complete than that suffered by the Persians +at the hands of their despised antagonists. + +As if to establish beyond dispute the identity of governing +conditions in both land and maritime wars, the next very conspicuous +disappointment of an elaborately organised force was that of the +Athenian fleet at Syracuse. At the time Athens, without question, +stood at the head of the naval world: her empire was in the truest +sense the product of sea-power. Her navy, whilst unequalled in size, +might claim, without excessive exaggeration, to be invincible. The +great armament which the Athenians despatched to Sicily seemed, in +numbers alone, capable of triumphing over all resistance. If the +Athenian navy had already met with some explicable mishaps, it +looked back with complacent confidence on the glorious achievements +of more than half a century previously. It had enjoyed many years +of what was so nearly a maritime peace that its principal exploits +had been the subjection of states weak to insignificance on the +sea as compared with imperial Athens. Profuse expenditure on its +maintenance; the 'continued practice' of which Pericles boasted, +the peace manoeuvres of a remote past; skilfully designed equipment; +and the memory of past glories;--all these did not avail to save +it from defeat at the hands of an enemy who only began to organise +a fleet when the Athenians had invaded his coast waters. + +Ideal perfection as a regular army has never been so nearly reached +as by that of Sparta. The Spartan spent his life in the barrack +and the mess-room; his amusements were the exercises of the parade +ground. For many generations a Spartan force had never been defeated +in a pitched battle. We have had, in modern times, some instances +of a hectoring soldiery arrogantly prancing amongst populations +whose official defenders it had defeated in battle; but nonesuch +could vie with the Spartans in the sublimity of their military +self-esteem. Overweening confidence in the prowess of her army +led Sparta to trample with ruthless disdain on the rights of +others. The iniquitous attack on Thebes, a state thought incapable +of effectual resentment, was avenged by the defeat of Leuctra, +which announced the end of the political supremacy and the military +predominance of Sparta. + +In the series of struggles with Carthage which resulted in putting +Rome in a position enabling her eventually to win the dominion +of the ancient world, the issue was to be decided on the water. +Carthage was essentially a maritime state. The foundation of the +city was effected by a maritime expedition; its dominions lay on +the neighbouring coast or in regions to which the Carthaginians +could penetrate only by traversing the sea. To Carthage her fleet +was 'all in all': her navy, supported by large revenues and +continuously maintained, was more of a 'regular' force than any +modern navy before the second half of the seventeenth century. The +Romans were almost without a fleet, and when they formed one the +undertaking was ridiculed by the Carthaginians with an unconcealed +assumption of superiority. The defeat of the latter off Mylæ, +the first of several, came as a great surprise to them, and, as +we can see now, indicated the eventual ruin of their city. + +We are so familiar with stories of the luxury and corruption of +the Romans during the decline of the empire that we are likely +to forget that the decline went on for centuries, and that their +armed forces, however recruited, presented over and over again +abundant signs of physical courage and vigour. The victory of +Stilicho over Alaric at Pollentia has been aptly paralleled with +that of Marius over the Cimbri. This was by no means the only +achievement of the Roman army of the decadence. A century and +a quarter later--when the Empire of the West had fallen and the +general decline had made further progress--Belisarius conducted +successful campaigns in Persia, in North Africa, in Sicily, and +in Italy. The mere list of countries shows that the mobility and +endurance of the Roman forces during a period in which little +creditable is generally looked for were not inferior to their +discipline and courage. Yet they met with disastrous defeat after +all, and at the hands of races which they had more than once +proved themselves capable of withstanding. It could not have been +because the later Roman equipment was inferior, the organisation +less elaborate, or the training less careful than those of their +barbarian enemies. + +Though it is held by some in these days that the naval power +of Spain in the latter part of the sixteenth century was not +really formidable, that does not appear to have been the opinion +of contemporaries, whether Spaniards or otherwise. Some English +seamen of the time did, indeed, declare their conviction that +Philip the Second's navy was not so much to be feared as many +of their fellow-countrymen thought; but, in the public opinion +of the age, Spain was the greatest, or indeed the one great, +naval state. She possessed a more systematically organised navy +than any other country having the ocean for a field of action +had then, or till long afterwards. Even Genoa and Venice, whose +operations, moreover, were restricted to Mediterranean waters, +could not have been served by more finished specimens of the +naval officer and the man-of-war's man of the time than a large +proportion of the military _personnel_ of the regular Spanish +fleet. As Basques, Castilians, Catalans, or Aragonese, or all +combined, the crews of Spanish fighting ships could look back +upon a glorious past. It was no wonder that, by common consent +of those who manned it, the title of 'Invincible' was informally +conferred upon the Armada which, in 1588, sailed for the English +Channel. How it fared is a matter of common knowledge. No one +could have been more surprised at the result than the gallant +officers who led its squadrons. + +Spain furnishes another instance of the unexpected overthrow of +a military body to which long cohesion and precise organisation +were believed to have secured invincibility. The Spanish was +considered the 'most redoubtable infantry in Europe' till its +unexpected defeat at Rocroi. The effects of this defeat were +far-reaching. Notwithstanding the bravery of her sons, which +has never been open to question, and, in fact, has always been +conspicuous, the military superiority of Spain was broken beyond +repair. + +In the history of other countries are to be found examples equally +instructive. The defeats of Almansa, Brihuega, and Villaviciosa +were nearly contemporary with the victories of Blenheim and +Ramillies; and the thousands of British troops compelled to lay +down their arms at the first named belonged to the same service +as their fellow-countrymen who so often marched to victory under +Marlborough. A striking example of the disappointment which lies +in wait for military self-satisfaction was furnished by the defeat +of Soubise at Rossbach by Frederick the Great. Before the action +the French had ostentatiously shown their contempt for their +opponent. + +The service which gloried in the exploits of Anson and of Hawke +discerned the approach of the Seven Years' war without misgiving; +and the ferocity shown in the treatment of Byng enables us now +to measure the surprise caused by the result of the action off +Minorca. There were further surprises in store for the English +Navy. At the end of the Seven Years' war its reputation for +invincibility was generally established. Few, perhaps none, ventured +to doubt that, if there were anything like equality between the +opposing forces, a meeting between the French and the British +fleets could have but one result--viz. the decisive victory of +the latter. Experience in the English Channel, on the other side +of the Atlantic, and in the Bay of Bengal--during the war of +American Independence--roughly upset this flattering anticipation. +Yet, in the end, the British Navy came out the unquestioned victor +in the struggle: which proves the excellence of its quality. After +every allowance is made for the incapacity of the Government, +we must suspect that there was something else which so often +frustrated the efforts of such a formidable force as the British +Navy of the day must essentially have been. On land the surprises +were even more mortifying; and it is no exaggeration to say that, +a year before it occurred, such an event as the surrender of +Burgoyne's army to an imperfectly organised and trained body of +provincials would have seemed impossible. + +The army which Frederick the Great bequeathed to Prussia was +universally regarded as the model of efficiency. Its methods were +copied in other countries, and foreign officers desiring to excel +in their profession made pilgrimages to Berlin and Potsdam to drink +of the stream of military knowledge at its source. When it came in +contact with the tumultuous array of revolutionary France, the +performances of the force that preserved the tradition of the great +Frederick were disappointingly wanting in brilliancy. A few years +later it suffered an overwhelming disaster. The Prussian defeat +at Jena was serious as a military event; its political effects +were of the utmost importance. Yet many who were involved in that +disaster took, later on, an effective part in the expulsion of +the conquerors from their country, and in settling the history +of Europe for nearly half a century at Waterloo. + +The brilliancy of the exploits of Wellington and the British +army in Portugal and Spain has thrown into comparative obscurity +that part of the Peninsular war which was waged for years by +the French against the Spaniards. Spain, distracted by palace +intrigues and political faction, with the flower of her troops +in a distant comer of Europe, and several of her most important +fortresses in the hands of her assailant, seemed destined to +fall an easy and a speedy prey to the foremost military power in +the world. The attitude of the invaders made it evident that they +believed themselves to be marching to certain victory. Even the +British soldiers--of whom there were never many more than 50,000 +in the Peninsula, and for some years not half that number--were +disdained until they had been encountered. The French arms met +with disappointment after disappointment. On one occasion a whole +French army, over 18,000 strong, surrendered to a Spanish force, +and became prisoners of war. Before the struggle closed there +were six marshals of France with nearly 400,000 troops in the +Peninsula. The great efforts which these figures indicate were +unsuccessful, and the intruders were driven from the country. Yet +they were the comrades of the victors of Austerlitz, of Jena, +and of Wagram, and part of that mighty organisation which had +planted its victorious standards in Berlin and Vienna, held down +Prussia like a conquered province, and shattered into fragments +the holy Roman Empire. + +In 1812 the British Navy was at the zenith of its glory. It had +not only defeated all its opponents; it had also swept the seas of +the fleets of the historic maritime powers--of Spain, of France, +which had absorbed the Italian maritime states, of the Netherlands, +of Denmark. Warfare, nearly continuous for eighteen, and +uninterrupted for nine years, had transformed the British Navy +into an organisation more nearly resembling a permanently maintained +force than it had been throughout its previous history. Its long +employment in serious hostilities had saved it from some of the +failings which the narrow spirit inherent in a close profession +is only too sure to foster. It had, however, a confidence--not +unjustified by its previous exploits--in its own invincibility. +This confidence did not diminish, and was not less ostentatiously +exhibited, as its great achievements receded more and more into +the past. The new enemy who now appeared on the farther side of +the Atlantic was not considered formidable. In the British Navy +there were 145,000 men. In the United States Navy the number +of officers, seamen, and marines available for ocean service +was less than 4500--an insignificant numerical addition to the +enemies with whom we were already contending. The subsequent +and rapid increase in the American _personnel_ to 18,000 shows +the small extent to which it could be considered a 'regular' +force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered +by the hastily enrolled additions. Our defeats in the war of +1812 have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did +constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly +significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention. Rebuffs +of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at New +Orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of Busaco, +Fuentes de Onoro, and Salamanca, met with a serious defeat. + +When the Austro-Prussian war broke out in 1866, the Austrian +commander-in-chief, General Benedek, published an order, probably +still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the +contempt for the enemy felt in the Imperial army. Even those +who perceived that the Prussian forces were not fit subjects of +contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the Austrians. +Yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats +with the Prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of +hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of +superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign +to make peace to avoid further disasters. + +At the beginning of the Franco-German war of 1870, the widespread +anticipation of French victories was clearly shown by the unanimity +with which the journalists of various nationalities illustrated +their papers with maps giving the country between the French +frontier and Berlin, and omitting the part of France extending +to Paris. In less than five weeks from the opening of hostilities +events had made it certain that a map of the country to the eastward +of Lorraine would be practically useless to a student of the +campaign, unless it were to follow the route of the hundreds +of thousands of French soldiers who were conveyed to Germany as +prisoners of war. + +It is to be specially noted that in the above enumeration only +contests in which the result was unexpected--unexpected not only +by the beaten side but also by impartial observers--have been +specified. In all wars one side or the other is defeated; and it +has not been attempted to give a general _résumé_ of the history +of war. The object has been to show the frequency--in all ages +and in all circumstances of systematic, as distinguished from +savage, warfare--of the defeat of the force which by general +consent was regarded as certain to win. Now it is obvious that +a result so frequently reappearing must have a distinct cause, +which is well worth trying to find out. Discovery of the cause +may enable us to remove it in the future, and thus prevent results +which are likely to be all the more disastrous because they have +not been foreseen. + +Professional military writers--an expression which, as before +explained, includes naval--do not help us much in the prosecution +of the search which is so eminently desirable. As a rule, they +have contrived rather to hide than to bring to light the object +sought for. It would be doing them injustice to assume that this +has been done with deliberate intention. It is much more likely +due to professional bias, which exercises over the minds of members +of definitely limited professions incessant and potent domination. +When alluding to occurrences included in the enumeration given +above, they exhibit signs of a resolve to defend their profession +against possible imputations of inefficiency, much more than +a desire to get to the root of the matter. This explains the +unremitting eagerness of military writers to extol the special +qualities developed by long-continued service habits and methods. +They are always apprehensive of the possibility of credit being +given to fighting bodies more loosely organised and less precisely +trained in peace time than the body to which they themselves +belong. + +This sensitiveness as to the merits of their particular profession, +and impatience of even indirect criticism, are unnecessary. There +is nothing in the history of war to show that an untrained force +is better than a trained force. On the contrary, all historical +evidence is on the other side. In quite as many instances as are +presented by the opposite, the forces which put an unexpected +end to the military supremacy long possessed by their antagonists +were themselves, in the strictest sense of the word, 'regulars.' +The Thebans whom Epaminondas led to victory over the Spartans at +Leuctra no more resembled a hasty levy of armed peasants or men +imperfectly trained as soldiers than did Napoleon's army which +overthrew the Prussians at Jena, or the Germans who defeated the +French at Gravelotte and Sedan. Nothing could have been less like +an 'irregular' force than the fleet with which La Galissonnière +beat Byng off Minorca, or the French fleets which, in the war +of American Independence, so often disappointed the hopes of +the British. The records of war on land and by sea--especially +the extracts from them included in the enumeration already +given--lend no support to the silly suggestion that efficient +defence can be provided for a country by 'an untrained man with +a rifle behind a hedge.' The truth is that it was not the absence +of organisation or training on one side which enabled it to defeat +the other. If the beaten side had been elaborately organised and +carefully trained, there must have been something bad in its +organisation or its methods. + +Now this 'something bad,' this defect--wherever it has disclosed +itself--has been enough to neutralise the most splendid courage +and the most unselfish devotion. It has been seen that armies +and navies the valour of which has never been questioned have +been defeated by antagonists sometimes as highly organised as +they were, and sometimes much less so. This ought to put us on +the track of the cause which has produced an effect so little +anticipated. A 'regular' permanently embodied or maintained service +of fighting men is always likely to develop a spirit of intense +professional self-satisfaction. The more highly organised it is, +and the more sharply its official frontiers are defined, the +more intense is this spirit likely to become. A 'close' service of +the kind grows restive at outside criticism, and yields more and +more to the conviction that no advance in efficiency is possible +unless it be the result of suggestions emanating from its own +ranks. Its view of things becomes narrower and narrower, whereas +efficiency in war demands the very widest view. Ignorant critics +call the spirit thus engendered 'professional conservatism'; the +fact being that change is not objected to--is even welcomed, +however frequent it may be, provided only that it is suggested +from inside. An immediate result is 'unreality and formalism of +peace training'--to quote a recent thoughtful military critic. + +As the formalism becomes more pronounced, so the unreality increases. +The proposer or introducer of a system of organisation of training +or of exercises is often, perhaps usually, capable of distinguishing +between the true and the false, the real and the unreal. His +successors, the men who continue the execution of his plans, +can hardly bring to their work the open mind possessed by the +originator; they cannot escape from the influence of the methods +which have been provided for them ready made, and which they are +incessantly engaged in practising. This is not a peculiarity of +the military profession in either branch--it extends to nearly +every calling; but in the profession specified, which is a service +rather than a freely exercised profession, it is more prominent. +Human thought always has a tendency to run in grooves, and in +military institutions the grooves are purposely made deep, and +departure from them rigorously forbidden. All exercises, even +those designed to have the widest scope, tend to become mere +drill. Each performance produces, and bequeaths for use on the +next occasion, a set of customary methods of execution which are +readily adopted by the subsequent performers. There grows up in +time a kind of body of customary law governing the execution of +peace operations--the principles being peace-operation principles +wholly and solely--which law few dare to disobey, and which +eventually obtains the sanction of official written regulations. +As Scharnhorst, quoted by Baron von der Goltz, said, 'We have +begun to place the art of war higher than military virtues.' +The eminent authority who thus expressed himself wrote the words +before the great catastrophe of Jena; and, with prophetic insight +sharpened by his fear of the menacing tendency of peace-training +formalism and unreality, added his conviction that 'this has +been the ruin of nations from time immemorial.' + +Independently of the evidence of history already adduced, it +would be reasonable to conclude that the tendency is strengthened +and made more menacing when the service in which it prevails +becomes more highly specialised. If custom and regulation leave +little freedom of action to the individual members of an armed +force, the difficulty--sure to be experienced by them--of shaking +themselves clear of their fetters when the need for doing so arises +is increased. To realise--when peace is broken--the practical +conditions of war demands an effort of which the unfettered +intelligence alone seems capable. The great majority of successful +leaders in war on both elements have not been considerably, or +at all, superior in intellectual acuteness to numbers of their +fellows; but they have had strength of character, and their minds +were not squeezed in a mould into a commonplace and uniform pattern. + +The 'canker of a long peace,' during recent years at any rate, +is not manifested in disuse of arms, but in mistaken methods. +For a quarter of a century the civilised world has tended more +and more to become a drill-ground, but the spirit dominating +it has been that of the pedant. There has been more exercise +and less reality. The training, especially of officers, becomes +increasingly scholastic. This, and the deterioration consequent +on it, are not merely modern phenomena. They appear in all ages. +'The Sword of the Saracens,' says Gibbon, 'became less formidable +when their youth was drawn from the camp to the college.' The +essence of pedantry is want of originality. It is nourished on +imitation. For the pedant to imitate is enough of itself; to +him the suitability of the model is immaterial. Thus military +bodies have been ruined by mimicry of foreign arrangements quite +inapplicable to the conditions of the mimics' country. More than +twenty years ago Sir Henry Maine, speaking of the war of American +Independence, said, 'Next to their stubborn valour, the chief +secret of the colonists' success was the incapacity of the English +generals, trained in the stiff Prussian system soon to perish +at Jena, to adapt themselves to new conditions of warfare.' He +pointed out that the effect of this uncritical imitation of what +was foreign was again experienced by men 'full of admiration +of a newer German system.' We may not be able to explain what +it is, but, all the same, there does exist something which we +call national characteristics. The aim of all training should +be to utilise these to the full, not to ignore them. The naval +methods of a continental state with relatively small oceanic +interests, or with but a brief experience of securing these, +cannot be very applicable to a great maritime state whose chief +interests have been on the seas for many years. + +How is all this applicable to the ultimate efficiency of the +British Navy? It may be allowed that there is a good deal of +truth in what has been written above; but it may be said that +considerations sententiously presented cannot claim to have much +practical value so long as they are absolute and unapplied. The +statement cannot be disputed. It is unquestionably necessary +to make the application. The changes in naval _matériel_, so +often spoken of, introduced within the last fifty years have been +rivalled by the changes in the composition of the British Navy. +The human element remains in original individual character exactly +the same as it always was; but there has been a great change in +the opportunities and facilities offered for the development of +the faculties most desired in men-of-war's men. All reform--using +the word in its true sense of alteration, and not in its strained +sense of improvement--has been in the direction of securing perfect +uniformity. If we take the particular directly suggested by the +word just used, we may remember, almost with astonishment, that +there was no British naval uniform for anyone below the rank of +officer till after 1860. Now, at every inspection, much time +is taken up in ascertaining if the narrow tape embroidery on +a frock collar is of the regulation width, and if the rows of +tape are the proper distance apart. The diameter of a cloth cap +is officially defined; and any departure from the regulation +number of inches (and fractions of an inch) is as sure of involving +punishment as insubordination. + +It is the same in greater things. Till 1853--in which year the +change came into force--there was no permanent British naval +service except the commissioned and warrant officers. Not till +several years later did the new 'continuous service' men equal +half of the bluejacket aggregate. Now, every bluejacket proper +serves continuously, and has been in the navy since boyhood. The +training of the boys is made uniform. No member of the ship's +company--except a domestic--is now allowed to set foot on board +a sea-going ship till he has been put through a training course +which is exactly like that through which every other member of +his class passes. Even during the comparatively brief period in +which young officers entered the navy by joining the college +at Portsmouth, it was only the minority who received the special +academic training. Till the establishment of the _Illustrious_ +training school in 1855, the great majority of officers joined +their first ship as individuals from a variety of different and +quite independent quarters. Now, every one of them has, as a +preliminary condition, to spend a certain time--the same for +all--in a school. Till a much later period, every engineer entered +separately. Now, passing through a training establishment is +obligatory for engineers also. + +Within the service there has been repeated formation of distinct +branches or 'schools,' such as the further specialised specialist +gunnery and torpedo sections. It was not till 1860 that uniform +watch bills, quarter bills, and station bills were introduced, and +not till later that their general adoption was made compulsory. Up +to that time the internal organisation and discipline of a ship +depended on her own officers, it being supposed that capacity +to command a ship implied, at least, capacity to distribute and +train her crew. The result was a larger scope than is now thought +permissible for individual capability. However short-lived some +particular drill or exercise may be, however soon it is superseded +by another, as long as it lasts the strictest conformity to it is +rigorously enforced. Even the number of times that an exercise +has to be performed, difference in class of ship or in the nature +of the service on which she is employed notwithstanding, is +authoritatively laid down. Still more noteworthy, though much +less often spoken of than the change in _matériel_, has been +the progress of the navy towards centralisation. Naval duties +are now formulated at a desk on shore, and the mode of carrying +them out notified to the service in print. All this would have +been quite as astonishing to the contemporaries of Nelson or +of Exmouth and Codrington as the aspect of a battleship or of +a 12-inch breech-loading gun. + +Let it be clearly understood that none of these things has been +mentioned with the intention of criticising them either favourably +or unfavourably. They have been cited in order that it may be +seen that the change in naval affairs is by no means one in +_matériel_ only, and that the transformation in other matters has +been stupendous and revolutionary beyond all previous experience. +It follows inevitably from this that we shall wage war in future +under conditions dissimilar from any hitherto known. In this very +fact there lies the making of a great surprise. It will have +appeared from the historical statement given above how serious +a surprise sometimes turns out to be. Its consequences, always +significant, are not unfrequently far-reaching. The question of +practical moment is: How are we to guard ourselves against such +a surprise? To this a satisfactory answer can be given. It might +be summarised in the admonitions: abolish over-centralisation; +give proper scope to individual capacity and initiative; avoid +professional self-sufficiency. + +When closely looked at, it is one of the strangest manifestations +of the spirit of modern navies that, though the issues of land +warfare are rarely thought instructive, the peace methods of land +forces are extensively and eagerly copied by the sea-service. +The exercises of the parade ground and the barrack square are +taken over readily, and so are the parade ground and the barrack +square themselves. This may be right. The point is that it is +novel, and that a navy into the training of which the innovation +has entered must differ considerably from one that was without +it and found no need of it during a long course of serious wars. +At any rate, no one will deny that parade-ground evolutions and +barrack-square drill expressly aim at the elimination of +individuality, or just the quality to the possession of which +we owe the phenomenon called, in vulgar speech, the 'handy man.' +Habits and sentiments based on a great tradition, and the faculties +developed by them, are not killed all at once; but innovation +in the end annihilates them, and their not having yet entirely +disappeared gives no ground for doubting their eventual, and even +near, extinction. The aptitudes still universally most prized +in the seaman were produced and nourished by practices and under +conditions no longer allowed to prevail. Should we lose those +aptitudes, are we likely to reach the position in war gained +by our predecessors? + +For the British Empire the matter is vital: success in maritime +war, decisive and overwhelming, is indispensable to our existence. +We have to consider the desirability of 'taking stock' of our +moral, as well as of our material, naval equipment: to ascertain +where the accumulated effect of repeated innovations has carried +us. The mere fact of completing the investigation will help us to +rate at their true value the changes which have been introduced; +will show us what to retain, what to reject, and what to substitute. +There is no essential vagueness in these allusions. If they seem +vague, it is because the moment for particularising has not yet +come. The public opinion of the navy must first be turned in the +right direction. It must be led to question the soundness of +the basis on which many present methods rest. Having once begun +to do this, we shall find no difficulty in settling, in detail +and with precision, what the true elements of naval efficiency +are. + + + + +IV[59] + +THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT SERVICE + +[Footnote 59: Written in 1898. (_The_Times_.)] + +The regret, often expressed, that the crews of British merchant +ships now include a large proportion of foreigners, is founded +chiefly on the apprehension that a well-tested and hitherto secure +recruiting ground for the navy is likely to be closed. It has +been stated repeatedly, and the statement has been generally +accepted without question, that in former days, when a great +expansion of our fleet was forced on us by the near approach +of danger, we relied upon the ample resources of our merchant +service to complete the manning of our ships of war, even in +a short time, and that the demands of the navy upon the former +were always satisfied. It is assumed that compliance with those +demands was as a rule not voluntary, but was enforced by the +press-gang. The resources, it is said, existed and were within +reach, and the method employed in drawing upon them was a detail +of comparatively minor importance; our merchant ships were manned +by native-born British seamen, of whom tens of thousands were +always at hand, so that if volunteers were not forthcoming the +number wanted could be 'pressed' into the Royal service. It is +lamented that at the present day the condition of affairs is +different, that the presence in it of a large number of foreigners +forbids us to regard with any confidence the merchant service as an +adequate naval recruiting ground in the event of war, even though +we are ready to substitute for the system of 'impressment'--which +is now considered both undesirable and impossible--rewards likely +to attract volunteers. The importance of the subject need not +be dwelt upon. The necessity to a maritime state of a powerful +navy, including abundant resources for manning it, is now no +more disputed than the law of gravitation. If the proportion of +foreigners in our merchant service is too high it is certainly +deplorable; and if, being already too high, that proportion is +rising, an early remedy is urgently needed. I do not propose +to speak here of that matter, which is grave enough to require +separate treatment. + +My object is to present the results of an inquiry into the history +of the relations between the navy and the merchant service, from +which will appear to what extent the latter helped in bringing the +former up to a war footing, how far its assistance was affected +by the presence in it of any foreign element, and in what way +impressment ensured or expedited the rendering of the assistance. +The inquiry has necessarily been largely statistical; consequently +the results will often be given in a statistical form. This has the +great advantage of removing the conclusions arrived at from the +domain of mere opinion into that of admitted fact. The statistics +used are those which have not been, and are not likely to be, +questioned. It is desirable that this should be understood, because +official figures have not always commanded universal assent. Lord +Brougham, speaking in the House of Lords in 1849 of tables issued +by the Board of Trade, said that a lively impression prevailed +'that they could prove anything and everything'; and in connection +with them he adopted some unnamed person's remark, 'Give me half +an hour and the run of the multiplication table and I'll engage +to payoff the National Debt.' In this inquiry there has been no +occasion to use figures relating to the time of Lord Brougham's +observations. We will take the last three great maritime wars +in which our country has been engaged. These were: the war of +American Independence, the war with Revolutionary France to the +Peace of Amiens, and the war with Napoleon. The period covered +by these three contests roughly corresponds to the last quarter +of the eighteenth and the first fifteen years of the nineteenth +century. In each of the three wars there was a sudden and large +addition to the number of seamen in the navy; and in each there +were considerable annual increases as the struggle continued. It +must be understood that we shall deal with the case of seamen only; +the figures, which also were large, relating to the marines not +being included in our survey because it has never been contended +that their corps looked to the merchant service for any appreciable +proportion of its recruits. In taking note of the increase of +seamen voted for any year it will be necessary to make allowance +also for the 'waste' of the previous year. The waste, even in the +latter part of the last century, was large. Commander Robinson, +in his valuable work, 'The British Fleet,' gives details showing +that the waste during the Seven Years' war was so great as to be +truly shocking. In 1895 Lord Brassey (_Naval_Annual_) allowed +for the _personnel_ of the navy, even in these days of peace +and advanced sanitary science, a yearly waste of 5 per cent., a +percentage which is, I expect, rather lower than that officially +accepted. We may take it as certain that, during the three serious +wars above named, the annual waste was never less than 6 per +cent. This is, perhaps, to put it too low; but it is better to +understate the case than to appear to exaggerate it. The recruiting +demand, therefore, for a year of increased armament will be the +sum of the increase in men _plus_ the waste on the previous year's +numbers. + +The capacity of the British merchant service to supply what was +demanded would, of course, be all the greater the smaller the +number of foreigners it contained in its ranks. This is not only +generally admitted at the present day; it is also frequently +pointed out when it is asserted that the conditions now are less +favourable than they were owing to a recent influx of foreign +seamen. The fact, however, is that there were foreigners on board +British merchant ships, and, it would seem, in considerable numbers, +long before even the war of American Independence. By 13 George +II, c. 3, foreigners, not exceeding three-fourths of the crew, +were permitted in British vessels, 'and in two years to be +naturalised.' By 13 George II, c. 17, exemption from impressment +was granted to 'every person, being a foreigner, who shall serve in +any merchant ship, or other trading vessel or privateer belonging +to a subject of the Crown of Great Britain.' The Acts quoted +were passed about the time of the 'Jenkins' Ear War' and the +war of the Austrian Succession; but the fact that foreigners +were allowed to form the majority of a British vessel's crew is +worthy of notice. The effect and, probably, the object of this +legislation were not so much to permit foreign seamen to enter +our merchant service as to permit the number of those already +there to be increased. It was in 1759 that Lord, then Commander, +Duncan reported that the crew of the hired merchant ship _Royal_ +_Exchange_ consisted 'to a large extent of boys and foreigners, +many of whom could not speak English.' In 1770 by 11 George III, +c. 3, merchant ships were allowed to have three-fourths of their +crews foreigners till the 1st February 1772. Acts permitting +the same proportion of foreign seamen and extending the time +were passed in 1776, 1778, 1779, 1780, 1781, and 1782. A similar +Act was passed in 1792. It was in contemplation to reduce the +foreign proportion, after the war, to one-fourth. In 1794 it +was enacted (34 George III, c. 68), 'for the encouragement of +British seamen,' that after the expiration of six months from the +conclusion of the war, vessels in the foreign, as distinguished +from the coasting, trade were to have their commanders and +three-fourths of their crews British subjects. From the wording +of the Act it seems to have been taken for granted that the +proportion of three-fourths _bona_fide_ British-born seamen was +not likely to be generally exceeded. It will have been observed +that in all the legislation mentioned, from the time of George +II downwards, it was assumed as a matter of course that there +were foreign seamen on board our merchant vessels. The United +States citizens in the British Navy, about whom there was so +much discussion on the eve of the war of 1812, came principally +from our own merchant service, and not direct from the American. +It is remarkable that, until a recent date, the presence of +foreigners in British vessels, even in time of peace, was not +loudly or generally complained of. Mr. W. S. Lindsay, writing in +1876, stated that the throwing open the coasting trade in 1855 +had 'neither increased on the average the number of foreigners we +had hitherto been allowed to employ in our ships, nor deteriorated +the number and quality of British seamen.' I have brought forward +enough evidence to show that, as far as the merchant service +was the proper recruiting ground for the British Navy, it was +not one which was devoid of a considerable foreign element. + +We may, nevertheless, feel certain that that element never amounted +to, and indeed never nearly approached, three-fourths of the +whole number of men employed in our 'foreign-going' vessels. For +this, between 50,000 and 60,000 men would have been required, +at least in the last of the three wars above mentioned. If all +the foreign mercantile marines at the present day, when nearly +all have been so largely increased, were to combine, they could +not furnish the number required after their own wants had been +satisfied. During the period under review some of the leading +commercial nations were at war with us; so that few, if any, +seamen could have come to us from them. Our custom-house statistics +indicate an increase in the shipping trade of the neutral nations +sufficient to have rendered it impossible for them to spare us +any much larger number of seamen. Therefore, it is extremely +difficult to resist the conclusion that during the wars the +composition of our merchant service remained nearly what it was +during peace. It contained a far from insignificant proportion +of foreigners; and that proportion was augmented, though by no +means enormously, whilst war was going on. This leads us to the +further conclusion that, if our merchant service supplied the +navy with many men, it could recover only a small part of the +number from foreign countries. In fact, any that it could give +it had to replace from our own population almost exclusively. + +The question now to be considered is, What was the capacity of +the merchant service for supplying the demands of the navy? In +the year 1770 the number of seamen voted for the navy was 11,713. +Owing to a fear of a difficulty with Spain about the Falkland +Islands, the number for the following year was suddenly raised +to 31,927. Consequently, the increase was 20,214, which, added +to the 'waste' on the previous year, made the whole naval demand +about 21,000. We have not got statistics of the seamen of the +whole British Empire for this period, but we have figures which +will enable us to compute the number with sufficient accuracy +for the purpose in hand. In England and Wales there were some +59,000 seamen, and those of the rest of the empire amounted to +about 21,000. Large as the 'waste' was in the Royal Navy, it +was, and still is, much larger in the merchant service. We may +safely put it at 8 per cent. at least. Therefore, simply to keep +up its numbers--80,000--the merchant service would have had to +engage fully 6400 fresh hands. In view of these figures, it is +difficult to believe that it could have furnished the navy with +21,000 men, or, indeed, with any number approximating thereto. +It could not possibly have done so without restricting its +operations, if only for a time. So far were its operations from +shrinking that they were positively extended. The English tonnage +'cleared outwards' from our ports was for the years mentioned +as follows: 1770, 703,495; 1771, 773,390; 1772 818,108. + +Owing to the generally slow rate of sailing when on voyages and +to the great length of time taken in unloading and reloading +abroad--both being often effected 'in the stream' and with the +ship's own boats--the figures for clearances outward much more +nearly represented the amount of our 'foreign-going' tonnage +a century ago than similar figures would now in these days of +rapid movement. After 1771 the navy was reduced and kept at a +relatively low standard till 1775. In that year the state of +affairs in America rendered an increase of our naval forces +necessary. In 1778 we were at war with France; in 1779 with Spain +as well; and in December 1780 we had the Dutch for enemies in +addition. In September 1783 we were again at peace. The way in +which we had to increase the navy will be seen in the following +table:-- + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | 1774 | 15,646 | -- | -- | -- | + | 1775 | 18,000 | 2,354 | 936 | 3,290 | + | 1776 | 21,335 | 3,335 | 1,080 | 4,415 | + | 1777 | 34,871 | 13,536 | 1,278 | 14,184 | + | 1778 | 48,171 | 13,300 | 2,088 | 15,388 | + | 1779 | 52,611 | 4,440 | 2,886 | 7,326 | + | 1780 | 66,221 | 13,610 | 3,156 | 16,766 | + | 1781 | 69,683 | 3,462 | 3,972 | 7,434 | + | 1782 | 78,695 | 9,012 | 4,176 | 13,188 | + | 1783 | 84,709 | 6,014 | 4,722 | 10,736 | + ------------------------------------------------------- + +It cannot be believed that the merchant service, with its then +dimensions, could have possibly satisfied these great and repeated +demands, besides making up its own 'waste,' unless its size were +much reduced. After 1777, indeed, there was a considerable fall +in the figures of English tonnage 'outwards.' I give these figures +down to the first year of peace. + + 1777 736,234 tons 'outwards.' + 1778 657,238 " " + 1779 590,911 " " + 1780 619,462 " " + 1781 547,953 " " + 1782 552,851 " " + 1783 795,669 " " + 1784 846,355 " " + +At first sight it would seem as if there had, indeed, been a +shrinkage. We find, however, on further examination that in reality +there had been none. 'During the [American] war the ship-yards in +every port of Britain were full of employment; and consequently +new ship-yards were set up in places where ships had never been +built before.' Even the diminution in the statistics of outward +clearances indicated no diminution in the number of merchant +ships or their crews. The missing tonnage was merely employed +elsewhere. 'At this time there were about 1000 vessels of private +property employed by the Government as transports and in other +branches of the public service.' Of course there had been some +diminution due to the transfer of what had been British-American +shipping to a new independent flag. This would not have set free +any men to join the navy. + +When we come to the Revolutionary war we find ourselves confronted +with similar conditions. The case of this war has often been +quoted as proving that in former days the navy had to rely +practically exclusively on the merchant service when expansion +was necessary. In giving evidence before a Parliamentary committee +about fifty years ago, Admiral Sir T. Byam Martin, referring +to the great increase of the fleet in 1793, said, 'It was the +merchant service that enabled us to man some sixty ships of the +line and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels.' He +added that we had been able to bring promptly together 'about +35,000 or 40,000 men of the mercantile marine.' The requirements +of the navy amounted, as stated by the admiral, to about 40,000 +men; to be exact, 39,045. The number of seamen in the British +Empire in 1793 was 118,952. In the next year the number showed +no diminution; in fact it increased, though but slightly, to +119,629. How our merchant service could have satisfied the +above-mentioned immense demand on it in addition to making good +its waste and then have even increased is a thing that baffles +comprehension. No such example of elasticity is presented by +any other institution. Admiral Byam Martin spoke so positively, +and, indeed, with such justly admitted authority, that we should +have to give up the problem as insoluble were it not for other +passages in the admiral's own evidence. It may be mentioned that +all the witnesses did not hold his views. Sir James Stirling, an +officer of nearly if not quite equal authority, differed from +him. In continuation of his evidence Sir T. Byam Martin stated +that afterwards the merchant service could give only a small +and occasional supply, as ships arrived from foreign ports or as +apprentices grew out of their time. Now, during the remaining years +of this war and throughout the Napoleonic war, great as were the +demands of the navy, they only in one year, that of the rupture +of the Peace of Amiens, equalled the demand at the beginning of +the Revolutionary war. From the beginning of hostilities till +the final close of the conflict in 1815 the number of merchant +seamen fell only once--viz. in 1795, the fall being 3200. In 1795, +however, the demand for men for the navy was less than half that +of 1794. The utmost, therefore, that Sir T. Byam Martin desired +to establish was that, on a single occasion in an unusually +protracted continuance of war, the strength of our merchant service +enabled it to reinforce the navy up to the latter's requirements; +but its doing so prevented it from giving much help afterwards. +All the same, men in large numbers had to be found for the navy +yearly for a long time. This will appear from the tables which +follow:-- + + REVOLUTIONARY WAR + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | 1794 | 72,885 | 36,885 | 2,160 | 39,045 | + | 1795 | 85,000 | 12,115 | 4,368 | 16,483 | + | 1796 | 92,000 | 7,000 | 5,100 | 12,100 | + | 1797 | 100,000 | 8,000 | 5,520 | 13,520 | + | 1798 | 100,000 | -- | 6,000 | 6,000 | + | 1799 | 100,000 | -- | 6,000 | 6,000 | + | 1800 | 97,300 | -- | -- | -- | + | 1801 | 105,000 | 7,700 | Absorbed | 7,700 | + | | | | by | | + | | | | previous | | + | | | |reduction.| | + ------------------------------------------------------- + + NAPOLEONIC WAR + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | | /38,000\ | | | | + | 1803 | \77,600/ | 39,600 | -- | 39,600 | + | 1804 | 78,000 | 400 | 3,492 | 3,892 | + | | | |(for nine | | + | | | | months) | | + | 1805 | 90,000 | 12,000 | 4,680 | 16,680 | + | 1806 | 91,000 | 1,000 | 5,400 | 6,400 | + | 1807 | 98,600 | 7,600 | 5,460 | 13,060 | + | 1808 | 98,600 | -- | 5,460 | 5,460 | + | 1809 | 98,600 | -- | 5,460 | 5,460 | + | 1810 | 113,600 | 15,000 | 5,460 | 20,460 | + | 1811 | 113,600 | -- | 6,816 | 6,816 | + | 1812 | 113,600 | -- | 6,816 | 6,816 | + | 1813 | 108,600 | Reduction | -- | -- | + | | /86,000\ | | | | + | 1814 | \74,000/ | Do. | -- | -- | + ------------------------------------------------------- + +(No 'waste' is allowed for when there has been a reduction.) + +It is a reasonable presumption that, except perhaps on a single +occasion, the merchant service did not furnish the men required--not +from any want of patriotism or of public spirit, but simply because +it was impossible. Even as regards the single exception the evidence +is not uncontested; and by itself, though undoubtedly strong, it +is not convincing, in view of the well-grounded presumptions the +other way. The question then that naturally arises is--If the navy +did not fill up its complements from the merchant service, how +did it fill them up? The answer is easy. Our naval complements +were filled up largely with boys, largely with landsmen, largely +with fishermen, whose numbers permitted this without inconvenience +to their trade in general, and, to a small extent, with merchant +seamen. It may be suggested that the men wanted by the navy could +have been passed on to it from our merchant vessels, which could +then complete their own crews with boys, landsmen, and fishermen. +It was the age in which Dr. Price was a great authority on public +finance, the age of Mr. Pitt's sinking fund, when borrowed money +was repaid with further borrowings; so that a corresponding +roundabout method for manning the navy may have had attractions +for some people. A conclusive reason why it was not adopted is +that its adoption would have been possible only at the cost of +disorganising such a great industrial undertaking as our maritime +trade. That this disorganisation did not arise is proved by the +fact that our merchant service flourished and expanded. + +It is widely supposed that, wherever the men wanted for the navy +may have come from, they were forced into it by the system of +'impressment.' The popular idea of a man-of-war's 'lower deck' +of a century ago is that it was inhabited by a ship's company +which had been captured by the press-gang and was restrained +from revolting by the presence of a detachment of marines. The +prevalence of the belief that seamen were 'raised'--'recruited' is +not a naval term--for the navy by forcible means can be accounted +for without difficulty. The supposed ubiquity of the press-gang +and its violent procedure added much picturesque detail, and even +romance, to stories of naval life. Stories connected with it, +if authentic, though rare, would, indeed, make a deep impression +on the public; and what was really the exception would be taken +for the rule. There is no evidence to show that even from the +middle of the seventeenth century any considerable number of men +was raised by forcible impressment. I am not acquainted with a +single story of the press-gang which, even when much embellished, +professes to narrate the seizure of more than an insignificant body. +The allusions to forcible impressment made by naval historians +are, with few exceptions, complaints of the utter inefficiency +of the plan. In Mr. David, Hannay's excellent 'Short History of +the Royal Navy' will be found more than one illustration of its +inefficient working in the seventeenth century. Confirmation, +if confirmation is needed, can be adduced on the high authority +of Mr. M. Oppenheim. We wanted tens of thousands, and forcible +impressment was giving us half-dozens, or, at the best, scores. +Even of those it provided, but a small proportion was really +forced to serve. Mr. Oppenheim tells us of an Act of Parliament +(17 Charles I) legalising forcible impressment, which seems to +have been passed to satisfy the sailors. If anyone should think +this absurd, he may be referred to the remarkable expression of +opinion by some of the older seamen of Sunderland and Shields +when the Russian war broke out in 1854. The married sailors, they +said, naturally waited for the impressment, for 'we know that +has always been and always will be preceded by the proclamation +of bounty.' + +The most fruitful source of error as to the procedure of the +press-gang has been a deficient knowledge of etymology. The word +has, properly, no relation to the use of force, and has no +etymological connection with 'press' and its compounds, 'compress,' +'depress,' 'express,' 'oppress,' &c. 'Prest money is so-called +from the French word _prest_--that is, readie money, for that +it bindeth all those that have received it to be ready at all +times appointed.' Professor Laughton tells us that 'A prest or +imprest was an earnest or advance paid on account. A prest man +was really a man who received the prest of 12d., as a soldier +when enlisted.' Writers, and some in an age when precision in +spelling is thought important, have frequently spelled _prest_ +pressed, and _imprest_ impressed. The natural result has been +that the thousands who had received 'prest money' were classed +as 'pressed' into the service by force. + +The foregoing may be summed up as follows:-- + +For 170 years at least there never has been a time when the British +merchant service did not contain an appreciable percentage of +foreigners. + +During the last three (and greatest) maritime wars in which this +country has been involved only a small proportion of the immense +number of men required by the navy came, or could have come, +from the merchant service. + +The number of men raised for the navy by forcible impressment +in war time has been enormously exaggerated owing to a confusion +of terms. As a matter of fact the number so raised, for quite +two centuries, was only an insignificant fraction of the whole. + + + + +V + +FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT THE PRESS-GANG[60] + +[Footnote 60: Written in 1900, (_National_Review_.)] + +Of late years great attention has been paid to our naval history, +and many even of its obscure byways have been explored. A general +result of the investigation is that we are enabled to form a high +estimate of the merits of our naval administration in former +centuries. We find that for a long time the navy has possessed an +efficient organisation; that its right position as an element of +the national defences was understood ages ago; and that English +naval officers of a period which is now very remote showed by their +actions that they exactly appreciated and--when necessary--were able +to apply the true principles of maritime warfare. If anyone still +believes that the country has been saved more than once merely +by lucky chances of weather, and that the England of Elizabeth +has been converted into the great oceanic and colonial British +Empire of Victoria in 'a fit of absence of mind,' it will not +be for want of materials with which to form a correct judgment +on these points. + +It has been accepted generally that the principal method of manning +our fleet in the past--especially when war threatened to arise--was +to seize and put men on board the ships by force. This has been +taken for granted by many, and it seems to have been assumed that, +in any case, there is no way of either proving it or disproving +it. The truth, however, is that it is possible and--at least as +regards the period of our last great naval war--not difficult to +make sure if it is true or not. Records covering a long succession +of years still exist, and in these can be found the name of nearly +every seaman in the navy and a statement of the conditions on +which he joined it. The exceptions would not amount to more than +a few hundreds out of many tens of thousands of names, and would +be due to the disappearance--in itself very infrequent--of some of +the documents and to occasional, but also very rare, inaccuracies +in the entries. + +The historical evidence on which the belief in the prevalence +of impressment as a method of recruiting the navy for more than +a hundred years is based, is limited to contemporary statements +in the English newspapers, and especially in the issues of the +periodical called _The_Naval_Chronicle_, published in 1803, +the first year of the war following the rupture of the Peace +of Amiens. Readers of Captain Mahan's works on Sea-Power will +remember the picture he draws of the activity of the press-gang +in that year, his authority being _The_Naval_Chronicle_. This +evidence will be submitted directly to close examination, and +we shall see what importance ought to be attached to it. In the +great majority of cases, however, the belief above mentioned has +no historical foundation, but is to be traced to the frequency +with which the supposed operations of the press-gang were used +by the authors of naval stories and dramas, and by artists who +took scenes of naval life for their subject. Violent seizure and +abduction lend themselves to effective treatment in literature +and in art, and writers and painters did not neglect what was +so plainly suggested. + +A fruitful source of the widespread belief that our navy in the old +days was chiefly manned by recourse to compulsion, is a confusion +between two words of independent origin and different meaning, +which, in ages when exact spelling was not thought indispensable, +came to be written and pronounced alike. During our later great +maritime wars, the official term applied to anyone recruited by +impressment was 'prest-man.' In the sixteenth and seventeenth +centuries, and part of the eighteenth century, this term meant +the exact opposite. It meant a man who had voluntarily engaged to +serve, and who had received a sum in advance called 'prest-money.' +'A prest-man,' we are told by that high authority, Professor Sir +J. K. Laughton, 'was really a man who received the prest of 12d., +as a soldier when enlisted.' In the 'Encyclopædia Metropolitana' +(1845), we find:-- 'Impressing, or, more correctly, impresting, +i.e. paying earnest-money to seamen by the King's Commission to +the Admiralty, is a right of very ancient date, and established +by prescription, though not by statute. Many statutes, however, +imply its existence--one as far back as 2 Richard II, cap. 4.' An +old dictionary of James I's time (1617), called 'The Guide into +the Tongues, by the Industrie, Studie, Labour, and at the Charges +of John Minshew,' gives the following definition:--'Imprest-money. +G. [Gallic or French], Imprest-à nce; _Imprestanza_, from _in_ +and _prestare_, to lend or give beforehand.... Presse-money. T. +[Teutonic or German], Soldt, from salz, _salt_. For anciently +agreement or compact between the General and the soldier was +signified by salt.' Minshew also defines the expression 'to presse +souldiers' by the German _soldatenwerben_, and explains that +here the word _werben_ means prepare (_parare_). 'Prest-money,' +he says, 'is so-called of the French word _prest_, i.e. readie, +for that it bindeth those that have received it to be ready at +all times appointed.' In the posthumous work of Stephen Skinner, +'Etymologia Linguæ Anglicanæ' (1671), the author joins together +'press or imprest' as though they were the same, and gives two +definitions, viz.: (1) recruiting by force (_milites_cogere_); +(2) paying soldiers a sum of money and keeping them ready to serve. +Dr. Murray's 'New English Dictionary,' now in course of publication, +gives instances of the confusion between imprest and impress. A +consequence of this confusion has been that many thousands of +seamen who had received an advance of money have been regarded +as carried off to the navy by force. If to this misunderstanding +we add the effect on the popular mind of cleverly written stories +in which the press-gang figured prominently, we can easily see +how the belief in an almost universal adoption of compulsory +recruiting for the navy became general. It should, therefore, be +no matter of surprise when we find that the sensational reports +published in the English newspapers in 1803 were accepted without +question. + +Impressment of seamen for the navy has been called 'lawless,' and +sometimes it has been asserted that it was directly contrary to law. +There is, however, no doubt that it was perfectly legal, though its +legality was not based upon any direct statutory authority. Indirect +confirmations of it by statute are numerous. These appear in the +form of exemptions. The law of the land relating to this subject +was that all 'sea-faring' men were liable to impressment unless +specially protected by custom or statute. A consideration of the +long list of exemptions tends to make one believe that in reality +very few people were liable to be impressed. Some were 'protected' +by local custom, some by statute, and some by administrative +order. The number of the last must have been very great. The +'Protection Books' preserved in the Public Record Office form no +inconsiderable section of the Admiralty records. For the period +specially under notice, viz. that beginning with the year 1803, +there are no less than five volumes of 'protections.' Exemptions +by custom probably originated at a very remote date: ferrymen, +for example, being everywhere privileged from impressment. The +crews of colliers seem to have enjoyed the privilege by custom +before it was confirmed by Act of Parliament. The naval historian, +Burchett, writing of 1691, cites a 'Proclamation forbidding pressing +men from colliers.' + +Every ship in the coal trade had the following persons protected, +viz. two A.B.'s for every ship of 100 tons, and one for every 50 +tons in larger ships. When we come to consider the sensational +statements in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ of 1803, it will be well to +remember what the penalty for infringing the colliers' privilege +was. By the Act 6 & 7 William III, c. 18, sect. 19, 'Any officer +who presumes to impress any of the above shall forfeit to the +master or owner of such vessel £10 for every man so impressed; +and such officer shall be incapable of holding any place, office, +or employment in any of His Majesty's ships of war.' It is not +likely that the least scrupulous naval officer would make himself +liable to professional ruin as well as to a heavy fine. No parish +apprentice could be impressed for the sea service of the Crown +until he arrived at the age of eighteen (2 & 3 Anne, c. 6, sect. +4). Persons voluntarily binding themselves apprentices to sea +service could not be impressed for three years from the date +of their indentures. Besides sect. 15 of the Act of Anne just +quoted, exemptions were granted, before 1803, by 4 Anne, c. 19; +and 13 George II, c. 17. By the Act last mentioned all persons +fifty-five years of age and under eighteen were exempted, and +every foreigner serving in a ship belonging to a British subject, +and also all persons 'of what age soever who shall use the sea' +for two years, to be computed from the time of their first using +it. A customary exemption was extended to the proportion of the +crew of any ship necessary for her safe navigation. In practice +this must have reduced the numbers liable to impressment to small +dimensions. + +Even when the Admiralty decided to suspend all administrative +exemptions--or, as the phrase was, 'to press from all +protections'--many persons were still exempted. The customary +and statutory exemptions, of course, were unaffected. On the +5th November 1803 their Lordships informed officers in charge +of rendezvous that it was 'necessary for the speedy manning of +H.M. ships to impress all persons of the denominations exprest +in the press-warrant which you have received from us, without +regard to any protections, excepting, however, all such persons +as are protected pursuant to Acts of Parliament, and all others +who by the printed instructions which accompanied the said warrant +are forbidden to be imprest.' In addition to these a long list +of further exemptions was sent. The last in the list included +the crews of 'ships and vessels bound to foreign parts which +are laden and cleared outwards by the proper officers of H.M. +Customs.' It would seem that there was next to no one left liable +to impressment; and it is not astonishing that the Admiralty, as +shown by its action very shortly afterwards, felt that pressing +seamen was a poor way of manning the fleet. + +Though the war which broke out in 1803 was not formally declared +until May, active preparations were begun earlier. The navy had +been greatly reduced since the Peace of Amiens, and as late as +the 2nd December 1802 the House of Commons had voted that '50,000 +seamen be employed for the service of the year 1803, including +12,000 marines.' On the 14th March an additional number was voted. +It amounted to 10,000 men, of whom 2400 were to be marines. Much +larger additions were voted a few weeks later. The total increase +was 50,000 men; viz. 39,600 seamen and 10,400 marines. It never +occurred to anyone that forcible recruiting would be necessary +in the case of the marines, though the establishment of the corps +was to be nearly doubled, as it had to be brought up to 22,400 +from 12,000. Attention may be specially directed to this point. +The marine formed an integral part of a man-of-war's crew just as +the seamen did. He received no better treatment than the latter; +and as regards pecuniary remuneration, prospects of advancement, +and hope of attaining to the position of warrant officer, was, on +the whole, in a less favourable position. It seems to have been +universally accepted that voluntary enlistment would prove--as, +in fact, it did prove--sufficient in the case of the marines. +What we have got to see is how far it failed in the case of the +seamen, and how far its deficiencies were made up by compulsion. + +On the 12th March the Admiralty notified the Board of Ordnance that +twenty-two ships of the line--the names of which were stated--were +'coming forward' for sea. Many of these ships are mentioned in +_The_Naval_Chronicle_ as requiring men, and that journal gives +the names of several others of various classes in the same state. +The number altogether is thirty-one. The aggregate complements, +including marines and boys, of these ships amounted to 17,234. +The number of 'seamen' was 11,861, though this included some of +the officers who were borne on the same muster-list. The total +number of seamen actually required exceeded 11,500. The _Naval_ +_Chronicle_ contains a vivid, not to say sensational, account of +the steps taken to raise them. The report from Plymouth, dated +10th March, is as follows: 'Several bodies of Royal Marines in +parties of twelve and fourteen each, with their officers and +naval officers armed, proceeded towards the quays. So secret +were the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the +business on which they were going until they boarded the tier +of colliers at the New Quay, and other gangs the ships in the +Catwater and the Pool, and the gin-shops. A great number of prime +seamen were taken out and sent on board the Admiral's ship. They +also pressed landsmen of all descriptions; and the town looked +as if in a state of siege. At Stonehouse, Mutton Cove, Morris +Town, and in all the receiving and gin-shops at Dock [the present +Devonport] several hundreds of seamen and landsmen were picked +up and sent directly aboard the flag-ship. By the returns last +night it appears that upwards of 400 useful hands were pressed +last night in the Three Towns.... One press-gang entered the +Dock [Devonport] Theatre and cleared the whole gallery except +the women.' The reporter remarks: 'It is said that near 600 men +have been impressed in this neighbourhood.' The number--if +obtained--would not have been sufficient to complete the seamen +in the complements of a couple of line-of-battle ships. Naval +officers who remember the methods of manning ships which lasted +well into the middle of the nineteenth century, and of course long +after recourse to impressment had been given up, will probably +notice the remarkable fact that the reporter makes no mention of +any of the parties whose proceedings he described being engaged +in picking up men who had voluntarily joined ships fitting out, +but had not returned on board on the expiration of the leave +granted them. The description in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ might +be applied to events which--when impressment had ceased for half +a century--occurred over and over again at Portsmouth, Devonport, +and other ports when two or three ships happened to be put in +commission about the same time. + +We shall find that the 600 reported as impressed had to be +considerably reduced before long. The reporter afterwards wisely +kept himself from giving figures, except in a single instance +when he states that 'about forty' were taken out of the flotilla +of Plymouth trawlers. Reporting on 11th March he says that 'Last +Thursday and yesterday'--the day of the sensational report above +given--'several useful hands were picked up, mostly seamen, who +were concealed in the different lodgings and were discovered +by their girls.' He adds, 'Several prime seamen were yesterday +taken disguised as labourers in the different marble quarries +round the town.' On 14th October the report is that 'the different +press-gangs, with their officers, literally scoured the country +on the eastern roads and picked up several fine young fellows.' +Here, again, no distinction is drawn between men really impressed +and men who were arrested for being absent beyond the duration of +their leave. We are told next that 'upon a survey of all impressed +men before three captains and three surgeons of the Royal Navy, +such as were deemed unfit for His Majesty's service, as well as +all apprentices, were immediately discharged,' which, no doubt, +greatly diminished the above-mentioned 600. + +The reporter at Portsmouth begins his account of the 'press' +at that place by saying, 'They indiscriminately took every man +on board the colliers.' In view of what we know of the heavy +penalties to which officers who pressed more than a certain +proportion of a collier's crew were liable, we may take it that +this statement was made in error. On 14th March it was reported +that 'the constables and gangs from the ships continue very alert +in obtaining seamen, many of whom have been sent on board different +ships in the harbour this day.' We do not hear again from Portsmouth +till May, on the 7th of which month it was reported that 'about 700 +men were obtained.' On the 8th the report was that 'on Saturday +afternoon the gates of the town were shut and soldiers placed at +every avenue. Tradesmen were taken from their shops and sent on +board the ships in the harbour or placed in the guard-house for +the night, till they could be examined. If fit for His Majesty's +service they were kept, if in trade set at liberty.' The 'tradesmen,' +then, if really taken, were taken simply to be set free again. +As far as the reports first quoted convey any trustworthy +information, it appears that at Portsmouth and Plymouth during +March, April, and the first week of May, 1340 men were 'picked +up,' and that of these many were immediately discharged. How +many of the 1340 were not really impressed, but were what in +the navy are called 'stragglers,' i.e. men over-staying their +leave of absence, is not indicated. + +_The_Times_ of the 11th March 1803, and 9th May 1803, also contained +reports of the impressment operations. It says: 'The returns to +the Admiralty of the seamen impressed (apparently at the Thames +ports) on Tuesday night amounted to 1080, of whom no less than +two-thirds are considered prime hands. At Portsmouth, Portsea, +Gosport, and Cowes a general press took place the same night.... +Upwards of 600 seamen were collected in consequence of the +promptitude of the measures adopted.' It was added that the +Government 'relied upon increasing our naval forces with 10,000 +seamen, either volunteers or impressed men, in less than a +fortnight.' The figures show us how small a proportion of the +10,000 was even alleged to be made up of impressed men. A later +_Times_ report is that: 'The impress on Saturday, both above and +below the bridge, was the hottest that has been for some time. +The boats belonging to the ships at Deptford were particularly +active, and it is supposed they obtained upwards of 200 men.' _The_ +_Times_ reports thus account for 1280 men over and above the +1340 stated to have been impressed at Plymouth and Portsmouth, +thus making a grand total of 2620. It will be proved by official +figures directly that the last number was an over-estimate. + +Before going farther, attention may be called to one or two points +in connection with the above reports. The increase in the number +of seamen voted by Parliament in March was 7600. The reports of +the impressment operations only came down to May. It was not +till the 11th June that Parliament voted a further addition to the +navy of 32,000 seamen. Yet whilst the latter great increase was +being obtained--for obtained it was--the reporters are virtually +silent as to the action of the press-gang. We must ask ourselves, +if we could get 32,000 additional seamen with so little recourse +to impressment that the operations called for no special notice, +how was it that compulsion was necessary when only 7600 men were +wanted? The question is all the more pertinent when we recall +the state of affairs in the early part of 1803. + +The navy had been greatly reduced in the year before, the men +voted having diminished from 100,000 to 56,000. What became of +the 44,000 men not required, of whom about 35,000 must have been +of the seaman class and have been discharged from the service? +There was a further reduction of 6000, to take effect in the +beginning of 1803. Sir Sydney Smith, at that time a Member of +Parliament, in the debate of the 2nd December 1802, 'expressed +considerable regret at the great reductions which were suddenly +made, both in the King's dockyards and in the navy in general. +A prodigious number of men,' he said, 'had been thus reduced +to the utmost poverty and distress.' He stated that he 'knew, +from his own experience, that what was called an ordinary seaman +could hardly find employment at present, either in the King's or +in the merchants' service.' The increase of the fleet in March +must have seemed a godsend to thousands of men-of-war's men. If +there was any holding back on their part, it was due, no doubt, +to an expectation--which the sequel showed to be well founded--that +a bounty would be given to men joining the navy. + +The muster-book of a man-of-war is the official list of her crew. +It contains the name of every officer and man in the complement. +Primarily it was an account-book, as it contains entries of the +payments made to each person whose name appears in it. At the +beginning of the nineteenth century it was usual to make out +a fresh muster-book every two months, though that period was +not always exactly adhered to. Each new book was a copy of the +preceding one, with the addition of the names of persons who had +joined the ship since the closing of the latter. Until the ship +was paid off and thus put out of commission--or, in the case of a +very long commission, until 'new books' were ordered to be opened +so as to escape the inconveniences due to the repetition of large +numbers of entries--the name of every man that had belonged to her +remained on the list, his disposal--if no longer in the ship--being +noted in the proper column. One column was headed 'Whence, and +whether prest or not?' In this was noted his former ship, or the +fact of his being entered direct from the shore, which answered +to the question 'Whence?' There is reason to believe that the +muster-book being, as above said, primarily an account-book, the +words 'whether prest or not' were originally placed at the head +of the column so that it might be noted against each man entered +whether he had been paid 'prest-money' or not. However this may +be, the column at the beginning of the nineteenth century was +used for a record of the circumstances of the man's entering the +ship, whether he had been transferred from another, had joined +as a volunteer from the shore, or had been impressed. + +I have examined the muster-book of every ship mentioned in the +Admiralty letter to the Board of Ordnance above referred to, +and also of the ships mentioned in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ as +fitting out in the early part of 1803. There are altogether +thirty-three ships; but two of them, the _Utrecht_ and the +_Gelykheid_, were used as temporary receiving ships for newly +raised men.[61] The names on their lists are, therefore, merely +those of men who were passed on to other ships, in whose muster-books +they appeared again. There remained thirty-one ships which, as +far as could be ascertained, account for the additional force +which the Government had decided to put in commission, more than +two-thirds of them being ships of the line. As already stated, +their total complements amounted to 17,234, and the number of the +'blue-jackets' of full age to at least 11,500. The muster-books +appear to have been kept with great care. The only exception +seems to be that of the _Victory_, in which there is some reason +to think the number of men noted as 'prest' has been over-stated +owing to an error in copying the earlier book. Ships in 1803 +did not get their full crews at once, any more than they did +half a century later. I have, therefore, thought it necessary +to take the muster-books for the months in which the crews had +been brought up to completion. + +[Footnote 61: The words 'recruit' and 'enlist,' except as regards +marines, are unknown in the navy, in which they are replaced by +'raise' and 'enter.'] + +An examination of the books would be likely to dispel many +misconceptions about the old navy. Not only is it noted against +each man's name whether he was 'pressed' or a volunteer, it is +also noted if he was put on board ship as an alternative to +imprisonment on shore, this being indicated by the words 'civil +power,' an expression still used in the navy, but with a different +meaning. The percentage of men thus 'raised' was small. Sometimes +there is a note stating that the man had been allowed to enter +from the '----shire Militia.' A rare note is 'Brought on board +by soldiers,' which most likely indicated that the man had been +recaptured when attempting to desert. It is sometimes asserted +that many men who volunteered did so only to escape impressment. +This may be so; but it should be said that there are frequent +notations against the names of 'prest' men that they afterwards +volunteered. This shows the care that was taken to ascertain the +real conditions on which a man entered the service. For the purposes +of this inquiry all these men have been considered as impressed, +and they have not been counted amongst the volunteers. It is, +perhaps, permissible to set off against such men the number of +those who allowed themselves to be impressed to escape inconveniences +likely to be encountered if they remained at home. Of two John +Westlakes, ordinary seamen of the _Boadicea_, one--John (I.)--was +'prest,' but was afterwards 'taken out of the ship for a debt +of twenty pounds'; which shows that he had preferred to trust +himself to the press-gang rather than to his creditors. Without +being unduly imaginative, we may suppose that in 1803 there were +heroes who preferred being 'carried off' to defend their country +afloat to meeting the liabilities of putative paternity in their +native villages. + +The muster-books examined cover several months, during which +many 'prest' men were discharged and some managed to desert, +so that the total was never present at anyone time. That total +amounts to 1782. It is certain that even this is larger than +the reality, because it has been found impossible--without an +excessive expenditure of time and labour--to trace the cases +of men being sent from one ship to another, and thus appearing +twice over, or oftener, as 'prest' men. As an example of this +the _Minotaur_ may be cited. Out of twenty names on one page of +her muster-book thirteen are those of 'prest' men discharged to +other ships. The discharges from the _Victory_ were numerous; and +the _Ardent_, which was employed in keeping up communication with +the ships off Brest, passed men on to the latter when required. I +have, however, made no deductions from the 'prest' total to meet +these cases. We can see that not more than 1782 men, and probably +considerably fewer, were impressed to meet the increase of the +navy during the greater part of 1803. Admitting that there were +cases of impressment from merchant vessels abroad to complete +the crews of our men-of-war in distant waters, the total number +impressed--including these latter--could not have exceeded greatly +the figures first given. We know that owing to the reduction of +1802, as stated by Sir Sydney Smith, the seamen were looking +for ships rather than the ships for seamen. It seems justifiable +to infer that the whole number of impressed men on any particular +day did not exceed, almost certainly did not amount to, 2000. If +they had been spread over the whole navy they would not have made +2 per cent. of the united complements of the ships; and, as it was, +did not equal one-nineteenth of the 39,600 seamen ('blue-jackets') +raised to complete the navy to the establishment sanctioned by +Parliament. A system under which more than 37,000 volunteers +come forward to serve and less than 2000 men are obtained by +compulsion cannot be properly called compulsory. + +The Plymouth reporter of _The_Naval_Chronicle_ does not give +many details of the volunteering for the navy in 1803, though +he alludes to it in fluent terms more than once. On the 11th +October, however, he reports that, 'So many volunteer seamen +have arrived here this last week that upwards of £4000 bounty is +to be paid them afloat by the Paying Commissioner, Rear-Admiral +Dacres.' At the time the bounty was £2 10s. for an A.B., £1 10s. +for an ordinary seaman, and £1 for a landsman. Taking only £4000 +as the full amount paid, and assuming that the three classes were +equally represented, three men were obtained for every £5, or +2400 in all, a number raised in about a week, that may be compared +with that given as resulting from impressment. In reality, the +number of volunteers must have been larger, because the A.B.'s +were fewer than the other classes. + +Some people may be astonished because the practice of impressment, +which had proved to be so utterly inefficient, was not at once +and formally given up. No astonishment will be felt by those +who are conversant with the habits of Government Departments. In +every country public officials evince great and, indeed, almost +invincible reluctance to give up anything, whether it be a material +object or an administrative process, which they have once possessed +or conducted. One has only to stroll through the arsenals of the +world, or glance at the mooring-grounds of the maritime states, +to see to what an extent the passion for retaining the obsolete +and useless holds dominion over the official mind. A thing may +be known to be valueless--its retention may be proved to be +mischievous--yet proposals to abandon it will be opposed and +defeated. It is doubtful if any male human being over forty was +ever converted to a new faith of any kind. The public has to +wait until the generation of administrative Conservatives has +either passed away or been outnumbered by those acquainted only +with newer methods. Then the change is made; the certainty, +nevertheless, being that the new men in their turn will resist +improvements as obstinately and in exactly the same way as their +predecessors. + +To be just to the Board of Admiralty of 1803, it must be admitted +that some of its members seem to have lost faith in the efficacy of +impressment as a system of manning the navy. The Lords Commissioners +of that date could hardly--all of them, at any rate--have been so +thoroughly destitute of humour as not to suspect that seizing +a few score of men here and a few there when tens of thousands +were needed, was a very insufficient compensation for the large +correspondence necessitated by adherence to the system (and still +in existence). Their Lordships actively bombarded the Home Office +with letters pointing out, for example, that a number of British +seamen at Guernsey 'appeared to have repaired to that island with +a view to avoid being pressed'; that they were 'of opinion that +it would be highly proper that the sea-faring men (in Jersey as +well as Guernsey), not natives nor settled inhabitants, should +be impressed'; that when the captain of H.M.S. _Aigle_ had landed +at Portland 'for the purpose of raising men' some resistance +had 'been made by the sailors'; and dealing with other subjects +connected with the system. A complaint sent to the War Department +was that 'amongst a number of men lately impressed (at Leith) +there were eight or ten shipwrights who were sea-faring men, and +had been claimed as belonging to a Volunteer Artillery Corps.' + +We may suspect that there was some discussion at Whitehall as to +the wisdom of retaining a plan which caused so much inconvenience +and had such poor results. The conclusion seems to have been to +submit it to a searching test. The coasts of the United Kingdom +were studded with stations--thirty-seven generally, but the number +varied--for the entry of seamen. The ordinary official description +of these--as shown by entries in the muster-books--was 'rendezvous'; +but other terms were used. It has often been thought that they were +simply impressment offices. The fact is that many more men were +raised at these places by volunteering than by impressment. The +rendezvous, as a rule, were in charge of captains or commanders, +some few being entrusted to lieutenants. The men attached to each +were styled its 'gang,' a word which conveys no discredit in +nautical language. On 5th November 1803 the Admiralty sent to +the officers in charge of rendezvous the communication already +mentioned--to press men 'without regard to any protections,'--the +exceptions, indeed, being so many that the officers must have +wondered who could legitimately be taken. + +The order at first sight appeared sweeping enough. It contained +the following words: 'Whereas we think fit that a general press +from all protections as above mentioned shall commence at London +and in the neighbourhood thereof on the night of Monday next, +the 7th instant, you are therefore (after taking the proper +preparatory measures with all possible secrecy) hereby required +to impress and to give orders to the lieutenants under your command +to impress all persons of the above-mentioned denominations (except +as before excepted) and continue to do so until you receive orders +from us to the contrary.' As it was addressed to officers in +all parts of the United Kingdom, the 'general press' was not +confined to London and its neighbourhood, though it was to begin +in the capital. + +Though returns of the numbers impressed have not been discovered, +we have strong evidence that this 'general press,' notwithstanding +the secrecy with which it had been arranged, was a failure. On +the 6th December 1803, just a month after it had been tried, the +Admiralty formulated the following conclusion: 'On a consideration +of the expense attending the service of raising men on shore for +His Majesty's Fleet comparatively with the number procured, as +well as from other circumstances, there is reason to believe that +either proper exertions have not been made by some of the officers +employed on that service, or that there have been great abuses +and mismanagement in the expenditure of the public money.' This +means that it was now seen that impressment, though of little +use in obtaining men for the navy, was a very costly arrangement. +The Lords of the Admiralty accordingly ordered that 'the several +places of rendezvous should be visited and the conduct of the +officers employed in carrying out the above-mentioned service +should be inquired into on the spot.' Rear-Admiral Arthur Phillip, +the celebrated first Governor of New South Wales, was ordered +to make the inquiry. This was the last duty in which that +distinguished officer was employed, and his having been selected +for it appears to have been unknown to all his biographers. + +It is not surprising that after this the proceedings of the +press-gang occupy scarcely any space in our naval history. Such +references to them as there are will be found in the writings +of the novelist and the dramatist. Probably individual cases +of impressment occurred till nearly the end of the Great War; +but they could not have been many. Compulsory service most +unnecessarily caused--not much, but still some--unjustifiable +personal hardship. It tended to stir up a feeling hostile to +the navy. It required to work it machinery costly out of all +proportion to the results obtained. Indeed, it failed completely +to effect what had been expected of it. In the great days of old +our fleet, after all, was manned, not by impressed men, but by +volunteers. It was largely due to that that we became masters +of the sea. + + + + + +VI + +PROJECTED INVASIONS OF THE BRITISH ISLES[62] + +[Footnote 62: Written in 1900. (_The_Times_.)] + +The practice to which we have become accustomed of late, of +publishing original documents relating to naval and military +history, has been amply justified by the results. These meet +the requirements of two classes of readers. The publications +satisfy, or at any rate go far towards satisfying, the wishes +of those who want to be entertained, and also of those whose +higher motive is a desire to discover the truth about notable +historical occurrences. Putting the public in possession of the +materials, previously hidden in more or less inaccessible +muniment-rooms and record offices, with which the narratives of +professed historians have been constructed, has had advantages +likely to become more and more apparent as time goes on. It acts +as a check upon the imaginative tendencies which even eminent +writers have not always been able, by themselves, to keep under +proper control. The certainty, nay the mere probability, that +you will be confronted with the witnesses on whose evidence you +profess to have relied--the 'sources' from which your story is +derived--will suggest the necessity of sobriety of statement and +the advisability of subordinating rhetoric to veracity. Had the +contemporary documents been available for an immediate appeal to +them by the reading public, we should long ago have rid ourselves +of some dangerous superstitions. We should have abandoned our +belief in the fictions that the Armada of 1588 was defeated by the +weather, and that the great Herbert of Torrington was a lubber, +a traitor, and a coward. It is not easy to calculate the benefit +that we should have secured, had the presentation of some important +events in the history of our national defence been as accurate as +it was effective. Enormous sums of money have been wasted in trying +to make our defensive arrangements square with a conception of +history based upon misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts. +Pecuniary extravagance is bad enough; but there is a greater evil +still. We have been taught to cherish, and we have been reluctant +to abandon, a false standard of defence, though adherence to +such a standard can be shown to have brought the country within +measurable distance of grievous peril. Captain Duro, of the Spanish +Navy, in his 'Armada Invencible,' placed within our reach +contemporary evidence from the side of the assailants, thereby +assisting us to form a judgment on a momentous episode in naval +history. The evidence was completed; some being adduced from +the other side, by our fellow-countryman Sir J. K. Laughton, in +his 'Defeat of the Spanish Armada,' published by the Navy Records +Society. Others have worked on similar lines; and a healthier view +of our strategic conditions and needs is more widely held than +it was; though it cannot be said to be, even yet, universally +prevalent. Superstition, even the grossest, dies hard. + +Something deeper than mere literary interest, therefore, is to +be attributed to a work which has recently appeared in Paris.[63] +To speak strictly, it should be said that only the first volume of +three which will complete it has been published. It is, however, +in the nature of a work of the kind that its separate parts should +be virtually independent of each other. Consequently the volume +which we now have may be treated properly as a book by itself. +When completed the work is to contain all the documents relating +to the French preparations during the period 1793-1805, for taking +the offensive against England (_tous_les_documents_se_rapportant_ +_à _la_préparation_de_l'offensive_contre_l'Angleterre_). +The search for, the critical examination and the methodical +classification of, the papers were begun in October 1898. The +book is compiled by Captain Desbrière, of the French Cuirassiers, +who was specially authorised to continue his editorial labours +even after he had resumed his ordinary military duties. It bears +the _imprimatur_ of the staff of the army; and its preface is +written by an officer who was--and so signs himself--chief of +the historical section of that department. There is no necessity +to criticise the literary execution of the work. What is wanted +is to explain the nature of its contents and to indicate the +lessons which may be drawn from them. Nevertheless, attention +may be called to a curious misreading of history contained in +the preface. In stating the periods which the different volumes +of the book are to cover, the writer alludes to the Peace of +Amiens, which, he affirms, England was compelled to accept by +exhaustion, want of means of defence, and fear of the menaces of +the great First Consul then disposing of the resources of France, +aggrandised, pacified, and reinforced by alliances. The book being +what it is and coming whence it does, such a statement ought not +to be passed over. 'The desire for peace,' says an author so +easily accessible as J. R. Green, 'sprang from no sense of national +exhaustion. On the contrary, wealth had never increased so fast.... +Nor was there any ground for despondency in the aspect of the +war itself.' This was written in 1875 by an author so singularly +free from all taint of Chauvinism that he expressly resolved that +his work 'should never sink into a drum and trumpet history.' A +few figures will be interesting and, it may be added, conclusive. +Between 1793 when the war began and 1802 when the Peace of Amiens +interrupted it, the public income of Great Britain increased from +£16,382,000 to £28,000,000, the war taxes not being included +in the latter sum. The revenue of France, notwithstanding her +territorial acquisitions, sank from £18,800,000 to £18,000,000. +The French exports and imports by sea were annihilated; whilst +the British exports were doubled and the imports increased more +than 50 per cent. The French Navy had at the beginning 73, at +the end of the war 39, ships of the line; the British began the +contest with 135 and ended it with 202. Even as regards the army, +the British force at the end of the war was not greatly inferior +numerically to the French. It was, however, much scattered, being +distributed over the whole British Empire. In view of the question +under discussion, no excuse need be given for adducing these +facts. + +[Footnote 63: 1793-1805. _Projets_et_Tentatives_de_Débarquement_ +_aux_Iles_Britanniques_, par Édouard Desbrière, Capitaine breveté +aux 1er Cuirassiers. Paris, Chapelot et Cie. 1900. (Publié sous la +direction de la section historique de l'État-Major de l'Armée.)] + +Captain Desbrière in the present volume carries his collection +of documents down to the date at which the then General Bonaparte +gave up his connection with the flotilla that was being equipped +in the French Channel ports, and prepared to take command of +the expedition to Egypt. The volume therefore, in addition to +accounts of many projected, but never really attempted, descents +on the British Isles, gives a very complete history of Hoche's +expedition to Ireland; of the less important, but curious, descent +in Cardigan Bay known as the Fishguard, or Fishgard, expedition; +and of the formation of the first 'Army of England,' a designation +destined to attain greater celebrity in the subsequent war, when +France was ruled by the great soldier whom we know as the Emperor +Napoleon. The various documents are connected by Captain Desbrière +with an explanatory commentary, and here and there are illustrated +with notes. He has not rested content with the publication of +MSS. selected from the French archives. In preparing his book he +visited England and examined our records; and, besides, he has +inserted in their proper place passages from Captain Mahan's works +and also from those of English authors. The reader's interest in +the book is likely to be almost exclusively concentrated on the +detailed, and, where Captain Desbrière's commentary appears, +lucid, account of Hoche's expedition. Of course, the part devoted +to the creation of the 'Army of England' is not uninteresting; +but it is distinctly less so than the part relating to the +proceedings of Hoche. Several of the many plans submitted by +private persons, who here describe them in their own words, are +worth examination; and some, it may be mentioned, are amusing +in the _naïveté_ of their Anglophobia and in their obvious +indifference to the elementary principles of naval strategy. +In this indifference they have some distinguished companions. + +We are informed by Captain Desbrière that the idea of a hostile +descent on England was during a long time much favoured in France. +The national archives and those of the Ministries of War and +of Marine are filled with proposals for carrying it out, some +dating back to 1710. Whether emanating from private persons or +formulated in obedience to official direction, there are certain +features in all the proposals so marked that we are able to classify +the various schemes by grouping together those of a similar +character. In one class may be placed all those which aimed at +mere annoyance, to be effected by landing small bodies of men, not +always soldiers, to do as much damage as possible. The appearance +of these at many different points, it was believed, would so +harass the English that they would end the war, or at least so +divide their forces that their subjection might be looked for +with confidence. In another class might be placed proposals to +seize outlying, out not distant, British territory--the Channel +Islands or the Isle of Wight, for example. A third class might +comprise attempts on a greater scale, necessitating the employment +of a considerable body of troops and meriting the designation +'Invasion.' Some of these attempts were to be made in Great Britain, +some in Ireland. In every proposal for an attempt of this class, +whether it was to be made in Great Britain or in Ireland, it +was assumed that the invaders would receive assistance from the +people of the country invaded. Indeed, generally the bulk of the +force to be employed was ultimately to be composed of native +sympathisers, who were also to provide--at least at the +beginning--all the supplies and transport, both vehicles and +animals, required. Every plan, no matter to which class it might +belong, was based upon the assumption that the British naval +force could be avoided. Until we come to the time when General +Bonaparte, as he then was, dissociated himself from the first +'Army of England,' there is no trace, in any of the documents +now printed, of a belief in the necessity of obtaining command +of the sea before sending across it a considerable military +expedition. That there was such a thing as the command of the sea +is rarely alluded to; and when it is, it is merely to accentuate +the possibility of neutralising it by evading the force holding +it. There is something which almost deserves to be styled comical +in the absolutely unvarying confidence, alike of amateurs and +highly placed military officers, with which it was held that +a superior naval force was a thing that might be disregarded. +Generals who would have laughed to scorn anyone maintaining that, +though there was a powerful Prussian army on the road to one city +and an Austrian army on the road to the other, a French army +might force its way to either Berlin or Vienna without either +fighting or even being prepared to fight, such generals never +hesitated to approve expeditions obliged to traverse a region +in the occupation of a greatly superior force, the region being +pelagic and the force naval. We had seized the little islands +of St. Marcoff, a short distance from the coast of Normandy, +and held them for years. It was expressly admitted that their +recapture was impossible, 'à raison de la supériorité des forces +navales Anglaises'; but it was not even suspected that a much +more difficult operation, requiring longer time and a longer +voyage, was likely to be impracticable. We shall see by and by +how far this remarkable attitude of mind was supported by the +experience of Hoche's expedition to Ireland. + +Hoche himself was the inventor of a plan of harassing the English +enemy which long remained in favour. He proposed to organise what +was called a _Chouannerie_ in England. As that country had no +_Chouans_ of her own, the want was to be supplied by sending over +an expedition composed of convicts. Hoche's ideas were approved +and adopted by the eminent Carnot. The plan, to which the former +devoted great attention, was to land on the coast of Wales from +1000 to 1200 _forçats_, to be commanded by a certain Mascheret, +of whom Hoche wrote that he was 'le plus mauvais sujet dont on +puisse purger la France.' In a plan accepted and forwarded by +Hoche, it was laid down that the band, on reaching the enemy's +country, was, if possible, not to fight, but to pillage; each man +was to understand that he was sent to England to steal 100,000f., +'pour ensuite finir sa carrière tranquillement dans l'aisance,' +and was to be informed that he would receive a formal pardon from +the French Government. The plan, extraordinary as it was, was +one of the few put into execution. The famous Fishguard Invasion +was carried out by some fourteen hundred convicts commanded by an +American adventurer named Tate. The direction to avoid fighting +was exactly obeyed by Colonel Tate and the armed criminals under +his orders. He landed in Cardigan Bay from a small squadron of +French men-of-war at sunset on the 22nd February 1797; and, on the +appearance of Lord Cawdor with the local Yeomanry and Militia, asked +to be allowed to surrender on the 24th. At a subsequent exchange +of prisoners the French authorities refused to receive any of the +worthies who had accompanied Tate. At length 512 were allowed to +land; but were imprisoned in the forts of Cherbourg. The French +records contain many expressions of the dread experienced by the +inhabitants of the coast lest the English should put on shore in +France the malefactors whom they had captured at Fishguard. + +A more promising enterprise was that in which it was decided to +obtain the assistance of the Dutch, at the time in possession of +a considerable fleet. The Dutch fleet was to put to sea with the +object of engaging the English. An army of 15,000 was then to be +embarked in the ports of Holland, and was to effect a diversion in +favour of another and larger body, which, starting from France, was +to land in Ireland, repeating the attempt of Hoche in December 1796, +which will be dealt with later on. The enterprise was frustrated +by the action of Admiral Duncan, who decisively defeated the Dutch +fleet off Camperdown in October. It might have been supposed +that this would have driven home the lesson that no considerable +military expedition across the water has any chance of success +till the country sending it has obtained command of the sea; but +it did not. To Bonaparte the event was full of meaning; but no +other French soldier seems to have learned it--if we may take +Captain Desbrière's views as representative--even down to the +present day. On the 23rd February 1798 Bonaparte wrote: 'Opérer une +descente en Angleterre sans être maître de la mer est l'opération +la plus hardie et la plus difficile qui ait été faite.' There has +been much speculation as to the reasons which induced Bonaparte +to quit the command of the 'Army of England' after holding it +but a short time, and after having devoted great attention to +its organisation and proposed methods of transport across the +Channel. The question is less difficult than it has appeared +to be to many. One of the foremost men in France, Bonaparte was +ready to take the lead in any undertaking which seemed likely +to have a satisfactory ending--an ending which would redound +to the glory of the chief who conducted it. The most important +operation contemplated was the invasion of England; and--now that +Hoche was no more--Bonaparte might well claim to lead it. His +penetrating insight soon enabled him to see its impracticability +until the French had won the command of the Channel. Of that +there was not much likelihood; and at the first favourable moment +he dissociated himself from all connection with an enterprise +which offered so little promise of a successful termination that +it was all but certain not to be begun. An essential condition, +as already pointed out, of all the projected invasions was the +receipt of assistance from sympathisers in the enemy's country. +Hoche himself expected this even in Tate's case; but experience +proved the expectation to be baseless. When the prisoners taken +with Tate were being conducted to their place of confinement, +the difficulty was to protect them, 'car la population furieuse +contre les Français voulait les lyncher.' Captain Desbrière dwells +at some length on the mutinies in the British fleet in 1797, and +asks regretfully, 'Qu'avait-on fait pour profiter de cette chance +unique?' He remarks on the undoubted and really lamentable fact +that English historians have usually paid insufficient attention +to these occurrences. One, and perhaps the principal reason of their +silence, was the difficulty, at all events till quite lately, of +getting materials with which to compose a narrative. The result is +that the real character of the great mutinies has been altogether +misunderstood. Lord Camperdown's recently published life of his +great ancestor, Lord Duncan, has done something to put them in +their right light. As regards defence against the enemy, the +mutinies affected the security of the country very little. The +seamen always expressed their determination to do their duty if +the enemy put to sea. Even at the Nore they conspicuously displayed +their general loyalty; and, as a matter of fact, discipline had +regained its sway some time before the expedition preparing in +Holland was ready. How effectively the crews of the ships not +long before involved in the mutiny could fight, was proved at +Camperdown. + +Though earlier in date than the events just discussed, the celebrated +first expedition to Ireland has been intentionally left out of +consideration till now. As to the general features of the +undertaking, and even some of its more important details, the +documents now published add little to our knowledge. The literature +of the expedition is large, and Captain Chevalier had given us an +admirable account of it in his 'Histoire de la Marine Française +sous la première République.' The late Vice-Admiral Colomb submitted +it to a most instructive examination in the _Journal_of_the_ +_Royal_United_Service_Institution_ for January 1892. We can, +however, learn something from Captain Desbrière's collection. +The perusal suggests, or indeed compels, the conclusion that the +expedition was doomed to failure from the start. It had no money, +stores, or means of transport. There was no hope of finding these +in a country like the south-western corner of Ireland. Grouchy's +decision not to land the troops who had reached Bantry Bay was +no doubt dictated in reality by a perception of this; and by +the discovery that, even if he got on shore, sympathisers with him +would be practically non-existent. On reading the letters now made +public, one is convinced of Hoche's unfitness for the leadership +of such an enterprise. The adoration of mediocrities is confined +to no one cult and to no one age. Hoche's canonisation, for he +is a prominent saint in the Republican calendar, was due not so +much to what he did as to what he did not do. He did not hold the +supreme command in La Vendée till the most trying period of the +war was past. He did not continue the cruelties of the Jacobin +emissaries in the disturbed districts; but then his pacificatory +measures were taken when the spirit of ferocity which caused the +horrors of the _noyades_ and of the Terror had, even amongst +the mob of Paris, burnt itself out. He did not overthrow a +constitutional Government and enslave his country as Bonaparte +did; and, therefore, he is favourably compared with the latter, +whose opportunities he did not have. His letters show him to have +been an adept in the art of traducing colleagues behind their +backs. In writing he called Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse 'perfide,' +and spoke of his 'mauvaise foi.' He had a low opinion of General +Humbert, whom he bracketed with Mascheret. Grouchy, he said, was +'un inconséquent paperassier,' and General Vaillant 'un misérable +ivrogne.' He was placed in supreme command of the naval as well as +of the military forces, and was allowed to select the commander +of the former. Yet he and his nominee were amongst the small +fraction of the expeditionary body which never reached a place +where disembarkation was possible. + +Notwithstanding all this, the greater part of the fleet, and +of the troops conveyed by it, did anchor in Bantry Bay without +encountering an English man-of-war; and a large proportion continued +in the Bay, unmolested by our navy, for more than a fortnight. Is +not this, it may be asked, a sufficient refutation of those who +hold that command of the sea gives security against invasion? +As a matter of fact, command of the sea--even in the case in +question--did prevent invasion from being undertaken, still more +from being carried through, on a scale likely to be very formidable. +The total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom +633 were lost, owing to steps taken to avoid the hostile navy, +before the expedition had got fully under way. It is not necessary +to rate Hoche's capacity very highly in order to understand that +he, who had seen something of war on a grand scale, would not +have committed himself to the command of so small a body, without +cavalry, without means of transport on land, without supplies, with +but an insignificant artillery and that not furnished with horses, +and, as was avowed, without hope of subsequent reinforcement or +of open communications with its base--that he would not have +staked his reputation on the fate of a body so conditioned, if +he had been permitted by the naval conditions of the case to lead +a larger, more effectually organised, and better supplied army. +The commentary supplied by Captain Desbrière to the volume under +notice discloses his opinion that the failure of the expedition +to Ireland was due to the inefficiency of the French Navy. He +endeavours to be scrupulously fair to his naval fellow-countrymen; +but his conviction is apparent. It hardly admits of doubt that this +view has generally been, and still is, prevalent in the French +Army. Foreign soldiers of talent and experience generalise from +this as follows: Let them but have the direction of the naval +as well as of the military part of an expedition, and the invasion +of England must be successful. The complete direction which they +would like is exactly what Hoche did have. He chose the commander +of the fleet, and also chose or regulated the choice of the junior +flag officers and several of the captains. Admiral Morard de +Galles was not, and did not consider himself, equal to the task +for which Hoche's favour had selected him. His letter pointing +out his own disqualifications has a striking resemblance to the +one written by Medina Sidonia in deprecation of his appointment +in place of Santa Cruz. Nevertheless, the French naval officers +did succeed in conveying the greater part of the expeditionary +army to a point at which disembarkation was practicable. + +Now we have some lessons to learn from this. The advantages conferred +by command of the sea must be utilised intelligently; and it +was bad management which permitted an important anchorage to +remain for more than a fortnight in the hands of an invading +force. We need not impute to our neighbours a burning desire to +invade us; but it is a becoming exercise of ordinary strategic +precaution to contemplate preparations for repelling what, as a +mere military problem, they consider still feasible. No amount +of naval superiority will ever ensure every part of our coast +against incursions like that of Tate and his gaol-birds. Naval +superiority, however, will put in our hands the power of preventing +the arrival of an army strong enough to carry out a real invasion. +The strength of such an army will largely depend upon the amount of +mobile land force of which we can dispose. Consequently, defence +against invasion, even of an island, is the duty of a land army +as well as of a fleet. The more important part may, in our case, +be that of the latter; but the services of the former cannot be +dispensed with. The best method of utilising those services calls +for much thought. In 1798, when the 'First Army of England' menaced +us from the southern coast of the Channel, it was reported to our +Government that an examination of the plans formerly adopted for +frustrating intended invasions showed the advantage of troubling +the enemy in his own home and not waiting till he had come to +injure us in ours. + + + + +VII + +OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND[64] + +[Footnote 64: Written in 1906. (_The_Morning_Post_.)] + +It has been contended that raids by 'armaments with 1000, 20,000, +and 50,000 men on board respectively' have succeeded in evading +'our watching and chasing fleets,' and that consequently invasion +of the British Isles on a great scale is not only possible but +fairly practicable, British naval predominance notwithstanding. +I dispute the accuracy of the history involved in the allusions +to the above-stated figures. The number of men comprised in a +raiding or invading expedition is the number that is or can be +put on shore. The crews of the transports are not included in +it. In the cases alluded to, Humbert's expedition was to have +numbered 82 officers and 1017 other ranks, and 984 were put on +shore in Killala Bay. Though the round number, 1000, represents +this figure fairly enough, there was a 10 per cent. shrinkage +from the original embarkation strength. In Hoche's expedition +the total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom +633 were lost before the expedition had got clear of its port of +starting, and of the remainder only a portion reached Ireland. +General Bonaparte landed in Egypt not 50,000 men, but about 36,000. +In the expeditions of Hoche and Humbert it was not expected that +the force to be landed would suffice of itself, the belief being +that it would be joined in each case by a large body of adherents +in the raided country. Outside the ranks of the 'extremists of the +dinghy school'--whose number is unknown and is almost certainly +quite insignificant--no one asserts or ever has asserted that raids +in moderate strength are not possible even in the face of a strong +defending navy. It is a fact that the whole of our defence policy +for many generations has been based upon an admission of their +possibility. Captain Mahan's statement of the case has never been +questioned by anyone of importance. It is as follows: 'The control +of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single +ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross +more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents +upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded +harbours.' It is extraordinary that everyone does not perceive +that if this were not true the 'dinghy school' would be right. +Students of Clausewitz may be expected to remember that the art +of war does not consist in making raids that are unsuccessful; +that war is waged to gain certain great objects; and that the +course of hostilities between two powerful antagonists is affected +little one way or the other by raids even on a considerable scale. + +The Egyptian expedition of 1798 deserves fuller treatment than +it has generally received. The preparations at Toulon and some +Italian ports were known to the British Government. It being +impossible for even a Moltke or--comparative resources being taken +into account--the greater strategist Kodama to know everything +in the mind of an opponent, the sensible proceeding is to guard +against his doing what would be likely to do you most harm. The +British Government had reason to believe that the Toulon expedition +was intended to reinforce at an Atlantic port another expedition +to be directed against the British Isles, or to effect a landing +in Spain with a view to marching into Portugal and depriving our +navy of the use of Lisbon. Either if effected would probably cause +us serious mischief, and arrangements were made to prevent them. A +landing in Egypt was, as the event showed, of little importance. +The threat conveyed by it against our Indian possessions proved +to be an empty one. Upwards of 30,000 hostile troops were locked +up in a country from which they could exercise no influence on +the general course of the war, and in which in the end they had +to capitulate. Suppose that an expedition crossing the North Sea +with the object of invading this country had to content itself +with a landing in Iceland, having eventual capitulation before it, +should we not consider ourselves very fortunate, though it may +have temporarily occupied one of the Shetland Isles _en_route_? +The truth of the matter is that the Egyptian expedition was one of +the gravest of strategical mistakes, and but for the marvellous +subsequent achievements of Napoleon it would have been the typical +example of bad strategy adduced by lecturers and writers on the +art of war for the warning of students. + +The supposition that over-sea raids, even when successful in +part, in any way demonstrate the inefficiency of naval defence +would never be admitted if only land and sea warfare were regarded +as branches of one whole and not as quite distinct things. To be +consistent, those that admit the supposition should also admit that +the practicability of raids demonstrates still more conclusively +the insufficiency of defence by an army. An eminent military writer +has told us that 'a raiding party of 1000 French landed in Ireland +without opposition, after sixteen days of navigation, unobserved +by the British Navy; defeated and drove back the British troops +opposing them on four separate occasions... entirely occupied the +attention of all the available troops of a garrison of Ireland +100,000 strong; penetrated almost to the centre of the island, +and compelled the Lord-Lieutenant to send an urgent requisition +for "as great a reinforcement as possible."' If an inference is to +be drawn from this in the same way as one has been drawn from the +circumstances on the sea, it would follow that one hundred thousand +troops are not sufficient to prevent a raid by one thousand, and +consequently that one million troops would not be sufficient to +prevent one by ten thousand enemies. On this there would arise the +question, If an army a million strong gives no security against +a raid by ten thousand men, is an army worth having? And this +question, be it noted, would come, not from disciples of the +Blue Water School, 'extremist' or other, but from students of +military narrative. + +The truth is that raids are far more common on land than on the +ocean. For every one of the latter it would be possible to adduce +several of the former. Indeed, accounts of raids are amongst +the common-places of military history. There are few campaigns +since the time of that smart cavalry leader Mago, the younger +brother of Hannibal, in which raids on land did not occur or +in which they exercised any decisive influence on the issue of +hostilities. It is only the failure to see the connection between +warfare on land and naval warfare that prevents these land raids +being given the same significance and importance that is usually +given to those carried out across the sea. + +In the year 1809, the year of Wagram, Napoleon's military influence +in Central Germany was, to say the least, not at its lowest. +Yet Colonel Schill, of the Prussian cavalry, with 1200 men, +subsequently increased to 2000 infantry and 12 squadrons, proceeded +to Wittenberg, thence to Magdeburg, and next to Stralsund, which +he occupied and where he met his death in opposing an assault +made by 6000 French troops. He had defied for a month all the +efforts of a large army to suppress him. In the same year the +Duke of Brunswick-Oels and Colonel Dornberg, notwithstanding the +smallness of the force under them, by their action positively +induced Napoleon, only a few weeks before Wagram, to detach the +whole corps of Kellerman, 30,000 strong, which otherwise would +have been called up to the support of the Grande Armée, to the +region in which these enterprising raiders were operating. The +mileage covered by Schill was nearly as great as that covered by +the part of Hoche's expedition which under Grouchy did reach an +Irish port, though it was not landed. Instances of cavalry raids +were frequent in the War of Secession in America. The Federal +Colonel B. H. Grierson, of the 6th Illinois Cavalry, with another +Illinois and an Iowa cavalry regiment, in April 1863 made a raid +which lasted sixteen days, and in which he covered 600 miles of +hostile country, finally reaching Baton Rouge, where a friendly +force was stationed. The Confederate officers, John H. Morgan, +John S. Mosby, and especially N. B. Forrest, were famous for the +extent and daring of their raids. Of all the leaders of important +raids in the War of Secession none surpassed the great Confederate +cavalry General, J. E. B. Stuart, whose riding right round the +imposing Federal army is well known. Yet not one of the raids +above mentioned had any effect on the main course of the war +in which they occurred or on the result of the great conflict. + +In the last war the case was the same. In January 1905, General +Mischenko with 10,000 sabres and three batteries of artillery +marched right round the flank of Marshal Oyama's great Japanese +army, and occupied Niu-chwang--not the treaty port so-called, but +a place not very far from it. For several days he was unmolested, +and in about a week he got back to his friends with a loss which +was moderate in proportion to his numbers. In the following May +Mischenko made another raid, this time round General Nogi's flank. +He had with him fifty squadrons, a horse artillery battery, and a +battery of machine guns. Starting on the 17th, he was discovered +on the 18th, came in contact with his enemy on the 19th, but +met with no considerable hostile force till the 20th, when the +Japanese cavalry arrived just in time to collide with the Russian +rearguard of two squadrons. On this General Mischenko 'retired +at his ease for some thirty miles along the Japanese flank and +perhaps fifteen miles away from it.' These Russians' raids did +not alter the course of the war nor bring ultimate victory to +their standards. + +It would be considered by every military authority as a flagrant +absurdity to deduce from the history of these many raids on land +that a strong army is not a sufficient defence for a continental +country against invasion. What other efficient defence against +that can a continental country have? Apply the reasoning to the +case of an insular country, and reliance on naval defence will +be abundantly justified. + +To maintain that Canada, India, and Egypt respectively could +be invaded by the United States, Russia, and Turkey, backed by +Germany, notwithstanding any action that our navy could take, +would be equivalent to maintaining that one part of our empire +cannot or need not reinforce another. Suppose that we had a military +force numerically equal to or exceeding the Russian, how could any +of it be sent to defend Canada, India, and Egypt, or to reinforce +the defenders of those countries, unless our sea communications +were kept open? Can these be kept open except by the action of +our navy? It is plain that they cannot. + + + + +VIII + +QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HER SEAMEN[65] + +[Footnote 65: Written in 1900. (_Nineteenth_Century_and_After_, +1901.)] + +An eminent writer has recently repeated the accusations made +within the last forty years, and apparently only within that +period, against Queen Elizabeth of having starved the seamen +of her fleet by giving them food insufficient in quantity and +bad in quality, and of having robbed them by keeping them out of +the pay due to them. He also accuses the Queen, though somewhat +less plainly, of having deliberately acquiesced in a wholesale +slaughter of her seamen by remaining still, though no adequate +provision had been made for the care of the sick and wounded. +There are further charges of obstinately objecting, out of mere +stinginess, to take proper measures for the naval defence of the +country, and of withholding a sufficient supply of ammunition +from her ships when about to meet the enemy. Lest it should be +supposed that this is an exaggerated statement of the case against +Elizabeth as formulated by the writer in question, his own words +are given. + +He says: 'Instead of strengthening her armaments to the utmost, +and throwing herself upon her Parliament for aid, she clung to +her moneybags, actually reduced her fleet, withheld ammunition +and the more necessary stores, cut off the sailor's food, did, in +short, everything in her power to expose the country defenceless +to the enemy. The pursuit of the Armada was stopped by the failure +of the ammunition, which, apparently, had the fighting continued +longer, would have been fatal to the English fleet.' + +The writer makes on this the rather mild comment that 'treason +itself could scarcely have done worse.' Why 'scarcely'? Surely +the very blackest treason could not have done worse. He goes +on to ask: 'How were the glorious seamen, whose memory will be +for ever honoured by England and the world, rewarded after their +victory?' + +This is his answer: 'Their wages were left unpaid, they were +docked of their food, and served with poisonous drink, while for +the sick and wounded no hospitals were provided. More of them +were killed by the Queen's meanness than by the enemy.' + +It is safe to challenge the students of history throughout the +world to produce any parallel to conduct so infamous as that +which has thus been imputed to an English queen. If the charges +are true, there is no limit to the horror and loathing with which +we ought to regard Elizabeth. Are they true? That is the question. +I respectfully invite the attention of those who wish to know +the truth and to retain their reverence for a great historical +character, to the following examination of the accusations and of the +foundations on which they rest. It will not, I hope, be considered +presumptuous if I say that--in making this examination--personal +experience of life in the navy sufficiently extensive to embrace +both the present day and the time before the introduction of +the great modern changes in system and naval _matériel_ will be +of great help. Many things which have appeared so extraordinary +to landsmen that they could account for their occurrence only +by assuming that this must have been due to extreme culpability +or extreme folly will be quite familiar to naval officers whose +experience of the service goes back forty years or more, and +can be satisfactorily explained by them. + +There is little reason to doubt that the above-mentioned charges +against the great Queen are based exclusively on statements in +Froude's History. It is remarkable how closely Froude has been +followed by writers treating of Elizabeth and her reign. He was +known to have gone to original documents for the sources of his +narrative; and it seems to have been taken for granted, not only +that his fidelity was above suspicion--an assumption with which I +do not deal now--but also that his interpretation of the meaning +of those who wrote the papers consulted must be correct. Motley, +in his 'History of the United Netherlands,' published in 1860, +had dwelt upon the shortness of ammunition and provisions in +the Channel Fleet commanded by Lord Howard of Effingham; but +he attributed this to bad management on the part of officials, +and not to downright baseness on that of Elizabeth. + +Froude has placed beyond doubt his determination to make the Queen +responsible for all shortcomings. + +'The Queen,' he says, 'has taken upon herself the detailed +arrangement of everything. She and she alone was responsible. +She had extended to the dockyards the same hard thrift with which +she had pared down her expenses everywhere. She tied the ships to +harbour by supplying the stores in driblets. She allowed rations +but for a month, and permitted no reserves to be provided in the +victualling offices. The ships at Plymouth, furnished from a +distance, and with small quantities at a time, were often for +many days without food of any kind. Even at Plymouth, short food +and poisonous drink had brought dysentery among them. They had +to meet the enemy, as it were, with one arm bandaged by their +own sovereign. The greatest service ever done by an English fleet +had been thus successfully accomplished by men whose wages had +not been paid from the time of their engagement, half-starved, +with their clothes in rags, and so ill-found in the necessaries +of war that they had eked out their ammunition by what they could +take in action from the enemy himself. The men expected that +at least after such a service they would be paid their wages +in full. The Queen was cavilling over the accounts, and would +give no orders for money till she had demanded the meaning of +every penny that she was charged.... Their legitimate food had +been stolen from them by the Queen's own neglect.' + +We thus see that Froude has made Elizabeth personally responsible +for the short rations, the undue delay in paying wages earned, and +the fearful sickness which produced a heavy mortality amongst the +crews of her Channel Fleet; and also for insufficiently supplying +her ships with ammunition. + +The quotations from the book previously referred to make it clear +that it is possible to outdo Froude in his denunciations, even where +it is on his statements that the accusers found their charges. In +his 'History of England'--which is widely read, especially by +the younger generation of Englishmen--the Rev. J. Franck Bright +tells us, with regard to the defensive campaign against the Armada: +'The Queen's avarice went near to ruin the country. The miserable +supplies which Elizabeth had alone allowed to be sent them (the +ships in the Channel) had produced all sorts of disease, and +thousands of the crews came from their great victory only to die. +In the midst of privations and wanting in all the necessaries +of life, the sailors had fought with unflagging energy, with +their wages unpaid, with ammunition supplied to them with so +stingy a hand that each shot sent on board was registered and +accounted for; with provisions withheld, so that the food of +four men had habitually to be divided among six, and that food +so bad as to be really poisonous.' + +J. R. Green, in his 'History of the English People,' states that: +'While England was thrilling with the triumph over the Armada, its +Queen was coolly grumbling over the cost and making her profit +out of the spoiled provisions she had ordered for the fleet that +had saved her.' + +The object of each subsequent historian was to surpass the originator +of the calumnies against Elizabeth. In his sketch of her life in +the 'Dictionary of National Biography,' Dr. Augustus Jessopp +asserts that the Queen's ships 'were notoriously and scandalously +ill-furnished with stores and provisions for the sailors, and +it is impossible to lay the blame on anyone but the Queen.' He +had previously remarked that the merchant vessels which came to +the assistance of the men-of-war from London and the smaller +ports 'were as a rule far better furnished than the Queen's ships,' +which were 'without the barest necessaries.' After these extracts +one from Dr. S. R. Gardiner's 'Student's History of England' +will appear moderate. Here it is: 'Elizabeth having with her +usual economy kept the ships short of powder, they were forced +to come back' from the chase of the Armada. + +The above allegations constitute a heavy indictment of the Queen. +No heavier could well be brought against any sovereign or government. +Probably the first thing that occurs to anyone who, knowing what +Elizabeth's position was, reads the tremendous charges made against +her will be, that--if they are true--she must have been without a +rival in stupidity as well as in turpitude. There was no person +in the world who had as much cause to desire the defeat of the +Armada as she had. If the Duke of Medina Sidonia's expedition +had been successful she would have lost both her throne and her +life. She herself and her father had shown that there could be a +short way with Queens--consort or regnant--whom you had in your +power, and whose existence might be inconvenient to you. Yet, +if we are to believe her accusers, she did her best to ensure +her own dethronement and decapitation. 'The country saved itself +and its cause in spite of its Queen.' + +How did this extraordinary view of Elizabeth's conduct arise? +What had Froude to go upon when he came forward as her accuser? +These questions can be answered with ease. Every Government that +comes near going to war, or that has gone to war, is sure to +incur one of two charges, made according to circumstances. If +the Government prepares for war and yet peace is preserved, it +is accused of unpardonable extravagance in making preparations. +Whether it makes these on a sufficient scale or not, it is accused, +if war does break out--at least in the earlier period of the +contest--of not having done enough. Political opponents and the +'man in the street' agree in charging the administration with +panic profusion in one case, and with criminal niggardliness in +the other. Elizabeth hoped to preserve peace. She had succeeded +in keeping out of an 'official' war for a long time, and she had +much justification for the belief that she could do so still +longer. 'She could not be thoroughly persuaded,' says Mr. David +Hannay,[66] 'that it was hopeless to expect to avert the Spanish +invasion by artful diplomacy.' Whilst reasonable precautions +were not neglected, she was determined that no one should be +able to say with truth that she had needlessly thrown away money +in a fright. For the general naval policy of England at the time, +Elizabeth, as both the nominal and the real head of the Government, +is properly held responsible. The event showed the perfect efficiency +of that policy. + +[Footnote 66: _A_Short_History_of_the_Royal_Navy_, pp. 96, 97.] + +The war having really come, it was inevitable that the Government, +and Elizabeth as its head, should be blamed sooner or later for not +having made adequate provision for it. No one is better entitled +to speak on the naval policy of the Armada epoch than Mr. Julian +Corbett,[67] who is not disposed to assume that the Queen's action +was above criticism. He says that 'Elizabeth has usually been +regarded as guilty of complete and unpardonable inaction.' He +explains that 'the event at least justified the Queen's policy. +There is no trace of her having been blamed for it at the time at +home; nor is there any reason to doubt it was adopted sagaciously +and deliberately on the advice of her most capable officers.' +Mr. David Hannay, who, as an historian, rightly takes into +consideration the conditions of the age, points out that 'Elizabeth +was a very poor sovereign, and the maintenance of a great fleet +was a heavy drain upon her resources.' He adds: 'There is no +reason to suppose that Elizabeth and her Lord Treasurer were +careless of their duty; but the Government of the time had very +little experience in the maintenance of great military forces.' + +[Footnote 67: _Drake_and_the_Tudor_Navy_, 1898, vol. ii. p. 117.] + +If we take the charges against her in detail, we shall find that +each is as ill-founded as that of criminal neglect of naval +preparations generally. The most serious accusation is that with +regard to the victuals. It will most likely be a surprise to +many people to find that the seamen of Elizabeth were victualled +on a more abundant and much more costly scale than the seamen of +Victoria. Nevertheless, such is the fact. In 1565 the contract +allowance for victualling was 4-1/2d. a day for each man in harbour, +and 5d. a day at sea. There was also an allowance of 4d. a man +per month at sea and 8d. in harbour for 'purser's necessaries.' +Mr. Oppenheim, in whose valuable work[68] on naval administration +the details as to the Elizabethan victualling system are to be +found, tells us that in 1586 the rate was raised to 6d. a day +in harbour and 6-1/2d. at sea; and that in 1587 it was again +raised, this time to 6-1/2d. in harbour and 7d. at sea. These +sums were intended to cover both the cost of the food and storage, +custody, conveyance, &c., the present-day 'establishment charges.' +The repeated raising of the money allowance is convincing proof +that the victualling arrangements had not been neglected, and +that there was no refusal to sanction increased expenditure to +improve them. It is a great thing to have Mr. Oppenheim's high +authority for this, because he is not generally favourable to +the Queen, though even he admits that it 'is a moot point' how +far she was herself responsible. + +[Footnote 68: _The_Administration_of_the_Royal_Navy,_ +_1509-1660_. London, 1896.] + +If necessary, detailed arguments could be adduced to show that +to get the present value of the sums allowed in 1588 we ought +to multiply them by six[69] The sum allowed for each man's daily +food and the 'establishment charges'--increased as they had been +in 1586--did little more than cover the expenditure; and, though +it does not appear that the contractor lost money, he nevertheless +died a poor man. It will be hardly imputed to Elizabeth for iniquity +that she did not consider that the end of government was the +enrichment of contractors. The fact that she increased the money +payment again in 1587 may be accepted as proof that she did not +object to a fair bargain. As has been just said, the Elizabethan +scale of victualling was more abundant than the early Victorian, +and not less abundant than that given in the earlier years of +King Edward VII.[70] As shown by Mr. Hubert Hall and Thorold +Rogers, in the price-lists which they publish, the cost of a week's +allowance of food for a man-of-war's man in 1588, in the money of +the time, amounted to about 1s. 11-1/2d., which, multiplied by +six, would be about 11s. 9d. of our present money. The so-called +'savings price' of the early twentieth century allowance was +about 9-1/2d. a day, or 5s. 6-1/2d. weekly. The 'savings price' +is the amount of money which a man received if he did not take +up his victuals, each article having a price attached to it for +that purpose. It may be interesting to know that the full allowance +was rarely, perhaps never, taken up, and that some part of the +savings was till the last, and for many years had been, almost +invariably paid. + +[Footnote 69: See Mr. Hubert Hall's _Society_in_the_Elizabethan_ +_Age_, and Thorold Rogers's _History_of_Agriculture_and_Prices_, +vols. v. and vi. Froude himself puts the ratio at six to one.] + +[Footnote 70: It will be convenient to compare the two scales +in a footnote, observing that--as I hope will not be thought +impertinent--I draw on my own personal experience for the more +recent, which was in force for some years after I went to sea. + + WEEKLY + + ---------------------------------------------- + | | | Early | + | | Elizabethan | Victorian | + | | scale | scale | + |----------------------------------------------| + | Beef | 8 lbs. | 7 lbs. | + | Biscuit | 7 " | 7 " | + | Salted fish | 9 " | none | + | Cheese | 3/4 lb. | " | + | Butter | " | " | + | Beer | 7 gallons | " | + | Vegetables | none | 3-1/2 lbs. | + | Spirits | " | 7/8 pint | + | Tea | " | 1-3/4 oz. | + | Sugar | " | 14 " | + | Cocoa | " | 7 " | + ---------------------------------------------- + +There is now a small allowance of oatmeal, pepper, mustard, and +vinegar, against which we may set the 'purser's necessaries' of +Elizabeth's day. In that day but little sugar was used, and tea +and cocoa were unknown even in palaces. It is just a question +if seven gallons of beer did not make up for the weekly allowance +of these and for the seven-eighths of a pint of spirits. Tea +was only allowed in 1850, and was not an additional article. +It replaced part of the spirits. The biscuit allowance is now +8-3/4 lbs. Weekly. + +The Victorian dietary is more varied and wholesome than the +Elizabethan; but, as we have seen, it is less abundant and can be +obtained for much less money, even if we grant that the 'savings +price'--purposely kept low to avoid all suggestion that the men +are being bribed into stinting themselves--is less than the real +cost. The excess of this latter, however, is not likely to be +more than 30 per cent., so that Elizabeth's expenditure in this +department was more liberal than the present. Such defects as +were to be found in the Elizabethan naval dietary were common +to it with that of the English people generally. If there was +plenty, there was but little variety in the food of our ancestors +of all ranks three centuries ago. As far as was possible in the +conditions of the time, Elizabeth's Government did make provision +for victualling the fleet on a sufficient and even liberal scale; +and, notwithstanding slender pecuniary resources, repeatedly +increased the money assigned to it, on cause being shown. In +his eagerness to make Queen Elizabeth a monster of treacherous +rapacity, Froude has completely overreached himself, He says +that 'she permitted some miserable scoundrel to lay a plan before +her for saving expense, by cutting down the seamen's diet.' The +'miserable scoundrel' had submitted a proposal for diminishing +the expenses which the administration was certainly ill able +to bear, The candid reader will draw his own conclusions when +he finds that the Queen did not approve the plan submitted; and +yet that not one of her assailants has let this appear.[71] + +[Footnote 71: It may be stated here that the word 'rations' is +unknown in the navy. The official term is 'victuals.' The term +in common use is 'provisions.'] + +It is, of course, possible to concede that adequate arrangements +had been made for the general victualling of the fleet; and still +to maintain that, after all, the sailors afloat actually did +run short of food. In his striking 'Introduction to the Armada +Despatches' published by the Navy Records Society, Professor Sir +John Laughton declares that: 'To anyone examining the evidence, +there can be no question as to victualling being conducted on +a fairly liberal scale, as far as the money was concerned. It +was in providing the victuals that the difficulty lay.... When +a fleet of unprecedented magnitude was collected, when a sudden +and unwonted demand was made on the victualling officers, it +would have been strange indeed if things had gone quite smoothly.' + +There are plenty of naval officers who have had experience, and +within the last ten years of the nineteenth century, of the +difficulty, and sometimes of the impossibility, of getting sufficient +supplies for a large number of ships in rather out-of-the-way places. +In 1588 the comparative thinness of population and insufficiency +of communications and means of transport must have constituted +obstacles, far greater than any encountered in our own day, to +the collection of supplies locally and to their timely importation +from a distance. 'You would not believe,' says Lord Howard of +Effingham himself, 'what a wonderful thing it is to victual such +an army as this is in such a narrow corner of the earth, where +a man would think that neither victuals were to be had nor a cask +to put it in.' No more effective defence of Elizabeth and her +Ministers could well be advanced than that which Mr. Oppenheim puts +forward as a corroboration of the accusation against them. He says +that the victualling officials 'found no difficulty in arranging +for 13,000 men in 1596 and 9200 in 1597 after timely notice.' This +is really a high compliment, as it proves that the authorities +were quite ready to, and in fact did, learn from experience. Mr. +Oppenheim, however, is not an undiscriminating assailant of the +Queen; for he remarks, as has been already said, that, 'how far +Elizabeth was herself answerable is a moot point.' He tells us +that there 'is no direct evidence against her'; and the charge +levelled at her rests not on proof, but on 'strong probability.' +One would like to have another instance out of all history, of +probability, however strong, being deemed sufficient to convict +a person of unsurpassed treachery and stupidity combined, when +the direct evidence, which is not scanty, fails to support the +charge and indeed points the other way. + +The Lord Admiral himself and other officers have been quoted to +show how badly off the fleet was for food. Yet at the close of +the active operations against the Armada, Sir J. Hawkins wrote: +'Here is victual sufficient, and I know not why any should be +provided after September, but for those which my Lord doth mean +to leave in the narrow seas.' On the same day Howard himself +wrote from Dover: 'I have caused all the remains of victuals +to be laid here and at Sandwich, for the maintaining of them +that shall remain in the Narrow Seas.' Any naval officer with +experience of command who reads Howard's representations on the +subject of the victuals will at once perceive that what the Admiral +was anxious about was not the quantity on board the ships, but +the stock in reserve. Howard thought that the latter ought to +be a supply for six weeks. The Council thought a month's stock +would be enough; and--as shown by the extracts from Howard's +and Hawkins's letters just given--the Council was right in its +estimate. Anyone who has had to write or to read official letters +about stocks of stores and provisions will find something especially +modern in Howard's representations. + +Though the crews of the fleet did certainly come near the end of +their victuals afloat, there is no case of their having actually +run out of them. The complement of an ordinary man-of-war in the +latter part of the sixteenth century, judged by our modern standard, +was very large in proportion to her size. It was impossible for +her to carry provisions enough to last her men for a long time. +Any unexpected prolongation of a cruise threatened a reduction +to short commons. A great deal has been made of the fact that +Howard had to oblige six men to put up with the allowance of +four. 'When a large force,' says Mr. D. Hannay, 'was collected +for service during any length of time, it was the common rule to +divide four men's allowance among six.' There must be still many +officers and men to whom the plan would seem quite familiar. It is +indicated by a recognised form of words, 'six upon four.' I have +myself been 'six upon four' several times, mostly in the Pacific, +but also, on at least one occasion, in the East Indies. As far +as I could see, no one appeared to regard it as an intolerable +hardship. The Government, it should be known, made no profit +out of the process, because money was substituted for the food +not issued. Howard's recourse to it was not due to immediate +insufficiency. Speaking of the merchant vessels which came to +reinforce him, he says: 'We are fain to help them with victuals +to bring them thither. There is not any of them that hath one +day's victuals.' These merchant vessels were supplied by private +owners; and it is worth noting that, in the teeth of this statement +by Howard, Dr. Jessopp, in his eagerness to blacken Elizabeth, +says that they 'were, as a rule, far better furnished than the +Queen's ships.' The Lord Admiral on another occasion, before +the fight off Gravelines, said of the ships he hoped would join +him from Portsmouth: 'Though they have not two days' victuals, +let that not be the cause of their stay, for they shall have +victuals out of our fleet,' a conclusive proof that his ships +were not very short. + +As to the accusation of deliberately issuing food of bad quality, +that is effectually disposed of by the explanation already given +of the method employed in victualling the navy. A sum was paid +for each man's daily allowance to a contractor, who was expressly +bound to furnish 'good and seasonable victuals.'[72] Professor +Laughton, whose competence in the matter is universally allowed, +informs us that complaints of bad provisions are by no means +confined to the Armada epoch, and were due, not to intentional +dishonesty and neglect, but to insufficient knowledge of the +way to preserve provisions for use on rather long cruises. Mr. +Hannay says that the fleet sent to the coast of Spain, in the +year after the defeat of the Armada, suffered much from want +of food and sickness. 'Yet it was organised, not by the Queen, +but by a committee of adventurers who had every motive to fit +it out well.' It is the fashion with English historians to paint +the condition of the navy in the time of the Commonwealth in +glowing colours, yet Mr. Oppenheim cites many occasions of +well-founded complaints of the victuals. He says: 'The quality of +the food supplied to the men and the honesty of the victualling +agents both steadily deteriorated during the Commonwealth.' Lord +Howard's principal difficulty was with the beer, which would +go sour. The beer was the most frequent subject of protest in +the Commonwealth times. Also, in 1759, Lord (then Sir Edward) +Hawke reported: 'Our daily employment is condemning the beer +from Plymouth.' The difficulty of brewing beer that would stand +a sea voyage seemed to be insuperable. The authorities, however, +did not soon abandon attempts to get the right article. Complaints +continued to pour in; but they went on with their brewing till +1835, and then gave it up as hopeless. + +[Footnote 72: See 'The Mariners of England before the Armada,' by +Mr. H. Halliday Sparling, in the _English_Illustrated_Magazine_, +July 1, 1891.] + +One must have had personal experience of the change to enable +one to recognise the advance that has been made in the art of +preserving articles of food within the last half-century. In +the first Drury Lane pantomime that I can remember--about a year +before I went to sea--a practical illustration of the quality +of some of the food supplied to the navy was offered during the +harlequinade by the clown, who satisfied his curiosity as to +the contents of a large tin of 'preserved meat' by pulling out +a dead cat. On joining the service I soon learned that, owing +to the badness of the 'preserved' food that had been supplied, +the idea of issuing tinned meat had been abandoned. It was not +resumed till some years later. It is often made a joke against +naval officers of a certain age that, before eating a biscuit, +they have a trick of rapping the table with it. We contracted +the habit as midshipmen when it was necessary to get rid of the +weevils in the biscuit before it could be eaten, and a fairly +long experience taught us that rapping the table with it was +an effectual plan for expelling them. + +There is no more justification for accusing Queen Elizabeth of +failure to provide well-preserved food to her sailors than there +is for accusing her of not having sent supplies to Plymouth by +railway. Steam transport and efficient food preservation were +equally unknown in her reign and for long after. It has been +intimated above that, even had she wished to, she could not possibly +have made any money out of bad provisions. The victualling system +did not permit of her doing so. The austere republican virtue of +the Commonwealth authorities enabled them to do what was out of +Elizabeth's power. In 1653, 'beer and other provisions "decayed +and unfit for use" were licensed for export free of Customs.' Mr. +Oppenheim, who reports this fact, makes the remarkable comment +that this was done 'perhaps in the hope that such stores would +go to Holland,' with whose people we were at war. As the heavy +mortality in the navy had always been ascribed to the use of bad +provisions, we cannot refuse to give to the sturdy Republicans +who governed England in the seventeenth century the credit of +contemplating a more insidious and more effective method of damaging +their enemy than poisoning his wells. One would like to have it +from some jurist if the sale of poisonously bad food to your +enemy is disallowed by international law. + +That there was much sickness in the fleet and that many seamen died +is, unfortunately, true. If Howard's evidence is to be accepted--as +it always is when it seems to tell against the Queen--it is +impossible to attribute this to the bad quality of the food then +supplied. The Lord Admiral's official report is 'that the ships +of themselves be so infectious and corrupted as it is thought to +be a very plague; and we find that the fresh men that we draw +into our ships are infected one day and die the next.' The least +restrained assertor of the 'poisonous' food theory does not contend +that it killed men within twenty-four hours. The Armada reached +the Channel on the 20th of July (30th, New Style). A month earlier +Howard had reported that 'several men have fallen sick and by +thousands fain to be discharged'; and, after the fighting was +over, he said of the _Elizabeth_Jonas_, she 'hath had a great +infection in her from the beginning.' Lord Henry Seymour, who +commanded the division of the fleet stationed in the Straits +of Dover, noted that the sickness was a repetition of that of +the year before, and attributed it not to bad food, but to the +weather. 'Our men,' he wrote, 'fall sick by reason of the cold +nights and cold mornings we find; and I fear me they will drop +away faster than they did last year with Sir Henry Palmer, which +was thick enough.' + +'The sickness,' says Professor Laughton, 'was primarily and chiefly +due to infection from the shore and ignorance or neglect of what +we now know as sanitary laws.... Similar infections continued +occasionally to scourge our ships' companies, and still more +frequently French and Spanish ships' companies, till near the +close of the eighteenth century.' It is not likely that any evidence +would suffice to divert from their object writers eager to hurl +calumny at a great sovereign; but a little knowledge of naval +and of military history also would have saved their readers from +a belief in their accusations. In 1727 the fleet in the West +Indies commanded by Admiral Hosier, commemorated in Glover's +ballad, lost ten flag officers and captains, fifty lieutenants, +and 4000 seamen. In the Seven Years' war the total number belonging +to the fleet killed in action was 1512; whilst the number that +died of disease and were missing was 133,708. From 1778 to 1783, +out of 515,000 men voted by Parliament for the navy, 132,623 were +'sent sick.' In the summer, 1779, the French fleet cruising at +the mouth of the English Channel, after landing 500, had still +about 2000 men sick. At the beginning of autumn the number of +sick had become so great that many ships had not enough men to +work them. The _Ville_de_Paris_ had 560 sick, and lost 61. The +_Auguste_ had 500 sick, and lost 44. On board the _Intrépide_ +70 died out of 529 sick. These were the worst cases; but other +ships also suffered heavily. + +It is, perhaps, not generally remembered till what a very late +date armies and navies were more than decimated by disease. In +1810 the House of Commons affirmed by a resolution, concerning +the Walcheren Expedition: 'That on the 19th of August a malignant +disorder showed itself amongst H.M. troops; and that on the 8th +of September the number of sick amounted to upwards of 10,948 +men. That of the army which embarked for service in the Scheldt +sixty officers and 3900 men, exclusive of those killed by the +enemy, had died before the 1st of February last.' + +In a volume of 'Military, Medical, and Surgical Essays'[73] prepared +for the United States' Sanitary Commission, and edited by Dr. +Wm. A. Hammond, Surgeon-General of the U.S. Army, it is stated +that, in our Peninsular army, averaging a strength of 64,227 +officers and men, the annual rate of mortality from the 25th +of December 1810 to the 25th of May 1813 was 10 per cent. of +the officers and 16 per cent. of the men. We may calculate from +this that some 25,000 officers and men died. There were 22-1/2 +per cent., or over 14,000, 'constantly sick.' Out of 309,268 +French soldiers sent to the Crimea in 1855-6, the number of killed +and those who died of wounds was 7500, the number who died of +disease was 61,700. At the same date navies also suffered. Dr. +Stilon Mends, in his life of his father,[74] Admiral Sir William +Mends, prints a letter in which the Admiral, speaking of the +cholera in the fleets at Varna, says: 'The mortality on board +the _Montebello_, _Ville_de_Paris_, _Valmy_ (French ships), +and _Britannia_ (British) has been terrible; the first lost 152 +in three days, the second 120 in three days, the third 80 in ten +days, but the last lost 50 in one night and 10 the subsequent +day.' Kinglake tells us that in the end the _Britannia's_ loss +went up to 105. With the above facts before us, we are compelled +to adopt one of two alternatives. We must either maintain that +sanitary science made no advance between 1588 and 1855, or admit +that the mortality in Elizabeth's fleet became what it was owing to +ignorance of sanitary laws and not to intentional bad management. +As regards care of the sick, it is to be remembered that the +establishment of naval and military hospitals for the reception +of sick soldiers and sailors is of recent date. For instance, +the two great English military hospitals, Netley and the Herbert, +are only about sixty years old. + +[Footnote 73: Philadelphia, 1864.] + +[Footnote 74: London, 1899.] + +So far from our fleet in 1588 having been ill-supplied with +ammunition, it was in reality astonishingly well equipped, +considering the age. We learn from Mr. Julian Corbett,[75] that +'during the few years immediately preceding the outbreak of the +war, the Queen's navy had been entirely re-armed with brass guns, +and in the process of re-armament a great advance in simplicity +had been secured.' Froude, without seeing where the admission +would land him, admits that our fleet was more plentifully supplied +than the Armada, in which, he says, 'the supply of cartridges +was singularly small. The King [Philip the Second] probably +considered that a single action would decide the struggle; and +it amounted to but fifty rounds for each gun.' Our own supply +therefore exceeded fifty rounds. In his life of Vice-Admiral +Lord Lyons,[76] Sir S. Eardley Wilmot tells us that the British +ships which attacked the Sebastopol forts in October 1854 'could +only afford to expend seventy rounds per gun.' At the close of +the nineteenth century, the regulated allowance for guns mounted +on the broadside was eighty-five rounds each. Consequently, the +Elizabethan allowance was nearly, if not quite, as much as that +which our authorities, after an experience of naval warfare during +three centuries, thought sufficient. 'The full explanation,' says +Professor Laughton, 'of the want [of ammunition] seems to lie +in the rapidity of fire which has already been mentioned. The +ships had the usual quantity on board; but the expenditure was +more, very many times more, than anyone could have conceived.' +Mr. Julian Corbett considers it doubtful if the ammunition, in +at least one division of the fleet, was nearly exhausted. + +[Footnote 75: _The_Spanish_War_, 1585-87 (Navy Records Society), +1898, p. 323.] + +[Footnote 76: London, 1898, p. 236.] + +Exhaustion of the supply of ammunition in a single action is a +common naval occurrence. The not very decisive character of the +battle of Malaga between Sir George Rooke and the Count of Toulouse +in 1704 was attributed to insufficiency of ammunition, the supply +in our ships having been depleted by what 'Mediterranean' Byng, +afterwards Lord Torrington, calls the 'furious fire' opened on +Gibraltar. The Rev. Thomas Pocock, Chaplain of the _Ranelagh_, +Byng's flag-ship at Malaga, says:[77] 'Many of our ships went +out of the line for want of ammunition.' Byng's own opinion, as +stated by the compiler of his memoirs, was, that 'it may without +great vanity be said that the English had gained a greater victory +if they had been supplied with ammunition as they ought to have +been.' I myself heard the late Lord Alcester speak of the anxiety +that had been caused him by the state of his ships' magazines +after the attack on the Alexandria forts in 1882. At a still +later date, Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay interrupted his attack +on the Spanish squadron to ascertain how much ammunition his +ships had left. The carrying capacity of ships being limited, +rapid gun-fire in battle invariably brings with it the risk of +running short of ammunition. It did this in the nineteenth century +just as much as, probably even more than, it did in the sixteenth. + +[Footnote 77: In his journal (p. 197), printed as an Appendix +to _Memoirs_relating_to_the_Lord_Torrington_, edited by +J. K. Laughton for the Camden Society, 1889.] + +To charge Elizabeth with criminal parsimony because she insisted +on every shot being 'registered and accounted for' will be received +with ridicule by naval officers. Of course every shot, and for the +matter of that every other article expended, has to be accounted +for. One of the most important duties of the gunner of a man-of-war +is to keep a strict account of the expenditure of all gunnery +stores. This was more exactly done under Queen Victoria than it +was under Queen Elizabeth. Naval officers are more hostile to +'red tape' than most men, and they may lament the vast amount +of bookkeeping that modern auditors and committees of public +accounts insist upon, but they are convinced that a reasonable +check on expenditure of stores is indispensable to efficient +organisation. So far from blaming Elizabeth for demanding this, +they believe that both she and Burleigh, her Lord Treasurer, +were very much in advance of their age. + +Another charge against her is that she defrauded her seamen of +their wages. The following is Froude's statement:-- + +'Want of the relief, which, if they had been paid their wages, they +might have provided for themselves had aggravated the tendencies to +disease, and a frightful mortality now set in through the entire +fleet.' The word 'now' is interesting, Froude having had before +him Howard's and Seymour's letters, already quoted, showing that +the appearance of the sickness was by no means recent. Elizabeth's +illiberality towards her seamen may be judged from the fact that +in her reign their pay was certainly increased once and perhaps +twice.[78] In 1585 the sailor's pay was raised from 6s. 8d. to +10s. a month. A rise of pay of 50 per cent. all at once is, I +venture to say, entirely without parallel in the navy since, and +cannot well be called illiberal. The Elizabethan 10s. would be +equal to £3 in our present accounts; and, as the naval month at +the earlier date was the lunar, a sailor's yearly wages would +be equal to £39 now. The year's pay of an A.B., 'non-continuous +service,' as Elizabeth's sailors were, is at the present time £24 +6s. 8d. It is true that the sailor now can receive additional +pay for good-conduct badges, gunnery-training, &c., and also +can look forward to that immense boon--a pension--nearly, but +thanks to Sir J. Hawkins and Drake's establishment of the 'Chatham +Chest,' not quite unknown in the sixteenth century. Compared with +the rate of wages ruling on shore, Elizabeth's seamen were paid +highly. Mr. Hubert Hall states that for labourers 'the usual rate +was 2d. or 3d. a day.' Ploughmen received a shilling a week. In +these cases 'board' was also given. The sailor's pay was 5s. a +week with board. Even compared with skilled labour on shore the +sailor of the Armada epoch was well paid. Thorold Rogers gives, +for 1588, the wages, without board, of carpenters and masons at +10d. and 1s. a day. A plumber's wages varied from 10-1/2d. to +1s.; but there is one case of a plumber receiving as much as +1s. 4d., which was probably for a single day. + +[Footnote 78: Mr. Halliday Sparling, in the article already referred +to (p. 651), says twice; but Mr. Oppenheim seems to think that +the first increase was before Elizabeth's accession.] + +Delay in the payment of wages was not peculiar to the Elizabethan +system. It lasted very much longer, down to our own times in +fact. In 1588 the seamen of the fleet were kept without their +pay for several months. In the great majority of cases, and most +likely in all, the number of these months was less than six. Even +within the nineteenth century men-of-war's men had to wait for +their pay for years. Commander C. N. Robinson, in his 'British +Fleet,'[79] a book that ought to be in every Englishman's library, +remarks: 'All through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it +was the rule not to pay anybody until the end of the commission, +and to a certain degree the practice obtained until some fifty +years ago.' As to the nineteenth century, Lord Dundonald, speaking +in Parliament, may be quoted. He said that of the ships on the +East Indies station, the _Centurion's_ men had been unpaid for +eleven years; the _Rattlesnake's_ for fourteen; the _Fox's_ for +fifteen. The Elizabethan practice compared with this will look +almost precipitate instead of dilatory. To draw again on my personal +experience, I may say that I have been kept without pay for a +longer time than most of the people in Lord Howard's fleet, as, +for the first two years that I was at sea, young officers were +paid only once in six months; and then never in cash, but always +in bills. The reader may be left to imagine what happened when +a naval cadet tried to get a bill for some £7 or £8 cashed at +a small Spanish-American port. + +[Footnote 79: London, 1894.] + +A great deal has been made of the strict audit of the accounts +of Howard's fleet. The Queen, says Froude, 'would give no orders +for money till she had demanded the meaning of every penny that +she was charged.' Why she alone should be held up to obloquy +for this is not clear. Until a very recent period, well within +the last reign, no commanding officer, on a ship being paid off, +could receive the residue of his pay, or get any half-pay at +all, until his 'accounts had been passed.'[80] The same rule +applied to officers in charge of money or stores. It has been +made a further charge against Elizabeth that her officers had to +meet certain expenditure out of their own pockets. That certainly +is not a peculiarity of the sixteenth-century navy. Till less +than fifty years ago the captain of a British man-of-war had +to provide one of the three chronometers used in the navigation +of his ship. Even later than that the articles necessary for +cleaning the ship and everything required for decorating her +were paid for by the officers, almost invariably by the first +lieutenant, or second in command. There must be many officers +still serving who have spent sums, considerable in the aggregate, +of their own money on public objects. Though pressure in this +respect has been much relieved of late, there are doubtless many +who do so still. It is, in fact, a traditional practice in the +British Navy and is not in the least distinctly Elizabethan. + +[Footnote 80: This happened to me in 1904.] + +Some acquaintance with present conditions and accurate knowledge +of the naval methods prevailing in the great Queen's reign--a +knowledge which the publication of the original documents puts +within the reach of anyone who really cares to know the truth--will +convince the candid inquirer that Elizabeth's administration of the +navy compares favourably with that of any of her successors; and +that, for it, she deserves the admiration and unalloyed gratitude +of the nation. + + + + +IX[81] + +[Footnote 81: Written in 1905. (_Cornhill_Magazine_.)] + +NELSON: THE CENTENARY OF TRAFALGAR + +[The following article was read as an address, in compliance +with the request of its Council, at the annual meeting of the +Navy Records Society in July 1905. It was, and indeed is still, +my opinion, as stated to the meeting in some prefatory remarks, +that the address would have come better from a professed historian, +several members of the Society being well known as entitled to that +designation. The Council, however, considered that, as Nelson's +tactical principles and achievements should be dealt with, it would +be better for the address to be delivered by a naval officer--one, +moreover, who had personal experience of the manoeuvres of fleets +under sail. Space would not suffice for treating of Nelson's +merits as a strategist, though they are as great as those which +he possessed as a tactician.] + +Centenary commemorations are common enough; but the commemoration +of Nelson has a characteristic which distinguishes it from most, +if not from all, others. In these days we forget soon. What place +is still kept in our memories by even the most illustrious of +those who have but recently left us? It is not only that we do +not remember their wishes and injunctions; their existence has +almost faded from our recollection. It is not difficult to persuade +people to commemorate a departed worthy; but in most cases industry +has to take the place of enthusiasm, and moribund or extinct +remembrances have to be galvanised by assiduity into a semblance +of life. In the case of Nelson the conditions are very different. +He may have been misunderstood; even by his professional descendants +his acts and doctrines may have been misinterpreted; but he has +never been forgotten. + +The time has now come when we can specially do honour to Nelson's +memory without wounding the feelings of other nations. There is no +need to exult over or even to expatiate on the defeats of others. +In recalling the past it is more dignified as regards ourselves, +and more considerate of the honour of our great admiral, to think +of the valour and self-devotion rather than the misfortunes of +those against whom he fought. We can do full justice to Nelson's +memory without reopening old wounds. + +The first thing to be noted concerning him is that he is the +only man who has ever lived who by universal consent is without +a peer. This is said in full view of the new constellation rising +above the Eastern horizon; for that constellation, brilliant +as it is, has not yet reached the meridian. In every walk of +life, except that which Nelson chose as his own, you will find +several competitors for the first place, each one of whom will +have many supporters. Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal, Cæsar, +Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon have been severally +put forward for the palm of generalship. To those who would acclaim +Richelieu as the first of statesmen, others would oppose Chatham, +or William Pitt, or Cavour, or Bismarck, or Marquis Ito. Who was +the first of sculptors? who the first of painters? who the first +of poets? In every case there is a great difference of opinion. +Ask, however, who was the first of admirals, and the unanimous +reply will still be--'Nelson,' tried as he was by many years of +high command in war. It is not only amongst his fellow-countrymen +that his preeminence is acknowledged. Foreigners admit it as +readily as we proclaim it ourselves. + +We may consider what it was that gave Nelson this unique position +among men. The early conditions of his naval career were certainly +not favourable to him. It is true that he was promoted when young; +but so were many other officers. Nelson was made a commander only +a few months after the outbreak of war between Great Britain +and France, and was made a post-captain within a few days of the +declaration of war by Spain. An officer holding a rank qualifying +him for command at the outset of a great war might well have looked +forward confidently to exceptional opportunities of distinguishing +himself. Even in our own days, when some trifling campaign is +about to be carried on, the officers who are employed where they +can take no part in it vehemently lament their ill-fortune. How +much more disheartening must it have been to be excluded from +active participation in a great and long-continued conflict! This +was Nelson's case. As far as his hopes of gaining distinction +were concerned, fate seemed to persecute him pertinaciously. He +was a captain of more than four years' seniority when the treaty +of Versailles put an end to the war of American Independence. Yet, +with the exception of the brief Nicaragua expedition--which by +the side of the important occurrences of grand naval campaigns +must have seemed insignificant--his services during all those +years of hostilities were uneventful, and even humdrum. He seemed +to miss every important operation; and when the war ended--we may +almost say--he had never seen a ship fire a broadside in anger. + +There then came what promised to be, and in fact turned out to +be, a long period of peace. With no distinguished war service +to point to, and with the prospect before him of only uneventful +employment, or no employment afloat at all, Nelson might well +have been disheartened to the verge of despondency. That he was +not disheartened, but, instead thereof, made a name for himself +in such unfavourable circumstances, must be accepted as one of +the most convincing proofs of his rare force of character. To +have attracted the notice, and to have secured the confidence, +of so great a sea-officer as Lord Hood constituted a distinction +which could have been won only by merit so considerable that +it could not long remain unrecognised. The war of American +Independence had still seven months to run when Lord Hood pointed +to Nelson as an officer to be consulted on 'questions relative +to naval tactics,' Professor Laughton tells us that at that time +Nelson had never served with a fleet. Lord Hood was one of the +last men in the world to go out of his way to pay to a youthful +subordinate an empty compliment, and we may confidently base our +estimate of an officer's merits on Lord Hood's belief in them. + +He, no doubt, gave a Wide signification to the term 'tactics,' and +used it as embracing all that is included in the phrase 'conduct +of war.' He must have found out, from conversations with, and from +the remarks of, the young captain, whom he treated as intimately as +if he was his son, that the latter was already, what he continued +to be till the end, viz. a student of naval warfare. This point +deserves particular attention. The officers of the navy of the +present day, period of peace though it be, can imitate Nelson +at least in this. He had to wait a long time before he could +translate into brilliant action the result of his tactical studies. +Fourteen years after Lord Hood spoke of him as above related, by +a 'spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority +by signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick +perceptions,' Nelson entirely defeated the movement of the enemy's +fleet, contributed to the winning of a great victory, and, as +Captain Mahan tells us, 'emerged from merely personal distinction +to national renown.' The justification of dwelling on this is +to be found in the necessity, even at this day, of preventing +the repetition of mistakes concerning Nelson's qualities and +disposition. His recent biographers, Captain Mahan and Professor +Laughton, feel constrained to tell us over and over again that +Nelson's predominant characteristic was not mere 'headlong valour +and instinct for fighting'; that he was not the man 'to run needless +and useless risks' in battle. 'The breadth and acuteness of Nelson's +intellect,' says Mahan, 'have been too much overlooked in the +admiration excited by his unusually grand moral endowments of +resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility!' + +In forming a true conception of what Nelson was, the publications +of the Navy Records Society will help us greatly. There is something +very remarkable in the way in which Mr. Gutteridge's volume[82] +not only confirms Captain Mahan's refutation of the aspersions +on Nelson's honour and humanity, but also establishes Professor +Laughton's conclusions, reached many years ago, that it was the +orders given to him, and not his amour, which detained him at +Naples at a well-known epoch. The last volume issued by the Society, +that of Mr. Julian Corbett,[83] is, I venture to affirm, the +most useful to naval officers that has yet appeared among the +Society's publications. It will provide them with an admirable +historical introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly +help them in ascertaining the importance of Nelson's achievements +as a tactician. For my own part, I may say with gratitude that +but for Mr. Corbett's valuable work I could not have completed +this appreciation. + +[Footnote 82: _Nelson_and_the_Neapolitan_Jacobins_.] + +[Footnote 83: _Fighting_Instructions_, 1530-1816.] + +The most renowned of Nelson's achievements was that performed +in his final battle and victory. Strange as it may seem, that +celebrated performance has been the subject of much controversy, +and, brilliant as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been +freely, and indeed unfavourably, criticised. There is still much +difference of opinion as to the preliminary movements, and as +to the exact method by which Nelson's attack was made. It has +been often asserted that the method really followed was not that +which Nelson had expressly declared his intention of adopting. +The question raised concerning this is a difficult one, and, +until the appearance of Mr. Julian Corbett's recent work and +the interesting volume on Trafalgar lately published by Mr. H. +Newbolt, had not been fully discussed. The late Vice-Admiral +P. H. Colomb contributed to the _United_Service_Magazine_ of +September 1899 a very striking article on the subject of Nelson's +tactics in his last battle, and those who propose to study the +case should certainly peruse what he wrote. + +The criticism of Nelson's procedure at Trafalgar in its strongest +form may be summarised as follows. It is affirmed that he drew +up and communicated to the officers under his orders a certain +plan of attack; that just before the battle he changed his plan +without warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily; +that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and, because of +all this, that the British loss was much heavier and much less +evenly distributed among the ships of the fleet than it need have +been. The most formidable arraignment of the mode of Nelson's +last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper published +by Sir Charles Ekins in his book on 'Naval Battles,' and vouched +for by him as the work of an eye-witness--almost certainly, as +Mr. Julian Corbett holds, an officer on board the _Conqueror_ in +the battle. It is a remarkable document. Being critical rather +than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of Clerk +of Eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the +investigation of tactical questions ever published in the English +tongue. On it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable +views expressed concerning the British tactics at Trafalgar. As +it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism +of Nelson's action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we +criticise it in its turn. + +Notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually +took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean +tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have +an academic tinge. In fact, they are very much of the kind that a +clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities +inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class +of students. Between a professor of tactics, however clever, and +a commanding genius like Nelson the difference is great indeed. +The writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more +general opinion of his day. He has certainly suggested opinions +to later generations of naval officers. The captains who shared +in Nelson's last great victory did not agree among themselves as +to the mode in which the attack was introduced. It was believed +by some of them, and, thanks largely to the _Conqueror_ officer's +paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas Nelson had +announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast +or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead. Following +up the path of investigation to which, in his article above +mentioned, Admiral Colomb had already pointed, we can, I think, +arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was +adhered to. + +Before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be +convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that +Nelson exposed his fleet at Trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting +it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _Conqueror's_ +officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in +detail'; and that 'the brunt of the action would have been more +equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually +chosen been adopted. Now, Trafalgar was a battle in which an +inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior +fleet of thirty-three. The victory was so decisive that more than +half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed +on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell +an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the +rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port +near at hand. To gain such a victory over a superior force of +seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very +hard fighting was necessary. The only actions of the Napoleonic +period that can be compared with it are those of Camperdown, the +Nile, and Copenhagen. The proportionate loss at Trafalgar was the +least in all the four battles.[84] The allegation that, had Nelson +followed a different method at Trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action +would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily. In +nearly all sea-fights, whether Nelsonic in character or not, +half of the loss of the victors has fallen on considerably less +than half the fleet. That this has been the rule, whatever tactical +method may have been adopted, will appear from the following +statement. In Rodney's victory (12th April 1782) half the loss +fell upon nine ships out of thirty-six, or one-fourth; at 'The +First of June' it fell upon five ships out of twenty-five, or +one-fifth; at St. Vincent it fell upon three ships out of fifteen, +also one-fifth; at Trafalgar half the loss fell on five ships +out of twenty-seven, or very little less than an exact fifth. +It has, therefore, been conclusively shown that, faulty or not +faulty, long-announced or hastily adopted, the plan on which +the battle of Trafalgar was fought did not occasion excessive +loss to the victors or confine the loss, such as it was, to an +unduly small portion of their fleet. As bearing on this question +of the relative severity of the British loss at Trafalgar, it +may be remarked that in that battle there were several British +ships which had been in other great sea-fights. Their losses +in these latter were in nearly every case heavier than their +Trafalgar losses.[85] Authoritative and undisputed figures show +how baseless are the suggestions that Nelson's tactical procedure +at Trafalgar caused his fleet to suffer needlessly heavy loss. + +[Footnote 84: + Camperdown 825 loss out of 8,221: 10 per cent. + The Nile 896 " " 7,401: 12.1 " + Copenhagen 941 " " 6,892: 13.75 " + _Trafalgar_ 1,690 " " 17,256: 9.73 " ] + +[Footnote 85: + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- +| | | | | | Trafalgar | +| Ship | Action |Killed|Wounded|Total|--------------------| +| | | | | |Killed|Wounded|Total| +|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +|_Ajax_ | Rodney's | 9 | 10 | 19 | 2 | 9 | 11 | +| |(Ap. 12, 1782)| | | | | | | +|_Agamemnon_ | " | 15 | 22 | 37 | 2 | 8 | 10 | +|_Conqueror_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 3 | 9 | 12 | +|_Defence_ | 1st June | 17 | 36 | 53 | 7 | 29 | 36 | +|_Bellerophon_| The Nile | 49 | 148 | 197 | 27 | 123 | 150 | +|_Swiftsure_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 9 | 8 | 17 | +|_Defiance_ | Copenhagen | 24 | 21 | 45 | 17 | 53 | 70 | +|_Polyphemus_ | " | 6 | 25 | 31 | 2 | 4 | 6 | + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +[In only one case was the Trafalgar total loss greater than the +total loss of the same ship in an earlier fight; and in this +case (the _Defiance_) the number of killed at Trafalgar was only +about two-thirds of the number killed in the other action.] + +It is now necessary to investigate the statement that Nelson, +hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the +battle. This investigation is much more difficult than that into +the losses of the British fleet, because, whilst the latter can +be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon +conjecture. How desirable it is to make the investigation of +the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the +curious fact that the very completeness of Nelson's success at +Trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study +of tactics in the British Navy for more than three-quarters of +a century. His action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate, +so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel +in our service that Nelson's method consisted merely in rushing +at his enemy as soon as he saw him. Against this conception his +biographers, one after another, have protested in vain. + +At the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to +mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered. +One of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself +are not the same operations. Another is, that, in the order of +sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind' +or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other, +but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. Also, it +may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast +may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing +into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the +same operation. Again, adherence to a plan which presupposes +the enemy's fleet to be in a particular formation after he is +found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate +tactician. This remark is introduced here with full knowledge +of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that +Nelson did change his plan without warning. No admission of the +kind is intended. 'In all cases of anticipated battle,' says Mahan, +'Nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of +his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.' +The same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that +'No man was ever better served than Nelson by the inspiration +of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.' + +The plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of 9th October +1805 indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the British +fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main +divisions and an 'advance squadron,' would move against an enemy +assumed to be in single line-ahead. The 'advance squadron,' it +should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions, +but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either. +The name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships +composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, 'feeling +for' the enemy. On 19th October six ships were ordered 'to go +ahead during the night'; and, besides the frigates, two more +ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between +the six and the commander-in-chief's flag-ship. Thus eight ships +in effect composed an 'advance squadron,' and did not join either +of the main divisions at first. + +When it was expected that the British fleet would comprise forty +sail-of-the-line and the enemy's fleet forty-six, each British +main division was to be made up of sixteen ships; and eight +two-deckers added to either division would increase the strength +of the latter to twenty-four ships. It is interesting to note that, +omitting the _Africa_, which ship came up late, each British main +division on the morning of 21st October 1805 had nine ships--a +number which, by the addition of the eight already mentioned +as distinct from the divisions, could have been increased to +seventeen, thus, except for a fraction, exactly maintaining the +original proportion as regards the hostile fleet, which was now +found to be composed of thirty-three ships. + +During the night of 20th-21st October the Franco-Spanish fleet, +which had been sailing in three divisions and a 'squadron of +observation,' formed line and stood to the southward, heading a +little to the eastward of south. The 'squadron of observation' +was parallel to the main body and to windward (in this case to +the westward) of it, with the leading ships rather more advanced. + +The British main divisions steered WSW. till 1 A.M. After that +they steered SW. till 4 A.M. There are great difficulties about +the time, as the notation of it[86] differed considerably in +different ships; but the above hours are taken from the _Victory's_ +log. At 4 A.M. the British fleet, or rather its main divisions, +wore and stood N. by E. As the wind was about NW. by W., the +ships were close-hauled, and the leader of the 'lee-line,' i.e. +Collingwood's flag-ship, was when in station two points abaft +the _Victory's_ beam as soon as the 'order of sailing' in two +columns--which was to be the order of battle--had been formed. + +[Footnote 86: Except the chronometers, which were instruments of +navigation so precious as always to be kept under lock and key, +there were no clocks in the navy till some years after I joined +it. Time on board ship was kept by half-hour sand-glasses.] + +About 6 A.M. the enemy's fleet was sighted from the _Victory_, +and observed to bear from her E. by S. and be distant from her +ten or twelve miles. The distance is corroborated by observed +bearings from Collingwood's flag-ship.[87] Viewed from the British +ships, placed as they were relatively to it, the enemy's fleet +must have appeared as a long single line-ahead, perhaps not very +exactly formed. As soon as the hostile force was clearly made out, +the British divisions bore up and stood to the eastward, steering +by the _Victory's_ compass ENE. The position and formation of +the British main divisions were by this made exactly those in +which they are shown in the diagram usually attached to the +celebrated memorandum of 9th October 1805. The enemy must have +appeared to the British, who were ten or twelve miles to windward +of him, and on his beam, as if he were formed in line-ahead. He +therefore was also in the position and formation assigned to +him in that diagram. + +[Footnote 87: It would necessitate the use of some technicalities +to explain it fully; but it may be said that the bearings of +the extremes of the enemy's line observed from his flag-ship +prove that Collingwood was in the station that he ought to have +occupied when the British fleet was in the Order of Sailing and +close to the wind.] + +At a time which, because of the variety in the notations of it, +it is difficult to fix exactly, but somewhere between 7 and 8 +A.M., the enemy's ships wore together and endeavoured to form +a line to the northward, which, owing to the direction of the +wind, must have been about N. by E. and S. by W., or NNE. and +SSW. The operation--not merely of wearing, but of both wearing +and reforming the line, such as it was--took more than an hour +to complete. The wind was light; there was a westerly swell; +the ships were under easy sail; consequently there must have +been a good deal of leeway, and the hostile or 'combined' fleet +headed in the direction of Cadiz, towards which, we are expressly +told by a high French authority--Chevalier--it advanced. + +Nelson had to direct the course of his fleet so that its divisions, +when about to make the actual attack, would be just opposite the +points to which the respective hostile ships had advanced in +the meantime. In a light wind varying in force a direct course +to those points could not be settled once for all; but that first +chosen was very nearly right, and an alteration of a point, viz. +to E. by N., was for a considerable time all that was necessary. +Collingwood later made a signal to his division to alter course +one point to port, which brought them back to the earlier course, +which by the _Victory's_ compass had been ENE. The eight ships +of what has been referred to as the 'advance squadron' were +distributed between the two main British divisions, six being +assigned to Collingwood's and two to Nelson's. They did not all +join their divisions at the same time, some--probably owing to +the distance at which they had been employed from the rest of +the fleet and the feebleness of the breeze--not till several +hours after the combined fleet had been sighted. + +Collingwood preserved in his division a line-of-bearing apparently +until the very moment when the individual ships pushed on to make +the actual attack. The enemy's fleet is usually represented as +forming a curve. It would probably be more correct to call it a +very obtuse re-entering angle. This must have been largely due to +Gravina's 'squadron of observation' keeping away in succession, +to get into the wake of the rest of the line, which was forming +towards the north. About the centre of the combined fleet there +was a gap of a mile. Ahead and astern of this the ships were not +all in each other's wake. Many were to leeward of their stations, +thus giving the enemy's formation the appearance of a double line, +or rather of a string of groups of ships. It is important to +remember this, because no possible mode of attack--the enemy's +fleet being formed as it was--could have prevented some British +ships from being 'doubled on' when they cut into the enemy's +force. On 'The First of June,' notwithstanding that the advance +to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several British +ships were 'doubled on,' and even 'trebled on,' as will be seen +in the experiences on that day of the _Brunswick_, _Marlborough_, +_Royal_Sovereign_, and _Queen_Charlotte_ herself. + +Owing to the shape of the hostile 'line' at Trafalgar and the +formation in which he kept his division, Collingwood brought his +ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her +attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum. By +the terms of that document Nelson had specifically assigned to his +own division the work of seeing that the movements of Collingwood's +division should be interrupted as little as possible. It would, +of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position +of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the +memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after Collingwood was +getting near his objective point. In execution, therefore, of +the service allotted to his division, Nelson made a feint at +the enemy's van. This necessitated an alteration of course to +port, so that his ships came into a 'line-of-bearing' so very +oblique that it may well have been loosely called a 'line-ahead.' +Sir Charles Ekins says that the two British lines '_afterwards_ +fell into line-ahead, the ships in the wake of each other,' and +that this was in obedience to signal. Collingwood's line certainly +did not fall into line-ahead. At the most it was a rather oblique +line-of-bearing almost parallel to that part of the enemy's fleet +which he was about to attack. In Nelson's line there was more than +one alteration of course, as the _Victory's_ log expressly states +that she kept standing for the enemy's van, which we learn from +the French accounts was moving about N. by E. or NNE. In the light +wind prevailing the alterations of course must have rendered it, +towards the end of the forenoon, impossible to keep exact station, +even if the _Victory_ were to shorten sail, which we know she +did not. As Admiral Colomb pointed out, 'Several later signals +are recorded which were proper to make in lines-of-bearing, but +not in lines-ahead.' It is difficult to import into this fact +any other meaning but that of intention to preserve, however +obliquely, the line-of-bearing which undoubtedly had been formed +by the act of bearing-up as soon as the enemy's fleet had been +distinguished. + +When Collingwood had moved near enough to the enemy to let his +ships deliver their attacks, it became unnecessary for Nelson's +division to provide against the other's being interrupted. +Accordingly, he headed for the point at which he meant to cut into +the enemy's fleet. Now came the moment, as regards his division, +for doing what Collingwood's had already begun to do, viz. engage +in a 'pell-mell battle,'[88] which surely may be interpreted +as meaning a battle in which rigorous station-keeping was no +longer expected, and in which 'no captain could do very wrong +if he placed his ship alongside that of the enemy.' + +[Footnote 88: Nelson's own expression.] + +In several diagrams of the battle as supposed to have been fought +the two British divisions just before the moment of impact are +represented as converging towards each other. The Spanish diagram, +lately reproduced by Mr. Newbolt, shows this, as well as the English +diagrams. We may take it, therefore, that there was towards the +end of the forenoon a convergence of the two columns, and that +this was due to Nelson's return from his feint at the hostile van +to the line from which he intended to let go his ships to deliver +the actual attack. Collingwood's small alteration of course of +one point to port slightly, but only slightly, accentuated this +convergence. + +Enough has been said here of Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar. To +discuss them fully would lead me too far for this occasion. + +I can only express the hope that in the navy the subject will +receive fuller consideration hereafter. Nelson's last victory +was gained, be it remembered, in one afternoon, over a fleet more +than 20 per cent. his superior in numbers, and was so decisive +that more than half of the hostile ships were taken. This was the +crowning effort of seven years spent in virtually independent +command in time of war--seven years, too, illustrated by more +than one great victory. + +The more closely we look into Nelson's tactical achievements, +the more effective and brilliant do they appear. It is the same +with his character and disposition. The more exact researches +and investigations of recent times have removed from his name +the obloquy which it pleased some to cast upon it. We can see +now that his 'childlike, delighted vanity'--to use the phrase +of his greatest biographer--was but a thin incrustation on noble +qualities. As in the material world valueless earthy substances +surround a vein of precious metal, so through Nelson's moral +nature there ran an opulent lode of character, unimpaired in +its priceless worth by adjacent frailties which, in the majority +of mankind, are present without any precious stuff beneath them. +It is with minds prepared to see this that we should commemorate +our great admiral. + +Veneration of Nelson's memory cannot be confined to particular +objects or be limited by locality. His tomb is wider than the +space covered by dome or column, and his real monument is more +durable than any material construction. It is the unwritten and +spiritual memorial of him, firmly fixed in the hearts of his +fellow-countrymen. + + + + +X + +THE SHARE OF THE FLEET IN THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE[89] + +[Footnote 89: Written in 1907. (_Naval_Annual_, 1908.)] + +At the close of the Great War, which ended in the downfall of +Napoleon, the maritime position of the British Empire was not +only predominant--it also was, and long remained, beyond the +reach of challenge. After the stupendous events of the great +contest such successes as those at Algiers where we were helped +by the Dutch, at Navarino where we had two allies, and at Acre +were regarded as matters of course, and no very grave issue hung +upon any one of them. For more than half a century after Nelson's +death all the most brilliant achievements of British arms were +performed on shore, in India or in the Crimea. There were also many +small wars on land, and it may well have seemed to contemporaries +that the days of great naval contests were over and that force +of circumstances was converting us into a military from a naval +nation. The belief in the efficacy of naval defence was not extinct, +but it had ceased to operate actively. Even whilst the necessity +of that form of defence was far more urgent, inattention to or +ignorance of its true principles had occasionally allowed it to +grow weak, but the possibility of substituting something else for +it had not been pressed or even suggested. To this, however, we +had now come; and it was largely a consequence of the Crimean war. +In that war the British Army had nobly sustained its reputation +as a fighting machine. For the first time after a long interval +it had met in battle European troops, and had come out of the +conflict more renowned for bravery than ever. Nothing seemed +able to damp its heroism--not scantiness of food, not lack of +clothing amidst bitter cold, not miserable quarters, not superior +forces of a valiant enemy. It clung to its squalid abodes in the +positions which it was ordered to hold with a tenacious fortitude +that had never been surpassed in its glorious history, and that +defied all assaults. In combination with its brave allies it +brought to a triumphant conclusion a war of an altogether peculiar +character. + +The campaign in the Crimea was in reality the siege of a single +fortress. All the movements of the Western invaders were undertaken +to bring them within striking distance of the place, to keep +them within reach of it, or to capture it. Every battle that +occurred was fought with one of those objects. When the place +fell the war ended. The one general who, in the opinion of all +concerned, gained high distinction in the war was the general +who had prolonged the defence of Sebastopol by the skilful use +of earthworks. It was no wonder that the attack and defence of +fortified places assumed large importance in the eyes of the +British people. The command of the sea held by the allied powers +was so complete and all-pervading that no one stopped to think +what the course of hostilities would have been without it, any +more than men stop to think what the course of any particular +business would be if there were no atmosphere to breathe in. +Not a single allied soldier had been delayed on passage by the +hostile fleet; not a single merchant vessel belonging to the +allies had been captured by a hostile cruiser. Supplies and +reinforcements for the besieging armies were transported to them +without escort and with as little risk of interruption as if +the operations had been those of profound peace. + +No sooner was the Crimean war over than another struggle took +place, viz. the war of the Indian Mutiny, and that also was waged +entirely on land. Here again the command of the sea was so complete +that no interruption of it, even temporary, called attention to +its existence. Troops and supplies were sent to India from the +United Kingdom and from Hong-Kong; horses for military purposes +from Australia and South Africa; and in every case without a +thought of naval escort. The experience of hostilities in India +seemed to confirm the experience of the Crimea. What we had just +done to a great European nation was assumed to be what unfriendly +European nations would wish to do and would be able to do to +us. It was also assumed that the only way of frustrating their +designs would be to do what had recently been done in the hope +of frustrating ours, but to do it better. We must--it was +said--depend on fortifications, but more perfect than those which +had failed to save Sebastopol. + +The protection to be afforded by our fleet was deliberately declared +to be insufficient. It might, so it was held, be absent altogether, +and then there would be nothing but fortifications to stand between +us and the progress of an active enemy. In the result the policy +of constructing imposing passive defence-works on our coast was +adopted. The fortifications had to be multiplied. Dependence +on that class of defence inevitably leads to discovery after +discovery that some spot open to the kind of attack feared has +not been made secure. We began by fortifying the great dockyard +ports--on the sea side against a hostile fleet, on the land side +against hostile troops. Then it was perceived that to fortify +the dockyard ports in the mother country afforded very little +protection to the outlying portions of the empire. So their principal +ports also were given defence-works--sometimes of an elaborate +character. Again, it was found that commercial ports had been +left out and that they too must be fortified. When this was done +spots were observed at which an enemy might effect a landing +in force, to prevent which further forts or batteries must be +erected. The most striking thing in all this is the complete +omission to take note of the conditions involved in the command +of the sea. + +Evidently it had not been understood that it was that very command +which alone had enabled the armies of western Europe to proceed, +not only without serious interruption, but also without encountering +an attempt at obstruction, to the field in the Crimea on which +their victories had been won, and that the same command would be +necessary before any hostile expedition, large enough to justify +the construction of the fortifications specially intended to +repel it, could cross the sea and get within striking distance +of our shores. It should be deeply interesting to the people +of those parts of the British Empire which lie beyond sea to +note that the defensive system comprised in the fortification +of the coast of the United Kingdom promised no security to them +in the event of war. Making all proper allowance for the superior +urgency of defending the heart of the empire, we must still admit +that no system of defence is adequate which does not provide for +the defence of other valuable parts of the great body politic +as well. + +Again, the system of defence proved to be imperfect. Every part +of the empire depended for prosperity--some parts depended for +existence--on practically unrestricted traffic on the ocean. +This, which might be assailed at many points and on lines often +thousands of miles in length, could find little or no defence in +immovable fortifications. It could not be held that the existence +of these released the fleet from all duty but that of protecting +our ocean commerce, because, if any enemy's navy was able to +carry out an operation of such magnitude and difficulty as a +serious attack on our home territory, it would assuredly be able +to carry out the work of damaging our maritime trade. Power to +do the latter has always belonged to the navy which was in a +position to extend its activity persistently to the immediate +neighbourhood of its opponent's coast-line. + +It is not to be supposed that there was no one to point this +out. Several persons did so, but being mostly sailors they were +not listened to. In actual practice the whole domain of imperial +strategy was withdrawn from the intervention of the naval officer, +as though it were something with which he could not have anything +to do. Several great wars had been waged in Europe in the meantime, +and all of them were land wars. Naval forces, if employed at all, +were employed only just enough to bring out how insignificant their +participation in them was. As was to have been expected, the habit +of attaching importance to the naval element of imperial defence +declined. The empire, nevertheless, continued to grow. Its territory +was extended; its population, notably its population of European +stock, increased, and its wealth and the subsequent operations +of exchanging its productions for those of other countries were +enormously expanded. At the same time the navy, to the strength +and efficiency of which it had to look for security, declined +absolutely, and still more relatively. Other navies were advancing: +some had, as it were, come into existence. At last the true +conditions were discerned, and the nation, almost with one voice, +demanded that the naval defences of the empire should be put +upon a proper footing. + +Let no one dismiss the foregoing retrospect as merely ancient +history. On the contrary, let all those who desire to see the +British Empire follow the path of its natural development in +tranquillity study the recent past. By doing this we shall be +able to estimate aright the position of the fleet in the defence +of the empire. We must examine the circumstances in which we +are placed. For five-and-thirty years the nations of the world +have practically lived under the rule of force. The incessant +object of every great state has been to increase the strength +of its armed forces up to the point at which the cost becomes +intolerable. Countries separated from one another only by arbitrary +geographical lines add regiment to regiment and gun to gun, and +also devise continually fresh expedients for accelerating the +work of preparing their armies to take the field. The most +pacifically inclined nation must do in this respect as its neighbours +do, on pain of losing its independence and being mutilated in +its territory if it does not. This rivalry has spread to the +sea, and fleets are increased at a rate and at a cost in money +unknown to former times, even to those of war. The possession of +a powerful navy by some state which has no reason to apprehend +over-sea invasion and which has no maritime interests, however +intrinsically important they may be, commensurate with the strength +of its fleets, may not indicate a spirit of aggression; but it +at least indicates ability to become an aggressor. Consequently, +for the British fleet to fill its proper position in the defence +of the empire it must be strong. To be strong more than large +numbers will be required. It must have the right, that is the +best, material, the best organisation, the best discipline, the +best training, the best distribution. We shall ascertain the +position that it should hold, if we examine what it would have +to do when called upon for work more active than that of peace +time. With the exception of India and Canada no part of the empire +is liable to serious attack that does not come over-sea. Any +support that can be given to India or Canada by other parts of +the empire must be conveyed across the sea also. This at once +indicates the importance of ocean lines of communication. + +War is the method adopted, when less violent means of persuasion +have failed, to force your enemy to comply with your demands. +There are three principal ways of effecting this--invasion of his +country, raids on his territory, destruction or serious damage +of his sea-borne commerce. Successful invasion must compel the +invaded to come to terms, or his national existence will be lost. +Raids upon his territory may possibly so distress him that he +would rather concede your terms than continue the struggle.[90] +Damage to his sea-borne commerce may be carried so far that he +will be ruined if he does not give in. So much for one side of +the account; we have to examine the other. Against invasion, +raids, or attempts at commerce-destruction there must be some +form of defence, and, as a matter of historical fact, defence +against each has been repeatedly successful. If we need instances +we have only to peruse the history of the British Empire. + +[Footnote 90: Though raids rarely, if ever, decide a war, they +may cause inconvenience or local distress, and an enemy desiring +to make them should be obstructed as much as possible.] + +How was it that--whilst we landed invading armies in many hostile +countries, seized many portions of hostile territory, and drove +more than one enemy's commerce from the sea--our own country has +been free from successful invasion for more than eight centuries, +few portions of our territory have been taken from us even +temporarily, and our commerce has increased throughout protracted +maritime wars? To this there can only be one answer, viz. that +the arrangements for defence were effectual. What, then, were +these arrangements? They were comprised in the provision of a +powerful, well-distributed, well-handled navy, and of a mobile +army of suitable strength. It is to be observed that each element +possessed the characteristic of mobility. We have to deal here +more especially with the naval element, and we must study the +manner in which it operates. + +Naval war is sea-power in action; and sea-power, taken in the +narrow sense, has limitations. It may not, even when so taken, +cease to act at the enemy's coast-line, but its direct influence +extends only to the inner side of a narrow zone conforming to that +line. In a maritime contest each side tries to control the ocean +communications and to prevent the other from controlling them. If +either gains the control, something in addition to sea-power +strictly defined may begin to operate: the other side's territory +may be invaded or harassed by considerable raids, and its commerce +may be driven from the sea. It will be noticed that control of +ocean communications is the needful preliminary to these. It +is merely a variant of the often employed expression of the +necessity, in war, of obtaining command of the sea. In the case +of the most important portion of the British Empire, viz. the +United Kingdom, our loss of control of the ocean communications +would have a result which scarcely any foreign country would +experience. Other countries are dependent on importations for +some part of the food of their population and of the raw material +of their industry; but much of the importation is, and perhaps +all of it may be, effected by land. Here, we depend upon imports +from abroad for a very large part of the food of our people, +and of the raw material essential to the manufacture of the +commodities by the exchange of which we obtain necessary supplies; +and the whole of these imports come, and must come to us, by +sea. Also, if we had not freedom of exportation, our wealth and +the means of supporting a war would disappear. Probably all the +greater colonies and India could feed their inhabitants for a +moderately long time without sea-borne imports, but unless the +sea were open to them their prosperity would decline. + +This teaches us the necessity to the British Empire of controlling +our maritime communications, and equally teaches those who may +one day be our enemies the advisability of preventing us from +doing so. The lesson in either case is driven farther home by +other considerations connected with communications. In war a +belligerent has two tasks before him. He has to defend himself +and hurt his enemy. The more he hurts his enemy, the less is +he likely to be hurt himself. This defines the great principle +of offensive defence. To act in accordance with this principle, +a belligerent should try, as the saying goes, to carry the war +into the enemy's country. He should try to make his opponents +fight where he wants them to fight, which will probably be as +far as possible from his own territory and as near as possible +to theirs. Unless he can do this, invasion and even serious raids +by him will be out of the question. More than that, his inability +to do it will virtually indicate that on its part the other side +can fix the scene of active hostilities unpleasantly close to +the points from which he desires to keep its forces away. + +A line of ocean communications may be vulnerable throughout its +length; but it does not follow that an assailant can operate +against it with equal facility at every point, nor does it follow +that it is at every point equally worth assailing. Lines running +past hostile naval ports are especially open to assault in the +part near the ports; and lines formed by the confluence of two or +more other lines--like, for example, those which enter the English +Channel--will generally include a greater abundance of valuable +traffic than others. Consequently there are some parts at which +an enemy may be expected to be more active than elsewhere, and +it is from those very parts that it is most desirable to exclude +him. They are, as a rule, relatively near to the territory of the +state whose navy has to keep the lines open, that is to say, +prevent their being persistently beset by an enemy. The necessary +convergence of lines towards that state's ports shows that some +portion of them would have to be traversed, or their traversing +be attempted, by expeditions meant to carry out either invasion +or raids. If, therefore, the enemy can be excluded as above +mentioned, invasions, raids, and the more serious molestation of +sea-borne commerce by him will be prevented. + +If we consider particular cases we shall find proof upon proof +of the validity of the rule. Three great lines--one from the +neighbourhood of the Cape of Good Hope, one from the Red Sea, and +a third from India and Ceylon--converge near the south-western +part of Australia and run as one line towards the territory of the +important states farther east. If an assailant can be excluded +from the latter or combined line he must either divide his force +or operate on only one of the confluents, leaving the rest free. +The farther he can be pushed back from the point of confluence +the more effectually will he be limited to a single line, because +the combining lines, traced backwards, trend more and more apart, +and it is, therefore, more and more difficult for him to keep +detachments of his force within supporting distance of each other +if they continue to act against two or more lines. The particular +case of the approaches to the territory of the United Kingdom +has the same features, and proves the rule with equal clearness. +This latter case is so often adduced without mention of others, +that there is some risk of its being believed to be a solitary +one. It stands, however, exactly on all fours with all the rest +as regards the principle of the rule. + +A necessary consequence of an enemy's exclusion from the combined +line as it approaches the territory to be defended is--as already +suggested--that invasion of that territory and serious raids +upon it will be rendered impracticable. Indeed, if the exclusion +be absolutely complete and permanent, raids of every kind and +depredations on commerce in the neighbourhood will be prevented +altogether. It should be explained that though lines and +communications are spoken of, it is the area crossed by them +which is strategically important. A naval force, either guarding +or intending to assail a line, does not necessarily station itself +permanently upon it. All that it has to do is to remain, for the +proper length of time, within the strategic area across which the +defended or threatened line runs. The strategic area will be of +varying extent, its boundaries being determined by circumstances. +The object of the defence will be to make the area from which the +enemy's ships are excluded as extensive as possible. When the +enemy has been pushed back into his own waters and into his own +ports the exclusion is strategically complete. The sea is denied +to his invading and important raiding expeditions, and indeed to +most of his individual cruisers. At the same time it is free +to the other belligerent. To effect this a vigorous offensive +will be necessary. + +The immediate theatre of operations, the critical strategic area, +need not be, and often ought not to be, near the territory defended +by our navy. It is necessary to dwell upon this, because no principle +of naval warfare has been more frequently or more seriously +misapprehended. Misapprehension of it has led to mischievous and +dangerous distribution of naval force and to the squandering of +immense sums of money on local defence vessels; that is, vessels +only capable of operating in the very waters from which every +effort should be made to exclude the enemy. Failure to exclude +him from them can only be regarded as, at the very least, yielding +to him an important point in the great game of war. If we succeed +in keeping him away, the local defence craft of every class are +useless, and the money spent on them has been worse than wasted, +because, if it had not been so spent, it might have been devoted +to strengthening the kind of force which must be used to keep +the enemy where he ought to be kept, viz. at a distance from +our own waters. + +The demand that ships be so stationed that they will generally, +and except when actually cruising, be within sight of the +inhabitants, is common enough in the mother country, and perhaps +even more common in the over-sea parts of the British Empire. +Nothing justifies it but the honest ignorance of those who make +it; nothing explains compliance with it but the deplorable weakness +of authorities who yield to it. It was not by hanging about the +coast of England, when there was no enemy near it, with his fleet, +that Hawke or Nelson saved the country from invasion, nor was it +by remaining where they could be seen by the fellow-countrymen +of their crews that the French and English fleets shut up their +enemy in the Baltic and Black Sea, and thus gained and kept +undisputed command of the sea which enabled them, without +interruption, to invade their enemy's territory. + +The condition insisted upon by the Australasian Governments in +the agreement formerly made with the Home Government, that a +certain number of ships, in return for an annual contribution +of money, should always remain in Australasian waters, was in +reality greatly against the interests of that part of the empire. +The Australasian taxpayer was, in fact, made to insist upon being +injured in return for his money. The proceeding would have been +exactly paralleled by a householder who might insist that a +fire-engine, maintained out of rates to which he contributes, +should always be kept within a few feet of his front door, and +not be allowed to proceed to the end of the street to extinguish +a fire threatening to extend eventually to the householder's own +dwelling. When still further localised naval defence--localised +defence, that is, of what may be called the smaller description--is +considered, the danger involved in adopting it will be quite as +apparent, and the waste of money will be more obvious. Localised +defence is a near relation of passive defence. It owes its origin +to the same sentiment, viz. a belief in the efficacy of staying +where you are instead of carrying the war into the enemy's country. + +There may be cases in which no other kind of naval defence is +practicable. The immense costliness of modern navies puts it out +of the power of smaller states to maintain considerable sea-going +fleets. The historic maritime countries--Sweden, Denmark, the +Netherlands, and Portugal, the performances of whose seamen are +so justly celebrated--could not now send to sea a force equal in +number and fighting efficiency to a quarter of the force possessed +by anyone of the chief naval powers. The countries named, when +determined not to expose themselves unarmed to an assailant, can +provide themselves only with a kind of defence which, whatever +its detailed composition, must be of an intrinsically localised +character. + +In their case there is nothing else to be done; and in their +case defence of the character specified would be likely to prove +more efficacious than it could be expected to be elsewhere. War +is usually made in pursuit of an object valuable enough to justify +the risks inseparable from the attempt to gain it. Aggression by +any of the countries that have been mentioned is too improbable to +call for serious apprehension. Aggression against them is far more +likely. What they have to do is to make the danger of attacking them +so great that it will equal or outweigh any advantage that could +be gained by conquering them. Their wealth and resources, compared +with those of great aggressive states, are not large enough to +make up for much loss in war on the part of the latter engaging +in attempts to seize them. Therefore, what the small maritime +countries have to do is to make the form of naval defence to +which they are restricted efficacious enough to hurt an aggressor +so much that the victory which he may feel certain of gaining +will be quite barren. He will get no glory, even in these days +of self-advertisement, from the conquest of such relatively weak +antagonists; and the plunder will not suffice to repay him for +the damage received in effecting it. + +The case of a member of the great body known as the British Empire +is altogether different. Its conquest would probably be enormously +valuable to a conqueror; its ruin immensely damaging to the body +as a whole. Either would justify an enemy in running considerable +risks, and would afford him practically sufficient compensation +for considerable losses incurred. We may expect that, in war, +any chance of accomplishing either purpose will not be neglected. +Provision must, therefore, be made against the eventuality. Let +us for the moment suppose that, like one of the smaller countries +whose case has been adduced, we are restricted to localised defence. +An enemy not so restricted would be able to get, without being +molested, as near to our territory--whether in the mother country +or elsewhere--as the outer edge of the comparatively narrow belt +of water that our localised defences could have any hope of +controlling effectively. We should have abandoned to him the whole +of the ocean except a relatively minute strip of coast-waters. That +would be equivalent to saying good-bye to the maritime commerce on +which our wealth wholly, and our existence largely, depends. No +thoughtful British subject would find this tolerable. Everyone +would demand the institution of a different defence system. A +change, therefore, to the more active system would be inevitable. +It would begin with the introduction of a cruising force in addition +to the localised force. The unvarying lesson of naval history +would be that the cruising division should gain continuously +on the localised. It is only in times of peace, when men have +forgotten, or cannot be made to understand, what war is, that +the opposite takes place. + +If it be hoped that a localised force will render coast-wise +traffic safe from the enemy, a little knowledge of what has happened +in war and a sufficiently close investigation of conditions will +demonstrate how baseless the hope must be. Countries not yet +thickly populated would be in much the same condition as the +countries of western Europe a century ago, the similarity being +due to the relative scarcity of good land communications. A +part--probably not a very large part--of the articles required +by the people dwelling on and near the coast in one section would +be drawn from another similar section. These articles could be +most conveniently and cheaply transported by water. If it were +worth his while, an enemy disposing of an active cruising force +strong enough to make its way into the neighbourhood of the coast +waters concerned would interrupt the 'long-shore traffic' and defy +the efforts of a localised force to prevent him. The history of the +Great War at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning +of the nineteenth teems with instances of interruption by our +navy of the enemy's coast-wise trade when his ocean trade had +been destroyed. The history of the American War of 1812 supplies +other instances. + +The localised defence could not attempt to drive off hostile +cruisers remaining far from the shore and meaning to infest the +great lines of maritime communication running towards it. If +those cruisers are to be driven off at all it can be done only +by cruising ships. Unless, therefore, we are to be content to +leave our ocean routes, where most crowded and therefore most +vulnerable, to the mercy of an enemy, we must have cruisers to +meet the hostile cruisers. If we still adhere to our localised +defence, we shall have two distinct kinds of force---one provided +merely for local, and consequently restricted, action; the other +able to act near the shore or far out at sea as circumstances +may demand. If we go to the expense of providing both kinds, we +shall have followed the example of the sage who cut a large hole +in his study door for the cat and a small one for the kitten. + +Is local naval defence, then, of any use? Well, to tell the truth, +not much; and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. Even in +the case of the smaller maritime countries, to which reference +has been made above, defence of the character in question would +avail little if a powerful assailant were resolved to press home his +attack. That is to say, if only absolute belligerent considerations +were regarded. In war, however, qualifying considerations can +never be left out of sight. As the great Napoleon observed, you +can no more make war without incurring losses than you can make +omelettes without breaking eggs. The strategist--and the tactician +also, within his province--will always count the cost of a proposed +operation, even where they are nearly certain of success. The +occupation of a country, which would be of no great practical +value to you when you got it, would be a poor return for the +loss to which you would have been put in the process. That loss +might, and probably would, leave you at a great disadvantage +as regards enemies more nearly on an equality with yourself. It +would, therefore, not be the improbability of breaking down the +local naval defence of a minor maritime state, but the pressure +of qualifying and only indirectly belligerent considerations, +that would prevent its being attempted. + +In a struggle between two antagonists of the first rank, the +circumstances would be different. Purely belligerent considerations +would have fuller play. Mistakes will be made, of course, for +war is full of mistakes; but it may be accepted that an attack +on any position, however defended, is in itself proof that the +assailant believed the result hoped for to be quite worth the +cost of obtaining it. Consequently, in a struggle as assumed, +every mode of defence would have to stand on its intrinsic merits, +nearly or quite unaided by the influence of considerations more +or less foreign to it. Every scrap of local defence would, in +proportion to its amount, be a diminution of the offensive defence. +Advocates of the former may be challenged to produce from naval +history any instance of local naval defence succeeding against the +assaults of an actively aggressive navy. In the late war between +Japan and Russia the Russian local defence failed completely. + +In the last case, a class of vessel like that which had failed +in local defence was used successfully, because offensively, +by the Japanese. This and many another instance show that the +right way to use the kind of craft so often allocated to local +defence is to use them offensively. It is only thus that their +adoption by a great maritime power like the British Empire can +be justified. The origin and centre of our naval strength are +to be looked for in the United Kingdom. The shores of the latter +are near the shores of other great maritime powers. Its ports, +especially those at which its fleets are equipped and would be +likely to assemble on the imminence of war, are within reach of +more than one foreign place from which small swift craft to be used +offensively might be expected to issue. The method of frustrating +the efforts of these craft giving most promise of success is to +attack them as soon as possible after they issue from their own +port. To the acceptance of this principle we owe the origin of the +destroyer, devised to destroy hostile torpedo-boats before they +could reach a position from which they would be able to discharge +with effect their special weapon against our assembled ships. +It is true that the destroyer has been gradually converted into +a larger torpedo-boat. It is also true that when used as such +in local defence, as at Port Arthur, her failure was complete; +and just as true that she has never accomplished anything except +when used offensively. + +When, therefore, a naval country's coast is so near the ports of +another naval country that the latter would be able with swift +small craft to attack the former's shipping, the provision of +craft of a similar kind is likely to prove advantageous. War +between great powers is a two-sided game, and what one side can +do the other will at least be likely to attempt. Nothing supports +the view that it is well--either above or beneath the surface of +the water--to stand on the defensive and await attack. Everything +points to the superiority of the plan of beating up the enemy's +quarters and attacking him before he can get far from them on his +way towards his objective. Consequently the only justification +of expending money on the localised vessels of which we have +been speaking, is the probability that an enemy would have some +of his bases within reach of those vessels' efforts. Where this +condition does not exist, the money expended is, from the belligerent +point of view, thrown away. Here comes in the greatest foe of +belligerent efficiency, viz. political expediency. In time of +peace it is thought better to conciliate voters than to prepare +to meet an enemy. If local defence is thought to be pleasing to +an inexpert electorate, it is only too likely to be provided, +no matter how ineffectual and how costly in reality it will turn +out to be. + +Not only is the British Empire the first of naval powers, it +is also the first of colonial powers. One attribute is closely +connected with the other; neither, without the other, would be +applicable. The magnitude of our colonial domain, and especially +the imposing aspects of some of its greater components--the Dominion, +the Commonwealth, South Africa, New Zealand--are apt to blind +us to a feature of great strategical importance, and that is +the abundance and excellence of the naval bases that stud our +ocean lines of communication. In thinking of the great daughter +states we are liable to forget these; yet our possession of them +helps greatly to strengthen our naval position, because it +facilitates our assuming a far-reaching offensive. By themselves, +if not too numerous, they can afford valuable support to the +naval operations that are likely to prove most beneficial to +us. The fact that they are ours, and not an opponent's, also +constitutes for us an advantage of importance. Of course, they +have to be defended, or else they may fall into an opponent's +hands. Have we here a case in which highly localised or even +passive defences are desirable? No doubt we did act for a time +as though we believed that the question could only be answered +in the affirmative; but that was when we were under the influence +of the feelings engendered by observation of the long series of +land wars previously discussed. + +Perhaps we have not yet quite shaken off the effects of that +influence; but we have at least got so far as to tolerate the +statement of the other side of the question. It would be a great +mistake to suppose that the places alluded to are meant to be +ports of refuge for our ships. Though they were to serve that +purpose occasionally in the case of isolated merchant vessels, it +would be but an accident, and not the essence, of their existence. +What they are meant for is to be utilised as positions where our +men-of-war can make reasonably sure of finding supplies and the +means of refit. This assurance will largely depend upon their +power of resistance if attacked. Before we can decide how to +impart that power to them we shall have to see the kind of attack +against which they would have to be prepared. If they are on a +continent, like, for example, Gibraltar, attack on them by a +land force, however improbable, is physically possible. Against +an attack of the kind a naval force could give little direct +help. Most of our outlying naval bases are really or virtually +insular, and are open to attack only by an expedition coming +across the sea. An essential characteristic of a naval base is +that it should be able to furnish supplies as wanted to the +men-of-war needing to replenish their stocks. Some, and very +often all, of these supplies are not of native production and +must be brought to the base by sea. If the enemy can stop their +conveyance to it, the place is useless as a base and the enemy is +really in control of its communications. If he is in control of its +communications he can send against it as great an expedition as he +likes, and the place will be captured or completely neutralised. +Similarly, if we control the communications, not only can supplies +be conveyed to it, but also no hostile expedition will be allowed +to reach it. Thus the primary defence of the outlying base is +the active, sea-going fleet. Moderate local defence, chiefly +of the human kind, in the shape of a garrison, will certainly be +needed. Though the enemy has not been able to obtain control +of the communications of the place, fitful raids on it will be +possible; and the place should be fortified enough and garrisoned +enough to hold out against the inconsiderable assaults comprised +in these till our own ships can drive the enemy's away. + +Outlying naval bases, though but moderately fortified, that contain +depots of stores, docks, and other conveniences, have the vice +of all immobile establishments. When war does come, some of them +almost certainly, and all of them possibly, may not be in the +right place with regard to the critical area of operations. They +cannot, however, be moved. It will be necessary to do what has +been done over and over again in war, in the latest as well as +in earlier wars, and that is, establish temporary bases in more +convenient situations. Thus much, perhaps all, of the cost and +trouble of establishing and maintaining the permanent bases will +have been wasted. This inculcates the necessity of having not +as many bases as can be found, but as few as it is possible to +get on with. + +The control of ocean communications, or the command of the sea, +being the end of naval warfare, and its acquisition being practicable +only by the assumption of a vigorous offensive, it follows as a +matter of course that we must have a strong and in all respects +efficient mobile navy. This is the fundamental condition on which +the continued existence of the British Empire depends. It is +thoroughly well known to every foreign Government, friendly or +unfriendly. The true objective in naval warfare is the enemy's +navy. That must be destroyed or decisively defeated, or intimidated +into remaining in its ports. Not one of these can be effected +without a mobile, that is a sea-going, fleet. The British Empire +may fall to pieces from causes as yet unknown or unsuspected: it +cannot be kept together if it loses the power of gaining command +of the sea. This is not a result of deliberate policy: it is +inherent in the nature of the empire, scattered as its parts are +throughout the world, with only the highway of the sea between +them. + +Such is the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire: +such are its duties towards it. Duties in the case are mutual, and +some are owed to the fleet as well as by it. It is incumbent on +every section of the empire, without neglecting its land forces, +to lend zealous help in keeping the fleet efficient. It is not +to be supposed that this can be done only by making pecuniary +contributions to its maintenance. It is, indeed, very doubtful +if any real good can be done by urging colonies to make them. +It seems certain that the objections to this are greater than +any benefit that it can confer. Badgering our fellow-subjects +beyond sea for money payments towards the cost of the navy is +undignified and impolitic. The greatest sum asked for by the +most exacting postulant would not equal a twentieth part of the +imperial naval expenditure, and would not save the taxpayer of +the mother country a farthing in the pound of his income. No one +has yet been able to establish the equity of a demand that would +take something from the inhabitants of one colony and nothing from +those of another. Adequate voluntary contribution is a different +matter. + +There are other ways in which every trans-marine possession of +the Crown can lend a hand towards perfecting the efficiency of +the fleet--ways, too, which would leave each in complete and +unmenaced control of its own money. Sea-power does not consist +entirely of men-of-war. There must be docks, refitting +establishments, magazines, and depots of stores. Ports, which +men-of-war must visit at least occasionally in war for repair or +replenishment of supplies, will have to be made secure against +the assaults which it has been said that a hastily raiding enemy, +notwithstanding our general control of the communications, might +find a chance of making. Moderate fixed fortifications are all +the passive defence that would be needed; but good and active +troops must be available. If all these are not provided by the +part of the empire in which the necessary naval bases lie, they +will have to be provided by the mother country. If the former +provides them the latter will be spared the expense of doing +so, and spared expense with no loss of dignity, and with far +less risk of friction and inconvenience than if her taxpayers' +pockets had been nominally spared to the extent of a trifling +and reluctantly paid money contribution. + +It has been pointed out on an earlier page that a country can be, +and most probably will be, more effectually defended in a maritime +war if its fleet operates at a distance from, rather than near, +its shores. Every subject of our King should long to see this +condition exist if ever the empire is involved in hostilities. It +may be--for who can tell what war will bring?--that the people +of some great trans-marine dependency will have to choose between +allowing a campaign to be conducted in their country or forcing +the enemy to tolerate it in his. If they choose the latter they +must be prepared to furnish part at least of the mobile force +that can give effect to their choice. That is to say, they must +be prepared to back up our sea-power in its efforts to keep off +the tide of war from the neighbourhood of their homes. History +shows how rarely, during the struggle between European nations +for predominance in North America, the more settled parts of +our former American Colonies were the theatre of war: but then +the colonists of those days, few comparatively as they were, sent +strong contingents to the armies that went campaigning, in the +territory of the various enemies. This was in every way better--the +sequel proved how much better--than a money contribution begged +or extorted would have been. + +Helping in the manner first suggested need not result in dissociating +our fellow-subjects beyond the seas from participation in the work +of the active sea-going fleet. It is now, and still would be, +open to them as much as to any native or denizen of the mother +country. The time has fully come when the people of the greater +outlying parts of the empire should insist upon perfect equality +of treatment with their home fellow-subjects in this matter. +They should resent, as a now quite out-of-date and invidious +distinction, any difference in qualification for entry, locality +of service, or remuneration for any rank or rating. Self-respect +and a dignified confidence in their own qualities, the excellence +of which has been thoroughly tested, will prompt the King's colonial +subjects to ask for nothing but equal chances in a force on which +is laid so large a part of the duty of defending the empire. Why +should they cut themselves off from the promising career that +service in the Royal Navy opens to the capable, the zealous, +and the honourable aspirant of every grade? Some of the highest +posts in the navy are now, or lately have been, held by men who +not only happened to be born in British Colonies, but who also +belong to resident colonial families. Surely in this there is a +strong moral cement for binding and keeping the empire together. +It is unnecessary to expatiate on the contrast between the prospect +of such a career and that which is all that a small local service +could offer. It would soon be seen towards which the enterprising +and the energetic would instinctively gravitate. + +In the defence of the British Empire the fleet holds a twofold +position. To its general belligerent efficiency, its strength +and activity, we must look if the plans of an enemy are to be +brought to nought. It, and it only, can secure for us the control +of the ocean communications, on the freedom of which from serious +interruptions the prosperity--indeed, the existence--of a scattered +body must depend. In time of peace it can be made a great +consolidating force, fostering every sentiment of worthy local +patriotism whilst obliterating all inclination to mischievous +narrow particularism, and tending to perfect the unity which gives +virtue to national grandeur and is the true secret of national +independence and strength. + + + + +XI + +NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR[91] + +[Footnote 91: Written in 1905. (Read at Institute of Naval +Architects.)] + +The subject on which I have been invited to read a paper, and +which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for +anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be +expected to allot to it. To discuss it adequately, a volume of no +diminutive size would be necessary. It may, however, be possible +to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main +outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration +certain points which, over and above their historical interest, +may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day. + +In taking account of the conditions of the Trafalgar epoch we have +to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters. These +are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted +to meet it by the British. The former of these was described in +the House of Commons by William Pitt at the beginning of the +war in words which may be used without change at the present +time. On 16th May 1803 the war, which had been interrupted by the +unstable Peace of Amiens, was definitely resumed. The struggle +was now to be a war not so much between the United Kingdom and the +French nation as between the United Kingdom and the great Napoleon, +wielding more than the resources of France alone. Speaking a week +after the declaration of war, Pitt said that any expectation of +success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition +that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of +the country by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of +descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired +and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and +protracted war. More briefly stated, the hostile plan was to +invade the United Kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel +us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the East, from +which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived. The plan +was comprehensive, but not easily concealed. What we had to do +was to prevent the invasion of the United Kingdom and defend our +trade and our outlying territories. As not one of the hostile +objects could be attained except by making a maritime expedition +of some kind, that is to say, by an expedition which had to cross +more or less extensive areas of water, it necessarily followed +that our most effective method of defence was the keeping open +of our sea communications. It became necessary for us to make +such arrangements that the maritime paths by which a hostile +expedition could approach our home-coasts, or hostile cruisers +molest our sea-borne trade, or hostile squadrons move to the +attack of our trans-marine dependencies--that all these paths +should be so defended by our navy that either the enemy would +not venture to traverse them or, if he did, that he could be +driven off. + +Short as it is, the time at my disposal permits me to give a +few details. It was fully recognised that defence of the United +Kingdom against invasion could not be secured by naval means +alone. As in the times of Queen Elizabeth, so in those of George +III, no seaman of reputation contended that a sufficient land +force could be dispensed with. Our ablest seamen always held +that small hostile expeditions could be prepared in secret and +might be able to slip through the most complete lines of naval +defence that we could hope to maintain. It was not discovered +or alleged till the twentieth century that the crew of a dinghy +could not land in this country in the face of the navy. Therefore +an essential feature of our defensive strategy was the provision +of land forces in such numbers that an invader would have no +chance of succeeding except he came in strength so great that +his preparations could not be concealed and his expedition could +not cross the water unseen. + +As our mercantile marine was to be found in nearly every sea, +though in greater accumulation in some areas than in others, its +defence against the assaults of an enemy could only be ensured +by the virtual ubiquity of our cruising force. This, of course, +involved the necessity of employing a large number of cruisers, +and of arranging the distribution of them in accordance with the +relative amount and value of the traffic to be protected from +molestation in different parts of the ocean. It may be mentioned +here that the term 'cruiser,' at the time with which we are dealing, +was not limited to frigates and smaller classes of vessels. It +included also ships of the line, it being the old belief of the +British Navy, justified by the experience of many campaigns and +consecrated by the approval of our greatest admirals, that the +value of a ship of war was directly proportionate to her capacity +for cruising and keeping the sea. + +If the ocean paths used by our merchant ships--the trade routes +or sea communications of the United Kingdom with friendly or +neutral markets and areas of production--could be kept open by +our navy, that is, made so secure that our trade could traverse +them with so little risk of molestation that it could continue to +be carried on, it resulted as a matter of course that no sustained +attack could be made on our outlying territory. Where this was +possible it was where we had failed to keep open the route or line +of communications, in which case the particular trade following +it was, at least temporarily, destroyed, and the territory to +which the route led was either cut off or seized. Naturally, +when this was perceived, efforts were made to re-open and keep +open the endangered or interrupted communication line. + +Napoleon, notwithstanding his supereminent genius, made some +extraordinary mistakes about warfare on the sea. The explanation +of this has been given by a highly distinguished French admiral. +The Great Emperor, he says, was wanting in exact appreciation +of the difficulties of naval operations. He never understood +that the naval officer--alone of all men in the world--must be +master of two distinct professions. The naval officer must be +as completely a seaman as an officer in any mercantile marine; +and, in addition to this, he must be as accomplished in the use +of the material of war entrusted to his charge as the members of +any aimed force in the world. The Emperor's plan for the invasion +of the United Kingdom was conceived on a grand scale. A great +army, eventually 130,000 strong, was collected on the coast of +north-eastern France, with its headquarters at Boulogne. The +numerical strength of this army is worth attention. By far the +larger part of it was to have made the first descent on our +territory; the remainder was to be a reserve to follow as quickly +as possible. It has been doubted if Napoleon really meant to +invade this country, the suggestion being that his collection +of an army on the shores of the Straits of Dover and the English +Channel was merely a 'blind' to cover another intended movement. +The overwhelming weight of authoritative opinion is in favour +of the view that the project of invasion was real. It is highly +significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary. +It could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval +obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the +expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to +be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected. +The numerical strength in troops which Napoleon thought necessary +compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that +concealment became quite impossible. Consequently an important +part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened +locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of +precision. + +Notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of +naval warfare, the Great Emperor had grasped one of its leading +principles. Before the Peace of Amiens, indeed before his campaign +in Egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in Italy, he had seen +that the invasion of the United Kingdom was impracticable without +first obtaining the command of the sea. His strategic plan, +therefore, included arrangements to secure this. The details of +the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered; +but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment +of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied +in Nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. The gunboats, +transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of +many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern France and the +Netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition. +Fleets of line-of-battle ships were essential parts of it, and +on their effective action the success of the scheme was largely +made to depend. This feature remained unaltered in principle when, +less than twelve months before Trafalgar, Spain took part in the +war as Napoleon's ally, and brought him a great reinforcement +of ships and important assistance in money. + +We should not fail to notice that, before he considered himself +strong enough to undertake the invasion of the United Kingdom, +Napoleon found it necessary to have at his disposal the resources +of other countries besides France, notwithstanding that by herself +France had a population more than 60 per cent. greater than that +of England. By the alliance with Spain he had added largely to +the resources on which he could draw. Moreover, his strategic +position was geographically much improved. With the exception +of that of Portugal, the coast of western continental Europe, +from the Texel to Leghorn, and somewhat later to Taranto also, +was united in hostility to us. This complicated the strategic +problem which the British Navy had to solve, as it increased the +number of points to be watched; and it facilitated the junction +of Napoleon's Mediterranean naval forces with those assembled in +his Atlantic ports by supplying him with allied ports of refuge +and refit on Spanish territory--such as Cartagena or Cadiz--between +Toulon and the Bay of Biscay. Napoleon, therefore, enforced upon +us by the most convincing of all arguments the necessity of +maintaining the British Navy at the 'two-power standard' at least. +The lesson had been taught us long before by Philip II, who did +not venture on an attempt at invading this country till he was +master of the resources of the whole Iberian peninsula as well +as of those of the Spanish dominions in Italy, in the Burgundian +heritage, and in the distant regions across the Atlantic Ocean. + +At several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was +now the master, Napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and +win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough +to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across +the water which separated the starting points of his expedition +from the United Kingdom. Command of the sea to be won by a powerful +naval combination was thus an essential element in Napoleon's +strategy at the time of Trafalgar. It was not in deciding what +was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred: +it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he +went wrong. The British strategy adopted in opposition to that +of Napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of +the command of the sea. Formulated and carried into effect by +seamen, it differed in some important features from his. We may +leave out of sight for the moment the special arrangements made +in the English Channel to oppose the movements of Napoleon's +flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft. +The British strategy at the time of Trafalgar, as far as it was +concerned with opposition to Napoleon's sea-going fleets, may be +succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which +the enemy's forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable +strength. Though some of our admirals, notably Nelson himself, +objected to the application of the term 'blockade' to their plans, +the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they +should come out they would find outside their port a British +force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them +thoroughly and destroy them. Beating them and thus having done +with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what +was desired by our admirals. This necessitated a close watch on +the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let +the history of Cornwallis's command off Brest and of Nelson's +off Toulon suffice to tell us. + +The junction of two or more of Napoleon's fleets would have ensured +over almost any single British fleet a numerical superiority that +would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost +certain. To meet this condition the British strategy contemplated +the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another, +which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment +be effected. By this step we should preserve, if not a numerical +superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force +as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment, +even if undefeated, a certainty. The strategic problem before our +navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem. +The enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards Brest +or towards Toulon. In the latter case, a superior force might +fall upon our Mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in +the Atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from +the Atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. Against +the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of Napoleon +to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off +Toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was +to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval +control of the English Channel. + +After the addition of the Spanish Navy to his own, Napoleon to +some extent modified his strategic arrangements. The essential +feature of the scheme remained unaltered. It was to effect the +junction of the different parts of his naval force and thereupon +to dominate the situation, by evading the several British fleets +or detachments which were watching his. Before Spain joined him +in the war his intention was that his escaping fleets should +go out into the Atlantic, behind the backs, as it were, of the +British ships, and then make for the English Channel. When he +had the aid of Spain the point of junction was to be in the West +Indies. + +The remarkable thing about this was the evident belief that the +command of the sea might be won without fighting for it; won, +too, from the British Navy which was ready, and indeed wished, +to fight. We now see that Napoleon's naval strategy at the time +of Trafalgar, whilst it aimed at gaining command of the sea, was +based on what has been called evasion. The fundamental principle +of the British naval strategy of that time was quite different. +So far from thinking that the contest could be settled without +one or more battles, the British admirals, though nominally +blockading his ports, gave the enemy every facility for coming out +in order that they might be able to bring him to action. Napoleon, +on the contrary, declared that a battle would be useless, and +distinctly ordered his officers not to fight one. Could it be +that, when pitted against admirals whose accurate conception of +the conditions of naval warfare had been over and over again tested +during the hostilities ended by the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon still +trusted to the efficacy of methods which had proved so successful +when he was outmanoeuvring and intimidating the generals who +opposed him in North Italy? We can only explain his attitude +in the campaign of Trafalgar by attributing to him an expectation +that the British seamen of his day, tried as they had been in +the fire of many years of war, would succumb to his methods as +readily as the military formalists of central Europe. + +Napoleon had at his disposal between seventy and eighty French, +Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line, of which some sixty-seven +were available at the beginning of the Trafalgar campaign. In +January 1805, besides other ships of the class in distant waters +or specially employed, we--on our side--had eighty ships of the +line in commission. A knowledge of this will enable us to form +some idea of the chances of success that would have attended +Napoleon's concentration if it had been effected. To protect the +passage of his invading expedition across the English Channel +he did not depend only on concentrating his more distant fleets. +In the Texel there were, besides smaller vessels, nine sail of +the line. Thus the Emperor did what we may be sure any future +intending invader will not fail to do, viz. he provided his +expedition with a respectable naval escort. The British naval +officers of the day, who knew what war was, made arrangements to +deal with this escort. Lord Keith, who commanded in the Downs, +had under him six sail of the line in addition to many frigates +and sloops; and there were five more line-of-battle ships ready +at Spithead if required. + +There had been a demand in the country that the defence of our +shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to +gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats. +This was resisted by the naval officers. Nelson had already said, +'Our first defence is close to the enemy's ports,' thus agreeing +with a long line of eminent British seamen in their view of our +strategy. Lord St. Vincent said that 'Our great reliance is on the +vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in +the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, +and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.' +These are memorable words, which we should do well to ponder +in these days. The Government of the day insisted on having the +coastal boats; but St. Vincent succeeded in postponing the +preparation of them till the cruising ships had been manned. +His plan of defence has been described by his biographer as 'a +triple line of barricade; 50-gun ships, frigates, sloops of war, +and gun-vessels upon the coast of the enemy; in the Downs opposite +France another squadron, but of powerful ships of the line, +continually disposable, to support the former or attack any force +of the enemy which, it might be imagined possible, might slip +through the squadron hanging over the coast; and a force on the +beach on all the shores of the English ports, to render assurance +doubly sure.' This last item was the one that St. Vincent had +been compelled to adopt, and he was careful that it should be in +addition to those measures of defence in the efficacy of which +he and his brother seamen believed. Concerning it his biographer +makes the following remark: 'It is to be noted that Lord St. +Vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats +by gunboats,' &c. He objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or +long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful +to have the sea-going ships manned. Speaking of this coastal +defence scheme, he said: 'It would be a good bone for the officers +to pick, but a very dear one for the country.' + +The defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy +of the time. An important part was played by our fleets and groups +of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes +direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral +vessels carrying commodities to or from British ports. The strategy +of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long +belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted +number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity +of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by +the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size. This +can be seen in the lists of successive years. In January 1803 +the number of cruising frigates in commission was 107, and of +sloops and smaller vessels 139, the total being 246. In 1804 the +numbers were: Frigates, 108; sloops, &c., 181; with a total of +289. In 1805 the figures had grown to 129 frigates, 416 sloops, +&c., the total being 545. Most of these were employed in defending +commerce. We all know how completely Napoleon's project of invading +the United Kingdom was frustrated. It is less well known that +the measures for defending our sea-borne trade, indicated by the +figures just given, were triumphantly successful. Our mercantile +marine increased during the war, a sure proof that it had been +effectually defended. Consequently we may accept it as established +beyond the possibility of refutation that that branch of our naval +strategy at the time of Trafalgar which was concerned with the +defence of our trade was rightly conceived and properly carried +into effect. + +As has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade, +being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of +communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any +rate, of our transmarine territories. Napoleon held pertinaciously +to the belief that British prosperity was chiefly due to our +position in India. We owe it to Captain Mahan that we now know +that the eminent American Fulton--a name of interest to the members +of this Institution--told Pitt of the belief held abroad that +'the fountains of British wealth are in India and China.' In the +great scheme of naval concentration which the Emperor devised, +seizure of British Colonies in the West Indies had a definite +place. We kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force +capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the +neighbouring lines of communication. In 1803 we had four ships +of the line in the West Indian area. In 1804 we had six of the +same class; and in 1805, while the line-of-battle ships were +reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine +to twenty-five. Whether our Government divined Napoleon's designs +on India or not, it took measures to protect our interests there. +In January 1804 we had on the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies +stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller +two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one ships of +war in all. This would have been sufficient to repel a raiding +attack made in some strength. By the beginning of 1805 our East +Indies force had been increased; and in the year 1805 itself we +raised it to a strength of forty-one ships in all, of which nine +were of the line and seventeen were frigates. Had, therefore, any +of the hostile ships managed to get to the East Indies from the +Atlantic or the Mediterranean ports, in which they were being +watched by our navy, their chances of succeeding in their object +would have been small indeed. + +When we enter the domain of tactics strictly so-called, that is +to say, when we discuss the proceedings of naval forces--whether +single ships, squadrons, or fleets--in hostile contact with one +another, we find the time of Trafalgar full of instructive episodes. +Even with the most recent experience of naval warfare vividly +present to our minds, we can still regard Nelson as the greatest +of tacticians. Naval tactics may be roughly divided into two great +classes or sections, viz. the tactics of groups of ships, that +is to say, fleet actions; and the tactics of what the historian +James calls 'single ship actions,' that is to say, fights between +two individual ships. In the former the achievements of Nelson +stand out with incomparable brilliancy. It would be impossible +to describe his method fully in such a paper as this. We may, +however, say that Nelson was an innovator, and that his tactical +principles and methods have been generally misunderstood down +to this very day. If ever there was an admiral who was opposed +to an unthinking, headlong rush at an enemy, it was he. Yet this +is the character that he still bears in the conception of many. +He was, in truth, an industrious and patient student of tactics, +having studied them, in what in these days we should call a +scientific spirit, at an early period, when there was but little +reason to expect that he would ever be in a position to put to a +practical test the knowledge that he had acquired and the ideas +that he had formed. He saw that the old battle formation in single +line-ahead was insufficient if you wanted--as he himself always +did--to gain an overwhelming victory. He also saw that, though +an improvement on the old formation, Lord Howe's method of the +single line-abreast was still a good deal short of tactical +perfection. Therefore, he devised what he called, with pardonable +elation, the 'Nelson touch,' the attack in successive lines so +directed as to overwhelm one part of the enemy's fleet, whilst +the other part was prevented from coming to the assistance of the +first, and was in its turn overwhelmed or broken up. His object +was to bring a larger number of his own ships against a smaller +number of the enemy's. He would by this method destroy the part +attacked, suffering in the process so little damage himself that +with his whole force he would be able to deal effectively with the +hostile remnant if it ventured to try conclusions with him. It +is of the utmost importance that we should thoroughly understand +Nelson's fundamental tactical principle, viz. the bringing of +a larger number of ships to fight against a smaller number of +the enemy's. There is not, I believe, in the whole of the records +of Nelson's opinions and actions a single expression tending to +show that tactical efficiency was considered by him to be due +to superiority in size of individual ships of the same class +or--as far as _matériel_ was concerned--to anything but superior +numbers, of course at the critical point. He did not require, +and did not have, more ships in his own fleet than the whole of +those in the fleet of the enemy. What he wanted was to bring to +the point of impact, when the fight began, a larger number of +ships than were to be found in that part of the enemy's line. + +I believe that I am right in saying that, from the date of Salamis +downwards, history records no decisive naval victory in which the +victorious fleet has not succeeded in concentrating against a +relatively weak point in its enemy's formation a greater number +of its own ships. I know of nothing to show that this has not been +the rule throughout the ages of which detailed history furnishes +us with any memorial--no matter what the class of ship, what the +type of weapon, what the mode of propulsion. The rule certainly +prevailed in the battle of the 10th August 1904 off Port Arthur, +though it was not so overwhelmingly decisive as some others. We +may not even yet know enough of the sea fight in the Straits +of Tsushima to be able to describe it in detail; but we do know +that at least some of the Russian ships were defeated or destroyed +by a combination of Japanese ships against them. + +Looking back at the tactics of the Trafalgar epoch, we may see +that the history of them confirms the experience of earlier wars, +viz. that victory does not necessarily fall to the side which +has the biggest ships. It is a well-known fact of naval history +that generally the French ships were larger and the Spanish much +larger than the British ships of corresponding classes. This +superiority in size certainly did not carry with it victory in +action. On the other hand, British ships were generally bigger +than the Dutch ships with which they fought; and it is of great +significance that at Camperdown the victory was due, not to +superiority in the size of individual ships, but, as shown by +the different lists of killed and wounded, to the act of bringing +a larger number against a smaller. All that we have been able to +learn of the occurrences in the battle of the japan Sea supports +instead of being opposed to this conclusion; and it may be said +that there is nothing tending to upset it in the previous history +of the present war in the Far East. + +I do not know how far I am justified in expatiating on this point; +but, as it may help to bring the strategy and tactics of the +Trafalgar epoch into practical relation with the stately science of +which in our day this Institution is, as it were, the mother-shrine +and metropolitical temple, I may be allowed to dwell upon it a +little longer. The object aimed at by those who favour great size +of individual ships is not, of course, magnitude alone. It is to +turn out a ship which shall be more powerful than an individual +antagonist. All recent development of man-of-war construction has +taken the form of producing, or at any rate trying to produce, +a more powerful ship than those of earlier date, or belonging to +a rival navy. I know the issues that such statements are likely +to raise; and I ask you, as naval architects, to bear with me +patiently when I say what I am going to say. It is this: If you +devise for the ship so produced the tactical system for which +she is specially adapted you must, in order to be logical, base +your system on her power of defeating her particular antagonist. +Consequently, you must abandon the principle of concentration of +superior numbers against your enemy; and, what is more, must be +prepared to maintain that such concentration on his part against +yourself would be ineffectual. This will compel a reversion to +tactical methods which made a fleet action a series of duels +between pairs of combatants, and--a thing to be pondered on +seriously--never enabled anyone to win a decisive victory on the +sea. The position will not be made more logical if you demand both +superior size and also superior numbers, because if you adopt +the tactical system appropriate to one of the things demanded, +you will rule out the other. You cannot employ at the same time +two different and opposed tactical systems. + +It is not necessary to the line of argument above indicated to +ignore the merits of the battleship class. Like their predecessors, +the ships of the line, it is really battleships which in a naval +war dominate the situation. We saw that it was so at the time +of Trafalgar, and we see that it has been so in the war between +Russia and Japan, at all events throughout the 1904 campaign. +The experience of naval war, down to the close of that in which +Trafalgar was the most impressive event, led to the virtual +abandonment of ships of the line[92] above and below a certain +class. The 64-gun ships and smaller two-deckers had greatly +diminished in number, and repetitions of them grew more and more +rare. It was the same with the three-deckers, which, as the late +Admiral Colomb pointed out, continued to be built, though in +reduced numbers, not so much for their tactical efficiency as +for the convenient manner in which they met the demands for the +accommodation required in flag-ships. The tactical condition +which the naval architects of the Trafalgar period had to meet +was the employment of an increased number of two-deckers of the +medium classes. + +[Footnote 92: Experience of war, as regards increase in the number +of medium-sized men-of-war of the different classes, tended to the +same result in both the French Revolutionary war (1793 to 1801) +and the Napoleonic war which began in 1803. Taking both contests +down to the end of the Trafalgar year, the following table will +show how great was the development of the line-of-battle-ship +class below the three-decker and above the 64-gun ship. It will +also show that there was no development of, but a relative decline +in, the three-deckers and the 64's, the small additions, where +there were any, being generally due to captures from the enemy. +The two-deckers not 'fit to lie in a line' were at the end of the +Trafalgar year about half what they were when the first period +of the 'Great War' began. When we come to the frigate classes we +find the same result. In the earlier war 11 frigates of 44 and +40 guns were introduced into our navy. It is worth notice that +this number was not increased, and by the end of the Trafalgar +year had, on the contrary, declined to 10. The smallest frigates, +of 28 guns, were 27 in 1793, and 13 at the end of the Trafalgar +year. On the other hand, the increase in the medium frigate classes +(38, 36, and 32 guns) was very large. From 1793 to the end of the +Trafalgar year the 38-gun frigates increased from 8 to 50, and +the 36-gun frigates from 16 to 54. + + ------------------------------------------------------------- +| | | Napoleonic War to | +| | French | the end of the | +| | Revolutionary War | Trafalgar year | +| Classes of Ships |-------------------|-------------------| +| |Commence-|Commence-|Commence-|Commence-| +| | ment of | ment of | ment of | ment of | +| | 1793 | 1801 | 1803 | 1806 | +|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| 3-deckers | 31 | 32 | 29 | 29 | +| 2-deckers of 74 | 76 | 111 | 105 | 123 | +| guns, and above | | | | | +| 64 and 60 gun ships | 46 | 47 | 38 | 38 | +| 2-deckers not 'fit | 43 | 31 | 21 | 22 | +| to lie in a line' | | | | | +| Frigates 44 guns | 0 | 6 | 6 | 6 | +| " 40 " | 0 | 5 | 5 | 4 | +| " 38 " | 8 | 32 | 32 | 50 | +| " 36 " | 16 | 49 | 49 | 54 | +| " 32 " | 48 | 41 | 38 | 56 | +| " 28 " | 27 | 11 | 11 | 13 | + ------------------------------------------------------------- + +The liking for three-deckers, professed by some officers of Nelson's +time, seems to have been due to a belief, not in the merit of their +size as such, but in the value of the increased number of medium +guns carried on a 'middle' deck. There is, I believe, nothing to +show that the two-deckers _Gibraltar_ (2185 tons) and _Coesar_ +(2003) were considered more formidable than the three-deckers +_Balfleur_ (1947), _Glory_ (1944), or _Queen_ (1876). All these +ships were in the same fleet, and fought in the same battle.] + +A fleet of ships of the line as long as it could keep the sea, +that is, until it had to retreat into port before a stronger +fleet, controlled a certain area of water. Within that area smaller +men-of-war as well as friendly merchant ships were secure from +attack. As the fleet moved about, so the area moved with it. +Skilful disposition and manoeuvring added largely to the extent +of sea within which the maritime interests that the fleet was +meant to protect would be safe. It seems reasonable to expect that +it will be the same with modern fleets of suitable battleships. + +The tactics of 'single ship actions' at the time of Trafalgar +were based upon pure seamanship backed up by good gunnery. The +better a captain handled his ship the more likely he was to beat +his antagonist. Superior speed, where it existed, was used to +'gain the weather gage,' not in order to get a suitable range +for the faster ship's guns, but to compel her enemy to fight. +Superior speed was also used to run away, capacity to do which +was not then, and ought not to be now, reckoned a merit in a ship +expressly constructed for fighting, not fleeing. It is sometimes +claimed in these days that superior speed will enable a modern +ship to keep at a distance from her opponent which will be the +best range for her own guns. It has not been explained why a range +which best suits her guns should not be equally favourable for the +guns of her opponent; unless, indeed, the latter is assumed to be +weakly armed, in which case the distance at which the faster ship +might engage her would be a matter of comparative indifference. +There is nothing in the tactics of the time of Trafalgar to make +it appear that--when a fight had once begun--superior speed, +of course within moderate limits, conferred any considerable +tactical advantage in 'single ship actions,' and still less in +general or fleet actions. Taking up a position ahead or astern of +a hostile ship so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated +by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state +of the ship to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather +late in an action. + +A remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly +apparent in the era of Trafalgar. I have already alluded to the +tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle ships +to those of the medium classes. The same thing may be noticed +in the case of the frigates.[93] Those of 44, 40, and 28 guns +relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number +of the 38-gun, 36-gun, and 32-gun frigates increased. The officers +who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress +on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the +sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now +call the 'battleship' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.' +In the earlier time there were ships which were intermediate +between the ship of the line and the frigate. These were the +two-deckers of 56, 54, 50, 44, and even 40 guns. They had long +been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never +counted in the frigate classes. They seemed to have held a +nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them +in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured +cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit +for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending +or other cruiser service. The two-deckers just mentioned were +looked upon by the date of Trafalgar as forming an unnecessary +class of fighting ships. Some were employed, chiefly because they +existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true +battleships on one side and true frigates on the other.[94] + +[Footnote 93: See footnote 92.] + +[Footnote 94: See footnote 92.] + +In conclusion, I would venture to say that the strategical and +tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had +been mastered by our navy by the time of the Trafalgar campaign. +The effect of those lessons showed itself in our ship-building +policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history +of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means +to belligerent ends. + + + + +XII + +THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF A FLEET[95] + +[Footnote 95: Written in 1902. (Read at the Hong-Kong United Service +Institution.)] + +A problem which is not an attractive one, but which has to be +solved, is to arrange the proper method of supplying a fleet +and maintaining its communications. In time of peace as well as +in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles +of various kinds used on board ship, viz. naval stores, ordnance +stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, &c. +If we know the quantity of each description of stores that a +ship can carry, and if we estimate the progressive consumption, +we can compute, approximately but accurately enough for practical +purposes, the time at which replenishment would be necessary and +to what amount it should be made up. As a general rule ships +stow about three months' stores and provisions. The amount of +coal and engineers' stores, measured in time, depends on the +proceedings of the ship, and can only be calculated if we know +during what portion of any given period she will be under way. +Of course, this can be only roughly estimated. In peace time we +know nearly exactly what the expenditure of ammunition within a +given length of time--say, a quarter of a year--will be. For war +conditions we can only form an estimate based upon assumptions. + +The consumption of provisions depends upon the numbers of officers +and men, and in war or peace would be much the same. The greater +activity to be expected in war would lead to more wear and tear, +and consequently to a larger expenditure of naval stores. In +peaceful times the quarterly expenditure of ammunition does not +vary materially. In case we were at war, a single action might +cause us to expend in a few hours as much as half a dozen quarterly +peace allowances. There is a certain average number of days that +a ship of a particular class is under way in a year, and the +difference between that number and 365 is, of course, the measure +of the length of time she is at anchor or in harbour. Expenditure +of coal and of some important articles of engineers' stores depends +on the relation between the time that she is stationary and the +time she is under way. It should be particularly noted that the +distinction is not between time at anchor and time at sea, but +between time at anchor and 'time under way.' If a ship leaves +her anchorage to run an engine-trial after refit, or to fire +at a target, or to adjust compasses, or to go into dock--she +burns more coal than if she remained stationary. These occasions +of movement may be counted in with the days in which the ship +is at sea, and the total taken as the number of days under way. +It may be assumed that altogether these will amount to six or +seven a month. In time of war the period under way would probably +be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting +under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable, +so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be +greatly increased. + +The point to be made here is that--independently of strategic +conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the +supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is principally +that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except +provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must +be forwarded in larger quantities or at shorter intervals than in +peace time. If, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system +of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications +being left out of consideration for the present--will merely +have to be expanded in time of war. In other words, practice in +the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards +preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions. +That a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during +hostilities will not be doubted. + +The general principles which I propose to indicate are applicable +to any station. We may allow for a squadron composed of-- + + 4 battleships, + 4 large cruisers, + 4 second-class cruisers, + 13 smaller vessels of various kinds, and + 3 destroyers, + +being away from the principal base-port of the station for several +months of the year. The number of officers and men would be, in +round numbers, about 10,000. + +In estimating the amounts of stores of different kinds required +by men-of-war, it is necessary--in order to allow for proper +means of conveyance--to convert tons of dead-weight into tons +by measurement, as the two are not always exactly equivalent. In +the following enumeration only estimated amounts are stated, and +the figures are to be considered as approximate and not precise. +It is likely that in each item an expert maybe able to discover +some variation from the rigorously exact; but the general result +will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, especially +as experience will suggest corrections. + +A thousand men require about 3.1 tons of victualling stores, +packages included, daily, We may make this figure up to 3.5 tons +to allow for 'medical comforts' and canteen stores, Consequently +10,000 men require about 35 tons a day, and about 6300 tons for +six months. The assumed squadron, judging from experience, would +require in peace time about 600 tons of engineers' stores, about +400 tons of naval stores, and--if the ships started with only their +exact allowance on board and then carried out a full quarterly +practice twice--the quantity of ordnance stores and ammunition +required would be about 1140 tons, to meet the ordinary peace +rate of expenditure, We thus get for a full six months' supply +the following figures:-- + + Victualling stores 6,300 tons. + Engineers' stores 600 " + Naval stores 400 " + Ordnance stores and ammunition 1,140 " + ----- + Total 8,440 " + +Some allowance must be made for the needs of the 'auxiliaries,'[96] +the vessels that bring supplies and in other ways attend on the +fighting ships. This may be put at 7 per cent. The tonnage required +would accordingly amount in all to about 9000. + +[Footnote 96: The 7 per cent. mentioned in the text would probably +cover nearly all the demands--except coal--of auxiliaries, which +would not require much or any ammunition. Coal is provided for +separately.] + +The squadron would burn in harbour or when stationary about 110 +tons of coal a day, and when under way about 1050 tons a day. For +140 harbour-days the consumption would be about 15,400 tons; and +for 43 days under way about 45,150: so that for coal requirements +we should have the following:-- + + Harbour consumption 15,400 tons. + Under-way consumption 45,150 " + ------ + Total for fighting ships 60,550 " + 7 per cent. for auxiliaries (say) 4,250 " + ------ + Grand total 64,800 " + +Some time ago (in 1902) a representation was made from the China +station that, engine-room oil being expended whenever coal is +expended, there must be some proportion between the quantities +of each. It was, therefore, suggested that every collier should +bring to the squadron which she was supplying a proportionate +quantity of oil. This has been approved, and it has been ordered +that the proportions will be 75 gallons of oil to every 100 tons +of coal.[97] It was also suggested that the oil should be carried +in casks of two sizes, for the convenience of both large and +small ships. + +[Footnote 97: I was informed (on the 10th December 1902), some +time after the above was written, that the colliers supplying +the United States Navy are going to carry 100 gallons of oil +for every 100 tons of coal.] + +There is another commodity, which ships have never been able to +do without, and which they need now in higher proportion than +ever. That commodity is fresh water. The squadron constituted +as assumed would require an average of about 160 tons of fresh +water a day, and nearly 30,000 tons in six months. Of this the +ships, without adding very inconveniently to their coal consumption, +might themselves distil about one-half; but the remaining 15,000 +tons would have to be brought to them; and another thousand tons +would probably be wanted by the auxiliaries, making the full +six months' demand up to 16,000 tons. + +The tonnage requirements of the squadron and its 'auxiliaries' +for a full six months' period would be about 74,000, without +fresh water. As, however, the ships would have started with full +store-rooms, holds, and bunkers, and might be expected to return +to the principal base-port of the station at the end of the period, +stores for four-and-a-half months', and coal to meet twenty weeks', +consumption would be sufficient. These would be about 6750 tons +of stores and ammunition and 46,000 tons of coal.[98] + +[Footnote 98: To avoid complicating the question, the water or +distilling vessel, the hospital ship, and the repair vessel have +not been considered specially. Their coal and stores have been +allowed for.] + +The stores, &c., would have to be replenished twice and--as it would +not be prudent to let the ships run right out of them--replenishment +should take place at the end of the second and at the end of the +fourth months. Two vessels carrying stores and ammunition, if +capable of transporting a cargo of nearly 1700 tons apiece, would +bring all that was wanted at each replenishment. To diminish risk +of losing all of one description of supplies, if carried by itself +in a separate vessel, it has been considered desirable that each +supply-carrier, when employed, is to contain some ammunition, +some stores, and some provisions. There are great advantages +in having supply-carriers, including, of course, colliers, of +moderate size. Many officers must have had experience of the +inconvenience and delay due to the employment of a single very +large vessel which could only coal one man-of-war at a time. +Several vessels, each carrying a moderate amount of cargo, would +permit much more rapid replenishment of the ships of a squadron. +The inconvenience that would be caused by the loss or breakdown +of a supply-carrier would be reduced by employing several vessels +of moderate cargo-capacity instead of only one or two of great +capacity. + +Each battleship and large cruiser of the assumed squadron may be +expected to burn about 1000 tons of coal in five weeks, so that +the quantity to be used in that time by all those ships would +be 8000 tons. The remaining ships, scattered between different +places as most of them would probably be, would require about +3500 tons. Therefore, every five weeks or so 11,500 tons of coal +would be required. Four replenishments would be necessary in the +whole period, making a total of 46,000 tons. Each replenishment +could be conveyed in five colliers with 2300 tons apiece. + +Moderate dimensions in store- and coal-carriers would prove +convenient, not only because it would facilitate taking in stores +and coaling, if all the squadron were assembled at one place, +but also if part were at one place and part at another. Division +into several vessels, instead of concentration in a few, would +give great flexibility to the system of supply. A single very +capacious cargo-carrier might have to go first to one place and +supply the ships there, and then go to supply the remaining ships +lying at another anchorage. This would cause loss of time. The +same amount of cargo distributed amongst two or more vessels +would permit the ships at two or more places to be supplied +simultaneously. + +You may have noticed that I have been dealing with the question +as though stores and coal were to be transported direct to the +men-of-war wherever they might be and put straight on board them +from the carrying-vessels. There is, as you all know, another +method, which may be described as that of 'secondary bases.' +Speaking generally, each of our naval stations has a principal +base at which considerable or even extensive repairs of the ships +can be effected and at which stores are accumulated. Visits to +it for the sake of repair being necessary, the occasion may be +taken advantage of to replenish supplies, so that the maintenance +of a stock at the place makes for convenience, provided that +the stock is not too large. The so-called 'secondary base' is +a place at which it is intended to keep in store coal and other +articles in the hope that when war is in progress the supply of +our ships may be facilitated. It is a supply, and not a repairing +base. + +A comparison of the 'direct' system and 'secondary base' system +may be interesting. A navy being maintained for use in war, it +follows, as a matter of course, that the value of any part of +its equipment or organisation depends on its efficiency for war +purposes. The question to be answered is--Which of the two systems +promises to help us most during hostilities? This does not exclude +a regard for convenience and economy in time of peace, provided +that care is taken not to push economy too far and not to make +ordinary peace-time convenience impede arrangements essential +to the proper conduct of a naval campaign. + +It is universally admitted that a secondary base at which stocks +of stores are kept should be properly defended. This necessitates +the provision of fortifications and a garrison. Nearly every +article of naval stores of all classes has to be brought to our +bases by sea, just as much as if it were brought direct to our +ships. Consequently the communications of the base have to be +defended. They would continue to need defending even if our ships +ceased to draw supplies from it, because the communications of +the garrison must be kept open. We know what happened twice over +at Minorca when the latter was not done. + +The object of accumulating stores at a secondary base is to +facilitate the supply of fighting ships, it being rather confidently +assumed that the ships can go to it to replenish without being +obliged to absent themselves for long from the positions in which +they could best counteract the efforts of the enemy. When war is +going on it is not within the power of either side to arrange +its movements exactly as it pleases. Movements must, at all events +very often, conform to those of the enemy. It is not a bad rule +when going to war to give your enemy credit for a certain amount +of good sense. Our enemy's good sense is likely to lead him to +do exactly what we wish him not to do, and not to do that which +we wish him to do. We should, of course, like him to operate so +that our ships will not be employed at an inconvenient distance +from our base of supplies. If we have created permanent bases in +time of peace the enemy will know their whereabouts as well as +we do ourselves, and, unless he is a greater fool than it is safe +to think he is, he will try to make us derive as little benefit +from them as possible. He is likely to extend his operations to +localities at a distance from the places to which, if we have +the secondary base system of supply, he knows for certain that our +ships must resort. We shall have to do one of two things--either +let him carry on his operations undisturbed, or conform to his +movements. To this is due the common, if not invariable, experience +of naval warfare, that the fleet which assumes the offensive +has to establish what are sometimes called 'flying bases,' to +which it can resort at will. This explains why Nelson rarely +used Gibraltar as a base; why we occupied Balaclava in 1854; and +why the Americans used Guantanamo Bay in 1898. The flying base is +not fortified or garrisoned in advance. It is merely a convenient +anchorage, in a good position as regards the circumstances of +the war; and it can be abandoned for another, and resumed, if +desirable, as the conditions of the moment dictate. + +It is often argued that maintenance of stocks of stores at a +secondary base gives a fleet a free hand and at least relieves +it from the obligation of defending the line of communications. +We ought to examine both contentions. It is not easy to discover +where the freedom comes in if you must always proceed to a certain +place for supplies, whether convenient or not. It may be, and +very likely will be, of the utmost importance in war for a ship +to remain on a particular station. If her coal is running short +and can only be replenished by going to a base, go to the base she +must, however unfortunate the consequences. It has been mentioned +already that nearly every item on our store list has to be brought +to a base by sea. Let us ascertain to what extent the accumulation +of a stock at a place removes the necessity of defending the +communication line. Coal is so much the greater item that +consideration of it will cover that of all the rest. + +The squadron, as assumed, requires about 11,500 tons of coal +every five weeks in peace time. Some is commonly obtained from +contractors at foreign ports; but to avoid complicating the subject +we may leave contract issues out of consideration. If you keep +a stock of 10,000 tons at your permanent secondary base, you +will have enough to last your ships about four-and-a-half weeks. +Consequently you must have a stream of colliers running to the +place so as to arrive at intervals of not more than about thirty +days. Calculations founded on the experience of manoeuvres show +that in war time ships would require nearly three times the quantity +used in peace. It follows that, if you trebled your stock of +coal at the base and made it 30,000 tons, you would in war still +require colliers carrying that amount to arrive about every four +weeks. Picture the line of communications with the necessary +colliers on it, and see to what extent you are released from +the necessity of defending it. The bulk of other stores being +much less than that of coal, you could, no doubt, maintain a +sufficient stock of them to last through the probable duration +of the war; but, as you must keep your communications open to +ensure the arrival of your coal, it would be as easy for the +other stores to reach you as it would be for the coal itself. +Why oblige yourself to use articles kept long in store when much +fresher ones could be obtained? Therefore the maintenance of +store depots at a secondary base no more releases you from the +necessity of guarding your communications than it permits freedom +of movement to your ships. + +The secondary base in time of war is conditioned as follows. If +the enemy's sphere of activity is distant from the base which +you have equipped with store-houses and fortifications, the place +cannot be of any use to you. It can, and probably will, be a +cause of additional anxiety to you, because the communications +of its garrison must still be kept open. If it is used, freedom +of movement for the ships must be given up, because they cannot +go so far from it as to be obliged to consume a considerable +fraction of their coal in reaching it and returning to their +station. The line along which your colliers proceed to it must +be effectively guarded. + +Contrast this with the system of direct supply to the ships-of-war. +You choose for your flying base a position which will be as near +to the enemy's sphere of action as you choose to make it. You +can change its position in accordance with circumstances. If you +cease to use the position first chosen you need trouble yourself +no more about its special communications. You leave nothing at it +which will make it worth the enemy's while to try a dash at it. +The power of changing the flying base from one place to another +gives almost perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships. +Moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position +selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed +base. + +The defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on +the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route, +viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant. +Within the last few years a good deal has been written about +the employment of cruisers. The favourite idea seems to be that +peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to +take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. The history +of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. We need not forget +Nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number +attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of +vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually +unaltered. At the beginning of 1805, the year of Trafalgar, we +had--besides other classes--232 frigates and sloops in commission; +at the beginning of 1806 we had 264. It is doubtful if forty of +these were attached to fleets. + +It is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels +of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep +up with the fighting ships when at sea. This, perhaps, is due +to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on +the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. In +practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very +short time--from its supplies. Its movements depend on those of +its supply-train. The corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet +or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. As long as +these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered, +and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. All +that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right +place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying +that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies +and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called +communications'--the phrase being Mahan's. + +The efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely +on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. Why do +we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace +so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails +before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? There are +two reasons. One is, because we have used the permanent base +method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find +it difficult to form a conception of any other. The other reason +is that the direct supply method is thought to be too costly. +The first reason need not detain us. It is not worthy of even +a few minutes' consideration. The second reason deserves full +investigation. + +We ought to be always alive to the necessity of economy. The only +limit to economy of money in any plan of naval organisation is +that we should not carry it so far that it will be likely to impair +efficiency. Those who are familiar with the correspondence of the +great sea-officers of former days will have noticed how careful +they were to prevent anything like extravagant expenditure. This +inclination towards a proper parsimony of naval funds became +traditional in our service. The tradition has, perhaps, been +rather weakened in these days of abundant wealth; but we should +do our best not to let it die out. Extravagance is a serious foe +to efficient organisation, because where it prevails there is +a temptation to try imperfectly thought-out experiments, in the +belief that, if they fail, there will still be plenty of money +to permit others to be tried. This, of course, encourages slovenly +want of system, which is destructive of good organisation. + +We may assume, for the purposes of our investigation, that our +permanently equipped secondary base contains a stock of 10,000 tons +of coal. Any proportionate quantity, however, may be substituted +for this, as the general argument will remain unaffected. As +already intimated, coal is so much greater in bulk and aggregate +cost than any other class of stores that, if we arrange for its +supply, the provision of the rest is a comparatively small matter. +The squadron which we have had in view requires an estimated +amount of 46,000 tons of coal in six months' period specified, +and a further quantity of 4600 tons may be expected to suffice +for the ships employed in the neighbouring waters during the +remainder of the year. This latter amount would have to be brought +in smaller cargoes, say, five of 920 tons each. Allowing for +the colliers required during the six months whilst the whole +squadron has to be supplied an average cargo of 2300 tons, we +should want twenty arrivals with an aggregate of 46,000 tons, +and later on five arrivals of smaller colliers with an aggregate +of 4600 tons to complete the year. + +The freight or cost of conveyance to the place need not be considered +here, as it would be the same in either system. If we keep a stock +of supplies at a place we must incur expenditure to provide for +the storage of the articles. There would be what may be called +the capital charges for sites, buildings, residences, jetties, +tram lines, &c., for which £20,000 would probably not be enough, +but we may put it at that so as to avoid the appearance of +exaggeration. A further charge would be due to the provision of +tugs or steam launches, and perhaps lighters. This would hardly +be less than £15,000. Interest on money sunk, cost of repairs, +and maintenance, would not be excessive if they amounted to £3500 +a year. There must be some allowance for the coal used by the +tugs and steam launches. It is doubtful if £500 a year would +cover this; but we may put it at that. Salaries and wages of +staff, including persons employed in tugs and steam launches, +would reach quite £2500 a year. It is to be noted that the items +which these charges are assumed to cover cannot be dispensed +with. If depots are established at all, they must be so arranged +that the stores deposited in them can be securely kept and can +be utilised with proper expedition. The total of the charges +just enumerated is £6500 a year. + +There are other charges that cannot be escaped. For example, +landing a ton of coal at Wei-hai-wei, putting it into the depot, +and taking it off again to the man-of-war requiring it, costs $1 +20 cents, or at average official rate of exchange two shillings. +At Hong-Kong the cost is about 2s. 5d. a ton. The charge at 2s. +per ton on 50,600 tons would be £5060. I am assured by every +engineer officer to whom I have spoken on the subject that the +deterioration in coal due to the four different handlings which +it has to undergo if landed in lighters and taken off again to +ships from the coal-store cannot be put at less than 10 per cent. +Note that this is over and above such deterioration as would be +due to passing coal direct from the hold of a collier alongside +into a ship's bunkers. If anyone doubts this deterioration it would +be well for him to examine reports on coal and steam trials. He +will be unusually fortunate if he finds so small a deterioration as +10 per cent. The lowest that I can remember having seen reported +is 20 per cent.; reports of 30 and even 40 per cent. are quite +common. Some of it is for deterioration due to climate and length +of time in store. This, of course, is one of the inevitable +conditions of the secondary base system, the object of which is +to keep in stock a quantity of the article needed. Putting the +purchase price of the coal as low as 15s. a ton, a deterioration +due to repeated handling only of 10 per cent. on 50,600 tons +would amount to £3795. + +There is nearly always some loss of coal due to moving it. I +say 'nearly always' because it seems that there are occasions +on which coal being moved increases in bulk. It occurs when +competitive coaling is being carried on in a fleet and ships +try to beat records. A collier in these circumstances gives out +more coal than she took in. We shall probably be right if we +regard the increase in this case as what the German philosophers +call 'subjective,' that is, rather existent in the mind than in +the external region of objective, palpable fact. It may be taken +as hardly disputable that there will be less loss the shorter +the distance and the fewer the times the coal is moved. Without +counting it we see that the annual expenses enumerated are-- + + Establishment charges £6,500 + Landing and re-shipping 5,060 + Deterioration 3,795 + ------- + £15,355 + +This £15,355 is to be compared with the cost of the direct supply +system. The quantity of coal required would, as said above, have +to be carried in twenty colliers--counting each trip as that of +a separate vessel--with, on the average, 2300 tons apiece, and +five smaller ones. It would take fully four days to unload 2300 +tons at the secondary base, and even more if the labour supply +was uncertain or the labourers not well practised. Demurrage +for a vessel carrying the cargo mentioned, judging from actual +experience, would be about £32 a day; and probably about £16 a +day for the smaller vessels. If we admit an average delay, per +collier, of eighteen days, that is, fourteen days more than the +time necessary for removing the cargo into store, so as to allow +for colliers arriving when the ships to be coaled are absent, we +should get-- + + 20 X 14 X 32 £8,960 + 5 X 14 X 16 1,120 + ------- + £10,080 + +as the cost of transferring the coal from the holds to the +men-of-war's bunkers on the direct supply system. An average +of eighteen days is probably much too long to allow for each +collier's stay till cleared: because, on some occasions, ships +requiring coal may be counted on as sure to be present. Even +as it is, the £10,080 is a smaller sum than the £11,560 which +the secondary base system costs over and above the amount due to +increased deterioration of coal. If a comparison were instituted +as regards other kinds of stores, the particular figures might +be different, but the general result would be the same. + +The first thing that we have got to do is to rid our minds of +the belief that because we see a supply-carrier lying at anchor +for some days without being cleared, more money is being spent +than is spent on the maintenance of a shore depot. There may be +circumstances in which a secondary base is a necessity, but they +must be rare and exceptional. We saw that the establishment of one +does not help us in the matter of defending our communications. +We now see that, so far from being more economical than the +alternative method, the secondary base method is more costly. It +might have been demonstrated that it is really much more costly +than the figures given make it out to be, because ships obliged +to go to a base must expend coal in doing so, and coal costs +money. It is not surprising that consideration of the secondary +base system should evoke a recollection of the expression applied +by Dryden to the militia of his day: + + In peace a charge; in war a weak defence. + +I have to say that I did not prepare this paper simply for the +pleasure of reading it, or in order to bring before you mere +sets of figures and estimates of expense. My object has been +to arouse in some of the officers who hear me a determination +to devote a portion of their leisure to the consideration of +those great problems which must be solved by us if we are to +wage war successfully. Many proofs reach me of the ability and +zeal with which details of material are investigated by officers +in these days. The details referred to are not unimportant in +themselves; but the importance of several of them if put together +would be incomparably less than that of the great question to +which I have tried to direct your attention. + +The supply of a fleet is of high importance in both peace time +and time of war. Even in peace it sometimes causes an admiral to +pass a sleepless night. The arrangements which it necessitates +are often intricate, and success in completing them occasionally +seems far off. The work involved in devising suitable plans is +too much like drudgery to be welcome to those who undertake it. +All the same it has to be done: and surely no one will care to +deny that the fleet which has practised in quiet years the system +that must be followed in war will start with a great advantage on +its side when it is at last confronted with the stern realities +of naval warfare. + + +POSTSCRIPT + +The question of 'Communications,' if fully dealt with in the +foregoing paper, would have made it so long that its hearers might +have been tired out before its end was reached. The following +summary of the points that might have been enlarged upon, had +time allowed, may interest many officers:-- + +In time of war we must keep open our lines of communication. + +If we cannot, the war will have gone against us. + +Open communications mean that we can prevent the enemy from carrying +out decisive and sustained operations against them and along +their line. + +To keep communications open it is not necessary to secure every +friendly ship traversing the line against attacks by the enemy. +All that is necessary is to restrict the enemy's activity so +far that he can inflict only such a moderate percentage of loss +on the friendly vessels that, as a whole, they will not cease +to run. + +Keeping communications open will not secure a friendly place +against every form of attack. It will, however, secure a place +against attacks with large forces sustained for a considerable +length of time. If he can make attacks of this latter kind, it +is clear that the enemy controls the communications and that +we have failed to keep them open. + +If communications are open for the passage of vessels of the +friendly mercantile marine, it follows that the relatively much +smaller number of supply-vessels can traverse the line. + +As regards supply-vessels, a percentage of loss caused by the +enemy must be allowed for. If we put this at 10 per cent.--which, +taken absolutely, is probably sufficient--it means that _on_the_ +_average_ out of ten supply-vessels sent we expect nine to reach +their destination. + +We cannot, however, arrange that an equal loss will fall on every +group of ten vessels. Two such groups may arrive intact, whilst +a third may lose three vessels. Yet the 10 per cent. average +would be maintained. + +This condition has to be allowed for. Investigations some years +ago led to the conclusion that it would be prudent to send five +carriers for every four wanted. + +The word 'group' has been used above only in a descriptive sense. +Supply-carriers will often be safer if they proceed to their +destination separately. This, however, depends on circumstances. + + + + +INDEX + +Adventure, voyages of +Agincourt, battle of +Alcester, Lord +Alexander the Great +Alexandria, bombardment of +American War of Independence; Sir Henry Maine on +---- War of Secession; raids in +---- War with Spain +Ammunition, supply of; alleged shortage at the defeat of the + Armada +Army co-operation +Athenian Navy; at the battle of Syracuse +Australian Fleet, localisation of +Austro-Prussian War + + Baehr, C. F +Balaclava, capture of +Bantry Bay, French invasion of +Battleships, merits of; coal consumption of +Beer, for the Navy +Benedek, General +Blockades +Bounty for recruits +Brassey, Lord +Bright, Rev. J. F. +Brougham, Lord +Brunswick-Oels, Duke of +Burchett, quoted +Burleigh, Lord +Byng, Admiral (_see_under_ Torrington, Earl of). + +Cadiz, Expedition +Camperdown, battle of +Camperdown, Lord +Cardigan Bay, French invasion of +Carnot, President +Carrying trade, of the colonies; of the world +Carthaginian Navy; fall of +Cawdor, Lord +Centralisation, evils of +Charles II, King +'Chatham Chest' +Chevalier, Captain; quoted +Chino-Japanese War +Chioggia, battle of +Coal, allowance of; bases for; cost of +Coast defence (_see_also_under_ Invasion) +Collingwood, Admiral, at Trafalgar +Colomb, Vice-Admiral P. H.; on the Chino-Japanese War; on the + command of the sea; on Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar +Colonies, naval bases in the; contributions by the; and terms + of service in the navy +Command of the sea; and the claim to a salute; in the Crimean + War; local and temporary; and the French invasion; land + fortification and; in war; and our food supply; essential + to the Empire +Commerce, protection of naval; destruction of; at the time of + Trafalgar +Communications, in war; control of; with naval bases; of a + fleet +Corbett, Mr. Julian; on Nelson +Cornwallis, Admiral +Crécy, battle of +Crimean War; command of the sea in; mortality in +Cromwell, Oliver +Cruisers, necessity for; their equivalent at Trafalgar; coal + consumption of; duties of +Crusades + +Dacres, Rear-Admiral +De Burgh, Hubert +De Galles, Admiral Morard +De Grasse, Admiral +De la Gravière, Admiral +De Ruyter, Admiral +Defence, of naval commerce; against invasion; offensive; + inefficiency of localised; against raids +Desbrière, Capt. +Destroyers, origin of +Dewey, Admiral +'Dictionary of National Biography' +Dockyards, fortification of +Dornberg, Colonel +Drake, Sir Francis +Drury Lane Pantomime +Dryden, quoted +Duncan, Lord; Life of; quoted +Dundonald, Lord +Duro, Captain +Dutch East India Co. +---- Navy +---- War + + Economy and Efficiency +Edward III, King +Egypt, French Expedition to +Ekins, Sir Charles +Elizabeth (Queen) and her seamen +Empire, the defence of; and control of ocean communications +English Channel, command of the +Exploration, voyages of + +Fishguard, French invasion of +Fleet, positions in war for the; duties of the; and the defence + of Empire; supply and communications of the +'Fleet in being' +Food supply and control of the sea +Foods, preservation of +Foreign seamen, in our merchant service; their exemption from + impressment +Franco-German War +Froude's History +Fulton, quoted + + Gardiner, Dr. S. R., quoted +Genoese Navy +German Navy, in the Baltic +Gibbon, quoted +Gibraltar; siege of +Gravelines, battle of +Greek Navy +Green, J. R., quoted +Grierson, Colonel B. H. +Grouchy, Admiral +Gutteridge, Mr. + + Hall, Mr. Hubert +Hammond, Dr. W. A. +'Handy man' evolution of the +Hannay, Mr. D. +Hannibal +Hawke, Lord +Hawkins, Sir J. +Herodotus, quoted +History, influence of naval campaigns on; of war +Hoche, General +Holm, Adolf +Hood, Lord; and Nelson +Hosier, Admiral +Howard of Effingham, Lord; quoted +Howe, Lord; at Gibraltar; his tactics +Hughes, Sir Edward +Humbert's Bxpedition + +_Illustrious_ Training School +Impressment; exemption of foreigners from; inefficiency of; + legalised forcible; popular misconceptions of; exemptions + from (_see_also_under_ Press gang) +Indian Mutiny +International law, and the sea; and the sale of bad food +Invasion, prevention of; of British Isles; over sea and land + raids; land defence against; as a means of war +Ireland, French invasion of + + Jamaica, seizure of +James, quoted +Japan and China war +Jena, battle of +Jessopp, Dr. A. +Joyeuse, Admiral Villaret + + Keith, Lord +Killigrew, Vice-Admiral +Kinglake, quoted + +La Hogue, battle of +Laughton, Professor Sir J. K.; 'Defeat of the Armada,'; on + Nelson +Lepanto, battle of +Lindsay, W. S. +Local defence, inefficiency of; of naval bases +Lyons, Admiral Lord + +Mahan, Captain A. T.; on the Roman Navy; on sea commerce; on + early naval warfare; on the naval 'calling'; on the American + War of Independence; influence of his teaching; on the + Spanish-American War; on control of the sea; on impressment; + on Nelson at Trafalgar +Malaga, battle of +Manoeuvres +Marathon, battle of +Marines and impressment +Martin, Admiral Sir T. Byam +Medina-Sidonia, Duke of +Mediterranean, command of the +Mends, Dr. Stilon +---- Admiral Sir W. +Merchant Service, foreign seamen in our; historical relations + of the navy with the; its exemption from impressment (_see_ + _also_under_ Commerce) +Minorca +Mischenko, General +Mortality from disease in war +Motley, quoted +Mutiny at the Nore + +Napoleon, Emperor; and the invasion of England; expedition + to Egypt; on losses in War +Naval bases; defence of; cost of +_Naval_Chronicle_ +Naval strategy; in the American War of Independence; the frontier + in; and command of the sea; the fleet's position in War; + compared with military; and the French Expedition to Egypt; + in defence of Empire; for weak navies; at the time of Trafalgar +---- tactics, Nelson's achievements in; at Trafalgar; consideration + of cost in +---- warfare, influence on history of; the true objective in + (_see_also_under_ War) +Navies, costliness of; strength of foreign +Navigation Act (1651) +Navy, necessity for a strong; and Army co-operation; human + element in the; changes in organisation; conditions of service + in the; peace training of the; historical relations with the + merchant service; impressment in the; records of the; Queen + Elizabeth's; victualling the; pay in the; its mobility; and + the two-power standard; question of size of ships for the; + economy and efficiency in the +Navy Records Society +Nelson, Lord; on blockades; and the 'Nile'; his strategy; and + Trafalgar; his tactics +Netley Hospital +Newbolt, Mr. H. +Nile, battle of the + + Oil, ship's allowance of +Oppenheim, Mr. M. +Oversea raids + +Palmer, Six Henry +Peace training, and war; of the 'handy man' +Pepys, quoted +Pericles, quoted +Persian Navy +Peter the Great +Phillip, Rear-Admiral Arthur +Phoenician Navy +Pitt, William; quoted +Piracy +Pocock, Rev. Thomas +Poitiers, battle of +Policing the sea +Port Arthur, battle off +Ports, fortification of +Portuguese Navy +Press gang; popular misconceptions of the; facts and fancies + about the; in literature and art; operations of the +Price, Dr. + +Quiberon Bay, battle of + + Raiding attacks; prevention of +Raids, oversea and on land +Raleigh, Sir Walter +Recruiting, from the merchant service; by the press gang +Recruits, bounty for +Rhodes Navy +Robinson, Commander +Rodney, Lord +Rogers, Thorold +Roman Navy +Rooke, Sir George +Roosevelt, Mr. Theodore, quoted +Russo-Japanese War +---- Turkish War + +St. Vincent, Lord +Salamis, battle of +Salute, the claim to a +Saracen Navy +Schill, Colonel +Sea, International law and the +Sea Power, history and meaning of the term; defined; influence + on history of naval campaigns; of the Phoenicians; of Greece + and Persia; of Rome and Carthage; in the Middle Ages; of the + Saracens; and the Crusades; of Venice, Pisa and Genoa; of the + Turks; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; of Portugal + and Spain; rise in England of; and exploration and adventure; + and military co-operation; of the Dutch; and naval strategy; + in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; examples of + its efficiency; in recent times; in Crimean War; in American + War of Secession; in Russo-Turkish war; in Chino-Japanese War; + in Spanish-American War +Sebastopol, siege of +Seeley, Sir J. R. +Seymour, Lord Henry +Ships for the navy, question of size of; for supply +Sismondi, quoted +Sluys, battle of +Smith, Sir Sydney +Spanish Armada, defeat of the; Records of; Queen Elizabeth and the +---- American War +Spanish Indies +---- Navy +Spartan Army +Stirling, Sir James +Stores, reserve of ship's +Strategy (_see_under_ Naval Strategy) +Stuart, General J. E. B. +Suffren, Admiral +Supply and communications of a fleet +Supply ships, sizes of +Syracuse, battle of + +Tactics (_see_under_ Naval Tactics) +Tate, Colonel +Themistocles; and the Greek Navy +Thucydides, quoted +_Times_, quoted +Torpedo boats, defence against +Torrington, Earl of +Tourville, Admiral +Trafalgar, battle of; tactics of; British losses at; the attack; + contemporary strategy and tactics +Training (_see_under_ Peace Training) +Turkish Navy + +United States Navy + + Venetian Navy +Victualling allowances; and modern preserved foods + +Walcheren Expedition, mortality in Wales, French invasion of + + + + + +War, and its chief lessons; human element in; the unexpected + in; under modern conditions; how to avoid surprise in; + mortality from disease in; methods of making; command of the + sea in; compensation for losses in; Napoleon on loss of life + in; supplies in (_see_also_under_ Invasion, Naval Warfare, + and Raids) +Washington, George +Water, ship's allowance of +Waterloo, battle of +Wellington, Duke of +William III, King +Wilmot, Sir S. Eardley + +Xerxes; his highly trained Army + + +THE END + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Sea-Power and Other Studies +by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10694 *** diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cc0f24 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #10694 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10694) diff --git a/old/10694-8.txt b/old/10694-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d20418 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10694-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8708 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Sea-Power and Other Studies +by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Sea-Power and Other Studies + +Author: Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge + +Release Date: January 12, 2004 [EBook #10694] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SEA-POWER AND OTHER STUDIES *** + + + + +Produced by Robert J. Hall + + + + +SEA-POWER AND OTHER STUDIES + +BY ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN BRIDGE, G.C.B. + + + +PREFACE + +The essays collected in this volume are republished in the hope +that they may be of some use to those who are interested in naval +history. The aim has been to direct attention to certain historical +occurrences and conditions which the author ventures to think +have been often misunderstood. An endeavour has been made to +show the continuity of the operation of sea-power throughout +history, and the importance of recognising this at the present +day. + +In some cases specially relating to our navy at different periods +a revision of the more commonly accepted conclusions--formed, +it is believed, on imperfect knowledge--is asked for. + +It is also hoped that the intimate connection between naval history +in the strict sense and military history in the strict sense has +been made apparent, and likewise the fact that both are in reality +branches of the general history of a nation and not something +altogether distinct from and outside it. + +In a collection of essays on kindred subjects some repetitions +are inevitable, but it is believed that they will be found present +only to a moderate extent in the following pages. + +My nephew, Mr. J. S. C. Bridge, has very kindly seen the book +through the press. + +_June_ 1910. + + + + +CONTENTS + + I. SEA-POWER. + II. THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. + III. WAR AND ITS CHIEF LESSONS. + IV. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT + SERVICE. + V. FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT THE PRESS-GANG. + VI. PROJECTED INVASIONS OF THE BRITISH ISLES. + VII. OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND. +VIII. QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HER SEAMEN. + IX. NELSON: THE CENTENARY OF TRAFALGAR. + X. THE SHARE OF THE FLEET IN THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. + XI. NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR. + XII. THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF A FLEET. + INDEX. + + + + +Ten of the essays included in this volume first appeared in the +_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_, the _Times_, the _Morning_Post_, the +_National_Review_, the _Nineteenth_Century_and_After_, the +_Cornhill_Magazine_, and the _Naval_Annual_. The proprietors of +those publications have courteously given me permission to +republish them here. + +Special mention must be made of my obligation to the proprietors +of the _Encyclopoedia_Britannica_ for allowing me to reproduce +the essays on 'Sea-Power' and 'The Command of the Sea.' They are +the owners of the copyright of both essays, and their courtesy +to me is the more marked because they are about to republish them +themselves in the forthcoming edition of the _Encyclopoedia_. + +The paper on 'Naval Strategy and Tactics at the Time of Trafalgar' +was read at the Institute of Naval Architects, and that on 'The +Supply and Communications of a Fleet' at the Hong-Kong United +Service Institution. + + + + +I + +SEA-POWER[1] + +[Footnote 1: Written in 1899. (_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_.)] + +Sea-power is a term used to indicate two distinct, though cognate +things. The affinity of these two and the indiscriminate manner +in which the term has been applied to each have tended to obscure +its real significance. The obscurity has been deepened by the +frequency with which the term has been confounded with the old +phrase, 'Sovereignty of the sea,' and the still current expression, +'Command of the sea.' A discussion--etymological, or even +archæological in character--of the term must be undertaken as +an introduction to the explanation of its now generally accepted +meaning. It is one of those compound words in which a Teutonic +and a Latin (or Romance) element are combined, and which are +easily formed and become widely current when the sea is concerned. +Of such are 'sea-coast,' 'sea-forces' (the 'land- and sea-forces' +used to be a common designation of what we now call the 'Army +and Navy'), 'sea-service,' 'sea-serpent,' and 'sea-officer' (now +superseded by 'naval officer'). The term in one form is as old +as the fifteenth century. Edward III, in commemoration of the +naval victory of Sluys, coined gold 'nobles' which bore on one +side his effigy 'crowned, standing in a large ship, holding in +one hand a sword and in the other a shield.' An anonymous poet, +who wrote in the reign of Henry VI, says of this coin: + + For four things our noble showeth to me, + King, ship, and sword, and _power_of_the_sea_. + +Even in its present form the term is not of very recent date. +Grote [2] speaks of 'the conversion of Athens from a land-power +into a sea-power.' In a lecture published in 1883, but probably +delivered earlier, the late Sir J. R. Seeley says that 'commerce +was swept out of the Mediterranean by the besom of the Turkish +sea-power.'[3] The term also occurs in vol. xviii. of the +'Encyclopædia Britannica,' published in 1885. At p. 574 of that +volume (art. Persia) we are told that Themistocles was 'the founder +of the Attic sea-power.' The sense in which the term is used differs +in these extracts. In the first it means what we generally call +a 'naval power'--that is to say, a state having a considerable +navy in contradistinction to a 'military power,' a state with a +considerable army but only a relatively small navy. In the last +two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength +of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now +generally, and is likely to be exclusively, attached to the term +owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by +Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy in a series of +remarkable works.[4] The double use of the term is common in +German, though in that language both parts of the compound now +in use are Teutonic. One instance out of many may be cited from +the historian Adolf Holm.[5] He says[6] that Athens, being in +possession of a good naval port, could become '_eine_bedeutende_ +_Seemacht_,' i.e. an important naval power. He also says[7] that +Gelon of Syracuse, besides a large army (_Heer_), had '_eine_ +_bedeutende_Seemacht_,' meaning a considerable navy. The term, +in the first of the two senses, is old in German, as appears +from the following, extracted from Zedler's 'Grosses Universal +Lexicon,' vol. xxxvi:[8] 'Seemachten, Seepotenzen, Latin. _summae_ +_potestates_mari_potentes_.' 'Seepotenzen' is probably quite +obsolete now. It is interesting as showing that German no more +abhors Teuto-Latin or Teuto-Romance compounds than English. We may +note, as a proof of the indeterminate meaning of the expression +until his own epoch-making works had appeared, that Mahan himself +in his earliest book used it in both senses. He says,[9] 'The +Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea-power.' He alludes[10] +to the development of a nation as a 'sea-power,' and[11] to the +inferiority of the Confederate States 'as a sea-power.' Also,[12] +he remarks of the war of the Spanish Succession that 'before +it England was one of the sea-powers, after it she was _the_ +sea-power without any second.' In all these passages, as appears +from the use of the indefinite article, what is meant is a naval +power, or a state in possession of a strong navy. The other meaning +of the term forms the general subject of his writings above +enumerated. In his earlier works Mahan writes 'sea power' as +two words; but in a published letter of the 19th February 1897, +he joins them with a hyphen, and defends this formation of the +term and the sense in which he uses it. We may regard him as +the virtual inventor of the term in its more diffused meaning, +for--even if it had been employed by earlier writers in that +sense--it is he beyond all question who has given it general +currency. He has made it impossible for anyone to treat of sea-power +without frequent reference to his writings and conclusions. + +[Footnote 2: _Hist._of_Greece_, v. p. 67, published in 1849, but +with preface dated 1848.] + +[Footnote 3: _Expansion_of_England_, p. 89.] + +[Footnote 4: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, published 1890; +_Influence_of_Sea-power_on_the_French_Revolution_and_Empire_, +2 vols. 1892; _Nelson:_the_Embodiment_of_the_Sea-power_of_Great_ +_Britain_, 2 vols. 1897.] + +[Footnote 5: _Griechische_Geschichte_. Berlin, 1889.] + +[Footnote 6: _Ibid_. ii. p. 37.] + +[Footnote 7: _Ibid_. ii. p. 91.] + +[Footnote 8: Leipzig und Halle, 1743.] + +[Footnote 9: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, p. 35.] + +[Footnote 10: _Ibid_. p. 42.] + +[Footnote 11: _Ibid_. p. 43.] + +[Footnote 12: _Ibid_. p. 225.] + +There is something more than mere literary interest in the fact that +the term in another language was used more than two thousand years +ago. Before Mahan no historian--not even one of those who specially +devoted themselves to the narration of naval occurrences--had +evinced a more correct appreciation of the general principles +of naval warfare than Thucydides. He alludes several times to +the importance of getting command of the sea. This country would +have been saved some disasters and been less often in peril had +British writers--taken as guides by the public--possessed the same +grasp of the true principles of defence as Thucydides exhibited. +One passage in his history is worth quoting. Brief as it is, it +shows that on the subject of sea-power he was a predecessor of +Mahan. In a speech in favour of prosecuting the war, which he +puts into the mouth of Pericles, these words occur:-- _oi_meu_ +_gar_ouch_exousiu_allaeu_autilabeiu_amachei_aemiu_de_esti_ +_gae_pollae_kai_eu_uaesois_kai_kat_aepeirou_mega_gar_ +_to_tes_thalassaes_kratos_. The last part of this extract, +though often translated 'command of the sea,' or 'dominion of +the sea,' really has the wider meaning of sea-power, the 'power +of the sea' of the old English poet above quoted. This wider +meaning should be attached to certain passages in Herodotus,[13] +which have been generally interpreted 'commanding the sea,' or +by the mere titular and honorific 'having the dominion of the +sea.' One editor of Herodotus, Ch. F. Baehr, did, however, see +exactly what was meant, for, with reference to the allusion to +Polycrates, he says, _classe_maximum_valuit_. This is perhaps as +exact a definition of sea-power as could be given in a sentence. + +[Footnote 13: _Herodotus_, iii. 122 in two places; v.83.] + +It is, however, impossible to give a definition which would be at +the same time succinct and satisfactory. To say that 'sea-power' +means the sum-total of the various elements that go to make up +the naval strength of a state would be in reality to beg the +question. Mahan lays down the 'principal conditions affecting +the sea-power of nations,' but he does not attempt to give a +concise definition of it. Yet no one who has studied his works +will find it difficult to understand what it indicates. + +Our present task is to put readers in possession of the means +of doing this. The best, indeed--as Mahan has made us see--the +only effective way of attaining this object is to treat the matter +historically. Whatever date we may agree to assign to the formation +of the term itself, the idea--as we have seen--is as old as history. +It is not intended to give a condensed history of sea-power, but +rather an analysis of the idea and what it contains, illustrating +this analysis with examples from history ancient and modern. It +is important to know that it is not something which originated +in the middle of the seventeenth century, and having seriously +affected history in the eighteenth, ceased to have weight till +Captain Mahan appeared to comment on it in the last decade of +the nineteenth. With a few masterly touches Mahan, in his brief +allusion to the second Punic war, has illustrated its importance +in the struggle between Rome and Carthage. What has to be shown +is that the principles which he has laid down in that case, and +in cases much more modern, are true and have been true always and +everywhere. Until this is perceived there is much history which +cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to our welfare as a +maritime people that we should understand it thoroughly. Our +failure to understand it has more than once brought us, if not +to the verge of destruction, at any rate within a short distance +of serious disaster. + + +SEA-POWER IN ANCIENT TIMES + +The high antiquity of decisive naval campaigns is amongst the most +interesting features of international conflicts. Notwithstanding +the much greater frequency of land wars, the course of history +has been profoundly changed more often by contests on the water. +That this has not received the notice it deserved is true, and +Mahan tells us why. 'Historians generally,' he says, 'have been +unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither +special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining +influence of maritime strength on great issues has consequently been +overlooked.' Moralising on that which might have been is admittedly +a sterile process; but it is sometimes necessary to point, if +only by way of illustration, to a possible alternative. As in +modern times the fate of India and the fate of North America were +determined by sea-power, so also at a very remote epoch sea-power +decided whether or not Hellenic colonisation was to take root in, +and Hellenic culture to dominate, Central and Northern Italy as +it dominated Southern Italy, where traces of it are extant to this +day. A moment's consideration will enable us to see how different +the history of the world would have been had a Hellenised city +grown and prospered on the Seven Hills. Before the Tarquins were +driven out of Rome a Phocoean fleet was encountered (537 B.C.) off +Corsica by a combined force of Etruscans and Phoenicians, and +was so handled that the Phocoeans abandoned the island and settled +on the coast of Lucania.[14] The enterprise of their navigators +had built up for the Phoenician cities and their great off-shoot +Carthage, a sea-power which enabled them to gain the practical +sovereignty of the sea to the west of Sardinia and Sicily. The +control of these waters was the object of prolonged and memorable +struggles, for on it--as the result showed--depended the empire of +the world. From very remote times the consolidation and expansion, +from within outwards, of great continental states have had serious +consequences for mankind when they were accompanied by the +acquisition of a coast-line and the absorption of a maritime +population. We shall find that the process loses none of its +importance in recent years. 'The ancient empires,' says the historian +of Greece, Ernst Curtius, 'as long as no foreign elements had +intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water.' When +the condition, which Curtius notices in parenthesis, arose, the +'horror' disappeared. There is something highly significant in +the uniformity of the efforts of Assyria, Egypt, Babylon, and +Persia to get possession of the maritime resources of Phoenicia. +Our own immediate posterity will, perhaps, have to reckon with +the results of similar efforts in our own day. It is this which +gives a living interest to even the very ancient history of +sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical importance +to us now. We shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena connected +with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods. +Looked at in this light, the great conflicts of former ages are +full of useful, indeed necessary, instruction. + +[Footnote 14: Mommsen, _Hist._Rome_, English trans., i. p. 153.] + +In the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations +of the East against Europe--the Persian wars--sea-power was the +governing factor. Until Persia had expanded to the shores of the +Levant the European Greeks had little to fear from the ambition +of the great king. The conquest of Egypt by Cambyses had shown how +formidable that ambition could be when supported by an efficient +navy. With the aid of the naval forces of the Phoenician cities +the Persian invasion of Greece was rendered comparatively easy. +It was the naval contingents from Phoenicia which crushed the +Ionian revolt. The expedition of Mardonius, and still more that +of Datis and Artaphernes, had indicated the danger threatening +Greece when the master of a great army was likewise the master +of a great navy. Their defeat at Marathon was not likely to, +and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the Persians from +further attempts at aggression. As the advance of Cambyses into +Egypt had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of Xerxes +into Greece. By the good fortune sometimes vouch-safed to a people +which, owing to its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a +wise policy, scarcely deserves it, there appeared at Athens an +influential citizen who understood all that was meant by the +term sea-power. Themistocles saw more clearly than any of his +contemporaries that, to enable Athens to play a leading part in +the Hellenic world, she needed above all things a strong navy. +'He had already in his eye the battle-field of the future.' He +felt sure that the Persians would come back, and come with such +forces that resistance in the open field would be out of the +question. One scene of action remained--the sea. Persuaded by him +the Athenians increased their navy, so that of the 271 vessels +comprising the Greek fleet at Artemisium, 147 had been provided +by Athens, which also sent a large reinforcement after the first +action. Though no one has ever surpassed Themistocles in the +faculty of correctly estimating the importance of sea-power, +it was understood by Xerxes as clearly as by him that the issue +of the war depended upon naval operations. The arrangements made +under the Persian monarch's direction, and his very personal +movements, show that this was his view. He felt, and probably +expressed the feeling, exactly as--in the war of Arnerican +Independence--Washington did in the words, 'whatever efforts are +made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in +the present contest.' The decisive event was the naval action of +Salamis. To have made certain of success, the Persians should have +first obtained a command of the Ægean, as complete for all practical +purposes as the French and English had of the sea generally in +the war against Russia of 1854-56. The Persian sea-power was not +equal to the task. The fleet of the great king was numerically +stronger than that of the Greek allies; but it has been proved +many times that naval efficiency does not depend on numerical +superiority alone. The choice sections of the Persian fleet were +the contingents of the Ionians and Phoenicians. The former were +half-hearted or disaffected; whilst the latter were, at best, not +superior in skill, experience, and valour to the Greek sailors. At +Salamis Greece was saved not only from the ambition and vengeance +of Xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an +Oriental conqueror. Persia did not succeed against the Greeks, +not because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power, +artificially built up, was inferior to that which was a natural +element of the vitality of her foes. Ionia was lost and Greece +in the end enslaved, because the quarrels of Greeks with Greeks +led to the ruin of their naval states. + +The Peloponnesian was largely a naval war. The confidence of +the Athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its +outbreak. The immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in +time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the +conflict between Corinth and Corcyra of increasing the sea-power of +Athens. Hitherto the Athenian naval predominance had been virtually +confined to the Ægean Sea. The Corcyræan envoy, who pleaded for +help at Athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the +Athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important +situation 'with respect to the western regions towards which the +views of the Athenians had for some time been directed.'[15] +It was the 'weapon of her sea-power,' to adopt Mahan's phrase, +that enabled Athens to maintain the great conflict in which she +was engaged. Repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages +of disease amongst her people, and the rising disaffection of +her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance +on the water. The scale of the subsequent Syracusan expedition +showed how vigorous Athens still was down to the interruption +of the war by the peace of Nicias. The great expedition just +mentioned over-taxed her strength. Its failure brought about +the ruin of the state. It was held by contemporaries, and has +been held in our own day, that the Athenian defeat at Syracuse +was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the +force in Sicily properly supplied and reinforced. This explanation +of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. +The friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer +it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the +administration. After the despatch of the supporting expedition +under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, no further great reinforcement, +as Nicias admitted, was possible. The weakness of Athens was in +the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and +held high commands. A people which remembered the administration of +a Pericles, and yet allowed a Cleon or an Alcibiades to direct its +naval and military policy, courted defeat. Nicias, notwithstanding +the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of +a commander--firm resolution. He dared not face the obloquy +consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular +hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be +converted into an overwhelming disaster. 'The complete ruin of +Athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending +and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic +had been her rally, that [a year after Syracuse] she was found +again carrying on a terrible struggle.'[16] Nevertheless her +sea-power had indeed been ruined at Syracuse. Now she could wage +war only 'with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system.' +Even before Arginusæ it was seen that 'superiority of nautical +skill had passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies.'[17] + +[Footnote 15: Thirwall, _Hist._Greece_, iii. p. 96.] + +[Footnote 16: Grote, _Hist._Greece_, v. p. 354.] + +[Footnote 17: _Ibid._ p. 503.] + +The great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest between +Rome and Carthage was a sustained effort on the part of one to +gain and of the other to keep the control of the Western +Mediterranean. So completely had that control been exercised +by Carthage, that she had anticipated the Spanish commercial +policy in America. The Romans were precluded by treaties from +trading with the Carthaginian territories in Hispania, Africa, +and Sardinia. Rome, as Mommsen tells us, 'was from the first a +maritime city and, in the period of its vigour, never was so +foolish or so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect +its war marine and to desire to be a mere continental power.' It +may be that it was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion +that first prompted a trial of strength with Carthage. The vision +of universal empire could hardly as yet have formed itself in the +imagination of a single Roman. The area of Phoenician maritime +commerce was vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer +vulnerable points to the cupidity of rivals. It is probable that +the modern estimate of the sea-power of Carthage is much exaggerated. +It was great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great +when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge +it. Mommsen holds that, in the fourth and fifth centuries after +the foundation of Rome, 'the two main competitors for the dominion +of the Western waters' were Carthage and Syracuse. 'Carthage,' +he says, 'had the preponderance, and Syracuse sank more and more +into a second-rate naval power. The maritime importance of the +Etruscans was wholly gone.... Rome itself was not exempt from +the same fate; its own waters were likewise commanded by foreign +fleets.' The Romans were for a long time too much occupied at +home to take much interest in Mediterranean matters. The position +of the Carthaginians in the western basin of the Mediterranean +was very like that of the Portuguese long afterwards in India. +The latter kept within reach of the sea; 'nor did their rule ever +extend a day's march from their ships.'[18] 'The Carthaginians +in Spain,' says Mommsen, 'made no effort to acquire the interior +from the warlike native nations; they were content with the +possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell +and other fisheries.' Allowance being made for the numbers of the +classes engaged in administration, commerce, and supervision, +it is nearly certain that Carthage could not furnish the crews +required by both a great war-navy and a great mercantile marine. +No one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of Carthage +were composed largely of alien mercenaries. We have several examples +from which we can infer a parallel, if not an identical, condition +of her maritime resources. How, then, was the great Carthaginian +carrying-trade provided for? The experience of more than one +country will enable us to answer this question. The ocean trade +of those off-shoots or dependencies of the United Kingdom, viz. +the United States, Australasia, and India, is largely or chiefly +conducted by shipping of the old country. So that of Carthage was +largely conducted by old Phoenicians. These may have obtained a +'Carthaginian Register,' or the contemporary equivalent; but they +could not all have been purely Carthaginian or Liby-Phoenician. +This must have been the case even more with the war-navy. British +India for a considerable time possessed a real and indeed highly +efficient navy; but it was officered entirely and manned almost +entirely by men from the 'old country.' Moreover, it was small. The +wealth of India would have sufficed to furnish a larger material +element; but, as the country could not supply the _personnel_, +it would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of India +apart from that of England. As soon as the Romans chose to make +the most of their natural resources the maritime predominance +of Carthage was doomed. The artificial basis of the latter's +sea-power would not enable it to hold out against serious and +persistent assaults. Unless this is perceived it is impossible to +understand the story of the Punic wars. Judged by every visible +sign of strength, Carthage, the richer, the more enterprising, +ethnically the more predominant amongst her neighbours, and +apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the great +struggle with Rome which, by the conditions of the case, was to be +waged largely on the water. Yet those who had watched the struggles +of the Punic city with the Sicilian Greeks, and especially that +with Agathocles, must have seen reason to cherish doubts concerning +her naval strength. It was an anticipation of the case of Spain in +the age of Philip II. As the great Elizabethan seamen discerned +the defects of the Spanish naval establishment, so men at Rome +discerned those of the Carthaginian. Dates in connection with +this are of great significance. A comprehensive measure, with the +object of 'rescuing their marine from its condition of impotence,' +was taken by the Romans in the year 267 B.C. Four _quoestores_ +_classici_--in modern naval English we may perhaps call them +port-admirals--were nominated, and one was stationed at each +of four ports. The objects of the Roman Senate, so Mommsen tells +us, were very obvious. They were 'to recover their independence +by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of Tarentum, to +close the Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and to +emancipate themselves from Carthaginian supremacy.' Four years +afterwards the first Punic war began. It was, and had to be, +largely a naval contest. The Romans waged it with varying fortune, +but in the end triumphed by means of their sea-power. 'The sea +was the place where all great destinies were decided.'[19] The +victory of Catulus over the Carthaginian fleet off the Ægatian +Islands decided the war and left to the Romans the possession +of Sicily and the power of possessing themselves of Sardinia +and Corsica. It would be an interesting and perhaps not a barren +investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother +states of Phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of Alexander +the Great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the +Carthaginian defences. One thing was certain. Carthage had now +met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater +than her own. That rival also contained citizens who understood +the true importance of sea-power. 'With a statesmanlike sagacity +from which succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the +leading men of the Roman Commonwealth perceived that all their +coast-fortifications and coast-garrisons would prove inadequate +unless the war-marine of the state were again placed on a footing +that should command respect.'[20] It is a gloomy reflection that +the leading men of our own great maritime country could not see +this in 1860. A thorough comprehension of the events of the first +Punic war enables us to solve what, until Mahan wrote, had been +one of the standing enigmas of history, viz. Hannibal's invasion +of Italy by land instead of by sea in the second Punic war. Mahan's +masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts +as to the reason of Hannibal's action.[21] The naval predominance +in the western basin of the Mediterranean acquired by Rome had +never been lost. Though modern historians, even those belonging +to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the +Carthaginians knew well enough that the Romans were too strong +for them on the sea. Though other forces co-operated to bring +about the defeat of Carthage in the second Punic war, the Roman +navy, as Mahan demonstrates, was the most important. As a navy, he +tells us in words like those already quoted, 'acts on an element +strange to most writers, as its members have been from time +immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, +neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense +determining influence on the history of that era, and consequently +upon the history of the world, has been overlooked.' + +[Footnote 18: R. S. Whiteway, _Rise_of_the_Portuguese_Power_ +_in_India_ p. 12. Westminster, 1899.] + +[Footnote 19: J. H. Burton, _Hist._of_Scotland_, 1873, vol. i. +p. 318.] + +[Footnote 20: Mommsen, i. p. 427.] + +[Footnote 21: _Inf._on_Hist._, pp. 13-21.] + +The attainment of all but universal dominion by Rome was now +only a question of time. 'The annihilation of the Carthaginian +fleet had made the Romans masters of the sea.'[22] A lodgment +had already been gained in Illyricum, and countries farther east +were before long to be reduced to submission. A glance at the +map will show that to effect this the command of the eastern +basin of the Mediterranean, like that of the western, must be +secured by the Romans. The old historic navies of the Greek and +Phoenician states had declined. One considerable naval force +there was which, though it could not have prevented, was strong +enough to have delayed the Roman progress eastwards. This force +belonged to Rhodes, which in the years immediately following +the close of the second Punic war reached its highest point as +a naval power.[23] Far from trying to obstruct the advance of +the Romans the Rhodian fleet helped it. Hannibal, in his exile, +saw the necessity of being strong on the sea if the East was to +be saved from the grasp of his hereditary foe; but the resources +of Antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation of Hannibal, were +insufficient. In a later and more often-quoted struggle between +East and West--that which was decided at Actium--sea-power was +again seen to 'have the casting vote.' When the whole of the +Mediterranean coasts became part of a single state the importance +of the navy was naturally diminished; but in the struggles within +the declining empire it rose again at times. The contest of the +Vandal Genseric with Majorian and the African expedition of +Belisarius--not to mention others--were largely influenced by +the naval operations.[24] + +[Footnote 22: Schmitz, _Hist._Rome_, p. 256.] + +[Footnote 23: C. Torr, _Rhodes_in_Ancient_Times_, p. 40.] + +[Footnote 24: Gibbon, _Dec._and_Fall_, chaps. xxxvi. xli] + + +SEA-POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES + +A decisive event, the Mohammedan conquest of Northern Africa +from Egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how +great a part sea-power played in effecting it. Purely land +expeditions, or expeditions but slightly supported from the sea, +had ended in failure. The emperor at Constantinople still had at +his disposal a fleet capable of keeping open the communications +with his African province. It took the Saracens half a century +(647-698 A.D.) to win 'their way along the coast of Africa as +far as the Pillars of Hercules';[25] and, as Gibbon tells us, +it was not till the Commander of the Faithful had prepared a +great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the +Saracenic dominion was definitely established. It has been generally +assumed that the Arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his +death, spread the faith of Mohammed over vast regions, belonged +to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has +been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support +in prosecuting their conquests. In parts of Arabia, however, +maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the +Mohammedan empire had extended outwards from Mecca and Medina +till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences +to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above +mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. 'With the +conquest of Syria and Egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come +into the Saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of +a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for +meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. Great +attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet.'[26] +At first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the Phoenician +towns where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later +the crews were recruited from Syria, Egypt, and the coasts of +Asia Minor. Ships were built at most of the Syrian and Egyptian +ports, and also at Obolla and Bushire on the Persian Gulf,' whilst +the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and +encouraged. The sea-power thus created was largely artificial. +It drooped--as in similar cases--when the special encouragement +was withdrawn. 'In the days of Arabian energy,' says Hallam, +'Constantinople was twice, in 668 and 716, attacked by great +naval armaments.' The same authority believes that the abandonment +of such maritime enterprises by the Saracens may be attributed to +the removal of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. The removal +indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean +Sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. 'The +Greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the +sea,' with the result that in the middle of the tenth century +their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the +first successors of Heraclius. Not only was the fall of the empire, +by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, +but also much that had been lost was regained. 'At the close of +the tenth century the emperors of Constantinople possessed the +best and greatest part' of Southern Italy, part of Sicily, the +whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, +with some parts of Syria and Armenia.[27] + +[Footnote 25: Hallam, _Mid._Ages_, chap. vi.] + +[Footnote 26: Ameer Ali, Syed, _Short_Hist._Saracens_, p. 442] + +[Footnote 27: Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap. li.] + +Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its +own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial +creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when +it encounters a rival power of natural growth. How was it possible +for the Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even +the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? +How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist +for more than three-quarters of a century? Why did the Crusades +more and more become maritime expeditions? The answer to these +questions is to be found in the decline of the Mohammedan naval +defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of +the West. Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese transported crusading +forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the +Christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even +the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration +of conditions. This is evident when we look at the efforts of +the Christians to regain the lost kingdom. Saladin 'forgot that +the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, +and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx +from beyond the sea.'[28] Not only were the Crusaders helped by +the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received +reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the +'arrival of _Malik_Ankiltar_ (Richard Coeur de Lion) with twenty +shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.' + +[Footnote 28: Ameer Ali, Syed, pp. 359, 360.] + +Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the +importance of the naval states of Italy. That they had been able +to act effectively in the Levant may have been in some measure +due to the weakening of the Mohammedans by the disintegration +of the Seljukian power, the movements of the Moguls, and the +confusion consequent on the rise of the Ottomans. However that +may have been, the naval strength of those Italian states was +great absolutely as well as relatively. Sismondi, speaking of +Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, towards the end of the eleventh century, +says 'these three cities had more vessels on the Mediterranean +than the whole of Christendom besides.'[29] Dealing with a period +two centuries later, he declares it 'difficult to comprehend +how two simple cities could put to sea such prodigious fleets +as those of Pisa and Genoa.' The difficulty disappears when we +have Mahan's explanation. The maritime republics of Italy--like +Athens and Rhodes in ancient, Catalonia in mediæval, and England +and the Netherlands in more modern times--were 'peculiarly well +fitted, by situation and resources, for the control of the sea by +both war and commerce.' As far as the western Mediterranean was +concerned, Genoa and Pisa had given early proofs of their maritime +energy, and fixed themselves, in succession to the Saracens, in +the Balearic Isles, Sardinia, and Corsica. Sea-power was the +Themistoclean instrument with which they made a small state into +a great one. + +[Footnote 29: _Ital._Republics_, English ed., p. 29.] + +A fertile source of dispute between states is the acquisition +of territory beyond sea. As others have done before and since, +the maritime republics of Italy quarrelled over this. Sea-power +seemed, like Saturn, to devour its own children. In 1284, in a +great sea-fight off Meloria, the Pisans were defeated by the +Genoese with heavy loss, which, as Sismondi states, 'ruined the +maritime power' of the former. From that time Genoa, transferring +her activity to the Levant, became the rival of Venice, The fleets +of the two cities in 1298 met near Cyprus in an encounter, said +to be accidental, that began 'a terrible war which for seven +years stained the Mediterranean with blood and consumed immense +wealth.' In the next century the two republics, 'irritated by +commercial quarrels'--like the English and Dutch afterwards--were +again at war in the Levant. Sometimes one side, sometimes the +other was victorious; but the contest was exhausting to both, +and especially to Venice. Within a quarter of a century they +were at war again. Hostilities lasted till the Genoese met with +the crushing defeat of Chioggia. 'From this time,' says Hallam, +'Genoa never commanded the ocean with such navies as before; her +commerce gradually went into decay; and the fifteenth century, +the most splendid in the annals of Venice, is till recent times +the most ignominious in those of Genoa.' Venice seemed now to +have no naval rival, and had no fear that anyone could forbid +the ceremony in which the Doge, standing in the bows of the +_Bucentaur_, cast a ring into the Adriatic with the words, +_Desponsamus_te,_Mare,_in_signum_veri_perpetuique_dominii_. +The result of the combats at Chioggia, though fatal to it in +the long-run, did not at once destroy the naval importance of +Genoa. A remarkable characteristic of sea-power is the delusive +manner in which it appears to revive after a great defeat. The +Persian navy occasionally made a brave show afterwards; but in +reality it had received at Salamis a mortal wound. Athens seemed +strong enough on the sea after the catastrophe of Syracuse; but, +as already stated, her naval power had been given there a check +from which it never completely recovered. The navy of Carthage +had had similar experience; and, in later ages, the power of +the Turks was broken at Lepanto and that of Spain at Gravelines +notwithstanding deceptive appearances afterwards. Venice was +soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. The Turkish naval +historian, Haji Khalifeh,[30] tells us that, 'After the taking of +Constantinople, when they [the Ottomans] spread their conquests +over land and sea, it became necessary to build ships and make +armaments in order to subdue the fortresses and castles on the +Rumelian and Anatolian shores, and in the islands of the +Mediterranean.' Mohammed II established a great naval arsenal at +Constantinople. In 1470 the Turks, 'for the first time, equipped +a fleet with which they drove that of the Venetians out of the +Grecian seas.'[31] The Turkish wars of Venice lasted a long time. +In that which ended in 1503 the decline of the Venetians' naval +power was obvious. 'The Mussulmans had made progress in naval +discipline; the Venetian fleet could no longer cope with theirs.' +Henceforward it was as an allied contingent of other navies that +that of Venice was regarded as important. Dyer[32] quotes a striking +passage from a letter of Æneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II, +in which the writer affirms that, if the Venetians are defeated, +Christendom will not control the sea any longer; for neither the +Catalans nor the Genoese, without the Venetians, are equal to +the Turks. + +[Footnote 30: _Maritime_Wars_of_the_Turks_, Mitchell's trans., +p. 12.] + +[Footnote 31: Sismondi, p. 256.] + +[Footnote 32: _Hist._Europe_, i. p. 85.] + + +SEA-POWER IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES + +The last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule +that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older +maritime populations becomes a serious menace to its neighbours. +Even in the fifteenth century Mohammed II had made an attack on +Southern Italy; but his sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. +Suleymân the Magnificent directed the Ottoman forces towards +the West. With admirable strategic insight he conquered Rhodes, +and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on +his flank. 'The centenary of the conquest of Constantinople was +past, and the Turk had developed a great naval power besides +annexing Egypt and Syria.'[33] The Turkish fleets, under such +leaders as Khair-ad-din (Barbarossa), Piale, and Dragut, seemed +to command the Mediterranean including its western basin; but the +repulse at Malta in 1565 was a serious check, and the defeat at +Lepanto in 1571 virtually put an end to the prospect of Turkish +maritime dominion. The predominance of Portugal in the Indian +Ocean in the early part of the sixteenth century had seriously +diminished the Ottoman resources. The wealth derived from the trade +in that ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, had supplied +the Mohammedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to +contend with success against the Christians in Europe. 'The main +artery had been cut when the Portuguese took up the challenge +of the Mohammedan merchants of Calicut, and swept their ships +from the ocean.'[34] The sea-power of Portugal wisely employed +had exercised a great, though unperceived, influence. Though +enfeebled and diminishing, the Turkish navy was still able to act +with some effect in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the +sea-power of the Turks ceased to count as a factor of importance +in the relations between great states. + +[Footnote 33: Seeley, _British_Policy_, i. p. 143.] + +[Footnote 34: Whiteway, p. 2.] + +In the meantime the state which had a leading share in winning +the victory of Lepanto had been growing up in the West. Before +the union of its crown with that of Castile and the formation of +the Spanish monarchy, Aragon had been expanding till it reached +the sea. It was united with Catalonia in the twelfth century, and +it conquered Valencia in the thirteenth. Its long line of coast +opened the way to an extensive and flourishing commerce; and an +enterprising navy indemnified the nation for the scantiness of its +territory at home by the important foreign conquests of Sardinia, +Sicily, Naples, and the Balearic Isles. Amongst the maritime states +of the Mediterranean Catalonia had been conspicuous. She was to +the Iberian Peninsula much what Phoenicia had been to Syria. The +Catalan navy had disputed the empire of the Mediterranean with +the fleets of Pisa and Genoa. The incorporation of Catalonia +with Aragon added greatly to the strength of that kingdom. The +Aragonese kings were wise enough to understand and liberal enough +to foster the maritime interests of their new possessions.[35] +Their French and Italian neighbours were to feel, before long, the +effect of this policy; and when the Spanish monarchy had been +consolidated, it was felt not only by them, but by others also. +The more Spanish dominion was extended in Italy, the more were the +naval resources at the command of Spain augmented. Genoa became +'Spain's water-gate to Italy.... Henceforth the Spanish crown +found in the Dorias its admirals; their squadron was permanently +hired to the kings of Spain.' Spanish supremacy at sea was +established at the expense of France.[36] The acquisition of a +vast domain in the New World had greatly developed the maritime +activity of Castile, and Spain was as formidable on the ocean as +in the Mediterranean. After Portugal had been annexed the naval +vessels of that country were added to the Spanish, and the great +port of Lisbon became available as a place of equipment and as an +additional base of operations for oceanic campaigns. The fusion +of Spain and Portugal, says Seeley, 'produced a single state of +unlimited maritime dominion.... Henceforth the whole New World +belonged exclusively to Spain.' The story of the tremendous +catastrophe--the defeat of the Armada--by which the decline of +this dominion was heralded is well known. It is memorable, not +only because of the harm it did to Spain, but also because it +revealed the rise of another claimant to maritime pre-eminence--the +English nation. The effects of the catastrophe were not at once +visible. Spain still continued to look like the greatest power +in the world; and, though the English seamen were seen to be +something better than adventurous pirates--a character suggested +by some of their recent exploits--few could have comprehended +that they were engaged in building up what was to be a sea-power +greater than any known to history. + +[Footnote 35: Prescott, _Ferdinand_and_Isabella_, Introd. sects. +i. ii.] + +[Footnote 36: G. W. Prothero, in M. Hume's _Spain_, 1479-1788, +p. 65.] + +They were carrying forward, not beginning the building of this. +'England,' says Sir J. K. Laughton, 'had always believed in her +naval power, had always claimed the sovereignty of the Narrow +Seas; and more than two hundred years before Elizabeth came to the +throne, Edward III had testified to his sense of its importance +by ordering a gold coinage bearing a device showing the armed +strength and sovereignty of England based on the sea.'[37] It is +impossible to make intelligible the course of the many wars which +the English waged with the French in the Middle Ages unless the +true naval position of the former is rightly appreciated. Why were +Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt--not to mention other combats--fought, +not on English, but on continental soil? Why during the so-called +'Hundred Years' War' was England in reality the invader and not +the invaded? We of the present generation are at last aware of the +significance of naval defence, and know that, if properly utilised, +it is the best security against invasion that a sea-surrounded +state can enjoy. It is not, however, commonly remembered that +the same condition of security existed and was properly valued +in mediæval times. The battle of Sluys in 1340 rendered invasion +of England as impracticable as did that of La Hogue in 1692, +that of Quiberon Bay in 1759, and that of Trafalgar in 1805; and +it permitted, as did those battles, the transport of troops to +the continent to support our allies in wars which, had we not +been strong at sea, would have been waged on the soil of our own +country. Our early continental wars, therefore, are proofs of the +long-established efficiency of our naval defences. Notwithstanding +the greater attention paid, within the last dozen years or so, +to naval affairs, it is doubtful if the country generally even +yet recognises the extent to which its security depends upon a +good fleet as fully as our ancestors did nearly seven centuries +ago. The narrative of our pre-Elizabethan campaigns is interesting +merely as a story; and, when told--as for instance D. Hannay +has told it in the introductory chapters of his 'Short History +of the Royal Navy'--it will be found instructive and worthy of +careful study at the present day. Each of the principal events +in our early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of +the idea conveyed by the term 'sea-power,' and of the accuracy +with which its meaning was apprehended at the time. To take a +very early case, we may cite the defeat of Eustace the Monk by +Hubert de Burgh in 1217. Reinforcements and supplies had been +collected at Calais for conveyance to the army of Prince Louis +of France and the rebel barons who had been defeated at Lincoln. +The reinforcements tried to cross the Channel under the escort of +a fleet commanded by Eustace. Hubert de Burgh, who had stoutly +held Dover for King John, and was faithful to the young Henry +III, heard of the enemy's movements. 'If these people land,' +said he, 'England is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.' He +reasoned in almost the same words as Raleigh about four centuries +afterwards, and undoubtedly 'had grasped the true principles of +the defence of England.' He put to sea and defeated his opponent. +The fleet on which Prince Louis and the rebellious barons had +counted was destroyed; and with it their enterprise. 'No more +admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by +Englishmen on water.'[38] As introductory to a long series of +naval operations undertaken with a like object, it has deserved +detailed mention here. + +[Footnote 37: _Armada_, Introd. (Navy Records Society).] + +[Footnote 38: Hannay, p. 7.] + +The sixteenth century was marked by a decided advance in both +the development and the application of sea-power. Previously +its operation had been confined to the Mediterranean or to coast +waters outside it. Spanish or Basque seamen--by their proceedings +in the English Channel--had proved the practicability of, rather +than been engaged in, ocean warfare. The English, who withstood +them, were accustomed to seas so rough, to seasons so uncertain, +and to weather so boisterous, that the ocean had few terrors for +them. All that was wanting was a sufficient inducement to seek +distant fields of action and a development of the naval art that +would permit them to be reached. The discovery of the New World +supplied the first; the consequently increased length of voyages +and of absence from the coast led to the second. The world had +been moving onwards in other things as well as in navigation. +Intercommunication was becoming more and more frequent. What was +done by one people was soon known to others. It is a mistake to +suppose that, because the English had been behindhand in the +exploration of remote regions, they were wanting in maritime +enterprise. The career of the Cabots would of itself suffice to +render such a supposition doubtful. The English had two good +reasons for postponing voyages to and settlement in far-off lands. +They had their hands full nearer home; and they thoroughly, and as +it were by instinct, understood the conditions on which permanent +expansion must rest. They wanted to make sure of the line of +communication first. To effect this a sea-going marine of both +war and commerce and, for further expansion, stations on the +way were essential. The chart of the world furnishes evidence of +the wisdom and the thoroughness of their procedure. Taught by the +experience of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, when unimpeded by +the political circumstances of the time, and provided with suitable +equipment, the English displayed their energy in distant seas. It +now became simply a question of the efficiency of sea-power. If +this was not a quality of that of the English, then their efforts +were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their +country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest +of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious. The +principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a +characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in +connection with the exploring or colonising activity of most +other great nations even down to our own time. They were really +unofficial speculations in which, if the Government took part at +all, it was for the sake of the profit expected and almost, if +not exactly, like any private adventurer. The participation of +the Government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth +while to note. It conveyed a hint--and quite consciously--to all +whom it might concern that the speculations were 'under-written' +by the whole sea-power of England. The forces of more than one state +had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of +enemies in the Mediterranean or in the Narrow Seas. They had +been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications +across not very extensive areas of water. In the sixteenth century +they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether +carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms. This, +naturally enough, led to collisions. The contention waxed hot, +and was virtually decided when the Armada shaped course to the +northward after the fight off Gravelines. + +The expeditions against the Spanish Indies and, still more, those +against Philip II's peninsular territory, had helped to define +the limitations of sea-power. It became evident, and it was made +still more evident in the next century, that for a great country +to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone. It must also have +an adequate and properly organised mobile army. Notwithstanding +the number of times that this lesson has been repeated, we have +been slow to learn it. It is doubtful if we have learned it even +yet. English seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; +for they have always demanded--at any rate for upwards of three +centuries--that expeditions against foreign territory over-sea +should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops. On the +other hand, the necessity of organising the army of a maritime +insular state, and of training it with the object of rendering +effective aid in operations of the kind in question, has rarely +been perceived and acted upon by others. The result has been a +long series of inglorious or disastrous affairs like the West +Indies voyage of 1595-96, the Cadiz expedition of 1625, and that +to the Ile de Ré of 1627. Additions might be made to the list. +The failures of joint expeditions have often been explained by +alleging differences or quarrels between the naval and the military +commanders. This way of explaining them, however, is nothing but +the inveterate critical method of the streets by which cause +is taken for effect and effect for cause. The differences and +quarrels arose, no doubt; but they generally sprang out of the +recriminations consequent on, not producing, the want of success. +Another manifestation of the way in which sea-power works was first +observed in the seventeenth century. It suggested the adoption +of, and furnished the instrument for carrying out a distinct +maritime policy. What was practically a standing navy had come +into existence. As regards England this phenomenon was now of +respectable age. Long voyages and cruises of several ships in +company had been frequent during the latter half of the sixteenth +century and the early part of the seventeenth. Even the grandfathers +of the men who sailed with Blake and Penn in 1652 could not have +known a time when ships had never crossed the ocean, and squadrons +kept together for months had never cruised. However imperfect +it may have been, a system of provisioning ships and supplying +them with stores, and of preserving discipline amongst their +crews, had been developed, and had proved fairly satisfactory. +The Parliament and the Protector in turn found it necessary to +keep a considerable number of ships in commission, and make them +cruise and operate in company. It was not till well on in the +reign of Queen Victoria that the man-of-war's man was finally +differentiated from the merchant seaman; but two centuries before +some of the distinctive marks of the former had already begun to +be noticeable. There were seamen in the time of the Commonwealth +who rarely, perhaps some who never, served afloat except in a +man-of-war. Some of the interesting naval families which were +settled at Portsmouth and the eastern ports, and which--from +father to son--helped to recruit the ranks of our bluejackets +till a date later than that of the launch of the first ironclad, +could carry back their professional genealogy to at least the +days of Charles II, when, in all probability, it did not first +start. Though landsmen continued even after the civil war to be +given naval appointments, and though a permanent corps, through +the ranks of which everyone must pass, had not been formally +established, a body of real naval officers--men who could handle +their ships, supervise the working of the armament, and exercise +military command--had been formed. A navy, accordingly, was now +a weapon of undoubted keenness, capable of very effective use +by anyone who knew how to wield it. Having tasted the sweets +of intercourse with the Indies, whether in the occupation of +Portugal or of Spain, both English and Dutch were desirous of +getting a larger share of them. English maritime commerce had +increased and needed naval protection. If England was to maintain +the international position to which, as no one denied, she was +entitled, that commerce must be permitted to expand. The minds +of men in western Europe, moreover, were set upon obtaining for +their country territories in the New World, the amenities of +which were now known. From the reign of James I the Dutch had +shown great jealousy of English maritime enterprise. Where it was +possible, as in the East Indian Archipelago, they had destroyed +it. Their naval resources were great enough to let them hold +English shipping at their mercy, unless a vigorous effort were +made to protect it. The Dutch conducted the carrying trade of +a great part of the world, and the monopoly of this they were +resolved to keep, while the English were resolved to share in +it. The exclusion of the English from every trade-route, except +such as ran by their own coast or crossed the Narrow Seas, seemed +a by no means impossible contingency. There seemed also to be +but one way of preventing it, viz. by war. The supposed +unfriendliness of the Dutch, or at least of an important party +amongst them, to the regicide Government in England helped to +force the conflict. The Navigation Act of 1651 was passed and +regarded as a covert declaration of hostilities. So the first +Dutch war began. It established our claim to compete for the +position of a great maritime commercial power. + +The rise of the sea-power of the Dutch, and the magnitude which +it attained in a short time and in the most adverse circumstances, +have no parallel in history. The case of Athens was different, +because the Athenian power had not so much been unconsciously +developed out of a great maritime trade, as based on a military +marine deliberately and persistently fostered during many years. +Thirlwall believes that it was Solon who 'laid the foundations +of the Attic navy,'[39] a century before Salamis. The great +achievement of Themistocles was to convince his fellow-citizens +that their navy ought to be increased. Perhaps the nearest parallel +with the power of the Dutch was presented by that of Rhodes, which +rested largely on a carrying trade. The Rhodian undertakings, +however, were by comparison small and restricted in extent. Motley +declares of the Seven United Provinces that they 'commanded the +ocean,'[40] and that it would be difficult to exaggerate the +naval power of the young Commonwealth. Even in the days of Spain's +greatness English seamen positively declined to admit that she +was stronger than England on the sea; and the story of the Armada +justified their view. Our first two Dutch wars were, therefore, +contests between the two foremost naval states of the world for +what was primarily a maritime object. The identity of the cause +of the first and of the second war will be discerned by anyone +who compares what has been said about the circumstances leading +to the former, with Monk's remark as to the latter. He said that +the English wanted a larger share of the trade enjoyed by the +Dutch. It was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age +that the Dutch should try to prevent, by force, this want from +being satisfied. Anything like free and open competition was +repugnant to the general feeling. The high road to both individual +wealth and national prosperity was believed to lie in securing a +monopoly. Merchants or manufacturers who called for the abolition +of monopolies granted to particular courtiers and favourites had +not the smallest intention, on gaining their object, of throwing +open to the enterprise of all what had been monopolised. It was to +be kept for the exclusive benefit of some privileged or chartered +company. It was the same in greater affairs. As Mahan says, 'To +secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of the benefits +of sea commerce every effort was made to exclude others, either +by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory +regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.' The +apparent wealth of Spain was believed to be due to the rigorous +manner in which foreigners were excluded from trading with the +Spanish over-sea territories. The skill and enterprise of the +Dutch having enabled them to force themselves into this trade, +they were determined to keep it to themselves. The Dutch East India +Company was a powerful body, and largely dictated the maritime +policy of the country. We have thus come to an interesting point +in the historical consideration of sea-power. The Elizabethan +conflict with Spain had practically settled the question whether +or not the expanding nations were to be allowed to extend their +activities to territories in the New World. The first two Dutch +wars were to settle the question whether or not the ocean trade +of the world was to be open to any people qualified to engage +in it. We can see how largely these were maritime questions, +how much depended on the solution found for them, and how plain +it was that they must be settled by naval means. + +[Footnote 39: _Hist._Greece_, ii. p. 52.] + +[Footnote 40: _United_Netherlands_, ii. p. 132.] + +Mahan's great survey of sea-power opens in 1660, midway between +the first and second Dutch wars. 'The sailing-ship era, with its +distinctive features,' he tells us, 'had fairly begun.' The art +of war by sea, in its more important details, had been settled +by the first war. From the beginning of the second the general +features of ship design, the classification of ships, the armament +of ships, and the handling of fleets, were to remain without +essential alteration until the date of Navarino. Even the tactical +methods, except where improved on occasions by individual genius, +altered little. The great thing was to bring the whole broadside +force to bear on an enemy. Whether this was to be impartially +distributed throughout the hostile line or concentrated on one +part of it depended on the character of particular admirals. +It would have been strange if a period so long and so rich in +incidents had afforded no materials for forming a judgment on +the real significance of sea-power. The text, so to speak, chosen +by Mahan is that, notwithstanding the changes wrought in naval +_matériel_ during the last half-century, we can find in the history +of the past instructive illustrations of the general principles +of maritime war. These illustrations will prove of value not +only 'in those wider operations which embrace a whole theatre of +war,' but also, if rightly applied, 'in the tactical use of the +ships and weapons' of our own day. By a remarkable coincidence +the same doctrine was being preached at the same time and quite +independently by the late Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb in his work +on 'Naval Warfare.' As a prelude to the second Dutch war we find +a repetition of a process which had been adopted somewhat earlier. +That was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory. Until +the seventeenth century had well begun, naval, or combined naval +and military, operations against the distant possessions of an +enemy had been practically restricted to raiding or plundering +attacks on commercial centres. The Portuguese territory in South +America having come under Spanish dominion in consequence of the +annexation of Portugal to Spain, the Dutch--as the power of the +latter country declined--attempted to reduce part of that territory +into permanent possession. This improvement on the practice of +Drake and others was soon seen to be a game at which more than +one could play. An expedition sent by Cromwell to the West Indies +seized the Spanish island of Jamaica, which has remained in the +hands of its conquerors to this day. In 1664 an English force +occupied the Dutch North American settlements on the Hudson. Though +the dispossessed rulers were not quite in a position to throw stones +at sinners, this was rather a raid than an operation of recognised +warfare, because it preceded the formal outbreak of hostilities. +The conquered territory remained in English hands for more than +a century, and thus testified to the efficacy of a sea-power +which Europe had scarcely begun to recognise. Neither the second +nor the third Dutch war can be counted amongst the occurrences to +which Englishmen may look back with unalloyed satisfaction; but +they, unquestionably, disclosed some interesting manifestations +of sea-power. Much indignation has been expressed concerning the +corruption and inefficiency of the English Government of the +day, and its failure to take proper measures for keeping up the +navy as it should have been kept up. Some, perhaps a good deal, of +this indignation was deserved; but it would have been nearly as +well deserved by every other government of the day. Even in those +homes of political virtue where the administrative machinery was +worked by or in the interest of speculating capitalists and +privileged companies, the accumulating evidence of late years +has proved that everything was not considered to be, and as a +matter of fact was not, exactly as it ought to have been. Charles +II and his brother, the Duke of York, have been held up to obloquy +because they thought that the coast of England could be defended +against a naval enemy better by fortifications than by a good +fleet and, as Pepys noted, were 'not ashamed of it.' The truth +is that neither the king nor the duke believed in the power of +a navy to ward off attack from an island. This may have been +due to want of intellectual capacity; but it would be going a +long way to put it down to personal wickedness. They have had +many imitators, some in our own day. The huge forts which stud +the coast of the United Kingdom, and have been erected within +the memory of the present generation, are monuments, likely to +last for many years, of the inability of people, whom no one +could accuse of being vicious, to rate sea-power at its proper +value. It is much more likely that it was owing to a reluctance +to study questions of naval defence as industriously as they +deserved, and to that moral timidity which so often tempts even +men of proved physical courage to undertake the impossible task +of making themselves absolutely safe against hostile efforts +at every point. + +Charles II has also been charged with indifference to the interests +of his country, or worse, because during a great naval war he +adopted the plan of trying to weaken the enemy by destroying +his commerce. The king 'took a fatal resolution of laying up +his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise.' +It is expressly related that this was not Charles's own idea, +but that it was urged upon him by advisers whose opinion probably +seemed at the time as well worth listening to as that of others. +Anyhow, if the king erred, as he undoubtedly did, he erred in +good company. Fourteen hundred years earlier the statesmen who +conducted the great war against Carthage, and whose astuteness +has been the theme of innumerable panegyrics since, took the same +'fatal resolution.' In the midst of the great struggle they 'did +away with the fleet. At the most they encouraged privateering; and +with that view placed the war-vessels of the State at the disposal +of captains who were ready to undertake a corsair warfare on +their own account.'[41] In much later times this method has had +many and respectable defenders. Mahan's works are, in a sense, a +formal warning to his fellow-citizens not to adopt it. In France, +within the last years of the nineteenth century, it found, and +appears still to find, adherents enough to form a school. The +reappearance of belief in demonstrated impossibilities is a +recognised incident in human history; but it is usually confined +to the emotional or the vulgar. It is serious and filled with +menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer +the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence. The +third Dutch war may not have settled directly the position of +England in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country +above all other maritime states,--in the position, in fact, which +Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the British Empire, whichever +name may be given it, has retained up to the present. It also +manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power. +The United Provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest +monarchies in the world, France and England, were not destroyed. +Indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in +the State system of Europe. The Republic 'owed this astonishing +result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its +sea-power.' The effort, however, had undermined its strength +and helped forward its decline. + +[Footnote 41: Mommsen, ii. p. 52.] + +The war which was ended by the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 presents +two features of exceptional interest: one was the havoc wrought on +English commerce by the enemy; the other was Torrington's conduct +at and after the engagement off Beachy Head. Mahan discusses +the former with his usual lucidity. At no time has war against +commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results +than during this period. We suffered 'infinitely more than in +any former war.' Many of our merchants were ruined; and it is +affirmed that the English shipping was reduced to the necessity +of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags. The explanation is +that Louis XIV made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. Our +navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could +be spared to protect our maritime trade. This is only another way +of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the +navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose +the enemy's main force. Notwithstanding our losses we were on +the winning side in the conflict. Much misery and ruin had been +caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war. + +Torrington's proceedings in July 1690 were at the time the subject +of much angry debate. The debate, still meriting the epithet +angry, has been renewed within the last few years. The matter +has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of +a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those +who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who +ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown +away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible. Arthur +Herbert, Earl of Torrington--the later peerage is a viscounty held +by the Byng family--was in command of the allied English and Dutch +fleet in the Channel. 'The disparity of force,' says Mahan, 'was +still in favour of France in 1690, but it was not so great as +the year before.' We can measure the ability of the then English +Government for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its +wisdom, it had still further weakened our fleet by dividing it +(Vice-Admiral Killigrew having been sent to the Mediterranean with +a squadron), and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to +take the necessary steps to repair this error. The Government +having omitted, as even British Governments sometimes do, to +gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements +of the enemy, Torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a +considerably superior French fleet under Tourville, one of the +greatest of French sea-officers. Of late years the intentions of +the French have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that +in England at the time Tourville's movements were believed to +be preliminary to invasion. Whether Tourville deliberately meant +his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost +certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise his +victory would have been without any valuable result. Torrington +saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could, +though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing +serious harm. Though personally not a believer in the imminence of +invasion, the English admiral knew that 'most men were in fear that +the French would invade.' His own view was, 'that whilst we had a +fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.' Of late +years controversy has raged round this phrase, 'a fleet in being,' +and the strategic principle which it expresses. Most seamen were +at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with +Torrington. This might be supposed enough to settle the question. +It has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval +strategy. It was made at the time a matter of party politics. +This is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it +should be discussed. Both as a strategist and as a tactician +Torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. The +only English admirals who can be placed above him are Hawke and +Nelson. He paid the penalty of his pre-eminence: he could not +make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages +of his proceedings. Mahan, who is specially qualified to do him +full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a +consideration of Torrington's case, evidently because he had +no sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment. +The admiral's character had been taken away already by Macaulay, +who did have ample evidence before him. William III, with all his +fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal +to that of Napoleon; and Napoleon, in naval strategy, was often +wrong. William III understood that subject even less than the +French emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable +of understanding it. Consequently Torrington's action has been +put down to jealousy of the Dutch. There have been people who +accused Nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of +Caracciolo! The explanation of Torrington's conduct is this:-- +He had a fleet so much weaker than Tourville's that he could +not fight a general action with the latter without a practical +certainty of getting a crushing defeat. Such a result would have +laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says Mahan, +'if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of William's +throne in England.' Given certain movements of the French fleet, +Torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward +and join his force with that under Killigrew, which would make +him strong enough to hazard a battle. This proved impracticable. +There was then one course left. To retire before the French, +but not to keep far from them. He knew that, though not strong +enough to engage their whole otherwise unemployed fleet with any +hope of success, he would be quite strong enough to fight and +most likely beat it, when a part of it was trying either to deal +with our ships to the westward or to cover the disembarkation of +an invading army. He, therefore, proposed to keep his fleet 'in +being' in order to fall on the enemy when the latter would have +two affairs at the same time on his hands. The late Vice-Admiral +Colomb rose to a greater height than was usual even with him in +his criticism of this campaign. What Torrington did was merely +to reproduce on the sea what has been noticed dozens of times on +shore, viz. the menace by the flanking enemy. In land warfare +this is held to give exceptional opportunities for the display of +good generalship, but, to quote Mahan over again, a navy 'acts +on an element strange to most writers, its members have been +from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of +their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood.' +Whilst Torrington has had the support of seamen, his opponents +have been landsmen. For the crime of being a good strategist he +was brought before a court-martial, but acquitted. His sovereign, +who had been given the crowns of three kingdoms to defend our laws, +showed his respect for them by flouting a legally constituted +tribunal and disregarding its solemn finding. The admiral who +had saved his country was forced into retirement. Still, the +principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the bottom of all sound +strategy. + +Admiral Colomb has pointed out a great change of plan in the +later naval campaigns of the seventeenth century. Improvements +in naval architecture, in the methods of preserving food, and +in the arrangements for keeping the crews healthy, permitted +fleets to be employed at a distance from their home ports for +long continuous periods. The Dutch, when allies of the Spaniards, +kept a fleet in the Mediterranean for many months. The great De +Ruyter was mortally wounded in one of the battles there fought. +In the war of the Spanish Succession the Anglo-Dutch fleet found +its principal scene of action eastward of Gibraltar. This, as +it were, set the fashion for future wars. It became a kind of +tacitly accepted rule that the operation of British sea-power +was to be felt in the enemy's rather than in our own waters. The +hostile coast was regarded strategically as the British frontier, +and the sea was looked upon as territory which the enemy must +be prevented from invading. Acceptance of this principle led +in time to the so-called 'blockades' of Brest and Toulon. The +name was misleading. As Nelson took care to explain, there was +no desire to keep the enemy's fleet in; what was desired was to +be near enough to attack it if it came out. The wisdom of the +plan is undoubted. The hostile navy could be more easily watched +and more easily followed if it put to sea. To carry out this +plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency +than that of the enemy was necessary to us. With the exception +of that of American Independence, which will therefore require +special notice, our subsequent great wars were conducted in +accordance with the rule. + + +SEA-POWER IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND EARLY PART OF THE NINETEENTH +CENTURY + +In the early part of the eighteenth century there was a remarkable +manifestation of sea-power in the Baltic. Peter the Great, having +created an efficient army, drove the Swedes from the coast provinces +south of the Gulf of Finland. Like the earlier monarchies of which +we have spoken, Russia, in the Baltic at least, now became a naval +state. A large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy +established. It was a purely artificial creation, and showed +the merits and defects of its character. At first, and when under +the eye of its creator, it was strong; when Peter was no more it +dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh. +It enabled Peter the Great to conquer the neighbouring portion +of Finland, to secure his coast territories, and to dominate +the Baltic. In this he was assisted by the exhaustion of Sweden +consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible, +the position of a _quasi_ great power which she had held since +the days of Gustavus Adolphus. Sweden had been further weakened, +especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with Denmark, +which prevented all hope of Scandinavian predominance in the +Baltic, the control of which sea has in our own days passed into +the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy--the +modern German empire. + +The war of the Spanish Succession left Great Britain a Mediterranean +power, a position which, in spite of twice losing Minorca, she +still holds. In the war of the Austrian Succession, 'France was +forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and England +saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to +use it to the best advantage.'[42] This shows, as we shall find +that a later war showed more plainly, that even the Government +of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting +its naval affairs wisely. The Seven Years' war included some +brilliant displays of the efficacy of sea-power. It was this +which put the British in possession of Canada, decided which +European race was to rule in India, and led to a British occupation +of Havannah in one hemisphere and of Manila in the other. In +the same war we learned how, by a feeble use of sea-power, a +valuable possession like Minorca may be lost. At the same time +our maritime trade and the general prosperity of the kingdom +increased enormously. The result of the conflict made plain to +all the paramount importance of having in the principal posts +in the Government men capable of understanding what war is and +how it ought to be conducted. + +[Footnote 42: Mahan, _Inf._on_Hist._ p. 280.] + +This lesson, as the sequel demonstrated, had not been learned +when Great Britain became involved in a war with the insurgent +colonies in North America. Mahan's comment is striking: 'The +magnificence of sea-power and its value had perhaps been more +clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway and consequent exaltation +of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, +is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea-power +meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a +strife which endangered not only its most valuable colonies, but +even its own shores.'[43] We were, in fact, drawing too largely +on the _prestige_ acquired during the Seven Years' war; and we +were governed by men who did not understand the first principles +of naval warfare, and would not listen to those who did. They +quite ignored the teaching of the then comparatively recent wars +which has been alluded to already--that we should look upon the +enemy's coast as our frontier. A century and a half earlier the +Dutchman Grotius had written-- + + Quæ meta Britannis + Litora sunt aliis. + +[Footnote 43: _Influence_on_Hist._ p. 338.] + +Though ordinary prudence would have suggested ample preparation, +British ministers allowed their country to remain unprepared. +Instead of concentrating their efforts on the main objective, +they frittered away force in attempts to relieve two beleaguered +garrisons under the pretext of yielding to popular pressure, which +is the official term for acting on the advice of irresponsible +and uninstructed busybodies. 'Depuis le début de la crise,' says +Captain Chevalier, 'les ministres de la Grande Bretagne s'étaient +montrés inférieurs à leur tâche.' An impressive result of this was +the repeated appearance of powerful and indeed numerically superior +hostile fleets in the English Channel. The war--notwithstanding +that, perhaps because, land operations constituted an important +part of it, and in the end settled the issue--was essentially +oceanic. Captain Mahan says it was 'purely maritime.' It may +be true that, whatever the belligerent result, the political +result, as regards the _status_ of the insurgent colonies, would +have been the same. It is in the highest degree probable, indeed +it closely approaches to certainty, that a proper use of the +British sea-power would have prevented independence from being +conquered, as it were, at the point of the bayonet. There can be no +surprise in store for the student acquainted with the vagaries of +strategists who are influenced in war by political in preference +to military requirements. Still, it is difficult to repress an +emotion of astonishment on finding that a British Government +intentionally permitted De Grasse's fleet and the French army +in its convoy to cross the Atlantic unmolested, for fear of +postponing for a time the revictualling of the garrison beleaguered +at Gibraltar. Washington's opinion as to the importance of the +naval factor has been quoted already; and Mahan does not put +the case too strongly when he declares that the success of the +Americans was due to 'sea-power being in the hands of the French +and its improper distribution by the English authorities.' Our +navy, misdirected as it was, made a good fight of it, never allowed +itself to be decisively beaten in a considerable battle, and won +at least one great victory. At the point of contact with the +enemy, however, it was not in general so conspicuously successful +as it was in the Seven Years' war, or as it was to be in the +great conflict with the French republic and empire. The truth +is that its opponent, the French navy, was never so thoroughly +a sea-going force as it was in the war of American Independence; +and never so closely approached our own in real sea-experience +as it did during that period. We met antagonists who were very +nearly, but, fortunately for us, not quite as familiar with the +sea as we were ourselves; and we never found it so hard to beat +them, or even to avoid being beaten by them. An Englishman would, +naturally enough, start at the conclusion confronting him, if he +were to speculate as to the result of more than one battle had +the great Suffren's captains and crews been quite up to the level +of those commanded by stout old Sir Edward Hughes. Suffren, it +should be said, before going to the East Indies, had 'thirty-eight +years of almost uninterrupted sea-service.'[44] A glance at a +chart of the world, with the scenes of the general actions of +the war dotted on it, will show how notably oceanic the campaigns +were. The hostile fleets met over and over again on the far side +of the Atlantic and in distant Indian seas. The French navy had +penetrated into the ocean as readily and as far as we could do +ourselves. Besides this, it should be remembered that it was +not until the 12th April 1782. when Rodney in one hemisphere and +Suffren in the other showed them the way, that our officers were +able to escape from the fetters imposed on them by the _Fighting_ +_Instructions_,--a fact worth remembering in days in which it is +sometimes proposed, by establishing schools of naval tactics +on shore, to revive the pedantry which made a decisive success +in battle nearly impossible. + +[Footnote 44: Laughton, _Studies_in_Naval_Hist._ p. 103.] + +The mighty conflict which raged between Great Britain on one side +and France and her allies on the other, with little intermission, +for more than twenty years, presents a different aspect from that +of the war last mentioned. The victories which the British fleet +was to gain were generally to be overwhelming; if not, they were +looked upon as almost defeats. Whether the fleet opposed to ours +was, or was not, the more numerous, the result was generally the +same--our enemy was beaten. That there was a reason for this which +can be discovered is certain. A great deal has been made of the +disorganisation in the French navy consequent on the confusion of +the Revolution. That there was disorganisation is undoubted; that +it did impair discipline and, consequently, general efficiency will +not be disputed; but that it was considerable enough to account by +itself for the French naval defeats is altogether inadmissible. +Revolutionary disorder had invaded the land-forces to a greater +degree than it had invaded the sea-forces. The supersession, +flight, or guillotining of army officers had been beyond measure +more frequent than was the case with the naval officers. In spite +of all this the French armies were on the whole--even in the +early days of the Revolution--extraordinarily successful. In +1792 'the most formidable invasion that ever threatened France,' +as Alison calls it, was repelled, though the invaders were the +highly disciplined and veteran armies of Prussia and Austria. +It was nearly two years later that the French and English fleets +came into serious conflict. The first great battle, which we +call 'The Glorious First of June,' though a tactical victory +for us, was a strategical defeat. Villaret-Joyeuse manoeuvred so +as to cover the arrival in France of a fleet of merchant vessels +carrying sorely needed supplies of food, and in this he was +completely successful. His plan involved the probability, almost +the necessity, of fighting a general action which he was not at +all sure of winning. He was beaten, it is true; but the French +made so good a fight of it that their defeat was not nearly so +disastrous as the later defeats of the Nile or Trafalgar, and--at +the most--not more disastrous than that of Dominica. Yet no one +even alleges that there was disorder or disorganisation in the +French fleet at the date of anyone of those affairs. Indeed, +if the French navy was really disorganised in 1794, it would +have been better for France--judging from the events of 1798 and +1805--if the disorganisation had been allowed to continue. In +point of organisation the British Navy was inferior, and in point +of discipline not much superior to the French at the earliest +date; at the later dates, and especially at the latest, owing +to the all-pervading energy of Napoleon, the British was far +behind its rival in organisation, in 'science,' and in every +branch of training that can be imparted without going to sea. +We had the immense advantage of counting amongst our officers +some very able men. Nelson, of course, stands so high that he +holds a place entirely by himself. The other British chiefs, +good as they were, were not conspicuously superior to the Hawkes +and Rodneys of an earlier day. Howe was a great commander, but +he did little more than just appear on the scene in the war. +Almost the same may be said of Hood, of whom Nelson wrote, 'He +is the greatest sea-officer I ever knew.'[45] There must have +been something, therefore, beyond the meritorious qualities of +our principal officers which helped us so consistently to victory. +The many triumphs won could not have been due in every case to +the individual superiority of the British admiral or captain to +his opponent. There must have been bad as well as good amongst +the hundreds on our lists; and we cannot suppose that Providence +had so arranged it that in every action in which a British officer +of inferior ability commanded a still inferior French commander +was opposed to him. The explanation of our nearly unbroken success +is, that the British was a thoroughly sea-going navy, and became +more and more so every month; whilst the French, since the close +of the American war, had lost to a great extent its sea-going +character and, because we shut it up in its ports, became less +and less sea-going as hostilities continued. The war had been +for us, in the words of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, 'a continuous +course of victory won mainly by seamanship.' Our navy, as regards +sea-experience, especially of the officers, was immensely superior +to the French. This enabled the British Government to carry into +execution sound strategic plans, in accordance with which the coasts +of France and its dependent or allied countries were regarded as +the English frontier to be watched or patrolled by our fleets. + +[Footnote 45: Laughton, _Nelson's_Lett._and_Desp._ p. 71.] + +Before the long European war had been brought to a formal ending +we received some rude rebuffs from another opponent of unsuspected +vigour. In the quarrel with the United States, the so-called +'War of 1812,' the great sea-power of the British in the end +asserted its influence, and our antagonists suffered much more +severely, even absolutely, than ourselves. At the same time we +might have learned, for the Americans did their best to teach us, +that over-confidence in numerical strength and narrow professional +self-satisfaction are nearly sure to lead to reverses in war, and +not unlikely to end in grave disasters. We had now to meet the +_élite_ of one of the finest communities of seamen ever known. +Even in 1776 the Americans had a great maritime commerce, which, +as Mahan informs us, 'had come to be the wonder of the statesmen +of the mother country.' In the six-and-thirty years which had +elapsed since then this commerce had further increased. There +was no finer nursery of seamen than the then states of the American +Union. Roosevelt says that 'there was no better seaman in the +world' than the American, who 'had been bred to his work from +infancy.' A large proportion of the population 'was engaged in +sea-going pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a +resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them.'[46] +Having little or no naval protection, the American seaman had +to defend himself in many circumstances, and was compelled to +familiarise himself with the use of arms. The men who passed +through this practical, and therefore supremely excellent, training +school were numerous. Very many had been trained in English +men-of-war, and some in French ships. The state navy which they +were called on to man was small; and therefore its _personnel_, +though without any regular or avowed selection, was virtually +and in the highest sense a picked body. The lesson of the war +of 1812 should be learned by Englishmen of the present day, when +a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical +superiority, in the mere possession of heavier _matériel_, and +in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, which +confidence, as experience has shown, is too often the forerunner +of misfortune. It is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimise +the American successes. Certainly they have been exaggerated by +Americans and even by ourselves. To take the frigate actions +alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention, +we see that the captures in action amounted to three on each +side, the proportionate loss to our opponents, considering the +smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than ours. +We also see that no British frigate was taken after the first +seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years, and that +no British frigate succumbed except to admittedly superior force. +Attempts have been made to spread a belief that our reverses +were due to nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of our +enemy's ships. It is now established that the superiority in +these details, which the Americans certainly enjoyed, was not +great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories. +Of course, if superiority in mere _matériel_, beyond a certain +well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants, +his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged +that size of ship or calibre of guns--greater within reasonable +limits than we had--necessarily led to the defeat of British +ships by the French or Spaniards. In the words of Admiral Jurien +de la Gravière, 'The ships of the United States constantly fought +with the chances in their favour.' All this is indisputable. +Nevertheless we ought to see to it that in any future war our +sea-power, great as it may be, does not receive shocks like those +that it unquestionably did receive in 1812. + +[Footnote 46: _Naval_War_of_1812_, 3rd ed. pp. 29, 30.] + + +SEA-POWER IN RECENT TIMES + +We have now come to the end of the days of the naval wars of +old time. The subsequent period has been illustrated repeatedly +by manifestations of sea-power, often of great interest and +importance, though rarely understood or even discerned by the +nations which they more particularly concerned. The British +sea-power, notwithstanding the first year of the war of 1812, +had come out of the great European conflict unshaken and indeed +more preeminent than ever. The words used, half a century before +by a writer in the great French 'Encyclopédie,' seemed more exact +than when first written. '_L'empire_des_mers_,' he says, is, +'le plus avantageux de tous les empires; les Phoeniciens le +possédoient autre fois et c'est aux Anglois que cette gloire +appartient aujourd'hui sur toutes les puissances maritimes.'[47] +Vast out-lying territories had been acquired or were more firmly +held, and the communications of all the over-sea dominions of the +British Crown were secured against all possibility of serious +menace for many years to come. Our sea-power was so ubiquitous +and all-pervading that, like the atmosphere, we rarely thought +of it and rarely remembered its necessity or its existence. It +was not till recently that the greater part of the nation--for +there were many, and still are some exceptions--perceived that +it was the medium apart from which the British Empire could no +more live than it could have grown up. Forty years after the +fall of Napoleon we found ourselves again at war with a great +power. We had as our ally the owner of the greatest navy in the +world except our own. Our foe, as regards his naval forces, came +the next in order. Yet so overwhelming was the strength of Great +Britain and France on the sea that Russia never attempted to +employ her navy against them. Not to mention other expeditions, +considerable enough in themselves, military operations on the +largest scale were undertaken, carried on for many months, and +brought to a successful termination on a scene so remote that +it was two thousand miles from the country of one, and three +thousand from that of the other partner in the alliance. 'The +stream of supplies and reinforcements, which in terms of modern +war is called "communications,", was kept free from even the threat +of molestation, not by visible measures, but by the undisputed +efficacy of a real, though imperceptible sea-power. At the close +of the Russian war we encountered, and unhappily for us in +influential positions, men who, undismayed by the consequences +of mimicking in free England the cast-iron methods of the Great +Frederick, began to measure British requirements by standards +borrowed from abroad and altogether inapplicable to British +conditions. Because other countries wisely abstained from relying +on that which they did not possess, or had only imperfectly and +with elaborate art created, the mistress of the seas was led to +proclaim her disbelief in the very force that had made and kept +her dominion, and urged to defend herself with fortifications by +advisers who, like Charles II and the Duke of York two centuries +before, were 'not ashamed of it.' It was long before the peril +into which this brought the empire was perceived; but at last, +and in no small degree owing to the teachings of Mahan, the people +themselves took the matter in hand and insisted that a great +maritime empire should have adequate means of defending all that +made its existence possible. + +[Footnote 47: _Encyclopédie_, 7th Jan. 1765, art. 'Thalassarchie.'] + +In forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the +efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the American Secession +war. If ever there were hostilities in which, to the unobservant +or short-sighted, naval operations might at first glance seem +destined to count for little, they were these. The sequel, however, +made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors +of the success of the victorious side. The belligerents, the +Northern or Federal States and the Southern or Confederate States, +had a common land frontier of great length. The capital of each +section was within easy distance of this frontier, and the two +were not far apart. In wealth, population, and resources the +Federals were enormously superior. They alone possessed a navy, +though at first it was a small one. The one advantage on the +Confederate side was the large proportion of military officers +which belonged to it and their fine training as soldiers. In +_physique_ as well as in _morale_ the army of one side differed +little from that of the other; perhaps the Federal army was slightly +superior in the first, and the Confederate, as being recruited +from a dominant white race, in the second. Outnumbered, less well +equipped, and more scantily supplied, the Confederates nevertheless +kept up the war, with many brilliant successes on land, for four +years. Had they been able to maintain their trade with neutral +states they could have carried on the war longer, and--not +improbably--have succeeded in the end. The Federal navy, which was +largely increased, took away all chance of this. It established +effective blockades of the Confederate ports, and severed their +communications with the outside world. Indispensable articles of +equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, +became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished +antagonists. By dominating the rivers the Federals cut the +Confederacy asunder; and by the power they possessed of moving troops +by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated +the occupation of important points. Meanwhile the Confederates +could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant +vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of +the war remained absolutely unaffected. The great numbers of +men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles +of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree, +was notably uncommon on both sides, and the varying fortunes of +the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting +to the ordinary observer than the naval. It is not surprising, +therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years +before the American people could be made to see the great part +taken by the navy in the restoration of the Union; and what the +Americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations. + +In several great wars in Europe waged since France and England +made peace with Russia sea-power manifested itself but little. +In the Russo-Turkish war the great naval superiority of the Turks +in the Black Sea, where the Russians at the time had no fleet, +governed the plans, if not the course, of the campaigns. The +water being denied to them, the Russians were compelled to execute +their plan of invading Turkey by land. An advance to the Bosphorus +through the northern part of Asia Minor was impracticable without +help from a navy on the right flank. Consequently the only route +was a land one across the Danube and the Balkans. The advantages, +though not fully utilised, which the enforcement of this line of +advance put into the hands of the Turks, and the difficulties +and losses which it caused the Russians, exhibited in a striking +manner what sea-power can effect even when its operation is scarcely +observable. + +This was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. The +civil war in Chili between Congressists and Balmacedists is specially +interesting, because it throws into sharp relief the predominant +influence, when a non-maritime enemy is to be attacked, of a navy +followed up by an adequate land-force. At the beginning of the +dispute the Balmacedists, or President's party, had practically +all the army, and the Congressists, or Opposition party, nearly +all the Chilian navy. Unable to remain in the principal province +of the republic, and expelled from the waters of Valparaiso by the +Balmacedist garrisons of the forts--the only and doubtful service +which those works rendered to their own side--the Congressists +went off with the ships to the northern provinces, where they +counted many adherents. There they formed an army, and having +money at command, and open sea communications, they were able +to import equipment from abroad, and eventually to transport +their land-force, secured from molestation on the voyage by the +sea-power at their disposal, to the neighbourhood of Valparaiso, +where it was landed and triumphantly ended the campaign. + +It will have been noticed that, in its main outlines, this story +repeated that of many earlier campaigns. It was itself repeated, +as regards its general features, by the story of the war between +China and Japan in 1894-95. 'Every aspect of the war,' says Colomb, +'is interesting to this country, as Japan is to China in a position +similar to that which the British Islands occupy to the European +continent.'[48] It was additionally interesting because the sea-power +of Japan was a novelty. Though a novelty, it was well known by +English naval men to be superior in all essentials to that of +China, a novelty itself. As is the rule when two belligerents +are contending for something beyond a purely maritime object, +the final decision was to be on land. Korea was the principal +theatre of the land war; and, as far as access to it by sea was +concerned, the chief bases of the two sides were about the same +distance from it. It was possible for the Chinese to march there +by land. The Japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged +to cross the water. It will be seen at once that not only the +success of the Japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility +of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power. +The Japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea. Their +navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in +Korea, and for another which was landed in the Chinese province +of Shantung. The Chinese land-forces were defeated. The navy of +japan, being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister +service supplied or reinforced as required. It was, however, not +the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the Chinese +efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. What the navy +did was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power, +may be expected of a navy. It made the transport of the army +across the sea possible; and enabled it to do what of itself +the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance +of the enemy. + +[Footnote 48: _Naval_Warfare_, 3rd ed. p. 436.] + +The issue of the Spanish-American war, at least as regards the mere +defeat of Spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. That Spain, +even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to +the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the United States +must have been evident even to Spaniards. Be that as it may, an +early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and +however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished +examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. Mahan says of +it that, 'while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of +its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad +analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that +unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto +this day.'[49] The Spaniards were defeated by the superiority +of the American sea-power. 'A million of the best soldiers,' says +Mahan, 'would have been powerless in face of hostile control of +the sea.' That control was obtained and kept by the United States +navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops--and +their subsequent reinforcement and supply--to Spanish territory, +which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army +on shore. That it was the navy which made this final conquest +possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident +by the action of the United States Government, which stopped a +military expedition on the point of starting for Cuba until the +sea was cleared of all Spanish naval force worth attention. + +[Footnote 49: _Lessons_of_the_War_with_Spain_, p. 16.] + +The events of the long period which we have been considering +will have shown how sea-power operates, and what it effects. +What is in it will have appeared from this narrative more clearly +than would have been possible from any mere definition. Like +many other things, sea-power is composed of several elements. To +reach the highest degree of efficacy it should be based upon a +population naturally maritime, and on an ocean commerce naturally +developed rather than artificially enticed to extend itself. Its +outward and visible sign is a navy, strong in the discipline, +skill, and courage of a numerous _personnel_ habituated to the +sea, in the number and quality of its ships, in the excellence +of its _matériel_, and in the efficiency, scale, security, and +geographical position of its arsenals and bases. History has +demonstrated that sea-power thus conditioned can gain any purely +maritime object, can protect the trade and the communications of a +widely extended empire, and whilst so doing can ward off from its +shores a formidable invader. There are, however, limitations to be +noted. Left to itself its operation is confined to the water, or at +any rate to the inner edge of a narrow zone of coast. It prepares +the way for the advance of an army, the work of which it is not +intended, and is unable to perform. Behind it, in the territory +of which it guards the shores, there must be a land-force adjusted +in organisation, equipment, and numbers to the circumstances +of the country. The possession of a navy does not permit a +sea-surrounded state to dispense with all fixed defences or +fortification; but it does render it unnecessary and indeed absurd +that they should be abundant or gigantic. The danger which always +impends over the sea-power of any country is that, after being +long unused, it may lose touch of the sea. The revolution in +the constructive arts during the last half-century, which has +also been a period of but little-interrupted naval peace, and +the universal adoption of mechanical appliances, both for +ship-propulsion and for many minor services--mere _matériel_ +being thereby raised in the general estimation far above really +more important matters--makes the danger mentioned more menacing +in the present age than it has ever been before. + + + + +II + +THE COMMAND OF THE SEA[50] + +[Footnote 50: Written in 1899. (_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_.)] + +This phrase, a technical term of naval warfare, indicates a definite +strategical condition. The term has been substituted occasionally, +but less frequently of late years, for the much older 'Dominion +of the sea' or 'Sovereignty of the sea,' a legal term expressing +a claim, if not a right. It has also been sometimes treated as +though it were identical with the rhetorical expression 'Empire +of the sea.' Mahan, instead of it, uses the term 'Control of +the sea,' which has the merit of precision, and is not likely +to be misunderstood or mixed up with a form of words meaning +something different. The expression 'Command of the sea,' however, +in its proper and strategic sense, is so firmly fixed in the +language that it would be a hopeless task to try to expel it; +and as, no doubt, writers will continue to use it, it must be +explained and illustrated. Not only does it differ in meaning +from 'Dominion or Sovereignty of the sea,' it is not even truly +derived therefrom, as can be briefly shown. 'It has become an +uncontested principle of modern international law that the sea, +as a general rule, cannot be subjected to appropriation.'[51] +This, however, is quite modern. We ourselves did not admit the +principle till 1805; the Russians did not admit it till 1824; +and the Americans, and then only tacitly, not till 1894. Most +European nations at some time or other have claimed and have +exercised rights over some part of the sea, though far outside +the now well-recognised 'three miles' limit.' Venice claimed +the Adriatic, and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating +its northern waters. Genoa and France each claimed portions of +the western Mediterranean. Denmark and Sweden claimed to share +the Baltic between them. Spain claimed dominion over the Pacific +and the Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal over the Indian Ocean and +all the Atlantic south of Morocco.[52] The claim which has made +the greatest noise in the world is that once maintained by the +kings of England to the seas surrounding the British Isles. Like +other institutions, the English sovereignty of the sea was, and +was admitted to be, beneficent for a long period. Then came the +time when it ought to have been abandoned as obsolete; but it was +not, and so it led to war. The general conviction of the maritime +nations was that the Lord of the Sea would provide for the police +of the waters over which he exercised dominion. In rude ages when +men, like the ancients, readily 'turned themselves to piracy,' +this was of immense importance to trade; and, far from the right +of dominion being disputed by foreigners, it was insisted upon by +them and declared to carry with it certain duties. In 1299, not +only English merchants, but also 'the maritime people of Genoa, +Catalonia, Spain, Germany, Zealand, Holland, Frisia, Denmark, +Norway, and several other places of the empire' declared that the +kings of England had from time immemorial been in 'peaceable +possession of the sovereign lordship of the sea of England,' +and had done what was 'needful for the maintenance of peace, +right, and equity between people of all sorts, whether subjects +of another kingdom or not, who pass through those seas.'[53] The +English sovereignty was not exercised as giving authority to +exact toll. All that was demanded in return for keeping the sea +safe for peaceful traffic was a salute, enforced no doubt as a +formal admission of the right which permitted the (on the whole, +at any rate) effective police of the waters to be maintained. +The Dutch in the seventeenth century objected to the demand for +this salute. It was insisted upon. War ensued; but in the end +the Dutch acknowledged by solemn treaties their obligation to +render the salute. The time for exacting it, however, was really +past. S. R. Gardiner[54] maintains that though the 'question of +the flag' was the occasion, it was not the cause of the war. +There was not much, if any, piracy in the English Channel which +the King of England was specially called upon to suppress, and +if there had been the merchant vessels of the age were generally +able to defend themselves, while if they were not their governments +possessed force enough to give them the necessary protection. +We gave up our claim to exact the salute in 1805. + +[Footnote 51: W. E. Hall, _Treatise_on_International_Law_, +4th ed. 1895, p. 146.] + +[Footnote 52: Hall, pp. 48, 49.] + +[Footnote 53: J. K. Laughton, 'Sovereignty of the Sea,' _Fortnightly_ +_Review_, August 1866.] + +[Footnote 54: _The_First_Dutch_War_ (Navy Records Society), 1899.] + +The necessity of the foregoing short account of the 'Sovereignty +or Dominion of the Seas' will be apparent as soon as we come +to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series +of struggles, for the command of the sea. Gaining this was the +result of our wars with the Dutch in the seventeenth century. +At the time of the first Dutch war, 1652-54, and probably of +the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen, +believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our +part to retain, and on that of the Dutch to put an end to, the +English sovereignty or dominion. The obstinacy of the Dutch in +objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the English +flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most Englishmen, and +probably of most Dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which +other reasons may have rendered inevitable. The remarkable thing +about the Dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the +possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea. We came +out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the +greatest, naval power. It is this which prompted Vice-Admiral P. +H. Colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such +as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior +purpose,' &c. An explanation that would make all these terms +intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. It +will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts +to gain which, as Colomb tells us, the Anglo-Dutch wars were +the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the +nation whose power on the sea is paramount. It exists and may +be visible in time of peace. The command which, as said above, +expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in +time of war. It can easily be seen that the former is essential to +an empire like the British, the parts of which are bound together +by maritime communications. Inability to keep these communications +open can have only one result, viz. the loss of the parts with +which communication cannot be maintained. Experience of war as +well as reason will have made it evident that inability to keep +open sea-communications cannot be limited to any single line, +because the inability must be due either to incapacity in the +direction of hostilities or insufficiency of force. If we have +not force enough to keep open all the communications of our widely +extended empire, or if--having force enough--we are too foolish +to employ it properly, we do not hold the command of the sea, +and the empire must fall if seriously attacked. + +The strategic command of the sea in a particular war or campaign +has equal concern for all maritime belligerents. Before seeing +what it is, it will be well to learn on high authority what it is +not. Mahan says that command, or, to use his own term, 'control +of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single +ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross +more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents +upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded +harbours. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions +are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however +great the inequality of naval strength.'[55] The Anglo-French +command of the sea in 1854-56, complete as it was, did not enable +the allies to intercept the Russian ships in the North-Western +Pacific, nor did that held by the Federals in the American civil +war put an early stop to the cruises of the Confederate vessels. +What the term really does imply is the power possessed from the +first, or gained during hostilities, by one belligerent of carrying +out considerable over-sea expeditions at will. In the Russian +war just mentioned the allies had such overwhelmingly superior +sea-power that the Russians abandoned to them without a struggle +the command of the sea; and the more recent landing in South +Africa, more than six thousand miles away, of a large British army +without even a threat of interruption on the voyage is another +instance of unchallenged command. In wars between great powers +and also between secondary powers, if nearly equally matched, +this absence of challenge is rare. The rule is that the command +of the sea has to be won after hostilities begin. To win it the +enemy's naval force must be neutralised. It must be driven into +his ports and there blockaded or 'masked,' and thus rendered +virtually innocuous; or it must be defeated and destroyed. The +latter is the preferable, because the more effective, plan. As +was perceptible in the Spanish-American war of 1898, as long +as one belligerent's fleet is intact or at large, the other is +reluctant to carry out any considerable expedition over-sea. In +fact, the command of the sea has not been secured whilst the +enemy continues to have a 'fleet in being.'[56] + +[Footnote 55: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, 1890, p. 4.] + +[Footnote 56: See _ante_, Sea-Power, p. 50.] + +In 1782 a greatly superior Franco-Spanish fleet was covering +the siege of Gibraltar. Had this fleet succeeded in preventing +the revictualling of the fortress the garrison would have been +starved into surrender. A British fleet under Lord Howe, though +much weaker in numbers, had not been defeated and was still at +large. Howe, in spite of the odds against him, managed to get his +supply-ships in to the anchorage and to fight a partial action, in +which he did the allies as much damage as he received. There has +never been a display of higher tactical skill than this operation +of Howe's, though, it may be said, he owes his fame much more +to his less meritorious performance on the first of June. The +revictualling of Gibraltar surpassed even Suffren's feat of the +capture of Trincomalee in the same year. In 1798 the French, +assuming that a temporary superiority in the Mediterranean had +given them a free hand on the water, sent a great expedition to +Egypt. Though the army which was carried succeeded in landing +there, the covering fleet was destroyed by Nelson at the Nile, +and the army itself was eventually forced to surrender. The French +had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor +operations, you cannot separate the command of the Mediterranean +or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general. +Local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty +raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel; +but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring +considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything +likely to have an important influence on the course of the war. +If Great Britain has not naval force enough to retain command +of the Mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough +to retain command of the English Channel. It can be easily shown +why it should be so. In war danger comes less from conditions of +locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. Taking up a weak +position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of +his power, but it does not constitute it.[57] A maritime enemy's +power to hurt resides in his fleet. If that can be neutralised +his power disappears. It is in the highest degree improbable +that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into +fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in +which the enemy may try to do us mischief. The most promising +plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when +he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat +him. The proper station of the British fleet in war should, +accordingly, be the nearest possible point to the enemy's force. +This was the fundamental principle of Nelson's strategy, and it +is as valid now as ever it was. If we succeed in getting into +close proximity to the hostile fleet with an adequate force of +our own, our foe cannot obtain command of the sea, or of any +part of it, whether that part be the Mediterranean or the English +Channel, at any rate until he has defeated us. If he is strong +enough to defeat our fleet he obtains the command of the sea +in general; and it is for him to decide whether he shall show +the effectiveness of that command in the Mediterranean or in +the Channel. + +[Footnote 57: In his _History_of_Scotland_ (1873). J. H. M. Burton, +speaking of the Orkney and Shetland isles in the Viking times, +says (vol. i. p. 320): 'Those who occupied them were protected, +not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete +command over the North Sea held by the fleets that found shelter +in the fiords and firths.'] + +In the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular +area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or +at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements. +When the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought +not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a +small hostile expedition may slip across, say the Channel, throw +shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home +again unmolested. Its action would have no sort of influence on +the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless. It +would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were +repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated +system of 'cross-raiding,' discarded centuries ago, not at all +for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war +could be more effectually waged in other ways. The nation in +command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal +submission of an already defeated enemy, as Russia did when at +war with Sweden in 1719; but in such a case the other side cannot +retaliate. Temporary command of local waters will also permit of +operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks; +but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the +time available. If the duration of the temporary command is +insufficient the operation must fail. It must fail even if the +earlier steps have been taken successfully. Temporary command +of the Baltic in war might enable a German force to occupy an +Aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into +permanent command, Germany could make no use of the acquisition, +which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former +possessors. The command of the English Channel, which Napoleon +wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only +temporary. It is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened +in Egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite +independently of the proceedings of Villeneuve, he hesitated to +risk a second battle of the Nile and the loss of a second army. +It may have been this which justified his later statement that he +did not really mean to invade England. In any case, the English +practice of fixing the station of their fleet wherever that of +the enemy's was, would have seriously shortened the duration +of his command of the Channel, even if it had allowed it to be +won at all. Moreover, attempts to carry out a great operation +of war against time as well as against the efforts of the enemy +to prevent it are in the highest degree perilous. + +In war the British Navy has three prominent duties to discharge. It +has to protect our maritime trade, to keep open the communications +between the different parts of the empire, and to prevent invasion. +If we command the sea these duties will be discharged effectually. +As long as we command the sea the career of hostile cruisers +sent to prey on our commerce will be precarious, because command +of the sea carries with it the necessity of possessing an ample +cruiser force. As long as the condition mentioned is satisfied +our ocean communications will be kept open, because an inferior +enemy, who cannot obtain the command required, will be too much +occupied in seeing to his own safety to be able to interfere +seriously with that of any part of our empire. This being so, +it is evident that the greater operation of invasion cannot be +attempted, much less carried to a successful termination, by the +side which cannot make head against the opposing fleet. Command of +the sea is the indispensable preliminary condition of a successful +military expedition sent across the water. It enables the nation +which possesses it to attack its foes where it pleases and where +they seem to be most vulnerable. At the same time it gives to its +possessor security against serious counter-attacks, and affords +to his maritime commerce the most efficient protection that can +be devised. It is, in fact, the main object of naval warfare. + + + + +III + +WAR AND ITS CHIEF LESSONS[58] + +[Footnote 58: Written in 1900. (_Naval_Annual_, 1901.)] + +Had the expression 'real war' been introduced into the title of +this chapter, its introduction would have been justifiable. The +sources--if not of our knowledge of combat, at least of the views +which are sure to prevail when we come to actual fighting--are to +be found in two well-defined, dissimilar, and widely separated +areas. Within one are included the records of war; within the +other, remembrance of the exercises and manoeuvres of a time of +peace. The future belligerent will almost of a certainty have taken +a practical part in the latter, whilst it is probable that he will +have had no personal experience of the former. The longer the time +elapsed since hostilities were in progress, the more probable and +more general does this absence of experience become. The fighting +man--that is to say, the man set apart, paid, and trained so as +to be ready to fight when called upon--is of the same nature as +the rest of his species. This is a truism; but it is necessary to +insist upon it, because professional, and especially professorial, +strategists and tacticians almost invariably ignore it. That which +we have seen and know has not only more, but very much more, +influence upon the minds of nearly all of us than that of which +we have only heard, and, most likely, heard but imperfectly. The +result is that, when peace is interrupted and the fighting man--on +both sea and land--is confronted with the problems of practical +belligerency, he brings to his attempts at their solution an +intellectual equipment drawn, not from knowledge of real war, +but from the less trustworthy arsenal of the recollections of +his peace training. + +When peace, especially a long peace, ends, the methods which it +has introduced are the first enemies which the organised defenders +of a country have to overcome. There is plenty of evidence to prove +that--except, of course, in unequal conflicts between highly +organised, civilised states and savage or semi-barbarian +tribes--success in war is directly proportionate to the extent +of the preliminary victory over the predominance of impressions +derived from the habits and exercises of an armed force during +peace. That the cogency of this evidence is not invariably recognised +is to be attributed to insufficient attention to history and to +disinclination to apply its lessons properly. A primary object +of the _Naval_Annual_--indeed, the chief reason for its +publication--being to assist in advancing the efficiency of the +British Navy, its pages are eminently the place for a review +of the historical examples of the often-recurring inability of +systems established in peace to stand the test of war. Hostilities +on land being more frequent, and much more frequently written +about, than those by sea, the history of the former as well as +of the latter must be examined. The two classes of warfare have +much in common. The principles of their strategy are identical; +and, as regards some of their main features, so are those of +the tactics followed in each. Consequently the history of land +warfare has its lessons for those who desire to achieve success +in warfare on the sea. + +That this has often been lost sight of is largely due to a +misapprehension of the meaning of terms. The two words 'military' +and 'army' have been given, in English, a narrower signification +than they ought, and than they used, to have. Both terms have +been gradually restricted in their use, and made to apply only +to the land service. This has been unfortunate; because records +of occurrences and discussions, capable of imparting much valuable +instruction to naval officers, have been passed over by them +as inapplicable to their own calling. It may have been noticed +that Captain Mahan uses the word 'military' in its right sense +as indicating the members, and the most important class of +operations, of both land- and sea-forces. The French, through +whom the word has come to us from the Latin, use it in the same +sense as Mahan. _Un_militaire_ is a member of either a land +army or a navy. The 'Naval _and_ Military Intelligence' of the +English press is given under the heading 'Nouvelles Militaires' +in the French. Our word 'army' also came to us direct from the +French, who still apply it equally to both services--_armée_de_ +_terre,_armée_de_mer_. It is a participle, and means 'armed,' +the word 'force' being understood. The kindred words _armada_ in +Spanish and Portuguese, and _armata_ in Italian--equally derived +from the Latin--are used to indicate a fleet or navy, another +name being given to a land army. The word 'army' was generally +applied to a fleet in former days by the English, as will be +seen on reference to the Navy Records Society's volumes on the +defeat of the Spanish Armada. + +This short etymological discussion is not inappropriate here, +for it shows why we should not neglect authorities on the history +and conduct of war merely because they do not state specially +that they are dealing with the naval branch of it. + +A very slight knowledge of history is quite enough to make us +acquainted with the frequent recurrence of defeats and disasters +inflicted on armed forces by antagonists whose power to do so +had not been previously suspected. It has been the same on the +sea as on the land, though--owing to more copious records--we +may have a larger list of events on the latter. It will not be +denied that it is of immense importance to us to inquire how this +happened, and ascertain how--for the future--it may be rendered +highly improbable in our own case. A brief enumeration of the more +striking instances will make it plain that the events in question +have been confined to no particular age and to no particular +country. + +It may be said that the more elaborately organised and trained +in peace time an armed force happened to be, the more unexpected +always, and generally the more disastrous, was its downfall. +Examples of this are to be found in the earliest campaigns of +which we have anything like detailed accounts, and they continue +to reappear down to very recent times. In the elaborate nature +of its organisation and training there probably never has been +an army surpassing that led by Xerxes into Greece twenty-four +centuries ago. Something like eight years had been devoted to +its preparation. The minute account of its review by Xerxes on +the shores of the Hellespont proves that, however inefficient +the semi-civilised contingents accompanying it may have been, +the regular Persian army appeared, in discipline, equipment, +and drill, to have come up to the highest standard of the most +intense 'pipeclay' epoch. In numbers alone its superiority was +considerable to the last, and down to the very eve of Platæa its +commander openly displayed his contempt for his enemy. Yet no +defeat could be more complete than that suffered by the Persians +at the hands of their despised antagonists. + +As if to establish beyond dispute the identity of governing +conditions in both land and maritime wars, the next very conspicuous +disappointment of an elaborately organised force was that of the +Athenian fleet at Syracuse. At the time Athens, without question, +stood at the head of the naval world: her empire was in the truest +sense the product of sea-power. Her navy, whilst unequalled in size, +might claim, without excessive exaggeration, to be invincible. The +great armament which the Athenians despatched to Sicily seemed, in +numbers alone, capable of triumphing over all resistance. If the +Athenian navy had already met with some explicable mishaps, it +looked back with complacent confidence on the glorious achievements +of more than half a century previously. It had enjoyed many years +of what was so nearly a maritime peace that its principal exploits +had been the subjection of states weak to insignificance on the +sea as compared with imperial Athens. Profuse expenditure on its +maintenance; the 'continued practice' of which Pericles boasted, +the peace manoeuvres of a remote past; skilfully designed equipment; +and the memory of past glories;--all these did not avail to save +it from defeat at the hands of an enemy who only began to organise +a fleet when the Athenians had invaded his coast waters. + +Ideal perfection as a regular army has never been so nearly reached +as by that of Sparta. The Spartan spent his life in the barrack +and the mess-room; his amusements were the exercises of the parade +ground. For many generations a Spartan force had never been defeated +in a pitched battle. We have had, in modern times, some instances +of a hectoring soldiery arrogantly prancing amongst populations +whose official defenders it had defeated in battle; but nonesuch +could vie with the Spartans in the sublimity of their military +self-esteem. Overweening confidence in the prowess of her army +led Sparta to trample with ruthless disdain on the rights of +others. The iniquitous attack on Thebes, a state thought incapable +of effectual resentment, was avenged by the defeat of Leuctra, +which announced the end of the political supremacy and the military +predominance of Sparta. + +In the series of struggles with Carthage which resulted in putting +Rome in a position enabling her eventually to win the dominion +of the ancient world, the issue was to be decided on the water. +Carthage was essentially a maritime state. The foundation of the +city was effected by a maritime expedition; its dominions lay on +the neighbouring coast or in regions to which the Carthaginians +could penetrate only by traversing the sea. To Carthage her fleet +was 'all in all': her navy, supported by large revenues and +continuously maintained, was more of a 'regular' force than any +modern navy before the second half of the seventeenth century. The +Romans were almost without a fleet, and when they formed one the +undertaking was ridiculed by the Carthaginians with an unconcealed +assumption of superiority. The defeat of the latter off Mylæ, +the first of several, came as a great surprise to them, and, as +we can see now, indicated the eventual ruin of their city. + +We are so familiar with stories of the luxury and corruption of +the Romans during the decline of the empire that we are likely +to forget that the decline went on for centuries, and that their +armed forces, however recruited, presented over and over again +abundant signs of physical courage and vigour. The victory of +Stilicho over Alaric at Pollentia has been aptly paralleled with +that of Marius over the Cimbri. This was by no means the only +achievement of the Roman army of the decadence. A century and +a quarter later--when the Empire of the West had fallen and the +general decline had made further progress--Belisarius conducted +successful campaigns in Persia, in North Africa, in Sicily, and +in Italy. The mere list of countries shows that the mobility and +endurance of the Roman forces during a period in which little +creditable is generally looked for were not inferior to their +discipline and courage. Yet they met with disastrous defeat after +all, and at the hands of races which they had more than once +proved themselves capable of withstanding. It could not have been +because the later Roman equipment was inferior, the organisation +less elaborate, or the training less careful than those of their +barbarian enemies. + +Though it is held by some in these days that the naval power +of Spain in the latter part of the sixteenth century was not +really formidable, that does not appear to have been the opinion +of contemporaries, whether Spaniards or otherwise. Some English +seamen of the time did, indeed, declare their conviction that +Philip the Second's navy was not so much to be feared as many +of their fellow-countrymen thought; but, in the public opinion +of the age, Spain was the greatest, or indeed the one great, +naval state. She possessed a more systematically organised navy +than any other country having the ocean for a field of action +had then, or till long afterwards. Even Genoa and Venice, whose +operations, moreover, were restricted to Mediterranean waters, +could not have been served by more finished specimens of the +naval officer and the man-of-war's man of the time than a large +proportion of the military _personnel_ of the regular Spanish +fleet. As Basques, Castilians, Catalans, or Aragonese, or all +combined, the crews of Spanish fighting ships could look back +upon a glorious past. It was no wonder that, by common consent +of those who manned it, the title of 'Invincible' was informally +conferred upon the Armada which, in 1588, sailed for the English +Channel. How it fared is a matter of common knowledge. No one +could have been more surprised at the result than the gallant +officers who led its squadrons. + +Spain furnishes another instance of the unexpected overthrow of +a military body to which long cohesion and precise organisation +were believed to have secured invincibility. The Spanish was +considered the 'most redoubtable infantry in Europe' till its +unexpected defeat at Rocroi. The effects of this defeat were +far-reaching. Notwithstanding the bravery of her sons, which +has never been open to question, and, in fact, has always been +conspicuous, the military superiority of Spain was broken beyond +repair. + +In the history of other countries are to be found examples equally +instructive. The defeats of Almansa, Brihuega, and Villaviciosa +were nearly contemporary with the victories of Blenheim and +Ramillies; and the thousands of British troops compelled to lay +down their arms at the first named belonged to the same service +as their fellow-countrymen who so often marched to victory under +Marlborough. A striking example of the disappointment which lies +in wait for military self-satisfaction was furnished by the defeat +of Soubise at Rossbach by Frederick the Great. Before the action +the French had ostentatiously shown their contempt for their +opponent. + +The service which gloried in the exploits of Anson and of Hawke +discerned the approach of the Seven Years' war without misgiving; +and the ferocity shown in the treatment of Byng enables us now +to measure the surprise caused by the result of the action off +Minorca. There were further surprises in store for the English +Navy. At the end of the Seven Years' war its reputation for +invincibility was generally established. Few, perhaps none, ventured +to doubt that, if there were anything like equality between the +opposing forces, a meeting between the French and the British +fleets could have but one result--viz. the decisive victory of +the latter. Experience in the English Channel, on the other side +of the Atlantic, and in the Bay of Bengal--during the war of +American Independence--roughly upset this flattering anticipation. +Yet, in the end, the British Navy came out the unquestioned victor +in the struggle: which proves the excellence of its quality. After +every allowance is made for the incapacity of the Government, +we must suspect that there was something else which so often +frustrated the efforts of such a formidable force as the British +Navy of the day must essentially have been. On land the surprises +were even more mortifying; and it is no exaggeration to say that, +a year before it occurred, such an event as the surrender of +Burgoyne's army to an imperfectly organised and trained body of +provincials would have seemed impossible. + +The army which Frederick the Great bequeathed to Prussia was +universally regarded as the model of efficiency. Its methods were +copied in other countries, and foreign officers desiring to excel +in their profession made pilgrimages to Berlin and Potsdam to drink +of the stream of military knowledge at its source. When it came in +contact with the tumultuous array of revolutionary France, the +performances of the force that preserved the tradition of the great +Frederick were disappointingly wanting in brilliancy. A few years +later it suffered an overwhelming disaster. The Prussian defeat +at Jena was serious as a military event; its political effects +were of the utmost importance. Yet many who were involved in that +disaster took, later on, an effective part in the expulsion of +the conquerors from their country, and in settling the history +of Europe for nearly half a century at Waterloo. + +The brilliancy of the exploits of Wellington and the British +army in Portugal and Spain has thrown into comparative obscurity +that part of the Peninsular war which was waged for years by +the French against the Spaniards. Spain, distracted by palace +intrigues and political faction, with the flower of her troops +in a distant comer of Europe, and several of her most important +fortresses in the hands of her assailant, seemed destined to +fall an easy and a speedy prey to the foremost military power in +the world. The attitude of the invaders made it evident that they +believed themselves to be marching to certain victory. Even the +British soldiers--of whom there were never many more than 50,000 +in the Peninsula, and for some years not half that number--were +disdained until they had been encountered. The French arms met +with disappointment after disappointment. On one occasion a whole +French army, over 18,000 strong, surrendered to a Spanish force, +and became prisoners of war. Before the struggle closed there +were six marshals of France with nearly 400,000 troops in the +Peninsula. The great efforts which these figures indicate were +unsuccessful, and the intruders were driven from the country. Yet +they were the comrades of the victors of Austerlitz, of Jena, +and of Wagram, and part of that mighty organisation which had +planted its victorious standards in Berlin and Vienna, held down +Prussia like a conquered province, and shattered into fragments +the holy Roman Empire. + +In 1812 the British Navy was at the zenith of its glory. It had +not only defeated all its opponents; it had also swept the seas of +the fleets of the historic maritime powers--of Spain, of France, +which had absorbed the Italian maritime states, of the Netherlands, +of Denmark. Warfare, nearly continuous for eighteen, and +uninterrupted for nine years, had transformed the British Navy +into an organisation more nearly resembling a permanently maintained +force than it had been throughout its previous history. Its long +employment in serious hostilities had saved it from some of the +failings which the narrow spirit inherent in a close profession +is only too sure to foster. It had, however, a confidence--not +unjustified by its previous exploits--in its own invincibility. +This confidence did not diminish, and was not less ostentatiously +exhibited, as its great achievements receded more and more into +the past. The new enemy who now appeared on the farther side of +the Atlantic was not considered formidable. In the British Navy +there were 145,000 men. In the United States Navy the number +of officers, seamen, and marines available for ocean service +was less than 4500--an insignificant numerical addition to the +enemies with whom we were already contending. The subsequent +and rapid increase in the American _personnel_ to 18,000 shows +the small extent to which it could be considered a 'regular' +force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered +by the hastily enrolled additions. Our defeats in the war of +1812 have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did +constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly +significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention. Rebuffs +of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at New +Orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of Busaco, +Fuentes de Onoro, and Salamanca, met with a serious defeat. + +When the Austro-Prussian war broke out in 1866, the Austrian +commander-in-chief, General Benedek, published an order, probably +still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the +contempt for the enemy felt in the Imperial army. Even those +who perceived that the Prussian forces were not fit subjects of +contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the Austrians. +Yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats +with the Prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of +hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of +superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign +to make peace to avoid further disasters. + +At the beginning of the Franco-German war of 1870, the widespread +anticipation of French victories was clearly shown by the unanimity +with which the journalists of various nationalities illustrated +their papers with maps giving the country between the French +frontier and Berlin, and omitting the part of France extending +to Paris. In less than five weeks from the opening of hostilities +events had made it certain that a map of the country to the eastward +of Lorraine would be practically useless to a student of the +campaign, unless it were to follow the route of the hundreds +of thousands of French soldiers who were conveyed to Germany as +prisoners of war. + +It is to be specially noted that in the above enumeration only +contests in which the result was unexpected--unexpected not only +by the beaten side but also by impartial observers--have been +specified. In all wars one side or the other is defeated; and it +has not been attempted to give a general _résumé_ of the history +of war. The object has been to show the frequency--in all ages +and in all circumstances of systematic, as distinguished from +savage, warfare--of the defeat of the force which by general +consent was regarded as certain to win. Now it is obvious that +a result so frequently reappearing must have a distinct cause, +which is well worth trying to find out. Discovery of the cause +may enable us to remove it in the future, and thus prevent results +which are likely to be all the more disastrous because they have +not been foreseen. + +Professional military writers--an expression which, as before +explained, includes naval--do not help us much in the prosecution +of the search which is so eminently desirable. As a rule, they +have contrived rather to hide than to bring to light the object +sought for. It would be doing them injustice to assume that this +has been done with deliberate intention. It is much more likely +due to professional bias, which exercises over the minds of members +of definitely limited professions incessant and potent domination. +When alluding to occurrences included in the enumeration given +above, they exhibit signs of a resolve to defend their profession +against possible imputations of inefficiency, much more than +a desire to get to the root of the matter. This explains the +unremitting eagerness of military writers to extol the special +qualities developed by long-continued service habits and methods. +They are always apprehensive of the possibility of credit being +given to fighting bodies more loosely organised and less precisely +trained in peace time than the body to which they themselves +belong. + +This sensitiveness as to the merits of their particular profession, +and impatience of even indirect criticism, are unnecessary. There +is nothing in the history of war to show that an untrained force +is better than a trained force. On the contrary, all historical +evidence is on the other side. In quite as many instances as are +presented by the opposite, the forces which put an unexpected +end to the military supremacy long possessed by their antagonists +were themselves, in the strictest sense of the word, 'regulars.' +The Thebans whom Epaminondas led to victory over the Spartans at +Leuctra no more resembled a hasty levy of armed peasants or men +imperfectly trained as soldiers than did Napoleon's army which +overthrew the Prussians at Jena, or the Germans who defeated the +French at Gravelotte and Sedan. Nothing could have been less like +an 'irregular' force than the fleet with which La Galissonnière +beat Byng off Minorca, or the French fleets which, in the war +of American Independence, so often disappointed the hopes of +the British. The records of war on land and by sea--especially +the extracts from them included in the enumeration already +given--lend no support to the silly suggestion that efficient +defence can be provided for a country by 'an untrained man with +a rifle behind a hedge.' The truth is that it was not the absence +of organisation or training on one side which enabled it to defeat +the other. If the beaten side had been elaborately organised and +carefully trained, there must have been something bad in its +organisation or its methods. + +Now this 'something bad,' this defect--wherever it has disclosed +itself--has been enough to neutralise the most splendid courage +and the most unselfish devotion. It has been seen that armies +and navies the valour of which has never been questioned have +been defeated by antagonists sometimes as highly organised as +they were, and sometimes much less so. This ought to put us on +the track of the cause which has produced an effect so little +anticipated. A 'regular' permanently embodied or maintained service +of fighting men is always likely to develop a spirit of intense +professional self-satisfaction. The more highly organised it is, +and the more sharply its official frontiers are defined, the +more intense is this spirit likely to become. A 'close' service of +the kind grows restive at outside criticism, and yields more and +more to the conviction that no advance in efficiency is possible +unless it be the result of suggestions emanating from its own +ranks. Its view of things becomes narrower and narrower, whereas +efficiency in war demands the very widest view. Ignorant critics +call the spirit thus engendered 'professional conservatism'; the +fact being that change is not objected to--is even welcomed, +however frequent it may be, provided only that it is suggested +from inside. An immediate result is 'unreality and formalism of +peace training'--to quote a recent thoughtful military critic. + +As the formalism becomes more pronounced, so the unreality increases. +The proposer or introducer of a system of organisation of training +or of exercises is often, perhaps usually, capable of distinguishing +between the true and the false, the real and the unreal. His +successors, the men who continue the execution of his plans, +can hardly bring to their work the open mind possessed by the +originator; they cannot escape from the influence of the methods +which have been provided for them ready made, and which they are +incessantly engaged in practising. This is not a peculiarity of +the military profession in either branch--it extends to nearly +every calling; but in the profession specified, which is a service +rather than a freely exercised profession, it is more prominent. +Human thought always has a tendency to run in grooves, and in +military institutions the grooves are purposely made deep, and +departure from them rigorously forbidden. All exercises, even +those designed to have the widest scope, tend to become mere +drill. Each performance produces, and bequeaths for use on the +next occasion, a set of customary methods of execution which are +readily adopted by the subsequent performers. There grows up in +time a kind of body of customary law governing the execution of +peace operations--the principles being peace-operation principles +wholly and solely--which law few dare to disobey, and which +eventually obtains the sanction of official written regulations. +As Scharnhorst, quoted by Baron von der Goltz, said, 'We have +begun to place the art of war higher than military virtues.' +The eminent authority who thus expressed himself wrote the words +before the great catastrophe of Jena; and, with prophetic insight +sharpened by his fear of the menacing tendency of peace-training +formalism and unreality, added his conviction that 'this has +been the ruin of nations from time immemorial.' + +Independently of the evidence of history already adduced, it +would be reasonable to conclude that the tendency is strengthened +and made more menacing when the service in which it prevails +becomes more highly specialised. If custom and regulation leave +little freedom of action to the individual members of an armed +force, the difficulty--sure to be experienced by them--of shaking +themselves clear of their fetters when the need for doing so arises +is increased. To realise--when peace is broken--the practical +conditions of war demands an effort of which the unfettered +intelligence alone seems capable. The great majority of successful +leaders in war on both elements have not been considerably, or +at all, superior in intellectual acuteness to numbers of their +fellows; but they have had strength of character, and their minds +were not squeezed in a mould into a commonplace and uniform pattern. + +The 'canker of a long peace,' during recent years at any rate, +is not manifested in disuse of arms, but in mistaken methods. +For a quarter of a century the civilised world has tended more +and more to become a drill-ground, but the spirit dominating +it has been that of the pedant. There has been more exercise +and less reality. The training, especially of officers, becomes +increasingly scholastic. This, and the deterioration consequent +on it, are not merely modern phenomena. They appear in all ages. +'The Sword of the Saracens,' says Gibbon, 'became less formidable +when their youth was drawn from the camp to the college.' The +essence of pedantry is want of originality. It is nourished on +imitation. For the pedant to imitate is enough of itself; to +him the suitability of the model is immaterial. Thus military +bodies have been ruined by mimicry of foreign arrangements quite +inapplicable to the conditions of the mimics' country. More than +twenty years ago Sir Henry Maine, speaking of the war of American +Independence, said, 'Next to their stubborn valour, the chief +secret of the colonists' success was the incapacity of the English +generals, trained in the stiff Prussian system soon to perish +at Jena, to adapt themselves to new conditions of warfare.' He +pointed out that the effect of this uncritical imitation of what +was foreign was again experienced by men 'full of admiration +of a newer German system.' We may not be able to explain what +it is, but, all the same, there does exist something which we +call national characteristics. The aim of all training should +be to utilise these to the full, not to ignore them. The naval +methods of a continental state with relatively small oceanic +interests, or with but a brief experience of securing these, +cannot be very applicable to a great maritime state whose chief +interests have been on the seas for many years. + +How is all this applicable to the ultimate efficiency of the +British Navy? It may be allowed that there is a good deal of +truth in what has been written above; but it may be said that +considerations sententiously presented cannot claim to have much +practical value so long as they are absolute and unapplied. The +statement cannot be disputed. It is unquestionably necessary +to make the application. The changes in naval _matériel_, so +often spoken of, introduced within the last fifty years have been +rivalled by the changes in the composition of the British Navy. +The human element remains in original individual character exactly +the same as it always was; but there has been a great change in +the opportunities and facilities offered for the development of +the faculties most desired in men-of-war's men. All reform--using +the word in its true sense of alteration, and not in its strained +sense of improvement--has been in the direction of securing perfect +uniformity. If we take the particular directly suggested by the +word just used, we may remember, almost with astonishment, that +there was no British naval uniform for anyone below the rank of +officer till after 1860. Now, at every inspection, much time +is taken up in ascertaining if the narrow tape embroidery on +a frock collar is of the regulation width, and if the rows of +tape are the proper distance apart. The diameter of a cloth cap +is officially defined; and any departure from the regulation +number of inches (and fractions of an inch) is as sure of involving +punishment as insubordination. + +It is the same in greater things. Till 1853--in which year the +change came into force--there was no permanent British naval +service except the commissioned and warrant officers. Not till +several years later did the new 'continuous service' men equal +half of the bluejacket aggregate. Now, every bluejacket proper +serves continuously, and has been in the navy since boyhood. The +training of the boys is made uniform. No member of the ship's +company--except a domestic--is now allowed to set foot on board +a sea-going ship till he has been put through a training course +which is exactly like that through which every other member of +his class passes. Even during the comparatively brief period in +which young officers entered the navy by joining the college +at Portsmouth, it was only the minority who received the special +academic training. Till the establishment of the _Illustrious_ +training school in 1855, the great majority of officers joined +their first ship as individuals from a variety of different and +quite independent quarters. Now, every one of them has, as a +preliminary condition, to spend a certain time--the same for +all--in a school. Till a much later period, every engineer entered +separately. Now, passing through a training establishment is +obligatory for engineers also. + +Within the service there has been repeated formation of distinct +branches or 'schools,' such as the further specialised specialist +gunnery and torpedo sections. It was not till 1860 that uniform +watch bills, quarter bills, and station bills were introduced, and +not till later that their general adoption was made compulsory. Up +to that time the internal organisation and discipline of a ship +depended on her own officers, it being supposed that capacity +to command a ship implied, at least, capacity to distribute and +train her crew. The result was a larger scope than is now thought +permissible for individual capability. However short-lived some +particular drill or exercise may be, however soon it is superseded +by another, as long as it lasts the strictest conformity to it is +rigorously enforced. Even the number of times that an exercise +has to be performed, difference in class of ship or in the nature +of the service on which she is employed notwithstanding, is +authoritatively laid down. Still more noteworthy, though much +less often spoken of than the change in _matériel_, has been +the progress of the navy towards centralisation. Naval duties +are now formulated at a desk on shore, and the mode of carrying +them out notified to the service in print. All this would have +been quite as astonishing to the contemporaries of Nelson or +of Exmouth and Codrington as the aspect of a battleship or of +a 12-inch breech-loading gun. + +Let it be clearly understood that none of these things has been +mentioned with the intention of criticising them either favourably +or unfavourably. They have been cited in order that it may be +seen that the change in naval affairs is by no means one in +_matériel_ only, and that the transformation in other matters has +been stupendous and revolutionary beyond all previous experience. +It follows inevitably from this that we shall wage war in future +under conditions dissimilar from any hitherto known. In this very +fact there lies the making of a great surprise. It will have +appeared from the historical statement given above how serious +a surprise sometimes turns out to be. Its consequences, always +significant, are not unfrequently far-reaching. The question of +practical moment is: How are we to guard ourselves against such +a surprise? To this a satisfactory answer can be given. It might +be summarised in the admonitions: abolish over-centralisation; +give proper scope to individual capacity and initiative; avoid +professional self-sufficiency. + +When closely looked at, it is one of the strangest manifestations +of the spirit of modern navies that, though the issues of land +warfare are rarely thought instructive, the peace methods of land +forces are extensively and eagerly copied by the sea-service. +The exercises of the parade ground and the barrack square are +taken over readily, and so are the parade ground and the barrack +square themselves. This may be right. The point is that it is +novel, and that a navy into the training of which the innovation +has entered must differ considerably from one that was without +it and found no need of it during a long course of serious wars. +At any rate, no one will deny that parade-ground evolutions and +barrack-square drill expressly aim at the elimination of +individuality, or just the quality to the possession of which +we owe the phenomenon called, in vulgar speech, the 'handy man.' +Habits and sentiments based on a great tradition, and the faculties +developed by them, are not killed all at once; but innovation +in the end annihilates them, and their not having yet entirely +disappeared gives no ground for doubting their eventual, and even +near, extinction. The aptitudes still universally most prized +in the seaman were produced and nourished by practices and under +conditions no longer allowed to prevail. Should we lose those +aptitudes, are we likely to reach the position in war gained +by our predecessors? + +For the British Empire the matter is vital: success in maritime +war, decisive and overwhelming, is indispensable to our existence. +We have to consider the desirability of 'taking stock' of our +moral, as well as of our material, naval equipment: to ascertain +where the accumulated effect of repeated innovations has carried +us. The mere fact of completing the investigation will help us to +rate at their true value the changes which have been introduced; +will show us what to retain, what to reject, and what to substitute. +There is no essential vagueness in these allusions. If they seem +vague, it is because the moment for particularising has not yet +come. The public opinion of the navy must first be turned in the +right direction. It must be led to question the soundness of +the basis on which many present methods rest. Having once begun +to do this, we shall find no difficulty in settling, in detail +and with precision, what the true elements of naval efficiency +are. + + + + +IV[59] + +THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT SERVICE + +[Footnote 59: Written in 1898. (_The_Times_.)] + +The regret, often expressed, that the crews of British merchant +ships now include a large proportion of foreigners, is founded +chiefly on the apprehension that a well-tested and hitherto secure +recruiting ground for the navy is likely to be closed. It has +been stated repeatedly, and the statement has been generally +accepted without question, that in former days, when a great +expansion of our fleet was forced on us by the near approach +of danger, we relied upon the ample resources of our merchant +service to complete the manning of our ships of war, even in +a short time, and that the demands of the navy upon the former +were always satisfied. It is assumed that compliance with those +demands was as a rule not voluntary, but was enforced by the +press-gang. The resources, it is said, existed and were within +reach, and the method employed in drawing upon them was a detail +of comparatively minor importance; our merchant ships were manned +by native-born British seamen, of whom tens of thousands were +always at hand, so that if volunteers were not forthcoming the +number wanted could be 'pressed' into the Royal service. It is +lamented that at the present day the condition of affairs is +different, that the presence in it of a large number of foreigners +forbids us to regard with any confidence the merchant service as an +adequate naval recruiting ground in the event of war, even though +we are ready to substitute for the system of 'impressment'--which +is now considered both undesirable and impossible--rewards likely +to attract volunteers. The importance of the subject need not +be dwelt upon. The necessity to a maritime state of a powerful +navy, including abundant resources for manning it, is now no +more disputed than the law of gravitation. If the proportion of +foreigners in our merchant service is too high it is certainly +deplorable; and if, being already too high, that proportion is +rising, an early remedy is urgently needed. I do not propose +to speak here of that matter, which is grave enough to require +separate treatment. + +My object is to present the results of an inquiry into the history +of the relations between the navy and the merchant service, from +which will appear to what extent the latter helped in bringing the +former up to a war footing, how far its assistance was affected +by the presence in it of any foreign element, and in what way +impressment ensured or expedited the rendering of the assistance. +The inquiry has necessarily been largely statistical; consequently +the results will often be given in a statistical form. This has the +great advantage of removing the conclusions arrived at from the +domain of mere opinion into that of admitted fact. The statistics +used are those which have not been, and are not likely to be, +questioned. It is desirable that this should be understood, because +official figures have not always commanded universal assent. Lord +Brougham, speaking in the House of Lords in 1849 of tables issued +by the Board of Trade, said that a lively impression prevailed +'that they could prove anything and everything'; and in connection +with them he adopted some unnamed person's remark, 'Give me half +an hour and the run of the multiplication table and I'll engage +to payoff the National Debt.' In this inquiry there has been no +occasion to use figures relating to the time of Lord Brougham's +observations. We will take the last three great maritime wars +in which our country has been engaged. These were: the war of +American Independence, the war with Revolutionary France to the +Peace of Amiens, and the war with Napoleon. The period covered +by these three contests roughly corresponds to the last quarter +of the eighteenth and the first fifteen years of the nineteenth +century. In each of the three wars there was a sudden and large +addition to the number of seamen in the navy; and in each there +were considerable annual increases as the struggle continued. It +must be understood that we shall deal with the case of seamen only; +the figures, which also were large, relating to the marines not +being included in our survey because it has never been contended +that their corps looked to the merchant service for any appreciable +proportion of its recruits. In taking note of the increase of +seamen voted for any year it will be necessary to make allowance +also for the 'waste' of the previous year. The waste, even in the +latter part of the last century, was large. Commander Robinson, +in his valuable work, 'The British Fleet,' gives details showing +that the waste during the Seven Years' war was so great as to be +truly shocking. In 1895 Lord Brassey (_Naval_Annual_) allowed +for the _personnel_ of the navy, even in these days of peace +and advanced sanitary science, a yearly waste of 5 per cent., a +percentage which is, I expect, rather lower than that officially +accepted. We may take it as certain that, during the three serious +wars above named, the annual waste was never less than 6 per +cent. This is, perhaps, to put it too low; but it is better to +understate the case than to appear to exaggerate it. The recruiting +demand, therefore, for a year of increased armament will be the +sum of the increase in men _plus_ the waste on the previous year's +numbers. + +The capacity of the British merchant service to supply what was +demanded would, of course, be all the greater the smaller the +number of foreigners it contained in its ranks. This is not only +generally admitted at the present day; it is also frequently +pointed out when it is asserted that the conditions now are less +favourable than they were owing to a recent influx of foreign +seamen. The fact, however, is that there were foreigners on board +British merchant ships, and, it would seem, in considerable numbers, +long before even the war of American Independence. By 13 George +II, c. 3, foreigners, not exceeding three-fourths of the crew, +were permitted in British vessels, 'and in two years to be +naturalised.' By 13 George II, c. 17, exemption from impressment +was granted to 'every person, being a foreigner, who shall serve in +any merchant ship, or other trading vessel or privateer belonging +to a subject of the Crown of Great Britain.' The Acts quoted +were passed about the time of the 'Jenkins' Ear War' and the +war of the Austrian Succession; but the fact that foreigners +were allowed to form the majority of a British vessel's crew is +worthy of notice. The effect and, probably, the object of this +legislation were not so much to permit foreign seamen to enter +our merchant service as to permit the number of those already +there to be increased. It was in 1759 that Lord, then Commander, +Duncan reported that the crew of the hired merchant ship _Royal_ +_Exchange_ consisted 'to a large extent of boys and foreigners, +many of whom could not speak English.' In 1770 by 11 George III, +c. 3, merchant ships were allowed to have three-fourths of their +crews foreigners till the 1st February 1772. Acts permitting +the same proportion of foreign seamen and extending the time +were passed in 1776, 1778, 1779, 1780, 1781, and 1782. A similar +Act was passed in 1792. It was in contemplation to reduce the +foreign proportion, after the war, to one-fourth. In 1794 it +was enacted (34 George III, c. 68), 'for the encouragement of +British seamen,' that after the expiration of six months from the +conclusion of the war, vessels in the foreign, as distinguished +from the coasting, trade were to have their commanders and +three-fourths of their crews British subjects. From the wording +of the Act it seems to have been taken for granted that the +proportion of three-fourths _bona_fide_ British-born seamen was +not likely to be generally exceeded. It will have been observed +that in all the legislation mentioned, from the time of George +II downwards, it was assumed as a matter of course that there +were foreign seamen on board our merchant vessels. The United +States citizens in the British Navy, about whom there was so +much discussion on the eve of the war of 1812, came principally +from our own merchant service, and not direct from the American. +It is remarkable that, until a recent date, the presence of +foreigners in British vessels, even in time of peace, was not +loudly or generally complained of. Mr. W. S. Lindsay, writing in +1876, stated that the throwing open the coasting trade in 1855 +had 'neither increased on the average the number of foreigners we +had hitherto been allowed to employ in our ships, nor deteriorated +the number and quality of British seamen.' I have brought forward +enough evidence to show that, as far as the merchant service +was the proper recruiting ground for the British Navy, it was +not one which was devoid of a considerable foreign element. + +We may, nevertheless, feel certain that that element never amounted +to, and indeed never nearly approached, three-fourths of the +whole number of men employed in our 'foreign-going' vessels. For +this, between 50,000 and 60,000 men would have been required, +at least in the last of the three wars above mentioned. If all +the foreign mercantile marines at the present day, when nearly +all have been so largely increased, were to combine, they could +not furnish the number required after their own wants had been +satisfied. During the period under review some of the leading +commercial nations were at war with us; so that few, if any, +seamen could have come to us from them. Our custom-house statistics +indicate an increase in the shipping trade of the neutral nations +sufficient to have rendered it impossible for them to spare us +any much larger number of seamen. Therefore, it is extremely +difficult to resist the conclusion that during the wars the +composition of our merchant service remained nearly what it was +during peace. It contained a far from insignificant proportion +of foreigners; and that proportion was augmented, though by no +means enormously, whilst war was going on. This leads us to the +further conclusion that, if our merchant service supplied the +navy with many men, it could recover only a small part of the +number from foreign countries. In fact, any that it could give +it had to replace from our own population almost exclusively. + +The question now to be considered is, What was the capacity of +the merchant service for supplying the demands of the navy? In +the year 1770 the number of seamen voted for the navy was 11,713. +Owing to a fear of a difficulty with Spain about the Falkland +Islands, the number for the following year was suddenly raised +to 31,927. Consequently, the increase was 20,214, which, added +to the 'waste' on the previous year, made the whole naval demand +about 21,000. We have not got statistics of the seamen of the +whole British Empire for this period, but we have figures which +will enable us to compute the number with sufficient accuracy +for the purpose in hand. In England and Wales there were some +59,000 seamen, and those of the rest of the empire amounted to +about 21,000. Large as the 'waste' was in the Royal Navy, it +was, and still is, much larger in the merchant service. We may +safely put it at 8 per cent. at least. Therefore, simply to keep +up its numbers--80,000--the merchant service would have had to +engage fully 6400 fresh hands. In view of these figures, it is +difficult to believe that it could have furnished the navy with +21,000 men, or, indeed, with any number approximating thereto. +It could not possibly have done so without restricting its +operations, if only for a time. So far were its operations from +shrinking that they were positively extended. The English tonnage +'cleared outwards' from our ports was for the years mentioned +as follows: 1770, 703,495; 1771, 773,390; 1772 818,108. + +Owing to the generally slow rate of sailing when on voyages and +to the great length of time taken in unloading and reloading +abroad--both being often effected 'in the stream' and with the +ship's own boats--the figures for clearances outward much more +nearly represented the amount of our 'foreign-going' tonnage +a century ago than similar figures would now in these days of +rapid movement. After 1771 the navy was reduced and kept at a +relatively low standard till 1775. In that year the state of +affairs in America rendered an increase of our naval forces +necessary. In 1778 we were at war with France; in 1779 with Spain +as well; and in December 1780 we had the Dutch for enemies in +addition. In September 1783 we were again at peace. The way in +which we had to increase the navy will be seen in the following +table:-- + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | 1774 | 15,646 | -- | -- | -- | + | 1775 | 18,000 | 2,354 | 936 | 3,290 | + | 1776 | 21,335 | 3,335 | 1,080 | 4,415 | + | 1777 | 34,871 | 13,536 | 1,278 | 14,184 | + | 1778 | 48,171 | 13,300 | 2,088 | 15,388 | + | 1779 | 52,611 | 4,440 | 2,886 | 7,326 | + | 1780 | 66,221 | 13,610 | 3,156 | 16,766 | + | 1781 | 69,683 | 3,462 | 3,972 | 7,434 | + | 1782 | 78,695 | 9,012 | 4,176 | 13,188 | + | 1783 | 84,709 | 6,014 | 4,722 | 10,736 | + ------------------------------------------------------- + +It cannot be believed that the merchant service, with its then +dimensions, could have possibly satisfied these great and repeated +demands, besides making up its own 'waste,' unless its size were +much reduced. After 1777, indeed, there was a considerable fall +in the figures of English tonnage 'outwards.' I give these figures +down to the first year of peace. + + 1777 736,234 tons 'outwards.' + 1778 657,238 " " + 1779 590,911 " " + 1780 619,462 " " + 1781 547,953 " " + 1782 552,851 " " + 1783 795,669 " " + 1784 846,355 " " + +At first sight it would seem as if there had, indeed, been a +shrinkage. We find, however, on further examination that in reality +there had been none. 'During the [American] war the ship-yards in +every port of Britain were full of employment; and consequently +new ship-yards were set up in places where ships had never been +built before.' Even the diminution in the statistics of outward +clearances indicated no diminution in the number of merchant +ships or their crews. The missing tonnage was merely employed +elsewhere. 'At this time there were about 1000 vessels of private +property employed by the Government as transports and in other +branches of the public service.' Of course there had been some +diminution due to the transfer of what had been British-American +shipping to a new independent flag. This would not have set free +any men to join the navy. + +When we come to the Revolutionary war we find ourselves confronted +with similar conditions. The case of this war has often been +quoted as proving that in former days the navy had to rely +practically exclusively on the merchant service when expansion +was necessary. In giving evidence before a Parliamentary committee +about fifty years ago, Admiral Sir T. Byam Martin, referring +to the great increase of the fleet in 1793, said, 'It was the +merchant service that enabled us to man some sixty ships of the +line and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels.' He +added that we had been able to bring promptly together 'about +35,000 or 40,000 men of the mercantile marine.' The requirements +of the navy amounted, as stated by the admiral, to about 40,000 +men; to be exact, 39,045. The number of seamen in the British +Empire in 1793 was 118,952. In the next year the number showed +no diminution; in fact it increased, though but slightly, to +119,629. How our merchant service could have satisfied the +above-mentioned immense demand on it in addition to making good +its waste and then have even increased is a thing that baffles +comprehension. No such example of elasticity is presented by +any other institution. Admiral Byam Martin spoke so positively, +and, indeed, with such justly admitted authority, that we should +have to give up the problem as insoluble were it not for other +passages in the admiral's own evidence. It may be mentioned that +all the witnesses did not hold his views. Sir James Stirling, an +officer of nearly if not quite equal authority, differed from +him. In continuation of his evidence Sir T. Byam Martin stated +that afterwards the merchant service could give only a small +and occasional supply, as ships arrived from foreign ports or as +apprentices grew out of their time. Now, during the remaining years +of this war and throughout the Napoleonic war, great as were the +demands of the navy, they only in one year, that of the rupture +of the Peace of Amiens, equalled the demand at the beginning of +the Revolutionary war. From the beginning of hostilities till +the final close of the conflict in 1815 the number of merchant +seamen fell only once--viz. in 1795, the fall being 3200. In 1795, +however, the demand for men for the navy was less than half that +of 1794. The utmost, therefore, that Sir T. Byam Martin desired +to establish was that, on a single occasion in an unusually +protracted continuance of war, the strength of our merchant service +enabled it to reinforce the navy up to the latter's requirements; +but its doing so prevented it from giving much help afterwards. +All the same, men in large numbers had to be found for the navy +yearly for a long time. This will appear from the tables which +follow:-- + + REVOLUTIONARY WAR + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | 1794 | 72,885 | 36,885 | 2,160 | 39,045 | + | 1795 | 85,000 | 12,115 | 4,368 | 16,483 | + | 1796 | 92,000 | 7,000 | 5,100 | 12,100 | + | 1797 | 100,000 | 8,000 | 5,520 | 13,520 | + | 1798 | 100,000 | -- | 6,000 | 6,000 | + | 1799 | 100,000 | -- | 6,000 | 6,000 | + | 1800 | 97,300 | -- | -- | -- | + | 1801 | 105,000 | 7,700 | Absorbed | 7,700 | + | | | | by | | + | | | | previous | | + | | | |reduction.| | + ------------------------------------------------------- + + NAPOLEONIC WAR + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | | /38,000\ | | | | + | 1803 | \77,600/ | 39,600 | -- | 39,600 | + | 1804 | 78,000 | 400 | 3,492 | 3,892 | + | | | |(for nine | | + | | | | months) | | + | 1805 | 90,000 | 12,000 | 4,680 | 16,680 | + | 1806 | 91,000 | 1,000 | 5,400 | 6,400 | + | 1807 | 98,600 | 7,600 | 5,460 | 13,060 | + | 1808 | 98,600 | -- | 5,460 | 5,460 | + | 1809 | 98,600 | -- | 5,460 | 5,460 | + | 1810 | 113,600 | 15,000 | 5,460 | 20,460 | + | 1811 | 113,600 | -- | 6,816 | 6,816 | + | 1812 | 113,600 | -- | 6,816 | 6,816 | + | 1813 | 108,600 | Reduction | -- | -- | + | | /86,000\ | | | | + | 1814 | \74,000/ | Do. | -- | -- | + ------------------------------------------------------- + +(No 'waste' is allowed for when there has been a reduction.) + +It is a reasonable presumption that, except perhaps on a single +occasion, the merchant service did not furnish the men required--not +from any want of patriotism or of public spirit, but simply because +it was impossible. Even as regards the single exception the evidence +is not uncontested; and by itself, though undoubtedly strong, it +is not convincing, in view of the well-grounded presumptions the +other way. The question then that naturally arises is--If the navy +did not fill up its complements from the merchant service, how +did it fill them up? The answer is easy. Our naval complements +were filled up largely with boys, largely with landsmen, largely +with fishermen, whose numbers permitted this without inconvenience +to their trade in general, and, to a small extent, with merchant +seamen. It may be suggested that the men wanted by the navy could +have been passed on to it from our merchant vessels, which could +then complete their own crews with boys, landsmen, and fishermen. +It was the age in which Dr. Price was a great authority on public +finance, the age of Mr. Pitt's sinking fund, when borrowed money +was repaid with further borrowings; so that a corresponding +roundabout method for manning the navy may have had attractions +for some people. A conclusive reason why it was not adopted is +that its adoption would have been possible only at the cost of +disorganising such a great industrial undertaking as our maritime +trade. That this disorganisation did not arise is proved by the +fact that our merchant service flourished and expanded. + +It is widely supposed that, wherever the men wanted for the navy +may have come from, they were forced into it by the system of +'impressment.' The popular idea of a man-of-war's 'lower deck' +of a century ago is that it was inhabited by a ship's company +which had been captured by the press-gang and was restrained +from revolting by the presence of a detachment of marines. The +prevalence of the belief that seamen were 'raised'--'recruited' is +not a naval term--for the navy by forcible means can be accounted +for without difficulty. The supposed ubiquity of the press-gang +and its violent procedure added much picturesque detail, and even +romance, to stories of naval life. Stories connected with it, +if authentic, though rare, would, indeed, make a deep impression +on the public; and what was really the exception would be taken +for the rule. There is no evidence to show that even from the +middle of the seventeenth century any considerable number of men +was raised by forcible impressment. I am not acquainted with a +single story of the press-gang which, even when much embellished, +professes to narrate the seizure of more than an insignificant body. +The allusions to forcible impressment made by naval historians +are, with few exceptions, complaints of the utter inefficiency +of the plan. In Mr. David, Hannay's excellent 'Short History of +the Royal Navy' will be found more than one illustration of its +inefficient working in the seventeenth century. Confirmation, +if confirmation is needed, can be adduced on the high authority +of Mr. M. Oppenheim. We wanted tens of thousands, and forcible +impressment was giving us half-dozens, or, at the best, scores. +Even of those it provided, but a small proportion was really +forced to serve. Mr. Oppenheim tells us of an Act of Parliament +(17 Charles I) legalising forcible impressment, which seems to +have been passed to satisfy the sailors. If anyone should think +this absurd, he may be referred to the remarkable expression of +opinion by some of the older seamen of Sunderland and Shields +when the Russian war broke out in 1854. The married sailors, they +said, naturally waited for the impressment, for 'we know that +has always been and always will be preceded by the proclamation +of bounty.' + +The most fruitful source of error as to the procedure of the +press-gang has been a deficient knowledge of etymology. The word +has, properly, no relation to the use of force, and has no +etymological connection with 'press' and its compounds, 'compress,' +'depress,' 'express,' 'oppress,' &c. 'Prest money is so-called +from the French word _prest_--that is, readie money, for that +it bindeth all those that have received it to be ready at all +times appointed.' Professor Laughton tells us that 'A prest or +imprest was an earnest or advance paid on account. A prest man +was really a man who received the prest of 12d., as a soldier +when enlisted.' Writers, and some in an age when precision in +spelling is thought important, have frequently spelled _prest_ +pressed, and _imprest_ impressed. The natural result has been +that the thousands who had received 'prest money' were classed +as 'pressed' into the service by force. + +The foregoing may be summed up as follows:-- + +For 170 years at least there never has been a time when the British +merchant service did not contain an appreciable percentage of +foreigners. + +During the last three (and greatest) maritime wars in which this +country has been involved only a small proportion of the immense +number of men required by the navy came, or could have come, +from the merchant service. + +The number of men raised for the navy by forcible impressment +in war time has been enormously exaggerated owing to a confusion +of terms. As a matter of fact the number so raised, for quite +two centuries, was only an insignificant fraction of the whole. + + + + +V + +FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT THE PRESS-GANG[60] + +[Footnote 60: Written in 1900, (_National_Review_.)] + +Of late years great attention has been paid to our naval history, +and many even of its obscure byways have been explored. A general +result of the investigation is that we are enabled to form a high +estimate of the merits of our naval administration in former +centuries. We find that for a long time the navy has possessed an +efficient organisation; that its right position as an element of +the national defences was understood ages ago; and that English +naval officers of a period which is now very remote showed by their +actions that they exactly appreciated and--when necessary--were able +to apply the true principles of maritime warfare. If anyone still +believes that the country has been saved more than once merely +by lucky chances of weather, and that the England of Elizabeth +has been converted into the great oceanic and colonial British +Empire of Victoria in 'a fit of absence of mind,' it will not +be for want of materials with which to form a correct judgment +on these points. + +It has been accepted generally that the principal method of manning +our fleet in the past--especially when war threatened to arise--was +to seize and put men on board the ships by force. This has been +taken for granted by many, and it seems to have been assumed that, +in any case, there is no way of either proving it or disproving +it. The truth, however, is that it is possible and--at least as +regards the period of our last great naval war--not difficult to +make sure if it is true or not. Records covering a long succession +of years still exist, and in these can be found the name of nearly +every seaman in the navy and a statement of the conditions on +which he joined it. The exceptions would not amount to more than +a few hundreds out of many tens of thousands of names, and would +be due to the disappearance--in itself very infrequent--of some of +the documents and to occasional, but also very rare, inaccuracies +in the entries. + +The historical evidence on which the belief in the prevalence +of impressment as a method of recruiting the navy for more than +a hundred years is based, is limited to contemporary statements +in the English newspapers, and especially in the issues of the +periodical called _The_Naval_Chronicle_, published in 1803, +the first year of the war following the rupture of the Peace +of Amiens. Readers of Captain Mahan's works on Sea-Power will +remember the picture he draws of the activity of the press-gang +in that year, his authority being _The_Naval_Chronicle_. This +evidence will be submitted directly to close examination, and +we shall see what importance ought to be attached to it. In the +great majority of cases, however, the belief above mentioned has +no historical foundation, but is to be traced to the frequency +with which the supposed operations of the press-gang were used +by the authors of naval stories and dramas, and by artists who +took scenes of naval life for their subject. Violent seizure and +abduction lend themselves to effective treatment in literature +and in art, and writers and painters did not neglect what was +so plainly suggested. + +A fruitful source of the widespread belief that our navy in the old +days was chiefly manned by recourse to compulsion, is a confusion +between two words of independent origin and different meaning, +which, in ages when exact spelling was not thought indispensable, +came to be written and pronounced alike. During our later great +maritime wars, the official term applied to anyone recruited by +impressment was 'prest-man.' In the sixteenth and seventeenth +centuries, and part of the eighteenth century, this term meant +the exact opposite. It meant a man who had voluntarily engaged to +serve, and who had received a sum in advance called 'prest-money.' +'A prest-man,' we are told by that high authority, Professor Sir +J. K. Laughton, 'was really a man who received the prest of 12d., +as a soldier when enlisted.' In the 'Encyclopædia Metropolitana' +(1845), we find:-- 'Impressing, or, more correctly, impresting, +i.e. paying earnest-money to seamen by the King's Commission to +the Admiralty, is a right of very ancient date, and established +by prescription, though not by statute. Many statutes, however, +imply its existence--one as far back as 2 Richard II, cap. 4.' An +old dictionary of James I's time (1617), called 'The Guide into +the Tongues, by the Industrie, Studie, Labour, and at the Charges +of John Minshew,' gives the following definition:--'Imprest-money. +G. [Gallic or French], Imprest-ànce; _Imprestanza_, from _in_ +and _prestare_, to lend or give beforehand.... Presse-money. T. +[Teutonic or German], Soldt, from salz, _salt_. For anciently +agreement or compact between the General and the soldier was +signified by salt.' Minshew also defines the expression 'to presse +souldiers' by the German _soldatenwerben_, and explains that +here the word _werben_ means prepare (_parare_). 'Prest-money,' +he says, 'is so-called of the French word _prest_, i.e. readie, +for that it bindeth those that have received it to be ready at +all times appointed.' In the posthumous work of Stephen Skinner, +'Etymologia Linguæ Anglicanæ' (1671), the author joins together +'press or imprest' as though they were the same, and gives two +definitions, viz.: (1) recruiting by force (_milites_cogere_); +(2) paying soldiers a sum of money and keeping them ready to serve. +Dr. Murray's 'New English Dictionary,' now in course of publication, +gives instances of the confusion between imprest and impress. A +consequence of this confusion has been that many thousands of +seamen who had received an advance of money have been regarded +as carried off to the navy by force. If to this misunderstanding +we add the effect on the popular mind of cleverly written stories +in which the press-gang figured prominently, we can easily see +how the belief in an almost universal adoption of compulsory +recruiting for the navy became general. It should, therefore, be +no matter of surprise when we find that the sensational reports +published in the English newspapers in 1803 were accepted without +question. + +Impressment of seamen for the navy has been called 'lawless,' and +sometimes it has been asserted that it was directly contrary to law. +There is, however, no doubt that it was perfectly legal, though its +legality was not based upon any direct statutory authority. Indirect +confirmations of it by statute are numerous. These appear in the +form of exemptions. The law of the land relating to this subject +was that all 'sea-faring' men were liable to impressment unless +specially protected by custom or statute. A consideration of the +long list of exemptions tends to make one believe that in reality +very few people were liable to be impressed. Some were 'protected' +by local custom, some by statute, and some by administrative +order. The number of the last must have been very great. The +'Protection Books' preserved in the Public Record Office form no +inconsiderable section of the Admiralty records. For the period +specially under notice, viz. that beginning with the year 1803, +there are no less than five volumes of 'protections.' Exemptions +by custom probably originated at a very remote date: ferrymen, +for example, being everywhere privileged from impressment. The +crews of colliers seem to have enjoyed the privilege by custom +before it was confirmed by Act of Parliament. The naval historian, +Burchett, writing of 1691, cites a 'Proclamation forbidding pressing +men from colliers.' + +Every ship in the coal trade had the following persons protected, +viz. two A.B.'s for every ship of 100 tons, and one for every 50 +tons in larger ships. When we come to consider the sensational +statements in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ of 1803, it will be well to +remember what the penalty for infringing the colliers' privilege +was. By the Act 6 & 7 William III, c. 18, sect. 19, 'Any officer +who presumes to impress any of the above shall forfeit to the +master or owner of such vessel £10 for every man so impressed; +and such officer shall be incapable of holding any place, office, +or employment in any of His Majesty's ships of war.' It is not +likely that the least scrupulous naval officer would make himself +liable to professional ruin as well as to a heavy fine. No parish +apprentice could be impressed for the sea service of the Crown +until he arrived at the age of eighteen (2 & 3 Anne, c. 6, sect. +4). Persons voluntarily binding themselves apprentices to sea +service could not be impressed for three years from the date +of their indentures. Besides sect. 15 of the Act of Anne just +quoted, exemptions were granted, before 1803, by 4 Anne, c. 19; +and 13 George II, c. 17. By the Act last mentioned all persons +fifty-five years of age and under eighteen were exempted, and +every foreigner serving in a ship belonging to a British subject, +and also all persons 'of what age soever who shall use the sea' +for two years, to be computed from the time of their first using +it. A customary exemption was extended to the proportion of the +crew of any ship necessary for her safe navigation. In practice +this must have reduced the numbers liable to impressment to small +dimensions. + +Even when the Admiralty decided to suspend all administrative +exemptions--or, as the phrase was, 'to press from all +protections'--many persons were still exempted. The customary +and statutory exemptions, of course, were unaffected. On the +5th November 1803 their Lordships informed officers in charge +of rendezvous that it was 'necessary for the speedy manning of +H.M. ships to impress all persons of the denominations exprest +in the press-warrant which you have received from us, without +regard to any protections, excepting, however, all such persons +as are protected pursuant to Acts of Parliament, and all others +who by the printed instructions which accompanied the said warrant +are forbidden to be imprest.' In addition to these a long list +of further exemptions was sent. The last in the list included +the crews of 'ships and vessels bound to foreign parts which +are laden and cleared outwards by the proper officers of H.M. +Customs.' It would seem that there was next to no one left liable +to impressment; and it is not astonishing that the Admiralty, as +shown by its action very shortly afterwards, felt that pressing +seamen was a poor way of manning the fleet. + +Though the war which broke out in 1803 was not formally declared +until May, active preparations were begun earlier. The navy had +been greatly reduced since the Peace of Amiens, and as late as +the 2nd December 1802 the House of Commons had voted that '50,000 +seamen be employed for the service of the year 1803, including +12,000 marines.' On the 14th March an additional number was voted. +It amounted to 10,000 men, of whom 2400 were to be marines. Much +larger additions were voted a few weeks later. The total increase +was 50,000 men; viz. 39,600 seamen and 10,400 marines. It never +occurred to anyone that forcible recruiting would be necessary +in the case of the marines, though the establishment of the corps +was to be nearly doubled, as it had to be brought up to 22,400 +from 12,000. Attention may be specially directed to this point. +The marine formed an integral part of a man-of-war's crew just as +the seamen did. He received no better treatment than the latter; +and as regards pecuniary remuneration, prospects of advancement, +and hope of attaining to the position of warrant officer, was, on +the whole, in a less favourable position. It seems to have been +universally accepted that voluntary enlistment would prove--as, +in fact, it did prove--sufficient in the case of the marines. +What we have got to see is how far it failed in the case of the +seamen, and how far its deficiencies were made up by compulsion. + +On the 12th March the Admiralty notified the Board of Ordnance that +twenty-two ships of the line--the names of which were stated--were +'coming forward' for sea. Many of these ships are mentioned in +_The_Naval_Chronicle_ as requiring men, and that journal gives +the names of several others of various classes in the same state. +The number altogether is thirty-one. The aggregate complements, +including marines and boys, of these ships amounted to 17,234. +The number of 'seamen' was 11,861, though this included some of +the officers who were borne on the same muster-list. The total +number of seamen actually required exceeded 11,500. The _Naval_ +_Chronicle_ contains a vivid, not to say sensational, account of +the steps taken to raise them. The report from Plymouth, dated +10th March, is as follows: 'Several bodies of Royal Marines in +parties of twelve and fourteen each, with their officers and +naval officers armed, proceeded towards the quays. So secret +were the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the +business on which they were going until they boarded the tier +of colliers at the New Quay, and other gangs the ships in the +Catwater and the Pool, and the gin-shops. A great number of prime +seamen were taken out and sent on board the Admiral's ship. They +also pressed landsmen of all descriptions; and the town looked +as if in a state of siege. At Stonehouse, Mutton Cove, Morris +Town, and in all the receiving and gin-shops at Dock [the present +Devonport] several hundreds of seamen and landsmen were picked +up and sent directly aboard the flag-ship. By the returns last +night it appears that upwards of 400 useful hands were pressed +last night in the Three Towns.... One press-gang entered the +Dock [Devonport] Theatre and cleared the whole gallery except +the women.' The reporter remarks: 'It is said that near 600 men +have been impressed in this neighbourhood.' The number--if +obtained--would not have been sufficient to complete the seamen +in the complements of a couple of line-of-battle ships. Naval +officers who remember the methods of manning ships which lasted +well into the middle of the nineteenth century, and of course long +after recourse to impressment had been given up, will probably +notice the remarkable fact that the reporter makes no mention of +any of the parties whose proceedings he described being engaged +in picking up men who had voluntarily joined ships fitting out, +but had not returned on board on the expiration of the leave +granted them. The description in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ might +be applied to events which--when impressment had ceased for half +a century--occurred over and over again at Portsmouth, Devonport, +and other ports when two or three ships happened to be put in +commission about the same time. + +We shall find that the 600 reported as impressed had to be +considerably reduced before long. The reporter afterwards wisely +kept himself from giving figures, except in a single instance +when he states that 'about forty' were taken out of the flotilla +of Plymouth trawlers. Reporting on 11th March he says that 'Last +Thursday and yesterday'--the day of the sensational report above +given--'several useful hands were picked up, mostly seamen, who +were concealed in the different lodgings and were discovered +by their girls.' He adds, 'Several prime seamen were yesterday +taken disguised as labourers in the different marble quarries +round the town.' On 14th October the report is that 'the different +press-gangs, with their officers, literally scoured the country +on the eastern roads and picked up several fine young fellows.' +Here, again, no distinction is drawn between men really impressed +and men who were arrested for being absent beyond the duration of +their leave. We are told next that 'upon a survey of all impressed +men before three captains and three surgeons of the Royal Navy, +such as were deemed unfit for His Majesty's service, as well as +all apprentices, were immediately discharged,' which, no doubt, +greatly diminished the above-mentioned 600. + +The reporter at Portsmouth begins his account of the 'press' +at that place by saying, 'They indiscriminately took every man +on board the colliers.' In view of what we know of the heavy +penalties to which officers who pressed more than a certain +proportion of a collier's crew were liable, we may take it that +this statement was made in error. On 14th March it was reported +that 'the constables and gangs from the ships continue very alert +in obtaining seamen, many of whom have been sent on board different +ships in the harbour this day.' We do not hear again from Portsmouth +till May, on the 7th of which month it was reported that 'about 700 +men were obtained.' On the 8th the report was that 'on Saturday +afternoon the gates of the town were shut and soldiers placed at +every avenue. Tradesmen were taken from their shops and sent on +board the ships in the harbour or placed in the guard-house for +the night, till they could be examined. If fit for His Majesty's +service they were kept, if in trade set at liberty.' The 'tradesmen,' +then, if really taken, were taken simply to be set free again. +As far as the reports first quoted convey any trustworthy +information, it appears that at Portsmouth and Plymouth during +March, April, and the first week of May, 1340 men were 'picked +up,' and that of these many were immediately discharged. How +many of the 1340 were not really impressed, but were what in +the navy are called 'stragglers,' i.e. men over-staying their +leave of absence, is not indicated. + +_The_Times_ of the 11th March 1803, and 9th May 1803, also contained +reports of the impressment operations. It says: 'The returns to +the Admiralty of the seamen impressed (apparently at the Thames +ports) on Tuesday night amounted to 1080, of whom no less than +two-thirds are considered prime hands. At Portsmouth, Portsea, +Gosport, and Cowes a general press took place the same night.... +Upwards of 600 seamen were collected in consequence of the +promptitude of the measures adopted.' It was added that the +Government 'relied upon increasing our naval forces with 10,000 +seamen, either volunteers or impressed men, in less than a +fortnight.' The figures show us how small a proportion of the +10,000 was even alleged to be made up of impressed men. A later +_Times_ report is that: 'The impress on Saturday, both above and +below the bridge, was the hottest that has been for some time. +The boats belonging to the ships at Deptford were particularly +active, and it is supposed they obtained upwards of 200 men.' _The_ +_Times_ reports thus account for 1280 men over and above the +1340 stated to have been impressed at Plymouth and Portsmouth, +thus making a grand total of 2620. It will be proved by official +figures directly that the last number was an over-estimate. + +Before going farther, attention may be called to one or two points +in connection with the above reports. The increase in the number +of seamen voted by Parliament in March was 7600. The reports of +the impressment operations only came down to May. It was not +till the 11th June that Parliament voted a further addition to the +navy of 32,000 seamen. Yet whilst the latter great increase was +being obtained--for obtained it was--the reporters are virtually +silent as to the action of the press-gang. We must ask ourselves, +if we could get 32,000 additional seamen with so little recourse +to impressment that the operations called for no special notice, +how was it that compulsion was necessary when only 7600 men were +wanted? The question is all the more pertinent when we recall +the state of affairs in the early part of 1803. + +The navy had been greatly reduced in the year before, the men +voted having diminished from 100,000 to 56,000. What became of +the 44,000 men not required, of whom about 35,000 must have been +of the seaman class and have been discharged from the service? +There was a further reduction of 6000, to take effect in the +beginning of 1803. Sir Sydney Smith, at that time a Member of +Parliament, in the debate of the 2nd December 1802, 'expressed +considerable regret at the great reductions which were suddenly +made, both in the King's dockyards and in the navy in general. +A prodigious number of men,' he said, 'had been thus reduced +to the utmost poverty and distress.' He stated that he 'knew, +from his own experience, that what was called an ordinary seaman +could hardly find employment at present, either in the King's or +in the merchants' service.' The increase of the fleet in March +must have seemed a godsend to thousands of men-of-war's men. If +there was any holding back on their part, it was due, no doubt, +to an expectation--which the sequel showed to be well founded--that +a bounty would be given to men joining the navy. + +The muster-book of a man-of-war is the official list of her crew. +It contains the name of every officer and man in the complement. +Primarily it was an account-book, as it contains entries of the +payments made to each person whose name appears in it. At the +beginning of the nineteenth century it was usual to make out +a fresh muster-book every two months, though that period was +not always exactly adhered to. Each new book was a copy of the +preceding one, with the addition of the names of persons who had +joined the ship since the closing of the latter. Until the ship +was paid off and thus put out of commission--or, in the case of a +very long commission, until 'new books' were ordered to be opened +so as to escape the inconveniences due to the repetition of large +numbers of entries--the name of every man that had belonged to her +remained on the list, his disposal--if no longer in the ship--being +noted in the proper column. One column was headed 'Whence, and +whether prest or not?' In this was noted his former ship, or the +fact of his being entered direct from the shore, which answered +to the question 'Whence?' There is reason to believe that the +muster-book being, as above said, primarily an account-book, the +words 'whether prest or not' were originally placed at the head +of the column so that it might be noted against each man entered +whether he had been paid 'prest-money' or not. However this may +be, the column at the beginning of the nineteenth century was +used for a record of the circumstances of the man's entering the +ship, whether he had been transferred from another, had joined +as a volunteer from the shore, or had been impressed. + +I have examined the muster-book of every ship mentioned in the +Admiralty letter to the Board of Ordnance above referred to, +and also of the ships mentioned in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ as +fitting out in the early part of 1803. There are altogether +thirty-three ships; but two of them, the _Utrecht_ and the +_Gelykheid_, were used as temporary receiving ships for newly +raised men.[61] The names on their lists are, therefore, merely +those of men who were passed on to other ships, in whose muster-books +they appeared again. There remained thirty-one ships which, as +far as could be ascertained, account for the additional force +which the Government had decided to put in commission, more than +two-thirds of them being ships of the line. As already stated, +their total complements amounted to 17,234, and the number of the +'blue-jackets' of full age to at least 11,500. The muster-books +appear to have been kept with great care. The only exception +seems to be that of the _Victory_, in which there is some reason +to think the number of men noted as 'prest' has been over-stated +owing to an error in copying the earlier book. Ships in 1803 +did not get their full crews at once, any more than they did +half a century later. I have, therefore, thought it necessary +to take the muster-books for the months in which the crews had +been brought up to completion. + +[Footnote 61: The words 'recruit' and 'enlist,' except as regards +marines, are unknown in the navy, in which they are replaced by +'raise' and 'enter.'] + +An examination of the books would be likely to dispel many +misconceptions about the old navy. Not only is it noted against +each man's name whether he was 'pressed' or a volunteer, it is +also noted if he was put on board ship as an alternative to +imprisonment on shore, this being indicated by the words 'civil +power,' an expression still used in the navy, but with a different +meaning. The percentage of men thus 'raised' was small. Sometimes +there is a note stating that the man had been allowed to enter +from the '----shire Militia.' A rare note is 'Brought on board +by soldiers,' which most likely indicated that the man had been +recaptured when attempting to desert. It is sometimes asserted +that many men who volunteered did so only to escape impressment. +This may be so; but it should be said that there are frequent +notations against the names of 'prest' men that they afterwards +volunteered. This shows the care that was taken to ascertain the +real conditions on which a man entered the service. For the purposes +of this inquiry all these men have been considered as impressed, +and they have not been counted amongst the volunteers. It is, +perhaps, permissible to set off against such men the number of +those who allowed themselves to be impressed to escape inconveniences +likely to be encountered if they remained at home. Of two John +Westlakes, ordinary seamen of the _Boadicea_, one--John (I.)--was +'prest,' but was afterwards 'taken out of the ship for a debt +of twenty pounds'; which shows that he had preferred to trust +himself to the press-gang rather than to his creditors. Without +being unduly imaginative, we may suppose that in 1803 there were +heroes who preferred being 'carried off' to defend their country +afloat to meeting the liabilities of putative paternity in their +native villages. + +The muster-books examined cover several months, during which +many 'prest' men were discharged and some managed to desert, +so that the total was never present at anyone time. That total +amounts to 1782. It is certain that even this is larger than +the reality, because it has been found impossible--without an +excessive expenditure of time and labour--to trace the cases +of men being sent from one ship to another, and thus appearing +twice over, or oftener, as 'prest' men. As an example of this +the _Minotaur_ may be cited. Out of twenty names on one page of +her muster-book thirteen are those of 'prest' men discharged to +other ships. The discharges from the _Victory_ were numerous; and +the _Ardent_, which was employed in keeping up communication with +the ships off Brest, passed men on to the latter when required. I +have, however, made no deductions from the 'prest' total to meet +these cases. We can see that not more than 1782 men, and probably +considerably fewer, were impressed to meet the increase of the +navy during the greater part of 1803. Admitting that there were +cases of impressment from merchant vessels abroad to complete +the crews of our men-of-war in distant waters, the total number +impressed--including these latter--could not have exceeded greatly +the figures first given. We know that owing to the reduction of +1802, as stated by Sir Sydney Smith, the seamen were looking +for ships rather than the ships for seamen. It seems justifiable +to infer that the whole number of impressed men on any particular +day did not exceed, almost certainly did not amount to, 2000. If +they had been spread over the whole navy they would not have made +2 per cent. of the united complements of the ships; and, as it was, +did not equal one-nineteenth of the 39,600 seamen ('blue-jackets') +raised to complete the navy to the establishment sanctioned by +Parliament. A system under which more than 37,000 volunteers +come forward to serve and less than 2000 men are obtained by +compulsion cannot be properly called compulsory. + +The Plymouth reporter of _The_Naval_Chronicle_ does not give +many details of the volunteering for the navy in 1803, though +he alludes to it in fluent terms more than once. On the 11th +October, however, he reports that, 'So many volunteer seamen +have arrived here this last week that upwards of £4000 bounty is +to be paid them afloat by the Paying Commissioner, Rear-Admiral +Dacres.' At the time the bounty was £2 10s. for an A.B., £1 10s. +for an ordinary seaman, and £1 for a landsman. Taking only £4000 +as the full amount paid, and assuming that the three classes were +equally represented, three men were obtained for every £5, or +2400 in all, a number raised in about a week, that may be compared +with that given as resulting from impressment. In reality, the +number of volunteers must have been larger, because the A.B.'s +were fewer than the other classes. + +Some people may be astonished because the practice of impressment, +which had proved to be so utterly inefficient, was not at once +and formally given up. No astonishment will be felt by those +who are conversant with the habits of Government Departments. In +every country public officials evince great and, indeed, almost +invincible reluctance to give up anything, whether it be a material +object or an administrative process, which they have once possessed +or conducted. One has only to stroll through the arsenals of the +world, or glance at the mooring-grounds of the maritime states, +to see to what an extent the passion for retaining the obsolete +and useless holds dominion over the official mind. A thing may +be known to be valueless--its retention may be proved to be +mischievous--yet proposals to abandon it will be opposed and +defeated. It is doubtful if any male human being over forty was +ever converted to a new faith of any kind. The public has to +wait until the generation of administrative Conservatives has +either passed away or been outnumbered by those acquainted only +with newer methods. Then the change is made; the certainty, +nevertheless, being that the new men in their turn will resist +improvements as obstinately and in exactly the same way as their +predecessors. + +To be just to the Board of Admiralty of 1803, it must be admitted +that some of its members seem to have lost faith in the efficacy of +impressment as a system of manning the navy. The Lords Commissioners +of that date could hardly--all of them, at any rate--have been so +thoroughly destitute of humour as not to suspect that seizing +a few score of men here and a few there when tens of thousands +were needed, was a very insufficient compensation for the large +correspondence necessitated by adherence to the system (and still +in existence). Their Lordships actively bombarded the Home Office +with letters pointing out, for example, that a number of British +seamen at Guernsey 'appeared to have repaired to that island with +a view to avoid being pressed'; that they were 'of opinion that +it would be highly proper that the sea-faring men (in Jersey as +well as Guernsey), not natives nor settled inhabitants, should +be impressed'; that when the captain of H.M.S. _Aigle_ had landed +at Portland 'for the purpose of raising men' some resistance +had 'been made by the sailors'; and dealing with other subjects +connected with the system. A complaint sent to the War Department +was that 'amongst a number of men lately impressed (at Leith) +there were eight or ten shipwrights who were sea-faring men, and +had been claimed as belonging to a Volunteer Artillery Corps.' + +We may suspect that there was some discussion at Whitehall as to +the wisdom of retaining a plan which caused so much inconvenience +and had such poor results. The conclusion seems to have been to +submit it to a searching test. The coasts of the United Kingdom +were studded with stations--thirty-seven generally, but the number +varied--for the entry of seamen. The ordinary official description +of these--as shown by entries in the muster-books--was 'rendezvous'; +but other terms were used. It has often been thought that they were +simply impressment offices. The fact is that many more men were +raised at these places by volunteering than by impressment. The +rendezvous, as a rule, were in charge of captains or commanders, +some few being entrusted to lieutenants. The men attached to each +were styled its 'gang,' a word which conveys no discredit in +nautical language. On 5th November 1803 the Admiralty sent to +the officers in charge of rendezvous the communication already +mentioned--to press men 'without regard to any protections,'--the +exceptions, indeed, being so many that the officers must have +wondered who could legitimately be taken. + +The order at first sight appeared sweeping enough. It contained +the following words: 'Whereas we think fit that a general press +from all protections as above mentioned shall commence at London +and in the neighbourhood thereof on the night of Monday next, +the 7th instant, you are therefore (after taking the proper +preparatory measures with all possible secrecy) hereby required +to impress and to give orders to the lieutenants under your command +to impress all persons of the above-mentioned denominations (except +as before excepted) and continue to do so until you receive orders +from us to the contrary.' As it was addressed to officers in +all parts of the United Kingdom, the 'general press' was not +confined to London and its neighbourhood, though it was to begin +in the capital. + +Though returns of the numbers impressed have not been discovered, +we have strong evidence that this 'general press,' notwithstanding +the secrecy with which it had been arranged, was a failure. On +the 6th December 1803, just a month after it had been tried, the +Admiralty formulated the following conclusion: 'On a consideration +of the expense attending the service of raising men on shore for +His Majesty's Fleet comparatively with the number procured, as +well as from other circumstances, there is reason to believe that +either proper exertions have not been made by some of the officers +employed on that service, or that there have been great abuses +and mismanagement in the expenditure of the public money.' This +means that it was now seen that impressment, though of little +use in obtaining men for the navy, was a very costly arrangement. +The Lords of the Admiralty accordingly ordered that 'the several +places of rendezvous should be visited and the conduct of the +officers employed in carrying out the above-mentioned service +should be inquired into on the spot.' Rear-Admiral Arthur Phillip, +the celebrated first Governor of New South Wales, was ordered +to make the inquiry. This was the last duty in which that +distinguished officer was employed, and his having been selected +for it appears to have been unknown to all his biographers. + +It is not surprising that after this the proceedings of the +press-gang occupy scarcely any space in our naval history. Such +references to them as there are will be found in the writings +of the novelist and the dramatist. Probably individual cases +of impressment occurred till nearly the end of the Great War; +but they could not have been many. Compulsory service most +unnecessarily caused--not much, but still some--unjustifiable +personal hardship. It tended to stir up a feeling hostile to +the navy. It required to work it machinery costly out of all +proportion to the results obtained. Indeed, it failed completely +to effect what had been expected of it. In the great days of old +our fleet, after all, was manned, not by impressed men, but by +volunteers. It was largely due to that that we became masters +of the sea. + + + + + +VI + +PROJECTED INVASIONS OF THE BRITISH ISLES[62] + +[Footnote 62: Written in 1900. (_The_Times_.)] + +The practice to which we have become accustomed of late, of +publishing original documents relating to naval and military +history, has been amply justified by the results. These meet +the requirements of two classes of readers. The publications +satisfy, or at any rate go far towards satisfying, the wishes +of those who want to be entertained, and also of those whose +higher motive is a desire to discover the truth about notable +historical occurrences. Putting the public in possession of the +materials, previously hidden in more or less inaccessible +muniment-rooms and record offices, with which the narratives of +professed historians have been constructed, has had advantages +likely to become more and more apparent as time goes on. It acts +as a check upon the imaginative tendencies which even eminent +writers have not always been able, by themselves, to keep under +proper control. The certainty, nay the mere probability, that +you will be confronted with the witnesses on whose evidence you +profess to have relied--the 'sources' from which your story is +derived--will suggest the necessity of sobriety of statement and +the advisability of subordinating rhetoric to veracity. Had the +contemporary documents been available for an immediate appeal to +them by the reading public, we should long ago have rid ourselves +of some dangerous superstitions. We should have abandoned our +belief in the fictions that the Armada of 1588 was defeated by the +weather, and that the great Herbert of Torrington was a lubber, +a traitor, and a coward. It is not easy to calculate the benefit +that we should have secured, had the presentation of some important +events in the history of our national defence been as accurate as +it was effective. Enormous sums of money have been wasted in trying +to make our defensive arrangements square with a conception of +history based upon misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts. +Pecuniary extravagance is bad enough; but there is a greater evil +still. We have been taught to cherish, and we have been reluctant +to abandon, a false standard of defence, though adherence to +such a standard can be shown to have brought the country within +measurable distance of grievous peril. Captain Duro, of the Spanish +Navy, in his 'Armada Invencible,' placed within our reach +contemporary evidence from the side of the assailants, thereby +assisting us to form a judgment on a momentous episode in naval +history. The evidence was completed; some being adduced from +the other side, by our fellow-countryman Sir J. K. Laughton, in +his 'Defeat of the Spanish Armada,' published by the Navy Records +Society. Others have worked on similar lines; and a healthier view +of our strategic conditions and needs is more widely held than +it was; though it cannot be said to be, even yet, universally +prevalent. Superstition, even the grossest, dies hard. + +Something deeper than mere literary interest, therefore, is to +be attributed to a work which has recently appeared in Paris.[63] +To speak strictly, it should be said that only the first volume of +three which will complete it has been published. It is, however, +in the nature of a work of the kind that its separate parts should +be virtually independent of each other. Consequently the volume +which we now have may be treated properly as a book by itself. +When completed the work is to contain all the documents relating +to the French preparations during the period 1793-1805, for taking +the offensive against England (_tous_les_documents_se_rapportant_ +_à_la_préparation_de_l'offensive_contre_l'Angleterre_). +The search for, the critical examination and the methodical +classification of, the papers were begun in October 1898. The +book is compiled by Captain Desbrière, of the French Cuirassiers, +who was specially authorised to continue his editorial labours +even after he had resumed his ordinary military duties. It bears +the _imprimatur_ of the staff of the army; and its preface is +written by an officer who was--and so signs himself--chief of +the historical section of that department. There is no necessity +to criticise the literary execution of the work. What is wanted +is to explain the nature of its contents and to indicate the +lessons which may be drawn from them. Nevertheless, attention +may be called to a curious misreading of history contained in +the preface. In stating the periods which the different volumes +of the book are to cover, the writer alludes to the Peace of +Amiens, which, he affirms, England was compelled to accept by +exhaustion, want of means of defence, and fear of the menaces of +the great First Consul then disposing of the resources of France, +aggrandised, pacified, and reinforced by alliances. The book being +what it is and coming whence it does, such a statement ought not +to be passed over. 'The desire for peace,' says an author so +easily accessible as J. R. Green, 'sprang from no sense of national +exhaustion. On the contrary, wealth had never increased so fast.... +Nor was there any ground for despondency in the aspect of the +war itself.' This was written in 1875 by an author so singularly +free from all taint of Chauvinism that he expressly resolved that +his work 'should never sink into a drum and trumpet history.' A +few figures will be interesting and, it may be added, conclusive. +Between 1793 when the war began and 1802 when the Peace of Amiens +interrupted it, the public income of Great Britain increased from +£16,382,000 to £28,000,000, the war taxes not being included +in the latter sum. The revenue of France, notwithstanding her +territorial acquisitions, sank from £18,800,000 to £18,000,000. +The French exports and imports by sea were annihilated; whilst +the British exports were doubled and the imports increased more +than 50 per cent. The French Navy had at the beginning 73, at +the end of the war 39, ships of the line; the British began the +contest with 135 and ended it with 202. Even as regards the army, +the British force at the end of the war was not greatly inferior +numerically to the French. It was, however, much scattered, being +distributed over the whole British Empire. In view of the question +under discussion, no excuse need be given for adducing these +facts. + +[Footnote 63: 1793-1805. _Projets_et_Tentatives_de_Débarquement_ +_aux_Iles_Britanniques_, par Édouard Desbrière, Capitaine breveté +aux 1er Cuirassiers. Paris, Chapelot et Cie. 1900. (Publié sous la +direction de la section historique de l'État-Major de l'Armée.)] + +Captain Desbrière in the present volume carries his collection +of documents down to the date at which the then General Bonaparte +gave up his connection with the flotilla that was being equipped +in the French Channel ports, and prepared to take command of +the expedition to Egypt. The volume therefore, in addition to +accounts of many projected, but never really attempted, descents +on the British Isles, gives a very complete history of Hoche's +expedition to Ireland; of the less important, but curious, descent +in Cardigan Bay known as the Fishguard, or Fishgard, expedition; +and of the formation of the first 'Army of England,' a designation +destined to attain greater celebrity in the subsequent war, when +France was ruled by the great soldier whom we know as the Emperor +Napoleon. The various documents are connected by Captain Desbrière +with an explanatory commentary, and here and there are illustrated +with notes. He has not rested content with the publication of +MSS. selected from the French archives. In preparing his book he +visited England and examined our records; and, besides, he has +inserted in their proper place passages from Captain Mahan's works +and also from those of English authors. The reader's interest in +the book is likely to be almost exclusively concentrated on the +detailed, and, where Captain Desbrière's commentary appears, +lucid, account of Hoche's expedition. Of course, the part devoted +to the creation of the 'Army of England' is not uninteresting; +but it is distinctly less so than the part relating to the +proceedings of Hoche. Several of the many plans submitted by +private persons, who here describe them in their own words, are +worth examination; and some, it may be mentioned, are amusing +in the _naïveté_ of their Anglophobia and in their obvious +indifference to the elementary principles of naval strategy. +In this indifference they have some distinguished companions. + +We are informed by Captain Desbrière that the idea of a hostile +descent on England was during a long time much favoured in France. +The national archives and those of the Ministries of War and +of Marine are filled with proposals for carrying it out, some +dating back to 1710. Whether emanating from private persons or +formulated in obedience to official direction, there are certain +features in all the proposals so marked that we are able to classify +the various schemes by grouping together those of a similar +character. In one class may be placed all those which aimed at +mere annoyance, to be effected by landing small bodies of men, not +always soldiers, to do as much damage as possible. The appearance +of these at many different points, it was believed, would so +harass the English that they would end the war, or at least so +divide their forces that their subjection might be looked for +with confidence. In another class might be placed proposals to +seize outlying, out not distant, British territory--the Channel +Islands or the Isle of Wight, for example. A third class might +comprise attempts on a greater scale, necessitating the employment +of a considerable body of troops and meriting the designation +'Invasion.' Some of these attempts were to be made in Great Britain, +some in Ireland. In every proposal for an attempt of this class, +whether it was to be made in Great Britain or in Ireland, it +was assumed that the invaders would receive assistance from the +people of the country invaded. Indeed, generally the bulk of the +force to be employed was ultimately to be composed of native +sympathisers, who were also to provide--at least at the +beginning--all the supplies and transport, both vehicles and +animals, required. Every plan, no matter to which class it might +belong, was based upon the assumption that the British naval +force could be avoided. Until we come to the time when General +Bonaparte, as he then was, dissociated himself from the first +'Army of England,' there is no trace, in any of the documents +now printed, of a belief in the necessity of obtaining command +of the sea before sending across it a considerable military +expedition. That there was such a thing as the command of the sea +is rarely alluded to; and when it is, it is merely to accentuate +the possibility of neutralising it by evading the force holding +it. There is something which almost deserves to be styled comical +in the absolutely unvarying confidence, alike of amateurs and +highly placed military officers, with which it was held that +a superior naval force was a thing that might be disregarded. +Generals who would have laughed to scorn anyone maintaining that, +though there was a powerful Prussian army on the road to one city +and an Austrian army on the road to the other, a French army +might force its way to either Berlin or Vienna without either +fighting or even being prepared to fight, such generals never +hesitated to approve expeditions obliged to traverse a region +in the occupation of a greatly superior force, the region being +pelagic and the force naval. We had seized the little islands +of St. Marcoff, a short distance from the coast of Normandy, +and held them for years. It was expressly admitted that their +recapture was impossible, 'à raison de la supériorité des forces +navales Anglaises'; but it was not even suspected that a much +more difficult operation, requiring longer time and a longer +voyage, was likely to be impracticable. We shall see by and by +how far this remarkable attitude of mind was supported by the +experience of Hoche's expedition to Ireland. + +Hoche himself was the inventor of a plan of harassing the English +enemy which long remained in favour. He proposed to organise what +was called a _Chouannerie_ in England. As that country had no +_Chouans_ of her own, the want was to be supplied by sending over +an expedition composed of convicts. Hoche's ideas were approved +and adopted by the eminent Carnot. The plan, to which the former +devoted great attention, was to land on the coast of Wales from +1000 to 1200 _forçats_, to be commanded by a certain Mascheret, +of whom Hoche wrote that he was 'le plus mauvais sujet dont on +puisse purger la France.' In a plan accepted and forwarded by +Hoche, it was laid down that the band, on reaching the enemy's +country, was, if possible, not to fight, but to pillage; each man +was to understand that he was sent to England to steal 100,000f., +'pour ensuite finir sa carrière tranquillement dans l'aisance,' +and was to be informed that he would receive a formal pardon from +the French Government. The plan, extraordinary as it was, was +one of the few put into execution. The famous Fishguard Invasion +was carried out by some fourteen hundred convicts commanded by an +American adventurer named Tate. The direction to avoid fighting +was exactly obeyed by Colonel Tate and the armed criminals under +his orders. He landed in Cardigan Bay from a small squadron of +French men-of-war at sunset on the 22nd February 1797; and, on the +appearance of Lord Cawdor with the local Yeomanry and Militia, asked +to be allowed to surrender on the 24th. At a subsequent exchange +of prisoners the French authorities refused to receive any of the +worthies who had accompanied Tate. At length 512 were allowed to +land; but were imprisoned in the forts of Cherbourg. The French +records contain many expressions of the dread experienced by the +inhabitants of the coast lest the English should put on shore in +France the malefactors whom they had captured at Fishguard. + +A more promising enterprise was that in which it was decided to +obtain the assistance of the Dutch, at the time in possession of +a considerable fleet. The Dutch fleet was to put to sea with the +object of engaging the English. An army of 15,000 was then to be +embarked in the ports of Holland, and was to effect a diversion in +favour of another and larger body, which, starting from France, was +to land in Ireland, repeating the attempt of Hoche in December 1796, +which will be dealt with later on. The enterprise was frustrated +by the action of Admiral Duncan, who decisively defeated the Dutch +fleet off Camperdown in October. It might have been supposed +that this would have driven home the lesson that no considerable +military expedition across the water has any chance of success +till the country sending it has obtained command of the sea; but +it did not. To Bonaparte the event was full of meaning; but no +other French soldier seems to have learned it--if we may take +Captain Desbrière's views as representative--even down to the +present day. On the 23rd February 1798 Bonaparte wrote: 'Opérer une +descente en Angleterre sans être maître de la mer est l'opération +la plus hardie et la plus difficile qui ait été faite.' There has +been much speculation as to the reasons which induced Bonaparte +to quit the command of the 'Army of England' after holding it +but a short time, and after having devoted great attention to +its organisation and proposed methods of transport across the +Channel. The question is less difficult than it has appeared +to be to many. One of the foremost men in France, Bonaparte was +ready to take the lead in any undertaking which seemed likely +to have a satisfactory ending--an ending which would redound +to the glory of the chief who conducted it. The most important +operation contemplated was the invasion of England; and--now that +Hoche was no more--Bonaparte might well claim to lead it. His +penetrating insight soon enabled him to see its impracticability +until the French had won the command of the Channel. Of that +there was not much likelihood; and at the first favourable moment +he dissociated himself from all connection with an enterprise +which offered so little promise of a successful termination that +it was all but certain not to be begun. An essential condition, +as already pointed out, of all the projected invasions was the +receipt of assistance from sympathisers in the enemy's country. +Hoche himself expected this even in Tate's case; but experience +proved the expectation to be baseless. When the prisoners taken +with Tate were being conducted to their place of confinement, +the difficulty was to protect them, 'car la population furieuse +contre les Français voulait les lyncher.' Captain Desbrière dwells +at some length on the mutinies in the British fleet in 1797, and +asks regretfully, 'Qu'avait-on fait pour profiter de cette chance +unique?' He remarks on the undoubted and really lamentable fact +that English historians have usually paid insufficient attention +to these occurrences. One, and perhaps the principal reason of their +silence, was the difficulty, at all events till quite lately, of +getting materials with which to compose a narrative. The result is +that the real character of the great mutinies has been altogether +misunderstood. Lord Camperdown's recently published life of his +great ancestor, Lord Duncan, has done something to put them in +their right light. As regards defence against the enemy, the +mutinies affected the security of the country very little. The +seamen always expressed their determination to do their duty if +the enemy put to sea. Even at the Nore they conspicuously displayed +their general loyalty; and, as a matter of fact, discipline had +regained its sway some time before the expedition preparing in +Holland was ready. How effectively the crews of the ships not +long before involved in the mutiny could fight, was proved at +Camperdown. + +Though earlier in date than the events just discussed, the celebrated +first expedition to Ireland has been intentionally left out of +consideration till now. As to the general features of the +undertaking, and even some of its more important details, the +documents now published add little to our knowledge. The literature +of the expedition is large, and Captain Chevalier had given us an +admirable account of it in his 'Histoire de la Marine Française +sous la première République.' The late Vice-Admiral Colomb submitted +it to a most instructive examination in the _Journal_of_the_ +_Royal_United_Service_Institution_ for January 1892. We can, +however, learn something from Captain Desbrière's collection. +The perusal suggests, or indeed compels, the conclusion that the +expedition was doomed to failure from the start. It had no money, +stores, or means of transport. There was no hope of finding these +in a country like the south-western corner of Ireland. Grouchy's +decision not to land the troops who had reached Bantry Bay was +no doubt dictated in reality by a perception of this; and by +the discovery that, even if he got on shore, sympathisers with him +would be practically non-existent. On reading the letters now made +public, one is convinced of Hoche's unfitness for the leadership +of such an enterprise. The adoration of mediocrities is confined +to no one cult and to no one age. Hoche's canonisation, for he +is a prominent saint in the Republican calendar, was due not so +much to what he did as to what he did not do. He did not hold the +supreme command in La Vendée till the most trying period of the +war was past. He did not continue the cruelties of the Jacobin +emissaries in the disturbed districts; but then his pacificatory +measures were taken when the spirit of ferocity which caused the +horrors of the _noyades_ and of the Terror had, even amongst +the mob of Paris, burnt itself out. He did not overthrow a +constitutional Government and enslave his country as Bonaparte +did; and, therefore, he is favourably compared with the latter, +whose opportunities he did not have. His letters show him to have +been an adept in the art of traducing colleagues behind their +backs. In writing he called Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse 'perfide,' +and spoke of his 'mauvaise foi.' He had a low opinion of General +Humbert, whom he bracketed with Mascheret. Grouchy, he said, was +'un inconséquent paperassier,' and General Vaillant 'un misérable +ivrogne.' He was placed in supreme command of the naval as well as +of the military forces, and was allowed to select the commander +of the former. Yet he and his nominee were amongst the small +fraction of the expeditionary body which never reached a place +where disembarkation was possible. + +Notwithstanding all this, the greater part of the fleet, and +of the troops conveyed by it, did anchor in Bantry Bay without +encountering an English man-of-war; and a large proportion continued +in the Bay, unmolested by our navy, for more than a fortnight. Is +not this, it may be asked, a sufficient refutation of those who +hold that command of the sea gives security against invasion? +As a matter of fact, command of the sea--even in the case in +question--did prevent invasion from being undertaken, still more +from being carried through, on a scale likely to be very formidable. +The total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom +633 were lost, owing to steps taken to avoid the hostile navy, +before the expedition had got fully under way. It is not necessary +to rate Hoche's capacity very highly in order to understand that +he, who had seen something of war on a grand scale, would not +have committed himself to the command of so small a body, without +cavalry, without means of transport on land, without supplies, with +but an insignificant artillery and that not furnished with horses, +and, as was avowed, without hope of subsequent reinforcement or +of open communications with its base--that he would not have +staked his reputation on the fate of a body so conditioned, if +he had been permitted by the naval conditions of the case to lead +a larger, more effectually organised, and better supplied army. +The commentary supplied by Captain Desbrière to the volume under +notice discloses his opinion that the failure of the expedition +to Ireland was due to the inefficiency of the French Navy. He +endeavours to be scrupulously fair to his naval fellow-countrymen; +but his conviction is apparent. It hardly admits of doubt that this +view has generally been, and still is, prevalent in the French +Army. Foreign soldiers of talent and experience generalise from +this as follows: Let them but have the direction of the naval +as well as of the military part of an expedition, and the invasion +of England must be successful. The complete direction which they +would like is exactly what Hoche did have. He chose the commander +of the fleet, and also chose or regulated the choice of the junior +flag officers and several of the captains. Admiral Morard de +Galles was not, and did not consider himself, equal to the task +for which Hoche's favour had selected him. His letter pointing +out his own disqualifications has a striking resemblance to the +one written by Medina Sidonia in deprecation of his appointment +in place of Santa Cruz. Nevertheless, the French naval officers +did succeed in conveying the greater part of the expeditionary +army to a point at which disembarkation was practicable. + +Now we have some lessons to learn from this. The advantages conferred +by command of the sea must be utilised intelligently; and it +was bad management which permitted an important anchorage to +remain for more than a fortnight in the hands of an invading +force. We need not impute to our neighbours a burning desire to +invade us; but it is a becoming exercise of ordinary strategic +precaution to contemplate preparations for repelling what, as a +mere military problem, they consider still feasible. No amount +of naval superiority will ever ensure every part of our coast +against incursions like that of Tate and his gaol-birds. Naval +superiority, however, will put in our hands the power of preventing +the arrival of an army strong enough to carry out a real invasion. +The strength of such an army will largely depend upon the amount of +mobile land force of which we can dispose. Consequently, defence +against invasion, even of an island, is the duty of a land army +as well as of a fleet. The more important part may, in our case, +be that of the latter; but the services of the former cannot be +dispensed with. The best method of utilising those services calls +for much thought. In 1798, when the 'First Army of England' menaced +us from the southern coast of the Channel, it was reported to our +Government that an examination of the plans formerly adopted for +frustrating intended invasions showed the advantage of troubling +the enemy in his own home and not waiting till he had come to +injure us in ours. + + + + +VII + +OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND[64] + +[Footnote 64: Written in 1906. (_The_Morning_Post_.)] + +It has been contended that raids by 'armaments with 1000, 20,000, +and 50,000 men on board respectively' have succeeded in evading +'our watching and chasing fleets,' and that consequently invasion +of the British Isles on a great scale is not only possible but +fairly practicable, British naval predominance notwithstanding. +I dispute the accuracy of the history involved in the allusions +to the above-stated figures. The number of men comprised in a +raiding or invading expedition is the number that is or can be +put on shore. The crews of the transports are not included in +it. In the cases alluded to, Humbert's expedition was to have +numbered 82 officers and 1017 other ranks, and 984 were put on +shore in Killala Bay. Though the round number, 1000, represents +this figure fairly enough, there was a 10 per cent. shrinkage +from the original embarkation strength. In Hoche's expedition +the total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom +633 were lost before the expedition had got clear of its port of +starting, and of the remainder only a portion reached Ireland. +General Bonaparte landed in Egypt not 50,000 men, but about 36,000. +In the expeditions of Hoche and Humbert it was not expected that +the force to be landed would suffice of itself, the belief being +that it would be joined in each case by a large body of adherents +in the raided country. Outside the ranks of the 'extremists of the +dinghy school'--whose number is unknown and is almost certainly +quite insignificant--no one asserts or ever has asserted that raids +in moderate strength are not possible even in the face of a strong +defending navy. It is a fact that the whole of our defence policy +for many generations has been based upon an admission of their +possibility. Captain Mahan's statement of the case has never been +questioned by anyone of importance. It is as follows: 'The control +of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single +ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross +more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents +upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded +harbours.' It is extraordinary that everyone does not perceive +that if this were not true the 'dinghy school' would be right. +Students of Clausewitz may be expected to remember that the art +of war does not consist in making raids that are unsuccessful; +that war is waged to gain certain great objects; and that the +course of hostilities between two powerful antagonists is affected +little one way or the other by raids even on a considerable scale. + +The Egyptian expedition of 1798 deserves fuller treatment than +it has generally received. The preparations at Toulon and some +Italian ports were known to the British Government. It being +impossible for even a Moltke or--comparative resources being taken +into account--the greater strategist Kodama to know everything +in the mind of an opponent, the sensible proceeding is to guard +against his doing what would be likely to do you most harm. The +British Government had reason to believe that the Toulon expedition +was intended to reinforce at an Atlantic port another expedition +to be directed against the British Isles, or to effect a landing +in Spain with a view to marching into Portugal and depriving our +navy of the use of Lisbon. Either if effected would probably cause +us serious mischief, and arrangements were made to prevent them. A +landing in Egypt was, as the event showed, of little importance. +The threat conveyed by it against our Indian possessions proved +to be an empty one. Upwards of 30,000 hostile troops were locked +up in a country from which they could exercise no influence on +the general course of the war, and in which in the end they had +to capitulate. Suppose that an expedition crossing the North Sea +with the object of invading this country had to content itself +with a landing in Iceland, having eventual capitulation before it, +should we not consider ourselves very fortunate, though it may +have temporarily occupied one of the Shetland Isles _en_route_? +The truth of the matter is that the Egyptian expedition was one of +the gravest of strategical mistakes, and but for the marvellous +subsequent achievements of Napoleon it would have been the typical +example of bad strategy adduced by lecturers and writers on the +art of war for the warning of students. + +The supposition that over-sea raids, even when successful in +part, in any way demonstrate the inefficiency of naval defence +would never be admitted if only land and sea warfare were regarded +as branches of one whole and not as quite distinct things. To be +consistent, those that admit the supposition should also admit that +the practicability of raids demonstrates still more conclusively +the insufficiency of defence by an army. An eminent military writer +has told us that 'a raiding party of 1000 French landed in Ireland +without opposition, after sixteen days of navigation, unobserved +by the British Navy; defeated and drove back the British troops +opposing them on four separate occasions... entirely occupied the +attention of all the available troops of a garrison of Ireland +100,000 strong; penetrated almost to the centre of the island, +and compelled the Lord-Lieutenant to send an urgent requisition +for "as great a reinforcement as possible."' If an inference is to +be drawn from this in the same way as one has been drawn from the +circumstances on the sea, it would follow that one hundred thousand +troops are not sufficient to prevent a raid by one thousand, and +consequently that one million troops would not be sufficient to +prevent one by ten thousand enemies. On this there would arise the +question, If an army a million strong gives no security against +a raid by ten thousand men, is an army worth having? And this +question, be it noted, would come, not from disciples of the +Blue Water School, 'extremist' or other, but from students of +military narrative. + +The truth is that raids are far more common on land than on the +ocean. For every one of the latter it would be possible to adduce +several of the former. Indeed, accounts of raids are amongst +the common-places of military history. There are few campaigns +since the time of that smart cavalry leader Mago, the younger +brother of Hannibal, in which raids on land did not occur or +in which they exercised any decisive influence on the issue of +hostilities. It is only the failure to see the connection between +warfare on land and naval warfare that prevents these land raids +being given the same significance and importance that is usually +given to those carried out across the sea. + +In the year 1809, the year of Wagram, Napoleon's military influence +in Central Germany was, to say the least, not at its lowest. +Yet Colonel Schill, of the Prussian cavalry, with 1200 men, +subsequently increased to 2000 infantry and 12 squadrons, proceeded +to Wittenberg, thence to Magdeburg, and next to Stralsund, which +he occupied and where he met his death in opposing an assault +made by 6000 French troops. He had defied for a month all the +efforts of a large army to suppress him. In the same year the +Duke of Brunswick-Oels and Colonel Dornberg, notwithstanding the +smallness of the force under them, by their action positively +induced Napoleon, only a few weeks before Wagram, to detach the +whole corps of Kellerman, 30,000 strong, which otherwise would +have been called up to the support of the Grande Armée, to the +region in which these enterprising raiders were operating. The +mileage covered by Schill was nearly as great as that covered by +the part of Hoche's expedition which under Grouchy did reach an +Irish port, though it was not landed. Instances of cavalry raids +were frequent in the War of Secession in America. The Federal +Colonel B. H. Grierson, of the 6th Illinois Cavalry, with another +Illinois and an Iowa cavalry regiment, in April 1863 made a raid +which lasted sixteen days, and in which he covered 600 miles of +hostile country, finally reaching Baton Rouge, where a friendly +force was stationed. The Confederate officers, John H. Morgan, +John S. Mosby, and especially N. B. Forrest, were famous for the +extent and daring of their raids. Of all the leaders of important +raids in the War of Secession none surpassed the great Confederate +cavalry General, J. E. B. Stuart, whose riding right round the +imposing Federal army is well known. Yet not one of the raids +above mentioned had any effect on the main course of the war +in which they occurred or on the result of the great conflict. + +In the last war the case was the same. In January 1905, General +Mischenko with 10,000 sabres and three batteries of artillery +marched right round the flank of Marshal Oyama's great Japanese +army, and occupied Niu-chwang--not the treaty port so-called, but +a place not very far from it. For several days he was unmolested, +and in about a week he got back to his friends with a loss which +was moderate in proportion to his numbers. In the following May +Mischenko made another raid, this time round General Nogi's flank. +He had with him fifty squadrons, a horse artillery battery, and a +battery of machine guns. Starting on the 17th, he was discovered +on the 18th, came in contact with his enemy on the 19th, but +met with no considerable hostile force till the 20th, when the +Japanese cavalry arrived just in time to collide with the Russian +rearguard of two squadrons. On this General Mischenko 'retired +at his ease for some thirty miles along the Japanese flank and +perhaps fifteen miles away from it.' These Russians' raids did +not alter the course of the war nor bring ultimate victory to +their standards. + +It would be considered by every military authority as a flagrant +absurdity to deduce from the history of these many raids on land +that a strong army is not a sufficient defence for a continental +country against invasion. What other efficient defence against +that can a continental country have? Apply the reasoning to the +case of an insular country, and reliance on naval defence will +be abundantly justified. + +To maintain that Canada, India, and Egypt respectively could +be invaded by the United States, Russia, and Turkey, backed by +Germany, notwithstanding any action that our navy could take, +would be equivalent to maintaining that one part of our empire +cannot or need not reinforce another. Suppose that we had a military +force numerically equal to or exceeding the Russian, how could any +of it be sent to defend Canada, India, and Egypt, or to reinforce +the defenders of those countries, unless our sea communications +were kept open? Can these be kept open except by the action of +our navy? It is plain that they cannot. + + + + +VIII + +QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HER SEAMEN[65] + +[Footnote 65: Written in 1900. (_Nineteenth_Century_and_After_, +1901.)] + +An eminent writer has recently repeated the accusations made +within the last forty years, and apparently only within that +period, against Queen Elizabeth of having starved the seamen +of her fleet by giving them food insufficient in quantity and +bad in quality, and of having robbed them by keeping them out of +the pay due to them. He also accuses the Queen, though somewhat +less plainly, of having deliberately acquiesced in a wholesale +slaughter of her seamen by remaining still, though no adequate +provision had been made for the care of the sick and wounded. +There are further charges of obstinately objecting, out of mere +stinginess, to take proper measures for the naval defence of the +country, and of withholding a sufficient supply of ammunition +from her ships when about to meet the enemy. Lest it should be +supposed that this is an exaggerated statement of the case against +Elizabeth as formulated by the writer in question, his own words +are given. + +He says: 'Instead of strengthening her armaments to the utmost, +and throwing herself upon her Parliament for aid, she clung to +her moneybags, actually reduced her fleet, withheld ammunition +and the more necessary stores, cut off the sailor's food, did, in +short, everything in her power to expose the country defenceless +to the enemy. The pursuit of the Armada was stopped by the failure +of the ammunition, which, apparently, had the fighting continued +longer, would have been fatal to the English fleet.' + +The writer makes on this the rather mild comment that 'treason +itself could scarcely have done worse.' Why 'scarcely'? Surely +the very blackest treason could not have done worse. He goes +on to ask: 'How were the glorious seamen, whose memory will be +for ever honoured by England and the world, rewarded after their +victory?' + +This is his answer: 'Their wages were left unpaid, they were +docked of their food, and served with poisonous drink, while for +the sick and wounded no hospitals were provided. More of them +were killed by the Queen's meanness than by the enemy.' + +It is safe to challenge the students of history throughout the +world to produce any parallel to conduct so infamous as that +which has thus been imputed to an English queen. If the charges +are true, there is no limit to the horror and loathing with which +we ought to regard Elizabeth. Are they true? That is the question. +I respectfully invite the attention of those who wish to know +the truth and to retain their reverence for a great historical +character, to the following examination of the accusations and of the +foundations on which they rest. It will not, I hope, be considered +presumptuous if I say that--in making this examination--personal +experience of life in the navy sufficiently extensive to embrace +both the present day and the time before the introduction of +the great modern changes in system and naval _matériel_ will be +of great help. Many things which have appeared so extraordinary +to landsmen that they could account for their occurrence only +by assuming that this must have been due to extreme culpability +or extreme folly will be quite familiar to naval officers whose +experience of the service goes back forty years or more, and +can be satisfactorily explained by them. + +There is little reason to doubt that the above-mentioned charges +against the great Queen are based exclusively on statements in +Froude's History. It is remarkable how closely Froude has been +followed by writers treating of Elizabeth and her reign. He was +known to have gone to original documents for the sources of his +narrative; and it seems to have been taken for granted, not only +that his fidelity was above suspicion--an assumption with which I +do not deal now--but also that his interpretation of the meaning +of those who wrote the papers consulted must be correct. Motley, +in his 'History of the United Netherlands,' published in 1860, +had dwelt upon the shortness of ammunition and provisions in +the Channel Fleet commanded by Lord Howard of Effingham; but +he attributed this to bad management on the part of officials, +and not to downright baseness on that of Elizabeth. + +Froude has placed beyond doubt his determination to make the Queen +responsible for all shortcomings. + +'The Queen,' he says, 'has taken upon herself the detailed +arrangement of everything. She and she alone was responsible. +She had extended to the dockyards the same hard thrift with which +she had pared down her expenses everywhere. She tied the ships to +harbour by supplying the stores in driblets. She allowed rations +but for a month, and permitted no reserves to be provided in the +victualling offices. The ships at Plymouth, furnished from a +distance, and with small quantities at a time, were often for +many days without food of any kind. Even at Plymouth, short food +and poisonous drink had brought dysentery among them. They had +to meet the enemy, as it were, with one arm bandaged by their +own sovereign. The greatest service ever done by an English fleet +had been thus successfully accomplished by men whose wages had +not been paid from the time of their engagement, half-starved, +with their clothes in rags, and so ill-found in the necessaries +of war that they had eked out their ammunition by what they could +take in action from the enemy himself. The men expected that +at least after such a service they would be paid their wages +in full. The Queen was cavilling over the accounts, and would +give no orders for money till she had demanded the meaning of +every penny that she was charged.... Their legitimate food had +been stolen from them by the Queen's own neglect.' + +We thus see that Froude has made Elizabeth personally responsible +for the short rations, the undue delay in paying wages earned, and +the fearful sickness which produced a heavy mortality amongst the +crews of her Channel Fleet; and also for insufficiently supplying +her ships with ammunition. + +The quotations from the book previously referred to make it clear +that it is possible to outdo Froude in his denunciations, even where +it is on his statements that the accusers found their charges. In +his 'History of England'--which is widely read, especially by +the younger generation of Englishmen--the Rev. J. Franck Bright +tells us, with regard to the defensive campaign against the Armada: +'The Queen's avarice went near to ruin the country. The miserable +supplies which Elizabeth had alone allowed to be sent them (the +ships in the Channel) had produced all sorts of disease, and +thousands of the crews came from their great victory only to die. +In the midst of privations and wanting in all the necessaries +of life, the sailors had fought with unflagging energy, with +their wages unpaid, with ammunition supplied to them with so +stingy a hand that each shot sent on board was registered and +accounted for; with provisions withheld, so that the food of +four men had habitually to be divided among six, and that food +so bad as to be really poisonous.' + +J. R. Green, in his 'History of the English People,' states that: +'While England was thrilling with the triumph over the Armada, its +Queen was coolly grumbling over the cost and making her profit +out of the spoiled provisions she had ordered for the fleet that +had saved her.' + +The object of each subsequent historian was to surpass the originator +of the calumnies against Elizabeth. In his sketch of her life in +the 'Dictionary of National Biography,' Dr. Augustus Jessopp +asserts that the Queen's ships 'were notoriously and scandalously +ill-furnished with stores and provisions for the sailors, and +it is impossible to lay the blame on anyone but the Queen.' He +had previously remarked that the merchant vessels which came to +the assistance of the men-of-war from London and the smaller +ports 'were as a rule far better furnished than the Queen's ships,' +which were 'without the barest necessaries.' After these extracts +one from Dr. S. R. Gardiner's 'Student's History of England' +will appear moderate. Here it is: 'Elizabeth having with her +usual economy kept the ships short of powder, they were forced +to come back' from the chase of the Armada. + +The above allegations constitute a heavy indictment of the Queen. +No heavier could well be brought against any sovereign or government. +Probably the first thing that occurs to anyone who, knowing what +Elizabeth's position was, reads the tremendous charges made against +her will be, that--if they are true--she must have been without a +rival in stupidity as well as in turpitude. There was no person +in the world who had as much cause to desire the defeat of the +Armada as she had. If the Duke of Medina Sidonia's expedition +had been successful she would have lost both her throne and her +life. She herself and her father had shown that there could be a +short way with Queens--consort or regnant--whom you had in your +power, and whose existence might be inconvenient to you. Yet, +if we are to believe her accusers, she did her best to ensure +her own dethronement and decapitation. 'The country saved itself +and its cause in spite of its Queen.' + +How did this extraordinary view of Elizabeth's conduct arise? +What had Froude to go upon when he came forward as her accuser? +These questions can be answered with ease. Every Government that +comes near going to war, or that has gone to war, is sure to +incur one of two charges, made according to circumstances. If +the Government prepares for war and yet peace is preserved, it +is accused of unpardonable extravagance in making preparations. +Whether it makes these on a sufficient scale or not, it is accused, +if war does break out--at least in the earlier period of the +contest--of not having done enough. Political opponents and the +'man in the street' agree in charging the administration with +panic profusion in one case, and with criminal niggardliness in +the other. Elizabeth hoped to preserve peace. She had succeeded +in keeping out of an 'official' war for a long time, and she had +much justification for the belief that she could do so still +longer. 'She could not be thoroughly persuaded,' says Mr. David +Hannay,[66] 'that it was hopeless to expect to avert the Spanish +invasion by artful diplomacy.' Whilst reasonable precautions +were not neglected, she was determined that no one should be +able to say with truth that she had needlessly thrown away money +in a fright. For the general naval policy of England at the time, +Elizabeth, as both the nominal and the real head of the Government, +is properly held responsible. The event showed the perfect efficiency +of that policy. + +[Footnote 66: _A_Short_History_of_the_Royal_Navy_, pp. 96, 97.] + +The war having really come, it was inevitable that the Government, +and Elizabeth as its head, should be blamed sooner or later for not +having made adequate provision for it. No one is better entitled +to speak on the naval policy of the Armada epoch than Mr. Julian +Corbett,[67] who is not disposed to assume that the Queen's action +was above criticism. He says that 'Elizabeth has usually been +regarded as guilty of complete and unpardonable inaction.' He +explains that 'the event at least justified the Queen's policy. +There is no trace of her having been blamed for it at the time at +home; nor is there any reason to doubt it was adopted sagaciously +and deliberately on the advice of her most capable officers.' +Mr. David Hannay, who, as an historian, rightly takes into +consideration the conditions of the age, points out that 'Elizabeth +was a very poor sovereign, and the maintenance of a great fleet +was a heavy drain upon her resources.' He adds: 'There is no +reason to suppose that Elizabeth and her Lord Treasurer were +careless of their duty; but the Government of the time had very +little experience in the maintenance of great military forces.' + +[Footnote 67: _Drake_and_the_Tudor_Navy_, 1898, vol. ii. p. 117.] + +If we take the charges against her in detail, we shall find that +each is as ill-founded as that of criminal neglect of naval +preparations generally. The most serious accusation is that with +regard to the victuals. It will most likely be a surprise to +many people to find that the seamen of Elizabeth were victualled +on a more abundant and much more costly scale than the seamen of +Victoria. Nevertheless, such is the fact. In 1565 the contract +allowance for victualling was 4-1/2d. a day for each man in harbour, +and 5d. a day at sea. There was also an allowance of 4d. a man +per month at sea and 8d. in harbour for 'purser's necessaries.' +Mr. Oppenheim, in whose valuable work[68] on naval administration +the details as to the Elizabethan victualling system are to be +found, tells us that in 1586 the rate was raised to 6d. a day +in harbour and 6-1/2d. at sea; and that in 1587 it was again +raised, this time to 6-1/2d. in harbour and 7d. at sea. These +sums were intended to cover both the cost of the food and storage, +custody, conveyance, &c., the present-day 'establishment charges.' +The repeated raising of the money allowance is convincing proof +that the victualling arrangements had not been neglected, and +that there was no refusal to sanction increased expenditure to +improve them. It is a great thing to have Mr. Oppenheim's high +authority for this, because he is not generally favourable to +the Queen, though even he admits that it 'is a moot point' how +far she was herself responsible. + +[Footnote 68: _The_Administration_of_the_Royal_Navy,_ +_1509-1660_. London, 1896.] + +If necessary, detailed arguments could be adduced to show that +to get the present value of the sums allowed in 1588 we ought +to multiply them by six[69] The sum allowed for each man's daily +food and the 'establishment charges'--increased as they had been +in 1586--did little more than cover the expenditure; and, though +it does not appear that the contractor lost money, he nevertheless +died a poor man. It will be hardly imputed to Elizabeth for iniquity +that she did not consider that the end of government was the +enrichment of contractors. The fact that she increased the money +payment again in 1587 may be accepted as proof that she did not +object to a fair bargain. As has been just said, the Elizabethan +scale of victualling was more abundant than the early Victorian, +and not less abundant than that given in the earlier years of +King Edward VII.[70] As shown by Mr. Hubert Hall and Thorold +Rogers, in the price-lists which they publish, the cost of a week's +allowance of food for a man-of-war's man in 1588, in the money of +the time, amounted to about 1s. 11-1/2d., which, multiplied by +six, would be about 11s. 9d. of our present money. The so-called +'savings price' of the early twentieth century allowance was +about 9-1/2d. a day, or 5s. 6-1/2d. weekly. The 'savings price' +is the amount of money which a man received if he did not take +up his victuals, each article having a price attached to it for +that purpose. It may be interesting to know that the full allowance +was rarely, perhaps never, taken up, and that some part of the +savings was till the last, and for many years had been, almost +invariably paid. + +[Footnote 69: See Mr. Hubert Hall's _Society_in_the_Elizabethan_ +_Age_, and Thorold Rogers's _History_of_Agriculture_and_Prices_, +vols. v. and vi. Froude himself puts the ratio at six to one.] + +[Footnote 70: It will be convenient to compare the two scales +in a footnote, observing that--as I hope will not be thought +impertinent--I draw on my own personal experience for the more +recent, which was in force for some years after I went to sea. + + WEEKLY + + ---------------------------------------------- + | | | Early | + | | Elizabethan | Victorian | + | | scale | scale | + |----------------------------------------------| + | Beef | 8 lbs. | 7 lbs. | + | Biscuit | 7 " | 7 " | + | Salted fish | 9 " | none | + | Cheese | 3/4 lb. | " | + | Butter | " | " | + | Beer | 7 gallons | " | + | Vegetables | none | 3-1/2 lbs. | + | Spirits | " | 7/8 pint | + | Tea | " | 1-3/4 oz. | + | Sugar | " | 14 " | + | Cocoa | " | 7 " | + ---------------------------------------------- + +There is now a small allowance of oatmeal, pepper, mustard, and +vinegar, against which we may set the 'purser's necessaries' of +Elizabeth's day. In that day but little sugar was used, and tea +and cocoa were unknown even in palaces. It is just a question +if seven gallons of beer did not make up for the weekly allowance +of these and for the seven-eighths of a pint of spirits. Tea +was only allowed in 1850, and was not an additional article. +It replaced part of the spirits. The biscuit allowance is now +8-3/4 lbs. Weekly. + +The Victorian dietary is more varied and wholesome than the +Elizabethan; but, as we have seen, it is less abundant and can be +obtained for much less money, even if we grant that the 'savings +price'--purposely kept low to avoid all suggestion that the men +are being bribed into stinting themselves--is less than the real +cost. The excess of this latter, however, is not likely to be +more than 30 per cent., so that Elizabeth's expenditure in this +department was more liberal than the present. Such defects as +were to be found in the Elizabethan naval dietary were common +to it with that of the English people generally. If there was +plenty, there was but little variety in the food of our ancestors +of all ranks three centuries ago. As far as was possible in the +conditions of the time, Elizabeth's Government did make provision +for victualling the fleet on a sufficient and even liberal scale; +and, notwithstanding slender pecuniary resources, repeatedly +increased the money assigned to it, on cause being shown. In +his eagerness to make Queen Elizabeth a monster of treacherous +rapacity, Froude has completely overreached himself, He says +that 'she permitted some miserable scoundrel to lay a plan before +her for saving expense, by cutting down the seamen's diet.' The +'miserable scoundrel' had submitted a proposal for diminishing +the expenses which the administration was certainly ill able +to bear, The candid reader will draw his own conclusions when +he finds that the Queen did not approve the plan submitted; and +yet that not one of her assailants has let this appear.[71] + +[Footnote 71: It may be stated here that the word 'rations' is +unknown in the navy. The official term is 'victuals.' The term +in common use is 'provisions.'] + +It is, of course, possible to concede that adequate arrangements +had been made for the general victualling of the fleet; and still +to maintain that, after all, the sailors afloat actually did +run short of food. In his striking 'Introduction to the Armada +Despatches' published by the Navy Records Society, Professor Sir +John Laughton declares that: 'To anyone examining the evidence, +there can be no question as to victualling being conducted on +a fairly liberal scale, as far as the money was concerned. It +was in providing the victuals that the difficulty lay.... When +a fleet of unprecedented magnitude was collected, when a sudden +and unwonted demand was made on the victualling officers, it +would have been strange indeed if things had gone quite smoothly.' + +There are plenty of naval officers who have had experience, and +within the last ten years of the nineteenth century, of the +difficulty, and sometimes of the impossibility, of getting sufficient +supplies for a large number of ships in rather out-of-the-way places. +In 1588 the comparative thinness of population and insufficiency +of communications and means of transport must have constituted +obstacles, far greater than any encountered in our own day, to +the collection of supplies locally and to their timely importation +from a distance. 'You would not believe,' says Lord Howard of +Effingham himself, 'what a wonderful thing it is to victual such +an army as this is in such a narrow corner of the earth, where +a man would think that neither victuals were to be had nor a cask +to put it in.' No more effective defence of Elizabeth and her +Ministers could well be advanced than that which Mr. Oppenheim puts +forward as a corroboration of the accusation against them. He says +that the victualling officials 'found no difficulty in arranging +for 13,000 men in 1596 and 9200 in 1597 after timely notice.' This +is really a high compliment, as it proves that the authorities +were quite ready to, and in fact did, learn from experience. Mr. +Oppenheim, however, is not an undiscriminating assailant of the +Queen; for he remarks, as has been already said, that, 'how far +Elizabeth was herself answerable is a moot point.' He tells us +that there 'is no direct evidence against her'; and the charge +levelled at her rests not on proof, but on 'strong probability.' +One would like to have another instance out of all history, of +probability, however strong, being deemed sufficient to convict +a person of unsurpassed treachery and stupidity combined, when +the direct evidence, which is not scanty, fails to support the +charge and indeed points the other way. + +The Lord Admiral himself and other officers have been quoted to +show how badly off the fleet was for food. Yet at the close of +the active operations against the Armada, Sir J. Hawkins wrote: +'Here is victual sufficient, and I know not why any should be +provided after September, but for those which my Lord doth mean +to leave in the narrow seas.' On the same day Howard himself +wrote from Dover: 'I have caused all the remains of victuals +to be laid here and at Sandwich, for the maintaining of them +that shall remain in the Narrow Seas.' Any naval officer with +experience of command who reads Howard's representations on the +subject of the victuals will at once perceive that what the Admiral +was anxious about was not the quantity on board the ships, but +the stock in reserve. Howard thought that the latter ought to +be a supply for six weeks. The Council thought a month's stock +would be enough; and--as shown by the extracts from Howard's +and Hawkins's letters just given--the Council was right in its +estimate. Anyone who has had to write or to read official letters +about stocks of stores and provisions will find something especially +modern in Howard's representations. + +Though the crews of the fleet did certainly come near the end of +their victuals afloat, there is no case of their having actually +run out of them. The complement of an ordinary man-of-war in the +latter part of the sixteenth century, judged by our modern standard, +was very large in proportion to her size. It was impossible for +her to carry provisions enough to last her men for a long time. +Any unexpected prolongation of a cruise threatened a reduction +to short commons. A great deal has been made of the fact that +Howard had to oblige six men to put up with the allowance of +four. 'When a large force,' says Mr. D. Hannay, 'was collected +for service during any length of time, it was the common rule to +divide four men's allowance among six.' There must be still many +officers and men to whom the plan would seem quite familiar. It is +indicated by a recognised form of words, 'six upon four.' I have +myself been 'six upon four' several times, mostly in the Pacific, +but also, on at least one occasion, in the East Indies. As far +as I could see, no one appeared to regard it as an intolerable +hardship. The Government, it should be known, made no profit +out of the process, because money was substituted for the food +not issued. Howard's recourse to it was not due to immediate +insufficiency. Speaking of the merchant vessels which came to +reinforce him, he says: 'We are fain to help them with victuals +to bring them thither. There is not any of them that hath one +day's victuals.' These merchant vessels were supplied by private +owners; and it is worth noting that, in the teeth of this statement +by Howard, Dr. Jessopp, in his eagerness to blacken Elizabeth, +says that they 'were, as a rule, far better furnished than the +Queen's ships.' The Lord Admiral on another occasion, before +the fight off Gravelines, said of the ships he hoped would join +him from Portsmouth: 'Though they have not two days' victuals, +let that not be the cause of their stay, for they shall have +victuals out of our fleet,' a conclusive proof that his ships +were not very short. + +As to the accusation of deliberately issuing food of bad quality, +that is effectually disposed of by the explanation already given +of the method employed in victualling the navy. A sum was paid +for each man's daily allowance to a contractor, who was expressly +bound to furnish 'good and seasonable victuals.'[72] Professor +Laughton, whose competence in the matter is universally allowed, +informs us that complaints of bad provisions are by no means +confined to the Armada epoch, and were due, not to intentional +dishonesty and neglect, but to insufficient knowledge of the +way to preserve provisions for use on rather long cruises. Mr. +Hannay says that the fleet sent to the coast of Spain, in the +year after the defeat of the Armada, suffered much from want +of food and sickness. 'Yet it was organised, not by the Queen, +but by a committee of adventurers who had every motive to fit +it out well.' It is the fashion with English historians to paint +the condition of the navy in the time of the Commonwealth in +glowing colours, yet Mr. Oppenheim cites many occasions of +well-founded complaints of the victuals. He says: 'The quality of +the food supplied to the men and the honesty of the victualling +agents both steadily deteriorated during the Commonwealth.' Lord +Howard's principal difficulty was with the beer, which would +go sour. The beer was the most frequent subject of protest in +the Commonwealth times. Also, in 1759, Lord (then Sir Edward) +Hawke reported: 'Our daily employment is condemning the beer +from Plymouth.' The difficulty of brewing beer that would stand +a sea voyage seemed to be insuperable. The authorities, however, +did not soon abandon attempts to get the right article. Complaints +continued to pour in; but they went on with their brewing till +1835, and then gave it up as hopeless. + +[Footnote 72: See 'The Mariners of England before the Armada,' by +Mr. H. Halliday Sparling, in the _English_Illustrated_Magazine_, +July 1, 1891.] + +One must have had personal experience of the change to enable +one to recognise the advance that has been made in the art of +preserving articles of food within the last half-century. In +the first Drury Lane pantomime that I can remember--about a year +before I went to sea--a practical illustration of the quality +of some of the food supplied to the navy was offered during the +harlequinade by the clown, who satisfied his curiosity as to +the contents of a large tin of 'preserved meat' by pulling out +a dead cat. On joining the service I soon learned that, owing +to the badness of the 'preserved' food that had been supplied, +the idea of issuing tinned meat had been abandoned. It was not +resumed till some years later. It is often made a joke against +naval officers of a certain age that, before eating a biscuit, +they have a trick of rapping the table with it. We contracted +the habit as midshipmen when it was necessary to get rid of the +weevils in the biscuit before it could be eaten, and a fairly +long experience taught us that rapping the table with it was +an effectual plan for expelling them. + +There is no more justification for accusing Queen Elizabeth of +failure to provide well-preserved food to her sailors than there +is for accusing her of not having sent supplies to Plymouth by +railway. Steam transport and efficient food preservation were +equally unknown in her reign and for long after. It has been +intimated above that, even had she wished to, she could not possibly +have made any money out of bad provisions. The victualling system +did not permit of her doing so. The austere republican virtue of +the Commonwealth authorities enabled them to do what was out of +Elizabeth's power. In 1653, 'beer and other provisions "decayed +and unfit for use" were licensed for export free of Customs.' Mr. +Oppenheim, who reports this fact, makes the remarkable comment +that this was done 'perhaps in the hope that such stores would +go to Holland,' with whose people we were at war. As the heavy +mortality in the navy had always been ascribed to the use of bad +provisions, we cannot refuse to give to the sturdy Republicans +who governed England in the seventeenth century the credit of +contemplating a more insidious and more effective method of damaging +their enemy than poisoning his wells. One would like to have it +from some jurist if the sale of poisonously bad food to your +enemy is disallowed by international law. + +That there was much sickness in the fleet and that many seamen died +is, unfortunately, true. If Howard's evidence is to be accepted--as +it always is when it seems to tell against the Queen--it is +impossible to attribute this to the bad quality of the food then +supplied. The Lord Admiral's official report is 'that the ships +of themselves be so infectious and corrupted as it is thought to +be a very plague; and we find that the fresh men that we draw +into our ships are infected one day and die the next.' The least +restrained assertor of the 'poisonous' food theory does not contend +that it killed men within twenty-four hours. The Armada reached +the Channel on the 20th of July (30th, New Style). A month earlier +Howard had reported that 'several men have fallen sick and by +thousands fain to be discharged'; and, after the fighting was +over, he said of the _Elizabeth_Jonas_, she 'hath had a great +infection in her from the beginning.' Lord Henry Seymour, who +commanded the division of the fleet stationed in the Straits +of Dover, noted that the sickness was a repetition of that of +the year before, and attributed it not to bad food, but to the +weather. 'Our men,' he wrote, 'fall sick by reason of the cold +nights and cold mornings we find; and I fear me they will drop +away faster than they did last year with Sir Henry Palmer, which +was thick enough.' + +'The sickness,' says Professor Laughton, 'was primarily and chiefly +due to infection from the shore and ignorance or neglect of what +we now know as sanitary laws.... Similar infections continued +occasionally to scourge our ships' companies, and still more +frequently French and Spanish ships' companies, till near the +close of the eighteenth century.' It is not likely that any evidence +would suffice to divert from their object writers eager to hurl +calumny at a great sovereign; but a little knowledge of naval +and of military history also would have saved their readers from +a belief in their accusations. In 1727 the fleet in the West +Indies commanded by Admiral Hosier, commemorated in Glover's +ballad, lost ten flag officers and captains, fifty lieutenants, +and 4000 seamen. In the Seven Years' war the total number belonging +to the fleet killed in action was 1512; whilst the number that +died of disease and were missing was 133,708. From 1778 to 1783, +out of 515,000 men voted by Parliament for the navy, 132,623 were +'sent sick.' In the summer, 1779, the French fleet cruising at +the mouth of the English Channel, after landing 500, had still +about 2000 men sick. At the beginning of autumn the number of +sick had become so great that many ships had not enough men to +work them. The _Ville_de_Paris_ had 560 sick, and lost 61. The +_Auguste_ had 500 sick, and lost 44. On board the _Intrépide_ +70 died out of 529 sick. These were the worst cases; but other +ships also suffered heavily. + +It is, perhaps, not generally remembered till what a very late +date armies and navies were more than decimated by disease. In +1810 the House of Commons affirmed by a resolution, concerning +the Walcheren Expedition: 'That on the 19th of August a malignant +disorder showed itself amongst H.M. troops; and that on the 8th +of September the number of sick amounted to upwards of 10,948 +men. That of the army which embarked for service in the Scheldt +sixty officers and 3900 men, exclusive of those killed by the +enemy, had died before the 1st of February last.' + +In a volume of 'Military, Medical, and Surgical Essays'[73] prepared +for the United States' Sanitary Commission, and edited by Dr. +Wm. A. Hammond, Surgeon-General of the U.S. Army, it is stated +that, in our Peninsular army, averaging a strength of 64,227 +officers and men, the annual rate of mortality from the 25th +of December 1810 to the 25th of May 1813 was 10 per cent. of +the officers and 16 per cent. of the men. We may calculate from +this that some 25,000 officers and men died. There were 22-1/2 +per cent., or over 14,000, 'constantly sick.' Out of 309,268 +French soldiers sent to the Crimea in 1855-6, the number of killed +and those who died of wounds was 7500, the number who died of +disease was 61,700. At the same date navies also suffered. Dr. +Stilon Mends, in his life of his father,[74] Admiral Sir William +Mends, prints a letter in which the Admiral, speaking of the +cholera in the fleets at Varna, says: 'The mortality on board +the _Montebello_, _Ville_de_Paris_, _Valmy_ (French ships), +and _Britannia_ (British) has been terrible; the first lost 152 +in three days, the second 120 in three days, the third 80 in ten +days, but the last lost 50 in one night and 10 the subsequent +day.' Kinglake tells us that in the end the _Britannia's_ loss +went up to 105. With the above facts before us, we are compelled +to adopt one of two alternatives. We must either maintain that +sanitary science made no advance between 1588 and 1855, or admit +that the mortality in Elizabeth's fleet became what it was owing to +ignorance of sanitary laws and not to intentional bad management. +As regards care of the sick, it is to be remembered that the +establishment of naval and military hospitals for the reception +of sick soldiers and sailors is of recent date. For instance, +the two great English military hospitals, Netley and the Herbert, +are only about sixty years old. + +[Footnote 73: Philadelphia, 1864.] + +[Footnote 74: London, 1899.] + +So far from our fleet in 1588 having been ill-supplied with +ammunition, it was in reality astonishingly well equipped, +considering the age. We learn from Mr. Julian Corbett,[75] that +'during the few years immediately preceding the outbreak of the +war, the Queen's navy had been entirely re-armed with brass guns, +and in the process of re-armament a great advance in simplicity +had been secured.' Froude, without seeing where the admission +would land him, admits that our fleet was more plentifully supplied +than the Armada, in which, he says, 'the supply of cartridges +was singularly small. The King [Philip the Second] probably +considered that a single action would decide the struggle; and +it amounted to but fifty rounds for each gun.' Our own supply +therefore exceeded fifty rounds. In his life of Vice-Admiral +Lord Lyons,[76] Sir S. Eardley Wilmot tells us that the British +ships which attacked the Sebastopol forts in October 1854 'could +only afford to expend seventy rounds per gun.' At the close of +the nineteenth century, the regulated allowance for guns mounted +on the broadside was eighty-five rounds each. Consequently, the +Elizabethan allowance was nearly, if not quite, as much as that +which our authorities, after an experience of naval warfare during +three centuries, thought sufficient. 'The full explanation,' says +Professor Laughton, 'of the want [of ammunition] seems to lie +in the rapidity of fire which has already been mentioned. The +ships had the usual quantity on board; but the expenditure was +more, very many times more, than anyone could have conceived.' +Mr. Julian Corbett considers it doubtful if the ammunition, in +at least one division of the fleet, was nearly exhausted. + +[Footnote 75: _The_Spanish_War_, 1585-87 (Navy Records Society), +1898, p. 323.] + +[Footnote 76: London, 1898, p. 236.] + +Exhaustion of the supply of ammunition in a single action is a +common naval occurrence. The not very decisive character of the +battle of Malaga between Sir George Rooke and the Count of Toulouse +in 1704 was attributed to insufficiency of ammunition, the supply +in our ships having been depleted by what 'Mediterranean' Byng, +afterwards Lord Torrington, calls the 'furious fire' opened on +Gibraltar. The Rev. Thomas Pocock, Chaplain of the _Ranelagh_, +Byng's flag-ship at Malaga, says:[77] 'Many of our ships went +out of the line for want of ammunition.' Byng's own opinion, as +stated by the compiler of his memoirs, was, that 'it may without +great vanity be said that the English had gained a greater victory +if they had been supplied with ammunition as they ought to have +been.' I myself heard the late Lord Alcester speak of the anxiety +that had been caused him by the state of his ships' magazines +after the attack on the Alexandria forts in 1882. At a still +later date, Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay interrupted his attack +on the Spanish squadron to ascertain how much ammunition his +ships had left. The carrying capacity of ships being limited, +rapid gun-fire in battle invariably brings with it the risk of +running short of ammunition. It did this in the nineteenth century +just as much as, probably even more than, it did in the sixteenth. + +[Footnote 77: In his journal (p. 197), printed as an Appendix +to _Memoirs_relating_to_the_Lord_Torrington_, edited by +J. K. Laughton for the Camden Society, 1889.] + +To charge Elizabeth with criminal parsimony because she insisted +on every shot being 'registered and accounted for' will be received +with ridicule by naval officers. Of course every shot, and for the +matter of that every other article expended, has to be accounted +for. One of the most important duties of the gunner of a man-of-war +is to keep a strict account of the expenditure of all gunnery +stores. This was more exactly done under Queen Victoria than it +was under Queen Elizabeth. Naval officers are more hostile to +'red tape' than most men, and they may lament the vast amount +of bookkeeping that modern auditors and committees of public +accounts insist upon, but they are convinced that a reasonable +check on expenditure of stores is indispensable to efficient +organisation. So far from blaming Elizabeth for demanding this, +they believe that both she and Burleigh, her Lord Treasurer, +were very much in advance of their age. + +Another charge against her is that she defrauded her seamen of +their wages. The following is Froude's statement:-- + +'Want of the relief, which, if they had been paid their wages, they +might have provided for themselves had aggravated the tendencies to +disease, and a frightful mortality now set in through the entire +fleet.' The word 'now' is interesting, Froude having had before +him Howard's and Seymour's letters, already quoted, showing that +the appearance of the sickness was by no means recent. Elizabeth's +illiberality towards her seamen may be judged from the fact that +in her reign their pay was certainly increased once and perhaps +twice.[78] In 1585 the sailor's pay was raised from 6s. 8d. to +10s. a month. A rise of pay of 50 per cent. all at once is, I +venture to say, entirely without parallel in the navy since, and +cannot well be called illiberal. The Elizabethan 10s. would be +equal to £3 in our present accounts; and, as the naval month at +the earlier date was the lunar, a sailor's yearly wages would +be equal to £39 now. The year's pay of an A.B., 'non-continuous +service,' as Elizabeth's sailors were, is at the present time £24 +6s. 8d. It is true that the sailor now can receive additional +pay for good-conduct badges, gunnery-training, &c., and also +can look forward to that immense boon--a pension--nearly, but +thanks to Sir J. Hawkins and Drake's establishment of the 'Chatham +Chest,' not quite unknown in the sixteenth century. Compared with +the rate of wages ruling on shore, Elizabeth's seamen were paid +highly. Mr. Hubert Hall states that for labourers 'the usual rate +was 2d. or 3d. a day.' Ploughmen received a shilling a week. In +these cases 'board' was also given. The sailor's pay was 5s. a +week with board. Even compared with skilled labour on shore the +sailor of the Armada epoch was well paid. Thorold Rogers gives, +for 1588, the wages, without board, of carpenters and masons at +10d. and 1s. a day. A plumber's wages varied from 10-1/2d. to +1s.; but there is one case of a plumber receiving as much as +1s. 4d., which was probably for a single day. + +[Footnote 78: Mr. Halliday Sparling, in the article already referred +to (p. 651), says twice; but Mr. Oppenheim seems to think that +the first increase was before Elizabeth's accession.] + +Delay in the payment of wages was not peculiar to the Elizabethan +system. It lasted very much longer, down to our own times in +fact. In 1588 the seamen of the fleet were kept without their +pay for several months. In the great majority of cases, and most +likely in all, the number of these months was less than six. Even +within the nineteenth century men-of-war's men had to wait for +their pay for years. Commander C. N. Robinson, in his 'British +Fleet,'[79] a book that ought to be in every Englishman's library, +remarks: 'All through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it +was the rule not to pay anybody until the end of the commission, +and to a certain degree the practice obtained until some fifty +years ago.' As to the nineteenth century, Lord Dundonald, speaking +in Parliament, may be quoted. He said that of the ships on the +East Indies station, the _Centurion's_ men had been unpaid for +eleven years; the _Rattlesnake's_ for fourteen; the _Fox's_ for +fifteen. The Elizabethan practice compared with this will look +almost precipitate instead of dilatory. To draw again on my personal +experience, I may say that I have been kept without pay for a +longer time than most of the people in Lord Howard's fleet, as, +for the first two years that I was at sea, young officers were +paid only once in six months; and then never in cash, but always +in bills. The reader may be left to imagine what happened when +a naval cadet tried to get a bill for some £7 or £8 cashed at +a small Spanish-American port. + +[Footnote 79: London, 1894.] + +A great deal has been made of the strict audit of the accounts +of Howard's fleet. The Queen, says Froude, 'would give no orders +for money till she had demanded the meaning of every penny that +she was charged.' Why she alone should be held up to obloquy +for this is not clear. Until a very recent period, well within +the last reign, no commanding officer, on a ship being paid off, +could receive the residue of his pay, or get any half-pay at +all, until his 'accounts had been passed.'[80] The same rule +applied to officers in charge of money or stores. It has been +made a further charge against Elizabeth that her officers had to +meet certain expenditure out of their own pockets. That certainly +is not a peculiarity of the sixteenth-century navy. Till less +than fifty years ago the captain of a British man-of-war had +to provide one of the three chronometers used in the navigation +of his ship. Even later than that the articles necessary for +cleaning the ship and everything required for decorating her +were paid for by the officers, almost invariably by the first +lieutenant, or second in command. There must be many officers +still serving who have spent sums, considerable in the aggregate, +of their own money on public objects. Though pressure in this +respect has been much relieved of late, there are doubtless many +who do so still. It is, in fact, a traditional practice in the +British Navy and is not in the least distinctly Elizabethan. + +[Footnote 80: This happened to me in 1904.] + +Some acquaintance with present conditions and accurate knowledge +of the naval methods prevailing in the great Queen's reign--a +knowledge which the publication of the original documents puts +within the reach of anyone who really cares to know the truth--will +convince the candid inquirer that Elizabeth's administration of the +navy compares favourably with that of any of her successors; and +that, for it, she deserves the admiration and unalloyed gratitude +of the nation. + + + + +IX[81] + +[Footnote 81: Written in 1905. (_Cornhill_Magazine_.)] + +NELSON: THE CENTENARY OF TRAFALGAR + +[The following article was read as an address, in compliance +with the request of its Council, at the annual meeting of the +Navy Records Society in July 1905. It was, and indeed is still, +my opinion, as stated to the meeting in some prefatory remarks, +that the address would have come better from a professed historian, +several members of the Society being well known as entitled to that +designation. The Council, however, considered that, as Nelson's +tactical principles and achievements should be dealt with, it would +be better for the address to be delivered by a naval officer--one, +moreover, who had personal experience of the manoeuvres of fleets +under sail. Space would not suffice for treating of Nelson's +merits as a strategist, though they are as great as those which +he possessed as a tactician.] + +Centenary commemorations are common enough; but the commemoration +of Nelson has a characteristic which distinguishes it from most, +if not from all, others. In these days we forget soon. What place +is still kept in our memories by even the most illustrious of +those who have but recently left us? It is not only that we do +not remember their wishes and injunctions; their existence has +almost faded from our recollection. It is not difficult to persuade +people to commemorate a departed worthy; but in most cases industry +has to take the place of enthusiasm, and moribund or extinct +remembrances have to be galvanised by assiduity into a semblance +of life. In the case of Nelson the conditions are very different. +He may have been misunderstood; even by his professional descendants +his acts and doctrines may have been misinterpreted; but he has +never been forgotten. + +The time has now come when we can specially do honour to Nelson's +memory without wounding the feelings of other nations. There is no +need to exult over or even to expatiate on the defeats of others. +In recalling the past it is more dignified as regards ourselves, +and more considerate of the honour of our great admiral, to think +of the valour and self-devotion rather than the misfortunes of +those against whom he fought. We can do full justice to Nelson's +memory without reopening old wounds. + +The first thing to be noted concerning him is that he is the +only man who has ever lived who by universal consent is without +a peer. This is said in full view of the new constellation rising +above the Eastern horizon; for that constellation, brilliant +as it is, has not yet reached the meridian. In every walk of +life, except that which Nelson chose as his own, you will find +several competitors for the first place, each one of whom will +have many supporters. Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal, Cæsar, +Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon have been severally +put forward for the palm of generalship. To those who would acclaim +Richelieu as the first of statesmen, others would oppose Chatham, +or William Pitt, or Cavour, or Bismarck, or Marquis Ito. Who was +the first of sculptors? who the first of painters? who the first +of poets? In every case there is a great difference of opinion. +Ask, however, who was the first of admirals, and the unanimous +reply will still be--'Nelson,' tried as he was by many years of +high command in war. It is not only amongst his fellow-countrymen +that his preeminence is acknowledged. Foreigners admit it as +readily as we proclaim it ourselves. + +We may consider what it was that gave Nelson this unique position +among men. The early conditions of his naval career were certainly +not favourable to him. It is true that he was promoted when young; +but so were many other officers. Nelson was made a commander only +a few months after the outbreak of war between Great Britain +and France, and was made a post-captain within a few days of the +declaration of war by Spain. An officer holding a rank qualifying +him for command at the outset of a great war might well have looked +forward confidently to exceptional opportunities of distinguishing +himself. Even in our own days, when some trifling campaign is +about to be carried on, the officers who are employed where they +can take no part in it vehemently lament their ill-fortune. How +much more disheartening must it have been to be excluded from +active participation in a great and long-continued conflict! This +was Nelson's case. As far as his hopes of gaining distinction +were concerned, fate seemed to persecute him pertinaciously. He +was a captain of more than four years' seniority when the treaty +of Versailles put an end to the war of American Independence. Yet, +with the exception of the brief Nicaragua expedition--which by +the side of the important occurrences of grand naval campaigns +must have seemed insignificant--his services during all those +years of hostilities were uneventful, and even humdrum. He seemed +to miss every important operation; and when the war ended--we may +almost say--he had never seen a ship fire a broadside in anger. + +There then came what promised to be, and in fact turned out to +be, a long period of peace. With no distinguished war service +to point to, and with the prospect before him of only uneventful +employment, or no employment afloat at all, Nelson might well +have been disheartened to the verge of despondency. That he was +not disheartened, but, instead thereof, made a name for himself +in such unfavourable circumstances, must be accepted as one of +the most convincing proofs of his rare force of character. To +have attracted the notice, and to have secured the confidence, +of so great a sea-officer as Lord Hood constituted a distinction +which could have been won only by merit so considerable that +it could not long remain unrecognised. The war of American +Independence had still seven months to run when Lord Hood pointed +to Nelson as an officer to be consulted on 'questions relative +to naval tactics,' Professor Laughton tells us that at that time +Nelson had never served with a fleet. Lord Hood was one of the +last men in the world to go out of his way to pay to a youthful +subordinate an empty compliment, and we may confidently base our +estimate of an officer's merits on Lord Hood's belief in them. + +He, no doubt, gave a Wide signification to the term 'tactics,' and +used it as embracing all that is included in the phrase 'conduct +of war.' He must have found out, from conversations with, and from +the remarks of, the young captain, whom he treated as intimately as +if he was his son, that the latter was already, what he continued +to be till the end, viz. a student of naval warfare. This point +deserves particular attention. The officers of the navy of the +present day, period of peace though it be, can imitate Nelson +at least in this. He had to wait a long time before he could +translate into brilliant action the result of his tactical studies. +Fourteen years after Lord Hood spoke of him as above related, by +a 'spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority +by signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick +perceptions,' Nelson entirely defeated the movement of the enemy's +fleet, contributed to the winning of a great victory, and, as +Captain Mahan tells us, 'emerged from merely personal distinction +to national renown.' The justification of dwelling on this is +to be found in the necessity, even at this day, of preventing +the repetition of mistakes concerning Nelson's qualities and +disposition. His recent biographers, Captain Mahan and Professor +Laughton, feel constrained to tell us over and over again that +Nelson's predominant characteristic was not mere 'headlong valour +and instinct for fighting'; that he was not the man 'to run needless +and useless risks' in battle. 'The breadth and acuteness of Nelson's +intellect,' says Mahan, 'have been too much overlooked in the +admiration excited by his unusually grand moral endowments of +resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility!' + +In forming a true conception of what Nelson was, the publications +of the Navy Records Society will help us greatly. There is something +very remarkable in the way in which Mr. Gutteridge's volume[82] +not only confirms Captain Mahan's refutation of the aspersions +on Nelson's honour and humanity, but also establishes Professor +Laughton's conclusions, reached many years ago, that it was the +orders given to him, and not his amour, which detained him at +Naples at a well-known epoch. The last volume issued by the Society, +that of Mr. Julian Corbett,[83] is, I venture to affirm, the +most useful to naval officers that has yet appeared among the +Society's publications. It will provide them with an admirable +historical introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly +help them in ascertaining the importance of Nelson's achievements +as a tactician. For my own part, I may say with gratitude that +but for Mr. Corbett's valuable work I could not have completed +this appreciation. + +[Footnote 82: _Nelson_and_the_Neapolitan_Jacobins_.] + +[Footnote 83: _Fighting_Instructions_, 1530-1816.] + +The most renowned of Nelson's achievements was that performed +in his final battle and victory. Strange as it may seem, that +celebrated performance has been the subject of much controversy, +and, brilliant as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been +freely, and indeed unfavourably, criticised. There is still much +difference of opinion as to the preliminary movements, and as +to the exact method by which Nelson's attack was made. It has +been often asserted that the method really followed was not that +which Nelson had expressly declared his intention of adopting. +The question raised concerning this is a difficult one, and, +until the appearance of Mr. Julian Corbett's recent work and +the interesting volume on Trafalgar lately published by Mr. H. +Newbolt, had not been fully discussed. The late Vice-Admiral +P. H. Colomb contributed to the _United_Service_Magazine_ of +September 1899 a very striking article on the subject of Nelson's +tactics in his last battle, and those who propose to study the +case should certainly peruse what he wrote. + +The criticism of Nelson's procedure at Trafalgar in its strongest +form may be summarised as follows. It is affirmed that he drew +up and communicated to the officers under his orders a certain +plan of attack; that just before the battle he changed his plan +without warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily; +that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and, because of +all this, that the British loss was much heavier and much less +evenly distributed among the ships of the fleet than it need have +been. The most formidable arraignment of the mode of Nelson's +last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper published +by Sir Charles Ekins in his book on 'Naval Battles,' and vouched +for by him as the work of an eye-witness--almost certainly, as +Mr. Julian Corbett holds, an officer on board the _Conqueror_ in +the battle. It is a remarkable document. Being critical rather +than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of Clerk +of Eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the +investigation of tactical questions ever published in the English +tongue. On it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable +views expressed concerning the British tactics at Trafalgar. As +it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism +of Nelson's action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we +criticise it in its turn. + +Notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually +took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean +tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have +an academic tinge. In fact, they are very much of the kind that a +clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities +inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class +of students. Between a professor of tactics, however clever, and +a commanding genius like Nelson the difference is great indeed. +The writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more +general opinion of his day. He has certainly suggested opinions +to later generations of naval officers. The captains who shared +in Nelson's last great victory did not agree among themselves as +to the mode in which the attack was introduced. It was believed +by some of them, and, thanks largely to the _Conqueror_ officer's +paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas Nelson had +announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast +or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead. Following +up the path of investigation to which, in his article above +mentioned, Admiral Colomb had already pointed, we can, I think, +arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was +adhered to. + +Before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be +convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that +Nelson exposed his fleet at Trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting +it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _Conqueror's_ +officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in +detail'; and that 'the brunt of the action would have been more +equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually +chosen been adopted. Now, Trafalgar was a battle in which an +inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior +fleet of thirty-three. The victory was so decisive that more than +half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed +on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell +an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the +rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port +near at hand. To gain such a victory over a superior force of +seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very +hard fighting was necessary. The only actions of the Napoleonic +period that can be compared with it are those of Camperdown, the +Nile, and Copenhagen. The proportionate loss at Trafalgar was the +least in all the four battles.[84] The allegation that, had Nelson +followed a different method at Trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action +would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily. In +nearly all sea-fights, whether Nelsonic in character or not, +half of the loss of the victors has fallen on considerably less +than half the fleet. That this has been the rule, whatever tactical +method may have been adopted, will appear from the following +statement. In Rodney's victory (12th April 1782) half the loss +fell upon nine ships out of thirty-six, or one-fourth; at 'The +First of June' it fell upon five ships out of twenty-five, or +one-fifth; at St. Vincent it fell upon three ships out of fifteen, +also one-fifth; at Trafalgar half the loss fell on five ships +out of twenty-seven, or very little less than an exact fifth. +It has, therefore, been conclusively shown that, faulty or not +faulty, long-announced or hastily adopted, the plan on which +the battle of Trafalgar was fought did not occasion excessive +loss to the victors or confine the loss, such as it was, to an +unduly small portion of their fleet. As bearing on this question +of the relative severity of the British loss at Trafalgar, it +may be remarked that in that battle there were several British +ships which had been in other great sea-fights. Their losses +in these latter were in nearly every case heavier than their +Trafalgar losses.[85] Authoritative and undisputed figures show +how baseless are the suggestions that Nelson's tactical procedure +at Trafalgar caused his fleet to suffer needlessly heavy loss. + +[Footnote 84: + Camperdown 825 loss out of 8,221: 10 per cent. + The Nile 896 " " 7,401: 12.1 " + Copenhagen 941 " " 6,892: 13.75 " + _Trafalgar_ 1,690 " " 17,256: 9.73 " ] + +[Footnote 85: + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- +| | | | | | Trafalgar | +| Ship | Action |Killed|Wounded|Total|--------------------| +| | | | | |Killed|Wounded|Total| +|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +|_Ajax_ | Rodney's | 9 | 10 | 19 | 2 | 9 | 11 | +| |(Ap. 12, 1782)| | | | | | | +|_Agamemnon_ | " | 15 | 22 | 37 | 2 | 8 | 10 | +|_Conqueror_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 3 | 9 | 12 | +|_Defence_ | 1st June | 17 | 36 | 53 | 7 | 29 | 36 | +|_Bellerophon_| The Nile | 49 | 148 | 197 | 27 | 123 | 150 | +|_Swiftsure_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 9 | 8 | 17 | +|_Defiance_ | Copenhagen | 24 | 21 | 45 | 17 | 53 | 70 | +|_Polyphemus_ | " | 6 | 25 | 31 | 2 | 4 | 6 | + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +[In only one case was the Trafalgar total loss greater than the +total loss of the same ship in an earlier fight; and in this +case (the _Defiance_) the number of killed at Trafalgar was only +about two-thirds of the number killed in the other action.] + +It is now necessary to investigate the statement that Nelson, +hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the +battle. This investigation is much more difficult than that into +the losses of the British fleet, because, whilst the latter can +be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon +conjecture. How desirable it is to make the investigation of +the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the +curious fact that the very completeness of Nelson's success at +Trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study +of tactics in the British Navy for more than three-quarters of +a century. His action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate, +so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel +in our service that Nelson's method consisted merely in rushing +at his enemy as soon as he saw him. Against this conception his +biographers, one after another, have protested in vain. + +At the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to +mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered. +One of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself +are not the same operations. Another is, that, in the order of +sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind' +or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other, +but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. Also, it +may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast +may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing +into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the +same operation. Again, adherence to a plan which presupposes +the enemy's fleet to be in a particular formation after he is +found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate +tactician. This remark is introduced here with full knowledge +of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that +Nelson did change his plan without warning. No admission of the +kind is intended. 'In all cases of anticipated battle,' says Mahan, +'Nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of +his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.' +The same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that +'No man was ever better served than Nelson by the inspiration +of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.' + +The plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of 9th October +1805 indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the British +fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main +divisions and an 'advance squadron,' would move against an enemy +assumed to be in single line-ahead. The 'advance squadron,' it +should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions, +but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either. +The name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships +composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, 'feeling +for' the enemy. On 19th October six ships were ordered 'to go +ahead during the night'; and, besides the frigates, two more +ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between +the six and the commander-in-chief's flag-ship. Thus eight ships +in effect composed an 'advance squadron,' and did not join either +of the main divisions at first. + +When it was expected that the British fleet would comprise forty +sail-of-the-line and the enemy's fleet forty-six, each British +main division was to be made up of sixteen ships; and eight +two-deckers added to either division would increase the strength +of the latter to twenty-four ships. It is interesting to note that, +omitting the _Africa_, which ship came up late, each British main +division on the morning of 21st October 1805 had nine ships--a +number which, by the addition of the eight already mentioned +as distinct from the divisions, could have been increased to +seventeen, thus, except for a fraction, exactly maintaining the +original proportion as regards the hostile fleet, which was now +found to be composed of thirty-three ships. + +During the night of 20th-21st October the Franco-Spanish fleet, +which had been sailing in three divisions and a 'squadron of +observation,' formed line and stood to the southward, heading a +little to the eastward of south. The 'squadron of observation' +was parallel to the main body and to windward (in this case to +the westward) of it, with the leading ships rather more advanced. + +The British main divisions steered WSW. till 1 A.M. After that +they steered SW. till 4 A.M. There are great difficulties about +the time, as the notation of it[86] differed considerably in +different ships; but the above hours are taken from the _Victory's_ +log. At 4 A.M. the British fleet, or rather its main divisions, +wore and stood N. by E. As the wind was about NW. by W., the +ships were close-hauled, and the leader of the 'lee-line,' i.e. +Collingwood's flag-ship, was when in station two points abaft +the _Victory's_ beam as soon as the 'order of sailing' in two +columns--which was to be the order of battle--had been formed. + +[Footnote 86: Except the chronometers, which were instruments of +navigation so precious as always to be kept under lock and key, +there were no clocks in the navy till some years after I joined +it. Time on board ship was kept by half-hour sand-glasses.] + +About 6 A.M. the enemy's fleet was sighted from the _Victory_, +and observed to bear from her E. by S. and be distant from her +ten or twelve miles. The distance is corroborated by observed +bearings from Collingwood's flag-ship.[87] Viewed from the British +ships, placed as they were relatively to it, the enemy's fleet +must have appeared as a long single line-ahead, perhaps not very +exactly formed. As soon as the hostile force was clearly made out, +the British divisions bore up and stood to the eastward, steering +by the _Victory's_ compass ENE. The position and formation of +the British main divisions were by this made exactly those in +which they are shown in the diagram usually attached to the +celebrated memorandum of 9th October 1805. The enemy must have +appeared to the British, who were ten or twelve miles to windward +of him, and on his beam, as if he were formed in line-ahead. He +therefore was also in the position and formation assigned to +him in that diagram. + +[Footnote 87: It would necessitate the use of some technicalities +to explain it fully; but it may be said that the bearings of +the extremes of the enemy's line observed from his flag-ship +prove that Collingwood was in the station that he ought to have +occupied when the British fleet was in the Order of Sailing and +close to the wind.] + +At a time which, because of the variety in the notations of it, +it is difficult to fix exactly, but somewhere between 7 and 8 +A.M., the enemy's ships wore together and endeavoured to form +a line to the northward, which, owing to the direction of the +wind, must have been about N. by E. and S. by W., or NNE. and +SSW. The operation--not merely of wearing, but of both wearing +and reforming the line, such as it was--took more than an hour +to complete. The wind was light; there was a westerly swell; +the ships were under easy sail; consequently there must have +been a good deal of leeway, and the hostile or 'combined' fleet +headed in the direction of Cadiz, towards which, we are expressly +told by a high French authority--Chevalier--it advanced. + +Nelson had to direct the course of his fleet so that its divisions, +when about to make the actual attack, would be just opposite the +points to which the respective hostile ships had advanced in +the meantime. In a light wind varying in force a direct course +to those points could not be settled once for all; but that first +chosen was very nearly right, and an alteration of a point, viz. +to E. by N., was for a considerable time all that was necessary. +Collingwood later made a signal to his division to alter course +one point to port, which brought them back to the earlier course, +which by the _Victory's_ compass had been ENE. The eight ships +of what has been referred to as the 'advance squadron' were +distributed between the two main British divisions, six being +assigned to Collingwood's and two to Nelson's. They did not all +join their divisions at the same time, some--probably owing to +the distance at which they had been employed from the rest of +the fleet and the feebleness of the breeze--not till several +hours after the combined fleet had been sighted. + +Collingwood preserved in his division a line-of-bearing apparently +until the very moment when the individual ships pushed on to make +the actual attack. The enemy's fleet is usually represented as +forming a curve. It would probably be more correct to call it a +very obtuse re-entering angle. This must have been largely due to +Gravina's 'squadron of observation' keeping away in succession, +to get into the wake of the rest of the line, which was forming +towards the north. About the centre of the combined fleet there +was a gap of a mile. Ahead and astern of this the ships were not +all in each other's wake. Many were to leeward of their stations, +thus giving the enemy's formation the appearance of a double line, +or rather of a string of groups of ships. It is important to +remember this, because no possible mode of attack--the enemy's +fleet being formed as it was--could have prevented some British +ships from being 'doubled on' when they cut into the enemy's +force. On 'The First of June,' notwithstanding that the advance +to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several British +ships were 'doubled on,' and even 'trebled on,' as will be seen +in the experiences on that day of the _Brunswick_, _Marlborough_, +_Royal_Sovereign_, and _Queen_Charlotte_ herself. + +Owing to the shape of the hostile 'line' at Trafalgar and the +formation in which he kept his division, Collingwood brought his +ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her +attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum. By +the terms of that document Nelson had specifically assigned to his +own division the work of seeing that the movements of Collingwood's +division should be interrupted as little as possible. It would, +of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position +of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the +memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after Collingwood was +getting near his objective point. In execution, therefore, of +the service allotted to his division, Nelson made a feint at +the enemy's van. This necessitated an alteration of course to +port, so that his ships came into a 'line-of-bearing' so very +oblique that it may well have been loosely called a 'line-ahead.' +Sir Charles Ekins says that the two British lines '_afterwards_ +fell into line-ahead, the ships in the wake of each other,' and +that this was in obedience to signal. Collingwood's line certainly +did not fall into line-ahead. At the most it was a rather oblique +line-of-bearing almost parallel to that part of the enemy's fleet +which he was about to attack. In Nelson's line there was more than +one alteration of course, as the _Victory's_ log expressly states +that she kept standing for the enemy's van, which we learn from +the French accounts was moving about N. by E. or NNE. In the light +wind prevailing the alterations of course must have rendered it, +towards the end of the forenoon, impossible to keep exact station, +even if the _Victory_ were to shorten sail, which we know she +did not. As Admiral Colomb pointed out, 'Several later signals +are recorded which were proper to make in lines-of-bearing, but +not in lines-ahead.' It is difficult to import into this fact +any other meaning but that of intention to preserve, however +obliquely, the line-of-bearing which undoubtedly had been formed +by the act of bearing-up as soon as the enemy's fleet had been +distinguished. + +When Collingwood had moved near enough to the enemy to let his +ships deliver their attacks, it became unnecessary for Nelson's +division to provide against the other's being interrupted. +Accordingly, he headed for the point at which he meant to cut into +the enemy's fleet. Now came the moment, as regards his division, +for doing what Collingwood's had already begun to do, viz. engage +in a 'pell-mell battle,'[88] which surely may be interpreted +as meaning a battle in which rigorous station-keeping was no +longer expected, and in which 'no captain could do very wrong +if he placed his ship alongside that of the enemy.' + +[Footnote 88: Nelson's own expression.] + +In several diagrams of the battle as supposed to have been fought +the two British divisions just before the moment of impact are +represented as converging towards each other. The Spanish diagram, +lately reproduced by Mr. Newbolt, shows this, as well as the English +diagrams. We may take it, therefore, that there was towards the +end of the forenoon a convergence of the two columns, and that +this was due to Nelson's return from his feint at the hostile van +to the line from which he intended to let go his ships to deliver +the actual attack. Collingwood's small alteration of course of +one point to port slightly, but only slightly, accentuated this +convergence. + +Enough has been said here of Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar. To +discuss them fully would lead me too far for this occasion. + +I can only express the hope that in the navy the subject will +receive fuller consideration hereafter. Nelson's last victory +was gained, be it remembered, in one afternoon, over a fleet more +than 20 per cent. his superior in numbers, and was so decisive +that more than half of the hostile ships were taken. This was the +crowning effort of seven years spent in virtually independent +command in time of war--seven years, too, illustrated by more +than one great victory. + +The more closely we look into Nelson's tactical achievements, +the more effective and brilliant do they appear. It is the same +with his character and disposition. The more exact researches +and investigations of recent times have removed from his name +the obloquy which it pleased some to cast upon it. We can see +now that his 'childlike, delighted vanity'--to use the phrase +of his greatest biographer--was but a thin incrustation on noble +qualities. As in the material world valueless earthy substances +surround a vein of precious metal, so through Nelson's moral +nature there ran an opulent lode of character, unimpaired in +its priceless worth by adjacent frailties which, in the majority +of mankind, are present without any precious stuff beneath them. +It is with minds prepared to see this that we should commemorate +our great admiral. + +Veneration of Nelson's memory cannot be confined to particular +objects or be limited by locality. His tomb is wider than the +space covered by dome or column, and his real monument is more +durable than any material construction. It is the unwritten and +spiritual memorial of him, firmly fixed in the hearts of his +fellow-countrymen. + + + + +X + +THE SHARE OF THE FLEET IN THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE[89] + +[Footnote 89: Written in 1907. (_Naval_Annual_, 1908.)] + +At the close of the Great War, which ended in the downfall of +Napoleon, the maritime position of the British Empire was not +only predominant--it also was, and long remained, beyond the +reach of challenge. After the stupendous events of the great +contest such successes as those at Algiers where we were helped +by the Dutch, at Navarino where we had two allies, and at Acre +were regarded as matters of course, and no very grave issue hung +upon any one of them. For more than half a century after Nelson's +death all the most brilliant achievements of British arms were +performed on shore, in India or in the Crimea. There were also many +small wars on land, and it may well have seemed to contemporaries +that the days of great naval contests were over and that force +of circumstances was converting us into a military from a naval +nation. The belief in the efficacy of naval defence was not extinct, +but it had ceased to operate actively. Even whilst the necessity +of that form of defence was far more urgent, inattention to or +ignorance of its true principles had occasionally allowed it to +grow weak, but the possibility of substituting something else for +it had not been pressed or even suggested. To this, however, we +had now come; and it was largely a consequence of the Crimean war. +In that war the British Army had nobly sustained its reputation +as a fighting machine. For the first time after a long interval +it had met in battle European troops, and had come out of the +conflict more renowned for bravery than ever. Nothing seemed +able to damp its heroism--not scantiness of food, not lack of +clothing amidst bitter cold, not miserable quarters, not superior +forces of a valiant enemy. It clung to its squalid abodes in the +positions which it was ordered to hold with a tenacious fortitude +that had never been surpassed in its glorious history, and that +defied all assaults. In combination with its brave allies it +brought to a triumphant conclusion a war of an altogether peculiar +character. + +The campaign in the Crimea was in reality the siege of a single +fortress. All the movements of the Western invaders were undertaken +to bring them within striking distance of the place, to keep +them within reach of it, or to capture it. Every battle that +occurred was fought with one of those objects. When the place +fell the war ended. The one general who, in the opinion of all +concerned, gained high distinction in the war was the general +who had prolonged the defence of Sebastopol by the skilful use +of earthworks. It was no wonder that the attack and defence of +fortified places assumed large importance in the eyes of the +British people. The command of the sea held by the allied powers +was so complete and all-pervading that no one stopped to think +what the course of hostilities would have been without it, any +more than men stop to think what the course of any particular +business would be if there were no atmosphere to breathe in. +Not a single allied soldier had been delayed on passage by the +hostile fleet; not a single merchant vessel belonging to the +allies had been captured by a hostile cruiser. Supplies and +reinforcements for the besieging armies were transported to them +without escort and with as little risk of interruption as if +the operations had been those of profound peace. + +No sooner was the Crimean war over than another struggle took +place, viz. the war of the Indian Mutiny, and that also was waged +entirely on land. Here again the command of the sea was so complete +that no interruption of it, even temporary, called attention to +its existence. Troops and supplies were sent to India from the +United Kingdom and from Hong-Kong; horses for military purposes +from Australia and South Africa; and in every case without a +thought of naval escort. The experience of hostilities in India +seemed to confirm the experience of the Crimea. What we had just +done to a great European nation was assumed to be what unfriendly +European nations would wish to do and would be able to do to +us. It was also assumed that the only way of frustrating their +designs would be to do what had recently been done in the hope +of frustrating ours, but to do it better. We must--it was +said--depend on fortifications, but more perfect than those which +had failed to save Sebastopol. + +The protection to be afforded by our fleet was deliberately declared +to be insufficient. It might, so it was held, be absent altogether, +and then there would be nothing but fortifications to stand between +us and the progress of an active enemy. In the result the policy +of constructing imposing passive defence-works on our coast was +adopted. The fortifications had to be multiplied. Dependence +on that class of defence inevitably leads to discovery after +discovery that some spot open to the kind of attack feared has +not been made secure. We began by fortifying the great dockyard +ports--on the sea side against a hostile fleet, on the land side +against hostile troops. Then it was perceived that to fortify +the dockyard ports in the mother country afforded very little +protection to the outlying portions of the empire. So their principal +ports also were given defence-works--sometimes of an elaborate +character. Again, it was found that commercial ports had been +left out and that they too must be fortified. When this was done +spots were observed at which an enemy might effect a landing +in force, to prevent which further forts or batteries must be +erected. The most striking thing in all this is the complete +omission to take note of the conditions involved in the command +of the sea. + +Evidently it had not been understood that it was that very command +which alone had enabled the armies of western Europe to proceed, +not only without serious interruption, but also without encountering +an attempt at obstruction, to the field in the Crimea on which +their victories had been won, and that the same command would be +necessary before any hostile expedition, large enough to justify +the construction of the fortifications specially intended to +repel it, could cross the sea and get within striking distance +of our shores. It should be deeply interesting to the people +of those parts of the British Empire which lie beyond sea to +note that the defensive system comprised in the fortification +of the coast of the United Kingdom promised no security to them +in the event of war. Making all proper allowance for the superior +urgency of defending the heart of the empire, we must still admit +that no system of defence is adequate which does not provide for +the defence of other valuable parts of the great body politic +as well. + +Again, the system of defence proved to be imperfect. Every part +of the empire depended for prosperity--some parts depended for +existence--on practically unrestricted traffic on the ocean. +This, which might be assailed at many points and on lines often +thousands of miles in length, could find little or no defence in +immovable fortifications. It could not be held that the existence +of these released the fleet from all duty but that of protecting +our ocean commerce, because, if any enemy's navy was able to +carry out an operation of such magnitude and difficulty as a +serious attack on our home territory, it would assuredly be able +to carry out the work of damaging our maritime trade. Power to +do the latter has always belonged to the navy which was in a +position to extend its activity persistently to the immediate +neighbourhood of its opponent's coast-line. + +It is not to be supposed that there was no one to point this +out. Several persons did so, but being mostly sailors they were +not listened to. In actual practice the whole domain of imperial +strategy was withdrawn from the intervention of the naval officer, +as though it were something with which he could not have anything +to do. Several great wars had been waged in Europe in the meantime, +and all of them were land wars. Naval forces, if employed at all, +were employed only just enough to bring out how insignificant their +participation in them was. As was to have been expected, the habit +of attaching importance to the naval element of imperial defence +declined. The empire, nevertheless, continued to grow. Its territory +was extended; its population, notably its population of European +stock, increased, and its wealth and the subsequent operations +of exchanging its productions for those of other countries were +enormously expanded. At the same time the navy, to the strength +and efficiency of which it had to look for security, declined +absolutely, and still more relatively. Other navies were advancing: +some had, as it were, come into existence. At last the true +conditions were discerned, and the nation, almost with one voice, +demanded that the naval defences of the empire should be put +upon a proper footing. + +Let no one dismiss the foregoing retrospect as merely ancient +history. On the contrary, let all those who desire to see the +British Empire follow the path of its natural development in +tranquillity study the recent past. By doing this we shall be +able to estimate aright the position of the fleet in the defence +of the empire. We must examine the circumstances in which we +are placed. For five-and-thirty years the nations of the world +have practically lived under the rule of force. The incessant +object of every great state has been to increase the strength +of its armed forces up to the point at which the cost becomes +intolerable. Countries separated from one another only by arbitrary +geographical lines add regiment to regiment and gun to gun, and +also devise continually fresh expedients for accelerating the +work of preparing their armies to take the field. The most +pacifically inclined nation must do in this respect as its neighbours +do, on pain of losing its independence and being mutilated in +its territory if it does not. This rivalry has spread to the +sea, and fleets are increased at a rate and at a cost in money +unknown to former times, even to those of war. The possession of +a powerful navy by some state which has no reason to apprehend +over-sea invasion and which has no maritime interests, however +intrinsically important they may be, commensurate with the strength +of its fleets, may not indicate a spirit of aggression; but it +at least indicates ability to become an aggressor. Consequently, +for the British fleet to fill its proper position in the defence +of the empire it must be strong. To be strong more than large +numbers will be required. It must have the right, that is the +best, material, the best organisation, the best discipline, the +best training, the best distribution. We shall ascertain the +position that it should hold, if we examine what it would have +to do when called upon for work more active than that of peace +time. With the exception of India and Canada no part of the empire +is liable to serious attack that does not come over-sea. Any +support that can be given to India or Canada by other parts of +the empire must be conveyed across the sea also. This at once +indicates the importance of ocean lines of communication. + +War is the method adopted, when less violent means of persuasion +have failed, to force your enemy to comply with your demands. +There are three principal ways of effecting this--invasion of his +country, raids on his territory, destruction or serious damage +of his sea-borne commerce. Successful invasion must compel the +invaded to come to terms, or his national existence will be lost. +Raids upon his territory may possibly so distress him that he +would rather concede your terms than continue the struggle.[90] +Damage to his sea-borne commerce may be carried so far that he +will be ruined if he does not give in. So much for one side of +the account; we have to examine the other. Against invasion, +raids, or attempts at commerce-destruction there must be some +form of defence, and, as a matter of historical fact, defence +against each has been repeatedly successful. If we need instances +we have only to peruse the history of the British Empire. + +[Footnote 90: Though raids rarely, if ever, decide a war, they +may cause inconvenience or local distress, and an enemy desiring +to make them should be obstructed as much as possible.] + +How was it that--whilst we landed invading armies in many hostile +countries, seized many portions of hostile territory, and drove +more than one enemy's commerce from the sea--our own country has +been free from successful invasion for more than eight centuries, +few portions of our territory have been taken from us even +temporarily, and our commerce has increased throughout protracted +maritime wars? To this there can only be one answer, viz. that +the arrangements for defence were effectual. What, then, were +these arrangements? They were comprised in the provision of a +powerful, well-distributed, well-handled navy, and of a mobile +army of suitable strength. It is to be observed that each element +possessed the characteristic of mobility. We have to deal here +more especially with the naval element, and we must study the +manner in which it operates. + +Naval war is sea-power in action; and sea-power, taken in the +narrow sense, has limitations. It may not, even when so taken, +cease to act at the enemy's coast-line, but its direct influence +extends only to the inner side of a narrow zone conforming to that +line. In a maritime contest each side tries to control the ocean +communications and to prevent the other from controlling them. If +either gains the control, something in addition to sea-power +strictly defined may begin to operate: the other side's territory +may be invaded or harassed by considerable raids, and its commerce +may be driven from the sea. It will be noticed that control of +ocean communications is the needful preliminary to these. It +is merely a variant of the often employed expression of the +necessity, in war, of obtaining command of the sea. In the case +of the most important portion of the British Empire, viz. the +United Kingdom, our loss of control of the ocean communications +would have a result which scarcely any foreign country would +experience. Other countries are dependent on importations for +some part of the food of their population and of the raw material +of their industry; but much of the importation is, and perhaps +all of it may be, effected by land. Here, we depend upon imports +from abroad for a very large part of the food of our people, +and of the raw material essential to the manufacture of the +commodities by the exchange of which we obtain necessary supplies; +and the whole of these imports come, and must come to us, by +sea. Also, if we had not freedom of exportation, our wealth and +the means of supporting a war would disappear. Probably all the +greater colonies and India could feed their inhabitants for a +moderately long time without sea-borne imports, but unless the +sea were open to them their prosperity would decline. + +This teaches us the necessity to the British Empire of controlling +our maritime communications, and equally teaches those who may +one day be our enemies the advisability of preventing us from +doing so. The lesson in either case is driven farther home by +other considerations connected with communications. In war a +belligerent has two tasks before him. He has to defend himself +and hurt his enemy. The more he hurts his enemy, the less is +he likely to be hurt himself. This defines the great principle +of offensive defence. To act in accordance with this principle, +a belligerent should try, as the saying goes, to carry the war +into the enemy's country. He should try to make his opponents +fight where he wants them to fight, which will probably be as +far as possible from his own territory and as near as possible +to theirs. Unless he can do this, invasion and even serious raids +by him will be out of the question. More than that, his inability +to do it will virtually indicate that on its part the other side +can fix the scene of active hostilities unpleasantly close to +the points from which he desires to keep its forces away. + +A line of ocean communications may be vulnerable throughout its +length; but it does not follow that an assailant can operate +against it with equal facility at every point, nor does it follow +that it is at every point equally worth assailing. Lines running +past hostile naval ports are especially open to assault in the +part near the ports; and lines formed by the confluence of two or +more other lines--like, for example, those which enter the English +Channel--will generally include a greater abundance of valuable +traffic than others. Consequently there are some parts at which +an enemy may be expected to be more active than elsewhere, and +it is from those very parts that it is most desirable to exclude +him. They are, as a rule, relatively near to the territory of the +state whose navy has to keep the lines open, that is to say, +prevent their being persistently beset by an enemy. The necessary +convergence of lines towards that state's ports shows that some +portion of them would have to be traversed, or their traversing +be attempted, by expeditions meant to carry out either invasion +or raids. If, therefore, the enemy can be excluded as above +mentioned, invasions, raids, and the more serious molestation of +sea-borne commerce by him will be prevented. + +If we consider particular cases we shall find proof upon proof +of the validity of the rule. Three great lines--one from the +neighbourhood of the Cape of Good Hope, one from the Red Sea, and +a third from India and Ceylon--converge near the south-western +part of Australia and run as one line towards the territory of the +important states farther east. If an assailant can be excluded +from the latter or combined line he must either divide his force +or operate on only one of the confluents, leaving the rest free. +The farther he can be pushed back from the point of confluence +the more effectually will he be limited to a single line, because +the combining lines, traced backwards, trend more and more apart, +and it is, therefore, more and more difficult for him to keep +detachments of his force within supporting distance of each other +if they continue to act against two or more lines. The particular +case of the approaches to the territory of the United Kingdom +has the same features, and proves the rule with equal clearness. +This latter case is so often adduced without mention of others, +that there is some risk of its being believed to be a solitary +one. It stands, however, exactly on all fours with all the rest +as regards the principle of the rule. + +A necessary consequence of an enemy's exclusion from the combined +line as it approaches the territory to be defended is--as already +suggested--that invasion of that territory and serious raids +upon it will be rendered impracticable. Indeed, if the exclusion +be absolutely complete and permanent, raids of every kind and +depredations on commerce in the neighbourhood will be prevented +altogether. It should be explained that though lines and +communications are spoken of, it is the area crossed by them +which is strategically important. A naval force, either guarding +or intending to assail a line, does not necessarily station itself +permanently upon it. All that it has to do is to remain, for the +proper length of time, within the strategic area across which the +defended or threatened line runs. The strategic area will be of +varying extent, its boundaries being determined by circumstances. +The object of the defence will be to make the area from which the +enemy's ships are excluded as extensive as possible. When the +enemy has been pushed back into his own waters and into his own +ports the exclusion is strategically complete. The sea is denied +to his invading and important raiding expeditions, and indeed to +most of his individual cruisers. At the same time it is free +to the other belligerent. To effect this a vigorous offensive +will be necessary. + +The immediate theatre of operations, the critical strategic area, +need not be, and often ought not to be, near the territory defended +by our navy. It is necessary to dwell upon this, because no principle +of naval warfare has been more frequently or more seriously +misapprehended. Misapprehension of it has led to mischievous and +dangerous distribution of naval force and to the squandering of +immense sums of money on local defence vessels; that is, vessels +only capable of operating in the very waters from which every +effort should be made to exclude the enemy. Failure to exclude +him from them can only be regarded as, at the very least, yielding +to him an important point in the great game of war. If we succeed +in keeping him away, the local defence craft of every class are +useless, and the money spent on them has been worse than wasted, +because, if it had not been so spent, it might have been devoted +to strengthening the kind of force which must be used to keep +the enemy where he ought to be kept, viz. at a distance from +our own waters. + +The demand that ships be so stationed that they will generally, +and except when actually cruising, be within sight of the +inhabitants, is common enough in the mother country, and perhaps +even more common in the over-sea parts of the British Empire. +Nothing justifies it but the honest ignorance of those who make +it; nothing explains compliance with it but the deplorable weakness +of authorities who yield to it. It was not by hanging about the +coast of England, when there was no enemy near it, with his fleet, +that Hawke or Nelson saved the country from invasion, nor was it +by remaining where they could be seen by the fellow-countrymen +of their crews that the French and English fleets shut up their +enemy in the Baltic and Black Sea, and thus gained and kept +undisputed command of the sea which enabled them, without +interruption, to invade their enemy's territory. + +The condition insisted upon by the Australasian Governments in +the agreement formerly made with the Home Government, that a +certain number of ships, in return for an annual contribution +of money, should always remain in Australasian waters, was in +reality greatly against the interests of that part of the empire. +The Australasian taxpayer was, in fact, made to insist upon being +injured in return for his money. The proceeding would have been +exactly paralleled by a householder who might insist that a +fire-engine, maintained out of rates to which he contributes, +should always be kept within a few feet of his front door, and +not be allowed to proceed to the end of the street to extinguish +a fire threatening to extend eventually to the householder's own +dwelling. When still further localised naval defence--localised +defence, that is, of what may be called the smaller description--is +considered, the danger involved in adopting it will be quite as +apparent, and the waste of money will be more obvious. Localised +defence is a near relation of passive defence. It owes its origin +to the same sentiment, viz. a belief in the efficacy of staying +where you are instead of carrying the war into the enemy's country. + +There may be cases in which no other kind of naval defence is +practicable. The immense costliness of modern navies puts it out +of the power of smaller states to maintain considerable sea-going +fleets. The historic maritime countries--Sweden, Denmark, the +Netherlands, and Portugal, the performances of whose seamen are +so justly celebrated--could not now send to sea a force equal in +number and fighting efficiency to a quarter of the force possessed +by anyone of the chief naval powers. The countries named, when +determined not to expose themselves unarmed to an assailant, can +provide themselves only with a kind of defence which, whatever +its detailed composition, must be of an intrinsically localised +character. + +In their case there is nothing else to be done; and in their +case defence of the character specified would be likely to prove +more efficacious than it could be expected to be elsewhere. War +is usually made in pursuit of an object valuable enough to justify +the risks inseparable from the attempt to gain it. Aggression by +any of the countries that have been mentioned is too improbable to +call for serious apprehension. Aggression against them is far more +likely. What they have to do is to make the danger of attacking them +so great that it will equal or outweigh any advantage that could +be gained by conquering them. Their wealth and resources, compared +with those of great aggressive states, are not large enough to +make up for much loss in war on the part of the latter engaging +in attempts to seize them. Therefore, what the small maritime +countries have to do is to make the form of naval defence to +which they are restricted efficacious enough to hurt an aggressor +so much that the victory which he may feel certain of gaining +will be quite barren. He will get no glory, even in these days +of self-advertisement, from the conquest of such relatively weak +antagonists; and the plunder will not suffice to repay him for +the damage received in effecting it. + +The case of a member of the great body known as the British Empire +is altogether different. Its conquest would probably be enormously +valuable to a conqueror; its ruin immensely damaging to the body +as a whole. Either would justify an enemy in running considerable +risks, and would afford him practically sufficient compensation +for considerable losses incurred. We may expect that, in war, +any chance of accomplishing either purpose will not be neglected. +Provision must, therefore, be made against the eventuality. Let +us for the moment suppose that, like one of the smaller countries +whose case has been adduced, we are restricted to localised defence. +An enemy not so restricted would be able to get, without being +molested, as near to our territory--whether in the mother country +or elsewhere--as the outer edge of the comparatively narrow belt +of water that our localised defences could have any hope of +controlling effectively. We should have abandoned to him the whole +of the ocean except a relatively minute strip of coast-waters. That +would be equivalent to saying good-bye to the maritime commerce on +which our wealth wholly, and our existence largely, depends. No +thoughtful British subject would find this tolerable. Everyone +would demand the institution of a different defence system. A +change, therefore, to the more active system would be inevitable. +It would begin with the introduction of a cruising force in addition +to the localised force. The unvarying lesson of naval history +would be that the cruising division should gain continuously +on the localised. It is only in times of peace, when men have +forgotten, or cannot be made to understand, what war is, that +the opposite takes place. + +If it be hoped that a localised force will render coast-wise +traffic safe from the enemy, a little knowledge of what has happened +in war and a sufficiently close investigation of conditions will +demonstrate how baseless the hope must be. Countries not yet +thickly populated would be in much the same condition as the +countries of western Europe a century ago, the similarity being +due to the relative scarcity of good land communications. A +part--probably not a very large part--of the articles required +by the people dwelling on and near the coast in one section would +be drawn from another similar section. These articles could be +most conveniently and cheaply transported by water. If it were +worth his while, an enemy disposing of an active cruising force +strong enough to make its way into the neighbourhood of the coast +waters concerned would interrupt the 'long-shore traffic' and defy +the efforts of a localised force to prevent him. The history of the +Great War at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning +of the nineteenth teems with instances of interruption by our +navy of the enemy's coast-wise trade when his ocean trade had +been destroyed. The history of the American War of 1812 supplies +other instances. + +The localised defence could not attempt to drive off hostile +cruisers remaining far from the shore and meaning to infest the +great lines of maritime communication running towards it. If +those cruisers are to be driven off at all it can be done only +by cruising ships. Unless, therefore, we are to be content to +leave our ocean routes, where most crowded and therefore most +vulnerable, to the mercy of an enemy, we must have cruisers to +meet the hostile cruisers. If we still adhere to our localised +defence, we shall have two distinct kinds of force---one provided +merely for local, and consequently restricted, action; the other +able to act near the shore or far out at sea as circumstances +may demand. If we go to the expense of providing both kinds, we +shall have followed the example of the sage who cut a large hole +in his study door for the cat and a small one for the kitten. + +Is local naval defence, then, of any use? Well, to tell the truth, +not much; and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. Even in +the case of the smaller maritime countries, to which reference +has been made above, defence of the character in question would +avail little if a powerful assailant were resolved to press home his +attack. That is to say, if only absolute belligerent considerations +were regarded. In war, however, qualifying considerations can +never be left out of sight. As the great Napoleon observed, you +can no more make war without incurring losses than you can make +omelettes without breaking eggs. The strategist--and the tactician +also, within his province--will always count the cost of a proposed +operation, even where they are nearly certain of success. The +occupation of a country, which would be of no great practical +value to you when you got it, would be a poor return for the +loss to which you would have been put in the process. That loss +might, and probably would, leave you at a great disadvantage +as regards enemies more nearly on an equality with yourself. It +would, therefore, not be the improbability of breaking down the +local naval defence of a minor maritime state, but the pressure +of qualifying and only indirectly belligerent considerations, +that would prevent its being attempted. + +In a struggle between two antagonists of the first rank, the +circumstances would be different. Purely belligerent considerations +would have fuller play. Mistakes will be made, of course, for +war is full of mistakes; but it may be accepted that an attack +on any position, however defended, is in itself proof that the +assailant believed the result hoped for to be quite worth the +cost of obtaining it. Consequently, in a struggle as assumed, +every mode of defence would have to stand on its intrinsic merits, +nearly or quite unaided by the influence of considerations more +or less foreign to it. Every scrap of local defence would, in +proportion to its amount, be a diminution of the offensive defence. +Advocates of the former may be challenged to produce from naval +history any instance of local naval defence succeeding against the +assaults of an actively aggressive navy. In the late war between +Japan and Russia the Russian local defence failed completely. + +In the last case, a class of vessel like that which had failed +in local defence was used successfully, because offensively, +by the Japanese. This and many another instance show that the +right way to use the kind of craft so often allocated to local +defence is to use them offensively. It is only thus that their +adoption by a great maritime power like the British Empire can +be justified. The origin and centre of our naval strength are +to be looked for in the United Kingdom. The shores of the latter +are near the shores of other great maritime powers. Its ports, +especially those at which its fleets are equipped and would be +likely to assemble on the imminence of war, are within reach of +more than one foreign place from which small swift craft to be used +offensively might be expected to issue. The method of frustrating +the efforts of these craft giving most promise of success is to +attack them as soon as possible after they issue from their own +port. To the acceptance of this principle we owe the origin of the +destroyer, devised to destroy hostile torpedo-boats before they +could reach a position from which they would be able to discharge +with effect their special weapon against our assembled ships. +It is true that the destroyer has been gradually converted into +a larger torpedo-boat. It is also true that when used as such +in local defence, as at Port Arthur, her failure was complete; +and just as true that she has never accomplished anything except +when used offensively. + +When, therefore, a naval country's coast is so near the ports of +another naval country that the latter would be able with swift +small craft to attack the former's shipping, the provision of +craft of a similar kind is likely to prove advantageous. War +between great powers is a two-sided game, and what one side can +do the other will at least be likely to attempt. Nothing supports +the view that it is well--either above or beneath the surface of +the water--to stand on the defensive and await attack. Everything +points to the superiority of the plan of beating up the enemy's +quarters and attacking him before he can get far from them on his +way towards his objective. Consequently the only justification +of expending money on the localised vessels of which we have +been speaking, is the probability that an enemy would have some +of his bases within reach of those vessels' efforts. Where this +condition does not exist, the money expended is, from the belligerent +point of view, thrown away. Here comes in the greatest foe of +belligerent efficiency, viz. political expediency. In time of +peace it is thought better to conciliate voters than to prepare +to meet an enemy. If local defence is thought to be pleasing to +an inexpert electorate, it is only too likely to be provided, +no matter how ineffectual and how costly in reality it will turn +out to be. + +Not only is the British Empire the first of naval powers, it +is also the first of colonial powers. One attribute is closely +connected with the other; neither, without the other, would be +applicable. The magnitude of our colonial domain, and especially +the imposing aspects of some of its greater components--the Dominion, +the Commonwealth, South Africa, New Zealand--are apt to blind +us to a feature of great strategical importance, and that is +the abundance and excellence of the naval bases that stud our +ocean lines of communication. In thinking of the great daughter +states we are liable to forget these; yet our possession of them +helps greatly to strengthen our naval position, because it +facilitates our assuming a far-reaching offensive. By themselves, +if not too numerous, they can afford valuable support to the +naval operations that are likely to prove most beneficial to +us. The fact that they are ours, and not an opponent's, also +constitutes for us an advantage of importance. Of course, they +have to be defended, or else they may fall into an opponent's +hands. Have we here a case in which highly localised or even +passive defences are desirable? No doubt we did act for a time +as though we believed that the question could only be answered +in the affirmative; but that was when we were under the influence +of the feelings engendered by observation of the long series of +land wars previously discussed. + +Perhaps we have not yet quite shaken off the effects of that +influence; but we have at least got so far as to tolerate the +statement of the other side of the question. It would be a great +mistake to suppose that the places alluded to are meant to be +ports of refuge for our ships. Though they were to serve that +purpose occasionally in the case of isolated merchant vessels, it +would be but an accident, and not the essence, of their existence. +What they are meant for is to be utilised as positions where our +men-of-war can make reasonably sure of finding supplies and the +means of refit. This assurance will largely depend upon their +power of resistance if attacked. Before we can decide how to +impart that power to them we shall have to see the kind of attack +against which they would have to be prepared. If they are on a +continent, like, for example, Gibraltar, attack on them by a +land force, however improbable, is physically possible. Against +an attack of the kind a naval force could give little direct +help. Most of our outlying naval bases are really or virtually +insular, and are open to attack only by an expedition coming +across the sea. An essential characteristic of a naval base is +that it should be able to furnish supplies as wanted to the +men-of-war needing to replenish their stocks. Some, and very +often all, of these supplies are not of native production and +must be brought to the base by sea. If the enemy can stop their +conveyance to it, the place is useless as a base and the enemy is +really in control of its communications. If he is in control of its +communications he can send against it as great an expedition as he +likes, and the place will be captured or completely neutralised. +Similarly, if we control the communications, not only can supplies +be conveyed to it, but also no hostile expedition will be allowed +to reach it. Thus the primary defence of the outlying base is +the active, sea-going fleet. Moderate local defence, chiefly +of the human kind, in the shape of a garrison, will certainly be +needed. Though the enemy has not been able to obtain control +of the communications of the place, fitful raids on it will be +possible; and the place should be fortified enough and garrisoned +enough to hold out against the inconsiderable assaults comprised +in these till our own ships can drive the enemy's away. + +Outlying naval bases, though but moderately fortified, that contain +depots of stores, docks, and other conveniences, have the vice +of all immobile establishments. When war does come, some of them +almost certainly, and all of them possibly, may not be in the +right place with regard to the critical area of operations. They +cannot, however, be moved. It will be necessary to do what has +been done over and over again in war, in the latest as well as +in earlier wars, and that is, establish temporary bases in more +convenient situations. Thus much, perhaps all, of the cost and +trouble of establishing and maintaining the permanent bases will +have been wasted. This inculcates the necessity of having not +as many bases as can be found, but as few as it is possible to +get on with. + +The control of ocean communications, or the command of the sea, +being the end of naval warfare, and its acquisition being practicable +only by the assumption of a vigorous offensive, it follows as a +matter of course that we must have a strong and in all respects +efficient mobile navy. This is the fundamental condition on which +the continued existence of the British Empire depends. It is +thoroughly well known to every foreign Government, friendly or +unfriendly. The true objective in naval warfare is the enemy's +navy. That must be destroyed or decisively defeated, or intimidated +into remaining in its ports. Not one of these can be effected +without a mobile, that is a sea-going, fleet. The British Empire +may fall to pieces from causes as yet unknown or unsuspected: it +cannot be kept together if it loses the power of gaining command +of the sea. This is not a result of deliberate policy: it is +inherent in the nature of the empire, scattered as its parts are +throughout the world, with only the highway of the sea between +them. + +Such is the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire: +such are its duties towards it. Duties in the case are mutual, and +some are owed to the fleet as well as by it. It is incumbent on +every section of the empire, without neglecting its land forces, +to lend zealous help in keeping the fleet efficient. It is not +to be supposed that this can be done only by making pecuniary +contributions to its maintenance. It is, indeed, very doubtful +if any real good can be done by urging colonies to make them. +It seems certain that the objections to this are greater than +any benefit that it can confer. Badgering our fellow-subjects +beyond sea for money payments towards the cost of the navy is +undignified and impolitic. The greatest sum asked for by the +most exacting postulant would not equal a twentieth part of the +imperial naval expenditure, and would not save the taxpayer of +the mother country a farthing in the pound of his income. No one +has yet been able to establish the equity of a demand that would +take something from the inhabitants of one colony and nothing from +those of another. Adequate voluntary contribution is a different +matter. + +There are other ways in which every trans-marine possession of +the Crown can lend a hand towards perfecting the efficiency of +the fleet--ways, too, which would leave each in complete and +unmenaced control of its own money. Sea-power does not consist +entirely of men-of-war. There must be docks, refitting +establishments, magazines, and depots of stores. Ports, which +men-of-war must visit at least occasionally in war for repair or +replenishment of supplies, will have to be made secure against +the assaults which it has been said that a hastily raiding enemy, +notwithstanding our general control of the communications, might +find a chance of making. Moderate fixed fortifications are all +the passive defence that would be needed; but good and active +troops must be available. If all these are not provided by the +part of the empire in which the necessary naval bases lie, they +will have to be provided by the mother country. If the former +provides them the latter will be spared the expense of doing +so, and spared expense with no loss of dignity, and with far +less risk of friction and inconvenience than if her taxpayers' +pockets had been nominally spared to the extent of a trifling +and reluctantly paid money contribution. + +It has been pointed out on an earlier page that a country can be, +and most probably will be, more effectually defended in a maritime +war if its fleet operates at a distance from, rather than near, +its shores. Every subject of our King should long to see this +condition exist if ever the empire is involved in hostilities. It +may be--for who can tell what war will bring?--that the people +of some great trans-marine dependency will have to choose between +allowing a campaign to be conducted in their country or forcing +the enemy to tolerate it in his. If they choose the latter they +must be prepared to furnish part at least of the mobile force +that can give effect to their choice. That is to say, they must +be prepared to back up our sea-power in its efforts to keep off +the tide of war from the neighbourhood of their homes. History +shows how rarely, during the struggle between European nations +for predominance in North America, the more settled parts of +our former American Colonies were the theatre of war: but then +the colonists of those days, few comparatively as they were, sent +strong contingents to the armies that went campaigning, in the +territory of the various enemies. This was in every way better--the +sequel proved how much better--than a money contribution begged +or extorted would have been. + +Helping in the manner first suggested need not result in dissociating +our fellow-subjects beyond the seas from participation in the work +of the active sea-going fleet. It is now, and still would be, +open to them as much as to any native or denizen of the mother +country. The time has fully come when the people of the greater +outlying parts of the empire should insist upon perfect equality +of treatment with their home fellow-subjects in this matter. +They should resent, as a now quite out-of-date and invidious +distinction, any difference in qualification for entry, locality +of service, or remuneration for any rank or rating. Self-respect +and a dignified confidence in their own qualities, the excellence +of which has been thoroughly tested, will prompt the King's colonial +subjects to ask for nothing but equal chances in a force on which +is laid so large a part of the duty of defending the empire. Why +should they cut themselves off from the promising career that +service in the Royal Navy opens to the capable, the zealous, +and the honourable aspirant of every grade? Some of the highest +posts in the navy are now, or lately have been, held by men who +not only happened to be born in British Colonies, but who also +belong to resident colonial families. Surely in this there is a +strong moral cement for binding and keeping the empire together. +It is unnecessary to expatiate on the contrast between the prospect +of such a career and that which is all that a small local service +could offer. It would soon be seen towards which the enterprising +and the energetic would instinctively gravitate. + +In the defence of the British Empire the fleet holds a twofold +position. To its general belligerent efficiency, its strength +and activity, we must look if the plans of an enemy are to be +brought to nought. It, and it only, can secure for us the control +of the ocean communications, on the freedom of which from serious +interruptions the prosperity--indeed, the existence--of a scattered +body must depend. In time of peace it can be made a great +consolidating force, fostering every sentiment of worthy local +patriotism whilst obliterating all inclination to mischievous +narrow particularism, and tending to perfect the unity which gives +virtue to national grandeur and is the true secret of national +independence and strength. + + + + +XI + +NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR[91] + +[Footnote 91: Written in 1905. (Read at Institute of Naval +Architects.)] + +The subject on which I have been invited to read a paper, and +which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for +anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be +expected to allot to it. To discuss it adequately, a volume of no +diminutive size would be necessary. It may, however, be possible +to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main +outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration +certain points which, over and above their historical interest, +may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day. + +In taking account of the conditions of the Trafalgar epoch we have +to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters. These +are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted +to meet it by the British. The former of these was described in +the House of Commons by William Pitt at the beginning of the +war in words which may be used without change at the present +time. On 16th May 1803 the war, which had been interrupted by the +unstable Peace of Amiens, was definitely resumed. The struggle +was now to be a war not so much between the United Kingdom and the +French nation as between the United Kingdom and the great Napoleon, +wielding more than the resources of France alone. Speaking a week +after the declaration of war, Pitt said that any expectation of +success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition +that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of +the country by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of +descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired +and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and +protracted war. More briefly stated, the hostile plan was to +invade the United Kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel +us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the East, from +which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived. The plan +was comprehensive, but not easily concealed. What we had to do +was to prevent the invasion of the United Kingdom and defend our +trade and our outlying territories. As not one of the hostile +objects could be attained except by making a maritime expedition +of some kind, that is to say, by an expedition which had to cross +more or less extensive areas of water, it necessarily followed +that our most effective method of defence was the keeping open +of our sea communications. It became necessary for us to make +such arrangements that the maritime paths by which a hostile +expedition could approach our home-coasts, or hostile cruisers +molest our sea-borne trade, or hostile squadrons move to the +attack of our trans-marine dependencies--that all these paths +should be so defended by our navy that either the enemy would +not venture to traverse them or, if he did, that he could be +driven off. + +Short as it is, the time at my disposal permits me to give a +few details. It was fully recognised that defence of the United +Kingdom against invasion could not be secured by naval means +alone. As in the times of Queen Elizabeth, so in those of George +III, no seaman of reputation contended that a sufficient land +force could be dispensed with. Our ablest seamen always held +that small hostile expeditions could be prepared in secret and +might be able to slip through the most complete lines of naval +defence that we could hope to maintain. It was not discovered +or alleged till the twentieth century that the crew of a dinghy +could not land in this country in the face of the navy. Therefore +an essential feature of our defensive strategy was the provision +of land forces in such numbers that an invader would have no +chance of succeeding except he came in strength so great that +his preparations could not be concealed and his expedition could +not cross the water unseen. + +As our mercantile marine was to be found in nearly every sea, +though in greater accumulation in some areas than in others, its +defence against the assaults of an enemy could only be ensured +by the virtual ubiquity of our cruising force. This, of course, +involved the necessity of employing a large number of cruisers, +and of arranging the distribution of them in accordance with the +relative amount and value of the traffic to be protected from +molestation in different parts of the ocean. It may be mentioned +here that the term 'cruiser,' at the time with which we are dealing, +was not limited to frigates and smaller classes of vessels. It +included also ships of the line, it being the old belief of the +British Navy, justified by the experience of many campaigns and +consecrated by the approval of our greatest admirals, that the +value of a ship of war was directly proportionate to her capacity +for cruising and keeping the sea. + +If the ocean paths used by our merchant ships--the trade routes +or sea communications of the United Kingdom with friendly or +neutral markets and areas of production--could be kept open by +our navy, that is, made so secure that our trade could traverse +them with so little risk of molestation that it could continue to +be carried on, it resulted as a matter of course that no sustained +attack could be made on our outlying territory. Where this was +possible it was where we had failed to keep open the route or line +of communications, in which case the particular trade following +it was, at least temporarily, destroyed, and the territory to +which the route led was either cut off or seized. Naturally, +when this was perceived, efforts were made to re-open and keep +open the endangered or interrupted communication line. + +Napoleon, notwithstanding his supereminent genius, made some +extraordinary mistakes about warfare on the sea. The explanation +of this has been given by a highly distinguished French admiral. +The Great Emperor, he says, was wanting in exact appreciation +of the difficulties of naval operations. He never understood +that the naval officer--alone of all men in the world--must be +master of two distinct professions. The naval officer must be +as completely a seaman as an officer in any mercantile marine; +and, in addition to this, he must be as accomplished in the use +of the material of war entrusted to his charge as the members of +any aimed force in the world. The Emperor's plan for the invasion +of the United Kingdom was conceived on a grand scale. A great +army, eventually 130,000 strong, was collected on the coast of +north-eastern France, with its headquarters at Boulogne. The +numerical strength of this army is worth attention. By far the +larger part of it was to have made the first descent on our +territory; the remainder was to be a reserve to follow as quickly +as possible. It has been doubted if Napoleon really meant to +invade this country, the suggestion being that his collection +of an army on the shores of the Straits of Dover and the English +Channel was merely a 'blind' to cover another intended movement. +The overwhelming weight of authoritative opinion is in favour +of the view that the project of invasion was real. It is highly +significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary. +It could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval +obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the +expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to +be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected. +The numerical strength in troops which Napoleon thought necessary +compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that +concealment became quite impossible. Consequently an important +part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened +locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of +precision. + +Notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of +naval warfare, the Great Emperor had grasped one of its leading +principles. Before the Peace of Amiens, indeed before his campaign +in Egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in Italy, he had seen +that the invasion of the United Kingdom was impracticable without +first obtaining the command of the sea. His strategic plan, +therefore, included arrangements to secure this. The details of +the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered; +but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment +of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied +in Nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. The gunboats, +transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of +many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern France and the +Netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition. +Fleets of line-of-battle ships were essential parts of it, and +on their effective action the success of the scheme was largely +made to depend. This feature remained unaltered in principle when, +less than twelve months before Trafalgar, Spain took part in the +war as Napoleon's ally, and brought him a great reinforcement +of ships and important assistance in money. + +We should not fail to notice that, before he considered himself +strong enough to undertake the invasion of the United Kingdom, +Napoleon found it necessary to have at his disposal the resources +of other countries besides France, notwithstanding that by herself +France had a population more than 60 per cent. greater than that +of England. By the alliance with Spain he had added largely to +the resources on which he could draw. Moreover, his strategic +position was geographically much improved. With the exception +of that of Portugal, the coast of western continental Europe, +from the Texel to Leghorn, and somewhat later to Taranto also, +was united in hostility to us. This complicated the strategic +problem which the British Navy had to solve, as it increased the +number of points to be watched; and it facilitated the junction +of Napoleon's Mediterranean naval forces with those assembled in +his Atlantic ports by supplying him with allied ports of refuge +and refit on Spanish territory--such as Cartagena or Cadiz--between +Toulon and the Bay of Biscay. Napoleon, therefore, enforced upon +us by the most convincing of all arguments the necessity of +maintaining the British Navy at the 'two-power standard' at least. +The lesson had been taught us long before by Philip II, who did +not venture on an attempt at invading this country till he was +master of the resources of the whole Iberian peninsula as well +as of those of the Spanish dominions in Italy, in the Burgundian +heritage, and in the distant regions across the Atlantic Ocean. + +At several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was +now the master, Napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and +win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough +to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across +the water which separated the starting points of his expedition +from the United Kingdom. Command of the sea to be won by a powerful +naval combination was thus an essential element in Napoleon's +strategy at the time of Trafalgar. It was not in deciding what +was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred: +it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he +went wrong. The British strategy adopted in opposition to that +of Napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of +the command of the sea. Formulated and carried into effect by +seamen, it differed in some important features from his. We may +leave out of sight for the moment the special arrangements made +in the English Channel to oppose the movements of Napoleon's +flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft. +The British strategy at the time of Trafalgar, as far as it was +concerned with opposition to Napoleon's sea-going fleets, may be +succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which +the enemy's forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable +strength. Though some of our admirals, notably Nelson himself, +objected to the application of the term 'blockade' to their plans, +the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they +should come out they would find outside their port a British +force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them +thoroughly and destroy them. Beating them and thus having done +with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what +was desired by our admirals. This necessitated a close watch on +the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let +the history of Cornwallis's command off Brest and of Nelson's +off Toulon suffice to tell us. + +The junction of two or more of Napoleon's fleets would have ensured +over almost any single British fleet a numerical superiority that +would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost +certain. To meet this condition the British strategy contemplated +the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another, +which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment +be effected. By this step we should preserve, if not a numerical +superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force +as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment, +even if undefeated, a certainty. The strategic problem before our +navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem. +The enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards Brest +or towards Toulon. In the latter case, a superior force might +fall upon our Mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in +the Atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from +the Atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. Against +the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of Napoleon +to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off +Toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was +to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval +control of the English Channel. + +After the addition of the Spanish Navy to his own, Napoleon to +some extent modified his strategic arrangements. The essential +feature of the scheme remained unaltered. It was to effect the +junction of the different parts of his naval force and thereupon +to dominate the situation, by evading the several British fleets +or detachments which were watching his. Before Spain joined him +in the war his intention was that his escaping fleets should +go out into the Atlantic, behind the backs, as it were, of the +British ships, and then make for the English Channel. When he +had the aid of Spain the point of junction was to be in the West +Indies. + +The remarkable thing about this was the evident belief that the +command of the sea might be won without fighting for it; won, +too, from the British Navy which was ready, and indeed wished, +to fight. We now see that Napoleon's naval strategy at the time +of Trafalgar, whilst it aimed at gaining command of the sea, was +based on what has been called evasion. The fundamental principle +of the British naval strategy of that time was quite different. +So far from thinking that the contest could be settled without +one or more battles, the British admirals, though nominally +blockading his ports, gave the enemy every facility for coming out +in order that they might be able to bring him to action. Napoleon, +on the contrary, declared that a battle would be useless, and +distinctly ordered his officers not to fight one. Could it be +that, when pitted against admirals whose accurate conception of +the conditions of naval warfare had been over and over again tested +during the hostilities ended by the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon still +trusted to the efficacy of methods which had proved so successful +when he was outmanoeuvring and intimidating the generals who +opposed him in North Italy? We can only explain his attitude +in the campaign of Trafalgar by attributing to him an expectation +that the British seamen of his day, tried as they had been in +the fire of many years of war, would succumb to his methods as +readily as the military formalists of central Europe. + +Napoleon had at his disposal between seventy and eighty French, +Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line, of which some sixty-seven +were available at the beginning of the Trafalgar campaign. In +January 1805, besides other ships of the class in distant waters +or specially employed, we--on our side--had eighty ships of the +line in commission. A knowledge of this will enable us to form +some idea of the chances of success that would have attended +Napoleon's concentration if it had been effected. To protect the +passage of his invading expedition across the English Channel +he did not depend only on concentrating his more distant fleets. +In the Texel there were, besides smaller vessels, nine sail of +the line. Thus the Emperor did what we may be sure any future +intending invader will not fail to do, viz. he provided his +expedition with a respectable naval escort. The British naval +officers of the day, who knew what war was, made arrangements to +deal with this escort. Lord Keith, who commanded in the Downs, +had under him six sail of the line in addition to many frigates +and sloops; and there were five more line-of-battle ships ready +at Spithead if required. + +There had been a demand in the country that the defence of our +shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to +gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats. +This was resisted by the naval officers. Nelson had already said, +'Our first defence is close to the enemy's ports,' thus agreeing +with a long line of eminent British seamen in their view of our +strategy. Lord St. Vincent said that 'Our great reliance is on the +vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in +the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, +and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.' +These are memorable words, which we should do well to ponder +in these days. The Government of the day insisted on having the +coastal boats; but St. Vincent succeeded in postponing the +preparation of them till the cruising ships had been manned. +His plan of defence has been described by his biographer as 'a +triple line of barricade; 50-gun ships, frigates, sloops of war, +and gun-vessels upon the coast of the enemy; in the Downs opposite +France another squadron, but of powerful ships of the line, +continually disposable, to support the former or attack any force +of the enemy which, it might be imagined possible, might slip +through the squadron hanging over the coast; and a force on the +beach on all the shores of the English ports, to render assurance +doubly sure.' This last item was the one that St. Vincent had +been compelled to adopt, and he was careful that it should be in +addition to those measures of defence in the efficacy of which +he and his brother seamen believed. Concerning it his biographer +makes the following remark: 'It is to be noted that Lord St. +Vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats +by gunboats,' &c. He objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or +long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful +to have the sea-going ships manned. Speaking of this coastal +defence scheme, he said: 'It would be a good bone for the officers +to pick, but a very dear one for the country.' + +The defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy +of the time. An important part was played by our fleets and groups +of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes +direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral +vessels carrying commodities to or from British ports. The strategy +of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long +belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted +number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity +of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by +the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size. This +can be seen in the lists of successive years. In January 1803 +the number of cruising frigates in commission was 107, and of +sloops and smaller vessels 139, the total being 246. In 1804 the +numbers were: Frigates, 108; sloops, &c., 181; with a total of +289. In 1805 the figures had grown to 129 frigates, 416 sloops, +&c., the total being 545. Most of these were employed in defending +commerce. We all know how completely Napoleon's project of invading +the United Kingdom was frustrated. It is less well known that +the measures for defending our sea-borne trade, indicated by the +figures just given, were triumphantly successful. Our mercantile +marine increased during the war, a sure proof that it had been +effectually defended. Consequently we may accept it as established +beyond the possibility of refutation that that branch of our naval +strategy at the time of Trafalgar which was concerned with the +defence of our trade was rightly conceived and properly carried +into effect. + +As has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade, +being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of +communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any +rate, of our transmarine territories. Napoleon held pertinaciously +to the belief that British prosperity was chiefly due to our +position in India. We owe it to Captain Mahan that we now know +that the eminent American Fulton--a name of interest to the members +of this Institution--told Pitt of the belief held abroad that +'the fountains of British wealth are in India and China.' In the +great scheme of naval concentration which the Emperor devised, +seizure of British Colonies in the West Indies had a definite +place. We kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force +capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the +neighbouring lines of communication. In 1803 we had four ships +of the line in the West Indian area. In 1804 we had six of the +same class; and in 1805, while the line-of-battle ships were +reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine +to twenty-five. Whether our Government divined Napoleon's designs +on India or not, it took measures to protect our interests there. +In January 1804 we had on the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies +stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller +two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one ships of +war in all. This would have been sufficient to repel a raiding +attack made in some strength. By the beginning of 1805 our East +Indies force had been increased; and in the year 1805 itself we +raised it to a strength of forty-one ships in all, of which nine +were of the line and seventeen were frigates. Had, therefore, any +of the hostile ships managed to get to the East Indies from the +Atlantic or the Mediterranean ports, in which they were being +watched by our navy, their chances of succeeding in their object +would have been small indeed. + +When we enter the domain of tactics strictly so-called, that is +to say, when we discuss the proceedings of naval forces--whether +single ships, squadrons, or fleets--in hostile contact with one +another, we find the time of Trafalgar full of instructive episodes. +Even with the most recent experience of naval warfare vividly +present to our minds, we can still regard Nelson as the greatest +of tacticians. Naval tactics may be roughly divided into two great +classes or sections, viz. the tactics of groups of ships, that +is to say, fleet actions; and the tactics of what the historian +James calls 'single ship actions,' that is to say, fights between +two individual ships. In the former the achievements of Nelson +stand out with incomparable brilliancy. It would be impossible +to describe his method fully in such a paper as this. We may, +however, say that Nelson was an innovator, and that his tactical +principles and methods have been generally misunderstood down +to this very day. If ever there was an admiral who was opposed +to an unthinking, headlong rush at an enemy, it was he. Yet this +is the character that he still bears in the conception of many. +He was, in truth, an industrious and patient student of tactics, +having studied them, in what in these days we should call a +scientific spirit, at an early period, when there was but little +reason to expect that he would ever be in a position to put to a +practical test the knowledge that he had acquired and the ideas +that he had formed. He saw that the old battle formation in single +line-ahead was insufficient if you wanted--as he himself always +did--to gain an overwhelming victory. He also saw that, though +an improvement on the old formation, Lord Howe's method of the +single line-abreast was still a good deal short of tactical +perfection. Therefore, he devised what he called, with pardonable +elation, the 'Nelson touch,' the attack in successive lines so +directed as to overwhelm one part of the enemy's fleet, whilst +the other part was prevented from coming to the assistance of the +first, and was in its turn overwhelmed or broken up. His object +was to bring a larger number of his own ships against a smaller +number of the enemy's. He would by this method destroy the part +attacked, suffering in the process so little damage himself that +with his whole force he would be able to deal effectively with the +hostile remnant if it ventured to try conclusions with him. It +is of the utmost importance that we should thoroughly understand +Nelson's fundamental tactical principle, viz. the bringing of +a larger number of ships to fight against a smaller number of +the enemy's. There is not, I believe, in the whole of the records +of Nelson's opinions and actions a single expression tending to +show that tactical efficiency was considered by him to be due +to superiority in size of individual ships of the same class +or--as far as _matériel_ was concerned--to anything but superior +numbers, of course at the critical point. He did not require, +and did not have, more ships in his own fleet than the whole of +those in the fleet of the enemy. What he wanted was to bring to +the point of impact, when the fight began, a larger number of +ships than were to be found in that part of the enemy's line. + +I believe that I am right in saying that, from the date of Salamis +downwards, history records no decisive naval victory in which the +victorious fleet has not succeeded in concentrating against a +relatively weak point in its enemy's formation a greater number +of its own ships. I know of nothing to show that this has not been +the rule throughout the ages of which detailed history furnishes +us with any memorial--no matter what the class of ship, what the +type of weapon, what the mode of propulsion. The rule certainly +prevailed in the battle of the 10th August 1904 off Port Arthur, +though it was not so overwhelmingly decisive as some others. We +may not even yet know enough of the sea fight in the Straits +of Tsushima to be able to describe it in detail; but we do know +that at least some of the Russian ships were defeated or destroyed +by a combination of Japanese ships against them. + +Looking back at the tactics of the Trafalgar epoch, we may see +that the history of them confirms the experience of earlier wars, +viz. that victory does not necessarily fall to the side which +has the biggest ships. It is a well-known fact of naval history +that generally the French ships were larger and the Spanish much +larger than the British ships of corresponding classes. This +superiority in size certainly did not carry with it victory in +action. On the other hand, British ships were generally bigger +than the Dutch ships with which they fought; and it is of great +significance that at Camperdown the victory was due, not to +superiority in the size of individual ships, but, as shown by +the different lists of killed and wounded, to the act of bringing +a larger number against a smaller. All that we have been able to +learn of the occurrences in the battle of the japan Sea supports +instead of being opposed to this conclusion; and it may be said +that there is nothing tending to upset it in the previous history +of the present war in the Far East. + +I do not know how far I am justified in expatiating on this point; +but, as it may help to bring the strategy and tactics of the +Trafalgar epoch into practical relation with the stately science of +which in our day this Institution is, as it were, the mother-shrine +and metropolitical temple, I may be allowed to dwell upon it a +little longer. The object aimed at by those who favour great size +of individual ships is not, of course, magnitude alone. It is to +turn out a ship which shall be more powerful than an individual +antagonist. All recent development of man-of-war construction has +taken the form of producing, or at any rate trying to produce, +a more powerful ship than those of earlier date, or belonging to +a rival navy. I know the issues that such statements are likely +to raise; and I ask you, as naval architects, to bear with me +patiently when I say what I am going to say. It is this: If you +devise for the ship so produced the tactical system for which +she is specially adapted you must, in order to be logical, base +your system on her power of defeating her particular antagonist. +Consequently, you must abandon the principle of concentration of +superior numbers against your enemy; and, what is more, must be +prepared to maintain that such concentration on his part against +yourself would be ineffectual. This will compel a reversion to +tactical methods which made a fleet action a series of duels +between pairs of combatants, and--a thing to be pondered on +seriously--never enabled anyone to win a decisive victory on the +sea. The position will not be made more logical if you demand both +superior size and also superior numbers, because if you adopt +the tactical system appropriate to one of the things demanded, +you will rule out the other. You cannot employ at the same time +two different and opposed tactical systems. + +It is not necessary to the line of argument above indicated to +ignore the merits of the battleship class. Like their predecessors, +the ships of the line, it is really battleships which in a naval +war dominate the situation. We saw that it was so at the time +of Trafalgar, and we see that it has been so in the war between +Russia and Japan, at all events throughout the 1904 campaign. +The experience of naval war, down to the close of that in which +Trafalgar was the most impressive event, led to the virtual +abandonment of ships of the line[92] above and below a certain +class. The 64-gun ships and smaller two-deckers had greatly +diminished in number, and repetitions of them grew more and more +rare. It was the same with the three-deckers, which, as the late +Admiral Colomb pointed out, continued to be built, though in +reduced numbers, not so much for their tactical efficiency as +for the convenient manner in which they met the demands for the +accommodation required in flag-ships. The tactical condition +which the naval architects of the Trafalgar period had to meet +was the employment of an increased number of two-deckers of the +medium classes. + +[Footnote 92: Experience of war, as regards increase in the number +of medium-sized men-of-war of the different classes, tended to the +same result in both the French Revolutionary war (1793 to 1801) +and the Napoleonic war which began in 1803. Taking both contests +down to the end of the Trafalgar year, the following table will +show how great was the development of the line-of-battle-ship +class below the three-decker and above the 64-gun ship. It will +also show that there was no development of, but a relative decline +in, the three-deckers and the 64's, the small additions, where +there were any, being generally due to captures from the enemy. +The two-deckers not 'fit to lie in a line' were at the end of the +Trafalgar year about half what they were when the first period +of the 'Great War' began. When we come to the frigate classes we +find the same result. In the earlier war 11 frigates of 44 and +40 guns were introduced into our navy. It is worth notice that +this number was not increased, and by the end of the Trafalgar +year had, on the contrary, declined to 10. The smallest frigates, +of 28 guns, were 27 in 1793, and 13 at the end of the Trafalgar +year. On the other hand, the increase in the medium frigate classes +(38, 36, and 32 guns) was very large. From 1793 to the end of the +Trafalgar year the 38-gun frigates increased from 8 to 50, and +the 36-gun frigates from 16 to 54. + + ------------------------------------------------------------- +| | | Napoleonic War to | +| | French | the end of the | +| | Revolutionary War | Trafalgar year | +| Classes of Ships |-------------------|-------------------| +| |Commence-|Commence-|Commence-|Commence-| +| | ment of | ment of | ment of | ment of | +| | 1793 | 1801 | 1803 | 1806 | +|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| 3-deckers | 31 | 32 | 29 | 29 | +| 2-deckers of 74 | 76 | 111 | 105 | 123 | +| guns, and above | | | | | +| 64 and 60 gun ships | 46 | 47 | 38 | 38 | +| 2-deckers not 'fit | 43 | 31 | 21 | 22 | +| to lie in a line' | | | | | +| Frigates 44 guns | 0 | 6 | 6 | 6 | +| " 40 " | 0 | 5 | 5 | 4 | +| " 38 " | 8 | 32 | 32 | 50 | +| " 36 " | 16 | 49 | 49 | 54 | +| " 32 " | 48 | 41 | 38 | 56 | +| " 28 " | 27 | 11 | 11 | 13 | + ------------------------------------------------------------- + +The liking for three-deckers, professed by some officers of Nelson's +time, seems to have been due to a belief, not in the merit of their +size as such, but in the value of the increased number of medium +guns carried on a 'middle' deck. There is, I believe, nothing to +show that the two-deckers _Gibraltar_ (2185 tons) and _Coesar_ +(2003) were considered more formidable than the three-deckers +_Balfleur_ (1947), _Glory_ (1944), or _Queen_ (1876). All these +ships were in the same fleet, and fought in the same battle.] + +A fleet of ships of the line as long as it could keep the sea, +that is, until it had to retreat into port before a stronger +fleet, controlled a certain area of water. Within that area smaller +men-of-war as well as friendly merchant ships were secure from +attack. As the fleet moved about, so the area moved with it. +Skilful disposition and manoeuvring added largely to the extent +of sea within which the maritime interests that the fleet was +meant to protect would be safe. It seems reasonable to expect that +it will be the same with modern fleets of suitable battleships. + +The tactics of 'single ship actions' at the time of Trafalgar +were based upon pure seamanship backed up by good gunnery. The +better a captain handled his ship the more likely he was to beat +his antagonist. Superior speed, where it existed, was used to +'gain the weather gage,' not in order to get a suitable range +for the faster ship's guns, but to compel her enemy to fight. +Superior speed was also used to run away, capacity to do which +was not then, and ought not to be now, reckoned a merit in a ship +expressly constructed for fighting, not fleeing. It is sometimes +claimed in these days that superior speed will enable a modern +ship to keep at a distance from her opponent which will be the +best range for her own guns. It has not been explained why a range +which best suits her guns should not be equally favourable for the +guns of her opponent; unless, indeed, the latter is assumed to be +weakly armed, in which case the distance at which the faster ship +might engage her would be a matter of comparative indifference. +There is nothing in the tactics of the time of Trafalgar to make +it appear that--when a fight had once begun--superior speed, +of course within moderate limits, conferred any considerable +tactical advantage in 'single ship actions,' and still less in +general or fleet actions. Taking up a position ahead or astern of +a hostile ship so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated +by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state +of the ship to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather +late in an action. + +A remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly +apparent in the era of Trafalgar. I have already alluded to the +tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle ships +to those of the medium classes. The same thing may be noticed +in the case of the frigates.[93] Those of 44, 40, and 28 guns +relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number +of the 38-gun, 36-gun, and 32-gun frigates increased. The officers +who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress +on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the +sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now +call the 'battleship' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.' +In the earlier time there were ships which were intermediate +between the ship of the line and the frigate. These were the +two-deckers of 56, 54, 50, 44, and even 40 guns. They had long +been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never +counted in the frigate classes. They seemed to have held a +nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them +in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured +cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit +for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending +or other cruiser service. The two-deckers just mentioned were +looked upon by the date of Trafalgar as forming an unnecessary +class of fighting ships. Some were employed, chiefly because they +existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true +battleships on one side and true frigates on the other.[94] + +[Footnote 93: See footnote 92.] + +[Footnote 94: See footnote 92.] + +In conclusion, I would venture to say that the strategical and +tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had +been mastered by our navy by the time of the Trafalgar campaign. +The effect of those lessons showed itself in our ship-building +policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history +of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means +to belligerent ends. + + + + +XII + +THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF A FLEET[95] + +[Footnote 95: Written in 1902. (Read at the Hong-Kong United Service +Institution.)] + +A problem which is not an attractive one, but which has to be +solved, is to arrange the proper method of supplying a fleet +and maintaining its communications. In time of peace as well as +in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles +of various kinds used on board ship, viz. naval stores, ordnance +stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, &c. +If we know the quantity of each description of stores that a +ship can carry, and if we estimate the progressive consumption, +we can compute, approximately but accurately enough for practical +purposes, the time at which replenishment would be necessary and +to what amount it should be made up. As a general rule ships +stow about three months' stores and provisions. The amount of +coal and engineers' stores, measured in time, depends on the +proceedings of the ship, and can only be calculated if we know +during what portion of any given period she will be under way. +Of course, this can be only roughly estimated. In peace time we +know nearly exactly what the expenditure of ammunition within a +given length of time--say, a quarter of a year--will be. For war +conditions we can only form an estimate based upon assumptions. + +The consumption of provisions depends upon the numbers of officers +and men, and in war or peace would be much the same. The greater +activity to be expected in war would lead to more wear and tear, +and consequently to a larger expenditure of naval stores. In +peaceful times the quarterly expenditure of ammunition does not +vary materially. In case we were at war, a single action might +cause us to expend in a few hours as much as half a dozen quarterly +peace allowances. There is a certain average number of days that +a ship of a particular class is under way in a year, and the +difference between that number and 365 is, of course, the measure +of the length of time she is at anchor or in harbour. Expenditure +of coal and of some important articles of engineers' stores depends +on the relation between the time that she is stationary and the +time she is under way. It should be particularly noted that the +distinction is not between time at anchor and time at sea, but +between time at anchor and 'time under way.' If a ship leaves +her anchorage to run an engine-trial after refit, or to fire +at a target, or to adjust compasses, or to go into dock--she +burns more coal than if she remained stationary. These occasions +of movement may be counted in with the days in which the ship +is at sea, and the total taken as the number of days under way. +It may be assumed that altogether these will amount to six or +seven a month. In time of war the period under way would probably +be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting +under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable, +so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be +greatly increased. + +The point to be made here is that--independently of strategic +conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the +supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is principally +that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except +provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must +be forwarded in larger quantities or at shorter intervals than in +peace time. If, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system +of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications +being left out of consideration for the present--will merely +have to be expanded in time of war. In other words, practice in +the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards +preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions. +That a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during +hostilities will not be doubted. + +The general principles which I propose to indicate are applicable +to any station. We may allow for a squadron composed of-- + + 4 battleships, + 4 large cruisers, + 4 second-class cruisers, + 13 smaller vessels of various kinds, and + 3 destroyers, + +being away from the principal base-port of the station for several +months of the year. The number of officers and men would be, in +round numbers, about 10,000. + +In estimating the amounts of stores of different kinds required +by men-of-war, it is necessary--in order to allow for proper +means of conveyance--to convert tons of dead-weight into tons +by measurement, as the two are not always exactly equivalent. In +the following enumeration only estimated amounts are stated, and +the figures are to be considered as approximate and not precise. +It is likely that in each item an expert maybe able to discover +some variation from the rigorously exact; but the general result +will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, especially +as experience will suggest corrections. + +A thousand men require about 3.1 tons of victualling stores, +packages included, daily, We may make this figure up to 3.5 tons +to allow for 'medical comforts' and canteen stores, Consequently +10,000 men require about 35 tons a day, and about 6300 tons for +six months. The assumed squadron, judging from experience, would +require in peace time about 600 tons of engineers' stores, about +400 tons of naval stores, and--if the ships started with only their +exact allowance on board and then carried out a full quarterly +practice twice--the quantity of ordnance stores and ammunition +required would be about 1140 tons, to meet the ordinary peace +rate of expenditure, We thus get for a full six months' supply +the following figures:-- + + Victualling stores 6,300 tons. + Engineers' stores 600 " + Naval stores 400 " + Ordnance stores and ammunition 1,140 " + ----- + Total 8,440 " + +Some allowance must be made for the needs of the 'auxiliaries,'[96] +the vessels that bring supplies and in other ways attend on the +fighting ships. This may be put at 7 per cent. The tonnage required +would accordingly amount in all to about 9000. + +[Footnote 96: The 7 per cent. mentioned in the text would probably +cover nearly all the demands--except coal--of auxiliaries, which +would not require much or any ammunition. Coal is provided for +separately.] + +The squadron would burn in harbour or when stationary about 110 +tons of coal a day, and when under way about 1050 tons a day. For +140 harbour-days the consumption would be about 15,400 tons; and +for 43 days under way about 45,150: so that for coal requirements +we should have the following:-- + + Harbour consumption 15,400 tons. + Under-way consumption 45,150 " + ------ + Total for fighting ships 60,550 " + 7 per cent. for auxiliaries (say) 4,250 " + ------ + Grand total 64,800 " + +Some time ago (in 1902) a representation was made from the China +station that, engine-room oil being expended whenever coal is +expended, there must be some proportion between the quantities +of each. It was, therefore, suggested that every collier should +bring to the squadron which she was supplying a proportionate +quantity of oil. This has been approved, and it has been ordered +that the proportions will be 75 gallons of oil to every 100 tons +of coal.[97] It was also suggested that the oil should be carried +in casks of two sizes, for the convenience of both large and +small ships. + +[Footnote 97: I was informed (on the 10th December 1902), some +time after the above was written, that the colliers supplying +the United States Navy are going to carry 100 gallons of oil +for every 100 tons of coal.] + +There is another commodity, which ships have never been able to +do without, and which they need now in higher proportion than +ever. That commodity is fresh water. The squadron constituted +as assumed would require an average of about 160 tons of fresh +water a day, and nearly 30,000 tons in six months. Of this the +ships, without adding very inconveniently to their coal consumption, +might themselves distil about one-half; but the remaining 15,000 +tons would have to be brought to them; and another thousand tons +would probably be wanted by the auxiliaries, making the full +six months' demand up to 16,000 tons. + +The tonnage requirements of the squadron and its 'auxiliaries' +for a full six months' period would be about 74,000, without +fresh water. As, however, the ships would have started with full +store-rooms, holds, and bunkers, and might be expected to return +to the principal base-port of the station at the end of the period, +stores for four-and-a-half months', and coal to meet twenty weeks', +consumption would be sufficient. These would be about 6750 tons +of stores and ammunition and 46,000 tons of coal.[98] + +[Footnote 98: To avoid complicating the question, the water or +distilling vessel, the hospital ship, and the repair vessel have +not been considered specially. Their coal and stores have been +allowed for.] + +The stores, &c., would have to be replenished twice and--as it would +not be prudent to let the ships run right out of them--replenishment +should take place at the end of the second and at the end of the +fourth months. Two vessels carrying stores and ammunition, if +capable of transporting a cargo of nearly 1700 tons apiece, would +bring all that was wanted at each replenishment. To diminish risk +of losing all of one description of supplies, if carried by itself +in a separate vessel, it has been considered desirable that each +supply-carrier, when employed, is to contain some ammunition, +some stores, and some provisions. There are great advantages +in having supply-carriers, including, of course, colliers, of +moderate size. Many officers must have had experience of the +inconvenience and delay due to the employment of a single very +large vessel which could only coal one man-of-war at a time. +Several vessels, each carrying a moderate amount of cargo, would +permit much more rapid replenishment of the ships of a squadron. +The inconvenience that would be caused by the loss or breakdown +of a supply-carrier would be reduced by employing several vessels +of moderate cargo-capacity instead of only one or two of great +capacity. + +Each battleship and large cruiser of the assumed squadron may be +expected to burn about 1000 tons of coal in five weeks, so that +the quantity to be used in that time by all those ships would +be 8000 tons. The remaining ships, scattered between different +places as most of them would probably be, would require about +3500 tons. Therefore, every five weeks or so 11,500 tons of coal +would be required. Four replenishments would be necessary in the +whole period, making a total of 46,000 tons. Each replenishment +could be conveyed in five colliers with 2300 tons apiece. + +Moderate dimensions in store- and coal-carriers would prove +convenient, not only because it would facilitate taking in stores +and coaling, if all the squadron were assembled at one place, +but also if part were at one place and part at another. Division +into several vessels, instead of concentration in a few, would +give great flexibility to the system of supply. A single very +capacious cargo-carrier might have to go first to one place and +supply the ships there, and then go to supply the remaining ships +lying at another anchorage. This would cause loss of time. The +same amount of cargo distributed amongst two or more vessels +would permit the ships at two or more places to be supplied +simultaneously. + +You may have noticed that I have been dealing with the question +as though stores and coal were to be transported direct to the +men-of-war wherever they might be and put straight on board them +from the carrying-vessels. There is, as you all know, another +method, which may be described as that of 'secondary bases.' +Speaking generally, each of our naval stations has a principal +base at which considerable or even extensive repairs of the ships +can be effected and at which stores are accumulated. Visits to +it for the sake of repair being necessary, the occasion may be +taken advantage of to replenish supplies, so that the maintenance +of a stock at the place makes for convenience, provided that +the stock is not too large. The so-called 'secondary base' is +a place at which it is intended to keep in store coal and other +articles in the hope that when war is in progress the supply of +our ships may be facilitated. It is a supply, and not a repairing +base. + +A comparison of the 'direct' system and 'secondary base' system +may be interesting. A navy being maintained for use in war, it +follows, as a matter of course, that the value of any part of +its equipment or organisation depends on its efficiency for war +purposes. The question to be answered is--Which of the two systems +promises to help us most during hostilities? This does not exclude +a regard for convenience and economy in time of peace, provided +that care is taken not to push economy too far and not to make +ordinary peace-time convenience impede arrangements essential +to the proper conduct of a naval campaign. + +It is universally admitted that a secondary base at which stocks +of stores are kept should be properly defended. This necessitates +the provision of fortifications and a garrison. Nearly every +article of naval stores of all classes has to be brought to our +bases by sea, just as much as if it were brought direct to our +ships. Consequently the communications of the base have to be +defended. They would continue to need defending even if our ships +ceased to draw supplies from it, because the communications of +the garrison must be kept open. We know what happened twice over +at Minorca when the latter was not done. + +The object of accumulating stores at a secondary base is to +facilitate the supply of fighting ships, it being rather confidently +assumed that the ships can go to it to replenish without being +obliged to absent themselves for long from the positions in which +they could best counteract the efforts of the enemy. When war is +going on it is not within the power of either side to arrange +its movements exactly as it pleases. Movements must, at all events +very often, conform to those of the enemy. It is not a bad rule +when going to war to give your enemy credit for a certain amount +of good sense. Our enemy's good sense is likely to lead him to +do exactly what we wish him not to do, and not to do that which +we wish him to do. We should, of course, like him to operate so +that our ships will not be employed at an inconvenient distance +from our base of supplies. If we have created permanent bases in +time of peace the enemy will know their whereabouts as well as +we do ourselves, and, unless he is a greater fool than it is safe +to think he is, he will try to make us derive as little benefit +from them as possible. He is likely to extend his operations to +localities at a distance from the places to which, if we have +the secondary base system of supply, he knows for certain that our +ships must resort. We shall have to do one of two things--either +let him carry on his operations undisturbed, or conform to his +movements. To this is due the common, if not invariable, experience +of naval warfare, that the fleet which assumes the offensive +has to establish what are sometimes called 'flying bases,' to +which it can resort at will. This explains why Nelson rarely +used Gibraltar as a base; why we occupied Balaclava in 1854; and +why the Americans used Guantanamo Bay in 1898. The flying base is +not fortified or garrisoned in advance. It is merely a convenient +anchorage, in a good position as regards the circumstances of +the war; and it can be abandoned for another, and resumed, if +desirable, as the conditions of the moment dictate. + +It is often argued that maintenance of stocks of stores at a +secondary base gives a fleet a free hand and at least relieves +it from the obligation of defending the line of communications. +We ought to examine both contentions. It is not easy to discover +where the freedom comes in if you must always proceed to a certain +place for supplies, whether convenient or not. It may be, and +very likely will be, of the utmost importance in war for a ship +to remain on a particular station. If her coal is running short +and can only be replenished by going to a base, go to the base she +must, however unfortunate the consequences. It has been mentioned +already that nearly every item on our store list has to be brought +to a base by sea. Let us ascertain to what extent the accumulation +of a stock at a place removes the necessity of defending the +communication line. Coal is so much the greater item that +consideration of it will cover that of all the rest. + +The squadron, as assumed, requires about 11,500 tons of coal +every five weeks in peace time. Some is commonly obtained from +contractors at foreign ports; but to avoid complicating the subject +we may leave contract issues out of consideration. If you keep +a stock of 10,000 tons at your permanent secondary base, you +will have enough to last your ships about four-and-a-half weeks. +Consequently you must have a stream of colliers running to the +place so as to arrive at intervals of not more than about thirty +days. Calculations founded on the experience of manoeuvres show +that in war time ships would require nearly three times the quantity +used in peace. It follows that, if you trebled your stock of +coal at the base and made it 30,000 tons, you would in war still +require colliers carrying that amount to arrive about every four +weeks. Picture the line of communications with the necessary +colliers on it, and see to what extent you are released from +the necessity of defending it. The bulk of other stores being +much less than that of coal, you could, no doubt, maintain a +sufficient stock of them to last through the probable duration +of the war; but, as you must keep your communications open to +ensure the arrival of your coal, it would be as easy for the +other stores to reach you as it would be for the coal itself. +Why oblige yourself to use articles kept long in store when much +fresher ones could be obtained? Therefore the maintenance of +store depots at a secondary base no more releases you from the +necessity of guarding your communications than it permits freedom +of movement to your ships. + +The secondary base in time of war is conditioned as follows. If +the enemy's sphere of activity is distant from the base which +you have equipped with store-houses and fortifications, the place +cannot be of any use to you. It can, and probably will, be a +cause of additional anxiety to you, because the communications +of its garrison must still be kept open. If it is used, freedom +of movement for the ships must be given up, because they cannot +go so far from it as to be obliged to consume a considerable +fraction of their coal in reaching it and returning to their +station. The line along which your colliers proceed to it must +be effectively guarded. + +Contrast this with the system of direct supply to the ships-of-war. +You choose for your flying base a position which will be as near +to the enemy's sphere of action as you choose to make it. You +can change its position in accordance with circumstances. If you +cease to use the position first chosen you need trouble yourself +no more about its special communications. You leave nothing at it +which will make it worth the enemy's while to try a dash at it. +The power of changing the flying base from one place to another +gives almost perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships. +Moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position +selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed +base. + +The defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on +the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route, +viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant. +Within the last few years a good deal has been written about +the employment of cruisers. The favourite idea seems to be that +peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to +take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. The history +of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. We need not forget +Nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number +attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of +vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually +unaltered. At the beginning of 1805, the year of Trafalgar, we +had--besides other classes--232 frigates and sloops in commission; +at the beginning of 1806 we had 264. It is doubtful if forty of +these were attached to fleets. + +It is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels +of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep +up with the fighting ships when at sea. This, perhaps, is due +to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on +the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. In +practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very +short time--from its supplies. Its movements depend on those of +its supply-train. The corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet +or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. As long as +these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered, +and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. All +that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right +place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying +that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies +and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called +communications'--the phrase being Mahan's. + +The efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely +on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. Why do +we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace +so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails +before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? There are +two reasons. One is, because we have used the permanent base +method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find +it difficult to form a conception of any other. The other reason +is that the direct supply method is thought to be too costly. +The first reason need not detain us. It is not worthy of even +a few minutes' consideration. The second reason deserves full +investigation. + +We ought to be always alive to the necessity of economy. The only +limit to economy of money in any plan of naval organisation is +that we should not carry it so far that it will be likely to impair +efficiency. Those who are familiar with the correspondence of the +great sea-officers of former days will have noticed how careful +they were to prevent anything like extravagant expenditure. This +inclination towards a proper parsimony of naval funds became +traditional in our service. The tradition has, perhaps, been +rather weakened in these days of abundant wealth; but we should +do our best not to let it die out. Extravagance is a serious foe +to efficient organisation, because where it prevails there is +a temptation to try imperfectly thought-out experiments, in the +belief that, if they fail, there will still be plenty of money +to permit others to be tried. This, of course, encourages slovenly +want of system, which is destructive of good organisation. + +We may assume, for the purposes of our investigation, that our +permanently equipped secondary base contains a stock of 10,000 tons +of coal. Any proportionate quantity, however, may be substituted +for this, as the general argument will remain unaffected. As +already intimated, coal is so much greater in bulk and aggregate +cost than any other class of stores that, if we arrange for its +supply, the provision of the rest is a comparatively small matter. +The squadron which we have had in view requires an estimated +amount of 46,000 tons of coal in six months' period specified, +and a further quantity of 4600 tons may be expected to suffice +for the ships employed in the neighbouring waters during the +remainder of the year. This latter amount would have to be brought +in smaller cargoes, say, five of 920 tons each. Allowing for +the colliers required during the six months whilst the whole +squadron has to be supplied an average cargo of 2300 tons, we +should want twenty arrivals with an aggregate of 46,000 tons, +and later on five arrivals of smaller colliers with an aggregate +of 4600 tons to complete the year. + +The freight or cost of conveyance to the place need not be considered +here, as it would be the same in either system. If we keep a stock +of supplies at a place we must incur expenditure to provide for +the storage of the articles. There would be what may be called +the capital charges for sites, buildings, residences, jetties, +tram lines, &c., for which £20,000 would probably not be enough, +but we may put it at that so as to avoid the appearance of +exaggeration. A further charge would be due to the provision of +tugs or steam launches, and perhaps lighters. This would hardly +be less than £15,000. Interest on money sunk, cost of repairs, +and maintenance, would not be excessive if they amounted to £3500 +a year. There must be some allowance for the coal used by the +tugs and steam launches. It is doubtful if £500 a year would +cover this; but we may put it at that. Salaries and wages of +staff, including persons employed in tugs and steam launches, +would reach quite £2500 a year. It is to be noted that the items +which these charges are assumed to cover cannot be dispensed +with. If depots are established at all, they must be so arranged +that the stores deposited in them can be securely kept and can +be utilised with proper expedition. The total of the charges +just enumerated is £6500 a year. + +There are other charges that cannot be escaped. For example, +landing a ton of coal at Wei-hai-wei, putting it into the depot, +and taking it off again to the man-of-war requiring it, costs $1 +20 cents, or at average official rate of exchange two shillings. +At Hong-Kong the cost is about 2s. 5d. a ton. The charge at 2s. +per ton on 50,600 tons would be £5060. I am assured by every +engineer officer to whom I have spoken on the subject that the +deterioration in coal due to the four different handlings which +it has to undergo if landed in lighters and taken off again to +ships from the coal-store cannot be put at less than 10 per cent. +Note that this is over and above such deterioration as would be +due to passing coal direct from the hold of a collier alongside +into a ship's bunkers. If anyone doubts this deterioration it would +be well for him to examine reports on coal and steam trials. He +will be unusually fortunate if he finds so small a deterioration as +10 per cent. The lowest that I can remember having seen reported +is 20 per cent.; reports of 30 and even 40 per cent. are quite +common. Some of it is for deterioration due to climate and length +of time in store. This, of course, is one of the inevitable +conditions of the secondary base system, the object of which is +to keep in stock a quantity of the article needed. Putting the +purchase price of the coal as low as 15s. a ton, a deterioration +due to repeated handling only of 10 per cent. on 50,600 tons +would amount to £3795. + +There is nearly always some loss of coal due to moving it. I +say 'nearly always' because it seems that there are occasions +on which coal being moved increases in bulk. It occurs when +competitive coaling is being carried on in a fleet and ships +try to beat records. A collier in these circumstances gives out +more coal than she took in. We shall probably be right if we +regard the increase in this case as what the German philosophers +call 'subjective,' that is, rather existent in the mind than in +the external region of objective, palpable fact. It may be taken +as hardly disputable that there will be less loss the shorter +the distance and the fewer the times the coal is moved. Without +counting it we see that the annual expenses enumerated are-- + + Establishment charges £6,500 + Landing and re-shipping 5,060 + Deterioration 3,795 + ------- + £15,355 + +This £15,355 is to be compared with the cost of the direct supply +system. The quantity of coal required would, as said above, have +to be carried in twenty colliers--counting each trip as that of +a separate vessel--with, on the average, 2300 tons apiece, and +five smaller ones. It would take fully four days to unload 2300 +tons at the secondary base, and even more if the labour supply +was uncertain or the labourers not well practised. Demurrage +for a vessel carrying the cargo mentioned, judging from actual +experience, would be about £32 a day; and probably about £16 a +day for the smaller vessels. If we admit an average delay, per +collier, of eighteen days, that is, fourteen days more than the +time necessary for removing the cargo into store, so as to allow +for colliers arriving when the ships to be coaled are absent, we +should get-- + + 20 X 14 X 32 £8,960 + 5 X 14 X 16 1,120 + ------- + £10,080 + +as the cost of transferring the coal from the holds to the +men-of-war's bunkers on the direct supply system. An average +of eighteen days is probably much too long to allow for each +collier's stay till cleared: because, on some occasions, ships +requiring coal may be counted on as sure to be present. Even +as it is, the £10,080 is a smaller sum than the £11,560 which +the secondary base system costs over and above the amount due to +increased deterioration of coal. If a comparison were instituted +as regards other kinds of stores, the particular figures might +be different, but the general result would be the same. + +The first thing that we have got to do is to rid our minds of +the belief that because we see a supply-carrier lying at anchor +for some days without being cleared, more money is being spent +than is spent on the maintenance of a shore depot. There may be +circumstances in which a secondary base is a necessity, but they +must be rare and exceptional. We saw that the establishment of one +does not help us in the matter of defending our communications. +We now see that, so far from being more economical than the +alternative method, the secondary base method is more costly. It +might have been demonstrated that it is really much more costly +than the figures given make it out to be, because ships obliged +to go to a base must expend coal in doing so, and coal costs +money. It is not surprising that consideration of the secondary +base system should evoke a recollection of the expression applied +by Dryden to the militia of his day: + + In peace a charge; in war a weak defence. + +I have to say that I did not prepare this paper simply for the +pleasure of reading it, or in order to bring before you mere +sets of figures and estimates of expense. My object has been +to arouse in some of the officers who hear me a determination +to devote a portion of their leisure to the consideration of +those great problems which must be solved by us if we are to +wage war successfully. Many proofs reach me of the ability and +zeal with which details of material are investigated by officers +in these days. The details referred to are not unimportant in +themselves; but the importance of several of them if put together +would be incomparably less than that of the great question to +which I have tried to direct your attention. + +The supply of a fleet is of high importance in both peace time +and time of war. Even in peace it sometimes causes an admiral to +pass a sleepless night. The arrangements which it necessitates +are often intricate, and success in completing them occasionally +seems far off. The work involved in devising suitable plans is +too much like drudgery to be welcome to those who undertake it. +All the same it has to be done: and surely no one will care to +deny that the fleet which has practised in quiet years the system +that must be followed in war will start with a great advantage on +its side when it is at last confronted with the stern realities +of naval warfare. + + +POSTSCRIPT + +The question of 'Communications,' if fully dealt with in the +foregoing paper, would have made it so long that its hearers might +have been tired out before its end was reached. The following +summary of the points that might have been enlarged upon, had +time allowed, may interest many officers:-- + +In time of war we must keep open our lines of communication. + +If we cannot, the war will have gone against us. + +Open communications mean that we can prevent the enemy from carrying +out decisive and sustained operations against them and along +their line. + +To keep communications open it is not necessary to secure every +friendly ship traversing the line against attacks by the enemy. +All that is necessary is to restrict the enemy's activity so +far that he can inflict only such a moderate percentage of loss +on the friendly vessels that, as a whole, they will not cease +to run. + +Keeping communications open will not secure a friendly place +against every form of attack. It will, however, secure a place +against attacks with large forces sustained for a considerable +length of time. If he can make attacks of this latter kind, it +is clear that the enemy controls the communications and that +we have failed to keep them open. + +If communications are open for the passage of vessels of the +friendly mercantile marine, it follows that the relatively much +smaller number of supply-vessels can traverse the line. + +As regards supply-vessels, a percentage of loss caused by the +enemy must be allowed for. If we put this at 10 per cent.--which, +taken absolutely, is probably sufficient--it means that _on_the_ +_average_ out of ten supply-vessels sent we expect nine to reach +their destination. + +We cannot, however, arrange that an equal loss will fall on every +group of ten vessels. Two such groups may arrive intact, whilst +a third may lose three vessels. Yet the 10 per cent. average +would be maintained. + +This condition has to be allowed for. Investigations some years +ago led to the conclusion that it would be prudent to send five +carriers for every four wanted. + +The word 'group' has been used above only in a descriptive sense. +Supply-carriers will often be safer if they proceed to their +destination separately. This, however, depends on circumstances. + + + + +INDEX + +Adventure, voyages of +Agincourt, battle of +Alcester, Lord +Alexander the Great +Alexandria, bombardment of +American War of Independence; Sir Henry Maine on +---- War of Secession; raids in +---- War with Spain +Ammunition, supply of; alleged shortage at the defeat of the + Armada +Army co-operation +Athenian Navy; at the battle of Syracuse +Australian Fleet, localisation of +Austro-Prussian War + + Baehr, C. F +Balaclava, capture of +Bantry Bay, French invasion of +Battleships, merits of; coal consumption of +Beer, for the Navy +Benedek, General +Blockades +Bounty for recruits +Brassey, Lord +Bright, Rev. J. F. +Brougham, Lord +Brunswick-Oels, Duke of +Burchett, quoted +Burleigh, Lord +Byng, Admiral (_see_under_ Torrington, Earl of). + +Cadiz, Expedition +Camperdown, battle of +Camperdown, Lord +Cardigan Bay, French invasion of +Carnot, President +Carrying trade, of the colonies; of the world +Carthaginian Navy; fall of +Cawdor, Lord +Centralisation, evils of +Charles II, King +'Chatham Chest' +Chevalier, Captain; quoted +Chino-Japanese War +Chioggia, battle of +Coal, allowance of; bases for; cost of +Coast defence (_see_also_under_ Invasion) +Collingwood, Admiral, at Trafalgar +Colomb, Vice-Admiral P. H.; on the Chino-Japanese War; on the + command of the sea; on Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar +Colonies, naval bases in the; contributions by the; and terms + of service in the navy +Command of the sea; and the claim to a salute; in the Crimean + War; local and temporary; and the French invasion; land + fortification and; in war; and our food supply; essential + to the Empire +Commerce, protection of naval; destruction of; at the time of + Trafalgar +Communications, in war; control of; with naval bases; of a + fleet +Corbett, Mr. Julian; on Nelson +Cornwallis, Admiral +Crécy, battle of +Crimean War; command of the sea in; mortality in +Cromwell, Oliver +Cruisers, necessity for; their equivalent at Trafalgar; coal + consumption of; duties of +Crusades + +Dacres, Rear-Admiral +De Burgh, Hubert +De Galles, Admiral Morard +De Grasse, Admiral +De la Gravière, Admiral +De Ruyter, Admiral +Defence, of naval commerce; against invasion; offensive; + inefficiency of localised; against raids +Desbrière, Capt. +Destroyers, origin of +Dewey, Admiral +'Dictionary of National Biography' +Dockyards, fortification of +Dornberg, Colonel +Drake, Sir Francis +Drury Lane Pantomime +Dryden, quoted +Duncan, Lord; Life of; quoted +Dundonald, Lord +Duro, Captain +Dutch East India Co. +---- Navy +---- War + + Economy and Efficiency +Edward III, King +Egypt, French Expedition to +Ekins, Sir Charles +Elizabeth (Queen) and her seamen +Empire, the defence of; and control of ocean communications +English Channel, command of the +Exploration, voyages of + +Fishguard, French invasion of +Fleet, positions in war for the; duties of the; and the defence + of Empire; supply and communications of the +'Fleet in being' +Food supply and control of the sea +Foods, preservation of +Foreign seamen, in our merchant service; their exemption from + impressment +Franco-German War +Froude's History +Fulton, quoted + + Gardiner, Dr. S. R., quoted +Genoese Navy +German Navy, in the Baltic +Gibbon, quoted +Gibraltar; siege of +Gravelines, battle of +Greek Navy +Green, J. R., quoted +Grierson, Colonel B. H. +Grouchy, Admiral +Gutteridge, Mr. + + Hall, Mr. Hubert +Hammond, Dr. W. A. +'Handy man' evolution of the +Hannay, Mr. D. +Hannibal +Hawke, Lord +Hawkins, Sir J. +Herodotus, quoted +History, influence of naval campaigns on; of war +Hoche, General +Holm, Adolf +Hood, Lord; and Nelson +Hosier, Admiral +Howard of Effingham, Lord; quoted +Howe, Lord; at Gibraltar; his tactics +Hughes, Sir Edward +Humbert's Bxpedition + +_Illustrious_ Training School +Impressment; exemption of foreigners from; inefficiency of; + legalised forcible; popular misconceptions of; exemptions + from (_see_also_under_ Press gang) +Indian Mutiny +International law, and the sea; and the sale of bad food +Invasion, prevention of; of British Isles; over sea and land + raids; land defence against; as a means of war +Ireland, French invasion of + + Jamaica, seizure of +James, quoted +Japan and China war +Jena, battle of +Jessopp, Dr. A. +Joyeuse, Admiral Villaret + + Keith, Lord +Killigrew, Vice-Admiral +Kinglake, quoted + +La Hogue, battle of +Laughton, Professor Sir J. K.; 'Defeat of the Armada,'; on + Nelson +Lepanto, battle of +Lindsay, W. S. +Local defence, inefficiency of; of naval bases +Lyons, Admiral Lord + +Mahan, Captain A. T.; on the Roman Navy; on sea commerce; on + early naval warfare; on the naval 'calling'; on the American + War of Independence; influence of his teaching; on the + Spanish-American War; on control of the sea; on impressment; + on Nelson at Trafalgar +Malaga, battle of +Manoeuvres +Marathon, battle of +Marines and impressment +Martin, Admiral Sir T. Byam +Medina-Sidonia, Duke of +Mediterranean, command of the +Mends, Dr. Stilon +---- Admiral Sir W. +Merchant Service, foreign seamen in our; historical relations + of the navy with the; its exemption from impressment (_see_ + _also_under_ Commerce) +Minorca +Mischenko, General +Mortality from disease in war +Motley, quoted +Mutiny at the Nore + +Napoleon, Emperor; and the invasion of England; expedition + to Egypt; on losses in War +Naval bases; defence of; cost of +_Naval_Chronicle_ +Naval strategy; in the American War of Independence; the frontier + in; and command of the sea; the fleet's position in War; + compared with military; and the French Expedition to Egypt; + in defence of Empire; for weak navies; at the time of Trafalgar +---- tactics, Nelson's achievements in; at Trafalgar; consideration + of cost in +---- warfare, influence on history of; the true objective in + (_see_also_under_ War) +Navies, costliness of; strength of foreign +Navigation Act (1651) +Navy, necessity for a strong; and Army co-operation; human + element in the; changes in organisation; conditions of service + in the; peace training of the; historical relations with the + merchant service; impressment in the; records of the; Queen + Elizabeth's; victualling the; pay in the; its mobility; and + the two-power standard; question of size of ships for the; + economy and efficiency in the +Navy Records Society +Nelson, Lord; on blockades; and the 'Nile'; his strategy; and + Trafalgar; his tactics +Netley Hospital +Newbolt, Mr. H. +Nile, battle of the + + Oil, ship's allowance of +Oppenheim, Mr. M. +Oversea raids + +Palmer, Six Henry +Peace training, and war; of the 'handy man' +Pepys, quoted +Pericles, quoted +Persian Navy +Peter the Great +Phillip, Rear-Admiral Arthur +Phoenician Navy +Pitt, William; quoted +Piracy +Pocock, Rev. Thomas +Poitiers, battle of +Policing the sea +Port Arthur, battle off +Ports, fortification of +Portuguese Navy +Press gang; popular misconceptions of the; facts and fancies + about the; in literature and art; operations of the +Price, Dr. + +Quiberon Bay, battle of + + Raiding attacks; prevention of +Raids, oversea and on land +Raleigh, Sir Walter +Recruiting, from the merchant service; by the press gang +Recruits, bounty for +Rhodes Navy +Robinson, Commander +Rodney, Lord +Rogers, Thorold +Roman Navy +Rooke, Sir George +Roosevelt, Mr. Theodore, quoted +Russo-Japanese War +---- Turkish War + +St. Vincent, Lord +Salamis, battle of +Salute, the claim to a +Saracen Navy +Schill, Colonel +Sea, International law and the +Sea Power, history and meaning of the term; defined; influence + on history of naval campaigns; of the Phoenicians; of Greece + and Persia; of Rome and Carthage; in the Middle Ages; of the + Saracens; and the Crusades; of Venice, Pisa and Genoa; of the + Turks; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; of Portugal + and Spain; rise in England of; and exploration and adventure; + and military co-operation; of the Dutch; and naval strategy; + in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; examples of + its efficiency; in recent times; in Crimean War; in American + War of Secession; in Russo-Turkish war; in Chino-Japanese War; + in Spanish-American War +Sebastopol, siege of +Seeley, Sir J. R. +Seymour, Lord Henry +Ships for the navy, question of size of; for supply +Sismondi, quoted +Sluys, battle of +Smith, Sir Sydney +Spanish Armada, defeat of the; Records of; Queen Elizabeth and the +---- American War +Spanish Indies +---- Navy +Spartan Army +Stirling, Sir James +Stores, reserve of ship's +Strategy (_see_under_ Naval Strategy) +Stuart, General J. E. B. +Suffren, Admiral +Supply and communications of a fleet +Supply ships, sizes of +Syracuse, battle of + +Tactics (_see_under_ Naval Tactics) +Tate, Colonel +Themistocles; and the Greek Navy +Thucydides, quoted +_Times_, quoted +Torpedo boats, defence against +Torrington, Earl of +Tourville, Admiral +Trafalgar, battle of; tactics of; British losses at; the attack; + contemporary strategy and tactics +Training (_see_under_ Peace Training) +Turkish Navy + +United States Navy + + Venetian Navy +Victualling allowances; and modern preserved foods + +Walcheren Expedition, mortality in Wales, French invasion of + + + + + +War, and its chief lessons; human element in; the unexpected + in; under modern conditions; how to avoid surprise in; + mortality from disease in; methods of making; command of the + sea in; compensation for losses in; Napoleon on loss of life + in; supplies in (_see_also_under_ Invasion, Naval Warfare, + and Raids) +Washington, George +Water, ship's allowance of +Waterloo, battle of +Wellington, Duke of +William III, King +Wilmot, Sir S. Eardley + +Xerxes; his highly trained Army + + +THE END + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Sea-Power and Other Studies +by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SEA-POWER AND OTHER STUDIES *** + +***** This file should be named 10694-8.txt or 10694-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/6/9/10694/ + +Produced by Robert J. Hall + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: + https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL + + diff --git a/old/10694-8.zip b/old/10694-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b7520d --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10694-8.zip diff --git a/old/10694.txt b/old/10694.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67ae79f --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10694.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8708 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Sea-Power and Other Studies +by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Sea-Power and Other Studies + +Author: Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge + +Release Date: January 12, 2004 [EBook #10694] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SEA-POWER AND OTHER STUDIES *** + + + + +Produced by Robert J. Hall + + + + +SEA-POWER AND OTHER STUDIES + +BY ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN BRIDGE, G.C.B. + + + +PREFACE + +The essays collected in this volume are republished in the hope +that they may be of some use to those who are interested in naval +history. The aim has been to direct attention to certain historical +occurrences and conditions which the author ventures to think +have been often misunderstood. An endeavour has been made to +show the continuity of the operation of sea-power throughout +history, and the importance of recognising this at the present +day. + +In some cases specially relating to our navy at different periods +a revision of the more commonly accepted conclusions--formed, +it is believed, on imperfect knowledge--is asked for. + +It is also hoped that the intimate connection between naval history +in the strict sense and military history in the strict sense has +been made apparent, and likewise the fact that both are in reality +branches of the general history of a nation and not something +altogether distinct from and outside it. + +In a collection of essays on kindred subjects some repetitions +are inevitable, but it is believed that they will be found present +only to a moderate extent in the following pages. + +My nephew, Mr. J. S. C. Bridge, has very kindly seen the book +through the press. + +_June_ 1910. + + + + +CONTENTS + + I. SEA-POWER. + II. THE COMMAND OF THE SEA. + III. WAR AND ITS CHIEF LESSONS. + IV. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT + SERVICE. + V. FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT THE PRESS-GANG. + VI. PROJECTED INVASIONS OF THE BRITISH ISLES. + VII. OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND. +VIII. QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HER SEAMEN. + IX. NELSON: THE CENTENARY OF TRAFALGAR. + X. THE SHARE OF THE FLEET IN THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. + XI. NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR. + XII. THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF A FLEET. + INDEX. + + + + +Ten of the essays included in this volume first appeared in the +_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_, the _Times_, the _Morning_Post_, the +_National_Review_, the _Nineteenth_Century_and_After_, the +_Cornhill_Magazine_, and the _Naval_Annual_. The proprietors of +those publications have courteously given me permission to +republish them here. + +Special mention must be made of my obligation to the proprietors +of the _Encyclopoedia_Britannica_ for allowing me to reproduce +the essays on 'Sea-Power' and 'The Command of the Sea.' They are +the owners of the copyright of both essays, and their courtesy +to me is the more marked because they are about to republish them +themselves in the forthcoming edition of the _Encyclopoedia_. + +The paper on 'Naval Strategy and Tactics at the Time of Trafalgar' +was read at the Institute of Naval Architects, and that on 'The +Supply and Communications of a Fleet' at the Hong-Kong United +Service Institution. + + + + +I + +SEA-POWER[1] + +[Footnote 1: Written in 1899. (_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_.)] + +Sea-power is a term used to indicate two distinct, though cognate +things. The affinity of these two and the indiscriminate manner +in which the term has been applied to each have tended to obscure +its real significance. The obscurity has been deepened by the +frequency with which the term has been confounded with the old +phrase, 'Sovereignty of the sea,' and the still current expression, +'Command of the sea.' A discussion--etymological, or even +archaeological in character--of the term must be undertaken as +an introduction to the explanation of its now generally accepted +meaning. It is one of those compound words in which a Teutonic +and a Latin (or Romance) element are combined, and which are +easily formed and become widely current when the sea is concerned. +Of such are 'sea-coast,' 'sea-forces' (the 'land- and sea-forces' +used to be a common designation of what we now call the 'Army +and Navy'), 'sea-service,' 'sea-serpent,' and 'sea-officer' (now +superseded by 'naval officer'). The term in one form is as old +as the fifteenth century. Edward III, in commemoration of the +naval victory of Sluys, coined gold 'nobles' which bore on one +side his effigy 'crowned, standing in a large ship, holding in +one hand a sword and in the other a shield.' An anonymous poet, +who wrote in the reign of Henry VI, says of this coin: + + For four things our noble showeth to me, + King, ship, and sword, and _power_of_the_sea_. + +Even in its present form the term is not of very recent date. +Grote [2] speaks of 'the conversion of Athens from a land-power +into a sea-power.' In a lecture published in 1883, but probably +delivered earlier, the late Sir J. R. Seeley says that 'commerce +was swept out of the Mediterranean by the besom of the Turkish +sea-power.'[3] The term also occurs in vol. xviii. of the +'Encyclopaedia Britannica,' published in 1885. At p. 574 of that +volume (art. Persia) we are told that Themistocles was 'the founder +of the Attic sea-power.' The sense in which the term is used differs +in these extracts. In the first it means what we generally call +a 'naval power'--that is to say, a state having a considerable +navy in contradistinction to a 'military power,' a state with a +considerable army but only a relatively small navy. In the last +two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength +of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now +generally, and is likely to be exclusively, attached to the term +owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by +Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy in a series of +remarkable works.[4] The double use of the term is common in +German, though in that language both parts of the compound now +in use are Teutonic. One instance out of many may be cited from +the historian Adolf Holm.[5] He says[6] that Athens, being in +possession of a good naval port, could become '_eine_bedeutende_ +_Seemacht_,' i.e. an important naval power. He also says[7] that +Gelon of Syracuse, besides a large army (_Heer_), had '_eine_ +_bedeutende_Seemacht_,' meaning a considerable navy. The term, +in the first of the two senses, is old in German, as appears +from the following, extracted from Zedler's 'Grosses Universal +Lexicon,' vol. xxxvi:[8] 'Seemachten, Seepotenzen, Latin. _summae_ +_potestates_mari_potentes_.' 'Seepotenzen' is probably quite +obsolete now. It is interesting as showing that German no more +abhors Teuto-Latin or Teuto-Romance compounds than English. We may +note, as a proof of the indeterminate meaning of the expression +until his own epoch-making works had appeared, that Mahan himself +in his earliest book used it in both senses. He says,[9] 'The +Spanish Netherlands ceased to be a sea-power.' He alludes[10] +to the development of a nation as a 'sea-power,' and[11] to the +inferiority of the Confederate States 'as a sea-power.' Also,[12] +he remarks of the war of the Spanish Succession that 'before +it England was one of the sea-powers, after it she was _the_ +sea-power without any second.' In all these passages, as appears +from the use of the indefinite article, what is meant is a naval +power, or a state in possession of a strong navy. The other meaning +of the term forms the general subject of his writings above +enumerated. In his earlier works Mahan writes 'sea power' as +two words; but in a published letter of the 19th February 1897, +he joins them with a hyphen, and defends this formation of the +term and the sense in which he uses it. We may regard him as +the virtual inventor of the term in its more diffused meaning, +for--even if it had been employed by earlier writers in that +sense--it is he beyond all question who has given it general +currency. He has made it impossible for anyone to treat of sea-power +without frequent reference to his writings and conclusions. + +[Footnote 2: _Hist._of_Greece_, v. p. 67, published in 1849, but +with preface dated 1848.] + +[Footnote 3: _Expansion_of_England_, p. 89.] + +[Footnote 4: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, published 1890; +_Influence_of_Sea-power_on_the_French_Revolution_and_Empire_, +2 vols. 1892; _Nelson:_the_Embodiment_of_the_Sea-power_of_Great_ +_Britain_, 2 vols. 1897.] + +[Footnote 5: _Griechische_Geschichte_. Berlin, 1889.] + +[Footnote 6: _Ibid_. ii. p. 37.] + +[Footnote 7: _Ibid_. ii. p. 91.] + +[Footnote 8: Leipzig und Halle, 1743.] + +[Footnote 9: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, p. 35.] + +[Footnote 10: _Ibid_. p. 42.] + +[Footnote 11: _Ibid_. p. 43.] + +[Footnote 12: _Ibid_. p. 225.] + +There is something more than mere literary interest in the fact that +the term in another language was used more than two thousand years +ago. Before Mahan no historian--not even one of those who specially +devoted themselves to the narration of naval occurrences--had +evinced a more correct appreciation of the general principles +of naval warfare than Thucydides. He alludes several times to +the importance of getting command of the sea. This country would +have been saved some disasters and been less often in peril had +British writers--taken as guides by the public--possessed the same +grasp of the true principles of defence as Thucydides exhibited. +One passage in his history is worth quoting. Brief as it is, it +shows that on the subject of sea-power he was a predecessor of +Mahan. In a speech in favour of prosecuting the war, which he +puts into the mouth of Pericles, these words occur:-- _oi_meu_ +_gar_ouch_exousiu_allaeu_autilabeiu_amachei_aemiu_de_esti_ +_gae_pollae_kai_eu_uaesois_kai_kat_aepeirou_mega_gar_ +_to_tes_thalassaes_kratos_. The last part of this extract, +though often translated 'command of the sea,' or 'dominion of +the sea,' really has the wider meaning of sea-power, the 'power +of the sea' of the old English poet above quoted. This wider +meaning should be attached to certain passages in Herodotus,[13] +which have been generally interpreted 'commanding the sea,' or +by the mere titular and honorific 'having the dominion of the +sea.' One editor of Herodotus, Ch. F. Baehr, did, however, see +exactly what was meant, for, with reference to the allusion to +Polycrates, he says, _classe_maximum_valuit_. This is perhaps as +exact a definition of sea-power as could be given in a sentence. + +[Footnote 13: _Herodotus_, iii. 122 in two places; v.83.] + +It is, however, impossible to give a definition which would be at +the same time succinct and satisfactory. To say that 'sea-power' +means the sum-total of the various elements that go to make up +the naval strength of a state would be in reality to beg the +question. Mahan lays down the 'principal conditions affecting +the sea-power of nations,' but he does not attempt to give a +concise definition of it. Yet no one who has studied his works +will find it difficult to understand what it indicates. + +Our present task is to put readers in possession of the means +of doing this. The best, indeed--as Mahan has made us see--the +only effective way of attaining this object is to treat the matter +historically. Whatever date we may agree to assign to the formation +of the term itself, the idea--as we have seen--is as old as history. +It is not intended to give a condensed history of sea-power, but +rather an analysis of the idea and what it contains, illustrating +this analysis with examples from history ancient and modern. It +is important to know that it is not something which originated +in the middle of the seventeenth century, and having seriously +affected history in the eighteenth, ceased to have weight till +Captain Mahan appeared to comment on it in the last decade of +the nineteenth. With a few masterly touches Mahan, in his brief +allusion to the second Punic war, has illustrated its importance +in the struggle between Rome and Carthage. What has to be shown +is that the principles which he has laid down in that case, and +in cases much more modern, are true and have been true always and +everywhere. Until this is perceived there is much history which +cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to our welfare as a +maritime people that we should understand it thoroughly. Our +failure to understand it has more than once brought us, if not +to the verge of destruction, at any rate within a short distance +of serious disaster. + + +SEA-POWER IN ANCIENT TIMES + +The high antiquity of decisive naval campaigns is amongst the most +interesting features of international conflicts. Notwithstanding +the much greater frequency of land wars, the course of history +has been profoundly changed more often by contests on the water. +That this has not received the notice it deserved is true, and +Mahan tells us why. 'Historians generally,' he says, 'have been +unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither +special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining +influence of maritime strength on great issues has consequently been +overlooked.' Moralising on that which might have been is admittedly +a sterile process; but it is sometimes necessary to point, if +only by way of illustration, to a possible alternative. As in +modern times the fate of India and the fate of North America were +determined by sea-power, so also at a very remote epoch sea-power +decided whether or not Hellenic colonisation was to take root in, +and Hellenic culture to dominate, Central and Northern Italy as +it dominated Southern Italy, where traces of it are extant to this +day. A moment's consideration will enable us to see how different +the history of the world would have been had a Hellenised city +grown and prospered on the Seven Hills. Before the Tarquins were +driven out of Rome a Phocoean fleet was encountered (537 B.C.) off +Corsica by a combined force of Etruscans and Phoenicians, and +was so handled that the Phocoeans abandoned the island and settled +on the coast of Lucania.[14] The enterprise of their navigators +had built up for the Phoenician cities and their great off-shoot +Carthage, a sea-power which enabled them to gain the practical +sovereignty of the sea to the west of Sardinia and Sicily. The +control of these waters was the object of prolonged and memorable +struggles, for on it--as the result showed--depended the empire of +the world. From very remote times the consolidation and expansion, +from within outwards, of great continental states have had serious +consequences for mankind when they were accompanied by the +acquisition of a coast-line and the absorption of a maritime +population. We shall find that the process loses none of its +importance in recent years. 'The ancient empires,' says the historian +of Greece, Ernst Curtius, 'as long as no foreign elements had +intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water.' When +the condition, which Curtius notices in parenthesis, arose, the +'horror' disappeared. There is something highly significant in +the uniformity of the efforts of Assyria, Egypt, Babylon, and +Persia to get possession of the maritime resources of Phoenicia. +Our own immediate posterity will, perhaps, have to reckon with +the results of similar efforts in our own day. It is this which +gives a living interest to even the very ancient history of +sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical importance +to us now. We shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena connected +with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods. +Looked at in this light, the great conflicts of former ages are +full of useful, indeed necessary, instruction. + +[Footnote 14: Mommsen, _Hist._Rome_, English trans., i. p. 153.] + +In the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations +of the East against Europe--the Persian wars--sea-power was the +governing factor. Until Persia had expanded to the shores of the +Levant the European Greeks had little to fear from the ambition +of the great king. The conquest of Egypt by Cambyses had shown how +formidable that ambition could be when supported by an efficient +navy. With the aid of the naval forces of the Phoenician cities +the Persian invasion of Greece was rendered comparatively easy. +It was the naval contingents from Phoenicia which crushed the +Ionian revolt. The expedition of Mardonius, and still more that +of Datis and Artaphernes, had indicated the danger threatening +Greece when the master of a great army was likewise the master +of a great navy. Their defeat at Marathon was not likely to, +and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the Persians from +further attempts at aggression. As the advance of Cambyses into +Egypt had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of Xerxes +into Greece. By the good fortune sometimes vouch-safed to a people +which, owing to its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a +wise policy, scarcely deserves it, there appeared at Athens an +influential citizen who understood all that was meant by the +term sea-power. Themistocles saw more clearly than any of his +contemporaries that, to enable Athens to play a leading part in +the Hellenic world, she needed above all things a strong navy. +'He had already in his eye the battle-field of the future.' He +felt sure that the Persians would come back, and come with such +forces that resistance in the open field would be out of the +question. One scene of action remained--the sea. Persuaded by him +the Athenians increased their navy, so that of the 271 vessels +comprising the Greek fleet at Artemisium, 147 had been provided +by Athens, which also sent a large reinforcement after the first +action. Though no one has ever surpassed Themistocles in the +faculty of correctly estimating the importance of sea-power, +it was understood by Xerxes as clearly as by him that the issue +of the war depended upon naval operations. The arrangements made +under the Persian monarch's direction, and his very personal +movements, show that this was his view. He felt, and probably +expressed the feeling, exactly as--in the war of Arnerican +Independence--Washington did in the words, 'whatever efforts are +made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in +the present contest.' The decisive event was the naval action of +Salamis. To have made certain of success, the Persians should have +first obtained a command of the AEgean, as complete for all practical +purposes as the French and English had of the sea generally in +the war against Russia of 1854-56. The Persian sea-power was not +equal to the task. The fleet of the great king was numerically +stronger than that of the Greek allies; but it has been proved +many times that naval efficiency does not depend on numerical +superiority alone. The choice sections of the Persian fleet were +the contingents of the Ionians and Phoenicians. The former were +half-hearted or disaffected; whilst the latter were, at best, not +superior in skill, experience, and valour to the Greek sailors. At +Salamis Greece was saved not only from the ambition and vengeance +of Xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an +Oriental conqueror. Persia did not succeed against the Greeks, +not because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power, +artificially built up, was inferior to that which was a natural +element of the vitality of her foes. Ionia was lost and Greece +in the end enslaved, because the quarrels of Greeks with Greeks +led to the ruin of their naval states. + +The Peloponnesian was largely a naval war. The confidence of +the Athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its +outbreak. The immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in +time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the +conflict between Corinth and Corcyra of increasing the sea-power of +Athens. Hitherto the Athenian naval predominance had been virtually +confined to the AEgean Sea. The Corcyraean envoy, who pleaded for +help at Athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the +Athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important +situation 'with respect to the western regions towards which the +views of the Athenians had for some time been directed.'[15] +It was the 'weapon of her sea-power,' to adopt Mahan's phrase, +that enabled Athens to maintain the great conflict in which she +was engaged. Repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages +of disease amongst her people, and the rising disaffection of +her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance +on the water. The scale of the subsequent Syracusan expedition +showed how vigorous Athens still was down to the interruption +of the war by the peace of Nicias. The great expedition just +mentioned over-taxed her strength. Its failure brought about +the ruin of the state. It was held by contemporaries, and has +been held in our own day, that the Athenian defeat at Syracuse +was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the +force in Sicily properly supplied and reinforced. This explanation +of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. +The friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer +it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the +administration. After the despatch of the supporting expedition +under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, no further great reinforcement, +as Nicias admitted, was possible. The weakness of Athens was in +the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and +held high commands. A people which remembered the administration of +a Pericles, and yet allowed a Cleon or an Alcibiades to direct its +naval and military policy, courted defeat. Nicias, notwithstanding +the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of +a commander--firm resolution. He dared not face the obloquy +consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular +hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be +converted into an overwhelming disaster. 'The complete ruin of +Athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending +and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic +had been her rally, that [a year after Syracuse] she was found +again carrying on a terrible struggle.'[16] Nevertheless her +sea-power had indeed been ruined at Syracuse. Now she could wage +war only 'with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system.' +Even before Arginusae it was seen that 'superiority of nautical +skill had passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies.'[17] + +[Footnote 15: Thirwall, _Hist._Greece_, iii. p. 96.] + +[Footnote 16: Grote, _Hist._Greece_, v. p. 354.] + +[Footnote 17: _Ibid._ p. 503.] + +The great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest between +Rome and Carthage was a sustained effort on the part of one to +gain and of the other to keep the control of the Western +Mediterranean. So completely had that control been exercised +by Carthage, that she had anticipated the Spanish commercial +policy in America. The Romans were precluded by treaties from +trading with the Carthaginian territories in Hispania, Africa, +and Sardinia. Rome, as Mommsen tells us, 'was from the first a +maritime city and, in the period of its vigour, never was so +foolish or so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect +its war marine and to desire to be a mere continental power.' It +may be that it was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion +that first prompted a trial of strength with Carthage. The vision +of universal empire could hardly as yet have formed itself in the +imagination of a single Roman. The area of Phoenician maritime +commerce was vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer +vulnerable points to the cupidity of rivals. It is probable that +the modern estimate of the sea-power of Carthage is much exaggerated. +It was great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great +when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge +it. Mommsen holds that, in the fourth and fifth centuries after +the foundation of Rome, 'the two main competitors for the dominion +of the Western waters' were Carthage and Syracuse. 'Carthage,' +he says, 'had the preponderance, and Syracuse sank more and more +into a second-rate naval power. The maritime importance of the +Etruscans was wholly gone.... Rome itself was not exempt from +the same fate; its own waters were likewise commanded by foreign +fleets.' The Romans were for a long time too much occupied at +home to take much interest in Mediterranean matters. The position +of the Carthaginians in the western basin of the Mediterranean +was very like that of the Portuguese long afterwards in India. +The latter kept within reach of the sea; 'nor did their rule ever +extend a day's march from their ships.'[18] 'The Carthaginians +in Spain,' says Mommsen, 'made no effort to acquire the interior +from the warlike native nations; they were content with the +possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell +and other fisheries.' Allowance being made for the numbers of the +classes engaged in administration, commerce, and supervision, +it is nearly certain that Carthage could not furnish the crews +required by both a great war-navy and a great mercantile marine. +No one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of Carthage +were composed largely of alien mercenaries. We have several examples +from which we can infer a parallel, if not an identical, condition +of her maritime resources. How, then, was the great Carthaginian +carrying-trade provided for? The experience of more than one +country will enable us to answer this question. The ocean trade +of those off-shoots or dependencies of the United Kingdom, viz. +the United States, Australasia, and India, is largely or chiefly +conducted by shipping of the old country. So that of Carthage was +largely conducted by old Phoenicians. These may have obtained a +'Carthaginian Register,' or the contemporary equivalent; but they +could not all have been purely Carthaginian or Liby-Phoenician. +This must have been the case even more with the war-navy. British +India for a considerable time possessed a real and indeed highly +efficient navy; but it was officered entirely and manned almost +entirely by men from the 'old country.' Moreover, it was small. The +wealth of India would have sufficed to furnish a larger material +element; but, as the country could not supply the _personnel_, +it would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of India +apart from that of England. As soon as the Romans chose to make +the most of their natural resources the maritime predominance +of Carthage was doomed. The artificial basis of the latter's +sea-power would not enable it to hold out against serious and +persistent assaults. Unless this is perceived it is impossible to +understand the story of the Punic wars. Judged by every visible +sign of strength, Carthage, the richer, the more enterprising, +ethnically the more predominant amongst her neighbours, and +apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the great +struggle with Rome which, by the conditions of the case, was to be +waged largely on the water. Yet those who had watched the struggles +of the Punic city with the Sicilian Greeks, and especially that +with Agathocles, must have seen reason to cherish doubts concerning +her naval strength. It was an anticipation of the case of Spain in +the age of Philip II. As the great Elizabethan seamen discerned +the defects of the Spanish naval establishment, so men at Rome +discerned those of the Carthaginian. Dates in connection with +this are of great significance. A comprehensive measure, with the +object of 'rescuing their marine from its condition of impotence,' +was taken by the Romans in the year 267 B.C. Four _quoestores_ +_classici_--in modern naval English we may perhaps call them +port-admirals--were nominated, and one was stationed at each +of four ports. The objects of the Roman Senate, so Mommsen tells +us, were very obvious. They were 'to recover their independence +by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of Tarentum, to +close the Adriatic against fleets coming from Epirus, and to +emancipate themselves from Carthaginian supremacy.' Four years +afterwards the first Punic war began. It was, and had to be, +largely a naval contest. The Romans waged it with varying fortune, +but in the end triumphed by means of their sea-power. 'The sea +was the place where all great destinies were decided.'[19] The +victory of Catulus over the Carthaginian fleet off the AEgatian +Islands decided the war and left to the Romans the possession +of Sicily and the power of possessing themselves of Sardinia +and Corsica. It would be an interesting and perhaps not a barren +investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother +states of Phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of Alexander +the Great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the +Carthaginian defences. One thing was certain. Carthage had now +met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater +than her own. That rival also contained citizens who understood +the true importance of sea-power. 'With a statesmanlike sagacity +from which succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the +leading men of the Roman Commonwealth perceived that all their +coast-fortifications and coast-garrisons would prove inadequate +unless the war-marine of the state were again placed on a footing +that should command respect.'[20] It is a gloomy reflection that +the leading men of our own great maritime country could not see +this in 1860. A thorough comprehension of the events of the first +Punic war enables us to solve what, until Mahan wrote, had been +one of the standing enigmas of history, viz. Hannibal's invasion +of Italy by land instead of by sea in the second Punic war. Mahan's +masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts +as to the reason of Hannibal's action.[21] The naval predominance +in the western basin of the Mediterranean acquired by Rome had +never been lost. Though modern historians, even those belonging +to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the +Carthaginians knew well enough that the Romans were too strong +for them on the sea. Though other forces co-operated to bring +about the defeat of Carthage in the second Punic war, the Roman +navy, as Mahan demonstrates, was the most important. As a navy, he +tells us in words like those already quoted, 'acts on an element +strange to most writers, as its members have been from time +immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, +neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense +determining influence on the history of that era, and consequently +upon the history of the world, has been overlooked.' + +[Footnote 18: R. S. Whiteway, _Rise_of_the_Portuguese_Power_ +_in_India_ p. 12. Westminster, 1899.] + +[Footnote 19: J. H. Burton, _Hist._of_Scotland_, 1873, vol. i. +p. 318.] + +[Footnote 20: Mommsen, i. p. 427.] + +[Footnote 21: _Inf._on_Hist._, pp. 13-21.] + +The attainment of all but universal dominion by Rome was now +only a question of time. 'The annihilation of the Carthaginian +fleet had made the Romans masters of the sea.'[22] A lodgment +had already been gained in Illyricum, and countries farther east +were before long to be reduced to submission. A glance at the +map will show that to effect this the command of the eastern +basin of the Mediterranean, like that of the western, must be +secured by the Romans. The old historic navies of the Greek and +Phoenician states had declined. One considerable naval force +there was which, though it could not have prevented, was strong +enough to have delayed the Roman progress eastwards. This force +belonged to Rhodes, which in the years immediately following +the close of the second Punic war reached its highest point as +a naval power.[23] Far from trying to obstruct the advance of +the Romans the Rhodian fleet helped it. Hannibal, in his exile, +saw the necessity of being strong on the sea if the East was to +be saved from the grasp of his hereditary foe; but the resources +of Antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation of Hannibal, were +insufficient. In a later and more often-quoted struggle between +East and West--that which was decided at Actium--sea-power was +again seen to 'have the casting vote.' When the whole of the +Mediterranean coasts became part of a single state the importance +of the navy was naturally diminished; but in the struggles within +the declining empire it rose again at times. The contest of the +Vandal Genseric with Majorian and the African expedition of +Belisarius--not to mention others--were largely influenced by +the naval operations.[24] + +[Footnote 22: Schmitz, _Hist._Rome_, p. 256.] + +[Footnote 23: C. Torr, _Rhodes_in_Ancient_Times_, p. 40.] + +[Footnote 24: Gibbon, _Dec._and_Fall_, chaps. xxxvi. xli] + + +SEA-POWER IN THE MIDDLE AGES + +A decisive event, the Mohammedan conquest of Northern Africa +from Egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how +great a part sea-power played in effecting it. Purely land +expeditions, or expeditions but slightly supported from the sea, +had ended in failure. The emperor at Constantinople still had at +his disposal a fleet capable of keeping open the communications +with his African province. It took the Saracens half a century +(647-698 A.D.) to win 'their way along the coast of Africa as +far as the Pillars of Hercules';[25] and, as Gibbon tells us, +it was not till the Commander of the Faithful had prepared a +great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the +Saracenic dominion was definitely established. It has been generally +assumed that the Arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his +death, spread the faith of Mohammed over vast regions, belonged +to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has +been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support +in prosecuting their conquests. In parts of Arabia, however, +maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the +Mohammedan empire had extended outwards from Mecca and Medina +till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences +to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above +mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. 'With the +conquest of Syria and Egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come +into the Saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of +a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for +meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. Great +attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet.'[26] +At first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the Phoenician +towns where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later +the crews were recruited from Syria, Egypt, and the coasts of +Asia Minor. Ships were built at most of the Syrian and Egyptian +ports, and also at Obolla and Bushire on the Persian Gulf,' whilst +the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and +encouraged. The sea-power thus created was largely artificial. +It drooped--as in similar cases--when the special encouragement +was withdrawn. 'In the days of Arabian energy,' says Hallam, +'Constantinople was twice, in 668 and 716, attacked by great +naval armaments.' The same authority believes that the abandonment +of such maritime enterprises by the Saracens may be attributed to +the removal of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. The removal +indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean +Sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. 'The +Greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the +sea,' with the result that in the middle of the tenth century +their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the +first successors of Heraclius. Not only was the fall of the empire, +by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, +but also much that had been lost was regained. 'At the close of +the tenth century the emperors of Constantinople possessed the +best and greatest part' of Southern Italy, part of Sicily, the +whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, +with some parts of Syria and Armenia.[27] + +[Footnote 25: Hallam, _Mid._Ages_, chap. vi.] + +[Footnote 26: Ameer Ali, Syed, _Short_Hist._Saracens_, p. 442] + +[Footnote 27: Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap. li.] + +Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its +own punishment. Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial +creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when +it encounters a rival power of natural growth. How was it possible +for the Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even +the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? +How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist +for more than three-quarters of a century? Why did the Crusades +more and more become maritime expeditions? The answer to these +questions is to be found in the decline of the Mohammedan naval +defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of +the West. Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese transported crusading +forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the +Christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even +the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration +of conditions. This is evident when we look at the efforts of +the Christians to regain the lost kingdom. Saladin 'forgot that +the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, +and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx +from beyond the sea.'[28] Not only were the Crusaders helped by +the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received +reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the +'arrival of _Malik_Ankiltar_ (Richard Coeur de Lion) with twenty +shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.' + +[Footnote 28: Ameer Ali, Syed, pp. 359, 360.] + +Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the +importance of the naval states of Italy. That they had been able +to act effectively in the Levant may have been in some measure +due to the weakening of the Mohammedans by the disintegration +of the Seljukian power, the movements of the Moguls, and the +confusion consequent on the rise of the Ottomans. However that +may have been, the naval strength of those Italian states was +great absolutely as well as relatively. Sismondi, speaking of +Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, towards the end of the eleventh century, +says 'these three cities had more vessels on the Mediterranean +than the whole of Christendom besides.'[29] Dealing with a period +two centuries later, he declares it 'difficult to comprehend +how two simple cities could put to sea such prodigious fleets +as those of Pisa and Genoa.' The difficulty disappears when we +have Mahan's explanation. The maritime republics of Italy--like +Athens and Rhodes in ancient, Catalonia in mediaeval, and England +and the Netherlands in more modern times--were 'peculiarly well +fitted, by situation and resources, for the control of the sea by +both war and commerce.' As far as the western Mediterranean was +concerned, Genoa and Pisa had given early proofs of their maritime +energy, and fixed themselves, in succession to the Saracens, in +the Balearic Isles, Sardinia, and Corsica. Sea-power was the +Themistoclean instrument with which they made a small state into +a great one. + +[Footnote 29: _Ital._Republics_, English ed., p. 29.] + +A fertile source of dispute between states is the acquisition +of territory beyond sea. As others have done before and since, +the maritime republics of Italy quarrelled over this. Sea-power +seemed, like Saturn, to devour its own children. In 1284, in a +great sea-fight off Meloria, the Pisans were defeated by the +Genoese with heavy loss, which, as Sismondi states, 'ruined the +maritime power' of the former. From that time Genoa, transferring +her activity to the Levant, became the rival of Venice, The fleets +of the two cities in 1298 met near Cyprus in an encounter, said +to be accidental, that began 'a terrible war which for seven +years stained the Mediterranean with blood and consumed immense +wealth.' In the next century the two republics, 'irritated by +commercial quarrels'--like the English and Dutch afterwards--were +again at war in the Levant. Sometimes one side, sometimes the +other was victorious; but the contest was exhausting to both, +and especially to Venice. Within a quarter of a century they +were at war again. Hostilities lasted till the Genoese met with +the crushing defeat of Chioggia. 'From this time,' says Hallam, +'Genoa never commanded the ocean with such navies as before; her +commerce gradually went into decay; and the fifteenth century, +the most splendid in the annals of Venice, is till recent times +the most ignominious in those of Genoa.' Venice seemed now to +have no naval rival, and had no fear that anyone could forbid +the ceremony in which the Doge, standing in the bows of the +_Bucentaur_, cast a ring into the Adriatic with the words, +_Desponsamus_te,_Mare,_in_signum_veri_perpetuique_dominii_. +The result of the combats at Chioggia, though fatal to it in +the long-run, did not at once destroy the naval importance of +Genoa. A remarkable characteristic of sea-power is the delusive +manner in which it appears to revive after a great defeat. The +Persian navy occasionally made a brave show afterwards; but in +reality it had received at Salamis a mortal wound. Athens seemed +strong enough on the sea after the catastrophe of Syracuse; but, +as already stated, her naval power had been given there a check +from which it never completely recovered. The navy of Carthage +had had similar experience; and, in later ages, the power of +the Turks was broken at Lepanto and that of Spain at Gravelines +notwithstanding deceptive appearances afterwards. Venice was +soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. The Turkish naval +historian, Haji Khalifeh,[30] tells us that, 'After the taking of +Constantinople, when they [the Ottomans] spread their conquests +over land and sea, it became necessary to build ships and make +armaments in order to subdue the fortresses and castles on the +Rumelian and Anatolian shores, and in the islands of the +Mediterranean.' Mohammed II established a great naval arsenal at +Constantinople. In 1470 the Turks, 'for the first time, equipped +a fleet with which they drove that of the Venetians out of the +Grecian seas.'[31] The Turkish wars of Venice lasted a long time. +In that which ended in 1503 the decline of the Venetians' naval +power was obvious. 'The Mussulmans had made progress in naval +discipline; the Venetian fleet could no longer cope with theirs.' +Henceforward it was as an allied contingent of other navies that +that of Venice was regarded as important. Dyer[32] quotes a striking +passage from a letter of AEneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II, +in which the writer affirms that, if the Venetians are defeated, +Christendom will not control the sea any longer; for neither the +Catalans nor the Genoese, without the Venetians, are equal to +the Turks. + +[Footnote 30: _Maritime_Wars_of_the_Turks_, Mitchell's trans., +p. 12.] + +[Footnote 31: Sismondi, p. 256.] + +[Footnote 32: _Hist._Europe_, i. p. 85.] + + +SEA-POWER IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES + +The last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule +that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older +maritime populations becomes a serious menace to its neighbours. +Even in the fifteenth century Mohammed II had made an attack on +Southern Italy; but his sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. +Suleyman the Magnificent directed the Ottoman forces towards +the West. With admirable strategic insight he conquered Rhodes, +and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on +his flank. 'The centenary of the conquest of Constantinople was +past, and the Turk had developed a great naval power besides +annexing Egypt and Syria.'[33] The Turkish fleets, under such +leaders as Khair-ad-din (Barbarossa), Piale, and Dragut, seemed +to command the Mediterranean including its western basin; but the +repulse at Malta in 1565 was a serious check, and the defeat at +Lepanto in 1571 virtually put an end to the prospect of Turkish +maritime dominion. The predominance of Portugal in the Indian +Ocean in the early part of the sixteenth century had seriously +diminished the Ottoman resources. The wealth derived from the trade +in that ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, had supplied +the Mohammedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to +contend with success against the Christians in Europe. 'The main +artery had been cut when the Portuguese took up the challenge +of the Mohammedan merchants of Calicut, and swept their ships +from the ocean.'[34] The sea-power of Portugal wisely employed +had exercised a great, though unperceived, influence. Though +enfeebled and diminishing, the Turkish navy was still able to act +with some effect in the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the +sea-power of the Turks ceased to count as a factor of importance +in the relations between great states. + +[Footnote 33: Seeley, _British_Policy_, i. p. 143.] + +[Footnote 34: Whiteway, p. 2.] + +In the meantime the state which had a leading share in winning +the victory of Lepanto had been growing up in the West. Before +the union of its crown with that of Castile and the formation of +the Spanish monarchy, Aragon had been expanding till it reached +the sea. It was united with Catalonia in the twelfth century, and +it conquered Valencia in the thirteenth. Its long line of coast +opened the way to an extensive and flourishing commerce; and an +enterprising navy indemnified the nation for the scantiness of its +territory at home by the important foreign conquests of Sardinia, +Sicily, Naples, and the Balearic Isles. Amongst the maritime states +of the Mediterranean Catalonia had been conspicuous. She was to +the Iberian Peninsula much what Phoenicia had been to Syria. The +Catalan navy had disputed the empire of the Mediterranean with +the fleets of Pisa and Genoa. The incorporation of Catalonia +with Aragon added greatly to the strength of that kingdom. The +Aragonese kings were wise enough to understand and liberal enough +to foster the maritime interests of their new possessions.[35] +Their French and Italian neighbours were to feel, before long, the +effect of this policy; and when the Spanish monarchy had been +consolidated, it was felt not only by them, but by others also. +The more Spanish dominion was extended in Italy, the more were the +naval resources at the command of Spain augmented. Genoa became +'Spain's water-gate to Italy.... Henceforth the Spanish crown +found in the Dorias its admirals; their squadron was permanently +hired to the kings of Spain.' Spanish supremacy at sea was +established at the expense of France.[36] The acquisition of a +vast domain in the New World had greatly developed the maritime +activity of Castile, and Spain was as formidable on the ocean as +in the Mediterranean. After Portugal had been annexed the naval +vessels of that country were added to the Spanish, and the great +port of Lisbon became available as a place of equipment and as an +additional base of operations for oceanic campaigns. The fusion +of Spain and Portugal, says Seeley, 'produced a single state of +unlimited maritime dominion.... Henceforth the whole New World +belonged exclusively to Spain.' The story of the tremendous +catastrophe--the defeat of the Armada--by which the decline of +this dominion was heralded is well known. It is memorable, not +only because of the harm it did to Spain, but also because it +revealed the rise of another claimant to maritime pre-eminence--the +English nation. The effects of the catastrophe were not at once +visible. Spain still continued to look like the greatest power +in the world; and, though the English seamen were seen to be +something better than adventurous pirates--a character suggested +by some of their recent exploits--few could have comprehended +that they were engaged in building up what was to be a sea-power +greater than any known to history. + +[Footnote 35: Prescott, _Ferdinand_and_Isabella_, Introd. sects. +i. ii.] + +[Footnote 36: G. W. Prothero, in M. Hume's _Spain_, 1479-1788, +p. 65.] + +They were carrying forward, not beginning the building of this. +'England,' says Sir J. K. Laughton, 'had always believed in her +naval power, had always claimed the sovereignty of the Narrow +Seas; and more than two hundred years before Elizabeth came to the +throne, Edward III had testified to his sense of its importance +by ordering a gold coinage bearing a device showing the armed +strength and sovereignty of England based on the sea.'[37] It is +impossible to make intelligible the course of the many wars which +the English waged with the French in the Middle Ages unless the +true naval position of the former is rightly appreciated. Why were +Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt--not to mention other combats--fought, +not on English, but on continental soil? Why during the so-called +'Hundred Years' War' was England in reality the invader and not +the invaded? We of the present generation are at last aware of the +significance of naval defence, and know that, if properly utilised, +it is the best security against invasion that a sea-surrounded +state can enjoy. It is not, however, commonly remembered that +the same condition of security existed and was properly valued +in mediaeval times. The battle of Sluys in 1340 rendered invasion +of England as impracticable as did that of La Hogue in 1692, +that of Quiberon Bay in 1759, and that of Trafalgar in 1805; and +it permitted, as did those battles, the transport of troops to +the continent to support our allies in wars which, had we not +been strong at sea, would have been waged on the soil of our own +country. Our early continental wars, therefore, are proofs of the +long-established efficiency of our naval defences. Notwithstanding +the greater attention paid, within the last dozen years or so, +to naval affairs, it is doubtful if the country generally even +yet recognises the extent to which its security depends upon a +good fleet as fully as our ancestors did nearly seven centuries +ago. The narrative of our pre-Elizabethan campaigns is interesting +merely as a story; and, when told--as for instance D. Hannay +has told it in the introductory chapters of his 'Short History +of the Royal Navy'--it will be found instructive and worthy of +careful study at the present day. Each of the principal events +in our early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of +the idea conveyed by the term 'sea-power,' and of the accuracy +with which its meaning was apprehended at the time. To take a +very early case, we may cite the defeat of Eustace the Monk by +Hubert de Burgh in 1217. Reinforcements and supplies had been +collected at Calais for conveyance to the army of Prince Louis +of France and the rebel barons who had been defeated at Lincoln. +The reinforcements tried to cross the Channel under the escort of +a fleet commanded by Eustace. Hubert de Burgh, who had stoutly +held Dover for King John, and was faithful to the young Henry +III, heard of the enemy's movements. 'If these people land,' +said he, 'England is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.' He +reasoned in almost the same words as Raleigh about four centuries +afterwards, and undoubtedly 'had grasped the true principles of +the defence of England.' He put to sea and defeated his opponent. +The fleet on which Prince Louis and the rebellious barons had +counted was destroyed; and with it their enterprise. 'No more +admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by +Englishmen on water.'[38] As introductory to a long series of +naval operations undertaken with a like object, it has deserved +detailed mention here. + +[Footnote 37: _Armada_, Introd. (Navy Records Society).] + +[Footnote 38: Hannay, p. 7.] + +The sixteenth century was marked by a decided advance in both +the development and the application of sea-power. Previously +its operation had been confined to the Mediterranean or to coast +waters outside it. Spanish or Basque seamen--by their proceedings +in the English Channel--had proved the practicability of, rather +than been engaged in, ocean warfare. The English, who withstood +them, were accustomed to seas so rough, to seasons so uncertain, +and to weather so boisterous, that the ocean had few terrors for +them. All that was wanting was a sufficient inducement to seek +distant fields of action and a development of the naval art that +would permit them to be reached. The discovery of the New World +supplied the first; the consequently increased length of voyages +and of absence from the coast led to the second. The world had +been moving onwards in other things as well as in navigation. +Intercommunication was becoming more and more frequent. What was +done by one people was soon known to others. It is a mistake to +suppose that, because the English had been behindhand in the +exploration of remote regions, they were wanting in maritime +enterprise. The career of the Cabots would of itself suffice to +render such a supposition doubtful. The English had two good +reasons for postponing voyages to and settlement in far-off lands. +They had their hands full nearer home; and they thoroughly, and as +it were by instinct, understood the conditions on which permanent +expansion must rest. They wanted to make sure of the line of +communication first. To effect this a sea-going marine of both +war and commerce and, for further expansion, stations on the +way were essential. The chart of the world furnishes evidence of +the wisdom and the thoroughness of their procedure. Taught by the +experience of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, when unimpeded by +the political circumstances of the time, and provided with suitable +equipment, the English displayed their energy in distant seas. It +now became simply a question of the efficiency of sea-power. If +this was not a quality of that of the English, then their efforts +were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their +country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest +of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious. The +principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a +characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in +connection with the exploring or colonising activity of most +other great nations even down to our own time. They were really +unofficial speculations in which, if the Government took part at +all, it was for the sake of the profit expected and almost, if +not exactly, like any private adventurer. The participation of +the Government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth +while to note. It conveyed a hint--and quite consciously--to all +whom it might concern that the speculations were 'under-written' +by the whole sea-power of England. The forces of more than one state +had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of +enemies in the Mediterranean or in the Narrow Seas. They had +been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications +across not very extensive areas of water. In the sixteenth century +they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether +carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms. This, +naturally enough, led to collisions. The contention waxed hot, +and was virtually decided when the Armada shaped course to the +northward after the fight off Gravelines. + +The expeditions against the Spanish Indies and, still more, those +against Philip II's peninsular territory, had helped to define +the limitations of sea-power. It became evident, and it was made +still more evident in the next century, that for a great country +to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone. It must also have +an adequate and properly organised mobile army. Notwithstanding +the number of times that this lesson has been repeated, we have +been slow to learn it. It is doubtful if we have learned it even +yet. English seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; +for they have always demanded--at any rate for upwards of three +centuries--that expeditions against foreign territory over-sea +should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops. On the +other hand, the necessity of organising the army of a maritime +insular state, and of training it with the object of rendering +effective aid in operations of the kind in question, has rarely +been perceived and acted upon by others. The result has been a +long series of inglorious or disastrous affairs like the West +Indies voyage of 1595-96, the Cadiz expedition of 1625, and that +to the Ile de Re of 1627. Additions might be made to the list. +The failures of joint expeditions have often been explained by +alleging differences or quarrels between the naval and the military +commanders. This way of explaining them, however, is nothing but +the inveterate critical method of the streets by which cause +is taken for effect and effect for cause. The differences and +quarrels arose, no doubt; but they generally sprang out of the +recriminations consequent on, not producing, the want of success. +Another manifestation of the way in which sea-power works was first +observed in the seventeenth century. It suggested the adoption +of, and furnished the instrument for carrying out a distinct +maritime policy. What was practically a standing navy had come +into existence. As regards England this phenomenon was now of +respectable age. Long voyages and cruises of several ships in +company had been frequent during the latter half of the sixteenth +century and the early part of the seventeenth. Even the grandfathers +of the men who sailed with Blake and Penn in 1652 could not have +known a time when ships had never crossed the ocean, and squadrons +kept together for months had never cruised. However imperfect +it may have been, a system of provisioning ships and supplying +them with stores, and of preserving discipline amongst their +crews, had been developed, and had proved fairly satisfactory. +The Parliament and the Protector in turn found it necessary to +keep a considerable number of ships in commission, and make them +cruise and operate in company. It was not till well on in the +reign of Queen Victoria that the man-of-war's man was finally +differentiated from the merchant seaman; but two centuries before +some of the distinctive marks of the former had already begun to +be noticeable. There were seamen in the time of the Commonwealth +who rarely, perhaps some who never, served afloat except in a +man-of-war. Some of the interesting naval families which were +settled at Portsmouth and the eastern ports, and which--from +father to son--helped to recruit the ranks of our bluejackets +till a date later than that of the launch of the first ironclad, +could carry back their professional genealogy to at least the +days of Charles II, when, in all probability, it did not first +start. Though landsmen continued even after the civil war to be +given naval appointments, and though a permanent corps, through +the ranks of which everyone must pass, had not been formally +established, a body of real naval officers--men who could handle +their ships, supervise the working of the armament, and exercise +military command--had been formed. A navy, accordingly, was now +a weapon of undoubted keenness, capable of very effective use +by anyone who knew how to wield it. Having tasted the sweets +of intercourse with the Indies, whether in the occupation of +Portugal or of Spain, both English and Dutch were desirous of +getting a larger share of them. English maritime commerce had +increased and needed naval protection. If England was to maintain +the international position to which, as no one denied, she was +entitled, that commerce must be permitted to expand. The minds +of men in western Europe, moreover, were set upon obtaining for +their country territories in the New World, the amenities of +which were now known. From the reign of James I the Dutch had +shown great jealousy of English maritime enterprise. Where it was +possible, as in the East Indian Archipelago, they had destroyed +it. Their naval resources were great enough to let them hold +English shipping at their mercy, unless a vigorous effort were +made to protect it. The Dutch conducted the carrying trade of +a great part of the world, and the monopoly of this they were +resolved to keep, while the English were resolved to share in +it. The exclusion of the English from every trade-route, except +such as ran by their own coast or crossed the Narrow Seas, seemed +a by no means impossible contingency. There seemed also to be +but one way of preventing it, viz. by war. The supposed +unfriendliness of the Dutch, or at least of an important party +amongst them, to the regicide Government in England helped to +force the conflict. The Navigation Act of 1651 was passed and +regarded as a covert declaration of hostilities. So the first +Dutch war began. It established our claim to compete for the +position of a great maritime commercial power. + +The rise of the sea-power of the Dutch, and the magnitude which +it attained in a short time and in the most adverse circumstances, +have no parallel in history. The case of Athens was different, +because the Athenian power had not so much been unconsciously +developed out of a great maritime trade, as based on a military +marine deliberately and persistently fostered during many years. +Thirlwall believes that it was Solon who 'laid the foundations +of the Attic navy,'[39] a century before Salamis. The great +achievement of Themistocles was to convince his fellow-citizens +that their navy ought to be increased. Perhaps the nearest parallel +with the power of the Dutch was presented by that of Rhodes, which +rested largely on a carrying trade. The Rhodian undertakings, +however, were by comparison small and restricted in extent. Motley +declares of the Seven United Provinces that they 'commanded the +ocean,'[40] and that it would be difficult to exaggerate the +naval power of the young Commonwealth. Even in the days of Spain's +greatness English seamen positively declined to admit that she +was stronger than England on the sea; and the story of the Armada +justified their view. Our first two Dutch wars were, therefore, +contests between the two foremost naval states of the world for +what was primarily a maritime object. The identity of the cause +of the first and of the second war will be discerned by anyone +who compares what has been said about the circumstances leading +to the former, with Monk's remark as to the latter. He said that +the English wanted a larger share of the trade enjoyed by the +Dutch. It was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age +that the Dutch should try to prevent, by force, this want from +being satisfied. Anything like free and open competition was +repugnant to the general feeling. The high road to both individual +wealth and national prosperity was believed to lie in securing a +monopoly. Merchants or manufacturers who called for the abolition +of monopolies granted to particular courtiers and favourites had +not the smallest intention, on gaining their object, of throwing +open to the enterprise of all what had been monopolised. It was to +be kept for the exclusive benefit of some privileged or chartered +company. It was the same in greater affairs. As Mahan says, 'To +secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of the benefits +of sea commerce every effort was made to exclude others, either +by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory +regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.' The +apparent wealth of Spain was believed to be due to the rigorous +manner in which foreigners were excluded from trading with the +Spanish over-sea territories. The skill and enterprise of the +Dutch having enabled them to force themselves into this trade, +they were determined to keep it to themselves. The Dutch East India +Company was a powerful body, and largely dictated the maritime +policy of the country. We have thus come to an interesting point +in the historical consideration of sea-power. The Elizabethan +conflict with Spain had practically settled the question whether +or not the expanding nations were to be allowed to extend their +activities to territories in the New World. The first two Dutch +wars were to settle the question whether or not the ocean trade +of the world was to be open to any people qualified to engage +in it. We can see how largely these were maritime questions, +how much depended on the solution found for them, and how plain +it was that they must be settled by naval means. + +[Footnote 39: _Hist._Greece_, ii. p. 52.] + +[Footnote 40: _United_Netherlands_, ii. p. 132.] + +Mahan's great survey of sea-power opens in 1660, midway between +the first and second Dutch wars. 'The sailing-ship era, with its +distinctive features,' he tells us, 'had fairly begun.' The art +of war by sea, in its more important details, had been settled +by the first war. From the beginning of the second the general +features of ship design, the classification of ships, the armament +of ships, and the handling of fleets, were to remain without +essential alteration until the date of Navarino. Even the tactical +methods, except where improved on occasions by individual genius, +altered little. The great thing was to bring the whole broadside +force to bear on an enemy. Whether this was to be impartially +distributed throughout the hostile line or concentrated on one +part of it depended on the character of particular admirals. +It would have been strange if a period so long and so rich in +incidents had afforded no materials for forming a judgment on +the real significance of sea-power. The text, so to speak, chosen +by Mahan is that, notwithstanding the changes wrought in naval +_materiel_ during the last half-century, we can find in the history +of the past instructive illustrations of the general principles +of maritime war. These illustrations will prove of value not +only 'in those wider operations which embrace a whole theatre of +war,' but also, if rightly applied, 'in the tactical use of the +ships and weapons' of our own day. By a remarkable coincidence +the same doctrine was being preached at the same time and quite +independently by the late Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb in his work +on 'Naval Warfare.' As a prelude to the second Dutch war we find +a repetition of a process which had been adopted somewhat earlier. +That was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory. Until +the seventeenth century had well begun, naval, or combined naval +and military, operations against the distant possessions of an +enemy had been practically restricted to raiding or plundering +attacks on commercial centres. The Portuguese territory in South +America having come under Spanish dominion in consequence of the +annexation of Portugal to Spain, the Dutch--as the power of the +latter country declined--attempted to reduce part of that territory +into permanent possession. This improvement on the practice of +Drake and others was soon seen to be a game at which more than +one could play. An expedition sent by Cromwell to the West Indies +seized the Spanish island of Jamaica, which has remained in the +hands of its conquerors to this day. In 1664 an English force +occupied the Dutch North American settlements on the Hudson. Though +the dispossessed rulers were not quite in a position to throw stones +at sinners, this was rather a raid than an operation of recognised +warfare, because it preceded the formal outbreak of hostilities. +The conquered territory remained in English hands for more than +a century, and thus testified to the efficacy of a sea-power +which Europe had scarcely begun to recognise. Neither the second +nor the third Dutch war can be counted amongst the occurrences to +which Englishmen may look back with unalloyed satisfaction; but +they, unquestionably, disclosed some interesting manifestations +of sea-power. Much indignation has been expressed concerning the +corruption and inefficiency of the English Government of the +day, and its failure to take proper measures for keeping up the +navy as it should have been kept up. Some, perhaps a good deal, of +this indignation was deserved; but it would have been nearly as +well deserved by every other government of the day. Even in those +homes of political virtue where the administrative machinery was +worked by or in the interest of speculating capitalists and +privileged companies, the accumulating evidence of late years +has proved that everything was not considered to be, and as a +matter of fact was not, exactly as it ought to have been. Charles +II and his brother, the Duke of York, have been held up to obloquy +because they thought that the coast of England could be defended +against a naval enemy better by fortifications than by a good +fleet and, as Pepys noted, were 'not ashamed of it.' The truth +is that neither the king nor the duke believed in the power of +a navy to ward off attack from an island. This may have been +due to want of intellectual capacity; but it would be going a +long way to put it down to personal wickedness. They have had +many imitators, some in our own day. The huge forts which stud +the coast of the United Kingdom, and have been erected within +the memory of the present generation, are monuments, likely to +last for many years, of the inability of people, whom no one +could accuse of being vicious, to rate sea-power at its proper +value. It is much more likely that it was owing to a reluctance +to study questions of naval defence as industriously as they +deserved, and to that moral timidity which so often tempts even +men of proved physical courage to undertake the impossible task +of making themselves absolutely safe against hostile efforts +at every point. + +Charles II has also been charged with indifference to the interests +of his country, or worse, because during a great naval war he +adopted the plan of trying to weaken the enemy by destroying +his commerce. The king 'took a fatal resolution of laying up +his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise.' +It is expressly related that this was not Charles's own idea, +but that it was urged upon him by advisers whose opinion probably +seemed at the time as well worth listening to as that of others. +Anyhow, if the king erred, as he undoubtedly did, he erred in +good company. Fourteen hundred years earlier the statesmen who +conducted the great war against Carthage, and whose astuteness +has been the theme of innumerable panegyrics since, took the same +'fatal resolution.' In the midst of the great struggle they 'did +away with the fleet. At the most they encouraged privateering; and +with that view placed the war-vessels of the State at the disposal +of captains who were ready to undertake a corsair warfare on +their own account.'[41] In much later times this method has had +many and respectable defenders. Mahan's works are, in a sense, a +formal warning to his fellow-citizens not to adopt it. In France, +within the last years of the nineteenth century, it found, and +appears still to find, adherents enough to form a school. The +reappearance of belief in demonstrated impossibilities is a +recognised incident in human history; but it is usually confined +to the emotional or the vulgar. It is serious and filled with +menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer +the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence. The +third Dutch war may not have settled directly the position of +England in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country +above all other maritime states,--in the position, in fact, which +Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the British Empire, whichever +name may be given it, has retained up to the present. It also +manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power. +The United Provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest +monarchies in the world, France and England, were not destroyed. +Indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in +the State system of Europe. The Republic 'owed this astonishing +result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its +sea-power.' The effort, however, had undermined its strength +and helped forward its decline. + +[Footnote 41: Mommsen, ii. p. 52.] + +The war which was ended by the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 presents +two features of exceptional interest: one was the havoc wrought on +English commerce by the enemy; the other was Torrington's conduct +at and after the engagement off Beachy Head. Mahan discusses +the former with his usual lucidity. At no time has war against +commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results +than during this period. We suffered 'infinitely more than in +any former war.' Many of our merchants were ruined; and it is +affirmed that the English shipping was reduced to the necessity +of sailing under the Swedish and Danish flags. The explanation is +that Louis XIV made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. Our +navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could +be spared to protect our maritime trade. This is only another way +of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the +navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose +the enemy's main force. Notwithstanding our losses we were on +the winning side in the conflict. Much misery and ruin had been +caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war. + +Torrington's proceedings in July 1690 were at the time the subject +of much angry debate. The debate, still meriting the epithet +angry, has been renewed within the last few years. The matter +has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of +a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those +who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who +ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown +away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible. Arthur +Herbert, Earl of Torrington--the later peerage is a viscounty held +by the Byng family--was in command of the allied English and Dutch +fleet in the Channel. 'The disparity of force,' says Mahan, 'was +still in favour of France in 1690, but it was not so great as +the year before.' We can measure the ability of the then English +Government for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its +wisdom, it had still further weakened our fleet by dividing it +(Vice-Admiral Killigrew having been sent to the Mediterranean with +a squadron), and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to +take the necessary steps to repair this error. The Government +having omitted, as even British Governments sometimes do, to +gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements +of the enemy, Torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a +considerably superior French fleet under Tourville, one of the +greatest of French sea-officers. Of late years the intentions of +the French have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that +in England at the time Tourville's movements were believed to +be preliminary to invasion. Whether Tourville deliberately meant +his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost +certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise his +victory would have been without any valuable result. Torrington +saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could, +though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing +serious harm. Though personally not a believer in the imminence of +invasion, the English admiral knew that 'most men were in fear that +the French would invade.' His own view was, 'that whilst we had a +fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.' Of late +years controversy has raged round this phrase, 'a fleet in being,' +and the strategic principle which it expresses. Most seamen were +at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with +Torrington. This might be supposed enough to settle the question. +It has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval +strategy. It was made at the time a matter of party politics. +This is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it +should be discussed. Both as a strategist and as a tactician +Torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. The +only English admirals who can be placed above him are Hawke and +Nelson. He paid the penalty of his pre-eminence: he could not +make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages +of his proceedings. Mahan, who is specially qualified to do him +full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a +consideration of Torrington's case, evidently because he had +no sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment. +The admiral's character had been taken away already by Macaulay, +who did have ample evidence before him. William III, with all his +fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal +to that of Napoleon; and Napoleon, in naval strategy, was often +wrong. William III understood that subject even less than the +French emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable +of understanding it. Consequently Torrington's action has been +put down to jealousy of the Dutch. There have been people who +accused Nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of +Caracciolo! The explanation of Torrington's conduct is this:-- +He had a fleet so much weaker than Tourville's that he could +not fight a general action with the latter without a practical +certainty of getting a crushing defeat. Such a result would have +laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says Mahan, +'if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of William's +throne in England.' Given certain movements of the French fleet, +Torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward +and join his force with that under Killigrew, which would make +him strong enough to hazard a battle. This proved impracticable. +There was then one course left. To retire before the French, +but not to keep far from them. He knew that, though not strong +enough to engage their whole otherwise unemployed fleet with any +hope of success, he would be quite strong enough to fight and +most likely beat it, when a part of it was trying either to deal +with our ships to the westward or to cover the disembarkation of +an invading army. He, therefore, proposed to keep his fleet 'in +being' in order to fall on the enemy when the latter would have +two affairs at the same time on his hands. The late Vice-Admiral +Colomb rose to a greater height than was usual even with him in +his criticism of this campaign. What Torrington did was merely +to reproduce on the sea what has been noticed dozens of times on +shore, viz. the menace by the flanking enemy. In land warfare +this is held to give exceptional opportunities for the display of +good generalship, but, to quote Mahan over again, a navy 'acts +on an element strange to most writers, its members have been +from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of +their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood.' +Whilst Torrington has had the support of seamen, his opponents +have been landsmen. For the crime of being a good strategist he +was brought before a court-martial, but acquitted. His sovereign, +who had been given the crowns of three kingdoms to defend our laws, +showed his respect for them by flouting a legally constituted +tribunal and disregarding its solemn finding. The admiral who +had saved his country was forced into retirement. Still, the +principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the bottom of all sound +strategy. + +Admiral Colomb has pointed out a great change of plan in the +later naval campaigns of the seventeenth century. Improvements +in naval architecture, in the methods of preserving food, and +in the arrangements for keeping the crews healthy, permitted +fleets to be employed at a distance from their home ports for +long continuous periods. The Dutch, when allies of the Spaniards, +kept a fleet in the Mediterranean for many months. The great De +Ruyter was mortally wounded in one of the battles there fought. +In the war of the Spanish Succession the Anglo-Dutch fleet found +its principal scene of action eastward of Gibraltar. This, as +it were, set the fashion for future wars. It became a kind of +tacitly accepted rule that the operation of British sea-power +was to be felt in the enemy's rather than in our own waters. The +hostile coast was regarded strategically as the British frontier, +and the sea was looked upon as territory which the enemy must +be prevented from invading. Acceptance of this principle led +in time to the so-called 'blockades' of Brest and Toulon. The +name was misleading. As Nelson took care to explain, there was +no desire to keep the enemy's fleet in; what was desired was to +be near enough to attack it if it came out. The wisdom of the +plan is undoubted. The hostile navy could be more easily watched +and more easily followed if it put to sea. To carry out this +plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency +than that of the enemy was necessary to us. With the exception +of that of American Independence, which will therefore require +special notice, our subsequent great wars were conducted in +accordance with the rule. + + +SEA-POWER IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND EARLY PART OF THE NINETEENTH +CENTURY + +In the early part of the eighteenth century there was a remarkable +manifestation of sea-power in the Baltic. Peter the Great, having +created an efficient army, drove the Swedes from the coast provinces +south of the Gulf of Finland. Like the earlier monarchies of which +we have spoken, Russia, in the Baltic at least, now became a naval +state. A large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy +established. It was a purely artificial creation, and showed +the merits and defects of its character. At first, and when under +the eye of its creator, it was strong; when Peter was no more it +dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh. +It enabled Peter the Great to conquer the neighbouring portion +of Finland, to secure his coast territories, and to dominate +the Baltic. In this he was assisted by the exhaustion of Sweden +consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible, +the position of a _quasi_ great power which she had held since +the days of Gustavus Adolphus. Sweden had been further weakened, +especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with Denmark, +which prevented all hope of Scandinavian predominance in the +Baltic, the control of which sea has in our own days passed into +the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy--the +modern German empire. + +The war of the Spanish Succession left Great Britain a Mediterranean +power, a position which, in spite of twice losing Minorca, she +still holds. In the war of the Austrian Succession, 'France was +forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and England +saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to +use it to the best advantage.'[42] This shows, as we shall find +that a later war showed more plainly, that even the Government +of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting +its naval affairs wisely. The Seven Years' war included some +brilliant displays of the efficacy of sea-power. It was this +which put the British in possession of Canada, decided which +European race was to rule in India, and led to a British occupation +of Havannah in one hemisphere and of Manila in the other. In +the same war we learned how, by a feeble use of sea-power, a +valuable possession like Minorca may be lost. At the same time +our maritime trade and the general prosperity of the kingdom +increased enormously. The result of the conflict made plain to +all the paramount importance of having in the principal posts +in the Government men capable of understanding what war is and +how it ought to be conducted. + +[Footnote 42: Mahan, _Inf._on_Hist._ p. 280.] + +This lesson, as the sequel demonstrated, had not been learned +when Great Britain became involved in a war with the insurgent +colonies in North America. Mahan's comment is striking: 'The +magnificence of sea-power and its value had perhaps been more +clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway and consequent exaltation +of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, +is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea-power +meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a +strife which endangered not only its most valuable colonies, but +even its own shores.'[43] We were, in fact, drawing too largely +on the _prestige_ acquired during the Seven Years' war; and we +were governed by men who did not understand the first principles +of naval warfare, and would not listen to those who did. They +quite ignored the teaching of the then comparatively recent wars +which has been alluded to already--that we should look upon the +enemy's coast as our frontier. A century and a half earlier the +Dutchman Grotius had written-- + + Quae meta Britannis + Litora sunt aliis. + +[Footnote 43: _Influence_on_Hist._ p. 338.] + +Though ordinary prudence would have suggested ample preparation, +British ministers allowed their country to remain unprepared. +Instead of concentrating their efforts on the main objective, +they frittered away force in attempts to relieve two beleaguered +garrisons under the pretext of yielding to popular pressure, which +is the official term for acting on the advice of irresponsible +and uninstructed busybodies. 'Depuis le debut de la crise,' says +Captain Chevalier, 'les ministres de la Grande Bretagne s'etaient +montres inferieurs a leur tache.' An impressive result of this was +the repeated appearance of powerful and indeed numerically superior +hostile fleets in the English Channel. The war--notwithstanding +that, perhaps because, land operations constituted an important +part of it, and in the end settled the issue--was essentially +oceanic. Captain Mahan says it was 'purely maritime.' It may +be true that, whatever the belligerent result, the political +result, as regards the _status_ of the insurgent colonies, would +have been the same. It is in the highest degree probable, indeed +it closely approaches to certainty, that a proper use of the +British sea-power would have prevented independence from being +conquered, as it were, at the point of the bayonet. There can be no +surprise in store for the student acquainted with the vagaries of +strategists who are influenced in war by political in preference +to military requirements. Still, it is difficult to repress an +emotion of astonishment on finding that a British Government +intentionally permitted De Grasse's fleet and the French army +in its convoy to cross the Atlantic unmolested, for fear of +postponing for a time the revictualling of the garrison beleaguered +at Gibraltar. Washington's opinion as to the importance of the +naval factor has been quoted already; and Mahan does not put +the case too strongly when he declares that the success of the +Americans was due to 'sea-power being in the hands of the French +and its improper distribution by the English authorities.' Our +navy, misdirected as it was, made a good fight of it, never allowed +itself to be decisively beaten in a considerable battle, and won +at least one great victory. At the point of contact with the +enemy, however, it was not in general so conspicuously successful +as it was in the Seven Years' war, or as it was to be in the +great conflict with the French republic and empire. The truth +is that its opponent, the French navy, was never so thoroughly +a sea-going force as it was in the war of American Independence; +and never so closely approached our own in real sea-experience +as it did during that period. We met antagonists who were very +nearly, but, fortunately for us, not quite as familiar with the +sea as we were ourselves; and we never found it so hard to beat +them, or even to avoid being beaten by them. An Englishman would, +naturally enough, start at the conclusion confronting him, if he +were to speculate as to the result of more than one battle had +the great Suffren's captains and crews been quite up to the level +of those commanded by stout old Sir Edward Hughes. Suffren, it +should be said, before going to the East Indies, had 'thirty-eight +years of almost uninterrupted sea-service.'[44] A glance at a +chart of the world, with the scenes of the general actions of +the war dotted on it, will show how notably oceanic the campaigns +were. The hostile fleets met over and over again on the far side +of the Atlantic and in distant Indian seas. The French navy had +penetrated into the ocean as readily and as far as we could do +ourselves. Besides this, it should be remembered that it was +not until the 12th April 1782. when Rodney in one hemisphere and +Suffren in the other showed them the way, that our officers were +able to escape from the fetters imposed on them by the _Fighting_ +_Instructions_,--a fact worth remembering in days in which it is +sometimes proposed, by establishing schools of naval tactics +on shore, to revive the pedantry which made a decisive success +in battle nearly impossible. + +[Footnote 44: Laughton, _Studies_in_Naval_Hist._ p. 103.] + +The mighty conflict which raged between Great Britain on one side +and France and her allies on the other, with little intermission, +for more than twenty years, presents a different aspect from that +of the war last mentioned. The victories which the British fleet +was to gain were generally to be overwhelming; if not, they were +looked upon as almost defeats. Whether the fleet opposed to ours +was, or was not, the more numerous, the result was generally the +same--our enemy was beaten. That there was a reason for this which +can be discovered is certain. A great deal has been made of the +disorganisation in the French navy consequent on the confusion of +the Revolution. That there was disorganisation is undoubted; that +it did impair discipline and, consequently, general efficiency will +not be disputed; but that it was considerable enough to account by +itself for the French naval defeats is altogether inadmissible. +Revolutionary disorder had invaded the land-forces to a greater +degree than it had invaded the sea-forces. The supersession, +flight, or guillotining of army officers had been beyond measure +more frequent than was the case with the naval officers. In spite +of all this the French armies were on the whole--even in the +early days of the Revolution--extraordinarily successful. In +1792 'the most formidable invasion that ever threatened France,' +as Alison calls it, was repelled, though the invaders were the +highly disciplined and veteran armies of Prussia and Austria. +It was nearly two years later that the French and English fleets +came into serious conflict. The first great battle, which we +call 'The Glorious First of June,' though a tactical victory +for us, was a strategical defeat. Villaret-Joyeuse manoeuvred so +as to cover the arrival in France of a fleet of merchant vessels +carrying sorely needed supplies of food, and in this he was +completely successful. His plan involved the probability, almost +the necessity, of fighting a general action which he was not at +all sure of winning. He was beaten, it is true; but the French +made so good a fight of it that their defeat was not nearly so +disastrous as the later defeats of the Nile or Trafalgar, and--at +the most--not more disastrous than that of Dominica. Yet no one +even alleges that there was disorder or disorganisation in the +French fleet at the date of anyone of those affairs. Indeed, +if the French navy was really disorganised in 1794, it would +have been better for France--judging from the events of 1798 and +1805--if the disorganisation had been allowed to continue. In +point of organisation the British Navy was inferior, and in point +of discipline not much superior to the French at the earliest +date; at the later dates, and especially at the latest, owing +to the all-pervading energy of Napoleon, the British was far +behind its rival in organisation, in 'science,' and in every +branch of training that can be imparted without going to sea. +We had the immense advantage of counting amongst our officers +some very able men. Nelson, of course, stands so high that he +holds a place entirely by himself. The other British chiefs, +good as they were, were not conspicuously superior to the Hawkes +and Rodneys of an earlier day. Howe was a great commander, but +he did little more than just appear on the scene in the war. +Almost the same may be said of Hood, of whom Nelson wrote, 'He +is the greatest sea-officer I ever knew.'[45] There must have +been something, therefore, beyond the meritorious qualities of +our principal officers which helped us so consistently to victory. +The many triumphs won could not have been due in every case to +the individual superiority of the British admiral or captain to +his opponent. There must have been bad as well as good amongst +the hundreds on our lists; and we cannot suppose that Providence +had so arranged it that in every action in which a British officer +of inferior ability commanded a still inferior French commander +was opposed to him. The explanation of our nearly unbroken success +is, that the British was a thoroughly sea-going navy, and became +more and more so every month; whilst the French, since the close +of the American war, had lost to a great extent its sea-going +character and, because we shut it up in its ports, became less +and less sea-going as hostilities continued. The war had been +for us, in the words of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, 'a continuous +course of victory won mainly by seamanship.' Our navy, as regards +sea-experience, especially of the officers, was immensely superior +to the French. This enabled the British Government to carry into +execution sound strategic plans, in accordance with which the coasts +of France and its dependent or allied countries were regarded as +the English frontier to be watched or patrolled by our fleets. + +[Footnote 45: Laughton, _Nelson's_Lett._and_Desp._ p. 71.] + +Before the long European war had been brought to a formal ending +we received some rude rebuffs from another opponent of unsuspected +vigour. In the quarrel with the United States, the so-called +'War of 1812,' the great sea-power of the British in the end +asserted its influence, and our antagonists suffered much more +severely, even absolutely, than ourselves. At the same time we +might have learned, for the Americans did their best to teach us, +that over-confidence in numerical strength and narrow professional +self-satisfaction are nearly sure to lead to reverses in war, and +not unlikely to end in grave disasters. We had now to meet the +_elite_ of one of the finest communities of seamen ever known. +Even in 1776 the Americans had a great maritime commerce, which, +as Mahan informs us, 'had come to be the wonder of the statesmen +of the mother country.' In the six-and-thirty years which had +elapsed since then this commerce had further increased. There +was no finer nursery of seamen than the then states of the American +Union. Roosevelt says that 'there was no better seaman in the +world' than the American, who 'had been bred to his work from +infancy.' A large proportion of the population 'was engaged in +sea-going pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a +resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them.'[46] +Having little or no naval protection, the American seaman had +to defend himself in many circumstances, and was compelled to +familiarise himself with the use of arms. The men who passed +through this practical, and therefore supremely excellent, training +school were numerous. Very many had been trained in English +men-of-war, and some in French ships. The state navy which they +were called on to man was small; and therefore its _personnel_, +though without any regular or avowed selection, was virtually +and in the highest sense a picked body. The lesson of the war +of 1812 should be learned by Englishmen of the present day, when +a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical +superiority, in the mere possession of heavier _materiel_, and +in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, which +confidence, as experience has shown, is too often the forerunner +of misfortune. It is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimise +the American successes. Certainly they have been exaggerated by +Americans and even by ourselves. To take the frigate actions +alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention, +we see that the captures in action amounted to three on each +side, the proportionate loss to our opponents, considering the +smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than ours. +We also see that no British frigate was taken after the first +seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years, and that +no British frigate succumbed except to admittedly superior force. +Attempts have been made to spread a belief that our reverses +were due to nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of our +enemy's ships. It is now established that the superiority in +these details, which the Americans certainly enjoyed, was not +great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories. +Of course, if superiority in mere _materiel_, beyond a certain +well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants, +his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged +that size of ship or calibre of guns--greater within reasonable +limits than we had--necessarily led to the defeat of British +ships by the French or Spaniards. In the words of Admiral Jurien +de la Graviere, 'The ships of the United States constantly fought +with the chances in their favour.' All this is indisputable. +Nevertheless we ought to see to it that in any future war our +sea-power, great as it may be, does not receive shocks like those +that it unquestionably did receive in 1812. + +[Footnote 46: _Naval_War_of_1812_, 3rd ed. pp. 29, 30.] + + +SEA-POWER IN RECENT TIMES + +We have now come to the end of the days of the naval wars of +old time. The subsequent period has been illustrated repeatedly +by manifestations of sea-power, often of great interest and +importance, though rarely understood or even discerned by the +nations which they more particularly concerned. The British +sea-power, notwithstanding the first year of the war of 1812, +had come out of the great European conflict unshaken and indeed +more preeminent than ever. The words used, half a century before +by a writer in the great French 'Encyclopedie,' seemed more exact +than when first written. '_L'empire_des_mers_,' he says, is, +'le plus avantageux de tous les empires; les Phoeniciens le +possedoient autre fois et c'est aux Anglois que cette gloire +appartient aujourd'hui sur toutes les puissances maritimes.'[47] +Vast out-lying territories had been acquired or were more firmly +held, and the communications of all the over-sea dominions of the +British Crown were secured against all possibility of serious +menace for many years to come. Our sea-power was so ubiquitous +and all-pervading that, like the atmosphere, we rarely thought +of it and rarely remembered its necessity or its existence. It +was not till recently that the greater part of the nation--for +there were many, and still are some exceptions--perceived that +it was the medium apart from which the British Empire could no +more live than it could have grown up. Forty years after the +fall of Napoleon we found ourselves again at war with a great +power. We had as our ally the owner of the greatest navy in the +world except our own. Our foe, as regards his naval forces, came +the next in order. Yet so overwhelming was the strength of Great +Britain and France on the sea that Russia never attempted to +employ her navy against them. Not to mention other expeditions, +considerable enough in themselves, military operations on the +largest scale were undertaken, carried on for many months, and +brought to a successful termination on a scene so remote that +it was two thousand miles from the country of one, and three +thousand from that of the other partner in the alliance. 'The +stream of supplies and reinforcements, which in terms of modern +war is called "communications,", was kept free from even the threat +of molestation, not by visible measures, but by the undisputed +efficacy of a real, though imperceptible sea-power. At the close +of the Russian war we encountered, and unhappily for us in +influential positions, men who, undismayed by the consequences +of mimicking in free England the cast-iron methods of the Great +Frederick, began to measure British requirements by standards +borrowed from abroad and altogether inapplicable to British +conditions. Because other countries wisely abstained from relying +on that which they did not possess, or had only imperfectly and +with elaborate art created, the mistress of the seas was led to +proclaim her disbelief in the very force that had made and kept +her dominion, and urged to defend herself with fortifications by +advisers who, like Charles II and the Duke of York two centuries +before, were 'not ashamed of it.' It was long before the peril +into which this brought the empire was perceived; but at last, +and in no small degree owing to the teachings of Mahan, the people +themselves took the matter in hand and insisted that a great +maritime empire should have adequate means of defending all that +made its existence possible. + +[Footnote 47: _Encyclopedie_, 7th Jan. 1765, art. 'Thalassarchie.'] + +In forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the +efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the American Secession +war. If ever there were hostilities in which, to the unobservant +or short-sighted, naval operations might at first glance seem +destined to count for little, they were these. The sequel, however, +made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors +of the success of the victorious side. The belligerents, the +Northern or Federal States and the Southern or Confederate States, +had a common land frontier of great length. The capital of each +section was within easy distance of this frontier, and the two +were not far apart. In wealth, population, and resources the +Federals were enormously superior. They alone possessed a navy, +though at first it was a small one. The one advantage on the +Confederate side was the large proportion of military officers +which belonged to it and their fine training as soldiers. In +_physique_ as well as in _morale_ the army of one side differed +little from that of the other; perhaps the Federal army was slightly +superior in the first, and the Confederate, as being recruited +from a dominant white race, in the second. Outnumbered, less well +equipped, and more scantily supplied, the Confederates nevertheless +kept up the war, with many brilliant successes on land, for four +years. Had they been able to maintain their trade with neutral +states they could have carried on the war longer, and--not +improbably--have succeeded in the end. The Federal navy, which was +largely increased, took away all chance of this. It established +effective blockades of the Confederate ports, and severed their +communications with the outside world. Indispensable articles of +equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, +became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished +antagonists. By dominating the rivers the Federals cut the +Confederacy asunder; and by the power they possessed of moving troops +by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated +the occupation of important points. Meanwhile the Confederates +could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant +vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of +the war remained absolutely unaffected. The great numbers of +men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles +of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree, +was notably uncommon on both sides, and the varying fortunes of +the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting +to the ordinary observer than the naval. It is not surprising, +therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years +before the American people could be made to see the great part +taken by the navy in the restoration of the Union; and what the +Americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations. + +In several great wars in Europe waged since France and England +made peace with Russia sea-power manifested itself but little. +In the Russo-Turkish war the great naval superiority of the Turks +in the Black Sea, where the Russians at the time had no fleet, +governed the plans, if not the course, of the campaigns. The +water being denied to them, the Russians were compelled to execute +their plan of invading Turkey by land. An advance to the Bosphorus +through the northern part of Asia Minor was impracticable without +help from a navy on the right flank. Consequently the only route +was a land one across the Danube and the Balkans. The advantages, +though not fully utilised, which the enforcement of this line of +advance put into the hands of the Turks, and the difficulties +and losses which it caused the Russians, exhibited in a striking +manner what sea-power can effect even when its operation is scarcely +observable. + +This was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. The +civil war in Chili between Congressists and Balmacedists is specially +interesting, because it throws into sharp relief the predominant +influence, when a non-maritime enemy is to be attacked, of a navy +followed up by an adequate land-force. At the beginning of the +dispute the Balmacedists, or President's party, had practically +all the army, and the Congressists, or Opposition party, nearly +all the Chilian navy. Unable to remain in the principal province +of the republic, and expelled from the waters of Valparaiso by the +Balmacedist garrisons of the forts--the only and doubtful service +which those works rendered to their own side--the Congressists +went off with the ships to the northern provinces, where they +counted many adherents. There they formed an army, and having +money at command, and open sea communications, they were able +to import equipment from abroad, and eventually to transport +their land-force, secured from molestation on the voyage by the +sea-power at their disposal, to the neighbourhood of Valparaiso, +where it was landed and triumphantly ended the campaign. + +It will have been noticed that, in its main outlines, this story +repeated that of many earlier campaigns. It was itself repeated, +as regards its general features, by the story of the war between +China and Japan in 1894-95. 'Every aspect of the war,' says Colomb, +'is interesting to this country, as Japan is to China in a position +similar to that which the British Islands occupy to the European +continent.'[48] It was additionally interesting because the sea-power +of Japan was a novelty. Though a novelty, it was well known by +English naval men to be superior in all essentials to that of +China, a novelty itself. As is the rule when two belligerents +are contending for something beyond a purely maritime object, +the final decision was to be on land. Korea was the principal +theatre of the land war; and, as far as access to it by sea was +concerned, the chief bases of the two sides were about the same +distance from it. It was possible for the Chinese to march there +by land. The Japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged +to cross the water. It will be seen at once that not only the +success of the Japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility +of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power. +The Japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea. Their +navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in +Korea, and for another which was landed in the Chinese province +of Shantung. The Chinese land-forces were defeated. The navy of +japan, being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister +service supplied or reinforced as required. It was, however, not +the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the Chinese +efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. What the navy +did was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power, +may be expected of a navy. It made the transport of the army +across the sea possible; and enabled it to do what of itself +the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance +of the enemy. + +[Footnote 48: _Naval_Warfare_, 3rd ed. p. 436.] + +The issue of the Spanish-American war, at least as regards the mere +defeat of Spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. That Spain, +even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to +the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the United States +must have been evident even to Spaniards. Be that as it may, an +early collapse of the Spanish defence was not anticipated, and +however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished +examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. Mahan says of +it that, 'while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of +its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad +analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that +unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto +this day.'[49] The Spaniards were defeated by the superiority +of the American sea-power. 'A million of the best soldiers,' says +Mahan, 'would have been powerless in face of hostile control of +the sea.' That control was obtained and kept by the United States +navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops--and +their subsequent reinforcement and supply--to Spanish territory, +which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army +on shore. That it was the navy which made this final conquest +possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident +by the action of the United States Government, which stopped a +military expedition on the point of starting for Cuba until the +sea was cleared of all Spanish naval force worth attention. + +[Footnote 49: _Lessons_of_the_War_with_Spain_, p. 16.] + +The events of the long period which we have been considering +will have shown how sea-power operates, and what it effects. +What is in it will have appeared from this narrative more clearly +than would have been possible from any mere definition. Like +many other things, sea-power is composed of several elements. To +reach the highest degree of efficacy it should be based upon a +population naturally maritime, and on an ocean commerce naturally +developed rather than artificially enticed to extend itself. Its +outward and visible sign is a navy, strong in the discipline, +skill, and courage of a numerous _personnel_ habituated to the +sea, in the number and quality of its ships, in the excellence +of its _materiel_, and in the efficiency, scale, security, and +geographical position of its arsenals and bases. History has +demonstrated that sea-power thus conditioned can gain any purely +maritime object, can protect the trade and the communications of a +widely extended empire, and whilst so doing can ward off from its +shores a formidable invader. There are, however, limitations to be +noted. Left to itself its operation is confined to the water, or at +any rate to the inner edge of a narrow zone of coast. It prepares +the way for the advance of an army, the work of which it is not +intended, and is unable to perform. Behind it, in the territory +of which it guards the shores, there must be a land-force adjusted +in organisation, equipment, and numbers to the circumstances +of the country. The possession of a navy does not permit a +sea-surrounded state to dispense with all fixed defences or +fortification; but it does render it unnecessary and indeed absurd +that they should be abundant or gigantic. The danger which always +impends over the sea-power of any country is that, after being +long unused, it may lose touch of the sea. The revolution in +the constructive arts during the last half-century, which has +also been a period of but little-interrupted naval peace, and +the universal adoption of mechanical appliances, both for +ship-propulsion and for many minor services--mere _materiel_ +being thereby raised in the general estimation far above really +more important matters--makes the danger mentioned more menacing +in the present age than it has ever been before. + + + + +II + +THE COMMAND OF THE SEA[50] + +[Footnote 50: Written in 1899. (_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_.)] + +This phrase, a technical term of naval warfare, indicates a definite +strategical condition. The term has been substituted occasionally, +but less frequently of late years, for the much older 'Dominion +of the sea' or 'Sovereignty of the sea,' a legal term expressing +a claim, if not a right. It has also been sometimes treated as +though it were identical with the rhetorical expression 'Empire +of the sea.' Mahan, instead of it, uses the term 'Control of +the sea,' which has the merit of precision, and is not likely +to be misunderstood or mixed up with a form of words meaning +something different. The expression 'Command of the sea,' however, +in its proper and strategic sense, is so firmly fixed in the +language that it would be a hopeless task to try to expel it; +and as, no doubt, writers will continue to use it, it must be +explained and illustrated. Not only does it differ in meaning +from 'Dominion or Sovereignty of the sea,' it is not even truly +derived therefrom, as can be briefly shown. 'It has become an +uncontested principle of modern international law that the sea, +as a general rule, cannot be subjected to appropriation.'[51] +This, however, is quite modern. We ourselves did not admit the +principle till 1805; the Russians did not admit it till 1824; +and the Americans, and then only tacitly, not till 1894. Most +European nations at some time or other have claimed and have +exercised rights over some part of the sea, though far outside +the now well-recognised 'three miles' limit.' Venice claimed +the Adriatic, and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating +its northern waters. Genoa and France each claimed portions of +the western Mediterranean. Denmark and Sweden claimed to share +the Baltic between them. Spain claimed dominion over the Pacific +and the Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal over the Indian Ocean and +all the Atlantic south of Morocco.[52] The claim which has made +the greatest noise in the world is that once maintained by the +kings of England to the seas surrounding the British Isles. Like +other institutions, the English sovereignty of the sea was, and +was admitted to be, beneficent for a long period. Then came the +time when it ought to have been abandoned as obsolete; but it was +not, and so it led to war. The general conviction of the maritime +nations was that the Lord of the Sea would provide for the police +of the waters over which he exercised dominion. In rude ages when +men, like the ancients, readily 'turned themselves to piracy,' +this was of immense importance to trade; and, far from the right +of dominion being disputed by foreigners, it was insisted upon by +them and declared to carry with it certain duties. In 1299, not +only English merchants, but also 'the maritime people of Genoa, +Catalonia, Spain, Germany, Zealand, Holland, Frisia, Denmark, +Norway, and several other places of the empire' declared that the +kings of England had from time immemorial been in 'peaceable +possession of the sovereign lordship of the sea of England,' +and had done what was 'needful for the maintenance of peace, +right, and equity between people of all sorts, whether subjects +of another kingdom or not, who pass through those seas.'[53] The +English sovereignty was not exercised as giving authority to +exact toll. All that was demanded in return for keeping the sea +safe for peaceful traffic was a salute, enforced no doubt as a +formal admission of the right which permitted the (on the whole, +at any rate) effective police of the waters to be maintained. +The Dutch in the seventeenth century objected to the demand for +this salute. It was insisted upon. War ensued; but in the end +the Dutch acknowledged by solemn treaties their obligation to +render the salute. The time for exacting it, however, was really +past. S. R. Gardiner[54] maintains that though the 'question of +the flag' was the occasion, it was not the cause of the war. +There was not much, if any, piracy in the English Channel which +the King of England was specially called upon to suppress, and +if there had been the merchant vessels of the age were generally +able to defend themselves, while if they were not their governments +possessed force enough to give them the necessary protection. +We gave up our claim to exact the salute in 1805. + +[Footnote 51: W. E. Hall, _Treatise_on_International_Law_, +4th ed. 1895, p. 146.] + +[Footnote 52: Hall, pp. 48, 49.] + +[Footnote 53: J. K. Laughton, 'Sovereignty of the Sea,' _Fortnightly_ +_Review_, August 1866.] + +[Footnote 54: _The_First_Dutch_War_ (Navy Records Society), 1899.] + +The necessity of the foregoing short account of the 'Sovereignty +or Dominion of the Seas' will be apparent as soon as we come +to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series +of struggles, for the command of the sea. Gaining this was the +result of our wars with the Dutch in the seventeenth century. +At the time of the first Dutch war, 1652-54, and probably of +the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen, +believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our +part to retain, and on that of the Dutch to put an end to, the +English sovereignty or dominion. The obstinacy of the Dutch in +objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the English +flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most Englishmen, and +probably of most Dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which +other reasons may have rendered inevitable. The remarkable thing +about the Dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the +possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea. We came +out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the +greatest, naval power. It is this which prompted Vice-Admiral P. +H. Colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such +as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior +purpose,' &c. An explanation that would make all these terms +intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. It +will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts +to gain which, as Colomb tells us, the Anglo-Dutch wars were +the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the +nation whose power on the sea is paramount. It exists and may +be visible in time of peace. The command which, as said above, +expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in +time of war. It can easily be seen that the former is essential to +an empire like the British, the parts of which are bound together +by maritime communications. Inability to keep these communications +open can have only one result, viz. the loss of the parts with +which communication cannot be maintained. Experience of war as +well as reason will have made it evident that inability to keep +open sea-communications cannot be limited to any single line, +because the inability must be due either to incapacity in the +direction of hostilities or insufficiency of force. If we have +not force enough to keep open all the communications of our widely +extended empire, or if--having force enough--we are too foolish +to employ it properly, we do not hold the command of the sea, +and the empire must fall if seriously attacked. + +The strategic command of the sea in a particular war or campaign +has equal concern for all maritime belligerents. Before seeing +what it is, it will be well to learn on high authority what it is +not. Mahan says that command, or, to use his own term, 'control +of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single +ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross +more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents +upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded +harbours. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions +are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however +great the inequality of naval strength.'[55] The Anglo-French +command of the sea in 1854-56, complete as it was, did not enable +the allies to intercept the Russian ships in the North-Western +Pacific, nor did that held by the Federals in the American civil +war put an early stop to the cruises of the Confederate vessels. +What the term really does imply is the power possessed from the +first, or gained during hostilities, by one belligerent of carrying +out considerable over-sea expeditions at will. In the Russian +war just mentioned the allies had such overwhelmingly superior +sea-power that the Russians abandoned to them without a struggle +the command of the sea; and the more recent landing in South +Africa, more than six thousand miles away, of a large British army +without even a threat of interruption on the voyage is another +instance of unchallenged command. In wars between great powers +and also between secondary powers, if nearly equally matched, +this absence of challenge is rare. The rule is that the command +of the sea has to be won after hostilities begin. To win it the +enemy's naval force must be neutralised. It must be driven into +his ports and there blockaded or 'masked,' and thus rendered +virtually innocuous; or it must be defeated and destroyed. The +latter is the preferable, because the more effective, plan. As +was perceptible in the Spanish-American war of 1898, as long +as one belligerent's fleet is intact or at large, the other is +reluctant to carry out any considerable expedition over-sea. In +fact, the command of the sea has not been secured whilst the +enemy continues to have a 'fleet in being.'[56] + +[Footnote 55: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, 1890, p. 4.] + +[Footnote 56: See _ante_, Sea-Power, p. 50.] + +In 1782 a greatly superior Franco-Spanish fleet was covering +the siege of Gibraltar. Had this fleet succeeded in preventing +the revictualling of the fortress the garrison would have been +starved into surrender. A British fleet under Lord Howe, though +much weaker in numbers, had not been defeated and was still at +large. Howe, in spite of the odds against him, managed to get his +supply-ships in to the anchorage and to fight a partial action, in +which he did the allies as much damage as he received. There has +never been a display of higher tactical skill than this operation +of Howe's, though, it may be said, he owes his fame much more +to his less meritorious performance on the first of June. The +revictualling of Gibraltar surpassed even Suffren's feat of the +capture of Trincomalee in the same year. In 1798 the French, +assuming that a temporary superiority in the Mediterranean had +given them a free hand on the water, sent a great expedition to +Egypt. Though the army which was carried succeeded in landing +there, the covering fleet was destroyed by Nelson at the Nile, +and the army itself was eventually forced to surrender. The French +had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor +operations, you cannot separate the command of the Mediterranean +or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general. +Local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty +raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel; +but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring +considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything +likely to have an important influence on the course of the war. +If Great Britain has not naval force enough to retain command +of the Mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough +to retain command of the English Channel. It can be easily shown +why it should be so. In war danger comes less from conditions of +locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. Taking up a weak +position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of +his power, but it does not constitute it.[57] A maritime enemy's +power to hurt resides in his fleet. If that can be neutralised +his power disappears. It is in the highest degree improbable +that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into +fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in +which the enemy may try to do us mischief. The most promising +plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when +he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat +him. The proper station of the British fleet in war should, +accordingly, be the nearest possible point to the enemy's force. +This was the fundamental principle of Nelson's strategy, and it +is as valid now as ever it was. If we succeed in getting into +close proximity to the hostile fleet with an adequate force of +our own, our foe cannot obtain command of the sea, or of any +part of it, whether that part be the Mediterranean or the English +Channel, at any rate until he has defeated us. If he is strong +enough to defeat our fleet he obtains the command of the sea +in general; and it is for him to decide whether he shall show +the effectiveness of that command in the Mediterranean or in +the Channel. + +[Footnote 57: In his _History_of_Scotland_ (1873). J. H. M. Burton, +speaking of the Orkney and Shetland isles in the Viking times, +says (vol. i. p. 320): 'Those who occupied them were protected, +not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete +command over the North Sea held by the fleets that found shelter +in the fiords and firths.'] + +In the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular +area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or +at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements. +When the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought +not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a +small hostile expedition may slip across, say the Channel, throw +shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home +again unmolested. Its action would have no sort of influence on +the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless. It +would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were +repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated +system of 'cross-raiding,' discarded centuries ago, not at all +for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war +could be more effectually waged in other ways. The nation in +command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal +submission of an already defeated enemy, as Russia did when at +war with Sweden in 1719; but in such a case the other side cannot +retaliate. Temporary command of local waters will also permit of +operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks; +but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the +time available. If the duration of the temporary command is +insufficient the operation must fail. It must fail even if the +earlier steps have been taken successfully. Temporary command +of the Baltic in war might enable a German force to occupy an +Aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into +permanent command, Germany could make no use of the acquisition, +which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former +possessors. The command of the English Channel, which Napoleon +wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only +temporary. It is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened +in Egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite +independently of the proceedings of Villeneuve, he hesitated to +risk a second battle of the Nile and the loss of a second army. +It may have been this which justified his later statement that he +did not really mean to invade England. In any case, the English +practice of fixing the station of their fleet wherever that of +the enemy's was, would have seriously shortened the duration +of his command of the Channel, even if it had allowed it to be +won at all. Moreover, attempts to carry out a great operation +of war against time as well as against the efforts of the enemy +to prevent it are in the highest degree perilous. + +In war the British Navy has three prominent duties to discharge. It +has to protect our maritime trade, to keep open the communications +between the different parts of the empire, and to prevent invasion. +If we command the sea these duties will be discharged effectually. +As long as we command the sea the career of hostile cruisers +sent to prey on our commerce will be precarious, because command +of the sea carries with it the necessity of possessing an ample +cruiser force. As long as the condition mentioned is satisfied +our ocean communications will be kept open, because an inferior +enemy, who cannot obtain the command required, will be too much +occupied in seeing to his own safety to be able to interfere +seriously with that of any part of our empire. This being so, +it is evident that the greater operation of invasion cannot be +attempted, much less carried to a successful termination, by the +side which cannot make head against the opposing fleet. Command of +the sea is the indispensable preliminary condition of a successful +military expedition sent across the water. It enables the nation +which possesses it to attack its foes where it pleases and where +they seem to be most vulnerable. At the same time it gives to its +possessor security against serious counter-attacks, and affords +to his maritime commerce the most efficient protection that can +be devised. It is, in fact, the main object of naval warfare. + + + + +III + +WAR AND ITS CHIEF LESSONS[58] + +[Footnote 58: Written in 1900. (_Naval_Annual_, 1901.)] + +Had the expression 'real war' been introduced into the title of +this chapter, its introduction would have been justifiable. The +sources--if not of our knowledge of combat, at least of the views +which are sure to prevail when we come to actual fighting--are to +be found in two well-defined, dissimilar, and widely separated +areas. Within one are included the records of war; within the +other, remembrance of the exercises and manoeuvres of a time of +peace. The future belligerent will almost of a certainty have taken +a practical part in the latter, whilst it is probable that he will +have had no personal experience of the former. The longer the time +elapsed since hostilities were in progress, the more probable and +more general does this absence of experience become. The fighting +man--that is to say, the man set apart, paid, and trained so as +to be ready to fight when called upon--is of the same nature as +the rest of his species. This is a truism; but it is necessary to +insist upon it, because professional, and especially professorial, +strategists and tacticians almost invariably ignore it. That which +we have seen and know has not only more, but very much more, +influence upon the minds of nearly all of us than that of which +we have only heard, and, most likely, heard but imperfectly. The +result is that, when peace is interrupted and the fighting man--on +both sea and land--is confronted with the problems of practical +belligerency, he brings to his attempts at their solution an +intellectual equipment drawn, not from knowledge of real war, +but from the less trustworthy arsenal of the recollections of +his peace training. + +When peace, especially a long peace, ends, the methods which it +has introduced are the first enemies which the organised defenders +of a country have to overcome. There is plenty of evidence to prove +that--except, of course, in unequal conflicts between highly +organised, civilised states and savage or semi-barbarian +tribes--success in war is directly proportionate to the extent +of the preliminary victory over the predominance of impressions +derived from the habits and exercises of an armed force during +peace. That the cogency of this evidence is not invariably recognised +is to be attributed to insufficient attention to history and to +disinclination to apply its lessons properly. A primary object +of the _Naval_Annual_--indeed, the chief reason for its +publication--being to assist in advancing the efficiency of the +British Navy, its pages are eminently the place for a review +of the historical examples of the often-recurring inability of +systems established in peace to stand the test of war. Hostilities +on land being more frequent, and much more frequently written +about, than those by sea, the history of the former as well as +of the latter must be examined. The two classes of warfare have +much in common. The principles of their strategy are identical; +and, as regards some of their main features, so are those of +the tactics followed in each. Consequently the history of land +warfare has its lessons for those who desire to achieve success +in warfare on the sea. + +That this has often been lost sight of is largely due to a +misapprehension of the meaning of terms. The two words 'military' +and 'army' have been given, in English, a narrower signification +than they ought, and than they used, to have. Both terms have +been gradually restricted in their use, and made to apply only +to the land service. This has been unfortunate; because records +of occurrences and discussions, capable of imparting much valuable +instruction to naval officers, have been passed over by them +as inapplicable to their own calling. It may have been noticed +that Captain Mahan uses the word 'military' in its right sense +as indicating the members, and the most important class of +operations, of both land- and sea-forces. The French, through +whom the word has come to us from the Latin, use it in the same +sense as Mahan. _Un_militaire_ is a member of either a land +army or a navy. The 'Naval _and_ Military Intelligence' of the +English press is given under the heading 'Nouvelles Militaires' +in the French. Our word 'army' also came to us direct from the +French, who still apply it equally to both services--_armee_de_ +_terre,_armee_de_mer_. It is a participle, and means 'armed,' +the word 'force' being understood. The kindred words _armada_ in +Spanish and Portuguese, and _armata_ in Italian--equally derived +from the Latin--are used to indicate a fleet or navy, another +name being given to a land army. The word 'army' was generally +applied to a fleet in former days by the English, as will be +seen on reference to the Navy Records Society's volumes on the +defeat of the Spanish Armada. + +This short etymological discussion is not inappropriate here, +for it shows why we should not neglect authorities on the history +and conduct of war merely because they do not state specially +that they are dealing with the naval branch of it. + +A very slight knowledge of history is quite enough to make us +acquainted with the frequent recurrence of defeats and disasters +inflicted on armed forces by antagonists whose power to do so +had not been previously suspected. It has been the same on the +sea as on the land, though--owing to more copious records--we +may have a larger list of events on the latter. It will not be +denied that it is of immense importance to us to inquire how this +happened, and ascertain how--for the future--it may be rendered +highly improbable in our own case. A brief enumeration of the more +striking instances will make it plain that the events in question +have been confined to no particular age and to no particular +country. + +It may be said that the more elaborately organised and trained +in peace time an armed force happened to be, the more unexpected +always, and generally the more disastrous, was its downfall. +Examples of this are to be found in the earliest campaigns of +which we have anything like detailed accounts, and they continue +to reappear down to very recent times. In the elaborate nature +of its organisation and training there probably never has been +an army surpassing that led by Xerxes into Greece twenty-four +centuries ago. Something like eight years had been devoted to +its preparation. The minute account of its review by Xerxes on +the shores of the Hellespont proves that, however inefficient +the semi-civilised contingents accompanying it may have been, +the regular Persian army appeared, in discipline, equipment, +and drill, to have come up to the highest standard of the most +intense 'pipeclay' epoch. In numbers alone its superiority was +considerable to the last, and down to the very eve of Plataea its +commander openly displayed his contempt for his enemy. Yet no +defeat could be more complete than that suffered by the Persians +at the hands of their despised antagonists. + +As if to establish beyond dispute the identity of governing +conditions in both land and maritime wars, the next very conspicuous +disappointment of an elaborately organised force was that of the +Athenian fleet at Syracuse. At the time Athens, without question, +stood at the head of the naval world: her empire was in the truest +sense the product of sea-power. Her navy, whilst unequalled in size, +might claim, without excessive exaggeration, to be invincible. The +great armament which the Athenians despatched to Sicily seemed, in +numbers alone, capable of triumphing over all resistance. If the +Athenian navy had already met with some explicable mishaps, it +looked back with complacent confidence on the glorious achievements +of more than half a century previously. It had enjoyed many years +of what was so nearly a maritime peace that its principal exploits +had been the subjection of states weak to insignificance on the +sea as compared with imperial Athens. Profuse expenditure on its +maintenance; the 'continued practice' of which Pericles boasted, +the peace manoeuvres of a remote past; skilfully designed equipment; +and the memory of past glories;--all these did not avail to save +it from defeat at the hands of an enemy who only began to organise +a fleet when the Athenians had invaded his coast waters. + +Ideal perfection as a regular army has never been so nearly reached +as by that of Sparta. The Spartan spent his life in the barrack +and the mess-room; his amusements were the exercises of the parade +ground. For many generations a Spartan force had never been defeated +in a pitched battle. We have had, in modern times, some instances +of a hectoring soldiery arrogantly prancing amongst populations +whose official defenders it had defeated in battle; but nonesuch +could vie with the Spartans in the sublimity of their military +self-esteem. Overweening confidence in the prowess of her army +led Sparta to trample with ruthless disdain on the rights of +others. The iniquitous attack on Thebes, a state thought incapable +of effectual resentment, was avenged by the defeat of Leuctra, +which announced the end of the political supremacy and the military +predominance of Sparta. + +In the series of struggles with Carthage which resulted in putting +Rome in a position enabling her eventually to win the dominion +of the ancient world, the issue was to be decided on the water. +Carthage was essentially a maritime state. The foundation of the +city was effected by a maritime expedition; its dominions lay on +the neighbouring coast or in regions to which the Carthaginians +could penetrate only by traversing the sea. To Carthage her fleet +was 'all in all': her navy, supported by large revenues and +continuously maintained, was more of a 'regular' force than any +modern navy before the second half of the seventeenth century. The +Romans were almost without a fleet, and when they formed one the +undertaking was ridiculed by the Carthaginians with an unconcealed +assumption of superiority. The defeat of the latter off Mylae, +the first of several, came as a great surprise to them, and, as +we can see now, indicated the eventual ruin of their city. + +We are so familiar with stories of the luxury and corruption of +the Romans during the decline of the empire that we are likely +to forget that the decline went on for centuries, and that their +armed forces, however recruited, presented over and over again +abundant signs of physical courage and vigour. The victory of +Stilicho over Alaric at Pollentia has been aptly paralleled with +that of Marius over the Cimbri. This was by no means the only +achievement of the Roman army of the decadence. A century and +a quarter later--when the Empire of the West had fallen and the +general decline had made further progress--Belisarius conducted +successful campaigns in Persia, in North Africa, in Sicily, and +in Italy. The mere list of countries shows that the mobility and +endurance of the Roman forces during a period in which little +creditable is generally looked for were not inferior to their +discipline and courage. Yet they met with disastrous defeat after +all, and at the hands of races which they had more than once +proved themselves capable of withstanding. It could not have been +because the later Roman equipment was inferior, the organisation +less elaborate, or the training less careful than those of their +barbarian enemies. + +Though it is held by some in these days that the naval power +of Spain in the latter part of the sixteenth century was not +really formidable, that does not appear to have been the opinion +of contemporaries, whether Spaniards or otherwise. Some English +seamen of the time did, indeed, declare their conviction that +Philip the Second's navy was not so much to be feared as many +of their fellow-countrymen thought; but, in the public opinion +of the age, Spain was the greatest, or indeed the one great, +naval state. She possessed a more systematically organised navy +than any other country having the ocean for a field of action +had then, or till long afterwards. Even Genoa and Venice, whose +operations, moreover, were restricted to Mediterranean waters, +could not have been served by more finished specimens of the +naval officer and the man-of-war's man of the time than a large +proportion of the military _personnel_ of the regular Spanish +fleet. As Basques, Castilians, Catalans, or Aragonese, or all +combined, the crews of Spanish fighting ships could look back +upon a glorious past. It was no wonder that, by common consent +of those who manned it, the title of 'Invincible' was informally +conferred upon the Armada which, in 1588, sailed for the English +Channel. How it fared is a matter of common knowledge. No one +could have been more surprised at the result than the gallant +officers who led its squadrons. + +Spain furnishes another instance of the unexpected overthrow of +a military body to which long cohesion and precise organisation +were believed to have secured invincibility. The Spanish was +considered the 'most redoubtable infantry in Europe' till its +unexpected defeat at Rocroi. The effects of this defeat were +far-reaching. Notwithstanding the bravery of her sons, which +has never been open to question, and, in fact, has always been +conspicuous, the military superiority of Spain was broken beyond +repair. + +In the history of other countries are to be found examples equally +instructive. The defeats of Almansa, Brihuega, and Villaviciosa +were nearly contemporary with the victories of Blenheim and +Ramillies; and the thousands of British troops compelled to lay +down their arms at the first named belonged to the same service +as their fellow-countrymen who so often marched to victory under +Marlborough. A striking example of the disappointment which lies +in wait for military self-satisfaction was furnished by the defeat +of Soubise at Rossbach by Frederick the Great. Before the action +the French had ostentatiously shown their contempt for their +opponent. + +The service which gloried in the exploits of Anson and of Hawke +discerned the approach of the Seven Years' war without misgiving; +and the ferocity shown in the treatment of Byng enables us now +to measure the surprise caused by the result of the action off +Minorca. There were further surprises in store for the English +Navy. At the end of the Seven Years' war its reputation for +invincibility was generally established. Few, perhaps none, ventured +to doubt that, if there were anything like equality between the +opposing forces, a meeting between the French and the British +fleets could have but one result--viz. the decisive victory of +the latter. Experience in the English Channel, on the other side +of the Atlantic, and in the Bay of Bengal--during the war of +American Independence--roughly upset this flattering anticipation. +Yet, in the end, the British Navy came out the unquestioned victor +in the struggle: which proves the excellence of its quality. After +every allowance is made for the incapacity of the Government, +we must suspect that there was something else which so often +frustrated the efforts of such a formidable force as the British +Navy of the day must essentially have been. On land the surprises +were even more mortifying; and it is no exaggeration to say that, +a year before it occurred, such an event as the surrender of +Burgoyne's army to an imperfectly organised and trained body of +provincials would have seemed impossible. + +The army which Frederick the Great bequeathed to Prussia was +universally regarded as the model of efficiency. Its methods were +copied in other countries, and foreign officers desiring to excel +in their profession made pilgrimages to Berlin and Potsdam to drink +of the stream of military knowledge at its source. When it came in +contact with the tumultuous array of revolutionary France, the +performances of the force that preserved the tradition of the great +Frederick were disappointingly wanting in brilliancy. A few years +later it suffered an overwhelming disaster. The Prussian defeat +at Jena was serious as a military event; its political effects +were of the utmost importance. Yet many who were involved in that +disaster took, later on, an effective part in the expulsion of +the conquerors from their country, and in settling the history +of Europe for nearly half a century at Waterloo. + +The brilliancy of the exploits of Wellington and the British +army in Portugal and Spain has thrown into comparative obscurity +that part of the Peninsular war which was waged for years by +the French against the Spaniards. Spain, distracted by palace +intrigues and political faction, with the flower of her troops +in a distant comer of Europe, and several of her most important +fortresses in the hands of her assailant, seemed destined to +fall an easy and a speedy prey to the foremost military power in +the world. The attitude of the invaders made it evident that they +believed themselves to be marching to certain victory. Even the +British soldiers--of whom there were never many more than 50,000 +in the Peninsula, and for some years not half that number--were +disdained until they had been encountered. The French arms met +with disappointment after disappointment. On one occasion a whole +French army, over 18,000 strong, surrendered to a Spanish force, +and became prisoners of war. Before the struggle closed there +were six marshals of France with nearly 400,000 troops in the +Peninsula. The great efforts which these figures indicate were +unsuccessful, and the intruders were driven from the country. Yet +they were the comrades of the victors of Austerlitz, of Jena, +and of Wagram, and part of that mighty organisation which had +planted its victorious standards in Berlin and Vienna, held down +Prussia like a conquered province, and shattered into fragments +the holy Roman Empire. + +In 1812 the British Navy was at the zenith of its glory. It had +not only defeated all its opponents; it had also swept the seas of +the fleets of the historic maritime powers--of Spain, of France, +which had absorbed the Italian maritime states, of the Netherlands, +of Denmark. Warfare, nearly continuous for eighteen, and +uninterrupted for nine years, had transformed the British Navy +into an organisation more nearly resembling a permanently maintained +force than it had been throughout its previous history. Its long +employment in serious hostilities had saved it from some of the +failings which the narrow spirit inherent in a close profession +is only too sure to foster. It had, however, a confidence--not +unjustified by its previous exploits--in its own invincibility. +This confidence did not diminish, and was not less ostentatiously +exhibited, as its great achievements receded more and more into +the past. The new enemy who now appeared on the farther side of +the Atlantic was not considered formidable. In the British Navy +there were 145,000 men. In the United States Navy the number +of officers, seamen, and marines available for ocean service +was less than 4500--an insignificant numerical addition to the +enemies with whom we were already contending. The subsequent +and rapid increase in the American _personnel_ to 18,000 shows +the small extent to which it could be considered a 'regular' +force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered +by the hastily enrolled additions. Our defeats in the war of +1812 have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did +constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly +significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention. Rebuffs +of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at New +Orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of Busaco, +Fuentes de Onoro, and Salamanca, met with a serious defeat. + +When the Austro-Prussian war broke out in 1866, the Austrian +commander-in-chief, General Benedek, published an order, probably +still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the +contempt for the enemy felt in the Imperial army. Even those +who perceived that the Prussian forces were not fit subjects of +contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the Austrians. +Yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats +with the Prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of +hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of +superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign +to make peace to avoid further disasters. + +At the beginning of the Franco-German war of 1870, the widespread +anticipation of French victories was clearly shown by the unanimity +with which the journalists of various nationalities illustrated +their papers with maps giving the country between the French +frontier and Berlin, and omitting the part of France extending +to Paris. In less than five weeks from the opening of hostilities +events had made it certain that a map of the country to the eastward +of Lorraine would be practically useless to a student of the +campaign, unless it were to follow the route of the hundreds +of thousands of French soldiers who were conveyed to Germany as +prisoners of war. + +It is to be specially noted that in the above enumeration only +contests in which the result was unexpected--unexpected not only +by the beaten side but also by impartial observers--have been +specified. In all wars one side or the other is defeated; and it +has not been attempted to give a general _resume_ of the history +of war. The object has been to show the frequency--in all ages +and in all circumstances of systematic, as distinguished from +savage, warfare--of the defeat of the force which by general +consent was regarded as certain to win. Now it is obvious that +a result so frequently reappearing must have a distinct cause, +which is well worth trying to find out. Discovery of the cause +may enable us to remove it in the future, and thus prevent results +which are likely to be all the more disastrous because they have +not been foreseen. + +Professional military writers--an expression which, as before +explained, includes naval--do not help us much in the prosecution +of the search which is so eminently desirable. As a rule, they +have contrived rather to hide than to bring to light the object +sought for. It would be doing them injustice to assume that this +has been done with deliberate intention. It is much more likely +due to professional bias, which exercises over the minds of members +of definitely limited professions incessant and potent domination. +When alluding to occurrences included in the enumeration given +above, they exhibit signs of a resolve to defend their profession +against possible imputations of inefficiency, much more than +a desire to get to the root of the matter. This explains the +unremitting eagerness of military writers to extol the special +qualities developed by long-continued service habits and methods. +They are always apprehensive of the possibility of credit being +given to fighting bodies more loosely organised and less precisely +trained in peace time than the body to which they themselves +belong. + +This sensitiveness as to the merits of their particular profession, +and impatience of even indirect criticism, are unnecessary. There +is nothing in the history of war to show that an untrained force +is better than a trained force. On the contrary, all historical +evidence is on the other side. In quite as many instances as are +presented by the opposite, the forces which put an unexpected +end to the military supremacy long possessed by their antagonists +were themselves, in the strictest sense of the word, 'regulars.' +The Thebans whom Epaminondas led to victory over the Spartans at +Leuctra no more resembled a hasty levy of armed peasants or men +imperfectly trained as soldiers than did Napoleon's army which +overthrew the Prussians at Jena, or the Germans who defeated the +French at Gravelotte and Sedan. Nothing could have been less like +an 'irregular' force than the fleet with which La Galissonniere +beat Byng off Minorca, or the French fleets which, in the war +of American Independence, so often disappointed the hopes of +the British. The records of war on land and by sea--especially +the extracts from them included in the enumeration already +given--lend no support to the silly suggestion that efficient +defence can be provided for a country by 'an untrained man with +a rifle behind a hedge.' The truth is that it was not the absence +of organisation or training on one side which enabled it to defeat +the other. If the beaten side had been elaborately organised and +carefully trained, there must have been something bad in its +organisation or its methods. + +Now this 'something bad,' this defect--wherever it has disclosed +itself--has been enough to neutralise the most splendid courage +and the most unselfish devotion. It has been seen that armies +and navies the valour of which has never been questioned have +been defeated by antagonists sometimes as highly organised as +they were, and sometimes much less so. This ought to put us on +the track of the cause which has produced an effect so little +anticipated. A 'regular' permanently embodied or maintained service +of fighting men is always likely to develop a spirit of intense +professional self-satisfaction. The more highly organised it is, +and the more sharply its official frontiers are defined, the +more intense is this spirit likely to become. A 'close' service of +the kind grows restive at outside criticism, and yields more and +more to the conviction that no advance in efficiency is possible +unless it be the result of suggestions emanating from its own +ranks. Its view of things becomes narrower and narrower, whereas +efficiency in war demands the very widest view. Ignorant critics +call the spirit thus engendered 'professional conservatism'; the +fact being that change is not objected to--is even welcomed, +however frequent it may be, provided only that it is suggested +from inside. An immediate result is 'unreality and formalism of +peace training'--to quote a recent thoughtful military critic. + +As the formalism becomes more pronounced, so the unreality increases. +The proposer or introducer of a system of organisation of training +or of exercises is often, perhaps usually, capable of distinguishing +between the true and the false, the real and the unreal. His +successors, the men who continue the execution of his plans, +can hardly bring to their work the open mind possessed by the +originator; they cannot escape from the influence of the methods +which have been provided for them ready made, and which they are +incessantly engaged in practising. This is not a peculiarity of +the military profession in either branch--it extends to nearly +every calling; but in the profession specified, which is a service +rather than a freely exercised profession, it is more prominent. +Human thought always has a tendency to run in grooves, and in +military institutions the grooves are purposely made deep, and +departure from them rigorously forbidden. All exercises, even +those designed to have the widest scope, tend to become mere +drill. Each performance produces, and bequeaths for use on the +next occasion, a set of customary methods of execution which are +readily adopted by the subsequent performers. There grows up in +time a kind of body of customary law governing the execution of +peace operations--the principles being peace-operation principles +wholly and solely--which law few dare to disobey, and which +eventually obtains the sanction of official written regulations. +As Scharnhorst, quoted by Baron von der Goltz, said, 'We have +begun to place the art of war higher than military virtues.' +The eminent authority who thus expressed himself wrote the words +before the great catastrophe of Jena; and, with prophetic insight +sharpened by his fear of the menacing tendency of peace-training +formalism and unreality, added his conviction that 'this has +been the ruin of nations from time immemorial.' + +Independently of the evidence of history already adduced, it +would be reasonable to conclude that the tendency is strengthened +and made more menacing when the service in which it prevails +becomes more highly specialised. If custom and regulation leave +little freedom of action to the individual members of an armed +force, the difficulty--sure to be experienced by them--of shaking +themselves clear of their fetters when the need for doing so arises +is increased. To realise--when peace is broken--the practical +conditions of war demands an effort of which the unfettered +intelligence alone seems capable. The great majority of successful +leaders in war on both elements have not been considerably, or +at all, superior in intellectual acuteness to numbers of their +fellows; but they have had strength of character, and their minds +were not squeezed in a mould into a commonplace and uniform pattern. + +The 'canker of a long peace,' during recent years at any rate, +is not manifested in disuse of arms, but in mistaken methods. +For a quarter of a century the civilised world has tended more +and more to become a drill-ground, but the spirit dominating +it has been that of the pedant. There has been more exercise +and less reality. The training, especially of officers, becomes +increasingly scholastic. This, and the deterioration consequent +on it, are not merely modern phenomena. They appear in all ages. +'The Sword of the Saracens,' says Gibbon, 'became less formidable +when their youth was drawn from the camp to the college.' The +essence of pedantry is want of originality. It is nourished on +imitation. For the pedant to imitate is enough of itself; to +him the suitability of the model is immaterial. Thus military +bodies have been ruined by mimicry of foreign arrangements quite +inapplicable to the conditions of the mimics' country. More than +twenty years ago Sir Henry Maine, speaking of the war of American +Independence, said, 'Next to their stubborn valour, the chief +secret of the colonists' success was the incapacity of the English +generals, trained in the stiff Prussian system soon to perish +at Jena, to adapt themselves to new conditions of warfare.' He +pointed out that the effect of this uncritical imitation of what +was foreign was again experienced by men 'full of admiration +of a newer German system.' We may not be able to explain what +it is, but, all the same, there does exist something which we +call national characteristics. The aim of all training should +be to utilise these to the full, not to ignore them. The naval +methods of a continental state with relatively small oceanic +interests, or with but a brief experience of securing these, +cannot be very applicable to a great maritime state whose chief +interests have been on the seas for many years. + +How is all this applicable to the ultimate efficiency of the +British Navy? It may be allowed that there is a good deal of +truth in what has been written above; but it may be said that +considerations sententiously presented cannot claim to have much +practical value so long as they are absolute and unapplied. The +statement cannot be disputed. It is unquestionably necessary +to make the application. The changes in naval _materiel_, so +often spoken of, introduced within the last fifty years have been +rivalled by the changes in the composition of the British Navy. +The human element remains in original individual character exactly +the same as it always was; but there has been a great change in +the opportunities and facilities offered for the development of +the faculties most desired in men-of-war's men. All reform--using +the word in its true sense of alteration, and not in its strained +sense of improvement--has been in the direction of securing perfect +uniformity. If we take the particular directly suggested by the +word just used, we may remember, almost with astonishment, that +there was no British naval uniform for anyone below the rank of +officer till after 1860. Now, at every inspection, much time +is taken up in ascertaining if the narrow tape embroidery on +a frock collar is of the regulation width, and if the rows of +tape are the proper distance apart. The diameter of a cloth cap +is officially defined; and any departure from the regulation +number of inches (and fractions of an inch) is as sure of involving +punishment as insubordination. + +It is the same in greater things. Till 1853--in which year the +change came into force--there was no permanent British naval +service except the commissioned and warrant officers. Not till +several years later did the new 'continuous service' men equal +half of the bluejacket aggregate. Now, every bluejacket proper +serves continuously, and has been in the navy since boyhood. The +training of the boys is made uniform. No member of the ship's +company--except a domestic--is now allowed to set foot on board +a sea-going ship till he has been put through a training course +which is exactly like that through which every other member of +his class passes. Even during the comparatively brief period in +which young officers entered the navy by joining the college +at Portsmouth, it was only the minority who received the special +academic training. Till the establishment of the _Illustrious_ +training school in 1855, the great majority of officers joined +their first ship as individuals from a variety of different and +quite independent quarters. Now, every one of them has, as a +preliminary condition, to spend a certain time--the same for +all--in a school. Till a much later period, every engineer entered +separately. Now, passing through a training establishment is +obligatory for engineers also. + +Within the service there has been repeated formation of distinct +branches or 'schools,' such as the further specialised specialist +gunnery and torpedo sections. It was not till 1860 that uniform +watch bills, quarter bills, and station bills were introduced, and +not till later that their general adoption was made compulsory. Up +to that time the internal organisation and discipline of a ship +depended on her own officers, it being supposed that capacity +to command a ship implied, at least, capacity to distribute and +train her crew. The result was a larger scope than is now thought +permissible for individual capability. However short-lived some +particular drill or exercise may be, however soon it is superseded +by another, as long as it lasts the strictest conformity to it is +rigorously enforced. Even the number of times that an exercise +has to be performed, difference in class of ship or in the nature +of the service on which she is employed notwithstanding, is +authoritatively laid down. Still more noteworthy, though much +less often spoken of than the change in _materiel_, has been +the progress of the navy towards centralisation. Naval duties +are now formulated at a desk on shore, and the mode of carrying +them out notified to the service in print. All this would have +been quite as astonishing to the contemporaries of Nelson or +of Exmouth and Codrington as the aspect of a battleship or of +a 12-inch breech-loading gun. + +Let it be clearly understood that none of these things has been +mentioned with the intention of criticising them either favourably +or unfavourably. They have been cited in order that it may be +seen that the change in naval affairs is by no means one in +_materiel_ only, and that the transformation in other matters has +been stupendous and revolutionary beyond all previous experience. +It follows inevitably from this that we shall wage war in future +under conditions dissimilar from any hitherto known. In this very +fact there lies the making of a great surprise. It will have +appeared from the historical statement given above how serious +a surprise sometimes turns out to be. Its consequences, always +significant, are not unfrequently far-reaching. The question of +practical moment is: How are we to guard ourselves against such +a surprise? To this a satisfactory answer can be given. It might +be summarised in the admonitions: abolish over-centralisation; +give proper scope to individual capacity and initiative; avoid +professional self-sufficiency. + +When closely looked at, it is one of the strangest manifestations +of the spirit of modern navies that, though the issues of land +warfare are rarely thought instructive, the peace methods of land +forces are extensively and eagerly copied by the sea-service. +The exercises of the parade ground and the barrack square are +taken over readily, and so are the parade ground and the barrack +square themselves. This may be right. The point is that it is +novel, and that a navy into the training of which the innovation +has entered must differ considerably from one that was without +it and found no need of it during a long course of serious wars. +At any rate, no one will deny that parade-ground evolutions and +barrack-square drill expressly aim at the elimination of +individuality, or just the quality to the possession of which +we owe the phenomenon called, in vulgar speech, the 'handy man.' +Habits and sentiments based on a great tradition, and the faculties +developed by them, are not killed all at once; but innovation +in the end annihilates them, and their not having yet entirely +disappeared gives no ground for doubting their eventual, and even +near, extinction. The aptitudes still universally most prized +in the seaman were produced and nourished by practices and under +conditions no longer allowed to prevail. Should we lose those +aptitudes, are we likely to reach the position in war gained +by our predecessors? + +For the British Empire the matter is vital: success in maritime +war, decisive and overwhelming, is indispensable to our existence. +We have to consider the desirability of 'taking stock' of our +moral, as well as of our material, naval equipment: to ascertain +where the accumulated effect of repeated innovations has carried +us. The mere fact of completing the investigation will help us to +rate at their true value the changes which have been introduced; +will show us what to retain, what to reject, and what to substitute. +There is no essential vagueness in these allusions. If they seem +vague, it is because the moment for particularising has not yet +come. The public opinion of the navy must first be turned in the +right direction. It must be led to question the soundness of +the basis on which many present methods rest. Having once begun +to do this, we shall find no difficulty in settling, in detail +and with precision, what the true elements of naval efficiency +are. + + + + +IV[59] + +THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT SERVICE + +[Footnote 59: Written in 1898. (_The_Times_.)] + +The regret, often expressed, that the crews of British merchant +ships now include a large proportion of foreigners, is founded +chiefly on the apprehension that a well-tested and hitherto secure +recruiting ground for the navy is likely to be closed. It has +been stated repeatedly, and the statement has been generally +accepted without question, that in former days, when a great +expansion of our fleet was forced on us by the near approach +of danger, we relied upon the ample resources of our merchant +service to complete the manning of our ships of war, even in +a short time, and that the demands of the navy upon the former +were always satisfied. It is assumed that compliance with those +demands was as a rule not voluntary, but was enforced by the +press-gang. The resources, it is said, existed and were within +reach, and the method employed in drawing upon them was a detail +of comparatively minor importance; our merchant ships were manned +by native-born British seamen, of whom tens of thousands were +always at hand, so that if volunteers were not forthcoming the +number wanted could be 'pressed' into the Royal service. It is +lamented that at the present day the condition of affairs is +different, that the presence in it of a large number of foreigners +forbids us to regard with any confidence the merchant service as an +adequate naval recruiting ground in the event of war, even though +we are ready to substitute for the system of 'impressment'--which +is now considered both undesirable and impossible--rewards likely +to attract volunteers. The importance of the subject need not +be dwelt upon. The necessity to a maritime state of a powerful +navy, including abundant resources for manning it, is now no +more disputed than the law of gravitation. If the proportion of +foreigners in our merchant service is too high it is certainly +deplorable; and if, being already too high, that proportion is +rising, an early remedy is urgently needed. I do not propose +to speak here of that matter, which is grave enough to require +separate treatment. + +My object is to present the results of an inquiry into the history +of the relations between the navy and the merchant service, from +which will appear to what extent the latter helped in bringing the +former up to a war footing, how far its assistance was affected +by the presence in it of any foreign element, and in what way +impressment ensured or expedited the rendering of the assistance. +The inquiry has necessarily been largely statistical; consequently +the results will often be given in a statistical form. This has the +great advantage of removing the conclusions arrived at from the +domain of mere opinion into that of admitted fact. The statistics +used are those which have not been, and are not likely to be, +questioned. It is desirable that this should be understood, because +official figures have not always commanded universal assent. Lord +Brougham, speaking in the House of Lords in 1849 of tables issued +by the Board of Trade, said that a lively impression prevailed +'that they could prove anything and everything'; and in connection +with them he adopted some unnamed person's remark, 'Give me half +an hour and the run of the multiplication table and I'll engage +to payoff the National Debt.' In this inquiry there has been no +occasion to use figures relating to the time of Lord Brougham's +observations. We will take the last three great maritime wars +in which our country has been engaged. These were: the war of +American Independence, the war with Revolutionary France to the +Peace of Amiens, and the war with Napoleon. The period covered +by these three contests roughly corresponds to the last quarter +of the eighteenth and the first fifteen years of the nineteenth +century. In each of the three wars there was a sudden and large +addition to the number of seamen in the navy; and in each there +were considerable annual increases as the struggle continued. It +must be understood that we shall deal with the case of seamen only; +the figures, which also were large, relating to the marines not +being included in our survey because it has never been contended +that their corps looked to the merchant service for any appreciable +proportion of its recruits. In taking note of the increase of +seamen voted for any year it will be necessary to make allowance +also for the 'waste' of the previous year. The waste, even in the +latter part of the last century, was large. Commander Robinson, +in his valuable work, 'The British Fleet,' gives details showing +that the waste during the Seven Years' war was so great as to be +truly shocking. In 1895 Lord Brassey (_Naval_Annual_) allowed +for the _personnel_ of the navy, even in these days of peace +and advanced sanitary science, a yearly waste of 5 per cent., a +percentage which is, I expect, rather lower than that officially +accepted. We may take it as certain that, during the three serious +wars above named, the annual waste was never less than 6 per +cent. This is, perhaps, to put it too low; but it is better to +understate the case than to appear to exaggerate it. The recruiting +demand, therefore, for a year of increased armament will be the +sum of the increase in men _plus_ the waste on the previous year's +numbers. + +The capacity of the British merchant service to supply what was +demanded would, of course, be all the greater the smaller the +number of foreigners it contained in its ranks. This is not only +generally admitted at the present day; it is also frequently +pointed out when it is asserted that the conditions now are less +favourable than they were owing to a recent influx of foreign +seamen. The fact, however, is that there were foreigners on board +British merchant ships, and, it would seem, in considerable numbers, +long before even the war of American Independence. By 13 George +II, c. 3, foreigners, not exceeding three-fourths of the crew, +were permitted in British vessels, 'and in two years to be +naturalised.' By 13 George II, c. 17, exemption from impressment +was granted to 'every person, being a foreigner, who shall serve in +any merchant ship, or other trading vessel or privateer belonging +to a subject of the Crown of Great Britain.' The Acts quoted +were passed about the time of the 'Jenkins' Ear War' and the +war of the Austrian Succession; but the fact that foreigners +were allowed to form the majority of a British vessel's crew is +worthy of notice. The effect and, probably, the object of this +legislation were not so much to permit foreign seamen to enter +our merchant service as to permit the number of those already +there to be increased. It was in 1759 that Lord, then Commander, +Duncan reported that the crew of the hired merchant ship _Royal_ +_Exchange_ consisted 'to a large extent of boys and foreigners, +many of whom could not speak English.' In 1770 by 11 George III, +c. 3, merchant ships were allowed to have three-fourths of their +crews foreigners till the 1st February 1772. Acts permitting +the same proportion of foreign seamen and extending the time +were passed in 1776, 1778, 1779, 1780, 1781, and 1782. A similar +Act was passed in 1792. It was in contemplation to reduce the +foreign proportion, after the war, to one-fourth. In 1794 it +was enacted (34 George III, c. 68), 'for the encouragement of +British seamen,' that after the expiration of six months from the +conclusion of the war, vessels in the foreign, as distinguished +from the coasting, trade were to have their commanders and +three-fourths of their crews British subjects. From the wording +of the Act it seems to have been taken for granted that the +proportion of three-fourths _bona_fide_ British-born seamen was +not likely to be generally exceeded. It will have been observed +that in all the legislation mentioned, from the time of George +II downwards, it was assumed as a matter of course that there +were foreign seamen on board our merchant vessels. The United +States citizens in the British Navy, about whom there was so +much discussion on the eve of the war of 1812, came principally +from our own merchant service, and not direct from the American. +It is remarkable that, until a recent date, the presence of +foreigners in British vessels, even in time of peace, was not +loudly or generally complained of. Mr. W. S. Lindsay, writing in +1876, stated that the throwing open the coasting trade in 1855 +had 'neither increased on the average the number of foreigners we +had hitherto been allowed to employ in our ships, nor deteriorated +the number and quality of British seamen.' I have brought forward +enough evidence to show that, as far as the merchant service +was the proper recruiting ground for the British Navy, it was +not one which was devoid of a considerable foreign element. + +We may, nevertheless, feel certain that that element never amounted +to, and indeed never nearly approached, three-fourths of the +whole number of men employed in our 'foreign-going' vessels. For +this, between 50,000 and 60,000 men would have been required, +at least in the last of the three wars above mentioned. If all +the foreign mercantile marines at the present day, when nearly +all have been so largely increased, were to combine, they could +not furnish the number required after their own wants had been +satisfied. During the period under review some of the leading +commercial nations were at war with us; so that few, if any, +seamen could have come to us from them. Our custom-house statistics +indicate an increase in the shipping trade of the neutral nations +sufficient to have rendered it impossible for them to spare us +any much larger number of seamen. Therefore, it is extremely +difficult to resist the conclusion that during the wars the +composition of our merchant service remained nearly what it was +during peace. It contained a far from insignificant proportion +of foreigners; and that proportion was augmented, though by no +means enormously, whilst war was going on. This leads us to the +further conclusion that, if our merchant service supplied the +navy with many men, it could recover only a small part of the +number from foreign countries. In fact, any that it could give +it had to replace from our own population almost exclusively. + +The question now to be considered is, What was the capacity of +the merchant service for supplying the demands of the navy? In +the year 1770 the number of seamen voted for the navy was 11,713. +Owing to a fear of a difficulty with Spain about the Falkland +Islands, the number for the following year was suddenly raised +to 31,927. Consequently, the increase was 20,214, which, added +to the 'waste' on the previous year, made the whole naval demand +about 21,000. We have not got statistics of the seamen of the +whole British Empire for this period, but we have figures which +will enable us to compute the number with sufficient accuracy +for the purpose in hand. In England and Wales there were some +59,000 seamen, and those of the rest of the empire amounted to +about 21,000. Large as the 'waste' was in the Royal Navy, it +was, and still is, much larger in the merchant service. We may +safely put it at 8 per cent. at least. Therefore, simply to keep +up its numbers--80,000--the merchant service would have had to +engage fully 6400 fresh hands. In view of these figures, it is +difficult to believe that it could have furnished the navy with +21,000 men, or, indeed, with any number approximating thereto. +It could not possibly have done so without restricting its +operations, if only for a time. So far were its operations from +shrinking that they were positively extended. The English tonnage +'cleared outwards' from our ports was for the years mentioned +as follows: 1770, 703,495; 1771, 773,390; 1772 818,108. + +Owing to the generally slow rate of sailing when on voyages and +to the great length of time taken in unloading and reloading +abroad--both being often effected 'in the stream' and with the +ship's own boats--the figures for clearances outward much more +nearly represented the amount of our 'foreign-going' tonnage +a century ago than similar figures would now in these days of +rapid movement. After 1771 the navy was reduced and kept at a +relatively low standard till 1775. In that year the state of +affairs in America rendered an increase of our naval forces +necessary. In 1778 we were at war with France; in 1779 with Spain +as well; and in December 1780 we had the Dutch for enemies in +addition. In September 1783 we were again at peace. The way in +which we had to increase the navy will be seen in the following +table:-- + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | 1774 | 15,646 | -- | -- | -- | + | 1775 | 18,000 | 2,354 | 936 | 3,290 | + | 1776 | 21,335 | 3,335 | 1,080 | 4,415 | + | 1777 | 34,871 | 13,536 | 1,278 | 14,184 | + | 1778 | 48,171 | 13,300 | 2,088 | 15,388 | + | 1779 | 52,611 | 4,440 | 2,886 | 7,326 | + | 1780 | 66,221 | 13,610 | 3,156 | 16,766 | + | 1781 | 69,683 | 3,462 | 3,972 | 7,434 | + | 1782 | 78,695 | 9,012 | 4,176 | 13,188 | + | 1783 | 84,709 | 6,014 | 4,722 | 10,736 | + ------------------------------------------------------- + +It cannot be believed that the merchant service, with its then +dimensions, could have possibly satisfied these great and repeated +demands, besides making up its own 'waste,' unless its size were +much reduced. After 1777, indeed, there was a considerable fall +in the figures of English tonnage 'outwards.' I give these figures +down to the first year of peace. + + 1777 736,234 tons 'outwards.' + 1778 657,238 " " + 1779 590,911 " " + 1780 619,462 " " + 1781 547,953 " " + 1782 552,851 " " + 1783 795,669 " " + 1784 846,355 " " + +At first sight it would seem as if there had, indeed, been a +shrinkage. We find, however, on further examination that in reality +there had been none. 'During the [American] war the ship-yards in +every port of Britain were full of employment; and consequently +new ship-yards were set up in places where ships had never been +built before.' Even the diminution in the statistics of outward +clearances indicated no diminution in the number of merchant +ships or their crews. The missing tonnage was merely employed +elsewhere. 'At this time there were about 1000 vessels of private +property employed by the Government as transports and in other +branches of the public service.' Of course there had been some +diminution due to the transfer of what had been British-American +shipping to a new independent flag. This would not have set free +any men to join the navy. + +When we come to the Revolutionary war we find ourselves confronted +with similar conditions. The case of this war has often been +quoted as proving that in former days the navy had to rely +practically exclusively on the merchant service when expansion +was necessary. In giving evidence before a Parliamentary committee +about fifty years ago, Admiral Sir T. Byam Martin, referring +to the great increase of the fleet in 1793, said, 'It was the +merchant service that enabled us to man some sixty ships of the +line and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels.' He +added that we had been able to bring promptly together 'about +35,000 or 40,000 men of the mercantile marine.' The requirements +of the navy amounted, as stated by the admiral, to about 40,000 +men; to be exact, 39,045. The number of seamen in the British +Empire in 1793 was 118,952. In the next year the number showed +no diminution; in fact it increased, though but slightly, to +119,629. How our merchant service could have satisfied the +above-mentioned immense demand on it in addition to making good +its waste and then have even increased is a thing that baffles +comprehension. No such example of elasticity is presented by +any other institution. Admiral Byam Martin spoke so positively, +and, indeed, with such justly admitted authority, that we should +have to give up the problem as insoluble were it not for other +passages in the admiral's own evidence. It may be mentioned that +all the witnesses did not hold his views. Sir James Stirling, an +officer of nearly if not quite equal authority, differed from +him. In continuation of his evidence Sir T. Byam Martin stated +that afterwards the merchant service could give only a small +and occasional supply, as ships arrived from foreign ports or as +apprentices grew out of their time. Now, during the remaining years +of this war and throughout the Napoleonic war, great as were the +demands of the navy, they only in one year, that of the rupture +of the Peace of Amiens, equalled the demand at the beginning of +the Revolutionary war. From the beginning of hostilities till +the final close of the conflict in 1815 the number of merchant +seamen fell only once--viz. in 1795, the fall being 3200. In 1795, +however, the demand for men for the navy was less than half that +of 1794. The utmost, therefore, that Sir T. Byam Martin desired +to establish was that, on a single occasion in an unusually +protracted continuance of war, the strength of our merchant service +enabled it to reinforce the navy up to the latter's requirements; +but its doing so prevented it from giving much help afterwards. +All the same, men in large numbers had to be found for the navy +yearly for a long time. This will appear from the tables which +follow:-- + + REVOLUTIONARY WAR + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | 1794 | 72,885 | 36,885 | 2,160 | 39,045 | + | 1795 | 85,000 | 12,115 | 4,368 | 16,483 | + | 1796 | 92,000 | 7,000 | 5,100 | 12,100 | + | 1797 | 100,000 | 8,000 | 5,520 | 13,520 | + | 1798 | 100,000 | -- | 6,000 | 6,000 | + | 1799 | 100,000 | -- | 6,000 | 6,000 | + | 1800 | 97,300 | -- | -- | -- | + | 1801 | 105,000 | 7,700 | Absorbed | 7,700 | + | | | | by | | + | | | | previous | | + | | | |reduction.| | + ------------------------------------------------------- + + NAPOLEONIC WAR + + ------------------------------------------------------- + | | | | | Total | + | | Seamen | | | additional | + | | voted for | | | number | + | Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. | + |-------------------------------------------------------| + | | /38,000\ | | | | + | 1803 | \77,600/ | 39,600 | -- | 39,600 | + | 1804 | 78,000 | 400 | 3,492 | 3,892 | + | | | |(for nine | | + | | | | months) | | + | 1805 | 90,000 | 12,000 | 4,680 | 16,680 | + | 1806 | 91,000 | 1,000 | 5,400 | 6,400 | + | 1807 | 98,600 | 7,600 | 5,460 | 13,060 | + | 1808 | 98,600 | -- | 5,460 | 5,460 | + | 1809 | 98,600 | -- | 5,460 | 5,460 | + | 1810 | 113,600 | 15,000 | 5,460 | 20,460 | + | 1811 | 113,600 | -- | 6,816 | 6,816 | + | 1812 | 113,600 | -- | 6,816 | 6,816 | + | 1813 | 108,600 | Reduction | -- | -- | + | | /86,000\ | | | | + | 1814 | \74,000/ | Do. | -- | -- | + ------------------------------------------------------- + +(No 'waste' is allowed for when there has been a reduction.) + +It is a reasonable presumption that, except perhaps on a single +occasion, the merchant service did not furnish the men required--not +from any want of patriotism or of public spirit, but simply because +it was impossible. Even as regards the single exception the evidence +is not uncontested; and by itself, though undoubtedly strong, it +is not convincing, in view of the well-grounded presumptions the +other way. The question then that naturally arises is--If the navy +did not fill up its complements from the merchant service, how +did it fill them up? The answer is easy. Our naval complements +were filled up largely with boys, largely with landsmen, largely +with fishermen, whose numbers permitted this without inconvenience +to their trade in general, and, to a small extent, with merchant +seamen. It may be suggested that the men wanted by the navy could +have been passed on to it from our merchant vessels, which could +then complete their own crews with boys, landsmen, and fishermen. +It was the age in which Dr. Price was a great authority on public +finance, the age of Mr. Pitt's sinking fund, when borrowed money +was repaid with further borrowings; so that a corresponding +roundabout method for manning the navy may have had attractions +for some people. A conclusive reason why it was not adopted is +that its adoption would have been possible only at the cost of +disorganising such a great industrial undertaking as our maritime +trade. That this disorganisation did not arise is proved by the +fact that our merchant service flourished and expanded. + +It is widely supposed that, wherever the men wanted for the navy +may have come from, they were forced into it by the system of +'impressment.' The popular idea of a man-of-war's 'lower deck' +of a century ago is that it was inhabited by a ship's company +which had been captured by the press-gang and was restrained +from revolting by the presence of a detachment of marines. The +prevalence of the belief that seamen were 'raised'--'recruited' is +not a naval term--for the navy by forcible means can be accounted +for without difficulty. The supposed ubiquity of the press-gang +and its violent procedure added much picturesque detail, and even +romance, to stories of naval life. Stories connected with it, +if authentic, though rare, would, indeed, make a deep impression +on the public; and what was really the exception would be taken +for the rule. There is no evidence to show that even from the +middle of the seventeenth century any considerable number of men +was raised by forcible impressment. I am not acquainted with a +single story of the press-gang which, even when much embellished, +professes to narrate the seizure of more than an insignificant body. +The allusions to forcible impressment made by naval historians +are, with few exceptions, complaints of the utter inefficiency +of the plan. In Mr. David, Hannay's excellent 'Short History of +the Royal Navy' will be found more than one illustration of its +inefficient working in the seventeenth century. Confirmation, +if confirmation is needed, can be adduced on the high authority +of Mr. M. Oppenheim. We wanted tens of thousands, and forcible +impressment was giving us half-dozens, or, at the best, scores. +Even of those it provided, but a small proportion was really +forced to serve. Mr. Oppenheim tells us of an Act of Parliament +(17 Charles I) legalising forcible impressment, which seems to +have been passed to satisfy the sailors. If anyone should think +this absurd, he may be referred to the remarkable expression of +opinion by some of the older seamen of Sunderland and Shields +when the Russian war broke out in 1854. The married sailors, they +said, naturally waited for the impressment, for 'we know that +has always been and always will be preceded by the proclamation +of bounty.' + +The most fruitful source of error as to the procedure of the +press-gang has been a deficient knowledge of etymology. The word +has, properly, no relation to the use of force, and has no +etymological connection with 'press' and its compounds, 'compress,' +'depress,' 'express,' 'oppress,' &c. 'Prest money is so-called +from the French word _prest_--that is, readie money, for that +it bindeth all those that have received it to be ready at all +times appointed.' Professor Laughton tells us that 'A prest or +imprest was an earnest or advance paid on account. A prest man +was really a man who received the prest of 12d., as a soldier +when enlisted.' Writers, and some in an age when precision in +spelling is thought important, have frequently spelled _prest_ +pressed, and _imprest_ impressed. The natural result has been +that the thousands who had received 'prest money' were classed +as 'pressed' into the service by force. + +The foregoing may be summed up as follows:-- + +For 170 years at least there never has been a time when the British +merchant service did not contain an appreciable percentage of +foreigners. + +During the last three (and greatest) maritime wars in which this +country has been involved only a small proportion of the immense +number of men required by the navy came, or could have come, +from the merchant service. + +The number of men raised for the navy by forcible impressment +in war time has been enormously exaggerated owing to a confusion +of terms. As a matter of fact the number so raised, for quite +two centuries, was only an insignificant fraction of the whole. + + + + +V + +FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT THE PRESS-GANG[60] + +[Footnote 60: Written in 1900, (_National_Review_.)] + +Of late years great attention has been paid to our naval history, +and many even of its obscure byways have been explored. A general +result of the investigation is that we are enabled to form a high +estimate of the merits of our naval administration in former +centuries. We find that for a long time the navy has possessed an +efficient organisation; that its right position as an element of +the national defences was understood ages ago; and that English +naval officers of a period which is now very remote showed by their +actions that they exactly appreciated and--when necessary--were able +to apply the true principles of maritime warfare. If anyone still +believes that the country has been saved more than once merely +by lucky chances of weather, and that the England of Elizabeth +has been converted into the great oceanic and colonial British +Empire of Victoria in 'a fit of absence of mind,' it will not +be for want of materials with which to form a correct judgment +on these points. + +It has been accepted generally that the principal method of manning +our fleet in the past--especially when war threatened to arise--was +to seize and put men on board the ships by force. This has been +taken for granted by many, and it seems to have been assumed that, +in any case, there is no way of either proving it or disproving +it. The truth, however, is that it is possible and--at least as +regards the period of our last great naval war--not difficult to +make sure if it is true or not. Records covering a long succession +of years still exist, and in these can be found the name of nearly +every seaman in the navy and a statement of the conditions on +which he joined it. The exceptions would not amount to more than +a few hundreds out of many tens of thousands of names, and would +be due to the disappearance--in itself very infrequent--of some of +the documents and to occasional, but also very rare, inaccuracies +in the entries. + +The historical evidence on which the belief in the prevalence +of impressment as a method of recruiting the navy for more than +a hundred years is based, is limited to contemporary statements +in the English newspapers, and especially in the issues of the +periodical called _The_Naval_Chronicle_, published in 1803, +the first year of the war following the rupture of the Peace +of Amiens. Readers of Captain Mahan's works on Sea-Power will +remember the picture he draws of the activity of the press-gang +in that year, his authority being _The_Naval_Chronicle_. This +evidence will be submitted directly to close examination, and +we shall see what importance ought to be attached to it. In the +great majority of cases, however, the belief above mentioned has +no historical foundation, but is to be traced to the frequency +with which the supposed operations of the press-gang were used +by the authors of naval stories and dramas, and by artists who +took scenes of naval life for their subject. Violent seizure and +abduction lend themselves to effective treatment in literature +and in art, and writers and painters did not neglect what was +so plainly suggested. + +A fruitful source of the widespread belief that our navy in the old +days was chiefly manned by recourse to compulsion, is a confusion +between two words of independent origin and different meaning, +which, in ages when exact spelling was not thought indispensable, +came to be written and pronounced alike. During our later great +maritime wars, the official term applied to anyone recruited by +impressment was 'prest-man.' In the sixteenth and seventeenth +centuries, and part of the eighteenth century, this term meant +the exact opposite. It meant a man who had voluntarily engaged to +serve, and who had received a sum in advance called 'prest-money.' +'A prest-man,' we are told by that high authority, Professor Sir +J. K. Laughton, 'was really a man who received the prest of 12d., +as a soldier when enlisted.' In the 'Encyclopaedia Metropolitana' +(1845), we find:-- 'Impressing, or, more correctly, impresting, +i.e. paying earnest-money to seamen by the King's Commission to +the Admiralty, is a right of very ancient date, and established +by prescription, though not by statute. Many statutes, however, +imply its existence--one as far back as 2 Richard II, cap. 4.' An +old dictionary of James I's time (1617), called 'The Guide into +the Tongues, by the Industrie, Studie, Labour, and at the Charges +of John Minshew,' gives the following definition:--'Imprest-money. +G. [Gallic or French], Imprest-ance; _Imprestanza_, from _in_ +and _prestare_, to lend or give beforehand.... Presse-money. T. +[Teutonic or German], Soldt, from salz, _salt_. For anciently +agreement or compact between the General and the soldier was +signified by salt.' Minshew also defines the expression 'to presse +souldiers' by the German _soldatenwerben_, and explains that +here the word _werben_ means prepare (_parare_). 'Prest-money,' +he says, 'is so-called of the French word _prest_, i.e. readie, +for that it bindeth those that have received it to be ready at +all times appointed.' In the posthumous work of Stephen Skinner, +'Etymologia Linguae Anglicanae' (1671), the author joins together +'press or imprest' as though they were the same, and gives two +definitions, viz.: (1) recruiting by force (_milites_cogere_); +(2) paying soldiers a sum of money and keeping them ready to serve. +Dr. Murray's 'New English Dictionary,' now in course of publication, +gives instances of the confusion between imprest and impress. A +consequence of this confusion has been that many thousands of +seamen who had received an advance of money have been regarded +as carried off to the navy by force. If to this misunderstanding +we add the effect on the popular mind of cleverly written stories +in which the press-gang figured prominently, we can easily see +how the belief in an almost universal adoption of compulsory +recruiting for the navy became general. It should, therefore, be +no matter of surprise when we find that the sensational reports +published in the English newspapers in 1803 were accepted without +question. + +Impressment of seamen for the navy has been called 'lawless,' and +sometimes it has been asserted that it was directly contrary to law. +There is, however, no doubt that it was perfectly legal, though its +legality was not based upon any direct statutory authority. Indirect +confirmations of it by statute are numerous. These appear in the +form of exemptions. The law of the land relating to this subject +was that all 'sea-faring' men were liable to impressment unless +specially protected by custom or statute. A consideration of the +long list of exemptions tends to make one believe that in reality +very few people were liable to be impressed. Some were 'protected' +by local custom, some by statute, and some by administrative +order. The number of the last must have been very great. The +'Protection Books' preserved in the Public Record Office form no +inconsiderable section of the Admiralty records. For the period +specially under notice, viz. that beginning with the year 1803, +there are no less than five volumes of 'protections.' Exemptions +by custom probably originated at a very remote date: ferrymen, +for example, being everywhere privileged from impressment. The +crews of colliers seem to have enjoyed the privilege by custom +before it was confirmed by Act of Parliament. The naval historian, +Burchett, writing of 1691, cites a 'Proclamation forbidding pressing +men from colliers.' + +Every ship in the coal trade had the following persons protected, +viz. two A.B.'s for every ship of 100 tons, and one for every 50 +tons in larger ships. When we come to consider the sensational +statements in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ of 1803, it will be well to +remember what the penalty for infringing the colliers' privilege +was. By the Act 6 & 7 William III, c. 18, sect. 19, 'Any officer +who presumes to impress any of the above shall forfeit to the +master or owner of such vessel L10 for every man so impressed; +and such officer shall be incapable of holding any place, office, +or employment in any of His Majesty's ships of war.' It is not +likely that the least scrupulous naval officer would make himself +liable to professional ruin as well as to a heavy fine. No parish +apprentice could be impressed for the sea service of the Crown +until he arrived at the age of eighteen (2 & 3 Anne, c. 6, sect. +4). Persons voluntarily binding themselves apprentices to sea +service could not be impressed for three years from the date +of their indentures. Besides sect. 15 of the Act of Anne just +quoted, exemptions were granted, before 1803, by 4 Anne, c. 19; +and 13 George II, c. 17. By the Act last mentioned all persons +fifty-five years of age and under eighteen were exempted, and +every foreigner serving in a ship belonging to a British subject, +and also all persons 'of what age soever who shall use the sea' +for two years, to be computed from the time of their first using +it. A customary exemption was extended to the proportion of the +crew of any ship necessary for her safe navigation. In practice +this must have reduced the numbers liable to impressment to small +dimensions. + +Even when the Admiralty decided to suspend all administrative +exemptions--or, as the phrase was, 'to press from all +protections'--many persons were still exempted. The customary +and statutory exemptions, of course, were unaffected. On the +5th November 1803 their Lordships informed officers in charge +of rendezvous that it was 'necessary for the speedy manning of +H.M. ships to impress all persons of the denominations exprest +in the press-warrant which you have received from us, without +regard to any protections, excepting, however, all such persons +as are protected pursuant to Acts of Parliament, and all others +who by the printed instructions which accompanied the said warrant +are forbidden to be imprest.' In addition to these a long list +of further exemptions was sent. The last in the list included +the crews of 'ships and vessels bound to foreign parts which +are laden and cleared outwards by the proper officers of H.M. +Customs.' It would seem that there was next to no one left liable +to impressment; and it is not astonishing that the Admiralty, as +shown by its action very shortly afterwards, felt that pressing +seamen was a poor way of manning the fleet. + +Though the war which broke out in 1803 was not formally declared +until May, active preparations were begun earlier. The navy had +been greatly reduced since the Peace of Amiens, and as late as +the 2nd December 1802 the House of Commons had voted that '50,000 +seamen be employed for the service of the year 1803, including +12,000 marines.' On the 14th March an additional number was voted. +It amounted to 10,000 men, of whom 2400 were to be marines. Much +larger additions were voted a few weeks later. The total increase +was 50,000 men; viz. 39,600 seamen and 10,400 marines. It never +occurred to anyone that forcible recruiting would be necessary +in the case of the marines, though the establishment of the corps +was to be nearly doubled, as it had to be brought up to 22,400 +from 12,000. Attention may be specially directed to this point. +The marine formed an integral part of a man-of-war's crew just as +the seamen did. He received no better treatment than the latter; +and as regards pecuniary remuneration, prospects of advancement, +and hope of attaining to the position of warrant officer, was, on +the whole, in a less favourable position. It seems to have been +universally accepted that voluntary enlistment would prove--as, +in fact, it did prove--sufficient in the case of the marines. +What we have got to see is how far it failed in the case of the +seamen, and how far its deficiencies were made up by compulsion. + +On the 12th March the Admiralty notified the Board of Ordnance that +twenty-two ships of the line--the names of which were stated--were +'coming forward' for sea. Many of these ships are mentioned in +_The_Naval_Chronicle_ as requiring men, and that journal gives +the names of several others of various classes in the same state. +The number altogether is thirty-one. The aggregate complements, +including marines and boys, of these ships amounted to 17,234. +The number of 'seamen' was 11,861, though this included some of +the officers who were borne on the same muster-list. The total +number of seamen actually required exceeded 11,500. The _Naval_ +_Chronicle_ contains a vivid, not to say sensational, account of +the steps taken to raise them. The report from Plymouth, dated +10th March, is as follows: 'Several bodies of Royal Marines in +parties of twelve and fourteen each, with their officers and +naval officers armed, proceeded towards the quays. So secret +were the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the +business on which they were going until they boarded the tier +of colliers at the New Quay, and other gangs the ships in the +Catwater and the Pool, and the gin-shops. A great number of prime +seamen were taken out and sent on board the Admiral's ship. They +also pressed landsmen of all descriptions; and the town looked +as if in a state of siege. At Stonehouse, Mutton Cove, Morris +Town, and in all the receiving and gin-shops at Dock [the present +Devonport] several hundreds of seamen and landsmen were picked +up and sent directly aboard the flag-ship. By the returns last +night it appears that upwards of 400 useful hands were pressed +last night in the Three Towns.... One press-gang entered the +Dock [Devonport] Theatre and cleared the whole gallery except +the women.' The reporter remarks: 'It is said that near 600 men +have been impressed in this neighbourhood.' The number--if +obtained--would not have been sufficient to complete the seamen +in the complements of a couple of line-of-battle ships. Naval +officers who remember the methods of manning ships which lasted +well into the middle of the nineteenth century, and of course long +after recourse to impressment had been given up, will probably +notice the remarkable fact that the reporter makes no mention of +any of the parties whose proceedings he described being engaged +in picking up men who had voluntarily joined ships fitting out, +but had not returned on board on the expiration of the leave +granted them. The description in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ might +be applied to events which--when impressment had ceased for half +a century--occurred over and over again at Portsmouth, Devonport, +and other ports when two or three ships happened to be put in +commission about the same time. + +We shall find that the 600 reported as impressed had to be +considerably reduced before long. The reporter afterwards wisely +kept himself from giving figures, except in a single instance +when he states that 'about forty' were taken out of the flotilla +of Plymouth trawlers. Reporting on 11th March he says that 'Last +Thursday and yesterday'--the day of the sensational report above +given--'several useful hands were picked up, mostly seamen, who +were concealed in the different lodgings and were discovered +by their girls.' He adds, 'Several prime seamen were yesterday +taken disguised as labourers in the different marble quarries +round the town.' On 14th October the report is that 'the different +press-gangs, with their officers, literally scoured the country +on the eastern roads and picked up several fine young fellows.' +Here, again, no distinction is drawn between men really impressed +and men who were arrested for being absent beyond the duration of +their leave. We are told next that 'upon a survey of all impressed +men before three captains and three surgeons of the Royal Navy, +such as were deemed unfit for His Majesty's service, as well as +all apprentices, were immediately discharged,' which, no doubt, +greatly diminished the above-mentioned 600. + +The reporter at Portsmouth begins his account of the 'press' +at that place by saying, 'They indiscriminately took every man +on board the colliers.' In view of what we know of the heavy +penalties to which officers who pressed more than a certain +proportion of a collier's crew were liable, we may take it that +this statement was made in error. On 14th March it was reported +that 'the constables and gangs from the ships continue very alert +in obtaining seamen, many of whom have been sent on board different +ships in the harbour this day.' We do not hear again from Portsmouth +till May, on the 7th of which month it was reported that 'about 700 +men were obtained.' On the 8th the report was that 'on Saturday +afternoon the gates of the town were shut and soldiers placed at +every avenue. Tradesmen were taken from their shops and sent on +board the ships in the harbour or placed in the guard-house for +the night, till they could be examined. If fit for His Majesty's +service they were kept, if in trade set at liberty.' The 'tradesmen,' +then, if really taken, were taken simply to be set free again. +As far as the reports first quoted convey any trustworthy +information, it appears that at Portsmouth and Plymouth during +March, April, and the first week of May, 1340 men were 'picked +up,' and that of these many were immediately discharged. How +many of the 1340 were not really impressed, but were what in +the navy are called 'stragglers,' i.e. men over-staying their +leave of absence, is not indicated. + +_The_Times_ of the 11th March 1803, and 9th May 1803, also contained +reports of the impressment operations. It says: 'The returns to +the Admiralty of the seamen impressed (apparently at the Thames +ports) on Tuesday night amounted to 1080, of whom no less than +two-thirds are considered prime hands. At Portsmouth, Portsea, +Gosport, and Cowes a general press took place the same night.... +Upwards of 600 seamen were collected in consequence of the +promptitude of the measures adopted.' It was added that the +Government 'relied upon increasing our naval forces with 10,000 +seamen, either volunteers or impressed men, in less than a +fortnight.' The figures show us how small a proportion of the +10,000 was even alleged to be made up of impressed men. A later +_Times_ report is that: 'The impress on Saturday, both above and +below the bridge, was the hottest that has been for some time. +The boats belonging to the ships at Deptford were particularly +active, and it is supposed they obtained upwards of 200 men.' _The_ +_Times_ reports thus account for 1280 men over and above the +1340 stated to have been impressed at Plymouth and Portsmouth, +thus making a grand total of 2620. It will be proved by official +figures directly that the last number was an over-estimate. + +Before going farther, attention may be called to one or two points +in connection with the above reports. The increase in the number +of seamen voted by Parliament in March was 7600. The reports of +the impressment operations only came down to May. It was not +till the 11th June that Parliament voted a further addition to the +navy of 32,000 seamen. Yet whilst the latter great increase was +being obtained--for obtained it was--the reporters are virtually +silent as to the action of the press-gang. We must ask ourselves, +if we could get 32,000 additional seamen with so little recourse +to impressment that the operations called for no special notice, +how was it that compulsion was necessary when only 7600 men were +wanted? The question is all the more pertinent when we recall +the state of affairs in the early part of 1803. + +The navy had been greatly reduced in the year before, the men +voted having diminished from 100,000 to 56,000. What became of +the 44,000 men not required, of whom about 35,000 must have been +of the seaman class and have been discharged from the service? +There was a further reduction of 6000, to take effect in the +beginning of 1803. Sir Sydney Smith, at that time a Member of +Parliament, in the debate of the 2nd December 1802, 'expressed +considerable regret at the great reductions which were suddenly +made, both in the King's dockyards and in the navy in general. +A prodigious number of men,' he said, 'had been thus reduced +to the utmost poverty and distress.' He stated that he 'knew, +from his own experience, that what was called an ordinary seaman +could hardly find employment at present, either in the King's or +in the merchants' service.' The increase of the fleet in March +must have seemed a godsend to thousands of men-of-war's men. If +there was any holding back on their part, it was due, no doubt, +to an expectation--which the sequel showed to be well founded--that +a bounty would be given to men joining the navy. + +The muster-book of a man-of-war is the official list of her crew. +It contains the name of every officer and man in the complement. +Primarily it was an account-book, as it contains entries of the +payments made to each person whose name appears in it. At the +beginning of the nineteenth century it was usual to make out +a fresh muster-book every two months, though that period was +not always exactly adhered to. Each new book was a copy of the +preceding one, with the addition of the names of persons who had +joined the ship since the closing of the latter. Until the ship +was paid off and thus put out of commission--or, in the case of a +very long commission, until 'new books' were ordered to be opened +so as to escape the inconveniences due to the repetition of large +numbers of entries--the name of every man that had belonged to her +remained on the list, his disposal--if no longer in the ship--being +noted in the proper column. One column was headed 'Whence, and +whether prest or not?' In this was noted his former ship, or the +fact of his being entered direct from the shore, which answered +to the question 'Whence?' There is reason to believe that the +muster-book being, as above said, primarily an account-book, the +words 'whether prest or not' were originally placed at the head +of the column so that it might be noted against each man entered +whether he had been paid 'prest-money' or not. However this may +be, the column at the beginning of the nineteenth century was +used for a record of the circumstances of the man's entering the +ship, whether he had been transferred from another, had joined +as a volunteer from the shore, or had been impressed. + +I have examined the muster-book of every ship mentioned in the +Admiralty letter to the Board of Ordnance above referred to, +and also of the ships mentioned in _The_Naval_Chronicle_ as +fitting out in the early part of 1803. There are altogether +thirty-three ships; but two of them, the _Utrecht_ and the +_Gelykheid_, were used as temporary receiving ships for newly +raised men.[61] The names on their lists are, therefore, merely +those of men who were passed on to other ships, in whose muster-books +they appeared again. There remained thirty-one ships which, as +far as could be ascertained, account for the additional force +which the Government had decided to put in commission, more than +two-thirds of them being ships of the line. As already stated, +their total complements amounted to 17,234, and the number of the +'blue-jackets' of full age to at least 11,500. The muster-books +appear to have been kept with great care. The only exception +seems to be that of the _Victory_, in which there is some reason +to think the number of men noted as 'prest' has been over-stated +owing to an error in copying the earlier book. Ships in 1803 +did not get their full crews at once, any more than they did +half a century later. I have, therefore, thought it necessary +to take the muster-books for the months in which the crews had +been brought up to completion. + +[Footnote 61: The words 'recruit' and 'enlist,' except as regards +marines, are unknown in the navy, in which they are replaced by +'raise' and 'enter.'] + +An examination of the books would be likely to dispel many +misconceptions about the old navy. Not only is it noted against +each man's name whether he was 'pressed' or a volunteer, it is +also noted if he was put on board ship as an alternative to +imprisonment on shore, this being indicated by the words 'civil +power,' an expression still used in the navy, but with a different +meaning. The percentage of men thus 'raised' was small. Sometimes +there is a note stating that the man had been allowed to enter +from the '----shire Militia.' A rare note is 'Brought on board +by soldiers,' which most likely indicated that the man had been +recaptured when attempting to desert. It is sometimes asserted +that many men who volunteered did so only to escape impressment. +This may be so; but it should be said that there are frequent +notations against the names of 'prest' men that they afterwards +volunteered. This shows the care that was taken to ascertain the +real conditions on which a man entered the service. For the purposes +of this inquiry all these men have been considered as impressed, +and they have not been counted amongst the volunteers. It is, +perhaps, permissible to set off against such men the number of +those who allowed themselves to be impressed to escape inconveniences +likely to be encountered if they remained at home. Of two John +Westlakes, ordinary seamen of the _Boadicea_, one--John (I.)--was +'prest,' but was afterwards 'taken out of the ship for a debt +of twenty pounds'; which shows that he had preferred to trust +himself to the press-gang rather than to his creditors. Without +being unduly imaginative, we may suppose that in 1803 there were +heroes who preferred being 'carried off' to defend their country +afloat to meeting the liabilities of putative paternity in their +native villages. + +The muster-books examined cover several months, during which +many 'prest' men were discharged and some managed to desert, +so that the total was never present at anyone time. That total +amounts to 1782. It is certain that even this is larger than +the reality, because it has been found impossible--without an +excessive expenditure of time and labour--to trace the cases +of men being sent from one ship to another, and thus appearing +twice over, or oftener, as 'prest' men. As an example of this +the _Minotaur_ may be cited. Out of twenty names on one page of +her muster-book thirteen are those of 'prest' men discharged to +other ships. The discharges from the _Victory_ were numerous; and +the _Ardent_, which was employed in keeping up communication with +the ships off Brest, passed men on to the latter when required. I +have, however, made no deductions from the 'prest' total to meet +these cases. We can see that not more than 1782 men, and probably +considerably fewer, were impressed to meet the increase of the +navy during the greater part of 1803. Admitting that there were +cases of impressment from merchant vessels abroad to complete +the crews of our men-of-war in distant waters, the total number +impressed--including these latter--could not have exceeded greatly +the figures first given. We know that owing to the reduction of +1802, as stated by Sir Sydney Smith, the seamen were looking +for ships rather than the ships for seamen. It seems justifiable +to infer that the whole number of impressed men on any particular +day did not exceed, almost certainly did not amount to, 2000. If +they had been spread over the whole navy they would not have made +2 per cent. of the united complements of the ships; and, as it was, +did not equal one-nineteenth of the 39,600 seamen ('blue-jackets') +raised to complete the navy to the establishment sanctioned by +Parliament. A system under which more than 37,000 volunteers +come forward to serve and less than 2000 men are obtained by +compulsion cannot be properly called compulsory. + +The Plymouth reporter of _The_Naval_Chronicle_ does not give +many details of the volunteering for the navy in 1803, though +he alludes to it in fluent terms more than once. On the 11th +October, however, he reports that, 'So many volunteer seamen +have arrived here this last week that upwards of L4000 bounty is +to be paid them afloat by the Paying Commissioner, Rear-Admiral +Dacres.' At the time the bounty was L2 10s. for an A.B., L1 10s. +for an ordinary seaman, and L1 for a landsman. Taking only L4000 +as the full amount paid, and assuming that the three classes were +equally represented, three men were obtained for every L5, or +2400 in all, a number raised in about a week, that may be compared +with that given as resulting from impressment. In reality, the +number of volunteers must have been larger, because the A.B.'s +were fewer than the other classes. + +Some people may be astonished because the practice of impressment, +which had proved to be so utterly inefficient, was not at once +and formally given up. No astonishment will be felt by those +who are conversant with the habits of Government Departments. In +every country public officials evince great and, indeed, almost +invincible reluctance to give up anything, whether it be a material +object or an administrative process, which they have once possessed +or conducted. One has only to stroll through the arsenals of the +world, or glance at the mooring-grounds of the maritime states, +to see to what an extent the passion for retaining the obsolete +and useless holds dominion over the official mind. A thing may +be known to be valueless--its retention may be proved to be +mischievous--yet proposals to abandon it will be opposed and +defeated. It is doubtful if any male human being over forty was +ever converted to a new faith of any kind. The public has to +wait until the generation of administrative Conservatives has +either passed away or been outnumbered by those acquainted only +with newer methods. Then the change is made; the certainty, +nevertheless, being that the new men in their turn will resist +improvements as obstinately and in exactly the same way as their +predecessors. + +To be just to the Board of Admiralty of 1803, it must be admitted +that some of its members seem to have lost faith in the efficacy of +impressment as a system of manning the navy. The Lords Commissioners +of that date could hardly--all of them, at any rate--have been so +thoroughly destitute of humour as not to suspect that seizing +a few score of men here and a few there when tens of thousands +were needed, was a very insufficient compensation for the large +correspondence necessitated by adherence to the system (and still +in existence). Their Lordships actively bombarded the Home Office +with letters pointing out, for example, that a number of British +seamen at Guernsey 'appeared to have repaired to that island with +a view to avoid being pressed'; that they were 'of opinion that +it would be highly proper that the sea-faring men (in Jersey as +well as Guernsey), not natives nor settled inhabitants, should +be impressed'; that when the captain of H.M.S. _Aigle_ had landed +at Portland 'for the purpose of raising men' some resistance +had 'been made by the sailors'; and dealing with other subjects +connected with the system. A complaint sent to the War Department +was that 'amongst a number of men lately impressed (at Leith) +there were eight or ten shipwrights who were sea-faring men, and +had been claimed as belonging to a Volunteer Artillery Corps.' + +We may suspect that there was some discussion at Whitehall as to +the wisdom of retaining a plan which caused so much inconvenience +and had such poor results. The conclusion seems to have been to +submit it to a searching test. The coasts of the United Kingdom +were studded with stations--thirty-seven generally, but the number +varied--for the entry of seamen. The ordinary official description +of these--as shown by entries in the muster-books--was 'rendezvous'; +but other terms were used. It has often been thought that they were +simply impressment offices. The fact is that many more men were +raised at these places by volunteering than by impressment. The +rendezvous, as a rule, were in charge of captains or commanders, +some few being entrusted to lieutenants. The men attached to each +were styled its 'gang,' a word which conveys no discredit in +nautical language. On 5th November 1803 the Admiralty sent to +the officers in charge of rendezvous the communication already +mentioned--to press men 'without regard to any protections,'--the +exceptions, indeed, being so many that the officers must have +wondered who could legitimately be taken. + +The order at first sight appeared sweeping enough. It contained +the following words: 'Whereas we think fit that a general press +from all protections as above mentioned shall commence at London +and in the neighbourhood thereof on the night of Monday next, +the 7th instant, you are therefore (after taking the proper +preparatory measures with all possible secrecy) hereby required +to impress and to give orders to the lieutenants under your command +to impress all persons of the above-mentioned denominations (except +as before excepted) and continue to do so until you receive orders +from us to the contrary.' As it was addressed to officers in +all parts of the United Kingdom, the 'general press' was not +confined to London and its neighbourhood, though it was to begin +in the capital. + +Though returns of the numbers impressed have not been discovered, +we have strong evidence that this 'general press,' notwithstanding +the secrecy with which it had been arranged, was a failure. On +the 6th December 1803, just a month after it had been tried, the +Admiralty formulated the following conclusion: 'On a consideration +of the expense attending the service of raising men on shore for +His Majesty's Fleet comparatively with the number procured, as +well as from other circumstances, there is reason to believe that +either proper exertions have not been made by some of the officers +employed on that service, or that there have been great abuses +and mismanagement in the expenditure of the public money.' This +means that it was now seen that impressment, though of little +use in obtaining men for the navy, was a very costly arrangement. +The Lords of the Admiralty accordingly ordered that 'the several +places of rendezvous should be visited and the conduct of the +officers employed in carrying out the above-mentioned service +should be inquired into on the spot.' Rear-Admiral Arthur Phillip, +the celebrated first Governor of New South Wales, was ordered +to make the inquiry. This was the last duty in which that +distinguished officer was employed, and his having been selected +for it appears to have been unknown to all his biographers. + +It is not surprising that after this the proceedings of the +press-gang occupy scarcely any space in our naval history. Such +references to them as there are will be found in the writings +of the novelist and the dramatist. Probably individual cases +of impressment occurred till nearly the end of the Great War; +but they could not have been many. Compulsory service most +unnecessarily caused--not much, but still some--unjustifiable +personal hardship. It tended to stir up a feeling hostile to +the navy. It required to work it machinery costly out of all +proportion to the results obtained. Indeed, it failed completely +to effect what had been expected of it. In the great days of old +our fleet, after all, was manned, not by impressed men, but by +volunteers. It was largely due to that that we became masters +of the sea. + + + + + +VI + +PROJECTED INVASIONS OF THE BRITISH ISLES[62] + +[Footnote 62: Written in 1900. (_The_Times_.)] + +The practice to which we have become accustomed of late, of +publishing original documents relating to naval and military +history, has been amply justified by the results. These meet +the requirements of two classes of readers. The publications +satisfy, or at any rate go far towards satisfying, the wishes +of those who want to be entertained, and also of those whose +higher motive is a desire to discover the truth about notable +historical occurrences. Putting the public in possession of the +materials, previously hidden in more or less inaccessible +muniment-rooms and record offices, with which the narratives of +professed historians have been constructed, has had advantages +likely to become more and more apparent as time goes on. It acts +as a check upon the imaginative tendencies which even eminent +writers have not always been able, by themselves, to keep under +proper control. The certainty, nay the mere probability, that +you will be confronted with the witnesses on whose evidence you +profess to have relied--the 'sources' from which your story is +derived--will suggest the necessity of sobriety of statement and +the advisability of subordinating rhetoric to veracity. Had the +contemporary documents been available for an immediate appeal to +them by the reading public, we should long ago have rid ourselves +of some dangerous superstitions. We should have abandoned our +belief in the fictions that the Armada of 1588 was defeated by the +weather, and that the great Herbert of Torrington was a lubber, +a traitor, and a coward. It is not easy to calculate the benefit +that we should have secured, had the presentation of some important +events in the history of our national defence been as accurate as +it was effective. Enormous sums of money have been wasted in trying +to make our defensive arrangements square with a conception of +history based upon misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts. +Pecuniary extravagance is bad enough; but there is a greater evil +still. We have been taught to cherish, and we have been reluctant +to abandon, a false standard of defence, though adherence to +such a standard can be shown to have brought the country within +measurable distance of grievous peril. Captain Duro, of the Spanish +Navy, in his 'Armada Invencible,' placed within our reach +contemporary evidence from the side of the assailants, thereby +assisting us to form a judgment on a momentous episode in naval +history. The evidence was completed; some being adduced from +the other side, by our fellow-countryman Sir J. K. Laughton, in +his 'Defeat of the Spanish Armada,' published by the Navy Records +Society. Others have worked on similar lines; and a healthier view +of our strategic conditions and needs is more widely held than +it was; though it cannot be said to be, even yet, universally +prevalent. Superstition, even the grossest, dies hard. + +Something deeper than mere literary interest, therefore, is to +be attributed to a work which has recently appeared in Paris.[63] +To speak strictly, it should be said that only the first volume of +three which will complete it has been published. It is, however, +in the nature of a work of the kind that its separate parts should +be virtually independent of each other. Consequently the volume +which we now have may be treated properly as a book by itself. +When completed the work is to contain all the documents relating +to the French preparations during the period 1793-1805, for taking +the offensive against England (_tous_les_documents_se_rapportant_ +_a_la_preparation_de_l'offensive_contre_l'Angleterre_). +The search for, the critical examination and the methodical +classification of, the papers were begun in October 1898. The +book is compiled by Captain Desbriere, of the French Cuirassiers, +who was specially authorised to continue his editorial labours +even after he had resumed his ordinary military duties. It bears +the _imprimatur_ of the staff of the army; and its preface is +written by an officer who was--and so signs himself--chief of +the historical section of that department. There is no necessity +to criticise the literary execution of the work. What is wanted +is to explain the nature of its contents and to indicate the +lessons which may be drawn from them. Nevertheless, attention +may be called to a curious misreading of history contained in +the preface. In stating the periods which the different volumes +of the book are to cover, the writer alludes to the Peace of +Amiens, which, he affirms, England was compelled to accept by +exhaustion, want of means of defence, and fear of the menaces of +the great First Consul then disposing of the resources of France, +aggrandised, pacified, and reinforced by alliances. The book being +what it is and coming whence it does, such a statement ought not +to be passed over. 'The desire for peace,' says an author so +easily accessible as J. R. Green, 'sprang from no sense of national +exhaustion. On the contrary, wealth had never increased so fast.... +Nor was there any ground for despondency in the aspect of the +war itself.' This was written in 1875 by an author so singularly +free from all taint of Chauvinism that he expressly resolved that +his work 'should never sink into a drum and trumpet history.' A +few figures will be interesting and, it may be added, conclusive. +Between 1793 when the war began and 1802 when the Peace of Amiens +interrupted it, the public income of Great Britain increased from +L16,382,000 to L28,000,000, the war taxes not being included +in the latter sum. The revenue of France, notwithstanding her +territorial acquisitions, sank from L18,800,000 to L18,000,000. +The French exports and imports by sea were annihilated; whilst +the British exports were doubled and the imports increased more +than 50 per cent. The French Navy had at the beginning 73, at +the end of the war 39, ships of the line; the British began the +contest with 135 and ended it with 202. Even as regards the army, +the British force at the end of the war was not greatly inferior +numerically to the French. It was, however, much scattered, being +distributed over the whole British Empire. In view of the question +under discussion, no excuse need be given for adducing these +facts. + +[Footnote 63: 1793-1805. _Projets_et_Tentatives_de_Debarquement_ +_aux_Iles_Britanniques_, par Edouard Desbriere, Capitaine brevete +aux 1er Cuirassiers. Paris, Chapelot et Cie. 1900. (Publie sous la +direction de la section historique de l'Etat-Major de l'Armee.)] + +Captain Desbriere in the present volume carries his collection +of documents down to the date at which the then General Bonaparte +gave up his connection with the flotilla that was being equipped +in the French Channel ports, and prepared to take command of +the expedition to Egypt. The volume therefore, in addition to +accounts of many projected, but never really attempted, descents +on the British Isles, gives a very complete history of Hoche's +expedition to Ireland; of the less important, but curious, descent +in Cardigan Bay known as the Fishguard, or Fishgard, expedition; +and of the formation of the first 'Army of England,' a designation +destined to attain greater celebrity in the subsequent war, when +France was ruled by the great soldier whom we know as the Emperor +Napoleon. The various documents are connected by Captain Desbriere +with an explanatory commentary, and here and there are illustrated +with notes. He has not rested content with the publication of +MSS. selected from the French archives. In preparing his book he +visited England and examined our records; and, besides, he has +inserted in their proper place passages from Captain Mahan's works +and also from those of English authors. The reader's interest in +the book is likely to be almost exclusively concentrated on the +detailed, and, where Captain Desbriere's commentary appears, +lucid, account of Hoche's expedition. Of course, the part devoted +to the creation of the 'Army of England' is not uninteresting; +but it is distinctly less so than the part relating to the +proceedings of Hoche. Several of the many plans submitted by +private persons, who here describe them in their own words, are +worth examination; and some, it may be mentioned, are amusing +in the _naivete_ of their Anglophobia and in their obvious +indifference to the elementary principles of naval strategy. +In this indifference they have some distinguished companions. + +We are informed by Captain Desbriere that the idea of a hostile +descent on England was during a long time much favoured in France. +The national archives and those of the Ministries of War and +of Marine are filled with proposals for carrying it out, some +dating back to 1710. Whether emanating from private persons or +formulated in obedience to official direction, there are certain +features in all the proposals so marked that we are able to classify +the various schemes by grouping together those of a similar +character. In one class may be placed all those which aimed at +mere annoyance, to be effected by landing small bodies of men, not +always soldiers, to do as much damage as possible. The appearance +of these at many different points, it was believed, would so +harass the English that they would end the war, or at least so +divide their forces that their subjection might be looked for +with confidence. In another class might be placed proposals to +seize outlying, out not distant, British territory--the Channel +Islands or the Isle of Wight, for example. A third class might +comprise attempts on a greater scale, necessitating the employment +of a considerable body of troops and meriting the designation +'Invasion.' Some of these attempts were to be made in Great Britain, +some in Ireland. In every proposal for an attempt of this class, +whether it was to be made in Great Britain or in Ireland, it +was assumed that the invaders would receive assistance from the +people of the country invaded. Indeed, generally the bulk of the +force to be employed was ultimately to be composed of native +sympathisers, who were also to provide--at least at the +beginning--all the supplies and transport, both vehicles and +animals, required. Every plan, no matter to which class it might +belong, was based upon the assumption that the British naval +force could be avoided. Until we come to the time when General +Bonaparte, as he then was, dissociated himself from the first +'Army of England,' there is no trace, in any of the documents +now printed, of a belief in the necessity of obtaining command +of the sea before sending across it a considerable military +expedition. That there was such a thing as the command of the sea +is rarely alluded to; and when it is, it is merely to accentuate +the possibility of neutralising it by evading the force holding +it. There is something which almost deserves to be styled comical +in the absolutely unvarying confidence, alike of amateurs and +highly placed military officers, with which it was held that +a superior naval force was a thing that might be disregarded. +Generals who would have laughed to scorn anyone maintaining that, +though there was a powerful Prussian army on the road to one city +and an Austrian army on the road to the other, a French army +might force its way to either Berlin or Vienna without either +fighting or even being prepared to fight, such generals never +hesitated to approve expeditions obliged to traverse a region +in the occupation of a greatly superior force, the region being +pelagic and the force naval. We had seized the little islands +of St. Marcoff, a short distance from the coast of Normandy, +and held them for years. It was expressly admitted that their +recapture was impossible, 'a raison de la superiorite des forces +navales Anglaises'; but it was not even suspected that a much +more difficult operation, requiring longer time and a longer +voyage, was likely to be impracticable. We shall see by and by +how far this remarkable attitude of mind was supported by the +experience of Hoche's expedition to Ireland. + +Hoche himself was the inventor of a plan of harassing the English +enemy which long remained in favour. He proposed to organise what +was called a _Chouannerie_ in England. As that country had no +_Chouans_ of her own, the want was to be supplied by sending over +an expedition composed of convicts. Hoche's ideas were approved +and adopted by the eminent Carnot. The plan, to which the former +devoted great attention, was to land on the coast of Wales from +1000 to 1200 _forcats_, to be commanded by a certain Mascheret, +of whom Hoche wrote that he was 'le plus mauvais sujet dont on +puisse purger la France.' In a plan accepted and forwarded by +Hoche, it was laid down that the band, on reaching the enemy's +country, was, if possible, not to fight, but to pillage; each man +was to understand that he was sent to England to steal 100,000f., +'pour ensuite finir sa carriere tranquillement dans l'aisance,' +and was to be informed that he would receive a formal pardon from +the French Government. The plan, extraordinary as it was, was +one of the few put into execution. The famous Fishguard Invasion +was carried out by some fourteen hundred convicts commanded by an +American adventurer named Tate. The direction to avoid fighting +was exactly obeyed by Colonel Tate and the armed criminals under +his orders. He landed in Cardigan Bay from a small squadron of +French men-of-war at sunset on the 22nd February 1797; and, on the +appearance of Lord Cawdor with the local Yeomanry and Militia, asked +to be allowed to surrender on the 24th. At a subsequent exchange +of prisoners the French authorities refused to receive any of the +worthies who had accompanied Tate. At length 512 were allowed to +land; but were imprisoned in the forts of Cherbourg. The French +records contain many expressions of the dread experienced by the +inhabitants of the coast lest the English should put on shore in +France the malefactors whom they had captured at Fishguard. + +A more promising enterprise was that in which it was decided to +obtain the assistance of the Dutch, at the time in possession of +a considerable fleet. The Dutch fleet was to put to sea with the +object of engaging the English. An army of 15,000 was then to be +embarked in the ports of Holland, and was to effect a diversion in +favour of another and larger body, which, starting from France, was +to land in Ireland, repeating the attempt of Hoche in December 1796, +which will be dealt with later on. The enterprise was frustrated +by the action of Admiral Duncan, who decisively defeated the Dutch +fleet off Camperdown in October. It might have been supposed +that this would have driven home the lesson that no considerable +military expedition across the water has any chance of success +till the country sending it has obtained command of the sea; but +it did not. To Bonaparte the event was full of meaning; but no +other French soldier seems to have learned it--if we may take +Captain Desbriere's views as representative--even down to the +present day. On the 23rd February 1798 Bonaparte wrote: 'Operer une +descente en Angleterre sans etre maitre de la mer est l'operation +la plus hardie et la plus difficile qui ait ete faite.' There has +been much speculation as to the reasons which induced Bonaparte +to quit the command of the 'Army of England' after holding it +but a short time, and after having devoted great attention to +its organisation and proposed methods of transport across the +Channel. The question is less difficult than it has appeared +to be to many. One of the foremost men in France, Bonaparte was +ready to take the lead in any undertaking which seemed likely +to have a satisfactory ending--an ending which would redound +to the glory of the chief who conducted it. The most important +operation contemplated was the invasion of England; and--now that +Hoche was no more--Bonaparte might well claim to lead it. His +penetrating insight soon enabled him to see its impracticability +until the French had won the command of the Channel. Of that +there was not much likelihood; and at the first favourable moment +he dissociated himself from all connection with an enterprise +which offered so little promise of a successful termination that +it was all but certain not to be begun. An essential condition, +as already pointed out, of all the projected invasions was the +receipt of assistance from sympathisers in the enemy's country. +Hoche himself expected this even in Tate's case; but experience +proved the expectation to be baseless. When the prisoners taken +with Tate were being conducted to their place of confinement, +the difficulty was to protect them, 'car la population furieuse +contre les Francais voulait les lyncher.' Captain Desbriere dwells +at some length on the mutinies in the British fleet in 1797, and +asks regretfully, 'Qu'avait-on fait pour profiter de cette chance +unique?' He remarks on the undoubted and really lamentable fact +that English historians have usually paid insufficient attention +to these occurrences. One, and perhaps the principal reason of their +silence, was the difficulty, at all events till quite lately, of +getting materials with which to compose a narrative. The result is +that the real character of the great mutinies has been altogether +misunderstood. Lord Camperdown's recently published life of his +great ancestor, Lord Duncan, has done something to put them in +their right light. As regards defence against the enemy, the +mutinies affected the security of the country very little. The +seamen always expressed their determination to do their duty if +the enemy put to sea. Even at the Nore they conspicuously displayed +their general loyalty; and, as a matter of fact, discipline had +regained its sway some time before the expedition preparing in +Holland was ready. How effectively the crews of the ships not +long before involved in the mutiny could fight, was proved at +Camperdown. + +Though earlier in date than the events just discussed, the celebrated +first expedition to Ireland has been intentionally left out of +consideration till now. As to the general features of the +undertaking, and even some of its more important details, the +documents now published add little to our knowledge. The literature +of the expedition is large, and Captain Chevalier had given us an +admirable account of it in his 'Histoire de la Marine Francaise +sous la premiere Republique.' The late Vice-Admiral Colomb submitted +it to a most instructive examination in the _Journal_of_the_ +_Royal_United_Service_Institution_ for January 1892. We can, +however, learn something from Captain Desbriere's collection. +The perusal suggests, or indeed compels, the conclusion that the +expedition was doomed to failure from the start. It had no money, +stores, or means of transport. There was no hope of finding these +in a country like the south-western corner of Ireland. Grouchy's +decision not to land the troops who had reached Bantry Bay was +no doubt dictated in reality by a perception of this; and by +the discovery that, even if he got on shore, sympathisers with him +would be practically non-existent. On reading the letters now made +public, one is convinced of Hoche's unfitness for the leadership +of such an enterprise. The adoration of mediocrities is confined +to no one cult and to no one age. Hoche's canonisation, for he +is a prominent saint in the Republican calendar, was due not so +much to what he did as to what he did not do. He did not hold the +supreme command in La Vendee till the most trying period of the +war was past. He did not continue the cruelties of the Jacobin +emissaries in the disturbed districts; but then his pacificatory +measures were taken when the spirit of ferocity which caused the +horrors of the _noyades_ and of the Terror had, even amongst +the mob of Paris, burnt itself out. He did not overthrow a +constitutional Government and enslave his country as Bonaparte +did; and, therefore, he is favourably compared with the latter, +whose opportunities he did not have. His letters show him to have +been an adept in the art of traducing colleagues behind their +backs. In writing he called Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse 'perfide,' +and spoke of his 'mauvaise foi.' He had a low opinion of General +Humbert, whom he bracketed with Mascheret. Grouchy, he said, was +'un inconsequent paperassier,' and General Vaillant 'un miserable +ivrogne.' He was placed in supreme command of the naval as well as +of the military forces, and was allowed to select the commander +of the former. Yet he and his nominee were amongst the small +fraction of the expeditionary body which never reached a place +where disembarkation was possible. + +Notwithstanding all this, the greater part of the fleet, and +of the troops conveyed by it, did anchor in Bantry Bay without +encountering an English man-of-war; and a large proportion continued +in the Bay, unmolested by our navy, for more than a fortnight. Is +not this, it may be asked, a sufficient refutation of those who +hold that command of the sea gives security against invasion? +As a matter of fact, command of the sea--even in the case in +question--did prevent invasion from being undertaken, still more +from being carried through, on a scale likely to be very formidable. +The total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom +633 were lost, owing to steps taken to avoid the hostile navy, +before the expedition had got fully under way. It is not necessary +to rate Hoche's capacity very highly in order to understand that +he, who had seen something of war on a grand scale, would not +have committed himself to the command of so small a body, without +cavalry, without means of transport on land, without supplies, with +but an insignificant artillery and that not furnished with horses, +and, as was avowed, without hope of subsequent reinforcement or +of open communications with its base--that he would not have +staked his reputation on the fate of a body so conditioned, if +he had been permitted by the naval conditions of the case to lead +a larger, more effectually organised, and better supplied army. +The commentary supplied by Captain Desbriere to the volume under +notice discloses his opinion that the failure of the expedition +to Ireland was due to the inefficiency of the French Navy. He +endeavours to be scrupulously fair to his naval fellow-countrymen; +but his conviction is apparent. It hardly admits of doubt that this +view has generally been, and still is, prevalent in the French +Army. Foreign soldiers of talent and experience generalise from +this as follows: Let them but have the direction of the naval +as well as of the military part of an expedition, and the invasion +of England must be successful. The complete direction which they +would like is exactly what Hoche did have. He chose the commander +of the fleet, and also chose or regulated the choice of the junior +flag officers and several of the captains. Admiral Morard de +Galles was not, and did not consider himself, equal to the task +for which Hoche's favour had selected him. His letter pointing +out his own disqualifications has a striking resemblance to the +one written by Medina Sidonia in deprecation of his appointment +in place of Santa Cruz. Nevertheless, the French naval officers +did succeed in conveying the greater part of the expeditionary +army to a point at which disembarkation was practicable. + +Now we have some lessons to learn from this. The advantages conferred +by command of the sea must be utilised intelligently; and it +was bad management which permitted an important anchorage to +remain for more than a fortnight in the hands of an invading +force. We need not impute to our neighbours a burning desire to +invade us; but it is a becoming exercise of ordinary strategic +precaution to contemplate preparations for repelling what, as a +mere military problem, they consider still feasible. No amount +of naval superiority will ever ensure every part of our coast +against incursions like that of Tate and his gaol-birds. Naval +superiority, however, will put in our hands the power of preventing +the arrival of an army strong enough to carry out a real invasion. +The strength of such an army will largely depend upon the amount of +mobile land force of which we can dispose. Consequently, defence +against invasion, even of an island, is the duty of a land army +as well as of a fleet. The more important part may, in our case, +be that of the latter; but the services of the former cannot be +dispensed with. The best method of utilising those services calls +for much thought. In 1798, when the 'First Army of England' menaced +us from the southern coast of the Channel, it was reported to our +Government that an examination of the plans formerly adopted for +frustrating intended invasions showed the advantage of troubling +the enemy in his own home and not waiting till he had come to +injure us in ours. + + + + +VII + +OVER-SEA RAIDS AND RAIDS ON LAND[64] + +[Footnote 64: Written in 1906. (_The_Morning_Post_.)] + +It has been contended that raids by 'armaments with 1000, 20,000, +and 50,000 men on board respectively' have succeeded in evading +'our watching and chasing fleets,' and that consequently invasion +of the British Isles on a great scale is not only possible but +fairly practicable, British naval predominance notwithstanding. +I dispute the accuracy of the history involved in the allusions +to the above-stated figures. The number of men comprised in a +raiding or invading expedition is the number that is or can be +put on shore. The crews of the transports are not included in +it. In the cases alluded to, Humbert's expedition was to have +numbered 82 officers and 1017 other ranks, and 984 were put on +shore in Killala Bay. Though the round number, 1000, represents +this figure fairly enough, there was a 10 per cent. shrinkage +from the original embarkation strength. In Hoche's expedition +the total number of troops embarked was under 14,000, of whom +633 were lost before the expedition had got clear of its port of +starting, and of the remainder only a portion reached Ireland. +General Bonaparte landed in Egypt not 50,000 men, but about 36,000. +In the expeditions of Hoche and Humbert it was not expected that +the force to be landed would suffice of itself, the belief being +that it would be joined in each case by a large body of adherents +in the raided country. Outside the ranks of the 'extremists of the +dinghy school'--whose number is unknown and is almost certainly +quite insignificant--no one asserts or ever has asserted that raids +in moderate strength are not possible even in the face of a strong +defending navy. It is a fact that the whole of our defence policy +for many generations has been based upon an admission of their +possibility. Captain Mahan's statement of the case has never been +questioned by anyone of importance. It is as follows: 'The control +of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single +ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross +more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents +upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded +harbours.' It is extraordinary that everyone does not perceive +that if this were not true the 'dinghy school' would be right. +Students of Clausewitz may be expected to remember that the art +of war does not consist in making raids that are unsuccessful; +that war is waged to gain certain great objects; and that the +course of hostilities between two powerful antagonists is affected +little one way or the other by raids even on a considerable scale. + +The Egyptian expedition of 1798 deserves fuller treatment than +it has generally received. The preparations at Toulon and some +Italian ports were known to the British Government. It being +impossible for even a Moltke or--comparative resources being taken +into account--the greater strategist Kodama to know everything +in the mind of an opponent, the sensible proceeding is to guard +against his doing what would be likely to do you most harm. The +British Government had reason to believe that the Toulon expedition +was intended to reinforce at an Atlantic port another expedition +to be directed against the British Isles, or to effect a landing +in Spain with a view to marching into Portugal and depriving our +navy of the use of Lisbon. Either if effected would probably cause +us serious mischief, and arrangements were made to prevent them. A +landing in Egypt was, as the event showed, of little importance. +The threat conveyed by it against our Indian possessions proved +to be an empty one. Upwards of 30,000 hostile troops were locked +up in a country from which they could exercise no influence on +the general course of the war, and in which in the end they had +to capitulate. Suppose that an expedition crossing the North Sea +with the object of invading this country had to content itself +with a landing in Iceland, having eventual capitulation before it, +should we not consider ourselves very fortunate, though it may +have temporarily occupied one of the Shetland Isles _en_route_? +The truth of the matter is that the Egyptian expedition was one of +the gravest of strategical mistakes, and but for the marvellous +subsequent achievements of Napoleon it would have been the typical +example of bad strategy adduced by lecturers and writers on the +art of war for the warning of students. + +The supposition that over-sea raids, even when successful in +part, in any way demonstrate the inefficiency of naval defence +would never be admitted if only land and sea warfare were regarded +as branches of one whole and not as quite distinct things. To be +consistent, those that admit the supposition should also admit that +the practicability of raids demonstrates still more conclusively +the insufficiency of defence by an army. An eminent military writer +has told us that 'a raiding party of 1000 French landed in Ireland +without opposition, after sixteen days of navigation, unobserved +by the British Navy; defeated and drove back the British troops +opposing them on four separate occasions... entirely occupied the +attention of all the available troops of a garrison of Ireland +100,000 strong; penetrated almost to the centre of the island, +and compelled the Lord-Lieutenant to send an urgent requisition +for "as great a reinforcement as possible."' If an inference is to +be drawn from this in the same way as one has been drawn from the +circumstances on the sea, it would follow that one hundred thousand +troops are not sufficient to prevent a raid by one thousand, and +consequently that one million troops would not be sufficient to +prevent one by ten thousand enemies. On this there would arise the +question, If an army a million strong gives no security against +a raid by ten thousand men, is an army worth having? And this +question, be it noted, would come, not from disciples of the +Blue Water School, 'extremist' or other, but from students of +military narrative. + +The truth is that raids are far more common on land than on the +ocean. For every one of the latter it would be possible to adduce +several of the former. Indeed, accounts of raids are amongst +the common-places of military history. There are few campaigns +since the time of that smart cavalry leader Mago, the younger +brother of Hannibal, in which raids on land did not occur or +in which they exercised any decisive influence on the issue of +hostilities. It is only the failure to see the connection between +warfare on land and naval warfare that prevents these land raids +being given the same significance and importance that is usually +given to those carried out across the sea. + +In the year 1809, the year of Wagram, Napoleon's military influence +in Central Germany was, to say the least, not at its lowest. +Yet Colonel Schill, of the Prussian cavalry, with 1200 men, +subsequently increased to 2000 infantry and 12 squadrons, proceeded +to Wittenberg, thence to Magdeburg, and next to Stralsund, which +he occupied and where he met his death in opposing an assault +made by 6000 French troops. He had defied for a month all the +efforts of a large army to suppress him. In the same year the +Duke of Brunswick-Oels and Colonel Dornberg, notwithstanding the +smallness of the force under them, by their action positively +induced Napoleon, only a few weeks before Wagram, to detach the +whole corps of Kellerman, 30,000 strong, which otherwise would +have been called up to the support of the Grande Armee, to the +region in which these enterprising raiders were operating. The +mileage covered by Schill was nearly as great as that covered by +the part of Hoche's expedition which under Grouchy did reach an +Irish port, though it was not landed. Instances of cavalry raids +were frequent in the War of Secession in America. The Federal +Colonel B. H. Grierson, of the 6th Illinois Cavalry, with another +Illinois and an Iowa cavalry regiment, in April 1863 made a raid +which lasted sixteen days, and in which he covered 600 miles of +hostile country, finally reaching Baton Rouge, where a friendly +force was stationed. The Confederate officers, John H. Morgan, +John S. Mosby, and especially N. B. Forrest, were famous for the +extent and daring of their raids. Of all the leaders of important +raids in the War of Secession none surpassed the great Confederate +cavalry General, J. E. B. Stuart, whose riding right round the +imposing Federal army is well known. Yet not one of the raids +above mentioned had any effect on the main course of the war +in which they occurred or on the result of the great conflict. + +In the last war the case was the same. In January 1905, General +Mischenko with 10,000 sabres and three batteries of artillery +marched right round the flank of Marshal Oyama's great Japanese +army, and occupied Niu-chwang--not the treaty port so-called, but +a place not very far from it. For several days he was unmolested, +and in about a week he got back to his friends with a loss which +was moderate in proportion to his numbers. In the following May +Mischenko made another raid, this time round General Nogi's flank. +He had with him fifty squadrons, a horse artillery battery, and a +battery of machine guns. Starting on the 17th, he was discovered +on the 18th, came in contact with his enemy on the 19th, but +met with no considerable hostile force till the 20th, when the +Japanese cavalry arrived just in time to collide with the Russian +rearguard of two squadrons. On this General Mischenko 'retired +at his ease for some thirty miles along the Japanese flank and +perhaps fifteen miles away from it.' These Russians' raids did +not alter the course of the war nor bring ultimate victory to +their standards. + +It would be considered by every military authority as a flagrant +absurdity to deduce from the history of these many raids on land +that a strong army is not a sufficient defence for a continental +country against invasion. What other efficient defence against +that can a continental country have? Apply the reasoning to the +case of an insular country, and reliance on naval defence will +be abundantly justified. + +To maintain that Canada, India, and Egypt respectively could +be invaded by the United States, Russia, and Turkey, backed by +Germany, notwithstanding any action that our navy could take, +would be equivalent to maintaining that one part of our empire +cannot or need not reinforce another. Suppose that we had a military +force numerically equal to or exceeding the Russian, how could any +of it be sent to defend Canada, India, and Egypt, or to reinforce +the defenders of those countries, unless our sea communications +were kept open? Can these be kept open except by the action of +our navy? It is plain that they cannot. + + + + +VIII + +QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HER SEAMEN[65] + +[Footnote 65: Written in 1900. (_Nineteenth_Century_and_After_, +1901.)] + +An eminent writer has recently repeated the accusations made +within the last forty years, and apparently only within that +period, against Queen Elizabeth of having starved the seamen +of her fleet by giving them food insufficient in quantity and +bad in quality, and of having robbed them by keeping them out of +the pay due to them. He also accuses the Queen, though somewhat +less plainly, of having deliberately acquiesced in a wholesale +slaughter of her seamen by remaining still, though no adequate +provision had been made for the care of the sick and wounded. +There are further charges of obstinately objecting, out of mere +stinginess, to take proper measures for the naval defence of the +country, and of withholding a sufficient supply of ammunition +from her ships when about to meet the enemy. Lest it should be +supposed that this is an exaggerated statement of the case against +Elizabeth as formulated by the writer in question, his own words +are given. + +He says: 'Instead of strengthening her armaments to the utmost, +and throwing herself upon her Parliament for aid, she clung to +her moneybags, actually reduced her fleet, withheld ammunition +and the more necessary stores, cut off the sailor's food, did, in +short, everything in her power to expose the country defenceless +to the enemy. The pursuit of the Armada was stopped by the failure +of the ammunition, which, apparently, had the fighting continued +longer, would have been fatal to the English fleet.' + +The writer makes on this the rather mild comment that 'treason +itself could scarcely have done worse.' Why 'scarcely'? Surely +the very blackest treason could not have done worse. He goes +on to ask: 'How were the glorious seamen, whose memory will be +for ever honoured by England and the world, rewarded after their +victory?' + +This is his answer: 'Their wages were left unpaid, they were +docked of their food, and served with poisonous drink, while for +the sick and wounded no hospitals were provided. More of them +were killed by the Queen's meanness than by the enemy.' + +It is safe to challenge the students of history throughout the +world to produce any parallel to conduct so infamous as that +which has thus been imputed to an English queen. If the charges +are true, there is no limit to the horror and loathing with which +we ought to regard Elizabeth. Are they true? That is the question. +I respectfully invite the attention of those who wish to know +the truth and to retain their reverence for a great historical +character, to the following examination of the accusations and of the +foundations on which they rest. It will not, I hope, be considered +presumptuous if I say that--in making this examination--personal +experience of life in the navy sufficiently extensive to embrace +both the present day and the time before the introduction of +the great modern changes in system and naval _materiel_ will be +of great help. Many things which have appeared so extraordinary +to landsmen that they could account for their occurrence only +by assuming that this must have been due to extreme culpability +or extreme folly will be quite familiar to naval officers whose +experience of the service goes back forty years or more, and +can be satisfactorily explained by them. + +There is little reason to doubt that the above-mentioned charges +against the great Queen are based exclusively on statements in +Froude's History. It is remarkable how closely Froude has been +followed by writers treating of Elizabeth and her reign. He was +known to have gone to original documents for the sources of his +narrative; and it seems to have been taken for granted, not only +that his fidelity was above suspicion--an assumption with which I +do not deal now--but also that his interpretation of the meaning +of those who wrote the papers consulted must be correct. Motley, +in his 'History of the United Netherlands,' published in 1860, +had dwelt upon the shortness of ammunition and provisions in +the Channel Fleet commanded by Lord Howard of Effingham; but +he attributed this to bad management on the part of officials, +and not to downright baseness on that of Elizabeth. + +Froude has placed beyond doubt his determination to make the Queen +responsible for all shortcomings. + +'The Queen,' he says, 'has taken upon herself the detailed +arrangement of everything. She and she alone was responsible. +She had extended to the dockyards the same hard thrift with which +she had pared down her expenses everywhere. She tied the ships to +harbour by supplying the stores in driblets. She allowed rations +but for a month, and permitted no reserves to be provided in the +victualling offices. The ships at Plymouth, furnished from a +distance, and with small quantities at a time, were often for +many days without food of any kind. Even at Plymouth, short food +and poisonous drink had brought dysentery among them. They had +to meet the enemy, as it were, with one arm bandaged by their +own sovereign. The greatest service ever done by an English fleet +had been thus successfully accomplished by men whose wages had +not been paid from the time of their engagement, half-starved, +with their clothes in rags, and so ill-found in the necessaries +of war that they had eked out their ammunition by what they could +take in action from the enemy himself. The men expected that +at least after such a service they would be paid their wages +in full. The Queen was cavilling over the accounts, and would +give no orders for money till she had demanded the meaning of +every penny that she was charged.... Their legitimate food had +been stolen from them by the Queen's own neglect.' + +We thus see that Froude has made Elizabeth personally responsible +for the short rations, the undue delay in paying wages earned, and +the fearful sickness which produced a heavy mortality amongst the +crews of her Channel Fleet; and also for insufficiently supplying +her ships with ammunition. + +The quotations from the book previously referred to make it clear +that it is possible to outdo Froude in his denunciations, even where +it is on his statements that the accusers found their charges. In +his 'History of England'--which is widely read, especially by +the younger generation of Englishmen--the Rev. J. Franck Bright +tells us, with regard to the defensive campaign against the Armada: +'The Queen's avarice went near to ruin the country. The miserable +supplies which Elizabeth had alone allowed to be sent them (the +ships in the Channel) had produced all sorts of disease, and +thousands of the crews came from their great victory only to die. +In the midst of privations and wanting in all the necessaries +of life, the sailors had fought with unflagging energy, with +their wages unpaid, with ammunition supplied to them with so +stingy a hand that each shot sent on board was registered and +accounted for; with provisions withheld, so that the food of +four men had habitually to be divided among six, and that food +so bad as to be really poisonous.' + +J. R. Green, in his 'History of the English People,' states that: +'While England was thrilling with the triumph over the Armada, its +Queen was coolly grumbling over the cost and making her profit +out of the spoiled provisions she had ordered for the fleet that +had saved her.' + +The object of each subsequent historian was to surpass the originator +of the calumnies against Elizabeth. In his sketch of her life in +the 'Dictionary of National Biography,' Dr. Augustus Jessopp +asserts that the Queen's ships 'were notoriously and scandalously +ill-furnished with stores and provisions for the sailors, and +it is impossible to lay the blame on anyone but the Queen.' He +had previously remarked that the merchant vessels which came to +the assistance of the men-of-war from London and the smaller +ports 'were as a rule far better furnished than the Queen's ships,' +which were 'without the barest necessaries.' After these extracts +one from Dr. S. R. Gardiner's 'Student's History of England' +will appear moderate. Here it is: 'Elizabeth having with her +usual economy kept the ships short of powder, they were forced +to come back' from the chase of the Armada. + +The above allegations constitute a heavy indictment of the Queen. +No heavier could well be brought against any sovereign or government. +Probably the first thing that occurs to anyone who, knowing what +Elizabeth's position was, reads the tremendous charges made against +her will be, that--if they are true--she must have been without a +rival in stupidity as well as in turpitude. There was no person +in the world who had as much cause to desire the defeat of the +Armada as she had. If the Duke of Medina Sidonia's expedition +had been successful she would have lost both her throne and her +life. She herself and her father had shown that there could be a +short way with Queens--consort or regnant--whom you had in your +power, and whose existence might be inconvenient to you. Yet, +if we are to believe her accusers, she did her best to ensure +her own dethronement and decapitation. 'The country saved itself +and its cause in spite of its Queen.' + +How did this extraordinary view of Elizabeth's conduct arise? +What had Froude to go upon when he came forward as her accuser? +These questions can be answered with ease. Every Government that +comes near going to war, or that has gone to war, is sure to +incur one of two charges, made according to circumstances. If +the Government prepares for war and yet peace is preserved, it +is accused of unpardonable extravagance in making preparations. +Whether it makes these on a sufficient scale or not, it is accused, +if war does break out--at least in the earlier period of the +contest--of not having done enough. Political opponents and the +'man in the street' agree in charging the administration with +panic profusion in one case, and with criminal niggardliness in +the other. Elizabeth hoped to preserve peace. She had succeeded +in keeping out of an 'official' war for a long time, and she had +much justification for the belief that she could do so still +longer. 'She could not be thoroughly persuaded,' says Mr. David +Hannay,[66] 'that it was hopeless to expect to avert the Spanish +invasion by artful diplomacy.' Whilst reasonable precautions +were not neglected, she was determined that no one should be +able to say with truth that she had needlessly thrown away money +in a fright. For the general naval policy of England at the time, +Elizabeth, as both the nominal and the real head of the Government, +is properly held responsible. The event showed the perfect efficiency +of that policy. + +[Footnote 66: _A_Short_History_of_the_Royal_Navy_, pp. 96, 97.] + +The war having really come, it was inevitable that the Government, +and Elizabeth as its head, should be blamed sooner or later for not +having made adequate provision for it. No one is better entitled +to speak on the naval policy of the Armada epoch than Mr. Julian +Corbett,[67] who is not disposed to assume that the Queen's action +was above criticism. He says that 'Elizabeth has usually been +regarded as guilty of complete and unpardonable inaction.' He +explains that 'the event at least justified the Queen's policy. +There is no trace of her having been blamed for it at the time at +home; nor is there any reason to doubt it was adopted sagaciously +and deliberately on the advice of her most capable officers.' +Mr. David Hannay, who, as an historian, rightly takes into +consideration the conditions of the age, points out that 'Elizabeth +was a very poor sovereign, and the maintenance of a great fleet +was a heavy drain upon her resources.' He adds: 'There is no +reason to suppose that Elizabeth and her Lord Treasurer were +careless of their duty; but the Government of the time had very +little experience in the maintenance of great military forces.' + +[Footnote 67: _Drake_and_the_Tudor_Navy_, 1898, vol. ii. p. 117.] + +If we take the charges against her in detail, we shall find that +each is as ill-founded as that of criminal neglect of naval +preparations generally. The most serious accusation is that with +regard to the victuals. It will most likely be a surprise to +many people to find that the seamen of Elizabeth were victualled +on a more abundant and much more costly scale than the seamen of +Victoria. Nevertheless, such is the fact. In 1565 the contract +allowance for victualling was 4-1/2d. a day for each man in harbour, +and 5d. a day at sea. There was also an allowance of 4d. a man +per month at sea and 8d. in harbour for 'purser's necessaries.' +Mr. Oppenheim, in whose valuable work[68] on naval administration +the details as to the Elizabethan victualling system are to be +found, tells us that in 1586 the rate was raised to 6d. a day +in harbour and 6-1/2d. at sea; and that in 1587 it was again +raised, this time to 6-1/2d. in harbour and 7d. at sea. These +sums were intended to cover both the cost of the food and storage, +custody, conveyance, &c., the present-day 'establishment charges.' +The repeated raising of the money allowance is convincing proof +that the victualling arrangements had not been neglected, and +that there was no refusal to sanction increased expenditure to +improve them. It is a great thing to have Mr. Oppenheim's high +authority for this, because he is not generally favourable to +the Queen, though even he admits that it 'is a moot point' how +far she was herself responsible. + +[Footnote 68: _The_Administration_of_the_Royal_Navy,_ +_1509-1660_. London, 1896.] + +If necessary, detailed arguments could be adduced to show that +to get the present value of the sums allowed in 1588 we ought +to multiply them by six[69] The sum allowed for each man's daily +food and the 'establishment charges'--increased as they had been +in 1586--did little more than cover the expenditure; and, though +it does not appear that the contractor lost money, he nevertheless +died a poor man. It will be hardly imputed to Elizabeth for iniquity +that she did not consider that the end of government was the +enrichment of contractors. The fact that she increased the money +payment again in 1587 may be accepted as proof that she did not +object to a fair bargain. As has been just said, the Elizabethan +scale of victualling was more abundant than the early Victorian, +and not less abundant than that given in the earlier years of +King Edward VII.[70] As shown by Mr. Hubert Hall and Thorold +Rogers, in the price-lists which they publish, the cost of a week's +allowance of food for a man-of-war's man in 1588, in the money of +the time, amounted to about 1s. 11-1/2d., which, multiplied by +six, would be about 11s. 9d. of our present money. The so-called +'savings price' of the early twentieth century allowance was +about 9-1/2d. a day, or 5s. 6-1/2d. weekly. The 'savings price' +is the amount of money which a man received if he did not take +up his victuals, each article having a price attached to it for +that purpose. It may be interesting to know that the full allowance +was rarely, perhaps never, taken up, and that some part of the +savings was till the last, and for many years had been, almost +invariably paid. + +[Footnote 69: See Mr. Hubert Hall's _Society_in_the_Elizabethan_ +_Age_, and Thorold Rogers's _History_of_Agriculture_and_Prices_, +vols. v. and vi. Froude himself puts the ratio at six to one.] + +[Footnote 70: It will be convenient to compare the two scales +in a footnote, observing that--as I hope will not be thought +impertinent--I draw on my own personal experience for the more +recent, which was in force for some years after I went to sea. + + WEEKLY + + ---------------------------------------------- + | | | Early | + | | Elizabethan | Victorian | + | | scale | scale | + |----------------------------------------------| + | Beef | 8 lbs. | 7 lbs. | + | Biscuit | 7 " | 7 " | + | Salted fish | 9 " | none | + | Cheese | 3/4 lb. | " | + | Butter | " | " | + | Beer | 7 gallons | " | + | Vegetables | none | 3-1/2 lbs. | + | Spirits | " | 7/8 pint | + | Tea | " | 1-3/4 oz. | + | Sugar | " | 14 " | + | Cocoa | " | 7 " | + ---------------------------------------------- + +There is now a small allowance of oatmeal, pepper, mustard, and +vinegar, against which we may set the 'purser's necessaries' of +Elizabeth's day. In that day but little sugar was used, and tea +and cocoa were unknown even in palaces. It is just a question +if seven gallons of beer did not make up for the weekly allowance +of these and for the seven-eighths of a pint of spirits. Tea +was only allowed in 1850, and was not an additional article. +It replaced part of the spirits. The biscuit allowance is now +8-3/4 lbs. Weekly. + +The Victorian dietary is more varied and wholesome than the +Elizabethan; but, as we have seen, it is less abundant and can be +obtained for much less money, even if we grant that the 'savings +price'--purposely kept low to avoid all suggestion that the men +are being bribed into stinting themselves--is less than the real +cost. The excess of this latter, however, is not likely to be +more than 30 per cent., so that Elizabeth's expenditure in this +department was more liberal than the present. Such defects as +were to be found in the Elizabethan naval dietary were common +to it with that of the English people generally. If there was +plenty, there was but little variety in the food of our ancestors +of all ranks three centuries ago. As far as was possible in the +conditions of the time, Elizabeth's Government did make provision +for victualling the fleet on a sufficient and even liberal scale; +and, notwithstanding slender pecuniary resources, repeatedly +increased the money assigned to it, on cause being shown. In +his eagerness to make Queen Elizabeth a monster of treacherous +rapacity, Froude has completely overreached himself, He says +that 'she permitted some miserable scoundrel to lay a plan before +her for saving expense, by cutting down the seamen's diet.' The +'miserable scoundrel' had submitted a proposal for diminishing +the expenses which the administration was certainly ill able +to bear, The candid reader will draw his own conclusions when +he finds that the Queen did not approve the plan submitted; and +yet that not one of her assailants has let this appear.[71] + +[Footnote 71: It may be stated here that the word 'rations' is +unknown in the navy. The official term is 'victuals.' The term +in common use is 'provisions.'] + +It is, of course, possible to concede that adequate arrangements +had been made for the general victualling of the fleet; and still +to maintain that, after all, the sailors afloat actually did +run short of food. In his striking 'Introduction to the Armada +Despatches' published by the Navy Records Society, Professor Sir +John Laughton declares that: 'To anyone examining the evidence, +there can be no question as to victualling being conducted on +a fairly liberal scale, as far as the money was concerned. It +was in providing the victuals that the difficulty lay.... When +a fleet of unprecedented magnitude was collected, when a sudden +and unwonted demand was made on the victualling officers, it +would have been strange indeed if things had gone quite smoothly.' + +There are plenty of naval officers who have had experience, and +within the last ten years of the nineteenth century, of the +difficulty, and sometimes of the impossibility, of getting sufficient +supplies for a large number of ships in rather out-of-the-way places. +In 1588 the comparative thinness of population and insufficiency +of communications and means of transport must have constituted +obstacles, far greater than any encountered in our own day, to +the collection of supplies locally and to their timely importation +from a distance. 'You would not believe,' says Lord Howard of +Effingham himself, 'what a wonderful thing it is to victual such +an army as this is in such a narrow corner of the earth, where +a man would think that neither victuals were to be had nor a cask +to put it in.' No more effective defence of Elizabeth and her +Ministers could well be advanced than that which Mr. Oppenheim puts +forward as a corroboration of the accusation against them. He says +that the victualling officials 'found no difficulty in arranging +for 13,000 men in 1596 and 9200 in 1597 after timely notice.' This +is really a high compliment, as it proves that the authorities +were quite ready to, and in fact did, learn from experience. Mr. +Oppenheim, however, is not an undiscriminating assailant of the +Queen; for he remarks, as has been already said, that, 'how far +Elizabeth was herself answerable is a moot point.' He tells us +that there 'is no direct evidence against her'; and the charge +levelled at her rests not on proof, but on 'strong probability.' +One would like to have another instance out of all history, of +probability, however strong, being deemed sufficient to convict +a person of unsurpassed treachery and stupidity combined, when +the direct evidence, which is not scanty, fails to support the +charge and indeed points the other way. + +The Lord Admiral himself and other officers have been quoted to +show how badly off the fleet was for food. Yet at the close of +the active operations against the Armada, Sir J. Hawkins wrote: +'Here is victual sufficient, and I know not why any should be +provided after September, but for those which my Lord doth mean +to leave in the narrow seas.' On the same day Howard himself +wrote from Dover: 'I have caused all the remains of victuals +to be laid here and at Sandwich, for the maintaining of them +that shall remain in the Narrow Seas.' Any naval officer with +experience of command who reads Howard's representations on the +subject of the victuals will at once perceive that what the Admiral +was anxious about was not the quantity on board the ships, but +the stock in reserve. Howard thought that the latter ought to +be a supply for six weeks. The Council thought a month's stock +would be enough; and--as shown by the extracts from Howard's +and Hawkins's letters just given--the Council was right in its +estimate. Anyone who has had to write or to read official letters +about stocks of stores and provisions will find something especially +modern in Howard's representations. + +Though the crews of the fleet did certainly come near the end of +their victuals afloat, there is no case of their having actually +run out of them. The complement of an ordinary man-of-war in the +latter part of the sixteenth century, judged by our modern standard, +was very large in proportion to her size. It was impossible for +her to carry provisions enough to last her men for a long time. +Any unexpected prolongation of a cruise threatened a reduction +to short commons. A great deal has been made of the fact that +Howard had to oblige six men to put up with the allowance of +four. 'When a large force,' says Mr. D. Hannay, 'was collected +for service during any length of time, it was the common rule to +divide four men's allowance among six.' There must be still many +officers and men to whom the plan would seem quite familiar. It is +indicated by a recognised form of words, 'six upon four.' I have +myself been 'six upon four' several times, mostly in the Pacific, +but also, on at least one occasion, in the East Indies. As far +as I could see, no one appeared to regard it as an intolerable +hardship. The Government, it should be known, made no profit +out of the process, because money was substituted for the food +not issued. Howard's recourse to it was not due to immediate +insufficiency. Speaking of the merchant vessels which came to +reinforce him, he says: 'We are fain to help them with victuals +to bring them thither. There is not any of them that hath one +day's victuals.' These merchant vessels were supplied by private +owners; and it is worth noting that, in the teeth of this statement +by Howard, Dr. Jessopp, in his eagerness to blacken Elizabeth, +says that they 'were, as a rule, far better furnished than the +Queen's ships.' The Lord Admiral on another occasion, before +the fight off Gravelines, said of the ships he hoped would join +him from Portsmouth: 'Though they have not two days' victuals, +let that not be the cause of their stay, for they shall have +victuals out of our fleet,' a conclusive proof that his ships +were not very short. + +As to the accusation of deliberately issuing food of bad quality, +that is effectually disposed of by the explanation already given +of the method employed in victualling the navy. A sum was paid +for each man's daily allowance to a contractor, who was expressly +bound to furnish 'good and seasonable victuals.'[72] Professor +Laughton, whose competence in the matter is universally allowed, +informs us that complaints of bad provisions are by no means +confined to the Armada epoch, and were due, not to intentional +dishonesty and neglect, but to insufficient knowledge of the +way to preserve provisions for use on rather long cruises. Mr. +Hannay says that the fleet sent to the coast of Spain, in the +year after the defeat of the Armada, suffered much from want +of food and sickness. 'Yet it was organised, not by the Queen, +but by a committee of adventurers who had every motive to fit +it out well.' It is the fashion with English historians to paint +the condition of the navy in the time of the Commonwealth in +glowing colours, yet Mr. Oppenheim cites many occasions of +well-founded complaints of the victuals. He says: 'The quality of +the food supplied to the men and the honesty of the victualling +agents both steadily deteriorated during the Commonwealth.' Lord +Howard's principal difficulty was with the beer, which would +go sour. The beer was the most frequent subject of protest in +the Commonwealth times. Also, in 1759, Lord (then Sir Edward) +Hawke reported: 'Our daily employment is condemning the beer +from Plymouth.' The difficulty of brewing beer that would stand +a sea voyage seemed to be insuperable. The authorities, however, +did not soon abandon attempts to get the right article. Complaints +continued to pour in; but they went on with their brewing till +1835, and then gave it up as hopeless. + +[Footnote 72: See 'The Mariners of England before the Armada,' by +Mr. H. Halliday Sparling, in the _English_Illustrated_Magazine_, +July 1, 1891.] + +One must have had personal experience of the change to enable +one to recognise the advance that has been made in the art of +preserving articles of food within the last half-century. In +the first Drury Lane pantomime that I can remember--about a year +before I went to sea--a practical illustration of the quality +of some of the food supplied to the navy was offered during the +harlequinade by the clown, who satisfied his curiosity as to +the contents of a large tin of 'preserved meat' by pulling out +a dead cat. On joining the service I soon learned that, owing +to the badness of the 'preserved' food that had been supplied, +the idea of issuing tinned meat had been abandoned. It was not +resumed till some years later. It is often made a joke against +naval officers of a certain age that, before eating a biscuit, +they have a trick of rapping the table with it. We contracted +the habit as midshipmen when it was necessary to get rid of the +weevils in the biscuit before it could be eaten, and a fairly +long experience taught us that rapping the table with it was +an effectual plan for expelling them. + +There is no more justification for accusing Queen Elizabeth of +failure to provide well-preserved food to her sailors than there +is for accusing her of not having sent supplies to Plymouth by +railway. Steam transport and efficient food preservation were +equally unknown in her reign and for long after. It has been +intimated above that, even had she wished to, she could not possibly +have made any money out of bad provisions. The victualling system +did not permit of her doing so. The austere republican virtue of +the Commonwealth authorities enabled them to do what was out of +Elizabeth's power. In 1653, 'beer and other provisions "decayed +and unfit for use" were licensed for export free of Customs.' Mr. +Oppenheim, who reports this fact, makes the remarkable comment +that this was done 'perhaps in the hope that such stores would +go to Holland,' with whose people we were at war. As the heavy +mortality in the navy had always been ascribed to the use of bad +provisions, we cannot refuse to give to the sturdy Republicans +who governed England in the seventeenth century the credit of +contemplating a more insidious and more effective method of damaging +their enemy than poisoning his wells. One would like to have it +from some jurist if the sale of poisonously bad food to your +enemy is disallowed by international law. + +That there was much sickness in the fleet and that many seamen died +is, unfortunately, true. If Howard's evidence is to be accepted--as +it always is when it seems to tell against the Queen--it is +impossible to attribute this to the bad quality of the food then +supplied. The Lord Admiral's official report is 'that the ships +of themselves be so infectious and corrupted as it is thought to +be a very plague; and we find that the fresh men that we draw +into our ships are infected one day and die the next.' The least +restrained assertor of the 'poisonous' food theory does not contend +that it killed men within twenty-four hours. The Armada reached +the Channel on the 20th of July (30th, New Style). A month earlier +Howard had reported that 'several men have fallen sick and by +thousands fain to be discharged'; and, after the fighting was +over, he said of the _Elizabeth_Jonas_, she 'hath had a great +infection in her from the beginning.' Lord Henry Seymour, who +commanded the division of the fleet stationed in the Straits +of Dover, noted that the sickness was a repetition of that of +the year before, and attributed it not to bad food, but to the +weather. 'Our men,' he wrote, 'fall sick by reason of the cold +nights and cold mornings we find; and I fear me they will drop +away faster than they did last year with Sir Henry Palmer, which +was thick enough.' + +'The sickness,' says Professor Laughton, 'was primarily and chiefly +due to infection from the shore and ignorance or neglect of what +we now know as sanitary laws.... Similar infections continued +occasionally to scourge our ships' companies, and still more +frequently French and Spanish ships' companies, till near the +close of the eighteenth century.' It is not likely that any evidence +would suffice to divert from their object writers eager to hurl +calumny at a great sovereign; but a little knowledge of naval +and of military history also would have saved their readers from +a belief in their accusations. In 1727 the fleet in the West +Indies commanded by Admiral Hosier, commemorated in Glover's +ballad, lost ten flag officers and captains, fifty lieutenants, +and 4000 seamen. In the Seven Years' war the total number belonging +to the fleet killed in action was 1512; whilst the number that +died of disease and were missing was 133,708. From 1778 to 1783, +out of 515,000 men voted by Parliament for the navy, 132,623 were +'sent sick.' In the summer, 1779, the French fleet cruising at +the mouth of the English Channel, after landing 500, had still +about 2000 men sick. At the beginning of autumn the number of +sick had become so great that many ships had not enough men to +work them. The _Ville_de_Paris_ had 560 sick, and lost 61. The +_Auguste_ had 500 sick, and lost 44. On board the _Intrepide_ +70 died out of 529 sick. These were the worst cases; but other +ships also suffered heavily. + +It is, perhaps, not generally remembered till what a very late +date armies and navies were more than decimated by disease. In +1810 the House of Commons affirmed by a resolution, concerning +the Walcheren Expedition: 'That on the 19th of August a malignant +disorder showed itself amongst H.M. troops; and that on the 8th +of September the number of sick amounted to upwards of 10,948 +men. That of the army which embarked for service in the Scheldt +sixty officers and 3900 men, exclusive of those killed by the +enemy, had died before the 1st of February last.' + +In a volume of 'Military, Medical, and Surgical Essays'[73] prepared +for the United States' Sanitary Commission, and edited by Dr. +Wm. A. Hammond, Surgeon-General of the U.S. Army, it is stated +that, in our Peninsular army, averaging a strength of 64,227 +officers and men, the annual rate of mortality from the 25th +of December 1810 to the 25th of May 1813 was 10 per cent. of +the officers and 16 per cent. of the men. We may calculate from +this that some 25,000 officers and men died. There were 22-1/2 +per cent., or over 14,000, 'constantly sick.' Out of 309,268 +French soldiers sent to the Crimea in 1855-6, the number of killed +and those who died of wounds was 7500, the number who died of +disease was 61,700. At the same date navies also suffered. Dr. +Stilon Mends, in his life of his father,[74] Admiral Sir William +Mends, prints a letter in which the Admiral, speaking of the +cholera in the fleets at Varna, says: 'The mortality on board +the _Montebello_, _Ville_de_Paris_, _Valmy_ (French ships), +and _Britannia_ (British) has been terrible; the first lost 152 +in three days, the second 120 in three days, the third 80 in ten +days, but the last lost 50 in one night and 10 the subsequent +day.' Kinglake tells us that in the end the _Britannia's_ loss +went up to 105. With the above facts before us, we are compelled +to adopt one of two alternatives. We must either maintain that +sanitary science made no advance between 1588 and 1855, or admit +that the mortality in Elizabeth's fleet became what it was owing to +ignorance of sanitary laws and not to intentional bad management. +As regards care of the sick, it is to be remembered that the +establishment of naval and military hospitals for the reception +of sick soldiers and sailors is of recent date. For instance, +the two great English military hospitals, Netley and the Herbert, +are only about sixty years old. + +[Footnote 73: Philadelphia, 1864.] + +[Footnote 74: London, 1899.] + +So far from our fleet in 1588 having been ill-supplied with +ammunition, it was in reality astonishingly well equipped, +considering the age. We learn from Mr. Julian Corbett,[75] that +'during the few years immediately preceding the outbreak of the +war, the Queen's navy had been entirely re-armed with brass guns, +and in the process of re-armament a great advance in simplicity +had been secured.' Froude, without seeing where the admission +would land him, admits that our fleet was more plentifully supplied +than the Armada, in which, he says, 'the supply of cartridges +was singularly small. The King [Philip the Second] probably +considered that a single action would decide the struggle; and +it amounted to but fifty rounds for each gun.' Our own supply +therefore exceeded fifty rounds. In his life of Vice-Admiral +Lord Lyons,[76] Sir S. Eardley Wilmot tells us that the British +ships which attacked the Sebastopol forts in October 1854 'could +only afford to expend seventy rounds per gun.' At the close of +the nineteenth century, the regulated allowance for guns mounted +on the broadside was eighty-five rounds each. Consequently, the +Elizabethan allowance was nearly, if not quite, as much as that +which our authorities, after an experience of naval warfare during +three centuries, thought sufficient. 'The full explanation,' says +Professor Laughton, 'of the want [of ammunition] seems to lie +in the rapidity of fire which has already been mentioned. The +ships had the usual quantity on board; but the expenditure was +more, very many times more, than anyone could have conceived.' +Mr. Julian Corbett considers it doubtful if the ammunition, in +at least one division of the fleet, was nearly exhausted. + +[Footnote 75: _The_Spanish_War_, 1585-87 (Navy Records Society), +1898, p. 323.] + +[Footnote 76: London, 1898, p. 236.] + +Exhaustion of the supply of ammunition in a single action is a +common naval occurrence. The not very decisive character of the +battle of Malaga between Sir George Rooke and the Count of Toulouse +in 1704 was attributed to insufficiency of ammunition, the supply +in our ships having been depleted by what 'Mediterranean' Byng, +afterwards Lord Torrington, calls the 'furious fire' opened on +Gibraltar. The Rev. Thomas Pocock, Chaplain of the _Ranelagh_, +Byng's flag-ship at Malaga, says:[77] 'Many of our ships went +out of the line for want of ammunition.' Byng's own opinion, as +stated by the compiler of his memoirs, was, that 'it may without +great vanity be said that the English had gained a greater victory +if they had been supplied with ammunition as they ought to have +been.' I myself heard the late Lord Alcester speak of the anxiety +that had been caused him by the state of his ships' magazines +after the attack on the Alexandria forts in 1882. At a still +later date, Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay interrupted his attack +on the Spanish squadron to ascertain how much ammunition his +ships had left. The carrying capacity of ships being limited, +rapid gun-fire in battle invariably brings with it the risk of +running short of ammunition. It did this in the nineteenth century +just as much as, probably even more than, it did in the sixteenth. + +[Footnote 77: In his journal (p. 197), printed as an Appendix +to _Memoirs_relating_to_the_Lord_Torrington_, edited by +J. K. Laughton for the Camden Society, 1889.] + +To charge Elizabeth with criminal parsimony because she insisted +on every shot being 'registered and accounted for' will be received +with ridicule by naval officers. Of course every shot, and for the +matter of that every other article expended, has to be accounted +for. One of the most important duties of the gunner of a man-of-war +is to keep a strict account of the expenditure of all gunnery +stores. This was more exactly done under Queen Victoria than it +was under Queen Elizabeth. Naval officers are more hostile to +'red tape' than most men, and they may lament the vast amount +of bookkeeping that modern auditors and committees of public +accounts insist upon, but they are convinced that a reasonable +check on expenditure of stores is indispensable to efficient +organisation. So far from blaming Elizabeth for demanding this, +they believe that both she and Burleigh, her Lord Treasurer, +were very much in advance of their age. + +Another charge against her is that she defrauded her seamen of +their wages. The following is Froude's statement:-- + +'Want of the relief, which, if they had been paid their wages, they +might have provided for themselves had aggravated the tendencies to +disease, and a frightful mortality now set in through the entire +fleet.' The word 'now' is interesting, Froude having had before +him Howard's and Seymour's letters, already quoted, showing that +the appearance of the sickness was by no means recent. Elizabeth's +illiberality towards her seamen may be judged from the fact that +in her reign their pay was certainly increased once and perhaps +twice.[78] In 1585 the sailor's pay was raised from 6s. 8d. to +10s. a month. A rise of pay of 50 per cent. all at once is, I +venture to say, entirely without parallel in the navy since, and +cannot well be called illiberal. The Elizabethan 10s. would be +equal to L3 in our present accounts; and, as the naval month at +the earlier date was the lunar, a sailor's yearly wages would +be equal to L39 now. The year's pay of an A.B., 'non-continuous +service,' as Elizabeth's sailors were, is at the present time L24 +6s. 8d. It is true that the sailor now can receive additional +pay for good-conduct badges, gunnery-training, &c., and also +can look forward to that immense boon--a pension--nearly, but +thanks to Sir J. Hawkins and Drake's establishment of the 'Chatham +Chest,' not quite unknown in the sixteenth century. Compared with +the rate of wages ruling on shore, Elizabeth's seamen were paid +highly. Mr. Hubert Hall states that for labourers 'the usual rate +was 2d. or 3d. a day.' Ploughmen received a shilling a week. In +these cases 'board' was also given. The sailor's pay was 5s. a +week with board. Even compared with skilled labour on shore the +sailor of the Armada epoch was well paid. Thorold Rogers gives, +for 1588, the wages, without board, of carpenters and masons at +10d. and 1s. a day. A plumber's wages varied from 10-1/2d. to +1s.; but there is one case of a plumber receiving as much as +1s. 4d., which was probably for a single day. + +[Footnote 78: Mr. Halliday Sparling, in the article already referred +to (p. 651), says twice; but Mr. Oppenheim seems to think that +the first increase was before Elizabeth's accession.] + +Delay in the payment of wages was not peculiar to the Elizabethan +system. It lasted very much longer, down to our own times in +fact. In 1588 the seamen of the fleet were kept without their +pay for several months. In the great majority of cases, and most +likely in all, the number of these months was less than six. Even +within the nineteenth century men-of-war's men had to wait for +their pay for years. Commander C. N. Robinson, in his 'British +Fleet,'[79] a book that ought to be in every Englishman's library, +remarks: 'All through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it +was the rule not to pay anybody until the end of the commission, +and to a certain degree the practice obtained until some fifty +years ago.' As to the nineteenth century, Lord Dundonald, speaking +in Parliament, may be quoted. He said that of the ships on the +East Indies station, the _Centurion's_ men had been unpaid for +eleven years; the _Rattlesnake's_ for fourteen; the _Fox's_ for +fifteen. The Elizabethan practice compared with this will look +almost precipitate instead of dilatory. To draw again on my personal +experience, I may say that I have been kept without pay for a +longer time than most of the people in Lord Howard's fleet, as, +for the first two years that I was at sea, young officers were +paid only once in six months; and then never in cash, but always +in bills. The reader may be left to imagine what happened when +a naval cadet tried to get a bill for some L7 or L8 cashed at +a small Spanish-American port. + +[Footnote 79: London, 1894.] + +A great deal has been made of the strict audit of the accounts +of Howard's fleet. The Queen, says Froude, 'would give no orders +for money till she had demanded the meaning of every penny that +she was charged.' Why she alone should be held up to obloquy +for this is not clear. Until a very recent period, well within +the last reign, no commanding officer, on a ship being paid off, +could receive the residue of his pay, or get any half-pay at +all, until his 'accounts had been passed.'[80] The same rule +applied to officers in charge of money or stores. It has been +made a further charge against Elizabeth that her officers had to +meet certain expenditure out of their own pockets. That certainly +is not a peculiarity of the sixteenth-century navy. Till less +than fifty years ago the captain of a British man-of-war had +to provide one of the three chronometers used in the navigation +of his ship. Even later than that the articles necessary for +cleaning the ship and everything required for decorating her +were paid for by the officers, almost invariably by the first +lieutenant, or second in command. There must be many officers +still serving who have spent sums, considerable in the aggregate, +of their own money on public objects. Though pressure in this +respect has been much relieved of late, there are doubtless many +who do so still. It is, in fact, a traditional practice in the +British Navy and is not in the least distinctly Elizabethan. + +[Footnote 80: This happened to me in 1904.] + +Some acquaintance with present conditions and accurate knowledge +of the naval methods prevailing in the great Queen's reign--a +knowledge which the publication of the original documents puts +within the reach of anyone who really cares to know the truth--will +convince the candid inquirer that Elizabeth's administration of the +navy compares favourably with that of any of her successors; and +that, for it, she deserves the admiration and unalloyed gratitude +of the nation. + + + + +IX[81] + +[Footnote 81: Written in 1905. (_Cornhill_Magazine_.)] + +NELSON: THE CENTENARY OF TRAFALGAR + +[The following article was read as an address, in compliance +with the request of its Council, at the annual meeting of the +Navy Records Society in July 1905. It was, and indeed is still, +my opinion, as stated to the meeting in some prefatory remarks, +that the address would have come better from a professed historian, +several members of the Society being well known as entitled to that +designation. The Council, however, considered that, as Nelson's +tactical principles and achievements should be dealt with, it would +be better for the address to be delivered by a naval officer--one, +moreover, who had personal experience of the manoeuvres of fleets +under sail. Space would not suffice for treating of Nelson's +merits as a strategist, though they are as great as those which +he possessed as a tactician.] + +Centenary commemorations are common enough; but the commemoration +of Nelson has a characteristic which distinguishes it from most, +if not from all, others. In these days we forget soon. What place +is still kept in our memories by even the most illustrious of +those who have but recently left us? It is not only that we do +not remember their wishes and injunctions; their existence has +almost faded from our recollection. It is not difficult to persuade +people to commemorate a departed worthy; but in most cases industry +has to take the place of enthusiasm, and moribund or extinct +remembrances have to be galvanised by assiduity into a semblance +of life. In the case of Nelson the conditions are very different. +He may have been misunderstood; even by his professional descendants +his acts and doctrines may have been misinterpreted; but he has +never been forgotten. + +The time has now come when we can specially do honour to Nelson's +memory without wounding the feelings of other nations. There is no +need to exult over or even to expatiate on the defeats of others. +In recalling the past it is more dignified as regards ourselves, +and more considerate of the honour of our great admiral, to think +of the valour and self-devotion rather than the misfortunes of +those against whom he fought. We can do full justice to Nelson's +memory without reopening old wounds. + +The first thing to be noted concerning him is that he is the +only man who has ever lived who by universal consent is without +a peer. This is said in full view of the new constellation rising +above the Eastern horizon; for that constellation, brilliant +as it is, has not yet reached the meridian. In every walk of +life, except that which Nelson chose as his own, you will find +several competitors for the first place, each one of whom will +have many supporters. Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal, Caesar, +Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon have been severally +put forward for the palm of generalship. To those who would acclaim +Richelieu as the first of statesmen, others would oppose Chatham, +or William Pitt, or Cavour, or Bismarck, or Marquis Ito. Who was +the first of sculptors? who the first of painters? who the first +of poets? In every case there is a great difference of opinion. +Ask, however, who was the first of admirals, and the unanimous +reply will still be--'Nelson,' tried as he was by many years of +high command in war. It is not only amongst his fellow-countrymen +that his preeminence is acknowledged. Foreigners admit it as +readily as we proclaim it ourselves. + +We may consider what it was that gave Nelson this unique position +among men. The early conditions of his naval career were certainly +not favourable to him. It is true that he was promoted when young; +but so were many other officers. Nelson was made a commander only +a few months after the outbreak of war between Great Britain +and France, and was made a post-captain within a few days of the +declaration of war by Spain. An officer holding a rank qualifying +him for command at the outset of a great war might well have looked +forward confidently to exceptional opportunities of distinguishing +himself. Even in our own days, when some trifling campaign is +about to be carried on, the officers who are employed where they +can take no part in it vehemently lament their ill-fortune. How +much more disheartening must it have been to be excluded from +active participation in a great and long-continued conflict! This +was Nelson's case. As far as his hopes of gaining distinction +were concerned, fate seemed to persecute him pertinaciously. He +was a captain of more than four years' seniority when the treaty +of Versailles put an end to the war of American Independence. Yet, +with the exception of the brief Nicaragua expedition--which by +the side of the important occurrences of grand naval campaigns +must have seemed insignificant--his services during all those +years of hostilities were uneventful, and even humdrum. He seemed +to miss every important operation; and when the war ended--we may +almost say--he had never seen a ship fire a broadside in anger. + +There then came what promised to be, and in fact turned out to +be, a long period of peace. With no distinguished war service +to point to, and with the prospect before him of only uneventful +employment, or no employment afloat at all, Nelson might well +have been disheartened to the verge of despondency. That he was +not disheartened, but, instead thereof, made a name for himself +in such unfavourable circumstances, must be accepted as one of +the most convincing proofs of his rare force of character. To +have attracted the notice, and to have secured the confidence, +of so great a sea-officer as Lord Hood constituted a distinction +which could have been won only by merit so considerable that +it could not long remain unrecognised. The war of American +Independence had still seven months to run when Lord Hood pointed +to Nelson as an officer to be consulted on 'questions relative +to naval tactics,' Professor Laughton tells us that at that time +Nelson had never served with a fleet. Lord Hood was one of the +last men in the world to go out of his way to pay to a youthful +subordinate an empty compliment, and we may confidently base our +estimate of an officer's merits on Lord Hood's belief in them. + +He, no doubt, gave a Wide signification to the term 'tactics,' and +used it as embracing all that is included in the phrase 'conduct +of war.' He must have found out, from conversations with, and from +the remarks of, the young captain, whom he treated as intimately as +if he was his son, that the latter was already, what he continued +to be till the end, viz. a student of naval warfare. This point +deserves particular attention. The officers of the navy of the +present day, period of peace though it be, can imitate Nelson +at least in this. He had to wait a long time before he could +translate into brilliant action the result of his tactical studies. +Fourteen years after Lord Hood spoke of him as above related, by +a 'spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority +by signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick +perceptions,' Nelson entirely defeated the movement of the enemy's +fleet, contributed to the winning of a great victory, and, as +Captain Mahan tells us, 'emerged from merely personal distinction +to national renown.' The justification of dwelling on this is +to be found in the necessity, even at this day, of preventing +the repetition of mistakes concerning Nelson's qualities and +disposition. His recent biographers, Captain Mahan and Professor +Laughton, feel constrained to tell us over and over again that +Nelson's predominant characteristic was not mere 'headlong valour +and instinct for fighting'; that he was not the man 'to run needless +and useless risks' in battle. 'The breadth and acuteness of Nelson's +intellect,' says Mahan, 'have been too much overlooked in the +admiration excited by his unusually grand moral endowments of +resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility!' + +In forming a true conception of what Nelson was, the publications +of the Navy Records Society will help us greatly. There is something +very remarkable in the way in which Mr. Gutteridge's volume[82] +not only confirms Captain Mahan's refutation of the aspersions +on Nelson's honour and humanity, but also establishes Professor +Laughton's conclusions, reached many years ago, that it was the +orders given to him, and not his amour, which detained him at +Naples at a well-known epoch. The last volume issued by the Society, +that of Mr. Julian Corbett,[83] is, I venture to affirm, the +most useful to naval officers that has yet appeared among the +Society's publications. It will provide them with an admirable +historical introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly +help them in ascertaining the importance of Nelson's achievements +as a tactician. For my own part, I may say with gratitude that +but for Mr. Corbett's valuable work I could not have completed +this appreciation. + +[Footnote 82: _Nelson_and_the_Neapolitan_Jacobins_.] + +[Footnote 83: _Fighting_Instructions_, 1530-1816.] + +The most renowned of Nelson's achievements was that performed +in his final battle and victory. Strange as it may seem, that +celebrated performance has been the subject of much controversy, +and, brilliant as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been +freely, and indeed unfavourably, criticised. There is still much +difference of opinion as to the preliminary movements, and as +to the exact method by which Nelson's attack was made. It has +been often asserted that the method really followed was not that +which Nelson had expressly declared his intention of adopting. +The question raised concerning this is a difficult one, and, +until the appearance of Mr. Julian Corbett's recent work and +the interesting volume on Trafalgar lately published by Mr. H. +Newbolt, had not been fully discussed. The late Vice-Admiral +P. H. Colomb contributed to the _United_Service_Magazine_ of +September 1899 a very striking article on the subject of Nelson's +tactics in his last battle, and those who propose to study the +case should certainly peruse what he wrote. + +The criticism of Nelson's procedure at Trafalgar in its strongest +form may be summarised as follows. It is affirmed that he drew +up and communicated to the officers under his orders a certain +plan of attack; that just before the battle he changed his plan +without warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily; +that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and, because of +all this, that the British loss was much heavier and much less +evenly distributed among the ships of the fleet than it need have +been. The most formidable arraignment of the mode of Nelson's +last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper published +by Sir Charles Ekins in his book on 'Naval Battles,' and vouched +for by him as the work of an eye-witness--almost certainly, as +Mr. Julian Corbett holds, an officer on board the _Conqueror_ in +the battle. It is a remarkable document. Being critical rather +than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of Clerk +of Eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the +investigation of tactical questions ever published in the English +tongue. On it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable +views expressed concerning the British tactics at Trafalgar. As +it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism +of Nelson's action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we +criticise it in its turn. + +Notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually +took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean +tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have +an academic tinge. In fact, they are very much of the kind that a +clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities +inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class +of students. Between a professor of tactics, however clever, and +a commanding genius like Nelson the difference is great indeed. +The writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more +general opinion of his day. He has certainly suggested opinions +to later generations of naval officers. The captains who shared +in Nelson's last great victory did not agree among themselves as +to the mode in which the attack was introduced. It was believed +by some of them, and, thanks largely to the _Conqueror_ officer's +paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas Nelson had +announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast +or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead. Following +up the path of investigation to which, in his article above +mentioned, Admiral Colomb had already pointed, we can, I think, +arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was +adhered to. + +Before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be +convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that +Nelson exposed his fleet at Trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting +it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _Conqueror's_ +officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in +detail'; and that 'the brunt of the action would have been more +equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually +chosen been adopted. Now, Trafalgar was a battle in which an +inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior +fleet of thirty-three. The victory was so decisive that more than +half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed +on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell +an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the +rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port +near at hand. To gain such a victory over a superior force of +seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very +hard fighting was necessary. The only actions of the Napoleonic +period that can be compared with it are those of Camperdown, the +Nile, and Copenhagen. The proportionate loss at Trafalgar was the +least in all the four battles.[84] The allegation that, had Nelson +followed a different method at Trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action +would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily. In +nearly all sea-fights, whether Nelsonic in character or not, +half of the loss of the victors has fallen on considerably less +than half the fleet. That this has been the rule, whatever tactical +method may have been adopted, will appear from the following +statement. In Rodney's victory (12th April 1782) half the loss +fell upon nine ships out of thirty-six, or one-fourth; at 'The +First of June' it fell upon five ships out of twenty-five, or +one-fifth; at St. Vincent it fell upon three ships out of fifteen, +also one-fifth; at Trafalgar half the loss fell on five ships +out of twenty-seven, or very little less than an exact fifth. +It has, therefore, been conclusively shown that, faulty or not +faulty, long-announced or hastily adopted, the plan on which +the battle of Trafalgar was fought did not occasion excessive +loss to the victors or confine the loss, such as it was, to an +unduly small portion of their fleet. As bearing on this question +of the relative severity of the British loss at Trafalgar, it +may be remarked that in that battle there were several British +ships which had been in other great sea-fights. Their losses +in these latter were in nearly every case heavier than their +Trafalgar losses.[85] Authoritative and undisputed figures show +how baseless are the suggestions that Nelson's tactical procedure +at Trafalgar caused his fleet to suffer needlessly heavy loss. + +[Footnote 84: + Camperdown 825 loss out of 8,221: 10 per cent. + The Nile 896 " " 7,401: 12.1 " + Copenhagen 941 " " 6,892: 13.75 " + _Trafalgar_ 1,690 " " 17,256: 9.73 " ] + +[Footnote 85: + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- +| | | | | | Trafalgar | +| Ship | Action |Killed|Wounded|Total|--------------------| +| | | | | |Killed|Wounded|Total| +|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +|_Ajax_ | Rodney's | 9 | 10 | 19 | 2 | 9 | 11 | +| |(Ap. 12, 1782)| | | | | | | +|_Agamemnon_ | " | 15 | 22 | 37 | 2 | 8 | 10 | +|_Conqueror_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 3 | 9 | 12 | +|_Defence_ | 1st June | 17 | 36 | 53 | 7 | 29 | 36 | +|_Bellerophon_| The Nile | 49 | 148 | 197 | 27 | 123 | 150 | +|_Swiftsure_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 9 | 8 | 17 | +|_Defiance_ | Copenhagen | 24 | 21 | 45 | 17 | 53 | 70 | +|_Polyphemus_ | " | 6 | 25 | 31 | 2 | 4 | 6 | + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +[In only one case was the Trafalgar total loss greater than the +total loss of the same ship in an earlier fight; and in this +case (the _Defiance_) the number of killed at Trafalgar was only +about two-thirds of the number killed in the other action.] + +It is now necessary to investigate the statement that Nelson, +hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the +battle. This investigation is much more difficult than that into +the losses of the British fleet, because, whilst the latter can +be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon +conjecture. How desirable it is to make the investigation of +the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the +curious fact that the very completeness of Nelson's success at +Trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study +of tactics in the British Navy for more than three-quarters of +a century. His action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate, +so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel +in our service that Nelson's method consisted merely in rushing +at his enemy as soon as he saw him. Against this conception his +biographers, one after another, have protested in vain. + +At the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to +mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered. +One of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself +are not the same operations. Another is, that, in the order of +sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind' +or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other, +but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. Also, it +may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast +may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing +into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the +same operation. Again, adherence to a plan which presupposes +the enemy's fleet to be in a particular formation after he is +found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate +tactician. This remark is introduced here with full knowledge +of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that +Nelson did change his plan without warning. No admission of the +kind is intended. 'In all cases of anticipated battle,' says Mahan, +'Nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of +his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.' +The same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that +'No man was ever better served than Nelson by the inspiration +of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.' + +The plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of 9th October +1805 indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the British +fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main +divisions and an 'advance squadron,' would move against an enemy +assumed to be in single line-ahead. The 'advance squadron,' it +should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions, +but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either. +The name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships +composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, 'feeling +for' the enemy. On 19th October six ships were ordered 'to go +ahead during the night'; and, besides the frigates, two more +ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between +the six and the commander-in-chief's flag-ship. Thus eight ships +in effect composed an 'advance squadron,' and did not join either +of the main divisions at first. + +When it was expected that the British fleet would comprise forty +sail-of-the-line and the enemy's fleet forty-six, each British +main division was to be made up of sixteen ships; and eight +two-deckers added to either division would increase the strength +of the latter to twenty-four ships. It is interesting to note that, +omitting the _Africa_, which ship came up late, each British main +division on the morning of 21st October 1805 had nine ships--a +number which, by the addition of the eight already mentioned +as distinct from the divisions, could have been increased to +seventeen, thus, except for a fraction, exactly maintaining the +original proportion as regards the hostile fleet, which was now +found to be composed of thirty-three ships. + +During the night of 20th-21st October the Franco-Spanish fleet, +which had been sailing in three divisions and a 'squadron of +observation,' formed line and stood to the southward, heading a +little to the eastward of south. The 'squadron of observation' +was parallel to the main body and to windward (in this case to +the westward) of it, with the leading ships rather more advanced. + +The British main divisions steered WSW. till 1 A.M. After that +they steered SW. till 4 A.M. There are great difficulties about +the time, as the notation of it[86] differed considerably in +different ships; but the above hours are taken from the _Victory's_ +log. At 4 A.M. the British fleet, or rather its main divisions, +wore and stood N. by E. As the wind was about NW. by W., the +ships were close-hauled, and the leader of the 'lee-line,' i.e. +Collingwood's flag-ship, was when in station two points abaft +the _Victory's_ beam as soon as the 'order of sailing' in two +columns--which was to be the order of battle--had been formed. + +[Footnote 86: Except the chronometers, which were instruments of +navigation so precious as always to be kept under lock and key, +there were no clocks in the navy till some years after I joined +it. Time on board ship was kept by half-hour sand-glasses.] + +About 6 A.M. the enemy's fleet was sighted from the _Victory_, +and observed to bear from her E. by S. and be distant from her +ten or twelve miles. The distance is corroborated by observed +bearings from Collingwood's flag-ship.[87] Viewed from the British +ships, placed as they were relatively to it, the enemy's fleet +must have appeared as a long single line-ahead, perhaps not very +exactly formed. As soon as the hostile force was clearly made out, +the British divisions bore up and stood to the eastward, steering +by the _Victory's_ compass ENE. The position and formation of +the British main divisions were by this made exactly those in +which they are shown in the diagram usually attached to the +celebrated memorandum of 9th October 1805. The enemy must have +appeared to the British, who were ten or twelve miles to windward +of him, and on his beam, as if he were formed in line-ahead. He +therefore was also in the position and formation assigned to +him in that diagram. + +[Footnote 87: It would necessitate the use of some technicalities +to explain it fully; but it may be said that the bearings of +the extremes of the enemy's line observed from his flag-ship +prove that Collingwood was in the station that he ought to have +occupied when the British fleet was in the Order of Sailing and +close to the wind.] + +At a time which, because of the variety in the notations of it, +it is difficult to fix exactly, but somewhere between 7 and 8 +A.M., the enemy's ships wore together and endeavoured to form +a line to the northward, which, owing to the direction of the +wind, must have been about N. by E. and S. by W., or NNE. and +SSW. The operation--not merely of wearing, but of both wearing +and reforming the line, such as it was--took more than an hour +to complete. The wind was light; there was a westerly swell; +the ships were under easy sail; consequently there must have +been a good deal of leeway, and the hostile or 'combined' fleet +headed in the direction of Cadiz, towards which, we are expressly +told by a high French authority--Chevalier--it advanced. + +Nelson had to direct the course of his fleet so that its divisions, +when about to make the actual attack, would be just opposite the +points to which the respective hostile ships had advanced in +the meantime. In a light wind varying in force a direct course +to those points could not be settled once for all; but that first +chosen was very nearly right, and an alteration of a point, viz. +to E. by N., was for a considerable time all that was necessary. +Collingwood later made a signal to his division to alter course +one point to port, which brought them back to the earlier course, +which by the _Victory's_ compass had been ENE. The eight ships +of what has been referred to as the 'advance squadron' were +distributed between the two main British divisions, six being +assigned to Collingwood's and two to Nelson's. They did not all +join their divisions at the same time, some--probably owing to +the distance at which they had been employed from the rest of +the fleet and the feebleness of the breeze--not till several +hours after the combined fleet had been sighted. + +Collingwood preserved in his division a line-of-bearing apparently +until the very moment when the individual ships pushed on to make +the actual attack. The enemy's fleet is usually represented as +forming a curve. It would probably be more correct to call it a +very obtuse re-entering angle. This must have been largely due to +Gravina's 'squadron of observation' keeping away in succession, +to get into the wake of the rest of the line, which was forming +towards the north. About the centre of the combined fleet there +was a gap of a mile. Ahead and astern of this the ships were not +all in each other's wake. Many were to leeward of their stations, +thus giving the enemy's formation the appearance of a double line, +or rather of a string of groups of ships. It is important to +remember this, because no possible mode of attack--the enemy's +fleet being formed as it was--could have prevented some British +ships from being 'doubled on' when they cut into the enemy's +force. On 'The First of June,' notwithstanding that the advance +to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several British +ships were 'doubled on,' and even 'trebled on,' as will be seen +in the experiences on that day of the _Brunswick_, _Marlborough_, +_Royal_Sovereign_, and _Queen_Charlotte_ herself. + +Owing to the shape of the hostile 'line' at Trafalgar and the +formation in which he kept his division, Collingwood brought his +ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her +attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum. By +the terms of that document Nelson had specifically assigned to his +own division the work of seeing that the movements of Collingwood's +division should be interrupted as little as possible. It would, +of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position +of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the +memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after Collingwood was +getting near his objective point. In execution, therefore, of +the service allotted to his division, Nelson made a feint at +the enemy's van. This necessitated an alteration of course to +port, so that his ships came into a 'line-of-bearing' so very +oblique that it may well have been loosely called a 'line-ahead.' +Sir Charles Ekins says that the two British lines '_afterwards_ +fell into line-ahead, the ships in the wake of each other,' and +that this was in obedience to signal. Collingwood's line certainly +did not fall into line-ahead. At the most it was a rather oblique +line-of-bearing almost parallel to that part of the enemy's fleet +which he was about to attack. In Nelson's line there was more than +one alteration of course, as the _Victory's_ log expressly states +that she kept standing for the enemy's van, which we learn from +the French accounts was moving about N. by E. or NNE. In the light +wind prevailing the alterations of course must have rendered it, +towards the end of the forenoon, impossible to keep exact station, +even if the _Victory_ were to shorten sail, which we know she +did not. As Admiral Colomb pointed out, 'Several later signals +are recorded which were proper to make in lines-of-bearing, but +not in lines-ahead.' It is difficult to import into this fact +any other meaning but that of intention to preserve, however +obliquely, the line-of-bearing which undoubtedly had been formed +by the act of bearing-up as soon as the enemy's fleet had been +distinguished. + +When Collingwood had moved near enough to the enemy to let his +ships deliver their attacks, it became unnecessary for Nelson's +division to provide against the other's being interrupted. +Accordingly, he headed for the point at which he meant to cut into +the enemy's fleet. Now came the moment, as regards his division, +for doing what Collingwood's had already begun to do, viz. engage +in a 'pell-mell battle,'[88] which surely may be interpreted +as meaning a battle in which rigorous station-keeping was no +longer expected, and in which 'no captain could do very wrong +if he placed his ship alongside that of the enemy.' + +[Footnote 88: Nelson's own expression.] + +In several diagrams of the battle as supposed to have been fought +the two British divisions just before the moment of impact are +represented as converging towards each other. The Spanish diagram, +lately reproduced by Mr. Newbolt, shows this, as well as the English +diagrams. We may take it, therefore, that there was towards the +end of the forenoon a convergence of the two columns, and that +this was due to Nelson's return from his feint at the hostile van +to the line from which he intended to let go his ships to deliver +the actual attack. Collingwood's small alteration of course of +one point to port slightly, but only slightly, accentuated this +convergence. + +Enough has been said here of Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar. To +discuss them fully would lead me too far for this occasion. + +I can only express the hope that in the navy the subject will +receive fuller consideration hereafter. Nelson's last victory +was gained, be it remembered, in one afternoon, over a fleet more +than 20 per cent. his superior in numbers, and was so decisive +that more than half of the hostile ships were taken. This was the +crowning effort of seven years spent in virtually independent +command in time of war--seven years, too, illustrated by more +than one great victory. + +The more closely we look into Nelson's tactical achievements, +the more effective and brilliant do they appear. It is the same +with his character and disposition. The more exact researches +and investigations of recent times have removed from his name +the obloquy which it pleased some to cast upon it. We can see +now that his 'childlike, delighted vanity'--to use the phrase +of his greatest biographer--was but a thin incrustation on noble +qualities. As in the material world valueless earthy substances +surround a vein of precious metal, so through Nelson's moral +nature there ran an opulent lode of character, unimpaired in +its priceless worth by adjacent frailties which, in the majority +of mankind, are present without any precious stuff beneath them. +It is with minds prepared to see this that we should commemorate +our great admiral. + +Veneration of Nelson's memory cannot be confined to particular +objects or be limited by locality. His tomb is wider than the +space covered by dome or column, and his real monument is more +durable than any material construction. It is the unwritten and +spiritual memorial of him, firmly fixed in the hearts of his +fellow-countrymen. + + + + +X + +THE SHARE OF THE FLEET IN THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE[89] + +[Footnote 89: Written in 1907. (_Naval_Annual_, 1908.)] + +At the close of the Great War, which ended in the downfall of +Napoleon, the maritime position of the British Empire was not +only predominant--it also was, and long remained, beyond the +reach of challenge. After the stupendous events of the great +contest such successes as those at Algiers where we were helped +by the Dutch, at Navarino where we had two allies, and at Acre +were regarded as matters of course, and no very grave issue hung +upon any one of them. For more than half a century after Nelson's +death all the most brilliant achievements of British arms were +performed on shore, in India or in the Crimea. There were also many +small wars on land, and it may well have seemed to contemporaries +that the days of great naval contests were over and that force +of circumstances was converting us into a military from a naval +nation. The belief in the efficacy of naval defence was not extinct, +but it had ceased to operate actively. Even whilst the necessity +of that form of defence was far more urgent, inattention to or +ignorance of its true principles had occasionally allowed it to +grow weak, but the possibility of substituting something else for +it had not been pressed or even suggested. To this, however, we +had now come; and it was largely a consequence of the Crimean war. +In that war the British Army had nobly sustained its reputation +as a fighting machine. For the first time after a long interval +it had met in battle European troops, and had come out of the +conflict more renowned for bravery than ever. Nothing seemed +able to damp its heroism--not scantiness of food, not lack of +clothing amidst bitter cold, not miserable quarters, not superior +forces of a valiant enemy. It clung to its squalid abodes in the +positions which it was ordered to hold with a tenacious fortitude +that had never been surpassed in its glorious history, and that +defied all assaults. In combination with its brave allies it +brought to a triumphant conclusion a war of an altogether peculiar +character. + +The campaign in the Crimea was in reality the siege of a single +fortress. All the movements of the Western invaders were undertaken +to bring them within striking distance of the place, to keep +them within reach of it, or to capture it. Every battle that +occurred was fought with one of those objects. When the place +fell the war ended. The one general who, in the opinion of all +concerned, gained high distinction in the war was the general +who had prolonged the defence of Sebastopol by the skilful use +of earthworks. It was no wonder that the attack and defence of +fortified places assumed large importance in the eyes of the +British people. The command of the sea held by the allied powers +was so complete and all-pervading that no one stopped to think +what the course of hostilities would have been without it, any +more than men stop to think what the course of any particular +business would be if there were no atmosphere to breathe in. +Not a single allied soldier had been delayed on passage by the +hostile fleet; not a single merchant vessel belonging to the +allies had been captured by a hostile cruiser. Supplies and +reinforcements for the besieging armies were transported to them +without escort and with as little risk of interruption as if +the operations had been those of profound peace. + +No sooner was the Crimean war over than another struggle took +place, viz. the war of the Indian Mutiny, and that also was waged +entirely on land. Here again the command of the sea was so complete +that no interruption of it, even temporary, called attention to +its existence. Troops and supplies were sent to India from the +United Kingdom and from Hong-Kong; horses for military purposes +from Australia and South Africa; and in every case without a +thought of naval escort. The experience of hostilities in India +seemed to confirm the experience of the Crimea. What we had just +done to a great European nation was assumed to be what unfriendly +European nations would wish to do and would be able to do to +us. It was also assumed that the only way of frustrating their +designs would be to do what had recently been done in the hope +of frustrating ours, but to do it better. We must--it was +said--depend on fortifications, but more perfect than those which +had failed to save Sebastopol. + +The protection to be afforded by our fleet was deliberately declared +to be insufficient. It might, so it was held, be absent altogether, +and then there would be nothing but fortifications to stand between +us and the progress of an active enemy. In the result the policy +of constructing imposing passive defence-works on our coast was +adopted. The fortifications had to be multiplied. Dependence +on that class of defence inevitably leads to discovery after +discovery that some spot open to the kind of attack feared has +not been made secure. We began by fortifying the great dockyard +ports--on the sea side against a hostile fleet, on the land side +against hostile troops. Then it was perceived that to fortify +the dockyard ports in the mother country afforded very little +protection to the outlying portions of the empire. So their principal +ports also were given defence-works--sometimes of an elaborate +character. Again, it was found that commercial ports had been +left out and that they too must be fortified. When this was done +spots were observed at which an enemy might effect a landing +in force, to prevent which further forts or batteries must be +erected. The most striking thing in all this is the complete +omission to take note of the conditions involved in the command +of the sea. + +Evidently it had not been understood that it was that very command +which alone had enabled the armies of western Europe to proceed, +not only without serious interruption, but also without encountering +an attempt at obstruction, to the field in the Crimea on which +their victories had been won, and that the same command would be +necessary before any hostile expedition, large enough to justify +the construction of the fortifications specially intended to +repel it, could cross the sea and get within striking distance +of our shores. It should be deeply interesting to the people +of those parts of the British Empire which lie beyond sea to +note that the defensive system comprised in the fortification +of the coast of the United Kingdom promised no security to them +in the event of war. Making all proper allowance for the superior +urgency of defending the heart of the empire, we must still admit +that no system of defence is adequate which does not provide for +the defence of other valuable parts of the great body politic +as well. + +Again, the system of defence proved to be imperfect. Every part +of the empire depended for prosperity--some parts depended for +existence--on practically unrestricted traffic on the ocean. +This, which might be assailed at many points and on lines often +thousands of miles in length, could find little or no defence in +immovable fortifications. It could not be held that the existence +of these released the fleet from all duty but that of protecting +our ocean commerce, because, if any enemy's navy was able to +carry out an operation of such magnitude and difficulty as a +serious attack on our home territory, it would assuredly be able +to carry out the work of damaging our maritime trade. Power to +do the latter has always belonged to the navy which was in a +position to extend its activity persistently to the immediate +neighbourhood of its opponent's coast-line. + +It is not to be supposed that there was no one to point this +out. Several persons did so, but being mostly sailors they were +not listened to. In actual practice the whole domain of imperial +strategy was withdrawn from the intervention of the naval officer, +as though it were something with which he could not have anything +to do. Several great wars had been waged in Europe in the meantime, +and all of them were land wars. Naval forces, if employed at all, +were employed only just enough to bring out how insignificant their +participation in them was. As was to have been expected, the habit +of attaching importance to the naval element of imperial defence +declined. The empire, nevertheless, continued to grow. Its territory +was extended; its population, notably its population of European +stock, increased, and its wealth and the subsequent operations +of exchanging its productions for those of other countries were +enormously expanded. At the same time the navy, to the strength +and efficiency of which it had to look for security, declined +absolutely, and still more relatively. Other navies were advancing: +some had, as it were, come into existence. At last the true +conditions were discerned, and the nation, almost with one voice, +demanded that the naval defences of the empire should be put +upon a proper footing. + +Let no one dismiss the foregoing retrospect as merely ancient +history. On the contrary, let all those who desire to see the +British Empire follow the path of its natural development in +tranquillity study the recent past. By doing this we shall be +able to estimate aright the position of the fleet in the defence +of the empire. We must examine the circumstances in which we +are placed. For five-and-thirty years the nations of the world +have practically lived under the rule of force. The incessant +object of every great state has been to increase the strength +of its armed forces up to the point at which the cost becomes +intolerable. Countries separated from one another only by arbitrary +geographical lines add regiment to regiment and gun to gun, and +also devise continually fresh expedients for accelerating the +work of preparing their armies to take the field. The most +pacifically inclined nation must do in this respect as its neighbours +do, on pain of losing its independence and being mutilated in +its territory if it does not. This rivalry has spread to the +sea, and fleets are increased at a rate and at a cost in money +unknown to former times, even to those of war. The possession of +a powerful navy by some state which has no reason to apprehend +over-sea invasion and which has no maritime interests, however +intrinsically important they may be, commensurate with the strength +of its fleets, may not indicate a spirit of aggression; but it +at least indicates ability to become an aggressor. Consequently, +for the British fleet to fill its proper position in the defence +of the empire it must be strong. To be strong more than large +numbers will be required. It must have the right, that is the +best, material, the best organisation, the best discipline, the +best training, the best distribution. We shall ascertain the +position that it should hold, if we examine what it would have +to do when called upon for work more active than that of peace +time. With the exception of India and Canada no part of the empire +is liable to serious attack that does not come over-sea. Any +support that can be given to India or Canada by other parts of +the empire must be conveyed across the sea also. This at once +indicates the importance of ocean lines of communication. + +War is the method adopted, when less violent means of persuasion +have failed, to force your enemy to comply with your demands. +There are three principal ways of effecting this--invasion of his +country, raids on his territory, destruction or serious damage +of his sea-borne commerce. Successful invasion must compel the +invaded to come to terms, or his national existence will be lost. +Raids upon his territory may possibly so distress him that he +would rather concede your terms than continue the struggle.[90] +Damage to his sea-borne commerce may be carried so far that he +will be ruined if he does not give in. So much for one side of +the account; we have to examine the other. Against invasion, +raids, or attempts at commerce-destruction there must be some +form of defence, and, as a matter of historical fact, defence +against each has been repeatedly successful. If we need instances +we have only to peruse the history of the British Empire. + +[Footnote 90: Though raids rarely, if ever, decide a war, they +may cause inconvenience or local distress, and an enemy desiring +to make them should be obstructed as much as possible.] + +How was it that--whilst we landed invading armies in many hostile +countries, seized many portions of hostile territory, and drove +more than one enemy's commerce from the sea--our own country has +been free from successful invasion for more than eight centuries, +few portions of our territory have been taken from us even +temporarily, and our commerce has increased throughout protracted +maritime wars? To this there can only be one answer, viz. that +the arrangements for defence were effectual. What, then, were +these arrangements? They were comprised in the provision of a +powerful, well-distributed, well-handled navy, and of a mobile +army of suitable strength. It is to be observed that each element +possessed the characteristic of mobility. We have to deal here +more especially with the naval element, and we must study the +manner in which it operates. + +Naval war is sea-power in action; and sea-power, taken in the +narrow sense, has limitations. It may not, even when so taken, +cease to act at the enemy's coast-line, but its direct influence +extends only to the inner side of a narrow zone conforming to that +line. In a maritime contest each side tries to control the ocean +communications and to prevent the other from controlling them. If +either gains the control, something in addition to sea-power +strictly defined may begin to operate: the other side's territory +may be invaded or harassed by considerable raids, and its commerce +may be driven from the sea. It will be noticed that control of +ocean communications is the needful preliminary to these. It +is merely a variant of the often employed expression of the +necessity, in war, of obtaining command of the sea. In the case +of the most important portion of the British Empire, viz. the +United Kingdom, our loss of control of the ocean communications +would have a result which scarcely any foreign country would +experience. Other countries are dependent on importations for +some part of the food of their population and of the raw material +of their industry; but much of the importation is, and perhaps +all of it may be, effected by land. Here, we depend upon imports +from abroad for a very large part of the food of our people, +and of the raw material essential to the manufacture of the +commodities by the exchange of which we obtain necessary supplies; +and the whole of these imports come, and must come to us, by +sea. Also, if we had not freedom of exportation, our wealth and +the means of supporting a war would disappear. Probably all the +greater colonies and India could feed their inhabitants for a +moderately long time without sea-borne imports, but unless the +sea were open to them their prosperity would decline. + +This teaches us the necessity to the British Empire of controlling +our maritime communications, and equally teaches those who may +one day be our enemies the advisability of preventing us from +doing so. The lesson in either case is driven farther home by +other considerations connected with communications. In war a +belligerent has two tasks before him. He has to defend himself +and hurt his enemy. The more he hurts his enemy, the less is +he likely to be hurt himself. This defines the great principle +of offensive defence. To act in accordance with this principle, +a belligerent should try, as the saying goes, to carry the war +into the enemy's country. He should try to make his opponents +fight where he wants them to fight, which will probably be as +far as possible from his own territory and as near as possible +to theirs. Unless he can do this, invasion and even serious raids +by him will be out of the question. More than that, his inability +to do it will virtually indicate that on its part the other side +can fix the scene of active hostilities unpleasantly close to +the points from which he desires to keep its forces away. + +A line of ocean communications may be vulnerable throughout its +length; but it does not follow that an assailant can operate +against it with equal facility at every point, nor does it follow +that it is at every point equally worth assailing. Lines running +past hostile naval ports are especially open to assault in the +part near the ports; and lines formed by the confluence of two or +more other lines--like, for example, those which enter the English +Channel--will generally include a greater abundance of valuable +traffic than others. Consequently there are some parts at which +an enemy may be expected to be more active than elsewhere, and +it is from those very parts that it is most desirable to exclude +him. They are, as a rule, relatively near to the territory of the +state whose navy has to keep the lines open, that is to say, +prevent their being persistently beset by an enemy. The necessary +convergence of lines towards that state's ports shows that some +portion of them would have to be traversed, or their traversing +be attempted, by expeditions meant to carry out either invasion +or raids. If, therefore, the enemy can be excluded as above +mentioned, invasions, raids, and the more serious molestation of +sea-borne commerce by him will be prevented. + +If we consider particular cases we shall find proof upon proof +of the validity of the rule. Three great lines--one from the +neighbourhood of the Cape of Good Hope, one from the Red Sea, and +a third from India and Ceylon--converge near the south-western +part of Australia and run as one line towards the territory of the +important states farther east. If an assailant can be excluded +from the latter or combined line he must either divide his force +or operate on only one of the confluents, leaving the rest free. +The farther he can be pushed back from the point of confluence +the more effectually will he be limited to a single line, because +the combining lines, traced backwards, trend more and more apart, +and it is, therefore, more and more difficult for him to keep +detachments of his force within supporting distance of each other +if they continue to act against two or more lines. The particular +case of the approaches to the territory of the United Kingdom +has the same features, and proves the rule with equal clearness. +This latter case is so often adduced without mention of others, +that there is some risk of its being believed to be a solitary +one. It stands, however, exactly on all fours with all the rest +as regards the principle of the rule. + +A necessary consequence of an enemy's exclusion from the combined +line as it approaches the territory to be defended is--as already +suggested--that invasion of that territory and serious raids +upon it will be rendered impracticable. Indeed, if the exclusion +be absolutely complete and permanent, raids of every kind and +depredations on commerce in the neighbourhood will be prevented +altogether. It should be explained that though lines and +communications are spoken of, it is the area crossed by them +which is strategically important. A naval force, either guarding +or intending to assail a line, does not necessarily station itself +permanently upon it. All that it has to do is to remain, for the +proper length of time, within the strategic area across which the +defended or threatened line runs. The strategic area will be of +varying extent, its boundaries being determined by circumstances. +The object of the defence will be to make the area from which the +enemy's ships are excluded as extensive as possible. When the +enemy has been pushed back into his own waters and into his own +ports the exclusion is strategically complete. The sea is denied +to his invading and important raiding expeditions, and indeed to +most of his individual cruisers. At the same time it is free +to the other belligerent. To effect this a vigorous offensive +will be necessary. + +The immediate theatre of operations, the critical strategic area, +need not be, and often ought not to be, near the territory defended +by our navy. It is necessary to dwell upon this, because no principle +of naval warfare has been more frequently or more seriously +misapprehended. Misapprehension of it has led to mischievous and +dangerous distribution of naval force and to the squandering of +immense sums of money on local defence vessels; that is, vessels +only capable of operating in the very waters from which every +effort should be made to exclude the enemy. Failure to exclude +him from them can only be regarded as, at the very least, yielding +to him an important point in the great game of war. If we succeed +in keeping him away, the local defence craft of every class are +useless, and the money spent on them has been worse than wasted, +because, if it had not been so spent, it might have been devoted +to strengthening the kind of force which must be used to keep +the enemy where he ought to be kept, viz. at a distance from +our own waters. + +The demand that ships be so stationed that they will generally, +and except when actually cruising, be within sight of the +inhabitants, is common enough in the mother country, and perhaps +even more common in the over-sea parts of the British Empire. +Nothing justifies it but the honest ignorance of those who make +it; nothing explains compliance with it but the deplorable weakness +of authorities who yield to it. It was not by hanging about the +coast of England, when there was no enemy near it, with his fleet, +that Hawke or Nelson saved the country from invasion, nor was it +by remaining where they could be seen by the fellow-countrymen +of their crews that the French and English fleets shut up their +enemy in the Baltic and Black Sea, and thus gained and kept +undisputed command of the sea which enabled them, without +interruption, to invade their enemy's territory. + +The condition insisted upon by the Australasian Governments in +the agreement formerly made with the Home Government, that a +certain number of ships, in return for an annual contribution +of money, should always remain in Australasian waters, was in +reality greatly against the interests of that part of the empire. +The Australasian taxpayer was, in fact, made to insist upon being +injured in return for his money. The proceeding would have been +exactly paralleled by a householder who might insist that a +fire-engine, maintained out of rates to which he contributes, +should always be kept within a few feet of his front door, and +not be allowed to proceed to the end of the street to extinguish +a fire threatening to extend eventually to the householder's own +dwelling. When still further localised naval defence--localised +defence, that is, of what may be called the smaller description--is +considered, the danger involved in adopting it will be quite as +apparent, and the waste of money will be more obvious. Localised +defence is a near relation of passive defence. It owes its origin +to the same sentiment, viz. a belief in the efficacy of staying +where you are instead of carrying the war into the enemy's country. + +There may be cases in which no other kind of naval defence is +practicable. The immense costliness of modern navies puts it out +of the power of smaller states to maintain considerable sea-going +fleets. The historic maritime countries--Sweden, Denmark, the +Netherlands, and Portugal, the performances of whose seamen are +so justly celebrated--could not now send to sea a force equal in +number and fighting efficiency to a quarter of the force possessed +by anyone of the chief naval powers. The countries named, when +determined not to expose themselves unarmed to an assailant, can +provide themselves only with a kind of defence which, whatever +its detailed composition, must be of an intrinsically localised +character. + +In their case there is nothing else to be done; and in their +case defence of the character specified would be likely to prove +more efficacious than it could be expected to be elsewhere. War +is usually made in pursuit of an object valuable enough to justify +the risks inseparable from the attempt to gain it. Aggression by +any of the countries that have been mentioned is too improbable to +call for serious apprehension. Aggression against them is far more +likely. What they have to do is to make the danger of attacking them +so great that it will equal or outweigh any advantage that could +be gained by conquering them. Their wealth and resources, compared +with those of great aggressive states, are not large enough to +make up for much loss in war on the part of the latter engaging +in attempts to seize them. Therefore, what the small maritime +countries have to do is to make the form of naval defence to +which they are restricted efficacious enough to hurt an aggressor +so much that the victory which he may feel certain of gaining +will be quite barren. He will get no glory, even in these days +of self-advertisement, from the conquest of such relatively weak +antagonists; and the plunder will not suffice to repay him for +the damage received in effecting it. + +The case of a member of the great body known as the British Empire +is altogether different. Its conquest would probably be enormously +valuable to a conqueror; its ruin immensely damaging to the body +as a whole. Either would justify an enemy in running considerable +risks, and would afford him practically sufficient compensation +for considerable losses incurred. We may expect that, in war, +any chance of accomplishing either purpose will not be neglected. +Provision must, therefore, be made against the eventuality. Let +us for the moment suppose that, like one of the smaller countries +whose case has been adduced, we are restricted to localised defence. +An enemy not so restricted would be able to get, without being +molested, as near to our territory--whether in the mother country +or elsewhere--as the outer edge of the comparatively narrow belt +of water that our localised defences could have any hope of +controlling effectively. We should have abandoned to him the whole +of the ocean except a relatively minute strip of coast-waters. That +would be equivalent to saying good-bye to the maritime commerce on +which our wealth wholly, and our existence largely, depends. No +thoughtful British subject would find this tolerable. Everyone +would demand the institution of a different defence system. A +change, therefore, to the more active system would be inevitable. +It would begin with the introduction of a cruising force in addition +to the localised force. The unvarying lesson of naval history +would be that the cruising division should gain continuously +on the localised. It is only in times of peace, when men have +forgotten, or cannot be made to understand, what war is, that +the opposite takes place. + +If it be hoped that a localised force will render coast-wise +traffic safe from the enemy, a little knowledge of what has happened +in war and a sufficiently close investigation of conditions will +demonstrate how baseless the hope must be. Countries not yet +thickly populated would be in much the same condition as the +countries of western Europe a century ago, the similarity being +due to the relative scarcity of good land communications. A +part--probably not a very large part--of the articles required +by the people dwelling on and near the coast in one section would +be drawn from another similar section. These articles could be +most conveniently and cheaply transported by water. If it were +worth his while, an enemy disposing of an active cruising force +strong enough to make its way into the neighbourhood of the coast +waters concerned would interrupt the 'long-shore traffic' and defy +the efforts of a localised force to prevent him. The history of the +Great War at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning +of the nineteenth teems with instances of interruption by our +navy of the enemy's coast-wise trade when his ocean trade had +been destroyed. The history of the American War of 1812 supplies +other instances. + +The localised defence could not attempt to drive off hostile +cruisers remaining far from the shore and meaning to infest the +great lines of maritime communication running towards it. If +those cruisers are to be driven off at all it can be done only +by cruising ships. Unless, therefore, we are to be content to +leave our ocean routes, where most crowded and therefore most +vulnerable, to the mercy of an enemy, we must have cruisers to +meet the hostile cruisers. If we still adhere to our localised +defence, we shall have two distinct kinds of force---one provided +merely for local, and consequently restricted, action; the other +able to act near the shore or far out at sea as circumstances +may demand. If we go to the expense of providing both kinds, we +shall have followed the example of the sage who cut a large hole +in his study door for the cat and a small one for the kitten. + +Is local naval defence, then, of any use? Well, to tell the truth, +not much; and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. Even in +the case of the smaller maritime countries, to which reference +has been made above, defence of the character in question would +avail little if a powerful assailant were resolved to press home his +attack. That is to say, if only absolute belligerent considerations +were regarded. In war, however, qualifying considerations can +never be left out of sight. As the great Napoleon observed, you +can no more make war without incurring losses than you can make +omelettes without breaking eggs. The strategist--and the tactician +also, within his province--will always count the cost of a proposed +operation, even where they are nearly certain of success. The +occupation of a country, which would be of no great practical +value to you when you got it, would be a poor return for the +loss to which you would have been put in the process. That loss +might, and probably would, leave you at a great disadvantage +as regards enemies more nearly on an equality with yourself. It +would, therefore, not be the improbability of breaking down the +local naval defence of a minor maritime state, but the pressure +of qualifying and only indirectly belligerent considerations, +that would prevent its being attempted. + +In a struggle between two antagonists of the first rank, the +circumstances would be different. Purely belligerent considerations +would have fuller play. Mistakes will be made, of course, for +war is full of mistakes; but it may be accepted that an attack +on any position, however defended, is in itself proof that the +assailant believed the result hoped for to be quite worth the +cost of obtaining it. Consequently, in a struggle as assumed, +every mode of defence would have to stand on its intrinsic merits, +nearly or quite unaided by the influence of considerations more +or less foreign to it. Every scrap of local defence would, in +proportion to its amount, be a diminution of the offensive defence. +Advocates of the former may be challenged to produce from naval +history any instance of local naval defence succeeding against the +assaults of an actively aggressive navy. In the late war between +Japan and Russia the Russian local defence failed completely. + +In the last case, a class of vessel like that which had failed +in local defence was used successfully, because offensively, +by the Japanese. This and many another instance show that the +right way to use the kind of craft so often allocated to local +defence is to use them offensively. It is only thus that their +adoption by a great maritime power like the British Empire can +be justified. The origin and centre of our naval strength are +to be looked for in the United Kingdom. The shores of the latter +are near the shores of other great maritime powers. Its ports, +especially those at which its fleets are equipped and would be +likely to assemble on the imminence of war, are within reach of +more than one foreign place from which small swift craft to be used +offensively might be expected to issue. The method of frustrating +the efforts of these craft giving most promise of success is to +attack them as soon as possible after they issue from their own +port. To the acceptance of this principle we owe the origin of the +destroyer, devised to destroy hostile torpedo-boats before they +could reach a position from which they would be able to discharge +with effect their special weapon against our assembled ships. +It is true that the destroyer has been gradually converted into +a larger torpedo-boat. It is also true that when used as such +in local defence, as at Port Arthur, her failure was complete; +and just as true that she has never accomplished anything except +when used offensively. + +When, therefore, a naval country's coast is so near the ports of +another naval country that the latter would be able with swift +small craft to attack the former's shipping, the provision of +craft of a similar kind is likely to prove advantageous. War +between great powers is a two-sided game, and what one side can +do the other will at least be likely to attempt. Nothing supports +the view that it is well--either above or beneath the surface of +the water--to stand on the defensive and await attack. Everything +points to the superiority of the plan of beating up the enemy's +quarters and attacking him before he can get far from them on his +way towards his objective. Consequently the only justification +of expending money on the localised vessels of which we have +been speaking, is the probability that an enemy would have some +of his bases within reach of those vessels' efforts. Where this +condition does not exist, the money expended is, from the belligerent +point of view, thrown away. Here comes in the greatest foe of +belligerent efficiency, viz. political expediency. In time of +peace it is thought better to conciliate voters than to prepare +to meet an enemy. If local defence is thought to be pleasing to +an inexpert electorate, it is only too likely to be provided, +no matter how ineffectual and how costly in reality it will turn +out to be. + +Not only is the British Empire the first of naval powers, it +is also the first of colonial powers. One attribute is closely +connected with the other; neither, without the other, would be +applicable. The magnitude of our colonial domain, and especially +the imposing aspects of some of its greater components--the Dominion, +the Commonwealth, South Africa, New Zealand--are apt to blind +us to a feature of great strategical importance, and that is +the abundance and excellence of the naval bases that stud our +ocean lines of communication. In thinking of the great daughter +states we are liable to forget these; yet our possession of them +helps greatly to strengthen our naval position, because it +facilitates our assuming a far-reaching offensive. By themselves, +if not too numerous, they can afford valuable support to the +naval operations that are likely to prove most beneficial to +us. The fact that they are ours, and not an opponent's, also +constitutes for us an advantage of importance. Of course, they +have to be defended, or else they may fall into an opponent's +hands. Have we here a case in which highly localised or even +passive defences are desirable? No doubt we did act for a time +as though we believed that the question could only be answered +in the affirmative; but that was when we were under the influence +of the feelings engendered by observation of the long series of +land wars previously discussed. + +Perhaps we have not yet quite shaken off the effects of that +influence; but we have at least got so far as to tolerate the +statement of the other side of the question. It would be a great +mistake to suppose that the places alluded to are meant to be +ports of refuge for our ships. Though they were to serve that +purpose occasionally in the case of isolated merchant vessels, it +would be but an accident, and not the essence, of their existence. +What they are meant for is to be utilised as positions where our +men-of-war can make reasonably sure of finding supplies and the +means of refit. This assurance will largely depend upon their +power of resistance if attacked. Before we can decide how to +impart that power to them we shall have to see the kind of attack +against which they would have to be prepared. If they are on a +continent, like, for example, Gibraltar, attack on them by a +land force, however improbable, is physically possible. Against +an attack of the kind a naval force could give little direct +help. Most of our outlying naval bases are really or virtually +insular, and are open to attack only by an expedition coming +across the sea. An essential characteristic of a naval base is +that it should be able to furnish supplies as wanted to the +men-of-war needing to replenish their stocks. Some, and very +often all, of these supplies are not of native production and +must be brought to the base by sea. If the enemy can stop their +conveyance to it, the place is useless as a base and the enemy is +really in control of its communications. If he is in control of its +communications he can send against it as great an expedition as he +likes, and the place will be captured or completely neutralised. +Similarly, if we control the communications, not only can supplies +be conveyed to it, but also no hostile expedition will be allowed +to reach it. Thus the primary defence of the outlying base is +the active, sea-going fleet. Moderate local defence, chiefly +of the human kind, in the shape of a garrison, will certainly be +needed. Though the enemy has not been able to obtain control +of the communications of the place, fitful raids on it will be +possible; and the place should be fortified enough and garrisoned +enough to hold out against the inconsiderable assaults comprised +in these till our own ships can drive the enemy's away. + +Outlying naval bases, though but moderately fortified, that contain +depots of stores, docks, and other conveniences, have the vice +of all immobile establishments. When war does come, some of them +almost certainly, and all of them possibly, may not be in the +right place with regard to the critical area of operations. They +cannot, however, be moved. It will be necessary to do what has +been done over and over again in war, in the latest as well as +in earlier wars, and that is, establish temporary bases in more +convenient situations. Thus much, perhaps all, of the cost and +trouble of establishing and maintaining the permanent bases will +have been wasted. This inculcates the necessity of having not +as many bases as can be found, but as few as it is possible to +get on with. + +The control of ocean communications, or the command of the sea, +being the end of naval warfare, and its acquisition being practicable +only by the assumption of a vigorous offensive, it follows as a +matter of course that we must have a strong and in all respects +efficient mobile navy. This is the fundamental condition on which +the continued existence of the British Empire depends. It is +thoroughly well known to every foreign Government, friendly or +unfriendly. The true objective in naval warfare is the enemy's +navy. That must be destroyed or decisively defeated, or intimidated +into remaining in its ports. Not one of these can be effected +without a mobile, that is a sea-going, fleet. The British Empire +may fall to pieces from causes as yet unknown or unsuspected: it +cannot be kept together if it loses the power of gaining command +of the sea. This is not a result of deliberate policy: it is +inherent in the nature of the empire, scattered as its parts are +throughout the world, with only the highway of the sea between +them. + +Such is the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire: +such are its duties towards it. Duties in the case are mutual, and +some are owed to the fleet as well as by it. It is incumbent on +every section of the empire, without neglecting its land forces, +to lend zealous help in keeping the fleet efficient. It is not +to be supposed that this can be done only by making pecuniary +contributions to its maintenance. It is, indeed, very doubtful +if any real good can be done by urging colonies to make them. +It seems certain that the objections to this are greater than +any benefit that it can confer. Badgering our fellow-subjects +beyond sea for money payments towards the cost of the navy is +undignified and impolitic. The greatest sum asked for by the +most exacting postulant would not equal a twentieth part of the +imperial naval expenditure, and would not save the taxpayer of +the mother country a farthing in the pound of his income. No one +has yet been able to establish the equity of a demand that would +take something from the inhabitants of one colony and nothing from +those of another. Adequate voluntary contribution is a different +matter. + +There are other ways in which every trans-marine possession of +the Crown can lend a hand towards perfecting the efficiency of +the fleet--ways, too, which would leave each in complete and +unmenaced control of its own money. Sea-power does not consist +entirely of men-of-war. There must be docks, refitting +establishments, magazines, and depots of stores. Ports, which +men-of-war must visit at least occasionally in war for repair or +replenishment of supplies, will have to be made secure against +the assaults which it has been said that a hastily raiding enemy, +notwithstanding our general control of the communications, might +find a chance of making. Moderate fixed fortifications are all +the passive defence that would be needed; but good and active +troops must be available. If all these are not provided by the +part of the empire in which the necessary naval bases lie, they +will have to be provided by the mother country. If the former +provides them the latter will be spared the expense of doing +so, and spared expense with no loss of dignity, and with far +less risk of friction and inconvenience than if her taxpayers' +pockets had been nominally spared to the extent of a trifling +and reluctantly paid money contribution. + +It has been pointed out on an earlier page that a country can be, +and most probably will be, more effectually defended in a maritime +war if its fleet operates at a distance from, rather than near, +its shores. Every subject of our King should long to see this +condition exist if ever the empire is involved in hostilities. It +may be--for who can tell what war will bring?--that the people +of some great trans-marine dependency will have to choose between +allowing a campaign to be conducted in their country or forcing +the enemy to tolerate it in his. If they choose the latter they +must be prepared to furnish part at least of the mobile force +that can give effect to their choice. That is to say, they must +be prepared to back up our sea-power in its efforts to keep off +the tide of war from the neighbourhood of their homes. History +shows how rarely, during the struggle between European nations +for predominance in North America, the more settled parts of +our former American Colonies were the theatre of war: but then +the colonists of those days, few comparatively as they were, sent +strong contingents to the armies that went campaigning, in the +territory of the various enemies. This was in every way better--the +sequel proved how much better--than a money contribution begged +or extorted would have been. + +Helping in the manner first suggested need not result in dissociating +our fellow-subjects beyond the seas from participation in the work +of the active sea-going fleet. It is now, and still would be, +open to them as much as to any native or denizen of the mother +country. The time has fully come when the people of the greater +outlying parts of the empire should insist upon perfect equality +of treatment with their home fellow-subjects in this matter. +They should resent, as a now quite out-of-date and invidious +distinction, any difference in qualification for entry, locality +of service, or remuneration for any rank or rating. Self-respect +and a dignified confidence in their own qualities, the excellence +of which has been thoroughly tested, will prompt the King's colonial +subjects to ask for nothing but equal chances in a force on which +is laid so large a part of the duty of defending the empire. Why +should they cut themselves off from the promising career that +service in the Royal Navy opens to the capable, the zealous, +and the honourable aspirant of every grade? Some of the highest +posts in the navy are now, or lately have been, held by men who +not only happened to be born in British Colonies, but who also +belong to resident colonial families. Surely in this there is a +strong moral cement for binding and keeping the empire together. +It is unnecessary to expatiate on the contrast between the prospect +of such a career and that which is all that a small local service +could offer. It would soon be seen towards which the enterprising +and the energetic would instinctively gravitate. + +In the defence of the British Empire the fleet holds a twofold +position. To its general belligerent efficiency, its strength +and activity, we must look if the plans of an enemy are to be +brought to nought. It, and it only, can secure for us the control +of the ocean communications, on the freedom of which from serious +interruptions the prosperity--indeed, the existence--of a scattered +body must depend. In time of peace it can be made a great +consolidating force, fostering every sentiment of worthy local +patriotism whilst obliterating all inclination to mischievous +narrow particularism, and tending to perfect the unity which gives +virtue to national grandeur and is the true secret of national +independence and strength. + + + + +XI + +NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE TIME OF TRAFALGAR[91] + +[Footnote 91: Written in 1905. (Read at Institute of Naval +Architects.)] + +The subject on which I have been invited to read a paper, and +which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for +anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be +expected to allot to it. To discuss it adequately, a volume of no +diminutive size would be necessary. It may, however, be possible +to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main +outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration +certain points which, over and above their historical interest, +may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day. + +In taking account of the conditions of the Trafalgar epoch we have +to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters. These +are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted +to meet it by the British. The former of these was described in +the House of Commons by William Pitt at the beginning of the +war in words which may be used without change at the present +time. On 16th May 1803 the war, which had been interrupted by the +unstable Peace of Amiens, was definitely resumed. The struggle +was now to be a war not so much between the United Kingdom and the +French nation as between the United Kingdom and the great Napoleon, +wielding more than the resources of France alone. Speaking a week +after the declaration of war, Pitt said that any expectation of +success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition +that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of +the country by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of +descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired +and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and +protracted war. More briefly stated, the hostile plan was to +invade the United Kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel +us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the East, from +which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived. The plan +was comprehensive, but not easily concealed. What we had to do +was to prevent the invasion of the United Kingdom and defend our +trade and our outlying territories. As not one of the hostile +objects could be attained except by making a maritime expedition +of some kind, that is to say, by an expedition which had to cross +more or less extensive areas of water, it necessarily followed +that our most effective method of defence was the keeping open +of our sea communications. It became necessary for us to make +such arrangements that the maritime paths by which a hostile +expedition could approach our home-coasts, or hostile cruisers +molest our sea-borne trade, or hostile squadrons move to the +attack of our trans-marine dependencies--that all these paths +should be so defended by our navy that either the enemy would +not venture to traverse them or, if he did, that he could be +driven off. + +Short as it is, the time at my disposal permits me to give a +few details. It was fully recognised that defence of the United +Kingdom against invasion could not be secured by naval means +alone. As in the times of Queen Elizabeth, so in those of George +III, no seaman of reputation contended that a sufficient land +force could be dispensed with. Our ablest seamen always held +that small hostile expeditions could be prepared in secret and +might be able to slip through the most complete lines of naval +defence that we could hope to maintain. It was not discovered +or alleged till the twentieth century that the crew of a dinghy +could not land in this country in the face of the navy. Therefore +an essential feature of our defensive strategy was the provision +of land forces in such numbers that an invader would have no +chance of succeeding except he came in strength so great that +his preparations could not be concealed and his expedition could +not cross the water unseen. + +As our mercantile marine was to be found in nearly every sea, +though in greater accumulation in some areas than in others, its +defence against the assaults of an enemy could only be ensured +by the virtual ubiquity of our cruising force. This, of course, +involved the necessity of employing a large number of cruisers, +and of arranging the distribution of them in accordance with the +relative amount and value of the traffic to be protected from +molestation in different parts of the ocean. It may be mentioned +here that the term 'cruiser,' at the time with which we are dealing, +was not limited to frigates and smaller classes of vessels. It +included also ships of the line, it being the old belief of the +British Navy, justified by the experience of many campaigns and +consecrated by the approval of our greatest admirals, that the +value of a ship of war was directly proportionate to her capacity +for cruising and keeping the sea. + +If the ocean paths used by our merchant ships--the trade routes +or sea communications of the United Kingdom with friendly or +neutral markets and areas of production--could be kept open by +our navy, that is, made so secure that our trade could traverse +them with so little risk of molestation that it could continue to +be carried on, it resulted as a matter of course that no sustained +attack could be made on our outlying territory. Where this was +possible it was where we had failed to keep open the route or line +of communications, in which case the particular trade following +it was, at least temporarily, destroyed, and the territory to +which the route led was either cut off or seized. Naturally, +when this was perceived, efforts were made to re-open and keep +open the endangered or interrupted communication line. + +Napoleon, notwithstanding his supereminent genius, made some +extraordinary mistakes about warfare on the sea. The explanation +of this has been given by a highly distinguished French admiral. +The Great Emperor, he says, was wanting in exact appreciation +of the difficulties of naval operations. He never understood +that the naval officer--alone of all men in the world--must be +master of two distinct professions. The naval officer must be +as completely a seaman as an officer in any mercantile marine; +and, in addition to this, he must be as accomplished in the use +of the material of war entrusted to his charge as the members of +any aimed force in the world. The Emperor's plan for the invasion +of the United Kingdom was conceived on a grand scale. A great +army, eventually 130,000 strong, was collected on the coast of +north-eastern France, with its headquarters at Boulogne. The +numerical strength of this army is worth attention. By far the +larger part of it was to have made the first descent on our +territory; the remainder was to be a reserve to follow as quickly +as possible. It has been doubted if Napoleon really meant to +invade this country, the suggestion being that his collection +of an army on the shores of the Straits of Dover and the English +Channel was merely a 'blind' to cover another intended movement. +The overwhelming weight of authoritative opinion is in favour +of the view that the project of invasion was real. It is highly +significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary. +It could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval +obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the +expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to +be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected. +The numerical strength in troops which Napoleon thought necessary +compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that +concealment became quite impossible. Consequently an important +part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened +locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of +precision. + +Notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of +naval warfare, the Great Emperor had grasped one of its leading +principles. Before the Peace of Amiens, indeed before his campaign +in Egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in Italy, he had seen +that the invasion of the United Kingdom was impracticable without +first obtaining the command of the sea. His strategic plan, +therefore, included arrangements to secure this. The details of +the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered; +but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment +of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied +in Nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. The gunboats, +transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of +many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern France and the +Netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition. +Fleets of line-of-battle ships were essential parts of it, and +on their effective action the success of the scheme was largely +made to depend. This feature remained unaltered in principle when, +less than twelve months before Trafalgar, Spain took part in the +war as Napoleon's ally, and brought him a great reinforcement +of ships and important assistance in money. + +We should not fail to notice that, before he considered himself +strong enough to undertake the invasion of the United Kingdom, +Napoleon found it necessary to have at his disposal the resources +of other countries besides France, notwithstanding that by herself +France had a population more than 60 per cent. greater than that +of England. By the alliance with Spain he had added largely to +the resources on which he could draw. Moreover, his strategic +position was geographically much improved. With the exception +of that of Portugal, the coast of western continental Europe, +from the Texel to Leghorn, and somewhat later to Taranto also, +was united in hostility to us. This complicated the strategic +problem which the British Navy had to solve, as it increased the +number of points to be watched; and it facilitated the junction +of Napoleon's Mediterranean naval forces with those assembled in +his Atlantic ports by supplying him with allied ports of refuge +and refit on Spanish territory--such as Cartagena or Cadiz--between +Toulon and the Bay of Biscay. Napoleon, therefore, enforced upon +us by the most convincing of all arguments the necessity of +maintaining the British Navy at the 'two-power standard' at least. +The lesson had been taught us long before by Philip II, who did +not venture on an attempt at invading this country till he was +master of the resources of the whole Iberian peninsula as well +as of those of the Spanish dominions in Italy, in the Burgundian +heritage, and in the distant regions across the Atlantic Ocean. + +At several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was +now the master, Napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and +win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough +to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across +the water which separated the starting points of his expedition +from the United Kingdom. Command of the sea to be won by a powerful +naval combination was thus an essential element in Napoleon's +strategy at the time of Trafalgar. It was not in deciding what +was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred: +it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he +went wrong. The British strategy adopted in opposition to that +of Napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of +the command of the sea. Formulated and carried into effect by +seamen, it differed in some important features from his. We may +leave out of sight for the moment the special arrangements made +in the English Channel to oppose the movements of Napoleon's +flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft. +The British strategy at the time of Trafalgar, as far as it was +concerned with opposition to Napoleon's sea-going fleets, may be +succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which +the enemy's forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable +strength. Though some of our admirals, notably Nelson himself, +objected to the application of the term 'blockade' to their plans, +the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they +should come out they would find outside their port a British +force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them +thoroughly and destroy them. Beating them and thus having done +with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what +was desired by our admirals. This necessitated a close watch on +the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let +the history of Cornwallis's command off Brest and of Nelson's +off Toulon suffice to tell us. + +The junction of two or more of Napoleon's fleets would have ensured +over almost any single British fleet a numerical superiority that +would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost +certain. To meet this condition the British strategy contemplated +the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another, +which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment +be effected. By this step we should preserve, if not a numerical +superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force +as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment, +even if undefeated, a certainty. The strategic problem before our +navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem. +The enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards Brest +or towards Toulon. In the latter case, a superior force might +fall upon our Mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in +the Atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from +the Atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. Against +the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of Napoleon +to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off +Toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was +to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval +control of the English Channel. + +After the addition of the Spanish Navy to his own, Napoleon to +some extent modified his strategic arrangements. The essential +feature of the scheme remained unaltered. It was to effect the +junction of the different parts of his naval force and thereupon +to dominate the situation, by evading the several British fleets +or detachments which were watching his. Before Spain joined him +in the war his intention was that his escaping fleets should +go out into the Atlantic, behind the backs, as it were, of the +British ships, and then make for the English Channel. When he +had the aid of Spain the point of junction was to be in the West +Indies. + +The remarkable thing about this was the evident belief that the +command of the sea might be won without fighting for it; won, +too, from the British Navy which was ready, and indeed wished, +to fight. We now see that Napoleon's naval strategy at the time +of Trafalgar, whilst it aimed at gaining command of the sea, was +based on what has been called evasion. The fundamental principle +of the British naval strategy of that time was quite different. +So far from thinking that the contest could be settled without +one or more battles, the British admirals, though nominally +blockading his ports, gave the enemy every facility for coming out +in order that they might be able to bring him to action. Napoleon, +on the contrary, declared that a battle would be useless, and +distinctly ordered his officers not to fight one. Could it be +that, when pitted against admirals whose accurate conception of +the conditions of naval warfare had been over and over again tested +during the hostilities ended by the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon still +trusted to the efficacy of methods which had proved so successful +when he was outmanoeuvring and intimidating the generals who +opposed him in North Italy? We can only explain his attitude +in the campaign of Trafalgar by attributing to him an expectation +that the British seamen of his day, tried as they had been in +the fire of many years of war, would succumb to his methods as +readily as the military formalists of central Europe. + +Napoleon had at his disposal between seventy and eighty French, +Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line, of which some sixty-seven +were available at the beginning of the Trafalgar campaign. In +January 1805, besides other ships of the class in distant waters +or specially employed, we--on our side--had eighty ships of the +line in commission. A knowledge of this will enable us to form +some idea of the chances of success that would have attended +Napoleon's concentration if it had been effected. To protect the +passage of his invading expedition across the English Channel +he did not depend only on concentrating his more distant fleets. +In the Texel there were, besides smaller vessels, nine sail of +the line. Thus the Emperor did what we may be sure any future +intending invader will not fail to do, viz. he provided his +expedition with a respectable naval escort. The British naval +officers of the day, who knew what war was, made arrangements to +deal with this escort. Lord Keith, who commanded in the Downs, +had under him six sail of the line in addition to many frigates +and sloops; and there were five more line-of-battle ships ready +at Spithead if required. + +There had been a demand in the country that the defence of our +shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to +gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats. +This was resisted by the naval officers. Nelson had already said, +'Our first defence is close to the enemy's ports,' thus agreeing +with a long line of eminent British seamen in their view of our +strategy. Lord St. Vincent said that 'Our great reliance is on the +vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in +the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, +and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.' +These are memorable words, which we should do well to ponder +in these days. The Government of the day insisted on having the +coastal boats; but St. Vincent succeeded in postponing the +preparation of them till the cruising ships had been manned. +His plan of defence has been described by his biographer as 'a +triple line of barricade; 50-gun ships, frigates, sloops of war, +and gun-vessels upon the coast of the enemy; in the Downs opposite +France another squadron, but of powerful ships of the line, +continually disposable, to support the former or attack any force +of the enemy which, it might be imagined possible, might slip +through the squadron hanging over the coast; and a force on the +beach on all the shores of the English ports, to render assurance +doubly sure.' This last item was the one that St. Vincent had +been compelled to adopt, and he was careful that it should be in +addition to those measures of defence in the efficacy of which +he and his brother seamen believed. Concerning it his biographer +makes the following remark: 'It is to be noted that Lord St. +Vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats +by gunboats,' &c. He objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or +long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful +to have the sea-going ships manned. Speaking of this coastal +defence scheme, he said: 'It would be a good bone for the officers +to pick, but a very dear one for the country.' + +The defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy +of the time. An important part was played by our fleets and groups +of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes +direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral +vessels carrying commodities to or from British ports. The strategy +of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long +belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted +number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity +of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by +the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size. This +can be seen in the lists of successive years. In January 1803 +the number of cruising frigates in commission was 107, and of +sloops and smaller vessels 139, the total being 246. In 1804 the +numbers were: Frigates, 108; sloops, &c., 181; with a total of +289. In 1805 the figures had grown to 129 frigates, 416 sloops, +&c., the total being 545. Most of these were employed in defending +commerce. We all know how completely Napoleon's project of invading +the United Kingdom was frustrated. It is less well known that +the measures for defending our sea-borne trade, indicated by the +figures just given, were triumphantly successful. Our mercantile +marine increased during the war, a sure proof that it had been +effectually defended. Consequently we may accept it as established +beyond the possibility of refutation that that branch of our naval +strategy at the time of Trafalgar which was concerned with the +defence of our trade was rightly conceived and properly carried +into effect. + +As has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade, +being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of +communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any +rate, of our transmarine territories. Napoleon held pertinaciously +to the belief that British prosperity was chiefly due to our +position in India. We owe it to Captain Mahan that we now know +that the eminent American Fulton--a name of interest to the members +of this Institution--told Pitt of the belief held abroad that +'the fountains of British wealth are in India and China.' In the +great scheme of naval concentration which the Emperor devised, +seizure of British Colonies in the West Indies had a definite +place. We kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force +capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the +neighbouring lines of communication. In 1803 we had four ships +of the line in the West Indian area. In 1804 we had six of the +same class; and in 1805, while the line-of-battle ships were +reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine +to twenty-five. Whether our Government divined Napoleon's designs +on India or not, it took measures to protect our interests there. +In January 1804 we had on the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies +stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller +two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one ships of +war in all. This would have been sufficient to repel a raiding +attack made in some strength. By the beginning of 1805 our East +Indies force had been increased; and in the year 1805 itself we +raised it to a strength of forty-one ships in all, of which nine +were of the line and seventeen were frigates. Had, therefore, any +of the hostile ships managed to get to the East Indies from the +Atlantic or the Mediterranean ports, in which they were being +watched by our navy, their chances of succeeding in their object +would have been small indeed. + +When we enter the domain of tactics strictly so-called, that is +to say, when we discuss the proceedings of naval forces--whether +single ships, squadrons, or fleets--in hostile contact with one +another, we find the time of Trafalgar full of instructive episodes. +Even with the most recent experience of naval warfare vividly +present to our minds, we can still regard Nelson as the greatest +of tacticians. Naval tactics may be roughly divided into two great +classes or sections, viz. the tactics of groups of ships, that +is to say, fleet actions; and the tactics of what the historian +James calls 'single ship actions,' that is to say, fights between +two individual ships. In the former the achievements of Nelson +stand out with incomparable brilliancy. It would be impossible +to describe his method fully in such a paper as this. We may, +however, say that Nelson was an innovator, and that his tactical +principles and methods have been generally misunderstood down +to this very day. If ever there was an admiral who was opposed +to an unthinking, headlong rush at an enemy, it was he. Yet this +is the character that he still bears in the conception of many. +He was, in truth, an industrious and patient student of tactics, +having studied them, in what in these days we should call a +scientific spirit, at an early period, when there was but little +reason to expect that he would ever be in a position to put to a +practical test the knowledge that he had acquired and the ideas +that he had formed. He saw that the old battle formation in single +line-ahead was insufficient if you wanted--as he himself always +did--to gain an overwhelming victory. He also saw that, though +an improvement on the old formation, Lord Howe's method of the +single line-abreast was still a good deal short of tactical +perfection. Therefore, he devised what he called, with pardonable +elation, the 'Nelson touch,' the attack in successive lines so +directed as to overwhelm one part of the enemy's fleet, whilst +the other part was prevented from coming to the assistance of the +first, and was in its turn overwhelmed or broken up. His object +was to bring a larger number of his own ships against a smaller +number of the enemy's. He would by this method destroy the part +attacked, suffering in the process so little damage himself that +with his whole force he would be able to deal effectively with the +hostile remnant if it ventured to try conclusions with him. It +is of the utmost importance that we should thoroughly understand +Nelson's fundamental tactical principle, viz. the bringing of +a larger number of ships to fight against a smaller number of +the enemy's. There is not, I believe, in the whole of the records +of Nelson's opinions and actions a single expression tending to +show that tactical efficiency was considered by him to be due +to superiority in size of individual ships of the same class +or--as far as _materiel_ was concerned--to anything but superior +numbers, of course at the critical point. He did not require, +and did not have, more ships in his own fleet than the whole of +those in the fleet of the enemy. What he wanted was to bring to +the point of impact, when the fight began, a larger number of +ships than were to be found in that part of the enemy's line. + +I believe that I am right in saying that, from the date of Salamis +downwards, history records no decisive naval victory in which the +victorious fleet has not succeeded in concentrating against a +relatively weak point in its enemy's formation a greater number +of its own ships. I know of nothing to show that this has not been +the rule throughout the ages of which detailed history furnishes +us with any memorial--no matter what the class of ship, what the +type of weapon, what the mode of propulsion. The rule certainly +prevailed in the battle of the 10th August 1904 off Port Arthur, +though it was not so overwhelmingly decisive as some others. We +may not even yet know enough of the sea fight in the Straits +of Tsushima to be able to describe it in detail; but we do know +that at least some of the Russian ships were defeated or destroyed +by a combination of Japanese ships against them. + +Looking back at the tactics of the Trafalgar epoch, we may see +that the history of them confirms the experience of earlier wars, +viz. that victory does not necessarily fall to the side which +has the biggest ships. It is a well-known fact of naval history +that generally the French ships were larger and the Spanish much +larger than the British ships of corresponding classes. This +superiority in size certainly did not carry with it victory in +action. On the other hand, British ships were generally bigger +than the Dutch ships with which they fought; and it is of great +significance that at Camperdown the victory was due, not to +superiority in the size of individual ships, but, as shown by +the different lists of killed and wounded, to the act of bringing +a larger number against a smaller. All that we have been able to +learn of the occurrences in the battle of the japan Sea supports +instead of being opposed to this conclusion; and it may be said +that there is nothing tending to upset it in the previous history +of the present war in the Far East. + +I do not know how far I am justified in expatiating on this point; +but, as it may help to bring the strategy and tactics of the +Trafalgar epoch into practical relation with the stately science of +which in our day this Institution is, as it were, the mother-shrine +and metropolitical temple, I may be allowed to dwell upon it a +little longer. The object aimed at by those who favour great size +of individual ships is not, of course, magnitude alone. It is to +turn out a ship which shall be more powerful than an individual +antagonist. All recent development of man-of-war construction has +taken the form of producing, or at any rate trying to produce, +a more powerful ship than those of earlier date, or belonging to +a rival navy. I know the issues that such statements are likely +to raise; and I ask you, as naval architects, to bear with me +patiently when I say what I am going to say. It is this: If you +devise for the ship so produced the tactical system for which +she is specially adapted you must, in order to be logical, base +your system on her power of defeating her particular antagonist. +Consequently, you must abandon the principle of concentration of +superior numbers against your enemy; and, what is more, must be +prepared to maintain that such concentration on his part against +yourself would be ineffectual. This will compel a reversion to +tactical methods which made a fleet action a series of duels +between pairs of combatants, and--a thing to be pondered on +seriously--never enabled anyone to win a decisive victory on the +sea. The position will not be made more logical if you demand both +superior size and also superior numbers, because if you adopt +the tactical system appropriate to one of the things demanded, +you will rule out the other. You cannot employ at the same time +two different and opposed tactical systems. + +It is not necessary to the line of argument above indicated to +ignore the merits of the battleship class. Like their predecessors, +the ships of the line, it is really battleships which in a naval +war dominate the situation. We saw that it was so at the time +of Trafalgar, and we see that it has been so in the war between +Russia and Japan, at all events throughout the 1904 campaign. +The experience of naval war, down to the close of that in which +Trafalgar was the most impressive event, led to the virtual +abandonment of ships of the line[92] above and below a certain +class. The 64-gun ships and smaller two-deckers had greatly +diminished in number, and repetitions of them grew more and more +rare. It was the same with the three-deckers, which, as the late +Admiral Colomb pointed out, continued to be built, though in +reduced numbers, not so much for their tactical efficiency as +for the convenient manner in which they met the demands for the +accommodation required in flag-ships. The tactical condition +which the naval architects of the Trafalgar period had to meet +was the employment of an increased number of two-deckers of the +medium classes. + +[Footnote 92: Experience of war, as regards increase in the number +of medium-sized men-of-war of the different classes, tended to the +same result in both the French Revolutionary war (1793 to 1801) +and the Napoleonic war which began in 1803. Taking both contests +down to the end of the Trafalgar year, the following table will +show how great was the development of the line-of-battle-ship +class below the three-decker and above the 64-gun ship. It will +also show that there was no development of, but a relative decline +in, the three-deckers and the 64's, the small additions, where +there were any, being generally due to captures from the enemy. +The two-deckers not 'fit to lie in a line' were at the end of the +Trafalgar year about half what they were when the first period +of the 'Great War' began. When we come to the frigate classes we +find the same result. In the earlier war 11 frigates of 44 and +40 guns were introduced into our navy. It is worth notice that +this number was not increased, and by the end of the Trafalgar +year had, on the contrary, declined to 10. The smallest frigates, +of 28 guns, were 27 in 1793, and 13 at the end of the Trafalgar +year. On the other hand, the increase in the medium frigate classes +(38, 36, and 32 guns) was very large. From 1793 to the end of the +Trafalgar year the 38-gun frigates increased from 8 to 50, and +the 36-gun frigates from 16 to 54. + + ------------------------------------------------------------- +| | | Napoleonic War to | +| | French | the end of the | +| | Revolutionary War | Trafalgar year | +| Classes of Ships |-------------------|-------------------| +| |Commence-|Commence-|Commence-|Commence-| +| | ment of | ment of | ment of | ment of | +| | 1793 | 1801 | 1803 | 1806 | +|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| 3-deckers | 31 | 32 | 29 | 29 | +| 2-deckers of 74 | 76 | 111 | 105 | 123 | +| guns, and above | | | | | +| 64 and 60 gun ships | 46 | 47 | 38 | 38 | +| 2-deckers not 'fit | 43 | 31 | 21 | 22 | +| to lie in a line' | | | | | +| Frigates 44 guns | 0 | 6 | 6 | 6 | +| " 40 " | 0 | 5 | 5 | 4 | +| " 38 " | 8 | 32 | 32 | 50 | +| " 36 " | 16 | 49 | 49 | 54 | +| " 32 " | 48 | 41 | 38 | 56 | +| " 28 " | 27 | 11 | 11 | 13 | + ------------------------------------------------------------- + +The liking for three-deckers, professed by some officers of Nelson's +time, seems to have been due to a belief, not in the merit of their +size as such, but in the value of the increased number of medium +guns carried on a 'middle' deck. There is, I believe, nothing to +show that the two-deckers _Gibraltar_ (2185 tons) and _Coesar_ +(2003) were considered more formidable than the three-deckers +_Balfleur_ (1947), _Glory_ (1944), or _Queen_ (1876). All these +ships were in the same fleet, and fought in the same battle.] + +A fleet of ships of the line as long as it could keep the sea, +that is, until it had to retreat into port before a stronger +fleet, controlled a certain area of water. Within that area smaller +men-of-war as well as friendly merchant ships were secure from +attack. As the fleet moved about, so the area moved with it. +Skilful disposition and manoeuvring added largely to the extent +of sea within which the maritime interests that the fleet was +meant to protect would be safe. It seems reasonable to expect that +it will be the same with modern fleets of suitable battleships. + +The tactics of 'single ship actions' at the time of Trafalgar +were based upon pure seamanship backed up by good gunnery. The +better a captain handled his ship the more likely he was to beat +his antagonist. Superior speed, where it existed, was used to +'gain the weather gage,' not in order to get a suitable range +for the faster ship's guns, but to compel her enemy to fight. +Superior speed was also used to run away, capacity to do which +was not then, and ought not to be now, reckoned a merit in a ship +expressly constructed for fighting, not fleeing. It is sometimes +claimed in these days that superior speed will enable a modern +ship to keep at a distance from her opponent which will be the +best range for her own guns. It has not been explained why a range +which best suits her guns should not be equally favourable for the +guns of her opponent; unless, indeed, the latter is assumed to be +weakly armed, in which case the distance at which the faster ship +might engage her would be a matter of comparative indifference. +There is nothing in the tactics of the time of Trafalgar to make +it appear that--when a fight had once begun--superior speed, +of course within moderate limits, conferred any considerable +tactical advantage in 'single ship actions,' and still less in +general or fleet actions. Taking up a position ahead or astern of +a hostile ship so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated +by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state +of the ship to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather +late in an action. + +A remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly +apparent in the era of Trafalgar. I have already alluded to the +tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle ships +to those of the medium classes. The same thing may be noticed +in the case of the frigates.[93] Those of 44, 40, and 28 guns +relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number +of the 38-gun, 36-gun, and 32-gun frigates increased. The officers +who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress +on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the +sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now +call the 'battleship' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.' +In the earlier time there were ships which were intermediate +between the ship of the line and the frigate. These were the +two-deckers of 56, 54, 50, 44, and even 40 guns. They had long +been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never +counted in the frigate classes. They seemed to have held a +nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them +in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured +cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit +for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending +or other cruiser service. The two-deckers just mentioned were +looked upon by the date of Trafalgar as forming an unnecessary +class of fighting ships. Some were employed, chiefly because they +existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true +battleships on one side and true frigates on the other.[94] + +[Footnote 93: See footnote 92.] + +[Footnote 94: See footnote 92.] + +In conclusion, I would venture to say that the strategical and +tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had +been mastered by our navy by the time of the Trafalgar campaign. +The effect of those lessons showed itself in our ship-building +policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history +of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means +to belligerent ends. + + + + +XII + +THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF A FLEET[95] + +[Footnote 95: Written in 1902. (Read at the Hong-Kong United Service +Institution.)] + +A problem which is not an attractive one, but which has to be +solved, is to arrange the proper method of supplying a fleet +and maintaining its communications. In time of peace as well as +in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles +of various kinds used on board ship, viz. naval stores, ordnance +stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, &c. +If we know the quantity of each description of stores that a +ship can carry, and if we estimate the progressive consumption, +we can compute, approximately but accurately enough for practical +purposes, the time at which replenishment would be necessary and +to what amount it should be made up. As a general rule ships +stow about three months' stores and provisions. The amount of +coal and engineers' stores, measured in time, depends on the +proceedings of the ship, and can only be calculated if we know +during what portion of any given period she will be under way. +Of course, this can be only roughly estimated. In peace time we +know nearly exactly what the expenditure of ammunition within a +given length of time--say, a quarter of a year--will be. For war +conditions we can only form an estimate based upon assumptions. + +The consumption of provisions depends upon the numbers of officers +and men, and in war or peace would be much the same. The greater +activity to be expected in war would lead to more wear and tear, +and consequently to a larger expenditure of naval stores. In +peaceful times the quarterly expenditure of ammunition does not +vary materially. In case we were at war, a single action might +cause us to expend in a few hours as much as half a dozen quarterly +peace allowances. There is a certain average number of days that +a ship of a particular class is under way in a year, and the +difference between that number and 365 is, of course, the measure +of the length of time she is at anchor or in harbour. Expenditure +of coal and of some important articles of engineers' stores depends +on the relation between the time that she is stationary and the +time she is under way. It should be particularly noted that the +distinction is not between time at anchor and time at sea, but +between time at anchor and 'time under way.' If a ship leaves +her anchorage to run an engine-trial after refit, or to fire +at a target, or to adjust compasses, or to go into dock--she +burns more coal than if she remained stationary. These occasions +of movement may be counted in with the days in which the ship +is at sea, and the total taken as the number of days under way. +It may be assumed that altogether these will amount to six or +seven a month. In time of war the period under way would probably +be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting +under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable, +so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be +greatly increased. + +The point to be made here is that--independently of strategic +conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the +supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is principally +that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except +provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must +be forwarded in larger quantities or at shorter intervals than in +peace time. If, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system +of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications +being left out of consideration for the present--will merely +have to be expanded in time of war. In other words, practice in +the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards +preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions. +That a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during +hostilities will not be doubted. + +The general principles which I propose to indicate are applicable +to any station. We may allow for a squadron composed of-- + + 4 battleships, + 4 large cruisers, + 4 second-class cruisers, + 13 smaller vessels of various kinds, and + 3 destroyers, + +being away from the principal base-port of the station for several +months of the year. The number of officers and men would be, in +round numbers, about 10,000. + +In estimating the amounts of stores of different kinds required +by men-of-war, it is necessary--in order to allow for proper +means of conveyance--to convert tons of dead-weight into tons +by measurement, as the two are not always exactly equivalent. In +the following enumeration only estimated amounts are stated, and +the figures are to be considered as approximate and not precise. +It is likely that in each item an expert maybe able to discover +some variation from the rigorously exact; but the general result +will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, especially +as experience will suggest corrections. + +A thousand men require about 3.1 tons of victualling stores, +packages included, daily, We may make this figure up to 3.5 tons +to allow for 'medical comforts' and canteen stores, Consequently +10,000 men require about 35 tons a day, and about 6300 tons for +six months. The assumed squadron, judging from experience, would +require in peace time about 600 tons of engineers' stores, about +400 tons of naval stores, and--if the ships started with only their +exact allowance on board and then carried out a full quarterly +practice twice--the quantity of ordnance stores and ammunition +required would be about 1140 tons, to meet the ordinary peace +rate of expenditure, We thus get for a full six months' supply +the following figures:-- + + Victualling stores 6,300 tons. + Engineers' stores 600 " + Naval stores 400 " + Ordnance stores and ammunition 1,140 " + ----- + Total 8,440 " + +Some allowance must be made for the needs of the 'auxiliaries,'[96] +the vessels that bring supplies and in other ways attend on the +fighting ships. This may be put at 7 per cent. The tonnage required +would accordingly amount in all to about 9000. + +[Footnote 96: The 7 per cent. mentioned in the text would probably +cover nearly all the demands--except coal--of auxiliaries, which +would not require much or any ammunition. Coal is provided for +separately.] + +The squadron would burn in harbour or when stationary about 110 +tons of coal a day, and when under way about 1050 tons a day. For +140 harbour-days the consumption would be about 15,400 tons; and +for 43 days under way about 45,150: so that for coal requirements +we should have the following:-- + + Harbour consumption 15,400 tons. + Under-way consumption 45,150 " + ------ + Total for fighting ships 60,550 " + 7 per cent. for auxiliaries (say) 4,250 " + ------ + Grand total 64,800 " + +Some time ago (in 1902) a representation was made from the China +station that, engine-room oil being expended whenever coal is +expended, there must be some proportion between the quantities +of each. It was, therefore, suggested that every collier should +bring to the squadron which she was supplying a proportionate +quantity of oil. This has been approved, and it has been ordered +that the proportions will be 75 gallons of oil to every 100 tons +of coal.[97] It was also suggested that the oil should be carried +in casks of two sizes, for the convenience of both large and +small ships. + +[Footnote 97: I was informed (on the 10th December 1902), some +time after the above was written, that the colliers supplying +the United States Navy are going to carry 100 gallons of oil +for every 100 tons of coal.] + +There is another commodity, which ships have never been able to +do without, and which they need now in higher proportion than +ever. That commodity is fresh water. The squadron constituted +as assumed would require an average of about 160 tons of fresh +water a day, and nearly 30,000 tons in six months. Of this the +ships, without adding very inconveniently to their coal consumption, +might themselves distil about one-half; but the remaining 15,000 +tons would have to be brought to them; and another thousand tons +would probably be wanted by the auxiliaries, making the full +six months' demand up to 16,000 tons. + +The tonnage requirements of the squadron and its 'auxiliaries' +for a full six months' period would be about 74,000, without +fresh water. As, however, the ships would have started with full +store-rooms, holds, and bunkers, and might be expected to return +to the principal base-port of the station at the end of the period, +stores for four-and-a-half months', and coal to meet twenty weeks', +consumption would be sufficient. These would be about 6750 tons +of stores and ammunition and 46,000 tons of coal.[98] + +[Footnote 98: To avoid complicating the question, the water or +distilling vessel, the hospital ship, and the repair vessel have +not been considered specially. Their coal and stores have been +allowed for.] + +The stores, &c., would have to be replenished twice and--as it would +not be prudent to let the ships run right out of them--replenishment +should take place at the end of the second and at the end of the +fourth months. Two vessels carrying stores and ammunition, if +capable of transporting a cargo of nearly 1700 tons apiece, would +bring all that was wanted at each replenishment. To diminish risk +of losing all of one description of supplies, if carried by itself +in a separate vessel, it has been considered desirable that each +supply-carrier, when employed, is to contain some ammunition, +some stores, and some provisions. There are great advantages +in having supply-carriers, including, of course, colliers, of +moderate size. Many officers must have had experience of the +inconvenience and delay due to the employment of a single very +large vessel which could only coal one man-of-war at a time. +Several vessels, each carrying a moderate amount of cargo, would +permit much more rapid replenishment of the ships of a squadron. +The inconvenience that would be caused by the loss or breakdown +of a supply-carrier would be reduced by employing several vessels +of moderate cargo-capacity instead of only one or two of great +capacity. + +Each battleship and large cruiser of the assumed squadron may be +expected to burn about 1000 tons of coal in five weeks, so that +the quantity to be used in that time by all those ships would +be 8000 tons. The remaining ships, scattered between different +places as most of them would probably be, would require about +3500 tons. Therefore, every five weeks or so 11,500 tons of coal +would be required. Four replenishments would be necessary in the +whole period, making a total of 46,000 tons. Each replenishment +could be conveyed in five colliers with 2300 tons apiece. + +Moderate dimensions in store- and coal-carriers would prove +convenient, not only because it would facilitate taking in stores +and coaling, if all the squadron were assembled at one place, +but also if part were at one place and part at another. Division +into several vessels, instead of concentration in a few, would +give great flexibility to the system of supply. A single very +capacious cargo-carrier might have to go first to one place and +supply the ships there, and then go to supply the remaining ships +lying at another anchorage. This would cause loss of time. The +same amount of cargo distributed amongst two or more vessels +would permit the ships at two or more places to be supplied +simultaneously. + +You may have noticed that I have been dealing with the question +as though stores and coal were to be transported direct to the +men-of-war wherever they might be and put straight on board them +from the carrying-vessels. There is, as you all know, another +method, which may be described as that of 'secondary bases.' +Speaking generally, each of our naval stations has a principal +base at which considerable or even extensive repairs of the ships +can be effected and at which stores are accumulated. Visits to +it for the sake of repair being necessary, the occasion may be +taken advantage of to replenish supplies, so that the maintenance +of a stock at the place makes for convenience, provided that +the stock is not too large. The so-called 'secondary base' is +a place at which it is intended to keep in store coal and other +articles in the hope that when war is in progress the supply of +our ships may be facilitated. It is a supply, and not a repairing +base. + +A comparison of the 'direct' system and 'secondary base' system +may be interesting. A navy being maintained for use in war, it +follows, as a matter of course, that the value of any part of +its equipment or organisation depends on its efficiency for war +purposes. The question to be answered is--Which of the two systems +promises to help us most during hostilities? This does not exclude +a regard for convenience and economy in time of peace, provided +that care is taken not to push economy too far and not to make +ordinary peace-time convenience impede arrangements essential +to the proper conduct of a naval campaign. + +It is universally admitted that a secondary base at which stocks +of stores are kept should be properly defended. This necessitates +the provision of fortifications and a garrison. Nearly every +article of naval stores of all classes has to be brought to our +bases by sea, just as much as if it were brought direct to our +ships. Consequently the communications of the base have to be +defended. They would continue to need defending even if our ships +ceased to draw supplies from it, because the communications of +the garrison must be kept open. We know what happened twice over +at Minorca when the latter was not done. + +The object of accumulating stores at a secondary base is to +facilitate the supply of fighting ships, it being rather confidently +assumed that the ships can go to it to replenish without being +obliged to absent themselves for long from the positions in which +they could best counteract the efforts of the enemy. When war is +going on it is not within the power of either side to arrange +its movements exactly as it pleases. Movements must, at all events +very often, conform to those of the enemy. It is not a bad rule +when going to war to give your enemy credit for a certain amount +of good sense. Our enemy's good sense is likely to lead him to +do exactly what we wish him not to do, and not to do that which +we wish him to do. We should, of course, like him to operate so +that our ships will not be employed at an inconvenient distance +from our base of supplies. If we have created permanent bases in +time of peace the enemy will know their whereabouts as well as +we do ourselves, and, unless he is a greater fool than it is safe +to think he is, he will try to make us derive as little benefit +from them as possible. He is likely to extend his operations to +localities at a distance from the places to which, if we have +the secondary base system of supply, he knows for certain that our +ships must resort. We shall have to do one of two things--either +let him carry on his operations undisturbed, or conform to his +movements. To this is due the common, if not invariable, experience +of naval warfare, that the fleet which assumes the offensive +has to establish what are sometimes called 'flying bases,' to +which it can resort at will. This explains why Nelson rarely +used Gibraltar as a base; why we occupied Balaclava in 1854; and +why the Americans used Guantanamo Bay in 1898. The flying base is +not fortified or garrisoned in advance. It is merely a convenient +anchorage, in a good position as regards the circumstances of +the war; and it can be abandoned for another, and resumed, if +desirable, as the conditions of the moment dictate. + +It is often argued that maintenance of stocks of stores at a +secondary base gives a fleet a free hand and at least relieves +it from the obligation of defending the line of communications. +We ought to examine both contentions. It is not easy to discover +where the freedom comes in if you must always proceed to a certain +place for supplies, whether convenient or not. It may be, and +very likely will be, of the utmost importance in war for a ship +to remain on a particular station. If her coal is running short +and can only be replenished by going to a base, go to the base she +must, however unfortunate the consequences. It has been mentioned +already that nearly every item on our store list has to be brought +to a base by sea. Let us ascertain to what extent the accumulation +of a stock at a place removes the necessity of defending the +communication line. Coal is so much the greater item that +consideration of it will cover that of all the rest. + +The squadron, as assumed, requires about 11,500 tons of coal +every five weeks in peace time. Some is commonly obtained from +contractors at foreign ports; but to avoid complicating the subject +we may leave contract issues out of consideration. If you keep +a stock of 10,000 tons at your permanent secondary base, you +will have enough to last your ships about four-and-a-half weeks. +Consequently you must have a stream of colliers running to the +place so as to arrive at intervals of not more than about thirty +days. Calculations founded on the experience of manoeuvres show +that in war time ships would require nearly three times the quantity +used in peace. It follows that, if you trebled your stock of +coal at the base and made it 30,000 tons, you would in war still +require colliers carrying that amount to arrive about every four +weeks. Picture the line of communications with the necessary +colliers on it, and see to what extent you are released from +the necessity of defending it. The bulk of other stores being +much less than that of coal, you could, no doubt, maintain a +sufficient stock of them to last through the probable duration +of the war; but, as you must keep your communications open to +ensure the arrival of your coal, it would be as easy for the +other stores to reach you as it would be for the coal itself. +Why oblige yourself to use articles kept long in store when much +fresher ones could be obtained? Therefore the maintenance of +store depots at a secondary base no more releases you from the +necessity of guarding your communications than it permits freedom +of movement to your ships. + +The secondary base in time of war is conditioned as follows. If +the enemy's sphere of activity is distant from the base which +you have equipped with store-houses and fortifications, the place +cannot be of any use to you. It can, and probably will, be a +cause of additional anxiety to you, because the communications +of its garrison must still be kept open. If it is used, freedom +of movement for the ships must be given up, because they cannot +go so far from it as to be obliged to consume a considerable +fraction of their coal in reaching it and returning to their +station. The line along which your colliers proceed to it must +be effectively guarded. + +Contrast this with the system of direct supply to the ships-of-war. +You choose for your flying base a position which will be as near +to the enemy's sphere of action as you choose to make it. You +can change its position in accordance with circumstances. If you +cease to use the position first chosen you need trouble yourself +no more about its special communications. You leave nothing at it +which will make it worth the enemy's while to try a dash at it. +The power of changing the flying base from one place to another +gives almost perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships. +Moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position +selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed +base. + +The defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on +the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route, +viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant. +Within the last few years a good deal has been written about +the employment of cruisers. The favourite idea seems to be that +peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to +take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. The history +of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. We need not forget +Nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number +attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of +vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually +unaltered. At the beginning of 1805, the year of Trafalgar, we +had--besides other classes--232 frigates and sloops in commission; +at the beginning of 1806 we had 264. It is doubtful if forty of +these were attached to fleets. + +It is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels +of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep +up with the fighting ships when at sea. This, perhaps, is due +to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on +the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. In +practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very +short time--from its supplies. Its movements depend on those of +its supply-train. The corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet +or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. As long as +these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered, +and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. All +that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right +place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying +that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies +and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called +communications'--the phrase being Mahan's. + +The efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely +on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. Why do +we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace +so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails +before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? There are +two reasons. One is, because we have used the permanent base +method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find +it difficult to form a conception of any other. The other reason +is that the direct supply method is thought to be too costly. +The first reason need not detain us. It is not worthy of even +a few minutes' consideration. The second reason deserves full +investigation. + +We ought to be always alive to the necessity of economy. The only +limit to economy of money in any plan of naval organisation is +that we should not carry it so far that it will be likely to impair +efficiency. Those who are familiar with the correspondence of the +great sea-officers of former days will have noticed how careful +they were to prevent anything like extravagant expenditure. This +inclination towards a proper parsimony of naval funds became +traditional in our service. The tradition has, perhaps, been +rather weakened in these days of abundant wealth; but we should +do our best not to let it die out. Extravagance is a serious foe +to efficient organisation, because where it prevails there is +a temptation to try imperfectly thought-out experiments, in the +belief that, if they fail, there will still be plenty of money +to permit others to be tried. This, of course, encourages slovenly +want of system, which is destructive of good organisation. + +We may assume, for the purposes of our investigation, that our +permanently equipped secondary base contains a stock of 10,000 tons +of coal. Any proportionate quantity, however, may be substituted +for this, as the general argument will remain unaffected. As +already intimated, coal is so much greater in bulk and aggregate +cost than any other class of stores that, if we arrange for its +supply, the provision of the rest is a comparatively small matter. +The squadron which we have had in view requires an estimated +amount of 46,000 tons of coal in six months' period specified, +and a further quantity of 4600 tons may be expected to suffice +for the ships employed in the neighbouring waters during the +remainder of the year. This latter amount would have to be brought +in smaller cargoes, say, five of 920 tons each. Allowing for +the colliers required during the six months whilst the whole +squadron has to be supplied an average cargo of 2300 tons, we +should want twenty arrivals with an aggregate of 46,000 tons, +and later on five arrivals of smaller colliers with an aggregate +of 4600 tons to complete the year. + +The freight or cost of conveyance to the place need not be considered +here, as it would be the same in either system. If we keep a stock +of supplies at a place we must incur expenditure to provide for +the storage of the articles. There would be what may be called +the capital charges for sites, buildings, residences, jetties, +tram lines, &c., for which L20,000 would probably not be enough, +but we may put it at that so as to avoid the appearance of +exaggeration. A further charge would be due to the provision of +tugs or steam launches, and perhaps lighters. This would hardly +be less than L15,000. Interest on money sunk, cost of repairs, +and maintenance, would not be excessive if they amounted to L3500 +a year. There must be some allowance for the coal used by the +tugs and steam launches. It is doubtful if L500 a year would +cover this; but we may put it at that. Salaries and wages of +staff, including persons employed in tugs and steam launches, +would reach quite L2500 a year. It is to be noted that the items +which these charges are assumed to cover cannot be dispensed +with. If depots are established at all, they must be so arranged +that the stores deposited in them can be securely kept and can +be utilised with proper expedition. The total of the charges +just enumerated is L6500 a year. + +There are other charges that cannot be escaped. For example, +landing a ton of coal at Wei-hai-wei, putting it into the depot, +and taking it off again to the man-of-war requiring it, costs $1 +20 cents, or at average official rate of exchange two shillings. +At Hong-Kong the cost is about 2s. 5d. a ton. The charge at 2s. +per ton on 50,600 tons would be L5060. I am assured by every +engineer officer to whom I have spoken on the subject that the +deterioration in coal due to the four different handlings which +it has to undergo if landed in lighters and taken off again to +ships from the coal-store cannot be put at less than 10 per cent. +Note that this is over and above such deterioration as would be +due to passing coal direct from the hold of a collier alongside +into a ship's bunkers. If anyone doubts this deterioration it would +be well for him to examine reports on coal and steam trials. He +will be unusually fortunate if he finds so small a deterioration as +10 per cent. The lowest that I can remember having seen reported +is 20 per cent.; reports of 30 and even 40 per cent. are quite +common. Some of it is for deterioration due to climate and length +of time in store. This, of course, is one of the inevitable +conditions of the secondary base system, the object of which is +to keep in stock a quantity of the article needed. Putting the +purchase price of the coal as low as 15s. a ton, a deterioration +due to repeated handling only of 10 per cent. on 50,600 tons +would amount to L3795. + +There is nearly always some loss of coal due to moving it. I +say 'nearly always' because it seems that there are occasions +on which coal being moved increases in bulk. It occurs when +competitive coaling is being carried on in a fleet and ships +try to beat records. A collier in these circumstances gives out +more coal than she took in. We shall probably be right if we +regard the increase in this case as what the German philosophers +call 'subjective,' that is, rather existent in the mind than in +the external region of objective, palpable fact. It may be taken +as hardly disputable that there will be less loss the shorter +the distance and the fewer the times the coal is moved. Without +counting it we see that the annual expenses enumerated are-- + + Establishment charges L6,500 + Landing and re-shipping 5,060 + Deterioration 3,795 + ------- + L15,355 + +This L15,355 is to be compared with the cost of the direct supply +system. The quantity of coal required would, as said above, have +to be carried in twenty colliers--counting each trip as that of +a separate vessel--with, on the average, 2300 tons apiece, and +five smaller ones. It would take fully four days to unload 2300 +tons at the secondary base, and even more if the labour supply +was uncertain or the labourers not well practised. Demurrage +for a vessel carrying the cargo mentioned, judging from actual +experience, would be about L32 a day; and probably about L16 a +day for the smaller vessels. If we admit an average delay, per +collier, of eighteen days, that is, fourteen days more than the +time necessary for removing the cargo into store, so as to allow +for colliers arriving when the ships to be coaled are absent, we +should get-- + + 20 X 14 X 32 L8,960 + 5 X 14 X 16 1,120 + ------- + L10,080 + +as the cost of transferring the coal from the holds to the +men-of-war's bunkers on the direct supply system. An average +of eighteen days is probably much too long to allow for each +collier's stay till cleared: because, on some occasions, ships +requiring coal may be counted on as sure to be present. Even +as it is, the L10,080 is a smaller sum than the L11,560 which +the secondary base system costs over and above the amount due to +increased deterioration of coal. If a comparison were instituted +as regards other kinds of stores, the particular figures might +be different, but the general result would be the same. + +The first thing that we have got to do is to rid our minds of +the belief that because we see a supply-carrier lying at anchor +for some days without being cleared, more money is being spent +than is spent on the maintenance of a shore depot. There may be +circumstances in which a secondary base is a necessity, but they +must be rare and exceptional. We saw that the establishment of one +does not help us in the matter of defending our communications. +We now see that, so far from being more economical than the +alternative method, the secondary base method is more costly. It +might have been demonstrated that it is really much more costly +than the figures given make it out to be, because ships obliged +to go to a base must expend coal in doing so, and coal costs +money. It is not surprising that consideration of the secondary +base system should evoke a recollection of the expression applied +by Dryden to the militia of his day: + + In peace a charge; in war a weak defence. + +I have to say that I did not prepare this paper simply for the +pleasure of reading it, or in order to bring before you mere +sets of figures and estimates of expense. My object has been +to arouse in some of the officers who hear me a determination +to devote a portion of their leisure to the consideration of +those great problems which must be solved by us if we are to +wage war successfully. Many proofs reach me of the ability and +zeal with which details of material are investigated by officers +in these days. The details referred to are not unimportant in +themselves; but the importance of several of them if put together +would be incomparably less than that of the great question to +which I have tried to direct your attention. + +The supply of a fleet is of high importance in both peace time +and time of war. Even in peace it sometimes causes an admiral to +pass a sleepless night. The arrangements which it necessitates +are often intricate, and success in completing them occasionally +seems far off. The work involved in devising suitable plans is +too much like drudgery to be welcome to those who undertake it. +All the same it has to be done: and surely no one will care to +deny that the fleet which has practised in quiet years the system +that must be followed in war will start with a great advantage on +its side when it is at last confronted with the stern realities +of naval warfare. + + +POSTSCRIPT + +The question of 'Communications,' if fully dealt with in the +foregoing paper, would have made it so long that its hearers might +have been tired out before its end was reached. The following +summary of the points that might have been enlarged upon, had +time allowed, may interest many officers:-- + +In time of war we must keep open our lines of communication. + +If we cannot, the war will have gone against us. + +Open communications mean that we can prevent the enemy from carrying +out decisive and sustained operations against them and along +their line. + +To keep communications open it is not necessary to secure every +friendly ship traversing the line against attacks by the enemy. +All that is necessary is to restrict the enemy's activity so +far that he can inflict only such a moderate percentage of loss +on the friendly vessels that, as a whole, they will not cease +to run. + +Keeping communications open will not secure a friendly place +against every form of attack. It will, however, secure a place +against attacks with large forces sustained for a considerable +length of time. If he can make attacks of this latter kind, it +is clear that the enemy controls the communications and that +we have failed to keep them open. + +If communications are open for the passage of vessels of the +friendly mercantile marine, it follows that the relatively much +smaller number of supply-vessels can traverse the line. + +As regards supply-vessels, a percentage of loss caused by the +enemy must be allowed for. If we put this at 10 per cent.--which, +taken absolutely, is probably sufficient--it means that _on_the_ +_average_ out of ten supply-vessels sent we expect nine to reach +their destination. + +We cannot, however, arrange that an equal loss will fall on every +group of ten vessels. Two such groups may arrive intact, whilst +a third may lose three vessels. Yet the 10 per cent. average +would be maintained. + +This condition has to be allowed for. Investigations some years +ago led to the conclusion that it would be prudent to send five +carriers for every four wanted. + +The word 'group' has been used above only in a descriptive sense. +Supply-carriers will often be safer if they proceed to their +destination separately. This, however, depends on circumstances. + + + + +INDEX + +Adventure, voyages of +Agincourt, battle of +Alcester, Lord +Alexander the Great +Alexandria, bombardment of +American War of Independence; Sir Henry Maine on +---- War of Secession; raids in +---- War with Spain +Ammunition, supply of; alleged shortage at the defeat of the + Armada +Army co-operation +Athenian Navy; at the battle of Syracuse +Australian Fleet, localisation of +Austro-Prussian War + + Baehr, C. F +Balaclava, capture of +Bantry Bay, French invasion of +Battleships, merits of; coal consumption of +Beer, for the Navy +Benedek, General +Blockades +Bounty for recruits +Brassey, Lord +Bright, Rev. J. F. +Brougham, Lord +Brunswick-Oels, Duke of +Burchett, quoted +Burleigh, Lord +Byng, Admiral (_see_under_ Torrington, Earl of). + +Cadiz, Expedition +Camperdown, battle of +Camperdown, Lord +Cardigan Bay, French invasion of +Carnot, President +Carrying trade, of the colonies; of the world +Carthaginian Navy; fall of +Cawdor, Lord +Centralisation, evils of +Charles II, King +'Chatham Chest' +Chevalier, Captain; quoted +Chino-Japanese War +Chioggia, battle of +Coal, allowance of; bases for; cost of +Coast defence (_see_also_under_ Invasion) +Collingwood, Admiral, at Trafalgar +Colomb, Vice-Admiral P. H.; on the Chino-Japanese War; on the + command of the sea; on Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar +Colonies, naval bases in the; contributions by the; and terms + of service in the navy +Command of the sea; and the claim to a salute; in the Crimean + War; local and temporary; and the French invasion; land + fortification and; in war; and our food supply; essential + to the Empire +Commerce, protection of naval; destruction of; at the time of + Trafalgar +Communications, in war; control of; with naval bases; of a + fleet +Corbett, Mr. Julian; on Nelson +Cornwallis, Admiral +Crecy, battle of +Crimean War; command of the sea in; mortality in +Cromwell, Oliver +Cruisers, necessity for; their equivalent at Trafalgar; coal + consumption of; duties of +Crusades + +Dacres, Rear-Admiral +De Burgh, Hubert +De Galles, Admiral Morard +De Grasse, Admiral +De la Graviere, Admiral +De Ruyter, Admiral +Defence, of naval commerce; against invasion; offensive; + inefficiency of localised; against raids +Desbriere, Capt. +Destroyers, origin of +Dewey, Admiral +'Dictionary of National Biography' +Dockyards, fortification of +Dornberg, Colonel +Drake, Sir Francis +Drury Lane Pantomime +Dryden, quoted +Duncan, Lord; Life of; quoted +Dundonald, Lord +Duro, Captain +Dutch East India Co. +---- Navy +---- War + + Economy and Efficiency +Edward III, King +Egypt, French Expedition to +Ekins, Sir Charles +Elizabeth (Queen) and her seamen +Empire, the defence of; and control of ocean communications +English Channel, command of the +Exploration, voyages of + +Fishguard, French invasion of +Fleet, positions in war for the; duties of the; and the defence + of Empire; supply and communications of the +'Fleet in being' +Food supply and control of the sea +Foods, preservation of +Foreign seamen, in our merchant service; their exemption from + impressment +Franco-German War +Froude's History +Fulton, quoted + + Gardiner, Dr. S. R., quoted +Genoese Navy +German Navy, in the Baltic +Gibbon, quoted +Gibraltar; siege of +Gravelines, battle of +Greek Navy +Green, J. R., quoted +Grierson, Colonel B. H. +Grouchy, Admiral +Gutteridge, Mr. + + Hall, Mr. Hubert +Hammond, Dr. W. A. +'Handy man' evolution of the +Hannay, Mr. D. +Hannibal +Hawke, Lord +Hawkins, Sir J. +Herodotus, quoted +History, influence of naval campaigns on; of war +Hoche, General +Holm, Adolf +Hood, Lord; and Nelson +Hosier, Admiral +Howard of Effingham, Lord; quoted +Howe, Lord; at Gibraltar; his tactics +Hughes, Sir Edward +Humbert's Bxpedition + +_Illustrious_ Training School +Impressment; exemption of foreigners from; inefficiency of; + legalised forcible; popular misconceptions of; exemptions + from (_see_also_under_ Press gang) +Indian Mutiny +International law, and the sea; and the sale of bad food +Invasion, prevention of; of British Isles; over sea and land + raids; land defence against; as a means of war +Ireland, French invasion of + + Jamaica, seizure of +James, quoted +Japan and China war +Jena, battle of +Jessopp, Dr. A. +Joyeuse, Admiral Villaret + + Keith, Lord +Killigrew, Vice-Admiral +Kinglake, quoted + +La Hogue, battle of +Laughton, Professor Sir J. K.; 'Defeat of the Armada,'; on + Nelson +Lepanto, battle of +Lindsay, W. S. +Local defence, inefficiency of; of naval bases +Lyons, Admiral Lord + +Mahan, Captain A. T.; on the Roman Navy; on sea commerce; on + early naval warfare; on the naval 'calling'; on the American + War of Independence; influence of his teaching; on the + Spanish-American War; on control of the sea; on impressment; + on Nelson at Trafalgar +Malaga, battle of +Manoeuvres +Marathon, battle of +Marines and impressment +Martin, Admiral Sir T. Byam +Medina-Sidonia, Duke of +Mediterranean, command of the +Mends, Dr. Stilon +---- Admiral Sir W. +Merchant Service, foreign seamen in our; historical relations + of the navy with the; its exemption from impressment (_see_ + _also_under_ Commerce) +Minorca +Mischenko, General +Mortality from disease in war +Motley, quoted +Mutiny at the Nore + +Napoleon, Emperor; and the invasion of England; expedition + to Egypt; on losses in War +Naval bases; defence of; cost of +_Naval_Chronicle_ +Naval strategy; in the American War of Independence; the frontier + in; and command of the sea; the fleet's position in War; + compared with military; and the French Expedition to Egypt; + in defence of Empire; for weak navies; at the time of Trafalgar +---- tactics, Nelson's achievements in; at Trafalgar; consideration + of cost in +---- warfare, influence on history of; the true objective in + (_see_also_under_ War) +Navies, costliness of; strength of foreign +Navigation Act (1651) +Navy, necessity for a strong; and Army co-operation; human + element in the; changes in organisation; conditions of service + in the; peace training of the; historical relations with the + merchant service; impressment in the; records of the; Queen + Elizabeth's; victualling the; pay in the; its mobility; and + the two-power standard; question of size of ships for the; + economy and efficiency in the +Navy Records Society +Nelson, Lord; on blockades; and the 'Nile'; his strategy; and + Trafalgar; his tactics +Netley Hospital +Newbolt, Mr. H. +Nile, battle of the + + Oil, ship's allowance of +Oppenheim, Mr. M. +Oversea raids + +Palmer, Six Henry +Peace training, and war; of the 'handy man' +Pepys, quoted +Pericles, quoted +Persian Navy +Peter the Great +Phillip, Rear-Admiral Arthur +Phoenician Navy +Pitt, William; quoted +Piracy +Pocock, Rev. Thomas +Poitiers, battle of +Policing the sea +Port Arthur, battle off +Ports, fortification of +Portuguese Navy +Press gang; popular misconceptions of the; facts and fancies + about the; in literature and art; operations of the +Price, Dr. + +Quiberon Bay, battle of + + Raiding attacks; prevention of +Raids, oversea and on land +Raleigh, Sir Walter +Recruiting, from the merchant service; by the press gang +Recruits, bounty for +Rhodes Navy +Robinson, Commander +Rodney, Lord +Rogers, Thorold +Roman Navy +Rooke, Sir George +Roosevelt, Mr. Theodore, quoted +Russo-Japanese War +---- Turkish War + +St. Vincent, Lord +Salamis, battle of +Salute, the claim to a +Saracen Navy +Schill, Colonel +Sea, International law and the +Sea Power, history and meaning of the term; defined; influence + on history of naval campaigns; of the Phoenicians; of Greece + and Persia; of Rome and Carthage; in the Middle Ages; of the + Saracens; and the Crusades; of Venice, Pisa and Genoa; of the + Turks; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; of Portugal + and Spain; rise in England of; and exploration and adventure; + and military co-operation; of the Dutch; and naval strategy; + in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; examples of + its efficiency; in recent times; in Crimean War; in American + War of Secession; in Russo-Turkish war; in Chino-Japanese War; + in Spanish-American War +Sebastopol, siege of +Seeley, Sir J. R. +Seymour, Lord Henry +Ships for the navy, question of size of; for supply +Sismondi, quoted +Sluys, battle of +Smith, Sir Sydney +Spanish Armada, defeat of the; Records of; Queen Elizabeth and the +---- American War +Spanish Indies +---- Navy +Spartan Army +Stirling, Sir James +Stores, reserve of ship's +Strategy (_see_under_ Naval Strategy) +Stuart, General J. E. B. +Suffren, Admiral +Supply and communications of a fleet +Supply ships, sizes of +Syracuse, battle of + +Tactics (_see_under_ Naval Tactics) +Tate, Colonel +Themistocles; and the Greek Navy +Thucydides, quoted +_Times_, quoted +Torpedo boats, defence against +Torrington, Earl of +Tourville, Admiral +Trafalgar, battle of; tactics of; British losses at; the attack; + contemporary strategy and tactics +Training (_see_under_ Peace Training) +Turkish Navy + +United States Navy + + Venetian Navy +Victualling allowances; and modern preserved foods + +Walcheren Expedition, mortality in Wales, French invasion of + + + + + +War, and its chief lessons; human element in; the unexpected + in; under modern conditions; how to avoid surprise in; + mortality from disease in; methods of making; command of the + sea in; compensation for losses in; Napoleon on loss of life + in; supplies in (_see_also_under_ Invasion, Naval Warfare, + and Raids) +Washington, George +Water, ship's allowance of +Waterloo, battle of +Wellington, Duke of +William III, King +Wilmot, Sir S. Eardley + +Xerxes; his highly trained Army + + +THE END + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Sea-Power and Other Studies +by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SEA-POWER AND OTHER STUDIES *** + +***** This file should be named 10694.txt or 10694.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/6/9/10694/ + +Produced by Robert J. Hall + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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