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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13316 ***
+
+BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+
+WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY H.F. STEWART, D.D.
+
+FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
+
+AND E.K. RAND, PH.D.
+
+PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
+
+
+
+THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+WITH THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF "I.T." (1609)
+
+REVISED BY H.F. STEWART
+
+
+
+1918
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's Note: The paper edition of this book has Latin and English
+pages facing each other. This version of the text uses alternating Latin
+and English sections, with the English text slightly indented.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+  NOTE ON THE TEXT
+
+  INTRODUCTION
+
+  BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+  THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+
+  THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+  SYMMACHI VERSUS
+
+  INDEX
+
+
+
+
+NOTE ON THE TEXT
+
+In preparing the text of the _Consolatio_ I have used the apparatus in
+Peiper's edition (Teubner, 1871), since his reports, as I know in the case
+of the Tegernseensis, are generally accurate and complete; I have depended
+also on my own collations or excerpts from various of the important
+manuscripts, nearly all of which I have at least examined, and I have also
+followed, not always but usually, the opinions of Engelbrecht in his
+admirable article, _Die Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius_ in the
+_Sitzungsberichte_ of the Vienna Academy, cxliv. (1902) 1-60. The
+present text, then, has been constructed from only part of the material
+with which an editor should reckon, though the reader may at least assume
+that every reading in the text has, unless otherwise stated, the authority
+of some manuscript of the ninth or tenth century; in certain orthographical
+details, evidence from the text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ has been used
+without special mention of this fact. We look to August Engelbrecht for the
+first critical edition of the _Consolatio_ at, we hope, no distant
+date.
+
+The text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ is based on my own collations of all
+the important manuscripts of these works. An edition with complete
+_apparatus criticus_ will be ready before long for the Vienna
+_Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum_. The history of the
+text of the _Opuscula Sacra_, as I shall attempt to show elsewhere, is
+intimately connected with that of the _Consolatio_.
+
+E.K.R.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, of the famous Praenestine family of the
+Anicii, was born about 480 A.D. in Rome. His father was an ex-consul; he
+himself was consul under Theodoric the Ostrogoth in 510, and his two sons,
+children of a great grand-daughter of the renowned Q. Aurelius Symmachus,
+were joint consuls in 522. His public career was splendid and honourable,
+as befitted a man of his race, attainments, and character. But he fell
+under the displeasure of Theodoric, and was charged with conspiring to
+deliver Rome from his rule, and with corresponding treasonably to this end
+with Justin, Emperor of the East. He was thrown into prison at Pavia, where
+he wrote the _Consolation of Philosophy_, and he was brutally put to death
+in 524. His brief and busy life was marked by great literary achievement.
+His learning was vast, his industry untiring, his object unattainable--
+nothing less than the transmission to his countrymen of all the works of
+Plato and Aristotle, and the reconciliation of their apparently divergent
+views. To form the idea was a silent judgment on the learning of his day;
+to realize it was more than one man could accomplish; but Boethius
+accomplished much. He translated the [Greek: Eisagogae] of Porphyry, and
+the whole of Aristotle's _Organon_. He wrote a double commentary on the
+[Greek: Eisagogae] and commentaries on the _Categories_ and the _De
+Interpretatione_ of Aristotle, and on the _Topica_ of Cicero. He also
+composed original treatises on the categorical and hypothetical syllogism,
+on Division and on Topical Differences. He adapted the arithmetic of
+Nicomachus, and his textbook on music, founded on various Greek
+authorities, was in use at Oxford and Cambridge until modern times. His
+five theological _Tractates_ are here, together with the _Consolation of
+Philosophy_, to speak for themselves.
+
+Boethius was the last of the Roman philosophers, and the first of the
+scholastic theologians. The present volume serves to prove the truth of
+both these assertions.
+
+The _Consolation of Philosophy_ is indeed, as Gibbon called it, "a golden
+volume, not unworthy of the leisure of Plato or of Tully." To belittle its
+originality and sincerity, as is sometimes done, with a view to saving the
+Christianity of the writer, is to misunderstand his mind and his method.
+The _Consolatio_ is not, as has been maintained, a mere patchwork of
+translations from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Rather it is the supreme
+essay of one who throughout his life had found his highest solace in the
+dry light of reason. His chief source of refreshment, in the dungeon to
+which his beloved library had not accompanied him, was a memory well
+stocked with the poetry and thought of former days. The development of the
+argument is anything but Neoplatonic; it is all his own.
+
+And if the _Consolation of Philosophy_ admits Boethius to the company of
+Cicero or even of Plato, the theological _Tractates_ mark him as the
+forerunner of St. Thomas. It was the habit of a former generation to regard
+Boethius as an eclectic, the transmitter of a distorted Aristotelianism, a
+pagan, or at best a luke-warm Christian, who at the end cast off the faith
+which he had worn in times of peace, and wrapped himself in the philosophic
+cloak which properly belonged to him. The authenticity of the _Tractates_
+was freely denied. We know better now. The discovery by Alfred Holder, and
+the illuminating discussion by Hermann Usener,[1] of a fragment of
+Cassiodorus are sufficient confirmation of the manuscript tradition, apart
+from the work of scholars who have sought to justify that tradition from
+internal evidence. In that fragment Cassiodorus definitely ascribes to his
+friend Boethius "a book on the Trinity, some dogmatic chapters, and a book
+against Nestorius."[2] Boethius was without doubt a Christian, a Doctor and
+perhaps a martyr. Nor is it necessary to think that, when in prison, he put
+away his faith. If it is asked why the _Consolation of Philosophy_ contains
+no conscious or direct reference to the doctrines which are traced in the
+_Tractates_ with so sure a hand, and is, at most, not out of harmony with
+Christianity, the answer is simple. In the _Consolation_ he is writing
+philosophy; in the _Tractates_ he is writing theology. He observes what
+Pascal calls the orders of things. Philosophy belongs to one order,
+theology to another. They have different objects. The object of philosophy
+is to understand and explain the nature of the world around us; the object
+of theology is to understand and explain doctrines delivered by divine
+revelation. The scholastics recognized the distinction,[3] and the
+corresponding difference in the function of Faith and Reason. Their final
+aim was to co-ordinate the two, but this was not possible before the
+thirteenth century. Meanwhile Boethius helps to prepare the way. In the
+_Consolation_ he gives Reason her range, and suffers her, unaided, to
+vindicate the ways of Providence. In the _Tractates_ Reason is called in to
+give to the claims of Faith the support which it does not really lack.[4]
+Reason, however, has still a right to be heard. The distinction between
+_fides_ and _ratio_ is proclaimed in the first two _Tractates_. In the
+second especially it is drawn with a clearness worthy of St. Thomas
+himself; and there is, of course, the implication that the higher authority
+resides with _fides_. But the treatment is philosophical and extremely
+bold. Boethius comes back to the question of the substantiality of the
+divine Persons which he has discussed in Tr. I. from a fresh point of view.
+Once more he decides that the Persons are predicated relatively; even
+Trinity, he concludes, is not predicated substantially of deity. Does this
+square with catholic doctrine? It is possible to hear a note of challenge
+in his words to John the Deacon, _fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge_.
+Philosophy states the problem in unequivocal terms. Theology is required to
+say whether they commend themselves.
+
+One object of the scholastics, anterior to the final co-ordination of the
+two sciences, was to harmonize and codify all the answers to all the
+questions that philosophy raises. The ambition of Boethius was not so
+soaring, but it was sufficiently bold. He set out, first to translate, and
+then to reconcile, Plato and Aristotle; to go behind all the other systems,
+even the latest and the most in vogue, back to the two great masters, and
+to show that they have the truth, and are in substantial accord. So St.
+Thomas himself, if he cannot reconcile the teaching of Plato and Aristotle,
+at least desires to correct the one by the other, to discover what truth is
+common to both, and to show its correspondence with Christian doctrine. It
+is reasonable to conjecture that Boethius, if he had lived, might have
+attempted something of the kind. Were he alive to-day, he might feel more
+in tune with the best of the pagans than with most contemporary philosophic
+thought.
+
+In yet one more respect Boethius belongs to the company of the schoolmen.
+He not only put into circulation many precious philosophical notions,
+served as channel through which various works of Aristotle passed into the
+schools, and handed down to them a definite Aristotelian method for
+approaching the problem of faith; he also supplied material for that
+classification of the various sciences which is an essential accompaniment
+of every philosophical movement, and of which the Middle Ages felt the
+value.[5] The uniform distribution into natural sciences, mathematics and
+theology which he recommends may be traced in the work of various teachers
+up to the thirteenth century, when it is finally accepted and defended by
+St. Thomas in his commentary on the _De Trinitate_.
+
+A seventeenth-century translation of the _Consolatio Philosophiae_ is here
+presented with such alterations as are demanded by a better text, and the
+requirements of modern scholarship. There was, indeed, not much to do, for
+the rendering is most exact. This in a translation of that date is not a
+little remarkable. We look for fine English and poetry in an Elizabethan;
+but we do not often get from him such loyalty to the original as is here
+displayed.
+
+Of the author "I.T." nothing is known. He may have been John Thorie, a
+Fleming born in London in 1568, and a B.A. of Christ Church, 1586. Thorie
+"was a person well skilled in certain tongues, and a noted poet of his
+times" (Wood, _Athenae Oxon._ ed. Bliss, i. 624), but his known
+translations are apparently all from the Spanish.[6]
+
+Our translator dedicates his "Five books of Philosophical Comfort" to the
+Dowager Countess of Dorset, widow of Thomas Sackville, who was part author
+of _A Mirror for Magistrates_ and _Gorboduc_, and who, we learn from I.T.'s
+preface, meditated a similar work. I.T. does not unduly flatter his
+patroness, and he tells her plainly that she will not understand the
+philosophy of the book, though the theological and practical parts may be
+within her scope.
+
+The _Opuscula Sacra_ have never before, to our knowledge, been translated.
+In reading and rendering them we have been greatly helped by two mediaeval
+commentaries: one by John the Scot (edited by E.K. Rand in Traube's
+_Quellen und Untersuchungen_, vol. i. pt. 2, Munich, 1906); the other by
+Gilbert de la Porrée (printed in Migne, _P.L._ lxiv.). We also desire to
+record our indebtedness in many points of scholarship and philosophy to Mr.
+E.J. Thomas of Emmanuel College.
+
+Finally, thanks are due to Mr. Dolson for the suggestion in the footnote on
+the preceding page, and also to Professor Lane Cooper of Cornell University
+for many valuable corrections as this reprint was passing through the
+Press.
+
+H.F.S.
+E.K.R.
+
+_October, 1926._
+
+
+[1] _Anecdoton Holderi_, Leipzig, 1877.
+
+[2] _Scripsit librum de sancta trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica et
+librum contra Nestorium._ On the question of the genuineness of Tr. IV. _De
+fide catholica_ see note _ad loc_.
+
+[3] Cp. H. de Wulf, _Histoire de la Philosophie médiévale_ (Louvain and
+Paris 1915), p. 332.
+
+[4] See below, _De Trin_. vi. _ad fin_.
+
+[5] Cp. L. Baur, _Gundissalinus: de divisione_, Münster, 1905.
+
+[6] Mr. G. Bayley Dolson suggests with greater probability that I.T. was
+John Thorpe (fl. 1570-1610), architect to Thomas Sackville, Earl of Dorset.
+Cf. _American Journal of Philology_, vol. xlii. (1921), p. 266.
+
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+_Editio Princeps_:
+
+  Collected Works (except _De fide catholica_). Joh. et Greg. de
+  Gregoriis. Venice, 1491-92.
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_. Coburger. Nürnberg, 1473.
+
+  _De fide catholica_. Ed. Ren. Vallinus. Leyden, 1656.
+
+_Latest Critical Edition_:
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_ and Theological Tractates. R.
+  Peiper. Teubner, 1871.
+
+_Translations_:
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_.
+
+  Alfred the Great. Ed. W.J. Sedgefield. Oxford, 1899 and 1900.
+
+  Chaucer. Ed. W.W. Skeat in Chaucer's Complete Works. Vol. ii. Oxford,
+  1894.
+
+  H.R. James. _The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius_. London,
+  1897; reprinted 1906.
+
+  Judicis de Mirandol. _La Consolation philosophique de Boëce_.
+  Paris, 1861.
+
+_Illustrative Works_:
+
+  A. Engelbrecht. _Die Consolatio Phil. der B._ Sitzungsberichte der
+  Kön. Akad. Vienna, 1902.
+
+  Bardenhewer, _Patrologie_ (Boethius und Cassiodor, pp. 584 sqq.).
+  Freiburg im Breslau, 1894.
+
+  Hauréan. _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique._ Vol. i. Paris,
+  1872.
+
+  Hildebrand. _Boethius und seine Stellung zum Christentum._
+  Regensburg, 1885.
+
+  Hodgkin. _Italy and her Invaders._ Vols. iii. and iv. Oxford, 1885.
+
+  Ch. Jourdain. (1) _De l'origine des traditions sur le christianisme de
+  Boëce_; (2) _Des commentaires inédits sur La Consolation de la
+  philosophie_. (Excursions historiques et philosophiques à travers le
+  moyen àge.) Paris, 1888.
+
+  Fritz Klingner. _De Boethii consolatione_, Philol. Unters. xxvii.
+  Berlin, 1921.
+
+  F.D. Maurice. _Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy._ Vol. i. London,
+  1872.
+
+  F. Nitzsch. _Das System des B._ Berlin, 1860.
+
+  E.K. Rand. _Der dem B. zugeschriebene Traktat de Fide catholica_
+  (Jahrbuch für kl. Phil. xxvi.). 1901.
+
+  Semeria. _Il Cristianesimo di Sev. Boezio rivendicato_, Rome, 1900.
+
+  M. Schanz. _Gesch. der röm. Litteratur._ Teil iv. Boethius. Berlin,
+  1921.
+
+  H.F. Stewart. _Boethius: an Essay._ Edinburgh, 1891.
+
+  Usener. _Anecdoton Holderi._ Leipsic, 1877.
+
+
+
+
+BOETHIUS
+
+
+THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+AND THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+INCIPIT LIBER QVOMODO
+TRINITAS VNVS DEVS
+AC NON TRES DII
+
+AD Q. AVRELIVM MEMMIVM SYMMACHVM
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. ATQVE PATRICIVM SOCERVM
+
+Investigatam diutissime quaestionem, quantum nostrae mentis igniculum lux
+diuina dignata est, formatam rationibus litterisque mandatam offerendam
+uobis communicandamque curaui tam uestri cupidus iudicii quam nostri
+studiosus inuenti. Qua in re quid mihi sit animi quotiens stilo cogitata
+commendo, tum ex ipsa materiae difficultate tum ex eo quod raris id est
+uobis tantum conloquor, intellegi potest. Neque enim famae iactatione et
+inanibus uulgi clamoribus excitamur; sed si quis est fructus exterior, hic
+non potest aliam nisi materiae similem sperare sententiam. Quocumque igitur
+a uobis deieci oculos, partim ignaua segnities partim callidus liuor
+occurrit, ut contumeliam uideatur diuinis tractatibus inrogare qui talibus
+hominum monstris non agnoscenda haec potius quam proculcanda proiecerit.
+Idcirco stilum breuitate contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae
+disciplinis nouorum uerborum significationibus uelo, ut haec mihi tantum
+uobisque, si quando ad ea conuertitis oculos, conloquantur; ceteros uero
+ita submouimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiuerint ad ea etiam legenda
+uideantur indigni. Sane[7] tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae
+rationis intuitus ad diuinitatis ualet celsa conscendere. Nam ceteris
+quoque artibus idem quasi quidam finis est constitutus, quousque potest uia
+rationis accedere. Neque enim medicina aegris semper affert salutem; sed
+nulla erit culpa medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri oportebat omiserit.
+Idemque in ceteris. At quantum haec difficilior quaestio est, tam facilior
+esse debet ad ueniam. Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est, an ex beati
+Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos uenientia fructus
+extulerint. Ac de proposita quaestione hinc sumamus initium.
+
+
+[7] sed ne _codices optimi_.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE TRINITY IS ONE GOD NOT THREE GODS
+
+  A TREATISE BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE
+  ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO HIS FATHER-IN-LAW, QUINTUS AURELIUS MEMMIUS SYMMACHUS
+  MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  I have long pondered this problem with such mind as I have and all the
+  light that God has lent me. Now, having set it forth in logical order
+  and cast it into literary form, I venture to submit it to your judgment,
+  for which I care as much as for the results of my own research. You will
+  readily understand what I feel whenever I try to write down what I think
+  if you consider the difficulty of the topic and the fact that I discuss
+  it only with the few--I may say with no one but yourself. It is indeed
+  no desire for fame or empty popular applause that prompts my pen; if
+  there be any external reward, we may not look for more warmth in the
+  verdict than the subject itself arouses. For, apart from yourself,
+  wherever I turn my eyes, they fall on either the apathy of the dullard
+  or the jealousy of the shrewd, and a man who casts his thoughts before
+  the common herd--I will not say to consider but to trample under foot,
+  would seem to bring discredit on the study of divinity. So I purposely
+  use brevity and wrap up the ideas I draw from the deep questionings of
+  philosophy in new and unaccustomed words which speak only to you and to
+  myself, that is, if you deign to look at them. The rest of the world I
+  simply disregard: they cannot understand, and therefore do not deserve
+  to read. We should not of course press our inquiry further than man's
+  wit and reason are allowed to climb the height of heavenly knowledge.[8]
+  In all the liberal arts we see the same limit set beyond which reason
+  may not reach. Medicine, for instance, does not always bring health to
+  the sick, though the doctor will not be to blame if he has left nothing
+  undone which he ought to do. So with the other arts. In the present case
+  the very difficulty of the quest claims a lenient judgment. You must
+  however examine whether the seeds sown in my mind by St. Augustine's
+  writings[9] have borne fruit. And now let us begin our inquiry.
+
+
+  [8] Cf. the discussion of human _ratio_ and divine _intellegentia_ in
+  _Cons. v._ pr. 4 and 5.
+
+  [9] e.g. Aug. _De Trin._
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Christianae religionis reuerentiam plures usurpant, sed ea fides pollet
+maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter uniuersalium praecepta regularum,
+quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius
+cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanauit, catholica uel uniuersalis
+uocatur. Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate sententia est: "Pater," inquiunt,
+"deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus." Igitur pater filius spiritus
+sanctus unus non tres dii. Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. Eos
+enim differentia comitatur qui uel augent uel minuunt, ut Arriani qui
+gradibus meritorum trinitatem uariantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem
+diducunt. Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; praeter alteritatem
+enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest. Trium namque rerum uel
+quotlibet tum genere tum specie tum numero diuersitas constat; quotiens
+enim idem dicitur, totiens diuersum etiam praedicatur. Idem uero dicitur
+tribus modis: aut genere ut idem homo quod equus, quia his idem genus ut
+animal; uel specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo;
+uel numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diuersum etiam
+uel genere uel specie uel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam
+accidentium uarietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque specie sed
+suis accidentibus distant; nam uel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia
+separemus, tamen locus cunctis diuersus est quem unum fingere nullo modo
+possumus; duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens.
+Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  There are many who claim as theirs the dignity of the Christian
+  religion; but that form of faith is valid and only valid which, both on
+  account of the universal character of the rules and doctrines affirming
+  its authority, and because the worship in which they are expressed has
+  spread throughout the world, is called catholic or universal. The belief
+  of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as follows: the
+  Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore Father,
+  Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three Gods. The principle of this
+  union is absence of difference[10]: difference cannot be avoided by
+  those who add to or take from the Unity, as for instance the Arians,
+  who, by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break it up and
+  convert it to Plurality. For the essence of plurality is otherness;
+  apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. In fact, the
+  difference between three or more things lies in genus or species or
+  number. Difference is the necessary correlative of sameness. Sameness is
+  predicated in three ways: By genus; e.g. a man and a horse, because of
+  their common genus, animal. By species; e.g. Cato and Cicero, because of
+  their common species, man. By number; e.g. Tully and Cicero, because
+  they are numerically one. Similarly difference is expressed by genus,
+  species, and number. Now numerical difference is caused by variety of
+  accidents; three men differ neither by genus nor species but by their
+  accidents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents,[11]
+  still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be
+  regarded as the same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same
+  place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural
+  by their accidents that they are plural in number.
+
+
+  [10] The terms _differentia, numerus, species,_ are used expertly, as
+  would be expected of the author of the _In Isag. Porph. Commenta._ See
+  S. Brandt's edition of that work (in the Vienna _Corpus_, 1906), s.v.
+  _differentia,_ etc.
+
+  [11] This method of mental abstraction is employed more elaborately in
+  _Tr._ iii. (_vide infra_, p. 44) and in _Cons._ v. pr. 4, where the
+  notion of divine foreknowledge is abstracted in imagination.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut intellegi atque capi potest
+dispiciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum uidetur, eruditi est hominis unum
+quodque ut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare.
+
+Nam cum tres sint speculatiuae partes, _naturalis_, in motu
+inabstracta [Greek: anupexairetos] (considerat enim corporum formas cum
+materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu
+sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma
+materiae coniuncta), _mathematica_, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim
+formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae
+cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), _theologica_, sine
+motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu
+caret), in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis
+disciplinaliter, in diuinis intellectualiter uersari oportebit neque diduci
+ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae uere forma neque
+imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex
+forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia, sed secundum
+formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non
+secundum terram quod est eius materia, sed dicitur secundum aeris figuram.
+Terra quoque ipsa non secundum [Greek: apoion hulaen] dicitur, sed secundum
+siccitatem grauitatemque quae sunt formae. Nihil igitur secundum materiam
+esse dicitur sed secundum propriam formam. Sed diuina substantia sine
+materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt
+id quod sunt. Vnum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id
+est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae,
+sed non hoc uel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima
+corporeque, corpus et anima est, non uel corpus uel anima in partem; igitur
+non est id quod est. Quod uero non est ex hoc atque hoc, sed tantum est
+hoc, illud uere est id quod est; et est pulcherrimum fortissimumque quia
+nullo nititur. Quocirca hoc uere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo
+aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subiectum fieri potest; forma
+enim est, formae uero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod ceterae formae
+subiectae accidentibus sunt ut humanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo
+quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est; dum enim materia
+subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere uidetur
+humanitas. Forma uero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subiectum nec
+uero inesse materiae, neque enim esset forma sed imago. Ex his enim formis
+quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae uenerunt quae sunt in materia et
+corpus efficiunt. Nam ceteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur formas
+uocantes, dum imagines sint. Adsimulantur enim formis his quae non sunt in
+materia constitutae. Nulla igitur in eo diuersitas, nulla ex diuersitate
+pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo atque idcirco nec numerus.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  We will now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far
+  as they can be grasped and understood; for it has been wisely said,[12]
+  in my opinion, that it is a scholar's duty to formulate his belief about
+  anything according to its real nature.
+
+  Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds[13]: Physics,
+  Mathematics, and Theology. Physics deals with motion and is not abstract
+  or separable (i.e. [Greek: anupexairetos]); for it is concerned with the
+  forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms
+  cannot be separated in reality from their bodies.[14] As the bodies are
+  in motion--the earth, for instance, tending downwards, and fire tending
+  upwards, form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it
+  is annexed.
+
+  Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it
+  investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from
+  movement, which forms, however, being connected with matter cannot be
+  really separated from bodies.
+
+  Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable, for
+  the Divine Substance is without either matter or motion. In Physics,
+  then, we are bound to use scientific, in Mathematics, systematical, in
+  Theology, intellectual concepts; and in Theology we will not let
+  ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations, but will simply
+  apprehend that Form which is pure form and no image, which is very Being
+  and the source of Being. For everything owes its being to Form. Thus a
+  statue is not a statue on account of the brass which is its matter, but
+  on account of the form whereby the likeness of a living thing is
+  impressed upon it: the brass itself is not brass because of the earth
+  which is its matter, but because of its form. Likewise earth is not
+  earth by reason of unqualified matter,[15] but by reason of dryness and
+  weight, which are forms. So nothing is said to be because it has matter,
+  but because it has a distinctive form. But the Divine Substance is Form
+  without matter, and is therefore One, and is its own essence. But other
+  things are not simply their own essences, for each thing has its being
+  from the things of which it is composed, that is, from its parts. It is
+  This _and_ That, i.e. it is the totality of its parts in
+  conjunction; it is not This _or_ That taken apart. Earthly man, for
+  instance, since he consists of soul and body, is soul _and_ body,
+  not soul _or_ body, separately; therefore he is not his own
+  essence. That on the other hand which does not consist of This and That,
+  but is only This, is really its own essence, and is altogether beautiful
+  and stable because it is not grounded in anything. Wherefore that is
+  truly One in which is no number, in which nothing is present except its
+  own essence. Nor can it become the substrate of anything, for it is pure
+  Form, and pure Forms cannot be substrates.[16] For if humanity, like
+  other forms, is a substrate for accidents, it does not receive accidents
+  through the fact that it exists, but through the fact that matter is
+  subjected to it. Humanity appears indeed to appropriate the accident
+  which in reality belongs to the matter underlying the conception
+  Humanity. But Form which is without matter cannot be a substrate, and
+  cannot have its essence in matter, else it would not be form but a
+  reflexion. For from those forms which are outside matter come the forms
+  which are in matter and produce bodies. We misname the entities that
+  reside in bodies when we call them forms; they are mere images; they
+  only resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter. In Him,
+  then, is no difference, no plurality arising out of difference, no
+  multiplicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number.
+
+
+  [12] By Cicero (_Tusc_. v. 7. 19).
+
+  [13] Cf. the similar division of philosophy in _Isag. Porph_. ed. Brandt,
+  pp. 7 ff.
+
+  [14] _Sb_. though they may be separated in thought.
+
+  [15] [Greek: Apoios hulae] = [Greek: to amorphon, to aeides] of
+  Aristotle. Cf. [Greek: oute gar hulae to eidos (hae men apoios, to de
+  poiotaes tis) oute ex hulaes] (Alexander Aphrod. _De Anima_, 17. 17);
+  [Greek: ei de touto, apoios de hae hulae, apoion an eiae soma] (id. _De
+  anima libri mantissa_, 124. 7).
+
+  [16] This is Realism. Cf. "Sed si rerum ueritatem atque integritatem
+  perpendas, non est dubium quin uerae sint. Nam cum res omnes quae uerae
+  sunt sine his quinque (i.e. genus species differentia propria
+  accidentia) esse non possint, has ipsas quinque res uere intellectas
+  esse non dubites." _Isag., Porph. ed, pr._ i. (M. _P.L._ lxiv. col. 19,
+  Brandt, pp. 26 ff.). The two passages show that Boethius is definitely
+  committed to the Realistic position, although in his _Comment. in
+  Porphyr. a se translatum_ he holds the scales between Plato and
+  Aristotle, "quorum diiudicare sententias aptum esse non duxi" (cp.
+  Hauréau, _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique_, i. 120). As a fact in
+  the _Comment. in Porph._ he merely postpones the question, which in the
+  _De Trin._ he settles. Boethius was ridiculed in the Middle Ages for his
+  caution.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Deus uero a deo nullo differt, ne uel accidentibus uel substantialibus
+differentiis in subiecto positis distent. Vbi uero nulla est differentia,
+nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum. Nam
+quod tertio repetitur deus, cum pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus
+nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsae
+sunt, si aduertamus ad res numerabiles ac non ad ipsum numerum. Illic enim
+unitatum repetitio numerum facit. In eo autem numero qui in rebus
+numerabilibus constat, repetitio unitatum atque pluralitas minime facit
+numerabilium rerum numerosam diuersitatem. Numerus enim duplex est, unus
+quidem quo numeramus, alter uero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat. Etenim
+unum res est; unitas, quo unum dicimus. Duo rursus in rebus sunt ut homines
+uel lapides; dualitas nihil, sed tantum dualitas qua duo homines uel duo
+lapides fiunt. Et in ceteris eodem modo. Ergo in numero quo numeramus
+repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum uero numero non facit
+pluralitatem unitatum repetitio, uel si de eodem dicam "gladius unus mucro
+unus ensis unus." Potest enim unus tot uocabulis gladius agnosci; haec enim
+unitatum iteratio potius est non numeratio, uelut si ita dicamus "ensis
+mucro gladius," repetitio quaedam est eiusdem non numeratio diuersorum,
+uelut si dicam "sol sol sol," non tres soles effecerim, sed de uno totiens
+praedicauerim.
+
+Non igitur si de patre ac filio et spiritu sancto tertio praedicatur deus,
+idcirco trina praedicatio numerum facit. Hoc enim illis ut dictum est
+imminet qui inter eos distantiam faciunt meritorum. Catholicis uero nihil
+in differentia constituentibus ipsamque formam ut est esse ponentibus neque
+aliud esse quam est ipsum quod est opinantibus recte repetitio de eodem
+quam enumeratio diuersi uidetur esse cum dicitur "deus pater deus filius
+deus spiritus sanctus atque haec trinitas unus deus," uelut "ensis atque
+mucro unus gladius," uelut "sol sol sol unus sol."
+
+Sed hoc interim ad eam dictum sit significationem demonstrationemque qua
+ostenditur non omnem unitatum repetitionem numerum pluralitatemque
+perficere. Non uero ita dicitur "pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus" quasi
+multiuocum quiddam; nam mucro et ensis et ipse est et idem, pater uero ac
+filius et spiritus sanctus idem equidem est, non uero ipse. In qua re
+paulisper considerandum est. Requirentibus enim: "Ipse est pater qui
+filius?" "Minime," inquiunt. Rursus: "Idem alter qui alter?" Negatur. Non
+est igitur inter eos in re omni indifferentia; quare subintrat numerus quem
+ex subiectorum diuersitate confici superius explanatum est. De qua re
+breuite*r considerabimus, si prius illud, quem ad modum de deo unum quodque
+praedicatur, praemiserimus.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Now God differs from God in no respect, for there cannot be divine
+  essences distinguished either by accidents or by substantial differences
+  belonging to a substrate. But where there is no difference, there is no
+  sort of plurality and accordingly no number; here, therefore, is unity
+  alone. For whereas we say God thrice when we name the Father, Son, and
+  Holy Spirit, these three unities do not produce a plurality of number in
+  their own essences, if we think of what we count instead of what we
+  count with. For in the case of abstract number a repetition of single
+  items does produce plurality; but in the case of concrete number the
+  repetition and plural use of single items does not by any means produce
+  numerical difference in the objects counted. There are as a fact two
+  kinds of number. There is the number with which we count (abstract) and
+  the number inherent in the things counted (concrete). "One" is a thing--
+  the thing counted. Unity is that by which oneness is denoted. Again
+  "two" belongs to the class of things as men or stones; but not so
+  duality; duality is merely that whereby two men or two stones are
+  denoted; and so on. Therefore a repetition of unities[17] produces
+  plurality when it is a question of abstract, but not when it is a
+  question of concrete things, as, for example, if I say of one and the
+  same thing, "one sword, one brand, one blade."[18]  It is easy to see
+  that each of these names denotes a sword; I am not numbering unities but
+  simply repeating one thing, and in saying "sword, brand, blade," I
+  reiterate the one thing and do not enumerate several different things
+  any more than I produce three suns instead of merely mentioning one
+  thing thrice when I say "Sun, Sun, Sun."
+
+  So then if God be predicated thrice of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
+  threefold predication does not result in plural number. The risk of
+  that, as has been said, attends only on those who distinguish Them
+  according to merit. But Catholic Christians, allowing no difference of
+  merit in God, assuming Him to be Pure Form and believing Him to be
+  nothing else than His own essence, rightly regard the statement "the
+  Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and this Trinity
+  is one God," not as an enumeration of different things but as a
+  reiteration of one and the same thing, like the statement, "blade and
+  brand are one sword" or "sun, sun, and sun are one sun."
+
+  Let this be enough for the present to establish my meaning and to show
+  that not every repetition of units produces number and plurality. Still
+  in saying "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," we are not using synonymous
+  terms. "Brand and blade" are the same and identical, but "Father, Son,
+  and Holy Spirit," though the same, are not identical. This point
+  deserves a moment's consideration. When they ask "Is the Father the same
+  as the Son?" Catholics answer "No." "Is the One the same as the Other?"
+  The answer is in the negative. There is not, therefore, complete
+  indifference between Them; and so number does come in--number which we
+  explained was the result of diversity of substrates. We will briefly
+  debate this point when we have done examining how particular predicates
+  can be applied to God.
+
+
+  [17] e.g. if I say "one, one, one," I enounce three unities.
+
+  [18] The same words are used to illustrate the same matter in the
+  _Comment. in Arist._ [Greek: peri hermaeneias], 2nd ed. (Meiser) 56. 12.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Decem omnino praedicamenta traduntur quae de rebus omnibus uniuersaliter
+praedicantur, id est substantia, qualitas, quantitas, ad aliquid, ubi,
+quando, habere, situm esse, facere, pati. Haec igitur talis sunt qualia
+subiecta permiserint; nam pars eorum in reliquarum rerum praedicatione
+substantia est, pa*rs in accidentium numero est. At haec cum quis i*n
+diuinam uerterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantu*r quae praedicari possunt.
+Ad aliquid uero omnino non potest praedicari, nam substantia in illo non
+est uere substantia sed ultra substantiam; item qualitas et cetera quae
+uenire queunt. Quorum ut amplior fiat intellectus exempla subdenda sunt.
+
+Nam cum dicimus "deus," substantiam quidem significare uidemur, sed eam
+quae sit ultra substantiam; cum uero "iustus," qualitatem quidem sed non
+accidentem, sed eam quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam. Neque enim
+aliud est quod est, aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse deo quod
+iusto. Item cum dicitur "magnus uel maximus," quantitatem quidem
+significare uidemur, sed eam quae sit ipsa substantia, talis qualem esse
+diximus ultra substantiam; idem est enim esse deo quod magno. De forma enim
+eius superius monstratum est quoniam is sit forma et unum uere nec ulla
+pluralitas. Sed haec praedicamenta talia sunt, ut in quo sint ipsum esse
+faciant quod dicitur, diuise quidem in ceteris, in deo uero coniuncte atque
+copulate hoc modo: nam cum dicimus "substantia" (ut homo uel deus), ita
+dicitur quasi illud de quo praedicatur ipsum sit substantia, ut substantia
+homo uel deus. Sed distat, quoniam homo non integre ipsum homo est ac per
+hoc nec substantia; quod enim est, aliis debet quae non sunt homo. Deus
+uero hoc ipsum deus est; nihil enim aliud est nisi quod est, ac per hoc
+ipsum deus est. Rursus "iustus," quod est qualitas, ita dicitur quasi ipse
+hoc sit de quo praedicatur, id est si dicamus "homo iustus uel deus
+iustus," ipsum hominem uel deum iustos esse proponimus; sed differt, quod
+homo alter alter iustus, deus uero idem ipsum est quod est iustum. "Magnus"
+etiam homo uel deus dicitur atque ita quasi ipse sit homo magnus uel deus
+magnus; sed homo tantum magnus, deus uero ipsum magnus exsistit. Reliqua
+uero neque de deo neque de ceteris praedicantur. Nam ubi uel de homine uel
+de deo praedicari potest, de homine ut in foro, de deo ut ubique, sed ita
+ut non quasi ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur de qua dicitur. Non enim ita
+homo dicitur esse in foro quem ad modum esse albus uel longus nec quasi
+circumfusus et determinatus proprietate aliqua qua designari secundum se
+possit, sed tantum quo sit illud aliis informatum rebus per hanc
+praedicationem ostenditur.
+
+De deo uero non ita, nam quod ubique est ita dici uidetur non quod in omni
+sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest) sed quod omnis ei locus
+adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo
+nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est sed non in loco. "Quando"
+uero eodem praedicatur modo, ut de homine heri uenit, de deo semper est.
+Hic quoque non quasi esse aliquid dicitur illud ipsum de quo hesternus
+dicitur aduentus, sed quid ei secundum tempus accesserit praedicatur. Quod
+uero de deo dicitur "semper est," unum quidem significat, quasi omni
+praeterito fuerit, omni quoquo modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit.
+Quod de caelo et de ceteris inmortalibus corporibus secundum philosophos
+dici potest, at de deo non ita. Semper enim est, quoniam "semper"
+praesentis est in eo temporis tantumque inter nostrarum rerum praesens,
+quod est nunc, interest ac diuinarum, quod nostrum "nunc" quasi currens
+tempus facit et sempiternitatem, diuinum uero "nunc" permanens neque mouens
+sese atque consistens aeternitatem facit; cui nomini si adicias "semper,"
+facies eius quod est nunc iugem indefessumque ac per hoc perpetuum cursum
+quod est sempiternitas.
+
+Rursus habere uel facere eodem modo; dicimus enim "uestitus currit" de
+homine, de deo "cuncta possidens regit." Rursus de eo nihil quod est esse
+de utrisque dictum est, sed haec omnis praedicatio exterioribus datur
+omniaque haec quodam modo referuntur ad aliud. Cuius praedicationis
+differentiam sic facilius internoscimus: qui homo est uel deus refertur ad
+substantiam qua est aliquid, id est homo uel deus; qui iustus est refertur
+ad qualitatem qua scilicet est aliquid, id est iustus, qui magnus ad
+quantitatem qua est aliquid, id est magnus. Nam in ceteris praedicationibus
+nihil tale est. Qui enim dicit esse aliquem in foro uel ubique, refert
+quidem ad praedicamentum quod est ubi, sed non quo aliquid est uelut
+iustitia iustus. Item cum dico "currit" uel "regit" uel "nunc est" uel
+"semper est," refertur quidem uel ad facere uel ad tempus--si tamen interim
+diuinum illud semper tempus dici potest--sed non quo aliquo aliquid est
+uelut magnitudine magnum. Nam situm passionemque requiri in deo non
+oportet, neque enim sunt.
+
+Iamne patet quae sit differentia praedicationum? Quod aliae quidem quasi
+rem monstrant aliae uero quasi circumstantias rei quodque illa quidem[19]
+ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa uero ut non esse, sed
+potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Illa igitur, quae aliquid
+esse designant, secundum rem praedicationes uocentur. Quae cum de rebus
+subiectis dicuntur, uocantur accidentia secundum rem; cum uero de deo qui
+subiectus non est, secundum substantiam rei praedicatio nuncupatur.
+
+
+[19] quidem _vulg._; quae _codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  There are in all ten categories which can be universally predicated of
+  things, namely, Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time,
+  Condition, Situation, Activity, Passivity. Their meaning is determined
+  by the contingent subject; for some of them denote substance in making
+  predication of other things, others belong to the class of accidents.
+  But when these categories are applied to God they change their meaning
+  entirely. Relation, for instance, cannot be predicated at all of God;
+  for substance in Him is not really substantial but supersubstantial. So
+  with quality and the other possible attributes, of which we must add
+  examples for the sake of clearness.
+
+  When we say God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance
+  that is supersubstantial. When we say of Him, "He is just," we mention a
+  quality, not an accidental quality--rather a substantial and, in fact, a
+  supersubstantial quality.[20] For God is not one thing because He is,
+  and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be God
+  are one and the same. So when we say, "He is great or the greatest," we
+  seem to predicate quantity, but it is a quantity similar to this
+  substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with Him to
+  be great and to be God are all one. Again, concerning His Form, we have
+  already shown that He is Form, and truly One without Plurality. The
+  categories we have mentioned are such that they give to the thing to
+  which they are applied the character which they express; in created
+  things they express divided being, in God, conjoined and united being--
+  in the following manner. When we name a substance, as man or God, it
+  seems as though that of which the predication is made were substance
+  itself, as man or God is substance. But there is a difference: since a
+  man is not simply and entirely man, and in virtue of this he is not
+  substance. For what man is he owes to other things which are not man.
+  But God is simply and entirely God, for He is nothing else than what He
+  is, and therefore is, through simple existence, God. Again we apply
+  just, a quality, as though it were that of which it is predicated; that
+  is, if we say "a just man or just God," we assert that man or God is
+  just. But there is a difference, for man is one thing, and a just man is
+  another thing. But God is justice itself. So a man or God is said to be
+  great, and it would appear that man is substantially great or that God
+  is substantially great. But man is merely great; God is greatness.
+
+  The remaining categories are not predicable of God nor yet of created
+  things.[21]  For place is predicated of man or of God--a man is in the
+  market-place; God is everywhere--but in neither case is the predicate
+  identical with the object of predication. To say "A man is in the
+  market" is quite a different thing from saying "he is white or long,"
+  or, so to speak, encompassed and determined by some property which
+  enables him to be described in terms of his substance; this predicate of
+  place simply declares how far his substance is given a particular
+  setting amid other things.
+
+  It is otherwise, of course, with God. "He is everywhere" does not mean
+  that He is in every place, for He cannot be in any place at all--but
+  that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, although He
+  Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot anywhere be
+  in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. It is the same with
+  the category of time, as, "A man came yesterday; God is ever." Here
+  again the predicate of "coming yesterday" denotes not something
+  substantial, but something happening in terms of time. But the
+  expression "God is ever" denotes a single Present, summing up His
+  continual presence in all the past, in all the present--however that
+  term be used--and in all the future. Philosophers say that "ever" may be
+  applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal bodies. But as
+  applied to God it has a different meaning. He is ever, because "ever" is
+  with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference
+  between "now," which is our present, and the divine present. Our present
+  connotes changing time and sempiternity; God's present, abiding,
+  unmoved, and immoveable, connotes eternity. Add _semper_ to
+  _eternity_ and you get the constant, incessant and thereby
+  perpetual course of our present time, that is to say, sempiternity.[22]
+
+  It is just the same with the categories of condition and activity. For
+  example, we say "A man runs, clothed," "God rules, possessing all
+  things." Here again nothing substantial is asserted of either subject;
+  in fact all the categories we have hitherto named arise from what lies
+  outside substance, and all of them, so to speak, refer to something
+  other than substance. The difference between the categories is easily
+  seen by an example. Thus, the terms "man" and "God" refer to the
+  substance in virtue of which the subject is--man or God. The term "just"
+  refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz.
+  just; the term "great" to the quantity in virtue of which He is
+  something, viz. great. No other category save substance, quality, and
+  quantity refer to the substance of the subject. If I say of one "he is
+  in the market" or "everywhere," I am applying the category of place,
+  which is not a category of the substance, like "just" in virtue of
+  justice. So if I say, "he runs, He rules, he is now, He is ever," I make
+  reference to activity or time--if indeed God's "ever" can be described
+  as time--but not to a category of substance, like "great" in virtue of
+  greatness.
+
+  Finally, we must not look for the categories of situation and passivity
+  in God, for they simply are not to be found in Him.
+
+  Have I now made clear the difference between the categories? Some denote
+  the reality of a thing; others its accidental circumstances; the former
+  declare that a thing is something; the latter say nothing about its
+  being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak, something
+  external. Those categories which describe a thing in terms of its
+  substance may be called substantial categories; when they apply to
+  things as subjects they are called accidents. In reference to God, who
+  is not a subject at all, it is only possible to employ the category of
+  substance.
+
+
+  [20] Gilbert de la Porrée in his commentary on the _De Trin._ makes
+  Boethius's meaning clear. "Quod igitur in illo substantiam nominamus,
+  non est subiectionis ratione quod dicitur, sed ultra omnem quae
+  accidentibus est subiecta substantiam est essentia, absque omnibus quae
+  possunt accidere solitaria omnino." (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 1283). Cf. Aug.
+  _De Trin._ vii. 10.
+
+  [21] i.e. according to their substance.
+
+  [22] The doctrine is Augustine's, cf. _De Ciu. Dei_, xi. 6, xii. 16; but
+  Boethius's use of _sempiternitas_, as well as his word-building, seem to
+  be peculiar to himself. Claudianus Mamertus, speaking of applying the
+  categories to God, uses _sempiternitas_ as Boethius uses _aeternitas_.
+  Cf. _De Statu Animae_ i. 19. Apuleius seems to use both terms
+  interchangeably, e.g. _Asclep._ 29-31. On Boethius's distinction between
+  time and eternity see _Cons._ v. pr. 6, and Rand, _i er dem B. zugeschr.
+  Trakt. de fide_, pp. 425 ff, and Brandt in _Theol. Littzg._, 1902, p.
+  147.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Age nunc de relatiuis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus
+ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non uidentur secundum se facere
+praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno aduentu constare perspiciuntur. Age
+enim, quoniam dominus ac seruus relatiua sunt, uideamus utrumne ita sit ut
+secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas seruum, abstuleris
+et dominum; at non etiam si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque album, sed
+interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata perit nimirum album. At in
+domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non
+accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus
+coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato deperit seruo, constat non eam per se
+domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum.
+
+Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relatiuam quidquam rei de qua dicitur
+secundum se uel addere uel minuere uel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod est
+esse consistit, sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere,
+nec semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei
+igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod
+ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister
+accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter uelut albus ac
+longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me
+est minime uero ex sese.
+
+Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non
+faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare uel mutare queunt nullamque omnino
+uariare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque
+aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio uero non
+praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua
+dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest,
+quo quidem modo id quod uix intellegi potuit interpretatum est, personarum.
+Omnino enim magna regulae est ueritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias
+effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut
+pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis
+quidem ei est productio filii, relatiua uero praedicatio patris. Ac si
+meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus
+processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritum
+sanctum; hos, quoniam incorporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam uero
+pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus uero nullas habet
+differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae
+uero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas.
+Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et in rebus numerabilibus
+repetitio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem.  Trium igitur
+idonee constituta est unitas.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing
+  remarks have been preliminary; for qualities which obviously arise from
+  the association of another term do not appear to predicate anything
+  concerning the substance of a subject. For instance, master and
+  slave[23] are relative terms; let us see whether either of them are
+  predicates of substance. If you suppress the term slave,[24] you
+  simultaneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you
+  suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,[25]
+  though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in
+  the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental
+  quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term
+  slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental
+  quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the
+  power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when
+  the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the
+  substance of master, but is an adventitious augmentation arising from
+  the possession of slaves.
+
+  It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases,
+  decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it
+  is applied. The category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the
+  essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and
+  that not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject
+  itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and
+  stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is
+  left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again,
+  if I come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not
+  because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because
+  he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me,
+  and not in the least on the essence of his being.
+
+  Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of
+  a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way.
+  Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have
+  said, have no other difference but that of relation, and if relation is
+  not asserted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its
+  substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject,
+  but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly
+  understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth
+  that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences
+  and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that God became Father
+  by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to
+  be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very substance;
+  however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in
+  mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous
+  discussion, we shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the
+  Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be
+  spatially different, since They are incorporeal. But since the Father is
+  God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and since there are in
+  God no points of difference distinguishing Him from God, He differs from
+  none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no
+  plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God
+  can be begotten of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the
+  repetition of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the
+  Three is suitably established.
+
+
+  [23] _Dominus_ and _seruus_ are similarly used as illustration, _In
+  Cat._ (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 217).
+
+  [24] i.e. which is external to the master.
+
+  [25] i.e. which is external to the whitened thing.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea
+secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est
+trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, seruata uero
+unitas in eo quod est indifferentia uel substantiae uel operationis uel
+omnino eius quae secundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur substantia
+continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem; atque ideo sola
+singillatim proferuntur atque separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem
+pater qui filius non est nec idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tamen
+deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem
+magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. Sane sciendum est
+non semper talem esse relatiuam praedicationem, ut semper ad differens
+praedicetur, ut est seruus ad dominum; differunt enim. Nam omne aequale
+aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem
+idem est; et similis est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque
+ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem. Quod si id
+in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inueniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus
+alteritas. Nos uero nulla imaginatione diduci sed simplici intellectu erigi
+et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.
+
+Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc uestri normam iudicii
+exspectat subtilitas quaestionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime,
+uestrae statuet pronuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei
+fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitulante gratia diuina idonea argumentorum
+adiumenta praestitimus, illuc perfecti operis laetitia remeabit unde uenit
+effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas nequiuit ascendere, quantum
+inbecillitas subtrahit uota supplebunt.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  But since no relation can be affirmed of one subject alone, since a
+  predication referring to one substance is a predication without
+  relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is secured through the
+  category of relation, and the Unity is maintained through the fact that
+  there is no difference of substance, or operation, or generally of any
+  substantial predicate. So then, the category of substance preserves the
+  Unity, that of relation brings about the Trinity. Hence only terms
+  belonging to relation may be applied singly to Each. For the Father is
+  not the same as the Son, nor is either of Them the same as the Holy
+  Spirit. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each the same God, the same
+  in justice, in goodness, in greatness, and in everything that can be
+  predicated of substance. One must not forget that predicates of
+  relativity do not always involve relation to something other than the
+  subject, as slave involves master, where the two terms are different.
+  For equals are equal, like are like, identicals are identical, each with
+  other, and the relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is
+  a relation of identicals. A relation of this kind is not to be found in
+  created things, but that is because of the difference which we know
+  attaches to transient objects. We must not in speaking of God let
+  imagination lead us astray; we must let the Faculty of pure Knowledge
+  lift us up and teach us to know all things as far as they may be
+  known.[26]
+
+  I have now finished the investigation which I proposed. The exactness of
+  my reasoning awaits the standard of your judgment; your authority will
+  pronounce whether I have seen a straight path to the goal. If, God
+  helping me, I have furnished some support in argument to an article
+  which stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith, I shall render
+  joyous praise for the finished work to Him from whom the invitation
+  comes. But if human nature has failed to reach beyond its limits,
+  whatever is lost through my infirmity must be made good by my intention.
+
+
+  [26] Cf. _Cons._ v. pr. 4 and 5, especially in pr. 5 the passage "quare
+  in illius summae intellegentiae acumen si possumus erigamur."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+AD IOHANNEM DIACONVM
+
+VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS ET SPIRITVS
+SANCTVS DE DIVINITATE SVBSTANTIALITER
+PRAEDICENTVR
+
+Quaero an pater et filius ac spiritus sanctus de diuinitate substantialiter
+praedicentur an alio quolibet modo; uiamque indaginis hinc arbitror esse
+sumendam, unde rerum omnium manifestum constat exordium, id est ab ipsis
+catholicae fidei fundamentis. Si igitur interrogem, an qui dicitur pater
+substantia sit, respondetur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius
+substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo
+dubitauerit. Sed cum rursus colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non
+plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Vna igitur substantia trium nec
+separari ullo modo aut disiungi potest nec uelut partibus in unum coniuncta
+est, sed est una simpliciter. Quaecumque igitur de diuina substantia
+praedicantur, ea tribus oportet esse communia; idque signi erit quae sint
+quae de diuinitatis substantia praedicentur, quod quaecumque hoc modo
+dicuntur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singulariter praedicabuntur.
+Hoc modo si dicimus: "Pater deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus
+deus est," pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una
+deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de diuinitate substantialiter
+praedicari.
+
+Ita pater ueritas est, filius ueritas est, spiritus sanctus ueritas est;
+pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres ueritates sed una ueritas est. Si
+igitur una in his substantia una est ueritas, necesse est ueritatem
+substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incommutabilitate de iustitia de
+omnipotentia ac de ceteris omnibus quae tam de singulis quam de omnibus
+singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substantialiter dici. Vnde apparet
+ea quae cum in singulis separatim dici conuenit nec tamen in omnibus dici
+queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; qui uero iste sit,
+posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc uocabulum non transmittit ad
+filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantiale nomen hoc
+inditum; nam si substantiale esset, ut deus ut ueritas ut iustitia ut ipsa
+quoque substantia, de ceteris diceretur.
+
+Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque cum aliis iungit sicut in deo,
+sicut in ueritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non
+est idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus patrem ac filium
+ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa diuinitate substantialiter dici sed alio
+quodam modo; si enim substantialiter praedicaretur, et de singulis et de
+omnibus singulariter diceretur. Haec uero ad aliquid dici manifestum est;
+nam et pater alicuius pater est et filius alicuius filius est, spiritus
+alicuius spiritus. Quo fit, ut ne trinitas quidem substantialiter de deo
+praedicetur; non enim pater trinitas (qui enim pater est, filius ac
+spiritus sanctus non est) nec trinitas filius nec trinitas spiritus sanctus
+secundum eundem modum, sed trinitas quidem in personarum pluralitate
+consistit, unitas uero in substantiae simplicitate.
+
+Quod si personae diuisae sunt, substantia uero indiuisa sit, necesse est
+quod uocabulum ex personis originem capit id ad substantiam non pertinere;
+at trinitatem personarum diuersitas fecit, trinitas igitur non pertinet ad
+substantiam. Quo fit ut neque pater neque filius neque spiritus sanctus
+neque trinitas de deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed ut dictum est ad
+aliquid. Deus uero ueritas iustitia bonitas omnipotentia substantia
+inmutabilitas uirtus sapientia et quicquid huiusmodi excogitari potest
+substantialiter de diuinitate dicuntur. Haec si se recte et ex fide habent,
+ut me instruas peto; aut si aliqua re forte diuersus es, diligentius
+intuere quae dicta sunt et fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS
+
+  MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO JOHN THE DEACON
+
+  WHETHER FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT MAY BE SUBSTANTIALLY PREDICATED OF
+  THE DIVINITY
+
+  The question before us is whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be
+  predicated of the Divinity substantially or otherwise. And I think that
+  the method of our inquiry must be borrowed from what is admittedly the
+  surest source of all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the
+  catholic faith. If, then, I ask whether He who is called Father is a
+  substance, the answer will be yes. If I ask whether the Son is a
+  substance, the reply will be the same. So, too, no one will hesitate to
+  affirm that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other
+  hand, I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
+  result is not three substances but one substance. The one substance of
+  the Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made up of
+  various parts, combined into one: it is simply one. Everything,
+  therefore, that is affirmed of the divine substance must be common to
+  the Three, and we can recognize what predicates may be affirmed of the
+  substance of the godhead by this sign, that all those which are affirmed
+  of it may also be affirmed severally of each of the Three combined into
+  one. For instance if we say "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the
+  Holy Spirit is God," then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If
+  then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right
+  be predicated substantially of the Divinity.
+
+  Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is
+  truth; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth.
+  If, then, they are one substance and one truth, truth must of necessity
+  be a substantial predicate. So Goodness, Immutability, Justice,
+  Omnipotence and all the other predicates which we apply to the Persons
+  singly and collectively are plainly substantial predicates. Hence it
+  appears that what may be predicated of each single One but not of all
+  Three is not a substantial predicate, but of another kind--of what kind
+  I will examine presently. For He who is Father does not transmit this
+  name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name
+  is not attached to Him as something substantial; for if it were a
+  substantial predicate, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it
+  would be affirmed of the other Persons.
+
+  Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does He associate it
+  with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the
+  other predicates which I have already mentioned. The Spirit too is not
+  the same as the Father and the Son. Hence we gather that Father, Son,
+  and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the Divinity in a substantial
+  manner, but otherwise.[27] For if each term were predicated
+  substantially it would be affirmed of the three Persons both separately
+  and collectively. It is evident that these terms are relative, for the
+  Father is some one's Father, the Son is some one's Son, the Spirit is
+  some one's Spirit. Hence not even Trinity may be substantially[28]
+  predicated of God; for the Father is not Trinity--since He who is Father
+  is not Son and Holy Spirit--nor yet, by parity of reasoning, is the Son
+  Trinity nor the Holy Spirit Trinity, but the Trinity consists in
+  diversity of Persons, the Unity in simplicity of substance.
+
+  Now if the Persons are separate, while the Substance is undivided, it
+  must needs be that that term which is derived from Persons does not
+  belong to Substance. But the Trinity is effected by diversity of
+  Persons, wherefore Trinity does not belong to Substance. Hence neither
+  Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity can be substantially
+  predicated of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, Truth,
+  Justice, Goodness, Omnipotence, Substance, Immutability, Virtue, Wisdom
+  and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are applicable
+  substantially to divinity.
+
+  If I am right and speak in accordance with the Faith, I pray you confirm
+  me. But if you are in any point of another opinion, examine carefully
+  what I have said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason.[29]
+
+
+  [27] i.e. _personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
+
+  [28] i.e. _sed personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
+
+  [29] _Vide supra_, Introduction, p. xii.
+
+
+
+
+ITEM EIVSDEM
+AD EVNDEM
+
+QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE IN EO QVOD
+SINT BONAE SINT CVM NON SINT
+SVBSTANTIALIA BONA
+
+Postulas, ut ex Hebdomadibus nostris eius quaestionis obscuritatem quae
+continet modum quo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, cum non sint
+substantialia bona, digeram et paulo euidentius monstrem; idque eo dicis
+esse faciendum, quod non sit omnibus notum iter huiusmodi scriptionum. Tuus
+uero testis ipse sum quam haec uiuaciter fueris ante complexus. Hebdomadas
+uero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conseruo
+quam cuiquam participo quorum lasciuia ac petulantia nihil a ioco risuque
+patitur esse seiunctum.[30] Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus breuitatis
+aduersus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia tum id habent commodi, quod
+cum his solis qui digni sunt conloquuntur. Vt igitur in mathematica fieri
+solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus
+cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam.
+
+I. Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam.
+Harum duplex modus est. Nam una ita communis est, ut omnium sit hominum,
+ueluti si hanc proponas: "Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae
+relinquantur aequalia esse," nullus id intellegens neget. Alia uero est
+doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus uenit,
+ut est: "Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse," et cetera; quae non
+uulgus sed docti comprobant.
+
+II. Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at uero
+quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.
+
+III. Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo
+participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid,
+cum esse susceperit.
+
+IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum
+uero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
+
+V. Diuersum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic
+enim accidens hic substantia significatur.
+
+VI. Omne quod est[31] participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio uero
+participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est
+esse ut sit; est uero ut participet alio quolibet.
+
+VII. Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet.
+
+VIII. Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.
+
+IX. Omnis diuersitas discors, similitudo uero appetenda est; et quod
+appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc
+ipsum quod appetit.
+
+Sufficiunt igitur quae praemisimus; a prudente uero rationis interprete
+suis unumquodque aptabitur argumentis.
+
+Quaestio uero huiusmodi est. Ea quae sunt bona sunt; tenet enim communis
+sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne autem tendit ad
+simile. Quae igitur ad bonum tendunt bona ipsa sunt. Sed quemadmodum bona
+sint, inquirendum est, utrumne participatione an substantia? Si
+participatione, per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione
+album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est album non est. Et de ceteris
+qualitatibus eodem modo. Si igitur participatione sunt bona, ipsa per se
+nullo modo bona sunt: non igitur ad bonum tendunt. Sed concessum est. Non
+igitur participatione sunt bona sed substantia. Quorum uero substantia bona
+est, id quod sunt bona sunt; id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse.
+Esse igitur ipsorum bonum est; omnium igitur rerum ipsum esse bonum est.
+Sed si esse bonum est, ea quae sunt in eo quod sunt bona sunt idemque illis
+est esse quod boni esse; substantialia igitur bona sunt, quoniam non
+participant bonitatem. Quod si ipsum esse in eis bonum est, non est dubium
+quin substantialia cum sint bona, primo sint bono similia ac per hoc hoc
+ipsum bonum erunt; nihil enim illi praeter se ipsum simile est. Ex quo fit
+ut omnia quae sunt deus sint, quod dictu nefas est. Non sunt igitur
+substantialia bona ac per hoc non in his est esse bonum; non sunt igitur in
+eo quod sunt bona. Sed nec participant bonitatem; nullo enim modo ad bonum
+tenderent. Nullo modo igitur sunt bona.
+
+Huic quaestioni talis poterit adhiberi solutio. Multa sunt quae cum
+separari actu non possunt, animo tamen et cogitatione separantur; ut cum
+triangulum uel cetera a subiecta materia nullus actu separat, mente tamen
+segregans ipsum triangulum proprietatemque eius praeter materiam
+speculatur. Amoueamus igitur primi boni praesentiam paulisper ex animo,
+quod esse quidem constat idque ex omnium doctorum indoctorumque sententia
+barbararumque gentium religionibus cognosci potest. Hoc igitur paulisper
+amoto ponamus omnia esse quae sunt bona atque ea consideremus quemadmodum
+bona esse possent, si a primo bono minime defluxissent. Hinc intueor aliud
+in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod sunt. Ponatur enim una eademque
+substantia bona esse alba, grauis, rotunda. Tunc aliud esset ipsa illa
+substantia, aliud eius rotunditas, aliud color, aliud bonitas; nam si haec
+singula idem essent quod ipsa substantia, idem esset grauitas quod color,
+quod bonum et bonum quod grauitas--quod fieri natura non sinit. Aliud
+igitur tunc in eis esset esse, aliud aliquid esse, ac tunc bona quidem
+essent, esse tamen ipsum minime haberent bonum. Igitur si ullo modo essent,
+non a bono ac bona essent ac non idem essent quod bona, sed eis aliud esset
+esse aliud bonis esse. Quod si nihil omnino aliud essent nisi bona neque
+grauia neque colorata neque spatii dimensione distenta nec ulla in eis
+qualitas esset, nisi tantum bona essent, tunc non res sed rerum uideretur
+esse principium nec potius uiderentur, sed uideretur; unum enim solumque
+est huiusmodi, quod tantum bonum aliudque nihil sit. Quae quoniam non sunt
+simplicia, nec esse omnino poterant, nisi ea id quod solum bonum est esse
+uoluisset. Idcirco quoniam esse eorum a boni uoluntate defluxit, bona esse
+dicuntur. Primum enim bonum, quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est;
+secundum uero bonum, quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum
+quoque bonum est. Sed ipsum esse omnium rerum ex eo fluxit quod est primum
+bonum et quod bonum tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum.
+Ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum est; tunc enim in eo.
+
+Qua in re soluta quaestio est. Idcirco enim licet in eo quod sint bona
+sint, non sunt tamen similia primo bono, quoniam non quoquo modo sint res
+ipsum esse earum bonum est, sed quoniam non potest esse ipsum esse rerum,
+nisi a primo esse defluxerit, id est bono; idcirco ipsum esse bonum est nec
+est simile ei a quo est. Illud enim quoquo modo sit bonum est in eo quod
+est; non enim aliud est praeterquam bonum. Hoc autem nisi ab illo esset,
+bonum fortasse esse posset, sed bonum in eo quod est esse non posset. Tunc
+enim participaret forsitan bono; ipsum uero esse quod non haberent a bono,
+bonum habere non possent. Igitur sublato ab his bono primo mente et
+cogitatione, ista licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod essent bona esse non
+possent, et quoniam actu non potuere exsistere, nisi illud ea quod uere
+bonum est produxisset, idcirco et esse eorum bonum est et non est simile
+substantiali bono id quod ab eo fluxit; et nisi ab eo fluxissent, licet
+essent bona, tamen in eo quod sunt bona esse non possent, quoniam et
+praeter bonum et non ex bono essent, cum illud ipsum bonum primum est et
+ipsum esse sit et ipsum bonum et ipsum esse bonum. At non etiam alba in eo
+quod sunt alba esse oportebit ea quae alba sunt, quoniam ex uoluntate dei
+fluxerunt ut essent, alba minime. Aliud est enim esse, aliud albis esse;
+hoc ideo, quoniam qui ea ut essent effecit bonus quidem est, minime uero
+albus. Voluntatem igitur boni comitatum est ut essent bona in eo quod sunt;
+uoluntatem uero non albi non est comitata talis eius quod est proprietas ut
+esset album in eo quod est; neque enim ex albi uoluntate defluxerunt.
+Itaque quia uoluit esse ea alba qui erat non albus, sunt alba tantum; quia
+uero uoluit ea esse bona qui erat bonus, sunt bona in eo quod sunt.
+Secundum hanc igitur rationem cuncta oportet esse iusta, quoniam ipse
+iustus est qui ea esse uoluit? Ne hoc quidem. Nam bonum esse essentiam,
+iustum uero esse actum respicit. Idem autem est in eo esse quod agere; idem
+igitur bonum esse quod iustum. Nobis uero non est idem esse quod agere; non
+enim simplices sumus. Non est igitur nobis idem bonis esse quod iustis, sed
+idem nobis est esse omnibus in eo quod sumus. Bona igitur omnia sunt, non
+etiam iusta. Amplius bonum quidem generale est, iustum uero speciale nec
+species descendit in omnia. Idcirco alia quidem iusta alia aliud omnia
+bona.
+
+
+[30] seiunct. _Rand_; coniunct. _codd. opt._; disiunct. _vulg. Vallinus_.
+
+[31] est _codd. inferiores; om. codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME
+
+  HOW SUBSTANCES CAN BE GOOD IN VIRTUE OF THEIR EXISTENCE WITHOUT BEING
+  ABSOLUTE GOODS
+
+  You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure
+  question in my _Hebdomads_[32] concerning the manner in which
+  substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute
+  goods.[33] You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the
+  method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness
+  with what eagerness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess
+  I like to expound my _Hebdomads_ to myself, and would rather bury
+  my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert
+  and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is
+  made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that
+  waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret
+  doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks a language
+  understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore
+  followed the example of the mathematical[34] and cognate sciences and
+  laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that
+  follows.
+
+  I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it
+  is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible;
+  as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the remainders are
+  equal." Nobody who grasps that proposition will deny it. The other kind
+  is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same
+  class of common conceptions; as "Incorporeals cannot occupy space," and
+  the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.
+
+  II. Being and a concrete thing[35] are different. Simple Being awaits
+  manifestation, but a thing is and exists[36] as soon as it has received
+  the form which gives it Being.
+
+  III. A concrete thing can participate in something else; but absolute
+  Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is
+  effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has
+  acquired Being.
+
+  IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute
+  Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.
+
+  V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different;
+  the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.
+
+  VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being[37] through the
+  fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in
+  something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being
+  through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate
+  in something else.
+
+  VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its
+  particular Being.
+
+  VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one
+  and the same.
+
+  IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something
+  outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it
+  seeks.
+
+  These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent
+  interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to
+  each point.
+
+  Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned
+  are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends
+  to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must,
+  however, inquire how they are good--by participation or by substance. If
+  by participation, they are in no wise good in themselves; for a thing
+  which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by
+  virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are
+  good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they
+  do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are
+  good not by participation but by substance. But those things whose
+  substance is good are substantially good. But they owe their actual
+  Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good;
+  therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being
+  is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist
+  and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they
+  are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness.
+  But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since
+  they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore
+  they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself.
+  Hence all things that are, are God--an impious assertion. Wherefore
+  things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does
+  not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that
+  they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they
+  would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good.[38]
+
+  This problem admits of the following solution.[39] There are many things
+  which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be
+  separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a
+  triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but
+  mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from
+  matter. Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the
+  presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal
+  consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the
+  religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a
+  moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let
+  us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive from
+  the Prime Good. This process leads me to perceive that their Goodness
+  and their existence are two different things. For let me suppose that
+  one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, and round. Then it
+  must be admitted that its substance, roundness, colour, and goodness are
+  all different things. For if each of these qualities were the same as
+  its substance, weight would be the same thing as colour or goodness, and
+  goodness would be the same as colour; which is contrary to nature. Their
+  Being then in that case would be one thing, their quality another, and
+  they would be good, but they would not have their absolute Being good.
+  Therefore if they really existed at all, they would not be from good nor
+  good, they would not be the same as good, but Being and Goodness would
+  be for them two different things. But if they were nothing else but good
+  substances, and were neither heavy, nor coloured, and possessed neither
+  spatial dimension nor quality, beyond that of goodness, they (or rather
+  it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things. For there
+  is one thing alone that is by nature good to the exclusion of every
+  other quality. But since they are not simple, they could not even exist
+  at all unless that which is the one sole Good willed them to be. They
+  are called good simply because their Being is derived from the Will of
+  the Good. For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the
+  secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good
+  whose absolute Being is good. But the absolute Being of all things
+  derives from the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness
+  are rightly predicated as identical. Their absolute Being therefore is
+  good; for thereby it resides in Him.
+
+  Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the
+  fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple
+  reason that their absolute Being is not good under all circumstances,
+  but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the
+  Prime Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is
+  good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime
+  Good is good through the fact that it exists, irrespective of all
+  conditions, for it is nothing else than good; but the second good if it
+  derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good
+  through the fact that it exists. For in that case it might possibly
+  participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the
+  Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have
+  put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good,
+  would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could
+  not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore
+  their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial
+  Good is not like its source which produces it. And unless they had
+  derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good
+  through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and
+  not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is
+  substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we
+  need not say that white things are white through the fact that they
+  exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their
+  whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that
+  because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore
+  in accordance with the will of the Good that they should be good through
+  the fact that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of
+  one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it
+  white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is
+  white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who
+  was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the
+  fact that they exist because One who was good willed them to be good.
+  Ought, then, by parity of reason, all things to be just because He is
+  just who willed them to be? That is not so either. For to be good
+  involves Being, to be just involves an act. For Him being and action are
+  identical; to be good and to be just are one and the same for Him. But
+  being and action are not identical for us, for we are not simple. For
+  us, then, goodness is not the same thing as justice, but we all have the
+  same sort of Being in virtue of our existence. Therefore all things are
+  good, but all things are not just. Finally, good is a general, but just
+  is a species, and this species does not apply to all. Wherefore some
+  things are just, others are something else, but all things are good.
+
+
+  [32] Similarly Porphyry divided the works of Plotinus into six
+  _Enneades_ or groups of nine.
+
+  [33] Cf. discussion on the nature of good in _Cons._ iii. m. 10 and pr.
+  11 (_infra_, pp. 274 ff.).
+
+  [34] On this mathematical method of exposition cf. _Cons._ iii. pr. 10
+  (_infra_, p. 270).
+
+  [35] _Esse_ = Aristotle's [Greek: to ti esti]; _id quod est_ = [Greek:
+  tode ti].
+
+  [36] _Consistere_ = [Greek: hypostaenai].
+
+  [37] _Id quod est esse_ = [Greek: to ti aen einai].
+
+  [38] Cf. the similar _reductio ad absurdum_ in _Tr._ 5 (_infra_, p. 98)
+  and in _Cons._ v. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).
+
+  [39] _Vide supra_, p. 6, n. _b_.
+
+
+
+
+DE FIDE CATHOLICA
+
+Christianam fidem noui ac ueteris testamenti pandit auctoritas; et quamuis
+nomen ipsum Christi uetus intra semet continuerit instrumentum eumque
+semper signauerit affuturum quem credimus per partum uirginis iam uenisse,
+tamen in orbem terrarum ab ipsius nostri saluatoris mirabili manasse
+probatur aduentu.
+
+Haec autem religio nostra, quae uocatur christiana atque catholica, his
+fundamentis principaliter nititur asserens: ex aeterno, id est ante mundi
+constitutionem, ante omne uidelicet quod temporis potest retinere
+uocabulum, diuinam patris et filii ac spiritus sancti exstitisse
+substantiam, ita ut deum dicat patrem, deum filium, deum spiritum sanctum,
+nec tamen tres deos sed unum: patrem itaque habere filium ex sua substantia
+genitum et sibi nota ratione coaeternum, quem filium eatenus confitetur, ut
+non sit idem qui pater est: neque patrem aliquando fuisse filium, ne rursus
+in infinitum humanus animus diuinam progeniem cogitaret, neque filium in
+eadem natura qua patri coaeternus est aliquando fieri patrem, ne rursus in
+infinitum diuina progenies tenderetur: sanctum uero spiritum neque patrem
+esse neque filium atque ideo in illa natura nec genitum nec generantem sed
+a patre quoque procedentem uel filio; qui sit tamen processionis istius
+modus ita non possumus euidenter dicere, quemadmodum generationem filii ex
+paterna substantia non potest humanus animus aestimare. Haec autem ut
+credantur uetus ac noua informat instructio. De qua uelut arce religionis
+nostrae multi diuersa et humaniter atque ut ita dicam carnaliter sentientes
+aduersa locuti sunt, ut Arrius qui licet deum dicat filium, minorem tamen
+patre multipliciter et extra patris substantiam confitetur. Sabelliani
+quoque non tres exsistentes personas sed unam ausi sunt affirmare, eundem
+dicentes patrem esse qui filius est eundemque filium qui pater est atque
+spiritum sanctum eundem esse qui pater et filius est; ac per hoc unam
+dicunt esse personam sub uocabulorum diuersitate signatam.
+
+Manichaei quoque qui duo principia sibi coaeterna et aduersa profitentur,
+unigenitum dei esse non credunt. Indignum enim iudicant, si deus habere
+filium uideatur, nihil aliud cogitantes nisi carnaliter, ut quia haec
+generatio duorum corporum commixtione procedit, illic quoque indignum esse
+intellectum huiusmodi applicare; quae res eos nec uetus facit recipere
+testamentum neque in integro nouum. Nam sicut illud omnino error eorum non
+recipit ita ex uirgine generationem filii non uult admittere, ne humano
+corpore polluta uideatur dei fuisse natura. Sed de his hactenus; suo enim
+loco ponentur sicut ordo necessarius postularit.
+
+Ergo diuina ex aeterno natura et in aeternum sine aliqua mutabilitate
+perdurans sibi tantum conscia uoluntate sponte mundum uoluit fabricare
+eumque cum omnino non esset fecit ut esset, nec ex sua substantia protulit,
+ne diuinus natura crederetur, neque aliunde molitus est, ne iam exstitisse
+aliquid quod eius uoluntatem exsistentia propriae naturae iuuaret atque
+esset quod neque ab ipso factum esset et tamen esset; sed uerbo produxit
+caelos, terram creauit, ita ut caelesti habitatione dignas caelo naturas
+efficeret ac terrae terrena componeret. De caelestibus autem naturis, quae
+uniuersaliter uocatur angelica, quamuis illic distinctis ordinibus pulchra
+sint omnia, pars tamen quaedam plus appetens quam ei natura atque ipsius
+auctor naturae tribuerat de caelesti sede proiecta est; et quoniam
+angelorum numerum, id est supernae illius ciuitatis cuius ciues angeli
+sunt, imminutum noluit conditor permanere, formauit ex terra hominem atque
+spiritu uitae animauit, ratione composuit, arbitrii libertate decorauit
+eumque praefixa lege paradisi deliciis constituit, ut, si sine peccato
+manere uellet, tam ipsum quam eius progeniem angelicis coetibus sociaret,
+ut quia superior natura per superbiae malum ima petierat, inferior
+substantia per humilitatis bonum ad superna conscenderet. Sed ille auctor
+inuidiae non ferens hominem illuc ascendere ubi ipse non meruit permanere,
+temptatione adhibita fecit etiam ipsum eiusque comparem, quam de eius
+latere generandi causa formator produxerat, inoboedientiae suppliciis
+subiacere, ei quoque diuinitatem affuturam promittens, quam sibi dum
+arroganter usurpat elisus est. Haec autem reuelante deo Moysi famulo suo
+comperta sunt, cui etiam humani generis conditionem atque originem uoluit
+innotescere, sicut ab eo libri prolati testantur. Omnis enim diuina
+auctoritas his modis constare uidetur, ut aut historialis modus sit, qui
+nihil aliud nisi res gestas enuntiet, aut allegoricus, ut non illic possit
+historiae ordo consistere, aut certe ex utrisque compositus, ut et secundum
+historiam et secundum allegoriam manere uideatur. Haec autem pie
+intelligentibus et ueraci corde tenentibus satis abundeque relucent. Sed ad
+ordinem redeamus.
+
+Primus itaque homo ante peccatum cum sua coniuge incola paradisi fuit. At
+ubi aurem praebuit suasori et conditoris praeceptum neglexit attendere,
+exul effectus, terram iussus excolere atque a paradisi sinu seclusus in
+ignotis partibus sui generis posteritatem transposuit atque poenam quam
+ipse primus homo praeuaricationis reus exceperat generando transmisit in
+posteros. Hinc factum est ut et corporum atque animarum corruptio et mortis
+proueniret interitus primusque mortem in Abel filio suo meruit experiri, ut
+quanta esset poena quam ipse exceperit probaret in subole. Quod si ipse
+primus moreretur, nesciret quodam modo ac, si dici fas est, nec sentiret
+poenam suam, sed ideo expertus in altero est, ut quid sibi iure deberetur
+contemptor agnosceret et dum poenam mortis sustinet, ipsa exspectatione
+fortius torqueretur. Hoc autem praeuaricationis malum, quod in posteros
+naturaliter primus homo transfuderat, quidam Pelagius non admittens proprii
+nominis haeresim dedicauit, quam catholica fides a consortio sui mox
+reppulisse probatur. Ab ipso itaque primo homine procedens humanum genus ac
+multiplici numerositate succrescens erupit in lites, commouit bella,
+occupauit terrenam miseriam quia[40] felicitatem paradisi in primo patre
+perdiderat. Nec tamen ex his defuerunt quos sibi conditor gratiae
+sequestraret eiusque placitis inseruirent; quos licet meritum naturae
+damnaret, futuri tamen sacramenti et longe postmodum proferendi faciendo
+participes perditam uoluit reparare naturam. Impletus est ergo mundus
+humano genere atque ingressus est homo uias suas qui malitia propriae
+contumaciae despexerat conditorem. Hinc uolens deus per iustum potius
+hominem reparare genus humanum quam manere proteruum, poenalem multitudinem
+effusa diluuii inundatione excepto Noe iusto homine cum suis liberis atque
+his quae secum in arcam introduxerat interire permisit. Cur autem per arcae
+lignum uoluerit iustos eripere, notum est diuinarum scripturarum mentibus
+eruditis. Et quasi prima quaedam mundi aetas diluuio ultore transacta est.
+
+Reparatur itaque humanum genus atque propriae naturae uitium, quod
+praeuaricationis primus auctor infuderat, amplecti non destitit. Creuitque
+contumacia quam dudum diluuii unda puniuerat et qui numerosam annorum
+seriem permissus fuerat uiuere, in breuitate annorum humana aetas addicta
+est. Maluitque deus non iam diluuio punire genus humanum, sed eodem
+permanente eligere uiros per quorum seriem aliqua generatio commearet, ex
+qua nobis filium proprium uestitum humano corpore mundi in fine concederet.
+Quorum primus est Abraham, qui cum esset aetate confectus eiusque uxor
+decrepita, in senectute sua repromissionis largitione habere filium
+meruerunt. Hic uocatus est Isaac atque ipse genuit Iacob. Idem quoque
+duodecim patriarchas non reputante deo in eorum numero quos more suo natura
+produxerat. Hic ergo Iacob cum filiis ac domo sua transigendi causa
+Aegyptum uoluit habitare atque illic per annorum seriem multitudo
+concrescens coeperunt suspicioni esse[41] Aegyptiacis imperiis eosque
+Pharao magna ponderum mole premi decreuerat et grauibus oneribus
+affligebat. Tandem deus Aegyptii regis dominationem despiciens diuiso mari
+rubro, quod numquam antea natura ulla cognouerat, suum transduxit exercitum
+auctore Moyse et Aaron. Postea igitur pro eorum egressione altis Aegyptus
+plagis uastata est, cum nollet dimittere populum. Transmisso itaque ut
+dictum est mari rubro uenit per deserta eremi ad montem qui uocatur Sinai,
+ibique uniuersorum conditor deus uolens sacramenti futuri gratia populos
+erudire per Moysen data lege constituit, quemadmodum et sacrificiorum ritus
+et populorum mores instruerentur. Et cum multis annis multas quoque gentes
+per uiam debellassent, uenerunt tandem ad fluuium qui uocatur Iordanis duce
+iam Iesu Naue filio atque ad eorum transitum quemadmodum aquae maris rubri
+ita quoque Iordanis fluenta siccata sunt; peruentumque est ad eam ciuitatem
+quae nunc Hierosolyma uocatur. Atque dum ibi dei populus moraretur, post
+iudices et prophetas reges instituti leguntur, quorum post Saulem primatum
+Dauid de tribu Iuda legitur adeptus fuisse. Descendit itaque ab eo per
+singulas successiones regium stemma perductumque est usque ad Herodis
+tempora, qui primus ex gentilibus memoratis populis legitur imperasse. Sub
+quo exstitit beata uirgo Maria quae de Dauidica stirpe prouenerat, quae
+humani generis genuit conditorem. Hoc autem ideo quia multis infectus
+criminibus mundus iacebat in morte, electa est una gens in qua dei mandata
+clarescerent, ibique missi prophetae sunt et alii sancti uiri per quorum
+admonitionem ipse certe populus a tumore peruicaciae reuocaretur. Illi uero
+eosdem occidentes in suae nequitiae peruersitate manere uoluerunt.
+
+Atque iam in ultimis temporibus non prophetas neque alios sibi placitos sed
+ipsum unigenitum suum deus per uirginem nasci constituit, ut humana salus
+quae per primi hominis inoboedientiam deperierat per hominem deum rursus
+repararetur et quia exstiterat mulier quae causam mortis prima uiro
+suaserat, esset haec secunda mulier quae uitae causam humanis uisceribus
+apportaret. Nec uile uideatur quod dei filius ex uirgine natus est, quoniam
+praeter naturae modum conceptus et editus est. Virgo itaque de spiritu
+sancto incarnatum dei filium concepit, uirgo peperit, post eius editionem
+uirgo permansit; atque hominis factus est idemque dei filius, ita ut in eo
+et diuinae naturae radiaret splendor et humanae fragilitatis appareret
+assumptio. Sed huic tam sanae atque ueracissimae fidei exstiterant multi
+qui diuersa garrirent et praeter alios Nestorius et Eutyches repertores
+haereseos exstiterunt, quorum unus hominem solum, alter deum solum putauit
+asserere nec humanum corpus quod Christus induerat de humanae substantiae
+participatione uenisse. Sed haec hactenus.
+
+Creuit itaque secundum carnem Christus, baptizatus est, ut qui baptizandi
+formam erat ceteris tributurus, ipse primus quod docebat exciperet. Post
+baptismum uero elegit duodecim discipulos, quorum unus traditor eius fuit.
+Et quia sanam doctrinam Iudaeorum populus non ferebat, eum inlata manu
+crucis supplicio peremerunt. Occiditur ergo Christus, iacet tribus diebus
+ac noctibus in sepulcro, resurgit a mortuis, sicut ante constitutionem
+mundi ipse cum patre decreuerat, ascendit in caelos ubi, in eo quod dei
+filius est, numquam defuisse cognoscitur, ut assumptum hominem, quem
+diabolus non permiserat ad superna conscendere, secum dei filius caelesti
+habitationi sustolleret. Dat ergo formam discipulis suis baptizandi,
+docendi salutaria, efficientiam quoque miraculorum atque in uniuersum
+mundum ad uitam praecipit introire, ut praedicatio salutaris non iam in una
+tantum gente sed orbi terrarum praedicaretur. Et quoniam humanum genus
+naturae merito, quam ex primo praeuaricatore contraxerat, aeternae poenae
+iaculis fuerat uulneratum nec salutis suae erat idoneum, quod eam in
+parente perdiderat, medicinalia quaedam tribuit sacramenta, ut agnosceret
+aliud sibi deberi per naturae meritum, aliud per gratiae donum, ut natura
+nihil aliud nisi poenae summitteret, gratia uero, quae nullis meritis
+attributa est, quia nec gratia diceretur si meritis tribueretur, totum quod
+est salutis afferret.
+
+Diffunditur ergo per mundum caelestis illa doctrina, adunantur populi,
+instituuntur ecclesiae, fit unum corpus quod mundi latitudinem occuparet,
+cuius caput Christus ascendit in caelos, ut necessario caput suum membra
+sequerentur. Haec itaque doctrina et praesentem uitam bonis informat
+operibus et post consummationem saeculi resurrectura corpora nostra praeter
+corruptionem ad regna caelestia pollicetur, ita ut qui hic bene ipso
+donante uixerit, esset in illa resurrectione beatissimus, qui uero male,
+miser post munus resurrectionis adesset. Et hoc est principale religionis
+nostrae, ut credat non solum animas non perire, sed ipsa quoque corpora,
+quae mortis aduentus resoluerat, in statum pristinum futura de beatitudine
+reparari. Haec ergo ecclesia catholica per orbem diffusa tribus modis
+probatur exsistere: quidquid in ea tenetur, aut auctoritas est scripturarum
+aut traditio uniuersalis aut certe propria et particularis instructio. Sed
+auctoritate tota constringitur, uniuersali traditione maiorum nihilominus
+tota, priuatis uero constitutionibus et propriis informationibus unaquaeque
+uel pro locorum uarietate uel prout cuique bene uisum est subsistit et
+regitur. Sola ergo nunc est fidelium exspectatio qua credimus affuturum
+finem mundi, omnia corruptibilia transitura, resurrecturos homines ad
+examen futuri iudicii, recepturos pro meritis singulos et in perpetuum
+atque in aeternum debitis finibus permansuros; solumque est[42] praemium
+beatitudinis contemplatio conditoris--tanta dumtaxat, quanta a creatura ad
+creatorem fieri potest,--ut ex eis reparato angelico numero superna illa
+ciuitas impleatur, ubi rex est uirginis filius eritque gaudium sempiternum,
+delectatio, cibus, opus, laus perpetua creatoris.
+
+
+[40] qui _uel_ quod _codd._
+
+[41] suspiciones _uel_ suspicione _uel_ suspicio _uel_ subici _codd.
+meliores._
+
+[42] esse _codd_.
+
+
+
+
+  ON THE CATHOLIC FAITH[43]
+
+  The Christian Faith is proclaimed by the authority of the New Testament
+  and of the Old; but although the Old scripture[44] contains within its
+  pages the name of Christ and constantly gives token that He will come
+  who we believe has already come by the birth of the Virgin, yet the
+  diffusion of that faith throughout the world dates from the actual
+  miraculous coming of our Saviour.
+
+  Now this our religion which is called Christian and Catholic is founded
+  chiefly on the following assertions. From all eternity, that is, before
+  the world was established, and so before all that is meant by time
+  began, there has existed one divine substance of Father, Son, and Holy
+  Spirit in such wise that we confess the Father God, the Son God, and the
+  Holy Spirit God, and yet not three Gods but one God. Thus the Father
+  hath the Son, begotten of His substance and coeternal with Himself after
+  a manner that He alone knoweth. Him we confess to be Son in the sense
+  that He is not the same as the Father. Nor has the Father ever been Son,
+  for the human mind must not imagine a divine lineage stretching back
+  into infinity; nor can the Son, being of the same nature in virtue of
+  which He is coeternal with the Father, ever become Father, for the
+  divine lineage must not stretch forward into infinity. But the Holy
+  Spirit is neither Father nor Son, and therefore, albeit of the same
+  divine nature, neither begotten, nor begetting, but proceeding as well
+  from the Father as the Son.[45] Yet what the manner of that Procession
+  is we are no more able to state clearly than is the human mind able to
+  understand the generation of the Son from the substance of the Father.
+  But these articles are laid down for our belief by Old and New
+  Testament. Concerning which fortress and citadel[46] of our religion
+  many men have spoken otherwise and have even impugned it, being moved by
+  human, nay rather by carnal feeling. Arius, for instance, who, while
+  calling the Son God, declares Him to be vastly inferior to the Father
+  and of another substance. The Sabellians also have dared to affirm that
+  there are not three separate Persons but only One, saying that the
+  Father is the same as the Son and the Son the same as the Father and the
+  Holy Spirit the same as the Father and the Son; and so declaring that
+  there is but one divine Person expressed by different names.
+
+  The Manichaeans, too, who allow two coeternal and contrary principles,
+  do not believe in the Only-begotten Son of God. For they consider it a
+  thought unworthy of God that He should have a Son, since they entertain
+  the very carnal reflection that inasmuch as[47] human generation arises
+  from the mingling of two bodies, it is unworthy to hold a notion of this
+  sort in respect of the divine nature; whereas such a view finds no
+  sanction in the Old Testament and absolutely[48] none in the New. Yea,
+  their error which refuses this notion also refuses the Virgin birth of
+  the Son, because they would not have the God's nature defiled by the
+  man's body. But enough of this for the present; the points will be
+  presented in the proper place as the proper arrangement demands.
+
+  The divine nature then, abiding from all eternity and unto all eternity
+  without any change, by the exercise of a will known only to Himself,
+  determined of Himself to form the world, and brought it into being when
+  it was absolutely naught, nor did He produce it from His own substance,
+  lest it should be thought divine by nature, nor did He form it after any
+  model, lest it should be thought that anything had already come into
+  being which helped His will by the existence of an independent nature,
+  and that there should exist something that had not been made by Him and
+  yet existed; but by His Word He brought forth the heavens, and created
+  the earth[49] that so He might make natures worthy of a place in heaven,
+  and also fit earthly things to earth. But although in heaven all things
+  are beautiful and arranged in due order, yet one part of the heavenly
+  creation which is universally termed angelic,[50] seeking more than
+  nature and the Author of Nature had granted them, was cast forth from
+  its heavenly habitation; and because the Creator did not wish the roll
+  of the angels, that is of the heavenly city whose citizens the angels
+  are, to be diminished, He formed man out of the earth and breathed into
+  him the breath of life; He endowed him with reason, He adorned him with
+  freedom of choice and established him in the joys of Paradise, making
+  covenant aforehand that if he would remain without sin He would add him
+  and his offspring to the angelic hosts; so that as the higher nature had
+  fallen low through the curse of pride, the lower substance might ascend
+  on high through the blessing of humility. But the father of envy, loath
+  that man should climb to the place where he himself deserved not to
+  remain, put temptation before him and the consort whom the Creator had
+  brought forth out of his side for the continuance of the race, and laid
+  them open to punishment for disobedience, promising man also the gift of
+  Godhead, the arrogant attempt to seize which had caused his own fall.
+  All this was revealed by God to His servant Moses, whom He vouchsafed to
+  teach the creation and origin of man, as the books written by him
+  declare. For the divine authority is always conveyed in one of the
+  following ways--the historical, which simply announces facts; the
+  allegorical, whence historical matter is excluded; or else the two
+  combined, history and allegory conspiring to establish it. All this is
+  abundantly evident to pious hearers and steadfast believers.
+
+  But to return to the order of our discourse; the first man, before sin
+  came, dwelt with his consort in the Garden. But when he hearkened to the
+  voice of his wife and failed to keep the commandment of his Creator, he
+  was banished, bidden to till the ground, and being shut out from the
+  sheltering garden he carried abroad into unknown regions the children of
+  his loins; by begetting whom he transmitted to those that came after,
+  the punishment which he, the first man, had incurred by the sin of
+  disobedience. Hence it came to pass that corruption both of body and
+  soul ensued, and death; and this he was to taste first in his own son
+  Abel, in order that he might learn through his child the greatness of
+  the punishment that was laid upon him. For if he had died first he would
+  in some sense not have known, and if one may so say not have felt, his
+  punishment; but he tasted it in another in order that he might perceive
+  the due reward of his contempt, and, doomed to death himself, might be
+  the more sensibly touched by the apprehension of it. But this curse that
+  came of transgression which the first man had by natural propagation
+  transmitted to posterity, was denied by one Pelagius who so set up the
+  heresy which goes by his name and which the Catholic faith, as is known,
+  at once banished from its bosom. So the human race that sprang from the
+  first man and mightily increased and multiplied, broke into strife,
+  stirred up wars, and became the heir of earthly misery, because it had
+  lost the joys of Paradise in its first parent. Yet were there not a few
+  of mankind whom the Giver of Grace set apart for Himself and who were
+  obedient to His will; and though by desert of nature they were
+  condemned, yet God by making them partakers in the hidden mystery, long
+  afterwards to be revealed, vouchsafed to recover fallen nature. So the
+  earth was filled by the human race and man who by his own wanton
+  wilfulness had despised his Creator began to walk in his own ways. Hence
+  God willing rather to recover mankind through one just man than that it
+  should remain for ever contumacious, suffered all the guilty multitude
+  to perish by the wide waters of a flood, save only Noah, the just one,
+  with his children and all that he had brought with him into the ark. The
+  reason why He wished to save the just by an ark of wood is known to all
+  hearts learned in the Holy Scriptures. Thus what we may call the first
+  age of the world was ended by the avenging flood.
+
+  Thus the human race was restored, and yet it hastened to make its own
+  the vice of nature with which the first author of transgression had
+  infected it. And the wickedness increased which had once been punished
+  by the waters of the flood, and man who had been suffered to live for a
+  long series of years was reduced to the brief span of ordinary human
+  life. Yet would not God again visit the race by a flood, but rather,
+  letting it continue, He chose from it men of whose line a generation
+  should arise out of which He might in the last days grant us His own Son
+  to come to us, clothed in human form. Of these men Abraham is the first,
+  and although he was stricken in years and his wife past bearing, they
+  had in their old age the reward of a son in fulfilment of promise
+  unconditional. This son was named Isaac and he begat Jacob, who in his
+  turn begat the twelve Patriarchs, God not reckoning in their number
+  those whom nature in its ordinary course produced.[51] This Jacob, then,
+  together with his sons and his household determined to dwell in Egypt
+  for the purpose of trafficking; and the multitude of them increasing
+  there in the course of many years began to be a cause of suspicion to
+  the Egyptian rulers, and Pharaoh ordered them to be oppressed by
+  exceeding heavy tasks[52] and afflicted them with grievous burdens. At
+  length God, minded to set at naught the tyranny of the king of Egypt,
+  divided the Red Sea--a marvel such as nature had never known before--and
+  brought forth His host by the hands of Moses and Aaron. Thereafter on
+  account of their departure Egypt was vexed with sore plagues, because
+  they would not let the people go. So, after crossing the Red Sea, as I
+  have told, they passed through the desert of the wilderness and came to
+  the mount which is called Sinai, where God the Creator of all, wishing
+  to prepare the nations for the knowledge of the sacrament to come, laid
+  down by a law given through Moses how both the rites of sacrifices and
+  the national customs should be ordered. And after fighting down many
+  tribes in many years amidst their journeyings they came at last to the
+  river called Jordan, with Joshua the son of Nun now as their captain,
+  and, for their crossing, the streams of Jordan were dried up as the
+  waters of the Red Sea had been; so they finished their course to that
+  city which is now called Jerusalem. And while the people of God abode
+  there we read that there were set up first judges and prophets and then
+  kings, of whom we read that after Saul, David of the tribe of Judah
+  ascended the throne. So from him the royal race descended from father to
+  son and lasted till the days of Herod who, we read, was the first taken
+  out of the peoples called Gentile to bear sway. In whose days rose up
+  the blessed Virgin Mary, sprung from the stock of David, she who bore
+  the Maker of the human race. But it was just because the whole world lay
+  dead, stained with its many sins, that God chose out one race in which
+  His commands might shine clear; sending it prophets and other holy men,
+  to the end that by their warnings that people at least might be cured of
+  their swollen pride. But they slew these holy men and chose rather to
+  abide in their wanton wickedness.
+
+  And now at the last days of time, in place of prophets and other men
+  well-pleasing to Him, God willed that His only-begotten Son should be
+  born of a Virgin that so the salvation of mankind which had been lost
+  through the disobedience of the first man might be recovered by the God-
+  man, and that inasmuch as it was a woman who had first persuaded man to
+  that which wrought death there should be this second woman who should
+  bring forth from a human womb Him who gives Life. Nor let it be deemed a
+  thing unworthy that the Son of God was born of a Virgin, for it was out
+  of the course of nature that He was conceived and brought to birth.
+  Virgin then she conceived, by the Holy Spirit, the Son of God made
+  flesh, Virgin she bore Him, Virgin she continued after His birth; and He
+  became the Son of Man and likewise the Son of God that in Him the glory
+  of the divine nature might shine forth and at the same time the human
+  weakness be declared which He took upon Him. Yet against this article of
+  Faith so wholesome and altogether true there rose up many who babbled
+  other doctrine, and especially Nestorius and Eutyches, inventors of
+  heresy, of whom the one thought fit to say that He was man alone, the
+  other that He was God alone and that the human body put on by Christ had
+  not come by participation in human substance. But enough on this point.
+
+  So Christ grew after the flesh, and was baptized in order that He who
+  was to give the form of baptism to others should first Himself receive
+  what He taught. But after His baptism He chose twelve disciples, one of
+  whom betrayed Him. And because the people of the Jews would not bear
+  sound doctrine they laid hands upon Him and slew and crucified Him.
+  Christ, then, was slain; He lay three days and three nights in the tomb;
+  He rose again from the dead as He had predetermined with His Father
+  before the foundation of the world; He ascended into heaven whence we
+  know that He was never absent, because He is Son of God, in order that
+  as Son of God He might raise together with Him to the heavenly
+  habitation man whose flesh He had assumed, whom the devil had hindered
+  from ascending to the places on high. Therefore He bestowed on His
+  disciples the form of baptizing, the saving truth of the teaching, and
+  the mighty power of miracles, and bade them go throughout the whole
+  world to give it life, in order that the message of salvation might be
+  preached no longer in one nation only but among all the dwellers upon
+  earth. And because the human race was wounded by the weapon of eternal
+  punishment by reason of the nature which they had inherited from the
+  first transgressor and could not win a full meed of salvation because
+  they had lost it in its first parent, God instituted certain health-
+  giving sacraments to teach the difference between what grace bestowed
+  and human nature deserved, nature simply subjecting to punishment, but
+  grace, which is won by no merit, since it would not be grace if it were
+  due to merit, conferring all that belongs to salvation.
+
+  Therefore is that heavenly instruction spread throughout the world, the
+  peoples are knit together, churches are founded, and, filling the broad
+  earth, one body formed, whose head, even Christ, ascended into heaven in
+  order that the members might of necessity follow where the Head was
+  gone. Thus this teaching both inspires this present life unto good
+  works, and promises that in the end of the age our bodies shall rise
+  incorruptible to the kingdom of heaven, to the end that he who has lived
+  well on earth by God's gift should be altogether blessed in that
+  resurrection, but he who has lived amiss should, with the gift of
+  resurrection, enter upon misery. And this is a firm principle of our
+  religion, to believe not only that men's souls do not perish, but that
+  their very bodies, which the coming of death had destroyed, recover
+  their first state by the bliss that is to be. This Catholic church,
+  then, spread throughout the world, is known by three particular marks:
+  whatever is believed and taught in it has the authority of the
+  Scriptures, or of universal tradition, or at least of its own and proper
+  usage. And this authority is binding on the whole Church as is also the
+  universal tradition of the Fathers, while each separate church exists
+  and is governed by its private constitution and its proper rites
+  according to difference of locality and the good judgment of each. All,
+  therefore, that the faithful now expect is that the end of the world
+  will come, that all corruptible things shall pass away, that men shall
+  rise for future judgement, that each shall receive reward according to
+  his deserts and abide in the lot assigned to him for ever and for aye;
+  and the sole reward of bliss will be the contemplation of the Almighty,
+  so far, that is, as the creature may look on the Creator, to the end
+  that the number of the angels may be made up from these and the heavenly
+  city filled where the Virgin's Son is King and where will be everlasting
+  joy, delight, food, labour, and unending praise of the Creator.
+
+
+  [43] The conclusions adverse to the genuineness of this tractate,
+  reached in the dissertation _Der dem Boethius zugeschriebene Traktat de
+  Fide Catholica (Jahrbücher für kl. Phil._ xxvi. (1901) Supplementband)
+  by one of the editors, now seem to both unsound. The writer of that
+  dissertation intends to return to the subject elsewhere. This fourth
+  tractate, though lacking, in the best MSS., either an ascription to
+  Boethius or a title, is firmly imbedded in two distinct recensions of
+  Boethius's theological works. There is no reason to disturb it. Indeed
+  the _capita dogmatica_ mentioned by Cassiodorus can hardly refer to any
+  of the tractates except the fourth.
+
+  [44] For _instrumentum_=Holy Scripture cf. Tertull. _Apol._ 18, 19,
+  _adv. Hermog._ 19, etc.; for _instrumentum_=any historical writing cf.
+  Tert. _De Spect._ 5.
+
+  [45] Boethius is no heretic. By the sixth century _uel_ had lost its
+  strong separative force. Cp. "Noe cum sua uel trium natorum coniugibus,"
+  Greg. Tur. _H.F._ i. 20. Other examples in Bonnet, _La Latinité de Grég.
+  de Tours_, p. 313, and in Brandt's edition of the _Isag._ Index, s.v.
+  _uel_.
+
+  [46] _Vide Cons._ i. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 140), and cf. Dante, _De Mon._
+  iii. 16, 117.
+
+  [47] _Ut quia_. A very rare use. Cf. Baehrens, _Beiträge zur lat.
+  Syntaxis_ (_Philologus_, Supplementband xii. 1912). It
+  perhaps=Aristotle's [Greek: oion epei]. Cf. McKinlay, _Harvard Studies
+  in Cl. Philol._ xviii. 153.
+
+  [48] _In integro_=_prorsus_; cf. Brandt, _op. cit._ Index, s.v.
+  _integer_.
+
+  [49] The doctrine is orthodox, but note that Boethius does not say _ex
+  nihilo creauit_. _Vide infra_, p. 366 ll. 24 ff.
+
+  [50] _Vide infra, Cons._ iv. pr. 6, p. 342 l. 54.
+
+  [51] e.g. Ishmael also [Greek: kata sarka gegennaetai] Gal. iv. 23.
+
+  [52] Cf. "populus dei mirabiliter crescens ... quia ... erant
+  suspecta... laboribus premebatur," Aug. _De Ciu. Dei_, 18. 7. For other
+  coincidences see Rand, _op. cit._ pp. 423 ff.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+INCIPIT LIBER
+CONTRA EVTYCHEN ET NESTORIVM
+
+DOMINO SANCTO AC VENERABILI PATRI IOHANNI DIACONO
+BOETHIVS FILIVS
+
+Anxie te quidem diuque sustinui, ut de ea quae in conuentu mota est
+quaestione loqueremur. Sed quoniam et tu quominus uenires occupatione
+distractus es et ego in crastinum constitutis negotiis implicabor, mando
+litteris quae coram loquenda seruaueram. Meministi enim, cum in concilio
+legeretur epistola, recitatum Eutychianos ex duabus naturis Christum
+consistere confiteri, in duabus negare: catholicos uero utrique dicto fidem
+praebere, nam et ex duabus eum naturis consistere et in duabus apud uerae
+fidei sectatores aequaliter credi. Cuius dicti nouitate percussus harum
+coniunctionum quae ex duabus naturis uel in duabus consisterent
+differentias inquirebam, multum scilicet referre ratus nec inerti
+neglegentia praetereundum, quod episcopus scriptor epistolae tamquam ualde
+necessarium praeterire noluisset. Hic omnes apertam esse differentiam nec
+quicquam in eo esse caliginis inconditum confusumque strepere nec ullus in
+tanto tumultu qui leuiter attingeret quaestionem, nedum qui expediret
+inuentus est.
+
+Adsederam ego ab eo quem maxime intueri cupiebam longius atque adeo, si
+situm sedentium recorderis, auersus pluribusque oppositis, ne si aegerrime
+quidem cuperem, uultum nutumque eius aspicere poteram ex quo mihi aliqua
+eius darentur signa iudicii. Atqui ego quidem nihil ceteris amplius
+afferebam, immo uero aliquid etiam minus. Nam de re proposita aeque nihil
+ceteris sentiebam; minus uero quam ceteri ipse afferebam, falsae scilicet
+scientiae praesumptionem. Tuli aegerrime, fateor, compressusque indoctorum
+grege conticui metuens ne iure uiderer insanus, si sanus inter furiosos
+haberi contenderem. Meditabar igitur dehinc omnes animo quaestiones nec
+deglutiebam quod acceperam, sed frequentis consilii iteratione ruminabam.
+Tandem igitur patuere pulsanti animo fores et ueritas inuenta quaerenti
+omnes nebulas Eutychiani reclusit erroris. Vnde mihi maxime subiit
+admirari, quaenam haec indoctorum hominum esset audacia qui inscientiae
+uitium praesumptionis atque inpudentiae nube conentur obducere, cum non
+modo saepe id quod proponatur ignorent, uerum in huiusmodi contentionibus
+ne id quidem quod ipsi loquantur intellegant, quasi non deterior fiat
+inscientiae causa, dum tegitur.
+
+Sed ab illis ad te transeo, cui hoc quantulumcumque est examinandum prius
+perpendendumque transmitto. Quod si recte se habere pronuntiaueris, peto ut
+mei nominis hoc quoque inseras chartis; sin uero uel minuendum aliquid uel
+addendum uel aliqua mutatione uariandum est, id quoque postulo remitti,
+meis exemplaribus ita ut a te reuertitur transcribendum. Quae ubi ad calcem
+ducta constiterint, tum demum eius cuius soleo iudicio censenda
+transmittam. Sed quoniam semel res a conlocutione transfertur ad stilum,
+prius extremi sibique contrarii Nestorii atque Eutychis summoueantur
+errores; post uero adiuuante deo, Christianae medietatem fidei temperabo.
+Quoniam uero in tota quaestione contrariarum sibimet [Greek: haireseon] de
+personis dubitatur atque naturis, haec primitus definienda sunt et propriis
+differentiis segreganda.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  A TREATISE AGAINST EUTYCHES AND NESTORIUS
+
+  BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS
+  ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO HIS SAINTLY MASTER AND REVEREND FATHER JOHN THE DEACON
+  HIS SON BOETHIUS
+
+  I have been long and anxiously waiting for you to discuss with me the
+  problem which was raised at the meeting. But since your duties have
+  prevented your coming and I shall be for some time involved in my
+  business engagements, I am setting down in writing what I had been
+  keeping to say by word of mouth.
+
+  You no doubt remember how, when the letter[53] was read in the assembly,
+  it was asserted that the Eutychians confess that Christ is formed from
+  two natures but does not consist of them--whereas Catholics admit both
+  propositions, for among followers of the true Faith He is equally
+  believed to be of two natures and in two natures. Struck by the novelty
+  of this assertion I began to inquire what difference there can be
+  between unions formed from two natures and unions which consist in two
+  natures, for the point which the bishop who wrote the letter refused to
+  pass over because of its gravity, seemed to me of importance and not one
+  to be idly and carelessly slurred over. On that occasion all loudly
+  protested that the difference was evident, that there was no obscurity,
+  confusion or perplexity, and in the general storm and tumult there was
+  no one who really touched the edge of the problem, much less anyone who
+  solved it.
+
+  I was sitting a long way from the man whom I especially wished to
+  watch,[54] and if you recall the arrangement of the seats, I was turned
+  away from him, with so many between us, that however much I desired it I
+  could not see his face and expression and glean therefrom any sign of
+  his opinion. Personally, indeed, I had nothing more to contribute than
+  the rest, in fact rather less than more. I, no more than the others, had
+  any view about the question at issue, while my possible contribution was
+  less by one thing, namely, the false assumption of a knowledge that I
+  had not got. I was, I admit, much put out, and being overwhelmed by the
+  mob of ignorant speakers, I held my peace, fearing lest I should be
+  rightly set down as insane if I held out for being sane among those
+  madmen.[55] So I continued to ponder all the questions in my mind, not
+  swallowing what I had heard, but rather chewing the cud of constant
+  meditation. At last the door opened to my insistent knocking, and the
+  truth which I found cleared out of my way all the clouds of the
+  Eutychian error. And with this discovery a great wonder came upon me at
+  the vast temerity of unlearned men who use the cloak of impudent
+  presumption to cover up the vice of ignorance, for not only do they
+  often fail to grasp the point at issue, but in a debate of this kind
+  they do not even understand their own statements, forgetting that the
+  case of ignorance is all the worse if it is not honestly admitted.[56]
+
+  I turn from them to you, and to you I submit this little essay for your
+  first judgment and consideration. If you pronounce it to be sound I beg
+  you to place it among the other writings of mine which you possess; but
+  if there is anything to be struck out or added or changed in any way, I
+  would ask you to let me have your suggestions, in order that I may enter
+  them in my copies just as they leave your hands. When this revision has
+  been duly accomplished, then I will send the work on to be judged by the
+  man to whom I always submit everything.[57] But since the pen is now to
+  take the place of the living voice, let me first clear away the extreme
+  and self-contradictory errors of Nestorius and Eutyches; after that, by
+  God's help, I will temperately set forth the middle way of the Christian
+  Faith. But since in this whole question of self-contradictory heresies
+  the matter of debate is Persons and Natures, these terms must first be
+  defined and distinguished by their proper differences.
+
+
+  [53] Evidently the letter addressed to Pope Symmachus by the Oriental
+  bishops (_vide_ Mansi, _Concil_. viii. 221 ff.), in which they inquire
+  concerning the safe middle way between the heresies of Eutyches and
+  Nestorius. The date of the bishops' letter, and consequently, in all
+  probability, of Boethius's tractate was 512.
+
+  [54] Obviously his father-in-law Symmachus. _Vide_ p. 76, _eius cuius
+  soleo iudiclo_, etc.
+
+  [55] Cf. Hor. _Serm_. i. 3. 82; ii. 3. 40.
+
+  [56] Cf. _infra, de Cons._ i. pr. 4 (p. 142) _oportet uulnus detegas.
+
+  [57] _Vide supra_, p. 75, and _De Trin._ p. 3.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Natura igitur aut de solis corporibus dici potest aut de solis substantiis,
+id est corporeis atque incorporeis, aut de omnibus rebus quae quocumque
+modo esse dicuntur. Cum igitur tribus modis natura dici possit, tribus
+modis sine dubio definienda est. Nam si de omnibus rebus naturam dici
+placet, talis definitio dabitur quae res omnes quae sunt possit includere.
+Erit ergo huiusmodi: "natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquo modo
+intellectu capi possunt." In hac igitur definitione et accidentia et
+substantiae definiuntur; haec enim omnia intellectu capi possunt. Additum
+uero est "quoquo modo," quoniam deus et materia integro perfectoque
+intellectu intellegi non possunt, sed aliquo tamen modo ceterarum rerum
+priuatione capiuntur. Idcirco uero adiunximus "quae cum sint," quoniam
+etiam ipsum nihil significat aliquid sed non naturam. Neque enim quod sit
+aliquid sed potius non esse significat; omnis uero natura est. Et si de
+omnibus quidem rebus naturam dici placet, haec sit naturae definitio quam
+superius proposuimus. Sin uero de solis substantiis natura dicitur, quoniam
+substantiae omnes aut corporeae sunt aut incorporeae, dabimus definitionem
+naturae substantias significanti huiusmodi: "natura est uel quod facere uel
+quod pati possit." "Pati" quidem ac "facere," ut omnia corporea atque
+corporeorum anima; haec enim in corpore et a corpore et facit et patitur.
+"Facere" uero tantum ut deus ceteraque diuina. Habes igitur definitionem
+eius quoque significationis naturae quae tantum substantiis applicatur. Qua
+in re substantiae quoque est reddita definitio. Nam si nomen naturae
+substantiam monstrat, cum naturam descripsimus substantiae quoque est
+assignata descriptio. Quod si naturae nomen relictis incorporeis
+substantiis ad corporales usque contrahitur, ut corporeae tantum
+substantiae naturam habere uideantur, sicut Aristoteles ceterique et
+eiusmodi et multimodae philosophiae sectatores putant, definiemus eam, ut
+hi etiam qui naturam non nisi in corporibus esse posuerunt. Est autem eius
+definitio hoc modo: "natura est motus principium per se non per accidens."
+Quod "motus principium" dixi hoc est, quoniam corpus omne habet proprium
+motum, ut ignis sursum, terra deorsum. Item quod "per se principium motus"
+naturam esse proposui et non "per accidens," tale est, quoniam lectum
+quoque ligneum deorsum ferri necesse est, sed non deorsum per accidens
+fertur. Idcirco enim quia lignum est, quod est terra, pondere et grauitate
+deducitur. Non enim quia lectus est, deorsum cadit, sed quia terra est, id
+est quia terrae contigit, ut lectus esset; unde fit ut lignum naturaliter
+esse dicamus, lectum uero artificialiter. Est etiam alia significatio
+naturae per quam dicimus diuersam esse naturam auri atque argenti in hoc
+proprietatem rerum monstrare cupientes, quae significatio naturae
+definietur hoc modo: "natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica
+differentia." Cum igitur tot modis uel dicatur uel definiatur natura, tam
+catholici quam Nestorius secundum ultimam definitionem duas in Christo
+naturas esse constituunt; neque enim easdem in deum atque hominem
+differentias conuenire.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Nature, then, may be affirmed either of bodies alone or of substances
+  alone, that is, of corporeals or incorporeals, or of everything that is
+  in any way capable of affirmation. Since, then, nature can be affirmed
+  in three ways, it must obviously be defined in three ways. For if you
+  choose to affirm nature of the totality of things, the definition will
+  be of such a kind as to include all things that are. It will accordingly
+  be something of this kind: "Nature belongs to those things which, since
+  they exist, can in some measure be apprehended by the mind." This
+  definition, then, includes both accidents and substances, for they all
+  can be apprehended by the mind. But I add "in some measure" because God
+  and matter cannot be apprehended by mind, be it never so whole and
+  perfect, but still they are apprehended in a measure through the removal
+  of accidents. The reason for adding the words, "since they exist," is
+  that the mere word "nothing" denotes something, though it does not
+  denote nature. For it denotes, indeed, not that anything is, but rather
+  non-existence; but every nature exists. And if we choose to affirm
+  "nature" of the totality of things, the definition will be as we have
+  given it above.
+
+  But if "nature" is affirmed of substances alone, we shall, since all
+  substances are either corporeal or incorporeal, give to nature denoting
+  substances a definition of the following kind: "Nature is either that
+  which can act or that which can be acted upon." Now the power to act and
+  to suffer belongs to all corporeals and the soul of corporeals; for it
+  both acts in the body and suffers by the body. But only to act belongs
+  to God and other divine substances.
+
+  Here, then, you have a further definition of what nature is as applied
+  to substances alone. This definition comprises also the definition of
+  substance. For if the word nature signifies substance, when once we have
+  defined nature we have also settled the definition of substance. But if
+  we neglect incorporeal substances and confine the name nature to
+  corporeal substances so that they alone appear to possess the nature of
+  substance--which is the view of Aristotle and the adherents both of his
+  and various other schools--we shall define nature as those do who have
+  only allowed the word to be applied to bodies. Now, in accordance with
+  this view, the definition is as follows: "Nature is the principle of
+  movement properly inherent in and not accidentally attached to bodies."
+  I say "principle of movement" because every body has its proper
+  movement, fire moving upwards, the earth moving downwards. And what I
+  mean by "movement properly inherent and not accidentally attached" is
+  seen by the example of a wooden bed which is necessarily borne downward
+  and is not carried downward by accident. For it is drawn downward by
+  weight and heaviness because it is of wood, i.e. an earthly material.
+  For it falls down not because it is a bed, but because it is earth, that
+  is, because it is an accident of earth that it is a bed; hence we call
+  it wood in virtue of its nature, but bed in virtue of the art that
+  shaped it.
+
+  Nature has, further, another meaning according to which we speak of the
+  different nature of gold and silver, wishing thereby to point the
+  special property of things; this meaning of nature will be defined as
+  follows: "Nature is the specific difference that gives form to
+  anything." Thus, although nature is described or defined in all these
+  different ways, both Catholics and Nestorians firmly hold that there are
+  in Christ two natures of the kind laid down in our last definition, for
+  the same specific differences cannot apply to God and man.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Sed de persona maxime dubitari potest, quaenam ei definitio possit aptari.
+Si enim omnis habet natura personam, indissolubilis nodus est, quaenam
+inter naturam personamque possit esse discretio; aut si non aequatur
+persona naturae, sed infra terminum spatiumque naturae persona subsistit,
+difficile dictu est ad quas usque naturas persona perueniat, id est quas
+naturas conueniat habere personam, quas a personae uocabulo segregari. Nam
+illud quidem manifestum est personae subiectam esse naturam nec praeter
+naturam personam posse praedicari. Vestiganda sunt igitur haec
+inquirentibus hoc modo.
+
+Quoniam praeter naturam non potest esse persona quoniamque naturae aliae
+sunt substantiae, aliae accidentes et uidemus personam in accidentibus non
+posse constitui (quis enim dicat ullam albedinis uel nigredinis uel
+magnitudinis esse personam?), relinquitur ergo ut personam in substantiis
+dici conueniat. Sed substantiarum aliae sunt corporeae, aliae incorporeae.
+Corporearum uero aliae sunt uiuentes, aliae minime; uiuentium aliae sunt
+sensibiles, aliae minime; sensibilium aliae rationales, aliae inrationales.
+Item incorporearum aliae sunt rationales, aliae minime, ut pecudum uitae;
+rationalium uero alia est inmutabilis atque inpassibilis per naturam ut
+deus, alia per creationem mutabilis atque passibilis, nisi inpassibilis
+gratia substantiae ad inpassibilitatis firmitudinem permutetur ut angelorum
+atque animae. Ex quibus omnibus neque in non uiuentibus corporibus personam
+posse dici manifestum est (nullus enim lapidis ullam dicit esse personam),
+neque rursus eorum uiuentium quae sensu carent (neque enim ulla persona est
+arboris), nec uero eius quae intellectu ac ratione deseritur (nulla est
+enim persona equi uel bouis ceterorumque animalium quae muta ac sine
+ratione uitam solis sensibus degunt), at hominis dicimus esse personam,
+dicimus dei, dicimus angeli. Rursus substantiarum aliae sunt uniuersales,
+aliae particulares. Vniuersales sunt quae de singulis praedicantur ut homo,
+animal, lapis, lignum ceteraque huiusmodi quae uel genera uel species sunt;
+nam et homo de singulis hominibus et animal de singulis animalibus lapisque
+ac lignum de singulis lapidibus ac lignis dicuntur. Particularia uero sunt
+quae de aliis minime praedicantur ut Cicero, Plato, lapis hic unde haec
+Achillis statua facta est, lignum hoc unde haec mensa composita est. Sed in
+his omnibus nusquam in uniuersalibus persona dici potest, sed in
+singularibus tantum atque in indiuiduis; animalis enim uel generalis
+hominis nulla persona est, sed uel Ciceronis uel Platonis uel singulorum
+indiuiduorum personae singulae nuncupantur.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  But the proper definition of Person is a matter of very great
+  perplexity. For if every nature has person, the difference between
+  nature and person is a hard knot to unravel; or if person is not taken
+  as the equivalent of nature but is a term of less scope and range, it is
+  difficult to say to what natures it may be extended, that is, to what
+  natures the term person may be applied and what natures are dissociate
+  from it. For one thing is clear, namely that nature is a substrate of
+  Person, and that Person cannot be predicated apart from nature.
+
+  We must, therefore, conduct our inquiry into these points as follows.
+
+  Since Person cannot exist apart from a nature and since natures are
+  either substances or accidents and we see that a person cannot come into
+  being among accidents (for who can say there is any person of white or
+  black or size?), it therefore remains that Person is properly applied to
+  substances. But of substances, some are corporeal and others
+  incorporeal. And of corporeals, some are living and others the reverse;
+  of living substances, some are sensitive and others insensitive; of
+  sensitive substances, some are rational and others irrational.[58]
+  Similarly of incorporeal substances, some are rational, others the
+  reverse (for instance the animating spirits of beasts); but of rational
+  substances there is one which is immutable and impassible by nature,
+  namely God, another which in virtue of its creation is mutable and
+  passible except in that case where the Grace of the impassible substance
+  has transformed it to the unshaken impassibility which belongs to angels
+  and to the soul.
+
+  Now from all the definitions we have given it is clear that Person
+  cannot be affirmed of bodies which have no life (for no one ever said
+  that a stone had a person), nor yet of living things which lack sense
+  (for neither is there any person of a tree), nor finally of that which
+  is bereft of mind and reason (for there is no person of a horse or ox or
+  any other of the animals which dumb and unreasoning live a life of sense
+  alone), but we say there is a person of a man, of God, of an angel.
+  Again, some substances are universal, others are particular. Universal
+  terms are those which are predicated of individuals, as man, animal,
+  stone, stock and other things of this kind which are either genera or
+  species; for the term man is applied to individual men just as animal is
+  to individual animals, and stone and stock to individual stones and
+  stocks. But particulars are terms which are never predicated of other
+  things, as Cicero, Plato, this stone from which this statue of Achilles
+  was hewn, this piece of wood out of which this table was made. But in
+  all these things person cannot in any case be applied to universals, but
+  only to particulars and individuals; for there is no person of a man if
+  animal or general; only the single persons of Cicero, Plato, or other
+  single individuals are termed persons.
+
+  [58] For a similar example of the method of _diuisio_ cf. Cic. _De Off._
+  ii. 3. 11. Cf. also _Isag. Porph. edit. prima_, i. 10 (ed. Brandt, p.
+  29).
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationabilibus
+substantiaque omnis natura est nec in uniuersalibus sed in indiuiduis
+constat, reperta personae est definitio: "naturae rationabilis indiuidua
+substantia." Sed nos hac definitione eam quam Graeci [Greek: hupostasin]
+dicunt terminauimus. Nomen enim personae uidetur aliunde traductum, ex his
+scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque eos quorum interest
+homines repraesentabant. Persona uero dicta est a personando circumflexa
+paenultima. Quod si acuatur antepaenultima, apertissime a sono dicta
+uidebitur; idcirco autem a sono, quia concauitate ipsa maior necesse est
+uoluatur sonus. Graeci quoque has personas [Greek: prosopa] uocant ab eo
+quod ponantur in facie atque ante oculos obtegant uultum: [Greek: para tou
+pros tous opas tithesthai.] Sed quoniam personis inductis histriones
+indiuiduos homines quorum intererat in tragoedia uel in comoedia ut dictum
+est repraesentabant, id est Hecubam uel Medeam uel Simonem uel Chremetem,
+idcirco ceteros quoque homines, quorum certa pro sui forma esset agnitio,
+et Latini personam et Graeci [Greek: prosopa] nuncupauerunt. Longe uero
+illi signatius naturae rationabilis indiuiduam subsistentiam [Greek:
+hupostaseos] nomine uocauerunt, nos uero per inopiam significantium uocum
+translaticiam retinuimus nuncupationem, eam quam illi [Greek: hupostasin]
+dicunt personam uocantes; sed peritior Graecia sermonum [Greek: hupostasin]
+uocat indiuiduam subsistentiam. Atque, uti Graeca utar oratione in rebus
+quae a Graecis agitata Latina interpretatione translata sunt: [Greek: hai
+ousiai en men tois katholou einai dunantai. en de tois atomois kai kata
+meros monois huphistantai], id est: essentiae in uniuersalibus quidem esse
+possunt, in solis uero indiuiduis et particularibus substant. Intellectus
+enim uniuersalium rerum ex particularibus sumptus est. Quocirca cum ipsae
+subsistentiae in uniuersalibus quidem sint, in particularibus uero capiant
+substantiam, iure subsistentias particulariter substantes [Greek:
+hupostaseis] appellauerunt. Neque enim pensius subtiliusque intuenti idem
+uidebitur esse subsistentia quod substantia.
+
+Nam quod Graeci [Greek: ousiosin] uel [Greek: ousiosthai] dicunt, id nos
+subsistentiam uel subsistere appellamus; quod uero illi [Greek: hupostasin]
+uel [Greek: huphistasthai], id nos substantiam uel substare interpretamur.
+Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget.
+Substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse
+ualeant, subministrat; sub illis enim stat, dum subiectum est accidentibus.
+Itaque genera uel species subsistunt tantum; neque enim accidentia
+generibus speciebus*ue contingunt. Indiuidua uero non modo subsistunt uerum
+etiam substant, nam neque ipsa indigent accidentibus ut sint; informata
+enim sunt iam propriis et specificis differentiis et accidentibus ut esse
+possint ministrant, dum sunt scilicet subiecta. Quocirca [Greek: einai]
+atque [Greek: ousiosthai] esse atque subsistere, [Greek: huphistasthai]
+uero substare intellegitur. Neque enim uerborum inops Graecia est, ut
+Marcus Tullius alludit, sed essentiam, subsistentiam, substantiam, personam
+totidem nominibus reddit, essentiam quidem [Greek: ousian], subsistentiam
+uero [Greek: ousiosin], substantiam [Greek: hupostasin], personam [Greek:
+prosopon] appellans. Ideo autem [Greek: hupostaseis] Graeci indiuiduas
+substantias uocauerunt, quoniam ceteris subsunt et quibusdam quasi
+accidentibus subpositae subiectaeque sunt; atque idcirco nos quoque eas
+substantias nuncupamus quasi subpositas, quas illi[59] [Greek:
+hupostaseis], cumque etiam [Greek: prosopa] nuncupent easdem substantias,
+possumus nos quoque nuncupare personas. Idem est igitur [Greek: ousian]
+esse quod essentiam, idem [Greek: ousiosin] quod subsistentiam, idem
+[Greek: hupostasin] quod substantiam, idem [Greek: prosopon] quod personam.
+Quare autem de inrationabilibus animalibus Graecus [Greek: hupostasin] non
+dicat, sicut nos de eisdem nomen substantiae praedicamus, haec ratio est,
+quoniam nomen hoc melioribus applicatum est, ut aliqua id quod est
+excellentius, tametsi non descriptione naturae secundum id quod [Greek:
+huphistasthai] atque substare est, at certe [Greek: hupostaseos] uel
+substantiae uocabulis discerneretur.
+
+Est igitur et hominis quidem essentia, id est [Greek: ousia], et
+subsistentia, id est [Greek: ousiosis], et [Greek: hupostasis], id est
+substantia, et [Greek: prosopon], id est persona; [Greek: ousia], quidem
+atque essentia quoniam est, [Greek: ousiosis] uero atque subsistentia
+quoniam in nullo subiecto est, [Greek: hupostasis] uero atque substantia,
+quoniam subest ceteris quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est [Greek:
+ousioseis]; est [Greek: prosopon] atque persona, quoniam est rationabile
+indiuiduum. Deus quoque et [Greek: ousia] est et essentia, est enim et
+maxime ipse est a quo omnium esse proficiscitur. Est [Greek: ousiosis], id
+est subsistentia (subsistit enim nullo indigens), et [Greek:
+huphistasthai]; substat enim. Vnde etiam dicimus unam esse [Greek: ousian]
+uel [Greek: ousiosin], id est essentiam uel subsistentiam deitatis, sed
+tres [Greek: hupostaseis], id est tres substantias. Et quidem secundum hunc
+modum dixere unam trinitatis essentiam, tres substantias tresque personas.
+Nisi enim tres in deo substantias ecclesiasticus loquendi usus excluderet,
+uideretur idcirco de deo dici substantia, non quod ipse ceteris rebus quasi
+subiectum supponeretur, sed quod idem omnibus uti praeesset ita etiam quasi
+principium subesset rebus, dum eis omnibus [Greek: ousiosthai] uel
+subsistere subministrat.
+
+
+[59] quas illi _Vallinus_; quasi _uel_ quas _codd. meliores_.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Wherefore if Person belongs to substances alone, and these rational, and
+  if every nature is a substance, existing not in universals but in
+  individuals, we have found the definition of Person, viz.: "The
+  individual substance of a rational nature."[60] Now by this definition
+  we Latins have described what the Greeks call [Greek: hupostasis]. For
+  the word person seems to be borrowed from a different source, namely
+  from the masks which in comedies and tragedies used to signify the
+  different subjects of representation. Now _persona_ "mask" is
+  derived from _personare_, with a circumflex on the penultimate. But
+  if the accent is put on the antepenultimate[61] the word will clearly be
+  seen to come from _sonus_ "sound," and for this reason, that the
+  hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound. The Greeks, too, call
+  these masks [Greek: prosopa] from the fact that they are placed over the
+  face and conceal the countenance from the spectator: [Greek: para tou
+  pros tous opas tithesthai]. But since, as we have said, it was by the
+  masks they put on that actors played the different characters
+  represented in a tragedy or comedy--Hecuba or Medea or Simon or
+  Chremes,--so also all other men who could be recognized by their several
+  characteristics were designated by the Latins with the term
+  _persona_ and by the Greeks with [Greek: prosopa]. But the Greeks
+  far more clearly gave to the individual subsistence of a rational nature
+  the name [Greek: hupostasis] while we through want of appropriate words
+  have kept a borrowed term, calling that _persona_ which they call
+  [Greek: hupostasis]; but Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the
+  name [Greek: hupostasis] to the individual subsistence. And, if I may
+  use Greek in dealing with matters which were first mooted by Greeks
+  before they came to be interpreted in Latin: [Greek: hai ousiai en men
+  tois katholou einai dunantai. en de tois atomois kai kata meros monois
+  huphistantai], that is: essences indeed can have potential existence in
+  universals, but they have particular substantial existence in
+  particulars alone. For it is from particulars that all our comprehension
+  of universals is taken. Wherefore since subsistences are present in
+  universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly gave the
+  name [Greek: hupostasis] to subsistences which acquired substance
+  through the medium of particulars. For to no one using his eyes with any
+  care or penetration will subsistence and substance appear identical.
+
+  For our equivalents of the Greek terms [Greek: ousiosis ousiosthai] are
+  respectively _subsistentia_ and _subsistere_, while their
+  [Greek: hupostasis huphistasthai] are represented by our
+  _substantia_ and _substare_. For a thing has subsistence when
+  it does not require accidents in order to be, but that thing has
+  substance which supplies to other things, accidents to wit, a substrate
+  enabling them to be; for it "substands" those things so long as it is
+  subjected to accidents. Thus genera and species have only subsistence,
+  for accidents do not attach to genera and species. But particulars have
+  not only subsistence but substance, for they, no more than generals,
+  depend on accidents for their Being; for they are already provided with
+  their proper and specific differences and they enable accidents to be by
+  supplying them with a substrate. Wherefore _esse_ and
+  _subsistere_ represent [Greek: einai] and [Greek: ousiosthai],
+  while _substare_ represents [Greek: huphistasthai]. For Greece is
+  not, as Marcus Tullius[62] playfully says, short of words, but provides
+  exact equivalents for _essentia, subsistentia, substantia_ and
+  _persona_--[Greek: ousia] for _essentia_, [Greek: ousiosis]
+  for _subsistentia_, [Greek: hupostasis] for _substantia_,
+  [Greek: prosopon] for _persona_. But the Greeks called individual
+  substances [Greek: hupostaseis] because they underlie the rest and offer
+  support and substrate to what are called accidents; and we in our term
+  call them substances as being substrate--[Greek: hupostaseis], and since
+  they also term the same substances [Greek: prosopa], we too may call
+  them persons. So [Greek: ousia] is identical with essence, [Greek:
+  ousiosis] with subsistence, [Greek: hupostasis] with substance, [Greek:
+  prosopon] with person. But the reason why the Greek does not use [Greek:
+  hupostasis] of irrational animals while we apply the term substance to
+  them is this: This term was applied to things of higher value, in order
+  that what is more excellent might be distinguished, if not by a
+  definition of nature answering to the literal meaning of [Greek:
+  huphistasthai]=_substare_, at any rate by the words [Greek:
+  hupostasis]=_substantia_.
+
+  To begin with, then, man is essence, i.e. [Greek: ousia], subsistence,
+  i.e. [Greek: ousiosis, hupostasis], i.e. substance, [Greek: prosopon],
+  i.e. person: [Greek: ousia] or _essentia_ because he is, [Greek:
+  ousiosis], or subsistence because he is not accidental to any subject,
+  [Greek: hupostusis] or substance because he is subject to all the things
+  which are not subsistences or [Greek: ousioseis], while he is [Greek:
+  prosopon] or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is
+  [Greek: ousia], or essence, for He is and is especially that from which
+  proceeds the Being of all things. To Him belong [Greek: ousiosis], i.e.
+  subsistence, for He subsists in absolute independence, and [Greek:
+  huphistasthai], for He is substantial Being. Whence we go on to say that
+  there is one [Greek: ousia] or [Greek: ousiosis], i.e. one essence or
+  subsistence of the Godhead, but three [Greek: hupostaseis] or
+  substances. And indeed, following this use, men have spoken of One
+  essence, three substances and three persons of the Godhead. For did not
+  the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking
+  of God,[63] substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not
+  because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because,
+  just as He excels above all things, so He is the foundation and support
+  of things, supplying them all with [Greek: ousiosthai] or subsistence.
+
+
+  [60] Boethius's definition of _persona_ was adopted by St. Thomas (S. i.
+  29. 1), was regarded as classical by the Schoolmen, and has the approval
+  of modern theologians. Cf. Dorner, _Doctrine of Christ_, iii. p. 311.
+
+  [61] Implying a short penultimate.
+
+  [62] _Tusc._ ii. 15. 35.
+
+  [63] For a similar submission of his own opinion to the usage of the
+  Church cf. the end of _Tr._ i. and of _Tr._ ii.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Sed haec omnia idcirco sint dicta, ut differentiam naturae atque personae
+id est [Greek: ousias] atque [Greek: hupostaseos] monstraremus. Quo uero
+nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari, ecclesiasticae sit locutionis
+arbitrium. Hoc interim constet quod inter naturam personamque differre
+praediximus, quoniam natura est cuiuslibet substantiae specificata
+proprietas, persona uero rationabilis naturae indiuidua substantia. Hanc in
+Christo Nestorius duplicem esse constituit eo scilicet traductus errore,
+quod putauerit in omnibus naturis dici posse personam. Hoc enim praesumpto,
+quoniam in Christo duplicem naturam esse censebat, duplicem quoque personam
+esse confessus est. Qua in re eum falsum esse cum definitio superius dicta
+conuincat, tum haec argumentatio euidenter eius declarabit errorem. Si enim
+non est Christi una persona duasque naturas esse manifestum est, hominis
+scilicet atque dei (nec tam erit insipiens quisquam, utqui utramque earum a
+ratione seiungat), sequitur ut duae uideantur esse personae; est enim
+persona ut dictum est naturae rationabilis indiuidua substantia.
+
+Quae est igitur facta hominis deique coniunctio? Num ita quasi cum duo
+corpora sibimet apponuntur, ut tantum locis iuncta sint et nihil in alterum
+ex alterius qualitate perueniat? Quem coniunctionis Graeci modum [Greek:
+kata parathesin] uocant. Sed si ita humanitas diuinitati coniuncta est,
+nihil horum ex utrisque confectum est ac per hoc nihil est Christus. Nomen
+quippe ipsum unum quiddam significat singularitate uocabuli. At si duabus
+personis manentibus ea coniunctio qualem superius diximus facta est
+naturarum, unum ex duobus effici nihil potuit; omnino enim ex duabus
+personis nihil umquam fieri potest. Nihil igitur unum secundum Nestorium
+Christus est ac per hoc omnino nihil. Quod enim non est unum, nec esse
+omnino potest; esse enim atque unum conuertitur et quodcumque unum est est.
+Etiam ea quae ex pluribus coniunguntur ut aceruus, chorus, unum tamen sunt.
+Sed esse Christum manifeste ac ueraciter confitemur; unum igitur esse
+dicimus Christum. Quod si ita est, unam quoque Christi sine dubitatione
+personam esse necesse est. Nam si duae personae essent, unus esse non
+posset; duos uero esse dicere Christos nihil est aliud nisi praecipitatae
+mentis insania. Cur enim omnino duos audeat Christos uocare, unum hominem
+alium deum? Vel cur eum qui deus est Christum uocat, si eum quoque qui homo
+est Christum est appellaturus, cum nihil simile, nihil habeant ex
+copulatione coniunctum? Cur simili nomine diuersissimis abutatur naturis,
+cum, si Christum definire cogitur, utrisque ut ipse dicit Christis non
+possit unam definitionis adhibere substantiam? Si enim dei atque hominis
+diuersa substantia est unumque in utrisque Christi nomen nec diuersarum
+coniunctio substantiarum unam creditur fecisse personam, aequiuocum nomen
+est Christi et nulla potest definitione concludi. Quibus autem umquam
+scripturis nomen Christi geminatur? Quid uero noui per aduentum saluatoris
+effectum est? Nam catholicis et fidei ueritas et raritas miraculi constat.
+Quam enim magnum est quamque nouum, quam quod semel nec ullo alio saeculo
+possit euenire, ut eius qui solus est deus natura cum humana quae ab eo
+erat diuersissima conueniret atque ita ex distantibus naturis una fieret
+copulatione persona! Secundum Nestorii uero sententiam quid contingit noui?
+"Seruant," inquit, "proprias humanitas diuinitasque personas." Quando enim
+non fuit diuinitatis propria humanitatisque persona? Quando uero non erit?
+Vel quid amplius in Iesu generatione contingit quam in cuiuslibet alterius,
+si discretis utrisque personis discretae etiam fuere naturae? Ita enim
+personis manentibus illic nulla naturarum potuit esse coniunctio, ut in
+quolibet homine, cuius cum propria persona subsistat, nulla est ei
+excellentissimae substantiae coniuncta diuinitas. Sed fortasse Iesum, id
+est personam hominis, idcirco Christum uocet, quoniam per eam mira quaedam
+sit operata diuinitas. Esto. Deum uero ipsum Christi appellatione cur
+uocet? Cur uero non elementa quoque ipsa simili audeat appellare uocabulo
+per quae deus mira quaedam cotidianis motibus operatur? An quia
+inrationabiles substantiae non possunt habere personam qua[64] Christi
+uocabulum excipere possint[65]? Nonne in sanctis hominibus ac pietate
+conspicuis apertus diuinitatis actus agnoscitur? Nihil enim intererit, cur
+non sanctos quoque uiros eadem appellatione dignetur, si in adsumptione
+humanitatis non est una ex coniunctione persona. Sed dicat forsitan, "Illos
+quoque Christos uocari fateor, sed ad imaginem ueri Christi." Quod si nulla
+ex homine atque deo una persona coniuncta est, omnes ita ueros Christos
+arbitrabimur ut hunc qui ex uirgine genitus creditur. Nulla quippe in hoc
+adunata persona est ex dei atque hominis copulatione sicut nec in eis, qui
+dei spiritu de uenturo Christo praedicebant, propter quod etiam ipsi quoque
+appellati sunt Christi. Iam uero sequitur, ut personis manentibus nullo
+modo a diuinitate humanitas credatur adsumpta. Omnino enim disiuncta sunt
+quae aeque personis naturisque separantur, prorsus inquam disiuncta sunt
+nec magis inter se homines bouesque disiuncti quam diuinitas in Christo
+humanitasque discreta est, si mansere personae. Homines quippe ac boues una
+animalis communitate iunguntur; est enim illis secundum genus communis
+substantia eademque in uniuersalitatis collectione natura. Deo uero atque
+homini quid non erit diuersa ratione disiunctum, si sub diuersitate naturae
+personarum quoque credatur mansisse discretio? Non est igitur saluatum
+genus humanum, nulla in nos salus Christi generatione processit, tot
+prophetarum scripturae populum inlusere credentem, omnis ueteris testamenti
+spernatur auctoritas per quam salus mundo Christi generatione promittitur.
+Non autem prouenisse manifestum est, si eadem in persona est quae in natura
+diuersitas. Eundem quippe saluum fecit quem creditur adsumpsisse; nulla
+uero intellegi adsumptio potest, si manet aeque naturae personaeque
+discretio. Igitur qui adsumi manente persona non potuit, iure non uidebitur
+per Christi generationem potuisse saluari. Non est igitur per generationem
+Christi hominum saluata natura,--quod credi nefas est.
+
+Sed quamquam permulta sint quae hunc sensum inpugnare ualeant atque
+perfringere, de argumentorum copia tamen haec interim libasse sufficiat.
+
+
+[64] quae _codd._
+
+[65] possit _Vallinus_.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  You must consider that all I have said so far has been for the purpose
+  of marking the difference between Nature and Person, that is, [Greek:
+  ousia] and [Greek: hupostasis]. The exact terms which should be applied
+  in each case must be left to the decision of ecclesiastical usage. For
+  the time being let that distinction between Nature and Person hold which
+  I have affirmed, viz. that Nature is the specific property of any
+  substance, and Person the individual substance of a rational nature.
+  Nestorius affirmed that in Christ Person was twofold, being led astray
+  by the false notion that Person may be applied to every nature. For on
+  this assumption, understanding that there were in Christ two natures, he
+  declared that there were likewise two persons. And although the
+  definition which we have already given is enough to prove Nestorius
+  wrong, his error shall be further declared by the following argument. If
+  the Person of Christ is not single, and if it is clear that there are in
+  Him two natures, to wit, divine and human (and no one will be so foolish
+  as to fail to include either in the definition), it follows that there
+  must apparently be two persons; for Person, as has been said, is the
+  individual substance of a rational nature.
+
+  What kind of union, then, between God and man has been effected? Is it
+  as when two bodies are laid the one against the other, so that they are
+  only joined locally, and no touch of the quality of the one reaches the
+  other--the kind of union which the Greeks term [Greek: kata parathesin]
+  "by juxtaposition"? But if humanity has been united to divinity in this
+  way no one thing has been formed out of the two, and hence Christ is
+  nothing. The very name of Christ, indeed, denotes by its singular number
+  a unity. But if the two persons continued and such a union of natures as
+  we have above described took place, there could be no unity formed from
+  two things, for nothing could ever possibly be formed out of two
+  persons. Therefore Christ is, according to Nestorius, in no respect one,
+  and therefore He is absolutely nothing. For what is not one cannot exist
+  either; because Being and unity are convertible terms, and whatever is
+  one is. Even things which are made up of many items, such as a heap or
+  chorus, are nevertheless a unity. Now we openly and honestly confess
+  that Christ is; therefore we say that Christ is a Unity. And if this is
+  so, then without controversy the Person of Christ is one also. For if
+  the Persons were two He could not be one; but to say that there are two
+  Christs is nothing else than the madness of a distraught brain. Could
+  Nestorius, I ask, dare to call the one man and the one God in Christ two
+  Christs? Or why does he call Him Christ who is God, if he is also going
+  to call Him Christ who is man, when his combination gives the two no
+  common factor, no coherence? Why does he wrongly use the same name for
+  two utterly different natures, when, if he is compelled to define
+  Christ, he cannot, as he himself admits, apply the substance of one
+  definition to both his Christs? For if the substance of God is different
+  from that of man, and the one name of Christ applies to both, and the
+  combination of different substances is not believed to have formed one
+  Person, the name of Christ is equivocal[66] and cannot be comprised in
+  one definition. But in what Scriptures is the name of Christ ever made
+  double? Or what new thing has been wrought by the coming of the Saviour?
+  For the truth of the faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike
+  remain, for Catholics, unshaken. For how great and unprecedented a thing
+  it is--unique and incapable of repetition in any other age--that the
+  nature of Him who is God alone should come together with human nature
+  which was entirely different from God to form from different natures by
+  conjunction a single Person! But now, if we follow Nestorius, what
+  happens that is new? "Humanity and divinity," quoth he, "keep their
+  proper Persons." Well, when had not divinity and humanity each its
+  proper Person? And when, we answer, will this not be so? Or wherein is
+  the birth of Jesus more significant than that of any other child, if,
+  the two Persons remaining distinct, the natures also were distinct? For
+  while the Persons remained so there could no more be a union of natures
+  in Christ than there could be in any other man with whose substance, be
+  it never so perfect, no divinity was ever united because of the
+  subsistence of his proper person. But for the sake of argument let him
+  call Jesus, i.e. the human person, Christ, because through that person
+  God wrought certain wonders. Agreed. But why should he call God Himself
+  by the name of Christ? Why should he not go on to call the very elements
+  by that name? For through them in their daily movements God works
+  certain wonders. Is it because irrational substances cannot possess a
+  Person enabling them to receive the name of Christ? Is not the operation
+  of God seen plainly in men of holy life and notable piety? There will
+  surely be no reason not to call the saints also by that name, if Christ
+  taking humanity on Him is not one Person through conjunction. But
+  perhaps he will say, "I allow that such men are called Christs, but it
+  is because they are in the image of the true Christ." But if no one
+  Person has been formed of the union of God and man, we shall consider
+  all of them just as true Christs as Him who, we believe, was born of a
+  Virgin. For no Person has been made one by the union of God and man
+  either in Him or in them who by the Spirit of God foretold the coming
+  Christ, for which cause they too were called Christs. So now it follows
+  that so long as the Persons remain, we cannot in any wise believe that
+  humanity has been assumed by divinity. For things which differ alike in
+  persons and natures are certainly separate, nay absolutely separate; man
+  and oxen are not further separate than are divinity and humanity in
+  Christ, if the Persons have remained. Men indeed and oxen are united in
+  one animal nature, for by genus they have a common substance and the
+  same nature in the collection which forms the universal.[67] But God and
+  man will be at all points fundamentally different if we are to believe
+  that distinction of Persons continues under difference of nature. Then
+  the human race has not been saved, the birth of Christ has brought us no
+  salvation, the writings of all the prophets have but beguiled the people
+  that believed in them, contempt is poured upon the authority of the
+  whole Old Testament which promised to the world salvation by the birth
+  of Christ. It is plain that salvation has not been brought us, if there
+  is the same difference in Person that there is in Nature. No doubt He
+  saved that humanity which we believe He assumed; but no assumption can
+  be conceived, if the separation abides alike of Nature and of Person.
+  Hence that human nature which could not be assumed as long as the Person
+  continued, will certainly and rightly appear incapable of salvation by
+  the birth of Christ. Wherefore man's nature has not been saved by the
+  birth of Christ--an impious conclusion.[68]
+
+  But although there are many weapons strong enough to wound and demolish
+  the Nestorian view, let us for the moment be content with this small
+  selection from the store of arguments available.
+
+  [66] Cf. the discussion of _aequiuoca_=[Greek: homonumos] in _Isag.
+  Porph. Vide_ Brandt's Index.
+
+  [67] Vniuersalitas=[Greek: to katholou].
+
+  [68] For a similar _reductio ad absurdum_ ending in _quod nefas est_ see
+  _Tr._ iii. (_supra_, p. 44) and _Cons._ v. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Transeundum quippe est ad Eutychen qui cum a ueterum orbitis esset
+euagatus, in contrarium cucurrit errorem asserens tantum abesse, ut in
+Christo gemina persona credatur, ut ne naturam quidem in eo duplicem
+oporteat confiteri; ita quippe esse adsumptum hominem, ut ea sit adunatio
+facta cum deo, ut natura humana non manserit. Huius error ex eodem quo
+Nestorii fonte prolabitur. Nam sicut Nestorius arbitratur non posse esse
+naturam duplicem quin persona fieret duplex, atque ideo, cum in Christo
+naturam duplicem confiteretur, duplicem credidit esse personam, ita quoque
+Eutyches non putauit naturam duplicem esse sine duplicatione personae et
+cum non confiteretur duplicem esse personam, arbitratus est consequens, ut
+una uideretur esse natura. Itaque Nestorius recte tenens duplicem in
+Christo esse naturam sacrilege confitetur duas esse personas; Eutyches uero
+recte credens unam esse personam impie credit unam quoque esse naturam. Qui
+conuictus euidentia rerum, quandoquidem manifestum est aliam naturam esse
+hominis aliam dei, ait duas se confiteri in Christo naturas ante
+adunationem, unam uero post adunationem. Quae sententia non aperte quod
+uult eloquitur. Vt tamen eius dementiam perscrutemur, adunatio haec aut
+tempore generationis facta est aut tempore resurrectionis. Sed si tempore
+generationis facta est, uidetur putare et ante generationem fuisse humanam
+carnem non a Maria sumptam sed aliquo modo alio praeparatam, Mariam uero
+uirginem appositam ex qua caro nasceretur quae ab ea sumpta non esset,
+illam uero carnem quae antea fuerit esse et diuisam atque a diuinitatis
+substantia separatam; cum ex uirgine natus est, adunatum esse deo, ut una
+uideretur facta esse natura. Vel si haec eius sententia non est, illa esse
+poterit dicentis duas ante adunationem, unam post adunationem, si adunatio
+generatione perfecta est, ut corpus quidem a Maria sumpserit, sed, antequam
+sumeret, diuersam deitatis humanitatisque fuisse naturam; sumptam uero unam
+factam atque in diuinitatis cessisse substantiam. Quod si hanc adunationem
+non putat generatione sed resurrectione factam, rursus id duobus fieri
+arbitrabitur modis; aut enim genito Christo et non adsumente de Maria
+corpus aut adsumente ab eadem carnem, usque dum resurgeret quidem, duas
+fuisse naturas, post resurrectionem unam factam. De quibus illud disiunctum
+nascitur, quod interrogabimus hoc modo: natus ex Maria Christus aut ab ea
+carnem humanam traxit aut minime. Si non confitetur ex ea traxisse, dicat
+quo homine indutus aduenerit, utrumne eo qui deciderat praeuaricatione
+peccati an alio? Si eo de cuius semine ductus est homo, quem uestita
+diuinitas est? Nam si ex semine Abrahae atque Dauid et postremo Mariae non
+fuit caro illa qua natus est, ostendat ex cuius hominis sit carne
+deriuatus, quoniam post primum hominem caro omnis humana ex humana carne
+deducitur. Sed si quem dixerit hominem a quo generatio sumpta sit
+saluatoris praeter Mariam uirginem, et ipse errore confundetur et
+adscribere mendacii notam summae diuinitati inlusus ipse uidebitur, quando
+quod Abrahae atque Dauid promittitur in sanctis diuinationibus, ut ex eorum
+semine toti mundo salus oriatur, aliis distribuit, cum praesertim, si
+humana caro sumpta est, non ab alio sumi potuerit nisi unde etiam
+procreabatur. Si igitur a Maria non est sumptum corpus humanum sed a
+quolibet alio, per Mariam tamen est procreatum quod fuerat praeuaricatione
+corruptum, superius dicto repellitur argumento. Quod si non eo homine
+Christus indutus est qui pro peccati poena sustinuerat mortem, illud
+eueniet ex nullius hominis semine talem potuisse nasci qui fuerit sine
+originalis poena peccati. Ex nullo igitur talis sumpta est caro; unde fit
+ut nouiter uideatur esse formata. Sed haec aut ita hominum uisa est oculis,
+ut humanum putaretur corpus quod reuera non esset humanum, quippe quod
+nulli originali subiaceret poenae, aut noua quaedam uera nec poenae peccati
+subiacens originalis ad tempus hominis natura formata est? Si uerum hominis
+corpus non fuit, aperte arguitur mentita diuinitas, quae ostenderet
+hominibus corpus, quod cum uerum non esset, tum fallerentur ii[69] qui
+uerum esse arbitrarentur. At si noua ueraque non ex homine sumpta caro
+formata est, quo tanta tragoedia generationis? Vbi ambitus passionis? Ego
+quippe ne in homine quidem non stulte fieri puto quod inutiliter factum
+est. Ad quam uero utilitatem facta probabitur tanta humilitas diuinitatis,
+si homo qui periit generatione ac passione Christi saluatus non est,
+quoniam negatur adsumptus? Rursus igitur sicut ab eodem Nestorii fonte
+Eutychis error principium sumpsit, ita ad eundem finem relabitur, ut
+secundum Eutychen quoque non sit saluatum genus humanum, quoniam non is qui
+aeger esset et saluatione curaque egeret, adsumptus est. Traxisse autem
+hanc sententiam uidetur, si tamen huius erroris fuit ut crederet non fuisse
+corpus Christi uere ex homine sed extra atque adeo in caelo formatum,
+quoniam cum eo in caelum creditur ascendisse. Quod exemplum continet tale:
+"non ascendit in caelum, nisi qui de caelo descendit."
+
+
+[69] hii _uel_ hi _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  I must now pass to Eutyches who, wandering from the path of primitive
+  doctrine, has rushed into the opposite error[70] and asserts that so far
+  from our having to believe in a twofold Person in Christ, we must not
+  even confess a double Nature; humanity, he maintains, was so assumed
+  that the union with Godhead involved the disappearance of the human
+  nature. His error springs from the same source as that of Nestorius. For
+  just as Nestorius deems there could not be a double Nature unless the
+  Person were doubled, and therefore, confessing the double Nature in
+  Christ, has perforce believed the Person to be double, so also Eutyches
+  deemed that the Nature was not double unless the Person was double, and
+  since he did not confess a double Person, he thought it a necessary
+  consequence that the Nature should be regarded as single. Thus
+  Nestorius, rightly holding Christ's Nature to be double, sacrilegiously
+  professes the Persons to be two; whereas Eutyches, rightly believing the
+  Person to be single, impiously believes that the Nature also is single.
+  And being confuted by the plain evidence of facts, since it is clear
+  that the Nature of God is different from that of man, he declares his
+  belief to be: two Natures in Christ before the union and only one after
+  the union. Now this statement does not express clearly what he means.
+  However, let us scrutinize his extravagance. It is plain that this union
+  took place either at the moment of conception or at the moment of
+  resurrection. But if it happened at the moment of conception, Eutyches
+  seems to think that even before conception He had human flesh, not taken
+  from Mary but prepared in some other way, while the Virgin Mary was
+  brought in to give birth to flesh that was not taken from her; that this
+  flesh, which already existed, was apart and separate from the substance
+  of divinity, but that when He was born of the Virgin it was united to
+  God, so that the Nature seemed to be made one. Or if this be not his
+  opinion, since he says that there were two Natures before the union and
+  one after, supposing the union to be established by conception, an
+  alternative view may be that Christ indeed took a body from Mary but
+  that before He took it the Natures of Godhead and manhood were
+  different: but the Nature assumed became one with that of Godhead into
+  which it passed. But if he thinks that this union was effected not by
+  conception but by resurrection, we shall have to assume that this too
+  happened in one of two ways; either Christ was conceived and did
+  _not_ assume a body from Mary or He _did_ assume flesh from
+  her, and there were (until indeed He rose) two Natures which became one
+  after the Resurrection. From these alternatives a dilemma arises which
+  we will examine as follows: Christ who was born of Mary either did or
+  did not take human flesh from her. If Eutyches does not admit that He
+  took it from her, then let him say what manhood He put on to come among
+  us--that which had fallen through sinful disobedience or another? If it
+  was the manhood of that man from whom all men descend, what manhood did
+  divinity invest? For if that flesh in which He was born came not of the
+  seed of Abraham and of David and finally of Mary, let Eutyches show from
+  what man's flesh he descended, since, after the first man, all human
+  flesh is derived from human flesh. But if he shall name any child of man
+  beside Mary the Virgin as the cause of the conception of the Saviour, he
+  will both be confounded by his own error, and, himself a dupe, will
+  stand accused of stamping with falsehood the very Godhead for thus
+  transferring to others the promise of the sacred oracles made to Abraham
+  and David[71] that of their seed salvation should arise for all the
+  world, especially since if human flesh was taken it could not be taken
+  from any other but Him of whom it was begotten. If, therefore, His human
+  body was not taken from Mary but from any other, yet that was engendered
+  through Mary which had been corrupted by disobedience, Eutyches is
+  confuted by the argument already stated. But if Christ did not put on
+  that manhood which had endured death in punishment for sin, it will
+  result that of no man's seed could ever one have been born who should
+  be, like Him, without punishment for original sin. Therefore flesh like
+  His was taken from no man, whence it would appear to have been new-
+  formed for the purpose. But did this flesh then either so appear to
+  human eyes that the body was deemed human which was not really human,
+  because it was not subject to any primal penalty, or was some new true
+  human flesh formed as a makeshift, not subject to the penalty for
+  original sin? If it was not a truly human body, the Godhead is plainly
+  convicted of falsehood for displaying to men a body which was not real
+  and thus deceived those who thought it real.  But if flesh had been
+  formed new and real and not taken from man, to what purpose was the
+  tremendous tragedy of the conception? Where the value of His long
+  Passion? I cannot but consider foolish even a human action that is
+  useless. And to what useful end shall we say this great humiliation of
+  Divinity was wrought if ruined man has not been saved by the conception
+  and the Passion of Christ--for they denied that he was taken into
+  Godhead? Once more then, just as the error of Eutyches took its rise
+  from the same source as that of Nestorius, so it hastens to the same
+  goal inasmuch as according to Eutyches also the human race has not been
+  saved,[72] since man who was sick and needed health and salvation was
+  not taken into Godhead. Yet this is the conclusion he seems to have
+  drawn, if he erred so deeply as to believe that Christ's body was not
+  taken really from man but from a source outside him and prepared for the
+  purpose in heaven, for He is believed to have ascended with it up into
+  heaven. Which is the meaning of the text: none hath ascended into heaven
+  save Him who came down from heaven.
+
+
+  [70] The ecclesiastical _uia media_, with the relegation of opposing
+  theories to the extremes, which meet in a common fount of falsity, owes
+  something to Aristotle and to our author. _Vide infra_, p. 118.
+
+  [71] The use of this kind of argument by Boethius allays any suspicion
+  as to the genuineness of _Tr_. iv. which might be caused by the use of
+  allegorical interpretation therein. Note also that in the _Consolatio_
+  the framework is allegory, which is also freely applied in the details.
+
+  [72] Another _reductio ad absurdum_ or _ad impietatem_, cf. _supra_, p.
+  98, note b.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Sed satis de ea parte dictum uidetur, si corpus quod Christus excepit ex
+Maria non credatur adsumptum. Si uero adsumptum est ex Maria neque
+permansit perfecta humana diuinaque natura, id tribus effici potuit modis:
+aut enim diuinitas in humanitatem translata est aut humanitas in
+diuinitatem aut utraeque in se ita temperatae sunt atque commixtae, ut
+neutra substantia propriam formam teneret. Sed si diuinitas in humanitatem
+translata est, factum est, quod credi nefas est, ut humanitate inmutabili
+substantia permanente diuinitas uerteretur et quod passibile atque mutabile
+naturaliter exsisteret, id inmutabile permaneret, quod uero inmutabile
+atque inpassibile naturaliter creditur, id in rem mutabilem uerteretur. Hoc
+igitur fieri nulla ratione contingit. Sed humana forsitan natura in
+deitatem uideatur esse conuersa. Hoc uero qui fieri potest, si diuinitas in
+generatione Christi et humanam animam suscepit et corpus? Non enim omnis
+res in rem omnem uerti ac transmutari potest. Nam cum substantiarum aliae
+sint corporeae, aliae incorporeae, neque corporea in incorpoream neque
+incorporea in eam quae corpus est mutari potest, nec uero incorporea in se
+inuicem formas proprias mutant; sola enim mutari transformarique in se
+possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum, nec haec omnia, sed
+ea quae in se et facere et pati possunt. Id uero probatur hoc modo: neque
+enim potest aes in lapidem permutari nec uero idem aes in herbam nec
+quodlibet aliud corpus in quodlibet aliud transfigurari potest, nisi et
+eadem sit materia rerum in se transeuntium et a se et facere et pati
+possint, ut, cum uinum atque aqua miscentur, utraque sunt talia quae actum
+sibi passionemque communicent. Potest enim aquae qualitas a uini qualitate
+aliquid pati; potest item uini ab aquae qualitate aliquid pati. Atque
+idcirco si multum quidem fuerit aquae, uini uero paululum, non dicuntur
+inmixta, sed alterum alterius qualitate corrumpitur. Si quis enim uinum
+fundat in mare, non mixtum est mari uinum sed in mare corruptum, idcirco
+quoniam qualitas aquae multitudine sui corporis nihil passa est a qualitate
+uini, sed potius in se ipsam uini qualitatem propria multitudine
+commutauit. Si uero sint mediocres sibique aequales uel paulo inaequales
+naturae quae a se facere et pati possunt, illae miscentur et mediocribus
+inter se qualitatibus temperantur. Atque haec quidem in corporibus neque
+his omnibus, sed tantum quae a se, ut dictum est, et facere et pati possunt
+communi atque eadem materia subiecta. Omne enim corpus quod in generatione
+et corruptione subsistit communem uidetur habere materiam, sed non omne ab
+omni uel in omni uel facere aliquid uel pati potest. Corpora uero in
+incorporea nulla ratione poterunt permutari, quoniam nulla communi materia
+subiecta participant quae susceptis qualitatibus in alterutram permutetur.
+Omnis enim natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae nititur
+fundamento; nullum uero corpus est cui non sit materia subiecta. Quod cum
+ita sit cumque ne ea quidem quae communem materiam naturaliter habent in se
+transeant, nisi illis adsit potestas in se et a se faciendi ac patiendi,
+multo magis in se non permutabuntur quibus non modo communis materia non
+est, sed cum alia res materiae fundamento nititur ut corpus, alia omnino
+materiae subiecto non egeat ut incorporeum.
+
+Non igitur fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur, nec
+uero fieri potest, ut incorporalia in sese commixtione aliqua permutentur.
+Quorum enim communis nulla materia est, nec in se uerti ac permutari
+queunt. Nulla autem est incorporalibus materia rebus; non poterunt igitur
+in se inuicem permutari. Sed anima et deus incorporeae substantiae recte
+creduntur; non est igitur humana anima in diuinitatem a qua adsumpta est
+permutata. Quod si neque corpus neque anima in diuinitatem potuit uerti,
+nullo modo fieri potuit, ut humanitas conuerteretur in deum. Multo minus
+uero credi potest, ut utraque in sese confunderentur, quoniam neque
+incorporalitas transire ad corpus potest neque rursus e conuerso corpus ad
+incorporalitatem, quando quidem nulla his materia subiecta communis est
+quae alterutris substantiarum qualitatibus permutetur.
+
+At hi ita aiunt ex duabus quidem naturis Christum consistere, in duabus
+uero minime, hoc scilicet intendentes, quoniam quod ex duabus consistit ita
+unum fieri potest, ut illa ex quibus dicitur constare non maneant; ueluti
+cum mel aquae confunditur neutrum manet, sed alterum alterius copulatione
+corruptum quiddam tertium fecit, ita illud quidem quod ex melle atque aqua
+tertium fit constare ex utrisque dicitur, in utrisque uero negatur. Non
+enim poterit in utrisque constare, quando utrorumque natura non permanet.
+Ex utrisque enim constare potest, licet ea ex quibus coniungitur alterutra
+qualitate corrupta sint; in utrisque uero huiusmodi constare non poterit,
+quoniam ea quae in se transfusa sunt non manent ac non sunt utraque in
+quibus constare uideatur, cum ex utrisque constet in se inuicem qualitatum
+mutatione transfusis.
+
+Catholici uero utrumque rationabiliter confitentur, nam et ex utrisque
+naturis Christum et in utrisque consistere. Sed id qua ratione dicatur,
+paulo posterius explicabo. Nunc illud est manifestum conuictam esse
+Eutychis sententiam eo nomine, quod cum tribus modis fieri possit, ut ex
+duabus naturis una subsistat, ut aut diuinitas in humanitatem translata sit
+aut humanitas in diuinitatem aut utraque permixta sint, nullum horum modum
+fieri potuisse superius dicta argumentatione declaratur.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  I think enough has been said on the supposition that we should believe
+  that the body which Christ received was not taken from Mary. But if it
+  was taken from Mary and the human and divine natures did not continue,
+  each in its perfection, this may have happened in one of three ways.
+  Either Godhead was translated into manhood, or manhood into Godhead, or
+  both were so modified and mingled that neither substance kept its proper
+  form. But if Godhead was translated into manhood, that has happened
+  which piety forbids us to believe, viz. while the manhood continued in
+  unchangeable substance Godhead was changed, and that which was by nature
+  passible and mutable remained immutable, while that which we believe to
+  be by nature immutable and impassible was changed into a mutable thing.
+  This cannot happen on any show of reasoning. But perchance the human
+  nature may seem to be changed into Godhead. Yet how can this be if
+  Godhead in the conception of Christ received both human soul and body?
+  Things cannot be promiscuously changed and interchanged. For since some
+  substances are corporeal and others incorporeal, neither can a corporeal
+  substance be changed into an incorporeal, nor can an incorporeal be
+  changed into that which is body, nor yet incorporeals interchange their
+  proper forms; for only those things can be interchanged and transformed
+  which possess the common substrate of the same matter, nor can all of
+  these so behave, but only those which can act upon and be acted on by
+  each other. Now this is proved as follows: bronze can no more be
+  converted into stone than it can be into grass, and generally no body
+  can be transformed into any other body unless the things which pass into
+  each other have a common matter and can act upon and be acted on by each
+  other, as when wine and water are mingled both are of such a nature as
+  to allow reciprocal action and influence. For the quality of water can
+  be influenced in some degree by that of wine, similarly the quality of
+  wine can be influenced by that of water. And therefore if there be a
+  great deal of water but very little wine, they are not said to be
+  mingled, but the one is ruined by the quality of the other. For if you
+  pour wine into the sea the wine is not mingled with the sea but is lost
+  in the sea, simply because the quality of the water owing to its bulk
+  has been in no way affected by the quality of the wine, but rather by
+  its own bulk has changed the quality of the wine into water. But if the
+  natures which are capable of reciprocal action and influence are in
+  moderate proportion and equal or only slightly unequal, they are really
+  mingled and tempered by the qualities which are in moderate relation to
+  each other. This indeed takes place in bodies but not in all bodies, but
+  only in those, as has been said, which are capable of reciprocal action
+  and influence and have the same matter subject to their qualities. For
+  all bodies which subsist in conditions of birth and decay seem to
+  possess a common matter, but all bodies are not capable of reciprocal
+  action and influence. But corporeals cannot in any way be changed into
+  incorporeals because they do not share in any common underlying matter
+  which can be changed into this or that thing by taking on its qualities.
+  For the nature of no incorporeal substance rests upon a material basis;
+  but there is no body that has not matter as a substrate. Since this is
+  so, and since not even those things which naturally have a common matter
+  can pass over into each other unless they have the power of acting on
+  each other and being acted upon by each other, far more will those
+  things not suffer interchange which not only have no common matter but
+  are different in substance, since one of them, being body, rests on a
+  basis of matter, while the other, being incorporeal, cannot possibly
+  stand in need of a material substrate.
+
+  It is therefore impossible for a body to be changed into an incorporeal
+  species, nor will it ever be possible for incorporeals to be changed
+  into each other by any process of mingling. For things which have no
+  common matter cannot be changed and converted one into another. But
+  incorporeal things have no matter; they can never, therefore, be changed
+  about among themselves. But the soul and God are rightly believed to be
+  incorporeal substances; therefore the human soul has not been converted
+  into the Godhead by which it was assumed. But if neither body nor soul
+  can be turned into Godhead, it could not possibly happen that manhood
+  should be transformed into God. But it is much less credible that the
+  two should be confounded together since neither can incorporality pass
+  over to body, nor again, contrariwise, can body pass over into
+  incorporality when these have no common matter underlying them which can
+  be converted by the qualities of one of two substances.
+
+  But the Eutychians say that Christ consists indeed of two natures, but
+  not in two natures, meaning, no doubt, thereby, that a thing which
+  consists of two elements can so far become one, that the elements of
+  which it is said to be made up disappear; just as, for example, when
+  honey is mixed with water neither remains, but the one thing being
+  spoilt by conjunction with the other produces a certain third thing, so
+  that third thing which is produced by the combination of honey and water
+  is said to consist of both, but not in both. For it can never consist in
+  both so long as the nature of both does not continue. For it can consist
+  of both even though each element of which it is compounded has been
+  spoiled by the quality of the other; but it can never consist in both
+  natures of this kind since the elements which have been transmuted into
+  each other do not continue, and both the elements in which it seems to
+  consist cease to be, since it consists of two things translated into
+  each other by change of qualities.
+
+  But Catholics in accordance with reason confess both, for they say that
+  Christ consists both of and in two natures. How this can be affirmed I
+  will explain a little later. One thing is now clear; the opinion of
+  Eutyches has been confuted on the ground that, although there are three
+  ways by which the one nature can subsist of the two, viz. either the
+  translation of divinity into humanity or of humanity into divinity or
+  the compounding of both together, the foregoing train of reasoning
+  proves that no one of the three ways is a possibility.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Restat ut, quemadmodum catholica fides dicat, et in utrisque naturis
+Christum et ex utrisque consistere doceamus.
+
+Ex utrisque naturis aliquid consistere duo significat: unum quidem, cum ita
+dicimus aliquid ex duabus naturis iungi sicut ex melle atque aqua, id autem
+est ut ex quolibet modo confusis, uel si una uertatur in alteram uel si
+utraeque in se inuicem misceantur, nullo modo tamen utraeque permaneant;
+secundum hunc modum Eutyches ait ex utrisque naturis Christum consistere.
+
+Alter uero modus est ex utrisque consistendi quod ita ex duabus iunctum
+est, ut illa tamen ex quibus iunctum esse dicitur maneant nec in alterutra
+uertantur, ut cum dicimus coronam ex auro gemmisque compositam. Hic neque
+aurum in gemmas translatum est neque in aurum gemma conuersa, sed utraque
+permanent nec formam propriam derelinquunt. Talia ergo ex aliquibus
+constantia et in his constare dicimus ex quibus consistere praedicantur.
+Tunc enim possumus dicere coronam gemmis auroque consistere; sunt enim
+gemmae atque aurum in quibus corona consistat. Nam in priore modo non est
+mel atque aqua in quibus illud quod ex utrisque iungitur constet. Cum
+igitur utrasque manere naturas in Christo fides catholica confiteatur
+perfectasque easdem persistere nec alteram in alteram transmutari, iure
+dicit et in utrisque naturis Christum et ex utrisque consistere: in
+utrisque quidem, quia manent utraeque, ex utrisque uero, quia utrarumque
+adunatione manentium una persona fit Christi. Non autem secundum eam
+significationem ex utrisque naturis Christum iunctum esse fides catholica
+tenet, secundum quam Eutyches pronuntiat. Nam ille talem significationem
+coniunctionis ex utraque natura sumit, ut non confiteatur in utrisque
+consistere, neque enim utrasque manere; catholicus uero eam significationem
+ex utrisque consistendi sumit quae illi sit proxima eamque conseruet quae
+in utrisque consistere confitetur.
+
+Aequiuocum igitur est "ex utrisque consistere" ac potius amphibolum et
+gemina significatione diuersa designans: una quidem significatione non
+manere substantias ex quibus illud quod copulatum est dicatur esse
+coniunctum, alio modo significans ita ex utrisque coniunctum, ut utraque
+permaneant.
+
+Hoc igitur expedito aequiuocationis atque ambiguitatis nodo nihil est ultra
+quod possit opponi, quin id sit quod firma ueraque fides catholica
+continet; eundem Christum hominem esse perfectum, eundem deum eundemque qui
+homo sit perfectus atque deus unum esse deum ac dei filium, nec
+quaternitatem trinitati adstrui, dum homo additur supra perfectum deum, sed
+unam eandemque personam numerum trinitatis explere, ut cum humanitas passa
+sit, deus tamen passus esse dicatur, non quo ipsa deitas humanitas facta
+sit, sed quod a deitate fuerit adsumpta. Item qui homo est, dei filius
+appellatur non substantia diuinitatis sed humanitatis, quae tamen
+diuinitati naturali unitate coniuncta est. Et cum haec ita intellegentia
+discernantur permisceanturque, tamen unus idemque et homo sit perfectus et
+deus: deus quidem, quod ipse sit ex patris substantia genitus, homo uero,
+quod ex Maria sit uirgine procreatus. Itemque qui homo, deus eo quod a deo
+fuerit adsumptus, et qui deus, homo, quoniam uestitus homine sit. Cumque in
+eadem persona aliud sit diuinitas quae suscepit, aliud quam suscepit
+humanitas, idem tamen deus atque homo est. Nam si hominem intellegas, idem
+homo est atque deus, quoniam homo ex natura, deus adsumptione. Si uero deum
+intellegas, idem deus est atque homo, quoniam natura deus est, homo
+adsumptione. Fitque in eo gemina natura geminaque substantia, quoniam homo-
+deus unaque persona, quoniam idem homo atque deus. Mediaque est haec inter
+duas haereses uia sicut uirtutes quoque medium tenent. Omnis enim uirtus in
+medio rerum decore locata consistit. Siquid enim uel ultra uel infra quam
+oportuerit fiat, a uirtute disceditur. Medietatem igitur uirtus tenet.
+
+Quocirca si quattuor haec neque ultra neque infra esse possunt, ut in
+Christo aut duae naturae sint duaeque personae ut Nestorius ait, aut una
+persona unaque natura ut Eutyches ait, aut duae naturae sed una persona ut
+catholica fides credit, aut una natura duaeque personae,[73] cumque duas
+quidem naturas duasque personas in ea quae contra Nestorium dicta est
+responsione conuicerimus (unam uero personam unamque naturam esse non posse
+Eutyche proponente monstrauimus neque tamen tam amens quisquam huc usque
+exstitit, ut unam in eo naturam crederet sed geminas esse personas), restat
+ut ea sit uera quam fides catholica pronuntiat geminam substantiam sed unam
+esse personam. Quia uero paulo ante diximus Eutychen confiteri duas quidem
+in Christo ante adunationem naturas, unam uero post adunationem, cumque
+hunc errorem duplicem interpretaremur celare sententiam, ut haec adunatio
+aut generatione fieret, cum ex Maria corpus hominis minime sumeretur aut ad
+sumptum[74] quidem ex Maria per resurrectionem fieret adunatio, de utrisque
+quidem partibus idonee ut arbitror disputatum est. Nunc quaerendum est
+quomodo fieri potuerit ut duae naturae in unam substantiam miscerentur.
+
+
+[73] quod nullus haereticus adhuc attigit _addunt codices quidam_.
+
+[74] sumptum _codd._; adsumptum _preli diabolus_, ad sumptum _nos_.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  It remains for us to show how in accordance with the affirmation of
+  Catholic belief Christ consists at once in and of both natures.
+
+  The statement that a thing consists of two natures bears two meanings;
+  one, when we say that anything is a union of two natures, as e.g. honey
+  and water, where the union is such that in the combination, however the
+  elements be confounded, whether by one nature changing into the other,
+  or by both mingling with each other, the two entirely disappear. This is
+  the way in which according to Eutyches Christ consists of two natures.
+
+  The other way in which a thing can consist of two natures is when it is
+  so combined of two that the elements of which it is said to be combined
+  continue without changing into each other, as when we say that a crown
+  is composed of gold and gems. Here neither is the gold converted into
+  gems nor is the gem turned into gold, but both continue without
+  surrendering their proper form.
+
+  Things then like this, composed of various elements, we say consist also
+  in the elements of which they are composed. For in this case we can say
+  that a crown is composed of gems and gold, for gems and gold are that in
+  which the crown consists. For in the former mode of composition honey
+  and water is not that in which the resulting union of both consists.
+
+  Since then the Catholic Faith confesses that both natures continue in
+  Christ and that they both remain perfect, neither being transformed into
+  the other, it says with right that Christ consists both in and of the
+  two natures; _in_ the two because both continue, _of_ the two
+  because the One Person of Christ is formed by the union of the two
+  continuing natures.
+
+  But the Catholic Faith does not hold the union of Christ out of two
+  natures according to that sense which Eutyches puts upon it. For the
+  interpretation of the conjunction out of two natures which he adopts
+  forbids him to confess consistence in two or the continuance of the two
+  either; but the Catholic adopts an interpretation of the consistence out
+  of two which comes near to that of Eutyches, yet keeps the
+  interpretation which confesses consistence in two.
+
+  "To consist of two natures" is therefore an equivocal or rather a
+  doubtful term of double meaning denoting different things; according to
+  one of its interpretations the substances out of which the union is said
+  to have been composed do not continue, according to another the union
+  effected of the two is such that both natures continue.
+
+  When once this knot of doubt or ambiguity has been untied, nothing
+  further can be advanced to shake the true and solid content of the
+  Catholic Faith, which is that the same Christ is perfect man and God,
+  and that He who is perfect man and God is One God and Son of Man, that,
+  however, quaternity is not added to the Trinity by the addition of human
+  nature to perfect Godhead, but that one and the same Person completes
+  the number of the Trinity, so that, although it was the manhood which
+  suffered, yet God can be said to have suffered, not by manhood becoming
+  Godhead but by manhood being assumed by Godhead. Further, He who is man
+  is called Son of God not in virtue of divine but of human substance,
+  which latter none the less was conjoined to Godhead in a unity of
+  natures. And although thought is able to distinguish and combine the
+  manhood and the Godhead, yet one and the same is perfect man and God,
+  God because He was begotten of the substance of the Father, but man
+  because He was engendered of the Virgin Mary. And further He who is man
+  is God in that manhood was assumed by God, and He who is God is man in
+  that God was clothed with manhood. And although in the same Person the
+  Godhead which took manhood is different from the manhood which It took,
+  yet the same is God and man. For if you think of man, the same is man
+  and God, being man by nature, God by assumption. But if you think of
+  God, the same is God and man, being God by nature, man by assumption.
+  And in Him nature becomes double and substance double because He is God-
+  man, and One Person since the same is man and God. This is the middle
+  way between two heresies, just as virtues also hold a middle place.[75]
+  For every virtue has a place of honour midway between extremes. For if
+  it stands beyond or below where it should it ceases to be virtue. And so
+  virtue holds a middle place.
+
+  Wherefore if the following four assertions can be said to be neither
+  beyond or below reason, viz. that in Christ are either two Natures and
+  two Persons as Nestorius says, or one Person and one Nature as Eutyches
+  says, or two Natures but one Person as the Catholic Faith believes, or
+  one Nature and two Persons, and inasmuch as we have refuted the doctrine
+  of two Natures and two Persons in our argument against Nestorius and
+  incidentally have shown that the one Person and one Nature suggested by
+  Eutyches is impossible--since there has never been anyone so mad as to
+  believe that His Nature was single but His Person double--it remains
+  that the article of belief must be true which the Catholic Faith
+  affirms, viz. that the Nature is double, but the Person one. But as I
+  have just now remarked that Eutyches confesses two Natures in Christ
+  before the union, but only one after the union, and since I proved that
+  under this error lurked two opposite opinions, one, that the union was
+  brought about by conception although the human body was certainly not
+  taken from Mary; the other, that the body taken from Mary formed part of
+  the union by means of the Resurrection, I have, it seems to me, argued
+  the twofold aspect of the case as completely as it deserves. What we
+  have now to inquire is how it came to pass that two Natures were
+  combined into one Substance.
+
+
+  [75] _Vide supra_, p. 100 note.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Verumtamen est etiam nunc et alia quaestio quae ab his inferri potest qui
+corpus humanum ex Maria sumptum esse non credunt, sed alias fuisse
+sequestratum praeparatumque quod in adunatione ex Mariae utero gigni ac
+proferri uideretur. Aiunt enim: si ex homine sumptum est corpus, homo uero
+omnis ex prima praeuaricatione non solum peccato et morte tenebatur, uerum
+etiam affectibus peccatorum erat implicitus, eaque illi fuit poena peccati,
+ut, cum morte teneretur obstrictus, tamen esset reus etiam uoluntate
+peccandi, cur in Christo neque peccatum fuit neque uoluntas ulla peccandi?
+Et omnino habet animaduertendam dubitationem talis quaestio. Si enim ex
+carne humana Christi corpus adsumptum est, dubitari potest, quaenam caro
+haec quae adsumpta sit esse uideatur. Eum quippe saluauit quem etiam
+adsumpsit; sin uero talem hominem adsumpsit qualis Adam fuit ante peccatum,
+integram quidem uidetur humanam adsumpsisse naturam, sed tamen quae
+medicina penitus non egebat. Quomodo autem fieri potest, ut talem
+adsumpserit hominem qualis Adam fuit, cum in Adam potuerit esse peccandi
+uoluntas atque affectio, unde factum est ut etiam praetergressis diuinis
+praeceptis inoboedientiae delictis teneretur adstrictus? In Christo uero ne
+uoluntas quidem ulla creditur fuisse peccandi, cum praesertim si tale
+corpus hominis adsumpsit quale Adae ante peccatum fuit, non debuerit esse
+mortalis, quoniam Adam, si non peccasset, mortem nulla ratione sensisset.
+Cum igitur Christus non peccauerit, quaerendum est cur senserit mortem, si
+Adae corpus ante quam peccaret adsumpsit. Quod si talem statum suscepit
+hominis qualis Adae post peccatum fuit, uidetur etiam Christo non defuisse
+necessitas, ut et delictis subiceretur et passionibus confunderetur
+obductisque iudicii regulis bonum a malo non sincera integritate
+discerneret, quoniam has omnes poenas Adam delicti praeuaricatione
+suscepit.
+
+Contra quos respondendum est tres intellegi hominum posse status: unum
+quidem Adae ante delictum in quo, tametsi ab eo mors aberat nec adhuc ullo
+se delicto polluerat, poterat tamen in eo uoluntas esse peccandi: alter in
+quo mutari potuisset, si firmiter in dei praeceptis manere uoluisset, tunc
+enim id addendum foret ut non modo non peccaret aut peccare uellet sed ne
+posset quidem aut peccare aut uelle delinquere. Tertius status est post
+delictum in quo mors illum necessario subsecuta est et peccatum ipsum
+uoluntasque peccati. Quorum summitatum atque contrariorum haec loca sunt:
+is status qui praemium esset, si in praeceptis dei Adam manere uoluisset et
+is qui poenae fuit, quoniam manere noluit; in illo enim nec mors esset nec
+peccatum nec uoluntas ulla peccati, in hoc uero et mors et peccatum et
+delinquendi omnis affectio omniaque in perniciem prona nec quicquam in se
+opis habentia, ut post lapsum posset adsurgere. Ille uero medius status in
+quo praesentia quidem mortis uel peccati aberat, potestas uero utriusque
+constabat, inter utrumque statum est conlocatus. Ex his igitur tribus
+statibus Christus corporeae naturae singulas quodam modo indidit causas;
+nam quod mortale corpus adsumpsit ut mortem a genere humano fugaret, in eo
+statu ponendum est quod post Adae praeuaricationem poenaliter inflictum
+est. Quod uero non fuit in eo uoluntas ulla peccati, ex eo sumptum est
+statu qui esse potuisset, nisi uoluntatem insidiantis fraudibus
+applicasset. Restat igitur tertius status id est medius, ille scilicet qui
+eo tempore fuit, cum nec mors aderat et adesse poterat delinquendi
+uoluntas. In hoc igitur Adam talis fuit ut manducaret ac biberet, ut
+accepta digereret, ut laberetur in somnum et alia quae ei non defuerunt
+humana quidem sed concessa et quae nullam poenam mortis inferrent.
+
+Quae omnia habuisse Christum dubium non est; nam et manducauit et bibit et
+humani corporis officio functus est. Neque enim tanta indigentia in Adam
+fuisse credenda est ut nisi manducasset uiuere non potuisset, sed, si ex
+omni quidem ligno escam sumeret, semper uiuere potuisset hisque non mori;
+idcirco paradisi fructibus indigentiam explebat. Quam indigentiam fuisse in
+Christo nullus ignorat, sed potestate non necessitate; et ipsa indigentia
+ante resurrectionem in eo fuit, post resurrectionem uero talis exstitit ut
+ita illud corpus inmutaretur humanum, sicut Adae praeter praeuaricationis
+uinculum mutari potuisset. Quodque nos ipse dominus Iesus Christus uotis
+docuit optare, ut fiat uoluntas eius sicut in caelo et in terra et ut
+adueniat eius regnum et nos liberet a malo. Haec enim omnia illa beatissima
+humani generis fideliter credentium inmutatio deprecatur.
+
+Haec sunt quae ad te de fidei meae credulitate scripsi. Qua in re si quid
+perperam dictum est, non ita sum amator mei, ut ea quae semel effuderim
+meliori sententiae anteferre contendam. Si enim nihil est ex nobis boni,
+nihil est quod in nostris sententiis amare debeamus. Quod si ex illo cuncta
+sunt bona qui solus est bonus, illud potius bonum esse credendum est quod
+illa incommutabilis bonitas atque omnium bonorum causa perscribit.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Nevertheless there remains yet another question which can be advanced by
+  those who do not believe that the human body was taken from Mary, but
+  that the body was in some other way set apart and prepared, which in the
+  moment of union appeared to be conceived and born of Mary's womb. For
+  they say: if the body was taken from man while every man was, from the
+  time of the first disobedience, not only enslaved by sin and death but
+  also involved in sinful desires, and if his punishment for sin was that,
+  although he was held in chains of death, yet at the same time he should
+  be guilty because of the will to sin, why was there in Christ neither
+  sin nor any will to sin? And certainly such a question is attended by a
+  difficulty which deserves attention. For if the body of Christ was
+  assumed from human flesh, it is open to doubt of what kind we must
+  consider that flesh to be which was assumed.
+
+  In truth, the manhood which He assumed He likewise saved; but if He
+  assumed such manhood as Adam had before sin, He appears to have assumed
+  a human nature complete indeed, but one which was in no need of healing.
+  But how can it be that He assumed such manhood as Adam had when there
+  could be in Adam both the will and the desire to sin, whence it came to
+  pass that even after the divine commands had been broken, he was still
+  held captive to sins of disobedience? But we believe that in Christ
+  there was never any will to sin, because especially if He assumed such a
+  human body as Adam had before his sin, He could not be mortal, since
+  Adam, had he not sinned, would in no wise have suffered death. Since,
+  then, Christ never sinned, it must be asked why He suffered death if He
+  assumed the body of Adam before sin. But if He accepted human conditions
+  such as Adam's were after sin, it seems that Christ could not avoid
+  being subject to sin, perplexed by passions, and, since the canons of
+  judgment were obscured, prevented from distinguishing with unclouded
+  reason between good and evil, since Adam by his disobedience incurred
+  all these penalties of crime.
+
+  To whom we must reply[76] that there are three states of man to
+  envisage: one, that of Adam before his sin, in which, though free from
+  death and still unstained by any sin, he could yet have within him the
+  will to sin; the second, that in which he might have suffered change had
+  he chosen to abide steadfastly in the commands of God, for then it could
+  have been further granted him not only not to sin or wish to sin, but to
+  be incapable of sinning or of the will to transgress. The third state is
+  the state after sin, into which man needs must be pursued by death and
+  sin and the sinful will. Now the points of extreme divergence between
+  these states are the following: one state would have been for Adam a
+  reward if he had chosen to abide in God's laws; the other was his
+  punishment because he would not abide in them; for in the former state
+  there would have been no death nor sin nor sinful will, in the latter
+  there was both death and sin and every desire to transgress, and a
+  general tendency to ruin and a condition helpless to render possible a
+  rise after the Fall. But that middle state from which actual death or
+  sin was absent, but the power for both remained, is situate between the
+  other two.
+
+  Each one, then, of these three states somehow supplied to Christ a cause
+  for his corporeal nature; thus His assumption of a mortal body in order
+  to drive death far from the human race belongs properly to that state
+  which was laid on man by way of punishment after Adam's sin, whereas the
+  fact that there was in Christ no sinful will is borrowed from that state
+  which might have been if Adam had not surrendered his will to the frauds
+  of the tempter. There remains, then, the third or middle state, to wit,
+  that which was before death had come and while the will to sin might yet
+  be present. In this state, therefore, Adam was able to eat and drink,
+  digest the food he took, fall asleep, and perform all the other
+  functions which always belonged to him as man, though they were allowed
+  and brought with them no pain of death.
+
+  There is no doubt that Christ was in all points thus conditioned; for He
+  ate and drank and discharged the bodily function of the human body. For
+  we must not think that Adam was at the first subject to such need that
+  unless he ate he could not have lived, but rather that, if he had taken
+  food from every tree, he could have lived for ever, and by that food
+  have escaped death; and so by the fruits of the Garden he satisfied a
+  need.[77] And all know that in Christ the same need dwelt, but lying in
+  His own power and not laid upon Him. And this need was in Him before the
+  Resurrection, but after the Resurrection He became such that His human
+  body was changed as Adam's might have been but for the bands of
+  disobedience. Which state, moreover, our Lord Jesus Christ Himself
+  taught us to desire in our prayers, asking that His Will be done as in
+  heaven so on earth, and that His Kingdom come, and that He may deliver
+  us from evil. For all these things are sought in prayer by those members
+  of the human family who rightly believe and who are destined to undergo
+  that most blessed change of all.[78]
+
+  So much have I written to you concerning what I believe should be
+  believed. In which matter if I have said aught amiss, I am not so well
+  pleased with myself as to try to press my effusions in the face of wiser
+  judgment. For if there is no good thing in us there is nothing we should
+  fancy in our opinions. But if all things are good as coming from Him who
+  alone is good, that rather must be thought good which the Unchangeable
+  Good and Cause of all Good indites.
+
+
+  [76] This _respondendum_ has the true Thomist ring.
+
+  [77] Adam did not need to eat in order to live, but if he had not eaten
+  he would have suffered hunger, etc.
+
+  [78] The whole of this passage might be set in _Tr._ iv. without
+  altering the tone.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. EX MAG. OFF. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER I.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi,
+  Flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos.
+Ecce mihi lacerae dictant scribenda Camenae
+  Et ueris elegi fletibus ora rigant.
+Has saltem nullus potuit peruincere terror,                               5
+  Ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter.
+Gloria felicis olim uiridisque iuuentae
+  Solantur maesti nunc mea fata senis.
+Venit enim properata malis inopina senectus
+  Et dolor aetatem iussit inesse suam.                                   10
+Intempestiui funduntur uertice cani
+  Et tremit effeto corpore laxa cutis.
+Mors hominum felix quae se nec dulcibus annis
+  Inserit et maestis saepe uocata uenit.
+Eheu quam surda miseros auertitur aure                                   15
+  Et flentes oculos claudere saeua negat.
+Dum leuibus male fida bonis fortuna faueret,
+  Paene caput tristis merserat hora meum.
+Nunc quia fallacem mutauit nubila uultum,
+  Protrahit ingratas impia uita moras.                                   20
+Quid me felicem totiens iactastis amici?
+  Qui cecidit, stabili non erat ille gradu.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FIRST BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+  CONTAINING HIS COMPLAINT AND MISERIES
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  I that with youthful heat did verses write,
+  Must now my woes in doleful tunes indite.
+  My work is framed by Muses torn and rude,
+  And my sad cheeks are with true tears bedewed:
+  For these alone no terror could affray
+  From being partners of my weary way.
+  The art that was my young life's joy and glory
+  Becomes my solace now I'm old and sorry;
+  Sorrow has filched my youth from me, the thief!
+  My days are numbered not by time but Grief.[79]
+  Untimely hoary hairs cover my head,
+  And my loose skin quakes on my flesh half dead.
+  O happy death, that spareth sweetest years,
+  And comes in sorrow often called with tears.
+  Alas, how deaf is he to wretch's cries;
+  And loath he is to close up weeping eyes;
+  While trustless chance me with vain favours crowned,
+  That saddest hour my life had almost drowned:
+  Now she hath clouded her deceitful face,
+  My spiteful days prolong their weary race.
+  My friends, why did you count me fortunate?
+  He that is fallen, ne'er stood in settled state.
+
+
+  [79] Literally "For Old Age, unlooked for, sped by evils, has come, and
+  Grief has bidden her years lie on me."
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili
+officio signarem, adstitisse mihi supra uerticem uisa est mulier reuerendi
+admodum uultus, oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum ualentiam
+perspicacibus colore uiuido atque inexhausti uigoris, quamuis ita aeui
+plena foret ut nullo modo nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis
+ambiguae. Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese hominum mensuram cohibebat, nunc
+uero pulsare caelum summi uerticis cacumine uidebatur; quae cum altius
+caput extulisset, ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum
+frustrabatur intuitum. Vestes erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio,
+indissolubili materia perfectae quas, uti post eadem prodente cognoui, suis
+manibus ipsa texuerat. Quarum speciem, ueluti fumosas imagines solet,
+caligo quaedam neglectae uetustatis obduxerat. Harum in extrema margine
+[Greek: PI] Graecum, in supremo uero [Greek: THETA], legebatur intextum.
+Atque inter utrasque litteras in scalarum modum gradus quidam insigniti
+uidebantur quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus. Eandem
+tamen uestem uiolentorum quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas
+quisque potuit abstulerant. Et dextera quidem eius libellos, sceptrum uero
+sinistra gestabat.
+
+Quae ubi poeticas Musas uidit nostro adsistentes toro fletibusque meis
+uerba dictantes, commota paulisper ac toruis inflammata luminibus: "Quis,"
+inquit, "has scenicas meretriculas ad hunc aegrum permisit accedere quae
+dolores eius non modo nullis remediis fouerent, uerum dulcibus insuper
+alerent uenenis? Hae sunt enim quae infructuosis affectuum spinis uberem
+fructibus rationis segetem necant hominumque mentes assuefaciunt morbo, non
+liberant. At si quem profanum, uti uulgo solitum uobis, blanditiae uestrae
+detraherent, minus moleste ferendum putarem; nihil quippe in eo nostrae
+operae laederentur. Hunc uero Eleaticis atque Academicis studiis
+innutritum? Sed abite potius Sirenes usque in exitium dulces meisque eum
+Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite."
+
+His ille chorus increpitus deiecit humi maestior uultum confessusque rubore
+uerecundiam limen tristis excessit. At ego cuius acies lacrimis mersa
+caligaret nec dinoscere possem, quaenam haec esset mulier tam imperiosae
+auctoritatis, obstipui uisuque in terram defixo quidnam deinceps esset
+actura, exspectare tacitus coepi. Tum illa propius accedens in extrema
+lectuli mei parte consedit meumque intuens uultum luctu grauem atque in
+humum maerore deiectum his uersibus de nostrae mentis perturbatione
+conquesta est.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  While I ruminated these things with myself, and determined to set forth
+  my woful complaint in writing, methought I saw a woman stand above my
+  head, having a grave countenance, glistening clear eye, and of quicker
+  sight than commonly Nature doth afford; her colour fresh and bespeaking
+  unabated vigour, and yet discovering so many years, that she could not
+  at all be thought to belong to our times; her stature uncertain and
+  doubtful, for sometime she exceeded not the common height of men, and
+  sometime she seemed to touch the heavens with her head, and if she
+  lifted it up to the highest, she pierced the very heavens, so that she
+  could not be seen by the beholders; her garments were made of most fine
+  threads with cunning workmanship into an ever-during stuff, which (as I
+  knew afterward by her own report) she had woven with her own hands. A
+  certain duskishness caused by negligence and time had darkened their
+  colour, as it is wont to happen when pictures stand in a smoky room. In
+  the lower part of them was placed the Greek letter [Greek: PI], and in
+  the upper [Greek: THETA],[80] and betwixt the two letters, in the manner
+  of stairs, there were certain degrees made, by which there was a passage
+  from the lower to the higher letter: this her garment had been cut by
+  the violence of some, who had taken away such pieces as they could get.
+  In her right hand she had certain books, and in her left hand she held a
+  sceptre.
+
+  This woman, seeing the poetical Muses standing about my bed, and
+  suggesting words to my tears, being moved for a little space, and
+  inflamed with angry looks: "Who," saith she, "hath permitted these
+  tragical harlots to have access to this sick man, which will not only
+  not comfort his grief with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them
+  with sugared poison? For these be they which with the fruitless thorns
+  of affections do kill the fruitful crop of reason, and do accustom men's
+  minds to sickness, instead of curing them. But if your flattery did
+  deprive us of some profane fellow,[81] as commonly it happeneth, I
+  should think that it were not so grievously to be taken, for in him our
+  labours should receive no harm. But now have you laid hold of him who
+  hath been brought up in Eleatical and Academical studies?[82] Rather get
+  you gone, you Sirens pleasant even to destruction, and leave him to my
+  Muses to be cured and healed."
+
+  That company being thus checked, overcome with grief, casting their eyes
+  upon the ground, and betraying their bashfulness with blushing, went
+  sadly away. But I, whose sight was dimmed with tears, so that I could
+  not discern what this woman might be, so imperious, and of such
+  authority, was astonished, and, fixing my countenance upon the earth,
+  began to expect with silence what she would do afterward. Then she
+  coming nigher, sat down at my bed's feet, and beholding my countenance
+  sad with mourning, and cast upon the ground with grief, complained of
+  the perturbation of my mind with these verses.
+
+
+  [80] Cf. "est enim philosophia genus, species uero eius duae, una quae
+  [Greek: theoraetikae] dicitur, altera quae [Greek: praktikae], id est
+  speculatiua et actiua." Boeth. _In Porph. Dial._ i.
+
+  [81] This scorn of the _profanum vulgus_ appears again and again in the
+  theological tractates, e.g. _Tr._ iii. (_supra_, p. 4), _Tr._ v.
+  (_supra_, p. 74).
+
+  [82] Zeno of Elea invented Dialectic: Plato was the first to lecture on
+  philosophy in the gymnasium of the Academia.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Heu quam praecipiti mersa profundo
+Mens hebet et propria luce relicta
+Tendit in externas ire tenebras,
+Terrenis quotiens flatibus aucta
+Crescit in inmensum noxia cura.                                           5
+Hic quondam caelo liber aperto
+Suetus in aetherios ire meatus
+Cernebat rosei lumina solis,
+Visebat gelidae sidera lunae
+Et quaecumque uagos stella recursus                                      10
+Exercet uarios flexa per orbes,
+Comprensam numeris uictor habebat.
+Quin etiam causas unde sonora
+Flamina sollicitent aequora ponti,
+Quis uoluat stabilem spiritus orbem                                      15
+Vel cur hesperias sidus in undas
+Casurum rutilo surgat ab ortu,
+Quid ueris placidas temperet horas,
+Vt terram roseis floribus ornet,
+Quis dedit ut pleno fertilis anno                                        20
+Autumnus grauidis influat uuis
+Rimari solitus atque latentis
+Naturae uarias reddere causas,
+Nunc iacet effeto lumine mentis
+Et pressus grauibus colla catenis                                        25
+Decliuemque gerens pondere uultum
+Cogitur, heu, stolidam cernere terram.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  Alas, how thy dull mind is headlong cast
+  In depths of woe, where, all her light once lost,
+  She doth to walk in utter darkness haste,
+  While cares grow great with earthly tempests tost.
+  He that through the opened heavens did freely run,
+  And used to travel the celestial ways,
+  Marking the rosy splendour of the sun,
+  And noting Cynthia's cold and watery rays;
+  He that did bravely comprehend in verse
+  The different spheres and wandering course of stars,
+  He that was wont the causes to rehearse
+  Why sounding winds do with the seas make wars,
+  What spirit moves the world's well-settled frame,
+  And why the sun, whom forth the east doth bring,
+  In western waves doth hide his falling flame,
+  Searching what power tempers the pleasing Spring
+  Which makes the earth her rosy flowers to bear,
+  Whose gift it is that Autumn's fruitful season
+  Should with full grapes flow in a plenteous year,
+  Telling of secret Nature every reason,
+  Now having lost the beauty of his mind
+  Lies with his neck compassed in ponderous chains;
+  His countenance with heavy weight declined,
+  Him to behold the sullen earth constrains.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+"Sed medicinae," inquit, "tempus est quam querelae." Tum uero totis in me
+intenta luminibus: "Tune ille es," ait, "qui nostro quondam lacte nutritus
+nostris educatus alimentis in uirilis animi robur euaseras? Atqui talia
+contuleramus arma quae nisi prior abiecisses, inuicta te firmitate
+tuerentur. Agnoscisne me? Quid taces? Pudore an stupore siluisti? Mallem
+pudore, sed te, ut uideo, stupor oppressit." Cumque me non modo tacitum sed
+elinguem prorsus mutumque uidisset, admouit pectori meo leniter manum et:
+"Nihil," inquit, "pericli est; lethargum patitur communem inlusarum mentium
+morbum. Sui paulisper oblitus est; recordabitur facile, si quidem nos ante
+cognouerit. Quod ut possit, paulisper lumina eius mortalium rerum nube
+caligantia tergamus." Haec dixit oculosque meos fletibus undantes contracta
+in rugam ueste siccauit.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  "But it is rather time," saith she, "to apply remedies, than to make
+  complaints." And then looking wistfully upon me: "Art thou he," saith
+  she, "which, being long since nursed with our milk, and brought up with
+  our nourishments, wert come to man's estate? But we had given thee such
+  weapons as, if thou hadst not cast them away, would have made thee
+  invincible. Dost thou not know me? Why dost thou not speak? Is it
+  shamefastness or insensibleness that makes thee silent? I had rather it
+  were shamefastness, but I perceive thou art become insensible." And
+  seeing me not only silent but altogether mute and dumb, fair and easily
+  she laid her hand upon my breast saying: "There is no danger; he is in a
+  lethargy, the common disease of deceived minds; he hath a little forgot
+  himself, but he will easily remember himself again, if he be brought to
+  know us first. To which end, let us a little wipe his eyes, dimmed with
+  the cloud of mortal things." And having thus said, with a corner of her
+  garment she dried my eyes which were wet with tears.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Tunc me discussa liquerunt nocte tenebrae
+  Luminibusque prior rediit uigor,
+Vt, cum praecipiti glomerantur sidera Coro
+  Nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus,
+Sol latet ac nondum caelo uenientibus astris,                             5
+  Desuper in terram nox funditur;
+Hanc si Threicio Boreas emissus ab antro
+  Verberet et clausam reseret diem,
+Emicat ac subito uibratus lumine Phoebus
+  Mirantes oculos radiis ferit.                                          10
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Then fled the night and darkness did me leave.
+  Mine eyes their wonted strength receive,
+  As when swift Corus spreads the stars with clouds
+    And the clear sky a veil of tempest shrouds
+  The sun doth lurk, the earth receiveth night.
+    Lacking the boon of starry light;
+  But if fierce Boreas, sent from Thrace, make way
+    For the restoring of the day,
+  Phoebus with fresh and sudden beams doth rise,
+    Striking with light our wondering eyes.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis hausi caelum et ad cognoscendam
+medicantis faciem mentem recepi. Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos
+intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam cuius ab adulescentia laribus
+obuersatus fueram Philosophiam. "Et quid," inquam, "tu in has exilii nostri
+solitudines o omnium magistra uirtutum supero cardine delapsa uenisti? An
+ut tu quoque mecum rea falsis criminationibus agiteris?
+
+"An," inquit illa, "te alumne desererem nec sarcinam quam mei nominis
+inuidia sustulisti, communicato tecum labore partirer? Atqui Philosophiae
+fas non erat incomitatum relinquere iter innocentis; meam scilicet
+criminationem uererer et quasi nouum aliquid acciderit, perhorrescerem?
+Nunc enim primum censes apud inprobos mores lacessitam periculis esse
+sapientiam? Nonne apud ueteres quoque ante nostri Platonis aetatem magnum
+saepe certamen cum stultitiae temeritate certauimus eodemque superstite
+praeceptor eius Socrates iniustae uictoriam mortis me adstante promeruit?
+Cuius hereditatem cum deinceps Epicureum uulgus ac Stoicum ceterique pro
+sua quisque parte raptum ire molirentur meque reclamantem renitentemque
+uelut in partem praedae traherent, uestem quam meis texueram manibus,
+disciderunt abreptisque ab ea panniculis totam me sibi cessisse credentes
+abiere. In quibus quoniam quaedam nostri habitus uestigia uidebantur, meos
+esse familiares inprudentia rata nonnullos eorum profanae multitudinis
+errore peruertit.
+
+Quod si nec Anaxagorae fugam nec Socratis uenenum nec Zenonis tormenta
+quoniam sunt peregrina nouisti, at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos quorum
+nec peruetusta nec incelebris memoria est, scire potuisti. Quos nihil aliud
+in cladem detraxit nisi quod nostris moribus instituti studiis improborum
+dissimillimi uidebantur. Itaque nihil est quod admirere, si in hoc uitae
+salo circumflantibus agitemur procellis, quibus hoc maxime propositum est
+pessimis displicere. Quorum quidem tametsi est numerosus exercitus,
+spernendus tamen est, quoniam nullo duce regitur, sed errore tantum temere
+ac passim lymphante raptatur. Qui si quando contra nos aciem struens
+ualentior incubuerit, nostra quidem dux copias suas in arcem contrahit,
+illi uero circa diripiendas inutiles sarcinulas occupantur. At nos desuper
+inridemus uilissima rerum quaeque rapientes securi totius furiosi tumultus
+eoque uallo muniti quo grassanti stultitiae adspirare fas non sit.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  In like manner, the mists of sadness dissolved, I came to myself and
+  recovered my judgment, so that I knew my Physician's face; wherefore
+  casting mine eyes upon her somewhat stedfastly, I beheld my nurse
+  Philosophy, in whose house I had remained from my youth, and I said: "O
+  Mistress of all virtues, for what cause art thou come from heaven into
+  this our solitary banishment? Art thou come to bear me company in being
+  falsely accused?"
+
+  "Should I," saith she, "forsake thee, my disciple, and not divide the
+  burden, which thou bearest through hatred of my name, by partaking of
+  thy labour? But Philosophy never thought it lawful to forsake the
+  innocent in his trouble. Should I fear any accusations, as though this
+  were any new matter? For dost thou think that this is the first time
+  that Wisdom hath been exposed to danger by wicked men? Have we not in
+  ancient times before our Plato's age had oftentimes great conflicts with
+  the rashness of folly? And while he lived, had not his master Socrates
+  the victory of an unjust death in my presence, whose inheritance, when
+  afterward the mob of Epicures, Stoics, and others (every one for his own
+  sect) endeavoured to usurp, and as it were in part of their prey, sought
+  to draw me to them, exclaiming and striving against them; they tore the
+  garment which I had woven with my own hands, and having gotten some
+  little pieces of it, thinking me to be wholly in their possession,
+  departed. Some of whom, because certain signs of my apparel appeared
+  upon them, were rashly supposed to be my familiar friends, and condemned
+  accordingly through the error of the profane multitude.
+
+  But if thou hast not heard of the flight of Anaxagoras, the poison of
+  Socrates, nor the torments of Zeno, because they are foreign examples;
+  yet thou mayst have heard of Canius, of Seneca, of Soranus,[83] whose
+  memory is both fresh and famous, whom nothing else brought to their
+  overthrow but that they had been instructed in our school and were
+  altogether disliking to the humours of wicked men; wherefore thou hast
+  no cause to marvel, if in the sea of this life we be tossed with
+  boisterous storms, whose chiefest purpose is to displease the wicked; of
+  which though there be an huge army, yet it is to be despised, because it
+  is not governed by any captain, but is carried up and down by
+  fantastical error without any order at all. And if at any time they
+  assail us with great force, our captain retireth her band into a
+  castle,[84] leaving them occupied in sacking unprofitable baggage. And
+  from above we laugh them to scorn for seeking so greedily after most
+  vile things, being safe from all their furious assault, and fortified
+  with that defence which aspiring folly cannot prevail against.
+
+
+  [83] On Julius Kanius or Canius the Stoic cf. Seneca, _De Tranq._ xiv.
+  4-9; on Soranus cf. Tac. _Annal._ i. 16.
+
+  [84] Cf. _arce religionis nostrae, Tr._ iv. (_supra_, p. 54).
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quisquis composito serenus aeuo
+Fatum sub pedibus egit[85] superbum
+Fortunamque tuens utramque rectus
+Inuictum potuit tenere uultum,
+Non illum rabies minaeque ponti                                           5
+Versum funditus exagitantis aestum
+Nec ruptis quotiens uagus caminis
+Torquet fumificos Vesaeuus ignes
+Aut celsas soliti ferire turres
+Ardentis uia fulminis mouebit.                                           10
+Quid tantum miseri saeuos tyrannos
+Mirantur sine uiribus furentes?
+Nec speres aliquid nec extimescas,
+Exarmaueris impotentis iram.
+At quisquis trepidus pauet uel optat,                                    15
+Quod non sit stabilis suique iuris,
+Abiecit clipeum locoque motus
+Nectit qua ualeat trahi catenam.
+
+
+[85] _Fortasse_ iecit; cf. Verg. _Georg._ ii. 491 _sq._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Who mildly can his age dispose,
+  And at his feet proud destiny throws:
+  Who stoutly doth each chance behold,
+  Keeping his countenance uncontrolled:
+  Not him the ocean's rage and threat,
+  Stirring the waves with angry heat,
+  Nor hot Vesuvius when he casts
+  From broken hills enflaméd blasts,
+  Nor fiery thunder can dismay,
+  Which takes the tops of towers away.
+  Why do fierce tyrants us affright,
+  Whose rage is far beyond their might?
+  For nothing hope, nor fear thou harm,
+  So their weak wrath thou shalt disarm.
+  But he whom hope or terror takes,
+  Being a slave, his shield forsakes,
+  And leaves his place, and doth provide
+  A chain wherewith his hands are tied.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+"Sentisne," inquit, "haec atque animo inlabuntur tuo, an [Greek: onos
+luras]? Quid fles, quid lacrimis manas?
+
+[Greek: Exauda, mae keuthe nooi.]
+
+Si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet uulnus detegas."
+
+Tum ego collecto in uires animo: "Anne adhuc eget admonitione nec per se
+satis eminet fortunae in nos saeuientis asperitas? Nihilne te ipsa loci
+facies mouet? Haecine est bibliotheca, quam certissimam tibi sedem nostris
+in laribus ipsa delegeras? In qua mecum saepe residens de humanarum
+diuinarumque rerum scientia disserebas? Talis habitus talisque uultus erat,
+*cum tecum naturae secreta rimarer, cum mihi siderum uias radio
+describeres, cum mores nostros totiusque uitae rationem ad caelestis
+ordinis exempla formares? Haecine praemia referimus tibi obsequentes? Atqui
+tu hanc sententiam Platonis ore sanxisti: beatas fore res publicas, si eas
+uel studiosi sapientiae regerent uel earum rectores studere sapientiae
+contigisset. Tu eiusdem uiri ore hanc sapientibus capessendae rei publicae
+necessariam causam esse monuisti, ne improbis flagitiosisque ciuibus urbium
+relicta gubernacula pestem bonis ac perniciem ferrent.
+
+Hanc igitur auctoritatem secutus quod a te inter secreta otia didiceram
+transferre in actum publicae administrationis optaui. Tu mihi et qui te
+sapientium mentibus inseruit deus conscii nullum me ad magistratum nisi
+commune bonorum omnium studium detulisse. Inde cum inprobis graues
+inexorabilesque discordiae et quod conscientiae libertas habet, pro tuendo
+iure spreta potentiorum semper offensio.
+
+Quotiens ego Conigastum in inbecilli cuiusque fortunas impetum facientem
+obuius excepi, quotiens Triguillam regiae praepositum domus ab incepta,
+perpetrata iam prorsus iniuria deieci, quotiens miseros quos infinitis
+calumniis inpunita barbarorum semper auaritia uexabat, obiecta periculis
+auctoritate protexi! Numquam me ab iure ad iniuriam quisquam detraxit.
+Prouincialium fortunas tum priuatis rapinis tum publicis uectigalibus
+pessumdari non aliter quam qui patiebantur indolui.
+
+Cum acerbae famis tempore grauis atque inexplicabilis indicta coemptio
+profligatura inopia Campaniam prouinciam uideretur, certamen aduersum
+praefectum praetorii communis commodi ratione suscepi, rege cognoscente
+contendi et ne coemptio exigeretur, euici. Paulinum consularem uirum cuius
+opes Palatinae canes iam spe atque ambitione deuorassent, ab ipsis hiantium
+faucibus traxi. Ne Albinum consularem uirum praeiudicatae accusationis
+poena corriperet, odiis me Cypriani delatoris opposui. Satisne in me magnas
+uideor exaceruasse discordias? Sed esse apud ceteros tutior debui qui mihi
+amore iustitiae nihil apud aulicos quo magis essem tutior reseruaui. Quibus
+autem deferentibus perculsi sumus? Quorum Basilius olim regio ministerio
+depulsus in delationem nostri nominis alieni aeris necessitate compulsus
+est. Opilionem uero atque Gaudentium cum ob innumeras multiplicesque
+fraudes ire in exilium regia censura decreuisset cumque illi parere
+nolentes sacrarum sese aedium defensione tuerentur compertumque id regi
+foret, edixit: uti ni intra praescriptum diem Rauenna urbe decederent,
+notas insigniti frontibus pellerentur. Quid huic seueritati posse astrui
+uidetur? Atqui in eo die deferentibus eisdem nominis nostri delatio
+suscepta est. Quid igitur? Nostraene artes ita meruerunt? An illos
+accusatores iustos fecit praemissa damnatio? Itane nihil fortunam puduit si
+minus accusatae innocentiae, at accusantium uilitatis?[86] At cuius
+criminis arguimur summam quaeris? Senatum dicimur saluum esse uoluisse.
+Modum desideras? Delatorem ne documenta deferret quibus senatum maiestatis
+reum faceret impedisse criminamur.
+
+Quid igitur o magistra censes? Infitiabimur crimen, ne tibi pudor simus? At
+uolui nec umquam uelle desistam. Fatebimur? Sed impediendi delatoris opera
+cessauit. An optasse illius ordinis salutem nefas uocabo? Ille quidem suis
+de me decretis, uti hoc nefas esset, effecerat. Sed sibi semper mentiens
+inprudentia rerum merita non potest inmutare nec mihi Socratico decreto fas
+esse arbitror uel occuluisse ueritatem uel concessisse mendacium. Verum id
+quoquo modo sit, tuo sapientiumque iudicio aestimandum relinquo. Cuius rei
+seriem atque ueritatem, ne latere posteros queat, stilo etiam memoriaeque
+mandaui.
+
+Nam de compositis falso litteris quibus libertatem arguor sperasse Romanam
+quid attinet dicere? Quarum fraus aperta patuisset, si nobis ipsorum
+confessione delatorum, quod in omnibus negotiis maximas uires habet, uti
+licuisset. Nam quae sperari reliqua libertas potest? Atque utinam posset
+ulla! Respondissem Canii uerbo, qui cum a Gaio Caesare Germanici filio
+conscius contra se factae coniurationis fuisse diceretur: 'Si ego,' inquit,
+'scissem, tu nescisses.' Qua in re non ita sensus nostros maeror hebetauit
+ut impios scelerata contra uirtutem querar molitos, sed quae sperauerint
+effecisse uehementer admiror. Nam deteriora uelle nostri fuerit fortasse
+defectus, posse contra innocentiam, quae sceleratus quisque conceperit
+inspectante deo, monstri simile est. Vnde haud iniuria tuorum quidam
+familiarium quaesiuit: 'Si quidem deus,' inquit, 'est, unde mala? Bona uero
+unde, si non est?' Sed fas fuerit nefarios homines qui bonorum omnium
+totiusque senatus sanguinem petunt, nos etiam quos propugnare bonis
+senatuique uiderant, perditum ire uoluisse. Sed num idem de patribus quoque
+merebamur? Meministi, ut opinor, quoniam me dicturum quid facturumue
+praesens semper ipsa dirigebas, meministi, inquam, Veronae cum rex auidus
+exitii communis maiestatis crimen in Albinum delatae ad cunctum senatus
+ordinem transferre moliretur, uniuersi innocentiam senatus quanta mei
+periculi securitate defenderim. Scis me haec et uera proferre et in nulla
+umquam mei laude iactasse. Minuit enim quodam modo se probantis
+conscientiae secretum, quotiens ostentando quis factum recipit famae
+pretium. Sed innocentiam nostram quis exceperit euentus uides; pro uerae
+uirtutis praemiis falsi sceleris poenas subimus. Et cuius umquam facinoris
+manifesta confessio ita iudices habuit in seueritate concordes ut non
+aliquos uel ipse ingenii error humani uel fortunae condicio cunctis
+mortalibus incerta submitteret? Si inflammare sacras aedes uoluisse, si
+sacerdotes impio iugulare gladio, si bonis omnibus necem struxisse
+diceremur, praesentem tamen sententia, confessum tamen conuictumue
+punisset. Nunc quingentis fere passuum milibus procul muti atque indefensi
+ob studium propensius in senatum morti proscriptionique damnamur. O meritos
+de simili crimine neminem posse conuinci!
+
+Cuius dignitatem reatus ipsi etiam qui detulere uiderunt, quam uti alicuius
+sceleris admixtione fuscarent, ob ambitum dignitatis sacrilegio me
+conscientiam polluisse mentiti sunt. Atqui et tu insita nobis omnem rerum
+mortalium cupidinem de nostri animi sede pellebas et sub tuis oculis
+sacrilegio locum esse fas non erat. Instillabas enim auribus
+cogitationibusque cotidie meis Pythagoricum illud [Greek: hepou theoi].[87]
+Nec conueniebat uilissimorum me spirituum praesidia captare quem tu in hanc
+excellentiam componebas ut consimilem deo faceres. Praeterea penetral
+innocens domus, honestissimorum coetus amicorum, socer etiam sanctus et
+aeque ac tu ipsa[88] reuerendus ab omni nos huius criminis suspitione
+defendunt. Sed, o nefas, illi uero de te tanti criminis fidem capiunt atque
+hoc ipso uidebimur affines fuisse maleficio, quod tuis inbuti disciplinis,
+tuis instituti moribus sumus. Ita non est satis nihil mihi tuam profuisse
+reuerentiam, nisi ultro tu mea potius offensione lacereris. At uero hic
+etiam nostris malis cumulus accedit, quod existimatio plurimorum non rerum
+merita sed fortunae spectat euentum eaque tantum iudicat esse prouisa quae
+felicitas commendauerit. Quo fit ut existimatio bona prima omnium deserat
+infelices. Qui nunc populi rumores, quam dissonae multiplicesque
+sententiae, piget reminisci. Hoc tantum dixerim ultimam esse aduersae
+fortunae sarcinam, quod dum miseris aliquod crimen affingitur, quae
+perferunt meruisse creduntur. Et ego quidem bonis omnibus pulsus,
+dignitatibus exutus, existimatione foedatus ob beneficium supplicium tuli.
+
+Videre autem uideor nefarias sceleratorum officinas gaudio laetitiaque
+fluitantes, perditissimum quemque nouis delationum fraudibus imminentem,
+iacere bonos nostri discriminis terrore prostratos, flagitiosum quemque ad
+audendum quidem facinus impunitate, ad efficiendum uero praemiis incitari,
+insontes autem non modo securitate, uerum ipsa etiam defensione priuatos.
+Itaque libet exclamare:
+
+
+[86] uilitatis _Glareanus_; uilitas _codd._
+
+[87] [Greek: theon] _codd._
+
+[88] ipsa _Sitzmannus_; ipso _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  "Understandest thou these things," saith she, "and do they make
+  impression in thy mind? Art thou 'like the ass, deaf to the lyre'? Why
+  weepest thou? Why sheddest thou so many tears? Speak out; hide not thy
+  thoughts.[89] If thou expectest to be cured, thou must discover thy
+  wound.[90]"
+
+  Then I, collecting the forces of my mind together, made her answer in
+  these words: "Doth the cruelty of fortune's rage need further
+  declaration, or doth it not sufficiently appear of itself? Doth not the
+  very countenance of this place move thee? Is this the library which thou
+  thyself hadst chosen to sit in at my house, in which thou hast
+  oftentimes discoursed with me of the knowledge of divine and human
+  things? Had I this attire or countenance when I searched the secrets of
+  nature with thee, when thou describedst unto me the course of the stars
+  with thy geometrical rod, when thou didst frame my conversation and the
+  manner of my whole life according to the pattern of the celestial order?
+  Are these the rewards which thy obedient servants have? But thou didst
+  decree that sentence by the mouth of Plato: That commonwealths should be
+  happy, if either the students of wisdom did govern them, or those which
+  were appointed to govern them would give themselves to the study of
+  wisdom.[91] Thou by the same philosopher didst admonish us that it is a
+  sufficient cause for wise men to take upon themselves the government of
+  the commonwealth, lest, if the rule of cities were left in the hands of
+  lewd and wicked citizens, they should work the subversion and overthrow
+  of the good.
+
+  Wherefore, following this authority, I desired to practise that by
+  public administration which I had learnt of thee in private conference.
+  Thou and God Himself who had inserted thee in the minds of the wise, are
+  my witnesses that nothing but the common desire of all good men brought
+  me to be a magistrate. This hath been the cause of my grievous and
+  irreconcilable disagreements with wicked men, and that which freedom of
+  conscience carrieth with it, of ever contemning the indignation of
+  potentates for the defence of justice.
+
+  How often have I encountered with Conigastus, violently possessing
+  himself with poor men's goods? How often have I put back Triguilla,
+  Provost of the King's house, from injuries which he had begun, yea, and
+  finished also? How often have I protected, by putting my authority in
+  danger, such poor wretches as the unpunished covetousness of the
+  barbarous did vex with infinite reproaches? Never did any man draw me
+  from right to wrong. It grieved me no less than them which suffered it,
+  to see the wealth of our subjects wasted, partly by private pillage, and
+  partly by public tributes.
+
+  When in the time of a great dearth things were set at so excessive and
+  unreasonable a rate that the province of Campania was like to be
+  altogether impoverished, for the common good I stuck not to contend with
+  the chief Praetor himself, and the matter was discussed before the King,
+  and I prevailed so far that it went not forward. I drew Paulinus, who
+  had been Consul, out of the very mouth of the gaping courtiers, who like
+  ravenous curs had already in hope and ambition devoured his riches. That
+  Albinus who had likewise been Consul might not be punished upon
+  presumptuous[92] and false accusation, I exposed myself to the hatred of
+  Cyprian his accuser. May I seem to have provoked enmity enough against
+  myself? But others should so much the more have procured my safety,
+  since that for the love I bear to justice I left myself no way by the
+  means of courtiers to be safe. But by whose accusations did I receive
+  this blow? By theirs who, long since having put Basil out of the King's
+  service, compelled him now to accuse me, by the necessity which he was
+  driven to by debt. Opilio likewise and Gaudentius being banished by the
+  King's decree, for the injuries and manifold deceits which they had
+  committed, because they would not obey, defended themselves by taking
+  sanctuary, of which the King hearing, gave sentence, that unless they
+  departed out of the city of Ravenna within certain days, they should be
+  branded in the foreheads, and put out by force. What could be added to
+  this severity? And yet that very day their accusations against me went
+  for current. What might be the reason of this? Did my dealing deserve
+  it? Or did the condemnation, which went before, make them just accusers?
+  Was not fortune ashamed, if not that innocency was accused, yet at least
+  that it had so vile and base accusers? But what crime was laid to my
+  charge? Wilt thou have it in one word? I am said to have desired the
+  Senate's safety. Wilt thou know the manner how? I am blamed for having
+  hindered their accuser to bring forth evidence by which he should prove
+  the Senate guilty of treason.
+
+  What thinkest thou, O Mistress? Shall I deny this charge, that I may not
+  shame thee? But it is true, I desired it, neither will I ever cease from
+  having that desire. Shall I confess it? But I have already left
+  hindering their accuser. Shall I call it an offence to have wished the
+  safety of that order? Indeed the Senate with their decrees concerning me
+  had made it an offence. But folly, always deceiving herself, cannot
+  change the deserts of things, nor, according to the decree of
+  Socrates,[93] do I think it is lawful either to conceal the truth or
+  grant a lie. But how this may be, I leave to thine and Wisdom's censure.
+  And that posterity may not be ignorant of the course and truth of the
+  matter, I have put it down in writing.
+
+  For why should I speak of those feigned letters, in which I am charged
+  to have hoped for Roman liberty? The deceit of which would manifestly
+  have appeared, if it might have been lawful for me to have used the
+  confession of my very accusers, which in all business is of greatest
+  force. For what liberty remaineth there to be hoped for? I would to God
+  there were any! I would have answered as Canius did, who being charged
+  by Gaius Caesar, son to Germanicus, that he was privy to the conspiracy
+  made against him, answered: 'If I had been made acquainted with it, thou
+  shouldest never have known of it.'[94] Neither hath sorrow so dulled my
+  wits in this matter that I complain of the wicked endeavours of sinful
+  men against virtue, but I exceedingly marvel to see that they have
+  brought to pass the things they hoped to do. For the desire of doing
+  evil may be attributed to our weakness, but that in the sight of God the
+  wicked should be able to compass whatsoever they contrive against the
+  innocent, is altogether monstrous. Whence not without cause one of thy
+  familiar friends[95] demanded: 'If,' saith he, 'there be a God, from
+  whence proceed so many evils? And if there be no God, from whence cometh
+  any good?' But let that pass that wicked men, which seek the blood of
+  all good men, and of the whole Senate, would also have overthrown me,
+  whom they saw to stand in defence of good men and of the Senate. But did
+  I deserve the same of the Senators themselves? I suppose thou
+  rememberest how thou being present didst alway direct me when I went
+  about to say or do anything. Thou rememberest, I say, when at Verona the
+  King, being desirous of a common overthrow, endeavoured to lay the
+  treason, whereof only Albinus was accused, upon the whole order of the
+  Senate, with how great security of my own danger I defended the
+  innocency of the whole Senate. Thou knowest that these things which I
+  say are true, and that I was never delighted in my own praise, for the
+  secret of a good conscience is in some sort diminished when by declaring
+  what he hath done a man receiveth the reward of fame. But thou seest to
+  what pass my innocency is come; instead of the rewards of true virtue, I
+  undergo the punishment of wickedness, wherewith I am falsely charged.
+  Was it ever yet seen that the manifest confession of any crime made the
+  judges so at one in severity, that either the error of man's judgment or
+  the condition of fortune, which is certain to none, did not incline some
+  of them to favour? If I had been accused that I would have burnt the
+  churches, or wickedly have killed the priests, or have sought the death
+  of all good men, yet sentence should have been pronounced against me
+  present, having confessed, and being convicted. Now being conveyed five
+  hundred miles off, dumb and defenceless, I am condemned to death and
+  proscription for bearing the Senate too much good will. O Senate, which
+  deserves that never any may be convicted of the like crime!
+
+  The dignity of which accusation even the very accusers themselves saw,
+  which that they might obscure by adding some sort of fault, they belied
+  me that I defiled my conscience with sacrilege, for an ambitious desire
+  of preferment. But thou, which hadst seated thyself in me, didst repel
+  from the seat of my mind all desire of mortal things, and within thy
+  sight there was no place for sacrilege to harbour; for thou didst instil
+  into my ears and thoughts daily that saying of Pythagoras, 'Follow
+  God.'[96] Neither was it fitting for me to use the aid of most vile
+  spirits when thou wast shaping me into that excellency to make me like
+  to God. Besides the innocency which appeared in the most retired rooms
+  of my house, the assembly of my most honourable friends, my holy father-
+  in-law Symmachus, who is as worthy of reverence as thou thyself art, do
+  clear me from all suspicion of this crime. But O detestable wickedness!
+  they the rather credit thee with so great a crime, and think me the
+  nigher to such mischievous dealing, because I am endued with thy
+  knowledge, and adorned with thy virtues, so that it is not enough that I
+  reap no commodity for thy respect, unless thou beest also dishonoured
+  for the hatred conceived against me. And that my miseries may increase
+  the more, the greatest part do not so much respect the value of things
+  as the event of fortune, and they esteem only that to be providently
+  done which the happy success commends. By which means it cometh to pass
+  that the first loss which miserable men have is their estimation and the
+  good opinion which was had of them. What rumours go now among the
+  people, what dissonant and diverse opinions! I cannot abide to think of
+  them; only this will I say, the last burden of adversity is that when
+  they which are in misery are accused of any crime, they are thought to
+  deserve whatsoever they suffer. And I, spoiled of all my goods, bereaved
+  of my dignities, blemished in my good name, for benefits receive
+  punishments.
+
+  And methinks I see the cursed crews of the wicked abounding with joy and
+  gladness, and every lost companion devising with himself how to accuse
+  others falsely, good men lie prostrate with the terror of my danger, and
+  every lewd fellow is provoked by impunity to attempt any wickedness, and
+  by rewards to bring it to effect; but the innocent are not only deprived
+  of all security, but also of any manner of defence. Wherefore I may well
+  exclaim:
+
+
+  [89] Homer, _Il._ i. 363.
+
+  [90] Cf. _Tr._ v. (_supra_, p. 76), _quasi non deterior fiat
+  inscientiae causa dum tegitur._
+
+  [91] Plato, _Rep._ v. 473.
+
+  [92] Presumptuous=founded on presumption.
+
+  [93] Cp. Plato, _Rep._ vi. 485; the [Greek: philosophos] cannot be
+  [Greek: philopseudaes.]
+
+  [94] _Vide supra_, p. 69. This seems to be the only record of Canius's
+  retort to Caligula.
+
+  [95] i.e. Epicurus, cp. Lact. _De Ira Dei_ xiii.
+
+  [96] Cf. [Greek: ho bios apas suntetaktai pros to akolouthein toi
+  Theoi], Iambl. _De Vita Pyth._ xviii., and Seneca, _De Vita Beata_ xv.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+O stelliferi conditor orbis
+Qui perpetuo nixus solio
+Rapido caelum turbine uersas
+Legemque pati sidera cogis,
+Vt nunc pleno lucida cornu                                                5
+Totis fratris obuia flammis
+Condat stellas luna minores,
+Nunc obscuro pallida cornu
+Phoebo propior lumina perdat,
+Et qui primae tempore noctis                                             10
+Agit algentes Hesperos ortus,
+Solitas iterum mutet habenas
+Phoebi pallens Lucifer ortu.
+Tu frondifluae frigore brumae
+Stringis lucem breuiore mora:                                            15
+Tu, cum feruida uenerit aestas,
+Agiles nocti diuidis horas.
+Tua uis uarium temperat annum
+Vt quas Boreae spiritus aufert
+Reuehat mites Zephyrus frondes                                           20
+Quaeque Arcturus semina uidit
+Sirius altas urat segetes.
+Nihil antiqua lege solutum
+Linquit propriae stationis opus.
+Omnia certo fine gubernans                                               25
+Hominum solos respuis actus
+Merito rector cohibere modo.
+Nam cur tantas lubrica uersat
+Fortuna uices? Premit insontes
+Debita sceleri noxia poena,                                              30
+At peruersi resident celso
+Mores solio sanctaque calcant
+Iniusta uice colla nocentes.
+Latet obscuris condita uirtus
+Clara tenebris iustusque tulit                                           35
+Crimen iniqui.
+Nil periuria, nil nocet ipsis
+Fraus mendaci compta colore.
+Sed cum libuit uiribus uti,
+Quos innumeri metuunt populi                                             40
+Summos gaudent subdere reges.
+O iam miseras respice terras
+Quisquis rerum foedera nectis.
+Operis tanti pars non uilis
+Homines quatimur fortunae salo.                                          45
+Rapidos rector comprime fluctus
+Et quo caelum regis immensum
+Firma stabiles foedere terras."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+    Creator of the Sky,
+  Who sittest on Thine eternal throne on high,
+    Who dost quick motions cause
+  In all the heavens, and givest stars their laws,
+    That the pale Queen of Night,
+  Sometimes receiving all her brother's light,
+    Should shine in her full pride,
+  And with her beams the lesser stars should hide;
+    Sometimes she wants her grace,
+  When the sun's rays are in less distant place;
+    And Hesperus that flies,
+  Driving the cold, before the night doth rise,
+    And oft with sudden change
+  Before the sun as Lucifer doth range.[97]
+    Thou short the days dost make,
+  When Winter from the trees the leaves doth take;
+    Thou, when the fiery sun
+  Doth Summer cause, makest the nights swiftly run.
+    Thy might doth rule the year,
+  As northern winds the leaves away do bear,
+    So Zephyrus from west
+  The plants in all their freshness doth revest;
+    And Syrius burns that corn
+  With which Arcturus did the earth adorn.
+    None from Thy laws are free,
+  Nor can forsake their place ordained by Thee.
+    Thou to that certain end
+  Governest all things; deniest Thou to intend
+    The acts of men alone,
+  Directing them in measure from Thy throne?
+    For why should slippery chance
+  Rule all things with such doubtful governance?
+    Or why should punishments,
+  Due to the guilty, light on innocents?
+    But now the highest place
+  Giveth to naughty manners greatest grace,
+    And wicked people vex
+  Good men, and tread unjustly on their necks;
+    Virtue in darkness lurks,
+  And righteous souls are charged with impious works,
+    Deceits nor perjuries
+  Disgrace not those who colour them with lies,
+    For, when it doth them please
+  To show their force, they to their will with ease
+    The hearts of kings can steer,
+  To whom so many crouch with trembling fear.
+    O Thou that joinest with love
+  All worldly things, look from Thy seat above
+    On the earth's wretched state;
+  We men, not the least work thou didst create,
+    With fortune's blasts do shake;
+  Thou careful ruler, these fierce tempests slake,
+    And for the earth provide
+  Those laws by which Thou heaven in peace dost guide."
+
+
+  [97] Literally, "And that he who as Hesperus, in the early hours of the
+  night, drives the cold stars before him, should change chariot (lit. his
+  accustomed reins) and become Lucifer, growing pale in the first rays of
+  the sun."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Haec ubi continuato dolore delatraui, illa uultu placido nihilque meis
+questibus mota: "Cum te," inquit, "maestum lacrimantemque uidissem, ilico
+miserum exsulemque cognoui. Sed quam id longinquum esset exilium, nisi tua
+prodidisset oratio, nesciebam. Sed tu quam procul a patria non quidem
+pulsus es sed aberrasti; ac si te pulsum existimari mauis, te potius ipse
+pepulisti. Nam id quidem de te numquam cuiquam fas fuisset. Si enim cuius
+oriundo sis patriae reminiscare, non uti Atheniensium quondam multitudinis
+imperio regitur, sed
+
+[Greek: heis koiranos estin, heis basileus]
+
+qui frequentia ciuium non depulsione laetetur; cuius agi frenis atque
+obtemperare iustitiae summa libertas est. An ignoras illam tuae ciuitatis
+antiquissimam legem, qua sanctum est ei ius exulare non esse quisquis in ea
+sedem fundare maluerit? Nam qui uallo eius ac munimine continetur, nullus
+metus est ne exul esse mereatur. At quisquis eam inhabitare uelle desierit,
+pariter desinit etiam mereri. Itaque non tam me loci huius quam tua facies
+mouet nec bibliothecae potius comptos ebore ac uitro parietes quam tuae
+mentis sedem requiro, in qua non libros sed id quod libris pretium facit,
+librorum quondam meorum sententias, collocaui. Et tu quidem de tuis in
+commune bonum meritis uera quidem, sed pro multitudine gestorum tibi pauca
+dixisti. De obiectorum tibi uel honestate uel falsitate cunctis nota
+memorasti. De sceleribus fraudibusque delatorum recte tu quidem strictim
+attingendum putasti, quod ea melius uberiusque recognoscentis omnia uulgi
+ore celebrentur. Increpuisti etiam uehementer iniusti factum senatus. De
+nostra etiam criminatione doluisti, laesae quoque opinionis damna fleuisti.
+Postremus aduersum fortunam dolor incanduit conquestusque non aequa meritis
+praemia pensari. In extremo Musae saeuientis, uti quae caelum terras quoque
+pax regeret, uota posuisti. Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus
+incubuit diuersumque te dolor, ira, maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es,
+nondum te ualidiora remedia contingunt. Itaque lenioribus paulisper utemur,
+ut quae in tumorem perturbationibus influentibus induruerunt, ad acrioris
+uim medicaminis recipiendum tactu blandiore mollescant.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  When I had uttered these speeches with continued grief, she, with an
+  amiable countenance and nothing moved with my complaints, said: "When I
+  first saw thee sad and weeping, I forthwith knew thee to be in misery
+  and banishment. But I had not known how far off thou wert banished, if
+  thy speech had not bewrayed it. O how far art thou gone from thy
+  country, not being driven away, but wandering of thine own accord! Or if
+  thou hadst rather be thought to have been driven out, it hath been only
+  by thyself; for never could any other but thyself have done it; for if
+  thou rememberest of what country thou art, it is not governed as Athens
+  was wont to be, by the multitude, but 'one is its ruler, one its
+  king,'[98] who desires to have abundance of citizens, and not to have
+  them driven away. To be governed by whose authority, and to be subject
+  to her laws, is the greatest freedom that can be. Art thou ignorant of
+  that most ancient law of thy city, by which it is decreed that he may
+  not be banished that hath made choice of it for his dwelling-place;[99]
+  for he that is within her fort or hold need not fear lest he deserve to
+  be banished? But whosoever ceaseth to desire to dwell in it, ceaseth
+  likewise to deserve so great a benefit. Wherefore the countenance of
+  this place moveth me not so much as thy countenance doth. Neither do I
+  much require thy library adorned with ivory adornments, and its crystal
+  walls, as the seat of thy mind, in which I have not placed books, but
+  that which makes books to be esteemed of, I mean the sentences of my
+  books, which were written long since. And that which thou hast said of
+  thy deserts to the common good, is true indeed, but little in respect of
+  the many things which thou hast done. That which thou hast reported,
+  either of the honesty or of the falseness of those things which are
+  objected against thee, is known to all men. Thou didst well to touch but
+  briefly the wickedness and deceit of thy accusers, for that the common
+  people to whose notice they are come do more fitly and largely speak of
+  them. Thou hast also sharply rebuked the unjust Senate's deed. Thou hast
+  also grieved at our accusation, and hast bewailed the loss or
+  diminishing of our good name; and lastly, thy sorrow raged against
+  fortune, and thou complainedst that deserts were not equally rewarded.
+  In the end of thy bitter verse, thou desiredst that the earth might be
+  governed by that peace which heaven enjoyeth. But because thou art
+  turmoiled with the multitude of affections, grief and anger drawing thee
+  to divers parts, in the plight thou art now, the more forcible remedies
+  cannot be applied unto thee; wherefore, for a while, we will use the
+  more easy, that thy affections, which are, as it were, hardened and
+  swollen with perturbations, may by gentle handling be mollified and
+  disposed to receive the force of sharper medicines.
+
+
+  [98] Hom. _Il._ ii. 204.
+
+  [99] Cf. Cicero, _Pro domo sua_. 29. 77.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Cum Phoebi radiis graue
+Cancri sidus inaestuat,
+Tum qui larga negantibus
+Sulcis semina credidit,
+Elusus Cereris fide                                                       5
+Quernas pergat ad arbores.
+Numquam purpureum nemus
+Lecturus uiolas petas
+Cum saeuis aquilonibus
+Stridens campus inhorruit,                                               10
+Nec quaeras auida manu
+Vernos stringere palmites,
+Vuis si libeat frui;
+Autumno potius sua
+Bacchus munera contulit.                                                 15
+Signat tempora propriis
+Aptans officiis deus
+Nec quas ipse coercuit
+Misceri patitur uices.
+Sic quod praecipiti uia                                                  20
+Certum deserit ordinem
+Laetos non habet exitus.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  When hot with Phoebus' beams
+  The Crab casts fiery gleams,
+  He that doth then with seed
+  Th'unwilling furrows feed,
+  Deceivéd of his bread
+  Must be with acorns fed.
+  Seek not the flowery woods
+  For violets' sweet buds,
+  When fields are overcast
+  With the fierce northern blast,
+  Nor hope thou home to bring
+  Vine-clusters in the Spring
+  If thou in grapes delight:
+  In autumn Bacchus' might
+  With them doth deck our clime.
+  God every several time
+  With proper grace hath crowned
+  Nor will those laws confound
+  Which He once settled hath.
+  He that with headlong path
+  This certain order leaves,
+  An hapless end receives.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Primum igitur paterisne me pauculis rogationibus statum tuae mentis
+attingere atque temptare, ut qui modus sit tuae curationis intellegam?" "Tu
+uero arbitratu," inquam, "tuo quae uoles ut responsurum rogato." Tum illa:
+"Huncine," inquit, "mundum temerariis agi fortuitisque casibus putas, an
+ullum credis ei regimen inesse rationis?" "Atqui," inquam, "nullo
+existimauerim modo ut fortuita temeritate tam certa moueantur, uerum operi
+suo conditorem praesidere deum scio nec umquam fuerit dies qui me ab hac
+sententiae ueritate depellat."
+
+"Ita est," inquit. "Nam id etiam paulo ante cecinisti, hominesque tantum
+diuinae exortes curae esse deplorasti. Nam de ceteris quin ratione
+regerentur, nihil mouebare. Papae autem! Vehementer admiror cur in tam
+salubri sententia locatus aegrotes. Verum altius perscrutemur; nescio quid
+abesse coniecto.
+
+"Sed dic mihi, quoniam deo mundum regi non ambigis, quibus etiam
+gubernaculis regatur aduertis?" "Vix," inquam, "rogationis tuae sententiam
+nosco, nedum ad inquisita respondere queam." "Num me," inquit, "fefellit
+abesse aliquid, per quod, uelut hiante ualli robore, in animum tuum
+perturbationum morbus inrepserit? Sed dic mihi, meministine, quis sit rerum
+finis, quoue totius naturae tendat intentio?" "Audieram," inquam, "sed
+memoriam maeror hebetauit." "Atqui scis unde cuncta processerint?" "Noui,"
+inquam, deumque esse respondi. "Et qui fieri potest, ut principio cognito
+quis sit rerum finis ignores? Verum hi perturbationum mores, ea ualentia
+est, ut mouere quidem loco hominem possint, conuellere autem sibique totum
+exstirpare non possint.
+
+Sed hoc quoque respondeas uelim, hominemne te esse meministi?" "Quidni,"
+inquam, "meminerim?" "Quid igitur homo sit, poterisne proferre?" "Hocine
+interrogas an esse me sciam rationale animal atque mortale? Scio et id me
+esse confiteor." Et illa: "Nihilne aliud te esse nouisti?" "Nihil."
+
+"Iam scio," inquit, "morbi tui aliam uel maximam causam; quid ipse sis,
+nosse desisti. Quare plenissime uel aegritudinis tuae rationem uel aditum
+reconciliandae sospitatis inueni. Nam quoniam tui obliuione confunderis, et
+exsulem te et exspoliatum propriis bonis esse doluisti. Quoniam uero quis
+sit rerum finis ignoras, nequam homines atque nefarios potentes felicesque
+arbitraris. Quoniam uero quibus gubernaculis mundus regatur oblitus es, has
+fortunarum uices aestimas sine rectore fluitare--magnae non ad morbum modo
+uerum ad interitum quoque causae. Sed sospitatis auctori grates, quod te
+nondum totum natura destituit. Habemus maximum tuae fomitem salutis ueram
+de mundi gubernatione sententiam, quod eam non casuum temeritati sed
+diuinae rationi subditam credis. Nihil igitur pertimescas; iam tibi ex hac
+minima scintillula uitalis calor inluxerit. Sed quoniam firmioribus
+remediis nondum tempus est et eam mentium constat esse naturam, ut quotiens
+abiecerint ueras falsis opinionibus induantur ex quibus orta perturbationum
+caligo uerum illum confundit intuitum, hanc paulisper lenibus
+mediocribusque fomentis attenuare temptabo, ut dimotis fallacium
+affectionum tenebris splendorem uerae lucis possis agnoscere.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  First, therefore, wilt thou let me touch and try the state of thy mind
+  by asking thee a few questions, that I may understand how thou art to be
+  cured?" To which I answered: "Ask me what questions thou wilt, and I
+  will answer thee." And then she said: "Thinkest thou that this world is
+  governed by haphazard and chance? Or rather dost thou believe that it is
+  ruled by reason?" "I can," quoth I, "in no manner imagine that such
+  certain motions are caused by rash chance. And I know that God the
+  Creator doth govern His work, nor shall the day ever come to draw me
+  from the truth of that judgment."
+
+  "It is so," saith she, "for so thou saidst in thy verse a little before,
+  and bewailedst that only men were void of God's care; for as for the
+  rest, thou didst not doubt but that they were governed by reason. And
+  surely I cannot choose but exceedingly admire how thou canst be ill
+  affected, holding so wholesome an opinion. But let us search further; I
+  guess thou wantest something, but I know not what.
+
+  Tell me, since thou doubtest not that the world is governed by God,
+  canst thou tell me also by what means it is governed?" "I do scarcely,"
+  quoth I, "understand what thou askest, and much less am I able to make
+  thee a sufficient answer." "Was I," quoth she, "deceived in thinking
+  that thou wantedst something by which, as by the breach of a fortress,
+  the sickness of perturbations hath entered into thy mind? But tell me,
+  dost thou remember what is the end of things? Or to what the whole
+  intention of nature tendeth?" "I have heard it," quoth I, "but grief
+  hath dulled my memory." "But knowest thou from whence all things had
+  their beginning?" "I know," quoth I, and answered, that from God. "And
+  how can it be that, knowing the beginning, thou canst be ignorant of the
+  end? But this is the condition and force of perturbations, that they may
+  alter a man, but wholly destroy, and as it were root him out of himself,
+  they cannot.
+
+  But I would have thee answer me to this also; dost thou remember that
+  thou art a man?" "Why should I not remember it?" quoth I. "Well then,
+  canst thou explicate what man is?" "Dost thou ask me if I know that I am
+  a reasonable and mortal living creature? I know and confess myself to be
+  so." To which she replied: "Dost thou not know thyself to be anything
+  else?" "Not anything."
+
+  "Now I know," quoth she, "another, and that perhaps the greatest, cause
+  of thy sickness: thou hast forgotten what thou art. Wherefore I have
+  fully found out both the manner of thy disease and the means of thy
+  recovery; for the confusion which thou art in, by the forgetfulness of
+  thyself, is the cause why thou art so much grieved at thy exile and the
+  loss of thy goods. And because thou art ignorant what is the end of
+  things, thou thinkest that lewd and wicked men be powerful and happy;
+  likewise, because thou hast forgotten by what means the world is
+  governed, thou imaginest that these alternations of fortune do fall out
+  without any guide, sufficient causes not only of sickness, but also of
+  death itself. But thanks be to the author of thy health, that Nature
+  hath not altogether forsaken thee. We have the greatest nourisher of thy
+  health, the true opinion of the government of the world, in that thou
+  believest that it is not subject to the events of chance, but to divine
+  reason. Wherefore fear nothing; out of this little sparkle will be
+  enkindled thy vital heat. But because it is not yet time to use more
+  solid remedies, and it is manifest that the nature of minds is such that
+  as often as they cast away true opinions they are possessed with false,
+  out of which the darkness of perturbations arising doth make them that
+  they cannot discern things aright, I will endeavour to dissolve this
+  cloud with gentle and moderate fomentations; that having removed the
+  obscurity of deceitful affections, thou mayest behold the splendour of
+  true light.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Nubibus atris
+Condita nullum
+Fundere possunt
+Sidera lumen.
+Si mare uoluens                                                           5
+Turbidus Auster
+Misceat aestum,
+Vitrea dudum
+Parque serenis
+Vnda diebus                                                              10
+Mox resoluto
+Sordida caeno
+Visibus obstat.
+Quique uagatur
+Montibus altis                                                           15
+Defluus amnis,
+Saepe resistit
+Rupe soluti
+Obice saxi.
+Tu quoque si uis                                                         20
+Lumine claro
+Cernere uerum,
+Tramite recto
+Carpere callem,
+Gaudia pelle,                                                            25
+Pelle timorem
+Spemque fugato
+Nec dolor adsit.
+Nubila mens est
+Vinctaque frenis,                                                        30
+Haec ubi regnant."
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  When stars are shrouded
+  With dusky night,
+  They yield no light
+  Being so clouded.
+  When the wind moveth
+  And churneth the sea,
+  The flood, clear as day,
+  Foul and dark proveth.
+  And rivers creeping
+  Down a high hill
+  Stand often still,
+  Rocks them back keeping.
+  If thou wouldst brightly
+  See Truth's clear rays,
+  Or walk those ways
+  Which lead most rightly,
+  All joy forsaking
+  Fear must thou fly,
+  And hopes defy,
+  No sorrow taking.
+  For where these terrors
+  Reign in the mind,
+  They it do bind
+  In cloudy errors."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER PRIMVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER II
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Post haec paulisper obticuit atque ubi attentionem meam modesta
+taciturnitate collegit, sic exorsa est: "Si penitus aegritudinis tuae
+causas habitumque cognovi, fortunae prioris affectu desiderioque tabescis.
+Ea tantum animi tui sicuti tu tibi fingis mutata peruertit. Intellego
+multiformes illius prodigii fucos et eo usque cum his quos eludere nititur
+blandissimam familiaritatem, dum intolerabili dolore confundat quos
+insperata reliquerit. Cuius si naturam mores ac meritum reminiscare, nec
+habuisse te in ea pulchrum aliquid nec amisisse cognosces, sed ut arbitror
+haud multum tibi haec in memoriam reuocare laborauerim. Solebas enim
+praesentem quoque blandientemque uirilibus incessere uerbis eamque de
+nostro adyto prolatis insectabare sententiis. Verum omnis subita mutatio
+rerum non sine quodam quasi fluctu contingit animorum; sic factum est ut tu
+quoque paulisper a tua tranquillitate descisceres. Sed tempus est haurire
+te aliquid ac degustare molle atque iucundum quod ad interiora transmissum
+ualidioribus haustibus uiam fecerit. Adsit igitur Rhetoricae suadela
+dulcedinis quae tum tantum recto calle procedit, cum nostra instituta non
+deserit cumque hac Musica laris nostri uernacula nunc leuiores nunc
+grauiores modos succinat.
+
+Quid est igitur o homo quod te in maestitiam luctumque deiecit? Nouum,
+credo, aliquid inusitatumque uidisti. Tu fortunam putas erga te esse
+mutatam; erras. Hi semper eius mores sunt ista natura. Seruauit circa te
+propriam potius in ipsa sui mutabilitate constantiam. Talis erat cum
+blandiebatur, cum tibi falsae inlecebris felicitatis alluderet.
+Deprehendisti caeci numinis ambiguos uultus. Quae sese adhuc uelat aliis,
+tota tibi prorsus innotuit. Si probas, utere moribus; ne queraris. Si
+perfidiam perhorrescis, sperne atque abice perniciosa ludentem. Nam quae
+nunc tibi est tanti causa maeroris, haec eadem tranquillitatis esse
+debuisset, Reliquit enim te quam non relicturam nemo umquam poterit esse
+securus. An uero tu pretiosam aestimas abituram felicitatem? Et cara tibi
+est fortuna praesens nec manendi fida et cum discesserit adlatura maerorem.
+Quod si nec ex arbitrio retineri potest et calamitosos fugiens facit, quid
+est aliud fugax quam futurae quoddam calamitatis indicium? Neque enim quod
+ante oculos situm est, suffecerit intueri; rerum exitus prudentia metitur
+eademque in alterutro mutabilitas nec formidandas fortunae minas nec
+exoptandas facit esse blanditias.  Postremo aequo animo toleres oportet
+quidquid intra fortunae aream geritur, cum semel iugo eius colla
+submiseris. Quod si manendi abeundique scribere legem uelis ei quam tu tibi
+dominam sponte legisti, nonne iniurius fueris et inpatientia sortem
+exacerbes quam permutare non possis? Si uentis uela committeres, non quo
+uoluntas peteret sed quo flatus impellerent, promoueres; si aruis semina
+crederes, feraces inter se annos sterilesque pensares. Fortunae te regendum
+dedisti; dominae moribus oportet obtemperes.  Tu uero uoluentis rotae
+impetum retinere conaris? At, omnium mortalium stolidissime, si manere
+incipit, fors esse desistit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE SECOND BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  After this she remained silent for a while; and, having by that her
+  modesty made me attentive, began in this wise: "If I be rightly informed
+  of the causes and condition of thy disease, thou languishest with the
+  affection of thy former fortune, and the change of that alone, as thou
+  imaginest, hath overthrown so much of thy mind. I know the manifold
+  illusions of that monster, exercising most alluring familiarity with
+  them whom she meaneth to deceive, to the end she may confound them with
+  intolerable grief, by forsaking them upon the sudden, whose nature,
+  customs, and desert, if thou rememberest, thou shalt know that thou
+  neither didst possess nor hast lost anything of estimation in it; and,
+  as I hope, I shall not need to labour much to bring these things to thy
+  remembrance, for thou wert wont, when she was present, and flattered
+  thee most, to assail her with manful words, and pursue her with
+  sentences taken forth of our most hidden knowledge. But every sudden
+  change of things happeneth not without a certain wavering and
+  disquietness of mind. And this is the cause that thou also for a while
+  hast lost thy former tranquillity and peace. But it is time for thee to
+  take and taste some gentle and pleasant thing which being received may
+  prepare thee for stronger potions. Wherefore let us use the sweetness of
+  Rhetoric's persuasions, which then only is well employed when it
+  forsaketh not our ordinances; and with this, let Music, a little slave
+  belonging to our house, chant sometime lighter and sometime sadder
+  notes.
+
+  Wherefore, O man, what is it that hath cast thee into sorrow and grief?
+  Thou hast, methinks, seen something new and unwonted. If thou thinkest
+  that fortune hath altered her manner of proceeding toward thee, thou art
+  in an error. This was alway her fashion; this is her nature. She hath
+  kept that constancy in thy affairs which is proper to her, in being
+  mutable; such was her condition when she fawned upon thee and allured
+  thee with enticements of feigned happiness. Thou hast discovered the
+  doubtful looks of this blind goddess. She, which concealeth herself from
+  others, is wholly known to thee. If thou likest her, frame thyself to
+  her conditions, and make no complaint. If thou detestest her treachery,
+  despise and cast her off, with her pernicious flattery. For that which
+  hath caused thee so much sorrow should have brought thee to great
+  tranquillity. For she hath forsaken thee, of whom no man can be secure.
+  Dost thou esteem that happiness precious which thou art to lose? And is
+  the present fortune dear unto thee, of whose stay thou art not sure, and
+  whose departure will breed thy grief? And if she can neither be kept at
+  our will, and maketh them miserable whom she at last leaveth, what else
+  is fickle fortune but a token of future calamity? For it is not
+  sufficient to behold that which we have before our eyes; wisdom
+  pondereth the event of things, and this mutability on both sides maketh
+  the threats of fortune not to be feared, nor her flatterings to be
+  desired. Finally, thou must take in good part whatsoever happeneth unto
+  thee within the reach of fortune, when once thou hast submitted thy neck
+  to her yoke. And if to her whom, of thine own accord, thou hast chosen
+  for thy mistress, thou wouldest prescribe a law how long she were to
+  stay, and when to depart, shouldst thou not do her mighty wrong, and
+  with thy impatience make thy estate more intolerable, which thou canst
+  not better? If thou settest up thy sails to the wind, thou shalt be
+  carried not whither thy will desirest, but whither the gale driveth. If
+  thou sowest thy seed, thou considerest that there are as well barren as
+  fertile years. Thou hast yielded thyself to fortune's sway; thou must be
+  content with the conditions of thy mistress. Endeavourest thou to stay
+  the force of the turning wheel? But thou foolishest man that ever was,
+  if it beginneth to stay, it ceaseth to be fortune.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec cum superba uerterit uices dextra
+Et aestuantis more fertur Euripi,
+Dudum tremendos saeua proterit reges
+Humilemque uicti subleuat fallax uultum.
+Non illa miseros audit aut curat fletus                                   5
+Vltroque gemitus dura quos fecit ridet.
+Sic illa ludit, sic suas probat uires
+Magnumque suis demonstrat [100] ostentum, si quis
+Visatur una stratus ac felix hora.
+
+
+[100] monstrat _codd_.
+
+
+
+
+  I
+
+  The pride of fickle fortune spareth none,
+  And, like the floods of swift Euripus borne, [101]
+  Oft casteth mighty princes from their throne,
+  And oft the abject captive doth adorn.
+  She cares not for the wretch's tears and moan,
+  And the sad groans, which she hath caused, doth scorn.
+  Thus doth she play, to make her power more known,
+  Showing her slaves a marvel, when man's state
+  Is in one hour both downcast and fortunate.
+
+
+  [101] Literally, "When fortune with proud right hand plies her changes
+  and ebbs and flows like foaming Euripus." Euripus was proverbial for
+  irregular tides.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Vellem autem pauca tecum fortunae ipsius uerbis agitare. Tu igitur an ius
+postulet, animaduerte. 'Quid tu homo ream me cotidianis agis querelis? Quam
+tibi fecimus iniuriam? Quae tua tibi detraximus bona? Quouis iudice de opum
+dignitatumque mecum possessione contende.  Et si cuiusquam mortalium
+proprium quid horum esse monstraueris, ego iam tua fuisse quae repetis,
+sponte concedam.
+
+Cum te matris utero natura produxit, nudum rebus omnibus inopemque suscepi,
+meis opibus foui et quod te nunc inpatientem nostri facit, fauore prona
+indulgentius educaui, omnium quae mei iuris sunt affluentia et splendore
+circumdedi. Nunc mihi retrahere manum libet. Habes gratiam uelut usus
+alienis, non habes ius querelae tamquam prorsus tua perdideris. Quid igitur
+ingemiscis? Nulla tibi a nobis est allata uiolentia. Opes honores ceteraque
+talium mei sunt iuris. Dominam famulae cognoscunt; mecum ueniunt, me
+abeunte discedunt. Audacter adfirmem, si tua forent quae amissa conquereris
+nullo modo perdidisses. An ego sola meum ius exercere prohibebor? Licet
+caelo proferre lucidos dies eosdemque tenebrosis noctibus condere. Licet
+anno terrae uultum nunc floribus frugibusque redimire, nunc nimbis
+frigoribusque confundere. Ius est mari nunc strato aequore blandiri, nunc
+procellis ac fluctibus inhorrescere. Nos ad constantiam nostris moribus
+alienam inexpleta hominum cupiditas alligabit? Haec nostra uis est, hunc
+continuum ludum ludimus; rotam uolubili orbe uersamus, infima summis summa
+infimis mutare gaudemus. Ascende si placet, sed ea lege ne utique[102] cum
+ludicri mei ratio poscet, descendere iniuriam putes. An tu mores ignorabas
+meos? Nesciebas Croesum regem Lydorum Cyro paulo ante formidabilem mox
+deinde miserandum rogi flammis traditum misso caelitus imbre defensum? Num
+te praeterit Paulum Persi regis a se capti calamitatibus pias inpendisse
+lacrimas? Quid tragoediarum clamor aliud deflet nisi indiscreto ictu
+fortunam felicia regna uertentem? Nonne adulescentulus [Greek: doious
+pithous ton men hena kakon ton d'heteron eaon] in Iouis limine iacere
+didicisti? Quid si uberius de bonorum parte sumpsisti? Quid si a te non
+tota discessi? Quid si haec ipsa mei mutabilitas iusta tibi causa est
+sperandi meliora? Tamen ne animo contabescas et intra commune omnibus
+regnum locatus proprio uiuere iure desideres.
+
+
+[102] utique _Klussmann_; uti _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  II
+
+  But I would urge thee a little with Fortune's own speeches. Wherefore
+  consider thou if she asketh not reason. 'For what cause, O man, chargest
+  thou me with daily complaints? What injury have I done thee? What goods
+  of thine have I taken from thee? Contend with me before any judge about
+  the possession of riches and dignities; and if thou canst show that the
+  propriety of any of these things belong to any mortal wight, I will
+  forthwith willingly grant that those things which thou demandest were
+  thine. When Nature produced thee out of thy mother's womb, I received
+  thee naked and poor in all respects, cherished thee with my wealth, and
+  (which maketh thee now to fall out with me) being forward to favour
+  thee, I had most tender care for thy education, and adorned thee with
+  the abundance and splendour of all things which are in my power. Now it
+  pleaseth me to withdraw my hand, yield thanks, as one that hath had the
+  use of that which was not his own. Thou hast no just cause to complain,
+  as though thou hadst lost that which was fully thine own. Wherefore
+  lamentest thou? I have offered thee no violence. Riches, honours, and
+  the rest of that sort belong to me. They acknowledge me for their
+  mistress, and themselves for my servants, they come with me, and when I
+  go away they likewise depart. I may boldly affirm, if those things which
+  thou complainest to be taken from thee had been thine own, thou shouldst
+  never have lost them. Must I only be forbidden to use my right? It is
+  lawful for the heaven to bring forth fair days, and to hide them again
+  in darksome nights. It is lawful for the year sometime to compass the
+  face of the earth with flowers and fruits, and sometime to cover it with
+  clouds and cold. The sea hath right sometime to fawn with calms, and
+  sometime to frown with storms and waves. And shall the insatiable desire
+  of men tie me to constancy, so contrary to my custom? This is my force,
+  this is the sport which I continually use. I turn about my wheel with
+  speed, and take a pleasure to turn things upside down. Ascend, if thou
+  wilt, but with this condition, that thou thinkest it not an injury to
+  descend when the course of my sport so requireth. Didst thou not know my
+  fashion? Wert thou ignorant how Croesus, King of the Lydians, not long
+  before a terror to Cyrus, within a while after came to such misery that
+  he should have been burnt had he not been saved by a shower sent from
+  heaven?[103] Hast thou forgotten how Paul piously bewailed the
+  calamities of King Perses his prisoner?[104] What other thing doth the
+  outcry of tragedies lament, but that fortune, having no respect,
+  overturneth happy states? Didst thou not learn in thy youth that there
+  lay two barrels, the one of good things and the other of bad,[105] at
+  Jupiter's threshold? But what if thou hast tasted more abundantly of the
+  good? What if I be not wholly gone from thee? What if this mutability of
+  mine be a just cause for thee to hope for better? Notwithstanding, lose
+  not thy courage, and, living in a kingdom which is common to all men,
+  desire not to be governed by peculiar laws proper only to thyself.
+
+
+  [103] Cf. Herod, i. 87.
+
+  [104] Cf. Livy xlv. 8. Paul=Aemilius Paulus surnamed Macedonius for his
+  defeat of Perses last king of Macedonia in 168 B.C.
+
+  [105] _Il._ xxiv. 527.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Si quantas rapidis flatibus incitus
+  Pontus uersat harenas
+Aut quot stelliferis edita noctibus
+  Caelo sidera fulgent
+Tantas fundat opes nec retrahat manum                                     5
+  Pleno copia cornu,
+Humanum miseras haud ideo genus
+  Cesset flere querellas.
+Quamuis uota libens excipiat deus
+  Multi prodigus auri                                                    10
+Et claris auidos ornet honoribus,
+  Nil iam parta uidentur,
+Sed quaesita uorans saeua rapacitas
+  Altos[106] pandit hiatus.
+Quae iam praecipitem frena cupidinem                                     15
+  Certo fine retentent,
+Largis cum potius muneribus fluens
+  Sitis ardescit habendi?
+Numquam diues agit qui trepidus gemens
+  Sese credit egentem.'                                                  20
+
+
+[106] altos _vulg._; alios _codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  If Plenty as much wealth should give, ne'er holding back her hand,
+  As the swift winds in troubled seas do toss up heaps of sand,
+  Or as the stars in lightsome nights shine forth on heaven's face,
+  Yet wretched men would still accuse their miserable case.
+  Should God, too liberal of His gold, their greedy wishes hear,
+  And with bright honour them adorn; yet all that nothing were,
+  Since ravenous minds, devouring all, for more are ready still.
+  What bridle can contain in bounds this their contentless will,
+  When filled with riches they retain the thirst of having more?
+  He is not rich that fears and grieves, and counts himself but poor.'
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+His igitur si pro se tecum fortuna loqueretur, quid profecto contra
+hisceres non haberes, aut si quid est quo querelam tuam iure tuearis,
+proferas oportet. Dabimus dicendi locum." Tum ego: "Speciosa quidem ista
+sunt," inquam, "oblitaque Rhetoricae ac Musicae melle dulcedinis; tum
+tantum, cum audiuntur, oblectant. Sed miseris malorum altior sensus est.
+Itaque cum haec auribus insonare desierint, insitus animum maeror
+praegrauat." Et illa: "Ita est," inquit. "Haec enim nondum morbi tui
+remedia sed adhuc contumacis aduersum curationem doloris fomenta quaedam
+sunt. Nam quae in profundum sese penetrent, cum tempestiuum fuerit
+admouebo. Verumtamen ne te existimari miserum uelis, an numerum modumque
+tuae felicitatis oblitus es?
+
+Taceo quod desolatum parente summorum te uirorum cura suscepit delectusque
+in affinitatem principum ciuitatis, quod pretiosissimum propinquitatis
+genus est, prius carus quam proximus esse coepisti. Quis non te
+felicissimum cum tanto splendore socerorum, cum coniugis pudore, cum
+masculae quoque prolis opportunitate praedicauit? Praetereo, libet enim
+praeterire communia, sumptas in adulescentia negatas senibus dignitates; ad
+singularem felicitatis tuae cumulum uenire delectat. Si quis rerum
+mortalium fructus ullum beatitudinis pondus habet, poteritne illius memoria
+lucis quantalibet ingruentium malorum mole deleri, cum duos pariter
+consules liberos tuos domo prouehi sub frequentia patrum, sub plebis
+alacritate uidisti, cum eisdem in curia curules insidentibus tu regiae
+laudis orator ingenii gloriam facundiaeque meruisti, cum in circo duorum
+medius consulum circumfusae multitudinis expectationem triumphali
+largitione satiasti? Dedisti ut opinor uerba fortunae, dum te illa
+demulcet, dum te ut delicias suas fouet. Munus quod nulli umquam priuato
+commodauerat abstulisti. Visne igitur cum fortuna calculum ponere? Nunc te
+primum liuenti oculo praestrinxit. Si numerum modumque laetorum tristiumue
+consideres, adhuc te felicem negare non possis. Quod si idcirco te
+fortunatum esse non aestimas, quoniam quae tunc laeta uidebantur abierunt,
+non est quod te miserum putes, quoniam quae nunc creduntur maesta
+praetereunt. An tu in hanc uitae scaenam nunc primum subitus hospesque
+uenisti? Vllamne humanis rebus inesse constantiam reris, cum ipsum saepe
+hominem uelox hora dissoluat? Nam etsi rara est fortuitis manendi fides,
+ultimus tamen uitae dies mors quaedam fortunae est etiam manentis. Quid
+igitur referre putas, tune illam moriendo deseras an te illa fugiendo?
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Wherefore if fortune should plead with thee thus in her own defence,
+  doubtless thou wouldst not have a word to answer her. But if there be
+  anything which thou canst allege in thy own defence, thou must utter it.
+  We will give thee full liberty to speak." Then I said: "These things
+  make a fair show and, being set out with pleasant rhetoric and music,
+  delight only so long as they are heard. But those which are miserable
+  have a deeper feeling of their miseries. Therefore, when the sound of
+  these things is past, hidden sorrow oppresseth the mind." "It is so
+  indeed," quoth she, "for these be not the remedies of thy disease, but
+  certain fomentations to assuage thy grief, which as yet resisteth all
+  cure. But when it shall be time, I will apply that which shall pierce to
+  the quick. And yet there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself
+  miserable. Hast thou forgotten how many ways, and in what degree thou
+  art happy?
+
+  I pass over with silence that, having lost thy father, thou wert
+  provided for by men of the best sort, and, being chosen to have affinity
+  with the chiefest of the city, thou begannest sooner to be dear unto
+  them than to be akin, which is the most excellent kind of kindred. Who
+  esteemed thee not most happy, having so noble a father-in-law, so chaste
+  a wife, and so noble sons? I say nothing (for I will not speak of
+  ordinary matters) of the dignities denied to others in their age, and
+  granted to thee in thy youth. I desire to come to the singular top of
+  thy felicity. If any fruit of mortal things hath any weight of
+  happiness, can the remembrance of that light be destroyed with any cloud
+  of miseries that can overcast thee? When thou sawst thy two sons being
+  both Consuls together carried from their house, the Senators
+  accompanying them, and the people rejoicing with them; when, they
+  sitting in the Senate in their chairs of state, thou making an oration
+  in the King's praise deservedst the glory of wit and eloquence. When in
+  public assembly, thou, standing betwixt thy two sons, didst satisfy with
+  thy triumphant liberality the expectation of the multitudes gathered
+  together, I suppose thou flatteredst fortune, while she fawned thus upon
+  thee, as her dearest friend. Thou obtainedst more at her hands than ever
+  private man had before thee. Wilt thou then reckon with fortune? This is
+  the first time that ever she frowned upon thee. If thou considerest the
+  number and measure of thy joyful and sad accidents, thou canst not
+  choose but think thyself fortunate hitherto; and if thou esteemest not
+  thyself fortunate because those things which seemed joyful are past,
+  there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself miserable, since those
+  things which thou now takest to be sorrowful do pass. Comest thou now
+  first as a pilgrim and stranger into the theatre of this life? Supposest
+  thou to find any constancy in human affairs, since that man himself is
+  soon gone? For although things subject to fortune seldom keep touch in
+  staying, yet the end of life is a certain death, even of that fortune
+  which remaineth. Wherefore, what matter is it whether thou by dying
+  leavest it, or it forsaketh thee by flying?
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Cum polo Phoebus roseis quadrigis
+  Lucem spargere coeperit,
+Pallet albentes hebetata uultus
+  Flammis stella prementibus.
+Cum nemus flatu Zephyri tepentis                                          5
+  Vernis inrubuit rosis,
+Spiret insanum nebulosus Auster:
+  Iam spinis abeat decus.
+Saepe tranquillo radiat sereno
+  Immotis mare fluctibus,                                                10
+Saepe feruentes Aquilo procellas
+  Verso concitat aequore.
+Rara si constat sua forma mundo,
+  Si tantas uariat uices,
+Crede fortunis hominum caducis,                                          15
+  Bonis crede fugacibus.
+Constat aeterna positumque lege est
+  Vt constet genitum nihil."
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  When Phoebus with his rosy team
+    Showeth his lightsome beam,
+  The dull and darkened stars retire
+    Yielding to greater fire.
+  When Zephyrus his warmth doth bring,
+    Sweet roses deck the spring;
+  Let noisome Auster blow apace,
+    Plants soon will lose their grace.
+  The sea hath often quiet stood
+    With an unmoved flood,
+  And often is turmoiled with waves,
+    When boisterous Boreas raves.
+  If thus the world never long tarry
+    The same, but often vary,
+  On fading fortunes then rely,
+    Trust to those goods that fly.
+  An everlasting law is made,
+    That all things born shall fade."
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum ego: "Vera," inquam, "commemoras, o uirtutum omnium nutrix, nec
+infitiari possum prosperitatis meae uelocissimum cursum. Sed hoc est quod
+recolentem uehementius coquit. Nam in omni aduersitate fortunae
+infelicissimum est genus infortunii fuisse felicem." "Sed quod tu," inquit,
+"falsae opinionis supplicium luas, id rebus iure imputare non possis. Nam
+si te hoc inane nomen fortuitae felicitatis mouet, quam pluribus maximisque
+abundes mecum reputes licet. Igitur si quod in omni fortunae tuae censu
+pretiosissimum possidebas, id tibi diuinitus inlaesum adhuc inuiolatumque
+seruatur, poterisne meliora quaeque retinens de infortunio iure causari?
+
+Atqui uiget incolumis illud pretiosissimum generis humani decus Symmachus
+socer et quod uitae pretio non segnis emeres, uir totus ex sapientia
+uirtutibusque factus suarum securus tuis ingemiscit iniuriis. Viuit uxor
+ingenio modesta, pudicitia pudore praecellens et, ut omnes eius dotes
+breuiter includam, patri similis. Viuit inquam tibique tantum uitae huius
+exosa spiritum seruat quoque uno felicitatem minui tuam uel ipsa
+concesserim, tui desiderio lacrimis ac dolore tabescit.
+
+Quid dicam liberos consulares quorum iam, ut in id aetatis pueris, uel
+paterni uel auiti specimen elucet ingenii? Cum igitur praecipua sit
+mortalibus uitae cura retinendae, o te si tua bona cognoscas felicem, cui
+suppetunt etiam nunc quae uita nemo dubitat esse cariora! Quare sicca iam
+lacrimas. Nondum est ad unum omnes exosa fortuna nec tibi nimium ualida
+tempestas incubuit, quando tenaces haerent ancorae quae nec praesentis
+solamen nec futuri spem temporis abesse patiantur."
+
+"Et haereant," inquam, "precor; illis namque manentibus, utcumque se res
+habeant, enatabimus. Sed quantum ornamentis nostris decesserit, uides." Et
+illa: "Promouimus," inquit, "aliquantum, si te nondum totius tuae sortis
+piget. Sed delicias tuas ferre non possum qui abesse aliquid tuae
+beatitudini tam luctuosus atque anxius conqueraris. Quis est enim tam
+conpositae felicitatis ut non aliqua ex parte cum status sui qualitate
+rixetur? Anxia enim res est humanorum condicio bonorum et quae uel numquam
+tota proueniat uel numquam perpetua subsistat. Huic census exuberat, sed
+est pudori degener sanguis; hunc nobilitas notum facit, sed angustia rei
+familiaris inclusus esse mallet ignotus. Ille utroque circumfluus uitam
+caelibem deflet; ille nuptiis felix orbus liberis alieno censum nutrit
+heredi. Alius prole laetatus filii filiaeue delictis maestus inlacrimat.
+Idcirco nemo facile cum fortunae suae condicione concordat; inest enim
+singulis quod inexpertus ignoret, expertus exhorreat. Adde quod felicissimi
+cuiusque delicatissimus sensus est et nisi ad nutum cuncta suppetant, omnis
+aduersitatis insolens minimis quibusque prosternitur; adeo perexigua sunt
+quae fortunatissimis beatitudinis summam detrahunt. Quam multos esse
+coniectas qui sese caelo proximos arbitrentur, si de fortunae tuae
+reliquiis pars eis minima contingat? Hic ipse locus quem tu exilium uocas,
+incolentibus patria est; adeo nihil est miserum nisi cum putes contraque
+beata sors omnis est aequanimitate tolerantis. Quis est ille tam felix qui
+cum dederit inpatientiae manus, statum suum mutare non optet? Quam multis
+amaritudinibus humanae felicitatis dulcedo respersa est! Quae si etiam
+fruenti iucunda esse uideatur, tamen quo minus cum uelit abeat retineri non
+possit. Liquet igitur quam sit mortalium rerum misera beatitudo quae nec
+apud aequanimos perpetua perdurat necanxios tota delectat.
+
+Quid igitur o mortales extra petitis intra uos positam felicitatem? Error
+uos inscitiaque confundit. Ostendam breuiter tibi summae cardinem
+felicitatis. Estne aliquid tibi te ipso pretiosius? Nihil inquies. Igitur
+si tui compos fueris, possidebis quod nec tu amittere umquam uelis nec
+fortuna possit auferre. Atque ut agnoscas in his fortuitis rebus
+beatitudinem constare non posse, sic collige.  Si beatitudo est summum
+naturae bonum ratione degentis nec est summum bonum quod eripi ullo modo
+potest, quoniam praecellit id quod nequeat auferri, manifestum est
+quoniam[107] ad beatitudinem percipiendam fortunae instabilitas adspirare
+non possit. Ad haec quem caduca ista felicitas uehit uel scit eam uel
+nescit esse mutabilem. Si nescit, quaenam beata sors esse potest
+ignorantiae caecitate? Si scit, metuat necesse est, ne amittat quod amitti
+posse non dubitat; quare continuus timor non sinit esse felicem. An uel si
+amiserit, neglegendum putat? Sic quoque perexile bonum est quod aequo animo
+feratur amissum. Et quoniam tu idem es cui persuasum atque insitum
+permultis demonstrationibus scio mentes hominum nullo modo esse mortales
+cumque clarum sit fortuitam felicitatem corporis morte finiri, dubitari
+nequit, si haec afferre beatitudinem potest, quin omne mortalium genus in
+miseriam mortis fine labatur. Quod si multos scimus beatitudinis fructum
+non morte solum uerum etiam doloribus suppliciisque quaesisse, quonam modo
+praesens facere beatos potest quae miseros transacta non efficit?
+
+
+[107] quin _codices_.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  To which I answered: "The things which thou reportest are true, O nurse
+  of all virtues, and I cannot deny the most speedy course of my
+  prosperity. But this is that which vexeth me most, when I remember it.
+  For in all adversity of fortune it is the most unhappy kind of
+  misfortune to have been happy." "But," quoth she, "thou canst not justly
+  impute to the things themselves that thou art punished for thy false
+  opinion. For if this vain name of casual felicity moveth thee, let us
+  make accompt with how many and how great things thou aboundest.
+  Wherefore, if that which in all thy revenues of fortune thou esteemest
+  most precious doth still by God's providence remain safe and untouched,
+  canst thou, retaining the best, justly complain of misfortune?
+
+  But thy father-in-law, Symmachus (that most excellent ornament of
+  mankind) liveth in safety, and for the obtaining of which thou wouldst
+  willingly spend thy life, that man wholly framed to wisdom and virtues,
+  being secure of his own, mourneth for thy injuries. Thy wife liveth,
+  modest in disposition, eminent in chastity, and, to rehearse briefly all
+  her excellent gifts, like her father. She liveth, I say, and weary of
+  her life reserveth her breath only for thee. In which alone even I must
+  grant that thy felicity is diminished, she consumeth herself with tears
+  and grief for thy sake.
+
+  What should I speak of thy children, which have been Consuls, in whom
+  already, as in children of that age, their father's or grandfather's
+  good disposition appeareth? Wherefore, since the greatest care that
+  mortal men have is to save their lives, O happy man that thou art, if
+  thou knowest thine own wealth, who still hast remaining those things
+  which no man doubteth to be dearer than life itself? And therefore cease
+  weeping. Fortune hath not hitherto showed her hatred against you all,
+  neither art thou assailed with too boisterous a storm, since those
+  anchors hold fast which permit neither the comfort of the time present
+  nor the hope of the time to come to be wanting."
+
+  "And I pray God," quoth I, "that they may hold fast, for so long as they
+  remain, howsoever the world goeth we shall escape drowning. But thou
+  seest how great a part of our ornaments is lost." "We have gotten a
+  little ground," quoth she, "if thy whole estate be not irksome unto
+  thee. But I cannot suffer thy daintiness, who with such lamentation and
+  anxiety complaineth that something is wanting to thy happiness. For who
+  hath so entire happiness that he is not in some part offended with the
+  condition of his estate? The nature of human felicity is doubtful and
+  uncertain, and is neither ever wholly obtained, or never lasteth always.
+  One man hath great revenues, but is contemned for his base lineage.
+  Another's nobility maketh him known, but, oppressed with penury, had
+  rather be unknown. Some, abounding with both, bewail their life without
+  marriage. Some other, well married but wanting children, provideth
+  riches for strangers to inherit. Others, finally, having children,
+  mournfully bewail the vices which their sons or daughters are given to.
+  So that scarce any man is pleased with the condition of his fortune. For
+  there is something in every estate, which without experience is not
+  known, and being experienced doth molest and trouble. Besides that,
+  those which are most happy are most sensible,[108] and unless all things
+  fall out to their liking, impatient of all adversity, every little cross
+  overthrows them, so small are the occasions which take from the most
+  fortunate the height of their happiness. How many are there, thinkest
+  thou, which would think themselves almost in Heaven if they had but the
+  least part of the remains of thy fortune? This very place, which thou
+  callest banishment, is to the inhabitants thereof their native land. So
+  true it is that nothing is miserable but what is thought so, and
+  contrariwise, every estate is happy if he that bears it be content. Who
+  is so happy that if he yieldeth to discontent, desireth not to change
+  his estate? How much bitterness is mingled with the sweetness of man's
+  felicity, which, though it seemeth so pleasant while it is enjoyed, yet
+  can it not be retained from going away when it will. And by this it
+  appeareth how miserable is the blessedness of mortal things, which
+  neither endureth alway with the contented, nor wholly delighteth the
+  pensive.
+
+  Wherefore, O mortal men, why seek you for your felicity abroad, which is
+  placed within yourselves? Error and ignorance do confound you. I will
+  briefly show thee the centre of thy chiefest happiness. Is there
+  anything more precious to thee than thyself? I am sure thou wilt say,
+  nothing. Wherefore, if thou enjoyest thyself, thou shalt possess that
+  which neither thou wilt ever wish to lose nor fortune can take away. And
+  that thou mayst acknowledge that blessedness cannot consist in these
+  casual things, gather it thus. If blessedness be the chiefest good of
+  nature endued with reason, and that is not the chiefest good which may
+  by any means be taken away, because that which cannot be taken away is
+  better, it is manifest that the instability of fortune cannot aspire to
+  the obtaining of blessedness. Moreover, he that now enjoyeth this
+  brittle felicity, either knoweth it to be mutable or no. If not, what
+  estate can be blessed by ignorant blindness? And if he knoweth it, he
+  must needs fear lest he lose that which he doubteth not may be lost,
+  wherefore continual fear permitteth him not to be happy. Or though he
+  should lose it, doth he think that a thing of no moment? But so it were
+  a very small good which he would be content to lose. And because thou
+  art one whom I know to be fully persuaded and convinced by innumerable
+  demonstrations that the souls of men are in no wise mortal, and since it
+  is clear that casual felicity is ended by the body's death, there is no
+  doubt, if this can cause blessedness, but that all mankind falleth into
+  misery by death. But if we know many who have sought to reap the fruit
+  of blessedness, not only by death, but also by affliction and torments,
+  how can present happiness make men happy, the loss of which causeth not
+  misery?
+
+
+  [108] _i.e._ sensitive.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quisquis uolet perennem
+  Cautus ponere sedem
+Stabilisque nec sonori
+  Sterni flatibus Euri
+Et fluctibus minantem                                                     5
+  Curat spernere pontum,
+Montis cacumen alti,
+  Bibulas uitet harenas.
+Illud proteruus Auster
+  Totis uiribus urget,                                                   10
+Hae pendulum solutae
+  Pondus ferre recusant.
+Fugiens periculosam
+  Sortem sedis amoenae
+Humili domum memento                                                     15
+  Certus figere saxo.
+Quamuis tonet ruinis
+  Miscens aequora uentus,
+Tu conditus quieti
+  Felix robore ualli                                                     20
+Duces serenus aeuum
+  Ridens aetheris iras.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Who with an heedful care
+  Will an eternal seat prepare,
+  Which cannot be down cast
+  By force of windy blast,
+  And will the floods despise,
+  When threatening billows do arise,
+  He not on hills must stand,
+  Nor on the dangerous sinking sand.
+  For there the winds will threat,
+  And him with furious tempests beat,
+  And here the ground too weak
+  Will with the heavy burden break.[109]
+  Fly then the dangerous case
+  Of an untried delightful place,
+  And thy poor house bestow
+  In stony places firm and low.
+  For though the winds do sound,
+  And waves of troubled seas confound:
+  Yet thou to rest disposed
+  In thy safe lowly vale inclosed,
+  Mayst live a quiet age,
+  Scorning the air's distempered rage.
+
+
+  [109] Literally, "These shifting sands refuse to bear the weight laid
+  upon them."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Sed quoniam rationum iam in te mearum fomenta descendunt, paulo
+ualidioribus utendum puto. Age enim si iam caduca et momentaria fortunae
+dona non essent, quid in eis est quod aut uestrum umquam fieri queat aut
+non perspectum consideratumque uilescat? Diuitiaene uel uestra uel sui
+natura pretiosae sunt? Quid earum potius, aurumne an uis congesta pecuniae?
+Atqui haec effundendo magis quam coaceruando melius nitent, si quidem
+auaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. Quod si manere apud quemque
+non potest quod transfertur in alterum, tunc est pretiosa pecunia cum
+translata in alios largiendi usu desinit possideri. At eadem si apud unum
+quanta est ubique gentium congeratur, ceteros sui inopes fecerit. Et uox
+quidem tota pariter multorum replet auditum; uestrae uero diuitiae nisi
+comminutae in plures transire non possunt. Quod cum factum est, pauperes
+necesse est faciant quos relinquunt. O igitur angustas inopesque diuitias
+quas nec habere totas pluribus licet et ad quemlibet sine ceterorum
+paupertate non ueniunt! An gemmarum fulgor oculos trahit? Sed si quid est
+in hoc splendore praecipui, gemmarum est lux illa non hominum, quas quidem
+mirari homines uehementer admiror. Quid est enim carens animae motu atque
+compage quod animatae rationabilique naturae pulchrum esse iure uideatur?
+Quae tametsi conditoris opera suique distinctione postremae aliquid
+pulchritudinis trahunt, infra uestram tamen excellentiam conlocatae
+admirationem uestram nullo modo merebantur. An uos agrorum pulchritudo
+delectat? Quidni? Est enim pulcherrimi operis pulchra portio. Sic quondam
+sereni maris facie gaudemus; sic caelum sidera lunam solemque miramur. Num
+te horum aliquid attingit? Num audes alicuius talium splendore gloriari? An
+uernis floribus ipse distingueris aut tua in aestiuos fructus intumescit
+ubertas? Quid inanibus gaudiis raperis? Quid externa bona pro tuis
+amplexaris? Numquam tua faciet esse fortuna quae a te natura rerum fecit
+aliena. Terrarum quidem fructus animantium procul dubio debentur alimentis.
+Sed si, quod naturae satis est, replere indigentiam uelis, nihil est quod
+fortunae affluentiam petas. Paucis enim minimisque natura contenta est,
+cuius satietatem si superfluis urgere uelis, aut iniucundum quod infuderis
+fiet aut noxium. Iam uero pulchrum uariis fulgere uestibus putas, quarum si
+grata intuitu species est, aut materiae naturam aut ingenium mirabor
+artificis. An uero te longus ordo famulorum facit esse felicem? Qui si
+uitiosi moribus sint, perniciosa domus sarcina et ipsi domino uehementer
+inimica; sin uero probi, quonam modo in tuis opibus aliena probitas
+numerabitur? Ex quibus omnibus nihil horum quae tu in tuis conputas bonis
+tuum esse bonum liquido monstratur. Quibus si nihil inest appetendae
+pulchritudinis, quid est quod uel amissis doleas uel laeteris retentis?
+Quod si natura pulchra sunt, quid id tua refert? Nam haec per se a tuis
+quoque opibus sequestrata placuissent. Neque enim idcirco sunt pretiosa
+quod in tuas uenere diuitias, sed quoniam pretiosa uidebantur, tuis ea
+diuitiis adnumerare maluisti. Quid autem tanto fortunae strepitu
+desideratis? Fugare credo indigentiam copia quaeritis. Atqui hoc uobis in
+contrarium cedit. Pluribus quippe adminiculis opus est ad tuendam pretiosae
+supellectilis uarietatem, uerumque illud est permultis eos indigere qui
+permulta possideant contraque minimum qui abundantiam suam naturae
+necessitate non ambitus superfluitate metiantur. Itane autem nullum est
+proprium uobis atque insitum bonum ut in externis ac sepositis rebus bona
+uestra quaeratis? Sic rerum uersa condicio est ut diuinum merito rationis
+animal non aliter sibi splendere nisi inanimatae supellectilis possessione
+uideatur? Et alia quidem suis contenta sunt; uos autem deo mente consimiles
+ab rebus infimis excellentis naturae ornamenta captatis nec intellegitis
+quantam conditori uestro faciatis iniuriam. Ille genus humanum terrenis
+omnibus praestare uoluit; uos dignitatem uestram infra infima quaeque
+detruditis. Nam si omne cuiusque bonum eo cuius est constat esse
+pretiosius, cum uilissima rerum uestra bona esse iudicatis, eisdem uosmet
+ipsos uestra existimatione submittitis; quod quidem haud inmerito cadit.
+Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est ut tum tantum ceteris rebus cum se
+cognoscit excellat, eadem tamen infra bestias redigatur, si se nosse
+desierit. Nam ceteris animantibus sese ignorare naturae est; hominibus
+uitio uenit. Quam uero late patet uester hic error qui ornari posse aliquid
+ornamentis existimatis alienis? At id fieri nequit. Nam si quid ex
+appositis luceat, ipsa quidem quae sunt apposita laudantur; illud uero his
+tectum atque uelatum in sua nihilo minus foeditate perdurat. Ego uero nego
+ullum esse bonum quod noceat habenti. Num id mentior? 'Minime,' inquis.
+Atqui diuitiae possidentibus persaepe nocuerunt, cum pessimus quisque eoque
+alieni magis auidus quidquid usquam auri gemmarumque est se solum qui
+habeat dignissimum putat. Tu igitur qui nunc contum gladiumque sollicitus
+pertimescis, si uitae huius callem uacuus uiator intrasses, coram latrone
+cantares. O praeclara opum mortalium beatitudo quam cum adeptus fueris
+securus esse desistis!
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  But since the soothing of my reasons begins to sink into thee, I will
+  use those which are somewhat more forcible. Go to the*n, if the gifts of
+  fortune were not brittle and momentary, what is there in them which can
+  either ever be made your own, or, well weighed and considered, seemeth
+  not vile and of no accompt? Are riches precious in virtue either of
+  their own nature or of yours? What part of them can be so esteemed of?
+  The gold or the heaps of money? But these make a fairer show when they
+  are spent than when they are kept. For covetousness alway maketh men
+  odious, as liberality famous. And if a man cannot have that which is
+  given to another, then money is precious when, bestowed upon others, by
+  the use of liberality it is not possessed any longer. But if all the
+  money in the whole world were gathered into one man's custody, all other
+  men should be poor. The voice at the same time wholly filleth the ears
+  of many, but your riches cannot pass to many, except they be diminished,
+  which being done, they must needs make them poor whom they leave. O
+  scant and poor riches, which neither can be wholly possessed of many,
+  and come to none without the impoverishment of others! Doth the
+  glittering of jewels draw thy eyes after them? But if there be any great
+  matter in this show, not men but the jewels shine, which I exceedingly
+  marvel that men admire. For what is there wanting life and members that
+  may justly seem beautiful to a nature not only endued with life but also
+  with reason? Which, though by their maker's workmanship and their own
+  variety they have some part of basest beauty, yet it is so far inferior
+  to your excellency that it did in no sort deserve your admiration. Doth
+  the pleasant prospect of the fields delight you? Why not? For it is a
+  fair portion of a most fair work. So we are delighted with a calm sea,
+  so we admire the sky, the stars, the sun, and the moon. Do any of these
+  belong to thee? Darest thou boast of the beauty which any of them have?
+  Art thou thyself adorned with May flowers? Or doth thy fertility teem
+  with the fruits of summer? Why rejoicest thou vainly? Why embracest thou
+  outward goods as if they were thine own? Fortune will never make those
+  things thine which by the appointment of Nature belong not to thee. The
+  fruits of the earth are doubtless appointed for the sustenance of living
+  creatures. But if thou wilt only satisfy want, which sufficeth Nature,
+  there is no cause to require the superfluities of fortune. For Nature is
+  contented with little and with the smallest things, and, if, being
+  satisfied, thou wilt overlay it with more than needs, that which thou
+  addest will either become unpleasant or hurtful. But perhaps thou
+  thinkest it a fine thing to go decked in gay apparel, which, if they
+  make a fair show, I will admire either the goodness of the stuff or the
+  invention of the workman. Or doth the multitude of servants make thee
+  happy? Who, if they be vicious, they are a pernicious burden to thy
+  house, and exceedingly troublesome to their master; and if they be
+  honest, how shall other men's honesty be counted amongst thy treasures?
+  By all which is manifestly proved that none of these goods which thou
+  accountest thine, are thine indeed. And if there is nothing in these
+  worthy to be desired, why art thou either glad when thou hast them or
+  sorry when thou losest them? Or what is it to thee, if they be precious
+  by nature? For in this respect they would have pleased thee, though they
+  had belonged to others. For they are not precious because they are come
+  to be thine, but because they seemed precious thou wert desirous to have
+  them. Now, what desire you with such loud praise of fortune? Perhaps you
+  seek to drive away penury with plenty. But this falleth out quite
+  contrary, for you stand in need of many supplies, to protect all this
+  variety of precious ornaments. And it is true that they which have much,
+  need much; and contrariwise, that they need little which measure not
+  their wealth by the superfluity of ambition, but by the necessity of
+  nature. Have you no proper and inward good, that you seek your goods in
+  those things which are outward and separated from you? Is the condition
+  of things so changed that a living creature, deservedly accounted divine
+  for the gift of reason, seemeth to have no other excellency than the
+  possession of a little household stuff without life? All other creatures
+  are content with that they have of their own; and you, who in your mind
+  carry the likeness of God, are content to take the ornaments of your
+  excellent nature from the most base and vile things, neither understand
+  you what injury you do your Creator. He would have mankind to excel all
+  earthly things; you debase your dignity under every meanest creature.
+  For if it be manifest that the good of everything is more precious than
+  that whose good it is, since you judge the vilest things that can be to
+  be your goods, you deject yourselves under them in your own estimation,
+  which questionless cometh not undeservedly to pass; for this is the
+  condition of man's nature, that then only it surpasseth other things
+  when it knoweth itself, and it is worse than beasts when it is without
+  that knowledge. For in other living creatures the ignorance of
+  themselves is nature, but in men it is vice. And how far doth this error
+  of yours extend, who think that any can be adorned with the ornaments of
+  another? Which can in no wise be. For if any adjoined thing seem
+  precious, it is that which is praised, but that which is covered and
+  enwrapped in it remaineth, notwithstanding, with the foul baseness which
+  it hath of itself. Moreover, I deny that to be good which hurteth the
+  possessor. Am I deceived in this? I am sure thou wilt say no. But riches
+  have often hurt their possessors, since every lewdest companion, who are
+  consequently most desirous of that which is not their own, think
+  themselves most worthy to possess alone all the gold and jewels in the
+  world. Wherefore thou, who with much perturbation fearest now to be
+  assailed and slain, if thou hadst entered the path of this life like a
+  poor passenger, needest not be afraid, but mightest rejoice and sing
+  even in the sight of most ravenous thieves.[110] O excellent happiness
+  of mortal riches, which, when thou hast gotten, thou hast lost thy
+  safety!
+
+
+  [110] Cf. Juvenal, _Sat._ x. 19-22.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Felix nimium prior aetas
+Contenta fidelibus aruis
+Nec inerti perdita luxu,
+Facili quae sera solebat
+Ieiunia soluere glande.                                                   5
+Non Bacchica munera norant
+Liquido confundere melle
+Nec lucida uellera Serum
+Tyrio miscere ueneno.
+Somnos dabat herba salubres,                                             10
+Potum quoque lubricus amnis,
+Vmbras altissima pinus.
+Nondum maris alta secabat
+Nec mercibus undique lectis
+Noua litora uiderat hospes.                                              15
+Tunc classica saeua tacebant,
+Odiis neque fusus acerbis
+Cruor horrida tinxerat arua.
+Quid enim furor hosticus ulla
+Vellet prior arma mouere,                                                20
+Cum uulnera saeua uiderent
+Nec praemia sanguinis ulla?
+Vtinam modo nostra redirent
+In mores tempora priscos!
+Sed saeuior ignibus Aetnae                                               25
+Feruens amor ardet habendi.
+Heu primus quis fuit ille
+Auri qui pondera tecti
+Gemmasque latere uolentes
+Pretiosa pericula fodit?                                                 30
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+    Too much the former age was blest,
+  When fields their pleaséd owners failéd not,
+    Who, with no slothful lust opprest,
+  Broke their long fasts with acorns eas'ly got.
+    No wine with honey mixéd was,
+  Nor did they silk in purple colours steep;
+    They slept upon the wholesome grass,
+  And their cool drink did fetch from rivers deep.
+    The pines did hide them with their shade,
+  No merchants through the dangerous billows went,
+    Nor with desire of gainful trade
+  Their traffic into foreign countries sent.
+    Then no shrill trumpets did amate
+  The minds of soldiers with their daunting sounds,
+    Nor weapons were with deadly hate
+  Dyed with the dreadful blood of gaping wounds.
+    For how could any fury draw
+  The mind of man to stir up war in vain,
+    When nothing but fierce wounds he saw,
+  And for his blood no recompense should gain?
+    O that the ancient manners would
+  In these our latter hapless times return!
+    Now the desire of having gold
+  Doth like the flaming fires of Aetna burn.
+    Ah, who was he that first did show
+  The heaps of treasure which the earth did hide,
+    And jewels which lay close below,
+  By which he costly dangers did provide?
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Quid autem de dignitatibus potentiaque disseram quae uos uerae dignitatis
+ac potestatis inscii caelo exaequatis? Quae si in improbissimum quemque
+ceciderunt, quae flammis Aetnae eructuantibus, quod diluuium tantas strages
+dederint? Certe, uti meminisse te arbitror, consulare imperium, quod
+libertatis principium fuerat, ob superbiam consulum uestri ueteres abolere
+cupiuerunt, qui ob eandem superbiam prius regium de ciuitate nomen
+abstulerant. At si quando, quod perrarum est, probis deferantur, quid in
+eis aliud quam probitas utentium placet? Ita fit ut non uirtutibus ex
+dignitate sed ex uirtute dignitatibus honor accedat. Quae uero est ista
+uestra expetibilis ac praeclara potentia? Nonne, o terrena animalia,
+consideratis quibus qui praesidere uideamini? Nunc si inter mures uideres
+unum aliquem ius sibi ac potestatem prae ceteris uindicantem, quanto
+mouereris cachinno! Quid uero, si corpus spectes, inbecillius homine
+reperire queas quos saepe muscularum quoque uel morsus uel in secreta
+quaeque reptantium necat introitus? Quo uero quisquam ius aliquod in
+quempiam nisi in solum corpus et quod infra corpus est, fortunam loquor,
+possit exserere? Num quidquam libero imperabis animo? Num mentem firma sibi
+ratione cohaerentem de statu propriae quietis amouebis? Cum liberum quendam
+uirum suppliciis se tyrannus adacturum putaret, ut aduersum se factae
+coniurationis conscios proderet, linguam ille momordit atque abscidit et in
+os tyranni saeuientis abiecit; ita cruciatus, quos putabat tyrannus
+materiam crudelitatis, uir sapiens fecit esse uirtutis. Quid autem est quod
+in alium facere quisquam[111] possit, quod sustinere ab alio ipse non
+possit? Busiridem accipimus necare hospites solitum ab Hercule hospite
+fuisse mactatum. Regulus plures Poenorum bello captos in uincla coniecerat,
+sed mox ipse uictorum catenis manus praebuit. Vllamne igitur eius hominis
+potentiam putas, qui quod ipse in alio potest, ne id in se alter ualeat
+efficere non possit? Ad haec si ipsis dignitatibus ac potestatibus inesset
+aliquid naturalis ac proprii boni, numquam pessimis prouenirent. Neque enim
+sibi solent aduersa sociari; natura respuit ut contraria quaeque iungantur.
+Ita cum pessimos plerumque dignitatibus fungi dubium non sit, illud etiam
+liquet natura sui bona non esse quae se pessimis haerere patiantur. Quod
+quidem de cunctis fortunae muneribus dignius existimari potest, quae ad
+improbissimum quemque uberiora perueniunt. De quibus illud etiam
+considerandum puto, quod nemo dubitat esse fortem, cui fortitudinem inesse
+conspexerit, et cuicumque uelocitas adest manifestum est esse uelocem. Sic
+musica quidem musicos medicina medicos rhetorice rhetores facit. Agit enim
+cuiusque rei natura quod proprium est nec contrariarum rerum miscetur
+effectibus et ultro quae sunt auersa depellit. Atqui nec opes inexpletam
+restinguere auaritiam queunt nec potestas sui compotem fecerit quem
+uitiosae libidines insolubilibus adstrictum retinent catenis, et collata
+improbis dignitas non modo non efficit dignos, sed prodit potius et
+ostentat indignos. Cur ita prouenit? Gaudetis enim res sese aliter habentes
+falsis compellare nominibus quae facile ipsarum rerum redarguuntur effectu;
+itaque nec illae diuitiae nec illa potentia nec haec dignitas iure
+appellari potest. Postremo idem de tota concludere fortuna licet in qua
+nihil expetendum, nihil natiuae bonitatis inesse manifestum est, quae nec
+se bonis semper adiungit et bonos quibus fuerit adiuncta non efficit.
+
+
+[111] quisque _codd. optimi_.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  Now, why should I discourse of dignities and power which you, not
+  knowing what true dignity and power meaneth, exalt to the skies? And if
+  they light upon wicked men, what Aetnas, belching flames, or what deluge
+  can cause so great harms? I suppose thou rememberest how your ancestors,
+  by reason of the consuls' arrogancy, desired to abolish that government
+  which had been the beginning of their freedom, who before, for the same
+  cause, had removed the government of kings from their city. And if
+  sometime, which is very seldom, good men be preferred to honours,[112]
+  what other thing can give contentment in them but the honesty of those
+  which have them? So that virtues are not honoured by dignities, but
+  dignities by virtue. But what is this excellent power which you esteemed
+  so desirable? Consider you not, O earthly wights, whom you seem to
+  excel? For if among mice thou shouldst see one claim jurisdiction and
+  power to himself over the rest, to what a laughter it would move thee!
+  And what, if thou respectest the body, canst thou find more weak than
+  man, whom even the biting of little flies or the entering of creeping
+  worms doth often kill? Now, how can any man exercise jurisdiction upon
+  anybody except upon their bodies, and that which is inferior to their
+  bodies, I mean their fortunes? Canst thou ever imperiously impose
+  anything upon a free mind? Canst thou remove a soul settled in firm
+  reason from the quiet state which it possesseth? When a tyrant thought
+  to compel a certain free man by torments to bewray his confederates of a
+  conspiracy attempted against him, he bit off his tongue, and spit it out
+  upon the cruel tyrant's face,[113] by that means wisely making those
+  tortures, which the tyrant thought matter of cruelty, to be to him
+  occasion of virtue. Now, what is there that any can enforce upon another
+  which he may not himself be enforced to sustain by another? We read that
+  Busiris, wont to kill his guests, was himself slain by his guest
+  Hercules.[114] Regulus had laid fetters upon many Africans taken in war,
+  but ere long he found his own hands environed with his conqueror's
+  chains.[115] Wherefore thinkest thou the power of that man to be
+  anything worth, who cannot hinder another from doing that to him which
+  he can do to another? Moreover, if dignities and power had any natural
+  and proper good in them, they would never be bestowed upon the worst
+  men, for one opposite useth not to accompany another; nature refuseth to
+  have contraries joined. So that, since there is no doubt but that men of
+  the worst sort often enjoy dignities, it is also manifest that they are
+  not naturally good which may follow most naughty men. Which may more
+  worthily be thought of all fortune's gifts which are more plentifully
+  bestowed upon every lewd companion. Concerning which, I take that also
+  to be worthy consideration, that no man doubteth him to be a valiant man
+  in whom he seeth valour, and it is manifest that he which hath swiftness
+  is swift. So, likewise, music maketh musicians, physic physicians, and
+  rhetoric rhetoricians. For the nature of everything doth that which is
+  proper unto it, and is not mixed with contrary effects but repelleth all
+  opposites. But neither can riches extinguish unsatiable avarice, nor
+  power make him master of himself whom vicious lusts keep chained in
+  strongest fetters. And dignity bestowed upon wicked men doth not only
+  not make them worthy but rather bewrayeth and discovereth their
+  unworthiness. How cometh this to pass? Because in miscalling things that
+  are otherwise, you take a pleasure which is easily refuted by the effect
+  of the things themselves. Wherefore, by right, these things are not to
+  be called riches, this is not to be called power, that is not to be
+  called dignity. Lastly, we may conclude the same of all fortunes in
+  which it is manifest there is nothing to be desired, nothing naturally
+  good, which neither are always bestowed upon good men, nor do make them
+  good whom they are bestowed upon.
+
+
+  [112] The subject of _deferantur_ is _dignitates potentiaque_.
+
+  [113] The free man was the philosopher Anaxarchus: the tyrant, Nicocreon
+  the Cypriote. For the story see Diogenes Laertius ix. 59.
+
+  [114] Cf. Apollod. ii. 5. 11; Claudian xviii. 159; Virg. _Georg._ iii. 4.
+
+  [115] Cf. Cicero, _De Off._ iii. 99.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Nouimus quantas dederit ruinas
+Vrbe flammata patribusque caesis
+Fratre qui quondam ferus interempto
+Matris effuso maduit cruore
+Corpus et uisu gelidum pererrans                                          5
+Ora non tinxit lacrimis, sed esse
+Censor extincti potuit decoris.
+Hic tamen sceptro populos regebat
+Quos uidet condens radios sub undas
+Phoebus extremo ueniens ab ortu,                                         10
+Quos premunt septem gelidi triones,
+Quos Notus sicco uiolentus aestu
+Torret ardentes recoquens harenas.
+Celsa num tandem ualuit potestas
+Vertere praui rabiem Neronis?                                            15
+Heu grauem sortem, quotiens iniquus
+Additur saeuo gladius ueneno!"
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+    We know what stirs he made
+  Who did the Senate slay and Rome with fire invade,
+    Who did his brother kill,
+  And with his mother's blood his moistened hand did fill;
+    Who looked on that cold face
+  Tearless, and nicely marked her members' several grace.[116]
+    Yet his dread power controlled
+  Those people whom the sun doth in the east behold,
+    And those who do remain
+  In western lands or dwell under Boötes' wain
+    And those whose skins are tanned
+  With southern winds, which roast and burn the parched sand.
+    What? Could this glorious might
+  Restrain the furious rage of wicked Nero's spite?
+    But oh! mishap most bad,
+  Which doth the wicked sword to cruel poison add!"
+
+
+  [116] Literally, "but could be the critic of her dead beauty." Cf. Suet.
+  _Nero_ 24; Tac. _Ann._ xiv. 9.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Tum ego: "Scis," inquam, "ipsa minimum nobis ambitionem mortalium rerum
+fuisse dominatam. Sed materiam gerendis rebus optauimus quo ne uirtus
+tacita consenesceret." Et illa: "Atqui hoc unum est quod praestantes quidem
+natura mentes sed nondum ad extremam manum uirtutum perfectione perductas
+allicere possit, gloriae scilicet cupido et optimorum in rem publicam fama
+meritorum; quae quam sit exilis et totius uacua ponderis, sic considera.
+Omnem terrae ambitum, sicuti astrologicis demonstrationibus accepisti, ad
+caeli spatium puncti constat obtinere rationem, id est ut, si ad caelestis
+globi magnitudinem conferatur, nihil spatii prorsus habere iudicetur. Huius
+igitur tam exiguae in mundo regionis quarta fere portio est, sicut
+Ptolomaeo probante didicisti, quae nobis cognitis animantibus incolatur.
+Huic quartae, si quantum maria paludesque premunt quantumque siti uasta
+regio distenditur cogitatione subtraxeris, uix angustissima inhabitandi
+hominibus area relinquetur. In hoc igitur minimo puncti quodam puncto
+circumsaepti atque conclusi de peruulganda fama, de proferendo nomine
+cogitatis? Aut quid habeat amplum magnificumque gloria tam angustis
+exiguisque limitibus artata? Adde quod hoc ipsum breuis habitaculi saeptum
+plures incolunt nationes lingua, moribus, totius uitae ratione distantes,
+ad quas tum difficultate itinerum tum loquendi diuersitate tum commercii
+insolentia non modo fama hominum singulorum sed ne urbium quidem peruenire
+queat. Aetate denique Marci Tullii, sicut ipse quodam loco significat,
+nondum Caucasum montem Romanae rei publicae fama transcenderat, et erat
+tunc adulta Parthis etiam ceterisque id locorum gentibus formidolosa.
+Videsne igitur quam sit angusta, quam compressa gloria quam dilatare ac
+propagare laboratis? An ubi Romani nominis transire fama nequit, Romani
+hominis gloria progredietur? Quid quod diuersarum gentium mores inter se
+atque instituta discordant, ut quod apud alios laude apud alios supplicio
+dignum iudicetur. Quo fit ut si quem famae praedicatio delectat, huic in
+plurimos populos nomen proferre nullo modo conducat. Erit igitur peruagata
+inter suos gloria quisque contentus et intra unius gentis terminos
+praeclara illa famae inmortalitas coartabitur.
+
+Sed quam multos clarissimos suis temporibus uiros scriptorum inops deleuit
+obliuio! Quamquam quid ipsa scripta proficiant, quae cum suis auctoribus
+premit longior atque obscura uetustas? Vos uero inmortalitatem uobis
+propagare uidemini, cum futuri famam temporis cogitatis. Quod si
+aeternitatis infinita spatia pertractes, quid habes quod de nominis tui
+diuturnitate laeteris? Vnius etenim mora momenti, si decem milibus
+conferatur annis, quoniam utrumque spatium definitum est, minimam, licet,
+habet tamen aliquam portionem. At hic ipse numerus annorum eiusque
+quamlibet multiplex ad interminabilem diuturnitatem ne comparari quidem
+potest. Etenim finitis ad se inuicem fuerit quaedam, infiniti uero atque
+finiti nulla umquam poterit esse collatio. Ita fit ut quamlibet prolixi
+temporis fama, si cum inexhausta aeternitate cogitetur, non parua sed plane
+nulla esse uideatur. Vos autem nisi ad populares auras inanesque rumores
+recte facere nescitis et relicta conscientiae uirtutisque praestantia de
+alienis praemia sermunculis postulatis. Accipe in huiusmodi arrogantiae
+leuitate quam festiue aliquis inluserit. Nam cum quidam adortus esset
+hominem contumeliis, qui non ad uerae uirtutis usum sed ad superbam gloriam
+falsum sibi philosophi nomen induerat, adiecissetque iam se sciturum, an
+ille philosophus esset, si quidem illatas iniurias leniter patienterque
+tolerasset, ille patientiam paulisper adsumpsit acceptaque contumelia uelut
+insultans: 'Iam tandem,' inquit, 'intellegis me esse philosophum?' Tum ille
+nimium mordaciter: 'Intellexeram,' inquit, 'si tacuisses.' Quid autem est
+quod ad praecipuos uiros, de his enim sermo est, qui uirtute gloriam
+petunt, quid, inquam, est quod ad hos de fama post resolutum morte suprema
+corpus attineat? Nam si, quod nostrae rationes credi uetant, toti moriuntur
+homines, nulla est omnino gloria, cum is cuius ea esse dicitur non exstet
+omnino. Sin uero bene sibi mens conscia terreno carcere resoluta caelum
+libera petit, nonne omne terrenum negotium spernat quae se caelo fruens
+terrenis gaudet exemptam?
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Then I said: "Thou thyself knowest that the ambition of mortal things
+  hath borne as little sway with me as with any, but I desired matter of
+  action, lest old age should come upon me ere I had done anything." To
+  which she answered: "This is the only thing which is able to entice such
+  minds as, being well qualified by nature, are not yet fully brought to
+  full excellence by the perfecting of virtues, I mean desire of glory,
+  and fame of best deserts towards their commonwealth, which how slender
+  it is, and void of all weight, consider this: thou hast learnt by
+  astronomical demonstrations that the compass of the whole earth compared
+  to the scope of heaven is no bigger than a pin's point, which is as much
+  as to say that, if it be conferred with the greatness of the celestial
+  sphere, it hath no bigness at all. And of this so small a region in the
+  world only the fourth part is known to be inhabited by living creatures
+  known to us, as Ptolemy[117] proveth. From which fourth part, if thou
+  takest away in imagination the seas, the marsh grounds, and all other
+  desert places, there will scarcely be left any room at all for men to
+  inhabit. Wherefore, enclosed and shut up in this smallest point of that
+  other point, do you think of extending your fame and enlarging your
+  name? But what great or heroical matter can that glory have, which is
+  pent up in so small and narrow bounds? Besides that the little compass
+  of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, different in
+  language, fashions, and conversation, to which by reason of the
+  difficulties in travelling, the diversity of speech, and the scarcity of
+  traffic, not only the Fame of particular men but even of cities can
+  hardly come. Finally, in the age of Marcus Tullius, as he himself
+  writeth,[118] the fame of the Roman Commonwealth had not passed the
+  mountain Caucasus, and yet it was then in the most flourishing estate,
+  fearful even to the Parthians and to the rest of the nations about.
+  Seest thou therefore how strait and narrow that glory is which you
+  labour to enlarge and increase? Where the fame of the Roman name could
+  not pass, can the glory of a Roman man penetrate? Moreover, the customs
+  and laws of diverse nations do so much differ the one from the other,
+  that the same thing which some commend as laudable, others condemn as
+  deserving punishment. So that if a man be delighted with the praise of
+  fame, it is no way convenient for him to be named in many countries.
+  Wherefore, every man must be content with that glory which he may have
+  at home, and that noble immortality of fame must be comprehended within
+  the compass of one nation.
+
+  Now, how many, most famous while they lived, are altogether forgotten
+  for want of writers! Though what do writings themselves avail which
+  perish, as well as their authors, by continuance and obscurity of time?
+  But you imagine that you make yourselves immortal when you cast your
+  eyes upon future fame. Whereas, if thou weighest attentively the
+  infinite spaces of eternity, what cause hast thou to rejoice at the
+  prolonging of thy name? For if we compare the stay of one moment with
+  ten thousand years, since both be limited, they have some proportion,
+  though it be but very small. But this number of years, how oft so ever
+  it be multiplied, is no way comparable to endless eternity. For limited
+  things may in some sort be compared among themselves, but that which is
+  infinite admitteth no comparison at all with the limited. So that the
+  fame of never so long time, if it be compared with everlasting eternity,
+  seemeth not little but none at all. But without popular blasts and vain
+  rumours you know not how to do well, and, rejecting the excellency of a
+  good conscience and of virtue, you choose to be rewarded with others'
+  tattling. Hear how pleasantly one jested at this vain and contemptible
+  arrogancy. For having assaulted with reproachful speeches a certain
+  fellow who had falsely taken upon him the name of a philosopher, not for
+  the use of virtue but for vainglory, and having added that now he would
+  know whether he were a philosopher or no by his gentle and patient
+  bearing of injuries, the other took all patiently for a while, and
+  having borne his contumely, as it were, triumphing, said: 'Dost thou now
+  at length think me a philosopher?' To which he bitingly replied: 'I
+  would have thought thee one if thou hadst holden thy peace.' But what
+  have excellent men (for of these I speak) who seek for glory by virtue,
+  what have we, I say, to expect for these by fame after final death hath
+  dissolved the body? For if, contrary to our belief, men wholly perish,
+  there is no glory at all, since he to whom it is said to belong is
+  nowhere extant. But if a guiltless mind freed from earthly imprisonment
+  goeth forthwith to heaven, will she not despise all earthly traffic who,
+  enjoying heaven, rejoiceth to see herself exempted from earthly affairs?
+
+
+  [117] Claudius Ptolemaeus, mathematician, astronomer, geographer, fl.
+  A.D. 139-161.
+
+  [118] Cf. _Somn. Scip._ 6. 14 ap. Macr. _Comment._ ii. 10.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Quicumque solam mente praecipiti petit
+  Summumque credit gloriam,
+Late patentes aetheris cernat plagas
+  Artumque terrarum situm.
+Breuem replere non ualentis ambitum                                       5
+  Pudebit aucti nominis.
+Quid o superbi colla mortali iugo
+  Frustra leuare gestiunt?
+Licet remotos fama per populos means
+  Diffusa linguas explicet                                               10
+Et magna titulis fulgeat claris domus,
+  Mors spernit altam gloriam,
+Inuoluit humile pariter et celsum caput
+  Aequatque summis infima.
+Vbi nunc fidelis ossa Fabricii manent,                                   15
+  Quid Brutus aut rigidus Cato?
+Signat superstes fama tenuis pauculis
+  Inane nomen litteris.
+Sed quod decora nouimus uocabula,
+  Num scire consumptos datur?                                            20
+Iacetis ergo prorsus ignorabiles
+  Nec fama notos efficit.
+Quod si putatis longius uitam trahi
+  Mortalis aura nominis,
+Cum sera uobis rapiet hoc etiam dies,                                    25
+  Iam uos secunda mors manet.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  He that to honour only seeks to mount
+    And that his chiefest end doth count,
+  Let him behold the largeness of the skies
+    And on the strait earth cast his eyes;
+  He will despise the glory of his name,
+    Which cannot fill so small a frame.
+  Why do proud men scorn that their necks should bear
+    That yoke which every man must wear?
+  Though fame through many nations fly along
+    And should be blazed by every tongue,
+  And houses shine with our forefathers' stories,
+    Yet Death contemns these stately glories,
+  And, summoning both rich and poor to die,
+    Makes the low equal with the high.
+  Who knows where faithful Fabrice' bones are pressed,
+    Where Brutus and strict Cato rest?[119]
+  A slender fame consigns their titles vain
+    In some few letters to remain.
+  Because their famous names in books we read,
+    Come we by them to know the dead?
+  You dying, then, remembered are by none,
+    Nor any fame can make you known.
+  But if you think that life outstrippeth death,
+    Your names borne up with mortal breath,
+  When length of time takes this away likewise,
+    A second death shall you surprise.
+
+
+  [119] Caius Luscinus Fabricius, Consul 282 B.C., opponent of Pyrrhus;
+  Lucius Iunius Brutus, Consul 509 B.C., founder of the Republic; Marcus
+  Porcius Cato (Cato maior). Consul 195 B.C., great-grandfather of M.
+  Porcius Cato (Uticensis).
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Sed ne me inexorabile contra fortunam gerere bellum putes, est aliquando
+cum de hominibus illa, fallax illa nihil, bene mereatur, tum scilicet cum
+se aperit, cum frontem detegit moresque profitetur. Nondum forte quid
+loquar intellegis. Mirum est quod dicere gestio, eoque sententiam uerbis
+explicare uix queo. Etenim plus hominibus reor aduersam quam prosperam
+prodesse fortunam. Illa enim semper specie felicitatis cum uidetur blanda,
+mentitur; haec semper uera est, cum se instabilem mutatione demonstrat.
+Illa fallit, haec instruit, illa mendacium specie bonorum mentes fruentium
+ligat, haec cognitione fragilis felicitatis absoluit. Itaque illam uideas
+uentosam, fluentem suique semper ignaram, hanc sobriam succinctamque et
+ipsius aduersitatis exercitatione prudentem. Postremo felix a uero bono
+deuios blanditiis trahit, aduersa plerumque ad uera bona reduces unco
+retrahit. An hoc inter minima aestimandum putas quod amicorum tibi fidelium
+mentes haec aspera, haec horribilis fortuna detexit, haec tibi certos
+sodalium uultus ambiguosque secreuit, discedens suos abstulit, tuos
+reliquit? Quanti hoc integer, ut uidebaris tibi fortunatus, emisses! Nunc
+et amissas opes querere; quod pretiosissimum diuitiarum genus est amicos
+inuenisti.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  But lest thou shouldst think that I am at implacable war with Fortune,
+  there is a time when this thy goddess ceasing to deceive deserveth of
+  men, to wit, when she declareth herself, when she discovereth her face
+  and showeth herself in her own colours. Perhaps thou understandest not
+  yet what I say. I would utter a wonderful thing, insomuch as I can
+  scarcely explicate my mind in words. For I think that Fortune, when she
+  is opposite, is more profitable to men than when she is favourable. For
+  in prosperity, by a show of happiness and seeming to caress, she is ever
+  false, but in adversity when she showeth herself inconstant by changing,
+  she is ever true. In that she deceiveth, in this she instructeth; in
+  that she imprisoneth the minds of men with falsely seeming goods, which
+  they enjoy, in this she setteth them at liberty by discovering the
+  uncertainty of them. Wherefore, in that thou shalt alway see her puffed
+  up, and wavering, and blinded with a self-conceit of herself, in this
+  thou shalt find her sober, settled, and, with the very exercise of
+  adversity, wise. Finally, prosperity with her flatterings withdraweth
+  men from true goodness, adversity recalleth and reclaimeth them many
+  times by force[120] to true happiness. Dost thou esteem it a small
+  benefit that this rough and harsh Fortune hath made known unto thee the
+  minds of thy faithful friends? She hath severed thy assured from thy
+  doubtful friends; prosperity at her departure took away with her those
+  which were hers, and left thee thine. How dearly wouldst thou have
+  bought this before thy fall, and when thou seemedst to thyself
+  fortunate! Now thou dost even lament thy lost riches; thou hast found
+  friends, the most precious treasure in the world.
+
+
+  [120] Literally, "pulleth them back with a hook."
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Quod mundus stabili fide
+Concordes uariat uices,
+Quod pugnantia semina
+Foedus perpetuum tenent,
+Quod Phoebus roseum diem                                                  5
+Curru prouehit aureo,
+Vt quas duxerit Hesperos
+Phoebe noctibus imperet,
+Vt fluctus auidum mare
+Certo fine coerceat,                                                     10
+Ne terris liceat uagis
+Latos tendere terminos,
+Hanc rerum seriem ligat
+Terras ac pelagus regens
+Et caelo imperitans amor.                                                15
+Hic si frena remiserit,
+Quidquid nunc amat inuicem
+Bellum continuo geret
+Et quam nunc socia fide
+Pulchris motibus incitant*,                                              20
+Certent soluere machinam.
+Hic sancto populos quoque
+Iunctos foedere continet,
+Hic et coniugii sacrum
+Castis nectit amoribus,                                                  25
+Hic fidis etiam sua
+Dictat iura sodalibus.
+O felix hominum genus,
+Si uestros animos amor
+Quo caelum regitur regat."                                               30
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  That this fair world in settled course her several forms should vary,
+  That a perpetual law should tame the fighting seeds of things,
+  That Phoebus should the rosy day in his bright chariot carry,
+  That Phoebe should govern the nights which Hesperus forth brings,
+  That to the floods of greedy seas are certain bounds assigned,
+  Which them, lest they usurp too much upon the earth, debar,
+  Love ruling heaven, and earth, and seas, them in this course doth bind.
+  And if it once let loose their reins, their friendship turns to war,
+  Tearing the world whose ordered form their quiet motions bear.
+  By it all holy laws are made and marriage rites are tied,
+  By it is faithful friendship joined. How happy mortals were,
+  If that pure love did guide their minds, which heavenly spheres
+    doth guide!"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER SECVNDVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER III.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Iam cantum illa finiuerat, cum me audiendi auidum stupentemque arrectis
+adhuc auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat. Itaque paulo post: "O," inquam,
+"summum lassorum solamen animorum quam tu me uel sententiarum pondere uel
+canendi etiam iucunditate refouisti! Adeo ut iam me post haec inparem
+fortunae ictibus esse non arbitrer. Itaque remedia quae paulo acriora esse
+dicebas, non modo non perhorresco, sed audiendi auidus uehementer
+efflagito." Tum illa "Sensi," inquit, "cum uerba nostra tacitus attentusque
+rapiebas, eumque tuae mentis habitum uel exspectaui uel, quod est uerius,
+ipsa perfeci. Talia sunt quippe quae restant, ut degustata quidem mordeant,
+interius autem recepta dulcescant. Sed quod tu te audiendi cupidum dicis,
+quanto ardore flagrares, si quonam te ducere aggrediamur agnosceres!"
+"Quonam?" inquam. "Ad ueram," inquit, "felicitatem, quam tuus quoque
+somniat animus, sed occupato ad imagines uisu ipsam illam non potest
+intueri." Tum ego: "Fac obsecro et quae illa uera sit, sine cunctatione
+demonstra." "Faciam," inquit illa, "tui causa libenter. Sed quae tibi causa
+notior est, eam prius designare uerbis atque informare conabor ut ea
+perspecta cum in contrariam partem flexeris oculos, uerae beatitudinis
+speciem possis agnoscere.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE THIRD BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Though she had ended her verse, yet the sweetness of it made me remain
+  astonished, attentive, and desirous to hear her longer. Wherefore, after
+  a while, I said: "O most effectual refreshment of wearied minds, how
+  have I been comforted with thy weighty sentences and pleasing music!
+  Insomuch that I begin to think myself not unable to encounter the
+  assaults of Fortune. Wherefore, I am not now afraid, but rather
+  earnestly desire to know those remedies, which before thou toldest me
+  were too sharp." To which she answered: "I perceived as much as thou
+  sayest, when I saw thee hearken to my speeches with so great silence and
+  attention, and I expected this disposition of thy mind, or rather more
+  truly caused it myself. For the remedies which remain are of that sort
+  that they are bitter to the taste, but being inwardly received wax
+  sweet. And whereas thou sayest that thou art desirous to hear; how much
+  would this desire increase if thou knewest whither we go about to bring
+  thee!" "Whither?" quoth I. "To true felicity," quoth she, "which thy
+  mind also dreameth of, but thy sight is so dimmed with phantasies that
+  thou canst not behold it as it is." Then I beseeched her to explicate
+  without delay wherein true happiness consisteth. To which she answered:
+  "I will willingly do so for thy sake, but first I will endeavour to
+  declare in words and to give shape to that which is better known unto
+  thee, that, having thoroughly understood it, by reflecting of the
+  contrary thou mayest discover the type of perfect blessedness.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Qui serere ingenuum uolet agrum,
+Liberat arua prius fruticibus,
+Falce rubos filicemque resecat,
+Vt noua fruge grauis Ceres eat.
+Dulcior est apium mage labor,                                             5
+Si malus ora prius sapor edat.
+Gratius astra nitent ubi Notus
+Desinit imbriferos dare sonos.
+Lucifer ut tenebras pepulerit
+Pulchra dies roseos agit equos.                                          10
+Tu quoque falsa tuens bona prius
+Incipe colla iugo retrahere.
+Vera dehinc animum subierint."
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  He that a fruitful field will sow,
+  Doth first the ground from bushes free,
+  All fern and briars likewise mow,
+  That he his harvest great may see.
+  Honey seems sweeter to our taste,
+  If cloyed with noisome food it be.
+  Stars clearer shine when Notus' blast
+  Hath ceased the rainy storms to breed.
+  When Lucifer hath night defaced,
+  The day's bright horses then succeed.
+  So thou, whom seeming goods do feed,
+  First shake off yokes which so thee press
+  That Truth may then thy mind possess."
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Tum defixo paululum uisu et uelut in augustam suae mentis sedem recepta sic
+coepit: "Omnis mortalium cura quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet,
+diuerso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur
+peruenire. Id autem est bonum quo quis adepto nihil ulterius desiderare
+queat. Quod quidem est omnium summum bonorum cunctaque intra se bona
+continens, cui si quid aforet summum esse non posset, quoniam relinqueretur
+extrinsecus quod posset optari. Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem statum
+bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum. Hunc, uti diximus, diuerso tramite
+mortales omnes conantur adipisci. Est enim mentibus hominum ueri boni
+naturaliter inserta cupiditas, sed ad falsa deuius error abducit. Quorum
+quidem alii summum bonum esse nihilo indigere credentes ut diuitiis
+affluant elaborant; alii uero bonum quod sit dignissimum ueneratione
+iudicantes adeptis honoribus reuerendi ciuibus suis esse nituntur. Sunt qui
+summum bonum in summa potentia esse constituant; hi uel regnare ipsi uolunt
+uel regnantibus adhaerere conantur. At quibus optimum quiddam claritas
+uidetur, hi uel belli uel pacis artibus gloriosum nomen propagare
+festinant. Plurimi uero boni fructum gaudio laetitiaque metiuntur; hi
+felicissimum putant uoluptate diffluere. Sunt etiam qui horum fines
+causasque alterutro permutent, ut qui diuitias ob potentiam uoluptatesque
+desiderant uel qui potentiam seu pecuniae causa seu proferendi nominis
+appetunt. In his igitur ceterisque talibus humanorum actuum uotorumque
+uersatur intentio, ueluti nobilitas fauorque popularis quae uidentur
+quandam claritudinem comparare, uxor ac liberi quae iucunditatis gratia
+petuntur; amicorum uero quod sanctissimum quidem genus est, non in fortuna
+sed in uirtute numeratur, reliquum uero uel potentiae causa uel
+delectationis assumitur. Iam uero corporis bona promptum est ut ad
+superiora referantur. Robur enim magnitudoque uidetur praestare ualentiam,
+pulchritudo atque uelocitas celebritatem, salubritas uoluptatem; quibus
+omnibus solam beatitudinem desiderari liquet. Nam quod quisque prae ceteris
+petit, id summum esse iudicat bonum. Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse
+definiuimus; quare beatum esse iudicat statum quem prae ceteris quisque
+desiderat.
+
+Habes igitur ante oculos propositam fere formam felicitatis humanae--opes,
+honores, potentiam, gloriam, uoluptates. Quae quidem sola considerans
+Epicurus consequenter sibi summum bonum uoluptatem esse constituit, quod
+cetera omnia iucunditatem animo uideantur afferre. Sed ad hominum studia
+reuertor, quorum animus etsi caligante memoria tamen bonum suum repetit,
+sed uelut ebrius domum quo tramite reuertatur ignorat. Num enim uidentur
+errare hi qui nihilo indigere nituntur? Atqui non est aliud quod aeque
+perficere beatitudinem possit quam copiosus bonorum omnium status nec
+alieni egens sed sibi ipse sufficiens. Num uero labuntur hi qui quod sit
+optimum, id etiam reuerentiae cultu dignissimum putent? Minime. Neque enim
+uile quiddam contemnendumque est quod adipisci omnium fere mortalium
+laborat intentio. An in bonis non est numeranda potentia? Quid igitur? Num
+imbecillum ac sine uiribus aestimandum est, quod omnibus rebus constat esse
+praestantius? An claritudo nihili pendenda est? Sed sequestrari nequit quin
+omne quod excellentissimum sit id etiam uideatur esse clarissimum. Nam non
+esse anxiam tristemque beatitudinem nec doloribus molestiisque subiectam
+quid attinet dicere, quando in minimis quoque rebus id appetitur quod
+habere fruique delectet? Atqui haec sunt quae adipisci homines uolunt eaque
+de causa diuitias, dignitates, regna, gloriam uoluptatesque desiderant quod
+per haec sibi sufficientiam, reuerentiam, potentiam, celebritatem,
+laetitiam credunt esse uenturam. Bonum est igitur quod tam diuersis studiis
+homines petunt; in quo quanta sit naturae uis facile monstratur, cum licet
+uariae dissidentesque sententiae tamen in diligendo boni fine consentiunt.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  Then, for a while looking steadfastly upon the ground, and, as it were,
+  retiring herself to the most secret seat of her soul, she began in this
+  manner: "All men's thoughts, which are turmoiled with manifold cares,
+  take indeed divers courses, but yet endeavour to attain the same end of
+  happiness, which is that good which, being once obtained, nothing can be
+  further desired. Which is the chiefest of all goods, and containeth in
+  itself whatsoever is good, and if it wanted anything it could not be the
+  chiefest, because there would something remain besides it which might be
+  wished for. Wherefore, it is manifest that blessedness is an estate
+  replenished with all that is good. This, as we said, all men endeavour
+  to obtain by divers ways. For there is naturally ingrafted in men's
+  minds an earnest desire of that which is truly good; but deceitful error
+  withdraweth it to that which falsely seemeth such. So that some,
+  esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all means to
+  abound with riches; others, deeming that to be good which is most
+  deserving of honour, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their
+  fellow-citizens. Others think it the greatest felicity to have great
+  power and authority, and these will either reign themselves or at least
+  procure to be great with princes. But they who think fame better than
+  all these, make all speed possible to spread their names far and near,
+  by achieving some worthy enterprise either in war or peace. Many measure
+  good by joy and mirth, and their chiefest care is how they may abound
+  with pleasure. Some interchange the ends and means of these things one
+  with the other, wanting now riches for the sake of power and pleasure,
+  now power for the sake of wealth and fame. At these and such other do
+  men's actions and desires aim, as nobility and popularity, which make
+  men esteemed; wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. But
+  friendship, that most sacred thing, is rather to be attributed to virtue
+  than to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for
+  power or pleasure. And it is an easy matter to reduce all corporal goods
+  to the former heads. For strength and greatness give ability; beauty and
+  swiftness, fame; and health yieldeth pleasure. By all which we
+  manifestly seek for nothing else but happiness. For that which every man
+  seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all
+  one with happiness. Wherefore he esteemeth that estate happy which he
+  preferreth before all other.
+
+  And thus thou hast in a manner seen the form of human felicity--riches,
+  honour, power, glory, pleasure. Which Epicurus only considering,
+  consequently took pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest
+  seemed to delight the mind. But I return to the careful thoughts of men,
+  whose minds, though obscured, yet seek after the greatest good, but like
+  a drunken man know not the way home. For seem they to err who endeavour
+  to want nothing? But nothing can cause happiness so much as the
+  plentiful possession of all that is good, needing the help of none, but
+  is sufficient of itself. Or do they err who take that which is best to
+  be likewise most worthy of respect? No. For it is no vile or
+  contemptible thing which almost all men labour to obtain. Or is not
+  power to be esteemed good? Why, then, is that to be accounted feeble and
+  of no force, which manifestly surpasses all other things? Or is fame to
+  be contemned? But it cannot be ignored that the most excellent is also
+  most famous. For to what purpose should I say that happiness is not sad
+  or melancholy, or subject to grief and trouble, when even in smallest
+  matters we desire that which we delight to have and enjoy? And these be
+  the things which men desire to obtain, and to this end procure riches,
+  dignities, kingdoms, glory, and pleasures, because by them they think to
+  have sufficiency, respect, power, fame, delight, and joy. Wherefore,
+  that is good which men seek after by divers desires, in which the force
+  of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different
+  opinions, yet they agree in choosing for their end that which is good.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Quantas rerum flectat habenas
+Natura potens, quibus inmensum
+Legibus orbem prouida seruet
+Stringatque ligans inresoluto
+Singula nexu, placet arguto                                               5
+Fidibus lentis promere cantu.
+Quamuis Poeni pulchra leones
+Vincula gestent manibusque datas
+Captent escas metuantque trucem
+Soliti uerbera ferre magistrum,                                          10
+Si cruor horrida tinxerit ora,
+Resides olim redeunt animi
+Fremituque graui meminere sui;
+Laxant nodis colla solutis
+Primusque lacer dente cruento                                            15
+Domitor rabidas imbuit iras.
+Quae canit altis garrula ramis
+Ales caueae clauditur antro;
+Huic licet inlita pocula melle
+Largasque dapes dulci studio                                             20
+Ludens hominum cura ministret,
+Si tamen arto saliens texto
+Nemorum gratas uiderit umbras,
+Sparsas pedibus proterit escas,
+Siluas tantum maesta requirit,                                           25
+Siluas dulci uoce susurrat.
+Validis quondam uiribus acta
+Pronum flectit uirga cacumen;
+Hanc si curuans dextra remisit,
+Recto spectat uertice caelum.                                            30
+Cadit Hesperias Phoebus in undas,
+Sed secreto tramite rursus
+Currum solitos uertit ad ortus.
+Repetunt proprios quaeque recursus
+Redituque suo singula gaudent                                            35
+Nec manet ulli traditus ordo
+Nisi quod fini iunxerit ortum
+Stabilemque sui fecerit orbem.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  How the first reins of all things guided are
+  By powerful Nature as the chiefest cause,
+  And how she keeps, with a foreseeing care,
+  The spacious world in order by her laws,
+  And to sure knots which nothing can untie,
+  By her strong hand all earthly motions draws--
+  To show all this we purpose now to try
+  Our pliant string, our musick's thrilling sound.
+  Although the Libyan lions often lie
+  Gentle and tame in splendid fetters bound,[121]
+  And fearing their incensed master's wrath,
+  With patient looks endure each blow and wound,
+  Yet if their jaws they once in blood do bathe,
+  They, gaining courage,[122] with fierce noise awake
+  The force which Nature in them seated hath,
+  And from their necks the broken chains do shake;
+  Then he that tamed them first doth feel their rage,
+  And torn in pieces doth their fury slake.
+  The bird shut up in an unpleasing cage,
+  Which on the lofty trees did lately sing,
+  Though men, her want of freedom to assuage,
+  Should unto her with careful labour bring
+  The sweetest meats which they can best devise,
+  Yet when within her prison fluttering
+  The pleasing shadows of the groves she spies,
+  Her hated food she scatters with her feet,
+  In yearning spirit to the woods she flies,
+  The woods' delights do tune her accents sweet.
+  When some strong hand doth tender plant constrain
+  With his debased top the ground to meet,
+  If it let go, the crooked twig again
+  Up toward Heaven itself it straight doth raise.
+  Phoebus doth fall into the western main,
+  Yet doth he back return by secret ways,
+  And to the earth doth guide his chariot's race.
+  Each thing a certain course and laws obeys,
+  Striving to turn back to his proper place;
+  Nor any settled order can be found,
+  But that which doth within itself embrace
+  The births and ends of all things in a round.
+
+
+  [121] Literally, "and take food offered by the hand."
+
+  [122] Literally, "their spirits, hitherto sluggish, return."
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Vos quoque, o terrena animalia, tenui licet imagine uestrum tamen
+principium somniatis uerumque illum beatitudinis finem licet minime
+perspicaci qualicumque tamen cogitatione prospicitis eoque uos et ad uerum
+bonum naturalis ducit intentio et ab eodem multiplex error abducit.
+Considera namque an per ea quibus se homines adepturos beatitudinem putant
+ad destinatum finem ualeant peruenire. Si enim uel pecuniae uel honores
+ceteraque tale quid afferunt cui nihil bonorum abesse uideatur, nos quoque
+fateamur fieri aliquos horum adeptione felices. Quod si neque id ualent
+efficere quod promittunt bonisque pluribus carent, nonne liquido falsa in
+eis beatitudinis species deprehenditur? Primum igitur te ipsum qui paulo
+ante diuitiis affluebas, interrogo: Inter illas abundantissimas opes
+numquamne animum tuum concepta ex qualibet iniuria confudit anxietas?"
+"Atqui," inquam, "libero me fuisse animo quin aliquid semper angerer
+reminisci non queo." "Nonne quia uel aberat quod abesse non uelles uel
+aderat quod adesse noluisses?" "Ita est," inquam. "Illius igitur
+praesentiam huius absentiam desiderabas?" "Confiteor," inquam. "Eget uero,"
+inquit, "eo quod quisque desiderat?" "Eget," inquam. "Qui uero eget aliquo,
+non est usquequaque sibi ipse sufficiens?" "Minime," inquam. "Tu itaque
+hanc insufficientiam plenus," inquit, "opibus sustinebas?" "Quidni?"
+inquam. "Opes igitur nihilo indigentem sufficientemque sibi facere nequeunt
+et hoc erat quod promittere uidebantur. Atqui hoc quoque maxime
+considerandum puto quod nihil habeat suapte natura pecunia ut his a quibus
+possidetur inuitis nequeat auferri." "Fateor," inquam. "Quidni fateare, cum
+eam cotidie ualentior aliquis eripiat inuito? Vnde enim forenses
+querimoniae nisi quod uel ui uel fraude nolentibus pecuniae repetuntur
+ereptae?" "Ita est," inquam. "Egebit igitur," inquit, "extrinsecus petito
+praesidio quo suam pecuniam quisque tueatur?" "Quis id," inquam, "neget?"
+"Atqui non egeret eo, nisi possideret pecuniam quam posset amittere?"
+"Dubitari," inquam, "nequit." "In contrarium igitur relapsa res est; nam
+quae sufficientes sibi facere putabantur opes, alieno potius praesidio
+faciunt indigentes. Quis autem modus est quo pellatur diuitiis indigentia?
+Num enim diuites esurire nequeunt? Num sitire non possunt? Num frigus
+hibernum pecuniosorum membra non sentiunt? Sed adest, inquies, opulentis
+quo famem satient, quo sitim frigusque depellant. Sed hoc modo consolari
+quidem diuitiis indigentia potest, auferri penitus non potest. Nam si haec
+hians semper atque aliquid poscens opibus expletur, maneat necesse est quae
+possit expleri. Taceo quod naturae minimum, quod auaritiae nihil satis est.
+Quare si opes nec submouere possunt indigentiam et ipsae suam faciunt, quid
+est quod eas sufficientiam praestare credatis?
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  You also, O earthly creatures, though slightly and as it were in a dream
+  acknowledge your beginning, and though not perspicuously yet in some
+  sort behold that true end of happiness, so that the intention of nature
+  leadeth you to the true good, and manifold error withdraweth you from
+  it. For consider whether those things, by which men think to obtain
+  happiness, can bring them to their desired end. For if either money, or
+  honour, or any of the rest be of that quality that they want nothing
+  which is good, we will also confess that they are able to make men
+  happy. But if they neither be able to perform that they promise, and
+  want many things which are good, are they not manifestly discovered to
+  have a false appearance of happiness? First then, I ask thee thyself,
+  who not long since didst abound with wealth; in that plenty of riches,
+  was thy mind never troubled with any injuries?" "I cannot remember,"
+  quoth I, "that ever my mind was so free from trouble but that something
+  or other still vexed me." "Was it not because thou either wantedst
+  something which thou wouldst have had, or else hadst something which
+  thou wouldst have wanted?" "It is true," quoth I. "Then thou desiredst
+  the presence of that, and the absence of this?" "I confess I did," quoth
+  I. "And doth not a man want that," quoth she, "which he desireth?" "He
+  doth," quoth I. "But he that wanteth anything is not altogether
+  sufficient of himself?" "He is not," quoth I. "So that thou feltest this
+  insufficiency, even the height of thy wealth?" "Why not?" quoth I. "Then
+  riches cannot make a man wanting nothing nor sufficient of himself, and
+  this was that they seemed to promise. But this is most of all to be
+  considered, that money hath nothing of itself which can keep it from
+  being taken from them which possess it, against their will." "I grant
+  it," quoth I. "Why shouldst thou not grant it, since that every day
+  those which are more potent take it from others perforce? For from
+  whence proceed so many complaints in law, but that money gotten either
+  by violence or deceit is sought to be recovered by that means?" "It is
+  so indeed," quoth I. "So that every man needeth some other help to
+  defend his money?" "Who denies that?" quoth I. "But he should not need
+  that help, unless he had money which he might lose?" "There is no doubt
+  of that," quoth I. "Now then the matter is fallen out quite contrary;
+  for riches, which are thought to suffice of themselves, rather make men
+  stand in need of other helps. And after what manner do riches expel
+  penury? For are not rich men hungry? Are they not thirsty? Or doth much
+  money make the owners senseless of cold in winter? But thou wilt say,
+  wealthy men have wherewithal to satisfy their hunger, slake their
+  thirst, and defend themselves from cold. But in this sort, though want
+  may be somewhat relieved by wealth, yet it cannot altogether be taken
+  away. For if ever gaping and craving it be satiated by riches, there
+  must needs always remain something to be satiated. I omit, that to
+  nature very little, to covetousness nothing is sufficient. Wherefore if
+  riches can neither remove wants, and cause some themselves, why imagine
+  you that they can cause sufficiency?
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quamuis fluente diues auri gurgite
+  Non expleturas cogat auarus opes
+Oneretque bacis colla rubri litoris
+  Ruraque centeno scindat opima boue,
+Nec cura mordax deseret superstitem,                                      5
+  Defunctumque leues non comitantur opes.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Although the rich man from his mines of gold
+  Dig treasure which his mind can never fill,
+  And lofty neck with precious pearls enfold,
+  And his fat fields with many oxen till,
+  Yet biting cares will never leave his head,
+  Nor will his wealth attend him being dead.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Sed dignitates honorabilem reuerendumque cui prouenerint reddunt. Num uis
+ea est magistratibus ut utentium mentibus uirtutes inserant uitia
+depellant? Atqui non fugare sed illustrare potius nequitiam solent; quo fit
+ut indignemur eas saepe nequissimis hominibus contigisse, unde Catullus
+licet in curuli Nonium sedentem strumam tamen appellat. Videsne quantum
+malis dedecus adiciant dignitates? Atqui minus eorum patebit indignitas, si
+nullis honoribus inclarescant. Tu quoque num tandem tot periculis adduci
+potuisti ut cum Decorato gerere magistratum putares, cum in eo mentem
+nequissimi scurrae delatorisque respiceres? Non enim possumus ob honores
+reuerentia dignos iudicare quos ipsis honoribus iudicamus indignos. At si
+quem sapientia praeditum uideres, num posses eum uel reuerentia uel ea qua
+est praeditus sapientia non dignum putare? Minime. Inest enim dignitas
+propria uirtuti, quam protinus in eos quibus fuerit adiuncta transfundit.
+Quod quia populares facere nequeunt honores, liquet eos propriam dignitatis
+pulchritudinem non habere.
+
+In quo illud est animaduertendum magis. Nam si eo abiectior est quo magis a
+pluribus quisque contemnitur, cum reuerendos facere nequeat quos pluribus
+ostentat, despectiores potius improbos dignitas facit. Verum non impune;
+reddunt namque improbi parem dignitatibus uicem quas sua contagione
+commaculant. Atque ut agnoscas ueram illam reuerentiam per has umbratiles
+dignitates non posse contingere; si qui multiplici consulatu functus in
+barbaras nationes forte deuenerit, uenerandumne barbaris honor faciet?
+Atqui si hoc naturale munus dignitatibus foret, ab officio suo quoquo
+gentium nullo modo cessarent, sicut ignis ubique terrarum numquam tamen
+calere desistit, sed quoniam id eis non propria uis sed hominum fallax
+adnectit opinio, uanescunt ilico, cum ad eos uenerint qui dignitates eas
+esse non aestimant.
+
+Sed hoc apud exteras nationes. Inter eos uero apud quos ortae sunt, num
+perpetuo perdurant? Atqui praetura magna olim potestas nunc inane nomen et
+senatorii census grauis sarcina; si quis populi quondam curasset annonam,
+magnus habebatur, nunc ea praefectura quid abiectius? Vt enim paulo ante
+diximus, quod nihil habet proprii decoris, opinione utentium nunc
+splendorem accipit nunc amittit. Si igitur reuerendos facere nequeunt
+dignitates, si ultro improborum contagione sordescunt, si mutatione
+temporum splendere desinunt, si gentium aestimatione uilescunt, quid est
+quod in se expetendae pulchritudinis habeant, nedum aliis praestent?
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  But dignities make him honourable and reverend on whom they light. Have
+  offices that force to plant virtues and expel vices in the minds of
+  those who have them? But they are not wont to banish, but rather to make
+  wickedness splendid. So that we many times complain because most wicked
+  men obtain them. Whereupon Catullus called Nonius a scab or impostume
+  though he sat in his chair of estate.[123] Seest thou what great
+  ignominy dignities heap upon evil men? For their unworthiness would less
+  appear if they were never advanced to any honours. Could so many dangers
+  ever make thee think to bear office with Decoratus,[124] having
+  discovered him to be a very varlet and spy? For we cannot for their
+  honours account them worthy of respect whom we judge unworthy of the
+  honours themselves. But if thou seest any man endued with wisdom, canst
+  thou esteem him unworthy of that respect or wisdom which he hath? No,
+  truly. For virtue hath a proper dignity of her own, which she presently
+  endueth her possessors withal. Which since popular preferments cannot
+  do, it is manifest that they have not the beauty which is proper to true
+  dignity.
+
+  In which we are farther to consider that, if to be contemned of many
+  make men abject, dignities make the wicked to be despised the more by
+  laying them open to the view of the world. But the dignities go not
+  scot-free, for wicked men do as much for them, defiling them with their
+  own infection. And that thou mayst plainly see that true respect cannot
+  be gotten by these painted dignities, let one that hath been often
+  Consul go among barbarous nations; will that honour make those barbarous
+  people respect him? And yet, if this were natural to dignities, they
+  would never forsake their function in any nation whatsoever; as fire,
+  wheresoever it be, always remaineth hot. But because not their own
+  nature, but the deceitful opinion of men attributeth that to them, they
+  forthwith come to nothing, being brought to them who esteem them not to
+  be dignities.
+
+  And this for foreign nations. But do they always last among them where
+  they had their beginning? The Praetorship, a great dignity in time past,
+  is now an idle name, and an heavy burden of the Senate's fortune. If
+  heretofore one had care of the people's provision, he was accounted a
+  great man; now what is more abject than that office? For as we said
+  before, that which hath no proper dignity belonging unto it sometime
+  receiveth and sometime loseth his value at the users' discretion.
+  Wherefore if dignities cannot make us respected, if they be easily
+  defiled with the infection of the wicked, if their worth decays by
+  change of times, if diversities of nations make them contemptible, what
+  beauty have they in themselves, or can they afford to others, worth the
+  desiring?
+
+
+  [123] Cf. Catull. lii.
+
+  [124] Decoratus was quaestor _circa_ 508; cf. Cassiod. _Ep_. v. 3 and 4.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quamuis se Tyrio superbus ostro
+  Comeret et niueis lapillis,
+Inuisus tamen omnibus uigebat
+  Luxuriae Nero saeuientis.
+Sed quondam dabat improbus uerendis                                       5
+  Patribus indecores curules.
+Quis illos igitur putet beatos
+  Quos miseri tribuunt honores?
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Though fierce and lustful Nero did adorn
+  Himself with purple robes, which pearls did grace,
+  He did but gain a general hate and scorn.
+  Yet wickedly he officers most base
+  Over the reverend Senators did place.
+  Who would esteem of fading honours then
+  Which may be given thus by the wickedest men?
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+An uero regna regumque familiaritas efficere potentem ualet? Quidni, quando
+eorum felicitas perpetuo perdurat? Atqui plena est exemplorum uetustas,
+plena etiam praesens aetas, qui reges felicitatem calamitate mutauerint. O
+praeclara potentia quae ne ad conseruationem quidem sui satis efficax
+inuenitur! Quod si haec regnorum potestas beatitudinis auctor est, nonne si
+qua parte defuerit, felicitatem minuat, miseriam inportet? Sed quamuis late
+humana tendantur imperia, plures necesse est gentes relinqui quibus regum
+quisque non imperet. Qua uero parte beatos faciens desinit potestas, hac
+inpotentia subintrat quae miseros facit; hoc igitur modo maiorem regibus
+inesse necesse est miseriae portionem. Expertus sortis suae periculorum
+tyrannus regni metus pendentis supra uerticem gladii terrore simulauit.
+Quae est igitur haec potestas quae sollicitudinum morsus expellere, quae
+formidinum aculeos uitare nequit? Atqui uellent ipsi uixisse securi, sed
+nequeunt; dehinc de potestate gloriantur. An tu potentem censes quem uideas
+uelle quod non possit efficere? Potentem censes qui satellite latus ambit,
+qui quos terret ipse plus metuit, qui ut potens esse uideatur, in
+seruientium manu situm est? Nam quid ego de regum familiaribus disseram,
+cum regna ipsa tantae inbecillitatis plena demonstrem? Quos quidem regia
+potestas saepe incolumis saepe autem lapsa prosternit. Nero Senecam
+familiarem praeceptoremque suum ad eligendae mortis coegit arbitrium.
+Papinianum diu inter aulicos potentem militum gladiis Antoninus obiecit.
+Atqui uterque potentiae suae renuntiare uoluerunt, quorum Seneca opes etiam
+suas tradere Neroni seque in otium conferre conatus est; sed dum ruituros
+moles ipsa trahit, neuter quod uoluit effecit. Quae est igitur ista
+potentia quam pertimescunt habentes, quam nec cum habere uelis tutus sis et
+cum deponere cupias uitare non possis? An praesidio sunt amici quos non
+uirtus sed fortuna conciliat? Sed quem felicitas amicum fecit, infortunium
+faciet inimicum. Quae uero pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris
+inimicus?
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  But can kingdoms and the familiarity of kings make a man mighty? Why
+  not, when their felicity lasteth always? But both former and present
+  times are full of examples that many kings have changed their happiness
+  with misery. O excellent power, which is not sufficient to uphold
+  itself! And if this strength of kingdoms be the author of blessedness,
+  doth it not diminish happiness and bring misery, when it is in any way
+  defective? But though some empires extend themselves far, there will
+  still remain many nations out of their dominions. Now, where the power
+  endeth which maketh them happy, there entereth the contrary which maketh
+  them miserable, so that all kings must needs have less happiness than
+  misery. That Tyrant, knowing by experience the dangers of his estate,
+  signified the fears incident to a kingdom, by the hanging of a drawn
+  sword over a man's head.[125] What power is this, then, which cannot
+  expel nor avoid biting cares and pricking fears? They would willingly
+  have lived securely, but could not, and yet they brag of their power.
+  Thinkest thou him mighty whom thou seest desire that which he cannot do?
+  Thinkest thou him mighty who dareth not go without his guard; who
+  feareth others more than they fear him; who cannot seem mighty, except
+  his servants please? For what should I speak of kings' followers, since
+  I show that kingdoms themselves are so full of weakness? Whom the power
+  of kings often standing, but many times falling, doth overthrow. Nero
+  compelled Seneca, his familiar friend and master, to make choice of his
+  own death.[126] Antoninus called Papinianus, who had been long a gallant
+  courtier, to be cut in pieces with his soldiers' swords.[127] Yet they
+  would both have renounced their power, yea Seneca endeavoured to deliver
+  up his riches also to Nero, and to give himself to a contemplative life.
+  But their very greatness drawing them to their destruction, neither of
+  them could compass that which they desired. Wherefore what power is this
+  that the possessors fear, which when thou wilt have, thou art not
+  secure, and when thou wilt leave, thou canst not avoid? Are we the
+  better for those friends which love us not for our virtue but for our
+  prosperity? But whom prosperity maketh our friend, adversity will make
+  our enemy. And what plague is able to hurt us more than a familiar
+  enemy?
+
+
+  [125] Cic. _Tusc. Disp._ v. 21. 62.
+
+  [126] Cf. Tac. _Ann._ xiv. 53, 54.
+
+  [127] Cf. Spartian. _Caracallus_ 8.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Qui se uolet esse potentem
+Animos domet ille feroces
+Nec uicta libidine colla
+Foedis submittat habenis.
+Etenim licet Indica longe                                                 5
+Tellus tua iura tremescat
+Et seruiat ultima Thyle,
+Tamen atras pellere curas
+Miserasque fugare querelas
+Non posse potentia non est.                                              10
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Who would be powerful, must
+  His own affections check,
+  Nor let foul reins of lust
+  Subdue his conquered neck.
+  For though the Indian land
+  Should tremble at thy beck,
+  And though thy dread command
+  Far Thule's isle obey,
+  Unless thou canst withstand
+  And boldly drive away
+  Black care and wretched moan,
+  Thy might is small or none.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Gloria uero quam fallax saepe, quam turpis est! Vnde non iniuria tragicus
+exclamat:
+
+  [Greek: O doxa doxa murioisi dae broton
+  ouden gegosi bioton onkosas megan.]
+
+Plures enim magnum saepe nomen falsis uulgi opinionibus abstulerunt; quo
+quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur, suis ipsi
+necesse est laudibus erubescant. Quae si etiam meritis conquisita sit, quid
+tamen sapientis adiecerit conscientiae qui bonum suum non populari rumore,
+sed conscientiae ueritate metitur? Quod si hoc ipsum propagasse nomen
+pulchrum uidetur, consequens est ut foedum non extendisse iudicetur. Sed
+cum, uti paulo ante disserui, plures gentes esse necesse sit ad quas unius
+fama hominis nequeat peruenire, fit ut quem tu aestimas esse gloriosum, pro
+maxima parte terrarum uideatur inglorius. Inter haec uero popularem gratiam
+ne commemoratione quidem dignam puto, quae nec iudicio prouenit nec umquam
+firma perdurat. Iam uero quam sit inane quam futtile nobilitatis nomen,
+quis non uideat? Quae si ad claritudinem refertur, aliena est. Videtur
+namque esse nobilitas quaedam de meritis ueniens laus parentum. Quod si
+claritudinem praedicatio facit, illi sint clari necesse est qui
+praedicantur. Quare splendidum te, si tuam non habes, aliena claritudo non
+efficit. Quod si quid est in nobilitate bonum, id esse arbitror solum, ut
+inposita nobilibus necessitudo uideatur ne a maiorum uirtute degeneret.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  As for glory, how deceitful it is oftentimes, and dishonest! For which
+  cause the tragical poet deservedly exclaimeth: "O glory, glory, thou
+  hast raised to honour and dignity myriads of worthless mortals!"[128]
+  For many have often been much spoken of through the false opinions of
+  the common people. Than which what can be imagined more vile? For those
+  who are falsely commended must needs blush at their own praises. Which
+  glory though it be gotten by deserts, yet what adds it to a wise man's
+  conscience who measureth his own good, not by popular rumours, but by
+  his own certain knowledge? And if it seemeth a fair thing to have
+  dilated our fame, consequently we must judge it a foul thing not to have
+  it extended. But since, as I showed a little before, there must needs be
+  many nations to which the fame of one man cannot arrive, it cometh to
+  pass that he whom thou esteemeth glorious, in the greater part of the
+  world seemeth to have no glory at all. And here now I think popular
+  glory not worth the speaking of, which neither proceedeth from judgment,
+  nor ever hath any firmness. Likewise, who seeth not what a vain and idle
+  thing it is to be called noble? Which insofar as it concerneth fame, is
+  not our own. For nobility seemeth to be a certain praise proceeding from
+  our parents' deserts. But if praising causeth fame, they must
+  necessarily be famous who are praised. Wherefore the fame of others, if
+  thou hast none of thine own, maketh not thee renowned. But if there be
+  anything good in nobility, I judge it only to be this, that it imposeth
+  a necessity upon those which are noble, not to suffer their nobility to
+  degenerate from the virtue of their ancestors.
+
+
+  [128] Eurip. _Androm._ 319.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Omne hominum genus in terris simili surgit ab ortu.
+Vnus enim rerum pater est, unus cuncta ministrat.
+Ille dedit Phoebo radios dedit et cornua lunae,
+Ille homines etiam terris dedit ut sidera caelo,
+Hic clausit membris animos celsa sede petitos.                            5
+Mortales igitur cunctos edit nobile germen.
+Quid genus et proauos strepitis? Si primordia uestra
+Auctoremque deum spectes, nullus degener exstat,
+Ni uitiis peiora fouens proprium deserat ortum.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  The general race of men from a like birth is born.
+  All things one Father have, Who doth them all adorn,
+  Who gave the sun his rays, and the pale moon her horn,
+  The lofty heaven for stars, low earth for mortals chose;
+  He souls fetched down from high in bodies did enclose;
+  And thus from noble seed all men did first compose.
+  Why brag you of your stock? Since none is counted base,
+  If you consider God the author of your race,
+  But he that with foul vice doth his own birth deface.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Quid autem de corporis uoluptatibus loquar, quarum appetentia quidem plena
+est anxietatis; satietas uero poenitentiae? Quantos illae morbos, quam
+intolerabiles dolores quasi quendam fructum nequitiae fruentium solent
+referre corporibus! Quarum motus quid habeat iucunditatis, ignoro. Tristes
+uero esse uoluptatum exitus, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum uolet,
+intelleget. Quae si beatos explicare possunt, nihil causae est quin pecudes
+quoque beatae esse dicantur quarum omnis ad explendam corporalem lacunam
+festinat intentio. Honestissima quidem coniugis foret liberorumque
+iucunditas, sed nimis e natura dictum est nescio quem filios inuenisse
+tortorem; quorum quam sit mordax quaecumque condicio, neque alias expertum
+te neque nunc anxium necesse est admonere. In quo Euripidis mei sententiam
+probo, qui carentem liberis infortunio dixit esse felicem.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Now what should I speak of bodily pleasures, the desire of which is full
+  of anxiety, and the enjoying of them breeds repentance? How many
+  diseases, how intolerable griefs bring they forth in the bodies of their
+  possessors, as it were the fruits of their own wickedness! I know not
+  what sweetness their beginnings have, but whosoever will remember his
+  lusts shall understand that the end of pleasure is sadness. Which if it
+  be able to cause happiness, there is no reason why beasts should not be
+  thought blessed, whose whole intention is bent to supply their corporal
+  wants. That pleasure which proceedeth from wife and children should be
+  most honest; but it was too naturally spoken, that some tormentor
+  invented children, whose condition, whatsoever it be, how biting it is,
+  I need not tell thee, who hast had experience heretofore, and art not
+  now free from care. In which I approve the opinion of Euripides, who
+  said that they which had no children are happy by being
+  unfortunate.[129]
+
+
+  [129] Cf. _Androm._ 420.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Habet hoc uoluptas omnis,
+Stimulis agit fruentes
+Apiumque par uolantum
+Vbi grata mella fudit,
+Fugit et nimis tenaci                                                     5
+Ferit icta corda morsu.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  All pleasure hath this property,
+  She woundeth those who have her most.
+  And, like unto the angry bee
+  Who hath her pleasant honey lost,
+  She flies away with nimble wing
+  And in our hearts doth leave her sting.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Nihil igitur dubium est quin hae ad beatitudinem uiae deuia quaedam sint
+nec perducere quemquam eo ualeant ad quod se perducturas esse promittunt.
+Quantis uero implicitae malis sint, breuissime monstrabo. Quid enim?
+Pecuniamne congregare conaberis? Sed eripies habenti. Dignitatibus fulgere
+uelis? Danti supplicabis et qui praeire ceteros honore cupis, poscendi
+humilitate uilesces. Potentiamne desideras? Subiectorum insidiis obnoxius
+periculis subiacebis. Gloriam petas? Sed per aspera quaeque distractus
+securus esse desistis. Voluptariam uitam degas? Sed quis non spernat atque
+abiciat uilissimae fragilissimaeque rei corporis seruum? Iam uero qui bona
+prae se corporis ferunt, quam exigua, quam fragili possessione nituntur!
+Num enim elephantos mole, tauros robore superare poteritis, num tigres
+uelocitate praeibitis? Respicite caeli spatium, firmitudinem, celeritatem
+et aliquando desinite uilia mirari. Quod quidem caelum non his potius est
+quam sua qua regitur ratione mirandum. Formae uero nitor ut rapidus est, ut
+uelox et uernalium florum mutabilitate fugacior! Quod si, ut
+Aristoteles[130] ait, Lynceis oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum uisus
+obstantia penetraret, nonne introspectis uisceribus illud Alcibiadis
+superficie pulcherrimum corpus turpissimum uideretur? Igitur te pulchrum
+uideri non tua natura sed oculorum spectantium reddit infirmitas. Sed
+aestimate quam uultis nimio corporis bona, dum sciatis hoc quodcumque
+miramini triduanae febris igniculo posse dissolui!  Ex quibus omnibus illud
+redigere in summam licet, quod haec quae nec praestare quae pollicentur
+bona possunt nec omnium bonorum congregatione perfecta sunt, ea nec ad
+beatitudinem quasi quidam calles ferunt nec beatos ipsa perficiunt.
+
+
+[130] Probably from the lost _Protrepticus_ of Aristotle. See Bywater,
+_Journal of Philology_, ii. (1869), 59, and Hartlich, _Leipz. Stud._ xi.
+(1889), 250.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Wherefore there is no doubt but that these ways to happiness are only
+  certain by-paths, which can never bring any man thither whither they
+  promise to lead him. And with how great evils they are beset, I will
+  briefly show. For what? Wilt thou endeavour to gather money? But thou
+  shalt take it away from him who hath it. Wilt thou excel in dignities?
+  Thou shalt crouch to the giver, and thou who desirest to surpass others
+  in honour shalt become vile by thy baseness in begging. Wishest thou for
+  power? Thou shalt be in danger of thy subjects' treacheries. Seekest
+  thou for glory? But, drawn into many dangers, thou shalt lose thy
+  safety. Wilt thou live a voluptuous life? But who would not despise and
+  neglect the service of so vile and frail a thing as his body? Now they
+  who boast of the habilities of their body, upon how unsteadfast a
+  possession do they ground themselves! For can you be bigger than
+  elephants, or stronger than bulls? Or swifter than tigers? Look upon the
+  space, firmness, and speedy motion of the heavens, and cease at length
+  to have in admiration these base things. Which heavens are not more to
+  be admired for these qualities than for the manner of their government.
+  As for the glittering of beauty, how soon and swiftly doth it vanish
+  away! As suddenly decaying and changing as the frail flowers in the
+  spring. And if, as Aristotle saith, men had Lynceus's eyes, that they
+  could see through stone walls, would not they judge that body of
+  Alcibiades, seeming outwardly most fair, to be most foul and ugly by
+  discovering his entrails? Wherefore not thy nature but the weakness of
+  the beholders' eyes maketh thee seem fair. But esteem the goods of the
+  body as much as you will, so that you acknowledge this, that whatsoever
+  you admire may be dissolved with the burning of an ague of three days.
+  Out of which we may briefly collect this sum; that these goods, which
+  can neither perform that they promise, nor are perfect by having all
+  that is good, do neither, as so many paths, lead men to happiness, nor
+  make men happy of themselves.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Eheu quae miseros tramite deuios
+  Abducit ignorantia!
+Non aurum in uiridi quaeritis arbore
+  Nec uite gemmas carpitis,
+Non altis laqueos montibus abditis                                        5
+  Vt pisce ditetis dapes
+Nec uobis capreas si libeat sequi,
+  Tyrrhena captatis uada.
+Ipsos quin etiam fluctibus abditos
+  Norunt recessus aequoris,                                              10
+Quae gemmis niueis unda feracior
+  Vel quae rubentis purpurae
+Nec non quae tenero pisce uel asperis
+  Praestent echinis litora.
+Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum,                                    15
+  Nescire caeci sustinent,
+Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum,
+  Tellure demersi petunt.
+Quid dignum stolidis mentibus inprecer?
+  Opes honores ambiant;                                                  20
+Et cum falsa graui mole parauerint,
+  Tum uera cognoscant bona.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Alas, how ignorance makes wretches stray
+        Out of the way!
+  You from green trees expect no golden mines
+        Nor pearls from vines,
+  Nor use you on mountains to lay your net
+        Fishes to get,
+  Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please,
+        Run you to seas.
+  Men will be skilful in the hidden caves
+        Of the ocean waves,
+  And in what coasts the orient pearls are bred,
+        Or purple red,
+  Also, what different sorts of fishes store
+        Each several shore.
+  But when they come their chiefest good to find,
+        Then are they blind,
+  And search for that under the earth, which lies
+        Above the skies.
+  How should I curse these fools? Let thirst them hold
+        Of fame and gold,
+  That, having got false goods with pain, they learn
+        True to discern.
+
+
+
+
+IX.
+
+"Hactenus mendacis formam felicitatis ostendisse suffecerit, quam si
+perspicaciter intueris, ordo est deinceps quae sit uera monstrare." "Atqui
+uideo," inquam, "nec opibus sufficientiam nec regnis potentiam nec
+reuerentiam dignitatibus nec celebritatem gloria nec laetitiam uoluptatibus
+posse contingere." "An etiam causas, cur id ita sit, deprehendisti?" "Tenui
+quidem ueluti rimula mihi uideor intueri, sed ex te apertius cognoscere
+malim."
+
+"Atqui promptissima ratio est. Quod enim simplex est indiuisumque natura,
+id error humanus separat et a uero atque perfecto ad falsum imperfectumque
+traducit. An tu arbitraris quod nihilo indigeat egere potentia?" "Minime,"
+inquam. "Recte tu quidem. Nam si quid est quod in ulla re inbecillioris
+ualentiae sit, in hac praesidio necesse est egeat alieno." "Ita est,"
+inquam. "Igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque una est eademque natura." "Sic
+uidetur." "Quod uero huiusmodi sit, spernendumne esse censes an contra
+rerum omnium ueneratione dignissimum?" "At hoc," inquam, "ne dubitari
+quidem potest." "Addamus igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque reuerentiam, ut
+haec tria unum esse iudicemus." "Addamus, si quidem uera uolumus
+confiteri."
+
+"Quid uero," inquit, "obscurumne hoc atque ignobile censes esse an omni
+celebritate clarissimum? Considera uero, ne quod nihilo indigere, quod
+potentissimum, quod honore dignissimum esse concessum est, egere
+claritudine quam sibi praestare non possit atque ob id aliqua ex parte
+uideatur abiectius." "Non possum," inquam, "quin hoc uti est ita etiam
+celeberrimum esse confitear." "Consequens igitur est ut claritudinem
+superioribus tribus nihil differre fateamur." "Consequitur," inquam. "Quod
+igitur nullius egeat alieni, quod suis cuncta uiribus possit, quod sit
+clarum atque reuerendum, nonne hoc etiam constat esse laetissimum?" "Sed
+unde huic," inquam, "tali maeror ullus obrepat ne cogitare quidem possum;
+quare plenum esse laetitiae, si quidem superiora manebunt, necesse est
+confiteri." "Atqui illud quoque per eadem necessarium est sufficientiae,
+potentiae, claritudinis, reuerentiae, iucunditatis nomina quidem esse
+diuersa, nullo modo uero discrepare substantiam." "Necesse est," inquam.
+"Hoc igitur quod est unum simplexque natura, prauitas humana dispertit et
+dum rei quae partibus caret partem conatur adipisci, nec portionem quae
+nulla est nec ipsam quam minime affectat assequitur." "Quonam," inquam,
+"modo?" "Qui diuitias," inquit, "petit penuriae fuga, de potentia nihil
+laborat, uilis obscurusque esse mauult, multas etiam sibi naturales quoque
+subtrahit uoluptates, ne pecuniam quam parauit amittat. Sed hoc modo ne
+sufficientia quidem contingit ei quem ualentia deserit, quem molestia
+pungit, quem uilitas abicit, quem recondit obscuritas. Qui uero solum posse
+desiderat, profligat opes, despicit uoluptates honoremque potentia carentem
+gloriam quoque nihili pendit. Sed hunc quoque quam multa deficiant uides.
+Fit enim ut aliquando necessariis egeat, ut anxietatibus mordeatur cumque
+haec depellere nequeat, etiam id quod maxime petebat potens esse desistat.
+Similiter ratiocinari de honoribus, gloria, uoluptatibus licet. Nam cum
+unumquodque horum idem quod cetera sit, quisquis horum aliquid sine ceteris
+petit, ne illud quidem quod desiderat apprehendit." "Quid igitur?" inquam.
+"Si qui cuncta simul cupiat adipisci, summam quidem ille beatitudinis
+uelit. Sed num in his eam reperiet, quae demonstrauimus id quod pollicentur
+non posse conferre?" "Minime," inquam. "In his igitur quae singula quaedam
+expetendorum praestare creduntur, beatitudo nullo modo uestiganda est."
+"Fateor," inquam, "et hoc nihil dici uerius potest." "Habes igitur,"
+inquit, "et formam falsae felicitatis et causas. Deflecte nunc in aduersum
+mentis intuitum; ibi enim ueram quam promisimus statim uidebis." "Atqui
+haec," inquam, "uel caeco perspicua est eamque tu paulo ante monstrasti,
+dum falsae causas aperire conaris. Nam nisi fallor ea uera est et perfecta
+felicitas quae sufficientem, potentem, reuerendum, celebrem laetumque
+perficiat. Atque ut me interius animaduertisse cognoscas, quae unum horum,
+quoniam idem cuncta sunt, ueraciter praestare potest hanc esse plenam
+beatitudinem sine ambiguitate cognosco." "O te alumne hac opinione felicem,
+si quidem hoc," inquit, "adieceris...." "Quidnam?" inquam. "Essene aliquid
+in his mortalibus caducisque rebus putas quod huiusmodi statum possit
+afferre?" "Minime," inquam, "puto idque a te, nihil ut amplius desideretur,
+ostensum est." "Haec igitur uel imagines ueri boni uel inperfecta quaedam
+bona dare mortalibus uidentur, uerum autem atque perfectum bonum conferre
+non possunt." "Assentior," inquam. "Quoniam igitur agnouisti quae uera illa
+sit, quae autem beatitudinem mentiantur, nunc superest ut unde ueram hanc
+petere possis agnoscas." "Id quidem," inquam, "iam dudum uehementer
+exspecto." "Sed cum, ut in Timaeo[131] Platoni," inquit, "nostro placet, in
+minimis quoque rebus diuinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc
+faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur?"
+"Inuocandum," inquam, "rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite
+fundatur exordium." "Recte," inquit, ac simul ita modulata est.
+
+
+[131] uti Timaeo _codd. optimi._
+
+
+
+
+  IX.
+
+  "Let it suffice that we have hitherto discovered the form of false
+  felicity, which if thou hast plainly seen, order now requireth that we
+  show thee in what true happiness consisteth." "I see," quoth I, "that
+  neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdoms, nor respect by
+  dignities, nor renown by glory, nor joy can be gotten by pleasures."
+  "Hast thou also understood the causes why it is so?" "Methink I have a
+  little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldst declare them more
+  plainly."
+
+  "The reason is manifest, for that which is simple and undivided of
+  itself, is divided by men's error, and is translated from true and
+  perfect to false and unperfect. Thinkest thou that which needeth
+  nothing, to stand in need of power?" "No," quoth I. "Thou sayest well,
+  for if any power in any respect be weak, in this it must necessarily
+  stand in need of the help of others." "It is true," quoth I. "Wherefore
+  sufficiency and power have one and the same nature." "So it seemeth."
+  "Now thinkest thou, that which is of this sort ought to be despised, or
+  rather that it is worthy to be respected above all other things?" "There
+  can be no doubt of this," quoth I. "Let us add respect then to
+  sufficiency and power, so that we judge these three to be one." "We must
+  add it if we confess the truth."
+
+  "What now," quoth she, "thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or
+  rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether that which thou hast
+  granted to want nothing, to be most potent, and most worthy of honour,
+  may seem to want fame, which it cannot yield itself, and for that cause
+  be in some respect more abject." "I must needs confess," quoth I, "that,
+  being what it is, this is also most famous." "Consequently then we must
+  acknowledge that fame differeth nothing from the former three." "We must
+  so," quoth I. "Wherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can perform
+  all things by its own power, which is famous and respected, is it not
+  manifest that it is also most pleasant?" To which I answered: "How such
+  a man should fall into any grief, I can by no means imagine. Wherefore
+  if that which we have said hitherto be true, we must needs confess that
+  he is most joyful and content." "And by the same reason it followeth
+  that sufficiency, power, fame, respect, pleasure have indeed divers
+  names, but differ not in substance." "It followeth indeed," quoth I.
+  "This then, which is one and simple by nature, man's wickedness
+  divideth, and while he endeavoureth to obtain part of that which hath no
+  parts, he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he
+  seeketh not after." "How is this?" quoth I. "He who seeketh after
+  riches," quoth she, "to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, he had
+  rather be base and obscure, he depriveth himself even of many natural
+  pleasures that he may not lose the money which he hath gotten. But by
+  this means he attaineth not to sufficiency, whom power forsaketh, whom
+  trouble molesteth, whom baseness maketh abject, whom obscurity
+  overwhelmeth. Again, he that only desireth power, consumeth wealth,
+  despiseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not
+  potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For
+  sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and
+  being not able to rid himself, ceaseth to be powerful, which was the
+  only thing he aimed at. The like discourse may be made of honours,
+  glory, pleasures. For since every one of these things is the same with
+  the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth
+  not that which he desireth." "What then?" quoth I. "If one should desire
+  to have them all together, he should wish for the sum of happiness, but
+  shall he find it in these things which we have showed cannot perform
+  what they promise?" "No," quoth I. "Wherefore we must by no means seek
+  for happiness in these things which are thought to afford the several
+  portions of that which is to be desired." "I confess it," quoth I, "and
+  nothing can be more true than this." "Now then," quoth she, "thou hast
+  both the form and causes of false felicity; cast but the eyes of thy
+  mind on the contrary, and thou shalt presently espy true happiness,
+  which we promised to show thee." "This," quoth I, "is evident, even to
+  him that is blind, and thou showedst it a little before, while thou
+  endeavouredst to lay open the causes of the false. For, if I be not
+  deceived, that is true and perfect happiness which maketh a man
+  sufficient, potent, respected, famous, joyful. And that thou mayest know
+  that I understood thee aright, that which can truly perform any one of
+  these because they are all one, I acknowledge to be full and perfect
+  happiness." "O my scholar, I think thee happy by having this opinion, if
+  thou addest this also." "What?" quoth I. "Dost thou imagine that there
+  is any mortal or frail thing which can cause this happy estate?" "I do
+  not," quoth I, "and that hath been so proved by thee, that more cannot
+  be desired." "Wherefore these things seem to afford men the images of
+  the true good, or certain unperfect goods, but they cannot give them the
+  true and perfect good itself." "I am of the same mind," quoth I. "Now
+  then, since thou knowest wherein true happiness consisteth, and what
+  have only a false show of it, it remaineth that thou shouldst learn
+  where thou mayest seek for this which is true." "This is that," quoth I,
+  "which I have long earnestly expected." "But since, as Plato teacheth
+  (in Timaeus),[132] we must implore God's assistance even in our least
+  affairs, what, thinkest thou, must we do now, that we may deserve to
+  find the seat of that sovereign good?" "We must," quoth I, "invocate the
+  Father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good
+  foundation." "Thou sayest rightly," quoth she, and withal sung in this
+  sort.
+
+
+  [132] Cf. _Tim._ 27.
+
+
+
+
+IX.
+
+"O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas
+Terrarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo
+Ire iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moueri.
+Quem non externae pepulerunt fingere causae
+Materiae fluitantis opus, uerum insita summi                              5
+Forma boni liuore carens, tu cuncta superno
+Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
+Mundum mente gerens similique in imagine formans
+Perfectasque iubens perfectum absoluere partes.
+Tu numeris elementa ligas ut frigora flammis                             10
+Arida conueniant liquidis, ne purior ignis
+Euolet aut mersas deducant pondera terras.
+Tu triplicis mediam naturae cuncta mouentem
+Conectens animam per consona membra resoluis.
+Quae cum secta duos motum glomerauit in orbes,                           15
+In semet reditura meat mentemque profundam
+Circuit et simili conuertit imagine caelum.
+Tu causis animas paribus uitasque minores
+Prouehis et leuibus sublimes curribus aptans
+In caelum terramque seris quas lege benigna                              20
+Ad te conuersas reduci facis igne reuerti.
+Da pater augustam menti conscendere sedem,
+Da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta
+In te conspicuos animi defigere uisus.
+Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis                                25
+Atque tuo splendore mica! Tu namque serenum,
+Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,
+Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem.
+
+
+
+
+  IX.[133]
+
+  "O Thou, that dost the world in lasting order guide,
+  Father of heaven and earth, Who makest time swiftly slide,
+  And, standing still Thyself, yet fram'st all moving laws,
+  Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause:
+  But by a sweet desire, where envy hath no place,
+  Thy goodness moving Thee to give each thing his grace,
+  Thou dost all creatures' forms from highest patterns take,
+  From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make.
+  Thus Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame.
+  Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixed with flame
+  And dry things join with moist, lest fire away should fly,
+  Or earth, opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.
+  Thou in consenting parts fitly disposed hast
+  Th'all-moving soul in midst of threefold nature placed,
+  Which, cut in several parts that run a different race,
+  Into itself returns, and circling doth embrace
+  The highest mind, and heaven with like proportion drives.
+  Thou with like cause dost make the souls and lesser lives,
+  Fix them in chariots swift, and widely scatterest
+  O'er heaven and earth; then at Thy fatherly behest
+  They stream, like fire returning, back to Thee, their God.
+  Dear Father, let my mind Thy hallowed seat ascend,
+  Let me behold the spring of grace and find Thy light,
+  That I on Thee may fix my soul's well clearéd sight.
+  Cast off the earthly weight wherewith I am opprest,
+  Shine as Thou art most bright, Thou only calm and rest
+  To pious men whose end is to behold Thy ray,
+  Who their beginning art, their guide, their bound, and way.[134]
+
+
+  [133] This poem is a masterly abridgment of the first part of the
+  _Timaeus_, and was eagerly fastened on by commentators of the early
+  Middle Ages whose direct knowledge of Plato was confined to the
+  translation of that dialogue by Chalcidius.
+
+  [134] Cf. the string of nouns in _Tr._ iv. (_supra_, p. 70 _ad fin._).
+
+
+
+
+X.
+
+Quoniam igitur quae sit imperfecti, quae etiam perfecti boni forma uidisti,
+nunc demonstrandum reor quonam haec felicitatis perfectio constituta sit.
+In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum quale
+paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei
+subiectae ueritatem cassa cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin exsistat
+sitque hoc ueluti quidam omnium fons bonorum negari nequit. Omne enim quod
+inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse
+perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere inperfectum quid esse
+uideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim
+perfectione sublata, unde illud quod inperfectum perhibetur exstiterit ne
+fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum
+coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema
+atque effeta dilabitur. Quod si, uti paulo ante monstrauimus, est quaedam
+boni fragilis inperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non
+potest dubitari." "Firmissime," inquam, "uerissimeque conclusum est." "Quo
+uero," inquit, "habitet, ita considera. Deum rerum omnium principem bonum
+esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil deo melius
+excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet? Ita uero
+bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse
+conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit. Erit
+enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius
+atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora
+esse claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est
+summum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Sed perfectum bonum
+ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus; ueram igitur beatitudinem in summo
+deo sitam esse necesse est." "Accipio," inquam, "nec est quod contradici
+ullo modo queat." "Sed quaeso," inquit, "te uide quam id sancte atque
+inuiolabiliter probes quod boni summi summum deum diximus esse
+plenissimum." "Quonam," inquam, "modo?" "Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem illud
+summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur uel extrinsecus accepisse uel ita
+naturaliter habere praesumas, quasi habentis dei habitaeque beatitudinis
+diuersam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes,
+praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis. Sed
+hunc esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur. Quod si
+natura quidem inest, sed est ratione diuersum, cum de rerum principe
+loquamur deo, fingat qui potest: quis haec diuersa coniunxerit? Postremo
+quod a qualibet re diuersum est, id non est illud a quo intellegitur esse
+diuersum. Quare quod a summo bono diuersum est sui natura, id summum bonum
+non est--quod nefas est de eo cogitare quo nihil constat esse praestantius.
+Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit exsistere,
+quare quod omnium principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonum
+uerissima ratione concluserim." "Rectissime," inquam. "Sed summum bonum
+beatitudinem esse concessum est." "Ita est," inquam. "Igitur," inquit,
+"deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri." "Nec propositis,"
+inquam, "prioribus refragari queo et illis hoc inlatum consequens esse
+perspicio."
+
+"Respice," inquit, "an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa
+bona quae a se diuersa sint esse non possunt. Etenim quae discrepant bona,
+non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet; quare neutrum poterit esse
+perfectum, cum alterutri alterum deest. Sed quod perfectum non sit, id
+summum non esse manifestum est; nullo modo igitur quae summa sunt bona ea
+possunt esse diuersa. Atqui et beatitudinem et deum summum bonum esse
+collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinem quae sit summa
+diuinitas." "Nihil," inquam, "nec reapse uerius[135] nec ratiocinatione
+firmius nec deo dignius concludi potest." "Super haec," inquit, "igitur
+ueluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae
+porismata ipsi uocant, ita ego quoque tibi ueluti corollarium dabo. Nam
+quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beatitudo uero est ipsa
+diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione beatos fieri manifestum est: sed uti
+iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatem
+adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus deus,
+sed natura quidem unus; participatione uero nihil prohibet esse quam
+plurimos." "Et pulchrum," inquam, "hoc atque pretiosum, siue porisma siue
+corollarium uocari mauis." "Atqui hoc quoque pulchrius nihil est, quod his
+annectendum esse ratio persuadet." "Quid?" inquam.
+
+"Cum multa," inquit, "beatitudo continere uideatur, utrumne haec omnia unum
+ueluti corpus beatitudinis quadam partium uarietate coniungant an sit eorum
+aliquid quod beatitudinis substantiam compleat, ad hoc uero cetera
+referantur?" "Vellem," inquam, "id ipsarum rerum commemoratione
+patefaceres." "Nonne," inquit, "beatitudinem bonum esse censemus?" "Ac
+summum quidem," inquam. "Addas," inquit, "hoc omnibus licet. Nam eadem
+sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reuerentia quoque, claritas
+ac uoluptas beatitudo esse iudicatur. Quid igitur? Haecine omnia
+bonum--sufficientia potentia ceteraque--ueluti quaedam beatitudinis membra
+sunt an ad bonum ueluti ad uerticem cuncta referuntur?" "Intellego,"
+inquam, "quid inuestigandum proponas, sed quid constituas audire desidero."
+"Cuius discretionem rei sic accipe. Si haec omnia beatitudinis membra
+forent, a se quoque inuicem discreparent. Haec est enim partium natura ut
+unum corpus diuersa componant. Atqui haec omnia idem esse monstrata sunt;
+minime igitur membra sunt. Alioquin ex uno membro beatitudo uidebitur esse
+coniuncta--quod fieri nequit." "Id quidem," inquam, "dubium non est, sed
+id quod restat exspecto." "Ad bonum uero cetera referri palam est. Idcirco
+enim sufficientia petitur quoniam bonum esse iudicatur, idcirco potentia
+quoniam id quoque esse creditur bonum; idem de reuerentia, claritudine,
+iucunditate coniectare licet. Omnium igitur expetendorum summa atque causa
+bonum est. Quod enim neque re neque similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum,
+id expeti nullo modo potest. Contraque etiam quae natura bona non sunt,
+tamen si esse uideantur, quasi uere bona sint appetuntur. Quo fit uti
+summa, cardo atque causa expetendorum omnium bonitas esse iure credatur.
+Cuius uero causa quid expetitur, id maxime uidetur optari, ueluti si
+salutis causa quispiam uelit equitare, non tam equitandi motum desiderat
+quam salutis effectum. Cum igitur omnia boni gratia petantur, non illa
+potius quam bonum ipsum desideratur ab omnibus. Sed propter quod cetera
+optantur, beatitudinem esse concessimus; quare sic quoque sola quaeritur
+beatitudo. Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni et beatitudinis unam atque
+eandem esse substantiam." "Nihil uideo cur dissentire quispiam possit."
+"Sed deum ueramque beatitudinem unum atque idem esse monstrauimus." "Ita,"
+inquam. "Securo igitur concludere licet dei quoque in ipso bono nec usquam
+alio sitam esse substantiam.
+
+
+[135] reapse uerius _Schepss_: re ab seuerius _uel_ re ipsa uerius _codd.
+opt._
+
+
+
+
+  X.
+
+  Wherefore since thou hast seen what is the form of perfect and imperfect
+  good, now I think we must show in what this perfection of happiness is
+  placed. And inquire first whether there can be any such good extant in
+  the world, as thou hast defined; lest, contrary to truth, we be deceived
+  with an empty show of thought. But it cannot be denied that there is
+  some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness.
+  For all that is said to be imperfect is so termed for the want it hath
+  of perfection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something
+  imperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind.
+  For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there
+  should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that
+  which is defective and not complete, but, proceeding from entire and
+  absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and enfeebled. But if, as
+  we showed before, there be a certain imperfect felicity of frail goods,
+  it cannot be doubted but that there is some solid and perfect happiness
+  also." "Thou hast," quoth I, "concluded most firmly and most truly."
+  "Now where this good dwelleth," quoth she, "consider this. The common
+  conceit of men's minds proveth that God the Prince of all things is
+  good. For, since nothing can be imagined better than God, who doubteth
+  but that is good than which is nothing better? And reason doth in such
+  sort demonstrate God to be good that it convinceth Him to be perfectly
+  good. For unless He were so, He could not be the chief of all things.
+  For there would be something better than He, having perfect goodness,
+  which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than He. For it
+  is already manifest that perfect things were before the imperfect.
+  Wherefore, lest our reasoning should have no end, we must confess that
+  the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign and perfect goodness. But we
+  have concluded that perfect goodness is true happiness, wherefore true
+  blessedness must necessarily be placed in the most high God." "I agree,"
+  quoth I, "neither can this be any way contradicted." "But I pray thee,"
+  quoth she, "see how boldly and inviolably thou approvest that which we
+  said, that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign goodness." "How?"
+  quoth I. "That thou presumest not that this Father of all things hath
+  either received from others that sovereign good with which He is said to
+  be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort that thou shouldst
+  think that the substance of the blessedness which is had, and of God who
+  hath it, were diverse. For if thou thinkest that He had it from others,
+  thou mayest also infer that he who gave it was better than the receiver.
+  But we most worthily confess that He is the most excellent of all
+  things. And if He hath it by nature, but as a diverse thing, since we
+  speak of God the Prince of all things, let him that can, invent who
+  united these diverse things. Finally, that which is different from
+  anything, is not that from which it is understood to differ. Wherefore
+  that which is naturally different from the sovereign good, is not the
+  sovereign good itself. Which it were impious to think of God, than whom,
+  we know certainly, nothing is better. For doubtless the nature of
+  nothing can be better than the beginning of it. Wherefore I may most
+  truly conclude that which is the beginning of all things to be also in
+  His own substance the chiefest good." "Most rightly," quoth I. "But it
+  is granted that the chiefest good is blessedness?" "It is," quoth I.
+  "Wherefore," quoth she, "we must needs confess that blessedness itself
+  is God." "I can neither contradict," quoth I, "thy former propositions,
+  and I see this illation followeth from them."
+
+  "Consider," saith she, "if the same be not more firmly proved hence,
+  because there cannot be two chief goods, the one different from the
+  other. For it is manifest that of those goods which differ, the one is
+  not the other, wherefore neither of them can be perfect, wanting the
+  other. But manifestly that which is not perfect, is not the chiefest,
+  wherefore the chief goods cannot be diverse. Now we have proved that
+  both blessedness and God are the chiefest good, wherefore that must
+  needs be the highest blessedness which is the highest divinity." "There
+  can be nothing," quoth I, "concluded more truly than this, nor more
+  firmly in arguing, nor more worthy God himself." "Upon this then," quoth
+  she, "as the geometricians[136] are wont, out of their propositions
+  which they have demonstrated, to infer something which they call
+  _porismata_ (deductions) so will I give thee as it were a
+  _corollarium_. For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining
+  of blessedness, and blessedness is nothing else but divinity, it is
+  manifest that men are made blessed by the obtaining of divinity. And as
+  men are made just by the obtaining of justice, and wise by the obtaining
+  of wisdom, so they who obtain divinity must needs in like manner become
+  gods. Wherefore everyone that is blessed is a god, but by nature there
+  is only one God; but there may be many by participation." "This is,"
+  quoth I, "an excellent and precious _porisma_ or
+  _corollarium_." "But there is nothing more excellent than that
+  which reason persuadeth us to add." "What?" quoth I.
+
+  "Since," quoth she, "blessedness seemeth to contain many things, whether
+  do they all concur as divers parts to the composition of one entire body
+  of blessedness, or doth some one of them form the substance of
+  blessedness to which the rest are to be referred?" "I desire," quoth I,
+  "that thou wouldst declare this point, by the enumeration of the
+  particulars." "Do we not think," quoth she, "that blessedness is good?"
+  "Yea, the chiefest good," quoth I. "Thou mayest," quoth she, "add this
+  to them all. For blessedness is accounted the chiefest sufficiency, the
+  chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? Are all these--
+  sufficiency, power, and the rest--the good, in the sense that they are
+  members of it, or rather are they referred to good as to the head?" "I
+  understand," quoth I, "what thou proposest, but I desire to hear what
+  thou concludest." "This is the decision of this matter. If all these
+  were members of blessedness, they should differ one from another. For
+  this is the nature of parts, that being divers they compose one body.
+  But we have proved that all these are one and the same thing. Wherefore
+  they are no members, otherwise blessedness should be compacted of one
+  member, which cannot be." "There is no doubt of this," quoth I, "but I
+  expect that which is behind." "It is manifest that the rest are to be
+  referred to goodness; for sufficiency is desired, because it is esteemed
+  good, and likewise power, because that likewise is thought to be good.
+  And we may conjecture the same of respect, fame, and pleasure. Wherefore
+  goodness is the sum and cause of all that is desired. For that which is
+  neither good indeed, nor beareth any show of goodness, can by no means
+  be sought after. And contrariwise those things which are not good of
+  their own nature, yet, if they seem such, are desired as if they were
+  truly good. So that the sum, origin, and cause of all that is sought
+  after is rightly thought to be goodness. And that on account of which a
+  thing is sought, seemeth to be the chief object of desire. As if one
+  would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of
+  riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore, since all things are desired
+  in respect of goodness, they are not so much wished for as goodness
+  itself. But we granted that to be blessedness for which other things are
+  desired, wherefore in like manner only blessedness is sought after; by
+  which it plainly appeareth, that goodness and blessedness have one and
+  the self-same substance." "I see not how any man can dissent." "But we
+  have showed that God and true blessedness are one and the self-same
+  thing." "It is so," quoth I. "We may then securely conclude that the
+  substance of God consisteth in nothing else but in goodness.
+
+
+  [136] _Vide supra_, _Tr_. iii. p. 40.
+
+
+
+
+X.
+
+Huc omnes pariter uenite capti
+Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis
+Terrenas habitans libido mentes,
+Haec erit uobis requies laborum,
+Hic portus placida manens quiete,                                         5
+Hoc patens unum miseris asylum,
+Non quidquid Tagus aureis harenis
+Donat aut Hermus rutilante ripa
+Aut Indus calido propinquus orbi
+Candidis miscens uirides lapillos,                                       10
+Inlustrent aciem magisque caecos
+In suas condunt animos tenebras.
+Hoc quidquid placet excitatque mentes,
+Infimis tellus aluit cauernis;
+Splendor quo regitur uigetque caelum,                                    15
+Vitat obscuras animae ruinas.
+Hanc quisquis poterit notare lucem,
+Candidos Phoebi radios negabit."
+
+
+
+
+  X.[137]
+
+    Come hither, all you that are bound,
+    Whose base and earthly minds are drowned
+  By lust which doth them tie in cruel chains:
+    Here is a seat for men opprest,
+    Here is a port of pleasant rest;
+  Here may a wretch have refuge from his pains.
+    No gold, which Tagus' sands bestow,
+    Nor which on Hermus' banks doth flow,
+  Nor precious stones which scorched Indians get[138],
+    Can clear the sharpness of the mind,
+    But rather make it far more blind,
+  And in the farther depth of darkness set.
+    For this that sets our souls on work
+    Buried in caves of earth doth lurk.
+  But heaven is guided by another light,
+    Which causeth us to shun the dark[139],
+    And who this light doth truly mark,
+  Must needs deny that Phoebus' beams are bright."
+
+
+  [137] For the discussion on the nature of good in this poem and the next
+  piece of prose cf. _supra_, pp. 38 ff.
+
+  [138] Literally, "Nor Indus, neighbour of the torrid zone, blending its
+  green and white pebbles."
+
+  [139] Literally, "The light which gives guidance and vigour to the sky
+  shuns the darkness of ruined minds."
+
+
+
+
+XI.
+
+"Assentior," inquam, "cuncta enim firmissimis nexa rationibus constant."
+Tum illa, "Quanti," inquit, "aestimabis, si bonum ipsum quid sit
+agnoueris?" "Infinito," inquam, "si quidem mihi pariter deum quoque qui
+bonum est continget agnoscere." "Atqui hoc uerissima," inquit, "ratione
+patefaciam, maneant modo quae paulo ante conclusa sunt." "Manebunt."
+"Nonne," inquit, "monstrauimus ea quae appetuntur pluribus idcirco uera
+perfectaque bona non esse quoniam a se inuicem discreparent cumque alteri
+abesset alterum, plenum absolutumque bonum afferre non posse? Tum autem
+uerum bonum fieri cum in unam ueluti formam atque efficientiam colliguntur,
+ut quae sufficientia est, eadem sit potentia, reuerentia, claritas atque
+iucunditas, nisi uero unum atque idem omnia sint, nihil habere quo inter
+expetenda numerentur?" "Demonstratum," inquam, "nec dubitari ullo modo
+potest." "Quae igitur cum discrepant minime bona sunt, cum uero unum esse
+coeperint, bona fiunt; nonne haec ut bona sint, unitatis fieri adeptione
+contingit?" "Ita," inquam, "uidetur." "Sed omne quod bonum est boni
+participatione bonum esse concedis an minime?" "Ita est." "Oportet igitur
+idem esse unum atque bonum simili ratione concedas; eadem namque substantia
+est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diuersus effectus." "Negare," inquam,
+"nequeo." "Nostine igitur," inquit, "omne quod est tam diu manere atque
+subsistere quam diu sit unum, sed interire atque dissolui pariter atque
+unum destiterit?" "Quonam modo?" "Vt in animalibus," inquit, "cum in unum
+coeunt ac permanent anima corpusque, id animal uocatur; cum uero haec
+unitas utriusque separatione dissoluitur, interire nec iam esse animal
+liquet. Ipsum quoque corpus cum in una forma membrorum coniunctione
+permanet, humana uisitur species; at si distributae segregataeque partes
+corporis distraxerint unitatem, desinit esse quod fuerat. Eoque modo
+percurrenti cetera procul dubio patebit subsistere unumquodque, dum unum
+est, cum uero unum esse desinit, interire." "Consideranti," inquam, "mihi
+plura minime aliud uidetur." "Estne igitur," inquit, "quod in quantum
+naturaliter agat relicta subsistendi appetentia uenire ad interitum
+corruptionemque desideret?"  "Si animalia," inquam, "considerem quae habent
+aliquam uolendi nolendique naturam, nihil inuenio quod nullis extra
+cogentibus abiciant manendi intentionem et ad interitum sponte festinent.
+Omne namque animal tueri salutem laborat, mortem uero perniciemque deuitat.
+Sed quid de herbis arboribusque, quid de inanimatis omnino consentiam rebus
+prorsus dubito."
+
+"Atqui non est quod de hoc quoque possis ambigere, cum herbas atque arbores
+intuearis primum sibi conuenientibus innasci locis, ubi quantum earum
+natura queat cito exarescere atque interire non possint. Nam aliae quidem
+campis aliae montibus oriuntur, alias ferunt paludes, aliae saxis haerent,
+aliarum fecundae sunt steriles harenae, quas si in alia quispiam loca
+transferre conetur, arescant. Sed dat cuique natura quod conuenit et ne,
+dum manere possunt, intereant, elaborat. Quid quod omnes uelut in terras
+ore demerso trahunt alimenta radicibus ac per medullas robur corticemque
+diffundunt? Quid quod mollissimum quidque, sicuti medulla est, interiore
+semper sede reconditur, extra uero quadam ligni firmitate, ultimus autem
+cortex aduersum caeli intemperiem quasi mali patiens defensor opponitur?
+Iam uero quanta est naturae diligentia, ut cuncta semine multiplicato
+propagentur! Quae omnia non modo ad tempus manendi uerum generatim quoque
+quasi in perpetuum permanendi ueluti quasdam machinas esse quis nesciat? Ea
+etiam quae inanimata esse creduntur nonne quod suum est quaeque simili
+ratione desiderant? Cur enim flammas quidem sursum leuitas uehit, terras
+uero deorsum pondus deprimit, nisi quod haec singulis loca motionesque
+conueniunt? Porro autem quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque
+conseruat, sicuti ea quae sunt inimica corrumpunt. Iam uero quae dura sunt
+ut lapides, adhaerent tenacissime partibus suis et ne facile dissoluantur
+resistunt. Quae uero liquentia ut aer atque aqua, facile quidem
+diuidentibus cedunt, sed cito in ea rursus a quibus sunt abscisa
+relabuntur, ignis uero omnem refugit sectionem. Neque nunc nos de
+uoluntariis animae cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione
+tractamus, sicuti est quod acceptas escas sine cogitatione transigimus,
+quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes; nam ne in animalibus quidem
+manendi amor ex animae uoluntatibus, uerum ex naturae principiis uenit. Nam
+saepe mortem cogentibus causis quam natura reformidat uoluntas amplectitur,
+contraque illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas gignendi opus,
+quod natura semper appetit, interdum coercet uoluntas. Adeo haec sui
+caritas non ex animali motione sed ex naturali intentione procedit. Dedit
+enim prouidentia creatis a se rebus hanc uel maximam manendi causam ut
+quoad possunt naturaliter manere desiderent; quare nihil est quod ullo modo
+queas dubitare cuncta quae sunt appetere naturaliter constantiam
+permanendi, deuitare perniciem."
+
+"Confiteor," inquam, "nunc me indubitato cernere quae dudum incerta
+uidebantur." "Quod autem," inquit, "subsistere ac permanere petit, id unum
+esse desiderat; hoc enim sublato ne esse quidem cuiquam permanebit." "Verum
+est," inquam. "Omnia igitur," inquit, "unum desiderant." Consensi. "Sed
+unum id ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum." "Ita quidem." "Cuncta igitur
+bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas licet: ipsum bonum esse quod
+desideretur ab omnibus." "Nihil," inquam, "uerius excogitari potest. Nam
+uel ad nihil unum cuncta referuntur et uno ueluti uertice destituta sine
+rectore fluitabunt, aut si quid est ad quod uniuersa festinent, id erit
+omnium summum bonorum." Et illa: "Nimium," inquit, "o alumne laetor, ipsam
+enim mediae ueritatis notam mente fixisti. Sed in hoc patuit tibi quod
+ignorare te paulo ante dicebas." "Quid?" inquam. "Quis esset," inquit,
+"rerum omnium finis. Is est enim profecto, quod desideratur ab omnibus,
+quod quia bonum esse collegimus, oportet rerum omnium finem bonum esse
+fateamur.
+
+
+
+
+  XI.
+
+  "I consent," quoth I, "for all is grounded upon most firm reasons." "But
+  what account wilt thou make," quoth she, "to know what goodness itself
+  is?" "I will esteem it infinitely," quoth I, "because by this means I
+  shall come to know God also, who is nothing else but goodness." "I will
+  conclude this," quoth she, "most certainly, if those things be not
+  denied which I have already proved." "They shall not," quoth I. "Have we
+  not proved," quoth she, "that those things which are desired of many,
+  are not true and perfect goods, because they differ one from another
+  and, being separated, cannot cause complete and absolute goodness, which
+  is only found when they are united as it were into one form and
+  causality, that the same may be sufficiency, power, respect, fame, and
+  pleasure? And except they be all one and the same thing, that they have
+  nothing worth the desiring?" "It hath been proved," quoth I, "neither
+  can it be any way doubted of." "Those things, then, which, when they
+  differ, are not good and when they are one, become good, are they not
+  made good by obtaining unity?" "So methink," quoth I. "But dost thou
+  grant that all that is good is good by partaking goodness?" "It is so."
+  "Thou must grant then likewise that unity and goodness are the same. For
+  those things have the same substance, which naturally have not diverse
+  effects." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Knowest thou then," quoth she,
+  "that everything that is doth so long remain and subsist as it is one,
+  and perisheth and is dissolved so soon as it ceaseth to be one?" "How?"
+  "As in living creatures," quoth she, "so long as the body and soul
+  remain united, the living creature remaineth. But when this unity is
+  dissolved by their separation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is
+  no longer a living creature. The body also itself, so long as it
+  remaineth in one form by the conjunction of the parts, appeareth the
+  likeness of a man. But if the members of the body, being separated and
+  sundered, have lost their unity, it is no longer the same. And in like
+  manner it will be manifest to him that will descend to other
+  particulars, that everything continueth so long as it is one, and
+  perisheth when it loseth unity." "Considering more particulars, I find
+  it to be no otherwise." "Is there anything," quoth she, "that in the
+  course of nature, leaving the desire of being, seeketh to come to
+  destruction and corruption?" "If," quoth I, "I consider living creatures
+  which have any nature to will and nill, I find nothing that without
+  extern compulsion forsake the intention to remain, and of their own
+  accord hasten to destruction. For every living creature laboureth to
+  preserve his health, and escheweth death and detriment. But what I
+  should think of herbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am
+  altogether doubtful."
+
+  "But there is no cause why thou shouldst doubt of this, if thou
+  considerest first that herbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their
+  nature, where, so much as their constitution permitteth, they cannot
+  soon wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other upon hills, some
+  in fenny, other in stony places, and the barren sands are fertile for
+  some, which if thou wouldst transplant into other places they die. But
+  nature giveth every one that which is fitting, and striveth to keep them
+  from decaying so long as they can remain. What should I tell thee, if
+  all of them, thrusting as it were their lips into the ground, draw
+  nourishment by their roots, and convey substance and bark by the inward
+  pith? What, that always the softest, as the pith, is placed within, and
+  is covered without by the strength of the wood, and last of all the bark
+  is exposed to the weather, as being best able to bear it off? And how
+  great is the diligence of nature that all things may continue by the
+  multiplication of seed; all which who knoweth not to be, as it were,
+  certain engines, not only to remain for a time, but successively in a
+  manner to endure for ever? Those things also which are thought to be
+  without all life, doth not every one in like manner desire that which
+  appertaineth to their own good? For why doth levity lift up flames, or
+  heaviness weigh down the earth, but because these places and motions are
+  convenient for them? And that which is agreeable to everything
+  conserveth it, as that which is opposite causeth corruption. Likewise
+  those things which are hard, as stones, stick most firmly to their
+  parts, and make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid things,
+  as air and water, are indeed easily divided, but do easily also join
+  again. And fire flieth all division. Neither do we now treat of the
+  voluntary motions of the understanding soul, but only of natural
+  operations. Of which sort is, to digest that which we have eaten,
+  without thinking of it, to breathe in our sleep not thinking what we do.
+  For even in living creatures the love of life proceedeth not from the
+  will of the soul, but from the principles of nature. For the will many
+  times embraceth death upon urgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and
+  contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of
+  mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though
+  nature doth always desire it. So true it is that this self-love
+  proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from natural intention.
+  For providence gave to her creatures this as the greatest cause of
+  continuance, that they naturally desire to continue so long as they may,
+  wherefore there is no cause why thou shouldst any way doubt that all
+  things which are desire naturally stability of remaining, and eschew
+  corruption."
+
+  "I confess," quoth I, "that I now see undoubtedly that which before
+  seemed very doubtful." "Now that," quoth she, "which desireth to
+  continue and remain seeketh to have unity. For if this be taken away,
+  being itself cannot remain." "It is true," quoth I. "All things then,"
+  quoth she, "desire unity." I granted it to be so. "But we have showed
+  that unity is the same as goodness." "You have indeed." "All things then
+  desire goodness, which thou mayest define thus: Goodness is that which
+  is desired of all things." "There can be nothing imagined more true. For
+  either all things have reference to no one principle and, being
+  destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusion without any
+  ruler: or if there be anything to which all things hasten, that must be
+  the chiefest of all goods." "I rejoice greatly O scholar," quoth she,
+  "for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very mark of verity. But in this
+  thou hast discovered that which a little before thou saidest thou wert
+  ignorant of." "What is that?" quoth I. "What the end of all things is,"
+  quoth she. "For certainly it is that which is desired of all things,
+  which since we have concluded to be goodness, we must also confess that
+  goodness is the end of all things.
+
+
+
+
+XI.
+
+Quisquis profunda mente uestigat uerum
+Cupitque nullis ille deuiis falli,
+In se reuoluat intimi lucem uisus
+Longosque in orbem cogat inflectens motus
+Animumque doceat quidquid extra molitur                                   5
+Suis retrusum possidere thesauris.
+Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes
+Lucebit ipso perspicacius Phoebo.
+Non omne namque mente depulit lumen
+Obliuiosam corpus inuehens molem.                                        10
+Haeret profecto semen introrsum ueri
+Quod excitatur uentilante doctrina.
+Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
+Ni mersus alto uiueret fomes corde?
+Quod si Platonis Musa personat uerum,                                    15
+Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur."
+
+
+
+
+  XI.
+
+  He that would seek the truth with thoughts profound
+  And would not stray in ways that are not right,
+  He to himself must turn his inward sight,
+  And guide his motions in a circled round,
+  Teaching his mind that ever she design
+  Herself in her own treasures to possess:
+  So that which late lay hidden in cloudiness
+  More bright and clear than Phoebus' beams shall shine.
+  Flesh hath not quenched all the spirit's light,
+  Though this oblivion's lump holds her opprest.
+  Some seed of truth remaineth in our breast,
+  Which skilful learning eas'ly doth excite.
+  For being askt how can we answer true
+  Unless that grace within our hearts did dwell?
+  If Plato's heavenly muse the truth us tell,
+  We learning things remember them anew."[140]
+
+
+  [140] For Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence cf. _Meno_ 81-86, and
+  _Phaedo_ 72-76.
+
+
+
+XII.
+
+Tum ego: "Platoni," inquam, "uehementer assentior, nam me horum iam secundo
+commemoras, primum quod memoriam corporea contagione, dehinc cum maeroris
+mole pressus amisi." Tum illa: "Si priora," inquit, "concessa respicias, ne
+illud quidem longius aberit quin recorderis quod te dudum nescire confessus
+es." "Quid?" inquam. "Quibus," ait illa, "gubernaculis mundus regatur."
+"Memini," inquam, "me inscitiam meam fuisse confessum, sed quid afferas,
+licet iam prospiciam, planius tamen ex te audire desidero." "Mundum,"
+inquit, "hunc deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas." "Ne nunc
+quidem arbitror," inquam, "nec umquam dubitandum putabo quibusque in hoc
+rationibus accedam breuiter exponam. Mundus hic ex tam diuersis
+contrariisque partibus in unam formam minime conuenisset, nisi unus esset
+qui tam diuersa coniungeret. Coniuncta uero naturarum ipsa diuersitas
+inuicem discors dissociaret atque diuelleret, nisi unus esset qui quod
+nexuit contineret. Non tam uero certus naturae ordo procederet nec tam
+dispositos motus locis, temporibus, efficientia, spatiis, qualitatibus
+explicarent, nisi unus esset qui has mutationum uarietates manens ipse
+disponeret.  Hoc quidquid est quo condita manent atque agitantur, usitato
+cunctis uocabulo deum nomino."
+
+Tum illa: "Cum haec," inquit, "ita sentias, paruam mihi restare operam puto
+ut felicitatis compos patriam sospes reuisas. Sed quae proposuimus
+intueamur. Nonne in beatitudine sufficientiam numerauimus deumque
+beatitudinem ipsam esse consensimus?" "Ita quidem." "Et ad mundum igitur,"
+inquit, "regendum nullis extrinsecus adminiculis indigebit; alioquin si quo
+egeat, plenam sufficientiam non habebit." "Id," inquam, "ita est
+necessarium." "Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit." "Negari," inquam,
+"nequit." "Atqui deus ipsum bonum esse monstratus est." "Memini," inquam.
+"Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit, si quidem per se regit omnia quem bonum
+esse consensimus et hic est ueluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum quo
+mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur." "Vehementer
+assentior," inquam, "et id te paulo ante dicturam tenui licet suspicione
+prospexi." "Credo;" inquit, "iam enim ut arbitror uigilantius ad cernenda
+uera oculos deducis. Sed quod dicam non minus ad contuendum patet." "Quid?"
+inquam. "Cum deus," inquit, "omnia bonitatis clauo gubernare iure credatur
+eademque omnia sicuti docui ad bonum naturali intentione festinent, num
+dubitari potest quin uoluntaria regantur seque ad disponentis nutum ueluti
+conuenientia contemperataque rectori sponte conuertant?" "Ita," inquam,
+"necesse est; nec beatum regimen esse uideretur, si quidem detrectantium
+iugum foret, non obtemperantium salus." "Nihil est igitur quod naturam
+seruans deo contraire conetur." "Nihil," inquam. "Quod si conetur," ait,
+"num tandem proficiet quidquam aduersus eum quem iure beatitudinis
+potentissimum esse concessimus?" "Prorsus," inquam, "nihil ualeret." "Non
+est igitur aliquid quod summo huic bono uel uelit uel possit obsistere."
+"Non," inquam, "arbitror." "Est igitur summum," inquit, "bonum quod regit
+cuncta fortiter suauiterque disponit." Tum ego: "Quam," inquam, "me non
+modo ea quae conclusa est summa rationum, uerum multo magis haec ipsa
+quibus uteris uerba delectant, ut tandem aliquando stultitiam magna
+lacerantem sui pudeat."
+
+"Accepisti," inquit, "in fabulis lacessentes caelum Gigantas; sed illos
+quoque, uti condignum fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit. Sed uisne rationes
+ipsas inuicem collidamus? Forsitan ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulchra
+quaedam ueritatis scintilla dissiliat." "Tuo," inquam, "arbitratu." "Deum,"
+inquit, "esse omnium potentem nemo dubitauerit." "Qui quidem," inquam,
+"mente consistat, nullus prorsus ambigat." "Qui uero est," inquit, "omnium
+potens, nihil est quod ille non possit." "Nihil," inquam. "Num igitur deus
+facere malum potest?" "Minime," inquam. "Malum igitur," inquit, "nihil est,
+cum id facere ille non possit, qui nihil non potest." "Ludisne," inquam,
+"me inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens, quae nunc quidem qua
+egrediaris introeas, nunc uero quo introieris egrediare, an mirabilem
+quendam diuinae simplicitatis orbem complicas? Etenim paulo ante
+beatitudine incipiens eam summum bonum esse dicebas quam in summo deo sitam
+loquebare. Ipsum quoque deum summum esse bonum plenamque beatitudinem
+disserebas; ex quo neminem beatum fore nisi qui pariter deus esset quasi
+munusculum dabas. Rursus ipsam boni formam dei ac beatitudinis loquebaris
+esse substantiam ipsumque unum id ipsum esse bonum docebas quod ab omni
+rerum natura peteretur. Deum quoque bonitatis gubernaculis uniuersitatem
+regere disputabas uolentiaque cuncta parere nec ullam mali esse naturam.
+Atque haec nullis extrinsecus sumptis sed ex altero altero fidem trahente
+insitis domesticisque probationibus explicabas."
+
+Tum illa: "Minime," inquit, "ludimus remque omnium maximam dei munere quem
+dudum deprecabamur exegimus. Ea est enim diuinae forma substantiae ut neque
+in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut
+de ea Parmenides ait:
+
+  [Greek: Pantothen eukuklou sphairaes enalinkion onkoi],
+
+rerum orbem mobilem rotat, dum se immobilem ipsa conseruat. Quod si
+rationes quoque non extra petitas sed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitum
+collocatas agitauimus, nihil est quod admirere, cum Platone sanciente
+didiceris cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones.
+
+
+
+
+  XII.
+
+  Then I said that I did very well like of Plato's doctrine, for thou dost
+  bring these things to my remembrance now the second time, first, because
+  I lost their memory by the contagion of my body, and after when I was
+  oppressed with the burden of grief. "If," quoth she, "thou reflectest
+  upon that which heretofore hath been granted, thou wilt not be far from
+  remembering that which in the beginning thou confessedst thyself to be
+  ignorant of." "What?" quoth I. "By what government," quoth she, "the
+  world is ruled." "I remember," quoth I, "that I did confess my
+  ignorance, but though I foresee what thou wilt say, yet I desire to hear
+  it more plainly from thyself." "Thou thoughtest a little before that it
+  was not to be doubted that this world is governed by God." "Neither do I
+  think now," quoth I, "neither will I ever think, that it is to be
+  doubted of, and I will briefly explicate the reasons which move me to
+  think so. This world could never have been compacted of so many divers
+  and contrary parts, unless there were One that doth unite these so
+  different things; and this disagreeing diversity of natures being united
+  would separate and divide this concord, unless there were One that
+  holdeth together that which He united. Neither would the course of
+  nature continue so certain, nor would the different parts hold so well-
+  ordered motions in due places, times, causality, spaces and qualities,
+  unless there were One who, Himself remaining quiet, disposeth and
+  ordereth this variety of motions. This, whatsoever it be, by which
+  things created continue and are moved, I call God, a name which all men
+  use."[141]
+
+  "Since," quoth she, "thou art of this mind, I think with little labour
+  thou mayest be capable of felicity, and return to thy country in safety.
+  But let us consider what we proposed. Have we not placed sufficiency in
+  happiness, and granted that God is blessedness itself?" "Yes truly."
+  "Wherefore," quoth she, "He will need no outward helps to govern the
+  world, otherwise, if He needed anything, He had not full sufficiency."
+  "That," quoth I, "must necessarily be so." "Wherefore He disposeth all
+  things by Himself." "No doubt He doth," quoth I. "But it hath been
+  proved that God is goodness itself." "I remember it very well," quoth I.
+  "Then He disposeth all things by goodness: since He governeth all things
+  by Himself, whom we have granted to be goodness. And this is as it were
+  the helm and rudder by which the frame of the world is kept steadfast
+  and uncorrupted." "I most willingly agree," quoth I, "and I foresaw a
+  little before, though only with a slender guess, that thou wouldst
+  conclude this." "I believe thee," quoth she, "for now I suppose thou
+  lookest more watchfully about thee to discern the truth. But that which
+  I shall say is no less manifest." "What?" quoth I. "Since that God is
+  deservedly thought to govern all things with the helm of goodness, and
+  all these things likewise, as I have showed, hasten to goodness with
+  their natural contention, can there be any doubt made but that they are
+  governed willingly, and that they frame themselves of their own accord
+  to their disposer's beck, as agreeable and conformable to their ruler?"
+  "It must needs be so," quoth I, "neither would it seem an happy
+  government, if it were an imposed yoke, not a desired health." "There is
+  nothing then which, following nature, endeavoureth to resist God."
+  "Nothing," quoth I. "What if anything doth endeavour," quoth she, "can
+  anything prevail against Him, whom we have granted to be most powerful
+  by reason of His blessedness?" "No doubt," quoth I, "nothing could
+  prevail." "Wherefore there is nothing which either will or can resist
+  this sovereign goodness." "I think not," quoth I. "It is then the
+  sovereign goodness which governeth all things strongly, and disposeth
+  them sweetly." "How much," quoth I, "doth not only the reason which thou
+  allegest, but much more the very words which thou usest, delight me,
+  that folly which so much vexed me may at length be ashamed of herself."
+
+  "Thou hast heard in the poets' fables," quoth she, "how the giants
+  provoked heaven, but this benign fortitude put them also down, as they
+  deserved. But wilt thou have our arguments contend together? Perhaps by
+  this clash there will fly out some beautiful spark of truth." "As it
+  pleaseth thee," quoth I. "No man can doubt," quoth she, "but that God is
+  almighty." "No man," quoth I, "that is well in his wits." "But," quoth
+  she, "there is nothing that He who is almighty cannot do." "Nothing,"
+  quoth I. "Can God do evil?" "No," quoth I, "Wherefore," quoth she, "evil
+  is nothing, since He cannot do it who can do anything." "Dost thou mock
+  me," quoth I, "making with thy reasons an inextricable labyrinth,
+  because thou dost now go in where thou meanest to go out again, and
+  after go out, where thou camest in, or dost thou frame a wonderful
+  circle of the simplicity of God? For a little before taking thy
+  beginning from blessedness, thou affirmedst that to be the chiefest good
+  which thou saidst was placed in God, and likewise thou provedst, that
+  God Himself is the chiefest good and full happiness, out of which thou
+  madest me a present of that inference, that no man shall be happy unless
+  he be also a God. Again thou toldest me that the form of goodness is the
+  substance of God and of blessedness, and that unity is the same with
+  goodness, because it is desired by the nature of all things; thou didst
+  also dispute that God governeth the whole world with the helm of
+  goodness, and that all things obey willingly, and that there is no
+  nature of evil, and thou didst explicate all these things with no
+  foreign or far-fetched proofs, but with those which were proper and
+  drawn from inward principles, the one confirming the other."
+
+  "We neither play nor mock," quoth she, "and we have finished the
+  greatest matter that can be by the assistance of God, whose aid we
+  implored in the beginning. For such is the form of the Divine substance
+  that it is neither divided into outward things, nor receiveth any such
+  into itself, but as Parmenides saith of it:
+
+    In body like a sphere well-rounded on all sides,[142]
+
+  it doth roll about the moving orb of things, while it keepeth itself
+  unmovable. And if we have used no far-fetched reasons, but such as were
+  placed within the compass of the matter we handled, thou hast no cause
+  to marvel, since thou hast learned in Plato's school that our speeches
+  must be like and as it were akin to the things we speak of.
+
+
+  [141] _Vide supra, Tr._ iv. (pp. 56 ff.).
+
+  [142] Cf. _Frag._ 8. 43 (Diels, _Vorsokratiker_, i. p. 158).
+
+
+
+
+XII.
+
+Felix qui potuit boni
+Fontem uisere lucidum,
+Felix qui potuit grauis
+Terrae soluere uincula.
+Quondam funera coniugis                                                   5
+Vates Threicius gemens
+Postquam flebilibus modis
+Siluas currere mobiles,
+Amnes stare coegerat,
+Iunxitque intrepidum latus                                               10
+Saeuis cerua leonibus,
+Nec uisum timuit lepus
+Iam cantu placidum canem,
+Cum flagrantior intima
+Feruor pectoris ureret,                                                  15
+Nec qui cuncta subegerant
+Mulcerent dominum modi,
+Inmites superos querens
+Infernas adiit domos.
+Illic blanda sonantibus                                                  20
+Chordis carmina temperans
+Quidquid praecipuis deae
+Matris fontibus hauserat,
+Quod luctus dabat impotens,
+Quod luctum geminans amor,                                               25
+Deflet Taenara commouens
+Et dulci ueniam prece
+Vmbrarum dominos rogat.
+Stupet tergeminus nouo
+Captus carmine ianitor,                                                  30
+Quae sontes agitant metu
+Vltrices scelerum deae
+Iam maestae lacrimis madent.
+Non Ixionium caput
+Velox praecipitat rota                                                   35
+Et longa site perditus
+Spernit flumina Tantalus.
+Vultur dum satur est modis,
+Non traxit Tityi iecur.
+Tandem, 'Vincimur,' arbiter                                              40
+Vmbrarum miserans ait,
+'Donamus comitem uiro
+Emptam carmine coniugem.
+Sed lex dona coerceat,
+Ne, dum Tartara liquerit,                                                45
+Fas sit lumina flectere.'
+Quis legem det amantibus?
+Maior lex amor est sibi.
+Heu, noctis prope terminos
+Orpheus Eurydicen suam                                                   50
+Vidit, perdidit, occidit.
+Vos haec fabula respicit
+Quicumque in superum diem
+Mentem ducere quaeritis.
+Nam qui Tartareum in specus                                              55
+Victus lumina flexerit,
+Quidquid praecipuum trahit
+Perdit, dum uidet inferos."
+
+
+
+
+  XII.
+
+  Happy is he that can behold
+  The well-spring whence all good doth rise,
+  Happy is he that can unfold
+  The bands with which the earth him ties.
+  The Thracian poet whose sweet song
+  Performed his wife's sad obsequies,
+  And forced the woods to run along
+  When he his mournful tunes did play,
+  Whose powerful music was so strong
+  That it could make the rivers stay;
+  The fearful hinds not daunted were,
+  But with the lions took their way,
+  Nor did the hare behold with fear
+  The dog whom these sweet notes appease.
+  When force of grief drew yet more near,
+  And on his heart did burning seize,
+  Nor tunes which all in quiet bound
+  Could any jot their master ease,
+  The gods above too hard he found,
+  And Pluto's palace visiting.
+  He mixed sweet verses with the sound
+  Of his loud harp's delightful string,
+  All that he drank with thirsty draught
+  From his high mother's chiefest spring,
+  All that his restless grief him taught,
+  And love which gives grief double aid,
+  With this even hell itself was caught,
+  Whither he went, and pardon prayed
+  For his dear spouse (unheard request).
+  The three-head porter was dismayed,
+  Ravished with his unwonted guest,
+  The Furies, which in tortures keep
+  The guilty souls with pains opprest,
+  Moved with his song began to weep.
+  Ixion's wheel now standing still
+  Turns not his head with motions steep.
+  Though Tantalus might drink at will,
+  To quench his thirst he would forbear.
+  The vulture full with music shrill
+  Doth not poor Tityus' liver tear.
+  'We by his verses conquered are,'
+  Saith the great King whom spirits fear.
+  'Let us not then from him debar
+  His wife whom he with songs doth gain.
+  Yet lest our gift should stretch too far,
+  We will it with this law restrain,
+  That when from hell he takes his flight,
+  He shall from looking back refrain.'
+  Who can for lovers laws indite?
+  Love hath no law but her own will.
+  Orpheus, seeing on the verge of night
+  Eurydice, doth lose and kill
+  Her and himself with foolish love.
+  But you this feigned tale fulfil,
+  Who think unto the day above
+  To bring with speed your darksome mind.
+  For if, your eye conquered, you move
+  Backward to Pluto left behind,
+  All the rich prey which thence you took,
+  You lose while back to hell you look."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER TERTIVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER IV
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec cum Philosophia dignitate uultus et oris grauitate seruata leniter
+suauiterque cecinisset, tum ego nondum penitus insiti maeroris oblitus
+intentionem dicere adhuc aliquid parantis abrupi. Et: "O," inquam, "ueri
+praeuia luminis quae usque adhuc tua fudit oratio, cum sui speculatione
+diuina tum tuis rationibus inuicta patuerunt, eaque mihi etsi ob iniuriae
+dolorem nuper oblita non tamen antehac prorsus ignorata dixisti. Sed ea
+ipsa est uel maxima nostri causa maeroris, quod, cum rerum bonus rector
+exsistat, uel esse omnino mala possint uel impunita praetereant; quod solum
+quanta dignum sit admiratione profecto consideras. At huic aliud maius
+adiungitur.  Nam imperante florenteque nequitia uirtus non solum praemiis
+caret, uerum etiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur et in locum
+facinorum supplicia luit. Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis
+omnia sed bona tantummodo uolentis dei nemo satis potest nec admirari nec
+conqueri."
+
+Tum illa: "Et esset," inquit, "infiniti stuporis omnibusque horribilius
+monstris, si, uti tu aestimas, in tanti uelut patrisfamilias dispositissima
+domo uilia uasa colerentur, pretiosa sordescerent. Sed non ita est. Nam si
+ea quae paulo ante conclusa sunt inconuulsa seruantur, ipso de cuius nunc
+regno loquimur auctore cognosces semper quidem potentes esse bonos, malos
+uero abiectos semper atque inbecillos nec sine poena umquam esse uitia nec
+sine praemio uirtutes, bonis felicia, malis semper infortunata contingere
+multaque id genus quae sopitis querelis firma te soliditate corroborent. Et
+quoniam uerae formam beatitudinis me dudum monstrante uidisti, quo etiam
+sita sit agnouisti, decursis omnibus quae praemittere necessarium puto,
+uiam tibi quae te domum reuehat ostendam. Pennas etiam tuae menti quibus se
+in altum tollere possit adfigam, ut perturbatione depulsa sospes in patriam
+meo ductu, mea semita, meis etiam uehiculis reuertaris.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FOURTH BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  When Philosophy had sung these verses with a soft and sweet voice,
+  observing due dignity and gravity in her countenance and gesture, I, not
+  having altogether forgotten my inward grief, interrupted her speech
+  which she was about to continue, and said: "O thou who bringest us to
+  see true light, those things which hitherto thou hast treated of have
+  manifestly appeared both to be divine when contemplated apart, and
+  invincible when supported by thy reasons, and what thou hast uttered,
+  though the force of grief had made me forget it of late, yet heretofore
+  I was not altogether ignorant of it. But this is the chiefest cause of
+  my sorrow, that since the governor of all things is so good, there can
+  either be any evil at all, or that it pass unpunished. Which alone I
+  beseech thee consider, how much admiration it deserveth. But there is
+  another greater than this; for wickedness bearing rule and sway, virtue
+  is not only without reward, but lieth also trodden under the wicked's
+  feet, and is punished instead of vice. That which things should be done
+  in the kingdom of God, who knoweth all things, can do all things, but
+  will do only that which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor
+  complain."
+
+  To which she answered: "It were indeed infinitely strange, and
+  surpassing all monsters, if, as thou conceivest, in the best-ordered
+  house of so great an householder the vilest vessels were made account of
+  and the precious neglected; but it is not so. For if those things which
+  were a little before concluded be kept unviolated, thou shalt by His
+  help, of whose kingdom we speak, know that the good are always powerful,
+  and the evil always abject and weak, and that vices are never without
+  punishment, nor virtue without reward, and that the good are always
+  prosperous, and the evil unfortunate, and many things of that sort,
+  which will take away all cause of complaint, and give thee firm and
+  solid strength. And since by my means thou hast already seen the form of
+  true blessedness, and known where it is placed, running over all those
+  things which I think necessary to rehearse, I will show thee the way
+  which will carry thee home. And I will also fasten wings upon thy mind,
+  with which she may rouse herself, that, all perturbation being driven
+  away, thou mayest return safely into thy country by my direction, by my
+  path, and with my wings.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Sunt etenim pennae uolucres mihi
+  Quae celsa conscendant poli.
+Quas sibi cum uelox mens induit,
+  Terras perosa despicit,
+Aeris inmensi superat globum,                                             5
+  Nubesque postergum uidet,
+Quique agili motu calet aetheris,
+  Transcendit ignis uerticem,
+Donec in astriferas surgat domos
+  Phoeboque coniungat uias                                               10
+Aut comitetur iter gelidi senis
+  Miles corusci sideris,
+Vel quocumque micans nox pingitur,
+  Recurrat astri circulum
+Atque ubi iam exhausti fuerit satis,                                     15
+  Polum relinquat extimum
+Dorsaque uelocis premat aetheris
+  Compos uerendi luminis.
+Hic regum sceptrum dominus tenet
+  Orbisque habenas temperat                                              20
+Et uolucrem currum stabilis regit
+  Rerum coruscus arbiter.
+Huc te si reducem referat uia,
+  Quam nunc requiris immemor:
+'Haec,' dices, 'memini, patria est mihi,                                 25
+  Hinc ortus; hic sistam gradum."
+Quod si terrarum placeat tibi
+  Noctem relictam uisere,
+Quos miseri toruos populi timent
+  Cernes tyrannos exules."                                               30
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  For I have swift and nimble wings which will ascend the lofty skies,
+  With which when thy quick mind is clad, it will the loathéd earth
+      despise,
+  And go beyond the airy globe, and watery clouds behind thee leave,
+  Passing the fire which scorching heat doth from the heavens' swift
+      course receive,
+  Until it reach the starry house, and get to tread bright Phoebus' ways,
+  Following the chilly sire's path,[143] companion of his flashing rays,
+  And trace the circle of the stars which in the night to us appear,
+  And having stayed there long enough go on beyond the farthest sphere,
+  Sitting upon the highest orb partaker of the glorious light,
+  Where the great King his sceptre holds, and the world's reins doth guide
+      aright,
+  And, firm in his swift chariot, doth everything in order set.
+  Unto this seat when thou art brought, thy country, which thou didst
+      forget,
+  Thou then wilt challenge to thyself, saying: 'This is the glorious land
+  Where I was born, and in this soil my feet for evermore shall stand.
+  Whence if thou pleasest to behold the earthly night which thou hast
+      left,
+  Those tyrants which the people fear will seem of their true home
+      bereft.'"
+
+
+  [143] Cf. "frigida Saturni sese quo Stella receptet," Virg. _Georg._ i.
+  336.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Tum ego: "Papae," inquam, "ut magna promittis! Nec dubito quin possis
+efficere; tu modo quem excitaueris ne moreris." "Primum igitur," inquit,
+"bonis semper adesse potentiam, malos cunctis uiribus esse desertos
+agnoscas licebit, quorum quidem alterum demonstratur ex altero. Nam cum
+bonum malumque contraria sint, si bonum potens esse constiterit, liquet
+inbecillitas mali; at si fragilitas clarescat mali, boni firmitas nota est.
+Sed uti nostrae sententiae fides abundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam
+nunc hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans.
+
+Duo sunt quibus omnis humanorum actuum constat effectus, uoluntas scilicet
+ac potestas, quorum si alterutrum desit, nihil est quod explicari queat.
+Deficiente etenim uoluntate ne aggreditur quidem quisque quod non uult; at
+si potestas absit, uoluntas frustra sit. Quo fit ut si quem uideas adipisci
+uelle quod minime adipiscatur, huic obtinendi quod uoluerit defuisse
+ualentiam dubitare non possis." "Perspicuum est," inquam, "nec ullo modo
+negari potest." "Quem uero effecisse quod uoluerit uideas, num etiam
+potuisse dubitabis?" "Minime." "Quod uero quisque potest, in eo ualidus,
+quod uero non potest, in hoc imbecillis esse censendus est." "Fateor,"
+inquam. "Meministine igitur," inquit, "superioribus rationibus esse
+collectum intentionem omnem uoluntatis humanae quae diuersis studiis agitur
+ad beatitudinem festinare?" "Memini," inquam, "illud quoque esse
+demonstratum." "Num recordaris beatitudinem ipsum esse bonum eoque modo,
+cum beatitudo petitur, ab omnibus desiderari bonum?" "Minime," inquam,
+"recordor, quoniam id memoriae fixum teneo." "Omnes igitur homines boni
+pariter ac mali indiscreta intentione ad bonum peruenire nituntur?" "Ita,"
+inquam, "consequens est." "Sed certum est adeptione boni bonos fieri."
+"Certum." "Adipiscuntur igitur boni quod appetunt?" "Sic uidetur." "Mali
+uero si adipiscerentur quod appetunt bonum, mali esse non possent." "Ita
+est." "Cum igitur utrique bonum petant, sed hi quidem adipiscantur, illi
+uero minime, num dubium est bonos quidem potentes esse, qui uero mali sunt
+imbecillos?" "Quisquis," inquam, "dubitat, nec rerum naturam nec
+consequentiam potest considerare rationum." "Rursus," inquit, "si duo sint
+quibus idem secundum naturam propositum sit eorumque unus naturali officio
+id ipsum agat atque perficiat, alter uero naturale illud officium minime
+administrare queat, alio uero modo quam naturae conuenit non quidem impleat
+propositum suum sed imitetur implentem, quemnam horum ualentiorem esse
+decernis?" "Etsi coniecto," inquam, "quid uelis, planius tamen audire
+desidero." "Ambulandi," inquit, "motum secundum naturam esse hominibus num
+negabis?" "Minime," inquam. "Eiusque rei pedum officium esse naturale num
+dubitas?" "Ne hoc quidem," inquam. "Si quis igitur pedibus incedere ualens
+ambulet aliusque cui hoc naturale pedum desit officium, manibus nitens
+ambulare conetur, quis horum iure ualentior existimari potest?" "Contexe,"
+inquam, "cetera; nam quin naturalis officii potens eo qui idem nequeat
+ualentior sit, nullus ambigat." "Sed summum bonum, quod aeque malis
+bonisque propositum, boni quidem naturali officio uirtutum petunt, mali
+uero uariam per cupiditatem, quod adipiscendi boni naturale officium non
+est, idem ipsum conantur adipisci. An tu aliter existimas?"  "Minime,"
+inquam, "nam etiam quod est consequens patet. Ex his enim quae concesserim,
+bonos quidem potentes, malos uero esse necesse est imbecillos."
+
+"Recte," inquit, "praecurris idque, uti medici sperare solent, indicium est
+erectae iam resistentisque naturae. Sed quoniam te ad intellegendum
+promptissimum esse conspicio, crebras coaceruabo rationes. Vide enim quanta
+uitiosorum hominum pateat infirmitas qui ne ad hoc quidem peruenire queunt
+ad quod eos naturalis ducit ac paene compellit intentio. Et quid si hoc tam
+magno ac paene inuicto praeeuntis naturae desererentur auxilio? Considera
+uero quanta sceleratos homines habeat impotentia. Neque enim leuia aut
+ludicra praemia petunt, quae consequi atque obtinere non possunt, sed circa
+ipsam rerum summam uerticemque deficiunt nec in eo miseris contingit
+effectus quod solum dies noctesque moliuntur; in qua re bonorum uires
+eminent. Sicut enim eum qui pedibus incedens ad eum locum usque peruenire
+potuisset, quo nihil ulterius peruium iaceret incessui, ambulandi
+potentissimum esse censeres, ita eum qui expetendorum finem quo nihil ultra
+est apprehendit, potentissimum necesse est iudices. Ex quo fit quod huic
+obiacet, ut idem scelesti, idem uiribus omnibus uideantur esse deserti. Cur
+enim relicta uirtute uitia sectantur? Inscitiane bonorum? Sed quid
+eneruatius ignorantiae caecitate? An sectanda nouerunt? Sed transuersos eos
+libido praecipitat. Sic quoque intemperantia fragiles qui obluctari uitio
+nequeunt. An scientes uolentesque bonum deserunt, ad uitia deflectunt? Sed
+hoc modo non solum potentes esse sed omnino esse desinunt. Nam qui communem
+omnium quae sunt finem relinquunt, pariter quoque esse desistunt. Quod
+quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominum sunt,
+eosdem non esse dicamus; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mali sunt eos
+malos esse non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque simpliciter nego.
+
+Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, simpliciter uero hominem appellare
+non possis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim, sed esse absolute
+nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet seruatque naturam; quod
+uero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sua natura situm est derelinquit.
+'Sed possunt,' inquies, 'mali.' Ne ego quidem negauerim, sed haec eorum
+potentia non a uiribus sed ab imbecillitate descendit. Possunt enim mala
+quae minime ualerent, si in bonorum efficientia manere potuissent. Quae
+possibilitas eos euidentius nihil posse demonstrat. Nam si, uti paulo ante
+collegimus, malum nihil est, cum mala tantummodo possint, nihil posse
+improbos liquet." "Perspicuum est." "Atque ut intellegas quaenam sit huius
+potentiae uis, summo bono nihil potentius esse paulo ante definiuimus."
+"Ita est," inquam. "Sed idem," inquit, "facere malum nequit." "Minime."
+"Est igitur," inquit, "aliquis qui omnia posse homines putet?" "Nisi quis
+insaniat, nemo." "Atqui idem possunt mala." "Vtinam quidem," inquam, "non
+possent." "Cum igitur bonorum tantummodo potens possit omnia, non uero
+queant omnia potentes etiam malorum, eosdem qui mala possunt minus posse
+manifestum est. Huc accedit quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam
+omniaque expetenda referri ad bonum uelut ad quoddam naturae suae cacumen
+ostendimus. Sed patrandi sceleris possibilitas referri ad bonum non potest;
+expetenda igitur non est. Atqui omnis potentia expetenda est; liquet igitur
+malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem
+potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet infirmitas ueramque illam
+Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod desiderent facere posse
+sapientes, improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desiderent
+explere non posse. Faciunt enim quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id
+bonum quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam
+ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt.
+
+
+
+
+  II.[144]
+
+  "Oh!" quoth I. "How great things dost thou promise! And I doubt not but
+  thou canst perform them, wherefore stay me not now that thou hast
+  stirred up my desires." "First then," quoth she, "that good men are
+  always powerful, and evil men of no strength, thou mayest easily know,
+  the one is proved by the other. For since that good and evil are
+  contraries, if it be convinced that goodness is potent, the weakness of
+  evil will be also manifest; and contrariwise if we discern the frailty
+  of evil, we must needs acknowledge the firmness of goodness. But that
+  our opinions may be more certainly embraced, I will take both ways,
+  confirming my propositions, sometime from one part, sometime from
+  another.
+
+  There be two things by which all human actions are effected, will and
+  power, of which if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed.
+  For if there want will, no man taketh anything in hand against his will,
+  and if there be not power, the will is in vain. So that, if thou seest
+  any willing to obtain that which he doth not obtain, thou canst not
+  doubt but that he wanted power to obtain what he would." "It is
+  manifest," quoth I, "and can by no means be denied." "And wilt thou
+  doubt that he could, whom thou seest bring to pass what he desired?"
+  "No." "But every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that
+  which he cannot do." "I confess it," quoth I. "Dost thou remember then,"
+  quoth she, "that it was inferred by our former discourses that all the
+  intentions of man's will doth hasten to happiness, though their courses
+  be divers?" "I remember," quoth I, "that that also was proved." "Dost
+  thou also call to mind that blessedness is goodness itself, and
+  consequently when blessedness is sought after, goodness must of course
+  be desired?" "I call it not to mind, for I have it already fixed in my
+  memory." "Wherefore all men both good and bad without difference of
+  intentions endeavour to obtain goodness." "It followeth," quoth I. "But
+  it is certain that men are made good by the obtaining of goodness." "It
+  is so." "Wherefore good men obtain what they desire." "So it seemeth."
+  "And if evil men did obtain the goodness they desire, they could not be
+  evil." "It is true." "Wherefore since they both desire goodness, but the
+  one obtaineth it and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men
+  are powerful, and the evil weak." "Whosoever doubteth of this," quoth I,
+  "he neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy
+  reasons." "Again," quoth she, "if there be two to whom the same thing is
+  proposed according to nature, and the one of them bringeth it perfectly
+  to pass with his natural function, but the other cannot exercise that
+  natural function but after another manner than is agreeable to nature,
+  and doth not perform that which he had proposed, but imitateth the other
+  who performeth it: which of these two wilt thou judge to be more
+  powerful?" "Though I conjecture," quoth I, "at thy meaning, yet I desire
+  to hear it more plainly." "Wilt thou deny," quoth she, "that the motion
+  of walking is agreeable to the nature of men?" "No," quoth I. "And
+  makest thou any doubt that the function of it doth naturally belong to
+  the feet?" "There is no doubt of this neither," quoth I. "Wherefore if
+  one that can go upon his feet doth walk, and another who hath not this
+  natural function of his feet endeavoureth to walk by creeping upon his
+  hands, which of these two is deservedly to be esteemed the stronger?"
+  "Infer the rest," quoth I, "for no man doubteth but that he which can
+  use that natural function is stronger than he which cannot." "But,"
+  quoth she, "the good seek to obtain the chiefest good, which is equally
+  proposed to bad and good, by the natural function of virtues, but the
+  evil endeavour to obtain the same by divers concupiscences, which are
+  not the natural function of obtaining goodness. Thinkest thou
+  otherwise?" "No," quoth I, "for it is manifest what followeth. For by
+  the force of that which I have already granted, it is necessary that
+  good men are powerful and evil men weak."
+
+  "Thou runnest before rightly," quoth she, "and it is (as physicians are
+  wont to hope) a token of an erected and resisting nature. Wherefore,
+  since I see thee most apt and willing to comprehend, I will therefore
+  heap up many reasons together. For consider the great weakness of
+  vicious men, who cannot come so far as their natural intention leadeth
+  and almost compelleth them. And what if they were destitute of this so
+  great and almost invincible help of the direction of nature? Ponder
+  likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or
+  trifling rewards[145] which they desire, and cannot obtain: but they
+  fail in the very sum and top of things: neither can the poor wretches
+  compass that which they only labour for nights and days: in which thing
+  the forces of the good eminently appear. For as thou wouldst judge him
+  to be most able to walk who going on foot could come as far as there
+  were any place to go in: so must thou of force judge him most powerful
+  who obtaineth the end of all that can be desired, beyond which there is
+  nothing. Hence that which is opposite also followeth, that the same men
+  are wicked and destitute of all forces. For why do they follow vices,
+  forsaking virtues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more
+  devoid of strength than blind ignorance? Or do they know what they
+  should embrace, but passion driveth them headlong the contrary way? So
+  also intemperance makes them frail, since they cannot strive against
+  vice. Or do they wittingly and willingly forsake goodness, and decline
+  to vices? But in this sort they leave not only to be powerful, but even
+  to be at all. For they which leave the common end of all things which
+  are, leave also being. Which may perhaps seem strange to some, that we
+  should say that evil men are not at all, who are the greatest part of
+  men: but yet it is so. For I deny not that evil men are evil, but withal
+  I say that purely and simply they are not.
+
+  For as thou mayest call a carcase a dead man, but not simply a man, so I
+  confess that the vicious are evil, but I cannot grant that they are
+  absolutely. For that is which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but
+  that which faileth from this leaveth also to be that which is in his own
+  nature. But thou wilt say that evil men can do many things, neither will
+  I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces but from
+  weakness. For they can do evil, which they could not do if they could
+  have remained in the performance of that which is good. Which
+  possibility declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if,
+  as we concluded a little before, evil is nothing, since they can only do
+  evil, it is manifest that the wicked can do nothing." "It is most
+  manifest." "And that thou mayest understand what the force of this power
+  is; we determined a little before that there is nothing more powerful
+  than the Sovereign Goodness." "It is true," quoth I. "But He cannot do
+  evil." "No." "Is there any then," quoth she, "that think that men can do
+  all things?" "No man, except he be mad, thinketh so." "But yet men can
+  do evil." "I would to God they could not," quoth I. "Since therefore he
+  that can only do good, can do all things, and they who can do evil,
+  cannot do all things, it is manifest that they which can do evil are
+  less potent. Moreover, we have proved that all power is to be accounted
+  among those things which are to be wished for, and that all such things
+  have reference to goodness, as to the very height of their nature. But
+  the possibility of committing wickedness cannot have reference to
+  goodness. Wherefore it is not to be wished for. Yet all power is to be
+  wished for; and consequently it is manifest, possibility of evil is no
+  power. By all which the power of the good and the undoubted infirmity of
+  evil appeareth. And it is manifest that the sentence of Plato is true:
+  that only wise men can do that which they desire, and that the wicked
+  men practise indeed what they list, but cannot perform what they would.
+  For they do what they list, thinking to obtain the good which they
+  desire by those things which cause them delight; but they obtain it not,
+  because shameful action cannot arrive to happiness.[146]
+
+
+  [144] The whole of this and of the following chapter is a paraphrase of
+  Plato's _Gorgias_.
+
+  [145] Cf. Virgil, _Aen._ xii. 764.
+
+  [146] Cf. Plato, _Gorgias_, 468, 469; _Alcibiades I._ 134 c.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Quos uides sedere celsos solii culmine reges
+Purpura claros nitente saeptos tristibus armis
+Ore toruo comminantes rabie cordis anhelos,
+Detrahat si quis superbis uani tegmina cultus,
+Iam uidebit intus artas dominos ferre catenas.                            5
+Hinc enim libido uersat auidis corda uenenis,
+Hinc flagellat ira mentem fluctus turbida tollens
+Maeror aut captos fatigat aut spes lubrica torquet
+Ergo cum caput tot unum cernas ferre tyrannos,
+Non facit quod optat ipse dominis pressus iniquis.                       10
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  The kings whom we behold
+  In highest glory placed,
+  And with rich purple graced,
+  Compassed with soldiers bold;
+  Whose countenance shows fierce threats,
+  Who with rash fury chide,
+  If any strip the pride
+  From their vainglorious feats;
+  He'll see them close oppressed
+  Within by galling chains
+  For filthy lust there reigns
+  And poisoneth their breast,
+  Wrath often them perplexeth
+  Raising their minds like waves,
+  Sorrow their power enslaves
+  And sliding hope them vexeth.
+  So many tyrants still
+  Dwelling in one poor heart,
+  Except they first depart
+  She cannot have her will.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Videsne igitur quanto in caeno probra uoluantur, qua probitas luce
+resplendeat? In quo perspicuum est numquam bonis praemia numquam sua
+sceleribus deesse supplicia. Rerum etenim quae geruntur illud propter quod
+unaquaeque res geritur, eiusdem rei praemium esse non iniuria uideri
+potest, uti currendi in stadio propter quam curritur iacet praemium corona.
+Sed beatitudinem esse idem ipsum bonum propter quod omnia geruntur
+ostendimus. Est igitur humanis actibus ipsum bonum ueluti praemium commune
+propositum. Atqui hoc a bonis non potest separari neque enim bonus ultra
+iure uocabitur qui careat bono; quare probos mores sua praemia non
+relinquunt. Quantumlibet igitur saeuiant mali, sapienti tamen corona non
+decidet, non arescet. Neque enim probis animis proprium decus aliena
+decerpit improbitas. Quod si extrinsecus accepto laetaretur, poterat hoc
+uel alius quispiam uel ipse etiam qui contulisset auferre; sed quoniam id
+sua cuique probitas confert, tum suo praemio carebit, cum probus esse
+desierit. Postremo cum omne praemium idcirco appetatur quoniam bonum esse
+creditur, quis boni compotem praemii iudicet expertem? At cuius praemii?
+Omnium pulcherrimi maximique. Memento etenim corollarii illius quod paulo
+ante praecipuum dedi ac sic collige: cum ipsum bonum beatitudo sit, bonos
+omnes eo ipso quod boni sint fieri beatos liquet. Sed qui beati sint deos
+esse conuenit. Est igitur praemium bonorum quod nullus. deterat dies,
+nullius minuat potestas, nullius fuscet improbitas, deos fieri. Quae cum
+ita sint, de malorum quoque inseparabili poena dubitare sapiens nequeat.
+Nam cum bonum malumque item poenae atque praemium aduersa fronte
+dissideant, quae in boni praemio uidemus accedere eadem necesse est in mali
+poena contraria parte respondeant. Sicut igitur probis probitas ipsa fit
+praemium, ita improbis nequitia ipsa supplicium est. Iam uero quisquis
+afficitur poena, malo se affectum esse non dubitat. Si igitur sese ipsi
+aestimare uelint, possuntne sibi supplicii expertes uideri quos omnium
+malorum extrema nequitia non affecit modo uerum etiam uehementer infecit?
+Vide autem ex aduersa parte bonorum, quae improbos poena comitetur. Omne
+namque quod sit unum esse ipsumque unum bonum esse paulo ante didicisti,
+cui consequens est ut omne quod sit id etiam bonum esse uideatur. Hoc
+igitur modo quidquid a bono deficit esse desistit; quo fit ut mali desinant
+esse quod fuerant, sed fuisse homines adhuc ipsa humani corporis reliqua
+species ostentat. Quare uersi in malitiam humanam quoque amisere naturam.
+Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere sola probitas possit, necesse est
+ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit, infra hominis meritum detrudat
+improbitas. Euenit igitur, ut quem transformatum uitiis uideas hominem
+aestimare non possis. Auaritia feruet alienarum opum uiolentus ereptor?
+Lupi similem dixeris. Ferox atque inquies linguam litigiis exercet? Cani
+comparabis. Insidiator occultus subripuisse fraudibus gaudet? Vulpeculis
+exaequetur. Irae intemperans fremit? Leonis animum gestare credatur.
+Pauidus ac fugax non metuenda formidat? Ceruis similis habeatur. Segnis ac
+stupidus torpit? Asinum uiuit. Leuis atque inconstans studia permutat?
+Nihil auibus differt. Foedis inmundisque libidinibus immergitur? Sordidae
+suis uoluptate detinetur. Ita fit ut qui probitate deserta homo esse
+desierit, cum in diuinam condicionem transire non possit, uertatur in
+beluam.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Seest thou then in what mire wickedness wallows, and how clearly honesty
+  shineth? By which it is manifest that the good are never without
+  rewards, nor the evil without punishments. For in all things that are
+  done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of
+  that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he
+  runneth is proposed as a reward. But we have showed that blessedness is
+  the selfsame goodness for which all things are done. Wherefore this
+  goodness is proposed as a common reward for all human actions, and this
+  cannot be separated from those who are good. For he shall not rightly be
+  any longer called good, who wanteth goodness; wherefore virtuous manners
+  are not left without their due rewards. And how much so ever the evil do
+  rage, yet the wise man's crown will not fade nor wither.  For others'
+  wickedness depriveth not virtuous minds of their proper glory. But if he
+  should rejoice at anything which he hath from others, either he who gave
+  it, or any other might take it away. But because every man's virtue is
+  the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward when he leaveth to
+  be virtuous. Lastly, since every reward is therefore desired because it
+  is thought to be good, who can judge him to be devoid of reward, which
+  hath goodness for his possession?  But what reward hath he? The most
+  beautiful and the greatest that can be. For remember that
+  _corollarium_ [147] which I presented thee with a little before, as
+  with a rare and precious jewel, and infer thus: Since that goodness
+  itself is happiness, it is manifest that all good men even by being good
+  are made happy.  But we agreed that happy men are gods. Wherefore the
+  reward of good men, which no time can waste, no man's power diminish, no
+  man's wickedness obscure, is to become gods. Which things being so, no
+  wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punishment of the evil.
+  For since goodness and evil, punishment and reward, are opposite the one
+  to the other, those things which we see fall out in the reward of
+  goodness must needs be answerable in a contrary manner in the punishment
+  of evil. Wherefore as to honest men honesty itself is a reward, so to
+  the wicked their very wickedness is a punishment. And he that is
+  punished doubteth not but that he is afflicted with the evil. Wherefore
+  if they would truly consider their own estate, can they think themselves
+  free from punishment, whom wickedness, the worst of all evils, doth not
+  only touch but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment which
+  accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the virtuous.
+  For thou learnedst not long before that whatsoever is at all is one, and
+  that unity is goodness, by which it followeth that whatsoever is must
+  also be good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth from goodness
+  ceaseth to be, by which it followeth that evil men leave to be that
+  which they were, but the shape of men, which they still retain, showeth
+  them to have been men: wherefore by embracing wickedness they have lost
+  the nature of men. But since virtue alone can exalt us above men,
+  wickedness must needs cast those under the desert of men, which it hath
+  bereaved of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man
+  whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extorter of other
+  men's goods carried away with his covetous desire? Thou mayest liken him
+  to a wolf. Is the angry and unquiet man always contending and brawling?
+  Thou mayest compare him to a dog. Doth the treacherous fellow rejoice
+  that he hath deceived others with his hidden frauds? Let him be
+  accounted no better than a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let
+  him be thought to have a lion's mind. Is the fearful and timorous afraid
+  without cause? Let him be esteemed like to hares and deer. Is the slow
+  and stupid always idle? He liveth an ass's life. Doth the light and
+  unconstant change his courses? He is nothing different from the birds.
+  Is he drowned in filthy and unclean lusts? He is entangled in the
+  pleasure of a stinking sow. So that he who, leaving virtue, ceaseth to
+  be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the divine condition, is turned
+  into a beast.
+
+
+  [147] _Vide supra, p. 270._
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Vela Neritii ducis
+Et uagas pelago rates
+Eurus appulit insulae,
+Pulchra qua residens dea
+Solis edita semine                                                        5
+Miscet hospitibus nouis
+Tacta carmine pocula.
+Quos ut in uarios modos
+Vertit herbipotens manus,
+Hunc apri facies tegit,                                                  10
+Ille Marmaricus leo
+Dente crescit et unguibus.
+Hic lupis nuper additus,
+Flere dum parat, ululat.
+Ille tigris ut Indica                                                    15
+Tecta mitis obambulat.
+Sed licet uariis malis
+Numen Arcadis alitis
+Obsitum miserans ducem
+Peste soluerit hospitis,                                                 20
+Iam tamen mala remiges
+Ore pocula traxerant,
+Iam sues Cerealia
+Glande pabula uerterant
+Et nihil manet integrum                                                  25
+Voce corpore perditis.
+Sola mens stabilis super
+Monstra quae patitur gemit.
+O leuem nimium manum
+Nec potentia gramina,                                                    30
+Membra quae ualeant licet,
+Corda uertere non ualent!
+Intus est hominum uigor
+Arce conditus abdita.
+Haec uenena potentius                                                    35
+Detrahunt hominem sibi
+Dira quae penitus meant
+Nec nocentia corpori
+Mentis uulnere saeuiunt."
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  The sails which wise Ulysses bore,
+  And ships which in the seas long time did stray
+  The eastern wind drave to that shore
+  Where the fair Goddess Lady Circe lay,
+  Daughter by birth to Phoebus bright,
+  Who with enchanted cups and charms did stay
+  Her guests, deceived with their delight
+  And into sundry figures them did change,
+  Being most skilful in the might
+  And secret force of herbs and simples strange;
+  Some like to savage boars, and some
+  Like lions fierce, which daily use to range
+  Through Libya,[148] in tooth and claw become.
+  Others are changed to the shape and guise
+  Of ravenous wolves, and waxing dumb
+  Use howling in the stead of manly cries.
+  Others like to the tiger rove[149]
+  Which in the scorched Indian desert lies.
+  And though the winged son of Jove[150]
+  From these bewitchéd cups' delightful taste
+  To keep the famous captain strove,
+  Yet them the greedy mariners embraced
+  With much desire, till turned to swine
+  Instead of bread they fed on oaken mast.
+  Ruined in voice and form, no sign
+  Remains to them of any human grace;
+  Only their minds unchanged repine
+  To see their bodies in such ugly case.
+  O feeble hand and idle art
+  Which, though it could the outward limbs deface,
+  Yet had no force to change the heart.
+  For all the force of men given by God's arm
+  Lies hidden in their inmost part.
+  The poisons therefore which within them swarm
+  More deeply pierce, and with more might,
+  For to the body though they do no harm,
+  Yet on the soul they work their spite."
+
+
+  [148] Literally "Marmaric," i.e. properly, the region between Egypt and
+  the great Syrtis; generally, African, cf. Lucan iii. 293.
+
+  [149] Literally, "rove tame round the house."
+
+  [150] i.e. Mercury who was born in Arcadia; cf. Virg. _Aen._ viii.
+  129-138.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum ego: "Fateor," inquam, "nec iniuria dici uideo uitiosos, tametsi humani
+corporis speciem seruent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari; sed
+quorum atrox scelerataque mens bonorum pernicie saeuit, id ipsum eis licere
+noluissem." "Nec licet," inquit, "uti conuenienti monstrabitur loco. Sed
+tamen si id ipsum quod eis licere creditur auferatur, magna ex parte
+sceleratorum hominum poena releuetur. Etenim quod incredibile cuiquam forte
+uideatur, infeliciores esse necesse est malos, cum cupita perfecerint, quam
+si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint. Nam si miserum est uoluisse praua,
+potuisse miserius est, sine quo uoluntatis miserae langueret effectus.
+Itaque cum sua singulis miseria sit, triplici infortunio necesse est
+urgeantur quos uideas scelus uelle, posse, perficere." "Accedo," inquam,
+"sed uti hoc infortunio cito careant patrandi sceleris possibilitate
+deserti uehementer exopto." "Carebunt," inquit, "ocius quam uel tu forsitan
+uelis uel illi sese aestiment esse carituros. Neque enim est aliquid in tam
+breuibus uitae metis ita serum quod exspectare longum immortalis praesertim
+animus putet: quorum magna spes et excelsa facinorum machina repentino
+atque insperato saepe fine destruitur, quod quidem illis miseriae modum
+statuit.
+
+Nam si nequitia miseros facit, miserior sit necesse est diuturnior nequam;
+quos infelicissimos esse iudicarem, si non eorum malitiam saltem mors
+extrema finiret. Etenim si de prauitatis infortunio uera conclusimus,
+infinitam liquet esse miseriam quam esse constat aeternam." Tum ego: "Mira
+quidem," inquam, "et concessu difficilis inlatio, sed his eam quae prius
+concessa sunt nimium conuenire cognosco." "Recte," inquit, "aestimas. Sed
+qui conclusioni accedere durum putat, aequum est uel falsum aliquid
+praecessisse demonstret uel collocationem propositionum non esse efficacem
+necessariae conclusionis ostendat; alioquin concessis praecedentibus nihil
+prorsus est quod de inlatione causetur. Nam hoc quoque quod dicam non minus
+mirum uideatur, sed ex his quae sumpta sunt aeque est necessarium."
+"Quidnam?" inquam. "Feliciores," inquit, "esse improbos supplicia luentes
+quam si eos nulla iustitiae poena coerceat. Neque id nunc molior quod
+cuiuis ueniat in mentem, corrigi ultione prauos mores et ad rectum
+supplicii terrore deduci, ceteris quoque exemplum esse culpanda fugiendi,
+sed alio quodam modo infeliciores esse improbos arbitror impunitos, tametsi
+nulla ratio correctionis, nullus respectus habeatur exempli." "Et quis
+erit," inquam, "praeter hos alius modus?" Et illa: "Bonos," inquit, "esse
+felices, malos uero miseros nonne concessimus?" "Ita est," inquam. "Si
+igitur," inquit, "miseriae cuiuspiam bonum aliquid addatur, nonne felicior
+est eo cuius pura ac solitaria sine cuiusquam boni admixtione miseria est?"
+"Sic," inquam, "uidetur." "Quid si eidem misero qui cunctis careat bonis,
+praeter ea quibus miser est malum aliud fuerit adnexum, nonne multo
+infelicior eo censendus est cuius infortunium boni participatione
+releuatur?" "Quidni?" inquam. "Sed puniri improbos iustum, impunitos uero
+elabi iniquum esse manifestum est." "Quis id neget?" "Sed ne illud quidem,"
+ait, "quisquam negabit bonum esse omne quod iustum est contraque quod
+iniustum est malum." Liquere, respondi.[151] "Habent igitur improbi, cum
+puniuntur, quidem boni aliquid adnexum poenam ipsam scilicet quae ratione
+iustitiae bona est, idemque cum supplicio carent, inest eis aliquid
+ulterius mali ipsa impunitas quam iniquitatis merito malum esse confessus
+es." "Negare non possum." "Multo igitur infeliciores improbi sunt iniusta
+impunitate donati quam iusta ultione puniti." Tum ego: "Ista quidem
+consequentia sunt eis quae paulo ante conclusa sunt.
+
+Sed quaeso," inquam, "te, nullane animarum supplicia post defunctum morte
+corpus relinquis?" "Et magna quidem," inquit, "quorum alia poenali
+acerbitate, alia uero purgatoria clementia exerceri puto. Sed nunc de his
+disserere consilium non est. Id uero hactenus egimus, ut quae indignissima
+tibi uidebatur malorum potestas eam nullam esse cognosceres quosque
+impunitos querebare, uideres numquam improbitatis suae carere suppliciis,
+licentiam quam cito finiri precabaris nec longam esse disceres
+infelicioremque fore, si diuturnior, infelicissimam uero, si esset aeterna;
+post haec miseriores esse improbos iniusta impunitate dimissos quam iusta
+ultione punitos. Cui sententiae consequens est ut tum demum grauioribus
+suppliciis urgeantur, cum impuniti esse creduntur."
+
+Tum ego: "Cum tuas," inquam, "rationes considero, nihil dici uerius puto.
+At si ad hominum iudicia reuertar, quis ille est cui haec non credenda modo
+sed saltem audienda uideantur?" "Ita est," inquit illa. "Nequeunt enim
+oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae ueritatis attollere,
+similesque auibus sunt quarum intuitum nox inluminat dies caecat. Dum enim
+non rerum ordinem, sed suos intuentur affectus, uel licentiam uel
+impunitatem scelerum putant esse felicem. Vide autem quid aeterna lex
+sanciat. Melioribus animum conformaueris, nihil opus est iudice praemium
+deferente tu te ipse excellentioribus addidisti. Studium ad peiora
+deflexeris, extra ne quaesieris ultorem. Tu te ipse in deteriora trusisti,
+ueluti si uicibus sordidam humum caelumque respicias, cunctis extra
+cessantibus ipsa cernendi ratione nunc caeno nunc sideribus interesse
+uidearis. At uulgus ista non respicit. Quid igitur? Hisne accedamus quos
+beluis similes esse monstrauimus? Quid si quis amisso penitus uisu ipsum
+etiam se habuisse obliuisceretur intuitum nihilque sibi ad humanam
+perfectionem deesse arbitraretur, num uidentes eadem caecos putaremus? Nam
+ne illud quidem adquiescent quod aeque ualidis rationum nititur
+firmamentis: infeliciores eos esse qui faciant quam qui patiantur
+iniuriam." "Vellem," inquam, "has ipsas audire rationes." "Omnem," inquit,
+"improbum num supplicio dignum negas?" "Minime." "Infelices uero esse qui
+sint improbi multipliciter liquet." "Ita," inquam. "Qui igitur supplicio
+digni sunt miseros esse non dubitas?" "Conuenit," inquam. "Si igitur
+cognitor," ait, "resideres, cui supplicium inferendum putares, eine qui
+fecisset an qui pertulisset iniuriam?" "Nec ambigo," inquam, "quin perpesso
+satisfacerem dolore facientis." "Miserior igitur tibi iniuriae inlator quam
+acceptor esse uideretur." "Consequitur," inquam. "Hinc igitur aliis de
+causis ea radice nitentibus, quod turpitudo suapte natura miseros faciat,
+apparet inlatam cuilibet iniuriam non accipientis sed inferentis esse
+miseriam." "Atqui nunc," ait, "contra faciunt oratores. Pro his enim qui
+graue quid acerbumque perpessi sunt miserationem iudicum excitare conantur,
+cum magis admittentibus iustior miseratio debeatur; quos non ab iratis sed
+a propitiis potius miserantibusque accusatoribus ad iudicium ueluti aegros
+ad medicum duci oportebat, ut culpae morbos supplicio resecarent. Quo pacto
+defensorum opera uel tota frigeret, uel si prodesse hominibus mallet, in
+accusationis habitum uerteretur, Ipsi quoque improbi, si eis aliqua rimula
+uirtutem relictam fas esset aspicere uitiorumque sordes poenarum
+cruciatibus se deposituros uiderent compensatione adipiscendae probitatis,
+nec hos cruciatus esse ducerent defensorumque operam repudiarent ac se
+totos accusatoribus iudicibusque permitterent. Quo fit ut apud sapientes
+nullus prorsus odio locus relinquatur. Nam bonos quis nisi stultissimus
+oderit? Malos uero odisse ratione caret. Nam si, uti corporum languor, ita
+uitiositas quidam est quasi morbus animorum, cum aegros corpore minime
+dignos odio sed potius miseratione iudicemus, multo magis non insequendi
+sed miserandi sunt quorum mentes omni languore atrocior urget improbitas.
+
+
+[151] Sed puniri ... respondi _quae infra_ (_in pag. 328 l. 73_) _post_
+ultioni puniti _in codicibus habentur huc transponenda esse censuit P.
+Langenus, demonstrauit A. Engelbrecht._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Then said I, "I confess and perceive that thou affirmest not without
+  cause that the vicious, though they keep the outward shape of men, are
+  in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would
+  have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the
+  good, restrained from executing their malice." "They are restrained,"
+  quoth she, "as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this
+  liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is
+  in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible)
+  evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pass
+  their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it
+  be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable
+  to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could not
+  have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar
+  misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness,
+  whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness." "I grant it,"
+  quoth I, "but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this
+  misery, having lost the power to perform their malice." "They will lose
+  it," quoth she, "sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they
+  themselves suppose. For in the short compass of this life there is
+  nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should
+  think it long in coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of
+  the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected
+  end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.
+
+  For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more
+  miserable he must needs be; and I should judge them the most unhappy men
+  that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have
+  concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the
+  wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite." "A strange
+  illation," quoth I, "and hard to be granted; but I see that those things
+  which were granted before agree very well with these." "Thou thinkest
+  aright," quoth she, "but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the
+  conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is
+  false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary
+  conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no
+  reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude
+  now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of
+  those things which are already assumed." "What?" quoth I. "That wicked
+  men," quoth she, "are more happy being punished than if they escaped the
+  hands of justice. Neither do I now go about to show that which may come
+  into every man's mind, that evil customs are corrected by chastisement,
+  and are reduced to virtue by the terror of punishment, and that others
+  may take example to avoid evil, but in another manner also I think
+  vicious men that go unpunished to be more miserable, although we take no
+  account of correction and pay no regard to example." "And what other
+  manner shall this be," quoth I, "besides these?" "Have we not granted,"
+  quoth she, "that the good are happy, and the evil miserable?" "We have,"
+  quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "something that is good be added to one's
+  misery, is he not happier than another whose misery is desolate and
+  solitary, without any participation of goodness?" "So it seemeth," quoth
+  I. "What if there be some other evil annexed to this miserable man who
+  is deprived of all goodness, besides those which make him miserable, is
+  he not to be accounted much more unhappy than he whose misery is
+  lightened by partaking of goodness?" "Why not?" quoth I. "But it is
+  manifest that it is just that the wicked be punished, and unjust that
+  they should go unpunished." "Who can deny that?" "But neither will any
+  man deny this," quoth she, "that whatsoever is just, is good, and
+  contrariwise, that whatsoever is unjust, is evil." "Certainly," I
+  answered. "Then the wicked have some good annexed when they are
+  punished, to wit, the punishment itself, which by reason of justice is
+  good, and when they are not punished, they have a further evil, the very
+  impunity which thou hast deservedly granted to be an evil because of its
+  injustice." "I cannot deny it." "Wherefore the vicious are far more
+  unhappy by escaping punishment unjustly, than by being justly punished."
+  "This followeth," quoth I, "out of that which hath been concluded
+  before.
+
+  But I pray thee, leavest thou no punishments for the souls after the
+  death of the body?" "And those great too," quoth she. "Some of which I
+  think to be executed as sharp punishments, and others as merciful
+  purgations.[152] But I purpose not now to treat of those. But we have
+  hitherto laboured that thou shouldest perceive the power of the wicked,
+  which to thee seemed intolerable, to be none at all, and that thou
+  shouldest see, that those whom thou complainedst went unpunished, do
+  never escape without punishment for their wickedness. And that thou
+  shouldest learn that the licence which thou wishedst might soon end, is
+  not long, and yet the longer the more miserable, and most unhappy if it
+  were everlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being
+  permitted to escape with unjust impunity, than being punished with just
+  severity. Out of which it followeth that they are then more grievously
+  punished, when they are thought to go scot-free."
+
+  "When I consider thy reasons," quoth I, "I think nothing can be said
+  more truly. But if I return to the judgments of men, who is there that
+  will think them worthy to be believed or so much as heard?" "It is
+  true," quoth she, "for they cannot lift up their eyes accustomed to
+  darkness, to behold the light of manifest truth, and they are like those
+  birds whose sight is quickened by the night, and dimmed by the day. For
+  while they look upon, not the order of things, but their own affections,
+  they think that licence and impunity to sin is happy. But see what the
+  eternal law establisheth. If thou apply thy mind to the better, thou
+  needest no judge to reward thee: thou hast joined thyself to the more
+  excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, never expect
+  any other to punish thee: thou hast put thyself in a miserable estate;
+  as if by turns thou lookest down to the miry ground, and up to heaven,
+  setting aside all outward causes, by the very law of sight thou seemest
+  sometime to be in the dirt, and sometime present to the stars. But the
+  common sort considereth not these things. What then? Shall we join
+  ourselves to them whom we have proved to be like beasts? What if one
+  having altogether lost his sight should likewise forget that he ever had
+  any, and should think that he wanted nothing which belongeth to human
+  perfection: should we likewise think them blind, that see as well as
+  they saw before? For they will not grant that neither, which may be
+  proved by as forcible reasons, that they are more unhappy that do injury
+  than they which suffer it." "I would," quoth I, "hear these reasons."
+  "Deniest thou," quoth she, "that every wicked man deserveth punishment?"
+  "No." "And it is many ways clear that the vicious are miserable?" "Yes,"
+  quoth I. "Then you do not doubt that those who deserve punishment are
+  wretched?" "It is true," quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "thou wert to
+  examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that
+  did or that suffered wrong?" "I doubt not," quoth I, "but that I would
+  satisfy him that suffered with the sorrow of him that did it." "The
+  offerer of the injury then would seem to thee more miserable than the
+  receiver?" "It followeth," quoth I. "Hence therefore, and for other
+  causes grounded upon that principle that dishonesty of itself maketh men
+  miserable, it appeareth that the injury which is offered any man is not
+  the receiver's but the doer's misery." "But now-a-days," quoth she,
+  "orators take the contrary course. For they endeavour to draw the judges
+  to commiseration of them who have suffered any grievous afflictions;
+  whereas pity is more justly due to the causers thereof, who should be
+  brought, not by angry, but rather by favourable and compassionate
+  accusers to judgment, as it were sick men to a physician, that their
+  diseases and faults might be taken away by punishments; by which means
+  the defenders' labour would either wholly cease, or if they had rather
+  do their clients some good, they would change their defence into
+  accusations. And the wicked themselves, if they could behold virtue
+  abandoned by them, through some little rift, and perceive that they
+  might be delivered from the filth of sin by the affliction of
+  punishments, obtaining virtue in exchange, they would not esteem of
+  torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly
+  resign themselves to their accusers and judges. By which means it cometh
+  to pass, that in wise men there is no place for hatred. For who but a
+  very fool would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against
+  reason. For as faintness is a disease of the body, so is vice a sickness
+  of the mind. Wherefore, since we judge those that have corporal
+  infirmities to be rather worthy of compassion than of hatred, much more
+  are they to be pitied, and not abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with
+  wickedness, the greatest malady that may be.
+
+
+  [152] See discussion of this passage in _Boethius, An Essay,_ H. F.
+  Stewart (1891), pp. 98 ff.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quod tantos iuuat excitare motus
+  Et propria fatum sollicitare manu?
+Si mortem petitis, propinquat ipsa
+  Sponte sua uolucres nec remoratur equos.
+Quos serpens leo tigris ursus aper                                        5
+  Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt.
+An distant quia dissidentque mores,
+  Iniustas acies et fera bella mouent
+Alternisque uolunt perire telis?
+  Non est iusta satis saeuitiae ratio.                                   10
+Vis aptam meritis uicem referre?
+  Dilige iure bonos et miseresce malis."
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Why should we strive to die so many ways,
+    And slay ourselves with our own hands?
+    If we seek death, she ready stands,
+  She willing comes, her chariot never stays.
+  Those against whom the wild beasts arméd be,
+    Against themselves with weapons rage.[153]
+    Do they such wars unjustly wage,
+  Because their lives and manners disagree,
+  And so themselves with mutual weapons kill?
+    Alas, but this revenge is small.
+    Wouldst thou give due desert to all?
+  Love then the good, and pity thou the ill."
+
+
+  [153] Literally, "Men whom serpent, lion, tiger, bear, and boar attack
+  with tooth, yet attack each other with the sword."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Hic ego: "Video," inquam, "quae sit uel felicitas uel miseria in ipsis
+proborum atque improborum meritis constituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna
+populari non nihil boni maliue inesse perpendo. Neque enim sapientum
+quisquam exul inops ignominiosusque esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus,
+honore reuerendus, potentia ualidus, in sua permanens urbe florere. Sic
+enim clarius testatiusque sapientiae tractatur officium, cum in
+contingentes populos regentium quodam modo beatitudo transfunditur, cum
+praesertim carcer, nex[154] ceteraque legalium tormenta poenarum
+perniciosis potius ciuibus propter quos etiam constituta sunt debeantur.
+Cur haec igitur uersa uice mutentur scelerumque supplicia bonos premant,
+praemia uirtutum mali rapiant, uehementer admiror, quaeque tam iniustae
+confusionis ratio uideatur ex te scire desidero. Minus etenim mirarer, si
+misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector
+exaggerat. Qui cum saepe bonis iucunda, malis aspera contraque bonis dura
+tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehenditur, quid est quod a
+fortuitis casibus differre uideatur?" "Nec mirum," inquit, "si quid ordinis
+ignorata ratione temerarium confusumque credatur. Sed tu quamuis causam
+tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat,
+recte fieri cuncta ne dubites.
+
+
+[154] lex _plerique codd._
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+  "I see," quoth I, "what felicity or misery is placed in the deserts of
+  honest and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good or
+  evil even in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather live in
+  banishment, poverty, and ignominy, than prosper in his own country,
+  being rich, respected, and powerful. For in this manner is the office of
+  wisdom performed with more credit and renown, when the governors'
+  happiness is participated by the people about them; so chiefly because
+  prisons, death, and other torments of legal punishments are rather due
+  to pernicious subjects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I
+  much marvel why these things are thus turned upside down, and the
+  punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while evil men obtain the
+  rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee what may seem to be
+  the reason of so unjust confusion. For I would marvel less if I thought
+  that all things were disordered by casual events. Now God being the
+  Governor, my astonishment is increased. For since that He distributeth
+  oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is
+  distasteful to the bad, and contrariwise adversity to the good, and
+  prosperity to the evil, unless we find out the cause hereof, what
+  difference may there seem to be betwixt this and accidental chances?"
+  "It is no marvel," quoth she, "if anything be thought temerarious and
+  confused, when we know not the order it hath. But although thou beest
+  ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because the world
+  hath a governor, doubt not but all things are well done.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit
+  Propinqua summo cardine labi,
+Cur legat tardus plaustra Bootes
+  Mergatque seras aequore flammas,
+Cum nimis celeres explicet ortus,                                         5
+  Legem stupebit aetheris alti.
+Palleant plenae cornua lunae
+  Infecta metis noctis opacae
+Quaeque fulgenti texerat ore
+  Confusa Phoebe detegat astra,                                          10
+Commouet gentes publicus error
+  Lassantque crebris pulsibus aera.
+Nemo miratur flamina Cori
+  Litus frementi tundere fluctu
+Nec niuis duram frigore molem                                            15
+  Feruente Phoebi soluier aestu.
+Hic enim causas cernere promptum est,
+  Illic latentes pectora turbant.
+Cuncta quae rara prouehit aetas
+  Stupetque subitis mobile uulgus,                                       20
+Cedat inscitiae nubilus error,
+  Cessent profecto mira uideri."
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Who knows not how the stars near to the poles do slide,
+    And how Boötes his slow wain doth guide,
+  And why he sets so late, and doth so early rise,
+    May wonder at the courses of the skies.
+  If when the moon is full her horns seem pale to sight,
+    Infested with the darkness of the night,
+  And stars from which all grace she with her brightness took,
+    Now show themselves, while she doth dimly look,
+  A public error straight through vulgar minds doth pass,
+    And they with many strokes beat upon brass.[155]
+  None wonders why the winds upon the waters blow.
+    Nor why hot Phoebus' beams dissolve the snow.
+  These easy are to know, the other hidden lie,
+    And therefore more our hearts they terrify.
+  All strange events which time to light more seldom brings,
+    And the vain people count as sudden things,
+  If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free,
+    No longer would by us admired be."
+
+
+[155] See Tylor's _Primitive Culture_, pp. 296 ff. Cf "carmina uel caelo
+possunt deducere lunam," Virg. _Ecl._ viii. 69, and Juvenal, _Sat._ vi. 440
+sq.
+
+
+
+
+VI
+
+"Ita est," inquam; "sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas euoluere
+uelatasque caligine explicare rationes, quaeso uti quae hinc decernas.
+quoniam hoc me miraculum maxime perturbat, edisseras." Tum illa paulisper
+arridens: "Ad rem me," inquit, "omnium quaesitu maximam uocas, cui uix
+exhausti quicquam satis sit. Talis namque materia est ut una dubitatione
+succisa innumerabiles aliae uelut hydrae capita succrescant, nec ullus
+fuerit modus, nisi quis eas uiuacissimo mentis igne coerceat. In hac enim
+de prouidentiae simplicitate, de fati serie, de repentinis casibus, de
+cognitione ac praedestinatione diuina, de arbitrii libertate quaeri solet,
+quae quanti oneris sint ipse perpendis. Sed quoniam haec quoque te nosse
+quaedam medicinae tuae portio est, quamquam angusto limite temporis saepti
+tamen aliquid delibare[156] conabimur. Quod si te musici carminis
+oblectamenta delectant, hanc oportet paulisper differas uoluptatem, dum
+nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes." "Vt libet," inquam. Tunc uelut ab alio
+orsa principio ita disseruit: "Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium
+naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo mouetur modo, causas, ordinem,
+formas ex diuinae mentis stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis
+arce composita multiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit. Qui modus cum in
+ipsa diuinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur;
+cum uero ad ea quae mouet atque disponit refertur, fatum a ueteribus
+appellatum est. Quae diuersa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusque uim
+mente conspexerit. Nam prouidentia est ipsa illa diuina ratio in summo
+omnium principe constituta quae cuncta disponit; fatum uero inhaerens rebus
+mobilibus dispositio per quam prouidentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus.
+Prouidentia namque cuncta pariter quamuis diuersa quamuis infinita
+complectitur; fatum uero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac
+temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in diuinae
+mentis adunata prospectum prouidentia sit, eadem uero adunatio digesta
+atque explicata temporibus fatum uocetur. Quae licet diuersa sint, alterum
+tamen pendet ex altero. Ordo namque fatalis ex prouidentiae simplicitate
+procedit. Sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens mouet
+operis effectum, et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat, per
+temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter
+stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa quae disposuit
+multipliciter ac temporaliter administrat. Siue igitur famulantibus
+quibusdam prouidentiae diuinis spiritibus fatum exercetur seu anima seu
+tota inseruiente natura seu caelestibus siderum motibus seu angelica
+uirtute seu daemonum uaria sollertia seu aliquibus horum seu omnibus
+fatalis series texitur, illud certe manifestum est immobilem simplicemque
+gerendarum formam rerum esse prouidentiam, fatum uero eorum quae diuina
+simplicitas gerenda disposuit mobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem. Quo
+fit ut omnia quae fato subsunt prouidentiae quoque subiecta sint cui ipsum
+etiam subiacet fatum, quaedam uero quae sub prouidentia locata sunt fati
+seriem superent. Ea uero sunt quae primae propinqua diuinitati stabiliter
+fixa fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Nam ut orbium circa eundem
+cardinem sese uertentium qui est intimus ad simplicitatem medietatis
+accedit ceterorumque extra locatorum ueluti cardo quidam circa quem
+uersentur exsistit, extimus uero maiore ambitu rotatus quanto a puncti
+media indiuiduitate discedit tanto amplioribus spatiis explicatur, si quid
+uero illi se medio conectat et societ, in simplicitatem cogitur diffundique
+ac diffluere cessat, simili ratione quod longius a prima mente discedit
+maioribus fati nexibus implicatur ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est quanto
+illum rerum cardinem uicinius petit. Quod si supernae mentis haeserit
+firmitati, motu carens fati quoque supergreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti
+est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad
+aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus, ita est fati series
+mobilis ad prouidentiae stabilem simplicitatem. Ea series caelum ac sidera
+mouet, elementa in se inuicem temperat et alterna commutatione transformat;
+eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes fetuum seminumque renouat
+progressus. Haec actus etiam fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum
+conexione constringit, quae cum ab immobilis prouidentiae proficiscatur
+exordiis, ipsas quoque immutabiles esse necesse est. Ita enim res optime
+reguntur, si manens in diuina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum
+ordinem promat. Hic uero ordo res mutabiles et alioquin temere fluituras
+propria incommutabilitate coerceat. Quo fit ut tametsi uobis hunc ordinem
+minime considerare ualentibus confusa omnia perturbataque uideantur, nihilo
+minus tamen suus modus ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat. Nihil est enim
+quod mali causa ne ab ipsis quidem improbis fiat; quos, ut uberrime
+demonstratum est, bonum quaerentes prauus error auertit, nedum ordo de
+summi boni cardine proficiscens a suo quoquam deflectat exordio.
+
+Quae uero, inquies, potest ulla iniquior esse confusio, quam ut bonis tum
+aduersa tum prospera, malis etiam tum optata tum odiosa contingant? Num
+igitur ea mentis integritate homines degunt, ut quos probos improbosue
+censuerunt eos quoque uti existimant esse necesse sit? Atqui in hoc hominum
+iudicia depugnant, et quos alii praemio alii supplicio dignos arbitrantur.
+Sed concedamus ut aliquis possit bonos malosque discernere; num igitur
+potent intueri illam intimam temperiem, uelut in corporibus dici solet,
+animorum?  Non enim dissimile est miraculum nescienti cur sanis corporibus
+his quidem dulcia illis uero amara conueniant, cur aegri etiam quidam
+lenibus quidam uero acribus adiuuentur? At hoc medicus, qui sanitatis
+ipsius atque aegritudinis modum temperamentumque dinoscit, minime miratur.
+Quid uero aliud animorum salus uidetur esse quam probitas? Quid aegritudo
+quam uitia? Quis autem alius uel seruator bonorum uel malorum depulsor quam
+rector ac medicator mentium deus? Qui cum ex alta prouidentiae specula
+respexit, quid unicuique conueniat agnoscit et quod conuenire nouit
+accommodat. Hic iam fit illud fatalis ordinis insigne miraculum, cum ab
+sciente geritur quod stupeant ignorantes. Nam ut pauca quae ratio ualet
+humana de diuina profunditate perstringam, de hoc quem tu iustissimum et
+aequi seruantissimum putas omnia scienti prouidentiae diuersum uidetur; et
+uictricem quidem causam dis, uictam uero Catoni placuisse familiaris noster
+Lucanus admonuit. Hic igitur quidquid citra spem uideas geri, rebus quidem
+rectus ordo est, opinioni uero tuae peruersa confusio. Sed sit aliquis ita
+bene moratus ut de eo diuinum iudicium pariter et humanum consentiat, sed
+est animi uiribus infirmus; cui si quid eueniat aduersi, desinet colere
+forsitan innocentiam per quam non potuit retinere fortunam. Parcit itaque
+sapiens dispensatio ei quem deteriorem facere possit aduersitas, ne cui non
+conuenit laborare patiatur. Est alius cunctis uirtutibus absolutus
+sanctusque ac deo proximus; hunc contingi quibuslibet aduersis nefas
+prouidentia iudicat adeo ut ne corporeis quidem morbis agitari sinat. Nam
+ut quidam me quoque excellentior:
+
+  [Greek: Andros dae ierou demas aitheres oikodomaesan.]
+
+Fit autem saepe, uti bonis summa rerum regenda deferatur, ut exuberans
+retundatur improbitas. Aliis mixta quaedam pro animorum qualitate
+distribuit; quosdam remordet ne longa felicitate luxurient, alios
+duris[157] agitari ut uirtutes animi patientiae usu atque exercitatione
+confirment. Alii plus aequo metuunt quod ferre possunt, alii plus aequo
+despiciunt quod ferre non possunt; hos in experimentum sui tristibus ducit.
+Nonnulli uenerandum saeculi nomen gloriosae pretio mortis emerunt: quidam
+suppliciis inexpugnabiles exemplum ceteris praetulerunt inuictam malis esse
+uirtutem. Quae quam recte atque disposite et ex eorum bono quibus accedere
+uidentur fiant, nulla dubitatio est. Nam illud quoque, quod improbis nunc
+tristia nunc optata proueniunt, ex eisdem ducitur causis; ac de tristibus
+quidem nemo miratur, quod eos male meritos omnes existimant. Quorum quidem
+supplicia tum ceteros ab sceleribus deterrent, tum ipsos quibus inuehuntur
+emendant; laeta uero magnum bonis argumentum loquuntur, quid de huiusmodi
+felicitate debeant iudicare quam famulari saepe improbis cernant.  In qua
+re illud etiam dispensari credo, quod est forsitan alicuius tam praeceps
+atque inportuna natura ut eum in scelera potius exacerbare possit rei
+familiaris inopia; huius morbo prouidentia collatae pecuniae remedio
+medetur. Hic foedatam probris conscientiam exspectans et se cum fortuna sua
+comparans, forsitan pertimescit ne cuius ei iucundus usus est, sit tristis
+amissio. Mutabit igitur mores ac dum fortunam metuit amittere; nequitiam
+derelinquit. Alios in cladem meritam praecipitauit indigne acta felicitas;
+quibusdam permissum puniendi ius, ut exercitii bonis et malis esset causa
+supplicii. Nam ut probis atque improbis nullum foedus est, ita ipsi inter
+se improbi nequeunt conuenire. Quidni, cum a semet ipsis discerpentibus
+conscientiam uitiis quisque dissentiat faciantque saepe, quae cum gesserint
+non fuisse gerenda decernant? Ex quo saepe summa illa prouidentia protulit
+insigne miraculum, ut malos mali bonos facerent. Nam dum iniqua sibi a
+pessimis quidam perpeti uidentur, noxiorum odio flagrantes ad uirtutis
+frugem rediere, dum se eis dissimiles student esse quos oderant. Sola est
+enim diuina uis cui mala quoque bona sint, cum eis competenter utendo
+alicuius boni elicit effectum. Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur, ut
+quod adsignata ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen
+ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno prouidentiae liceat temeritati.
+
+  [Greek: Argaleon de me tauta theon hos pant agoreuein.]
+
+Neque enim fas est homini cunctas diuinae operae machinas uel ingenio
+comprehendere uel explicare sermone. Hoc tantum perspexisse sufficiat, quod
+naturarum omnium proditor deus idem ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat,
+dumque ea quae protulit in sui similitudinem retinere festinat, malum omne
+de reipublicae suae terminis per fatalis seriem necessitatis eliminet. Quo
+fit ut quae in terris abundare creduntur, si disponentem prouidentiam
+spectes, nihil usquam mali esse perpendas. Sed uideo te iam dudum et
+pondere quaestionis oneratum et rationis prolixitate fatigatum aliquam
+carminis exspectare dulcedinem. Accipe igitur haustum quo refectus firmior
+in ulteriora contendas.
+
+
+[156] deliberare _codd._; delibare _coni._ Pulmannus.
+
+[157] _Fortasse_ sinit _post_ duris _addendum est_.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+  "It is true," quoth I, "but since it is thy profession to explicate the
+  causes of hidden things, and to unfold the reasons which are covered
+  with darkness, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare what conclusion thou
+  drawest from these things, for this miracle troubleth me above all
+  others." Then she smiling a little said: "Thou invitest me to a matter
+  which is most hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently
+  declared; for it is such that, one doubt being taken away, innumerable
+  others, like the heads of Hydra, succeed, neither will they have any end
+  unless a man repress them with the most lively fire of his mind. For in
+  this matter are wont to be handled these questions: of the simplicity of
+  Providence; of the course of Fate; of sudden chances; of God's knowledge
+  and predestination, and of free will; which how weighty they are, thou
+  thyself discerneth. But because it is part of thy cure to know these
+  things also, though the time be short, yet we will endeavour to touch
+  them briefly. But if the sweetness of verse delight thee, thou must
+  forbear this pleasure for a while, until I propose unto thee some few
+  arguments." "As it pleaseth thee," quoth I.
+
+  Then taking as it were a new beginning, she discoursed in this manner:
+  "The generation of all things, and all the proceedings of mutable
+  natures, and whatsoever is moved in any sort, take their causes, order,
+  and forms from the stability of the Divine mind. This, placed in the
+  castle of its own simplicity, hath determined manifold ways for doing
+  things; which ways being considered in the purity of God's
+  understanding, are named Providence, but being referred to those things
+  which He moveth and disposeth, they are by the ancients called Fate. The
+  diversity of which will easily appear if we weigh the force of both. For
+  Providence is the very Divine reason itself, seated in the highest
+  Prince, which disposeth all things. But Fate is a disposition inherent
+  in changeable things, by which Providence connecteth all things in their
+  due order. For Providence embraceth all things together, though diverse,
+  though infinite; but Fate putteth every particular thing into motion
+  being distributed by places, forms, and time; so that this unfolding of
+  temporal order being united into the foresight of God's mind is
+  Providence, and the same uniting, being digested and unfolded in time,
+  is called Fate. Which although they be diverse yet the one dependeth on
+  the other. For fatal order proceedeth from the simplicity of Providence.
+  For as a workman conceiving the form of anything in his mind taketh his
+  work in hand, and executeth by order of time that which he had simply
+  and in a moment foreseen, so God by His Providence disposeth whatsoever
+  is to be done with simplicity and stability, and by Fate effecteth by
+  manifold ways and in the order of time those very things which He
+  disposeth. Wherefore, whether Fate be exercised by the subordination of
+  certain Divine spirits to Providence, or this fatal web be woven by a
+  soul or by the service of all nature, or by the heavenly motions of the
+  stars, by angelical virtue, or by diabolical industry, or by some or all
+  of these, that certainly is manifest that Providence is an immoveable
+  and simple form of those things which are to be done, and Fate a
+  moveable connexion and temporal order of those things which the Divine
+  simplicity hath disposed to be done. So that all that is under Fate is
+  also subject to Providence, to which also Fate itself obeyeth. But some
+  things which are placed under Providence are above the course of Fate.
+  And they are those things which nigh to the first Divinity, being stable
+  and fixed, exceed the order of fatal mobility. For as of orbs which turn
+  about the same centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the
+  midst, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without
+  it, about which they are turned, and the outmost, wheeled with a greater
+  compass, by how much it departeth from the middle indivisibility of the
+  centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces, but that which
+  is joined and coupled to that middle approacheth to simplicity, and
+  ceaseth to spread and flow abroad, in like manner that which departeth
+  farthest from the first mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of
+  Fate, and everything is so much the freer from Fate, by how much it
+  draweth nigh to the hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the
+  stability of the Sovereign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also
+  the necessity of Fate. Wherefore in what sort discourse of reason is
+  compared to pure understanding, that which is produced to that which is,
+  time to eternity, a circle to the centre, such is the course of moveable
+  Fate to the stable simplicity of Providence. That course moveth the
+  heaven and stars, tempereth the elements one with another, and
+  transformeth them by mutual changing. The same reneweth all rising and
+  dying things by like proceeding of fruits and seeds. This comprehendeth
+  also the actions and fortunes of men by an unloosable connexion of
+  causes, which since it proceeds from the principles of unmovable
+  Providence, the causes also must needs be immutable. For in this manner
+  things are best governed, if the simplicity which remaineth in the
+  Divine mind produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order
+  restraineth with its own immutability things otherwise mutable, and
+  which would have a confused course. Whereof it ensueth that though all
+  things seem confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider
+  this order, notwithstanding all things are disposed by their own proper
+  measure directing them to good. For there is nothing which is done for
+  the love of evil, even by the wicked themselves: whom, as hath been
+  abundantly proved, lewd error carrieth away while they are seeking after
+  that which is good, so far is it that order proceeding from the hinge of
+  the Sovereign Goodness should avert any from his first beginning.
+
+  But, thou wilt say, what more unjust confusion can there be than that
+  both adversity and prosperity should happen to the good, and in like
+  manner both desired and hateful things to the wicked? But are men so
+  completely wise that whomsoever they judge wicked or honest must needs
+  be so? How then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to
+  divers the same men seem worthy of reward and punishment! But let us
+  grant that some are able to discern the good from the evil. Can they
+  therefore behold, as is wont to be said of bodies, that inward
+  complexion of souls? For he that knoweth not the cause may marvel in
+  like manner why some sound bodies agree better with sweet things and
+  other with tart; and why some sick men are healed with gentle and some
+  with sharper physic. But to a physician who knoweth the manner and
+  temper both of health and sickness this is nothing strange. Now, what is
+  the health of souls but virtue? What sickness have they but vices? And
+  who either conserveth goodness or expelleth evils, but God the Ruler and
+  Governor of men's minds? Who beholding from His high turret of
+  providence seeth what is fitting for everyone, and applieth that which
+  He knoweth to be most convenient. Here ariseth that strange wonder of
+  fatal order, to wit that He that knoweth what is best, doth that which
+  the ignorant admire. For to touch briefly some few things of the divine
+  depth, which human reason is able to attain, he whom thou thinketh most
+  just and most observant of equity, seemeth otherwise in the eyes of
+  Providence which knoweth all. And our disciple Lucan noteth that the
+  cause of conquerers pleased the gods, and that of the conquered,
+  Cato.[158] Wherefore whatsoever thou seest done here against thy
+  expectation is right order in the things themselves, but a perverse
+  confusion in thy opinion. But let there be one so well conditioned that
+  God and men approve and praise him; yet perhaps he is so weak a minded
+  man, that if he falleth into adversity, he will forsake his innocency,
+  which was not able to keep him in prosperity. Wherefore God's wise
+  dispensation spareth him that adversity might make worse, lest he should
+  suffer to whom difficulties are dangerous.
+
+  There is another complete in all virtues, a saint and high to God;
+  Providence judgeth it a sacrilege to lay affliction on him, insomuch
+  that she permitteth him not to be troubled so much as with corporal
+  sickness. For as one that excelleth me saith 'the body of an holy man is
+  builded of pure ether.'[159] It happeneth often also that the chief
+  command is given to good men, that wickedness, which otherwise would
+  overflow all, may be kept down. She mixeth for others sour and sweet
+  according to the disposition of their souls; she troubles some lest they
+  should fall to dissolution by long prosperity, others are vexed with
+  hardships, that they may confirm the forces of their mind with the use
+  and exercise of patience. Some are too much afraid of that which they
+  are able to bear. Others make less account than there is cause of that
+  which they cannot endure. All these she affrayeth with afflictions that
+  they make trial of themselves. Many have bought the renown of this world
+  with a glorious death. Some, overcoming all torments, have showed by
+  their example that virtues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things
+  how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good upon whom
+  they are seen to fall, there can be no doubt. For that sometime
+  grievous, sometime pleasant things befall in like manner the wicked,
+  proceedeth from the same causes. And as for adversity no man marvelleth
+  because all think they deserve ill. Whose punishments do both terrify
+  others from the like courses, and move them to amend themselves. And
+  their prosperity is a great argument to the good, what they ought to
+  judge of this happiness which they see oftentimes bestowed upon the
+  wicked. In which thing also is to be considered that peradventure some
+  have so headlong and untoward a disposition, that poverty would rather
+  make him worse; whose disease is cured by Providence, with giving him
+  store of money. Another, knowing his own guilty conscience, and
+  comparing his character with his own estate, is afraid lest the loss of
+  that should be grievous unto him, the use of which is pleasant.
+  Wherefore he resolveth to change his customs, and whiles he feareth to
+  lose his prosperity, he forsaketh wickedness. The increase of honour
+  undeservedly obtained hath thrown some headlong into their deserved
+  destruction. Others are permitted to have authority to punish others,
+  that they may exercise the good and punish the bad. For as there is no
+  league between virtuous and wicked men, so neither can the wicked agree
+  among themselves. Why not? Since they disagree within themselves by
+  reason of their vices which tear their conscience, so that they many
+  times do that which afterwards they wish undone. From whence that
+  highest Providence often worketh that wonderful miracle, that evil men
+  make those which are evil good. For some, considering the injustice done
+  them by most wicked men, inflamed with hatred of evildoers have returned
+  to the practice of virtue, procuring to be contrary to them whom they
+  hate. For it is only a divine strength to which even evil things are
+  good, when, by using them in due sort, it draweth some good effect out
+  of them. For a certain order embraceth all things, so that even that
+  which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falleth into
+  another, yet that is order also, lest confused rashness should bear any
+  sway in the kingdom of Providence. 'But it is hard for me to rehearse
+  all this as if I were a God.'[160] For it is impossible for any man
+  either to comprehend by his wit or to explicate in speech all the frame
+  of God's work. Be it sufficient that we have seen thus much, that God,
+  the author of all natures, directeth and disposeth all things to
+  goodness, and while He endeavoureth to retain in His own likeness those
+  things which He hath produced, He banisheth all evil from the bounds of
+  His commonwealth, by the course of fatal necessity. So that if thou
+  considerest the disposition of Providence, thou wilt perceive that evil,
+  which is thought so to abound upon earth, hath no place left for it at
+  all. But I see that long since burdened with so weighty a question, and
+  wearied with my long discourse, thou expectest the delight of verses;
+  wherefore take a draught, that, being refreshed, thou mayest be able to
+  go forward.
+
+
+  [158] _Pharsal_. i. 126.
+
+  [159] Source unknown.
+
+  [160] Homer, _Il._ xii. 176.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Si uis celsi iura tonantis
+Pura sollers cernere mente,
+Aspice summi culmina caeli.
+Illic iusto foedere rerum
+Veterem seruant sidera pacem.                                             5
+Non sol rutilo concitus igne
+Gelidum Phoebes impedit axem
+Nec quae summo uertice mundi
+Flectit rapidos Vrsa meatus.
+Numquam occiduo lota profundo                                            10
+Cetera cernens sidera mergi
+Cupit oceano tingere flammas.
+Semper uicibus temporis aequis
+Vesper seras nuntiat umbras
+Reuehitque diem Lucifer almum.                                           15
+Sic aeternos reficit cursus
+Alternus amor, sic astrigeris
+Bellum discors exulat oris.
+Haec concordia temperat aequis
+Elementa modis, ut pugnantia                                             20
+Vicibus cedant umida siccis
+Iungantque fidem frigora flammis
+Pendulus ignis surgat in altum
+Terraeque graues pondere sidant.
+Isdem causis uere tepenti                                                25
+Spirat florifer annus odores,
+Aestas Cererem feruida siccat,
+Remeat pomis grauis autumnus,
+Hiemem defluus inrigat imber.
+Haec temperies alit ac profert                                           30
+Quidquid uitam spirat in orbe.
+Eadem rapiens condit et aufert
+Obitu mergens orta supremo.
+Sedet interea conditor altus
+Rerumque regens flectit habenas                                          35
+Rex et dominus fons et origo
+Lex et sapiens arbiter aequi
+Et quae motu concitat ire,
+Sistit retrahens ac uaga firmat.
+Nam nisi rectos reuocans itus                                            40
+Flexos iterum cogat in orbes,
+Quae nunc stabilis continet ordo
+Dissaepta suo fonte fatiscant.
+Hic est cunctis communis amor
+Repetuntque boni fine teneri,                                            45
+Quia non aliter durare queant,
+Nisi conuerso rursus amore
+Refluant causae quae dedit esse.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+      If thou would'st see
+    God's laws with purest mind,
+    Thy sight on heaven must fixéd be,
+  Whose settled course the stars in peace doth bind.
+      The sun's bright fire
+    Stops not his sister's team,
+    Nor doth the northern bear desire
+  Within the ocean's wave to hide her beam.
+      Though she behold
+    The other stars there couching,
+    Yet she uncessantly is rolled
+  About high heaven, the ocean never touching.
+      The evening light
+    With certain course doth show
+    The coming of the shady night,
+  And Lucifer before the day doth go.
+      This mutual love
+    Courses eternal makes,
+    And from the starry spheres above
+  All cause of war and dangerous discord takes.
+      This sweet consent
+    In equal bands doth tie
+    The nature of each element,
+  So that the moist things yield unto the dry,
+      The piercing cold
+    With flames doth friendship keep,
+    The trembling fire the highest place doth hold,
+  And the gross earth sinks down into the deep.
+      The flowery year
+    Breathes odours in the spring
+    The scorching summer corn doth bear,
+  The autumn fruit from laden trees doth bring.
+      The falling rain
+    Doth winter's moisture give.
+    These rules thus nourish and maintain
+  All creatures which we see on earth to live.
+      And when they die,
+    These bring them to their end,
+    While their Creator sits on high,
+  Whose hand the reins of the whole world doth bend.
+      He as their King
+    Rules them with lordly might.
+    From Him they rise, flourish, and spring,
+  He as their law and judge decides their right.
+      Those things whose course
+    Most swiftly glides away
+    His might doth often backward force,
+  And suddenly their wandering motion stay.
+      Unless His strength
+    Their violence should bound,
+    And them which else would run at length,
+  Should bring within the compass of a round,
+      That firm decree
+    Which now doth all adorn
+    Would soon destroyed and broken be,
+  Things being far from their beginning borne.
+      This powerful love
+    Is common unto all,
+    Which for desire of good do move
+  Back to the springs from whence they first did fall.
+      No worldly thing
+    Can a continuance have
+    Unless love back again it bring
+  Unto the cause which first the essence gave.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Iamne igitur uides quid haec omnia quae diximus consequatur?" "Quidnam?"
+inquam. "Omnem," inquit, "bonam prorsus esse fortunam." "Et qui id,"
+inquam, "fieri potest?" "Attende," inquit. "Cum omnis fortuna uel iucunda
+uel aspera tum remunerandi exercendiue bonos tum puniendi corrigendiue
+improbos causa deferatur, omnis bona quam uel iustam constat esse uel
+utilem." "Nimis quidem," inquam, "uera ratio et si quam paulo ante docuisti
+prouidentiam fatumue considerem, firmis uiribus nixa sententia. Sed eam si
+placet inter eas quas inopinabiles paulo ante posuisti numeremus." "Qui?"
+inquit. "Quia id hominum sermo communis usurpat et quidem crebro quorundam
+malam esse fortunam." "Visne igitur," inquit, "paulisper uulgi sermonibus
+accedamus, ne nimium uelut ab humanitatis usu recessisse uideamur?" "Vt
+placet," inquam. "Nonne igitur bonum censes esse quod prodest?" "Ita est,"
+inquam, "Quae uero aut exercet aut corrigit, prodest?" "Fateor," inquam.
+"Bona igitur?" "Quidni?" "Sed haec eorum est qui uel in uirtute positi
+contra aspera bellum gerunt, uel a uitiis declinantes uirtutis iter
+arripiunt." "Negare," inquam, "nequeo." "Quid uero iucunda, quae in
+praemium tribuitur bonis, num uulgus malam esse decernit?" "Nequaquam;
+uerum uti est ita quoque esse optimam censet." "Quid reliqua, quae cum sit
+aspera, iusto supplicio malos coercet, num bonam populus putat?" "Immo
+omnium," inquam, "quae excogitari possunt, iudicat esse miserrimam." "Vide
+igitur ne opinionem populi sequentes quiddam ualde inopinabile
+confecerimus." "Quid?" inquam. "Ex his enim," ait, "quae concessa sunt,
+euenit eorum quidem qui uel sunt uel in possessione uel in prouectu uel in
+adeptione uirtutis, omnem quaecumque sit bonam, in improbitate uero
+manentibus omnem pessimam esse fortunam." "Hoc," inquam, "uerum est,
+tametsi nemo audeat confiteri." "Quare," inquit, "ita uir sapiens moleste
+ferre non debet, quotiens in fortunae certamen adducitur, ut uirum fortem
+non decet indignari, quotiens increpuit bellicus tumultus; utrique enim,
+huic quidem gloriae propagandae illi uero conformandae sapientiae,
+difficultas ipsa materia est. Ex quo etiam uirtus uocatur quod suis uiribus
+nitens non superetur aduersis. Neque enim uos in prouectu positi uirtutis
+diffluere deliciis et emarcescere uoluptate uenistis. Proelium cum omni
+fortuna nimis[161] acre conseritis, ne uos aut tristis opprimat aut iucunda
+corrumpat. Firmis medium uiribus occupate! Quidquid aut infra subsistit aut
+ultra progreditur, habet contemptum felicitatis, non habet praemium
+laboris. In uestra enim situm manu qualem uobis fortunam formare malitis;
+omnis enim quae uidetur aspera nisi aut exercet aut corrigit punit.
+
+
+[161] animis _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Perceivest thou now what followeth of all that we have hitherto said?"
+  "What?" quoth I. "That," quoth she, "all manner of fortune is good."
+  "How can that be?" quoth I. "Be attentive," quoth she; "since that all
+  fortune, be it pleasing or unpleasing, is directed to the reward or
+  exercise of the good, and to the punishment and direction of the wicked,
+  it is manifest it is all good, since all is just or profitable." "Thy
+  reason is very true," quoth I, "and if I consider Providence and Fate,
+  which thou didst explicate a little before, thy opinion is well
+  grounded. But if thou pleasest let us account it among those which thou
+  not long since supposest incredible." "Why?" quoth she. "Because men
+  commonly use to say and repeat that some have ill fortune." "Shall we,"
+  quoth she, "frame our speech to the vulgar phrase, lest we seem to have
+  as it were forsaken the use of human conversation?" "As it pleaseth
+  thee," quoth I. "Dost thou not think then that that is good which is
+  profitable?" "Yes," quoth I. "But that fortune which either exerciseth
+  or correcteth is profitable?" "It is true," quoth I. "It is good then?"
+  "Why not?" "But this is the estate of them who being either virtuous
+  strive with adversity, or forsaking vices betake themselves to the way
+  of virtue." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Now, what sayest thou to that
+  pleasing fortune which is given in reward to the good, doth the common
+  people account it bad?" "No, but judgeth it exceeding good, as it is
+  indeed." "And what of the other which, being unpleasing, restraineth the
+  evil with just punishment, doth not the people think it good?" "Nay,"
+  quoth I, "they think it the most miserable that can be." "Look then,"
+  quoth she, "how, following the people's opinion, we have concluded a
+  very incredible matter." "What?" quoth I. "For it followeth," quoth she,
+  "out of that which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoever it be,
+  who are either in the possession or increase or entrance of virtue, is
+  good: and theirs, which remain in vices, the worst that may be." "This,"
+  quoth I, "is true, though none dare say so." "Wherefore," quoth she, "a
+  wise man must be no more troubled when he is assaulted with adversity,
+  than a valiant captain dismayed at the sound of an alarum. For
+  difficulties are the matter by which the one must extend his glory, and
+  the other increase his wisdom. For which cause virtue is so called,
+  because it hath sufficient strength to overcome adversity.[162] For
+  you, that are proficients in virtue, are not come hither to be dissolute
+  with dainties or to languish in pleasures. You skirmish fiercely with
+  any fortune, lest either affliction oppress you or prosperity corrupt
+  you. Stay yourselves strongly in the mean! For whatsoever cometh either
+  short, or goeth beyond, may well contemn felicity, but will never obtain
+  any reward of labour. For it is placed in your power to frame to
+  yourselves what fortune you please. For all that seemeth unsavoury
+  either exerciseth or correcteth or punisheth.
+
+
+  [162] Boethius shows his independence in adopting for _uirtus_ a
+  different etymology from that given by Cicero, viz. _uir_ (of. 2
+  _Tusoul._ xviii.).
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Bella bis quinis operatus annis
+Vltor Atrides Phrygiae ruinis
+Fratris amissos thalamos piauit;
+Ille dum Graiae dare uela classi
+Optat et uentos redimit cruore,                                           5
+Exuit patrem miserumque tristis
+Foederat natae iugulum sacerdos.
+Fleuit amissos Ithacus sodales
+Quos ferus uasto recubans in antro
+Mersit inmani Polyphemus aluo;                                           10
+Sed tamen caeco furibundus ore
+Gaudium maestis lacrimis rependit.
+Herculem duri celebrant labores.
+Ille Centauros domuit superbos,
+Abstulit saeuo spolium leoni                                             15
+Fixit et certis uolucres sagittis,
+Poma cernenti rapuit draconi
+Aureo laeuam grauior metallo,
+Cerberum traxit triplici catena.
+Victor immitem posuisse fertur                                           20
+Pabulum saeuis dominum quadrigis.
+Hydra combusto periit ueneno,
+Fronte turpatus Achelous amnis
+Ora demersit pudibunda ripis.
+Strauit Antaeum Libycis harenis,                                         25
+Cacus Euandri satiauit iras
+Quosque pressurus foret altus orbis
+Saetiger spumis umeros notauit.
+Vltimus caelum[163] labor inreflexo
+Sustulit collo pretiumque rursus                                         30
+Vltimi caelum meruit laboris.
+Ite nunc fortes ubi celsa magni
+Ducit exempli uia! Cur inertes
+Terga nudatis? Superata tellus
+Sidera donat."                                                           35
+
+
+[163] caelo _codd. mellores._
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+    Revengeful Atreus' son did ten whole years employ
+  In wars, till he his brother's loss repaid with ransacked Troy.
+    He setting forth the fleet of Greece upon the seas,
+  And knowing well that only blood the angry winds would please,
+    Forgot a father's part, and with his cruel knife
+  Unto the gods did sacrifice his dearest daughter's life.
+    Ulysses wailed the loss of his most faithful men,
+  Whom Polyphemus did devour enclosed in his den
+    But when his hands by sleight had made the Cyclops blind,
+  Most pleasant joy instead of former tears possessed his mind.
+    Hercules famous is for his laborious toil,
+  Who tamed the Centaurs and did take the dreadful lion's spoil.
+    He the Stymphalian birds with piercing arrows strook,
+  And from the watchful dragon's care the golden apples took.[164]
+    He in a threefold chain the hellish porter led,
+  And with their cruel master's flesh the savage horses fed.
+    He did th' increasing heads of poisonous Hydra burn,
+  And breaking Achelous' horns, did make him back return.[165]*
+    He on the Libyan sands did proud Antaeus kill,
+  And with the mighty Cacus' blood Euander's wrath fulfil.
+    That world-uplifting back the boar's white foam did fleck.
+  To hold on high the sphere of heaven with never bending neck
+    Of all his many toils the last was, and most hard,
+  And for this last and greatest toil the heaven was his reward.
+    You gallant men pursue this way of high renown,
+  Why yield you? Overcome the earth, and you the stars shall crown,"
+
+
+  [164] Literally, "his left hand weighted with the golden metal."
+
+  [165] Lit. "The river Achelous dishonoured in his brow (by the loss of
+  his horns) buried his shame-stricken face in his banks."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. EX MAG. OFF. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER QVARTVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER V.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Dixerat orationisque cursum ad alia quaedam tractanda atque expedienda
+uertebat. Tum ego: "Recta quidem," inquam, "exhortatio tuaque prorsus
+auctoritate dignissima, sed quod tu dudum de prouidentia quaestionem
+pluribus aliis implicitam esse dixisti, re experior. Quaero enim an esse
+aliquid omnino et quidnam esse casum arbitrere." Tum illa: "Festino,"
+inquit; "debitum promissionis absoluere uiamque tibi qua patriam reueharis
+aperire. Haec autem etsi perutilia cognitu tamen a propositi nostri tramite
+paulisper auersa sunt, uerendumque est ne deuiis fatigatus ad emetiendum
+rectum iter sufficere non possis." "Ne id," inquam, "prorsus uereare. Nam
+quietis mihi loco fuerit ea quibus maxime delector agnoscere, simul cum
+omne disputationis tuae latus indubitata fide constiterit, nihil de
+sequentibus ambigatur." Tum illa: "Morem," inquit, "geram tibi," simulque
+sic orsa est: "Si quidem," inquit, "aliquis euentum temerario motu nullaque
+causarum conexione productum casum esse definiat, nihil omnino casum esse
+confirmo et praeter subiectae rei significationem inanem prorsus uocem esse
+decerno. Quis enim coercente in ordinem cuncta deo locus esse ullus
+temeritati reliquus potest? Nam nihil ex nihilo exsistere uera sententia
+est cui nemo umquam ueterum refragatus est, quamquam id illi non de
+operante principio, sed de materiali subiecto hoc omnium de natura rationum
+quasi quoddam iecerint fundamentum. At si nullis ex causis aliquid oriatur,
+id de nihilo ortum esse uidebitur. Quod si hoc fieri nequit, ne casum
+quidem huiusmodi esse possibile est qualem paulo ante definiuimus." "Quid
+igitur," inquam, "nihilne est quod uel casus uel fortuitum iure appellari
+queat? An est aliquid, tametsi uulgus lateat, cui uocabula ista
+conueniant?" "Aristoteles meus id," inquit, "in Physicis et breui et ueri
+propinqua ratione definiuit."  "Quonam," inquam "modo?" "Quotiens," ait,
+"aliquid cuiuspiam rei gratia geritur aliudque quibusdam de causis quam
+quod intendebatur obtingit, casus uocatur, ut si quis colendi agri causa
+fodiens humum defossi auri pondus inueniat. Hoc igitur fortuito quidem
+creditur accidisse, uerum non de nihilo est; nam proprias causas habet
+quarum inprouisus inopinatusque concursus casum uidetur operatus.  Nam nisi
+cultor agri humum foderet, nisi eo loci pecuniam suam depositor obruisset,
+aurum non esset inuentum. Haec sunt igitur fortuiti causa compendii, quod
+ex obuiis sibi et confluentibus causis, non ex gerentis intentione
+prouenit. Neque enim uel qui aurum obruit uel qui agrum exercuit ut ea
+pecunia reperiretur intendit; sed uti dixi, quo ille obruit hunc fodisse
+conuenit atque concurrit. Licet igitur definire casum esse inopinatum ex
+confluentibus causis in his quae ob aliquid geruntur euentum; concurrere
+uero atque confluere causas facit ordo ille ineuitabili conexione
+procedens; qui de prouidentiae fonte descendens cuncta suis locis
+temporibusque disponit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FIFTH BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Having said thus, she began to turn her speech to treat and explicate
+  certain other questions, when I interrupted her, saying: "Thy
+  exhortation is very good, and well-seeming thy authority. But I find it
+  true by experience, as thou affirmedst, that the question of Providence
+  is entangled with many other. For I desire to know whether thou thinkest
+  chance to be anything at all, and what it is." "I make haste," quoth
+  she, "to perform my promise, and to show thee the way by which thou
+  mayest return to thy country. But these other questions, though they be
+  very profitable, yet they are somewhat from our purpose, and it is to be
+  feared lest being wearied with digressions thou beest not able to finish
+  thy direct journey." "There is no fear of that," quoth I, "for it will
+  be a great ease to me to understand those things in which I take great
+  delight, and withal, when thy disputation is fenced in on every side
+  with sure conviction, there can be no doubt made of anything thou shalt
+  infer." "I will," quoth she, "do as thou wouldst me have," and withal
+  began in this manner. "If any shall define chance to be an event
+  produced by a confused motion, and without connexion of causes, I affirm
+  that there is no such thing, and that chance is only an empty voice that
+  hath beneath it no real signification. For what place can confusion
+  have, since God disposeth all things in due order? For it is a true
+  sentence that of nothing cometh nothing, which none of the ancients
+  denied, though they held not that principle of the efficient cause, but
+  of the material subject, laying it down as in a manner the ground of all
+  their reasonings concerning nature. But if anything proceedeth from no
+  causes, that will seem to have come from nothing, which if it cannot be,
+  neither is it possible there should be any such chance as is defined a
+  little before." "What then," quoth I, "is there nothing that can rightly
+  be called chance or fortune? Or is there something, though unknown to
+  the common sort, to which these names agree?" "My Aristotle," quoth she,
+  "in his _Books of Nature_[166] declared this point briefly and very
+  near the truth." "How?" quoth I. "When," quoth she, "anything is done
+  for some certain cause, and some other thing happeneth for other reasons
+  than that which was intended, this is called chance; as if one digging
+  his ground with intention to till it, findeth an hidden treasure. This
+  is thought to have fallen thus out by fortune, but it is not of nothing,
+  for it hath peculiar causes whose unexpected and not foreseen concourse
+  seemeth to have brought forth a chance. For unless the husbandman had
+  digged up his ground, and unless the other had hidden his money in that
+  place, the treasure had not been found. These are therefore the causes
+  of this fortunate accident, which proceedeth from the meeting and
+  concourse of causes, and not from the intention of the doer. For neither
+  he that hid the gold nor he that tilled his ground had any intention
+  that the money should be found, but, as I said, it followed and
+  concurred that this man should dig up in the place where the other hid.
+  Wherefore, we may define chance thus: That it is an unexpected event of
+  concurring causes in those things which are done to some end and
+  purpose. Now the cause why causes so concur and meet so together, is
+  that order proceeding with inevitable connexion, which, descending from
+  the fountain of Providence, disposeth all things in their places and
+  times.
+
+
+  [166] _Phys._ ii. 4.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Rupis Achaemeniae scopulis ubi uersa sequentum
+  Pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax,
+Tigris et Euphrates uno se fonte resoluunt
+  Et mox abiunctis dissociantur aquis.
+Si coeant cursumque iterum reuocentur in unum,                            5
+  Confluat alterni quod trahit unda uadi;
+Conuenient puppes et uulsi flumine trunci
+  Mixtaque fortuitos implicet unda modos,
+Quos tamen ipsa uagos terrae decliuia casus
+  Gurgitis et lapsi defluus ordo regit.                                  10
+Sic quae permissis fluitare uidetur habenis
+  Fors patitur frenos ipsaque lege meat."
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  In the Achaemenian rocks, where Parthians with their darts
+  In their dissembled flight do wound their enemies,
+  Tigris from the same head doth with Euphrates rise,
+  And forthwith they themselves divide in several parts;
+  But if they join again, and them one channel bound,
+  Bringing together all that both their waves do bear;
+  The ships and trees, whose roots they from the bank do tear,
+  Will meet, and they their floods will mingle and confound,
+  Yet run this wandering course in places which are low,
+  And in these sliding streams a settled law remains.[167]
+  So fortune, though it seems to run with careless reins,
+  Yet hath it certain rule, and doth in order flow."
+
+
+  [167] Lit. "Yet all these (apparently) random happenings are governed by
+  the shelving ground and the flowing course of the stream as it runs."
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+"Animaduerto," inquam, "idque, uti tu dicis, ita esse consentio. Sed in hac
+haerentium sibi serie causarum estne ulla nostri arbitrii libertas an ipsos
+quoque humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena constringit?" "Est," inquit,
+"neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit
+arbitrii. Nam quod ratione uti naturaliter potest id habet iudicium quo
+quidque discernat; per se igitur fugienda optandaue dinoscit. Quod uero
+quis optandum esse iudicat petit; refugit uero quod aestimat esse
+fugiendum. Quare quibus in ipsis inest ratio, inest etiam uolendi
+nolendique libertas. Sed hanc non in omnibus aequam esse constituo. Nam
+supernis diuinisque substantiis et perspicax iudicium et incorrupta
+uoluntas et efficax optatorum praesto est potestas. Humanas uero animas
+liberiores quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis diuinae speculatione
+conseruant, minus uero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam, cum
+terrenis artubus colligantur. Extrema uero est seruitus, cum uitiis deditae
+rationis propriae possessione ceciderunt. Nam ubi oculos a summae luce
+ueritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa deiecerint, mox inscitiae nube
+caligant, perniciosis turbantur affectibus quibus accedendo consentiendoque
+quam inuexere sibi adiuuant seruitutem et sunt quodam modo propria
+libertate captiuae. Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens
+prouidentiae cernit intuitus et suis quaeque meritis praedestinata
+disponit.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  "I observe it," quoth I, "and I acknowledge it to be as thou sayest. But
+  in this rank of coherent causes, have we any free-will, or doth the
+  fatal chain fasten also the motions of men's minds?" "We have," quoth
+  she, "for there can be no reasonable nature, unless it be endued with
+  free-will. For that which naturally hath the use of reason hath also
+  judgment by which it can discern of everything by itself, wherefore of
+  itself it distinguished betwixt those things which are to be avoided,
+  and those which are to be desired. Now every one seeketh for that which
+  he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his judgment
+  is to be avoided. Wherefore, they which have reason in themselves have
+  freedom to will and nill. But yet I consider not this equal in all. For
+  the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgment and
+  an uncorrupted will, and an effectual power to obtain their desires. But
+  the minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves
+  in the contemplation of God, and less when they come to their bodies,
+  and yet less when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their
+  greatest bondage is when, giving themselves to vices, they lose
+  possession of their own reason. For, having cast their eyes from the
+  light of the sovereign truth to inferior obscurities, forthwith they are
+  blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtful affections,
+  by yielding and consenting to which they increase the bondage which they
+  laid upon themselves, and are, after a certain manner, captives by their
+  own freedom. Which notwithstanding that foresight of Providence which
+  beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeth, and by predestination
+  disposeth of everything by their merits.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+[Greek: Pant' ephoran kai pant' epakouein][168]
+Puro clarum lumine Phoebum
+Melliflui canit oris Homerus:
+Qui tamen intima uiscera terrae
+Non ualet aut pelagi radiorum                                             5
+Infirma perrumpere luce.
+Haud sic magni conditor orbis;
+Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti
+Nulla terrae mole resistunt,
+Non nox atris nubibus obstat.                                            10
+Quae sint, quae fuerint ueniantque
+Vno mentis cernit in ictu;
+Quem, quia respicit omnia solus,
+Verum possis dicere solem."
+
+
+[168] disponit [Greek: Pant' ephoron kai pant' epakogon] _sic Peiper et
+similiter editores priores. Versum in rectum locum Engelbrecht restituit,
+quam quidem emendationem noster interpres uidetur praesensisse._
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+    Sweet Homer[169] sings the praise
+    Of Phoebus clear and bright,
+    And yet his strongest rays
+    Cannot with feeble light
+    Cast through the secret ways
+    Of earth and seas his sight,
+  Though 'all lies open to his eyes.'[170]
+  But He who did this world devise--
+
+    The earth's vast depths unseen
+    From his sight are not free,
+    No clouds can stand between,
+    He at one time doth see
+    What are, and what have been,
+    And what shall after be.
+  Whom, since he only vieweth all,
+  You rightly the true Sun may call."
+
+
+  [169] Cf. _Il._ iv. 277, _Od._ xii. 323.
+
+  [170] This line renders the Greek with which Boethius begins the poem,
+  adapting Homer's phrase "all surveying, all o'erhearing." See the
+  critical note on p. 372.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Tum ego: "En," inquam, "difficiliore rursus ambiguitate confundor."
+"Quaenam," inquit, "ista est? Iam enim quibus perturbere coniecto."
+"Nimium," inquam, "aduersari ac repugnare uidetur praenoscere uniuersa deum
+et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium. Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque
+falli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod prouidentia futurum esse
+praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia
+uoluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas; neque enim uel
+factum aliud ullum uel quaelibet exsistere poterit uoluntas nisi quam
+nescia falli prouidentia diuina praesenserit. Nam si aliorsum quam prouisae
+sunt detorqueri ualent, non iam erit futuri firma praescientia, sed opinio
+potius incerta, quod de deo credere nefas iudico. Neque enim illam probo
+rationem qua se quidam credunt hunc quaestionis nodum posse dissoluere.
+Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse euenturum, quoniam id prouidentia futurum
+esse prospexerit, sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid futurum est, id
+diuinam prouidentiam latere non posse eoque modo necessarium hoc in
+contrariam relabi partem, neque enim necesse esse contingere quae
+prouidentur, sed necesse esse quae futura sunt prouideri--quasi uero quae
+cuius rei causa sit praescientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum
+necessitas prouidentiae laboretur, ac non illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo
+modo sese habeat ordo causarum, necessarium esse euentum praescitarum
+rerum, etiam si praescientia futuris rebus eueniendi necessitatem non
+uideatur inferre. Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere
+coniectat ueram esse necesse est; atque e conuerso rursus, si de quopiam
+uera sit opinio quoniam sedet, eum sedere necesse est. In utroque igitur
+necessitas inest, in hoc quidem sedendi, at uero in altero ueritatis. Sed
+non idcirco quisque sedet quoniam uera est opinio, sed haec potius uera est
+quoniam quempiam sedere praecessit. Ita cum causa ueritatis ex altera parte
+procedat, inest tamen communis in utraque necessitas.
+
+Similia de prouidentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet. Nam etiam si
+idcirco quoniam futura sunt, prouidentur, non uero ideo quoniam prouidentur
+eueniunt, nihilo minus tamen ab deo uel uentura prouideri uel prouisa
+necesse est euenire,[171] quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum
+satis est. Iam uero quam praeposterum est ut aeternae praescientiae
+temporalium rerum euentus causa esse dicatur! Quid est autem aliud
+arbitrari ideo deum futura quoniam sunt euentura prouidere, quam putare
+quae olim acciderunt causam summae illius esse prouidentiae? Ad haec sicuti
+cum quid esse scio, id ipsum esse necesse est, ita cum quid futurum noui,
+id ipsum futurum esse necesse est. Sic fit igitur ut euentus praescitae rei
+nequeat euitari. Postremo si quid aliquis aliorsum atque sese res habet
+existimet, id non modo scientia non est, sed est opinio fallax ab scientiae
+ueritate longe diuersa. Quare si quid ita futurum est ut eius certus ac
+necessarius non sit euentus, id euenturum esse praesciri qui poterit? Sicut
+enim scientia ipsa impermixta est falsitati, ita id quod ab ea concipitur
+esse aliter atque concipitur nequit. Ea namque causa est cur mendacio
+scientia careat, quod se ita rem quamque habere necesse est uti eam sese
+habere scientia comprehendit. Quid igitur? Quonam modo deus haec incerta
+futura praenoscit? Nam si ineuitabiliter euentura censet quae etiam non
+euenire possibile est, fallitur; quod non sentire modo nefas est, sed etiam
+uoce proferre. At si ita uti sunt, ita ea futura esse decernit, ut aeque
+uel fieri ea uel non fieri posse cognoscat, quae est haec praescientia quae
+nihil certum nihil stabile comprehendit? Aut quid hoc refert uaticinio illo
+ridiculo Tiresiae?
+
+  Quidquid dicam, aut erit aut non.
+
+Quid etiam diuina prouidentia humana opinione praestiterit; si uti homines
+incerta iudicat quorum est incertus euentus? Quod si apud illum rerum
+omnium certissimum fontem nihil incerti esse potest, certus eorum est
+euentus quae futura firmiter ille praescierit. Quare nulla est humanis
+consiliis actionibusque libertas quas diuina mens sine falsitatis errore
+cuncta prospiciens ad unum alligat et constringit euentum. Quo semel
+recepto quantus occasus humanarum rerum consequatur liquet. Frustra enim
+bonis malisque praemia poenaeue proponuntur quae nullus meruit liber ac
+uoluntarius motus animorum. Idque omnium uidebitur iniquissimum quod nunc
+aequissimum iudicatur uel puniri improbos uel remunerari probos quos ad
+alterutrum non propria mittit uoluntas, sed futuri cogit certa necessitas.
+Nec uitia igitur nec uirtutes quidquam fuerint, sed omnium meritorum potius
+mixta atque indiscreta confusio. Quoque nihil sceleratius excogitari
+potest, cum ex prouidentia rerum omnis ordo ducatur nihilque consiliis
+liceat humanis, fit ut uitia quoque nostra ad bonorum omnium referantur
+auctorem. Igitur nec sperandi aliquid nec deprecandi ulla ratio est. Quid
+enim uel speret quisque uel etiam deprecetur, quando optanda omnia series
+indeflexa conectit? Auferetur igitur unicum illud inter homines deumque
+commercium sperandi scilicet ac deprecandi. Si quidem iustae humilitatis
+pretio inaestimabilem uicem diuinae gratiae promeremur, qui solus modus est
+quo cum deo colloqui homines posse uideantur illique inaccessae luci prius
+quoque quam impetrent ipsa supplicandi ratione coniungi. Quae si recepta
+futurorum necessitate nihil uirium habere credantur, quid erit quo summo
+illi rerum principi conecti atque adhaerere possimus? Quare necesse erit
+humanum genus, uti paulo ante cantabas, dissaeptum atque disiunctum suo
+fonte fatiscere.
+
+
+[171] euenire prouisa _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Then I complained that I was now in a greater confusion and more
+  doubtful difficulty than before. "What is that?" quoth she, "for I
+  already conjecture what it is that troubleth thee." "It seemeth," quoth
+  I, "to be altogether impossible and repugnant that God foreseeth all
+  things, and that there should be any free-will. For if God beholdeth all
+  things and cannot be deceived, that must of necessity follow which His
+  providence foreseeth to be to come. Wherefore, if from eternity he doth
+  not only foreknow the deeds of men, but also their counsels and wills,
+  there can be no free-will; for there is not any other deed or will, but
+  those which the divine providence, that cannot be deceived, hath
+  foreseen. For if things can be drawn aside to any other end than was
+  foreknown, there will not be any firm knowledge of that which is to
+  come, but rather an uncertain opinion, which in my opinion were impious
+  to believe of God. Neither do I allow of that reason with which some
+  suppose that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question. For they
+  say that nothing is therefore to come to pass because Providence did
+  foresee it, but rather contrariwise, because it shall be, it could not
+  be unknown to Providence, and in this manner the necessity passes over
+  to the other side. For it is not necessary, they argue, that those
+  things should happen which are foreseen, but it is necessary that those
+  things should be foreseen that are to come--as though our problem were
+  this, which of them is the cause of a thing, the foreknowledge of the
+  necessity of things to come, or the necessity of the foreknowledge of
+  things to come, and we were not trying to prove that, howsoever these
+  causes be ordered, the event of the things which are foreknown is
+  necessary, even though the foreknowledge seemeth not to confer necessity
+  of being upon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth the opinion
+  which thinketh so must needs be true, and again on the other side, if
+  the opinion that one sitteth be true, he must needs sit. Wherefore,
+  there is necessity in both, in the one of sitting and in the other of
+  truth. But one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but rather this
+  is true because one hath taken his seat. So that though the cause of
+  truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both.
+
+  And the like is to be inferred of Providence and future things. For even
+  though they be foreseen because they shall be, yet they do not come to
+  pass because they are foreseen, notwithstanding it is necessary that
+  either things to come be foreseen by God, or that things foreseen do
+  fall out, which alone is sufficient to overthrow free-will. But see how
+  preposterous it is that the event of temporal things should be said to
+  be the cause of the everlasting foreknowledge! And what else is it to
+  think that God doth therefore foresee future things, because they are to
+  happen, than to affirm that those things which happened long since, are
+  the cause of that sovereign providence? Furthermore, as when I know
+  anything to be, it must needs be; so when I know that anything shall be,
+  it must needs be to come. And so it followeth that the event of a thing
+  foreknown cannot be avoided. Finally, if any man thinketh otherwise than
+  the thing is, that is not only no knowledge, but it is a deceitful
+  opinion far from the truth of knowledge; wherefore, if anything is to be
+  in such sort that the event of it is not certain or necessary, how can
+  that be foreknown that it shall happen? For as knowledge is without
+  mixture of falsity, so that which is conceived by it cannot be otherwise
+  than it is conceived. For this is the cause why knowledge is without
+  deceit, because everything must needs be so as the knowledge
+  apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth God foreknow that these
+  uncertain things shall be? For if He judgeth that those things shall
+  happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, He is
+  deceived, which is not only impious to think, but also to speak. But if
+  He supposeth that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that He
+  knoweth that they may equally be done and not be done, what
+  foreknowledge is this which comprehendeth no certain or stable thing? Or
+  in what is this better than that ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias
+  "Whatsoever I say shall either be or not be"[172]? or in what shall the
+  divine providence exceed human opinion, if, as men, God judgeth those
+  things to be uncertain the event of which is doubtful? But if nothing
+  can be uncertain to that most certain fountain of all things, the
+  occurrence of those things is certain, which He doth certainly know
+  shall be. Wherefore there is no freedom in human counsels and actions,
+  which the divine mind, foreseeing all things without error or falsehood,
+  tieth and bindeth to one event. Which once admitted, it is evident what
+  ruin of human affairs will ensue. For in vain are rewards and
+  punishments proposed to good and evil, which no free and voluntary
+  motion of their minds hath deserved. And that will seem most unjust
+  which is now judged most just, that either the wicked should be punished
+  or the good rewarded, since their own will leadeth them to neither, but
+  they are compelled by the certain necessity of that which is to come. By
+  which means virtues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will
+  follow a mixed confusion of all deserts. And--than which there can be
+  nothing invented more impious--since that all order of things proceedeth
+  from Providence, and human counsels can do nothing, it followeth that
+  our vices also shall be referred to the author of goodness. Wherefore
+  there is no means left to hope or pray for anything, since an unflexible
+  course connecteth all things that can be desired! Wherefore that only
+  traffic betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall be taken away: if
+  indeed by the price of just humility we deserve the unestimable benefit
+  of God's grace; for this is the only manner by which it seemeth that men
+  may talk with God, and by the very manner of supplication be joined to
+  that inaccessible light before they obtain anything; which if by the
+  admitting the necessity of future things, they be thought to have no
+  force, by what shall we be united and cleave to that Sovereign Prince of
+  all things? Wherefore mankind must needs (as thou saidest in thy verse a
+  little before), being separated and severed from its source, fail and
+  fall away.
+
+
+  [172] Hor. _Sat._ ii. 5. 59.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quaenam discors foedera rerum
+Causa resoluit? Quis tanta deus
+Veris statuit bella duobus,
+Vt quae carptim singula constent
+Eadem nolint mixta iugari?                                                5
+An nulla est discordia ueris
+Semperque sibi certa cohaerent?
+Sed mens caecis obruta membris
+Nequit oppressi luminis igne
+Rerum tenues noscere nexus.                                              10
+Sed cur tanto flagrat amore
+Veri tectas reperire notas?
+Scitne quod appetit anxia nosse?
+Sed quis nota scire laborat?
+At si nescit, quid caeca petit?                                          15
+Quis enim quidquam nescius optet
+Aut quis ualeat nescita sequi?
+Quoue inueniat, quisque[173] repertam
+Queat ignarus noscere formam?
+An cum mentem cerneret altam,                                            20
+Pariter summam et singula norat?
+Nunc membrorum condita nube
+Non in totum est oblita sui
+Summamque tenet singula perdens.
+Igitur quisquis uera requirit,                                           25
+Neutro est habitu; nam neque nouit
+Nec penitus tamen omnia nescit,
+Sed quam retinens meminit summam
+Consulit alte uisa retractans,
+Vt seruatis queat oblitas                                                30
+           Addere partes."
+
+
+[173] quisque _codex Bambergensis_ s. xi.: quis _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  What cause of discord breaks the bands of love?
+  What God between two truths such wars doth move?
+  That things which severally well settled be
+  Yet joined in one will never friendly prove?
+  Or in true things can we no discord see,
+  Because all certainties do still agree?
+  But our dull soul, covered with members blind,
+  Knows not the secret laws which things do bind,
+  By the drowned light of her oppressed fire.
+  Why then, the hidden notes of things to find,
+  Doth she with such a love of truth desire?
+  If she knows that which she doth so require,
+  Why wisheth she known things to know again?
+  If she knows not, why strives she with blind pain?
+  Who after things unknown will strive to go?
+  Or will such ignorant pursuit maintain?
+  How shall she find them out? Or having so,
+  How shall she then their forms and natures know?
+  Because this soul the highest mind did view,
+  Must we needs say that it all nature knew?
+  Now she, though clouds of flesh do her debar,
+  Forgets not all that was her ancient due,
+  But in her mind some general motions are,
+  Though not the skill of things particular.
+  He that seeks truth in neither course doth fall;
+  Not knowing all, nor ignorant of all,
+  He marketh general things which he retains,
+  And matters seen on high doth back recall,
+  And things forgotten to his mind regains,
+  And joins them to that part which there remains."
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum illa: "Vetus," inquit, "haec est de prouidentia querela Marcoque
+Tullio, cum diuinationem distribuit, uehementer agitata tibique ipsi res
+diu prorsus multumque quaesita, sed haud quaquam ab ullo uestrum hactenus
+satis diligenter ac firmiter expedita. Cuius caliginis causa est, quod
+humanae ratiocinationis motus ad diuinae praescientiae simplicitatem non
+potest admoueri, quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil prorsus
+relinquetur ambigui. Quod ita demum patefacere atque expedire temptabo, si
+prius ea quibus moueris expendero. Quaero enim, cur illam soluentium
+rationem minus efficacem putes, quae quia praescientiam non esse futuris
+rebus causam necessitatis existimat, nihil impediri praescientia arbitrii
+libertatem putat. Num enim tu aliunde argumentum futurorum necessitatis
+trahis, nisi quod ea quae praesciuntur non euenire non possunt? Si igitur
+praenotio nullam futuris rebus adicit necessitatem, quod tu etiam paulo
+ante fatebare, quid est quod uoluntarii exitus rerum ad certum cogantur
+euentum? Etenim positionis gratia, ut quid consequatur aduertas, statuamus
+nullam esse praescientiam. Num igitur quantum ad hoc attinet, quae ex
+arbitrio eueniunt ad necessitatem cogantur?" "Minime." "Statuamus iterum
+esse, sed nihil rebus necessitatis iniungere; manebit ut opinor eadem
+uoluntatis integra atque absoluta libertas.
+
+Sed praescientia, inquies, tametsi futuris eueniendi necessitas non est,
+signum tamen est necessario ea esse uentura. Hoc igitur modo, etiam si
+praecognitio non fuisset, necessarios futurorum exitus esse constaret. Omne
+etenim signum tantum quid sit ostendit, non uero efficit quod designat.
+Quare demonstrandum prius est nihil non ex necessitate contingere, ut
+praenotionem signum esse huius necessitatis appareat. Alioquin si haec
+nulla est, ne illa quidem eius rei signum poterit esse quae non est. Iam
+uero probationem firma ratione subnixam constat non ex signis neque petitis
+extrinsecus argumentis sed ex conuenientibus necessariisque causis esse
+ducendam. Sed qui fieri potest ut ea non proueniant quae futura esse
+prouidentur? Quasi uero nos ea quae prouidentia futura esse praenoscit non
+esse euentura credamus ac non illud potius arbitremur, licet eueniant,
+nihil tamen ut euenirent sui natura necessitatis habuisse; quod hinc facile
+perpendas licebit. Plura etenim dum fiunt subiecta oculis intuemur, ut ea
+quae in quadrigis moderandis atque flectendis facere spectantur aurigae
+atque ad hunc modum cetera. Num igitur quidquam illorum ita fieri
+necessitas ulla compellit?" "Minime. Frustra enim esset artis effectus, si
+omnia coacta mouerentur." "Quae igitur cum fiunt carent exsistendi
+necessitate, eadem prius quam fiant sine necessitate futura sunt. Quare
+sunt quaedam euentura quorum exitus ab omni necessitate sit absolutus. Nam
+illud quidem nullum arbitror esse dicturum, quod quae nunc fiunt, prius
+quam fierent, euentura non fuerint. Haec igitur etiam praecognita liberos
+habent euentus. Nam sicut scientia praesentium rerum nihil his quae fiunt,
+ita praescientia futurorum nihil his quae uentura sunt necessitatis
+importat. Sed hoc, inquis, ipsum dubitatur, an earum rerum quae necessarios
+exitus non habent ulla possit esse praenotio. Dissonare etenim uidentur
+putasque si praeuideantur consequi necessitatem, si necessitas desit minime
+praesciri nihilque scientia comprehendi posse nisi certum; quod si quae
+incerti sunt exitus ea quasi certa prouidentur, opinionis id esse caliginem
+non scientiae ueritatem. Aliter enim ac sese res habeat arbitrari ab
+integritate scientiae credis esse diuersum. Cuius erroris causa est, quod
+omnia quae quisque nouit ex ipsorum tantum ui atque natura cognosci
+aestimat quae sciuntur; quod totum contra est Omne enim quod cognoscitur
+non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur
+facultatem. Nam ut hoc breui liqueat exemplo, eandem corporis rotunditatem
+aliter uisus aliter tactus agnoscit. Ille eminus manens totum simul iactis
+radiis intuetur; hic uero cohaerens orbi atque coniunctus circa ipsum motus
+ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. Ipsum quoque hominem aliter
+sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur.
+Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio uero solam
+sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio uero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque
+ipsam quae singularibus inest uniuersali consideratione perpendit.
+Intellegentiae uero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque
+uniuersitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie
+contuetur.
+
+In quo illud maxime considerandum est: nam superior comprehendendi uis
+amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit.
+Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam ualet uel uniuersales species
+imaginatio contuetur uel ratio capit simplicem formam, sed intellegentia
+quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat,
+sed eo modo quo formam ipsam, quae nulli alii nota esse poterat,
+comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuersum et imaginationis figuram et
+materiale sensibile cognoscit nec ratione utens nec imaginatione nec
+sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta
+prospiciens. Ratio quoque cum quid uniuersale respicit, nec imaginatione
+nec sensibus utens imaginabilia uel sensibilia comprehendit. Haec est enim
+quae conceptionis suae uniuersale ita definiuit: homo est animal bipes
+rationale. Quae cum uniuersalis notio sit, tum imaginabilem sensibilemque
+esse rem nullus ignorat, quod illa non imaginatione uel sensu sed in
+rationali conceptione considerat. Imaginatio quoque tametsi ex sensibus
+uisendi formandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente
+sensibilia quaeque conlustrat non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione
+iudicandi. Videsne igitur ut in cognoscendo cuncta sua potius facultate
+quam eorum quae cognoscuntur utantur? Neque id iniuria; nam cum omne
+iudicium iudicantis actus exsistat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non
+ex aliena sed ex propria potestate perficiat.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  "This," quoth she, "is an ancient complaint of providence, vehemently
+  pursued by Marcus Tullius in his _Distribution of Divination_,[174]
+  and a thing which thou thyself hast made great and long search after.
+  But hitherto none of you have used sufficient diligence and vigour in
+  the explication thereof. The cause of which obscurity is for that the
+  motion of human discourse cannot attain to the simplicity of the divine
+  knowledge, which if by any means we could conceive, there would not
+  remain any doubt at all; which I will endeavour to make manifest and
+  plain when I have first explicated that which moveth thee. For I demand
+  why thou thinkest their solution unsufficient, who think that free-will
+  is not hindered by foreknowledge, because they suppose that
+  foreknowledge is not the cause of any necessity in things to come. For
+  fetchest thou any proof for the necessity of future things from any
+  other principle, but only from this, that those things which are
+  foreknown cannot choose but happen? Wherefore if foreknowledge imposeth
+  no necessity upon future events, which thou didst grant not long before,
+  why should voluntary actions be tied to any certain success? For
+  example's sake, that thou mayest see what will follow, let us suppose
+  that there were no providence or foresight at all. Would those things
+  which proceed from free-will be compelled to any necessity by this
+  means?" "No." "Again, let us grant it to be, but that it imposeth no
+  necessity upon anything; no doubt the same freedom of will will remain
+  whole and absolute.
+
+  But thou wilt say, even though foreknowledge be not a necessity for
+  things to happen, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily come to
+  pass. Wherefore now, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the events
+  of future things would have been necessary. For all signs only show what
+  is, but cause not that which they design. And consequently it must first
+  be proved that all things fall out by necessity, that it may appear that
+  foreknowledge is a sign of this necessity. For otherwise, if there be no
+  necessity, neither can foreknowledge be the sign of that which is not.
+  Besides it is manifest that every firm proof must be drawn from
+  intrinsical and necessary causes and not from signs and other farfetched
+  arguments. But how is it possible those things should not happen which
+  are foreseen to be to come? As though we did believe that those things
+  will not be which providence hath foreknown and do not rather judge that
+  although they happen, yet by their own nature they had no necessity of
+  being, which thou mayest easily gather hence. For we see many things
+  with our eyes while they are in doing, as those things which the
+  coachmen do while they drive and turn their coaches and in like manner
+  other things. Now doth necessity compel any of these things to be done
+  in this sort?" "No. For in vain should art labour if all things were
+  moved by compulsion." "Wherefore, as these things are without necessity
+  when they are in doing, so likewise they are to come without necessity
+  before they be done. And consequently there are some things to come
+  whose event is free from all necessity. For I suppose no man will say
+  that those things which are done now were not to come before they were
+  done. Wherefore these things even being foreseen come freely to effect.
+  For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things
+  which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledge in things to come. But
+  thou wilt say: This is the question, whether there can be any
+  foreknowledge of those things whose events are not necessary. For these
+  things seem opposite, and thou thinkest that, if future things be
+  foreseen, there followeth necessity, if there be no necessity, that they
+  that are not foreknown, and that nothing can be perfectly known unless
+  it be certain. But if uncertain events be foreseen as certain, it is
+  manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of
+  knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be far from the integrity of
+  knowledge to judge otherwise than the thing is. The cause of which error
+  is because thou thinkest that all that is known is known only by the
+  force and nature of the things themselves, which is altogether
+  otherwise. For all that is known is not comprehended according to the
+  force which it hath in itself, but rather according to the faculty of
+  them which know it. For to explicate it with a brief example: the sight
+  and the feeling do diversely discern the same roundness of a die. The
+  sight standing aloof beholdeth it altogether by his beams; but the
+  feeling united and joined to the orb, being moved about the compass of
+  it, comprehendeth the roundness by parts. Likewise sense, imagination,
+  reason and understanding do diversely behold a man. For sense looketh
+  upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject, the imagination
+  discerneth it alone without matter, reason passeth beyond this also and
+  considereth universally the species or kind which is in particulars. The
+  eye of the understanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compass of
+  the whole world it beholdeth with the clear eye of the mind that simple
+  form in itself.
+
+  In which that is chiefly to be considered, that the superior force of
+  comprehending embraceth the inferior; but the inferior can by no means
+  attain to the superior; for the sense hath no force out of matter,
+  neither doth the imagination conceive universal species, nor is reason
+  capable of the simple form, but the understanding, as it were looking
+  downward, having conceived that form, discerneth of all things which are
+  under it, but in that sort in which it apprehendeth that form which can
+  be known by none of the other. For it knoweth the universality of
+  reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense,
+  neither using reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were
+  formally beholding all things with that one twinkling of the mind.
+  Likewise reason, when it considereth any universality, comprehendeth
+  both imagination and sensible things without the use of either
+  imagination or senses. For she defineth the universality of her conceit
+  thus: Man is a reasonable, two-footed, living creature, which being an
+  universal knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and
+  sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable conceiving and not
+  by imagination or sense. Imagination also, although it began by the
+  senses of seeing and forming figures, yet when sense is absent it
+  beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary
+  manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how all these in knowing do rather
+  use their own force and faculty than the force of those things which are
+  known? Nor undeservedly; for since all judgment is the act of him who
+  judgeth, it is necessary that every one should perfect his operation by
+  his own power and not by the force of any other.
+
+
+  [174] _De diuin_, ii.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quondam porticus attulit
+Obscuros nimium senes
+Qui sensus et imagines
+E corporibus extimis
+Credant mentibus imprimi,                                                 5
+Vt quondam celeri stilo
+Mos est aequore paginae,
+Quae nullas habeat notas,
+Pressas figere litteras.
+Sed mens si propriis uigens                                              10
+Nihil motibus explicat,
+Sed tantum patiens iacet
+Notis subdita corporum
+Cassasque in speculi uicem
+Rerum reddit imagines,                                                   15
+Vnde haec sic animis uiget
+Cernens omnia notio?
+Quae uis singula perspicit
+Aut quae cognita diuidit?
+Quae diuisa recolligit                                                   20
+Alternumque legens iter
+Nunc summis caput inserit,
+Nunc decedit in infima,
+Tum sese referens sibi
+Veris falsa redarguit?                                                   25
+Haec est efficiens magis
+Longe causa potentior
+Quam quae materiae modo
+Impressas patitur notas.
+Praecedit tamen excitans                                                 30
+Ac uires animi mouens
+Viuo in corpore passio.
+Cum uel lux oculos ferit
+Vel uox auribus instrepit,
+Tum mentis uigor excitus                                                 35
+Quas intus species tenet
+Ad motus similes uocans
+Notis applicat exteris
+Introrsumque reconditis
+Formis miscet imagines.                                                  40
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Cloudy old prophets of the Porch[175] once taught
+  That sense and shape presented to the thought
+    From outward objects their impression take,
+  As when upon a paper smooth and plain
+  On which as yet no marks of ink have lain
+    We with a nimble pen do letters make.
+  But if our minds to nothing can apply
+  Their proper motions, but do patient lie
+    Subject to forms which do from bodies flow,
+  As a glass renders empty[176] shapes of things,
+  Who then can show from whence that motion springs
+    By force of which the mind all things doth know?
+  Or by what skill are several things espied?
+  And being known what power doth them divide,
+    And thus divided doth again unite,
+  And with a various journey oft aspires
+  To highest things, and oft again retires
+    To basest, nothing being out of sight,
+  And when she back unto herself doth move,
+  Doth all the falsehoods by the truth reprove?
+    This vigour needs must be an active cause,
+  And with more powerful forces must be deckt,
+  Than that which from those forms, that do reflect
+    From outward matter, all her virtue draws.
+  And yet in living bodies passion's might
+  Doth go before, whose office is to incite,
+    And the first motions in the mind to make.
+  As when the light unto our eyes appears,
+  Or some loud voice is sounded in our ears,
+    Then doth the strength of the dull mind awake
+  Those phantasies which she retains within;
+  She stirreth up such notions to begin,
+    Whose objects with their natures best agree,
+  And thus applying them to outward things,
+  She joins the external shapes which thence she brings
+    With forms which in herself included be.
+
+
+  [175] The Porch, _i.e._ the Painted Porch ([Greek: stoa poikilae]) at
+  Athens, the great hall adorned with frescoes of the battle of Marathon,
+  which served as lecture-room to Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect.
+
+  [176] Cf. Quin potius noscas rerum simulacra uagari
+            Multa modis multis nulla ui cassaque sensu.
+
+  "But rather you are to know that idols or things wander about many in
+  number in many ways, of no force, powerless to excite sense."--Lucr. iv.
+  127, 128 (trans. Munro).
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamuis afficiant instrumenta sensuum
+forinsecus obiectae qualitates animique agentis uigorem passio corporis
+antecedat quae in se actum mentis prouocet excitetque interim quiescentes
+intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non
+passione insignitur, sed ex sua ui subiectam corpori iudicat passionem,
+quanto magis ea quae cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt, in
+discernendo non obiecta extrinsecus sequuntur, sed actum suae mentis
+expediunt? Hac itaque ratione multiplices cognitiones diuersis ac
+differentibus cessere substantiis. Sensus enim solus cunctis aliis
+cognitionibus destitutus immobilibus animantibus cessit quales sunt conchae
+maris quaeque alia saxis haerentia nutriuntur, imaginatio uero mobilibus
+beluis quibus iam inesse fugiendi appetendiue aliquis uidetur affectus,
+ratio uero humani tantum generis est sicut intellegentia sola diuini. Quo
+fit ut ea notitia ceteris praestet quae suapte natura non modo proprium sed
+ceterarum quoque notitiarum subiecta cognoscit. Quid igitur, si
+ratiocinationi sensus imaginatioque refragentur, nihil esse illud
+uniuersale dicentes quod sese intueri ratio putet? Quod enim sensibile uel
+imaginabile est, id uniuersum esse non posse; aut igitur rationis uerum
+esse iudicium nec quidquam esse sensibile, aut quoniam sibi notum sit plura
+sensibus et imaginationi esse subiecta, inanem conceptionem esse rationis
+quae quod sensibile sit ac singulare quasi quiddam uniuersale consideret.
+Ad haec, si ratio contra respondeat se quidem et quod sensibile et quod
+imaginabile sit in uniuersitatis ratione conspicere, illa uero ad
+uniuersitatis cognitionem adspirare non posse, quoniam eorum notio
+corporales figuras non possit excedere, de rerum uero cognitione firmiori
+potius perfectiorique iudicio esse credendum, in huiusmodi igitur lite nos
+quibus tam ratiocinandi quam imaginandi etiam sentiendique uis inest nonne
+rationis potius causam probaremus? Simile est quod humana ratio diuinam
+intellegentiam futura, nisi ut ipsa cognoscit, non putat intueri. Nam ita
+disseris: Si qua certos ac necessarios habere non uideantur euentus, ea
+certo euentura praesciri nequeunt. Harum igitur rerum nulla est
+praescientia, quam si etiam in his esse credamus, nihil erit quod non ex
+necessitate proueniat. Si igitur uti rationis participes sumus ita diuinae
+iudicium mentis habere possemus, sicut imaginationem sensumque rationi
+cedere oportere iudicauimus, sic diuinae sese menti humanam submittere
+rationem iustissimum censeremus. Quare in illius summae intellegentiae
+cacumen, si possumus, erigamur; illic enim ratio uidebit quod in se non
+potest intueri, id autem est, quonam modo etiam quae certos exitus non
+habent, certa tamen uideat ac definita praenotio neque id sit opinio sed
+summae potius scientiae nullis terminis inclusa simplicitas.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  And if in sentient bodies, although the qualities of outward objects do
+  move the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the
+  vigour of the active mind, provoking her action to itself and exciting
+  the inward forms which before lay quiet; if, I say, in perceiving these
+  corporal objects the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by
+  her own force judgeth of the passion itself, which is objected to the
+  body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their mind
+  and not only follow the outward objects in their judgment, which are
+  free from all affections of the body? Wherefore in this sort have
+  diverse and different substances knowledges of many kinds. For only
+  sense destitute of all other means of knowledge is in those living
+  creatures which are unmovable, as some shell-fish and other which stick
+  to stones and so are nourished; and imagination in movable beasts who
+  seem to have some power to covet and fly. But reason belongeth only to
+  mankind, as understanding to things divine. So that that knowledge is
+  most excellent which of itself doth not only know her own object, but
+  also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination
+  repugn to discourse and reason, affirming that universality to be
+  nothing which reason thinketh herself to see? For that cannot be
+  universal, they argue, which is either sensible or imaginable; wherefore
+  either the judgment of reason must be true and nothing at all sensible,
+  or because they know that many things are subject to the senses and
+  imagination, the conceit of reason is vain, which considereth that which
+  is sensible and singular as if it were universal. Moreover if reason
+  should answer that she beholdeth in her universality all that which is
+  sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of
+  universality, because their knowledge cannot surpass corporal figures
+  and shapes, and that we must give more credit to the firmer and more
+  perfect judgment about the knowledge of things, in this contention
+  should not we, who have the power of discoursing as well as of
+  imagination and sense, rather take reason's part? The very like
+  happeneth when human reason doth not think that the divine understanding
+  doth behold future things otherwise than she herself doth. For thus thou
+  arguest: If any things seem not to have certain and necessary events,
+  they cannot be certainly foreknown to be to come. Wherefore there is no
+  foreknowledge of these things, and if we think that there is any, there
+  shall be nothing which happeneth not of necessity. If, therefore, as we
+  are endued with reason, we could likewise have the judgment proper to
+  the divine mind, as we have judged that imagination and sense must yield
+  to reason, so likewise we would think it most reasonable and just that
+  human reason should submit herself to the divine mind. Wherefore let us
+  be lifted up as much as we can to that height of the highest mind; for
+  there reason shall see that which she cannot behold in herself. And that
+  is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even those things
+  which have no certain issue, and that this is no opinion, but rather the
+  simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed within no bounds.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Quam uariis terras animalia permeant figuris!
+Namque alia extento sunt corpore pulueremque uerrunt
+Continuumque trahunt ui pectoris incitata sulcum
+Sunt quibus alarum leuitas uaga uerberetque uentos
+Et liquido longi spatia aetheris enatet uolatu,                           5
+Haec pressisse solo uestigia gressibusque gaudent
+Vel uirides campos transmittere uel subire siluas.
+Quae uariis uideas licet omnia discrepare formis,
+Prona tamen facies hebetes ualet ingrauare sensus.
+Vnica gens hominum celsum leuat altius cacumen                           10
+Atque leuis recto stat corpore despicitque terras.
+Haec nisi terrenus male desipis, admonet figura,
+Qui recto caelum uultu petis exserisque frontem,
+In sublime feras animum quoque, ne grauata pessum
+Inferior sidat mens corpore celsius leuata.                              15
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  What several figures things that live upon the earth do keep!
+  Some have their bodies stretched in length by which the dust they sweep
+  And do continual furrows make while on their breasts they creep.
+  Some lightly soaring up on high with wings the wind do smite
+  And through the longest airy space pass with an easy flight.
+  Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight,
+  Which through the pleasant fields do pass or to the woods do go,
+  Whose several forms though to our eyes they do a difference show,
+  Yet by their looks cast down on earth their senses heavy grow.
+  Men only with more stately shape to higher objects rise,
+  Who with erected bodies stand and do the earth despise.
+  These figures warn (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eyes)
+  That thou who with an upright face dost look upon the sky,
+  Shouldst also raise thy mind aloft, lest while thou bearest high
+  Thine earthly head, thy soul opprest beneath thy body lie.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Quoniam igitur, uti paulo ante monstratum est, omne quod scitur non ex sua
+sed ex conprehendentium natura cognoscitur, intueamur nunc quantum fas est,
+quis sit diuinae substantiae status, ut quaenam etiam scientia eius sit,
+possimus agnoscere. Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium
+commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur aeternitas consideremus; haec enim
+nobis naturam pariter diuinam scientiamque patefacit. Aeternitas igitur est
+interminabilis uitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, quod ex collatione
+temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid uiuit in tempore id praesens a
+praeteritis in futura procedit nihilque est in tempore constitutum quod
+totum uitae suae spatium pariter possit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem
+nondum adprehendit; hesternum uero iam perdidit; in hodierna quoque uita
+non amplius uiuitis quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod igitur
+temporis patitur condicionem, licet illud, sicuti de mundo censuit
+Aristoteles, nec coeperit umquam esse nec desinat uitaque eius cum temporis
+infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est ut aeternum esse iure credatur.
+Non enim totum simul infinitae licet uitae spatium comprehendit atque
+complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta iam non habet. Quod igitur
+interminabilis uitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet,
+cui neque futuri quidquam absit nec praeteriti fluxerit, id aeternum esse
+iure perhibetur, idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper
+adsistere et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem. Vnde non recte
+quidam, qui cum audiunt uisum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium
+temporis nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum
+fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci uitam, quod
+mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis uitae totam pariter complexum
+esse praesentiam, quod diuinae mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque
+deus conditis rebus antiquior uideri debet temporis quantitate sed
+simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Hunc enim uitae immobilis
+praesentarium statum infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur cumque
+eum effingere atque aequare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum,
+ex simplicitate praesentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac praeteriti
+quantitatem; et cum totam pariter uitae suae plenitudinem nequeat
+possidere, hoc ipso quod aliquo modo numquam esse desinit; illud quod
+implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus uidetur aemulari alligans
+se ad qualemcumque praesentiam huius exigui uolucrisque momenti, quae,
+quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque
+contigerit id praestat ut esse uideantur. Quoniam uero manere non potuit,
+infinitum temporis iter arripuit eoque modo factum est ut continuaret eundo
+uitam cuius plenitudinem complecti non ualuit permanendo. Itaque si digna
+rebus nomina uelimus imponere, Platonem sequentes deum quidem aeternum,
+mundum uero dicamus esse perpetuum. Quoniam igitur omne iudicium secundum
+sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est autem deo semper
+aeternus ac praesentarius status; scientia quoque eius omnem temporis
+supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae infinitaque
+praeteriti ac futuri spatia complectens omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua
+simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praesentiam pensare uelis qua
+cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam
+deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis; unde non praeuidentia sed
+prouidentia potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituta quasi ab
+excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat. Quid igitur postulas ut
+necessaria fiant quae diuino lumine lustrentur, cum ne homines quidem
+necessaria faciant esse quae uideant? Num enim quae praesentia cernis,
+aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus?" "Minime." "Atqui si est
+diuini humanique praesentis digna collatio, uti uos uestro hoc temporario
+praesenti quaedam uidetis, ita ille omnia suo cernit aeterno. Quare haec
+diuina praenotio naturam rerum proprietatemque non mutat taliaque apud se
+praesentia spectat qualia in tempore olim futura prouenient. Nec rerum
+iudicia confundit unoque suae mentis intuitu tam necessarie quam non
+necessarie uentura dinoscit; sicuti uos cum pariter ambulare in terra
+hominem et oriri in caelo solem uidetis, quamquam simul utrumque conspectum
+tamen discernitis et hoc uoluntarium illud esse necessarium iudicatis, ita
+igitur cuncta despiciens diuinus intuitus qualitatem rerum minime perturbat
+apud se quidem praesentium, ad condicionem uero temporis futurarum. Quo fit
+ut hoc non sit opinio sed ueritate potius nixa cognitio, cum exstaturum
+quid esse cognoscit quod idem exsistendi necessitate carere non nesciat.
+Hic si dicas quod euenturum deus uidet id non euenire non posse, quod autem
+non potest non euenire id ex necessitate contingere, meque ad hoc nomen
+necessitatis adstringas; fatebor rem quidem solidissimae ueritatis sed cui
+uix aliquis nisi diuini speculator accesserit. Respondebo namque idem
+futurum, cum ad diuinam notionem refertur, necessarium, cum uero in sua
+natura perpenditur, liberum prorsus atque absolutum uideri. Duae sunt
+etenim necessitates, simplex una, ueluti quod necesse est omnes homines
+esse mortales, altera condicionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum
+ambulare necesse est; quod enim quisque nouit, id esse aliter ac notum est
+nequit, sed haec condicio minime secum illam simplicem trahit. Hanc enim
+necessitatem non propria facit natura sed condicionis adiectio; nulla enim
+necessitas cogit incedere uoluntate gradientem, quamuis eum tum cum
+graditur incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo, si quid prouidentia
+praesens uidet, id esse necesse est, tametsi nullam naturae habeat
+necessitatem. Atqui deus ea futura quae ex arbitrii libertate proueniunt
+praesentia contuetur. Haec igitur ad intuitum relata diuinum necessaria
+fiant per condicionem diuinae notionis; per se uero considerata ab absoluta
+naturae suae libertate non desinunt. Fient igitur procul dubio cuncta quae
+futura deus esse praenoscit, sed eorum quaedam de libero proficiscuntur
+arbitrio; quae quamuis eueniant, exsistendo tamen naturam propriam non
+amittunt, qua priusquam fierent etiam non euenire potuissent. Quid igitur
+refert non esse necessaria, cum propter diuinae scientiae condicionem modis
+omnibus necessitatis instar eueniet? Hoc scilicet quod ea quae paulo ante
+proposui, sol oriens et gradiens homo. Quae dum fiunt, non fieri non
+possunt; eorum tamen unum prius quoque quam fieret, necesse erat exsistere,
+alterum uero minime. Ita etiam quae praesentia deus habet, dubio procul
+exsistent, sed eorum hoc quidem de rerum necessitate descendit, illud uero
+de potestate facientium. Haud igitur iniuria diximus haec si ad diuinam
+notitiam referantur necessaria, si per se considerentur necessitatis esse
+nexibus absoluta; sicuti omne quod sensibus patet, si ad rationem referas,
+uniuersale est, si ad se ipsa respicias, singulare. 'Sed si in mea,'
+inquies, 'potestate situm est mutare propositum, euacuabo prouidentiam, cum
+quae illa praenoscit forte mutauero.' Respondebo: propositum te quidem tuum
+posse deflectere, sed quoniam et id te posse et an facias quoue conuertas
+praesens prouidentiae ueritas intuetur, diuinam te praescientiam non posse
+uitare, sicuti praesentis oculi effugere non possis intuitum, quamuis te in
+uarias actiones libera uoluntate conuerteris. Quid igitur inquies? Ex meane
+dispositione scientia diuina mutabitur, ut cum ego nunc hoc nunc aliud
+uelim, illa quoque noscendi uices alternare uideatur? Minime. Omne namque
+futurum diuinus praecurrit intuitus et ad praesentiam propriae cognitionis
+retorquet ac reuocat nec alternat, ut aestimas, nunc hoc nunc illud
+praenoscendi uice, sed uno ictu mutationes tuas manens praeuenit atque
+complectitur. Quam comprehendendi omnia uisendique praesentiam non ex
+futurarum prouentu rerum, sed ex propria deus simplicitate sortitus est. Ex
+quo illud quoque resoluitur quod paulo ante posuisti indignum esse, si
+scientiae dei causam futura nostra praestare dicantur. Haec enim scientiae
+uis praesentaria notione cuncta complectens rebus modum omnibus ipsa
+constituit, nihil uero posterioribus debet. Quae cum ita sint, manet
+intemerata mortalibus arbitrii libertas nec iniquae leges solutis omni
+necessitate uoluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. Manet etiam spectator
+desuper cunctorum praescius deus uisionisque eius praesens semper
+aeternitas cum nostrorum actuum futura qualitate concurrit bonis praemia
+malis supplicia dispensans. Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque;
+quae cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt. Auersamini igitur
+uitia, colite uirtutes, ad rectas spes animum subleuate, humiles preces in
+excelsa porrigite. Magna uobis est, si dissimulare non uultis, necessitas
+indicta probitatis, cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis."
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  Seeing, therefore, as hath been showed, all that is known is not
+  comprehended by its own nature but by the power of him which
+  comprehendeth it, let us see now, as much as we may, what is the state
+  of the divine substance that we may also know what His knowledge is.
+  Wherefore it is the common judgment of all that live by reason that God
+  is everlasting, and therefore let us consider what eternity is. For this
+  declareth unto us both the divine nature and knowledge. Eternity
+  therefore is a perfect possession altogether of an endless life, which
+  is more manifest by the comparison of temporal things, for whatsoever
+  liveth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past to times
+  to come, and there is nothing placed in time which can embrace all the
+  space of its life at once. But it hath not yet attained to-morrow and
+  hath lost yesterday. And you live no more in this day's life than in
+  that movable and transitory moment. Wherefore, whatsoever suffereth the
+  condition of time, although, as Aristotle thought of the world, it never
+  began nor were ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time,
+  yet it is not such that it ought to be called everlasting. For it doth
+  not comprehend and embrace all the space of its life together, though
+  that life be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to
+  come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fulness of
+  an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is absent,
+  nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be accounted
+  everlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in itself,
+  it may always be present to itself, and have an infinity of movable time
+  present to it. Wherefore they are deceived who, hearing that Plato
+  thought that this world had neither beginning of time nor should ever
+  have any end, think that by this means the created world should be
+  coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be carried through an
+  endless life, which Plato attributed to the world, another thing to
+  embrace the whole presence of an endless life together, which is
+  manifestly proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to seem more
+  ancient than the things created, by the quantity of time, but rather by
+  the simplicity of His divine nature. For that infinite motion of
+  temporal things imitateth the present state of the unmovable life, and
+  since it cannot express nor equal it, it falleth from immobility to
+  motion, and from the simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an
+  infinite quantity of future and past, and since it cannot possess
+  together all the fulness of its life, by never leaving to be in some
+  sort, it seemeth to emulate in part that which it cannot fully obtain
+  and express, tying itself to this small presence of this short and swift
+  moment, which because it carrieth a certain image of that abiding
+  presence, whosoever hath it, seemeth to be. But because it could not
+  stay it undertook an infinite journey of time, and so it came to pass
+  that it continued that life by going whose plenitude it could not
+  comprehend by staying. Wherefore, if we will give things their right
+  names, following Plato, let us say that God is everlasting and the world
+  perpetual. Wherefore, since every judgment comprehendeth those things
+  which are subject unto it, according to its own nature, and God hath
+  always an everlasting and present state, His knowledge also surpassing
+  all motions of time, remaineth in the simplicity of His presence, and
+  comprehending the infinite spaces of that which is past and to come,
+  considereth all things in His simple knowledge as though they were now
+  in doing. So that, if thou wilt weigh His foreknowledge with which He
+  discerneth all things, thou wilt more rightly esteem it to be the
+  knowledge of a never fading instant than a foreknowledge as of a thing
+  to come. For which cause it is not called praevidence or foresight, but
+  rather providence, because, placed far from inferior things, it
+  overlooketh all things, as it were, from the highest top of things. Why,
+  therefore, wilt thou have those things necessary which are illustrated
+  by the divine light, since that not even men make not those things
+  necessary which they see? For doth thy sight impose any necessity upon
+  those things which thou seest present?" "No." "But the present instant
+  of men may well be compared to that of God in this: that as you see some
+  things in your temporal instant, so He beholdeth all things in His
+  eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge doth not change the
+  nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in His
+  presence as they will after come to be, neither doth He confound the
+  judgment of things, and with one sight of His mind He discerneth as well
+  those things which shall happen necessarily as otherwise. As you, when
+  at one time you see a man walking upon the earth and the sun rising in
+  heaven, although they be both seen at once, yet you discern and judge
+  that the one is voluntary, and the other necessary, so likewise the
+  divine sight beholding all things disturbeth not the quality of things
+  which to Him are present, but in respect of time are yet to come. And so
+  this is not an opinion but rather a knowledge grounded upon truth, when
+  He knoweth that such a thing shall be, which likewise He is not ignorant
+  that it hath no necessity of being. Here if thou sayest that cannot
+  choose but happen which God seeth shall happen, and that which cannot
+  choose but happen, must be of necessity, and so tiest me to this name of
+  necessity, I will grant that it is a most solid truth, but whereof
+  scarce any but a contemplator of divinity is capable. For I will answer
+  that the same thing is necessary when it is referred to the Divine
+  knowledge; but when it is weighed in its own nature that it seemeth
+  altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities: the one
+  simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortal; the other
+  conditional, as if thou knowest that any man walketh, he must needs
+  walk. For what a man knoweth cannot be otherwise than it is known. But
+  this conditional draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity.
+  For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding a
+  condition. For no necessity maketh him to go that goeth of his own
+  accord, although it be necessary that he goeth while he goeth. In like
+  manner, if providence seeth anything present, that must needs be,
+  although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future
+  things, which proceed from free-will, present. These things, therefore,
+  being referred to the divine sight are necessary by the condition of the
+  divine knowledge, and, considered by themselves, they lose not absolute
+  freedom of their own nature. Wherefore doubtless all those things come
+  to pass which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceed from
+  free-will, which though they come to pass, yet do not, by coining into
+  being, lose, since before they came to pass, they might also not have
+  happened. But what importeth it that they are not necessary, since that
+  by reason of the condition of the divine knowledge they come to pass in
+  all respects as if they were necessary? It hath the same import as those
+  things which I proposed a little before--the sun rising and the man
+  going. While they are in doing, they cannot choose but be in doing; yet
+  one of them was necessarily to be before it was, and the other not.
+  Likewise those things which God hath present, will have doubtless a
+  being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things, other from
+  the power of the doers. And therefore we said not without cause that
+  these, if they be referred to God's knowledge, are necessary; and if
+  they be considered by themselves, they are free from the bonds of
+  necessity. As whatsoever is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to
+  reason, is universal; if thou considerest the things themselves, it is
+  singular or particular. But thou wilt say, 'If it is in my power to
+  change my purpose, shall I frustrate providence if I chance to alter
+  those things which she foreknoweth?' I answer that thou mayest indeed
+  change thy purpose, but because the truth of providence, being present,
+  seeth that thou canst do so, and whether thou wilt do so or no, and what
+  thou purposest anew, thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge, even
+  as thou canst not avoid the sight of an eye which is present, although
+  thou turnest thyself to divers actions by thy free-will.
+
+  But yet thou wilt inquire whether God's knowledge shall be changed by
+  thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another,
+  it should also seem to have divers knowledges. No. For God's sight
+  preventeth all that is to come and recalleth and draweth it to the
+  presence of His own knowledge; neither doth He vary, as thou imaginest,
+  now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving
+  preventeth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of
+  comprehending and seeing all things, God hath not by the event of future
+  things but by His own simplicity. By which that doubt is also resolved
+  which thou didst put a little before, that it is an unworthy thing that
+  our future actions should be said to cause the knowledge of God. For
+  this force of the divine knowledge comprehending all things with a
+  present notion appointeth to everything its measure and receiveth
+  nothing from ensuing accidents. All which being so, the free-will of
+  mortal men remaineth unviolated, neither are the laws unjust which
+  propose punishments and rewards to our wills, which are free from all
+  necessity. There remaineth also a beholder of all things which is God,
+  who foreseeth all things, and the eternity of His vision, which is
+  always present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions,
+  distributing rewards to the good and punishments to the evil. Neither do
+  we in vain put our hope in God or pray to Him; for if we do this well
+  and as we ought, we shall not lose our labour or be without effect.
+  Wherefore fly vices, embrace virtues, possess your minds with worthy
+  hopes, offer up humble prayers to your highest Prince. There is, if you
+  will not dissemble, a great necessity of doing well imposed upon you,
+  since you live in the sight of your Judge, who beholdeth all things."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SYMMACHI VERSVS
+
+Fortunae et uirtutis opus, Seuerine Boethi,
+  E patria pulsus non tua per scelera,
+Tandem ignotus habes qui te colat, ut tua uirtus
+  Vt tua fortuna promeruitque [Greek: sophos].
+Post obitum dant fata locum, post fata superstes
+  Vxoris propriae te quoque fama colit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+EPIGRAM BY SYMMACHUS[177]
+
+Boethius! model of all weal and worth,
+Unjustly from thy country driven forth,
+Thy fame, unfamed at last, yet one shall praise,
+One voice the cry of approbation raise;
+What life denied, through death kind heaven giveth;
+Thine honour in thy wife's for ever liveth.
+
+
+[177] This epigram was found by Barth in a Merseburg codex, and first
+printed in his _Adversaria_ (1624). If genuine (and the faithful
+reproduction the error SYMMACHIVS for SYMMACHI VS or VR, i.e. VERSVS, is in
+its favour), the author may be either the son or the father-in-law of
+Boethius. Some readers may prefer to rank this poem with the epitaph on
+Elpis, the supposititious first wife of Boethius, on whom see Obbarius, _De
+cons._ p. xii. At any rate it is as old as the times of Hrabanus Maurus,
+who imitated it in a poem also first published by Barth. See Peiper,
+_Cons._ p. xxxviiii.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Aaron.
+Abel.
+Abraham.
+abstraction.
+academical studies.
+Achaemenian rocks.
+Achelous.
+Achilles, statue of.
+Adam.
+[Greek: aeides, to].
+Aemilius Paulus.
+_aequiuocus_.
+_aeternitas_.
+Agamemnon, _see_ Atrides.
+age, the former.
+Agrippina.
+Albinus.
+Alcibiades.
+Alexander Aphrod..
+allegorical method.
+Anaxagoras.
+Anaxarchus.
+angels.
+Antaeus.
+Antoninus (Caracalla).
+Apollodorus.
+Apuleius.
+Arcturus.
+Arians
+Aristotle,
+  on nature;
+  _De physicis_;
+  _Protrepticus_;
+Arius.
+Atrides.
+Augustine, St.
+Auster.
+
+Bacchus.
+baptism.
+Basil, informer.
+Being.
+Boethius,
+  life;
+  the first scholastic;
+  an independent philosopher;
+  his philosophic ambition;
+  his achievement;
+  a Christian;
+  perhaps a martyr;
+  son-in-law of Symmachus;
+  his wife;
+  his sons;
+  early training;
+  youthful poetry;
+  premature old age;
+  his learning;
+  his library;
+  his lofty position;
+  his principles;
+  the champion of the oppressed;
+  of the Senate;
+  his accusers;
+  his accusation;
+  sentence.
+Boötes.
+Boreas.
+Brutus.
+Busiris.
+
+Cacus.
+Caesar, _see_ Gaius.
+Campania.
+Canius.
+Cassiodorus.
+categories, the ten.
+Catholic Church,
+  faith;
+  religion.
+Catholics.
+Cato.
+Catullus.
+Caucasus.
+Centaurs.
+Cerberus.
+Ceres.
+Chremes.
+Christ,
+  advent of;
+  baptism;
+  life and death;
+  resurrection and ascension;
+  nature;
+  person;
+  divinity;
+  humanity;
+  Perfect Man and Perfect God.
+Christian faith,
+  religion.
+Cicero,
+  _De diuinatione_;
+  _Tusc_.
+Circe.
+Claudian.
+Claudianus, Mamertus,
+  _coemptio_.
+Conigastus,
+_consistere_,
+_Consolation of Philosophy_,
+  method and object.
+consulate.
+corollary, see _porisma_.
+Corus.
+Crab.
+Croesus.
+Cyclops.
+Cynthia.
+Cyprian, informer.
+Cyrus.
+
+Dante.
+David.
+Decoratus.
+demons.
+Devil.
+dialectic.
+difference.
+Diogenes Laertius.
+Dionysius.
+divine nature, eternal,
+  substance.
+divinity of Christ, _see_ Christ,
+_diuisio_.
+Dorset, Countess of.
+
+[Greek: Eisagogae], Porphyry's.
+Eleatic studies.
+elements.
+Elpis.
+_Enneades_.
+Epicureans.
+Epicurus.
+_esse_.
+_essentia_.
+eternity.
+Etna.
+Euphrates.
+Euripides.
+Euripus.
+Eurus.
+Eutyches.
+Eutychian error.
+Eutychians.
+Evander.
+Eve.
+evil is nothing.
+
+Fabricius.
+Fame.
+fatal order.
+Fate.
+fire, nature of.
+Flood.
+form.
+Fortune.
+free-will.
+Furies.
+
+Gaius Caesar (Caligula).
+Gaudentius.
+geometricians.
+Germanicus.
+Giants.
+Gilbert de la Porrée.
+Glory.
+God, categories applied to,
+  without difference;
+  is what He is;
+  is Pure Form;
+  is [Greek: ousia, ousiosis, huphistasthai];
+  One;
+  Triune;
+  is good;
+  goodness;
+  happiness;
+  everlasting;
+  omnipresent;
+  just;
+  omnipotent;
+  incomprehensible;
+  one Father;
+  true Sun;
+  Creator;
+  Ruler;
+  Mover;
+  Judge;
+  sees all things;
+  foresees all things;
+  His knowledge;
+  His providence;
+  cannot do evil;
+  wills only good;
+  prayer to Him not vain.
+good, the prime.
+good, all seek.
+goodness is happiness, is God.
+grace.
+Greek.
+
+Happiness is God.
+Hauréau.
+_Hebdomads_.
+Hecuba.
+Hercules.
+heresy, see Arius, Eutyches, Nestorius, Sabellians.
+Hermus.
+Herodotus.
+Hesperus.
+Holder.
+Homer.
+Horace.
+human nature, humanity of Christ, _see_ Christ.
+humanity.
+
+Iamblichus.
+_id quod est_.
+_id quod est esse_.
+Indus.
+_instrumentum_.
+Isaac.
+Ishmael.
+Ixion.
+
+Jacob.
+Jerusalem.
+Jesus.
+Jews.
+Iohannes Scottus.
+John the Deacon.
+Jordan.
+Joshua.
+Judah.
+
+Kanius, _see_ Canius.
+[Greek: kata parathesin].
+
+Latin.
+lethargy.
+Livy.
+Lucan.
+Lucifer.
+Lucretius.
+Lybia.
+Lybian lions.
+Lydians.
+Lynceus.
+
+Macedonius. _see_ Aemilius Paulus.
+Macrobius.
+Mary, the Blessed Virgin,.
+mathematical method.
+mathematics.
+matter.
+Medea.
+Mercury.
+Moses.
+Muses.
+music,
+  Boethius on.
+
+Nature,
+  phenomenal;
+  nature;
+  nature of plants.
+Neoplatonism.
+Neritius, son of, _see_ Ulysses.
+Nero.
+Nestorius.
+Nicocreon.
+Nicomachus.
+_nihilo, ex_..
+Noah.
+Nonius.
+Notus.
+number.
+
+[Greek: oion epei].
+[Greek: onos luras].
+Opilio.
+Orpheus.
+[Greek: ousia].
+[Greek: ousiosis].
+[Greek: ousiosthai].
+
+[Greek: PI].
+_Palatini canes_.
+Papinianus.
+Parmenides.
+Parthiaus.
+Paulinus.
+Paulus, see Aemilius Paulus.
+Pelagius.
+Perses.
+_persona_.
+Person defined.
+Pharaoh.
+Philosophy,
+  appearance of;
+  character;
+  function;
+  power.
+Phoebe.
+Phoebus.
+physics.
+Plato,
+  and Boethius;
+  and S. Thomas;
+  and the Academy;
+  his muse;
+  Reminiscence;
+  quoted or referred to, _Gorg._;
+  _Tim_;
+  _Meno_;
+  _Phaedo_;
+  _Rep_.
+Plotinus.
+Plurality.
+Pluto.
+Polyphemus.
+Porch.
+_porisma_.
+Porphyry.
+praetorship.
+praevidence.
+predicaments, _see_ categories.
+Providence.
+Ptolemy.
+purgation.
+Pythagoras.
+
+Ravenna.
+realism.
+Red Sea.
+_reductio ad absurdum_.
+Regulus.
+relation, category of.
+religion, the Christian.
+Resurrection.
+rhetoric.
+Roman liberty,
+  republic.
+Rusticiana.
+
+Sabellians.
+Sackville, Thomas.
+_sacrilegium_.
+saints.
+Saturn.
+Saul.
+scripture.
+_sempiternitas_.
+senate.
+Seneca.
+Simon.
+Sinai.
+Sirius.
+Socrates.
+Son, the, _see_ Trinity.
+Soranus.
+Spartianus.
+Spirit, Holy, _see_ Trinity,
+  procession of;
+  a substance.
+statue of Achilles.
+Stoics.
+Stymphalian birds.
+_subsisistentia, subsistere_.
+substance, divine.
+_substantia, substare_.
+Suetonius.
+sun, _see_ Phoebus.
+Symmachus, Q. Aurel.,
+  Q. Aur. Memmius;
+  Boethius;
+  Pope.
+Syrtes.
+
+Tacitus.
+Tantalus.
+Tertullian.
+Testament, Old and New.
+[Greek: THETA].
+Theodoric.
+Theology.
+Thomas, St.
+Thorie, J.
+Thrace.
+Thule.
+Tigris.
+_Timaeus_, see Plato.
+Tiresias.
+Tityus.
+triangie.
+Triguilla.
+Trinity,
+  the unity of;
+  cannot be substantially predicated of God.
+
+[Greek: ulae, apoios].
+Ulysses.
+unity.
+unity of Trinity.
+[Greek: upostasis].
+[Greek: upostaenai].
+Usener.
+_ut quia_.
+[Greek: uphistasthai].
+
+_UEL = et_.
+Verona.
+Vesuvius.
+_uia media_.
+Virgil.
+_uirtus_.
+
+Will, _see_ free-will.
+Wulf, H. de.
+
+Zeno.
+Zephyrus.
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Theological Tractates and The
+Consolation of Philosophy, by Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 13316 ***
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #13316 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13316)
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Theological Tractates and The
+Consolation of Philosophy, by Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy
+
+Author: Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
+
+Release Date: August 29, 2004 [EBook #13316]
+
+Language: English and Latin
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Robert Connal and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+
+WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY H.F. STEWART, D.D.
+
+FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
+
+AND E.K. RAND, PH.D.
+
+PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
+
+
+
+THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+WITH THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF "I.T." (1609)
+
+REVISED BY H.F. STEWART
+
+
+
+1918
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's Note: The paper edition of this book has Latin and English
+pages facing each other. This version of the text uses alternating Latin
+and English sections, with the English text slightly indented.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+  NOTE ON THE TEXT
+
+  INTRODUCTION
+
+  BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+  THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+
+  THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+  SYMMACHI VERSUS
+
+  INDEX
+
+
+
+
+NOTE ON THE TEXT
+
+In preparing the text of the _Consolatio_ I have used the apparatus in
+Peiper's edition (Teubner, 1871), since his reports, as I know in the case
+of the Tegernseensis, are generally accurate and complete; I have depended
+also on my own collations or excerpts from various of the important
+manuscripts, nearly all of which I have at least examined, and I have also
+followed, not always but usually, the opinions of Engelbrecht in his
+admirable article, _Die Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius_ in the
+_Sitzungsberichte_ of the Vienna Academy, cxliv. (1902) 1-60. The
+present text, then, has been constructed from only part of the material
+with which an editor should reckon, though the reader may at least assume
+that every reading in the text has, unless otherwise stated, the authority
+of some manuscript of the ninth or tenth century; in certain orthographical
+details, evidence from the text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ has been used
+without special mention of this fact. We look to August Engelbrecht for the
+first critical edition of the _Consolatio_ at, we hope, no distant
+date.
+
+The text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ is based on my own collations of all
+the important manuscripts of these works. An edition with complete
+_apparatus criticus_ will be ready before long for the Vienna
+_Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum_. The history of the
+text of the _Opuscula Sacra_, as I shall attempt to show elsewhere, is
+intimately connected with that of the _Consolatio_.
+
+E.K.R.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, of the famous Praenestine family of the
+Anicii, was born about 480 A.D. in Rome. His father was an ex-consul; he
+himself was consul under Theodoric the Ostrogoth in 510, and his two sons,
+children of a great grand-daughter of the renowned Q. Aurelius Symmachus,
+were joint consuls in 522. His public career was splendid and honourable,
+as befitted a man of his race, attainments, and character. But he fell
+under the displeasure of Theodoric, and was charged with conspiring to
+deliver Rome from his rule, and with corresponding treasonably to this end
+with Justin, Emperor of the East. He was thrown into prison at Pavia, where
+he wrote the _Consolation of Philosophy_, and he was brutally put to death
+in 524. His brief and busy life was marked by great literary achievement.
+His learning was vast, his industry untiring, his object unattainable--
+nothing less than the transmission to his countrymen of all the works of
+Plato and Aristotle, and the reconciliation of their apparently divergent
+views. To form the idea was a silent judgment on the learning of his day;
+to realize it was more than one man could accomplish; but Boethius
+accomplished much. He translated the [Greek: Eisagogae] of Porphyry, and
+the whole of Aristotle's _Organon_. He wrote a double commentary on the
+[Greek: Eisagogae] and commentaries on the _Categories_ and the _De
+Interpretatione_ of Aristotle, and on the _Topica_ of Cicero. He also
+composed original treatises on the categorical and hypothetical syllogism,
+on Division and on Topical Differences. He adapted the arithmetic of
+Nicomachus, and his textbook on music, founded on various Greek
+authorities, was in use at Oxford and Cambridge until modern times. His
+five theological _Tractates_ are here, together with the _Consolation of
+Philosophy_, to speak for themselves.
+
+Boethius was the last of the Roman philosophers, and the first of the
+scholastic theologians. The present volume serves to prove the truth of
+both these assertions.
+
+The _Consolation of Philosophy_ is indeed, as Gibbon called it, "a golden
+volume, not unworthy of the leisure of Plato or of Tully." To belittle its
+originality and sincerity, as is sometimes done, with a view to saving the
+Christianity of the writer, is to misunderstand his mind and his method.
+The _Consolatio_ is not, as has been maintained, a mere patchwork of
+translations from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Rather it is the supreme
+essay of one who throughout his life had found his highest solace in the
+dry light of reason. His chief source of refreshment, in the dungeon to
+which his beloved library had not accompanied him, was a memory well
+stocked with the poetry and thought of former days. The development of the
+argument is anything but Neoplatonic; it is all his own.
+
+And if the _Consolation of Philosophy_ admits Boethius to the company of
+Cicero or even of Plato, the theological _Tractates_ mark him as the
+forerunner of St. Thomas. It was the habit of a former generation to regard
+Boethius as an eclectic, the transmitter of a distorted Aristotelianism, a
+pagan, or at best a luke-warm Christian, who at the end cast off the faith
+which he had worn in times of peace, and wrapped himself in the philosophic
+cloak which properly belonged to him. The authenticity of the _Tractates_
+was freely denied. We know better now. The discovery by Alfred Holder, and
+the illuminating discussion by Hermann Usener,[1] of a fragment of
+Cassiodorus are sufficient confirmation of the manuscript tradition, apart
+from the work of scholars who have sought to justify that tradition from
+internal evidence. In that fragment Cassiodorus definitely ascribes to his
+friend Boethius "a book on the Trinity, some dogmatic chapters, and a book
+against Nestorius."[2] Boethius was without doubt a Christian, a Doctor and
+perhaps a martyr. Nor is it necessary to think that, when in prison, he put
+away his faith. If it is asked why the _Consolation of Philosophy_ contains
+no conscious or direct reference to the doctrines which are traced in the
+_Tractates_ with so sure a hand, and is, at most, not out of harmony with
+Christianity, the answer is simple. In the _Consolation_ he is writing
+philosophy; in the _Tractates_ he is writing theology. He observes what
+Pascal calls the orders of things. Philosophy belongs to one order,
+theology to another. They have different objects. The object of philosophy
+is to understand and explain the nature of the world around us; the object
+of theology is to understand and explain doctrines delivered by divine
+revelation. The scholastics recognized the distinction,[3] and the
+corresponding difference in the function of Faith and Reason. Their final
+aim was to co-ordinate the two, but this was not possible before the
+thirteenth century. Meanwhile Boethius helps to prepare the way. In the
+_Consolation_ he gives Reason her range, and suffers her, unaided, to
+vindicate the ways of Providence. In the _Tractates_ Reason is called in to
+give to the claims of Faith the support which it does not really lack.[4]
+Reason, however, has still a right to be heard. The distinction between
+_fides_ and _ratio_ is proclaimed in the first two _Tractates_. In the
+second especially it is drawn with a clearness worthy of St. Thomas
+himself; and there is, of course, the implication that the higher authority
+resides with _fides_. But the treatment is philosophical and extremely
+bold. Boethius comes back to the question of the substantiality of the
+divine Persons which he has discussed in Tr. I. from a fresh point of view.
+Once more he decides that the Persons are predicated relatively; even
+Trinity, he concludes, is not predicated substantially of deity. Does this
+square with catholic doctrine? It is possible to hear a note of challenge
+in his words to John the Deacon, _fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge_.
+Philosophy states the problem in unequivocal terms. Theology is required to
+say whether they commend themselves.
+
+One object of the scholastics, anterior to the final co-ordination of the
+two sciences, was to harmonize and codify all the answers to all the
+questions that philosophy raises. The ambition of Boethius was not so
+soaring, but it was sufficiently bold. He set out, first to translate, and
+then to reconcile, Plato and Aristotle; to go behind all the other systems,
+even the latest and the most in vogue, back to the two great masters, and
+to show that they have the truth, and are in substantial accord. So St.
+Thomas himself, if he cannot reconcile the teaching of Plato and Aristotle,
+at least desires to correct the one by the other, to discover what truth is
+common to both, and to show its correspondence with Christian doctrine. It
+is reasonable to conjecture that Boethius, if he had lived, might have
+attempted something of the kind. Were he alive to-day, he might feel more
+in tune with the best of the pagans than with most contemporary philosophic
+thought.
+
+In yet one more respect Boethius belongs to the company of the schoolmen.
+He not only put into circulation many precious philosophical notions,
+served as channel through which various works of Aristotle passed into the
+schools, and handed down to them a definite Aristotelian method for
+approaching the problem of faith; he also supplied material for that
+classification of the various sciences which is an essential accompaniment
+of every philosophical movement, and of which the Middle Ages felt the
+value.[5] The uniform distribution into natural sciences, mathematics and
+theology which he recommends may be traced in the work of various teachers
+up to the thirteenth century, when it is finally accepted and defended by
+St. Thomas in his commentary on the _De Trinitate_.
+
+A seventeenth-century translation of the _Consolatio Philosophiae_ is here
+presented with such alterations as are demanded by a better text, and the
+requirements of modern scholarship. There was, indeed, not much to do, for
+the rendering is most exact. This in a translation of that date is not a
+little remarkable. We look for fine English and poetry in an Elizabethan;
+but we do not often get from him such loyalty to the original as is here
+displayed.
+
+Of the author "I.T." nothing is known. He may have been John Thorie, a
+Fleming born in London in 1568, and a B.A. of Christ Church, 1586. Thorie
+"was a person well skilled in certain tongues, and a noted poet of his
+times" (Wood, _Athenae Oxon._ ed. Bliss, i. 624), but his known
+translations are apparently all from the Spanish.[6]
+
+Our translator dedicates his "Five books of Philosophical Comfort" to the
+Dowager Countess of Dorset, widow of Thomas Sackville, who was part author
+of _A Mirror for Magistrates_ and _Gorboduc_, and who, we learn from I.T.'s
+preface, meditated a similar work. I.T. does not unduly flatter his
+patroness, and he tells her plainly that she will not understand the
+philosophy of the book, though the theological and practical parts may be
+within her scope.
+
+The _Opuscula Sacra_ have never before, to our knowledge, been translated.
+In reading and rendering them we have been greatly helped by two mediaeval
+commentaries: one by John the Scot (edited by E.K. Rand in Traube's
+_Quellen und Untersuchungen_, vol. i. pt. 2, Munich, 1906); the other by
+Gilbert de la Porrée (printed in Migne, _P.L._ lxiv.). We also desire to
+record our indebtedness in many points of scholarship and philosophy to Mr.
+E.J. Thomas of Emmanuel College.
+
+Finally, thanks are due to Mr. Dolson for the suggestion in the footnote on
+the preceding page, and also to Professor Lane Cooper of Cornell University
+for many valuable corrections as this reprint was passing through the
+Press.
+
+H.F.S.
+E.K.R.
+
+_October, 1926._
+
+
+[1] _Anecdoton Holderi_, Leipzig, 1877.
+
+[2] _Scripsit librum de sancta trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica et
+librum contra Nestorium._ On the question of the genuineness of Tr. IV. _De
+fide catholica_ see note _ad loc_.
+
+[3] Cp. H. de Wulf, _Histoire de la Philosophie médiévale_ (Louvain and
+Paris 1915), p. 332.
+
+[4] See below, _De Trin_. vi. _ad fin_.
+
+[5] Cp. L. Baur, _Gundissalinus: de divisione_, Münster, 1905.
+
+[6] Mr. G. Bayley Dolson suggests with greater probability that I.T. was
+John Thorpe (fl. 1570-1610), architect to Thomas Sackville, Earl of Dorset.
+Cf. _American Journal of Philology_, vol. xlii. (1921), p. 266.
+
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+_Editio Princeps_:
+
+  Collected Works (except _De fide catholica_). Joh. et Greg. de
+  Gregoriis. Venice, 1491-92.
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_. Coburger. Nürnberg, 1473.
+
+  _De fide catholica_. Ed. Ren. Vallinus. Leyden, 1656.
+
+_Latest Critical Edition_:
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_ and Theological Tractates. R.
+  Peiper. Teubner, 1871.
+
+_Translations_:
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_.
+
+  Alfred the Great. Ed. W.J. Sedgefield. Oxford, 1899 and 1900.
+
+  Chaucer. Ed. W.W. Skeat in Chaucer's Complete Works. Vol. ii. Oxford,
+  1894.
+
+  H.R. James. _The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius_. London,
+  1897; reprinted 1906.
+
+  Judicis de Mirandol. _La Consolation philosophique de Boëce_.
+  Paris, 1861.
+
+_Illustrative Works_:
+
+  A. Engelbrecht. _Die Consolatio Phil. der B._ Sitzungsberichte der
+  Kön. Akad. Vienna, 1902.
+
+  Bardenhewer, _Patrologie_ (Boethius und Cassiodor, pp. 584 sqq.).
+  Freiburg im Breslau, 1894.
+
+  Hauréan. _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique._ Vol. i. Paris,
+  1872.
+
+  Hildebrand. _Boethius und seine Stellung zum Christentum._
+  Regensburg, 1885.
+
+  Hodgkin. _Italy and her Invaders._ Vols. iii. and iv. Oxford, 1885.
+
+  Ch. Jourdain. (1) _De l'origine des traditions sur le christianisme de
+  Boëce_; (2) _Des commentaires inédits sur La Consolation de la
+  philosophie_. (Excursions historiques et philosophiques à travers le
+  moyen àge.) Paris, 1888.
+
+  Fritz Klingner. _De Boethii consolatione_, Philol. Unters. xxvii.
+  Berlin, 1921.
+
+  F.D. Maurice. _Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy._ Vol. i. London,
+  1872.
+
+  F. Nitzsch. _Das System des B._ Berlin, 1860.
+
+  E.K. Rand. _Der dem B. zugeschriebene Traktat de Fide catholica_
+  (Jahrbuch für kl. Phil. xxvi.). 1901.
+
+  Semeria. _Il Cristianesimo di Sev. Boezio rivendicato_, Rome, 1900.
+
+  M. Schanz. _Gesch. der röm. Litteratur._ Teil iv. Boethius. Berlin,
+  1921.
+
+  H.F. Stewart. _Boethius: an Essay._ Edinburgh, 1891.
+
+  Usener. _Anecdoton Holderi._ Leipsic, 1877.
+
+
+
+
+BOETHIUS
+
+
+THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+AND THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+INCIPIT LIBER QVOMODO
+TRINITAS VNVS DEVS
+AC NON TRES DII
+
+AD Q. AVRELIVM MEMMIVM SYMMACHVM
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. ATQVE PATRICIVM SOCERVM
+
+Investigatam diutissime quaestionem, quantum nostrae mentis igniculum lux
+diuina dignata est, formatam rationibus litterisque mandatam offerendam
+uobis communicandamque curaui tam uestri cupidus iudicii quam nostri
+studiosus inuenti. Qua in re quid mihi sit animi quotiens stilo cogitata
+commendo, tum ex ipsa materiae difficultate tum ex eo quod raris id est
+uobis tantum conloquor, intellegi potest. Neque enim famae iactatione et
+inanibus uulgi clamoribus excitamur; sed si quis est fructus exterior, hic
+non potest aliam nisi materiae similem sperare sententiam. Quocumque igitur
+a uobis deieci oculos, partim ignaua segnities partim callidus liuor
+occurrit, ut contumeliam uideatur diuinis tractatibus inrogare qui talibus
+hominum monstris non agnoscenda haec potius quam proculcanda proiecerit.
+Idcirco stilum breuitate contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae
+disciplinis nouorum uerborum significationibus uelo, ut haec mihi tantum
+uobisque, si quando ad ea conuertitis oculos, conloquantur; ceteros uero
+ita submouimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiuerint ad ea etiam legenda
+uideantur indigni. Sane[7] tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae
+rationis intuitus ad diuinitatis ualet celsa conscendere. Nam ceteris
+quoque artibus idem quasi quidam finis est constitutus, quousque potest uia
+rationis accedere. Neque enim medicina aegris semper affert salutem; sed
+nulla erit culpa medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri oportebat omiserit.
+Idemque in ceteris. At quantum haec difficilior quaestio est, tam facilior
+esse debet ad ueniam. Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est, an ex beati
+Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos uenientia fructus
+extulerint. Ac de proposita quaestione hinc sumamus initium.
+
+
+[7] sed ne _codices optimi_.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE TRINITY IS ONE GOD NOT THREE GODS
+
+  A TREATISE BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE
+  ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO HIS FATHER-IN-LAW, QUINTUS AURELIUS MEMMIUS SYMMACHUS
+  MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  I have long pondered this problem with such mind as I have and all the
+  light that God has lent me. Now, having set it forth in logical order
+  and cast it into literary form, I venture to submit it to your judgment,
+  for which I care as much as for the results of my own research. You will
+  readily understand what I feel whenever I try to write down what I think
+  if you consider the difficulty of the topic and the fact that I discuss
+  it only with the few--I may say with no one but yourself. It is indeed
+  no desire for fame or empty popular applause that prompts my pen; if
+  there be any external reward, we may not look for more warmth in the
+  verdict than the subject itself arouses. For, apart from yourself,
+  wherever I turn my eyes, they fall on either the apathy of the dullard
+  or the jealousy of the shrewd, and a man who casts his thoughts before
+  the common herd--I will not say to consider but to trample under foot,
+  would seem to bring discredit on the study of divinity. So I purposely
+  use brevity and wrap up the ideas I draw from the deep questionings of
+  philosophy in new and unaccustomed words which speak only to you and to
+  myself, that is, if you deign to look at them. The rest of the world I
+  simply disregard: they cannot understand, and therefore do not deserve
+  to read. We should not of course press our inquiry further than man's
+  wit and reason are allowed to climb the height of heavenly knowledge.[8]
+  In all the liberal arts we see the same limit set beyond which reason
+  may not reach. Medicine, for instance, does not always bring health to
+  the sick, though the doctor will not be to blame if he has left nothing
+  undone which he ought to do. So with the other arts. In the present case
+  the very difficulty of the quest claims a lenient judgment. You must
+  however examine whether the seeds sown in my mind by St. Augustine's
+  writings[9] have borne fruit. And now let us begin our inquiry.
+
+
+  [8] Cf. the discussion of human _ratio_ and divine _intellegentia_ in
+  _Cons. v._ pr. 4 and 5.
+
+  [9] e.g. Aug. _De Trin._
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Christianae religionis reuerentiam plures usurpant, sed ea fides pollet
+maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter uniuersalium praecepta regularum,
+quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius
+cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanauit, catholica uel uniuersalis
+uocatur. Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate sententia est: "Pater," inquiunt,
+"deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus." Igitur pater filius spiritus
+sanctus unus non tres dii. Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. Eos
+enim differentia comitatur qui uel augent uel minuunt, ut Arriani qui
+gradibus meritorum trinitatem uariantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem
+diducunt. Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; praeter alteritatem
+enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest. Trium namque rerum uel
+quotlibet tum genere tum specie tum numero diuersitas constat; quotiens
+enim idem dicitur, totiens diuersum etiam praedicatur. Idem uero dicitur
+tribus modis: aut genere ut idem homo quod equus, quia his idem genus ut
+animal; uel specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo;
+uel numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diuersum etiam
+uel genere uel specie uel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam
+accidentium uarietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque specie sed
+suis accidentibus distant; nam uel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia
+separemus, tamen locus cunctis diuersus est quem unum fingere nullo modo
+possumus; duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens.
+Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  There are many who claim as theirs the dignity of the Christian
+  religion; but that form of faith is valid and only valid which, both on
+  account of the universal character of the rules and doctrines affirming
+  its authority, and because the worship in which they are expressed has
+  spread throughout the world, is called catholic or universal. The belief
+  of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as follows: the
+  Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore Father,
+  Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three Gods. The principle of this
+  union is absence of difference[10]: difference cannot be avoided by
+  those who add to or take from the Unity, as for instance the Arians,
+  who, by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break it up and
+  convert it to Plurality. For the essence of plurality is otherness;
+  apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. In fact, the
+  difference between three or more things lies in genus or species or
+  number. Difference is the necessary correlative of sameness. Sameness is
+  predicated in three ways: By genus; e.g. a man and a horse, because of
+  their common genus, animal. By species; e.g. Cato and Cicero, because of
+  their common species, man. By number; e.g. Tully and Cicero, because
+  they are numerically one. Similarly difference is expressed by genus,
+  species, and number. Now numerical difference is caused by variety of
+  accidents; three men differ neither by genus nor species but by their
+  accidents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents,[11]
+  still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be
+  regarded as the same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same
+  place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural
+  by their accidents that they are plural in number.
+
+
+  [10] The terms _differentia, numerus, species,_ are used expertly, as
+  would be expected of the author of the _In Isag. Porph. Commenta._ See
+  S. Brandt's edition of that work (in the Vienna _Corpus_, 1906), s.v.
+  _differentia,_ etc.
+
+  [11] This method of mental abstraction is employed more elaborately in
+  _Tr._ iii. (_vide infra_, p. 44) and in _Cons._ v. pr. 4, where the
+  notion of divine foreknowledge is abstracted in imagination.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut intellegi atque capi potest
+dispiciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum uidetur, eruditi est hominis unum
+quodque ut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare.
+
+Nam cum tres sint speculatiuae partes, _naturalis_, in motu
+inabstracta [Greek: anupexairetos] (considerat enim corporum formas cum
+materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu
+sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma
+materiae coniuncta), _mathematica_, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim
+formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae
+cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), _theologica_, sine
+motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu
+caret), in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis
+disciplinaliter, in diuinis intellectualiter uersari oportebit neque diduci
+ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae uere forma neque
+imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex
+forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia, sed secundum
+formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non
+secundum terram quod est eius materia, sed dicitur secundum aeris figuram.
+Terra quoque ipsa non secundum [Greek: apoion hulaen] dicitur, sed secundum
+siccitatem grauitatemque quae sunt formae. Nihil igitur secundum materiam
+esse dicitur sed secundum propriam formam. Sed diuina substantia sine
+materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt
+id quod sunt. Vnum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id
+est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae,
+sed non hoc uel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima
+corporeque, corpus et anima est, non uel corpus uel anima in partem; igitur
+non est id quod est. Quod uero non est ex hoc atque hoc, sed tantum est
+hoc, illud uere est id quod est; et est pulcherrimum fortissimumque quia
+nullo nititur. Quocirca hoc uere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo
+aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subiectum fieri potest; forma
+enim est, formae uero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod ceterae formae
+subiectae accidentibus sunt ut humanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo
+quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est; dum enim materia
+subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere uidetur
+humanitas. Forma uero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subiectum nec
+uero inesse materiae, neque enim esset forma sed imago. Ex his enim formis
+quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae uenerunt quae sunt in materia et
+corpus efficiunt. Nam ceteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur formas
+uocantes, dum imagines sint. Adsimulantur enim formis his quae non sunt in
+materia constitutae. Nulla igitur in eo diuersitas, nulla ex diuersitate
+pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo atque idcirco nec numerus.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  We will now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far
+  as they can be grasped and understood; for it has been wisely said,[12]
+  in my opinion, that it is a scholar's duty to formulate his belief about
+  anything according to its real nature.
+
+  Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds[13]: Physics,
+  Mathematics, and Theology. Physics deals with motion and is not abstract
+  or separable (i.e. [Greek: anupexairetos]); for it is concerned with the
+  forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms
+  cannot be separated in reality from their bodies.[14] As the bodies are
+  in motion--the earth, for instance, tending downwards, and fire tending
+  upwards, form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it
+  is annexed.
+
+  Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it
+  investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from
+  movement, which forms, however, being connected with matter cannot be
+  really separated from bodies.
+
+  Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable, for
+  the Divine Substance is without either matter or motion. In Physics,
+  then, we are bound to use scientific, in Mathematics, systematical, in
+  Theology, intellectual concepts; and in Theology we will not let
+  ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations, but will simply
+  apprehend that Form which is pure form and no image, which is very Being
+  and the source of Being. For everything owes its being to Form. Thus a
+  statue is not a statue on account of the brass which is its matter, but
+  on account of the form whereby the likeness of a living thing is
+  impressed upon it: the brass itself is not brass because of the earth
+  which is its matter, but because of its form. Likewise earth is not
+  earth by reason of unqualified matter,[15] but by reason of dryness and
+  weight, which are forms. So nothing is said to be because it has matter,
+  but because it has a distinctive form. But the Divine Substance is Form
+  without matter, and is therefore One, and is its own essence. But other
+  things are not simply their own essences, for each thing has its being
+  from the things of which it is composed, that is, from its parts. It is
+  This _and_ That, i.e. it is the totality of its parts in
+  conjunction; it is not This _or_ That taken apart. Earthly man, for
+  instance, since he consists of soul and body, is soul _and_ body,
+  not soul _or_ body, separately; therefore he is not his own
+  essence. That on the other hand which does not consist of This and That,
+  but is only This, is really its own essence, and is altogether beautiful
+  and stable because it is not grounded in anything. Wherefore that is
+  truly One in which is no number, in which nothing is present except its
+  own essence. Nor can it become the substrate of anything, for it is pure
+  Form, and pure Forms cannot be substrates.[16] For if humanity, like
+  other forms, is a substrate for accidents, it does not receive accidents
+  through the fact that it exists, but through the fact that matter is
+  subjected to it. Humanity appears indeed to appropriate the accident
+  which in reality belongs to the matter underlying the conception
+  Humanity. But Form which is without matter cannot be a substrate, and
+  cannot have its essence in matter, else it would not be form but a
+  reflexion. For from those forms which are outside matter come the forms
+  which are in matter and produce bodies. We misname the entities that
+  reside in bodies when we call them forms; they are mere images; they
+  only resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter. In Him,
+  then, is no difference, no plurality arising out of difference, no
+  multiplicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number.
+
+
+  [12] By Cicero (_Tusc_. v. 7. 19).
+
+  [13] Cf. the similar division of philosophy in _Isag. Porph_. ed. Brandt,
+  pp. 7 ff.
+
+  [14] _Sb_. though they may be separated in thought.
+
+  [15] [Greek: Apoios hulae] = [Greek: to amorphon, to aeides] of
+  Aristotle. Cf. [Greek: oute gar hulae to eidos (hae men apoios, to de
+  poiotaes tis) oute ex hulaes] (Alexander Aphrod. _De Anima_, 17. 17);
+  [Greek: ei de touto, apoios de hae hulae, apoion an eiae soma] (id. _De
+  anima libri mantissa_, 124. 7).
+
+  [16] This is Realism. Cf. "Sed si rerum ueritatem atque integritatem
+  perpendas, non est dubium quin uerae sint. Nam cum res omnes quae uerae
+  sunt sine his quinque (i.e. genus species differentia propria
+  accidentia) esse non possint, has ipsas quinque res uere intellectas
+  esse non dubites." _Isag., Porph. ed, pr._ i. (M. _P.L._ lxiv. col. 19,
+  Brandt, pp. 26 ff.). The two passages show that Boethius is definitely
+  committed to the Realistic position, although in his _Comment. in
+  Porphyr. a se translatum_ he holds the scales between Plato and
+  Aristotle, "quorum diiudicare sententias aptum esse non duxi" (cp.
+  Hauréau, _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique_, i. 120). As a fact in
+  the _Comment. in Porph._ he merely postpones the question, which in the
+  _De Trin._ he settles. Boethius was ridiculed in the Middle Ages for his
+  caution.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Deus uero a deo nullo differt, ne uel accidentibus uel substantialibus
+differentiis in subiecto positis distent. Vbi uero nulla est differentia,
+nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum. Nam
+quod tertio repetitur deus, cum pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus
+nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsae
+sunt, si aduertamus ad res numerabiles ac non ad ipsum numerum. Illic enim
+unitatum repetitio numerum facit. In eo autem numero qui in rebus
+numerabilibus constat, repetitio unitatum atque pluralitas minime facit
+numerabilium rerum numerosam diuersitatem. Numerus enim duplex est, unus
+quidem quo numeramus, alter uero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat. Etenim
+unum res est; unitas, quo unum dicimus. Duo rursus in rebus sunt ut homines
+uel lapides; dualitas nihil, sed tantum dualitas qua duo homines uel duo
+lapides fiunt. Et in ceteris eodem modo. Ergo in numero quo numeramus
+repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum uero numero non facit
+pluralitatem unitatum repetitio, uel si de eodem dicam "gladius unus mucro
+unus ensis unus." Potest enim unus tot uocabulis gladius agnosci; haec enim
+unitatum iteratio potius est non numeratio, uelut si ita dicamus "ensis
+mucro gladius," repetitio quaedam est eiusdem non numeratio diuersorum,
+uelut si dicam "sol sol sol," non tres soles effecerim, sed de uno totiens
+praedicauerim.
+
+Non igitur si de patre ac filio et spiritu sancto tertio praedicatur deus,
+idcirco trina praedicatio numerum facit. Hoc enim illis ut dictum est
+imminet qui inter eos distantiam faciunt meritorum. Catholicis uero nihil
+in differentia constituentibus ipsamque formam ut est esse ponentibus neque
+aliud esse quam est ipsum quod est opinantibus recte repetitio de eodem
+quam enumeratio diuersi uidetur esse cum dicitur "deus pater deus filius
+deus spiritus sanctus atque haec trinitas unus deus," uelut "ensis atque
+mucro unus gladius," uelut "sol sol sol unus sol."
+
+Sed hoc interim ad eam dictum sit significationem demonstrationemque qua
+ostenditur non omnem unitatum repetitionem numerum pluralitatemque
+perficere. Non uero ita dicitur "pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus" quasi
+multiuocum quiddam; nam mucro et ensis et ipse est et idem, pater uero ac
+filius et spiritus sanctus idem equidem est, non uero ipse. In qua re
+paulisper considerandum est. Requirentibus enim: "Ipse est pater qui
+filius?" "Minime," inquiunt. Rursus: "Idem alter qui alter?" Negatur. Non
+est igitur inter eos in re omni indifferentia; quare subintrat numerus quem
+ex subiectorum diuersitate confici superius explanatum est. De qua re
+breuite*r considerabimus, si prius illud, quem ad modum de deo unum quodque
+praedicatur, praemiserimus.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Now God differs from God in no respect, for there cannot be divine
+  essences distinguished either by accidents or by substantial differences
+  belonging to a substrate. But where there is no difference, there is no
+  sort of plurality and accordingly no number; here, therefore, is unity
+  alone. For whereas we say God thrice when we name the Father, Son, and
+  Holy Spirit, these three unities do not produce a plurality of number in
+  their own essences, if we think of what we count instead of what we
+  count with. For in the case of abstract number a repetition of single
+  items does produce plurality; but in the case of concrete number the
+  repetition and plural use of single items does not by any means produce
+  numerical difference in the objects counted. There are as a fact two
+  kinds of number. There is the number with which we count (abstract) and
+  the number inherent in the things counted (concrete). "One" is a thing--
+  the thing counted. Unity is that by which oneness is denoted. Again
+  "two" belongs to the class of things as men or stones; but not so
+  duality; duality is merely that whereby two men or two stones are
+  denoted; and so on. Therefore a repetition of unities[17] produces
+  plurality when it is a question of abstract, but not when it is a
+  question of concrete things, as, for example, if I say of one and the
+  same thing, "one sword, one brand, one blade."[18]  It is easy to see
+  that each of these names denotes a sword; I am not numbering unities but
+  simply repeating one thing, and in saying "sword, brand, blade," I
+  reiterate the one thing and do not enumerate several different things
+  any more than I produce three suns instead of merely mentioning one
+  thing thrice when I say "Sun, Sun, Sun."
+
+  So then if God be predicated thrice of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
+  threefold predication does not result in plural number. The risk of
+  that, as has been said, attends only on those who distinguish Them
+  according to merit. But Catholic Christians, allowing no difference of
+  merit in God, assuming Him to be Pure Form and believing Him to be
+  nothing else than His own essence, rightly regard the statement "the
+  Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and this Trinity
+  is one God," not as an enumeration of different things but as a
+  reiteration of one and the same thing, like the statement, "blade and
+  brand are one sword" or "sun, sun, and sun are one sun."
+
+  Let this be enough for the present to establish my meaning and to show
+  that not every repetition of units produces number and plurality. Still
+  in saying "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," we are not using synonymous
+  terms. "Brand and blade" are the same and identical, but "Father, Son,
+  and Holy Spirit," though the same, are not identical. This point
+  deserves a moment's consideration. When they ask "Is the Father the same
+  as the Son?" Catholics answer "No." "Is the One the same as the Other?"
+  The answer is in the negative. There is not, therefore, complete
+  indifference between Them; and so number does come in--number which we
+  explained was the result of diversity of substrates. We will briefly
+  debate this point when we have done examining how particular predicates
+  can be applied to God.
+
+
+  [17] e.g. if I say "one, one, one," I enounce three unities.
+
+  [18] The same words are used to illustrate the same matter in the
+  _Comment. in Arist._ [Greek: peri hermaeneias], 2nd ed. (Meiser) 56. 12.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Decem omnino praedicamenta traduntur quae de rebus omnibus uniuersaliter
+praedicantur, id est substantia, qualitas, quantitas, ad aliquid, ubi,
+quando, habere, situm esse, facere, pati. Haec igitur talis sunt qualia
+subiecta permiserint; nam pars eorum in reliquarum rerum praedicatione
+substantia est, pa*rs in accidentium numero est. At haec cum quis i*n
+diuinam uerterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantu*r quae praedicari possunt.
+Ad aliquid uero omnino non potest praedicari, nam substantia in illo non
+est uere substantia sed ultra substantiam; item qualitas et cetera quae
+uenire queunt. Quorum ut amplior fiat intellectus exempla subdenda sunt.
+
+Nam cum dicimus "deus," substantiam quidem significare uidemur, sed eam
+quae sit ultra substantiam; cum uero "iustus," qualitatem quidem sed non
+accidentem, sed eam quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam. Neque enim
+aliud est quod est, aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse deo quod
+iusto. Item cum dicitur "magnus uel maximus," quantitatem quidem
+significare uidemur, sed eam quae sit ipsa substantia, talis qualem esse
+diximus ultra substantiam; idem est enim esse deo quod magno. De forma enim
+eius superius monstratum est quoniam is sit forma et unum uere nec ulla
+pluralitas. Sed haec praedicamenta talia sunt, ut in quo sint ipsum esse
+faciant quod dicitur, diuise quidem in ceteris, in deo uero coniuncte atque
+copulate hoc modo: nam cum dicimus "substantia" (ut homo uel deus), ita
+dicitur quasi illud de quo praedicatur ipsum sit substantia, ut substantia
+homo uel deus. Sed distat, quoniam homo non integre ipsum homo est ac per
+hoc nec substantia; quod enim est, aliis debet quae non sunt homo. Deus
+uero hoc ipsum deus est; nihil enim aliud est nisi quod est, ac per hoc
+ipsum deus est. Rursus "iustus," quod est qualitas, ita dicitur quasi ipse
+hoc sit de quo praedicatur, id est si dicamus "homo iustus uel deus
+iustus," ipsum hominem uel deum iustos esse proponimus; sed differt, quod
+homo alter alter iustus, deus uero idem ipsum est quod est iustum. "Magnus"
+etiam homo uel deus dicitur atque ita quasi ipse sit homo magnus uel deus
+magnus; sed homo tantum magnus, deus uero ipsum magnus exsistit. Reliqua
+uero neque de deo neque de ceteris praedicantur. Nam ubi uel de homine uel
+de deo praedicari potest, de homine ut in foro, de deo ut ubique, sed ita
+ut non quasi ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur de qua dicitur. Non enim ita
+homo dicitur esse in foro quem ad modum esse albus uel longus nec quasi
+circumfusus et determinatus proprietate aliqua qua designari secundum se
+possit, sed tantum quo sit illud aliis informatum rebus per hanc
+praedicationem ostenditur.
+
+De deo uero non ita, nam quod ubique est ita dici uidetur non quod in omni
+sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest) sed quod omnis ei locus
+adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo
+nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est sed non in loco. "Quando"
+uero eodem praedicatur modo, ut de homine heri uenit, de deo semper est.
+Hic quoque non quasi esse aliquid dicitur illud ipsum de quo hesternus
+dicitur aduentus, sed quid ei secundum tempus accesserit praedicatur. Quod
+uero de deo dicitur "semper est," unum quidem significat, quasi omni
+praeterito fuerit, omni quoquo modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit.
+Quod de caelo et de ceteris inmortalibus corporibus secundum philosophos
+dici potest, at de deo non ita. Semper enim est, quoniam "semper"
+praesentis est in eo temporis tantumque inter nostrarum rerum praesens,
+quod est nunc, interest ac diuinarum, quod nostrum "nunc" quasi currens
+tempus facit et sempiternitatem, diuinum uero "nunc" permanens neque mouens
+sese atque consistens aeternitatem facit; cui nomini si adicias "semper,"
+facies eius quod est nunc iugem indefessumque ac per hoc perpetuum cursum
+quod est sempiternitas.
+
+Rursus habere uel facere eodem modo; dicimus enim "uestitus currit" de
+homine, de deo "cuncta possidens regit." Rursus de eo nihil quod est esse
+de utrisque dictum est, sed haec omnis praedicatio exterioribus datur
+omniaque haec quodam modo referuntur ad aliud. Cuius praedicationis
+differentiam sic facilius internoscimus: qui homo est uel deus refertur ad
+substantiam qua est aliquid, id est homo uel deus; qui iustus est refertur
+ad qualitatem qua scilicet est aliquid, id est iustus, qui magnus ad
+quantitatem qua est aliquid, id est magnus. Nam in ceteris praedicationibus
+nihil tale est. Qui enim dicit esse aliquem in foro uel ubique, refert
+quidem ad praedicamentum quod est ubi, sed non quo aliquid est uelut
+iustitia iustus. Item cum dico "currit" uel "regit" uel "nunc est" uel
+"semper est," refertur quidem uel ad facere uel ad tempus--si tamen interim
+diuinum illud semper tempus dici potest--sed non quo aliquo aliquid est
+uelut magnitudine magnum. Nam situm passionemque requiri in deo non
+oportet, neque enim sunt.
+
+Iamne patet quae sit differentia praedicationum? Quod aliae quidem quasi
+rem monstrant aliae uero quasi circumstantias rei quodque illa quidem[19]
+ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa uero ut non esse, sed
+potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Illa igitur, quae aliquid
+esse designant, secundum rem praedicationes uocentur. Quae cum de rebus
+subiectis dicuntur, uocantur accidentia secundum rem; cum uero de deo qui
+subiectus non est, secundum substantiam rei praedicatio nuncupatur.
+
+
+[19] quidem _vulg._; quae _codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  There are in all ten categories which can be universally predicated of
+  things, namely, Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time,
+  Condition, Situation, Activity, Passivity. Their meaning is determined
+  by the contingent subject; for some of them denote substance in making
+  predication of other things, others belong to the class of accidents.
+  But when these categories are applied to God they change their meaning
+  entirely. Relation, for instance, cannot be predicated at all of God;
+  for substance in Him is not really substantial but supersubstantial. So
+  with quality and the other possible attributes, of which we must add
+  examples for the sake of clearness.
+
+  When we say God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance
+  that is supersubstantial. When we say of Him, "He is just," we mention a
+  quality, not an accidental quality--rather a substantial and, in fact, a
+  supersubstantial quality.[20] For God is not one thing because He is,
+  and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be God
+  are one and the same. So when we say, "He is great or the greatest," we
+  seem to predicate quantity, but it is a quantity similar to this
+  substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with Him to
+  be great and to be God are all one. Again, concerning His Form, we have
+  already shown that He is Form, and truly One without Plurality. The
+  categories we have mentioned are such that they give to the thing to
+  which they are applied the character which they express; in created
+  things they express divided being, in God, conjoined and united being--
+  in the following manner. When we name a substance, as man or God, it
+  seems as though that of which the predication is made were substance
+  itself, as man or God is substance. But there is a difference: since a
+  man is not simply and entirely man, and in virtue of this he is not
+  substance. For what man is he owes to other things which are not man.
+  But God is simply and entirely God, for He is nothing else than what He
+  is, and therefore is, through simple existence, God. Again we apply
+  just, a quality, as though it were that of which it is predicated; that
+  is, if we say "a just man or just God," we assert that man or God is
+  just. But there is a difference, for man is one thing, and a just man is
+  another thing. But God is justice itself. So a man or God is said to be
+  great, and it would appear that man is substantially great or that God
+  is substantially great. But man is merely great; God is greatness.
+
+  The remaining categories are not predicable of God nor yet of created
+  things.[21]  For place is predicated of man or of God--a man is in the
+  market-place; God is everywhere--but in neither case is the predicate
+  identical with the object of predication. To say "A man is in the
+  market" is quite a different thing from saying "he is white or long,"
+  or, so to speak, encompassed and determined by some property which
+  enables him to be described in terms of his substance; this predicate of
+  place simply declares how far his substance is given a particular
+  setting amid other things.
+
+  It is otherwise, of course, with God. "He is everywhere" does not mean
+  that He is in every place, for He cannot be in any place at all--but
+  that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, although He
+  Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot anywhere be
+  in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. It is the same with
+  the category of time, as, "A man came yesterday; God is ever." Here
+  again the predicate of "coming yesterday" denotes not something
+  substantial, but something happening in terms of time. But the
+  expression "God is ever" denotes a single Present, summing up His
+  continual presence in all the past, in all the present--however that
+  term be used--and in all the future. Philosophers say that "ever" may be
+  applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal bodies. But as
+  applied to God it has a different meaning. He is ever, because "ever" is
+  with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference
+  between "now," which is our present, and the divine present. Our present
+  connotes changing time and sempiternity; God's present, abiding,
+  unmoved, and immoveable, connotes eternity. Add _semper_ to
+  _eternity_ and you get the constant, incessant and thereby
+  perpetual course of our present time, that is to say, sempiternity.[22]
+
+  It is just the same with the categories of condition and activity. For
+  example, we say "A man runs, clothed," "God rules, possessing all
+  things." Here again nothing substantial is asserted of either subject;
+  in fact all the categories we have hitherto named arise from what lies
+  outside substance, and all of them, so to speak, refer to something
+  other than substance. The difference between the categories is easily
+  seen by an example. Thus, the terms "man" and "God" refer to the
+  substance in virtue of which the subject is--man or God. The term "just"
+  refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz.
+  just; the term "great" to the quantity in virtue of which He is
+  something, viz. great. No other category save substance, quality, and
+  quantity refer to the substance of the subject. If I say of one "he is
+  in the market" or "everywhere," I am applying the category of place,
+  which is not a category of the substance, like "just" in virtue of
+  justice. So if I say, "he runs, He rules, he is now, He is ever," I make
+  reference to activity or time--if indeed God's "ever" can be described
+  as time--but not to a category of substance, like "great" in virtue of
+  greatness.
+
+  Finally, we must not look for the categories of situation and passivity
+  in God, for they simply are not to be found in Him.
+
+  Have I now made clear the difference between the categories? Some denote
+  the reality of a thing; others its accidental circumstances; the former
+  declare that a thing is something; the latter say nothing about its
+  being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak, something
+  external. Those categories which describe a thing in terms of its
+  substance may be called substantial categories; when they apply to
+  things as subjects they are called accidents. In reference to God, who
+  is not a subject at all, it is only possible to employ the category of
+  substance.
+
+
+  [20] Gilbert de la Porrée in his commentary on the _De Trin._ makes
+  Boethius's meaning clear. "Quod igitur in illo substantiam nominamus,
+  non est subiectionis ratione quod dicitur, sed ultra omnem quae
+  accidentibus est subiecta substantiam est essentia, absque omnibus quae
+  possunt accidere solitaria omnino." (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 1283). Cf. Aug.
+  _De Trin._ vii. 10.
+
+  [21] i.e. according to their substance.
+
+  [22] The doctrine is Augustine's, cf. _De Ciu. Dei_, xi. 6, xii. 16; but
+  Boethius's use of _sempiternitas_, as well as his word-building, seem to
+  be peculiar to himself. Claudianus Mamertus, speaking of applying the
+  categories to God, uses _sempiternitas_ as Boethius uses _aeternitas_.
+  Cf. _De Statu Animae_ i. 19. Apuleius seems to use both terms
+  interchangeably, e.g. _Asclep._ 29-31. On Boethius's distinction between
+  time and eternity see _Cons._ v. pr. 6, and Rand, _i er dem B. zugeschr.
+  Trakt. de fide_, pp. 425 ff, and Brandt in _Theol. Littzg._, 1902, p.
+  147.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Age nunc de relatiuis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus
+ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non uidentur secundum se facere
+praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno aduentu constare perspiciuntur. Age
+enim, quoniam dominus ac seruus relatiua sunt, uideamus utrumne ita sit ut
+secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas seruum, abstuleris
+et dominum; at non etiam si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque album, sed
+interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata perit nimirum album. At in
+domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non
+accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus
+coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato deperit seruo, constat non eam per se
+domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum.
+
+Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relatiuam quidquam rei de qua dicitur
+secundum se uel addere uel minuere uel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod est
+esse consistit, sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere,
+nec semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei
+igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod
+ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister
+accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter uelut albus ac
+longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me
+est minime uero ex sese.
+
+Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non
+faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare uel mutare queunt nullamque omnino
+uariare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque
+aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio uero non
+praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua
+dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest,
+quo quidem modo id quod uix intellegi potuit interpretatum est, personarum.
+Omnino enim magna regulae est ueritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias
+effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut
+pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis
+quidem ei est productio filii, relatiua uero praedicatio patris. Ac si
+meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus
+processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritum
+sanctum; hos, quoniam incorporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam uero
+pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus uero nullas habet
+differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae
+uero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas.
+Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et in rebus numerabilibus
+repetitio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem.  Trium igitur
+idonee constituta est unitas.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing
+  remarks have been preliminary; for qualities which obviously arise from
+  the association of another term do not appear to predicate anything
+  concerning the substance of a subject. For instance, master and
+  slave[23] are relative terms; let us see whether either of them are
+  predicates of substance. If you suppress the term slave,[24] you
+  simultaneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you
+  suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,[25]
+  though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in
+  the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental
+  quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term
+  slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental
+  quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the
+  power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when
+  the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the
+  substance of master, but is an adventitious augmentation arising from
+  the possession of slaves.
+
+  It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases,
+  decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it
+  is applied. The category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the
+  essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and
+  that not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject
+  itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and
+  stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is
+  left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again,
+  if I come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not
+  because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because
+  he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me,
+  and not in the least on the essence of his being.
+
+  Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of
+  a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way.
+  Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have
+  said, have no other difference but that of relation, and if relation is
+  not asserted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its
+  substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject,
+  but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly
+  understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth
+  that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences
+  and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that God became Father
+  by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to
+  be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very substance;
+  however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in
+  mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous
+  discussion, we shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the
+  Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be
+  spatially different, since They are incorporeal. But since the Father is
+  God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and since there are in
+  God no points of difference distinguishing Him from God, He differs from
+  none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no
+  plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God
+  can be begotten of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the
+  repetition of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the
+  Three is suitably established.
+
+
+  [23] _Dominus_ and _seruus_ are similarly used as illustration, _In
+  Cat._ (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 217).
+
+  [24] i.e. which is external to the master.
+
+  [25] i.e. which is external to the whitened thing.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea
+secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est
+trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, seruata uero
+unitas in eo quod est indifferentia uel substantiae uel operationis uel
+omnino eius quae secundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur substantia
+continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem; atque ideo sola
+singillatim proferuntur atque separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem
+pater qui filius non est nec idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tamen
+deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem
+magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. Sane sciendum est
+non semper talem esse relatiuam praedicationem, ut semper ad differens
+praedicetur, ut est seruus ad dominum; differunt enim. Nam omne aequale
+aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem
+idem est; et similis est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque
+ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem. Quod si id
+in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inueniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus
+alteritas. Nos uero nulla imaginatione diduci sed simplici intellectu erigi
+et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.
+
+Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc uestri normam iudicii
+exspectat subtilitas quaestionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime,
+uestrae statuet pronuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei
+fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitulante gratia diuina idonea argumentorum
+adiumenta praestitimus, illuc perfecti operis laetitia remeabit unde uenit
+effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas nequiuit ascendere, quantum
+inbecillitas subtrahit uota supplebunt.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  But since no relation can be affirmed of one subject alone, since a
+  predication referring to one substance is a predication without
+  relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is secured through the
+  category of relation, and the Unity is maintained through the fact that
+  there is no difference of substance, or operation, or generally of any
+  substantial predicate. So then, the category of substance preserves the
+  Unity, that of relation brings about the Trinity. Hence only terms
+  belonging to relation may be applied singly to Each. For the Father is
+  not the same as the Son, nor is either of Them the same as the Holy
+  Spirit. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each the same God, the same
+  in justice, in goodness, in greatness, and in everything that can be
+  predicated of substance. One must not forget that predicates of
+  relativity do not always involve relation to something other than the
+  subject, as slave involves master, where the two terms are different.
+  For equals are equal, like are like, identicals are identical, each with
+  other, and the relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is
+  a relation of identicals. A relation of this kind is not to be found in
+  created things, but that is because of the difference which we know
+  attaches to transient objects. We must not in speaking of God let
+  imagination lead us astray; we must let the Faculty of pure Knowledge
+  lift us up and teach us to know all things as far as they may be
+  known.[26]
+
+  I have now finished the investigation which I proposed. The exactness of
+  my reasoning awaits the standard of your judgment; your authority will
+  pronounce whether I have seen a straight path to the goal. If, God
+  helping me, I have furnished some support in argument to an article
+  which stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith, I shall render
+  joyous praise for the finished work to Him from whom the invitation
+  comes. But if human nature has failed to reach beyond its limits,
+  whatever is lost through my infirmity must be made good by my intention.
+
+
+  [26] Cf. _Cons._ v. pr. 4 and 5, especially in pr. 5 the passage "quare
+  in illius summae intellegentiae acumen si possumus erigamur."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+AD IOHANNEM DIACONVM
+
+VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS ET SPIRITVS
+SANCTVS DE DIVINITATE SVBSTANTIALITER
+PRAEDICENTVR
+
+Quaero an pater et filius ac spiritus sanctus de diuinitate substantialiter
+praedicentur an alio quolibet modo; uiamque indaginis hinc arbitror esse
+sumendam, unde rerum omnium manifestum constat exordium, id est ab ipsis
+catholicae fidei fundamentis. Si igitur interrogem, an qui dicitur pater
+substantia sit, respondetur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius
+substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo
+dubitauerit. Sed cum rursus colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non
+plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Vna igitur substantia trium nec
+separari ullo modo aut disiungi potest nec uelut partibus in unum coniuncta
+est, sed est una simpliciter. Quaecumque igitur de diuina substantia
+praedicantur, ea tribus oportet esse communia; idque signi erit quae sint
+quae de diuinitatis substantia praedicentur, quod quaecumque hoc modo
+dicuntur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singulariter praedicabuntur.
+Hoc modo si dicimus: "Pater deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus
+deus est," pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una
+deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de diuinitate substantialiter
+praedicari.
+
+Ita pater ueritas est, filius ueritas est, spiritus sanctus ueritas est;
+pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres ueritates sed una ueritas est. Si
+igitur una in his substantia una est ueritas, necesse est ueritatem
+substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incommutabilitate de iustitia de
+omnipotentia ac de ceteris omnibus quae tam de singulis quam de omnibus
+singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substantialiter dici. Vnde apparet
+ea quae cum in singulis separatim dici conuenit nec tamen in omnibus dici
+queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; qui uero iste sit,
+posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc uocabulum non transmittit ad
+filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantiale nomen hoc
+inditum; nam si substantiale esset, ut deus ut ueritas ut iustitia ut ipsa
+quoque substantia, de ceteris diceretur.
+
+Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque cum aliis iungit sicut in deo,
+sicut in ueritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non
+est idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus patrem ac filium
+ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa diuinitate substantialiter dici sed alio
+quodam modo; si enim substantialiter praedicaretur, et de singulis et de
+omnibus singulariter diceretur. Haec uero ad aliquid dici manifestum est;
+nam et pater alicuius pater est et filius alicuius filius est, spiritus
+alicuius spiritus. Quo fit, ut ne trinitas quidem substantialiter de deo
+praedicetur; non enim pater trinitas (qui enim pater est, filius ac
+spiritus sanctus non est) nec trinitas filius nec trinitas spiritus sanctus
+secundum eundem modum, sed trinitas quidem in personarum pluralitate
+consistit, unitas uero in substantiae simplicitate.
+
+Quod si personae diuisae sunt, substantia uero indiuisa sit, necesse est
+quod uocabulum ex personis originem capit id ad substantiam non pertinere;
+at trinitatem personarum diuersitas fecit, trinitas igitur non pertinet ad
+substantiam. Quo fit ut neque pater neque filius neque spiritus sanctus
+neque trinitas de deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed ut dictum est ad
+aliquid. Deus uero ueritas iustitia bonitas omnipotentia substantia
+inmutabilitas uirtus sapientia et quicquid huiusmodi excogitari potest
+substantialiter de diuinitate dicuntur. Haec si se recte et ex fide habent,
+ut me instruas peto; aut si aliqua re forte diuersus es, diligentius
+intuere quae dicta sunt et fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS
+
+  MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO JOHN THE DEACON
+
+  WHETHER FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT MAY BE SUBSTANTIALLY PREDICATED OF
+  THE DIVINITY
+
+  The question before us is whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be
+  predicated of the Divinity substantially or otherwise. And I think that
+  the method of our inquiry must be borrowed from what is admittedly the
+  surest source of all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the
+  catholic faith. If, then, I ask whether He who is called Father is a
+  substance, the answer will be yes. If I ask whether the Son is a
+  substance, the reply will be the same. So, too, no one will hesitate to
+  affirm that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other
+  hand, I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
+  result is not three substances but one substance. The one substance of
+  the Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made up of
+  various parts, combined into one: it is simply one. Everything,
+  therefore, that is affirmed of the divine substance must be common to
+  the Three, and we can recognize what predicates may be affirmed of the
+  substance of the godhead by this sign, that all those which are affirmed
+  of it may also be affirmed severally of each of the Three combined into
+  one. For instance if we say "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the
+  Holy Spirit is God," then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If
+  then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right
+  be predicated substantially of the Divinity.
+
+  Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is
+  truth; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth.
+  If, then, they are one substance and one truth, truth must of necessity
+  be a substantial predicate. So Goodness, Immutability, Justice,
+  Omnipotence and all the other predicates which we apply to the Persons
+  singly and collectively are plainly substantial predicates. Hence it
+  appears that what may be predicated of each single One but not of all
+  Three is not a substantial predicate, but of another kind--of what kind
+  I will examine presently. For He who is Father does not transmit this
+  name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name
+  is not attached to Him as something substantial; for if it were a
+  substantial predicate, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it
+  would be affirmed of the other Persons.
+
+  Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does He associate it
+  with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the
+  other predicates which I have already mentioned. The Spirit too is not
+  the same as the Father and the Son. Hence we gather that Father, Son,
+  and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the Divinity in a substantial
+  manner, but otherwise.[27] For if each term were predicated
+  substantially it would be affirmed of the three Persons both separately
+  and collectively. It is evident that these terms are relative, for the
+  Father is some one's Father, the Son is some one's Son, the Spirit is
+  some one's Spirit. Hence not even Trinity may be substantially[28]
+  predicated of God; for the Father is not Trinity--since He who is Father
+  is not Son and Holy Spirit--nor yet, by parity of reasoning, is the Son
+  Trinity nor the Holy Spirit Trinity, but the Trinity consists in
+  diversity of Persons, the Unity in simplicity of substance.
+
+  Now if the Persons are separate, while the Substance is undivided, it
+  must needs be that that term which is derived from Persons does not
+  belong to Substance. But the Trinity is effected by diversity of
+  Persons, wherefore Trinity does not belong to Substance. Hence neither
+  Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity can be substantially
+  predicated of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, Truth,
+  Justice, Goodness, Omnipotence, Substance, Immutability, Virtue, Wisdom
+  and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are applicable
+  substantially to divinity.
+
+  If I am right and speak in accordance with the Faith, I pray you confirm
+  me. But if you are in any point of another opinion, examine carefully
+  what I have said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason.[29]
+
+
+  [27] i.e. _personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
+
+  [28] i.e. _sed personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
+
+  [29] _Vide supra_, Introduction, p. xii.
+
+
+
+
+ITEM EIVSDEM
+AD EVNDEM
+
+QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE IN EO QVOD
+SINT BONAE SINT CVM NON SINT
+SVBSTANTIALIA BONA
+
+Postulas, ut ex Hebdomadibus nostris eius quaestionis obscuritatem quae
+continet modum quo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, cum non sint
+substantialia bona, digeram et paulo euidentius monstrem; idque eo dicis
+esse faciendum, quod non sit omnibus notum iter huiusmodi scriptionum. Tuus
+uero testis ipse sum quam haec uiuaciter fueris ante complexus. Hebdomadas
+uero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conseruo
+quam cuiquam participo quorum lasciuia ac petulantia nihil a ioco risuque
+patitur esse seiunctum.[30] Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus breuitatis
+aduersus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia tum id habent commodi, quod
+cum his solis qui digni sunt conloquuntur. Vt igitur in mathematica fieri
+solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus
+cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam.
+
+I. Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam.
+Harum duplex modus est. Nam una ita communis est, ut omnium sit hominum,
+ueluti si hanc proponas: "Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae
+relinquantur aequalia esse," nullus id intellegens neget. Alia uero est
+doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus uenit,
+ut est: "Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse," et cetera; quae non
+uulgus sed docti comprobant.
+
+II. Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at uero
+quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.
+
+III. Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo
+participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid,
+cum esse susceperit.
+
+IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum
+uero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
+
+V. Diuersum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic
+enim accidens hic substantia significatur.
+
+VI. Omne quod est[31] participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio uero
+participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est
+esse ut sit; est uero ut participet alio quolibet.
+
+VII. Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet.
+
+VIII. Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.
+
+IX. Omnis diuersitas discors, similitudo uero appetenda est; et quod
+appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc
+ipsum quod appetit.
+
+Sufficiunt igitur quae praemisimus; a prudente uero rationis interprete
+suis unumquodque aptabitur argumentis.
+
+Quaestio uero huiusmodi est. Ea quae sunt bona sunt; tenet enim communis
+sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne autem tendit ad
+simile. Quae igitur ad bonum tendunt bona ipsa sunt. Sed quemadmodum bona
+sint, inquirendum est, utrumne participatione an substantia? Si
+participatione, per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione
+album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est album non est. Et de ceteris
+qualitatibus eodem modo. Si igitur participatione sunt bona, ipsa per se
+nullo modo bona sunt: non igitur ad bonum tendunt. Sed concessum est. Non
+igitur participatione sunt bona sed substantia. Quorum uero substantia bona
+est, id quod sunt bona sunt; id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse.
+Esse igitur ipsorum bonum est; omnium igitur rerum ipsum esse bonum est.
+Sed si esse bonum est, ea quae sunt in eo quod sunt bona sunt idemque illis
+est esse quod boni esse; substantialia igitur bona sunt, quoniam non
+participant bonitatem. Quod si ipsum esse in eis bonum est, non est dubium
+quin substantialia cum sint bona, primo sint bono similia ac per hoc hoc
+ipsum bonum erunt; nihil enim illi praeter se ipsum simile est. Ex quo fit
+ut omnia quae sunt deus sint, quod dictu nefas est. Non sunt igitur
+substantialia bona ac per hoc non in his est esse bonum; non sunt igitur in
+eo quod sunt bona. Sed nec participant bonitatem; nullo enim modo ad bonum
+tenderent. Nullo modo igitur sunt bona.
+
+Huic quaestioni talis poterit adhiberi solutio. Multa sunt quae cum
+separari actu non possunt, animo tamen et cogitatione separantur; ut cum
+triangulum uel cetera a subiecta materia nullus actu separat, mente tamen
+segregans ipsum triangulum proprietatemque eius praeter materiam
+speculatur. Amoueamus igitur primi boni praesentiam paulisper ex animo,
+quod esse quidem constat idque ex omnium doctorum indoctorumque sententia
+barbararumque gentium religionibus cognosci potest. Hoc igitur paulisper
+amoto ponamus omnia esse quae sunt bona atque ea consideremus quemadmodum
+bona esse possent, si a primo bono minime defluxissent. Hinc intueor aliud
+in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod sunt. Ponatur enim una eademque
+substantia bona esse alba, grauis, rotunda. Tunc aliud esset ipsa illa
+substantia, aliud eius rotunditas, aliud color, aliud bonitas; nam si haec
+singula idem essent quod ipsa substantia, idem esset grauitas quod color,
+quod bonum et bonum quod grauitas--quod fieri natura non sinit. Aliud
+igitur tunc in eis esset esse, aliud aliquid esse, ac tunc bona quidem
+essent, esse tamen ipsum minime haberent bonum. Igitur si ullo modo essent,
+non a bono ac bona essent ac non idem essent quod bona, sed eis aliud esset
+esse aliud bonis esse. Quod si nihil omnino aliud essent nisi bona neque
+grauia neque colorata neque spatii dimensione distenta nec ulla in eis
+qualitas esset, nisi tantum bona essent, tunc non res sed rerum uideretur
+esse principium nec potius uiderentur, sed uideretur; unum enim solumque
+est huiusmodi, quod tantum bonum aliudque nihil sit. Quae quoniam non sunt
+simplicia, nec esse omnino poterant, nisi ea id quod solum bonum est esse
+uoluisset. Idcirco quoniam esse eorum a boni uoluntate defluxit, bona esse
+dicuntur. Primum enim bonum, quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est;
+secundum uero bonum, quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum
+quoque bonum est. Sed ipsum esse omnium rerum ex eo fluxit quod est primum
+bonum et quod bonum tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum.
+Ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum est; tunc enim in eo.
+
+Qua in re soluta quaestio est. Idcirco enim licet in eo quod sint bona
+sint, non sunt tamen similia primo bono, quoniam non quoquo modo sint res
+ipsum esse earum bonum est, sed quoniam non potest esse ipsum esse rerum,
+nisi a primo esse defluxerit, id est bono; idcirco ipsum esse bonum est nec
+est simile ei a quo est. Illud enim quoquo modo sit bonum est in eo quod
+est; non enim aliud est praeterquam bonum. Hoc autem nisi ab illo esset,
+bonum fortasse esse posset, sed bonum in eo quod est esse non posset. Tunc
+enim participaret forsitan bono; ipsum uero esse quod non haberent a bono,
+bonum habere non possent. Igitur sublato ab his bono primo mente et
+cogitatione, ista licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod essent bona esse non
+possent, et quoniam actu non potuere exsistere, nisi illud ea quod uere
+bonum est produxisset, idcirco et esse eorum bonum est et non est simile
+substantiali bono id quod ab eo fluxit; et nisi ab eo fluxissent, licet
+essent bona, tamen in eo quod sunt bona esse non possent, quoniam et
+praeter bonum et non ex bono essent, cum illud ipsum bonum primum est et
+ipsum esse sit et ipsum bonum et ipsum esse bonum. At non etiam alba in eo
+quod sunt alba esse oportebit ea quae alba sunt, quoniam ex uoluntate dei
+fluxerunt ut essent, alba minime. Aliud est enim esse, aliud albis esse;
+hoc ideo, quoniam qui ea ut essent effecit bonus quidem est, minime uero
+albus. Voluntatem igitur boni comitatum est ut essent bona in eo quod sunt;
+uoluntatem uero non albi non est comitata talis eius quod est proprietas ut
+esset album in eo quod est; neque enim ex albi uoluntate defluxerunt.
+Itaque quia uoluit esse ea alba qui erat non albus, sunt alba tantum; quia
+uero uoluit ea esse bona qui erat bonus, sunt bona in eo quod sunt.
+Secundum hanc igitur rationem cuncta oportet esse iusta, quoniam ipse
+iustus est qui ea esse uoluit? Ne hoc quidem. Nam bonum esse essentiam,
+iustum uero esse actum respicit. Idem autem est in eo esse quod agere; idem
+igitur bonum esse quod iustum. Nobis uero non est idem esse quod agere; non
+enim simplices sumus. Non est igitur nobis idem bonis esse quod iustis, sed
+idem nobis est esse omnibus in eo quod sumus. Bona igitur omnia sunt, non
+etiam iusta. Amplius bonum quidem generale est, iustum uero speciale nec
+species descendit in omnia. Idcirco alia quidem iusta alia aliud omnia
+bona.
+
+
+[30] seiunct. _Rand_; coniunct. _codd. opt._; disiunct. _vulg. Vallinus_.
+
+[31] est _codd. inferiores; om. codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME
+
+  HOW SUBSTANCES CAN BE GOOD IN VIRTUE OF THEIR EXISTENCE WITHOUT BEING
+  ABSOLUTE GOODS
+
+  You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure
+  question in my _Hebdomads_[32] concerning the manner in which
+  substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute
+  goods.[33] You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the
+  method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness
+  with what eagerness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess
+  I like to expound my _Hebdomads_ to myself, and would rather bury
+  my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert
+  and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is
+  made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that
+  waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret
+  doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks a language
+  understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore
+  followed the example of the mathematical[34] and cognate sciences and
+  laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that
+  follows.
+
+  I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it
+  is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible;
+  as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the remainders are
+  equal." Nobody who grasps that proposition will deny it. The other kind
+  is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same
+  class of common conceptions; as "Incorporeals cannot occupy space," and
+  the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.
+
+  II. Being and a concrete thing[35] are different. Simple Being awaits
+  manifestation, but a thing is and exists[36] as soon as it has received
+  the form which gives it Being.
+
+  III. A concrete thing can participate in something else; but absolute
+  Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is
+  effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has
+  acquired Being.
+
+  IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute
+  Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.
+
+  V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different;
+  the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.
+
+  VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being[37] through the
+  fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in
+  something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being
+  through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate
+  in something else.
+
+  VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its
+  particular Being.
+
+  VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one
+  and the same.
+
+  IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something
+  outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it
+  seeks.
+
+  These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent
+  interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to
+  each point.
+
+  Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned
+  are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends
+  to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must,
+  however, inquire how they are good--by participation or by substance. If
+  by participation, they are in no wise good in themselves; for a thing
+  which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by
+  virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are
+  good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they
+  do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are
+  good not by participation but by substance. But those things whose
+  substance is good are substantially good. But they owe their actual
+  Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good;
+  therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being
+  is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist
+  and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they
+  are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness.
+  But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since
+  they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore
+  they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself.
+  Hence all things that are, are God--an impious assertion. Wherefore
+  things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does
+  not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that
+  they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they
+  would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good.[38]
+
+  This problem admits of the following solution.[39] There are many things
+  which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be
+  separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a
+  triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but
+  mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from
+  matter. Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the
+  presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal
+  consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the
+  religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a
+  moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let
+  us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive from
+  the Prime Good. This process leads me to perceive that their Goodness
+  and their existence are two different things. For let me suppose that
+  one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, and round. Then it
+  must be admitted that its substance, roundness, colour, and goodness are
+  all different things. For if each of these qualities were the same as
+  its substance, weight would be the same thing as colour or goodness, and
+  goodness would be the same as colour; which is contrary to nature. Their
+  Being then in that case would be one thing, their quality another, and
+  they would be good, but they would not have their absolute Being good.
+  Therefore if they really existed at all, they would not be from good nor
+  good, they would not be the same as good, but Being and Goodness would
+  be for them two different things. But if they were nothing else but good
+  substances, and were neither heavy, nor coloured, and possessed neither
+  spatial dimension nor quality, beyond that of goodness, they (or rather
+  it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things. For there
+  is one thing alone that is by nature good to the exclusion of every
+  other quality. But since they are not simple, they could not even exist
+  at all unless that which is the one sole Good willed them to be. They
+  are called good simply because their Being is derived from the Will of
+  the Good. For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the
+  secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good
+  whose absolute Being is good. But the absolute Being of all things
+  derives from the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness
+  are rightly predicated as identical. Their absolute Being therefore is
+  good; for thereby it resides in Him.
+
+  Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the
+  fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple
+  reason that their absolute Being is not good under all circumstances,
+  but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the
+  Prime Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is
+  good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime
+  Good is good through the fact that it exists, irrespective of all
+  conditions, for it is nothing else than good; but the second good if it
+  derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good
+  through the fact that it exists. For in that case it might possibly
+  participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the
+  Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have
+  put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good,
+  would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could
+  not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore
+  their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial
+  Good is not like its source which produces it. And unless they had
+  derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good
+  through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and
+  not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is
+  substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we
+  need not say that white things are white through the fact that they
+  exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their
+  whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that
+  because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore
+  in accordance with the will of the Good that they should be good through
+  the fact that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of
+  one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it
+  white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is
+  white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who
+  was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the
+  fact that they exist because One who was good willed them to be good.
+  Ought, then, by parity of reason, all things to be just because He is
+  just who willed them to be? That is not so either. For to be good
+  involves Being, to be just involves an act. For Him being and action are
+  identical; to be good and to be just are one and the same for Him. But
+  being and action are not identical for us, for we are not simple. For
+  us, then, goodness is not the same thing as justice, but we all have the
+  same sort of Being in virtue of our existence. Therefore all things are
+  good, but all things are not just. Finally, good is a general, but just
+  is a species, and this species does not apply to all. Wherefore some
+  things are just, others are something else, but all things are good.
+
+
+  [32] Similarly Porphyry divided the works of Plotinus into six
+  _Enneades_ or groups of nine.
+
+  [33] Cf. discussion on the nature of good in _Cons._ iii. m. 10 and pr.
+  11 (_infra_, pp. 274 ff.).
+
+  [34] On this mathematical method of exposition cf. _Cons._ iii. pr. 10
+  (_infra_, p. 270).
+
+  [35] _Esse_ = Aristotle's [Greek: to ti esti]; _id quod est_ = [Greek:
+  tode ti].
+
+  [36] _Consistere_ = [Greek: hypostaenai].
+
+  [37] _Id quod est esse_ = [Greek: to ti aen einai].
+
+  [38] Cf. the similar _reductio ad absurdum_ in _Tr._ 5 (_infra_, p. 98)
+  and in _Cons._ v. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).
+
+  [39] _Vide supra_, p. 6, n. _b_.
+
+
+
+
+DE FIDE CATHOLICA
+
+Christianam fidem noui ac ueteris testamenti pandit auctoritas; et quamuis
+nomen ipsum Christi uetus intra semet continuerit instrumentum eumque
+semper signauerit affuturum quem credimus per partum uirginis iam uenisse,
+tamen in orbem terrarum ab ipsius nostri saluatoris mirabili manasse
+probatur aduentu.
+
+Haec autem religio nostra, quae uocatur christiana atque catholica, his
+fundamentis principaliter nititur asserens: ex aeterno, id est ante mundi
+constitutionem, ante omne uidelicet quod temporis potest retinere
+uocabulum, diuinam patris et filii ac spiritus sancti exstitisse
+substantiam, ita ut deum dicat patrem, deum filium, deum spiritum sanctum,
+nec tamen tres deos sed unum: patrem itaque habere filium ex sua substantia
+genitum et sibi nota ratione coaeternum, quem filium eatenus confitetur, ut
+non sit idem qui pater est: neque patrem aliquando fuisse filium, ne rursus
+in infinitum humanus animus diuinam progeniem cogitaret, neque filium in
+eadem natura qua patri coaeternus est aliquando fieri patrem, ne rursus in
+infinitum diuina progenies tenderetur: sanctum uero spiritum neque patrem
+esse neque filium atque ideo in illa natura nec genitum nec generantem sed
+a patre quoque procedentem uel filio; qui sit tamen processionis istius
+modus ita non possumus euidenter dicere, quemadmodum generationem filii ex
+paterna substantia non potest humanus animus aestimare. Haec autem ut
+credantur uetus ac noua informat instructio. De qua uelut arce religionis
+nostrae multi diuersa et humaniter atque ut ita dicam carnaliter sentientes
+aduersa locuti sunt, ut Arrius qui licet deum dicat filium, minorem tamen
+patre multipliciter et extra patris substantiam confitetur. Sabelliani
+quoque non tres exsistentes personas sed unam ausi sunt affirmare, eundem
+dicentes patrem esse qui filius est eundemque filium qui pater est atque
+spiritum sanctum eundem esse qui pater et filius est; ac per hoc unam
+dicunt esse personam sub uocabulorum diuersitate signatam.
+
+Manichaei quoque qui duo principia sibi coaeterna et aduersa profitentur,
+unigenitum dei esse non credunt. Indignum enim iudicant, si deus habere
+filium uideatur, nihil aliud cogitantes nisi carnaliter, ut quia haec
+generatio duorum corporum commixtione procedit, illic quoque indignum esse
+intellectum huiusmodi applicare; quae res eos nec uetus facit recipere
+testamentum neque in integro nouum. Nam sicut illud omnino error eorum non
+recipit ita ex uirgine generationem filii non uult admittere, ne humano
+corpore polluta uideatur dei fuisse natura. Sed de his hactenus; suo enim
+loco ponentur sicut ordo necessarius postularit.
+
+Ergo diuina ex aeterno natura et in aeternum sine aliqua mutabilitate
+perdurans sibi tantum conscia uoluntate sponte mundum uoluit fabricare
+eumque cum omnino non esset fecit ut esset, nec ex sua substantia protulit,
+ne diuinus natura crederetur, neque aliunde molitus est, ne iam exstitisse
+aliquid quod eius uoluntatem exsistentia propriae naturae iuuaret atque
+esset quod neque ab ipso factum esset et tamen esset; sed uerbo produxit
+caelos, terram creauit, ita ut caelesti habitatione dignas caelo naturas
+efficeret ac terrae terrena componeret. De caelestibus autem naturis, quae
+uniuersaliter uocatur angelica, quamuis illic distinctis ordinibus pulchra
+sint omnia, pars tamen quaedam plus appetens quam ei natura atque ipsius
+auctor naturae tribuerat de caelesti sede proiecta est; et quoniam
+angelorum numerum, id est supernae illius ciuitatis cuius ciues angeli
+sunt, imminutum noluit conditor permanere, formauit ex terra hominem atque
+spiritu uitae animauit, ratione composuit, arbitrii libertate decorauit
+eumque praefixa lege paradisi deliciis constituit, ut, si sine peccato
+manere uellet, tam ipsum quam eius progeniem angelicis coetibus sociaret,
+ut quia superior natura per superbiae malum ima petierat, inferior
+substantia per humilitatis bonum ad superna conscenderet. Sed ille auctor
+inuidiae non ferens hominem illuc ascendere ubi ipse non meruit permanere,
+temptatione adhibita fecit etiam ipsum eiusque comparem, quam de eius
+latere generandi causa formator produxerat, inoboedientiae suppliciis
+subiacere, ei quoque diuinitatem affuturam promittens, quam sibi dum
+arroganter usurpat elisus est. Haec autem reuelante deo Moysi famulo suo
+comperta sunt, cui etiam humani generis conditionem atque originem uoluit
+innotescere, sicut ab eo libri prolati testantur. Omnis enim diuina
+auctoritas his modis constare uidetur, ut aut historialis modus sit, qui
+nihil aliud nisi res gestas enuntiet, aut allegoricus, ut non illic possit
+historiae ordo consistere, aut certe ex utrisque compositus, ut et secundum
+historiam et secundum allegoriam manere uideatur. Haec autem pie
+intelligentibus et ueraci corde tenentibus satis abundeque relucent. Sed ad
+ordinem redeamus.
+
+Primus itaque homo ante peccatum cum sua coniuge incola paradisi fuit. At
+ubi aurem praebuit suasori et conditoris praeceptum neglexit attendere,
+exul effectus, terram iussus excolere atque a paradisi sinu seclusus in
+ignotis partibus sui generis posteritatem transposuit atque poenam quam
+ipse primus homo praeuaricationis reus exceperat generando transmisit in
+posteros. Hinc factum est ut et corporum atque animarum corruptio et mortis
+proueniret interitus primusque mortem in Abel filio suo meruit experiri, ut
+quanta esset poena quam ipse exceperit probaret in subole. Quod si ipse
+primus moreretur, nesciret quodam modo ac, si dici fas est, nec sentiret
+poenam suam, sed ideo expertus in altero est, ut quid sibi iure deberetur
+contemptor agnosceret et dum poenam mortis sustinet, ipsa exspectatione
+fortius torqueretur. Hoc autem praeuaricationis malum, quod in posteros
+naturaliter primus homo transfuderat, quidam Pelagius non admittens proprii
+nominis haeresim dedicauit, quam catholica fides a consortio sui mox
+reppulisse probatur. Ab ipso itaque primo homine procedens humanum genus ac
+multiplici numerositate succrescens erupit in lites, commouit bella,
+occupauit terrenam miseriam quia[40] felicitatem paradisi in primo patre
+perdiderat. Nec tamen ex his defuerunt quos sibi conditor gratiae
+sequestraret eiusque placitis inseruirent; quos licet meritum naturae
+damnaret, futuri tamen sacramenti et longe postmodum proferendi faciendo
+participes perditam uoluit reparare naturam. Impletus est ergo mundus
+humano genere atque ingressus est homo uias suas qui malitia propriae
+contumaciae despexerat conditorem. Hinc uolens deus per iustum potius
+hominem reparare genus humanum quam manere proteruum, poenalem multitudinem
+effusa diluuii inundatione excepto Noe iusto homine cum suis liberis atque
+his quae secum in arcam introduxerat interire permisit. Cur autem per arcae
+lignum uoluerit iustos eripere, notum est diuinarum scripturarum mentibus
+eruditis. Et quasi prima quaedam mundi aetas diluuio ultore transacta est.
+
+Reparatur itaque humanum genus atque propriae naturae uitium, quod
+praeuaricationis primus auctor infuderat, amplecti non destitit. Creuitque
+contumacia quam dudum diluuii unda puniuerat et qui numerosam annorum
+seriem permissus fuerat uiuere, in breuitate annorum humana aetas addicta
+est. Maluitque deus non iam diluuio punire genus humanum, sed eodem
+permanente eligere uiros per quorum seriem aliqua generatio commearet, ex
+qua nobis filium proprium uestitum humano corpore mundi in fine concederet.
+Quorum primus est Abraham, qui cum esset aetate confectus eiusque uxor
+decrepita, in senectute sua repromissionis largitione habere filium
+meruerunt. Hic uocatus est Isaac atque ipse genuit Iacob. Idem quoque
+duodecim patriarchas non reputante deo in eorum numero quos more suo natura
+produxerat. Hic ergo Iacob cum filiis ac domo sua transigendi causa
+Aegyptum uoluit habitare atque illic per annorum seriem multitudo
+concrescens coeperunt suspicioni esse[41] Aegyptiacis imperiis eosque
+Pharao magna ponderum mole premi decreuerat et grauibus oneribus
+affligebat. Tandem deus Aegyptii regis dominationem despiciens diuiso mari
+rubro, quod numquam antea natura ulla cognouerat, suum transduxit exercitum
+auctore Moyse et Aaron. Postea igitur pro eorum egressione altis Aegyptus
+plagis uastata est, cum nollet dimittere populum. Transmisso itaque ut
+dictum est mari rubro uenit per deserta eremi ad montem qui uocatur Sinai,
+ibique uniuersorum conditor deus uolens sacramenti futuri gratia populos
+erudire per Moysen data lege constituit, quemadmodum et sacrificiorum ritus
+et populorum mores instruerentur. Et cum multis annis multas quoque gentes
+per uiam debellassent, uenerunt tandem ad fluuium qui uocatur Iordanis duce
+iam Iesu Naue filio atque ad eorum transitum quemadmodum aquae maris rubri
+ita quoque Iordanis fluenta siccata sunt; peruentumque est ad eam ciuitatem
+quae nunc Hierosolyma uocatur. Atque dum ibi dei populus moraretur, post
+iudices et prophetas reges instituti leguntur, quorum post Saulem primatum
+Dauid de tribu Iuda legitur adeptus fuisse. Descendit itaque ab eo per
+singulas successiones regium stemma perductumque est usque ad Herodis
+tempora, qui primus ex gentilibus memoratis populis legitur imperasse. Sub
+quo exstitit beata uirgo Maria quae de Dauidica stirpe prouenerat, quae
+humani generis genuit conditorem. Hoc autem ideo quia multis infectus
+criminibus mundus iacebat in morte, electa est una gens in qua dei mandata
+clarescerent, ibique missi prophetae sunt et alii sancti uiri per quorum
+admonitionem ipse certe populus a tumore peruicaciae reuocaretur. Illi uero
+eosdem occidentes in suae nequitiae peruersitate manere uoluerunt.
+
+Atque iam in ultimis temporibus non prophetas neque alios sibi placitos sed
+ipsum unigenitum suum deus per uirginem nasci constituit, ut humana salus
+quae per primi hominis inoboedientiam deperierat per hominem deum rursus
+repararetur et quia exstiterat mulier quae causam mortis prima uiro
+suaserat, esset haec secunda mulier quae uitae causam humanis uisceribus
+apportaret. Nec uile uideatur quod dei filius ex uirgine natus est, quoniam
+praeter naturae modum conceptus et editus est. Virgo itaque de spiritu
+sancto incarnatum dei filium concepit, uirgo peperit, post eius editionem
+uirgo permansit; atque hominis factus est idemque dei filius, ita ut in eo
+et diuinae naturae radiaret splendor et humanae fragilitatis appareret
+assumptio. Sed huic tam sanae atque ueracissimae fidei exstiterant multi
+qui diuersa garrirent et praeter alios Nestorius et Eutyches repertores
+haereseos exstiterunt, quorum unus hominem solum, alter deum solum putauit
+asserere nec humanum corpus quod Christus induerat de humanae substantiae
+participatione uenisse. Sed haec hactenus.
+
+Creuit itaque secundum carnem Christus, baptizatus est, ut qui baptizandi
+formam erat ceteris tributurus, ipse primus quod docebat exciperet. Post
+baptismum uero elegit duodecim discipulos, quorum unus traditor eius fuit.
+Et quia sanam doctrinam Iudaeorum populus non ferebat, eum inlata manu
+crucis supplicio peremerunt. Occiditur ergo Christus, iacet tribus diebus
+ac noctibus in sepulcro, resurgit a mortuis, sicut ante constitutionem
+mundi ipse cum patre decreuerat, ascendit in caelos ubi, in eo quod dei
+filius est, numquam defuisse cognoscitur, ut assumptum hominem, quem
+diabolus non permiserat ad superna conscendere, secum dei filius caelesti
+habitationi sustolleret. Dat ergo formam discipulis suis baptizandi,
+docendi salutaria, efficientiam quoque miraculorum atque in uniuersum
+mundum ad uitam praecipit introire, ut praedicatio salutaris non iam in una
+tantum gente sed orbi terrarum praedicaretur. Et quoniam humanum genus
+naturae merito, quam ex primo praeuaricatore contraxerat, aeternae poenae
+iaculis fuerat uulneratum nec salutis suae erat idoneum, quod eam in
+parente perdiderat, medicinalia quaedam tribuit sacramenta, ut agnosceret
+aliud sibi deberi per naturae meritum, aliud per gratiae donum, ut natura
+nihil aliud nisi poenae summitteret, gratia uero, quae nullis meritis
+attributa est, quia nec gratia diceretur si meritis tribueretur, totum quod
+est salutis afferret.
+
+Diffunditur ergo per mundum caelestis illa doctrina, adunantur populi,
+instituuntur ecclesiae, fit unum corpus quod mundi latitudinem occuparet,
+cuius caput Christus ascendit in caelos, ut necessario caput suum membra
+sequerentur. Haec itaque doctrina et praesentem uitam bonis informat
+operibus et post consummationem saeculi resurrectura corpora nostra praeter
+corruptionem ad regna caelestia pollicetur, ita ut qui hic bene ipso
+donante uixerit, esset in illa resurrectione beatissimus, qui uero male,
+miser post munus resurrectionis adesset. Et hoc est principale religionis
+nostrae, ut credat non solum animas non perire, sed ipsa quoque corpora,
+quae mortis aduentus resoluerat, in statum pristinum futura de beatitudine
+reparari. Haec ergo ecclesia catholica per orbem diffusa tribus modis
+probatur exsistere: quidquid in ea tenetur, aut auctoritas est scripturarum
+aut traditio uniuersalis aut certe propria et particularis instructio. Sed
+auctoritate tota constringitur, uniuersali traditione maiorum nihilominus
+tota, priuatis uero constitutionibus et propriis informationibus unaquaeque
+uel pro locorum uarietate uel prout cuique bene uisum est subsistit et
+regitur. Sola ergo nunc est fidelium exspectatio qua credimus affuturum
+finem mundi, omnia corruptibilia transitura, resurrecturos homines ad
+examen futuri iudicii, recepturos pro meritis singulos et in perpetuum
+atque in aeternum debitis finibus permansuros; solumque est[42] praemium
+beatitudinis contemplatio conditoris--tanta dumtaxat, quanta a creatura ad
+creatorem fieri potest,--ut ex eis reparato angelico numero superna illa
+ciuitas impleatur, ubi rex est uirginis filius eritque gaudium sempiternum,
+delectatio, cibus, opus, laus perpetua creatoris.
+
+
+[40] qui _uel_ quod _codd._
+
+[41] suspiciones _uel_ suspicione _uel_ suspicio _uel_ subici _codd.
+meliores._
+
+[42] esse _codd_.
+
+
+
+
+  ON THE CATHOLIC FAITH[43]
+
+  The Christian Faith is proclaimed by the authority of the New Testament
+  and of the Old; but although the Old scripture[44] contains within its
+  pages the name of Christ and constantly gives token that He will come
+  who we believe has already come by the birth of the Virgin, yet the
+  diffusion of that faith throughout the world dates from the actual
+  miraculous coming of our Saviour.
+
+  Now this our religion which is called Christian and Catholic is founded
+  chiefly on the following assertions. From all eternity, that is, before
+  the world was established, and so before all that is meant by time
+  began, there has existed one divine substance of Father, Son, and Holy
+  Spirit in such wise that we confess the Father God, the Son God, and the
+  Holy Spirit God, and yet not three Gods but one God. Thus the Father
+  hath the Son, begotten of His substance and coeternal with Himself after
+  a manner that He alone knoweth. Him we confess to be Son in the sense
+  that He is not the same as the Father. Nor has the Father ever been Son,
+  for the human mind must not imagine a divine lineage stretching back
+  into infinity; nor can the Son, being of the same nature in virtue of
+  which He is coeternal with the Father, ever become Father, for the
+  divine lineage must not stretch forward into infinity. But the Holy
+  Spirit is neither Father nor Son, and therefore, albeit of the same
+  divine nature, neither begotten, nor begetting, but proceeding as well
+  from the Father as the Son.[45] Yet what the manner of that Procession
+  is we are no more able to state clearly than is the human mind able to
+  understand the generation of the Son from the substance of the Father.
+  But these articles are laid down for our belief by Old and New
+  Testament. Concerning which fortress and citadel[46] of our religion
+  many men have spoken otherwise and have even impugned it, being moved by
+  human, nay rather by carnal feeling. Arius, for instance, who, while
+  calling the Son God, declares Him to be vastly inferior to the Father
+  and of another substance. The Sabellians also have dared to affirm that
+  there are not three separate Persons but only One, saying that the
+  Father is the same as the Son and the Son the same as the Father and the
+  Holy Spirit the same as the Father and the Son; and so declaring that
+  there is but one divine Person expressed by different names.
+
+  The Manichaeans, too, who allow two coeternal and contrary principles,
+  do not believe in the Only-begotten Son of God. For they consider it a
+  thought unworthy of God that He should have a Son, since they entertain
+  the very carnal reflection that inasmuch as[47] human generation arises
+  from the mingling of two bodies, it is unworthy to hold a notion of this
+  sort in respect of the divine nature; whereas such a view finds no
+  sanction in the Old Testament and absolutely[48] none in the New. Yea,
+  their error which refuses this notion also refuses the Virgin birth of
+  the Son, because they would not have the God's nature defiled by the
+  man's body. But enough of this for the present; the points will be
+  presented in the proper place as the proper arrangement demands.
+
+  The divine nature then, abiding from all eternity and unto all eternity
+  without any change, by the exercise of a will known only to Himself,
+  determined of Himself to form the world, and brought it into being when
+  it was absolutely naught, nor did He produce it from His own substance,
+  lest it should be thought divine by nature, nor did He form it after any
+  model, lest it should be thought that anything had already come into
+  being which helped His will by the existence of an independent nature,
+  and that there should exist something that had not been made by Him and
+  yet existed; but by His Word He brought forth the heavens, and created
+  the earth[49] that so He might make natures worthy of a place in heaven,
+  and also fit earthly things to earth. But although in heaven all things
+  are beautiful and arranged in due order, yet one part of the heavenly
+  creation which is universally termed angelic,[50] seeking more than
+  nature and the Author of Nature had granted them, was cast forth from
+  its heavenly habitation; and because the Creator did not wish the roll
+  of the angels, that is of the heavenly city whose citizens the angels
+  are, to be diminished, He formed man out of the earth and breathed into
+  him the breath of life; He endowed him with reason, He adorned him with
+  freedom of choice and established him in the joys of Paradise, making
+  covenant aforehand that if he would remain without sin He would add him
+  and his offspring to the angelic hosts; so that as the higher nature had
+  fallen low through the curse of pride, the lower substance might ascend
+  on high through the blessing of humility. But the father of envy, loath
+  that man should climb to the place where he himself deserved not to
+  remain, put temptation before him and the consort whom the Creator had
+  brought forth out of his side for the continuance of the race, and laid
+  them open to punishment for disobedience, promising man also the gift of
+  Godhead, the arrogant attempt to seize which had caused his own fall.
+  All this was revealed by God to His servant Moses, whom He vouchsafed to
+  teach the creation and origin of man, as the books written by him
+  declare. For the divine authority is always conveyed in one of the
+  following ways--the historical, which simply announces facts; the
+  allegorical, whence historical matter is excluded; or else the two
+  combined, history and allegory conspiring to establish it. All this is
+  abundantly evident to pious hearers and steadfast believers.
+
+  But to return to the order of our discourse; the first man, before sin
+  came, dwelt with his consort in the Garden. But when he hearkened to the
+  voice of his wife and failed to keep the commandment of his Creator, he
+  was banished, bidden to till the ground, and being shut out from the
+  sheltering garden he carried abroad into unknown regions the children of
+  his loins; by begetting whom he transmitted to those that came after,
+  the punishment which he, the first man, had incurred by the sin of
+  disobedience. Hence it came to pass that corruption both of body and
+  soul ensued, and death; and this he was to taste first in his own son
+  Abel, in order that he might learn through his child the greatness of
+  the punishment that was laid upon him. For if he had died first he would
+  in some sense not have known, and if one may so say not have felt, his
+  punishment; but he tasted it in another in order that he might perceive
+  the due reward of his contempt, and, doomed to death himself, might be
+  the more sensibly touched by the apprehension of it. But this curse that
+  came of transgression which the first man had by natural propagation
+  transmitted to posterity, was denied by one Pelagius who so set up the
+  heresy which goes by his name and which the Catholic faith, as is known,
+  at once banished from its bosom. So the human race that sprang from the
+  first man and mightily increased and multiplied, broke into strife,
+  stirred up wars, and became the heir of earthly misery, because it had
+  lost the joys of Paradise in its first parent. Yet were there not a few
+  of mankind whom the Giver of Grace set apart for Himself and who were
+  obedient to His will; and though by desert of nature they were
+  condemned, yet God by making them partakers in the hidden mystery, long
+  afterwards to be revealed, vouchsafed to recover fallen nature. So the
+  earth was filled by the human race and man who by his own wanton
+  wilfulness had despised his Creator began to walk in his own ways. Hence
+  God willing rather to recover mankind through one just man than that it
+  should remain for ever contumacious, suffered all the guilty multitude
+  to perish by the wide waters of a flood, save only Noah, the just one,
+  with his children and all that he had brought with him into the ark. The
+  reason why He wished to save the just by an ark of wood is known to all
+  hearts learned in the Holy Scriptures. Thus what we may call the first
+  age of the world was ended by the avenging flood.
+
+  Thus the human race was restored, and yet it hastened to make its own
+  the vice of nature with which the first author of transgression had
+  infected it. And the wickedness increased which had once been punished
+  by the waters of the flood, and man who had been suffered to live for a
+  long series of years was reduced to the brief span of ordinary human
+  life. Yet would not God again visit the race by a flood, but rather,
+  letting it continue, He chose from it men of whose line a generation
+  should arise out of which He might in the last days grant us His own Son
+  to come to us, clothed in human form. Of these men Abraham is the first,
+  and although he was stricken in years and his wife past bearing, they
+  had in their old age the reward of a son in fulfilment of promise
+  unconditional. This son was named Isaac and he begat Jacob, who in his
+  turn begat the twelve Patriarchs, God not reckoning in their number
+  those whom nature in its ordinary course produced.[51] This Jacob, then,
+  together with his sons and his household determined to dwell in Egypt
+  for the purpose of trafficking; and the multitude of them increasing
+  there in the course of many years began to be a cause of suspicion to
+  the Egyptian rulers, and Pharaoh ordered them to be oppressed by
+  exceeding heavy tasks[52] and afflicted them with grievous burdens. At
+  length God, minded to set at naught the tyranny of the king of Egypt,
+  divided the Red Sea--a marvel such as nature had never known before--and
+  brought forth His host by the hands of Moses and Aaron. Thereafter on
+  account of their departure Egypt was vexed with sore plagues, because
+  they would not let the people go. So, after crossing the Red Sea, as I
+  have told, they passed through the desert of the wilderness and came to
+  the mount which is called Sinai, where God the Creator of all, wishing
+  to prepare the nations for the knowledge of the sacrament to come, laid
+  down by a law given through Moses how both the rites of sacrifices and
+  the national customs should be ordered. And after fighting down many
+  tribes in many years amidst their journeyings they came at last to the
+  river called Jordan, with Joshua the son of Nun now as their captain,
+  and, for their crossing, the streams of Jordan were dried up as the
+  waters of the Red Sea had been; so they finished their course to that
+  city which is now called Jerusalem. And while the people of God abode
+  there we read that there were set up first judges and prophets and then
+  kings, of whom we read that after Saul, David of the tribe of Judah
+  ascended the throne. So from him the royal race descended from father to
+  son and lasted till the days of Herod who, we read, was the first taken
+  out of the peoples called Gentile to bear sway. In whose days rose up
+  the blessed Virgin Mary, sprung from the stock of David, she who bore
+  the Maker of the human race. But it was just because the whole world lay
+  dead, stained with its many sins, that God chose out one race in which
+  His commands might shine clear; sending it prophets and other holy men,
+  to the end that by their warnings that people at least might be cured of
+  their swollen pride. But they slew these holy men and chose rather to
+  abide in their wanton wickedness.
+
+  And now at the last days of time, in place of prophets and other men
+  well-pleasing to Him, God willed that His only-begotten Son should be
+  born of a Virgin that so the salvation of mankind which had been lost
+  through the disobedience of the first man might be recovered by the God-
+  man, and that inasmuch as it was a woman who had first persuaded man to
+  that which wrought death there should be this second woman who should
+  bring forth from a human womb Him who gives Life. Nor let it be deemed a
+  thing unworthy that the Son of God was born of a Virgin, for it was out
+  of the course of nature that He was conceived and brought to birth.
+  Virgin then she conceived, by the Holy Spirit, the Son of God made
+  flesh, Virgin she bore Him, Virgin she continued after His birth; and He
+  became the Son of Man and likewise the Son of God that in Him the glory
+  of the divine nature might shine forth and at the same time the human
+  weakness be declared which He took upon Him. Yet against this article of
+  Faith so wholesome and altogether true there rose up many who babbled
+  other doctrine, and especially Nestorius and Eutyches, inventors of
+  heresy, of whom the one thought fit to say that He was man alone, the
+  other that He was God alone and that the human body put on by Christ had
+  not come by participation in human substance. But enough on this point.
+
+  So Christ grew after the flesh, and was baptized in order that He who
+  was to give the form of baptism to others should first Himself receive
+  what He taught. But after His baptism He chose twelve disciples, one of
+  whom betrayed Him. And because the people of the Jews would not bear
+  sound doctrine they laid hands upon Him and slew and crucified Him.
+  Christ, then, was slain; He lay three days and three nights in the tomb;
+  He rose again from the dead as He had predetermined with His Father
+  before the foundation of the world; He ascended into heaven whence we
+  know that He was never absent, because He is Son of God, in order that
+  as Son of God He might raise together with Him to the heavenly
+  habitation man whose flesh He had assumed, whom the devil had hindered
+  from ascending to the places on high. Therefore He bestowed on His
+  disciples the form of baptizing, the saving truth of the teaching, and
+  the mighty power of miracles, and bade them go throughout the whole
+  world to give it life, in order that the message of salvation might be
+  preached no longer in one nation only but among all the dwellers upon
+  earth. And because the human race was wounded by the weapon of eternal
+  punishment by reason of the nature which they had inherited from the
+  first transgressor and could not win a full meed of salvation because
+  they had lost it in its first parent, God instituted certain health-
+  giving sacraments to teach the difference between what grace bestowed
+  and human nature deserved, nature simply subjecting to punishment, but
+  grace, which is won by no merit, since it would not be grace if it were
+  due to merit, conferring all that belongs to salvation.
+
+  Therefore is that heavenly instruction spread throughout the world, the
+  peoples are knit together, churches are founded, and, filling the broad
+  earth, one body formed, whose head, even Christ, ascended into heaven in
+  order that the members might of necessity follow where the Head was
+  gone. Thus this teaching both inspires this present life unto good
+  works, and promises that in the end of the age our bodies shall rise
+  incorruptible to the kingdom of heaven, to the end that he who has lived
+  well on earth by God's gift should be altogether blessed in that
+  resurrection, but he who has lived amiss should, with the gift of
+  resurrection, enter upon misery. And this is a firm principle of our
+  religion, to believe not only that men's souls do not perish, but that
+  their very bodies, which the coming of death had destroyed, recover
+  their first state by the bliss that is to be. This Catholic church,
+  then, spread throughout the world, is known by three particular marks:
+  whatever is believed and taught in it has the authority of the
+  Scriptures, or of universal tradition, or at least of its own and proper
+  usage. And this authority is binding on the whole Church as is also the
+  universal tradition of the Fathers, while each separate church exists
+  and is governed by its private constitution and its proper rites
+  according to difference of locality and the good judgment of each. All,
+  therefore, that the faithful now expect is that the end of the world
+  will come, that all corruptible things shall pass away, that men shall
+  rise for future judgement, that each shall receive reward according to
+  his deserts and abide in the lot assigned to him for ever and for aye;
+  and the sole reward of bliss will be the contemplation of the Almighty,
+  so far, that is, as the creature may look on the Creator, to the end
+  that the number of the angels may be made up from these and the heavenly
+  city filled where the Virgin's Son is King and where will be everlasting
+  joy, delight, food, labour, and unending praise of the Creator.
+
+
+  [43] The conclusions adverse to the genuineness of this tractate,
+  reached in the dissertation _Der dem Boethius zugeschriebene Traktat de
+  Fide Catholica (Jahrbücher für kl. Phil._ xxvi. (1901) Supplementband)
+  by one of the editors, now seem to both unsound. The writer of that
+  dissertation intends to return to the subject elsewhere. This fourth
+  tractate, though lacking, in the best MSS., either an ascription to
+  Boethius or a title, is firmly imbedded in two distinct recensions of
+  Boethius's theological works. There is no reason to disturb it. Indeed
+  the _capita dogmatica_ mentioned by Cassiodorus can hardly refer to any
+  of the tractates except the fourth.
+
+  [44] For _instrumentum_=Holy Scripture cf. Tertull. _Apol._ 18, 19,
+  _adv. Hermog._ 19, etc.; for _instrumentum_=any historical writing cf.
+  Tert. _De Spect._ 5.
+
+  [45] Boethius is no heretic. By the sixth century _uel_ had lost its
+  strong separative force. Cp. "Noe cum sua uel trium natorum coniugibus,"
+  Greg. Tur. _H.F._ i. 20. Other examples in Bonnet, _La Latinité de Grég.
+  de Tours_, p. 313, and in Brandt's edition of the _Isag._ Index, s.v.
+  _uel_.
+
+  [46] _Vide Cons._ i. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 140), and cf. Dante, _De Mon._
+  iii. 16, 117.
+
+  [47] _Ut quia_. A very rare use. Cf. Baehrens, _Beiträge zur lat.
+  Syntaxis_ (_Philologus_, Supplementband xii. 1912). It
+  perhaps=Aristotle's [Greek: oion epei]. Cf. McKinlay, _Harvard Studies
+  in Cl. Philol._ xviii. 153.
+
+  [48] _In integro_=_prorsus_; cf. Brandt, _op. cit._ Index, s.v.
+  _integer_.
+
+  [49] The doctrine is orthodox, but note that Boethius does not say _ex
+  nihilo creauit_. _Vide infra_, p. 366 ll. 24 ff.
+
+  [50] _Vide infra, Cons._ iv. pr. 6, p. 342 l. 54.
+
+  [51] e.g. Ishmael also [Greek: kata sarka gegennaetai] Gal. iv. 23.
+
+  [52] Cf. "populus dei mirabiliter crescens ... quia ... erant
+  suspecta... laboribus premebatur," Aug. _De Ciu. Dei_, 18. 7. For other
+  coincidences see Rand, _op. cit._ pp. 423 ff.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+INCIPIT LIBER
+CONTRA EVTYCHEN ET NESTORIVM
+
+DOMINO SANCTO AC VENERABILI PATRI IOHANNI DIACONO
+BOETHIVS FILIVS
+
+Anxie te quidem diuque sustinui, ut de ea quae in conuentu mota est
+quaestione loqueremur. Sed quoniam et tu quominus uenires occupatione
+distractus es et ego in crastinum constitutis negotiis implicabor, mando
+litteris quae coram loquenda seruaueram. Meministi enim, cum in concilio
+legeretur epistola, recitatum Eutychianos ex duabus naturis Christum
+consistere confiteri, in duabus negare: catholicos uero utrique dicto fidem
+praebere, nam et ex duabus eum naturis consistere et in duabus apud uerae
+fidei sectatores aequaliter credi. Cuius dicti nouitate percussus harum
+coniunctionum quae ex duabus naturis uel in duabus consisterent
+differentias inquirebam, multum scilicet referre ratus nec inerti
+neglegentia praetereundum, quod episcopus scriptor epistolae tamquam ualde
+necessarium praeterire noluisset. Hic omnes apertam esse differentiam nec
+quicquam in eo esse caliginis inconditum confusumque strepere nec ullus in
+tanto tumultu qui leuiter attingeret quaestionem, nedum qui expediret
+inuentus est.
+
+Adsederam ego ab eo quem maxime intueri cupiebam longius atque adeo, si
+situm sedentium recorderis, auersus pluribusque oppositis, ne si aegerrime
+quidem cuperem, uultum nutumque eius aspicere poteram ex quo mihi aliqua
+eius darentur signa iudicii. Atqui ego quidem nihil ceteris amplius
+afferebam, immo uero aliquid etiam minus. Nam de re proposita aeque nihil
+ceteris sentiebam; minus uero quam ceteri ipse afferebam, falsae scilicet
+scientiae praesumptionem. Tuli aegerrime, fateor, compressusque indoctorum
+grege conticui metuens ne iure uiderer insanus, si sanus inter furiosos
+haberi contenderem. Meditabar igitur dehinc omnes animo quaestiones nec
+deglutiebam quod acceperam, sed frequentis consilii iteratione ruminabam.
+Tandem igitur patuere pulsanti animo fores et ueritas inuenta quaerenti
+omnes nebulas Eutychiani reclusit erroris. Vnde mihi maxime subiit
+admirari, quaenam haec indoctorum hominum esset audacia qui inscientiae
+uitium praesumptionis atque inpudentiae nube conentur obducere, cum non
+modo saepe id quod proponatur ignorent, uerum in huiusmodi contentionibus
+ne id quidem quod ipsi loquantur intellegant, quasi non deterior fiat
+inscientiae causa, dum tegitur.
+
+Sed ab illis ad te transeo, cui hoc quantulumcumque est examinandum prius
+perpendendumque transmitto. Quod si recte se habere pronuntiaueris, peto ut
+mei nominis hoc quoque inseras chartis; sin uero uel minuendum aliquid uel
+addendum uel aliqua mutatione uariandum est, id quoque postulo remitti,
+meis exemplaribus ita ut a te reuertitur transcribendum. Quae ubi ad calcem
+ducta constiterint, tum demum eius cuius soleo iudicio censenda
+transmittam. Sed quoniam semel res a conlocutione transfertur ad stilum,
+prius extremi sibique contrarii Nestorii atque Eutychis summoueantur
+errores; post uero adiuuante deo, Christianae medietatem fidei temperabo.
+Quoniam uero in tota quaestione contrariarum sibimet [Greek: haireseon] de
+personis dubitatur atque naturis, haec primitus definienda sunt et propriis
+differentiis segreganda.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  A TREATISE AGAINST EUTYCHES AND NESTORIUS
+
+  BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS
+  ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO HIS SAINTLY MASTER AND REVEREND FATHER JOHN THE DEACON
+  HIS SON BOETHIUS
+
+  I have been long and anxiously waiting for you to discuss with me the
+  problem which was raised at the meeting. But since your duties have
+  prevented your coming and I shall be for some time involved in my
+  business engagements, I am setting down in writing what I had been
+  keeping to say by word of mouth.
+
+  You no doubt remember how, when the letter[53] was read in the assembly,
+  it was asserted that the Eutychians confess that Christ is formed from
+  two natures but does not consist of them--whereas Catholics admit both
+  propositions, for among followers of the true Faith He is equally
+  believed to be of two natures and in two natures. Struck by the novelty
+  of this assertion I began to inquire what difference there can be
+  between unions formed from two natures and unions which consist in two
+  natures, for the point which the bishop who wrote the letter refused to
+  pass over because of its gravity, seemed to me of importance and not one
+  to be idly and carelessly slurred over. On that occasion all loudly
+  protested that the difference was evident, that there was no obscurity,
+  confusion or perplexity, and in the general storm and tumult there was
+  no one who really touched the edge of the problem, much less anyone who
+  solved it.
+
+  I was sitting a long way from the man whom I especially wished to
+  watch,[54] and if you recall the arrangement of the seats, I was turned
+  away from him, with so many between us, that however much I desired it I
+  could not see his face and expression and glean therefrom any sign of
+  his opinion. Personally, indeed, I had nothing more to contribute than
+  the rest, in fact rather less than more. I, no more than the others, had
+  any view about the question at issue, while my possible contribution was
+  less by one thing, namely, the false assumption of a knowledge that I
+  had not got. I was, I admit, much put out, and being overwhelmed by the
+  mob of ignorant speakers, I held my peace, fearing lest I should be
+  rightly set down as insane if I held out for being sane among those
+  madmen.[55] So I continued to ponder all the questions in my mind, not
+  swallowing what I had heard, but rather chewing the cud of constant
+  meditation. At last the door opened to my insistent knocking, and the
+  truth which I found cleared out of my way all the clouds of the
+  Eutychian error. And with this discovery a great wonder came upon me at
+  the vast temerity of unlearned men who use the cloak of impudent
+  presumption to cover up the vice of ignorance, for not only do they
+  often fail to grasp the point at issue, but in a debate of this kind
+  they do not even understand their own statements, forgetting that the
+  case of ignorance is all the worse if it is not honestly admitted.[56]
+
+  I turn from them to you, and to you I submit this little essay for your
+  first judgment and consideration. If you pronounce it to be sound I beg
+  you to place it among the other writings of mine which you possess; but
+  if there is anything to be struck out or added or changed in any way, I
+  would ask you to let me have your suggestions, in order that I may enter
+  them in my copies just as they leave your hands. When this revision has
+  been duly accomplished, then I will send the work on to be judged by the
+  man to whom I always submit everything.[57] But since the pen is now to
+  take the place of the living voice, let me first clear away the extreme
+  and self-contradictory errors of Nestorius and Eutyches; after that, by
+  God's help, I will temperately set forth the middle way of the Christian
+  Faith. But since in this whole question of self-contradictory heresies
+  the matter of debate is Persons and Natures, these terms must first be
+  defined and distinguished by their proper differences.
+
+
+  [53] Evidently the letter addressed to Pope Symmachus by the Oriental
+  bishops (_vide_ Mansi, _Concil_. viii. 221 ff.), in which they inquire
+  concerning the safe middle way between the heresies of Eutyches and
+  Nestorius. The date of the bishops' letter, and consequently, in all
+  probability, of Boethius's tractate was 512.
+
+  [54] Obviously his father-in-law Symmachus. _Vide_ p. 76, _eius cuius
+  soleo iudiclo_, etc.
+
+  [55] Cf. Hor. _Serm_. i. 3. 82; ii. 3. 40.
+
+  [56] Cf. _infra, de Cons._ i. pr. 4 (p. 142) _oportet uulnus detegas.
+
+  [57] _Vide supra_, p. 75, and _De Trin._ p. 3.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Natura igitur aut de solis corporibus dici potest aut de solis substantiis,
+id est corporeis atque incorporeis, aut de omnibus rebus quae quocumque
+modo esse dicuntur. Cum igitur tribus modis natura dici possit, tribus
+modis sine dubio definienda est. Nam si de omnibus rebus naturam dici
+placet, talis definitio dabitur quae res omnes quae sunt possit includere.
+Erit ergo huiusmodi: "natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquo modo
+intellectu capi possunt." In hac igitur definitione et accidentia et
+substantiae definiuntur; haec enim omnia intellectu capi possunt. Additum
+uero est "quoquo modo," quoniam deus et materia integro perfectoque
+intellectu intellegi non possunt, sed aliquo tamen modo ceterarum rerum
+priuatione capiuntur. Idcirco uero adiunximus "quae cum sint," quoniam
+etiam ipsum nihil significat aliquid sed non naturam. Neque enim quod sit
+aliquid sed potius non esse significat; omnis uero natura est. Et si de
+omnibus quidem rebus naturam dici placet, haec sit naturae definitio quam
+superius proposuimus. Sin uero de solis substantiis natura dicitur, quoniam
+substantiae omnes aut corporeae sunt aut incorporeae, dabimus definitionem
+naturae substantias significanti huiusmodi: "natura est uel quod facere uel
+quod pati possit." "Pati" quidem ac "facere," ut omnia corporea atque
+corporeorum anima; haec enim in corpore et a corpore et facit et patitur.
+"Facere" uero tantum ut deus ceteraque diuina. Habes igitur definitionem
+eius quoque significationis naturae quae tantum substantiis applicatur. Qua
+in re substantiae quoque est reddita definitio. Nam si nomen naturae
+substantiam monstrat, cum naturam descripsimus substantiae quoque est
+assignata descriptio. Quod si naturae nomen relictis incorporeis
+substantiis ad corporales usque contrahitur, ut corporeae tantum
+substantiae naturam habere uideantur, sicut Aristoteles ceterique et
+eiusmodi et multimodae philosophiae sectatores putant, definiemus eam, ut
+hi etiam qui naturam non nisi in corporibus esse posuerunt. Est autem eius
+definitio hoc modo: "natura est motus principium per se non per accidens."
+Quod "motus principium" dixi hoc est, quoniam corpus omne habet proprium
+motum, ut ignis sursum, terra deorsum. Item quod "per se principium motus"
+naturam esse proposui et non "per accidens," tale est, quoniam lectum
+quoque ligneum deorsum ferri necesse est, sed non deorsum per accidens
+fertur. Idcirco enim quia lignum est, quod est terra, pondere et grauitate
+deducitur. Non enim quia lectus est, deorsum cadit, sed quia terra est, id
+est quia terrae contigit, ut lectus esset; unde fit ut lignum naturaliter
+esse dicamus, lectum uero artificialiter. Est etiam alia significatio
+naturae per quam dicimus diuersam esse naturam auri atque argenti in hoc
+proprietatem rerum monstrare cupientes, quae significatio naturae
+definietur hoc modo: "natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica
+differentia." Cum igitur tot modis uel dicatur uel definiatur natura, tam
+catholici quam Nestorius secundum ultimam definitionem duas in Christo
+naturas esse constituunt; neque enim easdem in deum atque hominem
+differentias conuenire.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Nature, then, may be affirmed either of bodies alone or of substances
+  alone, that is, of corporeals or incorporeals, or of everything that is
+  in any way capable of affirmation. Since, then, nature can be affirmed
+  in three ways, it must obviously be defined in three ways. For if you
+  choose to affirm nature of the totality of things, the definition will
+  be of such a kind as to include all things that are. It will accordingly
+  be something of this kind: "Nature belongs to those things which, since
+  they exist, can in some measure be apprehended by the mind." This
+  definition, then, includes both accidents and substances, for they all
+  can be apprehended by the mind. But I add "in some measure" because God
+  and matter cannot be apprehended by mind, be it never so whole and
+  perfect, but still they are apprehended in a measure through the removal
+  of accidents. The reason for adding the words, "since they exist," is
+  that the mere word "nothing" denotes something, though it does not
+  denote nature. For it denotes, indeed, not that anything is, but rather
+  non-existence; but every nature exists. And if we choose to affirm
+  "nature" of the totality of things, the definition will be as we have
+  given it above.
+
+  But if "nature" is affirmed of substances alone, we shall, since all
+  substances are either corporeal or incorporeal, give to nature denoting
+  substances a definition of the following kind: "Nature is either that
+  which can act or that which can be acted upon." Now the power to act and
+  to suffer belongs to all corporeals and the soul of corporeals; for it
+  both acts in the body and suffers by the body. But only to act belongs
+  to God and other divine substances.
+
+  Here, then, you have a further definition of what nature is as applied
+  to substances alone. This definition comprises also the definition of
+  substance. For if the word nature signifies substance, when once we have
+  defined nature we have also settled the definition of substance. But if
+  we neglect incorporeal substances and confine the name nature to
+  corporeal substances so that they alone appear to possess the nature of
+  substance--which is the view of Aristotle and the adherents both of his
+  and various other schools--we shall define nature as those do who have
+  only allowed the word to be applied to bodies. Now, in accordance with
+  this view, the definition is as follows: "Nature is the principle of
+  movement properly inherent in and not accidentally attached to bodies."
+  I say "principle of movement" because every body has its proper
+  movement, fire moving upwards, the earth moving downwards. And what I
+  mean by "movement properly inherent and not accidentally attached" is
+  seen by the example of a wooden bed which is necessarily borne downward
+  and is not carried downward by accident. For it is drawn downward by
+  weight and heaviness because it is of wood, i.e. an earthly material.
+  For it falls down not because it is a bed, but because it is earth, that
+  is, because it is an accident of earth that it is a bed; hence we call
+  it wood in virtue of its nature, but bed in virtue of the art that
+  shaped it.
+
+  Nature has, further, another meaning according to which we speak of the
+  different nature of gold and silver, wishing thereby to point the
+  special property of things; this meaning of nature will be defined as
+  follows: "Nature is the specific difference that gives form to
+  anything." Thus, although nature is described or defined in all these
+  different ways, both Catholics and Nestorians firmly hold that there are
+  in Christ two natures of the kind laid down in our last definition, for
+  the same specific differences cannot apply to God and man.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Sed de persona maxime dubitari potest, quaenam ei definitio possit aptari.
+Si enim omnis habet natura personam, indissolubilis nodus est, quaenam
+inter naturam personamque possit esse discretio; aut si non aequatur
+persona naturae, sed infra terminum spatiumque naturae persona subsistit,
+difficile dictu est ad quas usque naturas persona perueniat, id est quas
+naturas conueniat habere personam, quas a personae uocabulo segregari. Nam
+illud quidem manifestum est personae subiectam esse naturam nec praeter
+naturam personam posse praedicari. Vestiganda sunt igitur haec
+inquirentibus hoc modo.
+
+Quoniam praeter naturam non potest esse persona quoniamque naturae aliae
+sunt substantiae, aliae accidentes et uidemus personam in accidentibus non
+posse constitui (quis enim dicat ullam albedinis uel nigredinis uel
+magnitudinis esse personam?), relinquitur ergo ut personam in substantiis
+dici conueniat. Sed substantiarum aliae sunt corporeae, aliae incorporeae.
+Corporearum uero aliae sunt uiuentes, aliae minime; uiuentium aliae sunt
+sensibiles, aliae minime; sensibilium aliae rationales, aliae inrationales.
+Item incorporearum aliae sunt rationales, aliae minime, ut pecudum uitae;
+rationalium uero alia est inmutabilis atque inpassibilis per naturam ut
+deus, alia per creationem mutabilis atque passibilis, nisi inpassibilis
+gratia substantiae ad inpassibilitatis firmitudinem permutetur ut angelorum
+atque animae. Ex quibus omnibus neque in non uiuentibus corporibus personam
+posse dici manifestum est (nullus enim lapidis ullam dicit esse personam),
+neque rursus eorum uiuentium quae sensu carent (neque enim ulla persona est
+arboris), nec uero eius quae intellectu ac ratione deseritur (nulla est
+enim persona equi uel bouis ceterorumque animalium quae muta ac sine
+ratione uitam solis sensibus degunt), at hominis dicimus esse personam,
+dicimus dei, dicimus angeli. Rursus substantiarum aliae sunt uniuersales,
+aliae particulares. Vniuersales sunt quae de singulis praedicantur ut homo,
+animal, lapis, lignum ceteraque huiusmodi quae uel genera uel species sunt;
+nam et homo de singulis hominibus et animal de singulis animalibus lapisque
+ac lignum de singulis lapidibus ac lignis dicuntur. Particularia uero sunt
+quae de aliis minime praedicantur ut Cicero, Plato, lapis hic unde haec
+Achillis statua facta est, lignum hoc unde haec mensa composita est. Sed in
+his omnibus nusquam in uniuersalibus persona dici potest, sed in
+singularibus tantum atque in indiuiduis; animalis enim uel generalis
+hominis nulla persona est, sed uel Ciceronis uel Platonis uel singulorum
+indiuiduorum personae singulae nuncupantur.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  But the proper definition of Person is a matter of very great
+  perplexity. For if every nature has person, the difference between
+  nature and person is a hard knot to unravel; or if person is not taken
+  as the equivalent of nature but is a term of less scope and range, it is
+  difficult to say to what natures it may be extended, that is, to what
+  natures the term person may be applied and what natures are dissociate
+  from it. For one thing is clear, namely that nature is a substrate of
+  Person, and that Person cannot be predicated apart from nature.
+
+  We must, therefore, conduct our inquiry into these points as follows.
+
+  Since Person cannot exist apart from a nature and since natures are
+  either substances or accidents and we see that a person cannot come into
+  being among accidents (for who can say there is any person of white or
+  black or size?), it therefore remains that Person is properly applied to
+  substances. But of substances, some are corporeal and others
+  incorporeal. And of corporeals, some are living and others the reverse;
+  of living substances, some are sensitive and others insensitive; of
+  sensitive substances, some are rational and others irrational.[58]
+  Similarly of incorporeal substances, some are rational, others the
+  reverse (for instance the animating spirits of beasts); but of rational
+  substances there is one which is immutable and impassible by nature,
+  namely God, another which in virtue of its creation is mutable and
+  passible except in that case where the Grace of the impassible substance
+  has transformed it to the unshaken impassibility which belongs to angels
+  and to the soul.
+
+  Now from all the definitions we have given it is clear that Person
+  cannot be affirmed of bodies which have no life (for no one ever said
+  that a stone had a person), nor yet of living things which lack sense
+  (for neither is there any person of a tree), nor finally of that which
+  is bereft of mind and reason (for there is no person of a horse or ox or
+  any other of the animals which dumb and unreasoning live a life of sense
+  alone), but we say there is a person of a man, of God, of an angel.
+  Again, some substances are universal, others are particular. Universal
+  terms are those which are predicated of individuals, as man, animal,
+  stone, stock and other things of this kind which are either genera or
+  species; for the term man is applied to individual men just as animal is
+  to individual animals, and stone and stock to individual stones and
+  stocks. But particulars are terms which are never predicated of other
+  things, as Cicero, Plato, this stone from which this statue of Achilles
+  was hewn, this piece of wood out of which this table was made. But in
+  all these things person cannot in any case be applied to universals, but
+  only to particulars and individuals; for there is no person of a man if
+  animal or general; only the single persons of Cicero, Plato, or other
+  single individuals are termed persons.
+
+  [58] For a similar example of the method of _diuisio_ cf. Cic. _De Off._
+  ii. 3. 11. Cf. also _Isag. Porph. edit. prima_, i. 10 (ed. Brandt, p.
+  29).
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationabilibus
+substantiaque omnis natura est nec in uniuersalibus sed in indiuiduis
+constat, reperta personae est definitio: "naturae rationabilis indiuidua
+substantia." Sed nos hac definitione eam quam Graeci [Greek: hupostasin]
+dicunt terminauimus. Nomen enim personae uidetur aliunde traductum, ex his
+scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque eos quorum interest
+homines repraesentabant. Persona uero dicta est a personando circumflexa
+paenultima. Quod si acuatur antepaenultima, apertissime a sono dicta
+uidebitur; idcirco autem a sono, quia concauitate ipsa maior necesse est
+uoluatur sonus. Graeci quoque has personas [Greek: prosopa] uocant ab eo
+quod ponantur in facie atque ante oculos obtegant uultum: [Greek: para tou
+pros tous opas tithesthai.] Sed quoniam personis inductis histriones
+indiuiduos homines quorum intererat in tragoedia uel in comoedia ut dictum
+est repraesentabant, id est Hecubam uel Medeam uel Simonem uel Chremetem,
+idcirco ceteros quoque homines, quorum certa pro sui forma esset agnitio,
+et Latini personam et Graeci [Greek: prosopa] nuncupauerunt. Longe uero
+illi signatius naturae rationabilis indiuiduam subsistentiam [Greek:
+hupostaseos] nomine uocauerunt, nos uero per inopiam significantium uocum
+translaticiam retinuimus nuncupationem, eam quam illi [Greek: hupostasin]
+dicunt personam uocantes; sed peritior Graecia sermonum [Greek: hupostasin]
+uocat indiuiduam subsistentiam. Atque, uti Graeca utar oratione in rebus
+quae a Graecis agitata Latina interpretatione translata sunt: [Greek: hai
+ousiai en men tois katholou einai dunantai. en de tois atomois kai kata
+meros monois huphistantai], id est: essentiae in uniuersalibus quidem esse
+possunt, in solis uero indiuiduis et particularibus substant. Intellectus
+enim uniuersalium rerum ex particularibus sumptus est. Quocirca cum ipsae
+subsistentiae in uniuersalibus quidem sint, in particularibus uero capiant
+substantiam, iure subsistentias particulariter substantes [Greek:
+hupostaseis] appellauerunt. Neque enim pensius subtiliusque intuenti idem
+uidebitur esse subsistentia quod substantia.
+
+Nam quod Graeci [Greek: ousiosin] uel [Greek: ousiosthai] dicunt, id nos
+subsistentiam uel subsistere appellamus; quod uero illi [Greek: hupostasin]
+uel [Greek: huphistasthai], id nos substantiam uel substare interpretamur.
+Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget.
+Substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse
+ualeant, subministrat; sub illis enim stat, dum subiectum est accidentibus.
+Itaque genera uel species subsistunt tantum; neque enim accidentia
+generibus speciebus*ue contingunt. Indiuidua uero non modo subsistunt uerum
+etiam substant, nam neque ipsa indigent accidentibus ut sint; informata
+enim sunt iam propriis et specificis differentiis et accidentibus ut esse
+possint ministrant, dum sunt scilicet subiecta. Quocirca [Greek: einai]
+atque [Greek: ousiosthai] esse atque subsistere, [Greek: huphistasthai]
+uero substare intellegitur. Neque enim uerborum inops Graecia est, ut
+Marcus Tullius alludit, sed essentiam, subsistentiam, substantiam, personam
+totidem nominibus reddit, essentiam quidem [Greek: ousian], subsistentiam
+uero [Greek: ousiosin], substantiam [Greek: hupostasin], personam [Greek:
+prosopon] appellans. Ideo autem [Greek: hupostaseis] Graeci indiuiduas
+substantias uocauerunt, quoniam ceteris subsunt et quibusdam quasi
+accidentibus subpositae subiectaeque sunt; atque idcirco nos quoque eas
+substantias nuncupamus quasi subpositas, quas illi[59] [Greek:
+hupostaseis], cumque etiam [Greek: prosopa] nuncupent easdem substantias,
+possumus nos quoque nuncupare personas. Idem est igitur [Greek: ousian]
+esse quod essentiam, idem [Greek: ousiosin] quod subsistentiam, idem
+[Greek: hupostasin] quod substantiam, idem [Greek: prosopon] quod personam.
+Quare autem de inrationabilibus animalibus Graecus [Greek: hupostasin] non
+dicat, sicut nos de eisdem nomen substantiae praedicamus, haec ratio est,
+quoniam nomen hoc melioribus applicatum est, ut aliqua id quod est
+excellentius, tametsi non descriptione naturae secundum id quod [Greek:
+huphistasthai] atque substare est, at certe [Greek: hupostaseos] uel
+substantiae uocabulis discerneretur.
+
+Est igitur et hominis quidem essentia, id est [Greek: ousia], et
+subsistentia, id est [Greek: ousiosis], et [Greek: hupostasis], id est
+substantia, et [Greek: prosopon], id est persona; [Greek: ousia], quidem
+atque essentia quoniam est, [Greek: ousiosis] uero atque subsistentia
+quoniam in nullo subiecto est, [Greek: hupostasis] uero atque substantia,
+quoniam subest ceteris quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est [Greek:
+ousioseis]; est [Greek: prosopon] atque persona, quoniam est rationabile
+indiuiduum. Deus quoque et [Greek: ousia] est et essentia, est enim et
+maxime ipse est a quo omnium esse proficiscitur. Est [Greek: ousiosis], id
+est subsistentia (subsistit enim nullo indigens), et [Greek:
+huphistasthai]; substat enim. Vnde etiam dicimus unam esse [Greek: ousian]
+uel [Greek: ousiosin], id est essentiam uel subsistentiam deitatis, sed
+tres [Greek: hupostaseis], id est tres substantias. Et quidem secundum hunc
+modum dixere unam trinitatis essentiam, tres substantias tresque personas.
+Nisi enim tres in deo substantias ecclesiasticus loquendi usus excluderet,
+uideretur idcirco de deo dici substantia, non quod ipse ceteris rebus quasi
+subiectum supponeretur, sed quod idem omnibus uti praeesset ita etiam quasi
+principium subesset rebus, dum eis omnibus [Greek: ousiosthai] uel
+subsistere subministrat.
+
+
+[59] quas illi _Vallinus_; quasi _uel_ quas _codd. meliores_.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Wherefore if Person belongs to substances alone, and these rational, and
+  if every nature is a substance, existing not in universals but in
+  individuals, we have found the definition of Person, viz.: "The
+  individual substance of a rational nature."[60] Now by this definition
+  we Latins have described what the Greeks call [Greek: hupostasis]. For
+  the word person seems to be borrowed from a different source, namely
+  from the masks which in comedies and tragedies used to signify the
+  different subjects of representation. Now _persona_ "mask" is
+  derived from _personare_, with a circumflex on the penultimate. But
+  if the accent is put on the antepenultimate[61] the word will clearly be
+  seen to come from _sonus_ "sound," and for this reason, that the
+  hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound. The Greeks, too, call
+  these masks [Greek: prosopa] from the fact that they are placed over the
+  face and conceal the countenance from the spectator: [Greek: para tou
+  pros tous opas tithesthai]. But since, as we have said, it was by the
+  masks they put on that actors played the different characters
+  represented in a tragedy or comedy--Hecuba or Medea or Simon or
+  Chremes,--so also all other men who could be recognized by their several
+  characteristics were designated by the Latins with the term
+  _persona_ and by the Greeks with [Greek: prosopa]. But the Greeks
+  far more clearly gave to the individual subsistence of a rational nature
+  the name [Greek: hupostasis] while we through want of appropriate words
+  have kept a borrowed term, calling that _persona_ which they call
+  [Greek: hupostasis]; but Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the
+  name [Greek: hupostasis] to the individual subsistence. And, if I may
+  use Greek in dealing with matters which were first mooted by Greeks
+  before they came to be interpreted in Latin: [Greek: hai ousiai en men
+  tois katholou einai dunantai. en de tois atomois kai kata meros monois
+  huphistantai], that is: essences indeed can have potential existence in
+  universals, but they have particular substantial existence in
+  particulars alone. For it is from particulars that all our comprehension
+  of universals is taken. Wherefore since subsistences are present in
+  universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly gave the
+  name [Greek: hupostasis] to subsistences which acquired substance
+  through the medium of particulars. For to no one using his eyes with any
+  care or penetration will subsistence and substance appear identical.
+
+  For our equivalents of the Greek terms [Greek: ousiosis ousiosthai] are
+  respectively _subsistentia_ and _subsistere_, while their
+  [Greek: hupostasis huphistasthai] are represented by our
+  _substantia_ and _substare_. For a thing has subsistence when
+  it does not require accidents in order to be, but that thing has
+  substance which supplies to other things, accidents to wit, a substrate
+  enabling them to be; for it "substands" those things so long as it is
+  subjected to accidents. Thus genera and species have only subsistence,
+  for accidents do not attach to genera and species. But particulars have
+  not only subsistence but substance, for they, no more than generals,
+  depend on accidents for their Being; for they are already provided with
+  their proper and specific differences and they enable accidents to be by
+  supplying them with a substrate. Wherefore _esse_ and
+  _subsistere_ represent [Greek: einai] and [Greek: ousiosthai],
+  while _substare_ represents [Greek: huphistasthai]. For Greece is
+  not, as Marcus Tullius[62] playfully says, short of words, but provides
+  exact equivalents for _essentia, subsistentia, substantia_ and
+  _persona_--[Greek: ousia] for _essentia_, [Greek: ousiosis]
+  for _subsistentia_, [Greek: hupostasis] for _substantia_,
+  [Greek: prosopon] for _persona_. But the Greeks called individual
+  substances [Greek: hupostaseis] because they underlie the rest and offer
+  support and substrate to what are called accidents; and we in our term
+  call them substances as being substrate--[Greek: hupostaseis], and since
+  they also term the same substances [Greek: prosopa], we too may call
+  them persons. So [Greek: ousia] is identical with essence, [Greek:
+  ousiosis] with subsistence, [Greek: hupostasis] with substance, [Greek:
+  prosopon] with person. But the reason why the Greek does not use [Greek:
+  hupostasis] of irrational animals while we apply the term substance to
+  them is this: This term was applied to things of higher value, in order
+  that what is more excellent might be distinguished, if not by a
+  definition of nature answering to the literal meaning of [Greek:
+  huphistasthai]=_substare_, at any rate by the words [Greek:
+  hupostasis]=_substantia_.
+
+  To begin with, then, man is essence, i.e. [Greek: ousia], subsistence,
+  i.e. [Greek: ousiosis, hupostasis], i.e. substance, [Greek: prosopon],
+  i.e. person: [Greek: ousia] or _essentia_ because he is, [Greek:
+  ousiosis], or subsistence because he is not accidental to any subject,
+  [Greek: hupostusis] or substance because he is subject to all the things
+  which are not subsistences or [Greek: ousioseis], while he is [Greek:
+  prosopon] or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is
+  [Greek: ousia], or essence, for He is and is especially that from which
+  proceeds the Being of all things. To Him belong [Greek: ousiosis], i.e.
+  subsistence, for He subsists in absolute independence, and [Greek:
+  huphistasthai], for He is substantial Being. Whence we go on to say that
+  there is one [Greek: ousia] or [Greek: ousiosis], i.e. one essence or
+  subsistence of the Godhead, but three [Greek: hupostaseis] or
+  substances. And indeed, following this use, men have spoken of One
+  essence, three substances and three persons of the Godhead. For did not
+  the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking
+  of God,[63] substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not
+  because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because,
+  just as He excels above all things, so He is the foundation and support
+  of things, supplying them all with [Greek: ousiosthai] or subsistence.
+
+
+  [60] Boethius's definition of _persona_ was adopted by St. Thomas (S. i.
+  29. 1), was regarded as classical by the Schoolmen, and has the approval
+  of modern theologians. Cf. Dorner, _Doctrine of Christ_, iii. p. 311.
+
+  [61] Implying a short penultimate.
+
+  [62] _Tusc._ ii. 15. 35.
+
+  [63] For a similar submission of his own opinion to the usage of the
+  Church cf. the end of _Tr._ i. and of _Tr._ ii.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Sed haec omnia idcirco sint dicta, ut differentiam naturae atque personae
+id est [Greek: ousias] atque [Greek: hupostaseos] monstraremus. Quo uero
+nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari, ecclesiasticae sit locutionis
+arbitrium. Hoc interim constet quod inter naturam personamque differre
+praediximus, quoniam natura est cuiuslibet substantiae specificata
+proprietas, persona uero rationabilis naturae indiuidua substantia. Hanc in
+Christo Nestorius duplicem esse constituit eo scilicet traductus errore,
+quod putauerit in omnibus naturis dici posse personam. Hoc enim praesumpto,
+quoniam in Christo duplicem naturam esse censebat, duplicem quoque personam
+esse confessus est. Qua in re eum falsum esse cum definitio superius dicta
+conuincat, tum haec argumentatio euidenter eius declarabit errorem. Si enim
+non est Christi una persona duasque naturas esse manifestum est, hominis
+scilicet atque dei (nec tam erit insipiens quisquam, utqui utramque earum a
+ratione seiungat), sequitur ut duae uideantur esse personae; est enim
+persona ut dictum est naturae rationabilis indiuidua substantia.
+
+Quae est igitur facta hominis deique coniunctio? Num ita quasi cum duo
+corpora sibimet apponuntur, ut tantum locis iuncta sint et nihil in alterum
+ex alterius qualitate perueniat? Quem coniunctionis Graeci modum [Greek:
+kata parathesin] uocant. Sed si ita humanitas diuinitati coniuncta est,
+nihil horum ex utrisque confectum est ac per hoc nihil est Christus. Nomen
+quippe ipsum unum quiddam significat singularitate uocabuli. At si duabus
+personis manentibus ea coniunctio qualem superius diximus facta est
+naturarum, unum ex duobus effici nihil potuit; omnino enim ex duabus
+personis nihil umquam fieri potest. Nihil igitur unum secundum Nestorium
+Christus est ac per hoc omnino nihil. Quod enim non est unum, nec esse
+omnino potest; esse enim atque unum conuertitur et quodcumque unum est est.
+Etiam ea quae ex pluribus coniunguntur ut aceruus, chorus, unum tamen sunt.
+Sed esse Christum manifeste ac ueraciter confitemur; unum igitur esse
+dicimus Christum. Quod si ita est, unam quoque Christi sine dubitatione
+personam esse necesse est. Nam si duae personae essent, unus esse non
+posset; duos uero esse dicere Christos nihil est aliud nisi praecipitatae
+mentis insania. Cur enim omnino duos audeat Christos uocare, unum hominem
+alium deum? Vel cur eum qui deus est Christum uocat, si eum quoque qui homo
+est Christum est appellaturus, cum nihil simile, nihil habeant ex
+copulatione coniunctum? Cur simili nomine diuersissimis abutatur naturis,
+cum, si Christum definire cogitur, utrisque ut ipse dicit Christis non
+possit unam definitionis adhibere substantiam? Si enim dei atque hominis
+diuersa substantia est unumque in utrisque Christi nomen nec diuersarum
+coniunctio substantiarum unam creditur fecisse personam, aequiuocum nomen
+est Christi et nulla potest definitione concludi. Quibus autem umquam
+scripturis nomen Christi geminatur? Quid uero noui per aduentum saluatoris
+effectum est? Nam catholicis et fidei ueritas et raritas miraculi constat.
+Quam enim magnum est quamque nouum, quam quod semel nec ullo alio saeculo
+possit euenire, ut eius qui solus est deus natura cum humana quae ab eo
+erat diuersissima conueniret atque ita ex distantibus naturis una fieret
+copulatione persona! Secundum Nestorii uero sententiam quid contingit noui?
+"Seruant," inquit, "proprias humanitas diuinitasque personas." Quando enim
+non fuit diuinitatis propria humanitatisque persona? Quando uero non erit?
+Vel quid amplius in Iesu generatione contingit quam in cuiuslibet alterius,
+si discretis utrisque personis discretae etiam fuere naturae? Ita enim
+personis manentibus illic nulla naturarum potuit esse coniunctio, ut in
+quolibet homine, cuius cum propria persona subsistat, nulla est ei
+excellentissimae substantiae coniuncta diuinitas. Sed fortasse Iesum, id
+est personam hominis, idcirco Christum uocet, quoniam per eam mira quaedam
+sit operata diuinitas. Esto. Deum uero ipsum Christi appellatione cur
+uocet? Cur uero non elementa quoque ipsa simili audeat appellare uocabulo
+per quae deus mira quaedam cotidianis motibus operatur? An quia
+inrationabiles substantiae non possunt habere personam qua[64] Christi
+uocabulum excipere possint[65]? Nonne in sanctis hominibus ac pietate
+conspicuis apertus diuinitatis actus agnoscitur? Nihil enim intererit, cur
+non sanctos quoque uiros eadem appellatione dignetur, si in adsumptione
+humanitatis non est una ex coniunctione persona. Sed dicat forsitan, "Illos
+quoque Christos uocari fateor, sed ad imaginem ueri Christi." Quod si nulla
+ex homine atque deo una persona coniuncta est, omnes ita ueros Christos
+arbitrabimur ut hunc qui ex uirgine genitus creditur. Nulla quippe in hoc
+adunata persona est ex dei atque hominis copulatione sicut nec in eis, qui
+dei spiritu de uenturo Christo praedicebant, propter quod etiam ipsi quoque
+appellati sunt Christi. Iam uero sequitur, ut personis manentibus nullo
+modo a diuinitate humanitas credatur adsumpta. Omnino enim disiuncta sunt
+quae aeque personis naturisque separantur, prorsus inquam disiuncta sunt
+nec magis inter se homines bouesque disiuncti quam diuinitas in Christo
+humanitasque discreta est, si mansere personae. Homines quippe ac boues una
+animalis communitate iunguntur; est enim illis secundum genus communis
+substantia eademque in uniuersalitatis collectione natura. Deo uero atque
+homini quid non erit diuersa ratione disiunctum, si sub diuersitate naturae
+personarum quoque credatur mansisse discretio? Non est igitur saluatum
+genus humanum, nulla in nos salus Christi generatione processit, tot
+prophetarum scripturae populum inlusere credentem, omnis ueteris testamenti
+spernatur auctoritas per quam salus mundo Christi generatione promittitur.
+Non autem prouenisse manifestum est, si eadem in persona est quae in natura
+diuersitas. Eundem quippe saluum fecit quem creditur adsumpsisse; nulla
+uero intellegi adsumptio potest, si manet aeque naturae personaeque
+discretio. Igitur qui adsumi manente persona non potuit, iure non uidebitur
+per Christi generationem potuisse saluari. Non est igitur per generationem
+Christi hominum saluata natura,--quod credi nefas est.
+
+Sed quamquam permulta sint quae hunc sensum inpugnare ualeant atque
+perfringere, de argumentorum copia tamen haec interim libasse sufficiat.
+
+
+[64] quae _codd._
+
+[65] possit _Vallinus_.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  You must consider that all I have said so far has been for the purpose
+  of marking the difference between Nature and Person, that is, [Greek:
+  ousia] and [Greek: hupostasis]. The exact terms which should be applied
+  in each case must be left to the decision of ecclesiastical usage. For
+  the time being let that distinction between Nature and Person hold which
+  I have affirmed, viz. that Nature is the specific property of any
+  substance, and Person the individual substance of a rational nature.
+  Nestorius affirmed that in Christ Person was twofold, being led astray
+  by the false notion that Person may be applied to every nature. For on
+  this assumption, understanding that there were in Christ two natures, he
+  declared that there were likewise two persons. And although the
+  definition which we have already given is enough to prove Nestorius
+  wrong, his error shall be further declared by the following argument. If
+  the Person of Christ is not single, and if it is clear that there are in
+  Him two natures, to wit, divine and human (and no one will be so foolish
+  as to fail to include either in the definition), it follows that there
+  must apparently be two persons; for Person, as has been said, is the
+  individual substance of a rational nature.
+
+  What kind of union, then, between God and man has been effected? Is it
+  as when two bodies are laid the one against the other, so that they are
+  only joined locally, and no touch of the quality of the one reaches the
+  other--the kind of union which the Greeks term [Greek: kata parathesin]
+  "by juxtaposition"? But if humanity has been united to divinity in this
+  way no one thing has been formed out of the two, and hence Christ is
+  nothing. The very name of Christ, indeed, denotes by its singular number
+  a unity. But if the two persons continued and such a union of natures as
+  we have above described took place, there could be no unity formed from
+  two things, for nothing could ever possibly be formed out of two
+  persons. Therefore Christ is, according to Nestorius, in no respect one,
+  and therefore He is absolutely nothing. For what is not one cannot exist
+  either; because Being and unity are convertible terms, and whatever is
+  one is. Even things which are made up of many items, such as a heap or
+  chorus, are nevertheless a unity. Now we openly and honestly confess
+  that Christ is; therefore we say that Christ is a Unity. And if this is
+  so, then without controversy the Person of Christ is one also. For if
+  the Persons were two He could not be one; but to say that there are two
+  Christs is nothing else than the madness of a distraught brain. Could
+  Nestorius, I ask, dare to call the one man and the one God in Christ two
+  Christs? Or why does he call Him Christ who is God, if he is also going
+  to call Him Christ who is man, when his combination gives the two no
+  common factor, no coherence? Why does he wrongly use the same name for
+  two utterly different natures, when, if he is compelled to define
+  Christ, he cannot, as he himself admits, apply the substance of one
+  definition to both his Christs? For if the substance of God is different
+  from that of man, and the one name of Christ applies to both, and the
+  combination of different substances is not believed to have formed one
+  Person, the name of Christ is equivocal[66] and cannot be comprised in
+  one definition. But in what Scriptures is the name of Christ ever made
+  double? Or what new thing has been wrought by the coming of the Saviour?
+  For the truth of the faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike
+  remain, for Catholics, unshaken. For how great and unprecedented a thing
+  it is--unique and incapable of repetition in any other age--that the
+  nature of Him who is God alone should come together with human nature
+  which was entirely different from God to form from different natures by
+  conjunction a single Person! But now, if we follow Nestorius, what
+  happens that is new? "Humanity and divinity," quoth he, "keep their
+  proper Persons." Well, when had not divinity and humanity each its
+  proper Person? And when, we answer, will this not be so? Or wherein is
+  the birth of Jesus more significant than that of any other child, if,
+  the two Persons remaining distinct, the natures also were distinct? For
+  while the Persons remained so there could no more be a union of natures
+  in Christ than there could be in any other man with whose substance, be
+  it never so perfect, no divinity was ever united because of the
+  subsistence of his proper person. But for the sake of argument let him
+  call Jesus, i.e. the human person, Christ, because through that person
+  God wrought certain wonders. Agreed. But why should he call God Himself
+  by the name of Christ? Why should he not go on to call the very elements
+  by that name? For through them in their daily movements God works
+  certain wonders. Is it because irrational substances cannot possess a
+  Person enabling them to receive the name of Christ? Is not the operation
+  of God seen plainly in men of holy life and notable piety? There will
+  surely be no reason not to call the saints also by that name, if Christ
+  taking humanity on Him is not one Person through conjunction. But
+  perhaps he will say, "I allow that such men are called Christs, but it
+  is because they are in the image of the true Christ." But if no one
+  Person has been formed of the union of God and man, we shall consider
+  all of them just as true Christs as Him who, we believe, was born of a
+  Virgin. For no Person has been made one by the union of God and man
+  either in Him or in them who by the Spirit of God foretold the coming
+  Christ, for which cause they too were called Christs. So now it follows
+  that so long as the Persons remain, we cannot in any wise believe that
+  humanity has been assumed by divinity. For things which differ alike in
+  persons and natures are certainly separate, nay absolutely separate; man
+  and oxen are not further separate than are divinity and humanity in
+  Christ, if the Persons have remained. Men indeed and oxen are united in
+  one animal nature, for by genus they have a common substance and the
+  same nature in the collection which forms the universal.[67] But God and
+  man will be at all points fundamentally different if we are to believe
+  that distinction of Persons continues under difference of nature. Then
+  the human race has not been saved, the birth of Christ has brought us no
+  salvation, the writings of all the prophets have but beguiled the people
+  that believed in them, contempt is poured upon the authority of the
+  whole Old Testament which promised to the world salvation by the birth
+  of Christ. It is plain that salvation has not been brought us, if there
+  is the same difference in Person that there is in Nature. No doubt He
+  saved that humanity which we believe He assumed; but no assumption can
+  be conceived, if the separation abides alike of Nature and of Person.
+  Hence that human nature which could not be assumed as long as the Person
+  continued, will certainly and rightly appear incapable of salvation by
+  the birth of Christ. Wherefore man's nature has not been saved by the
+  birth of Christ--an impious conclusion.[68]
+
+  But although there are many weapons strong enough to wound and demolish
+  the Nestorian view, let us for the moment be content with this small
+  selection from the store of arguments available.
+
+  [66] Cf. the discussion of _aequiuoca_=[Greek: homonumos] in _Isag.
+  Porph. Vide_ Brandt's Index.
+
+  [67] Vniuersalitas=[Greek: to katholou].
+
+  [68] For a similar _reductio ad absurdum_ ending in _quod nefas est_ see
+  _Tr._ iii. (_supra_, p. 44) and _Cons._ v. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Transeundum quippe est ad Eutychen qui cum a ueterum orbitis esset
+euagatus, in contrarium cucurrit errorem asserens tantum abesse, ut in
+Christo gemina persona credatur, ut ne naturam quidem in eo duplicem
+oporteat confiteri; ita quippe esse adsumptum hominem, ut ea sit adunatio
+facta cum deo, ut natura humana non manserit. Huius error ex eodem quo
+Nestorii fonte prolabitur. Nam sicut Nestorius arbitratur non posse esse
+naturam duplicem quin persona fieret duplex, atque ideo, cum in Christo
+naturam duplicem confiteretur, duplicem credidit esse personam, ita quoque
+Eutyches non putauit naturam duplicem esse sine duplicatione personae et
+cum non confiteretur duplicem esse personam, arbitratus est consequens, ut
+una uideretur esse natura. Itaque Nestorius recte tenens duplicem in
+Christo esse naturam sacrilege confitetur duas esse personas; Eutyches uero
+recte credens unam esse personam impie credit unam quoque esse naturam. Qui
+conuictus euidentia rerum, quandoquidem manifestum est aliam naturam esse
+hominis aliam dei, ait duas se confiteri in Christo naturas ante
+adunationem, unam uero post adunationem. Quae sententia non aperte quod
+uult eloquitur. Vt tamen eius dementiam perscrutemur, adunatio haec aut
+tempore generationis facta est aut tempore resurrectionis. Sed si tempore
+generationis facta est, uidetur putare et ante generationem fuisse humanam
+carnem non a Maria sumptam sed aliquo modo alio praeparatam, Mariam uero
+uirginem appositam ex qua caro nasceretur quae ab ea sumpta non esset,
+illam uero carnem quae antea fuerit esse et diuisam atque a diuinitatis
+substantia separatam; cum ex uirgine natus est, adunatum esse deo, ut una
+uideretur facta esse natura. Vel si haec eius sententia non est, illa esse
+poterit dicentis duas ante adunationem, unam post adunationem, si adunatio
+generatione perfecta est, ut corpus quidem a Maria sumpserit, sed, antequam
+sumeret, diuersam deitatis humanitatisque fuisse naturam; sumptam uero unam
+factam atque in diuinitatis cessisse substantiam. Quod si hanc adunationem
+non putat generatione sed resurrectione factam, rursus id duobus fieri
+arbitrabitur modis; aut enim genito Christo et non adsumente de Maria
+corpus aut adsumente ab eadem carnem, usque dum resurgeret quidem, duas
+fuisse naturas, post resurrectionem unam factam. De quibus illud disiunctum
+nascitur, quod interrogabimus hoc modo: natus ex Maria Christus aut ab ea
+carnem humanam traxit aut minime. Si non confitetur ex ea traxisse, dicat
+quo homine indutus aduenerit, utrumne eo qui deciderat praeuaricatione
+peccati an alio? Si eo de cuius semine ductus est homo, quem uestita
+diuinitas est? Nam si ex semine Abrahae atque Dauid et postremo Mariae non
+fuit caro illa qua natus est, ostendat ex cuius hominis sit carne
+deriuatus, quoniam post primum hominem caro omnis humana ex humana carne
+deducitur. Sed si quem dixerit hominem a quo generatio sumpta sit
+saluatoris praeter Mariam uirginem, et ipse errore confundetur et
+adscribere mendacii notam summae diuinitati inlusus ipse uidebitur, quando
+quod Abrahae atque Dauid promittitur in sanctis diuinationibus, ut ex eorum
+semine toti mundo salus oriatur, aliis distribuit, cum praesertim, si
+humana caro sumpta est, non ab alio sumi potuerit nisi unde etiam
+procreabatur. Si igitur a Maria non est sumptum corpus humanum sed a
+quolibet alio, per Mariam tamen est procreatum quod fuerat praeuaricatione
+corruptum, superius dicto repellitur argumento. Quod si non eo homine
+Christus indutus est qui pro peccati poena sustinuerat mortem, illud
+eueniet ex nullius hominis semine talem potuisse nasci qui fuerit sine
+originalis poena peccati. Ex nullo igitur talis sumpta est caro; unde fit
+ut nouiter uideatur esse formata. Sed haec aut ita hominum uisa est oculis,
+ut humanum putaretur corpus quod reuera non esset humanum, quippe quod
+nulli originali subiaceret poenae, aut noua quaedam uera nec poenae peccati
+subiacens originalis ad tempus hominis natura formata est? Si uerum hominis
+corpus non fuit, aperte arguitur mentita diuinitas, quae ostenderet
+hominibus corpus, quod cum uerum non esset, tum fallerentur ii[69] qui
+uerum esse arbitrarentur. At si noua ueraque non ex homine sumpta caro
+formata est, quo tanta tragoedia generationis? Vbi ambitus passionis? Ego
+quippe ne in homine quidem non stulte fieri puto quod inutiliter factum
+est. Ad quam uero utilitatem facta probabitur tanta humilitas diuinitatis,
+si homo qui periit generatione ac passione Christi saluatus non est,
+quoniam negatur adsumptus? Rursus igitur sicut ab eodem Nestorii fonte
+Eutychis error principium sumpsit, ita ad eundem finem relabitur, ut
+secundum Eutychen quoque non sit saluatum genus humanum, quoniam non is qui
+aeger esset et saluatione curaque egeret, adsumptus est. Traxisse autem
+hanc sententiam uidetur, si tamen huius erroris fuit ut crederet non fuisse
+corpus Christi uere ex homine sed extra atque adeo in caelo formatum,
+quoniam cum eo in caelum creditur ascendisse. Quod exemplum continet tale:
+"non ascendit in caelum, nisi qui de caelo descendit."
+
+
+[69] hii _uel_ hi _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  I must now pass to Eutyches who, wandering from the path of primitive
+  doctrine, has rushed into the opposite error[70] and asserts that so far
+  from our having to believe in a twofold Person in Christ, we must not
+  even confess a double Nature; humanity, he maintains, was so assumed
+  that the union with Godhead involved the disappearance of the human
+  nature. His error springs from the same source as that of Nestorius. For
+  just as Nestorius deems there could not be a double Nature unless the
+  Person were doubled, and therefore, confessing the double Nature in
+  Christ, has perforce believed the Person to be double, so also Eutyches
+  deemed that the Nature was not double unless the Person was double, and
+  since he did not confess a double Person, he thought it a necessary
+  consequence that the Nature should be regarded as single. Thus
+  Nestorius, rightly holding Christ's Nature to be double, sacrilegiously
+  professes the Persons to be two; whereas Eutyches, rightly believing the
+  Person to be single, impiously believes that the Nature also is single.
+  And being confuted by the plain evidence of facts, since it is clear
+  that the Nature of God is different from that of man, he declares his
+  belief to be: two Natures in Christ before the union and only one after
+  the union. Now this statement does not express clearly what he means.
+  However, let us scrutinize his extravagance. It is plain that this union
+  took place either at the moment of conception or at the moment of
+  resurrection. But if it happened at the moment of conception, Eutyches
+  seems to think that even before conception He had human flesh, not taken
+  from Mary but prepared in some other way, while the Virgin Mary was
+  brought in to give birth to flesh that was not taken from her; that this
+  flesh, which already existed, was apart and separate from the substance
+  of divinity, but that when He was born of the Virgin it was united to
+  God, so that the Nature seemed to be made one. Or if this be not his
+  opinion, since he says that there were two Natures before the union and
+  one after, supposing the union to be established by conception, an
+  alternative view may be that Christ indeed took a body from Mary but
+  that before He took it the Natures of Godhead and manhood were
+  different: but the Nature assumed became one with that of Godhead into
+  which it passed. But if he thinks that this union was effected not by
+  conception but by resurrection, we shall have to assume that this too
+  happened in one of two ways; either Christ was conceived and did
+  _not_ assume a body from Mary or He _did_ assume flesh from
+  her, and there were (until indeed He rose) two Natures which became one
+  after the Resurrection. From these alternatives a dilemma arises which
+  we will examine as follows: Christ who was born of Mary either did or
+  did not take human flesh from her. If Eutyches does not admit that He
+  took it from her, then let him say what manhood He put on to come among
+  us--that which had fallen through sinful disobedience or another? If it
+  was the manhood of that man from whom all men descend, what manhood did
+  divinity invest? For if that flesh in which He was born came not of the
+  seed of Abraham and of David and finally of Mary, let Eutyches show from
+  what man's flesh he descended, since, after the first man, all human
+  flesh is derived from human flesh. But if he shall name any child of man
+  beside Mary the Virgin as the cause of the conception of the Saviour, he
+  will both be confounded by his own error, and, himself a dupe, will
+  stand accused of stamping with falsehood the very Godhead for thus
+  transferring to others the promise of the sacred oracles made to Abraham
+  and David[71] that of their seed salvation should arise for all the
+  world, especially since if human flesh was taken it could not be taken
+  from any other but Him of whom it was begotten. If, therefore, His human
+  body was not taken from Mary but from any other, yet that was engendered
+  through Mary which had been corrupted by disobedience, Eutyches is
+  confuted by the argument already stated. But if Christ did not put on
+  that manhood which had endured death in punishment for sin, it will
+  result that of no man's seed could ever one have been born who should
+  be, like Him, without punishment for original sin. Therefore flesh like
+  His was taken from no man, whence it would appear to have been new-
+  formed for the purpose. But did this flesh then either so appear to
+  human eyes that the body was deemed human which was not really human,
+  because it was not subject to any primal penalty, or was some new true
+  human flesh formed as a makeshift, not subject to the penalty for
+  original sin? If it was not a truly human body, the Godhead is plainly
+  convicted of falsehood for displaying to men a body which was not real
+  and thus deceived those who thought it real.  But if flesh had been
+  formed new and real and not taken from man, to what purpose was the
+  tremendous tragedy of the conception? Where the value of His long
+  Passion? I cannot but consider foolish even a human action that is
+  useless. And to what useful end shall we say this great humiliation of
+  Divinity was wrought if ruined man has not been saved by the conception
+  and the Passion of Christ--for they denied that he was taken into
+  Godhead? Once more then, just as the error of Eutyches took its rise
+  from the same source as that of Nestorius, so it hastens to the same
+  goal inasmuch as according to Eutyches also the human race has not been
+  saved,[72] since man who was sick and needed health and salvation was
+  not taken into Godhead. Yet this is the conclusion he seems to have
+  drawn, if he erred so deeply as to believe that Christ's body was not
+  taken really from man but from a source outside him and prepared for the
+  purpose in heaven, for He is believed to have ascended with it up into
+  heaven. Which is the meaning of the text: none hath ascended into heaven
+  save Him who came down from heaven.
+
+
+  [70] The ecclesiastical _uia media_, with the relegation of opposing
+  theories to the extremes, which meet in a common fount of falsity, owes
+  something to Aristotle and to our author. _Vide infra_, p. 118.
+
+  [71] The use of this kind of argument by Boethius allays any suspicion
+  as to the genuineness of _Tr_. iv. which might be caused by the use of
+  allegorical interpretation therein. Note also that in the _Consolatio_
+  the framework is allegory, which is also freely applied in the details.
+
+  [72] Another _reductio ad absurdum_ or _ad impietatem_, cf. _supra_, p.
+  98, note b.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Sed satis de ea parte dictum uidetur, si corpus quod Christus excepit ex
+Maria non credatur adsumptum. Si uero adsumptum est ex Maria neque
+permansit perfecta humana diuinaque natura, id tribus effici potuit modis:
+aut enim diuinitas in humanitatem translata est aut humanitas in
+diuinitatem aut utraeque in se ita temperatae sunt atque commixtae, ut
+neutra substantia propriam formam teneret. Sed si diuinitas in humanitatem
+translata est, factum est, quod credi nefas est, ut humanitate inmutabili
+substantia permanente diuinitas uerteretur et quod passibile atque mutabile
+naturaliter exsisteret, id inmutabile permaneret, quod uero inmutabile
+atque inpassibile naturaliter creditur, id in rem mutabilem uerteretur. Hoc
+igitur fieri nulla ratione contingit. Sed humana forsitan natura in
+deitatem uideatur esse conuersa. Hoc uero qui fieri potest, si diuinitas in
+generatione Christi et humanam animam suscepit et corpus? Non enim omnis
+res in rem omnem uerti ac transmutari potest. Nam cum substantiarum aliae
+sint corporeae, aliae incorporeae, neque corporea in incorpoream neque
+incorporea in eam quae corpus est mutari potest, nec uero incorporea in se
+inuicem formas proprias mutant; sola enim mutari transformarique in se
+possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum, nec haec omnia, sed
+ea quae in se et facere et pati possunt. Id uero probatur hoc modo: neque
+enim potest aes in lapidem permutari nec uero idem aes in herbam nec
+quodlibet aliud corpus in quodlibet aliud transfigurari potest, nisi et
+eadem sit materia rerum in se transeuntium et a se et facere et pati
+possint, ut, cum uinum atque aqua miscentur, utraque sunt talia quae actum
+sibi passionemque communicent. Potest enim aquae qualitas a uini qualitate
+aliquid pati; potest item uini ab aquae qualitate aliquid pati. Atque
+idcirco si multum quidem fuerit aquae, uini uero paululum, non dicuntur
+inmixta, sed alterum alterius qualitate corrumpitur. Si quis enim uinum
+fundat in mare, non mixtum est mari uinum sed in mare corruptum, idcirco
+quoniam qualitas aquae multitudine sui corporis nihil passa est a qualitate
+uini, sed potius in se ipsam uini qualitatem propria multitudine
+commutauit. Si uero sint mediocres sibique aequales uel paulo inaequales
+naturae quae a se facere et pati possunt, illae miscentur et mediocribus
+inter se qualitatibus temperantur. Atque haec quidem in corporibus neque
+his omnibus, sed tantum quae a se, ut dictum est, et facere et pati possunt
+communi atque eadem materia subiecta. Omne enim corpus quod in generatione
+et corruptione subsistit communem uidetur habere materiam, sed non omne ab
+omni uel in omni uel facere aliquid uel pati potest. Corpora uero in
+incorporea nulla ratione poterunt permutari, quoniam nulla communi materia
+subiecta participant quae susceptis qualitatibus in alterutram permutetur.
+Omnis enim natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae nititur
+fundamento; nullum uero corpus est cui non sit materia subiecta. Quod cum
+ita sit cumque ne ea quidem quae communem materiam naturaliter habent in se
+transeant, nisi illis adsit potestas in se et a se faciendi ac patiendi,
+multo magis in se non permutabuntur quibus non modo communis materia non
+est, sed cum alia res materiae fundamento nititur ut corpus, alia omnino
+materiae subiecto non egeat ut incorporeum.
+
+Non igitur fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur, nec
+uero fieri potest, ut incorporalia in sese commixtione aliqua permutentur.
+Quorum enim communis nulla materia est, nec in se uerti ac permutari
+queunt. Nulla autem est incorporalibus materia rebus; non poterunt igitur
+in se inuicem permutari. Sed anima et deus incorporeae substantiae recte
+creduntur; non est igitur humana anima in diuinitatem a qua adsumpta est
+permutata. Quod si neque corpus neque anima in diuinitatem potuit uerti,
+nullo modo fieri potuit, ut humanitas conuerteretur in deum. Multo minus
+uero credi potest, ut utraque in sese confunderentur, quoniam neque
+incorporalitas transire ad corpus potest neque rursus e conuerso corpus ad
+incorporalitatem, quando quidem nulla his materia subiecta communis est
+quae alterutris substantiarum qualitatibus permutetur.
+
+At hi ita aiunt ex duabus quidem naturis Christum consistere, in duabus
+uero minime, hoc scilicet intendentes, quoniam quod ex duabus consistit ita
+unum fieri potest, ut illa ex quibus dicitur constare non maneant; ueluti
+cum mel aquae confunditur neutrum manet, sed alterum alterius copulatione
+corruptum quiddam tertium fecit, ita illud quidem quod ex melle atque aqua
+tertium fit constare ex utrisque dicitur, in utrisque uero negatur. Non
+enim poterit in utrisque constare, quando utrorumque natura non permanet.
+Ex utrisque enim constare potest, licet ea ex quibus coniungitur alterutra
+qualitate corrupta sint; in utrisque uero huiusmodi constare non poterit,
+quoniam ea quae in se transfusa sunt non manent ac non sunt utraque in
+quibus constare uideatur, cum ex utrisque constet in se inuicem qualitatum
+mutatione transfusis.
+
+Catholici uero utrumque rationabiliter confitentur, nam et ex utrisque
+naturis Christum et in utrisque consistere. Sed id qua ratione dicatur,
+paulo posterius explicabo. Nunc illud est manifestum conuictam esse
+Eutychis sententiam eo nomine, quod cum tribus modis fieri possit, ut ex
+duabus naturis una subsistat, ut aut diuinitas in humanitatem translata sit
+aut humanitas in diuinitatem aut utraque permixta sint, nullum horum modum
+fieri potuisse superius dicta argumentatione declaratur.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  I think enough has been said on the supposition that we should believe
+  that the body which Christ received was not taken from Mary. But if it
+  was taken from Mary and the human and divine natures did not continue,
+  each in its perfection, this may have happened in one of three ways.
+  Either Godhead was translated into manhood, or manhood into Godhead, or
+  both were so modified and mingled that neither substance kept its proper
+  form. But if Godhead was translated into manhood, that has happened
+  which piety forbids us to believe, viz. while the manhood continued in
+  unchangeable substance Godhead was changed, and that which was by nature
+  passible and mutable remained immutable, while that which we believe to
+  be by nature immutable and impassible was changed into a mutable thing.
+  This cannot happen on any show of reasoning. But perchance the human
+  nature may seem to be changed into Godhead. Yet how can this be if
+  Godhead in the conception of Christ received both human soul and body?
+  Things cannot be promiscuously changed and interchanged. For since some
+  substances are corporeal and others incorporeal, neither can a corporeal
+  substance be changed into an incorporeal, nor can an incorporeal be
+  changed into that which is body, nor yet incorporeals interchange their
+  proper forms; for only those things can be interchanged and transformed
+  which possess the common substrate of the same matter, nor can all of
+  these so behave, but only those which can act upon and be acted on by
+  each other. Now this is proved as follows: bronze can no more be
+  converted into stone than it can be into grass, and generally no body
+  can be transformed into any other body unless the things which pass into
+  each other have a common matter and can act upon and be acted on by each
+  other, as when wine and water are mingled both are of such a nature as
+  to allow reciprocal action and influence. For the quality of water can
+  be influenced in some degree by that of wine, similarly the quality of
+  wine can be influenced by that of water. And therefore if there be a
+  great deal of water but very little wine, they are not said to be
+  mingled, but the one is ruined by the quality of the other. For if you
+  pour wine into the sea the wine is not mingled with the sea but is lost
+  in the sea, simply because the quality of the water owing to its bulk
+  has been in no way affected by the quality of the wine, but rather by
+  its own bulk has changed the quality of the wine into water. But if the
+  natures which are capable of reciprocal action and influence are in
+  moderate proportion and equal or only slightly unequal, they are really
+  mingled and tempered by the qualities which are in moderate relation to
+  each other. This indeed takes place in bodies but not in all bodies, but
+  only in those, as has been said, which are capable of reciprocal action
+  and influence and have the same matter subject to their qualities. For
+  all bodies which subsist in conditions of birth and decay seem to
+  possess a common matter, but all bodies are not capable of reciprocal
+  action and influence. But corporeals cannot in any way be changed into
+  incorporeals because they do not share in any common underlying matter
+  which can be changed into this or that thing by taking on its qualities.
+  For the nature of no incorporeal substance rests upon a material basis;
+  but there is no body that has not matter as a substrate. Since this is
+  so, and since not even those things which naturally have a common matter
+  can pass over into each other unless they have the power of acting on
+  each other and being acted upon by each other, far more will those
+  things not suffer interchange which not only have no common matter but
+  are different in substance, since one of them, being body, rests on a
+  basis of matter, while the other, being incorporeal, cannot possibly
+  stand in need of a material substrate.
+
+  It is therefore impossible for a body to be changed into an incorporeal
+  species, nor will it ever be possible for incorporeals to be changed
+  into each other by any process of mingling. For things which have no
+  common matter cannot be changed and converted one into another. But
+  incorporeal things have no matter; they can never, therefore, be changed
+  about among themselves. But the soul and God are rightly believed to be
+  incorporeal substances; therefore the human soul has not been converted
+  into the Godhead by which it was assumed. But if neither body nor soul
+  can be turned into Godhead, it could not possibly happen that manhood
+  should be transformed into God. But it is much less credible that the
+  two should be confounded together since neither can incorporality pass
+  over to body, nor again, contrariwise, can body pass over into
+  incorporality when these have no common matter underlying them which can
+  be converted by the qualities of one of two substances.
+
+  But the Eutychians say that Christ consists indeed of two natures, but
+  not in two natures, meaning, no doubt, thereby, that a thing which
+  consists of two elements can so far become one, that the elements of
+  which it is said to be made up disappear; just as, for example, when
+  honey is mixed with water neither remains, but the one thing being
+  spoilt by conjunction with the other produces a certain third thing, so
+  that third thing which is produced by the combination of honey and water
+  is said to consist of both, but not in both. For it can never consist in
+  both so long as the nature of both does not continue. For it can consist
+  of both even though each element of which it is compounded has been
+  spoiled by the quality of the other; but it can never consist in both
+  natures of this kind since the elements which have been transmuted into
+  each other do not continue, and both the elements in which it seems to
+  consist cease to be, since it consists of two things translated into
+  each other by change of qualities.
+
+  But Catholics in accordance with reason confess both, for they say that
+  Christ consists both of and in two natures. How this can be affirmed I
+  will explain a little later. One thing is now clear; the opinion of
+  Eutyches has been confuted on the ground that, although there are three
+  ways by which the one nature can subsist of the two, viz. either the
+  translation of divinity into humanity or of humanity into divinity or
+  the compounding of both together, the foregoing train of reasoning
+  proves that no one of the three ways is a possibility.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Restat ut, quemadmodum catholica fides dicat, et in utrisque naturis
+Christum et ex utrisque consistere doceamus.
+
+Ex utrisque naturis aliquid consistere duo significat: unum quidem, cum ita
+dicimus aliquid ex duabus naturis iungi sicut ex melle atque aqua, id autem
+est ut ex quolibet modo confusis, uel si una uertatur in alteram uel si
+utraeque in se inuicem misceantur, nullo modo tamen utraeque permaneant;
+secundum hunc modum Eutyches ait ex utrisque naturis Christum consistere.
+
+Alter uero modus est ex utrisque consistendi quod ita ex duabus iunctum
+est, ut illa tamen ex quibus iunctum esse dicitur maneant nec in alterutra
+uertantur, ut cum dicimus coronam ex auro gemmisque compositam. Hic neque
+aurum in gemmas translatum est neque in aurum gemma conuersa, sed utraque
+permanent nec formam propriam derelinquunt. Talia ergo ex aliquibus
+constantia et in his constare dicimus ex quibus consistere praedicantur.
+Tunc enim possumus dicere coronam gemmis auroque consistere; sunt enim
+gemmae atque aurum in quibus corona consistat. Nam in priore modo non est
+mel atque aqua in quibus illud quod ex utrisque iungitur constet. Cum
+igitur utrasque manere naturas in Christo fides catholica confiteatur
+perfectasque easdem persistere nec alteram in alteram transmutari, iure
+dicit et in utrisque naturis Christum et ex utrisque consistere: in
+utrisque quidem, quia manent utraeque, ex utrisque uero, quia utrarumque
+adunatione manentium una persona fit Christi. Non autem secundum eam
+significationem ex utrisque naturis Christum iunctum esse fides catholica
+tenet, secundum quam Eutyches pronuntiat. Nam ille talem significationem
+coniunctionis ex utraque natura sumit, ut non confiteatur in utrisque
+consistere, neque enim utrasque manere; catholicus uero eam significationem
+ex utrisque consistendi sumit quae illi sit proxima eamque conseruet quae
+in utrisque consistere confitetur.
+
+Aequiuocum igitur est "ex utrisque consistere" ac potius amphibolum et
+gemina significatione diuersa designans: una quidem significatione non
+manere substantias ex quibus illud quod copulatum est dicatur esse
+coniunctum, alio modo significans ita ex utrisque coniunctum, ut utraque
+permaneant.
+
+Hoc igitur expedito aequiuocationis atque ambiguitatis nodo nihil est ultra
+quod possit opponi, quin id sit quod firma ueraque fides catholica
+continet; eundem Christum hominem esse perfectum, eundem deum eundemque qui
+homo sit perfectus atque deus unum esse deum ac dei filium, nec
+quaternitatem trinitati adstrui, dum homo additur supra perfectum deum, sed
+unam eandemque personam numerum trinitatis explere, ut cum humanitas passa
+sit, deus tamen passus esse dicatur, non quo ipsa deitas humanitas facta
+sit, sed quod a deitate fuerit adsumpta. Item qui homo est, dei filius
+appellatur non substantia diuinitatis sed humanitatis, quae tamen
+diuinitati naturali unitate coniuncta est. Et cum haec ita intellegentia
+discernantur permisceanturque, tamen unus idemque et homo sit perfectus et
+deus: deus quidem, quod ipse sit ex patris substantia genitus, homo uero,
+quod ex Maria sit uirgine procreatus. Itemque qui homo, deus eo quod a deo
+fuerit adsumptus, et qui deus, homo, quoniam uestitus homine sit. Cumque in
+eadem persona aliud sit diuinitas quae suscepit, aliud quam suscepit
+humanitas, idem tamen deus atque homo est. Nam si hominem intellegas, idem
+homo est atque deus, quoniam homo ex natura, deus adsumptione. Si uero deum
+intellegas, idem deus est atque homo, quoniam natura deus est, homo
+adsumptione. Fitque in eo gemina natura geminaque substantia, quoniam homo-
+deus unaque persona, quoniam idem homo atque deus. Mediaque est haec inter
+duas haereses uia sicut uirtutes quoque medium tenent. Omnis enim uirtus in
+medio rerum decore locata consistit. Siquid enim uel ultra uel infra quam
+oportuerit fiat, a uirtute disceditur. Medietatem igitur uirtus tenet.
+
+Quocirca si quattuor haec neque ultra neque infra esse possunt, ut in
+Christo aut duae naturae sint duaeque personae ut Nestorius ait, aut una
+persona unaque natura ut Eutyches ait, aut duae naturae sed una persona ut
+catholica fides credit, aut una natura duaeque personae,[73] cumque duas
+quidem naturas duasque personas in ea quae contra Nestorium dicta est
+responsione conuicerimus (unam uero personam unamque naturam esse non posse
+Eutyche proponente monstrauimus neque tamen tam amens quisquam huc usque
+exstitit, ut unam in eo naturam crederet sed geminas esse personas), restat
+ut ea sit uera quam fides catholica pronuntiat geminam substantiam sed unam
+esse personam. Quia uero paulo ante diximus Eutychen confiteri duas quidem
+in Christo ante adunationem naturas, unam uero post adunationem, cumque
+hunc errorem duplicem interpretaremur celare sententiam, ut haec adunatio
+aut generatione fieret, cum ex Maria corpus hominis minime sumeretur aut ad
+sumptum[74] quidem ex Maria per resurrectionem fieret adunatio, de utrisque
+quidem partibus idonee ut arbitror disputatum est. Nunc quaerendum est
+quomodo fieri potuerit ut duae naturae in unam substantiam miscerentur.
+
+
+[73] quod nullus haereticus adhuc attigit _addunt codices quidam_.
+
+[74] sumptum _codd._; adsumptum _preli diabolus_, ad sumptum _nos_.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  It remains for us to show how in accordance with the affirmation of
+  Catholic belief Christ consists at once in and of both natures.
+
+  The statement that a thing consists of two natures bears two meanings;
+  one, when we say that anything is a union of two natures, as e.g. honey
+  and water, where the union is such that in the combination, however the
+  elements be confounded, whether by one nature changing into the other,
+  or by both mingling with each other, the two entirely disappear. This is
+  the way in which according to Eutyches Christ consists of two natures.
+
+  The other way in which a thing can consist of two natures is when it is
+  so combined of two that the elements of which it is said to be combined
+  continue without changing into each other, as when we say that a crown
+  is composed of gold and gems. Here neither is the gold converted into
+  gems nor is the gem turned into gold, but both continue without
+  surrendering their proper form.
+
+  Things then like this, composed of various elements, we say consist also
+  in the elements of which they are composed. For in this case we can say
+  that a crown is composed of gems and gold, for gems and gold are that in
+  which the crown consists. For in the former mode of composition honey
+  and water is not that in which the resulting union of both consists.
+
+  Since then the Catholic Faith confesses that both natures continue in
+  Christ and that they both remain perfect, neither being transformed into
+  the other, it says with right that Christ consists both in and of the
+  two natures; _in_ the two because both continue, _of_ the two
+  because the One Person of Christ is formed by the union of the two
+  continuing natures.
+
+  But the Catholic Faith does not hold the union of Christ out of two
+  natures according to that sense which Eutyches puts upon it. For the
+  interpretation of the conjunction out of two natures which he adopts
+  forbids him to confess consistence in two or the continuance of the two
+  either; but the Catholic adopts an interpretation of the consistence out
+  of two which comes near to that of Eutyches, yet keeps the
+  interpretation which confesses consistence in two.
+
+  "To consist of two natures" is therefore an equivocal or rather a
+  doubtful term of double meaning denoting different things; according to
+  one of its interpretations the substances out of which the union is said
+  to have been composed do not continue, according to another the union
+  effected of the two is such that both natures continue.
+
+  When once this knot of doubt or ambiguity has been untied, nothing
+  further can be advanced to shake the true and solid content of the
+  Catholic Faith, which is that the same Christ is perfect man and God,
+  and that He who is perfect man and God is One God and Son of Man, that,
+  however, quaternity is not added to the Trinity by the addition of human
+  nature to perfect Godhead, but that one and the same Person completes
+  the number of the Trinity, so that, although it was the manhood which
+  suffered, yet God can be said to have suffered, not by manhood becoming
+  Godhead but by manhood being assumed by Godhead. Further, He who is man
+  is called Son of God not in virtue of divine but of human substance,
+  which latter none the less was conjoined to Godhead in a unity of
+  natures. And although thought is able to distinguish and combine the
+  manhood and the Godhead, yet one and the same is perfect man and God,
+  God because He was begotten of the substance of the Father, but man
+  because He was engendered of the Virgin Mary. And further He who is man
+  is God in that manhood was assumed by God, and He who is God is man in
+  that God was clothed with manhood. And although in the same Person the
+  Godhead which took manhood is different from the manhood which It took,
+  yet the same is God and man. For if you think of man, the same is man
+  and God, being man by nature, God by assumption. But if you think of
+  God, the same is God and man, being God by nature, man by assumption.
+  And in Him nature becomes double and substance double because He is God-
+  man, and One Person since the same is man and God. This is the middle
+  way between two heresies, just as virtues also hold a middle place.[75]
+  For every virtue has a place of honour midway between extremes. For if
+  it stands beyond or below where it should it ceases to be virtue. And so
+  virtue holds a middle place.
+
+  Wherefore if the following four assertions can be said to be neither
+  beyond or below reason, viz. that in Christ are either two Natures and
+  two Persons as Nestorius says, or one Person and one Nature as Eutyches
+  says, or two Natures but one Person as the Catholic Faith believes, or
+  one Nature and two Persons, and inasmuch as we have refuted the doctrine
+  of two Natures and two Persons in our argument against Nestorius and
+  incidentally have shown that the one Person and one Nature suggested by
+  Eutyches is impossible--since there has never been anyone so mad as to
+  believe that His Nature was single but His Person double--it remains
+  that the article of belief must be true which the Catholic Faith
+  affirms, viz. that the Nature is double, but the Person one. But as I
+  have just now remarked that Eutyches confesses two Natures in Christ
+  before the union, but only one after the union, and since I proved that
+  under this error lurked two opposite opinions, one, that the union was
+  brought about by conception although the human body was certainly not
+  taken from Mary; the other, that the body taken from Mary formed part of
+  the union by means of the Resurrection, I have, it seems to me, argued
+  the twofold aspect of the case as completely as it deserves. What we
+  have now to inquire is how it came to pass that two Natures were
+  combined into one Substance.
+
+
+  [75] _Vide supra_, p. 100 note.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Verumtamen est etiam nunc et alia quaestio quae ab his inferri potest qui
+corpus humanum ex Maria sumptum esse non credunt, sed alias fuisse
+sequestratum praeparatumque quod in adunatione ex Mariae utero gigni ac
+proferri uideretur. Aiunt enim: si ex homine sumptum est corpus, homo uero
+omnis ex prima praeuaricatione non solum peccato et morte tenebatur, uerum
+etiam affectibus peccatorum erat implicitus, eaque illi fuit poena peccati,
+ut, cum morte teneretur obstrictus, tamen esset reus etiam uoluntate
+peccandi, cur in Christo neque peccatum fuit neque uoluntas ulla peccandi?
+Et omnino habet animaduertendam dubitationem talis quaestio. Si enim ex
+carne humana Christi corpus adsumptum est, dubitari potest, quaenam caro
+haec quae adsumpta sit esse uideatur. Eum quippe saluauit quem etiam
+adsumpsit; sin uero talem hominem adsumpsit qualis Adam fuit ante peccatum,
+integram quidem uidetur humanam adsumpsisse naturam, sed tamen quae
+medicina penitus non egebat. Quomodo autem fieri potest, ut talem
+adsumpserit hominem qualis Adam fuit, cum in Adam potuerit esse peccandi
+uoluntas atque affectio, unde factum est ut etiam praetergressis diuinis
+praeceptis inoboedientiae delictis teneretur adstrictus? In Christo uero ne
+uoluntas quidem ulla creditur fuisse peccandi, cum praesertim si tale
+corpus hominis adsumpsit quale Adae ante peccatum fuit, non debuerit esse
+mortalis, quoniam Adam, si non peccasset, mortem nulla ratione sensisset.
+Cum igitur Christus non peccauerit, quaerendum est cur senserit mortem, si
+Adae corpus ante quam peccaret adsumpsit. Quod si talem statum suscepit
+hominis qualis Adae post peccatum fuit, uidetur etiam Christo non defuisse
+necessitas, ut et delictis subiceretur et passionibus confunderetur
+obductisque iudicii regulis bonum a malo non sincera integritate
+discerneret, quoniam has omnes poenas Adam delicti praeuaricatione
+suscepit.
+
+Contra quos respondendum est tres intellegi hominum posse status: unum
+quidem Adae ante delictum in quo, tametsi ab eo mors aberat nec adhuc ullo
+se delicto polluerat, poterat tamen in eo uoluntas esse peccandi: alter in
+quo mutari potuisset, si firmiter in dei praeceptis manere uoluisset, tunc
+enim id addendum foret ut non modo non peccaret aut peccare uellet sed ne
+posset quidem aut peccare aut uelle delinquere. Tertius status est post
+delictum in quo mors illum necessario subsecuta est et peccatum ipsum
+uoluntasque peccati. Quorum summitatum atque contrariorum haec loca sunt:
+is status qui praemium esset, si in praeceptis dei Adam manere uoluisset et
+is qui poenae fuit, quoniam manere noluit; in illo enim nec mors esset nec
+peccatum nec uoluntas ulla peccati, in hoc uero et mors et peccatum et
+delinquendi omnis affectio omniaque in perniciem prona nec quicquam in se
+opis habentia, ut post lapsum posset adsurgere. Ille uero medius status in
+quo praesentia quidem mortis uel peccati aberat, potestas uero utriusque
+constabat, inter utrumque statum est conlocatus. Ex his igitur tribus
+statibus Christus corporeae naturae singulas quodam modo indidit causas;
+nam quod mortale corpus adsumpsit ut mortem a genere humano fugaret, in eo
+statu ponendum est quod post Adae praeuaricationem poenaliter inflictum
+est. Quod uero non fuit in eo uoluntas ulla peccati, ex eo sumptum est
+statu qui esse potuisset, nisi uoluntatem insidiantis fraudibus
+applicasset. Restat igitur tertius status id est medius, ille scilicet qui
+eo tempore fuit, cum nec mors aderat et adesse poterat delinquendi
+uoluntas. In hoc igitur Adam talis fuit ut manducaret ac biberet, ut
+accepta digereret, ut laberetur in somnum et alia quae ei non defuerunt
+humana quidem sed concessa et quae nullam poenam mortis inferrent.
+
+Quae omnia habuisse Christum dubium non est; nam et manducauit et bibit et
+humani corporis officio functus est. Neque enim tanta indigentia in Adam
+fuisse credenda est ut nisi manducasset uiuere non potuisset, sed, si ex
+omni quidem ligno escam sumeret, semper uiuere potuisset hisque non mori;
+idcirco paradisi fructibus indigentiam explebat. Quam indigentiam fuisse in
+Christo nullus ignorat, sed potestate non necessitate; et ipsa indigentia
+ante resurrectionem in eo fuit, post resurrectionem uero talis exstitit ut
+ita illud corpus inmutaretur humanum, sicut Adae praeter praeuaricationis
+uinculum mutari potuisset. Quodque nos ipse dominus Iesus Christus uotis
+docuit optare, ut fiat uoluntas eius sicut in caelo et in terra et ut
+adueniat eius regnum et nos liberet a malo. Haec enim omnia illa beatissima
+humani generis fideliter credentium inmutatio deprecatur.
+
+Haec sunt quae ad te de fidei meae credulitate scripsi. Qua in re si quid
+perperam dictum est, non ita sum amator mei, ut ea quae semel effuderim
+meliori sententiae anteferre contendam. Si enim nihil est ex nobis boni,
+nihil est quod in nostris sententiis amare debeamus. Quod si ex illo cuncta
+sunt bona qui solus est bonus, illud potius bonum esse credendum est quod
+illa incommutabilis bonitas atque omnium bonorum causa perscribit.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Nevertheless there remains yet another question which can be advanced by
+  those who do not believe that the human body was taken from Mary, but
+  that the body was in some other way set apart and prepared, which in the
+  moment of union appeared to be conceived and born of Mary's womb. For
+  they say: if the body was taken from man while every man was, from the
+  time of the first disobedience, not only enslaved by sin and death but
+  also involved in sinful desires, and if his punishment for sin was that,
+  although he was held in chains of death, yet at the same time he should
+  be guilty because of the will to sin, why was there in Christ neither
+  sin nor any will to sin? And certainly such a question is attended by a
+  difficulty which deserves attention. For if the body of Christ was
+  assumed from human flesh, it is open to doubt of what kind we must
+  consider that flesh to be which was assumed.
+
+  In truth, the manhood which He assumed He likewise saved; but if He
+  assumed such manhood as Adam had before sin, He appears to have assumed
+  a human nature complete indeed, but one which was in no need of healing.
+  But how can it be that He assumed such manhood as Adam had when there
+  could be in Adam both the will and the desire to sin, whence it came to
+  pass that even after the divine commands had been broken, he was still
+  held captive to sins of disobedience? But we believe that in Christ
+  there was never any will to sin, because especially if He assumed such a
+  human body as Adam had before his sin, He could not be mortal, since
+  Adam, had he not sinned, would in no wise have suffered death. Since,
+  then, Christ never sinned, it must be asked why He suffered death if He
+  assumed the body of Adam before sin. But if He accepted human conditions
+  such as Adam's were after sin, it seems that Christ could not avoid
+  being subject to sin, perplexed by passions, and, since the canons of
+  judgment were obscured, prevented from distinguishing with unclouded
+  reason between good and evil, since Adam by his disobedience incurred
+  all these penalties of crime.
+
+  To whom we must reply[76] that there are three states of man to
+  envisage: one, that of Adam before his sin, in which, though free from
+  death and still unstained by any sin, he could yet have within him the
+  will to sin; the second, that in which he might have suffered change had
+  he chosen to abide steadfastly in the commands of God, for then it could
+  have been further granted him not only not to sin or wish to sin, but to
+  be incapable of sinning or of the will to transgress. The third state is
+  the state after sin, into which man needs must be pursued by death and
+  sin and the sinful will. Now the points of extreme divergence between
+  these states are the following: one state would have been for Adam a
+  reward if he had chosen to abide in God's laws; the other was his
+  punishment because he would not abide in them; for in the former state
+  there would have been no death nor sin nor sinful will, in the latter
+  there was both death and sin and every desire to transgress, and a
+  general tendency to ruin and a condition helpless to render possible a
+  rise after the Fall. But that middle state from which actual death or
+  sin was absent, but the power for both remained, is situate between the
+  other two.
+
+  Each one, then, of these three states somehow supplied to Christ a cause
+  for his corporeal nature; thus His assumption of a mortal body in order
+  to drive death far from the human race belongs properly to that state
+  which was laid on man by way of punishment after Adam's sin, whereas the
+  fact that there was in Christ no sinful will is borrowed from that state
+  which might have been if Adam had not surrendered his will to the frauds
+  of the tempter. There remains, then, the third or middle state, to wit,
+  that which was before death had come and while the will to sin might yet
+  be present. In this state, therefore, Adam was able to eat and drink,
+  digest the food he took, fall asleep, and perform all the other
+  functions which always belonged to him as man, though they were allowed
+  and brought with them no pain of death.
+
+  There is no doubt that Christ was in all points thus conditioned; for He
+  ate and drank and discharged the bodily function of the human body. For
+  we must not think that Adam was at the first subject to such need that
+  unless he ate he could not have lived, but rather that, if he had taken
+  food from every tree, he could have lived for ever, and by that food
+  have escaped death; and so by the fruits of the Garden he satisfied a
+  need.[77] And all know that in Christ the same need dwelt, but lying in
+  His own power and not laid upon Him. And this need was in Him before the
+  Resurrection, but after the Resurrection He became such that His human
+  body was changed as Adam's might have been but for the bands of
+  disobedience. Which state, moreover, our Lord Jesus Christ Himself
+  taught us to desire in our prayers, asking that His Will be done as in
+  heaven so on earth, and that His Kingdom come, and that He may deliver
+  us from evil. For all these things are sought in prayer by those members
+  of the human family who rightly believe and who are destined to undergo
+  that most blessed change of all.[78]
+
+  So much have I written to you concerning what I believe should be
+  believed. In which matter if I have said aught amiss, I am not so well
+  pleased with myself as to try to press my effusions in the face of wiser
+  judgment. For if there is no good thing in us there is nothing we should
+  fancy in our opinions. But if all things are good as coming from Him who
+  alone is good, that rather must be thought good which the Unchangeable
+  Good and Cause of all Good indites.
+
+
+  [76] This _respondendum_ has the true Thomist ring.
+
+  [77] Adam did not need to eat in order to live, but if he had not eaten
+  he would have suffered hunger, etc.
+
+  [78] The whole of this passage might be set in _Tr._ iv. without
+  altering the tone.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. EX MAG. OFF. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER I.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi,
+  Flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos.
+Ecce mihi lacerae dictant scribenda Camenae
+  Et ueris elegi fletibus ora rigant.
+Has saltem nullus potuit peruincere terror,                               5
+  Ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter.
+Gloria felicis olim uiridisque iuuentae
+  Solantur maesti nunc mea fata senis.
+Venit enim properata malis inopina senectus
+  Et dolor aetatem iussit inesse suam.                                   10
+Intempestiui funduntur uertice cani
+  Et tremit effeto corpore laxa cutis.
+Mors hominum felix quae se nec dulcibus annis
+  Inserit et maestis saepe uocata uenit.
+Eheu quam surda miseros auertitur aure                                   15
+  Et flentes oculos claudere saeua negat.
+Dum leuibus male fida bonis fortuna faueret,
+  Paene caput tristis merserat hora meum.
+Nunc quia fallacem mutauit nubila uultum,
+  Protrahit ingratas impia uita moras.                                   20
+Quid me felicem totiens iactastis amici?
+  Qui cecidit, stabili non erat ille gradu.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FIRST BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+  CONTAINING HIS COMPLAINT AND MISERIES
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  I that with youthful heat did verses write,
+  Must now my woes in doleful tunes indite.
+  My work is framed by Muses torn and rude,
+  And my sad cheeks are with true tears bedewed:
+  For these alone no terror could affray
+  From being partners of my weary way.
+  The art that was my young life's joy and glory
+  Becomes my solace now I'm old and sorry;
+  Sorrow has filched my youth from me, the thief!
+  My days are numbered not by time but Grief.[79]
+  Untimely hoary hairs cover my head,
+  And my loose skin quakes on my flesh half dead.
+  O happy death, that spareth sweetest years,
+  And comes in sorrow often called with tears.
+  Alas, how deaf is he to wretch's cries;
+  And loath he is to close up weeping eyes;
+  While trustless chance me with vain favours crowned,
+  That saddest hour my life had almost drowned:
+  Now she hath clouded her deceitful face,
+  My spiteful days prolong their weary race.
+  My friends, why did you count me fortunate?
+  He that is fallen, ne'er stood in settled state.
+
+
+  [79] Literally "For Old Age, unlooked for, sped by evils, has come, and
+  Grief has bidden her years lie on me."
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili
+officio signarem, adstitisse mihi supra uerticem uisa est mulier reuerendi
+admodum uultus, oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum ualentiam
+perspicacibus colore uiuido atque inexhausti uigoris, quamuis ita aeui
+plena foret ut nullo modo nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis
+ambiguae. Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese hominum mensuram cohibebat, nunc
+uero pulsare caelum summi uerticis cacumine uidebatur; quae cum altius
+caput extulisset, ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum
+frustrabatur intuitum. Vestes erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio,
+indissolubili materia perfectae quas, uti post eadem prodente cognoui, suis
+manibus ipsa texuerat. Quarum speciem, ueluti fumosas imagines solet,
+caligo quaedam neglectae uetustatis obduxerat. Harum in extrema margine
+[Greek: PI] Graecum, in supremo uero [Greek: THETA], legebatur intextum.
+Atque inter utrasque litteras in scalarum modum gradus quidam insigniti
+uidebantur quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus. Eandem
+tamen uestem uiolentorum quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas
+quisque potuit abstulerant. Et dextera quidem eius libellos, sceptrum uero
+sinistra gestabat.
+
+Quae ubi poeticas Musas uidit nostro adsistentes toro fletibusque meis
+uerba dictantes, commota paulisper ac toruis inflammata luminibus: "Quis,"
+inquit, "has scenicas meretriculas ad hunc aegrum permisit accedere quae
+dolores eius non modo nullis remediis fouerent, uerum dulcibus insuper
+alerent uenenis? Hae sunt enim quae infructuosis affectuum spinis uberem
+fructibus rationis segetem necant hominumque mentes assuefaciunt morbo, non
+liberant. At si quem profanum, uti uulgo solitum uobis, blanditiae uestrae
+detraherent, minus moleste ferendum putarem; nihil quippe in eo nostrae
+operae laederentur. Hunc uero Eleaticis atque Academicis studiis
+innutritum? Sed abite potius Sirenes usque in exitium dulces meisque eum
+Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite."
+
+His ille chorus increpitus deiecit humi maestior uultum confessusque rubore
+uerecundiam limen tristis excessit. At ego cuius acies lacrimis mersa
+caligaret nec dinoscere possem, quaenam haec esset mulier tam imperiosae
+auctoritatis, obstipui uisuque in terram defixo quidnam deinceps esset
+actura, exspectare tacitus coepi. Tum illa propius accedens in extrema
+lectuli mei parte consedit meumque intuens uultum luctu grauem atque in
+humum maerore deiectum his uersibus de nostrae mentis perturbatione
+conquesta est.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  While I ruminated these things with myself, and determined to set forth
+  my woful complaint in writing, methought I saw a woman stand above my
+  head, having a grave countenance, glistening clear eye, and of quicker
+  sight than commonly Nature doth afford; her colour fresh and bespeaking
+  unabated vigour, and yet discovering so many years, that she could not
+  at all be thought to belong to our times; her stature uncertain and
+  doubtful, for sometime she exceeded not the common height of men, and
+  sometime she seemed to touch the heavens with her head, and if she
+  lifted it up to the highest, she pierced the very heavens, so that she
+  could not be seen by the beholders; her garments were made of most fine
+  threads with cunning workmanship into an ever-during stuff, which (as I
+  knew afterward by her own report) she had woven with her own hands. A
+  certain duskishness caused by negligence and time had darkened their
+  colour, as it is wont to happen when pictures stand in a smoky room. In
+  the lower part of them was placed the Greek letter [Greek: PI], and in
+  the upper [Greek: THETA],[80] and betwixt the two letters, in the manner
+  of stairs, there were certain degrees made, by which there was a passage
+  from the lower to the higher letter: this her garment had been cut by
+  the violence of some, who had taken away such pieces as they could get.
+  In her right hand she had certain books, and in her left hand she held a
+  sceptre.
+
+  This woman, seeing the poetical Muses standing about my bed, and
+  suggesting words to my tears, being moved for a little space, and
+  inflamed with angry looks: "Who," saith she, "hath permitted these
+  tragical harlots to have access to this sick man, which will not only
+  not comfort his grief with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them
+  with sugared poison? For these be they which with the fruitless thorns
+  of affections do kill the fruitful crop of reason, and do accustom men's
+  minds to sickness, instead of curing them. But if your flattery did
+  deprive us of some profane fellow,[81] as commonly it happeneth, I
+  should think that it were not so grievously to be taken, for in him our
+  labours should receive no harm. But now have you laid hold of him who
+  hath been brought up in Eleatical and Academical studies?[82] Rather get
+  you gone, you Sirens pleasant even to destruction, and leave him to my
+  Muses to be cured and healed."
+
+  That company being thus checked, overcome with grief, casting their eyes
+  upon the ground, and betraying their bashfulness with blushing, went
+  sadly away. But I, whose sight was dimmed with tears, so that I could
+  not discern what this woman might be, so imperious, and of such
+  authority, was astonished, and, fixing my countenance upon the earth,
+  began to expect with silence what she would do afterward. Then she
+  coming nigher, sat down at my bed's feet, and beholding my countenance
+  sad with mourning, and cast upon the ground with grief, complained of
+  the perturbation of my mind with these verses.
+
+
+  [80] Cf. "est enim philosophia genus, species uero eius duae, una quae
+  [Greek: theoraetikae] dicitur, altera quae [Greek: praktikae], id est
+  speculatiua et actiua." Boeth. _In Porph. Dial._ i.
+
+  [81] This scorn of the _profanum vulgus_ appears again and again in the
+  theological tractates, e.g. _Tr._ iii. (_supra_, p. 4), _Tr._ v.
+  (_supra_, p. 74).
+
+  [82] Zeno of Elea invented Dialectic: Plato was the first to lecture on
+  philosophy in the gymnasium of the Academia.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Heu quam praecipiti mersa profundo
+Mens hebet et propria luce relicta
+Tendit in externas ire tenebras,
+Terrenis quotiens flatibus aucta
+Crescit in inmensum noxia cura.                                           5
+Hic quondam caelo liber aperto
+Suetus in aetherios ire meatus
+Cernebat rosei lumina solis,
+Visebat gelidae sidera lunae
+Et quaecumque uagos stella recursus                                      10
+Exercet uarios flexa per orbes,
+Comprensam numeris uictor habebat.
+Quin etiam causas unde sonora
+Flamina sollicitent aequora ponti,
+Quis uoluat stabilem spiritus orbem                                      15
+Vel cur hesperias sidus in undas
+Casurum rutilo surgat ab ortu,
+Quid ueris placidas temperet horas,
+Vt terram roseis floribus ornet,
+Quis dedit ut pleno fertilis anno                                        20
+Autumnus grauidis influat uuis
+Rimari solitus atque latentis
+Naturae uarias reddere causas,
+Nunc iacet effeto lumine mentis
+Et pressus grauibus colla catenis                                        25
+Decliuemque gerens pondere uultum
+Cogitur, heu, stolidam cernere terram.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  Alas, how thy dull mind is headlong cast
+  In depths of woe, where, all her light once lost,
+  She doth to walk in utter darkness haste,
+  While cares grow great with earthly tempests tost.
+  He that through the opened heavens did freely run,
+  And used to travel the celestial ways,
+  Marking the rosy splendour of the sun,
+  And noting Cynthia's cold and watery rays;
+  He that did bravely comprehend in verse
+  The different spheres and wandering course of stars,
+  He that was wont the causes to rehearse
+  Why sounding winds do with the seas make wars,
+  What spirit moves the world's well-settled frame,
+  And why the sun, whom forth the east doth bring,
+  In western waves doth hide his falling flame,
+  Searching what power tempers the pleasing Spring
+  Which makes the earth her rosy flowers to bear,
+  Whose gift it is that Autumn's fruitful season
+  Should with full grapes flow in a plenteous year,
+  Telling of secret Nature every reason,
+  Now having lost the beauty of his mind
+  Lies with his neck compassed in ponderous chains;
+  His countenance with heavy weight declined,
+  Him to behold the sullen earth constrains.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+"Sed medicinae," inquit, "tempus est quam querelae." Tum uero totis in me
+intenta luminibus: "Tune ille es," ait, "qui nostro quondam lacte nutritus
+nostris educatus alimentis in uirilis animi robur euaseras? Atqui talia
+contuleramus arma quae nisi prior abiecisses, inuicta te firmitate
+tuerentur. Agnoscisne me? Quid taces? Pudore an stupore siluisti? Mallem
+pudore, sed te, ut uideo, stupor oppressit." Cumque me non modo tacitum sed
+elinguem prorsus mutumque uidisset, admouit pectori meo leniter manum et:
+"Nihil," inquit, "pericli est; lethargum patitur communem inlusarum mentium
+morbum. Sui paulisper oblitus est; recordabitur facile, si quidem nos ante
+cognouerit. Quod ut possit, paulisper lumina eius mortalium rerum nube
+caligantia tergamus." Haec dixit oculosque meos fletibus undantes contracta
+in rugam ueste siccauit.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  "But it is rather time," saith she, "to apply remedies, than to make
+  complaints." And then looking wistfully upon me: "Art thou he," saith
+  she, "which, being long since nursed with our milk, and brought up with
+  our nourishments, wert come to man's estate? But we had given thee such
+  weapons as, if thou hadst not cast them away, would have made thee
+  invincible. Dost thou not know me? Why dost thou not speak? Is it
+  shamefastness or insensibleness that makes thee silent? I had rather it
+  were shamefastness, but I perceive thou art become insensible." And
+  seeing me not only silent but altogether mute and dumb, fair and easily
+  she laid her hand upon my breast saying: "There is no danger; he is in a
+  lethargy, the common disease of deceived minds; he hath a little forgot
+  himself, but he will easily remember himself again, if he be brought to
+  know us first. To which end, let us a little wipe his eyes, dimmed with
+  the cloud of mortal things." And having thus said, with a corner of her
+  garment she dried my eyes which were wet with tears.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Tunc me discussa liquerunt nocte tenebrae
+  Luminibusque prior rediit uigor,
+Vt, cum praecipiti glomerantur sidera Coro
+  Nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus,
+Sol latet ac nondum caelo uenientibus astris,                             5
+  Desuper in terram nox funditur;
+Hanc si Threicio Boreas emissus ab antro
+  Verberet et clausam reseret diem,
+Emicat ac subito uibratus lumine Phoebus
+  Mirantes oculos radiis ferit.                                          10
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Then fled the night and darkness did me leave.
+  Mine eyes their wonted strength receive,
+  As when swift Corus spreads the stars with clouds
+    And the clear sky a veil of tempest shrouds
+  The sun doth lurk, the earth receiveth night.
+    Lacking the boon of starry light;
+  But if fierce Boreas, sent from Thrace, make way
+    For the restoring of the day,
+  Phoebus with fresh and sudden beams doth rise,
+    Striking with light our wondering eyes.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis hausi caelum et ad cognoscendam
+medicantis faciem mentem recepi. Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos
+intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam cuius ab adulescentia laribus
+obuersatus fueram Philosophiam. "Et quid," inquam, "tu in has exilii nostri
+solitudines o omnium magistra uirtutum supero cardine delapsa uenisti? An
+ut tu quoque mecum rea falsis criminationibus agiteris?
+
+"An," inquit illa, "te alumne desererem nec sarcinam quam mei nominis
+inuidia sustulisti, communicato tecum labore partirer? Atqui Philosophiae
+fas non erat incomitatum relinquere iter innocentis; meam scilicet
+criminationem uererer et quasi nouum aliquid acciderit, perhorrescerem?
+Nunc enim primum censes apud inprobos mores lacessitam periculis esse
+sapientiam? Nonne apud ueteres quoque ante nostri Platonis aetatem magnum
+saepe certamen cum stultitiae temeritate certauimus eodemque superstite
+praeceptor eius Socrates iniustae uictoriam mortis me adstante promeruit?
+Cuius hereditatem cum deinceps Epicureum uulgus ac Stoicum ceterique pro
+sua quisque parte raptum ire molirentur meque reclamantem renitentemque
+uelut in partem praedae traherent, uestem quam meis texueram manibus,
+disciderunt abreptisque ab ea panniculis totam me sibi cessisse credentes
+abiere. In quibus quoniam quaedam nostri habitus uestigia uidebantur, meos
+esse familiares inprudentia rata nonnullos eorum profanae multitudinis
+errore peruertit.
+
+Quod si nec Anaxagorae fugam nec Socratis uenenum nec Zenonis tormenta
+quoniam sunt peregrina nouisti, at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos quorum
+nec peruetusta nec incelebris memoria est, scire potuisti. Quos nihil aliud
+in cladem detraxit nisi quod nostris moribus instituti studiis improborum
+dissimillimi uidebantur. Itaque nihil est quod admirere, si in hoc uitae
+salo circumflantibus agitemur procellis, quibus hoc maxime propositum est
+pessimis displicere. Quorum quidem tametsi est numerosus exercitus,
+spernendus tamen est, quoniam nullo duce regitur, sed errore tantum temere
+ac passim lymphante raptatur. Qui si quando contra nos aciem struens
+ualentior incubuerit, nostra quidem dux copias suas in arcem contrahit,
+illi uero circa diripiendas inutiles sarcinulas occupantur. At nos desuper
+inridemus uilissima rerum quaeque rapientes securi totius furiosi tumultus
+eoque uallo muniti quo grassanti stultitiae adspirare fas non sit.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  In like manner, the mists of sadness dissolved, I came to myself and
+  recovered my judgment, so that I knew my Physician's face; wherefore
+  casting mine eyes upon her somewhat stedfastly, I beheld my nurse
+  Philosophy, in whose house I had remained from my youth, and I said: "O
+  Mistress of all virtues, for what cause art thou come from heaven into
+  this our solitary banishment? Art thou come to bear me company in being
+  falsely accused?"
+
+  "Should I," saith she, "forsake thee, my disciple, and not divide the
+  burden, which thou bearest through hatred of my name, by partaking of
+  thy labour? But Philosophy never thought it lawful to forsake the
+  innocent in his trouble. Should I fear any accusations, as though this
+  were any new matter? For dost thou think that this is the first time
+  that Wisdom hath been exposed to danger by wicked men? Have we not in
+  ancient times before our Plato's age had oftentimes great conflicts with
+  the rashness of folly? And while he lived, had not his master Socrates
+  the victory of an unjust death in my presence, whose inheritance, when
+  afterward the mob of Epicures, Stoics, and others (every one for his own
+  sect) endeavoured to usurp, and as it were in part of their prey, sought
+  to draw me to them, exclaiming and striving against them; they tore the
+  garment which I had woven with my own hands, and having gotten some
+  little pieces of it, thinking me to be wholly in their possession,
+  departed. Some of whom, because certain signs of my apparel appeared
+  upon them, were rashly supposed to be my familiar friends, and condemned
+  accordingly through the error of the profane multitude.
+
+  But if thou hast not heard of the flight of Anaxagoras, the poison of
+  Socrates, nor the torments of Zeno, because they are foreign examples;
+  yet thou mayst have heard of Canius, of Seneca, of Soranus,[83] whose
+  memory is both fresh and famous, whom nothing else brought to their
+  overthrow but that they had been instructed in our school and were
+  altogether disliking to the humours of wicked men; wherefore thou hast
+  no cause to marvel, if in the sea of this life we be tossed with
+  boisterous storms, whose chiefest purpose is to displease the wicked; of
+  which though there be an huge army, yet it is to be despised, because it
+  is not governed by any captain, but is carried up and down by
+  fantastical error without any order at all. And if at any time they
+  assail us with great force, our captain retireth her band into a
+  castle,[84] leaving them occupied in sacking unprofitable baggage. And
+  from above we laugh them to scorn for seeking so greedily after most
+  vile things, being safe from all their furious assault, and fortified
+  with that defence which aspiring folly cannot prevail against.
+
+
+  [83] On Julius Kanius or Canius the Stoic cf. Seneca, _De Tranq._ xiv.
+  4-9; on Soranus cf. Tac. _Annal._ i. 16.
+
+  [84] Cf. _arce religionis nostrae, Tr._ iv. (_supra_, p. 54).
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quisquis composito serenus aeuo
+Fatum sub pedibus egit[85] superbum
+Fortunamque tuens utramque rectus
+Inuictum potuit tenere uultum,
+Non illum rabies minaeque ponti                                           5
+Versum funditus exagitantis aestum
+Nec ruptis quotiens uagus caminis
+Torquet fumificos Vesaeuus ignes
+Aut celsas soliti ferire turres
+Ardentis uia fulminis mouebit.                                           10
+Quid tantum miseri saeuos tyrannos
+Mirantur sine uiribus furentes?
+Nec speres aliquid nec extimescas,
+Exarmaueris impotentis iram.
+At quisquis trepidus pauet uel optat,                                    15
+Quod non sit stabilis suique iuris,
+Abiecit clipeum locoque motus
+Nectit qua ualeat trahi catenam.
+
+
+[85] _Fortasse_ iecit; cf. Verg. _Georg._ ii. 491 _sq._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Who mildly can his age dispose,
+  And at his feet proud destiny throws:
+  Who stoutly doth each chance behold,
+  Keeping his countenance uncontrolled:
+  Not him the ocean's rage and threat,
+  Stirring the waves with angry heat,
+  Nor hot Vesuvius when he casts
+  From broken hills enflaméd blasts,
+  Nor fiery thunder can dismay,
+  Which takes the tops of towers away.
+  Why do fierce tyrants us affright,
+  Whose rage is far beyond their might?
+  For nothing hope, nor fear thou harm,
+  So their weak wrath thou shalt disarm.
+  But he whom hope or terror takes,
+  Being a slave, his shield forsakes,
+  And leaves his place, and doth provide
+  A chain wherewith his hands are tied.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+"Sentisne," inquit, "haec atque animo inlabuntur tuo, an [Greek: onos
+luras]? Quid fles, quid lacrimis manas?
+
+[Greek: Exauda, mae keuthe nooi.]
+
+Si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet uulnus detegas."
+
+Tum ego collecto in uires animo: "Anne adhuc eget admonitione nec per se
+satis eminet fortunae in nos saeuientis asperitas? Nihilne te ipsa loci
+facies mouet? Haecine est bibliotheca, quam certissimam tibi sedem nostris
+in laribus ipsa delegeras? In qua mecum saepe residens de humanarum
+diuinarumque rerum scientia disserebas? Talis habitus talisque uultus erat,
+*cum tecum naturae secreta rimarer, cum mihi siderum uias radio
+describeres, cum mores nostros totiusque uitae rationem ad caelestis
+ordinis exempla formares? Haecine praemia referimus tibi obsequentes? Atqui
+tu hanc sententiam Platonis ore sanxisti: beatas fore res publicas, si eas
+uel studiosi sapientiae regerent uel earum rectores studere sapientiae
+contigisset. Tu eiusdem uiri ore hanc sapientibus capessendae rei publicae
+necessariam causam esse monuisti, ne improbis flagitiosisque ciuibus urbium
+relicta gubernacula pestem bonis ac perniciem ferrent.
+
+Hanc igitur auctoritatem secutus quod a te inter secreta otia didiceram
+transferre in actum publicae administrationis optaui. Tu mihi et qui te
+sapientium mentibus inseruit deus conscii nullum me ad magistratum nisi
+commune bonorum omnium studium detulisse. Inde cum inprobis graues
+inexorabilesque discordiae et quod conscientiae libertas habet, pro tuendo
+iure spreta potentiorum semper offensio.
+
+Quotiens ego Conigastum in inbecilli cuiusque fortunas impetum facientem
+obuius excepi, quotiens Triguillam regiae praepositum domus ab incepta,
+perpetrata iam prorsus iniuria deieci, quotiens miseros quos infinitis
+calumniis inpunita barbarorum semper auaritia uexabat, obiecta periculis
+auctoritate protexi! Numquam me ab iure ad iniuriam quisquam detraxit.
+Prouincialium fortunas tum priuatis rapinis tum publicis uectigalibus
+pessumdari non aliter quam qui patiebantur indolui.
+
+Cum acerbae famis tempore grauis atque inexplicabilis indicta coemptio
+profligatura inopia Campaniam prouinciam uideretur, certamen aduersum
+praefectum praetorii communis commodi ratione suscepi, rege cognoscente
+contendi et ne coemptio exigeretur, euici. Paulinum consularem uirum cuius
+opes Palatinae canes iam spe atque ambitione deuorassent, ab ipsis hiantium
+faucibus traxi. Ne Albinum consularem uirum praeiudicatae accusationis
+poena corriperet, odiis me Cypriani delatoris opposui. Satisne in me magnas
+uideor exaceruasse discordias? Sed esse apud ceteros tutior debui qui mihi
+amore iustitiae nihil apud aulicos quo magis essem tutior reseruaui. Quibus
+autem deferentibus perculsi sumus? Quorum Basilius olim regio ministerio
+depulsus in delationem nostri nominis alieni aeris necessitate compulsus
+est. Opilionem uero atque Gaudentium cum ob innumeras multiplicesque
+fraudes ire in exilium regia censura decreuisset cumque illi parere
+nolentes sacrarum sese aedium defensione tuerentur compertumque id regi
+foret, edixit: uti ni intra praescriptum diem Rauenna urbe decederent,
+notas insigniti frontibus pellerentur. Quid huic seueritati posse astrui
+uidetur? Atqui in eo die deferentibus eisdem nominis nostri delatio
+suscepta est. Quid igitur? Nostraene artes ita meruerunt? An illos
+accusatores iustos fecit praemissa damnatio? Itane nihil fortunam puduit si
+minus accusatae innocentiae, at accusantium uilitatis?[86] At cuius
+criminis arguimur summam quaeris? Senatum dicimur saluum esse uoluisse.
+Modum desideras? Delatorem ne documenta deferret quibus senatum maiestatis
+reum faceret impedisse criminamur.
+
+Quid igitur o magistra censes? Infitiabimur crimen, ne tibi pudor simus? At
+uolui nec umquam uelle desistam. Fatebimur? Sed impediendi delatoris opera
+cessauit. An optasse illius ordinis salutem nefas uocabo? Ille quidem suis
+de me decretis, uti hoc nefas esset, effecerat. Sed sibi semper mentiens
+inprudentia rerum merita non potest inmutare nec mihi Socratico decreto fas
+esse arbitror uel occuluisse ueritatem uel concessisse mendacium. Verum id
+quoquo modo sit, tuo sapientiumque iudicio aestimandum relinquo. Cuius rei
+seriem atque ueritatem, ne latere posteros queat, stilo etiam memoriaeque
+mandaui.
+
+Nam de compositis falso litteris quibus libertatem arguor sperasse Romanam
+quid attinet dicere? Quarum fraus aperta patuisset, si nobis ipsorum
+confessione delatorum, quod in omnibus negotiis maximas uires habet, uti
+licuisset. Nam quae sperari reliqua libertas potest? Atque utinam posset
+ulla! Respondissem Canii uerbo, qui cum a Gaio Caesare Germanici filio
+conscius contra se factae coniurationis fuisse diceretur: 'Si ego,' inquit,
+'scissem, tu nescisses.' Qua in re non ita sensus nostros maeror hebetauit
+ut impios scelerata contra uirtutem querar molitos, sed quae sperauerint
+effecisse uehementer admiror. Nam deteriora uelle nostri fuerit fortasse
+defectus, posse contra innocentiam, quae sceleratus quisque conceperit
+inspectante deo, monstri simile est. Vnde haud iniuria tuorum quidam
+familiarium quaesiuit: 'Si quidem deus,' inquit, 'est, unde mala? Bona uero
+unde, si non est?' Sed fas fuerit nefarios homines qui bonorum omnium
+totiusque senatus sanguinem petunt, nos etiam quos propugnare bonis
+senatuique uiderant, perditum ire uoluisse. Sed num idem de patribus quoque
+merebamur? Meministi, ut opinor, quoniam me dicturum quid facturumue
+praesens semper ipsa dirigebas, meministi, inquam, Veronae cum rex auidus
+exitii communis maiestatis crimen in Albinum delatae ad cunctum senatus
+ordinem transferre moliretur, uniuersi innocentiam senatus quanta mei
+periculi securitate defenderim. Scis me haec et uera proferre et in nulla
+umquam mei laude iactasse. Minuit enim quodam modo se probantis
+conscientiae secretum, quotiens ostentando quis factum recipit famae
+pretium. Sed innocentiam nostram quis exceperit euentus uides; pro uerae
+uirtutis praemiis falsi sceleris poenas subimus. Et cuius umquam facinoris
+manifesta confessio ita iudices habuit in seueritate concordes ut non
+aliquos uel ipse ingenii error humani uel fortunae condicio cunctis
+mortalibus incerta submitteret? Si inflammare sacras aedes uoluisse, si
+sacerdotes impio iugulare gladio, si bonis omnibus necem struxisse
+diceremur, praesentem tamen sententia, confessum tamen conuictumue
+punisset. Nunc quingentis fere passuum milibus procul muti atque indefensi
+ob studium propensius in senatum morti proscriptionique damnamur. O meritos
+de simili crimine neminem posse conuinci!
+
+Cuius dignitatem reatus ipsi etiam qui detulere uiderunt, quam uti alicuius
+sceleris admixtione fuscarent, ob ambitum dignitatis sacrilegio me
+conscientiam polluisse mentiti sunt. Atqui et tu insita nobis omnem rerum
+mortalium cupidinem de nostri animi sede pellebas et sub tuis oculis
+sacrilegio locum esse fas non erat. Instillabas enim auribus
+cogitationibusque cotidie meis Pythagoricum illud [Greek: hepou theoi].[87]
+Nec conueniebat uilissimorum me spirituum praesidia captare quem tu in hanc
+excellentiam componebas ut consimilem deo faceres. Praeterea penetral
+innocens domus, honestissimorum coetus amicorum, socer etiam sanctus et
+aeque ac tu ipsa[88] reuerendus ab omni nos huius criminis suspitione
+defendunt. Sed, o nefas, illi uero de te tanti criminis fidem capiunt atque
+hoc ipso uidebimur affines fuisse maleficio, quod tuis inbuti disciplinis,
+tuis instituti moribus sumus. Ita non est satis nihil mihi tuam profuisse
+reuerentiam, nisi ultro tu mea potius offensione lacereris. At uero hic
+etiam nostris malis cumulus accedit, quod existimatio plurimorum non rerum
+merita sed fortunae spectat euentum eaque tantum iudicat esse prouisa quae
+felicitas commendauerit. Quo fit ut existimatio bona prima omnium deserat
+infelices. Qui nunc populi rumores, quam dissonae multiplicesque
+sententiae, piget reminisci. Hoc tantum dixerim ultimam esse aduersae
+fortunae sarcinam, quod dum miseris aliquod crimen affingitur, quae
+perferunt meruisse creduntur. Et ego quidem bonis omnibus pulsus,
+dignitatibus exutus, existimatione foedatus ob beneficium supplicium tuli.
+
+Videre autem uideor nefarias sceleratorum officinas gaudio laetitiaque
+fluitantes, perditissimum quemque nouis delationum fraudibus imminentem,
+iacere bonos nostri discriminis terrore prostratos, flagitiosum quemque ad
+audendum quidem facinus impunitate, ad efficiendum uero praemiis incitari,
+insontes autem non modo securitate, uerum ipsa etiam defensione priuatos.
+Itaque libet exclamare:
+
+
+[86] uilitatis _Glareanus_; uilitas _codd._
+
+[87] [Greek: theon] _codd._
+
+[88] ipsa _Sitzmannus_; ipso _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  "Understandest thou these things," saith she, "and do they make
+  impression in thy mind? Art thou 'like the ass, deaf to the lyre'? Why
+  weepest thou? Why sheddest thou so many tears? Speak out; hide not thy
+  thoughts.[89] If thou expectest to be cured, thou must discover thy
+  wound.[90]"
+
+  Then I, collecting the forces of my mind together, made her answer in
+  these words: "Doth the cruelty of fortune's rage need further
+  declaration, or doth it not sufficiently appear of itself? Doth not the
+  very countenance of this place move thee? Is this the library which thou
+  thyself hadst chosen to sit in at my house, in which thou hast
+  oftentimes discoursed with me of the knowledge of divine and human
+  things? Had I this attire or countenance when I searched the secrets of
+  nature with thee, when thou describedst unto me the course of the stars
+  with thy geometrical rod, when thou didst frame my conversation and the
+  manner of my whole life according to the pattern of the celestial order?
+  Are these the rewards which thy obedient servants have? But thou didst
+  decree that sentence by the mouth of Plato: That commonwealths should be
+  happy, if either the students of wisdom did govern them, or those which
+  were appointed to govern them would give themselves to the study of
+  wisdom.[91] Thou by the same philosopher didst admonish us that it is a
+  sufficient cause for wise men to take upon themselves the government of
+  the commonwealth, lest, if the rule of cities were left in the hands of
+  lewd and wicked citizens, they should work the subversion and overthrow
+  of the good.
+
+  Wherefore, following this authority, I desired to practise that by
+  public administration which I had learnt of thee in private conference.
+  Thou and God Himself who had inserted thee in the minds of the wise, are
+  my witnesses that nothing but the common desire of all good men brought
+  me to be a magistrate. This hath been the cause of my grievous and
+  irreconcilable disagreements with wicked men, and that which freedom of
+  conscience carrieth with it, of ever contemning the indignation of
+  potentates for the defence of justice.
+
+  How often have I encountered with Conigastus, violently possessing
+  himself with poor men's goods? How often have I put back Triguilla,
+  Provost of the King's house, from injuries which he had begun, yea, and
+  finished also? How often have I protected, by putting my authority in
+  danger, such poor wretches as the unpunished covetousness of the
+  barbarous did vex with infinite reproaches? Never did any man draw me
+  from right to wrong. It grieved me no less than them which suffered it,
+  to see the wealth of our subjects wasted, partly by private pillage, and
+  partly by public tributes.
+
+  When in the time of a great dearth things were set at so excessive and
+  unreasonable a rate that the province of Campania was like to be
+  altogether impoverished, for the common good I stuck not to contend with
+  the chief Praetor himself, and the matter was discussed before the King,
+  and I prevailed so far that it went not forward. I drew Paulinus, who
+  had been Consul, out of the very mouth of the gaping courtiers, who like
+  ravenous curs had already in hope and ambition devoured his riches. That
+  Albinus who had likewise been Consul might not be punished upon
+  presumptuous[92] and false accusation, I exposed myself to the hatred of
+  Cyprian his accuser. May I seem to have provoked enmity enough against
+  myself? But others should so much the more have procured my safety,
+  since that for the love I bear to justice I left myself no way by the
+  means of courtiers to be safe. But by whose accusations did I receive
+  this blow? By theirs who, long since having put Basil out of the King's
+  service, compelled him now to accuse me, by the necessity which he was
+  driven to by debt. Opilio likewise and Gaudentius being banished by the
+  King's decree, for the injuries and manifold deceits which they had
+  committed, because they would not obey, defended themselves by taking
+  sanctuary, of which the King hearing, gave sentence, that unless they
+  departed out of the city of Ravenna within certain days, they should be
+  branded in the foreheads, and put out by force. What could be added to
+  this severity? And yet that very day their accusations against me went
+  for current. What might be the reason of this? Did my dealing deserve
+  it? Or did the condemnation, which went before, make them just accusers?
+  Was not fortune ashamed, if not that innocency was accused, yet at least
+  that it had so vile and base accusers? But what crime was laid to my
+  charge? Wilt thou have it in one word? I am said to have desired the
+  Senate's safety. Wilt thou know the manner how? I am blamed for having
+  hindered their accuser to bring forth evidence by which he should prove
+  the Senate guilty of treason.
+
+  What thinkest thou, O Mistress? Shall I deny this charge, that I may not
+  shame thee? But it is true, I desired it, neither will I ever cease from
+  having that desire. Shall I confess it? But I have already left
+  hindering their accuser. Shall I call it an offence to have wished the
+  safety of that order? Indeed the Senate with their decrees concerning me
+  had made it an offence. But folly, always deceiving herself, cannot
+  change the deserts of things, nor, according to the decree of
+  Socrates,[93] do I think it is lawful either to conceal the truth or
+  grant a lie. But how this may be, I leave to thine and Wisdom's censure.
+  And that posterity may not be ignorant of the course and truth of the
+  matter, I have put it down in writing.
+
+  For why should I speak of those feigned letters, in which I am charged
+  to have hoped for Roman liberty? The deceit of which would manifestly
+  have appeared, if it might have been lawful for me to have used the
+  confession of my very accusers, which in all business is of greatest
+  force. For what liberty remaineth there to be hoped for? I would to God
+  there were any! I would have answered as Canius did, who being charged
+  by Gaius Caesar, son to Germanicus, that he was privy to the conspiracy
+  made against him, answered: 'If I had been made acquainted with it, thou
+  shouldest never have known of it.'[94] Neither hath sorrow so dulled my
+  wits in this matter that I complain of the wicked endeavours of sinful
+  men against virtue, but I exceedingly marvel to see that they have
+  brought to pass the things they hoped to do. For the desire of doing
+  evil may be attributed to our weakness, but that in the sight of God the
+  wicked should be able to compass whatsoever they contrive against the
+  innocent, is altogether monstrous. Whence not without cause one of thy
+  familiar friends[95] demanded: 'If,' saith he, 'there be a God, from
+  whence proceed so many evils? And if there be no God, from whence cometh
+  any good?' But let that pass that wicked men, which seek the blood of
+  all good men, and of the whole Senate, would also have overthrown me,
+  whom they saw to stand in defence of good men and of the Senate. But did
+  I deserve the same of the Senators themselves? I suppose thou
+  rememberest how thou being present didst alway direct me when I went
+  about to say or do anything. Thou rememberest, I say, when at Verona the
+  King, being desirous of a common overthrow, endeavoured to lay the
+  treason, whereof only Albinus was accused, upon the whole order of the
+  Senate, with how great security of my own danger I defended the
+  innocency of the whole Senate. Thou knowest that these things which I
+  say are true, and that I was never delighted in my own praise, for the
+  secret of a good conscience is in some sort diminished when by declaring
+  what he hath done a man receiveth the reward of fame. But thou seest to
+  what pass my innocency is come; instead of the rewards of true virtue, I
+  undergo the punishment of wickedness, wherewith I am falsely charged.
+  Was it ever yet seen that the manifest confession of any crime made the
+  judges so at one in severity, that either the error of man's judgment or
+  the condition of fortune, which is certain to none, did not incline some
+  of them to favour? If I had been accused that I would have burnt the
+  churches, or wickedly have killed the priests, or have sought the death
+  of all good men, yet sentence should have been pronounced against me
+  present, having confessed, and being convicted. Now being conveyed five
+  hundred miles off, dumb and defenceless, I am condemned to death and
+  proscription for bearing the Senate too much good will. O Senate, which
+  deserves that never any may be convicted of the like crime!
+
+  The dignity of which accusation even the very accusers themselves saw,
+  which that they might obscure by adding some sort of fault, they belied
+  me that I defiled my conscience with sacrilege, for an ambitious desire
+  of preferment. But thou, which hadst seated thyself in me, didst repel
+  from the seat of my mind all desire of mortal things, and within thy
+  sight there was no place for sacrilege to harbour; for thou didst instil
+  into my ears and thoughts daily that saying of Pythagoras, 'Follow
+  God.'[96] Neither was it fitting for me to use the aid of most vile
+  spirits when thou wast shaping me into that excellency to make me like
+  to God. Besides the innocency which appeared in the most retired rooms
+  of my house, the assembly of my most honourable friends, my holy father-
+  in-law Symmachus, who is as worthy of reverence as thou thyself art, do
+  clear me from all suspicion of this crime. But O detestable wickedness!
+  they the rather credit thee with so great a crime, and think me the
+  nigher to such mischievous dealing, because I am endued with thy
+  knowledge, and adorned with thy virtues, so that it is not enough that I
+  reap no commodity for thy respect, unless thou beest also dishonoured
+  for the hatred conceived against me. And that my miseries may increase
+  the more, the greatest part do not so much respect the value of things
+  as the event of fortune, and they esteem only that to be providently
+  done which the happy success commends. By which means it cometh to pass
+  that the first loss which miserable men have is their estimation and the
+  good opinion which was had of them. What rumours go now among the
+  people, what dissonant and diverse opinions! I cannot abide to think of
+  them; only this will I say, the last burden of adversity is that when
+  they which are in misery are accused of any crime, they are thought to
+  deserve whatsoever they suffer. And I, spoiled of all my goods, bereaved
+  of my dignities, blemished in my good name, for benefits receive
+  punishments.
+
+  And methinks I see the cursed crews of the wicked abounding with joy and
+  gladness, and every lost companion devising with himself how to accuse
+  others falsely, good men lie prostrate with the terror of my danger, and
+  every lewd fellow is provoked by impunity to attempt any wickedness, and
+  by rewards to bring it to effect; but the innocent are not only deprived
+  of all security, but also of any manner of defence. Wherefore I may well
+  exclaim:
+
+
+  [89] Homer, _Il._ i. 363.
+
+  [90] Cf. _Tr._ v. (_supra_, p. 76), _quasi non deterior fiat
+  inscientiae causa dum tegitur._
+
+  [91] Plato, _Rep._ v. 473.
+
+  [92] Presumptuous=founded on presumption.
+
+  [93] Cp. Plato, _Rep._ vi. 485; the [Greek: philosophos] cannot be
+  [Greek: philopseudaes.]
+
+  [94] _Vide supra_, p. 69. This seems to be the only record of Canius's
+  retort to Caligula.
+
+  [95] i.e. Epicurus, cp. Lact. _De Ira Dei_ xiii.
+
+  [96] Cf. [Greek: ho bios apas suntetaktai pros to akolouthein toi
+  Theoi], Iambl. _De Vita Pyth._ xviii., and Seneca, _De Vita Beata_ xv.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+O stelliferi conditor orbis
+Qui perpetuo nixus solio
+Rapido caelum turbine uersas
+Legemque pati sidera cogis,
+Vt nunc pleno lucida cornu                                                5
+Totis fratris obuia flammis
+Condat stellas luna minores,
+Nunc obscuro pallida cornu
+Phoebo propior lumina perdat,
+Et qui primae tempore noctis                                             10
+Agit algentes Hesperos ortus,
+Solitas iterum mutet habenas
+Phoebi pallens Lucifer ortu.
+Tu frondifluae frigore brumae
+Stringis lucem breuiore mora:                                            15
+Tu, cum feruida uenerit aestas,
+Agiles nocti diuidis horas.
+Tua uis uarium temperat annum
+Vt quas Boreae spiritus aufert
+Reuehat mites Zephyrus frondes                                           20
+Quaeque Arcturus semina uidit
+Sirius altas urat segetes.
+Nihil antiqua lege solutum
+Linquit propriae stationis opus.
+Omnia certo fine gubernans                                               25
+Hominum solos respuis actus
+Merito rector cohibere modo.
+Nam cur tantas lubrica uersat
+Fortuna uices? Premit insontes
+Debita sceleri noxia poena,                                              30
+At peruersi resident celso
+Mores solio sanctaque calcant
+Iniusta uice colla nocentes.
+Latet obscuris condita uirtus
+Clara tenebris iustusque tulit                                           35
+Crimen iniqui.
+Nil periuria, nil nocet ipsis
+Fraus mendaci compta colore.
+Sed cum libuit uiribus uti,
+Quos innumeri metuunt populi                                             40
+Summos gaudent subdere reges.
+O iam miseras respice terras
+Quisquis rerum foedera nectis.
+Operis tanti pars non uilis
+Homines quatimur fortunae salo.                                          45
+Rapidos rector comprime fluctus
+Et quo caelum regis immensum
+Firma stabiles foedere terras."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+    Creator of the Sky,
+  Who sittest on Thine eternal throne on high,
+    Who dost quick motions cause
+  In all the heavens, and givest stars their laws,
+    That the pale Queen of Night,
+  Sometimes receiving all her brother's light,
+    Should shine in her full pride,
+  And with her beams the lesser stars should hide;
+    Sometimes she wants her grace,
+  When the sun's rays are in less distant place;
+    And Hesperus that flies,
+  Driving the cold, before the night doth rise,
+    And oft with sudden change
+  Before the sun as Lucifer doth range.[97]
+    Thou short the days dost make,
+  When Winter from the trees the leaves doth take;
+    Thou, when the fiery sun
+  Doth Summer cause, makest the nights swiftly run.
+    Thy might doth rule the year,
+  As northern winds the leaves away do bear,
+    So Zephyrus from west
+  The plants in all their freshness doth revest;
+    And Syrius burns that corn
+  With which Arcturus did the earth adorn.
+    None from Thy laws are free,
+  Nor can forsake their place ordained by Thee.
+    Thou to that certain end
+  Governest all things; deniest Thou to intend
+    The acts of men alone,
+  Directing them in measure from Thy throne?
+    For why should slippery chance
+  Rule all things with such doubtful governance?
+    Or why should punishments,
+  Due to the guilty, light on innocents?
+    But now the highest place
+  Giveth to naughty manners greatest grace,
+    And wicked people vex
+  Good men, and tread unjustly on their necks;
+    Virtue in darkness lurks,
+  And righteous souls are charged with impious works,
+    Deceits nor perjuries
+  Disgrace not those who colour them with lies,
+    For, when it doth them please
+  To show their force, they to their will with ease
+    The hearts of kings can steer,
+  To whom so many crouch with trembling fear.
+    O Thou that joinest with love
+  All worldly things, look from Thy seat above
+    On the earth's wretched state;
+  We men, not the least work thou didst create,
+    With fortune's blasts do shake;
+  Thou careful ruler, these fierce tempests slake,
+    And for the earth provide
+  Those laws by which Thou heaven in peace dost guide."
+
+
+  [97] Literally, "And that he who as Hesperus, in the early hours of the
+  night, drives the cold stars before him, should change chariot (lit. his
+  accustomed reins) and become Lucifer, growing pale in the first rays of
+  the sun."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Haec ubi continuato dolore delatraui, illa uultu placido nihilque meis
+questibus mota: "Cum te," inquit, "maestum lacrimantemque uidissem, ilico
+miserum exsulemque cognoui. Sed quam id longinquum esset exilium, nisi tua
+prodidisset oratio, nesciebam. Sed tu quam procul a patria non quidem
+pulsus es sed aberrasti; ac si te pulsum existimari mauis, te potius ipse
+pepulisti. Nam id quidem de te numquam cuiquam fas fuisset. Si enim cuius
+oriundo sis patriae reminiscare, non uti Atheniensium quondam multitudinis
+imperio regitur, sed
+
+[Greek: heis koiranos estin, heis basileus]
+
+qui frequentia ciuium non depulsione laetetur; cuius agi frenis atque
+obtemperare iustitiae summa libertas est. An ignoras illam tuae ciuitatis
+antiquissimam legem, qua sanctum est ei ius exulare non esse quisquis in ea
+sedem fundare maluerit? Nam qui uallo eius ac munimine continetur, nullus
+metus est ne exul esse mereatur. At quisquis eam inhabitare uelle desierit,
+pariter desinit etiam mereri. Itaque non tam me loci huius quam tua facies
+mouet nec bibliothecae potius comptos ebore ac uitro parietes quam tuae
+mentis sedem requiro, in qua non libros sed id quod libris pretium facit,
+librorum quondam meorum sententias, collocaui. Et tu quidem de tuis in
+commune bonum meritis uera quidem, sed pro multitudine gestorum tibi pauca
+dixisti. De obiectorum tibi uel honestate uel falsitate cunctis nota
+memorasti. De sceleribus fraudibusque delatorum recte tu quidem strictim
+attingendum putasti, quod ea melius uberiusque recognoscentis omnia uulgi
+ore celebrentur. Increpuisti etiam uehementer iniusti factum senatus. De
+nostra etiam criminatione doluisti, laesae quoque opinionis damna fleuisti.
+Postremus aduersum fortunam dolor incanduit conquestusque non aequa meritis
+praemia pensari. In extremo Musae saeuientis, uti quae caelum terras quoque
+pax regeret, uota posuisti. Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus
+incubuit diuersumque te dolor, ira, maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es,
+nondum te ualidiora remedia contingunt. Itaque lenioribus paulisper utemur,
+ut quae in tumorem perturbationibus influentibus induruerunt, ad acrioris
+uim medicaminis recipiendum tactu blandiore mollescant.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  When I had uttered these speeches with continued grief, she, with an
+  amiable countenance and nothing moved with my complaints, said: "When I
+  first saw thee sad and weeping, I forthwith knew thee to be in misery
+  and banishment. But I had not known how far off thou wert banished, if
+  thy speech had not bewrayed it. O how far art thou gone from thy
+  country, not being driven away, but wandering of thine own accord! Or if
+  thou hadst rather be thought to have been driven out, it hath been only
+  by thyself; for never could any other but thyself have done it; for if
+  thou rememberest of what country thou art, it is not governed as Athens
+  was wont to be, by the multitude, but 'one is its ruler, one its
+  king,'[98] who desires to have abundance of citizens, and not to have
+  them driven away. To be governed by whose authority, and to be subject
+  to her laws, is the greatest freedom that can be. Art thou ignorant of
+  that most ancient law of thy city, by which it is decreed that he may
+  not be banished that hath made choice of it for his dwelling-place;[99]
+  for he that is within her fort or hold need not fear lest he deserve to
+  be banished? But whosoever ceaseth to desire to dwell in it, ceaseth
+  likewise to deserve so great a benefit. Wherefore the countenance of
+  this place moveth me not so much as thy countenance doth. Neither do I
+  much require thy library adorned with ivory adornments, and its crystal
+  walls, as the seat of thy mind, in which I have not placed books, but
+  that which makes books to be esteemed of, I mean the sentences of my
+  books, which were written long since. And that which thou hast said of
+  thy deserts to the common good, is true indeed, but little in respect of
+  the many things which thou hast done. That which thou hast reported,
+  either of the honesty or of the falseness of those things which are
+  objected against thee, is known to all men. Thou didst well to touch but
+  briefly the wickedness and deceit of thy accusers, for that the common
+  people to whose notice they are come do more fitly and largely speak of
+  them. Thou hast also sharply rebuked the unjust Senate's deed. Thou hast
+  also grieved at our accusation, and hast bewailed the loss or
+  diminishing of our good name; and lastly, thy sorrow raged against
+  fortune, and thou complainedst that deserts were not equally rewarded.
+  In the end of thy bitter verse, thou desiredst that the earth might be
+  governed by that peace which heaven enjoyeth. But because thou art
+  turmoiled with the multitude of affections, grief and anger drawing thee
+  to divers parts, in the plight thou art now, the more forcible remedies
+  cannot be applied unto thee; wherefore, for a while, we will use the
+  more easy, that thy affections, which are, as it were, hardened and
+  swollen with perturbations, may by gentle handling be mollified and
+  disposed to receive the force of sharper medicines.
+
+
+  [98] Hom. _Il._ ii. 204.
+
+  [99] Cf. Cicero, _Pro domo sua_. 29. 77.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Cum Phoebi radiis graue
+Cancri sidus inaestuat,
+Tum qui larga negantibus
+Sulcis semina credidit,
+Elusus Cereris fide                                                       5
+Quernas pergat ad arbores.
+Numquam purpureum nemus
+Lecturus uiolas petas
+Cum saeuis aquilonibus
+Stridens campus inhorruit,                                               10
+Nec quaeras auida manu
+Vernos stringere palmites,
+Vuis si libeat frui;
+Autumno potius sua
+Bacchus munera contulit.                                                 15
+Signat tempora propriis
+Aptans officiis deus
+Nec quas ipse coercuit
+Misceri patitur uices.
+Sic quod praecipiti uia                                                  20
+Certum deserit ordinem
+Laetos non habet exitus.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  When hot with Phoebus' beams
+  The Crab casts fiery gleams,
+  He that doth then with seed
+  Th'unwilling furrows feed,
+  Deceivéd of his bread
+  Must be with acorns fed.
+  Seek not the flowery woods
+  For violets' sweet buds,
+  When fields are overcast
+  With the fierce northern blast,
+  Nor hope thou home to bring
+  Vine-clusters in the Spring
+  If thou in grapes delight:
+  In autumn Bacchus' might
+  With them doth deck our clime.
+  God every several time
+  With proper grace hath crowned
+  Nor will those laws confound
+  Which He once settled hath.
+  He that with headlong path
+  This certain order leaves,
+  An hapless end receives.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Primum igitur paterisne me pauculis rogationibus statum tuae mentis
+attingere atque temptare, ut qui modus sit tuae curationis intellegam?" "Tu
+uero arbitratu," inquam, "tuo quae uoles ut responsurum rogato." Tum illa:
+"Huncine," inquit, "mundum temerariis agi fortuitisque casibus putas, an
+ullum credis ei regimen inesse rationis?" "Atqui," inquam, "nullo
+existimauerim modo ut fortuita temeritate tam certa moueantur, uerum operi
+suo conditorem praesidere deum scio nec umquam fuerit dies qui me ab hac
+sententiae ueritate depellat."
+
+"Ita est," inquit. "Nam id etiam paulo ante cecinisti, hominesque tantum
+diuinae exortes curae esse deplorasti. Nam de ceteris quin ratione
+regerentur, nihil mouebare. Papae autem! Vehementer admiror cur in tam
+salubri sententia locatus aegrotes. Verum altius perscrutemur; nescio quid
+abesse coniecto.
+
+"Sed dic mihi, quoniam deo mundum regi non ambigis, quibus etiam
+gubernaculis regatur aduertis?" "Vix," inquam, "rogationis tuae sententiam
+nosco, nedum ad inquisita respondere queam." "Num me," inquit, "fefellit
+abesse aliquid, per quod, uelut hiante ualli robore, in animum tuum
+perturbationum morbus inrepserit? Sed dic mihi, meministine, quis sit rerum
+finis, quoue totius naturae tendat intentio?" "Audieram," inquam, "sed
+memoriam maeror hebetauit." "Atqui scis unde cuncta processerint?" "Noui,"
+inquam, deumque esse respondi. "Et qui fieri potest, ut principio cognito
+quis sit rerum finis ignores? Verum hi perturbationum mores, ea ualentia
+est, ut mouere quidem loco hominem possint, conuellere autem sibique totum
+exstirpare non possint.
+
+Sed hoc quoque respondeas uelim, hominemne te esse meministi?" "Quidni,"
+inquam, "meminerim?" "Quid igitur homo sit, poterisne proferre?" "Hocine
+interrogas an esse me sciam rationale animal atque mortale? Scio et id me
+esse confiteor." Et illa: "Nihilne aliud te esse nouisti?" "Nihil."
+
+"Iam scio," inquit, "morbi tui aliam uel maximam causam; quid ipse sis,
+nosse desisti. Quare plenissime uel aegritudinis tuae rationem uel aditum
+reconciliandae sospitatis inueni. Nam quoniam tui obliuione confunderis, et
+exsulem te et exspoliatum propriis bonis esse doluisti. Quoniam uero quis
+sit rerum finis ignoras, nequam homines atque nefarios potentes felicesque
+arbitraris. Quoniam uero quibus gubernaculis mundus regatur oblitus es, has
+fortunarum uices aestimas sine rectore fluitare--magnae non ad morbum modo
+uerum ad interitum quoque causae. Sed sospitatis auctori grates, quod te
+nondum totum natura destituit. Habemus maximum tuae fomitem salutis ueram
+de mundi gubernatione sententiam, quod eam non casuum temeritati sed
+diuinae rationi subditam credis. Nihil igitur pertimescas; iam tibi ex hac
+minima scintillula uitalis calor inluxerit. Sed quoniam firmioribus
+remediis nondum tempus est et eam mentium constat esse naturam, ut quotiens
+abiecerint ueras falsis opinionibus induantur ex quibus orta perturbationum
+caligo uerum illum confundit intuitum, hanc paulisper lenibus
+mediocribusque fomentis attenuare temptabo, ut dimotis fallacium
+affectionum tenebris splendorem uerae lucis possis agnoscere.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  First, therefore, wilt thou let me touch and try the state of thy mind
+  by asking thee a few questions, that I may understand how thou art to be
+  cured?" To which I answered: "Ask me what questions thou wilt, and I
+  will answer thee." And then she said: "Thinkest thou that this world is
+  governed by haphazard and chance? Or rather dost thou believe that it is
+  ruled by reason?" "I can," quoth I, "in no manner imagine that such
+  certain motions are caused by rash chance. And I know that God the
+  Creator doth govern His work, nor shall the day ever come to draw me
+  from the truth of that judgment."
+
+  "It is so," saith she, "for so thou saidst in thy verse a little before,
+  and bewailedst that only men were void of God's care; for as for the
+  rest, thou didst not doubt but that they were governed by reason. And
+  surely I cannot choose but exceedingly admire how thou canst be ill
+  affected, holding so wholesome an opinion. But let us search further; I
+  guess thou wantest something, but I know not what.
+
+  Tell me, since thou doubtest not that the world is governed by God,
+  canst thou tell me also by what means it is governed?" "I do scarcely,"
+  quoth I, "understand what thou askest, and much less am I able to make
+  thee a sufficient answer." "Was I," quoth she, "deceived in thinking
+  that thou wantedst something by which, as by the breach of a fortress,
+  the sickness of perturbations hath entered into thy mind? But tell me,
+  dost thou remember what is the end of things? Or to what the whole
+  intention of nature tendeth?" "I have heard it," quoth I, "but grief
+  hath dulled my memory." "But knowest thou from whence all things had
+  their beginning?" "I know," quoth I, and answered, that from God. "And
+  how can it be that, knowing the beginning, thou canst be ignorant of the
+  end? But this is the condition and force of perturbations, that they may
+  alter a man, but wholly destroy, and as it were root him out of himself,
+  they cannot.
+
+  But I would have thee answer me to this also; dost thou remember that
+  thou art a man?" "Why should I not remember it?" quoth I. "Well then,
+  canst thou explicate what man is?" "Dost thou ask me if I know that I am
+  a reasonable and mortal living creature? I know and confess myself to be
+  so." To which she replied: "Dost thou not know thyself to be anything
+  else?" "Not anything."
+
+  "Now I know," quoth she, "another, and that perhaps the greatest, cause
+  of thy sickness: thou hast forgotten what thou art. Wherefore I have
+  fully found out both the manner of thy disease and the means of thy
+  recovery; for the confusion which thou art in, by the forgetfulness of
+  thyself, is the cause why thou art so much grieved at thy exile and the
+  loss of thy goods. And because thou art ignorant what is the end of
+  things, thou thinkest that lewd and wicked men be powerful and happy;
+  likewise, because thou hast forgotten by what means the world is
+  governed, thou imaginest that these alternations of fortune do fall out
+  without any guide, sufficient causes not only of sickness, but also of
+  death itself. But thanks be to the author of thy health, that Nature
+  hath not altogether forsaken thee. We have the greatest nourisher of thy
+  health, the true opinion of the government of the world, in that thou
+  believest that it is not subject to the events of chance, but to divine
+  reason. Wherefore fear nothing; out of this little sparkle will be
+  enkindled thy vital heat. But because it is not yet time to use more
+  solid remedies, and it is manifest that the nature of minds is such that
+  as often as they cast away true opinions they are possessed with false,
+  out of which the darkness of perturbations arising doth make them that
+  they cannot discern things aright, I will endeavour to dissolve this
+  cloud with gentle and moderate fomentations; that having removed the
+  obscurity of deceitful affections, thou mayest behold the splendour of
+  true light.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Nubibus atris
+Condita nullum
+Fundere possunt
+Sidera lumen.
+Si mare uoluens                                                           5
+Turbidus Auster
+Misceat aestum,
+Vitrea dudum
+Parque serenis
+Vnda diebus                                                              10
+Mox resoluto
+Sordida caeno
+Visibus obstat.
+Quique uagatur
+Montibus altis                                                           15
+Defluus amnis,
+Saepe resistit
+Rupe soluti
+Obice saxi.
+Tu quoque si uis                                                         20
+Lumine claro
+Cernere uerum,
+Tramite recto
+Carpere callem,
+Gaudia pelle,                                                            25
+Pelle timorem
+Spemque fugato
+Nec dolor adsit.
+Nubila mens est
+Vinctaque frenis,                                                        30
+Haec ubi regnant."
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  When stars are shrouded
+  With dusky night,
+  They yield no light
+  Being so clouded.
+  When the wind moveth
+  And churneth the sea,
+  The flood, clear as day,
+  Foul and dark proveth.
+  And rivers creeping
+  Down a high hill
+  Stand often still,
+  Rocks them back keeping.
+  If thou wouldst brightly
+  See Truth's clear rays,
+  Or walk those ways
+  Which lead most rightly,
+  All joy forsaking
+  Fear must thou fly,
+  And hopes defy,
+  No sorrow taking.
+  For where these terrors
+  Reign in the mind,
+  They it do bind
+  In cloudy errors."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER PRIMVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER II
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Post haec paulisper obticuit atque ubi attentionem meam modesta
+taciturnitate collegit, sic exorsa est: "Si penitus aegritudinis tuae
+causas habitumque cognovi, fortunae prioris affectu desiderioque tabescis.
+Ea tantum animi tui sicuti tu tibi fingis mutata peruertit. Intellego
+multiformes illius prodigii fucos et eo usque cum his quos eludere nititur
+blandissimam familiaritatem, dum intolerabili dolore confundat quos
+insperata reliquerit. Cuius si naturam mores ac meritum reminiscare, nec
+habuisse te in ea pulchrum aliquid nec amisisse cognosces, sed ut arbitror
+haud multum tibi haec in memoriam reuocare laborauerim. Solebas enim
+praesentem quoque blandientemque uirilibus incessere uerbis eamque de
+nostro adyto prolatis insectabare sententiis. Verum omnis subita mutatio
+rerum non sine quodam quasi fluctu contingit animorum; sic factum est ut tu
+quoque paulisper a tua tranquillitate descisceres. Sed tempus est haurire
+te aliquid ac degustare molle atque iucundum quod ad interiora transmissum
+ualidioribus haustibus uiam fecerit. Adsit igitur Rhetoricae suadela
+dulcedinis quae tum tantum recto calle procedit, cum nostra instituta non
+deserit cumque hac Musica laris nostri uernacula nunc leuiores nunc
+grauiores modos succinat.
+
+Quid est igitur o homo quod te in maestitiam luctumque deiecit? Nouum,
+credo, aliquid inusitatumque uidisti. Tu fortunam putas erga te esse
+mutatam; erras. Hi semper eius mores sunt ista natura. Seruauit circa te
+propriam potius in ipsa sui mutabilitate constantiam. Talis erat cum
+blandiebatur, cum tibi falsae inlecebris felicitatis alluderet.
+Deprehendisti caeci numinis ambiguos uultus. Quae sese adhuc uelat aliis,
+tota tibi prorsus innotuit. Si probas, utere moribus; ne queraris. Si
+perfidiam perhorrescis, sperne atque abice perniciosa ludentem. Nam quae
+nunc tibi est tanti causa maeroris, haec eadem tranquillitatis esse
+debuisset, Reliquit enim te quam non relicturam nemo umquam poterit esse
+securus. An uero tu pretiosam aestimas abituram felicitatem? Et cara tibi
+est fortuna praesens nec manendi fida et cum discesserit adlatura maerorem.
+Quod si nec ex arbitrio retineri potest et calamitosos fugiens facit, quid
+est aliud fugax quam futurae quoddam calamitatis indicium? Neque enim quod
+ante oculos situm est, suffecerit intueri; rerum exitus prudentia metitur
+eademque in alterutro mutabilitas nec formidandas fortunae minas nec
+exoptandas facit esse blanditias.  Postremo aequo animo toleres oportet
+quidquid intra fortunae aream geritur, cum semel iugo eius colla
+submiseris. Quod si manendi abeundique scribere legem uelis ei quam tu tibi
+dominam sponte legisti, nonne iniurius fueris et inpatientia sortem
+exacerbes quam permutare non possis? Si uentis uela committeres, non quo
+uoluntas peteret sed quo flatus impellerent, promoueres; si aruis semina
+crederes, feraces inter se annos sterilesque pensares. Fortunae te regendum
+dedisti; dominae moribus oportet obtemperes.  Tu uero uoluentis rotae
+impetum retinere conaris? At, omnium mortalium stolidissime, si manere
+incipit, fors esse desistit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE SECOND BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  After this she remained silent for a while; and, having by that her
+  modesty made me attentive, began in this wise: "If I be rightly informed
+  of the causes and condition of thy disease, thou languishest with the
+  affection of thy former fortune, and the change of that alone, as thou
+  imaginest, hath overthrown so much of thy mind. I know the manifold
+  illusions of that monster, exercising most alluring familiarity with
+  them whom she meaneth to deceive, to the end she may confound them with
+  intolerable grief, by forsaking them upon the sudden, whose nature,
+  customs, and desert, if thou rememberest, thou shalt know that thou
+  neither didst possess nor hast lost anything of estimation in it; and,
+  as I hope, I shall not need to labour much to bring these things to thy
+  remembrance, for thou wert wont, when she was present, and flattered
+  thee most, to assail her with manful words, and pursue her with
+  sentences taken forth of our most hidden knowledge. But every sudden
+  change of things happeneth not without a certain wavering and
+  disquietness of mind. And this is the cause that thou also for a while
+  hast lost thy former tranquillity and peace. But it is time for thee to
+  take and taste some gentle and pleasant thing which being received may
+  prepare thee for stronger potions. Wherefore let us use the sweetness of
+  Rhetoric's persuasions, which then only is well employed when it
+  forsaketh not our ordinances; and with this, let Music, a little slave
+  belonging to our house, chant sometime lighter and sometime sadder
+  notes.
+
+  Wherefore, O man, what is it that hath cast thee into sorrow and grief?
+  Thou hast, methinks, seen something new and unwonted. If thou thinkest
+  that fortune hath altered her manner of proceeding toward thee, thou art
+  in an error. This was alway her fashion; this is her nature. She hath
+  kept that constancy in thy affairs which is proper to her, in being
+  mutable; such was her condition when she fawned upon thee and allured
+  thee with enticements of feigned happiness. Thou hast discovered the
+  doubtful looks of this blind goddess. She, which concealeth herself from
+  others, is wholly known to thee. If thou likest her, frame thyself to
+  her conditions, and make no complaint. If thou detestest her treachery,
+  despise and cast her off, with her pernicious flattery. For that which
+  hath caused thee so much sorrow should have brought thee to great
+  tranquillity. For she hath forsaken thee, of whom no man can be secure.
+  Dost thou esteem that happiness precious which thou art to lose? And is
+  the present fortune dear unto thee, of whose stay thou art not sure, and
+  whose departure will breed thy grief? And if she can neither be kept at
+  our will, and maketh them miserable whom she at last leaveth, what else
+  is fickle fortune but a token of future calamity? For it is not
+  sufficient to behold that which we have before our eyes; wisdom
+  pondereth the event of things, and this mutability on both sides maketh
+  the threats of fortune not to be feared, nor her flatterings to be
+  desired. Finally, thou must take in good part whatsoever happeneth unto
+  thee within the reach of fortune, when once thou hast submitted thy neck
+  to her yoke. And if to her whom, of thine own accord, thou hast chosen
+  for thy mistress, thou wouldest prescribe a law how long she were to
+  stay, and when to depart, shouldst thou not do her mighty wrong, and
+  with thy impatience make thy estate more intolerable, which thou canst
+  not better? If thou settest up thy sails to the wind, thou shalt be
+  carried not whither thy will desirest, but whither the gale driveth. If
+  thou sowest thy seed, thou considerest that there are as well barren as
+  fertile years. Thou hast yielded thyself to fortune's sway; thou must be
+  content with the conditions of thy mistress. Endeavourest thou to stay
+  the force of the turning wheel? But thou foolishest man that ever was,
+  if it beginneth to stay, it ceaseth to be fortune.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec cum superba uerterit uices dextra
+Et aestuantis more fertur Euripi,
+Dudum tremendos saeua proterit reges
+Humilemque uicti subleuat fallax uultum.
+Non illa miseros audit aut curat fletus                                   5
+Vltroque gemitus dura quos fecit ridet.
+Sic illa ludit, sic suas probat uires
+Magnumque suis demonstrat [100] ostentum, si quis
+Visatur una stratus ac felix hora.
+
+
+[100] monstrat _codd_.
+
+
+
+
+  I
+
+  The pride of fickle fortune spareth none,
+  And, like the floods of swift Euripus borne, [101]
+  Oft casteth mighty princes from their throne,
+  And oft the abject captive doth adorn.
+  She cares not for the wretch's tears and moan,
+  And the sad groans, which she hath caused, doth scorn.
+  Thus doth she play, to make her power more known,
+  Showing her slaves a marvel, when man's state
+  Is in one hour both downcast and fortunate.
+
+
+  [101] Literally, "When fortune with proud right hand plies her changes
+  and ebbs and flows like foaming Euripus." Euripus was proverbial for
+  irregular tides.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Vellem autem pauca tecum fortunae ipsius uerbis agitare. Tu igitur an ius
+postulet, animaduerte. 'Quid tu homo ream me cotidianis agis querelis? Quam
+tibi fecimus iniuriam? Quae tua tibi detraximus bona? Quouis iudice de opum
+dignitatumque mecum possessione contende.  Et si cuiusquam mortalium
+proprium quid horum esse monstraueris, ego iam tua fuisse quae repetis,
+sponte concedam.
+
+Cum te matris utero natura produxit, nudum rebus omnibus inopemque suscepi,
+meis opibus foui et quod te nunc inpatientem nostri facit, fauore prona
+indulgentius educaui, omnium quae mei iuris sunt affluentia et splendore
+circumdedi. Nunc mihi retrahere manum libet. Habes gratiam uelut usus
+alienis, non habes ius querelae tamquam prorsus tua perdideris. Quid igitur
+ingemiscis? Nulla tibi a nobis est allata uiolentia. Opes honores ceteraque
+talium mei sunt iuris. Dominam famulae cognoscunt; mecum ueniunt, me
+abeunte discedunt. Audacter adfirmem, si tua forent quae amissa conquereris
+nullo modo perdidisses. An ego sola meum ius exercere prohibebor? Licet
+caelo proferre lucidos dies eosdemque tenebrosis noctibus condere. Licet
+anno terrae uultum nunc floribus frugibusque redimire, nunc nimbis
+frigoribusque confundere. Ius est mari nunc strato aequore blandiri, nunc
+procellis ac fluctibus inhorrescere. Nos ad constantiam nostris moribus
+alienam inexpleta hominum cupiditas alligabit? Haec nostra uis est, hunc
+continuum ludum ludimus; rotam uolubili orbe uersamus, infima summis summa
+infimis mutare gaudemus. Ascende si placet, sed ea lege ne utique[102] cum
+ludicri mei ratio poscet, descendere iniuriam putes. An tu mores ignorabas
+meos? Nesciebas Croesum regem Lydorum Cyro paulo ante formidabilem mox
+deinde miserandum rogi flammis traditum misso caelitus imbre defensum? Num
+te praeterit Paulum Persi regis a se capti calamitatibus pias inpendisse
+lacrimas? Quid tragoediarum clamor aliud deflet nisi indiscreto ictu
+fortunam felicia regna uertentem? Nonne adulescentulus [Greek: doious
+pithous ton men hena kakon ton d'heteron eaon] in Iouis limine iacere
+didicisti? Quid si uberius de bonorum parte sumpsisti? Quid si a te non
+tota discessi? Quid si haec ipsa mei mutabilitas iusta tibi causa est
+sperandi meliora? Tamen ne animo contabescas et intra commune omnibus
+regnum locatus proprio uiuere iure desideres.
+
+
+[102] utique _Klussmann_; uti _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  II
+
+  But I would urge thee a little with Fortune's own speeches. Wherefore
+  consider thou if she asketh not reason. 'For what cause, O man, chargest
+  thou me with daily complaints? What injury have I done thee? What goods
+  of thine have I taken from thee? Contend with me before any judge about
+  the possession of riches and dignities; and if thou canst show that the
+  propriety of any of these things belong to any mortal wight, I will
+  forthwith willingly grant that those things which thou demandest were
+  thine. When Nature produced thee out of thy mother's womb, I received
+  thee naked and poor in all respects, cherished thee with my wealth, and
+  (which maketh thee now to fall out with me) being forward to favour
+  thee, I had most tender care for thy education, and adorned thee with
+  the abundance and splendour of all things which are in my power. Now it
+  pleaseth me to withdraw my hand, yield thanks, as one that hath had the
+  use of that which was not his own. Thou hast no just cause to complain,
+  as though thou hadst lost that which was fully thine own. Wherefore
+  lamentest thou? I have offered thee no violence. Riches, honours, and
+  the rest of that sort belong to me. They acknowledge me for their
+  mistress, and themselves for my servants, they come with me, and when I
+  go away they likewise depart. I may boldly affirm, if those things which
+  thou complainest to be taken from thee had been thine own, thou shouldst
+  never have lost them. Must I only be forbidden to use my right? It is
+  lawful for the heaven to bring forth fair days, and to hide them again
+  in darksome nights. It is lawful for the year sometime to compass the
+  face of the earth with flowers and fruits, and sometime to cover it with
+  clouds and cold. The sea hath right sometime to fawn with calms, and
+  sometime to frown with storms and waves. And shall the insatiable desire
+  of men tie me to constancy, so contrary to my custom? This is my force,
+  this is the sport which I continually use. I turn about my wheel with
+  speed, and take a pleasure to turn things upside down. Ascend, if thou
+  wilt, but with this condition, that thou thinkest it not an injury to
+  descend when the course of my sport so requireth. Didst thou not know my
+  fashion? Wert thou ignorant how Croesus, King of the Lydians, not long
+  before a terror to Cyrus, within a while after came to such misery that
+  he should have been burnt had he not been saved by a shower sent from
+  heaven?[103] Hast thou forgotten how Paul piously bewailed the
+  calamities of King Perses his prisoner?[104] What other thing doth the
+  outcry of tragedies lament, but that fortune, having no respect,
+  overturneth happy states? Didst thou not learn in thy youth that there
+  lay two barrels, the one of good things and the other of bad,[105] at
+  Jupiter's threshold? But what if thou hast tasted more abundantly of the
+  good? What if I be not wholly gone from thee? What if this mutability of
+  mine be a just cause for thee to hope for better? Notwithstanding, lose
+  not thy courage, and, living in a kingdom which is common to all men,
+  desire not to be governed by peculiar laws proper only to thyself.
+
+
+  [103] Cf. Herod, i. 87.
+
+  [104] Cf. Livy xlv. 8. Paul=Aemilius Paulus surnamed Macedonius for his
+  defeat of Perses last king of Macedonia in 168 B.C.
+
+  [105] _Il._ xxiv. 527.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Si quantas rapidis flatibus incitus
+  Pontus uersat harenas
+Aut quot stelliferis edita noctibus
+  Caelo sidera fulgent
+Tantas fundat opes nec retrahat manum                                     5
+  Pleno copia cornu,
+Humanum miseras haud ideo genus
+  Cesset flere querellas.
+Quamuis uota libens excipiat deus
+  Multi prodigus auri                                                    10
+Et claris auidos ornet honoribus,
+  Nil iam parta uidentur,
+Sed quaesita uorans saeua rapacitas
+  Altos[106] pandit hiatus.
+Quae iam praecipitem frena cupidinem                                     15
+  Certo fine retentent,
+Largis cum potius muneribus fluens
+  Sitis ardescit habendi?
+Numquam diues agit qui trepidus gemens
+  Sese credit egentem.'                                                  20
+
+
+[106] altos _vulg._; alios _codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  If Plenty as much wealth should give, ne'er holding back her hand,
+  As the swift winds in troubled seas do toss up heaps of sand,
+  Or as the stars in lightsome nights shine forth on heaven's face,
+  Yet wretched men would still accuse their miserable case.
+  Should God, too liberal of His gold, their greedy wishes hear,
+  And with bright honour them adorn; yet all that nothing were,
+  Since ravenous minds, devouring all, for more are ready still.
+  What bridle can contain in bounds this their contentless will,
+  When filled with riches they retain the thirst of having more?
+  He is not rich that fears and grieves, and counts himself but poor.'
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+His igitur si pro se tecum fortuna loqueretur, quid profecto contra
+hisceres non haberes, aut si quid est quo querelam tuam iure tuearis,
+proferas oportet. Dabimus dicendi locum." Tum ego: "Speciosa quidem ista
+sunt," inquam, "oblitaque Rhetoricae ac Musicae melle dulcedinis; tum
+tantum, cum audiuntur, oblectant. Sed miseris malorum altior sensus est.
+Itaque cum haec auribus insonare desierint, insitus animum maeror
+praegrauat." Et illa: "Ita est," inquit. "Haec enim nondum morbi tui
+remedia sed adhuc contumacis aduersum curationem doloris fomenta quaedam
+sunt. Nam quae in profundum sese penetrent, cum tempestiuum fuerit
+admouebo. Verumtamen ne te existimari miserum uelis, an numerum modumque
+tuae felicitatis oblitus es?
+
+Taceo quod desolatum parente summorum te uirorum cura suscepit delectusque
+in affinitatem principum ciuitatis, quod pretiosissimum propinquitatis
+genus est, prius carus quam proximus esse coepisti. Quis non te
+felicissimum cum tanto splendore socerorum, cum coniugis pudore, cum
+masculae quoque prolis opportunitate praedicauit? Praetereo, libet enim
+praeterire communia, sumptas in adulescentia negatas senibus dignitates; ad
+singularem felicitatis tuae cumulum uenire delectat. Si quis rerum
+mortalium fructus ullum beatitudinis pondus habet, poteritne illius memoria
+lucis quantalibet ingruentium malorum mole deleri, cum duos pariter
+consules liberos tuos domo prouehi sub frequentia patrum, sub plebis
+alacritate uidisti, cum eisdem in curia curules insidentibus tu regiae
+laudis orator ingenii gloriam facundiaeque meruisti, cum in circo duorum
+medius consulum circumfusae multitudinis expectationem triumphali
+largitione satiasti? Dedisti ut opinor uerba fortunae, dum te illa
+demulcet, dum te ut delicias suas fouet. Munus quod nulli umquam priuato
+commodauerat abstulisti. Visne igitur cum fortuna calculum ponere? Nunc te
+primum liuenti oculo praestrinxit. Si numerum modumque laetorum tristiumue
+consideres, adhuc te felicem negare non possis. Quod si idcirco te
+fortunatum esse non aestimas, quoniam quae tunc laeta uidebantur abierunt,
+non est quod te miserum putes, quoniam quae nunc creduntur maesta
+praetereunt. An tu in hanc uitae scaenam nunc primum subitus hospesque
+uenisti? Vllamne humanis rebus inesse constantiam reris, cum ipsum saepe
+hominem uelox hora dissoluat? Nam etsi rara est fortuitis manendi fides,
+ultimus tamen uitae dies mors quaedam fortunae est etiam manentis. Quid
+igitur referre putas, tune illam moriendo deseras an te illa fugiendo?
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Wherefore if fortune should plead with thee thus in her own defence,
+  doubtless thou wouldst not have a word to answer her. But if there be
+  anything which thou canst allege in thy own defence, thou must utter it.
+  We will give thee full liberty to speak." Then I said: "These things
+  make a fair show and, being set out with pleasant rhetoric and music,
+  delight only so long as they are heard. But those which are miserable
+  have a deeper feeling of their miseries. Therefore, when the sound of
+  these things is past, hidden sorrow oppresseth the mind." "It is so
+  indeed," quoth she, "for these be not the remedies of thy disease, but
+  certain fomentations to assuage thy grief, which as yet resisteth all
+  cure. But when it shall be time, I will apply that which shall pierce to
+  the quick. And yet there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself
+  miserable. Hast thou forgotten how many ways, and in what degree thou
+  art happy?
+
+  I pass over with silence that, having lost thy father, thou wert
+  provided for by men of the best sort, and, being chosen to have affinity
+  with the chiefest of the city, thou begannest sooner to be dear unto
+  them than to be akin, which is the most excellent kind of kindred. Who
+  esteemed thee not most happy, having so noble a father-in-law, so chaste
+  a wife, and so noble sons? I say nothing (for I will not speak of
+  ordinary matters) of the dignities denied to others in their age, and
+  granted to thee in thy youth. I desire to come to the singular top of
+  thy felicity. If any fruit of mortal things hath any weight of
+  happiness, can the remembrance of that light be destroyed with any cloud
+  of miseries that can overcast thee? When thou sawst thy two sons being
+  both Consuls together carried from their house, the Senators
+  accompanying them, and the people rejoicing with them; when, they
+  sitting in the Senate in their chairs of state, thou making an oration
+  in the King's praise deservedst the glory of wit and eloquence. When in
+  public assembly, thou, standing betwixt thy two sons, didst satisfy with
+  thy triumphant liberality the expectation of the multitudes gathered
+  together, I suppose thou flatteredst fortune, while she fawned thus upon
+  thee, as her dearest friend. Thou obtainedst more at her hands than ever
+  private man had before thee. Wilt thou then reckon with fortune? This is
+  the first time that ever she frowned upon thee. If thou considerest the
+  number and measure of thy joyful and sad accidents, thou canst not
+  choose but think thyself fortunate hitherto; and if thou esteemest not
+  thyself fortunate because those things which seemed joyful are past,
+  there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself miserable, since those
+  things which thou now takest to be sorrowful do pass. Comest thou now
+  first as a pilgrim and stranger into the theatre of this life? Supposest
+  thou to find any constancy in human affairs, since that man himself is
+  soon gone? For although things subject to fortune seldom keep touch in
+  staying, yet the end of life is a certain death, even of that fortune
+  which remaineth. Wherefore, what matter is it whether thou by dying
+  leavest it, or it forsaketh thee by flying?
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Cum polo Phoebus roseis quadrigis
+  Lucem spargere coeperit,
+Pallet albentes hebetata uultus
+  Flammis stella prementibus.
+Cum nemus flatu Zephyri tepentis                                          5
+  Vernis inrubuit rosis,
+Spiret insanum nebulosus Auster:
+  Iam spinis abeat decus.
+Saepe tranquillo radiat sereno
+  Immotis mare fluctibus,                                                10
+Saepe feruentes Aquilo procellas
+  Verso concitat aequore.
+Rara si constat sua forma mundo,
+  Si tantas uariat uices,
+Crede fortunis hominum caducis,                                          15
+  Bonis crede fugacibus.
+Constat aeterna positumque lege est
+  Vt constet genitum nihil."
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  When Phoebus with his rosy team
+    Showeth his lightsome beam,
+  The dull and darkened stars retire
+    Yielding to greater fire.
+  When Zephyrus his warmth doth bring,
+    Sweet roses deck the spring;
+  Let noisome Auster blow apace,
+    Plants soon will lose their grace.
+  The sea hath often quiet stood
+    With an unmoved flood,
+  And often is turmoiled with waves,
+    When boisterous Boreas raves.
+  If thus the world never long tarry
+    The same, but often vary,
+  On fading fortunes then rely,
+    Trust to those goods that fly.
+  An everlasting law is made,
+    That all things born shall fade."
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum ego: "Vera," inquam, "commemoras, o uirtutum omnium nutrix, nec
+infitiari possum prosperitatis meae uelocissimum cursum. Sed hoc est quod
+recolentem uehementius coquit. Nam in omni aduersitate fortunae
+infelicissimum est genus infortunii fuisse felicem." "Sed quod tu," inquit,
+"falsae opinionis supplicium luas, id rebus iure imputare non possis. Nam
+si te hoc inane nomen fortuitae felicitatis mouet, quam pluribus maximisque
+abundes mecum reputes licet. Igitur si quod in omni fortunae tuae censu
+pretiosissimum possidebas, id tibi diuinitus inlaesum adhuc inuiolatumque
+seruatur, poterisne meliora quaeque retinens de infortunio iure causari?
+
+Atqui uiget incolumis illud pretiosissimum generis humani decus Symmachus
+socer et quod uitae pretio non segnis emeres, uir totus ex sapientia
+uirtutibusque factus suarum securus tuis ingemiscit iniuriis. Viuit uxor
+ingenio modesta, pudicitia pudore praecellens et, ut omnes eius dotes
+breuiter includam, patri similis. Viuit inquam tibique tantum uitae huius
+exosa spiritum seruat quoque uno felicitatem minui tuam uel ipsa
+concesserim, tui desiderio lacrimis ac dolore tabescit.
+
+Quid dicam liberos consulares quorum iam, ut in id aetatis pueris, uel
+paterni uel auiti specimen elucet ingenii? Cum igitur praecipua sit
+mortalibus uitae cura retinendae, o te si tua bona cognoscas felicem, cui
+suppetunt etiam nunc quae uita nemo dubitat esse cariora! Quare sicca iam
+lacrimas. Nondum est ad unum omnes exosa fortuna nec tibi nimium ualida
+tempestas incubuit, quando tenaces haerent ancorae quae nec praesentis
+solamen nec futuri spem temporis abesse patiantur."
+
+"Et haereant," inquam, "precor; illis namque manentibus, utcumque se res
+habeant, enatabimus. Sed quantum ornamentis nostris decesserit, uides." Et
+illa: "Promouimus," inquit, "aliquantum, si te nondum totius tuae sortis
+piget. Sed delicias tuas ferre non possum qui abesse aliquid tuae
+beatitudini tam luctuosus atque anxius conqueraris. Quis est enim tam
+conpositae felicitatis ut non aliqua ex parte cum status sui qualitate
+rixetur? Anxia enim res est humanorum condicio bonorum et quae uel numquam
+tota proueniat uel numquam perpetua subsistat. Huic census exuberat, sed
+est pudori degener sanguis; hunc nobilitas notum facit, sed angustia rei
+familiaris inclusus esse mallet ignotus. Ille utroque circumfluus uitam
+caelibem deflet; ille nuptiis felix orbus liberis alieno censum nutrit
+heredi. Alius prole laetatus filii filiaeue delictis maestus inlacrimat.
+Idcirco nemo facile cum fortunae suae condicione concordat; inest enim
+singulis quod inexpertus ignoret, expertus exhorreat. Adde quod felicissimi
+cuiusque delicatissimus sensus est et nisi ad nutum cuncta suppetant, omnis
+aduersitatis insolens minimis quibusque prosternitur; adeo perexigua sunt
+quae fortunatissimis beatitudinis summam detrahunt. Quam multos esse
+coniectas qui sese caelo proximos arbitrentur, si de fortunae tuae
+reliquiis pars eis minima contingat? Hic ipse locus quem tu exilium uocas,
+incolentibus patria est; adeo nihil est miserum nisi cum putes contraque
+beata sors omnis est aequanimitate tolerantis. Quis est ille tam felix qui
+cum dederit inpatientiae manus, statum suum mutare non optet? Quam multis
+amaritudinibus humanae felicitatis dulcedo respersa est! Quae si etiam
+fruenti iucunda esse uideatur, tamen quo minus cum uelit abeat retineri non
+possit. Liquet igitur quam sit mortalium rerum misera beatitudo quae nec
+apud aequanimos perpetua perdurat necanxios tota delectat.
+
+Quid igitur o mortales extra petitis intra uos positam felicitatem? Error
+uos inscitiaque confundit. Ostendam breuiter tibi summae cardinem
+felicitatis. Estne aliquid tibi te ipso pretiosius? Nihil inquies. Igitur
+si tui compos fueris, possidebis quod nec tu amittere umquam uelis nec
+fortuna possit auferre. Atque ut agnoscas in his fortuitis rebus
+beatitudinem constare non posse, sic collige.  Si beatitudo est summum
+naturae bonum ratione degentis nec est summum bonum quod eripi ullo modo
+potest, quoniam praecellit id quod nequeat auferri, manifestum est
+quoniam[107] ad beatitudinem percipiendam fortunae instabilitas adspirare
+non possit. Ad haec quem caduca ista felicitas uehit uel scit eam uel
+nescit esse mutabilem. Si nescit, quaenam beata sors esse potest
+ignorantiae caecitate? Si scit, metuat necesse est, ne amittat quod amitti
+posse non dubitat; quare continuus timor non sinit esse felicem. An uel si
+amiserit, neglegendum putat? Sic quoque perexile bonum est quod aequo animo
+feratur amissum. Et quoniam tu idem es cui persuasum atque insitum
+permultis demonstrationibus scio mentes hominum nullo modo esse mortales
+cumque clarum sit fortuitam felicitatem corporis morte finiri, dubitari
+nequit, si haec afferre beatitudinem potest, quin omne mortalium genus in
+miseriam mortis fine labatur. Quod si multos scimus beatitudinis fructum
+non morte solum uerum etiam doloribus suppliciisque quaesisse, quonam modo
+praesens facere beatos potest quae miseros transacta non efficit?
+
+
+[107] quin _codices_.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  To which I answered: "The things which thou reportest are true, O nurse
+  of all virtues, and I cannot deny the most speedy course of my
+  prosperity. But this is that which vexeth me most, when I remember it.
+  For in all adversity of fortune it is the most unhappy kind of
+  misfortune to have been happy." "But," quoth she, "thou canst not justly
+  impute to the things themselves that thou art punished for thy false
+  opinion. For if this vain name of casual felicity moveth thee, let us
+  make accompt with how many and how great things thou aboundest.
+  Wherefore, if that which in all thy revenues of fortune thou esteemest
+  most precious doth still by God's providence remain safe and untouched,
+  canst thou, retaining the best, justly complain of misfortune?
+
+  But thy father-in-law, Symmachus (that most excellent ornament of
+  mankind) liveth in safety, and for the obtaining of which thou wouldst
+  willingly spend thy life, that man wholly framed to wisdom and virtues,
+  being secure of his own, mourneth for thy injuries. Thy wife liveth,
+  modest in disposition, eminent in chastity, and, to rehearse briefly all
+  her excellent gifts, like her father. She liveth, I say, and weary of
+  her life reserveth her breath only for thee. In which alone even I must
+  grant that thy felicity is diminished, she consumeth herself with tears
+  and grief for thy sake.
+
+  What should I speak of thy children, which have been Consuls, in whom
+  already, as in children of that age, their father's or grandfather's
+  good disposition appeareth? Wherefore, since the greatest care that
+  mortal men have is to save their lives, O happy man that thou art, if
+  thou knowest thine own wealth, who still hast remaining those things
+  which no man doubteth to be dearer than life itself? And therefore cease
+  weeping. Fortune hath not hitherto showed her hatred against you all,
+  neither art thou assailed with too boisterous a storm, since those
+  anchors hold fast which permit neither the comfort of the time present
+  nor the hope of the time to come to be wanting."
+
+  "And I pray God," quoth I, "that they may hold fast, for so long as they
+  remain, howsoever the world goeth we shall escape drowning. But thou
+  seest how great a part of our ornaments is lost." "We have gotten a
+  little ground," quoth she, "if thy whole estate be not irksome unto
+  thee. But I cannot suffer thy daintiness, who with such lamentation and
+  anxiety complaineth that something is wanting to thy happiness. For who
+  hath so entire happiness that he is not in some part offended with the
+  condition of his estate? The nature of human felicity is doubtful and
+  uncertain, and is neither ever wholly obtained, or never lasteth always.
+  One man hath great revenues, but is contemned for his base lineage.
+  Another's nobility maketh him known, but, oppressed with penury, had
+  rather be unknown. Some, abounding with both, bewail their life without
+  marriage. Some other, well married but wanting children, provideth
+  riches for strangers to inherit. Others, finally, having children,
+  mournfully bewail the vices which their sons or daughters are given to.
+  So that scarce any man is pleased with the condition of his fortune. For
+  there is something in every estate, which without experience is not
+  known, and being experienced doth molest and trouble. Besides that,
+  those which are most happy are most sensible,[108] and unless all things
+  fall out to their liking, impatient of all adversity, every little cross
+  overthrows them, so small are the occasions which take from the most
+  fortunate the height of their happiness. How many are there, thinkest
+  thou, which would think themselves almost in Heaven if they had but the
+  least part of the remains of thy fortune? This very place, which thou
+  callest banishment, is to the inhabitants thereof their native land. So
+  true it is that nothing is miserable but what is thought so, and
+  contrariwise, every estate is happy if he that bears it be content. Who
+  is so happy that if he yieldeth to discontent, desireth not to change
+  his estate? How much bitterness is mingled with the sweetness of man's
+  felicity, which, though it seemeth so pleasant while it is enjoyed, yet
+  can it not be retained from going away when it will. And by this it
+  appeareth how miserable is the blessedness of mortal things, which
+  neither endureth alway with the contented, nor wholly delighteth the
+  pensive.
+
+  Wherefore, O mortal men, why seek you for your felicity abroad, which is
+  placed within yourselves? Error and ignorance do confound you. I will
+  briefly show thee the centre of thy chiefest happiness. Is there
+  anything more precious to thee than thyself? I am sure thou wilt say,
+  nothing. Wherefore, if thou enjoyest thyself, thou shalt possess that
+  which neither thou wilt ever wish to lose nor fortune can take away. And
+  that thou mayst acknowledge that blessedness cannot consist in these
+  casual things, gather it thus. If blessedness be the chiefest good of
+  nature endued with reason, and that is not the chiefest good which may
+  by any means be taken away, because that which cannot be taken away is
+  better, it is manifest that the instability of fortune cannot aspire to
+  the obtaining of blessedness. Moreover, he that now enjoyeth this
+  brittle felicity, either knoweth it to be mutable or no. If not, what
+  estate can be blessed by ignorant blindness? And if he knoweth it, he
+  must needs fear lest he lose that which he doubteth not may be lost,
+  wherefore continual fear permitteth him not to be happy. Or though he
+  should lose it, doth he think that a thing of no moment? But so it were
+  a very small good which he would be content to lose. And because thou
+  art one whom I know to be fully persuaded and convinced by innumerable
+  demonstrations that the souls of men are in no wise mortal, and since it
+  is clear that casual felicity is ended by the body's death, there is no
+  doubt, if this can cause blessedness, but that all mankind falleth into
+  misery by death. But if we know many who have sought to reap the fruit
+  of blessedness, not only by death, but also by affliction and torments,
+  how can present happiness make men happy, the loss of which causeth not
+  misery?
+
+
+  [108] _i.e._ sensitive.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quisquis uolet perennem
+  Cautus ponere sedem
+Stabilisque nec sonori
+  Sterni flatibus Euri
+Et fluctibus minantem                                                     5
+  Curat spernere pontum,
+Montis cacumen alti,
+  Bibulas uitet harenas.
+Illud proteruus Auster
+  Totis uiribus urget,                                                   10
+Hae pendulum solutae
+  Pondus ferre recusant.
+Fugiens periculosam
+  Sortem sedis amoenae
+Humili domum memento                                                     15
+  Certus figere saxo.
+Quamuis tonet ruinis
+  Miscens aequora uentus,
+Tu conditus quieti
+  Felix robore ualli                                                     20
+Duces serenus aeuum
+  Ridens aetheris iras.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Who with an heedful care
+  Will an eternal seat prepare,
+  Which cannot be down cast
+  By force of windy blast,
+  And will the floods despise,
+  When threatening billows do arise,
+  He not on hills must stand,
+  Nor on the dangerous sinking sand.
+  For there the winds will threat,
+  And him with furious tempests beat,
+  And here the ground too weak
+  Will with the heavy burden break.[109]
+  Fly then the dangerous case
+  Of an untried delightful place,
+  And thy poor house bestow
+  In stony places firm and low.
+  For though the winds do sound,
+  And waves of troubled seas confound:
+  Yet thou to rest disposed
+  In thy safe lowly vale inclosed,
+  Mayst live a quiet age,
+  Scorning the air's distempered rage.
+
+
+  [109] Literally, "These shifting sands refuse to bear the weight laid
+  upon them."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Sed quoniam rationum iam in te mearum fomenta descendunt, paulo
+ualidioribus utendum puto. Age enim si iam caduca et momentaria fortunae
+dona non essent, quid in eis est quod aut uestrum umquam fieri queat aut
+non perspectum consideratumque uilescat? Diuitiaene uel uestra uel sui
+natura pretiosae sunt? Quid earum potius, aurumne an uis congesta pecuniae?
+Atqui haec effundendo magis quam coaceruando melius nitent, si quidem
+auaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. Quod si manere apud quemque
+non potest quod transfertur in alterum, tunc est pretiosa pecunia cum
+translata in alios largiendi usu desinit possideri. At eadem si apud unum
+quanta est ubique gentium congeratur, ceteros sui inopes fecerit. Et uox
+quidem tota pariter multorum replet auditum; uestrae uero diuitiae nisi
+comminutae in plures transire non possunt. Quod cum factum est, pauperes
+necesse est faciant quos relinquunt. O igitur angustas inopesque diuitias
+quas nec habere totas pluribus licet et ad quemlibet sine ceterorum
+paupertate non ueniunt! An gemmarum fulgor oculos trahit? Sed si quid est
+in hoc splendore praecipui, gemmarum est lux illa non hominum, quas quidem
+mirari homines uehementer admiror. Quid est enim carens animae motu atque
+compage quod animatae rationabilique naturae pulchrum esse iure uideatur?
+Quae tametsi conditoris opera suique distinctione postremae aliquid
+pulchritudinis trahunt, infra uestram tamen excellentiam conlocatae
+admirationem uestram nullo modo merebantur. An uos agrorum pulchritudo
+delectat? Quidni? Est enim pulcherrimi operis pulchra portio. Sic quondam
+sereni maris facie gaudemus; sic caelum sidera lunam solemque miramur. Num
+te horum aliquid attingit? Num audes alicuius talium splendore gloriari? An
+uernis floribus ipse distingueris aut tua in aestiuos fructus intumescit
+ubertas? Quid inanibus gaudiis raperis? Quid externa bona pro tuis
+amplexaris? Numquam tua faciet esse fortuna quae a te natura rerum fecit
+aliena. Terrarum quidem fructus animantium procul dubio debentur alimentis.
+Sed si, quod naturae satis est, replere indigentiam uelis, nihil est quod
+fortunae affluentiam petas. Paucis enim minimisque natura contenta est,
+cuius satietatem si superfluis urgere uelis, aut iniucundum quod infuderis
+fiet aut noxium. Iam uero pulchrum uariis fulgere uestibus putas, quarum si
+grata intuitu species est, aut materiae naturam aut ingenium mirabor
+artificis. An uero te longus ordo famulorum facit esse felicem? Qui si
+uitiosi moribus sint, perniciosa domus sarcina et ipsi domino uehementer
+inimica; sin uero probi, quonam modo in tuis opibus aliena probitas
+numerabitur? Ex quibus omnibus nihil horum quae tu in tuis conputas bonis
+tuum esse bonum liquido monstratur. Quibus si nihil inest appetendae
+pulchritudinis, quid est quod uel amissis doleas uel laeteris retentis?
+Quod si natura pulchra sunt, quid id tua refert? Nam haec per se a tuis
+quoque opibus sequestrata placuissent. Neque enim idcirco sunt pretiosa
+quod in tuas uenere diuitias, sed quoniam pretiosa uidebantur, tuis ea
+diuitiis adnumerare maluisti. Quid autem tanto fortunae strepitu
+desideratis? Fugare credo indigentiam copia quaeritis. Atqui hoc uobis in
+contrarium cedit. Pluribus quippe adminiculis opus est ad tuendam pretiosae
+supellectilis uarietatem, uerumque illud est permultis eos indigere qui
+permulta possideant contraque minimum qui abundantiam suam naturae
+necessitate non ambitus superfluitate metiantur. Itane autem nullum est
+proprium uobis atque insitum bonum ut in externis ac sepositis rebus bona
+uestra quaeratis? Sic rerum uersa condicio est ut diuinum merito rationis
+animal non aliter sibi splendere nisi inanimatae supellectilis possessione
+uideatur? Et alia quidem suis contenta sunt; uos autem deo mente consimiles
+ab rebus infimis excellentis naturae ornamenta captatis nec intellegitis
+quantam conditori uestro faciatis iniuriam. Ille genus humanum terrenis
+omnibus praestare uoluit; uos dignitatem uestram infra infima quaeque
+detruditis. Nam si omne cuiusque bonum eo cuius est constat esse
+pretiosius, cum uilissima rerum uestra bona esse iudicatis, eisdem uosmet
+ipsos uestra existimatione submittitis; quod quidem haud inmerito cadit.
+Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est ut tum tantum ceteris rebus cum se
+cognoscit excellat, eadem tamen infra bestias redigatur, si se nosse
+desierit. Nam ceteris animantibus sese ignorare naturae est; hominibus
+uitio uenit. Quam uero late patet uester hic error qui ornari posse aliquid
+ornamentis existimatis alienis? At id fieri nequit. Nam si quid ex
+appositis luceat, ipsa quidem quae sunt apposita laudantur; illud uero his
+tectum atque uelatum in sua nihilo minus foeditate perdurat. Ego uero nego
+ullum esse bonum quod noceat habenti. Num id mentior? 'Minime,' inquis.
+Atqui diuitiae possidentibus persaepe nocuerunt, cum pessimus quisque eoque
+alieni magis auidus quidquid usquam auri gemmarumque est se solum qui
+habeat dignissimum putat. Tu igitur qui nunc contum gladiumque sollicitus
+pertimescis, si uitae huius callem uacuus uiator intrasses, coram latrone
+cantares. O praeclara opum mortalium beatitudo quam cum adeptus fueris
+securus esse desistis!
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  But since the soothing of my reasons begins to sink into thee, I will
+  use those which are somewhat more forcible. Go to the*n, if the gifts of
+  fortune were not brittle and momentary, what is there in them which can
+  either ever be made your own, or, well weighed and considered, seemeth
+  not vile and of no accompt? Are riches precious in virtue either of
+  their own nature or of yours? What part of them can be so esteemed of?
+  The gold or the heaps of money? But these make a fairer show when they
+  are spent than when they are kept. For covetousness alway maketh men
+  odious, as liberality famous. And if a man cannot have that which is
+  given to another, then money is precious when, bestowed upon others, by
+  the use of liberality it is not possessed any longer. But if all the
+  money in the whole world were gathered into one man's custody, all other
+  men should be poor. The voice at the same time wholly filleth the ears
+  of many, but your riches cannot pass to many, except they be diminished,
+  which being done, they must needs make them poor whom they leave. O
+  scant and poor riches, which neither can be wholly possessed of many,
+  and come to none without the impoverishment of others! Doth the
+  glittering of jewels draw thy eyes after them? But if there be any great
+  matter in this show, not men but the jewels shine, which I exceedingly
+  marvel that men admire. For what is there wanting life and members that
+  may justly seem beautiful to a nature not only endued with life but also
+  with reason? Which, though by their maker's workmanship and their own
+  variety they have some part of basest beauty, yet it is so far inferior
+  to your excellency that it did in no sort deserve your admiration. Doth
+  the pleasant prospect of the fields delight you? Why not? For it is a
+  fair portion of a most fair work. So we are delighted with a calm sea,
+  so we admire the sky, the stars, the sun, and the moon. Do any of these
+  belong to thee? Darest thou boast of the beauty which any of them have?
+  Art thou thyself adorned with May flowers? Or doth thy fertility teem
+  with the fruits of summer? Why rejoicest thou vainly? Why embracest thou
+  outward goods as if they were thine own? Fortune will never make those
+  things thine which by the appointment of Nature belong not to thee. The
+  fruits of the earth are doubtless appointed for the sustenance of living
+  creatures. But if thou wilt only satisfy want, which sufficeth Nature,
+  there is no cause to require the superfluities of fortune. For Nature is
+  contented with little and with the smallest things, and, if, being
+  satisfied, thou wilt overlay it with more than needs, that which thou
+  addest will either become unpleasant or hurtful. But perhaps thou
+  thinkest it a fine thing to go decked in gay apparel, which, if they
+  make a fair show, I will admire either the goodness of the stuff or the
+  invention of the workman. Or doth the multitude of servants make thee
+  happy? Who, if they be vicious, they are a pernicious burden to thy
+  house, and exceedingly troublesome to their master; and if they be
+  honest, how shall other men's honesty be counted amongst thy treasures?
+  By all which is manifestly proved that none of these goods which thou
+  accountest thine, are thine indeed. And if there is nothing in these
+  worthy to be desired, why art thou either glad when thou hast them or
+  sorry when thou losest them? Or what is it to thee, if they be precious
+  by nature? For in this respect they would have pleased thee, though they
+  had belonged to others. For they are not precious because they are come
+  to be thine, but because they seemed precious thou wert desirous to have
+  them. Now, what desire you with such loud praise of fortune? Perhaps you
+  seek to drive away penury with plenty. But this falleth out quite
+  contrary, for you stand in need of many supplies, to protect all this
+  variety of precious ornaments. And it is true that they which have much,
+  need much; and contrariwise, that they need little which measure not
+  their wealth by the superfluity of ambition, but by the necessity of
+  nature. Have you no proper and inward good, that you seek your goods in
+  those things which are outward and separated from you? Is the condition
+  of things so changed that a living creature, deservedly accounted divine
+  for the gift of reason, seemeth to have no other excellency than the
+  possession of a little household stuff without life? All other creatures
+  are content with that they have of their own; and you, who in your mind
+  carry the likeness of God, are content to take the ornaments of your
+  excellent nature from the most base and vile things, neither understand
+  you what injury you do your Creator. He would have mankind to excel all
+  earthly things; you debase your dignity under every meanest creature.
+  For if it be manifest that the good of everything is more precious than
+  that whose good it is, since you judge the vilest things that can be to
+  be your goods, you deject yourselves under them in your own estimation,
+  which questionless cometh not undeservedly to pass; for this is the
+  condition of man's nature, that then only it surpasseth other things
+  when it knoweth itself, and it is worse than beasts when it is without
+  that knowledge. For in other living creatures the ignorance of
+  themselves is nature, but in men it is vice. And how far doth this error
+  of yours extend, who think that any can be adorned with the ornaments of
+  another? Which can in no wise be. For if any adjoined thing seem
+  precious, it is that which is praised, but that which is covered and
+  enwrapped in it remaineth, notwithstanding, with the foul baseness which
+  it hath of itself. Moreover, I deny that to be good which hurteth the
+  possessor. Am I deceived in this? I am sure thou wilt say no. But riches
+  have often hurt their possessors, since every lewdest companion, who are
+  consequently most desirous of that which is not their own, think
+  themselves most worthy to possess alone all the gold and jewels in the
+  world. Wherefore thou, who with much perturbation fearest now to be
+  assailed and slain, if thou hadst entered the path of this life like a
+  poor passenger, needest not be afraid, but mightest rejoice and sing
+  even in the sight of most ravenous thieves.[110] O excellent happiness
+  of mortal riches, which, when thou hast gotten, thou hast lost thy
+  safety!
+
+
+  [110] Cf. Juvenal, _Sat._ x. 19-22.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Felix nimium prior aetas
+Contenta fidelibus aruis
+Nec inerti perdita luxu,
+Facili quae sera solebat
+Ieiunia soluere glande.                                                   5
+Non Bacchica munera norant
+Liquido confundere melle
+Nec lucida uellera Serum
+Tyrio miscere ueneno.
+Somnos dabat herba salubres,                                             10
+Potum quoque lubricus amnis,
+Vmbras altissima pinus.
+Nondum maris alta secabat
+Nec mercibus undique lectis
+Noua litora uiderat hospes.                                              15
+Tunc classica saeua tacebant,
+Odiis neque fusus acerbis
+Cruor horrida tinxerat arua.
+Quid enim furor hosticus ulla
+Vellet prior arma mouere,                                                20
+Cum uulnera saeua uiderent
+Nec praemia sanguinis ulla?
+Vtinam modo nostra redirent
+In mores tempora priscos!
+Sed saeuior ignibus Aetnae                                               25
+Feruens amor ardet habendi.
+Heu primus quis fuit ille
+Auri qui pondera tecti
+Gemmasque latere uolentes
+Pretiosa pericula fodit?                                                 30
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+    Too much the former age was blest,
+  When fields their pleaséd owners failéd not,
+    Who, with no slothful lust opprest,
+  Broke their long fasts with acorns eas'ly got.
+    No wine with honey mixéd was,
+  Nor did they silk in purple colours steep;
+    They slept upon the wholesome grass,
+  And their cool drink did fetch from rivers deep.
+    The pines did hide them with their shade,
+  No merchants through the dangerous billows went,
+    Nor with desire of gainful trade
+  Their traffic into foreign countries sent.
+    Then no shrill trumpets did amate
+  The minds of soldiers with their daunting sounds,
+    Nor weapons were with deadly hate
+  Dyed with the dreadful blood of gaping wounds.
+    For how could any fury draw
+  The mind of man to stir up war in vain,
+    When nothing but fierce wounds he saw,
+  And for his blood no recompense should gain?
+    O that the ancient manners would
+  In these our latter hapless times return!
+    Now the desire of having gold
+  Doth like the flaming fires of Aetna burn.
+    Ah, who was he that first did show
+  The heaps of treasure which the earth did hide,
+    And jewels which lay close below,
+  By which he costly dangers did provide?
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Quid autem de dignitatibus potentiaque disseram quae uos uerae dignitatis
+ac potestatis inscii caelo exaequatis? Quae si in improbissimum quemque
+ceciderunt, quae flammis Aetnae eructuantibus, quod diluuium tantas strages
+dederint? Certe, uti meminisse te arbitror, consulare imperium, quod
+libertatis principium fuerat, ob superbiam consulum uestri ueteres abolere
+cupiuerunt, qui ob eandem superbiam prius regium de ciuitate nomen
+abstulerant. At si quando, quod perrarum est, probis deferantur, quid in
+eis aliud quam probitas utentium placet? Ita fit ut non uirtutibus ex
+dignitate sed ex uirtute dignitatibus honor accedat. Quae uero est ista
+uestra expetibilis ac praeclara potentia? Nonne, o terrena animalia,
+consideratis quibus qui praesidere uideamini? Nunc si inter mures uideres
+unum aliquem ius sibi ac potestatem prae ceteris uindicantem, quanto
+mouereris cachinno! Quid uero, si corpus spectes, inbecillius homine
+reperire queas quos saepe muscularum quoque uel morsus uel in secreta
+quaeque reptantium necat introitus? Quo uero quisquam ius aliquod in
+quempiam nisi in solum corpus et quod infra corpus est, fortunam loquor,
+possit exserere? Num quidquam libero imperabis animo? Num mentem firma sibi
+ratione cohaerentem de statu propriae quietis amouebis? Cum liberum quendam
+uirum suppliciis se tyrannus adacturum putaret, ut aduersum se factae
+coniurationis conscios proderet, linguam ille momordit atque abscidit et in
+os tyranni saeuientis abiecit; ita cruciatus, quos putabat tyrannus
+materiam crudelitatis, uir sapiens fecit esse uirtutis. Quid autem est quod
+in alium facere quisquam[111] possit, quod sustinere ab alio ipse non
+possit? Busiridem accipimus necare hospites solitum ab Hercule hospite
+fuisse mactatum. Regulus plures Poenorum bello captos in uincla coniecerat,
+sed mox ipse uictorum catenis manus praebuit. Vllamne igitur eius hominis
+potentiam putas, qui quod ipse in alio potest, ne id in se alter ualeat
+efficere non possit? Ad haec si ipsis dignitatibus ac potestatibus inesset
+aliquid naturalis ac proprii boni, numquam pessimis prouenirent. Neque enim
+sibi solent aduersa sociari; natura respuit ut contraria quaeque iungantur.
+Ita cum pessimos plerumque dignitatibus fungi dubium non sit, illud etiam
+liquet natura sui bona non esse quae se pessimis haerere patiantur. Quod
+quidem de cunctis fortunae muneribus dignius existimari potest, quae ad
+improbissimum quemque uberiora perueniunt. De quibus illud etiam
+considerandum puto, quod nemo dubitat esse fortem, cui fortitudinem inesse
+conspexerit, et cuicumque uelocitas adest manifestum est esse uelocem. Sic
+musica quidem musicos medicina medicos rhetorice rhetores facit. Agit enim
+cuiusque rei natura quod proprium est nec contrariarum rerum miscetur
+effectibus et ultro quae sunt auersa depellit. Atqui nec opes inexpletam
+restinguere auaritiam queunt nec potestas sui compotem fecerit quem
+uitiosae libidines insolubilibus adstrictum retinent catenis, et collata
+improbis dignitas non modo non efficit dignos, sed prodit potius et
+ostentat indignos. Cur ita prouenit? Gaudetis enim res sese aliter habentes
+falsis compellare nominibus quae facile ipsarum rerum redarguuntur effectu;
+itaque nec illae diuitiae nec illa potentia nec haec dignitas iure
+appellari potest. Postremo idem de tota concludere fortuna licet in qua
+nihil expetendum, nihil natiuae bonitatis inesse manifestum est, quae nec
+se bonis semper adiungit et bonos quibus fuerit adiuncta non efficit.
+
+
+[111] quisque _codd. optimi_.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  Now, why should I discourse of dignities and power which you, not
+  knowing what true dignity and power meaneth, exalt to the skies? And if
+  they light upon wicked men, what Aetnas, belching flames, or what deluge
+  can cause so great harms? I suppose thou rememberest how your ancestors,
+  by reason of the consuls' arrogancy, desired to abolish that government
+  which had been the beginning of their freedom, who before, for the same
+  cause, had removed the government of kings from their city. And if
+  sometime, which is very seldom, good men be preferred to honours,[112]
+  what other thing can give contentment in them but the honesty of those
+  which have them? So that virtues are not honoured by dignities, but
+  dignities by virtue. But what is this excellent power which you esteemed
+  so desirable? Consider you not, O earthly wights, whom you seem to
+  excel? For if among mice thou shouldst see one claim jurisdiction and
+  power to himself over the rest, to what a laughter it would move thee!
+  And what, if thou respectest the body, canst thou find more weak than
+  man, whom even the biting of little flies or the entering of creeping
+  worms doth often kill? Now, how can any man exercise jurisdiction upon
+  anybody except upon their bodies, and that which is inferior to their
+  bodies, I mean their fortunes? Canst thou ever imperiously impose
+  anything upon a free mind? Canst thou remove a soul settled in firm
+  reason from the quiet state which it possesseth? When a tyrant thought
+  to compel a certain free man by torments to bewray his confederates of a
+  conspiracy attempted against him, he bit off his tongue, and spit it out
+  upon the cruel tyrant's face,[113] by that means wisely making those
+  tortures, which the tyrant thought matter of cruelty, to be to him
+  occasion of virtue. Now, what is there that any can enforce upon another
+  which he may not himself be enforced to sustain by another? We read that
+  Busiris, wont to kill his guests, was himself slain by his guest
+  Hercules.[114] Regulus had laid fetters upon many Africans taken in war,
+  but ere long he found his own hands environed with his conqueror's
+  chains.[115] Wherefore thinkest thou the power of that man to be
+  anything worth, who cannot hinder another from doing that to him which
+  he can do to another? Moreover, if dignities and power had any natural
+  and proper good in them, they would never be bestowed upon the worst
+  men, for one opposite useth not to accompany another; nature refuseth to
+  have contraries joined. So that, since there is no doubt but that men of
+  the worst sort often enjoy dignities, it is also manifest that they are
+  not naturally good which may follow most naughty men. Which may more
+  worthily be thought of all fortune's gifts which are more plentifully
+  bestowed upon every lewd companion. Concerning which, I take that also
+  to be worthy consideration, that no man doubteth him to be a valiant man
+  in whom he seeth valour, and it is manifest that he which hath swiftness
+  is swift. So, likewise, music maketh musicians, physic physicians, and
+  rhetoric rhetoricians. For the nature of everything doth that which is
+  proper unto it, and is not mixed with contrary effects but repelleth all
+  opposites. But neither can riches extinguish unsatiable avarice, nor
+  power make him master of himself whom vicious lusts keep chained in
+  strongest fetters. And dignity bestowed upon wicked men doth not only
+  not make them worthy but rather bewrayeth and discovereth their
+  unworthiness. How cometh this to pass? Because in miscalling things that
+  are otherwise, you take a pleasure which is easily refuted by the effect
+  of the things themselves. Wherefore, by right, these things are not to
+  be called riches, this is not to be called power, that is not to be
+  called dignity. Lastly, we may conclude the same of all fortunes in
+  which it is manifest there is nothing to be desired, nothing naturally
+  good, which neither are always bestowed upon good men, nor do make them
+  good whom they are bestowed upon.
+
+
+  [112] The subject of _deferantur_ is _dignitates potentiaque_.
+
+  [113] The free man was the philosopher Anaxarchus: the tyrant, Nicocreon
+  the Cypriote. For the story see Diogenes Laertius ix. 59.
+
+  [114] Cf. Apollod. ii. 5. 11; Claudian xviii. 159; Virg. _Georg._ iii. 4.
+
+  [115] Cf. Cicero, _De Off._ iii. 99.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Nouimus quantas dederit ruinas
+Vrbe flammata patribusque caesis
+Fratre qui quondam ferus interempto
+Matris effuso maduit cruore
+Corpus et uisu gelidum pererrans                                          5
+Ora non tinxit lacrimis, sed esse
+Censor extincti potuit decoris.
+Hic tamen sceptro populos regebat
+Quos uidet condens radios sub undas
+Phoebus extremo ueniens ab ortu,                                         10
+Quos premunt septem gelidi triones,
+Quos Notus sicco uiolentus aestu
+Torret ardentes recoquens harenas.
+Celsa num tandem ualuit potestas
+Vertere praui rabiem Neronis?                                            15
+Heu grauem sortem, quotiens iniquus
+Additur saeuo gladius ueneno!"
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+    We know what stirs he made
+  Who did the Senate slay and Rome with fire invade,
+    Who did his brother kill,
+  And with his mother's blood his moistened hand did fill;
+    Who looked on that cold face
+  Tearless, and nicely marked her members' several grace.[116]
+    Yet his dread power controlled
+  Those people whom the sun doth in the east behold,
+    And those who do remain
+  In western lands or dwell under Boötes' wain
+    And those whose skins are tanned
+  With southern winds, which roast and burn the parched sand.
+    What? Could this glorious might
+  Restrain the furious rage of wicked Nero's spite?
+    But oh! mishap most bad,
+  Which doth the wicked sword to cruel poison add!"
+
+
+  [116] Literally, "but could be the critic of her dead beauty." Cf. Suet.
+  _Nero_ 24; Tac. _Ann._ xiv. 9.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Tum ego: "Scis," inquam, "ipsa minimum nobis ambitionem mortalium rerum
+fuisse dominatam. Sed materiam gerendis rebus optauimus quo ne uirtus
+tacita consenesceret." Et illa: "Atqui hoc unum est quod praestantes quidem
+natura mentes sed nondum ad extremam manum uirtutum perfectione perductas
+allicere possit, gloriae scilicet cupido et optimorum in rem publicam fama
+meritorum; quae quam sit exilis et totius uacua ponderis, sic considera.
+Omnem terrae ambitum, sicuti astrologicis demonstrationibus accepisti, ad
+caeli spatium puncti constat obtinere rationem, id est ut, si ad caelestis
+globi magnitudinem conferatur, nihil spatii prorsus habere iudicetur. Huius
+igitur tam exiguae in mundo regionis quarta fere portio est, sicut
+Ptolomaeo probante didicisti, quae nobis cognitis animantibus incolatur.
+Huic quartae, si quantum maria paludesque premunt quantumque siti uasta
+regio distenditur cogitatione subtraxeris, uix angustissima inhabitandi
+hominibus area relinquetur. In hoc igitur minimo puncti quodam puncto
+circumsaepti atque conclusi de peruulganda fama, de proferendo nomine
+cogitatis? Aut quid habeat amplum magnificumque gloria tam angustis
+exiguisque limitibus artata? Adde quod hoc ipsum breuis habitaculi saeptum
+plures incolunt nationes lingua, moribus, totius uitae ratione distantes,
+ad quas tum difficultate itinerum tum loquendi diuersitate tum commercii
+insolentia non modo fama hominum singulorum sed ne urbium quidem peruenire
+queat. Aetate denique Marci Tullii, sicut ipse quodam loco significat,
+nondum Caucasum montem Romanae rei publicae fama transcenderat, et erat
+tunc adulta Parthis etiam ceterisque id locorum gentibus formidolosa.
+Videsne igitur quam sit angusta, quam compressa gloria quam dilatare ac
+propagare laboratis? An ubi Romani nominis transire fama nequit, Romani
+hominis gloria progredietur? Quid quod diuersarum gentium mores inter se
+atque instituta discordant, ut quod apud alios laude apud alios supplicio
+dignum iudicetur. Quo fit ut si quem famae praedicatio delectat, huic in
+plurimos populos nomen proferre nullo modo conducat. Erit igitur peruagata
+inter suos gloria quisque contentus et intra unius gentis terminos
+praeclara illa famae inmortalitas coartabitur.
+
+Sed quam multos clarissimos suis temporibus uiros scriptorum inops deleuit
+obliuio! Quamquam quid ipsa scripta proficiant, quae cum suis auctoribus
+premit longior atque obscura uetustas? Vos uero inmortalitatem uobis
+propagare uidemini, cum futuri famam temporis cogitatis. Quod si
+aeternitatis infinita spatia pertractes, quid habes quod de nominis tui
+diuturnitate laeteris? Vnius etenim mora momenti, si decem milibus
+conferatur annis, quoniam utrumque spatium definitum est, minimam, licet,
+habet tamen aliquam portionem. At hic ipse numerus annorum eiusque
+quamlibet multiplex ad interminabilem diuturnitatem ne comparari quidem
+potest. Etenim finitis ad se inuicem fuerit quaedam, infiniti uero atque
+finiti nulla umquam poterit esse collatio. Ita fit ut quamlibet prolixi
+temporis fama, si cum inexhausta aeternitate cogitetur, non parua sed plane
+nulla esse uideatur. Vos autem nisi ad populares auras inanesque rumores
+recte facere nescitis et relicta conscientiae uirtutisque praestantia de
+alienis praemia sermunculis postulatis. Accipe in huiusmodi arrogantiae
+leuitate quam festiue aliquis inluserit. Nam cum quidam adortus esset
+hominem contumeliis, qui non ad uerae uirtutis usum sed ad superbam gloriam
+falsum sibi philosophi nomen induerat, adiecissetque iam se sciturum, an
+ille philosophus esset, si quidem illatas iniurias leniter patienterque
+tolerasset, ille patientiam paulisper adsumpsit acceptaque contumelia uelut
+insultans: 'Iam tandem,' inquit, 'intellegis me esse philosophum?' Tum ille
+nimium mordaciter: 'Intellexeram,' inquit, 'si tacuisses.' Quid autem est
+quod ad praecipuos uiros, de his enim sermo est, qui uirtute gloriam
+petunt, quid, inquam, est quod ad hos de fama post resolutum morte suprema
+corpus attineat? Nam si, quod nostrae rationes credi uetant, toti moriuntur
+homines, nulla est omnino gloria, cum is cuius ea esse dicitur non exstet
+omnino. Sin uero bene sibi mens conscia terreno carcere resoluta caelum
+libera petit, nonne omne terrenum negotium spernat quae se caelo fruens
+terrenis gaudet exemptam?
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Then I said: "Thou thyself knowest that the ambition of mortal things
+  hath borne as little sway with me as with any, but I desired matter of
+  action, lest old age should come upon me ere I had done anything." To
+  which she answered: "This is the only thing which is able to entice such
+  minds as, being well qualified by nature, are not yet fully brought to
+  full excellence by the perfecting of virtues, I mean desire of glory,
+  and fame of best deserts towards their commonwealth, which how slender
+  it is, and void of all weight, consider this: thou hast learnt by
+  astronomical demonstrations that the compass of the whole earth compared
+  to the scope of heaven is no bigger than a pin's point, which is as much
+  as to say that, if it be conferred with the greatness of the celestial
+  sphere, it hath no bigness at all. And of this so small a region in the
+  world only the fourth part is known to be inhabited by living creatures
+  known to us, as Ptolemy[117] proveth. From which fourth part, if thou
+  takest away in imagination the seas, the marsh grounds, and all other
+  desert places, there will scarcely be left any room at all for men to
+  inhabit. Wherefore, enclosed and shut up in this smallest point of that
+  other point, do you think of extending your fame and enlarging your
+  name? But what great or heroical matter can that glory have, which is
+  pent up in so small and narrow bounds? Besides that the little compass
+  of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, different in
+  language, fashions, and conversation, to which by reason of the
+  difficulties in travelling, the diversity of speech, and the scarcity of
+  traffic, not only the Fame of particular men but even of cities can
+  hardly come. Finally, in the age of Marcus Tullius, as he himself
+  writeth,[118] the fame of the Roman Commonwealth had not passed the
+  mountain Caucasus, and yet it was then in the most flourishing estate,
+  fearful even to the Parthians and to the rest of the nations about.
+  Seest thou therefore how strait and narrow that glory is which you
+  labour to enlarge and increase? Where the fame of the Roman name could
+  not pass, can the glory of a Roman man penetrate? Moreover, the customs
+  and laws of diverse nations do so much differ the one from the other,
+  that the same thing which some commend as laudable, others condemn as
+  deserving punishment. So that if a man be delighted with the praise of
+  fame, it is no way convenient for him to be named in many countries.
+  Wherefore, every man must be content with that glory which he may have
+  at home, and that noble immortality of fame must be comprehended within
+  the compass of one nation.
+
+  Now, how many, most famous while they lived, are altogether forgotten
+  for want of writers! Though what do writings themselves avail which
+  perish, as well as their authors, by continuance and obscurity of time?
+  But you imagine that you make yourselves immortal when you cast your
+  eyes upon future fame. Whereas, if thou weighest attentively the
+  infinite spaces of eternity, what cause hast thou to rejoice at the
+  prolonging of thy name? For if we compare the stay of one moment with
+  ten thousand years, since both be limited, they have some proportion,
+  though it be but very small. But this number of years, how oft so ever
+  it be multiplied, is no way comparable to endless eternity. For limited
+  things may in some sort be compared among themselves, but that which is
+  infinite admitteth no comparison at all with the limited. So that the
+  fame of never so long time, if it be compared with everlasting eternity,
+  seemeth not little but none at all. But without popular blasts and vain
+  rumours you know not how to do well, and, rejecting the excellency of a
+  good conscience and of virtue, you choose to be rewarded with others'
+  tattling. Hear how pleasantly one jested at this vain and contemptible
+  arrogancy. For having assaulted with reproachful speeches a certain
+  fellow who had falsely taken upon him the name of a philosopher, not for
+  the use of virtue but for vainglory, and having added that now he would
+  know whether he were a philosopher or no by his gentle and patient
+  bearing of injuries, the other took all patiently for a while, and
+  having borne his contumely, as it were, triumphing, said: 'Dost thou now
+  at length think me a philosopher?' To which he bitingly replied: 'I
+  would have thought thee one if thou hadst holden thy peace.' But what
+  have excellent men (for of these I speak) who seek for glory by virtue,
+  what have we, I say, to expect for these by fame after final death hath
+  dissolved the body? For if, contrary to our belief, men wholly perish,
+  there is no glory at all, since he to whom it is said to belong is
+  nowhere extant. But if a guiltless mind freed from earthly imprisonment
+  goeth forthwith to heaven, will she not despise all earthly traffic who,
+  enjoying heaven, rejoiceth to see herself exempted from earthly affairs?
+
+
+  [117] Claudius Ptolemaeus, mathematician, astronomer, geographer, fl.
+  A.D. 139-161.
+
+  [118] Cf. _Somn. Scip._ 6. 14 ap. Macr. _Comment._ ii. 10.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Quicumque solam mente praecipiti petit
+  Summumque credit gloriam,
+Late patentes aetheris cernat plagas
+  Artumque terrarum situm.
+Breuem replere non ualentis ambitum                                       5
+  Pudebit aucti nominis.
+Quid o superbi colla mortali iugo
+  Frustra leuare gestiunt?
+Licet remotos fama per populos means
+  Diffusa linguas explicet                                               10
+Et magna titulis fulgeat claris domus,
+  Mors spernit altam gloriam,
+Inuoluit humile pariter et celsum caput
+  Aequatque summis infima.
+Vbi nunc fidelis ossa Fabricii manent,                                   15
+  Quid Brutus aut rigidus Cato?
+Signat superstes fama tenuis pauculis
+  Inane nomen litteris.
+Sed quod decora nouimus uocabula,
+  Num scire consumptos datur?                                            20
+Iacetis ergo prorsus ignorabiles
+  Nec fama notos efficit.
+Quod si putatis longius uitam trahi
+  Mortalis aura nominis,
+Cum sera uobis rapiet hoc etiam dies,                                    25
+  Iam uos secunda mors manet.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  He that to honour only seeks to mount
+    And that his chiefest end doth count,
+  Let him behold the largeness of the skies
+    And on the strait earth cast his eyes;
+  He will despise the glory of his name,
+    Which cannot fill so small a frame.
+  Why do proud men scorn that their necks should bear
+    That yoke which every man must wear?
+  Though fame through many nations fly along
+    And should be blazed by every tongue,
+  And houses shine with our forefathers' stories,
+    Yet Death contemns these stately glories,
+  And, summoning both rich and poor to die,
+    Makes the low equal with the high.
+  Who knows where faithful Fabrice' bones are pressed,
+    Where Brutus and strict Cato rest?[119]
+  A slender fame consigns their titles vain
+    In some few letters to remain.
+  Because their famous names in books we read,
+    Come we by them to know the dead?
+  You dying, then, remembered are by none,
+    Nor any fame can make you known.
+  But if you think that life outstrippeth death,
+    Your names borne up with mortal breath,
+  When length of time takes this away likewise,
+    A second death shall you surprise.
+
+
+  [119] Caius Luscinus Fabricius, Consul 282 B.C., opponent of Pyrrhus;
+  Lucius Iunius Brutus, Consul 509 B.C., founder of the Republic; Marcus
+  Porcius Cato (Cato maior). Consul 195 B.C., great-grandfather of M.
+  Porcius Cato (Uticensis).
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Sed ne me inexorabile contra fortunam gerere bellum putes, est aliquando
+cum de hominibus illa, fallax illa nihil, bene mereatur, tum scilicet cum
+se aperit, cum frontem detegit moresque profitetur. Nondum forte quid
+loquar intellegis. Mirum est quod dicere gestio, eoque sententiam uerbis
+explicare uix queo. Etenim plus hominibus reor aduersam quam prosperam
+prodesse fortunam. Illa enim semper specie felicitatis cum uidetur blanda,
+mentitur; haec semper uera est, cum se instabilem mutatione demonstrat.
+Illa fallit, haec instruit, illa mendacium specie bonorum mentes fruentium
+ligat, haec cognitione fragilis felicitatis absoluit. Itaque illam uideas
+uentosam, fluentem suique semper ignaram, hanc sobriam succinctamque et
+ipsius aduersitatis exercitatione prudentem. Postremo felix a uero bono
+deuios blanditiis trahit, aduersa plerumque ad uera bona reduces unco
+retrahit. An hoc inter minima aestimandum putas quod amicorum tibi fidelium
+mentes haec aspera, haec horribilis fortuna detexit, haec tibi certos
+sodalium uultus ambiguosque secreuit, discedens suos abstulit, tuos
+reliquit? Quanti hoc integer, ut uidebaris tibi fortunatus, emisses! Nunc
+et amissas opes querere; quod pretiosissimum diuitiarum genus est amicos
+inuenisti.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  But lest thou shouldst think that I am at implacable war with Fortune,
+  there is a time when this thy goddess ceasing to deceive deserveth of
+  men, to wit, when she declareth herself, when she discovereth her face
+  and showeth herself in her own colours. Perhaps thou understandest not
+  yet what I say. I would utter a wonderful thing, insomuch as I can
+  scarcely explicate my mind in words. For I think that Fortune, when she
+  is opposite, is more profitable to men than when she is favourable. For
+  in prosperity, by a show of happiness and seeming to caress, she is ever
+  false, but in adversity when she showeth herself inconstant by changing,
+  she is ever true. In that she deceiveth, in this she instructeth; in
+  that she imprisoneth the minds of men with falsely seeming goods, which
+  they enjoy, in this she setteth them at liberty by discovering the
+  uncertainty of them. Wherefore, in that thou shalt alway see her puffed
+  up, and wavering, and blinded with a self-conceit of herself, in this
+  thou shalt find her sober, settled, and, with the very exercise of
+  adversity, wise. Finally, prosperity with her flatterings withdraweth
+  men from true goodness, adversity recalleth and reclaimeth them many
+  times by force[120] to true happiness. Dost thou esteem it a small
+  benefit that this rough and harsh Fortune hath made known unto thee the
+  minds of thy faithful friends? She hath severed thy assured from thy
+  doubtful friends; prosperity at her departure took away with her those
+  which were hers, and left thee thine. How dearly wouldst thou have
+  bought this before thy fall, and when thou seemedst to thyself
+  fortunate! Now thou dost even lament thy lost riches; thou hast found
+  friends, the most precious treasure in the world.
+
+
+  [120] Literally, "pulleth them back with a hook."
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Quod mundus stabili fide
+Concordes uariat uices,
+Quod pugnantia semina
+Foedus perpetuum tenent,
+Quod Phoebus roseum diem                                                  5
+Curru prouehit aureo,
+Vt quas duxerit Hesperos
+Phoebe noctibus imperet,
+Vt fluctus auidum mare
+Certo fine coerceat,                                                     10
+Ne terris liceat uagis
+Latos tendere terminos,
+Hanc rerum seriem ligat
+Terras ac pelagus regens
+Et caelo imperitans amor.                                                15
+Hic si frena remiserit,
+Quidquid nunc amat inuicem
+Bellum continuo geret
+Et quam nunc socia fide
+Pulchris motibus incitant*,                                              20
+Certent soluere machinam.
+Hic sancto populos quoque
+Iunctos foedere continet,
+Hic et coniugii sacrum
+Castis nectit amoribus,                                                  25
+Hic fidis etiam sua
+Dictat iura sodalibus.
+O felix hominum genus,
+Si uestros animos amor
+Quo caelum regitur regat."                                               30
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  That this fair world in settled course her several forms should vary,
+  That a perpetual law should tame the fighting seeds of things,
+  That Phoebus should the rosy day in his bright chariot carry,
+  That Phoebe should govern the nights which Hesperus forth brings,
+  That to the floods of greedy seas are certain bounds assigned,
+  Which them, lest they usurp too much upon the earth, debar,
+  Love ruling heaven, and earth, and seas, them in this course doth bind.
+  And if it once let loose their reins, their friendship turns to war,
+  Tearing the world whose ordered form their quiet motions bear.
+  By it all holy laws are made and marriage rites are tied,
+  By it is faithful friendship joined. How happy mortals were,
+  If that pure love did guide their minds, which heavenly spheres
+    doth guide!"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER SECVNDVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER III.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Iam cantum illa finiuerat, cum me audiendi auidum stupentemque arrectis
+adhuc auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat. Itaque paulo post: "O," inquam,
+"summum lassorum solamen animorum quam tu me uel sententiarum pondere uel
+canendi etiam iucunditate refouisti! Adeo ut iam me post haec inparem
+fortunae ictibus esse non arbitrer. Itaque remedia quae paulo acriora esse
+dicebas, non modo non perhorresco, sed audiendi auidus uehementer
+efflagito." Tum illa "Sensi," inquit, "cum uerba nostra tacitus attentusque
+rapiebas, eumque tuae mentis habitum uel exspectaui uel, quod est uerius,
+ipsa perfeci. Talia sunt quippe quae restant, ut degustata quidem mordeant,
+interius autem recepta dulcescant. Sed quod tu te audiendi cupidum dicis,
+quanto ardore flagrares, si quonam te ducere aggrediamur agnosceres!"
+"Quonam?" inquam. "Ad ueram," inquit, "felicitatem, quam tuus quoque
+somniat animus, sed occupato ad imagines uisu ipsam illam non potest
+intueri." Tum ego: "Fac obsecro et quae illa uera sit, sine cunctatione
+demonstra." "Faciam," inquit illa, "tui causa libenter. Sed quae tibi causa
+notior est, eam prius designare uerbis atque informare conabor ut ea
+perspecta cum in contrariam partem flexeris oculos, uerae beatitudinis
+speciem possis agnoscere.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE THIRD BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Though she had ended her verse, yet the sweetness of it made me remain
+  astonished, attentive, and desirous to hear her longer. Wherefore, after
+  a while, I said: "O most effectual refreshment of wearied minds, how
+  have I been comforted with thy weighty sentences and pleasing music!
+  Insomuch that I begin to think myself not unable to encounter the
+  assaults of Fortune. Wherefore, I am not now afraid, but rather
+  earnestly desire to know those remedies, which before thou toldest me
+  were too sharp." To which she answered: "I perceived as much as thou
+  sayest, when I saw thee hearken to my speeches with so great silence and
+  attention, and I expected this disposition of thy mind, or rather more
+  truly caused it myself. For the remedies which remain are of that sort
+  that they are bitter to the taste, but being inwardly received wax
+  sweet. And whereas thou sayest that thou art desirous to hear; how much
+  would this desire increase if thou knewest whither we go about to bring
+  thee!" "Whither?" quoth I. "To true felicity," quoth she, "which thy
+  mind also dreameth of, but thy sight is so dimmed with phantasies that
+  thou canst not behold it as it is." Then I beseeched her to explicate
+  without delay wherein true happiness consisteth. To which she answered:
+  "I will willingly do so for thy sake, but first I will endeavour to
+  declare in words and to give shape to that which is better known unto
+  thee, that, having thoroughly understood it, by reflecting of the
+  contrary thou mayest discover the type of perfect blessedness.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Qui serere ingenuum uolet agrum,
+Liberat arua prius fruticibus,
+Falce rubos filicemque resecat,
+Vt noua fruge grauis Ceres eat.
+Dulcior est apium mage labor,                                             5
+Si malus ora prius sapor edat.
+Gratius astra nitent ubi Notus
+Desinit imbriferos dare sonos.
+Lucifer ut tenebras pepulerit
+Pulchra dies roseos agit equos.                                          10
+Tu quoque falsa tuens bona prius
+Incipe colla iugo retrahere.
+Vera dehinc animum subierint."
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  He that a fruitful field will sow,
+  Doth first the ground from bushes free,
+  All fern and briars likewise mow,
+  That he his harvest great may see.
+  Honey seems sweeter to our taste,
+  If cloyed with noisome food it be.
+  Stars clearer shine when Notus' blast
+  Hath ceased the rainy storms to breed.
+  When Lucifer hath night defaced,
+  The day's bright horses then succeed.
+  So thou, whom seeming goods do feed,
+  First shake off yokes which so thee press
+  That Truth may then thy mind possess."
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Tum defixo paululum uisu et uelut in augustam suae mentis sedem recepta sic
+coepit: "Omnis mortalium cura quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet,
+diuerso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur
+peruenire. Id autem est bonum quo quis adepto nihil ulterius desiderare
+queat. Quod quidem est omnium summum bonorum cunctaque intra se bona
+continens, cui si quid aforet summum esse non posset, quoniam relinqueretur
+extrinsecus quod posset optari. Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem statum
+bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum. Hunc, uti diximus, diuerso tramite
+mortales omnes conantur adipisci. Est enim mentibus hominum ueri boni
+naturaliter inserta cupiditas, sed ad falsa deuius error abducit. Quorum
+quidem alii summum bonum esse nihilo indigere credentes ut diuitiis
+affluant elaborant; alii uero bonum quod sit dignissimum ueneratione
+iudicantes adeptis honoribus reuerendi ciuibus suis esse nituntur. Sunt qui
+summum bonum in summa potentia esse constituant; hi uel regnare ipsi uolunt
+uel regnantibus adhaerere conantur. At quibus optimum quiddam claritas
+uidetur, hi uel belli uel pacis artibus gloriosum nomen propagare
+festinant. Plurimi uero boni fructum gaudio laetitiaque metiuntur; hi
+felicissimum putant uoluptate diffluere. Sunt etiam qui horum fines
+causasque alterutro permutent, ut qui diuitias ob potentiam uoluptatesque
+desiderant uel qui potentiam seu pecuniae causa seu proferendi nominis
+appetunt. In his igitur ceterisque talibus humanorum actuum uotorumque
+uersatur intentio, ueluti nobilitas fauorque popularis quae uidentur
+quandam claritudinem comparare, uxor ac liberi quae iucunditatis gratia
+petuntur; amicorum uero quod sanctissimum quidem genus est, non in fortuna
+sed in uirtute numeratur, reliquum uero uel potentiae causa uel
+delectationis assumitur. Iam uero corporis bona promptum est ut ad
+superiora referantur. Robur enim magnitudoque uidetur praestare ualentiam,
+pulchritudo atque uelocitas celebritatem, salubritas uoluptatem; quibus
+omnibus solam beatitudinem desiderari liquet. Nam quod quisque prae ceteris
+petit, id summum esse iudicat bonum. Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse
+definiuimus; quare beatum esse iudicat statum quem prae ceteris quisque
+desiderat.
+
+Habes igitur ante oculos propositam fere formam felicitatis humanae--opes,
+honores, potentiam, gloriam, uoluptates. Quae quidem sola considerans
+Epicurus consequenter sibi summum bonum uoluptatem esse constituit, quod
+cetera omnia iucunditatem animo uideantur afferre. Sed ad hominum studia
+reuertor, quorum animus etsi caligante memoria tamen bonum suum repetit,
+sed uelut ebrius domum quo tramite reuertatur ignorat. Num enim uidentur
+errare hi qui nihilo indigere nituntur? Atqui non est aliud quod aeque
+perficere beatitudinem possit quam copiosus bonorum omnium status nec
+alieni egens sed sibi ipse sufficiens. Num uero labuntur hi qui quod sit
+optimum, id etiam reuerentiae cultu dignissimum putent? Minime. Neque enim
+uile quiddam contemnendumque est quod adipisci omnium fere mortalium
+laborat intentio. An in bonis non est numeranda potentia? Quid igitur? Num
+imbecillum ac sine uiribus aestimandum est, quod omnibus rebus constat esse
+praestantius? An claritudo nihili pendenda est? Sed sequestrari nequit quin
+omne quod excellentissimum sit id etiam uideatur esse clarissimum. Nam non
+esse anxiam tristemque beatitudinem nec doloribus molestiisque subiectam
+quid attinet dicere, quando in minimis quoque rebus id appetitur quod
+habere fruique delectet? Atqui haec sunt quae adipisci homines uolunt eaque
+de causa diuitias, dignitates, regna, gloriam uoluptatesque desiderant quod
+per haec sibi sufficientiam, reuerentiam, potentiam, celebritatem,
+laetitiam credunt esse uenturam. Bonum est igitur quod tam diuersis studiis
+homines petunt; in quo quanta sit naturae uis facile monstratur, cum licet
+uariae dissidentesque sententiae tamen in diligendo boni fine consentiunt.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  Then, for a while looking steadfastly upon the ground, and, as it were,
+  retiring herself to the most secret seat of her soul, she began in this
+  manner: "All men's thoughts, which are turmoiled with manifold cares,
+  take indeed divers courses, but yet endeavour to attain the same end of
+  happiness, which is that good which, being once obtained, nothing can be
+  further desired. Which is the chiefest of all goods, and containeth in
+  itself whatsoever is good, and if it wanted anything it could not be the
+  chiefest, because there would something remain besides it which might be
+  wished for. Wherefore, it is manifest that blessedness is an estate
+  replenished with all that is good. This, as we said, all men endeavour
+  to obtain by divers ways. For there is naturally ingrafted in men's
+  minds an earnest desire of that which is truly good; but deceitful error
+  withdraweth it to that which falsely seemeth such. So that some,
+  esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all means to
+  abound with riches; others, deeming that to be good which is most
+  deserving of honour, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their
+  fellow-citizens. Others think it the greatest felicity to have great
+  power and authority, and these will either reign themselves or at least
+  procure to be great with princes. But they who think fame better than
+  all these, make all speed possible to spread their names far and near,
+  by achieving some worthy enterprise either in war or peace. Many measure
+  good by joy and mirth, and their chiefest care is how they may abound
+  with pleasure. Some interchange the ends and means of these things one
+  with the other, wanting now riches for the sake of power and pleasure,
+  now power for the sake of wealth and fame. At these and such other do
+  men's actions and desires aim, as nobility and popularity, which make
+  men esteemed; wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. But
+  friendship, that most sacred thing, is rather to be attributed to virtue
+  than to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for
+  power or pleasure. And it is an easy matter to reduce all corporal goods
+  to the former heads. For strength and greatness give ability; beauty and
+  swiftness, fame; and health yieldeth pleasure. By all which we
+  manifestly seek for nothing else but happiness. For that which every man
+  seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all
+  one with happiness. Wherefore he esteemeth that estate happy which he
+  preferreth before all other.
+
+  And thus thou hast in a manner seen the form of human felicity--riches,
+  honour, power, glory, pleasure. Which Epicurus only considering,
+  consequently took pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest
+  seemed to delight the mind. But I return to the careful thoughts of men,
+  whose minds, though obscured, yet seek after the greatest good, but like
+  a drunken man know not the way home. For seem they to err who endeavour
+  to want nothing? But nothing can cause happiness so much as the
+  plentiful possession of all that is good, needing the help of none, but
+  is sufficient of itself. Or do they err who take that which is best to
+  be likewise most worthy of respect? No. For it is no vile or
+  contemptible thing which almost all men labour to obtain. Or is not
+  power to be esteemed good? Why, then, is that to be accounted feeble and
+  of no force, which manifestly surpasses all other things? Or is fame to
+  be contemned? But it cannot be ignored that the most excellent is also
+  most famous. For to what purpose should I say that happiness is not sad
+  or melancholy, or subject to grief and trouble, when even in smallest
+  matters we desire that which we delight to have and enjoy? And these be
+  the things which men desire to obtain, and to this end procure riches,
+  dignities, kingdoms, glory, and pleasures, because by them they think to
+  have sufficiency, respect, power, fame, delight, and joy. Wherefore,
+  that is good which men seek after by divers desires, in which the force
+  of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different
+  opinions, yet they agree in choosing for their end that which is good.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Quantas rerum flectat habenas
+Natura potens, quibus inmensum
+Legibus orbem prouida seruet
+Stringatque ligans inresoluto
+Singula nexu, placet arguto                                               5
+Fidibus lentis promere cantu.
+Quamuis Poeni pulchra leones
+Vincula gestent manibusque datas
+Captent escas metuantque trucem
+Soliti uerbera ferre magistrum,                                          10
+Si cruor horrida tinxerit ora,
+Resides olim redeunt animi
+Fremituque graui meminere sui;
+Laxant nodis colla solutis
+Primusque lacer dente cruento                                            15
+Domitor rabidas imbuit iras.
+Quae canit altis garrula ramis
+Ales caueae clauditur antro;
+Huic licet inlita pocula melle
+Largasque dapes dulci studio                                             20
+Ludens hominum cura ministret,
+Si tamen arto saliens texto
+Nemorum gratas uiderit umbras,
+Sparsas pedibus proterit escas,
+Siluas tantum maesta requirit,                                           25
+Siluas dulci uoce susurrat.
+Validis quondam uiribus acta
+Pronum flectit uirga cacumen;
+Hanc si curuans dextra remisit,
+Recto spectat uertice caelum.                                            30
+Cadit Hesperias Phoebus in undas,
+Sed secreto tramite rursus
+Currum solitos uertit ad ortus.
+Repetunt proprios quaeque recursus
+Redituque suo singula gaudent                                            35
+Nec manet ulli traditus ordo
+Nisi quod fini iunxerit ortum
+Stabilemque sui fecerit orbem.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  How the first reins of all things guided are
+  By powerful Nature as the chiefest cause,
+  And how she keeps, with a foreseeing care,
+  The spacious world in order by her laws,
+  And to sure knots which nothing can untie,
+  By her strong hand all earthly motions draws--
+  To show all this we purpose now to try
+  Our pliant string, our musick's thrilling sound.
+  Although the Libyan lions often lie
+  Gentle and tame in splendid fetters bound,[121]
+  And fearing their incensed master's wrath,
+  With patient looks endure each blow and wound,
+  Yet if their jaws they once in blood do bathe,
+  They, gaining courage,[122] with fierce noise awake
+  The force which Nature in them seated hath,
+  And from their necks the broken chains do shake;
+  Then he that tamed them first doth feel their rage,
+  And torn in pieces doth their fury slake.
+  The bird shut up in an unpleasing cage,
+  Which on the lofty trees did lately sing,
+  Though men, her want of freedom to assuage,
+  Should unto her with careful labour bring
+  The sweetest meats which they can best devise,
+  Yet when within her prison fluttering
+  The pleasing shadows of the groves she spies,
+  Her hated food she scatters with her feet,
+  In yearning spirit to the woods she flies,
+  The woods' delights do tune her accents sweet.
+  When some strong hand doth tender plant constrain
+  With his debased top the ground to meet,
+  If it let go, the crooked twig again
+  Up toward Heaven itself it straight doth raise.
+  Phoebus doth fall into the western main,
+  Yet doth he back return by secret ways,
+  And to the earth doth guide his chariot's race.
+  Each thing a certain course and laws obeys,
+  Striving to turn back to his proper place;
+  Nor any settled order can be found,
+  But that which doth within itself embrace
+  The births and ends of all things in a round.
+
+
+  [121] Literally, "and take food offered by the hand."
+
+  [122] Literally, "their spirits, hitherto sluggish, return."
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Vos quoque, o terrena animalia, tenui licet imagine uestrum tamen
+principium somniatis uerumque illum beatitudinis finem licet minime
+perspicaci qualicumque tamen cogitatione prospicitis eoque uos et ad uerum
+bonum naturalis ducit intentio et ab eodem multiplex error abducit.
+Considera namque an per ea quibus se homines adepturos beatitudinem putant
+ad destinatum finem ualeant peruenire. Si enim uel pecuniae uel honores
+ceteraque tale quid afferunt cui nihil bonorum abesse uideatur, nos quoque
+fateamur fieri aliquos horum adeptione felices. Quod si neque id ualent
+efficere quod promittunt bonisque pluribus carent, nonne liquido falsa in
+eis beatitudinis species deprehenditur? Primum igitur te ipsum qui paulo
+ante diuitiis affluebas, interrogo: Inter illas abundantissimas opes
+numquamne animum tuum concepta ex qualibet iniuria confudit anxietas?"
+"Atqui," inquam, "libero me fuisse animo quin aliquid semper angerer
+reminisci non queo." "Nonne quia uel aberat quod abesse non uelles uel
+aderat quod adesse noluisses?" "Ita est," inquam. "Illius igitur
+praesentiam huius absentiam desiderabas?" "Confiteor," inquam. "Eget uero,"
+inquit, "eo quod quisque desiderat?" "Eget," inquam. "Qui uero eget aliquo,
+non est usquequaque sibi ipse sufficiens?" "Minime," inquam. "Tu itaque
+hanc insufficientiam plenus," inquit, "opibus sustinebas?" "Quidni?"
+inquam. "Opes igitur nihilo indigentem sufficientemque sibi facere nequeunt
+et hoc erat quod promittere uidebantur. Atqui hoc quoque maxime
+considerandum puto quod nihil habeat suapte natura pecunia ut his a quibus
+possidetur inuitis nequeat auferri." "Fateor," inquam. "Quidni fateare, cum
+eam cotidie ualentior aliquis eripiat inuito? Vnde enim forenses
+querimoniae nisi quod uel ui uel fraude nolentibus pecuniae repetuntur
+ereptae?" "Ita est," inquam. "Egebit igitur," inquit, "extrinsecus petito
+praesidio quo suam pecuniam quisque tueatur?" "Quis id," inquam, "neget?"
+"Atqui non egeret eo, nisi possideret pecuniam quam posset amittere?"
+"Dubitari," inquam, "nequit." "In contrarium igitur relapsa res est; nam
+quae sufficientes sibi facere putabantur opes, alieno potius praesidio
+faciunt indigentes. Quis autem modus est quo pellatur diuitiis indigentia?
+Num enim diuites esurire nequeunt? Num sitire non possunt? Num frigus
+hibernum pecuniosorum membra non sentiunt? Sed adest, inquies, opulentis
+quo famem satient, quo sitim frigusque depellant. Sed hoc modo consolari
+quidem diuitiis indigentia potest, auferri penitus non potest. Nam si haec
+hians semper atque aliquid poscens opibus expletur, maneat necesse est quae
+possit expleri. Taceo quod naturae minimum, quod auaritiae nihil satis est.
+Quare si opes nec submouere possunt indigentiam et ipsae suam faciunt, quid
+est quod eas sufficientiam praestare credatis?
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  You also, O earthly creatures, though slightly and as it were in a dream
+  acknowledge your beginning, and though not perspicuously yet in some
+  sort behold that true end of happiness, so that the intention of nature
+  leadeth you to the true good, and manifold error withdraweth you from
+  it. For consider whether those things, by which men think to obtain
+  happiness, can bring them to their desired end. For if either money, or
+  honour, or any of the rest be of that quality that they want nothing
+  which is good, we will also confess that they are able to make men
+  happy. But if they neither be able to perform that they promise, and
+  want many things which are good, are they not manifestly discovered to
+  have a false appearance of happiness? First then, I ask thee thyself,
+  who not long since didst abound with wealth; in that plenty of riches,
+  was thy mind never troubled with any injuries?" "I cannot remember,"
+  quoth I, "that ever my mind was so free from trouble but that something
+  or other still vexed me." "Was it not because thou either wantedst
+  something which thou wouldst have had, or else hadst something which
+  thou wouldst have wanted?" "It is true," quoth I. "Then thou desiredst
+  the presence of that, and the absence of this?" "I confess I did," quoth
+  I. "And doth not a man want that," quoth she, "which he desireth?" "He
+  doth," quoth I. "But he that wanteth anything is not altogether
+  sufficient of himself?" "He is not," quoth I. "So that thou feltest this
+  insufficiency, even the height of thy wealth?" "Why not?" quoth I. "Then
+  riches cannot make a man wanting nothing nor sufficient of himself, and
+  this was that they seemed to promise. But this is most of all to be
+  considered, that money hath nothing of itself which can keep it from
+  being taken from them which possess it, against their will." "I grant
+  it," quoth I. "Why shouldst thou not grant it, since that every day
+  those which are more potent take it from others perforce? For from
+  whence proceed so many complaints in law, but that money gotten either
+  by violence or deceit is sought to be recovered by that means?" "It is
+  so indeed," quoth I. "So that every man needeth some other help to
+  defend his money?" "Who denies that?" quoth I. "But he should not need
+  that help, unless he had money which he might lose?" "There is no doubt
+  of that," quoth I. "Now then the matter is fallen out quite contrary;
+  for riches, which are thought to suffice of themselves, rather make men
+  stand in need of other helps. And after what manner do riches expel
+  penury? For are not rich men hungry? Are they not thirsty? Or doth much
+  money make the owners senseless of cold in winter? But thou wilt say,
+  wealthy men have wherewithal to satisfy their hunger, slake their
+  thirst, and defend themselves from cold. But in this sort, though want
+  may be somewhat relieved by wealth, yet it cannot altogether be taken
+  away. For if ever gaping and craving it be satiated by riches, there
+  must needs always remain something to be satiated. I omit, that to
+  nature very little, to covetousness nothing is sufficient. Wherefore if
+  riches can neither remove wants, and cause some themselves, why imagine
+  you that they can cause sufficiency?
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quamuis fluente diues auri gurgite
+  Non expleturas cogat auarus opes
+Oneretque bacis colla rubri litoris
+  Ruraque centeno scindat opima boue,
+Nec cura mordax deseret superstitem,                                      5
+  Defunctumque leues non comitantur opes.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Although the rich man from his mines of gold
+  Dig treasure which his mind can never fill,
+  And lofty neck with precious pearls enfold,
+  And his fat fields with many oxen till,
+  Yet biting cares will never leave his head,
+  Nor will his wealth attend him being dead.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Sed dignitates honorabilem reuerendumque cui prouenerint reddunt. Num uis
+ea est magistratibus ut utentium mentibus uirtutes inserant uitia
+depellant? Atqui non fugare sed illustrare potius nequitiam solent; quo fit
+ut indignemur eas saepe nequissimis hominibus contigisse, unde Catullus
+licet in curuli Nonium sedentem strumam tamen appellat. Videsne quantum
+malis dedecus adiciant dignitates? Atqui minus eorum patebit indignitas, si
+nullis honoribus inclarescant. Tu quoque num tandem tot periculis adduci
+potuisti ut cum Decorato gerere magistratum putares, cum in eo mentem
+nequissimi scurrae delatorisque respiceres? Non enim possumus ob honores
+reuerentia dignos iudicare quos ipsis honoribus iudicamus indignos. At si
+quem sapientia praeditum uideres, num posses eum uel reuerentia uel ea qua
+est praeditus sapientia non dignum putare? Minime. Inest enim dignitas
+propria uirtuti, quam protinus in eos quibus fuerit adiuncta transfundit.
+Quod quia populares facere nequeunt honores, liquet eos propriam dignitatis
+pulchritudinem non habere.
+
+In quo illud est animaduertendum magis. Nam si eo abiectior est quo magis a
+pluribus quisque contemnitur, cum reuerendos facere nequeat quos pluribus
+ostentat, despectiores potius improbos dignitas facit. Verum non impune;
+reddunt namque improbi parem dignitatibus uicem quas sua contagione
+commaculant. Atque ut agnoscas ueram illam reuerentiam per has umbratiles
+dignitates non posse contingere; si qui multiplici consulatu functus in
+barbaras nationes forte deuenerit, uenerandumne barbaris honor faciet?
+Atqui si hoc naturale munus dignitatibus foret, ab officio suo quoquo
+gentium nullo modo cessarent, sicut ignis ubique terrarum numquam tamen
+calere desistit, sed quoniam id eis non propria uis sed hominum fallax
+adnectit opinio, uanescunt ilico, cum ad eos uenerint qui dignitates eas
+esse non aestimant.
+
+Sed hoc apud exteras nationes. Inter eos uero apud quos ortae sunt, num
+perpetuo perdurant? Atqui praetura magna olim potestas nunc inane nomen et
+senatorii census grauis sarcina; si quis populi quondam curasset annonam,
+magnus habebatur, nunc ea praefectura quid abiectius? Vt enim paulo ante
+diximus, quod nihil habet proprii decoris, opinione utentium nunc
+splendorem accipit nunc amittit. Si igitur reuerendos facere nequeunt
+dignitates, si ultro improborum contagione sordescunt, si mutatione
+temporum splendere desinunt, si gentium aestimatione uilescunt, quid est
+quod in se expetendae pulchritudinis habeant, nedum aliis praestent?
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  But dignities make him honourable and reverend on whom they light. Have
+  offices that force to plant virtues and expel vices in the minds of
+  those who have them? But they are not wont to banish, but rather to make
+  wickedness splendid. So that we many times complain because most wicked
+  men obtain them. Whereupon Catullus called Nonius a scab or impostume
+  though he sat in his chair of estate.[123] Seest thou what great
+  ignominy dignities heap upon evil men? For their unworthiness would less
+  appear if they were never advanced to any honours. Could so many dangers
+  ever make thee think to bear office with Decoratus,[124] having
+  discovered him to be a very varlet and spy? For we cannot for their
+  honours account them worthy of respect whom we judge unworthy of the
+  honours themselves. But if thou seest any man endued with wisdom, canst
+  thou esteem him unworthy of that respect or wisdom which he hath? No,
+  truly. For virtue hath a proper dignity of her own, which she presently
+  endueth her possessors withal. Which since popular preferments cannot
+  do, it is manifest that they have not the beauty which is proper to true
+  dignity.
+
+  In which we are farther to consider that, if to be contemned of many
+  make men abject, dignities make the wicked to be despised the more by
+  laying them open to the view of the world. But the dignities go not
+  scot-free, for wicked men do as much for them, defiling them with their
+  own infection. And that thou mayst plainly see that true respect cannot
+  be gotten by these painted dignities, let one that hath been often
+  Consul go among barbarous nations; will that honour make those barbarous
+  people respect him? And yet, if this were natural to dignities, they
+  would never forsake their function in any nation whatsoever; as fire,
+  wheresoever it be, always remaineth hot. But because not their own
+  nature, but the deceitful opinion of men attributeth that to them, they
+  forthwith come to nothing, being brought to them who esteem them not to
+  be dignities.
+
+  And this for foreign nations. But do they always last among them where
+  they had their beginning? The Praetorship, a great dignity in time past,
+  is now an idle name, and an heavy burden of the Senate's fortune. If
+  heretofore one had care of the people's provision, he was accounted a
+  great man; now what is more abject than that office? For as we said
+  before, that which hath no proper dignity belonging unto it sometime
+  receiveth and sometime loseth his value at the users' discretion.
+  Wherefore if dignities cannot make us respected, if they be easily
+  defiled with the infection of the wicked, if their worth decays by
+  change of times, if diversities of nations make them contemptible, what
+  beauty have they in themselves, or can they afford to others, worth the
+  desiring?
+
+
+  [123] Cf. Catull. lii.
+
+  [124] Decoratus was quaestor _circa_ 508; cf. Cassiod. _Ep_. v. 3 and 4.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quamuis se Tyrio superbus ostro
+  Comeret et niueis lapillis,
+Inuisus tamen omnibus uigebat
+  Luxuriae Nero saeuientis.
+Sed quondam dabat improbus uerendis                                       5
+  Patribus indecores curules.
+Quis illos igitur putet beatos
+  Quos miseri tribuunt honores?
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Though fierce and lustful Nero did adorn
+  Himself with purple robes, which pearls did grace,
+  He did but gain a general hate and scorn.
+  Yet wickedly he officers most base
+  Over the reverend Senators did place.
+  Who would esteem of fading honours then
+  Which may be given thus by the wickedest men?
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+An uero regna regumque familiaritas efficere potentem ualet? Quidni, quando
+eorum felicitas perpetuo perdurat? Atqui plena est exemplorum uetustas,
+plena etiam praesens aetas, qui reges felicitatem calamitate mutauerint. O
+praeclara potentia quae ne ad conseruationem quidem sui satis efficax
+inuenitur! Quod si haec regnorum potestas beatitudinis auctor est, nonne si
+qua parte defuerit, felicitatem minuat, miseriam inportet? Sed quamuis late
+humana tendantur imperia, plures necesse est gentes relinqui quibus regum
+quisque non imperet. Qua uero parte beatos faciens desinit potestas, hac
+inpotentia subintrat quae miseros facit; hoc igitur modo maiorem regibus
+inesse necesse est miseriae portionem. Expertus sortis suae periculorum
+tyrannus regni metus pendentis supra uerticem gladii terrore simulauit.
+Quae est igitur haec potestas quae sollicitudinum morsus expellere, quae
+formidinum aculeos uitare nequit? Atqui uellent ipsi uixisse securi, sed
+nequeunt; dehinc de potestate gloriantur. An tu potentem censes quem uideas
+uelle quod non possit efficere? Potentem censes qui satellite latus ambit,
+qui quos terret ipse plus metuit, qui ut potens esse uideatur, in
+seruientium manu situm est? Nam quid ego de regum familiaribus disseram,
+cum regna ipsa tantae inbecillitatis plena demonstrem? Quos quidem regia
+potestas saepe incolumis saepe autem lapsa prosternit. Nero Senecam
+familiarem praeceptoremque suum ad eligendae mortis coegit arbitrium.
+Papinianum diu inter aulicos potentem militum gladiis Antoninus obiecit.
+Atqui uterque potentiae suae renuntiare uoluerunt, quorum Seneca opes etiam
+suas tradere Neroni seque in otium conferre conatus est; sed dum ruituros
+moles ipsa trahit, neuter quod uoluit effecit. Quae est igitur ista
+potentia quam pertimescunt habentes, quam nec cum habere uelis tutus sis et
+cum deponere cupias uitare non possis? An praesidio sunt amici quos non
+uirtus sed fortuna conciliat? Sed quem felicitas amicum fecit, infortunium
+faciet inimicum. Quae uero pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris
+inimicus?
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  But can kingdoms and the familiarity of kings make a man mighty? Why
+  not, when their felicity lasteth always? But both former and present
+  times are full of examples that many kings have changed their happiness
+  with misery. O excellent power, which is not sufficient to uphold
+  itself! And if this strength of kingdoms be the author of blessedness,
+  doth it not diminish happiness and bring misery, when it is in any way
+  defective? But though some empires extend themselves far, there will
+  still remain many nations out of their dominions. Now, where the power
+  endeth which maketh them happy, there entereth the contrary which maketh
+  them miserable, so that all kings must needs have less happiness than
+  misery. That Tyrant, knowing by experience the dangers of his estate,
+  signified the fears incident to a kingdom, by the hanging of a drawn
+  sword over a man's head.[125] What power is this, then, which cannot
+  expel nor avoid biting cares and pricking fears? They would willingly
+  have lived securely, but could not, and yet they brag of their power.
+  Thinkest thou him mighty whom thou seest desire that which he cannot do?
+  Thinkest thou him mighty who dareth not go without his guard; who
+  feareth others more than they fear him; who cannot seem mighty, except
+  his servants please? For what should I speak of kings' followers, since
+  I show that kingdoms themselves are so full of weakness? Whom the power
+  of kings often standing, but many times falling, doth overthrow. Nero
+  compelled Seneca, his familiar friend and master, to make choice of his
+  own death.[126] Antoninus called Papinianus, who had been long a gallant
+  courtier, to be cut in pieces with his soldiers' swords.[127] Yet they
+  would both have renounced their power, yea Seneca endeavoured to deliver
+  up his riches also to Nero, and to give himself to a contemplative life.
+  But their very greatness drawing them to their destruction, neither of
+  them could compass that which they desired. Wherefore what power is this
+  that the possessors fear, which when thou wilt have, thou art not
+  secure, and when thou wilt leave, thou canst not avoid? Are we the
+  better for those friends which love us not for our virtue but for our
+  prosperity? But whom prosperity maketh our friend, adversity will make
+  our enemy. And what plague is able to hurt us more than a familiar
+  enemy?
+
+
+  [125] Cic. _Tusc. Disp._ v. 21. 62.
+
+  [126] Cf. Tac. _Ann._ xiv. 53, 54.
+
+  [127] Cf. Spartian. _Caracallus_ 8.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Qui se uolet esse potentem
+Animos domet ille feroces
+Nec uicta libidine colla
+Foedis submittat habenis.
+Etenim licet Indica longe                                                 5
+Tellus tua iura tremescat
+Et seruiat ultima Thyle,
+Tamen atras pellere curas
+Miserasque fugare querelas
+Non posse potentia non est.                                              10
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Who would be powerful, must
+  His own affections check,
+  Nor let foul reins of lust
+  Subdue his conquered neck.
+  For though the Indian land
+  Should tremble at thy beck,
+  And though thy dread command
+  Far Thule's isle obey,
+  Unless thou canst withstand
+  And boldly drive away
+  Black care and wretched moan,
+  Thy might is small or none.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Gloria uero quam fallax saepe, quam turpis est! Vnde non iniuria tragicus
+exclamat:
+
+  [Greek: O doxa doxa murioisi dae broton
+  ouden gegosi bioton onkosas megan.]
+
+Plures enim magnum saepe nomen falsis uulgi opinionibus abstulerunt; quo
+quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur, suis ipsi
+necesse est laudibus erubescant. Quae si etiam meritis conquisita sit, quid
+tamen sapientis adiecerit conscientiae qui bonum suum non populari rumore,
+sed conscientiae ueritate metitur? Quod si hoc ipsum propagasse nomen
+pulchrum uidetur, consequens est ut foedum non extendisse iudicetur. Sed
+cum, uti paulo ante disserui, plures gentes esse necesse sit ad quas unius
+fama hominis nequeat peruenire, fit ut quem tu aestimas esse gloriosum, pro
+maxima parte terrarum uideatur inglorius. Inter haec uero popularem gratiam
+ne commemoratione quidem dignam puto, quae nec iudicio prouenit nec umquam
+firma perdurat. Iam uero quam sit inane quam futtile nobilitatis nomen,
+quis non uideat? Quae si ad claritudinem refertur, aliena est. Videtur
+namque esse nobilitas quaedam de meritis ueniens laus parentum. Quod si
+claritudinem praedicatio facit, illi sint clari necesse est qui
+praedicantur. Quare splendidum te, si tuam non habes, aliena claritudo non
+efficit. Quod si quid est in nobilitate bonum, id esse arbitror solum, ut
+inposita nobilibus necessitudo uideatur ne a maiorum uirtute degeneret.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  As for glory, how deceitful it is oftentimes, and dishonest! For which
+  cause the tragical poet deservedly exclaimeth: "O glory, glory, thou
+  hast raised to honour and dignity myriads of worthless mortals!"[128]
+  For many have often been much spoken of through the false opinions of
+  the common people. Than which what can be imagined more vile? For those
+  who are falsely commended must needs blush at their own praises. Which
+  glory though it be gotten by deserts, yet what adds it to a wise man's
+  conscience who measureth his own good, not by popular rumours, but by
+  his own certain knowledge? And if it seemeth a fair thing to have
+  dilated our fame, consequently we must judge it a foul thing not to have
+  it extended. But since, as I showed a little before, there must needs be
+  many nations to which the fame of one man cannot arrive, it cometh to
+  pass that he whom thou esteemeth glorious, in the greater part of the
+  world seemeth to have no glory at all. And here now I think popular
+  glory not worth the speaking of, which neither proceedeth from judgment,
+  nor ever hath any firmness. Likewise, who seeth not what a vain and idle
+  thing it is to be called noble? Which insofar as it concerneth fame, is
+  not our own. For nobility seemeth to be a certain praise proceeding from
+  our parents' deserts. But if praising causeth fame, they must
+  necessarily be famous who are praised. Wherefore the fame of others, if
+  thou hast none of thine own, maketh not thee renowned. But if there be
+  anything good in nobility, I judge it only to be this, that it imposeth
+  a necessity upon those which are noble, not to suffer their nobility to
+  degenerate from the virtue of their ancestors.
+
+
+  [128] Eurip. _Androm._ 319.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Omne hominum genus in terris simili surgit ab ortu.
+Vnus enim rerum pater est, unus cuncta ministrat.
+Ille dedit Phoebo radios dedit et cornua lunae,
+Ille homines etiam terris dedit ut sidera caelo,
+Hic clausit membris animos celsa sede petitos.                            5
+Mortales igitur cunctos edit nobile germen.
+Quid genus et proauos strepitis? Si primordia uestra
+Auctoremque deum spectes, nullus degener exstat,
+Ni uitiis peiora fouens proprium deserat ortum.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  The general race of men from a like birth is born.
+  All things one Father have, Who doth them all adorn,
+  Who gave the sun his rays, and the pale moon her horn,
+  The lofty heaven for stars, low earth for mortals chose;
+  He souls fetched down from high in bodies did enclose;
+  And thus from noble seed all men did first compose.
+  Why brag you of your stock? Since none is counted base,
+  If you consider God the author of your race,
+  But he that with foul vice doth his own birth deface.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Quid autem de corporis uoluptatibus loquar, quarum appetentia quidem plena
+est anxietatis; satietas uero poenitentiae? Quantos illae morbos, quam
+intolerabiles dolores quasi quendam fructum nequitiae fruentium solent
+referre corporibus! Quarum motus quid habeat iucunditatis, ignoro. Tristes
+uero esse uoluptatum exitus, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum uolet,
+intelleget. Quae si beatos explicare possunt, nihil causae est quin pecudes
+quoque beatae esse dicantur quarum omnis ad explendam corporalem lacunam
+festinat intentio. Honestissima quidem coniugis foret liberorumque
+iucunditas, sed nimis e natura dictum est nescio quem filios inuenisse
+tortorem; quorum quam sit mordax quaecumque condicio, neque alias expertum
+te neque nunc anxium necesse est admonere. In quo Euripidis mei sententiam
+probo, qui carentem liberis infortunio dixit esse felicem.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Now what should I speak of bodily pleasures, the desire of which is full
+  of anxiety, and the enjoying of them breeds repentance? How many
+  diseases, how intolerable griefs bring they forth in the bodies of their
+  possessors, as it were the fruits of their own wickedness! I know not
+  what sweetness their beginnings have, but whosoever will remember his
+  lusts shall understand that the end of pleasure is sadness. Which if it
+  be able to cause happiness, there is no reason why beasts should not be
+  thought blessed, whose whole intention is bent to supply their corporal
+  wants. That pleasure which proceedeth from wife and children should be
+  most honest; but it was too naturally spoken, that some tormentor
+  invented children, whose condition, whatsoever it be, how biting it is,
+  I need not tell thee, who hast had experience heretofore, and art not
+  now free from care. In which I approve the opinion of Euripides, who
+  said that they which had no children are happy by being
+  unfortunate.[129]
+
+
+  [129] Cf. _Androm._ 420.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Habet hoc uoluptas omnis,
+Stimulis agit fruentes
+Apiumque par uolantum
+Vbi grata mella fudit,
+Fugit et nimis tenaci                                                     5
+Ferit icta corda morsu.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  All pleasure hath this property,
+  She woundeth those who have her most.
+  And, like unto the angry bee
+  Who hath her pleasant honey lost,
+  She flies away with nimble wing
+  And in our hearts doth leave her sting.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Nihil igitur dubium est quin hae ad beatitudinem uiae deuia quaedam sint
+nec perducere quemquam eo ualeant ad quod se perducturas esse promittunt.
+Quantis uero implicitae malis sint, breuissime monstrabo. Quid enim?
+Pecuniamne congregare conaberis? Sed eripies habenti. Dignitatibus fulgere
+uelis? Danti supplicabis et qui praeire ceteros honore cupis, poscendi
+humilitate uilesces. Potentiamne desideras? Subiectorum insidiis obnoxius
+periculis subiacebis. Gloriam petas? Sed per aspera quaeque distractus
+securus esse desistis. Voluptariam uitam degas? Sed quis non spernat atque
+abiciat uilissimae fragilissimaeque rei corporis seruum? Iam uero qui bona
+prae se corporis ferunt, quam exigua, quam fragili possessione nituntur!
+Num enim elephantos mole, tauros robore superare poteritis, num tigres
+uelocitate praeibitis? Respicite caeli spatium, firmitudinem, celeritatem
+et aliquando desinite uilia mirari. Quod quidem caelum non his potius est
+quam sua qua regitur ratione mirandum. Formae uero nitor ut rapidus est, ut
+uelox et uernalium florum mutabilitate fugacior! Quod si, ut
+Aristoteles[130] ait, Lynceis oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum uisus
+obstantia penetraret, nonne introspectis uisceribus illud Alcibiadis
+superficie pulcherrimum corpus turpissimum uideretur? Igitur te pulchrum
+uideri non tua natura sed oculorum spectantium reddit infirmitas. Sed
+aestimate quam uultis nimio corporis bona, dum sciatis hoc quodcumque
+miramini triduanae febris igniculo posse dissolui!  Ex quibus omnibus illud
+redigere in summam licet, quod haec quae nec praestare quae pollicentur
+bona possunt nec omnium bonorum congregatione perfecta sunt, ea nec ad
+beatitudinem quasi quidam calles ferunt nec beatos ipsa perficiunt.
+
+
+[130] Probably from the lost _Protrepticus_ of Aristotle. See Bywater,
+_Journal of Philology_, ii. (1869), 59, and Hartlich, _Leipz. Stud._ xi.
+(1889), 250.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Wherefore there is no doubt but that these ways to happiness are only
+  certain by-paths, which can never bring any man thither whither they
+  promise to lead him. And with how great evils they are beset, I will
+  briefly show. For what? Wilt thou endeavour to gather money? But thou
+  shalt take it away from him who hath it. Wilt thou excel in dignities?
+  Thou shalt crouch to the giver, and thou who desirest to surpass others
+  in honour shalt become vile by thy baseness in begging. Wishest thou for
+  power? Thou shalt be in danger of thy subjects' treacheries. Seekest
+  thou for glory? But, drawn into many dangers, thou shalt lose thy
+  safety. Wilt thou live a voluptuous life? But who would not despise and
+  neglect the service of so vile and frail a thing as his body? Now they
+  who boast of the habilities of their body, upon how unsteadfast a
+  possession do they ground themselves! For can you be bigger than
+  elephants, or stronger than bulls? Or swifter than tigers? Look upon the
+  space, firmness, and speedy motion of the heavens, and cease at length
+  to have in admiration these base things. Which heavens are not more to
+  be admired for these qualities than for the manner of their government.
+  As for the glittering of beauty, how soon and swiftly doth it vanish
+  away! As suddenly decaying and changing as the frail flowers in the
+  spring. And if, as Aristotle saith, men had Lynceus's eyes, that they
+  could see through stone walls, would not they judge that body of
+  Alcibiades, seeming outwardly most fair, to be most foul and ugly by
+  discovering his entrails? Wherefore not thy nature but the weakness of
+  the beholders' eyes maketh thee seem fair. But esteem the goods of the
+  body as much as you will, so that you acknowledge this, that whatsoever
+  you admire may be dissolved with the burning of an ague of three days.
+  Out of which we may briefly collect this sum; that these goods, which
+  can neither perform that they promise, nor are perfect by having all
+  that is good, do neither, as so many paths, lead men to happiness, nor
+  make men happy of themselves.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Eheu quae miseros tramite deuios
+  Abducit ignorantia!
+Non aurum in uiridi quaeritis arbore
+  Nec uite gemmas carpitis,
+Non altis laqueos montibus abditis                                        5
+  Vt pisce ditetis dapes
+Nec uobis capreas si libeat sequi,
+  Tyrrhena captatis uada.
+Ipsos quin etiam fluctibus abditos
+  Norunt recessus aequoris,                                              10
+Quae gemmis niueis unda feracior
+  Vel quae rubentis purpurae
+Nec non quae tenero pisce uel asperis
+  Praestent echinis litora.
+Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum,                                    15
+  Nescire caeci sustinent,
+Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum,
+  Tellure demersi petunt.
+Quid dignum stolidis mentibus inprecer?
+  Opes honores ambiant;                                                  20
+Et cum falsa graui mole parauerint,
+  Tum uera cognoscant bona.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Alas, how ignorance makes wretches stray
+        Out of the way!
+  You from green trees expect no golden mines
+        Nor pearls from vines,
+  Nor use you on mountains to lay your net
+        Fishes to get,
+  Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please,
+        Run you to seas.
+  Men will be skilful in the hidden caves
+        Of the ocean waves,
+  And in what coasts the orient pearls are bred,
+        Or purple red,
+  Also, what different sorts of fishes store
+        Each several shore.
+  But when they come their chiefest good to find,
+        Then are they blind,
+  And search for that under the earth, which lies
+        Above the skies.
+  How should I curse these fools? Let thirst them hold
+        Of fame and gold,
+  That, having got false goods with pain, they learn
+        True to discern.
+
+
+
+
+IX.
+
+"Hactenus mendacis formam felicitatis ostendisse suffecerit, quam si
+perspicaciter intueris, ordo est deinceps quae sit uera monstrare." "Atqui
+uideo," inquam, "nec opibus sufficientiam nec regnis potentiam nec
+reuerentiam dignitatibus nec celebritatem gloria nec laetitiam uoluptatibus
+posse contingere." "An etiam causas, cur id ita sit, deprehendisti?" "Tenui
+quidem ueluti rimula mihi uideor intueri, sed ex te apertius cognoscere
+malim."
+
+"Atqui promptissima ratio est. Quod enim simplex est indiuisumque natura,
+id error humanus separat et a uero atque perfecto ad falsum imperfectumque
+traducit. An tu arbitraris quod nihilo indigeat egere potentia?" "Minime,"
+inquam. "Recte tu quidem. Nam si quid est quod in ulla re inbecillioris
+ualentiae sit, in hac praesidio necesse est egeat alieno." "Ita est,"
+inquam. "Igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque una est eademque natura." "Sic
+uidetur." "Quod uero huiusmodi sit, spernendumne esse censes an contra
+rerum omnium ueneratione dignissimum?" "At hoc," inquam, "ne dubitari
+quidem potest." "Addamus igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque reuerentiam, ut
+haec tria unum esse iudicemus." "Addamus, si quidem uera uolumus
+confiteri."
+
+"Quid uero," inquit, "obscurumne hoc atque ignobile censes esse an omni
+celebritate clarissimum? Considera uero, ne quod nihilo indigere, quod
+potentissimum, quod honore dignissimum esse concessum est, egere
+claritudine quam sibi praestare non possit atque ob id aliqua ex parte
+uideatur abiectius." "Non possum," inquam, "quin hoc uti est ita etiam
+celeberrimum esse confitear." "Consequens igitur est ut claritudinem
+superioribus tribus nihil differre fateamur." "Consequitur," inquam. "Quod
+igitur nullius egeat alieni, quod suis cuncta uiribus possit, quod sit
+clarum atque reuerendum, nonne hoc etiam constat esse laetissimum?" "Sed
+unde huic," inquam, "tali maeror ullus obrepat ne cogitare quidem possum;
+quare plenum esse laetitiae, si quidem superiora manebunt, necesse est
+confiteri." "Atqui illud quoque per eadem necessarium est sufficientiae,
+potentiae, claritudinis, reuerentiae, iucunditatis nomina quidem esse
+diuersa, nullo modo uero discrepare substantiam." "Necesse est," inquam.
+"Hoc igitur quod est unum simplexque natura, prauitas humana dispertit et
+dum rei quae partibus caret partem conatur adipisci, nec portionem quae
+nulla est nec ipsam quam minime affectat assequitur." "Quonam," inquam,
+"modo?" "Qui diuitias," inquit, "petit penuriae fuga, de potentia nihil
+laborat, uilis obscurusque esse mauult, multas etiam sibi naturales quoque
+subtrahit uoluptates, ne pecuniam quam parauit amittat. Sed hoc modo ne
+sufficientia quidem contingit ei quem ualentia deserit, quem molestia
+pungit, quem uilitas abicit, quem recondit obscuritas. Qui uero solum posse
+desiderat, profligat opes, despicit uoluptates honoremque potentia carentem
+gloriam quoque nihili pendit. Sed hunc quoque quam multa deficiant uides.
+Fit enim ut aliquando necessariis egeat, ut anxietatibus mordeatur cumque
+haec depellere nequeat, etiam id quod maxime petebat potens esse desistat.
+Similiter ratiocinari de honoribus, gloria, uoluptatibus licet. Nam cum
+unumquodque horum idem quod cetera sit, quisquis horum aliquid sine ceteris
+petit, ne illud quidem quod desiderat apprehendit." "Quid igitur?" inquam.
+"Si qui cuncta simul cupiat adipisci, summam quidem ille beatitudinis
+uelit. Sed num in his eam reperiet, quae demonstrauimus id quod pollicentur
+non posse conferre?" "Minime," inquam. "In his igitur quae singula quaedam
+expetendorum praestare creduntur, beatitudo nullo modo uestiganda est."
+"Fateor," inquam, "et hoc nihil dici uerius potest." "Habes igitur,"
+inquit, "et formam falsae felicitatis et causas. Deflecte nunc in aduersum
+mentis intuitum; ibi enim ueram quam promisimus statim uidebis." "Atqui
+haec," inquam, "uel caeco perspicua est eamque tu paulo ante monstrasti,
+dum falsae causas aperire conaris. Nam nisi fallor ea uera est et perfecta
+felicitas quae sufficientem, potentem, reuerendum, celebrem laetumque
+perficiat. Atque ut me interius animaduertisse cognoscas, quae unum horum,
+quoniam idem cuncta sunt, ueraciter praestare potest hanc esse plenam
+beatitudinem sine ambiguitate cognosco." "O te alumne hac opinione felicem,
+si quidem hoc," inquit, "adieceris...." "Quidnam?" inquam. "Essene aliquid
+in his mortalibus caducisque rebus putas quod huiusmodi statum possit
+afferre?" "Minime," inquam, "puto idque a te, nihil ut amplius desideretur,
+ostensum est." "Haec igitur uel imagines ueri boni uel inperfecta quaedam
+bona dare mortalibus uidentur, uerum autem atque perfectum bonum conferre
+non possunt." "Assentior," inquam. "Quoniam igitur agnouisti quae uera illa
+sit, quae autem beatitudinem mentiantur, nunc superest ut unde ueram hanc
+petere possis agnoscas." "Id quidem," inquam, "iam dudum uehementer
+exspecto." "Sed cum, ut in Timaeo[131] Platoni," inquit, "nostro placet, in
+minimis quoque rebus diuinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc
+faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur?"
+"Inuocandum," inquam, "rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite
+fundatur exordium." "Recte," inquit, ac simul ita modulata est.
+
+
+[131] uti Timaeo _codd. optimi._
+
+
+
+
+  IX.
+
+  "Let it suffice that we have hitherto discovered the form of false
+  felicity, which if thou hast plainly seen, order now requireth that we
+  show thee in what true happiness consisteth." "I see," quoth I, "that
+  neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdoms, nor respect by
+  dignities, nor renown by glory, nor joy can be gotten by pleasures."
+  "Hast thou also understood the causes why it is so?" "Methink I have a
+  little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldst declare them more
+  plainly."
+
+  "The reason is manifest, for that which is simple and undivided of
+  itself, is divided by men's error, and is translated from true and
+  perfect to false and unperfect. Thinkest thou that which needeth
+  nothing, to stand in need of power?" "No," quoth I. "Thou sayest well,
+  for if any power in any respect be weak, in this it must necessarily
+  stand in need of the help of others." "It is true," quoth I. "Wherefore
+  sufficiency and power have one and the same nature." "So it seemeth."
+  "Now thinkest thou, that which is of this sort ought to be despised, or
+  rather that it is worthy to be respected above all other things?" "There
+  can be no doubt of this," quoth I. "Let us add respect then to
+  sufficiency and power, so that we judge these three to be one." "We must
+  add it if we confess the truth."
+
+  "What now," quoth she, "thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or
+  rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether that which thou hast
+  granted to want nothing, to be most potent, and most worthy of honour,
+  may seem to want fame, which it cannot yield itself, and for that cause
+  be in some respect more abject." "I must needs confess," quoth I, "that,
+  being what it is, this is also most famous." "Consequently then we must
+  acknowledge that fame differeth nothing from the former three." "We must
+  so," quoth I. "Wherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can perform
+  all things by its own power, which is famous and respected, is it not
+  manifest that it is also most pleasant?" To which I answered: "How such
+  a man should fall into any grief, I can by no means imagine. Wherefore
+  if that which we have said hitherto be true, we must needs confess that
+  he is most joyful and content." "And by the same reason it followeth
+  that sufficiency, power, fame, respect, pleasure have indeed divers
+  names, but differ not in substance." "It followeth indeed," quoth I.
+  "This then, which is one and simple by nature, man's wickedness
+  divideth, and while he endeavoureth to obtain part of that which hath no
+  parts, he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he
+  seeketh not after." "How is this?" quoth I. "He who seeketh after
+  riches," quoth she, "to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, he had
+  rather be base and obscure, he depriveth himself even of many natural
+  pleasures that he may not lose the money which he hath gotten. But by
+  this means he attaineth not to sufficiency, whom power forsaketh, whom
+  trouble molesteth, whom baseness maketh abject, whom obscurity
+  overwhelmeth. Again, he that only desireth power, consumeth wealth,
+  despiseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not
+  potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For
+  sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and
+  being not able to rid himself, ceaseth to be powerful, which was the
+  only thing he aimed at. The like discourse may be made of honours,
+  glory, pleasures. For since every one of these things is the same with
+  the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth
+  not that which he desireth." "What then?" quoth I. "If one should desire
+  to have them all together, he should wish for the sum of happiness, but
+  shall he find it in these things which we have showed cannot perform
+  what they promise?" "No," quoth I. "Wherefore we must by no means seek
+  for happiness in these things which are thought to afford the several
+  portions of that which is to be desired." "I confess it," quoth I, "and
+  nothing can be more true than this." "Now then," quoth she, "thou hast
+  both the form and causes of false felicity; cast but the eyes of thy
+  mind on the contrary, and thou shalt presently espy true happiness,
+  which we promised to show thee." "This," quoth I, "is evident, even to
+  him that is blind, and thou showedst it a little before, while thou
+  endeavouredst to lay open the causes of the false. For, if I be not
+  deceived, that is true and perfect happiness which maketh a man
+  sufficient, potent, respected, famous, joyful. And that thou mayest know
+  that I understood thee aright, that which can truly perform any one of
+  these because they are all one, I acknowledge to be full and perfect
+  happiness." "O my scholar, I think thee happy by having this opinion, if
+  thou addest this also." "What?" quoth I. "Dost thou imagine that there
+  is any mortal or frail thing which can cause this happy estate?" "I do
+  not," quoth I, "and that hath been so proved by thee, that more cannot
+  be desired." "Wherefore these things seem to afford men the images of
+  the true good, or certain unperfect goods, but they cannot give them the
+  true and perfect good itself." "I am of the same mind," quoth I. "Now
+  then, since thou knowest wherein true happiness consisteth, and what
+  have only a false show of it, it remaineth that thou shouldst learn
+  where thou mayest seek for this which is true." "This is that," quoth I,
+  "which I have long earnestly expected." "But since, as Plato teacheth
+  (in Timaeus),[132] we must implore God's assistance even in our least
+  affairs, what, thinkest thou, must we do now, that we may deserve to
+  find the seat of that sovereign good?" "We must," quoth I, "invocate the
+  Father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good
+  foundation." "Thou sayest rightly," quoth she, and withal sung in this
+  sort.
+
+
+  [132] Cf. _Tim._ 27.
+
+
+
+
+IX.
+
+"O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas
+Terrarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo
+Ire iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moueri.
+Quem non externae pepulerunt fingere causae
+Materiae fluitantis opus, uerum insita summi                              5
+Forma boni liuore carens, tu cuncta superno
+Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
+Mundum mente gerens similique in imagine formans
+Perfectasque iubens perfectum absoluere partes.
+Tu numeris elementa ligas ut frigora flammis                             10
+Arida conueniant liquidis, ne purior ignis
+Euolet aut mersas deducant pondera terras.
+Tu triplicis mediam naturae cuncta mouentem
+Conectens animam per consona membra resoluis.
+Quae cum secta duos motum glomerauit in orbes,                           15
+In semet reditura meat mentemque profundam
+Circuit et simili conuertit imagine caelum.
+Tu causis animas paribus uitasque minores
+Prouehis et leuibus sublimes curribus aptans
+In caelum terramque seris quas lege benigna                              20
+Ad te conuersas reduci facis igne reuerti.
+Da pater augustam menti conscendere sedem,
+Da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta
+In te conspicuos animi defigere uisus.
+Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis                                25
+Atque tuo splendore mica! Tu namque serenum,
+Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,
+Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem.
+
+
+
+
+  IX.[133]
+
+  "O Thou, that dost the world in lasting order guide,
+  Father of heaven and earth, Who makest time swiftly slide,
+  And, standing still Thyself, yet fram'st all moving laws,
+  Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause:
+  But by a sweet desire, where envy hath no place,
+  Thy goodness moving Thee to give each thing his grace,
+  Thou dost all creatures' forms from highest patterns take,
+  From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make.
+  Thus Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame.
+  Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixed with flame
+  And dry things join with moist, lest fire away should fly,
+  Or earth, opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.
+  Thou in consenting parts fitly disposed hast
+  Th'all-moving soul in midst of threefold nature placed,
+  Which, cut in several parts that run a different race,
+  Into itself returns, and circling doth embrace
+  The highest mind, and heaven with like proportion drives.
+  Thou with like cause dost make the souls and lesser lives,
+  Fix them in chariots swift, and widely scatterest
+  O'er heaven and earth; then at Thy fatherly behest
+  They stream, like fire returning, back to Thee, their God.
+  Dear Father, let my mind Thy hallowed seat ascend,
+  Let me behold the spring of grace and find Thy light,
+  That I on Thee may fix my soul's well clearéd sight.
+  Cast off the earthly weight wherewith I am opprest,
+  Shine as Thou art most bright, Thou only calm and rest
+  To pious men whose end is to behold Thy ray,
+  Who their beginning art, their guide, their bound, and way.[134]
+
+
+  [133] This poem is a masterly abridgment of the first part of the
+  _Timaeus_, and was eagerly fastened on by commentators of the early
+  Middle Ages whose direct knowledge of Plato was confined to the
+  translation of that dialogue by Chalcidius.
+
+  [134] Cf. the string of nouns in _Tr._ iv. (_supra_, p. 70 _ad fin._).
+
+
+
+
+X.
+
+Quoniam igitur quae sit imperfecti, quae etiam perfecti boni forma uidisti,
+nunc demonstrandum reor quonam haec felicitatis perfectio constituta sit.
+In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum quale
+paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei
+subiectae ueritatem cassa cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin exsistat
+sitque hoc ueluti quidam omnium fons bonorum negari nequit. Omne enim quod
+inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse
+perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere inperfectum quid esse
+uideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim
+perfectione sublata, unde illud quod inperfectum perhibetur exstiterit ne
+fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum
+coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema
+atque effeta dilabitur. Quod si, uti paulo ante monstrauimus, est quaedam
+boni fragilis inperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non
+potest dubitari." "Firmissime," inquam, "uerissimeque conclusum est." "Quo
+uero," inquit, "habitet, ita considera. Deum rerum omnium principem bonum
+esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil deo melius
+excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet? Ita uero
+bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse
+conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit. Erit
+enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius
+atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora
+esse claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est
+summum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Sed perfectum bonum
+ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus; ueram igitur beatitudinem in summo
+deo sitam esse necesse est." "Accipio," inquam, "nec est quod contradici
+ullo modo queat." "Sed quaeso," inquit, "te uide quam id sancte atque
+inuiolabiliter probes quod boni summi summum deum diximus esse
+plenissimum." "Quonam," inquam, "modo?" "Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem illud
+summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur uel extrinsecus accepisse uel ita
+naturaliter habere praesumas, quasi habentis dei habitaeque beatitudinis
+diuersam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes,
+praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis. Sed
+hunc esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur. Quod si
+natura quidem inest, sed est ratione diuersum, cum de rerum principe
+loquamur deo, fingat qui potest: quis haec diuersa coniunxerit? Postremo
+quod a qualibet re diuersum est, id non est illud a quo intellegitur esse
+diuersum. Quare quod a summo bono diuersum est sui natura, id summum bonum
+non est--quod nefas est de eo cogitare quo nihil constat esse praestantius.
+Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit exsistere,
+quare quod omnium principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonum
+uerissima ratione concluserim." "Rectissime," inquam. "Sed summum bonum
+beatitudinem esse concessum est." "Ita est," inquam. "Igitur," inquit,
+"deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri." "Nec propositis,"
+inquam, "prioribus refragari queo et illis hoc inlatum consequens esse
+perspicio."
+
+"Respice," inquit, "an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa
+bona quae a se diuersa sint esse non possunt. Etenim quae discrepant bona,
+non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet; quare neutrum poterit esse
+perfectum, cum alterutri alterum deest. Sed quod perfectum non sit, id
+summum non esse manifestum est; nullo modo igitur quae summa sunt bona ea
+possunt esse diuersa. Atqui et beatitudinem et deum summum bonum esse
+collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinem quae sit summa
+diuinitas." "Nihil," inquam, "nec reapse uerius[135] nec ratiocinatione
+firmius nec deo dignius concludi potest." "Super haec," inquit, "igitur
+ueluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae
+porismata ipsi uocant, ita ego quoque tibi ueluti corollarium dabo. Nam
+quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beatitudo uero est ipsa
+diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione beatos fieri manifestum est: sed uti
+iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatem
+adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus deus,
+sed natura quidem unus; participatione uero nihil prohibet esse quam
+plurimos." "Et pulchrum," inquam, "hoc atque pretiosum, siue porisma siue
+corollarium uocari mauis." "Atqui hoc quoque pulchrius nihil est, quod his
+annectendum esse ratio persuadet." "Quid?" inquam.
+
+"Cum multa," inquit, "beatitudo continere uideatur, utrumne haec omnia unum
+ueluti corpus beatitudinis quadam partium uarietate coniungant an sit eorum
+aliquid quod beatitudinis substantiam compleat, ad hoc uero cetera
+referantur?" "Vellem," inquam, "id ipsarum rerum commemoratione
+patefaceres." "Nonne," inquit, "beatitudinem bonum esse censemus?" "Ac
+summum quidem," inquam. "Addas," inquit, "hoc omnibus licet. Nam eadem
+sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reuerentia quoque, claritas
+ac uoluptas beatitudo esse iudicatur. Quid igitur? Haecine omnia
+bonum--sufficientia potentia ceteraque--ueluti quaedam beatitudinis membra
+sunt an ad bonum ueluti ad uerticem cuncta referuntur?" "Intellego,"
+inquam, "quid inuestigandum proponas, sed quid constituas audire desidero."
+"Cuius discretionem rei sic accipe. Si haec omnia beatitudinis membra
+forent, a se quoque inuicem discreparent. Haec est enim partium natura ut
+unum corpus diuersa componant. Atqui haec omnia idem esse monstrata sunt;
+minime igitur membra sunt. Alioquin ex uno membro beatitudo uidebitur esse
+coniuncta--quod fieri nequit." "Id quidem," inquam, "dubium non est, sed
+id quod restat exspecto." "Ad bonum uero cetera referri palam est. Idcirco
+enim sufficientia petitur quoniam bonum esse iudicatur, idcirco potentia
+quoniam id quoque esse creditur bonum; idem de reuerentia, claritudine,
+iucunditate coniectare licet. Omnium igitur expetendorum summa atque causa
+bonum est. Quod enim neque re neque similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum,
+id expeti nullo modo potest. Contraque etiam quae natura bona non sunt,
+tamen si esse uideantur, quasi uere bona sint appetuntur. Quo fit uti
+summa, cardo atque causa expetendorum omnium bonitas esse iure credatur.
+Cuius uero causa quid expetitur, id maxime uidetur optari, ueluti si
+salutis causa quispiam uelit equitare, non tam equitandi motum desiderat
+quam salutis effectum. Cum igitur omnia boni gratia petantur, non illa
+potius quam bonum ipsum desideratur ab omnibus. Sed propter quod cetera
+optantur, beatitudinem esse concessimus; quare sic quoque sola quaeritur
+beatitudo. Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni et beatitudinis unam atque
+eandem esse substantiam." "Nihil uideo cur dissentire quispiam possit."
+"Sed deum ueramque beatitudinem unum atque idem esse monstrauimus." "Ita,"
+inquam. "Securo igitur concludere licet dei quoque in ipso bono nec usquam
+alio sitam esse substantiam.
+
+
+[135] reapse uerius _Schepss_: re ab seuerius _uel_ re ipsa uerius _codd.
+opt._
+
+
+
+
+  X.
+
+  Wherefore since thou hast seen what is the form of perfect and imperfect
+  good, now I think we must show in what this perfection of happiness is
+  placed. And inquire first whether there can be any such good extant in
+  the world, as thou hast defined; lest, contrary to truth, we be deceived
+  with an empty show of thought. But it cannot be denied that there is
+  some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness.
+  For all that is said to be imperfect is so termed for the want it hath
+  of perfection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something
+  imperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind.
+  For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there
+  should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that
+  which is defective and not complete, but, proceeding from entire and
+  absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and enfeebled. But if, as
+  we showed before, there be a certain imperfect felicity of frail goods,
+  it cannot be doubted but that there is some solid and perfect happiness
+  also." "Thou hast," quoth I, "concluded most firmly and most truly."
+  "Now where this good dwelleth," quoth she, "consider this. The common
+  conceit of men's minds proveth that God the Prince of all things is
+  good. For, since nothing can be imagined better than God, who doubteth
+  but that is good than which is nothing better? And reason doth in such
+  sort demonstrate God to be good that it convinceth Him to be perfectly
+  good. For unless He were so, He could not be the chief of all things.
+  For there would be something better than He, having perfect goodness,
+  which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than He. For it
+  is already manifest that perfect things were before the imperfect.
+  Wherefore, lest our reasoning should have no end, we must confess that
+  the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign and perfect goodness. But we
+  have concluded that perfect goodness is true happiness, wherefore true
+  blessedness must necessarily be placed in the most high God." "I agree,"
+  quoth I, "neither can this be any way contradicted." "But I pray thee,"
+  quoth she, "see how boldly and inviolably thou approvest that which we
+  said, that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign goodness." "How?"
+  quoth I. "That thou presumest not that this Father of all things hath
+  either received from others that sovereign good with which He is said to
+  be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort that thou shouldst
+  think that the substance of the blessedness which is had, and of God who
+  hath it, were diverse. For if thou thinkest that He had it from others,
+  thou mayest also infer that he who gave it was better than the receiver.
+  But we most worthily confess that He is the most excellent of all
+  things. And if He hath it by nature, but as a diverse thing, since we
+  speak of God the Prince of all things, let him that can, invent who
+  united these diverse things. Finally, that which is different from
+  anything, is not that from which it is understood to differ. Wherefore
+  that which is naturally different from the sovereign good, is not the
+  sovereign good itself. Which it were impious to think of God, than whom,
+  we know certainly, nothing is better. For doubtless the nature of
+  nothing can be better than the beginning of it. Wherefore I may most
+  truly conclude that which is the beginning of all things to be also in
+  His own substance the chiefest good." "Most rightly," quoth I. "But it
+  is granted that the chiefest good is blessedness?" "It is," quoth I.
+  "Wherefore," quoth she, "we must needs confess that blessedness itself
+  is God." "I can neither contradict," quoth I, "thy former propositions,
+  and I see this illation followeth from them."
+
+  "Consider," saith she, "if the same be not more firmly proved hence,
+  because there cannot be two chief goods, the one different from the
+  other. For it is manifest that of those goods which differ, the one is
+  not the other, wherefore neither of them can be perfect, wanting the
+  other. But manifestly that which is not perfect, is not the chiefest,
+  wherefore the chief goods cannot be diverse. Now we have proved that
+  both blessedness and God are the chiefest good, wherefore that must
+  needs be the highest blessedness which is the highest divinity." "There
+  can be nothing," quoth I, "concluded more truly than this, nor more
+  firmly in arguing, nor more worthy God himself." "Upon this then," quoth
+  she, "as the geometricians[136] are wont, out of their propositions
+  which they have demonstrated, to infer something which they call
+  _porismata_ (deductions) so will I give thee as it were a
+  _corollarium_. For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining
+  of blessedness, and blessedness is nothing else but divinity, it is
+  manifest that men are made blessed by the obtaining of divinity. And as
+  men are made just by the obtaining of justice, and wise by the obtaining
+  of wisdom, so they who obtain divinity must needs in like manner become
+  gods. Wherefore everyone that is blessed is a god, but by nature there
+  is only one God; but there may be many by participation." "This is,"
+  quoth I, "an excellent and precious _porisma_ or
+  _corollarium_." "But there is nothing more excellent than that
+  which reason persuadeth us to add." "What?" quoth I.
+
+  "Since," quoth she, "blessedness seemeth to contain many things, whether
+  do they all concur as divers parts to the composition of one entire body
+  of blessedness, or doth some one of them form the substance of
+  blessedness to which the rest are to be referred?" "I desire," quoth I,
+  "that thou wouldst declare this point, by the enumeration of the
+  particulars." "Do we not think," quoth she, "that blessedness is good?"
+  "Yea, the chiefest good," quoth I. "Thou mayest," quoth she, "add this
+  to them all. For blessedness is accounted the chiefest sufficiency, the
+  chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? Are all these--
+  sufficiency, power, and the rest--the good, in the sense that they are
+  members of it, or rather are they referred to good as to the head?" "I
+  understand," quoth I, "what thou proposest, but I desire to hear what
+  thou concludest." "This is the decision of this matter. If all these
+  were members of blessedness, they should differ one from another. For
+  this is the nature of parts, that being divers they compose one body.
+  But we have proved that all these are one and the same thing. Wherefore
+  they are no members, otherwise blessedness should be compacted of one
+  member, which cannot be." "There is no doubt of this," quoth I, "but I
+  expect that which is behind." "It is manifest that the rest are to be
+  referred to goodness; for sufficiency is desired, because it is esteemed
+  good, and likewise power, because that likewise is thought to be good.
+  And we may conjecture the same of respect, fame, and pleasure. Wherefore
+  goodness is the sum and cause of all that is desired. For that which is
+  neither good indeed, nor beareth any show of goodness, can by no means
+  be sought after. And contrariwise those things which are not good of
+  their own nature, yet, if they seem such, are desired as if they were
+  truly good. So that the sum, origin, and cause of all that is sought
+  after is rightly thought to be goodness. And that on account of which a
+  thing is sought, seemeth to be the chief object of desire. As if one
+  would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of
+  riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore, since all things are desired
+  in respect of goodness, they are not so much wished for as goodness
+  itself. But we granted that to be blessedness for which other things are
+  desired, wherefore in like manner only blessedness is sought after; by
+  which it plainly appeareth, that goodness and blessedness have one and
+  the self-same substance." "I see not how any man can dissent." "But we
+  have showed that God and true blessedness are one and the self-same
+  thing." "It is so," quoth I. "We may then securely conclude that the
+  substance of God consisteth in nothing else but in goodness.
+
+
+  [136] _Vide supra_, _Tr_. iii. p. 40.
+
+
+
+
+X.
+
+Huc omnes pariter uenite capti
+Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis
+Terrenas habitans libido mentes,
+Haec erit uobis requies laborum,
+Hic portus placida manens quiete,                                         5
+Hoc patens unum miseris asylum,
+Non quidquid Tagus aureis harenis
+Donat aut Hermus rutilante ripa
+Aut Indus calido propinquus orbi
+Candidis miscens uirides lapillos,                                       10
+Inlustrent aciem magisque caecos
+In suas condunt animos tenebras.
+Hoc quidquid placet excitatque mentes,
+Infimis tellus aluit cauernis;
+Splendor quo regitur uigetque caelum,                                    15
+Vitat obscuras animae ruinas.
+Hanc quisquis poterit notare lucem,
+Candidos Phoebi radios negabit."
+
+
+
+
+  X.[137]
+
+    Come hither, all you that are bound,
+    Whose base and earthly minds are drowned
+  By lust which doth them tie in cruel chains:
+    Here is a seat for men opprest,
+    Here is a port of pleasant rest;
+  Here may a wretch have refuge from his pains.
+    No gold, which Tagus' sands bestow,
+    Nor which on Hermus' banks doth flow,
+  Nor precious stones which scorched Indians get[138],
+    Can clear the sharpness of the mind,
+    But rather make it far more blind,
+  And in the farther depth of darkness set.
+    For this that sets our souls on work
+    Buried in caves of earth doth lurk.
+  But heaven is guided by another light,
+    Which causeth us to shun the dark[139],
+    And who this light doth truly mark,
+  Must needs deny that Phoebus' beams are bright."
+
+
+  [137] For the discussion on the nature of good in this poem and the next
+  piece of prose cf. _supra_, pp. 38 ff.
+
+  [138] Literally, "Nor Indus, neighbour of the torrid zone, blending its
+  green and white pebbles."
+
+  [139] Literally, "The light which gives guidance and vigour to the sky
+  shuns the darkness of ruined minds."
+
+
+
+
+XI.
+
+"Assentior," inquam, "cuncta enim firmissimis nexa rationibus constant."
+Tum illa, "Quanti," inquit, "aestimabis, si bonum ipsum quid sit
+agnoueris?" "Infinito," inquam, "si quidem mihi pariter deum quoque qui
+bonum est continget agnoscere." "Atqui hoc uerissima," inquit, "ratione
+patefaciam, maneant modo quae paulo ante conclusa sunt." "Manebunt."
+"Nonne," inquit, "monstrauimus ea quae appetuntur pluribus idcirco uera
+perfectaque bona non esse quoniam a se inuicem discreparent cumque alteri
+abesset alterum, plenum absolutumque bonum afferre non posse? Tum autem
+uerum bonum fieri cum in unam ueluti formam atque efficientiam colliguntur,
+ut quae sufficientia est, eadem sit potentia, reuerentia, claritas atque
+iucunditas, nisi uero unum atque idem omnia sint, nihil habere quo inter
+expetenda numerentur?" "Demonstratum," inquam, "nec dubitari ullo modo
+potest." "Quae igitur cum discrepant minime bona sunt, cum uero unum esse
+coeperint, bona fiunt; nonne haec ut bona sint, unitatis fieri adeptione
+contingit?" "Ita," inquam, "uidetur." "Sed omne quod bonum est boni
+participatione bonum esse concedis an minime?" "Ita est." "Oportet igitur
+idem esse unum atque bonum simili ratione concedas; eadem namque substantia
+est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diuersus effectus." "Negare," inquam,
+"nequeo." "Nostine igitur," inquit, "omne quod est tam diu manere atque
+subsistere quam diu sit unum, sed interire atque dissolui pariter atque
+unum destiterit?" "Quonam modo?" "Vt in animalibus," inquit, "cum in unum
+coeunt ac permanent anima corpusque, id animal uocatur; cum uero haec
+unitas utriusque separatione dissoluitur, interire nec iam esse animal
+liquet. Ipsum quoque corpus cum in una forma membrorum coniunctione
+permanet, humana uisitur species; at si distributae segregataeque partes
+corporis distraxerint unitatem, desinit esse quod fuerat. Eoque modo
+percurrenti cetera procul dubio patebit subsistere unumquodque, dum unum
+est, cum uero unum esse desinit, interire." "Consideranti," inquam, "mihi
+plura minime aliud uidetur." "Estne igitur," inquit, "quod in quantum
+naturaliter agat relicta subsistendi appetentia uenire ad interitum
+corruptionemque desideret?"  "Si animalia," inquam, "considerem quae habent
+aliquam uolendi nolendique naturam, nihil inuenio quod nullis extra
+cogentibus abiciant manendi intentionem et ad interitum sponte festinent.
+Omne namque animal tueri salutem laborat, mortem uero perniciemque deuitat.
+Sed quid de herbis arboribusque, quid de inanimatis omnino consentiam rebus
+prorsus dubito."
+
+"Atqui non est quod de hoc quoque possis ambigere, cum herbas atque arbores
+intuearis primum sibi conuenientibus innasci locis, ubi quantum earum
+natura queat cito exarescere atque interire non possint. Nam aliae quidem
+campis aliae montibus oriuntur, alias ferunt paludes, aliae saxis haerent,
+aliarum fecundae sunt steriles harenae, quas si in alia quispiam loca
+transferre conetur, arescant. Sed dat cuique natura quod conuenit et ne,
+dum manere possunt, intereant, elaborat. Quid quod omnes uelut in terras
+ore demerso trahunt alimenta radicibus ac per medullas robur corticemque
+diffundunt? Quid quod mollissimum quidque, sicuti medulla est, interiore
+semper sede reconditur, extra uero quadam ligni firmitate, ultimus autem
+cortex aduersum caeli intemperiem quasi mali patiens defensor opponitur?
+Iam uero quanta est naturae diligentia, ut cuncta semine multiplicato
+propagentur! Quae omnia non modo ad tempus manendi uerum generatim quoque
+quasi in perpetuum permanendi ueluti quasdam machinas esse quis nesciat? Ea
+etiam quae inanimata esse creduntur nonne quod suum est quaeque simili
+ratione desiderant? Cur enim flammas quidem sursum leuitas uehit, terras
+uero deorsum pondus deprimit, nisi quod haec singulis loca motionesque
+conueniunt? Porro autem quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque
+conseruat, sicuti ea quae sunt inimica corrumpunt. Iam uero quae dura sunt
+ut lapides, adhaerent tenacissime partibus suis et ne facile dissoluantur
+resistunt. Quae uero liquentia ut aer atque aqua, facile quidem
+diuidentibus cedunt, sed cito in ea rursus a quibus sunt abscisa
+relabuntur, ignis uero omnem refugit sectionem. Neque nunc nos de
+uoluntariis animae cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione
+tractamus, sicuti est quod acceptas escas sine cogitatione transigimus,
+quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes; nam ne in animalibus quidem
+manendi amor ex animae uoluntatibus, uerum ex naturae principiis uenit. Nam
+saepe mortem cogentibus causis quam natura reformidat uoluntas amplectitur,
+contraque illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas gignendi opus,
+quod natura semper appetit, interdum coercet uoluntas. Adeo haec sui
+caritas non ex animali motione sed ex naturali intentione procedit. Dedit
+enim prouidentia creatis a se rebus hanc uel maximam manendi causam ut
+quoad possunt naturaliter manere desiderent; quare nihil est quod ullo modo
+queas dubitare cuncta quae sunt appetere naturaliter constantiam
+permanendi, deuitare perniciem."
+
+"Confiteor," inquam, "nunc me indubitato cernere quae dudum incerta
+uidebantur." "Quod autem," inquit, "subsistere ac permanere petit, id unum
+esse desiderat; hoc enim sublato ne esse quidem cuiquam permanebit." "Verum
+est," inquam. "Omnia igitur," inquit, "unum desiderant." Consensi. "Sed
+unum id ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum." "Ita quidem." "Cuncta igitur
+bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas licet: ipsum bonum esse quod
+desideretur ab omnibus." "Nihil," inquam, "uerius excogitari potest. Nam
+uel ad nihil unum cuncta referuntur et uno ueluti uertice destituta sine
+rectore fluitabunt, aut si quid est ad quod uniuersa festinent, id erit
+omnium summum bonorum." Et illa: "Nimium," inquit, "o alumne laetor, ipsam
+enim mediae ueritatis notam mente fixisti. Sed in hoc patuit tibi quod
+ignorare te paulo ante dicebas." "Quid?" inquam. "Quis esset," inquit,
+"rerum omnium finis. Is est enim profecto, quod desideratur ab omnibus,
+quod quia bonum esse collegimus, oportet rerum omnium finem bonum esse
+fateamur.
+
+
+
+
+  XI.
+
+  "I consent," quoth I, "for all is grounded upon most firm reasons." "But
+  what account wilt thou make," quoth she, "to know what goodness itself
+  is?" "I will esteem it infinitely," quoth I, "because by this means I
+  shall come to know God also, who is nothing else but goodness." "I will
+  conclude this," quoth she, "most certainly, if those things be not
+  denied which I have already proved." "They shall not," quoth I. "Have we
+  not proved," quoth she, "that those things which are desired of many,
+  are not true and perfect goods, because they differ one from another
+  and, being separated, cannot cause complete and absolute goodness, which
+  is only found when they are united as it were into one form and
+  causality, that the same may be sufficiency, power, respect, fame, and
+  pleasure? And except they be all one and the same thing, that they have
+  nothing worth the desiring?" "It hath been proved," quoth I, "neither
+  can it be any way doubted of." "Those things, then, which, when they
+  differ, are not good and when they are one, become good, are they not
+  made good by obtaining unity?" "So methink," quoth I. "But dost thou
+  grant that all that is good is good by partaking goodness?" "It is so."
+  "Thou must grant then likewise that unity and goodness are the same. For
+  those things have the same substance, which naturally have not diverse
+  effects." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Knowest thou then," quoth she,
+  "that everything that is doth so long remain and subsist as it is one,
+  and perisheth and is dissolved so soon as it ceaseth to be one?" "How?"
+  "As in living creatures," quoth she, "so long as the body and soul
+  remain united, the living creature remaineth. But when this unity is
+  dissolved by their separation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is
+  no longer a living creature. The body also itself, so long as it
+  remaineth in one form by the conjunction of the parts, appeareth the
+  likeness of a man. But if the members of the body, being separated and
+  sundered, have lost their unity, it is no longer the same. And in like
+  manner it will be manifest to him that will descend to other
+  particulars, that everything continueth so long as it is one, and
+  perisheth when it loseth unity." "Considering more particulars, I find
+  it to be no otherwise." "Is there anything," quoth she, "that in the
+  course of nature, leaving the desire of being, seeketh to come to
+  destruction and corruption?" "If," quoth I, "I consider living creatures
+  which have any nature to will and nill, I find nothing that without
+  extern compulsion forsake the intention to remain, and of their own
+  accord hasten to destruction. For every living creature laboureth to
+  preserve his health, and escheweth death and detriment. But what I
+  should think of herbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am
+  altogether doubtful."
+
+  "But there is no cause why thou shouldst doubt of this, if thou
+  considerest first that herbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their
+  nature, where, so much as their constitution permitteth, they cannot
+  soon wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other upon hills, some
+  in fenny, other in stony places, and the barren sands are fertile for
+  some, which if thou wouldst transplant into other places they die. But
+  nature giveth every one that which is fitting, and striveth to keep them
+  from decaying so long as they can remain. What should I tell thee, if
+  all of them, thrusting as it were their lips into the ground, draw
+  nourishment by their roots, and convey substance and bark by the inward
+  pith? What, that always the softest, as the pith, is placed within, and
+  is covered without by the strength of the wood, and last of all the bark
+  is exposed to the weather, as being best able to bear it off? And how
+  great is the diligence of nature that all things may continue by the
+  multiplication of seed; all which who knoweth not to be, as it were,
+  certain engines, not only to remain for a time, but successively in a
+  manner to endure for ever? Those things also which are thought to be
+  without all life, doth not every one in like manner desire that which
+  appertaineth to their own good? For why doth levity lift up flames, or
+  heaviness weigh down the earth, but because these places and motions are
+  convenient for them? And that which is agreeable to everything
+  conserveth it, as that which is opposite causeth corruption. Likewise
+  those things which are hard, as stones, stick most firmly to their
+  parts, and make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid things,
+  as air and water, are indeed easily divided, but do easily also join
+  again. And fire flieth all division. Neither do we now treat of the
+  voluntary motions of the understanding soul, but only of natural
+  operations. Of which sort is, to digest that which we have eaten,
+  without thinking of it, to breathe in our sleep not thinking what we do.
+  For even in living creatures the love of life proceedeth not from the
+  will of the soul, but from the principles of nature. For the will many
+  times embraceth death upon urgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and
+  contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of
+  mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though
+  nature doth always desire it. So true it is that this self-love
+  proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from natural intention.
+  For providence gave to her creatures this as the greatest cause of
+  continuance, that they naturally desire to continue so long as they may,
+  wherefore there is no cause why thou shouldst any way doubt that all
+  things which are desire naturally stability of remaining, and eschew
+  corruption."
+
+  "I confess," quoth I, "that I now see undoubtedly that which before
+  seemed very doubtful." "Now that," quoth she, "which desireth to
+  continue and remain seeketh to have unity. For if this be taken away,
+  being itself cannot remain." "It is true," quoth I. "All things then,"
+  quoth she, "desire unity." I granted it to be so. "But we have showed
+  that unity is the same as goodness." "You have indeed." "All things then
+  desire goodness, which thou mayest define thus: Goodness is that which
+  is desired of all things." "There can be nothing imagined more true. For
+  either all things have reference to no one principle and, being
+  destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusion without any
+  ruler: or if there be anything to which all things hasten, that must be
+  the chiefest of all goods." "I rejoice greatly O scholar," quoth she,
+  "for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very mark of verity. But in this
+  thou hast discovered that which a little before thou saidest thou wert
+  ignorant of." "What is that?" quoth I. "What the end of all things is,"
+  quoth she. "For certainly it is that which is desired of all things,
+  which since we have concluded to be goodness, we must also confess that
+  goodness is the end of all things.
+
+
+
+
+XI.
+
+Quisquis profunda mente uestigat uerum
+Cupitque nullis ille deuiis falli,
+In se reuoluat intimi lucem uisus
+Longosque in orbem cogat inflectens motus
+Animumque doceat quidquid extra molitur                                   5
+Suis retrusum possidere thesauris.
+Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes
+Lucebit ipso perspicacius Phoebo.
+Non omne namque mente depulit lumen
+Obliuiosam corpus inuehens molem.                                        10
+Haeret profecto semen introrsum ueri
+Quod excitatur uentilante doctrina.
+Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
+Ni mersus alto uiueret fomes corde?
+Quod si Platonis Musa personat uerum,                                    15
+Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur."
+
+
+
+
+  XI.
+
+  He that would seek the truth with thoughts profound
+  And would not stray in ways that are not right,
+  He to himself must turn his inward sight,
+  And guide his motions in a circled round,
+  Teaching his mind that ever she design
+  Herself in her own treasures to possess:
+  So that which late lay hidden in cloudiness
+  More bright and clear than Phoebus' beams shall shine.
+  Flesh hath not quenched all the spirit's light,
+  Though this oblivion's lump holds her opprest.
+  Some seed of truth remaineth in our breast,
+  Which skilful learning eas'ly doth excite.
+  For being askt how can we answer true
+  Unless that grace within our hearts did dwell?
+  If Plato's heavenly muse the truth us tell,
+  We learning things remember them anew."[140]
+
+
+  [140] For Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence cf. _Meno_ 81-86, and
+  _Phaedo_ 72-76.
+
+
+
+XII.
+
+Tum ego: "Platoni," inquam, "uehementer assentior, nam me horum iam secundo
+commemoras, primum quod memoriam corporea contagione, dehinc cum maeroris
+mole pressus amisi." Tum illa: "Si priora," inquit, "concessa respicias, ne
+illud quidem longius aberit quin recorderis quod te dudum nescire confessus
+es." "Quid?" inquam. "Quibus," ait illa, "gubernaculis mundus regatur."
+"Memini," inquam, "me inscitiam meam fuisse confessum, sed quid afferas,
+licet iam prospiciam, planius tamen ex te audire desidero." "Mundum,"
+inquit, "hunc deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas." "Ne nunc
+quidem arbitror," inquam, "nec umquam dubitandum putabo quibusque in hoc
+rationibus accedam breuiter exponam. Mundus hic ex tam diuersis
+contrariisque partibus in unam formam minime conuenisset, nisi unus esset
+qui tam diuersa coniungeret. Coniuncta uero naturarum ipsa diuersitas
+inuicem discors dissociaret atque diuelleret, nisi unus esset qui quod
+nexuit contineret. Non tam uero certus naturae ordo procederet nec tam
+dispositos motus locis, temporibus, efficientia, spatiis, qualitatibus
+explicarent, nisi unus esset qui has mutationum uarietates manens ipse
+disponeret.  Hoc quidquid est quo condita manent atque agitantur, usitato
+cunctis uocabulo deum nomino."
+
+Tum illa: "Cum haec," inquit, "ita sentias, paruam mihi restare operam puto
+ut felicitatis compos patriam sospes reuisas. Sed quae proposuimus
+intueamur. Nonne in beatitudine sufficientiam numerauimus deumque
+beatitudinem ipsam esse consensimus?" "Ita quidem." "Et ad mundum igitur,"
+inquit, "regendum nullis extrinsecus adminiculis indigebit; alioquin si quo
+egeat, plenam sufficientiam non habebit." "Id," inquam, "ita est
+necessarium." "Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit." "Negari," inquam,
+"nequit." "Atqui deus ipsum bonum esse monstratus est." "Memini," inquam.
+"Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit, si quidem per se regit omnia quem bonum
+esse consensimus et hic est ueluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum quo
+mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur." "Vehementer
+assentior," inquam, "et id te paulo ante dicturam tenui licet suspicione
+prospexi." "Credo;" inquit, "iam enim ut arbitror uigilantius ad cernenda
+uera oculos deducis. Sed quod dicam non minus ad contuendum patet." "Quid?"
+inquam. "Cum deus," inquit, "omnia bonitatis clauo gubernare iure credatur
+eademque omnia sicuti docui ad bonum naturali intentione festinent, num
+dubitari potest quin uoluntaria regantur seque ad disponentis nutum ueluti
+conuenientia contemperataque rectori sponte conuertant?" "Ita," inquam,
+"necesse est; nec beatum regimen esse uideretur, si quidem detrectantium
+iugum foret, non obtemperantium salus." "Nihil est igitur quod naturam
+seruans deo contraire conetur." "Nihil," inquam. "Quod si conetur," ait,
+"num tandem proficiet quidquam aduersus eum quem iure beatitudinis
+potentissimum esse concessimus?" "Prorsus," inquam, "nihil ualeret." "Non
+est igitur aliquid quod summo huic bono uel uelit uel possit obsistere."
+"Non," inquam, "arbitror." "Est igitur summum," inquit, "bonum quod regit
+cuncta fortiter suauiterque disponit." Tum ego: "Quam," inquam, "me non
+modo ea quae conclusa est summa rationum, uerum multo magis haec ipsa
+quibus uteris uerba delectant, ut tandem aliquando stultitiam magna
+lacerantem sui pudeat."
+
+"Accepisti," inquit, "in fabulis lacessentes caelum Gigantas; sed illos
+quoque, uti condignum fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit. Sed uisne rationes
+ipsas inuicem collidamus? Forsitan ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulchra
+quaedam ueritatis scintilla dissiliat." "Tuo," inquam, "arbitratu." "Deum,"
+inquit, "esse omnium potentem nemo dubitauerit." "Qui quidem," inquam,
+"mente consistat, nullus prorsus ambigat." "Qui uero est," inquit, "omnium
+potens, nihil est quod ille non possit." "Nihil," inquam. "Num igitur deus
+facere malum potest?" "Minime," inquam. "Malum igitur," inquit, "nihil est,
+cum id facere ille non possit, qui nihil non potest." "Ludisne," inquam,
+"me inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens, quae nunc quidem qua
+egrediaris introeas, nunc uero quo introieris egrediare, an mirabilem
+quendam diuinae simplicitatis orbem complicas? Etenim paulo ante
+beatitudine incipiens eam summum bonum esse dicebas quam in summo deo sitam
+loquebare. Ipsum quoque deum summum esse bonum plenamque beatitudinem
+disserebas; ex quo neminem beatum fore nisi qui pariter deus esset quasi
+munusculum dabas. Rursus ipsam boni formam dei ac beatitudinis loquebaris
+esse substantiam ipsumque unum id ipsum esse bonum docebas quod ab omni
+rerum natura peteretur. Deum quoque bonitatis gubernaculis uniuersitatem
+regere disputabas uolentiaque cuncta parere nec ullam mali esse naturam.
+Atque haec nullis extrinsecus sumptis sed ex altero altero fidem trahente
+insitis domesticisque probationibus explicabas."
+
+Tum illa: "Minime," inquit, "ludimus remque omnium maximam dei munere quem
+dudum deprecabamur exegimus. Ea est enim diuinae forma substantiae ut neque
+in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut
+de ea Parmenides ait:
+
+  [Greek: Pantothen eukuklou sphairaes enalinkion onkoi],
+
+rerum orbem mobilem rotat, dum se immobilem ipsa conseruat. Quod si
+rationes quoque non extra petitas sed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitum
+collocatas agitauimus, nihil est quod admirere, cum Platone sanciente
+didiceris cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones.
+
+
+
+
+  XII.
+
+  Then I said that I did very well like of Plato's doctrine, for thou dost
+  bring these things to my remembrance now the second time, first, because
+  I lost their memory by the contagion of my body, and after when I was
+  oppressed with the burden of grief. "If," quoth she, "thou reflectest
+  upon that which heretofore hath been granted, thou wilt not be far from
+  remembering that which in the beginning thou confessedst thyself to be
+  ignorant of." "What?" quoth I. "By what government," quoth she, "the
+  world is ruled." "I remember," quoth I, "that I did confess my
+  ignorance, but though I foresee what thou wilt say, yet I desire to hear
+  it more plainly from thyself." "Thou thoughtest a little before that it
+  was not to be doubted that this world is governed by God." "Neither do I
+  think now," quoth I, "neither will I ever think, that it is to be
+  doubted of, and I will briefly explicate the reasons which move me to
+  think so. This world could never have been compacted of so many divers
+  and contrary parts, unless there were One that doth unite these so
+  different things; and this disagreeing diversity of natures being united
+  would separate and divide this concord, unless there were One that
+  holdeth together that which He united. Neither would the course of
+  nature continue so certain, nor would the different parts hold so well-
+  ordered motions in due places, times, causality, spaces and qualities,
+  unless there were One who, Himself remaining quiet, disposeth and
+  ordereth this variety of motions. This, whatsoever it be, by which
+  things created continue and are moved, I call God, a name which all men
+  use."[141]
+
+  "Since," quoth she, "thou art of this mind, I think with little labour
+  thou mayest be capable of felicity, and return to thy country in safety.
+  But let us consider what we proposed. Have we not placed sufficiency in
+  happiness, and granted that God is blessedness itself?" "Yes truly."
+  "Wherefore," quoth she, "He will need no outward helps to govern the
+  world, otherwise, if He needed anything, He had not full sufficiency."
+  "That," quoth I, "must necessarily be so." "Wherefore He disposeth all
+  things by Himself." "No doubt He doth," quoth I. "But it hath been
+  proved that God is goodness itself." "I remember it very well," quoth I.
+  "Then He disposeth all things by goodness: since He governeth all things
+  by Himself, whom we have granted to be goodness. And this is as it were
+  the helm and rudder by which the frame of the world is kept steadfast
+  and uncorrupted." "I most willingly agree," quoth I, "and I foresaw a
+  little before, though only with a slender guess, that thou wouldst
+  conclude this." "I believe thee," quoth she, "for now I suppose thou
+  lookest more watchfully about thee to discern the truth. But that which
+  I shall say is no less manifest." "What?" quoth I. "Since that God is
+  deservedly thought to govern all things with the helm of goodness, and
+  all these things likewise, as I have showed, hasten to goodness with
+  their natural contention, can there be any doubt made but that they are
+  governed willingly, and that they frame themselves of their own accord
+  to their disposer's beck, as agreeable and conformable to their ruler?"
+  "It must needs be so," quoth I, "neither would it seem an happy
+  government, if it were an imposed yoke, not a desired health." "There is
+  nothing then which, following nature, endeavoureth to resist God."
+  "Nothing," quoth I. "What if anything doth endeavour," quoth she, "can
+  anything prevail against Him, whom we have granted to be most powerful
+  by reason of His blessedness?" "No doubt," quoth I, "nothing could
+  prevail." "Wherefore there is nothing which either will or can resist
+  this sovereign goodness." "I think not," quoth I. "It is then the
+  sovereign goodness which governeth all things strongly, and disposeth
+  them sweetly." "How much," quoth I, "doth not only the reason which thou
+  allegest, but much more the very words which thou usest, delight me,
+  that folly which so much vexed me may at length be ashamed of herself."
+
+  "Thou hast heard in the poets' fables," quoth she, "how the giants
+  provoked heaven, but this benign fortitude put them also down, as they
+  deserved. But wilt thou have our arguments contend together? Perhaps by
+  this clash there will fly out some beautiful spark of truth." "As it
+  pleaseth thee," quoth I. "No man can doubt," quoth she, "but that God is
+  almighty." "No man," quoth I, "that is well in his wits." "But," quoth
+  she, "there is nothing that He who is almighty cannot do." "Nothing,"
+  quoth I. "Can God do evil?" "No," quoth I, "Wherefore," quoth she, "evil
+  is nothing, since He cannot do it who can do anything." "Dost thou mock
+  me," quoth I, "making with thy reasons an inextricable labyrinth,
+  because thou dost now go in where thou meanest to go out again, and
+  after go out, where thou camest in, or dost thou frame a wonderful
+  circle of the simplicity of God? For a little before taking thy
+  beginning from blessedness, thou affirmedst that to be the chiefest good
+  which thou saidst was placed in God, and likewise thou provedst, that
+  God Himself is the chiefest good and full happiness, out of which thou
+  madest me a present of that inference, that no man shall be happy unless
+  he be also a God. Again thou toldest me that the form of goodness is the
+  substance of God and of blessedness, and that unity is the same with
+  goodness, because it is desired by the nature of all things; thou didst
+  also dispute that God governeth the whole world with the helm of
+  goodness, and that all things obey willingly, and that there is no
+  nature of evil, and thou didst explicate all these things with no
+  foreign or far-fetched proofs, but with those which were proper and
+  drawn from inward principles, the one confirming the other."
+
+  "We neither play nor mock," quoth she, "and we have finished the
+  greatest matter that can be by the assistance of God, whose aid we
+  implored in the beginning. For such is the form of the Divine substance
+  that it is neither divided into outward things, nor receiveth any such
+  into itself, but as Parmenides saith of it:
+
+    In body like a sphere well-rounded on all sides,[142]
+
+  it doth roll about the moving orb of things, while it keepeth itself
+  unmovable. And if we have used no far-fetched reasons, but such as were
+  placed within the compass of the matter we handled, thou hast no cause
+  to marvel, since thou hast learned in Plato's school that our speeches
+  must be like and as it were akin to the things we speak of.
+
+
+  [141] _Vide supra, Tr._ iv. (pp. 56 ff.).
+
+  [142] Cf. _Frag._ 8. 43 (Diels, _Vorsokratiker_, i. p. 158).
+
+
+
+
+XII.
+
+Felix qui potuit boni
+Fontem uisere lucidum,
+Felix qui potuit grauis
+Terrae soluere uincula.
+Quondam funera coniugis                                                   5
+Vates Threicius gemens
+Postquam flebilibus modis
+Siluas currere mobiles,
+Amnes stare coegerat,
+Iunxitque intrepidum latus                                               10
+Saeuis cerua leonibus,
+Nec uisum timuit lepus
+Iam cantu placidum canem,
+Cum flagrantior intima
+Feruor pectoris ureret,                                                  15
+Nec qui cuncta subegerant
+Mulcerent dominum modi,
+Inmites superos querens
+Infernas adiit domos.
+Illic blanda sonantibus                                                  20
+Chordis carmina temperans
+Quidquid praecipuis deae
+Matris fontibus hauserat,
+Quod luctus dabat impotens,
+Quod luctum geminans amor,                                               25
+Deflet Taenara commouens
+Et dulci ueniam prece
+Vmbrarum dominos rogat.
+Stupet tergeminus nouo
+Captus carmine ianitor,                                                  30
+Quae sontes agitant metu
+Vltrices scelerum deae
+Iam maestae lacrimis madent.
+Non Ixionium caput
+Velox praecipitat rota                                                   35
+Et longa site perditus
+Spernit flumina Tantalus.
+Vultur dum satur est modis,
+Non traxit Tityi iecur.
+Tandem, 'Vincimur,' arbiter                                              40
+Vmbrarum miserans ait,
+'Donamus comitem uiro
+Emptam carmine coniugem.
+Sed lex dona coerceat,
+Ne, dum Tartara liquerit,                                                45
+Fas sit lumina flectere.'
+Quis legem det amantibus?
+Maior lex amor est sibi.
+Heu, noctis prope terminos
+Orpheus Eurydicen suam                                                   50
+Vidit, perdidit, occidit.
+Vos haec fabula respicit
+Quicumque in superum diem
+Mentem ducere quaeritis.
+Nam qui Tartareum in specus                                              55
+Victus lumina flexerit,
+Quidquid praecipuum trahit
+Perdit, dum uidet inferos."
+
+
+
+
+  XII.
+
+  Happy is he that can behold
+  The well-spring whence all good doth rise,
+  Happy is he that can unfold
+  The bands with which the earth him ties.
+  The Thracian poet whose sweet song
+  Performed his wife's sad obsequies,
+  And forced the woods to run along
+  When he his mournful tunes did play,
+  Whose powerful music was so strong
+  That it could make the rivers stay;
+  The fearful hinds not daunted were,
+  But with the lions took their way,
+  Nor did the hare behold with fear
+  The dog whom these sweet notes appease.
+  When force of grief drew yet more near,
+  And on his heart did burning seize,
+  Nor tunes which all in quiet bound
+  Could any jot their master ease,
+  The gods above too hard he found,
+  And Pluto's palace visiting.
+  He mixed sweet verses with the sound
+  Of his loud harp's delightful string,
+  All that he drank with thirsty draught
+  From his high mother's chiefest spring,
+  All that his restless grief him taught,
+  And love which gives grief double aid,
+  With this even hell itself was caught,
+  Whither he went, and pardon prayed
+  For his dear spouse (unheard request).
+  The three-head porter was dismayed,
+  Ravished with his unwonted guest,
+  The Furies, which in tortures keep
+  The guilty souls with pains opprest,
+  Moved with his song began to weep.
+  Ixion's wheel now standing still
+  Turns not his head with motions steep.
+  Though Tantalus might drink at will,
+  To quench his thirst he would forbear.
+  The vulture full with music shrill
+  Doth not poor Tityus' liver tear.
+  'We by his verses conquered are,'
+  Saith the great King whom spirits fear.
+  'Let us not then from him debar
+  His wife whom he with songs doth gain.
+  Yet lest our gift should stretch too far,
+  We will it with this law restrain,
+  That when from hell he takes his flight,
+  He shall from looking back refrain.'
+  Who can for lovers laws indite?
+  Love hath no law but her own will.
+  Orpheus, seeing on the verge of night
+  Eurydice, doth lose and kill
+  Her and himself with foolish love.
+  But you this feigned tale fulfil,
+  Who think unto the day above
+  To bring with speed your darksome mind.
+  For if, your eye conquered, you move
+  Backward to Pluto left behind,
+  All the rich prey which thence you took,
+  You lose while back to hell you look."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER TERTIVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER IV
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec cum Philosophia dignitate uultus et oris grauitate seruata leniter
+suauiterque cecinisset, tum ego nondum penitus insiti maeroris oblitus
+intentionem dicere adhuc aliquid parantis abrupi. Et: "O," inquam, "ueri
+praeuia luminis quae usque adhuc tua fudit oratio, cum sui speculatione
+diuina tum tuis rationibus inuicta patuerunt, eaque mihi etsi ob iniuriae
+dolorem nuper oblita non tamen antehac prorsus ignorata dixisti. Sed ea
+ipsa est uel maxima nostri causa maeroris, quod, cum rerum bonus rector
+exsistat, uel esse omnino mala possint uel impunita praetereant; quod solum
+quanta dignum sit admiratione profecto consideras. At huic aliud maius
+adiungitur.  Nam imperante florenteque nequitia uirtus non solum praemiis
+caret, uerum etiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur et in locum
+facinorum supplicia luit. Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis
+omnia sed bona tantummodo uolentis dei nemo satis potest nec admirari nec
+conqueri."
+
+Tum illa: "Et esset," inquit, "infiniti stuporis omnibusque horribilius
+monstris, si, uti tu aestimas, in tanti uelut patrisfamilias dispositissima
+domo uilia uasa colerentur, pretiosa sordescerent. Sed non ita est. Nam si
+ea quae paulo ante conclusa sunt inconuulsa seruantur, ipso de cuius nunc
+regno loquimur auctore cognosces semper quidem potentes esse bonos, malos
+uero abiectos semper atque inbecillos nec sine poena umquam esse uitia nec
+sine praemio uirtutes, bonis felicia, malis semper infortunata contingere
+multaque id genus quae sopitis querelis firma te soliditate corroborent. Et
+quoniam uerae formam beatitudinis me dudum monstrante uidisti, quo etiam
+sita sit agnouisti, decursis omnibus quae praemittere necessarium puto,
+uiam tibi quae te domum reuehat ostendam. Pennas etiam tuae menti quibus se
+in altum tollere possit adfigam, ut perturbatione depulsa sospes in patriam
+meo ductu, mea semita, meis etiam uehiculis reuertaris.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FOURTH BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  When Philosophy had sung these verses with a soft and sweet voice,
+  observing due dignity and gravity in her countenance and gesture, I, not
+  having altogether forgotten my inward grief, interrupted her speech
+  which she was about to continue, and said: "O thou who bringest us to
+  see true light, those things which hitherto thou hast treated of have
+  manifestly appeared both to be divine when contemplated apart, and
+  invincible when supported by thy reasons, and what thou hast uttered,
+  though the force of grief had made me forget it of late, yet heretofore
+  I was not altogether ignorant of it. But this is the chiefest cause of
+  my sorrow, that since the governor of all things is so good, there can
+  either be any evil at all, or that it pass unpunished. Which alone I
+  beseech thee consider, how much admiration it deserveth. But there is
+  another greater than this; for wickedness bearing rule and sway, virtue
+  is not only without reward, but lieth also trodden under the wicked's
+  feet, and is punished instead of vice. That which things should be done
+  in the kingdom of God, who knoweth all things, can do all things, but
+  will do only that which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor
+  complain."
+
+  To which she answered: "It were indeed infinitely strange, and
+  surpassing all monsters, if, as thou conceivest, in the best-ordered
+  house of so great an householder the vilest vessels were made account of
+  and the precious neglected; but it is not so. For if those things which
+  were a little before concluded be kept unviolated, thou shalt by His
+  help, of whose kingdom we speak, know that the good are always powerful,
+  and the evil always abject and weak, and that vices are never without
+  punishment, nor virtue without reward, and that the good are always
+  prosperous, and the evil unfortunate, and many things of that sort,
+  which will take away all cause of complaint, and give thee firm and
+  solid strength. And since by my means thou hast already seen the form of
+  true blessedness, and known where it is placed, running over all those
+  things which I think necessary to rehearse, I will show thee the way
+  which will carry thee home. And I will also fasten wings upon thy mind,
+  with which she may rouse herself, that, all perturbation being driven
+  away, thou mayest return safely into thy country by my direction, by my
+  path, and with my wings.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Sunt etenim pennae uolucres mihi
+  Quae celsa conscendant poli.
+Quas sibi cum uelox mens induit,
+  Terras perosa despicit,
+Aeris inmensi superat globum,                                             5
+  Nubesque postergum uidet,
+Quique agili motu calet aetheris,
+  Transcendit ignis uerticem,
+Donec in astriferas surgat domos
+  Phoeboque coniungat uias                                               10
+Aut comitetur iter gelidi senis
+  Miles corusci sideris,
+Vel quocumque micans nox pingitur,
+  Recurrat astri circulum
+Atque ubi iam exhausti fuerit satis,                                     15
+  Polum relinquat extimum
+Dorsaque uelocis premat aetheris
+  Compos uerendi luminis.
+Hic regum sceptrum dominus tenet
+  Orbisque habenas temperat                                              20
+Et uolucrem currum stabilis regit
+  Rerum coruscus arbiter.
+Huc te si reducem referat uia,
+  Quam nunc requiris immemor:
+'Haec,' dices, 'memini, patria est mihi,                                 25
+  Hinc ortus; hic sistam gradum."
+Quod si terrarum placeat tibi
+  Noctem relictam uisere,
+Quos miseri toruos populi timent
+  Cernes tyrannos exules."                                               30
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  For I have swift and nimble wings which will ascend the lofty skies,
+  With which when thy quick mind is clad, it will the loathéd earth
+      despise,
+  And go beyond the airy globe, and watery clouds behind thee leave,
+  Passing the fire which scorching heat doth from the heavens' swift
+      course receive,
+  Until it reach the starry house, and get to tread bright Phoebus' ways,
+  Following the chilly sire's path,[143] companion of his flashing rays,
+  And trace the circle of the stars which in the night to us appear,
+  And having stayed there long enough go on beyond the farthest sphere,
+  Sitting upon the highest orb partaker of the glorious light,
+  Where the great King his sceptre holds, and the world's reins doth guide
+      aright,
+  And, firm in his swift chariot, doth everything in order set.
+  Unto this seat when thou art brought, thy country, which thou didst
+      forget,
+  Thou then wilt challenge to thyself, saying: 'This is the glorious land
+  Where I was born, and in this soil my feet for evermore shall stand.
+  Whence if thou pleasest to behold the earthly night which thou hast
+      left,
+  Those tyrants which the people fear will seem of their true home
+      bereft.'"
+
+
+  [143] Cf. "frigida Saturni sese quo Stella receptet," Virg. _Georg._ i.
+  336.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Tum ego: "Papae," inquam, "ut magna promittis! Nec dubito quin possis
+efficere; tu modo quem excitaueris ne moreris." "Primum igitur," inquit,
+"bonis semper adesse potentiam, malos cunctis uiribus esse desertos
+agnoscas licebit, quorum quidem alterum demonstratur ex altero. Nam cum
+bonum malumque contraria sint, si bonum potens esse constiterit, liquet
+inbecillitas mali; at si fragilitas clarescat mali, boni firmitas nota est.
+Sed uti nostrae sententiae fides abundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam
+nunc hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans.
+
+Duo sunt quibus omnis humanorum actuum constat effectus, uoluntas scilicet
+ac potestas, quorum si alterutrum desit, nihil est quod explicari queat.
+Deficiente etenim uoluntate ne aggreditur quidem quisque quod non uult; at
+si potestas absit, uoluntas frustra sit. Quo fit ut si quem uideas adipisci
+uelle quod minime adipiscatur, huic obtinendi quod uoluerit defuisse
+ualentiam dubitare non possis." "Perspicuum est," inquam, "nec ullo modo
+negari potest." "Quem uero effecisse quod uoluerit uideas, num etiam
+potuisse dubitabis?" "Minime." "Quod uero quisque potest, in eo ualidus,
+quod uero non potest, in hoc imbecillis esse censendus est." "Fateor,"
+inquam. "Meministine igitur," inquit, "superioribus rationibus esse
+collectum intentionem omnem uoluntatis humanae quae diuersis studiis agitur
+ad beatitudinem festinare?" "Memini," inquam, "illud quoque esse
+demonstratum." "Num recordaris beatitudinem ipsum esse bonum eoque modo,
+cum beatitudo petitur, ab omnibus desiderari bonum?" "Minime," inquam,
+"recordor, quoniam id memoriae fixum teneo." "Omnes igitur homines boni
+pariter ac mali indiscreta intentione ad bonum peruenire nituntur?" "Ita,"
+inquam, "consequens est." "Sed certum est adeptione boni bonos fieri."
+"Certum." "Adipiscuntur igitur boni quod appetunt?" "Sic uidetur." "Mali
+uero si adipiscerentur quod appetunt bonum, mali esse non possent." "Ita
+est." "Cum igitur utrique bonum petant, sed hi quidem adipiscantur, illi
+uero minime, num dubium est bonos quidem potentes esse, qui uero mali sunt
+imbecillos?" "Quisquis," inquam, "dubitat, nec rerum naturam nec
+consequentiam potest considerare rationum." "Rursus," inquit, "si duo sint
+quibus idem secundum naturam propositum sit eorumque unus naturali officio
+id ipsum agat atque perficiat, alter uero naturale illud officium minime
+administrare queat, alio uero modo quam naturae conuenit non quidem impleat
+propositum suum sed imitetur implentem, quemnam horum ualentiorem esse
+decernis?" "Etsi coniecto," inquam, "quid uelis, planius tamen audire
+desidero." "Ambulandi," inquit, "motum secundum naturam esse hominibus num
+negabis?" "Minime," inquam. "Eiusque rei pedum officium esse naturale num
+dubitas?" "Ne hoc quidem," inquam. "Si quis igitur pedibus incedere ualens
+ambulet aliusque cui hoc naturale pedum desit officium, manibus nitens
+ambulare conetur, quis horum iure ualentior existimari potest?" "Contexe,"
+inquam, "cetera; nam quin naturalis officii potens eo qui idem nequeat
+ualentior sit, nullus ambigat." "Sed summum bonum, quod aeque malis
+bonisque propositum, boni quidem naturali officio uirtutum petunt, mali
+uero uariam per cupiditatem, quod adipiscendi boni naturale officium non
+est, idem ipsum conantur adipisci. An tu aliter existimas?"  "Minime,"
+inquam, "nam etiam quod est consequens patet. Ex his enim quae concesserim,
+bonos quidem potentes, malos uero esse necesse est imbecillos."
+
+"Recte," inquit, "praecurris idque, uti medici sperare solent, indicium est
+erectae iam resistentisque naturae. Sed quoniam te ad intellegendum
+promptissimum esse conspicio, crebras coaceruabo rationes. Vide enim quanta
+uitiosorum hominum pateat infirmitas qui ne ad hoc quidem peruenire queunt
+ad quod eos naturalis ducit ac paene compellit intentio. Et quid si hoc tam
+magno ac paene inuicto praeeuntis naturae desererentur auxilio? Considera
+uero quanta sceleratos homines habeat impotentia. Neque enim leuia aut
+ludicra praemia petunt, quae consequi atque obtinere non possunt, sed circa
+ipsam rerum summam uerticemque deficiunt nec in eo miseris contingit
+effectus quod solum dies noctesque moliuntur; in qua re bonorum uires
+eminent. Sicut enim eum qui pedibus incedens ad eum locum usque peruenire
+potuisset, quo nihil ulterius peruium iaceret incessui, ambulandi
+potentissimum esse censeres, ita eum qui expetendorum finem quo nihil ultra
+est apprehendit, potentissimum necesse est iudices. Ex quo fit quod huic
+obiacet, ut idem scelesti, idem uiribus omnibus uideantur esse deserti. Cur
+enim relicta uirtute uitia sectantur? Inscitiane bonorum? Sed quid
+eneruatius ignorantiae caecitate? An sectanda nouerunt? Sed transuersos eos
+libido praecipitat. Sic quoque intemperantia fragiles qui obluctari uitio
+nequeunt. An scientes uolentesque bonum deserunt, ad uitia deflectunt? Sed
+hoc modo non solum potentes esse sed omnino esse desinunt. Nam qui communem
+omnium quae sunt finem relinquunt, pariter quoque esse desistunt. Quod
+quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominum sunt,
+eosdem non esse dicamus; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mali sunt eos
+malos esse non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque simpliciter nego.
+
+Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, simpliciter uero hominem appellare
+non possis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim, sed esse absolute
+nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet seruatque naturam; quod
+uero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sua natura situm est derelinquit.
+'Sed possunt,' inquies, 'mali.' Ne ego quidem negauerim, sed haec eorum
+potentia non a uiribus sed ab imbecillitate descendit. Possunt enim mala
+quae minime ualerent, si in bonorum efficientia manere potuissent. Quae
+possibilitas eos euidentius nihil posse demonstrat. Nam si, uti paulo ante
+collegimus, malum nihil est, cum mala tantummodo possint, nihil posse
+improbos liquet." "Perspicuum est." "Atque ut intellegas quaenam sit huius
+potentiae uis, summo bono nihil potentius esse paulo ante definiuimus."
+"Ita est," inquam. "Sed idem," inquit, "facere malum nequit." "Minime."
+"Est igitur," inquit, "aliquis qui omnia posse homines putet?" "Nisi quis
+insaniat, nemo." "Atqui idem possunt mala." "Vtinam quidem," inquam, "non
+possent." "Cum igitur bonorum tantummodo potens possit omnia, non uero
+queant omnia potentes etiam malorum, eosdem qui mala possunt minus posse
+manifestum est. Huc accedit quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam
+omniaque expetenda referri ad bonum uelut ad quoddam naturae suae cacumen
+ostendimus. Sed patrandi sceleris possibilitas referri ad bonum non potest;
+expetenda igitur non est. Atqui omnis potentia expetenda est; liquet igitur
+malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem
+potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet infirmitas ueramque illam
+Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod desiderent facere posse
+sapientes, improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desiderent
+explere non posse. Faciunt enim quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id
+bonum quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam
+ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt.
+
+
+
+
+  II.[144]
+
+  "Oh!" quoth I. "How great things dost thou promise! And I doubt not but
+  thou canst perform them, wherefore stay me not now that thou hast
+  stirred up my desires." "First then," quoth she, "that good men are
+  always powerful, and evil men of no strength, thou mayest easily know,
+  the one is proved by the other. For since that good and evil are
+  contraries, if it be convinced that goodness is potent, the weakness of
+  evil will be also manifest; and contrariwise if we discern the frailty
+  of evil, we must needs acknowledge the firmness of goodness. But that
+  our opinions may be more certainly embraced, I will take both ways,
+  confirming my propositions, sometime from one part, sometime from
+  another.
+
+  There be two things by which all human actions are effected, will and
+  power, of which if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed.
+  For if there want will, no man taketh anything in hand against his will,
+  and if there be not power, the will is in vain. So that, if thou seest
+  any willing to obtain that which he doth not obtain, thou canst not
+  doubt but that he wanted power to obtain what he would." "It is
+  manifest," quoth I, "and can by no means be denied." "And wilt thou
+  doubt that he could, whom thou seest bring to pass what he desired?"
+  "No." "But every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that
+  which he cannot do." "I confess it," quoth I. "Dost thou remember then,"
+  quoth she, "that it was inferred by our former discourses that all the
+  intentions of man's will doth hasten to happiness, though their courses
+  be divers?" "I remember," quoth I, "that that also was proved." "Dost
+  thou also call to mind that blessedness is goodness itself, and
+  consequently when blessedness is sought after, goodness must of course
+  be desired?" "I call it not to mind, for I have it already fixed in my
+  memory." "Wherefore all men both good and bad without difference of
+  intentions endeavour to obtain goodness." "It followeth," quoth I. "But
+  it is certain that men are made good by the obtaining of goodness." "It
+  is so." "Wherefore good men obtain what they desire." "So it seemeth."
+  "And if evil men did obtain the goodness they desire, they could not be
+  evil." "It is true." "Wherefore since they both desire goodness, but the
+  one obtaineth it and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men
+  are powerful, and the evil weak." "Whosoever doubteth of this," quoth I,
+  "he neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy
+  reasons." "Again," quoth she, "if there be two to whom the same thing is
+  proposed according to nature, and the one of them bringeth it perfectly
+  to pass with his natural function, but the other cannot exercise that
+  natural function but after another manner than is agreeable to nature,
+  and doth not perform that which he had proposed, but imitateth the other
+  who performeth it: which of these two wilt thou judge to be more
+  powerful?" "Though I conjecture," quoth I, "at thy meaning, yet I desire
+  to hear it more plainly." "Wilt thou deny," quoth she, "that the motion
+  of walking is agreeable to the nature of men?" "No," quoth I. "And
+  makest thou any doubt that the function of it doth naturally belong to
+  the feet?" "There is no doubt of this neither," quoth I. "Wherefore if
+  one that can go upon his feet doth walk, and another who hath not this
+  natural function of his feet endeavoureth to walk by creeping upon his
+  hands, which of these two is deservedly to be esteemed the stronger?"
+  "Infer the rest," quoth I, "for no man doubteth but that he which can
+  use that natural function is stronger than he which cannot." "But,"
+  quoth she, "the good seek to obtain the chiefest good, which is equally
+  proposed to bad and good, by the natural function of virtues, but the
+  evil endeavour to obtain the same by divers concupiscences, which are
+  not the natural function of obtaining goodness. Thinkest thou
+  otherwise?" "No," quoth I, "for it is manifest what followeth. For by
+  the force of that which I have already granted, it is necessary that
+  good men are powerful and evil men weak."
+
+  "Thou runnest before rightly," quoth she, "and it is (as physicians are
+  wont to hope) a token of an erected and resisting nature. Wherefore,
+  since I see thee most apt and willing to comprehend, I will therefore
+  heap up many reasons together. For consider the great weakness of
+  vicious men, who cannot come so far as their natural intention leadeth
+  and almost compelleth them. And what if they were destitute of this so
+  great and almost invincible help of the direction of nature? Ponder
+  likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or
+  trifling rewards[145] which they desire, and cannot obtain: but they
+  fail in the very sum and top of things: neither can the poor wretches
+  compass that which they only labour for nights and days: in which thing
+  the forces of the good eminently appear. For as thou wouldst judge him
+  to be most able to walk who going on foot could come as far as there
+  were any place to go in: so must thou of force judge him most powerful
+  who obtaineth the end of all that can be desired, beyond which there is
+  nothing. Hence that which is opposite also followeth, that the same men
+  are wicked and destitute of all forces. For why do they follow vices,
+  forsaking virtues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more
+  devoid of strength than blind ignorance? Or do they know what they
+  should embrace, but passion driveth them headlong the contrary way? So
+  also intemperance makes them frail, since they cannot strive against
+  vice. Or do they wittingly and willingly forsake goodness, and decline
+  to vices? But in this sort they leave not only to be powerful, but even
+  to be at all. For they which leave the common end of all things which
+  are, leave also being. Which may perhaps seem strange to some, that we
+  should say that evil men are not at all, who are the greatest part of
+  men: but yet it is so. For I deny not that evil men are evil, but withal
+  I say that purely and simply they are not.
+
+  For as thou mayest call a carcase a dead man, but not simply a man, so I
+  confess that the vicious are evil, but I cannot grant that they are
+  absolutely. For that is which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but
+  that which faileth from this leaveth also to be that which is in his own
+  nature. But thou wilt say that evil men can do many things, neither will
+  I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces but from
+  weakness. For they can do evil, which they could not do if they could
+  have remained in the performance of that which is good. Which
+  possibility declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if,
+  as we concluded a little before, evil is nothing, since they can only do
+  evil, it is manifest that the wicked can do nothing." "It is most
+  manifest." "And that thou mayest understand what the force of this power
+  is; we determined a little before that there is nothing more powerful
+  than the Sovereign Goodness." "It is true," quoth I. "But He cannot do
+  evil." "No." "Is there any then," quoth she, "that think that men can do
+  all things?" "No man, except he be mad, thinketh so." "But yet men can
+  do evil." "I would to God they could not," quoth I. "Since therefore he
+  that can only do good, can do all things, and they who can do evil,
+  cannot do all things, it is manifest that they which can do evil are
+  less potent. Moreover, we have proved that all power is to be accounted
+  among those things which are to be wished for, and that all such things
+  have reference to goodness, as to the very height of their nature. But
+  the possibility of committing wickedness cannot have reference to
+  goodness. Wherefore it is not to be wished for. Yet all power is to be
+  wished for; and consequently it is manifest, possibility of evil is no
+  power. By all which the power of the good and the undoubted infirmity of
+  evil appeareth. And it is manifest that the sentence of Plato is true:
+  that only wise men can do that which they desire, and that the wicked
+  men practise indeed what they list, but cannot perform what they would.
+  For they do what they list, thinking to obtain the good which they
+  desire by those things which cause them delight; but they obtain it not,
+  because shameful action cannot arrive to happiness.[146]
+
+
+  [144] The whole of this and of the following chapter is a paraphrase of
+  Plato's _Gorgias_.
+
+  [145] Cf. Virgil, _Aen._ xii. 764.
+
+  [146] Cf. Plato, _Gorgias_, 468, 469; _Alcibiades I._ 134 c.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Quos uides sedere celsos solii culmine reges
+Purpura claros nitente saeptos tristibus armis
+Ore toruo comminantes rabie cordis anhelos,
+Detrahat si quis superbis uani tegmina cultus,
+Iam uidebit intus artas dominos ferre catenas.                            5
+Hinc enim libido uersat auidis corda uenenis,
+Hinc flagellat ira mentem fluctus turbida tollens
+Maeror aut captos fatigat aut spes lubrica torquet
+Ergo cum caput tot unum cernas ferre tyrannos,
+Non facit quod optat ipse dominis pressus iniquis.                       10
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  The kings whom we behold
+  In highest glory placed,
+  And with rich purple graced,
+  Compassed with soldiers bold;
+  Whose countenance shows fierce threats,
+  Who with rash fury chide,
+  If any strip the pride
+  From their vainglorious feats;
+  He'll see them close oppressed
+  Within by galling chains
+  For filthy lust there reigns
+  And poisoneth their breast,
+  Wrath often them perplexeth
+  Raising their minds like waves,
+  Sorrow their power enslaves
+  And sliding hope them vexeth.
+  So many tyrants still
+  Dwelling in one poor heart,
+  Except they first depart
+  She cannot have her will.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Videsne igitur quanto in caeno probra uoluantur, qua probitas luce
+resplendeat? In quo perspicuum est numquam bonis praemia numquam sua
+sceleribus deesse supplicia. Rerum etenim quae geruntur illud propter quod
+unaquaeque res geritur, eiusdem rei praemium esse non iniuria uideri
+potest, uti currendi in stadio propter quam curritur iacet praemium corona.
+Sed beatitudinem esse idem ipsum bonum propter quod omnia geruntur
+ostendimus. Est igitur humanis actibus ipsum bonum ueluti praemium commune
+propositum. Atqui hoc a bonis non potest separari neque enim bonus ultra
+iure uocabitur qui careat bono; quare probos mores sua praemia non
+relinquunt. Quantumlibet igitur saeuiant mali, sapienti tamen corona non
+decidet, non arescet. Neque enim probis animis proprium decus aliena
+decerpit improbitas. Quod si extrinsecus accepto laetaretur, poterat hoc
+uel alius quispiam uel ipse etiam qui contulisset auferre; sed quoniam id
+sua cuique probitas confert, tum suo praemio carebit, cum probus esse
+desierit. Postremo cum omne praemium idcirco appetatur quoniam bonum esse
+creditur, quis boni compotem praemii iudicet expertem? At cuius praemii?
+Omnium pulcherrimi maximique. Memento etenim corollarii illius quod paulo
+ante praecipuum dedi ac sic collige: cum ipsum bonum beatitudo sit, bonos
+omnes eo ipso quod boni sint fieri beatos liquet. Sed qui beati sint deos
+esse conuenit. Est igitur praemium bonorum quod nullus. deterat dies,
+nullius minuat potestas, nullius fuscet improbitas, deos fieri. Quae cum
+ita sint, de malorum quoque inseparabili poena dubitare sapiens nequeat.
+Nam cum bonum malumque item poenae atque praemium aduersa fronte
+dissideant, quae in boni praemio uidemus accedere eadem necesse est in mali
+poena contraria parte respondeant. Sicut igitur probis probitas ipsa fit
+praemium, ita improbis nequitia ipsa supplicium est. Iam uero quisquis
+afficitur poena, malo se affectum esse non dubitat. Si igitur sese ipsi
+aestimare uelint, possuntne sibi supplicii expertes uideri quos omnium
+malorum extrema nequitia non affecit modo uerum etiam uehementer infecit?
+Vide autem ex aduersa parte bonorum, quae improbos poena comitetur. Omne
+namque quod sit unum esse ipsumque unum bonum esse paulo ante didicisti,
+cui consequens est ut omne quod sit id etiam bonum esse uideatur. Hoc
+igitur modo quidquid a bono deficit esse desistit; quo fit ut mali desinant
+esse quod fuerant, sed fuisse homines adhuc ipsa humani corporis reliqua
+species ostentat. Quare uersi in malitiam humanam quoque amisere naturam.
+Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere sola probitas possit, necesse est
+ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit, infra hominis meritum detrudat
+improbitas. Euenit igitur, ut quem transformatum uitiis uideas hominem
+aestimare non possis. Auaritia feruet alienarum opum uiolentus ereptor?
+Lupi similem dixeris. Ferox atque inquies linguam litigiis exercet? Cani
+comparabis. Insidiator occultus subripuisse fraudibus gaudet? Vulpeculis
+exaequetur. Irae intemperans fremit? Leonis animum gestare credatur.
+Pauidus ac fugax non metuenda formidat? Ceruis similis habeatur. Segnis ac
+stupidus torpit? Asinum uiuit. Leuis atque inconstans studia permutat?
+Nihil auibus differt. Foedis inmundisque libidinibus immergitur? Sordidae
+suis uoluptate detinetur. Ita fit ut qui probitate deserta homo esse
+desierit, cum in diuinam condicionem transire non possit, uertatur in
+beluam.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Seest thou then in what mire wickedness wallows, and how clearly honesty
+  shineth? By which it is manifest that the good are never without
+  rewards, nor the evil without punishments. For in all things that are
+  done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of
+  that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he
+  runneth is proposed as a reward. But we have showed that blessedness is
+  the selfsame goodness for which all things are done. Wherefore this
+  goodness is proposed as a common reward for all human actions, and this
+  cannot be separated from those who are good. For he shall not rightly be
+  any longer called good, who wanteth goodness; wherefore virtuous manners
+  are not left without their due rewards. And how much so ever the evil do
+  rage, yet the wise man's crown will not fade nor wither.  For others'
+  wickedness depriveth not virtuous minds of their proper glory. But if he
+  should rejoice at anything which he hath from others, either he who gave
+  it, or any other might take it away. But because every man's virtue is
+  the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward when he leaveth to
+  be virtuous. Lastly, since every reward is therefore desired because it
+  is thought to be good, who can judge him to be devoid of reward, which
+  hath goodness for his possession?  But what reward hath he? The most
+  beautiful and the greatest that can be. For remember that
+  _corollarium_ [147] which I presented thee with a little before, as
+  with a rare and precious jewel, and infer thus: Since that goodness
+  itself is happiness, it is manifest that all good men even by being good
+  are made happy.  But we agreed that happy men are gods. Wherefore the
+  reward of good men, which no time can waste, no man's power diminish, no
+  man's wickedness obscure, is to become gods. Which things being so, no
+  wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punishment of the evil.
+  For since goodness and evil, punishment and reward, are opposite the one
+  to the other, those things which we see fall out in the reward of
+  goodness must needs be answerable in a contrary manner in the punishment
+  of evil. Wherefore as to honest men honesty itself is a reward, so to
+  the wicked their very wickedness is a punishment. And he that is
+  punished doubteth not but that he is afflicted with the evil. Wherefore
+  if they would truly consider their own estate, can they think themselves
+  free from punishment, whom wickedness, the worst of all evils, doth not
+  only touch but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment which
+  accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the virtuous.
+  For thou learnedst not long before that whatsoever is at all is one, and
+  that unity is goodness, by which it followeth that whatsoever is must
+  also be good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth from goodness
+  ceaseth to be, by which it followeth that evil men leave to be that
+  which they were, but the shape of men, which they still retain, showeth
+  them to have been men: wherefore by embracing wickedness they have lost
+  the nature of men. But since virtue alone can exalt us above men,
+  wickedness must needs cast those under the desert of men, which it hath
+  bereaved of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man
+  whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extorter of other
+  men's goods carried away with his covetous desire? Thou mayest liken him
+  to a wolf. Is the angry and unquiet man always contending and brawling?
+  Thou mayest compare him to a dog. Doth the treacherous fellow rejoice
+  that he hath deceived others with his hidden frauds? Let him be
+  accounted no better than a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let
+  him be thought to have a lion's mind. Is the fearful and timorous afraid
+  without cause? Let him be esteemed like to hares and deer. Is the slow
+  and stupid always idle? He liveth an ass's life. Doth the light and
+  unconstant change his courses? He is nothing different from the birds.
+  Is he drowned in filthy and unclean lusts? He is entangled in the
+  pleasure of a stinking sow. So that he who, leaving virtue, ceaseth to
+  be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the divine condition, is turned
+  into a beast.
+
+
+  [147] _Vide supra, p. 270._
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Vela Neritii ducis
+Et uagas pelago rates
+Eurus appulit insulae,
+Pulchra qua residens dea
+Solis edita semine                                                        5
+Miscet hospitibus nouis
+Tacta carmine pocula.
+Quos ut in uarios modos
+Vertit herbipotens manus,
+Hunc apri facies tegit,                                                  10
+Ille Marmaricus leo
+Dente crescit et unguibus.
+Hic lupis nuper additus,
+Flere dum parat, ululat.
+Ille tigris ut Indica                                                    15
+Tecta mitis obambulat.
+Sed licet uariis malis
+Numen Arcadis alitis
+Obsitum miserans ducem
+Peste soluerit hospitis,                                                 20
+Iam tamen mala remiges
+Ore pocula traxerant,
+Iam sues Cerealia
+Glande pabula uerterant
+Et nihil manet integrum                                                  25
+Voce corpore perditis.
+Sola mens stabilis super
+Monstra quae patitur gemit.
+O leuem nimium manum
+Nec potentia gramina,                                                    30
+Membra quae ualeant licet,
+Corda uertere non ualent!
+Intus est hominum uigor
+Arce conditus abdita.
+Haec uenena potentius                                                    35
+Detrahunt hominem sibi
+Dira quae penitus meant
+Nec nocentia corpori
+Mentis uulnere saeuiunt."
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  The sails which wise Ulysses bore,
+  And ships which in the seas long time did stray
+  The eastern wind drave to that shore
+  Where the fair Goddess Lady Circe lay,
+  Daughter by birth to Phoebus bright,
+  Who with enchanted cups and charms did stay
+  Her guests, deceived with their delight
+  And into sundry figures them did change,
+  Being most skilful in the might
+  And secret force of herbs and simples strange;
+  Some like to savage boars, and some
+  Like lions fierce, which daily use to range
+  Through Libya,[148] in tooth and claw become.
+  Others are changed to the shape and guise
+  Of ravenous wolves, and waxing dumb
+  Use howling in the stead of manly cries.
+  Others like to the tiger rove[149]
+  Which in the scorched Indian desert lies.
+  And though the winged son of Jove[150]
+  From these bewitchéd cups' delightful taste
+  To keep the famous captain strove,
+  Yet them the greedy mariners embraced
+  With much desire, till turned to swine
+  Instead of bread they fed on oaken mast.
+  Ruined in voice and form, no sign
+  Remains to them of any human grace;
+  Only their minds unchanged repine
+  To see their bodies in such ugly case.
+  O feeble hand and idle art
+  Which, though it could the outward limbs deface,
+  Yet had no force to change the heart.
+  For all the force of men given by God's arm
+  Lies hidden in their inmost part.
+  The poisons therefore which within them swarm
+  More deeply pierce, and with more might,
+  For to the body though they do no harm,
+  Yet on the soul they work their spite."
+
+
+  [148] Literally "Marmaric," i.e. properly, the region between Egypt and
+  the great Syrtis; generally, African, cf. Lucan iii. 293.
+
+  [149] Literally, "rove tame round the house."
+
+  [150] i.e. Mercury who was born in Arcadia; cf. Virg. _Aen._ viii.
+  129-138.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum ego: "Fateor," inquam, "nec iniuria dici uideo uitiosos, tametsi humani
+corporis speciem seruent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari; sed
+quorum atrox scelerataque mens bonorum pernicie saeuit, id ipsum eis licere
+noluissem." "Nec licet," inquit, "uti conuenienti monstrabitur loco. Sed
+tamen si id ipsum quod eis licere creditur auferatur, magna ex parte
+sceleratorum hominum poena releuetur. Etenim quod incredibile cuiquam forte
+uideatur, infeliciores esse necesse est malos, cum cupita perfecerint, quam
+si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint. Nam si miserum est uoluisse praua,
+potuisse miserius est, sine quo uoluntatis miserae langueret effectus.
+Itaque cum sua singulis miseria sit, triplici infortunio necesse est
+urgeantur quos uideas scelus uelle, posse, perficere." "Accedo," inquam,
+"sed uti hoc infortunio cito careant patrandi sceleris possibilitate
+deserti uehementer exopto." "Carebunt," inquit, "ocius quam uel tu forsitan
+uelis uel illi sese aestiment esse carituros. Neque enim est aliquid in tam
+breuibus uitae metis ita serum quod exspectare longum immortalis praesertim
+animus putet: quorum magna spes et excelsa facinorum machina repentino
+atque insperato saepe fine destruitur, quod quidem illis miseriae modum
+statuit.
+
+Nam si nequitia miseros facit, miserior sit necesse est diuturnior nequam;
+quos infelicissimos esse iudicarem, si non eorum malitiam saltem mors
+extrema finiret. Etenim si de prauitatis infortunio uera conclusimus,
+infinitam liquet esse miseriam quam esse constat aeternam." Tum ego: "Mira
+quidem," inquam, "et concessu difficilis inlatio, sed his eam quae prius
+concessa sunt nimium conuenire cognosco." "Recte," inquit, "aestimas. Sed
+qui conclusioni accedere durum putat, aequum est uel falsum aliquid
+praecessisse demonstret uel collocationem propositionum non esse efficacem
+necessariae conclusionis ostendat; alioquin concessis praecedentibus nihil
+prorsus est quod de inlatione causetur. Nam hoc quoque quod dicam non minus
+mirum uideatur, sed ex his quae sumpta sunt aeque est necessarium."
+"Quidnam?" inquam. "Feliciores," inquit, "esse improbos supplicia luentes
+quam si eos nulla iustitiae poena coerceat. Neque id nunc molior quod
+cuiuis ueniat in mentem, corrigi ultione prauos mores et ad rectum
+supplicii terrore deduci, ceteris quoque exemplum esse culpanda fugiendi,
+sed alio quodam modo infeliciores esse improbos arbitror impunitos, tametsi
+nulla ratio correctionis, nullus respectus habeatur exempli." "Et quis
+erit," inquam, "praeter hos alius modus?" Et illa: "Bonos," inquit, "esse
+felices, malos uero miseros nonne concessimus?" "Ita est," inquam. "Si
+igitur," inquit, "miseriae cuiuspiam bonum aliquid addatur, nonne felicior
+est eo cuius pura ac solitaria sine cuiusquam boni admixtione miseria est?"
+"Sic," inquam, "uidetur." "Quid si eidem misero qui cunctis careat bonis,
+praeter ea quibus miser est malum aliud fuerit adnexum, nonne multo
+infelicior eo censendus est cuius infortunium boni participatione
+releuatur?" "Quidni?" inquam. "Sed puniri improbos iustum, impunitos uero
+elabi iniquum esse manifestum est." "Quis id neget?" "Sed ne illud quidem,"
+ait, "quisquam negabit bonum esse omne quod iustum est contraque quod
+iniustum est malum." Liquere, respondi.[151] "Habent igitur improbi, cum
+puniuntur, quidem boni aliquid adnexum poenam ipsam scilicet quae ratione
+iustitiae bona est, idemque cum supplicio carent, inest eis aliquid
+ulterius mali ipsa impunitas quam iniquitatis merito malum esse confessus
+es." "Negare non possum." "Multo igitur infeliciores improbi sunt iniusta
+impunitate donati quam iusta ultione puniti." Tum ego: "Ista quidem
+consequentia sunt eis quae paulo ante conclusa sunt.
+
+Sed quaeso," inquam, "te, nullane animarum supplicia post defunctum morte
+corpus relinquis?" "Et magna quidem," inquit, "quorum alia poenali
+acerbitate, alia uero purgatoria clementia exerceri puto. Sed nunc de his
+disserere consilium non est. Id uero hactenus egimus, ut quae indignissima
+tibi uidebatur malorum potestas eam nullam esse cognosceres quosque
+impunitos querebare, uideres numquam improbitatis suae carere suppliciis,
+licentiam quam cito finiri precabaris nec longam esse disceres
+infelicioremque fore, si diuturnior, infelicissimam uero, si esset aeterna;
+post haec miseriores esse improbos iniusta impunitate dimissos quam iusta
+ultione punitos. Cui sententiae consequens est ut tum demum grauioribus
+suppliciis urgeantur, cum impuniti esse creduntur."
+
+Tum ego: "Cum tuas," inquam, "rationes considero, nihil dici uerius puto.
+At si ad hominum iudicia reuertar, quis ille est cui haec non credenda modo
+sed saltem audienda uideantur?" "Ita est," inquit illa. "Nequeunt enim
+oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae ueritatis attollere,
+similesque auibus sunt quarum intuitum nox inluminat dies caecat. Dum enim
+non rerum ordinem, sed suos intuentur affectus, uel licentiam uel
+impunitatem scelerum putant esse felicem. Vide autem quid aeterna lex
+sanciat. Melioribus animum conformaueris, nihil opus est iudice praemium
+deferente tu te ipse excellentioribus addidisti. Studium ad peiora
+deflexeris, extra ne quaesieris ultorem. Tu te ipse in deteriora trusisti,
+ueluti si uicibus sordidam humum caelumque respicias, cunctis extra
+cessantibus ipsa cernendi ratione nunc caeno nunc sideribus interesse
+uidearis. At uulgus ista non respicit. Quid igitur? Hisne accedamus quos
+beluis similes esse monstrauimus? Quid si quis amisso penitus uisu ipsum
+etiam se habuisse obliuisceretur intuitum nihilque sibi ad humanam
+perfectionem deesse arbitraretur, num uidentes eadem caecos putaremus? Nam
+ne illud quidem adquiescent quod aeque ualidis rationum nititur
+firmamentis: infeliciores eos esse qui faciant quam qui patiantur
+iniuriam." "Vellem," inquam, "has ipsas audire rationes." "Omnem," inquit,
+"improbum num supplicio dignum negas?" "Minime." "Infelices uero esse qui
+sint improbi multipliciter liquet." "Ita," inquam. "Qui igitur supplicio
+digni sunt miseros esse non dubitas?" "Conuenit," inquam. "Si igitur
+cognitor," ait, "resideres, cui supplicium inferendum putares, eine qui
+fecisset an qui pertulisset iniuriam?" "Nec ambigo," inquam, "quin perpesso
+satisfacerem dolore facientis." "Miserior igitur tibi iniuriae inlator quam
+acceptor esse uideretur." "Consequitur," inquam. "Hinc igitur aliis de
+causis ea radice nitentibus, quod turpitudo suapte natura miseros faciat,
+apparet inlatam cuilibet iniuriam non accipientis sed inferentis esse
+miseriam." "Atqui nunc," ait, "contra faciunt oratores. Pro his enim qui
+graue quid acerbumque perpessi sunt miserationem iudicum excitare conantur,
+cum magis admittentibus iustior miseratio debeatur; quos non ab iratis sed
+a propitiis potius miserantibusque accusatoribus ad iudicium ueluti aegros
+ad medicum duci oportebat, ut culpae morbos supplicio resecarent. Quo pacto
+defensorum opera uel tota frigeret, uel si prodesse hominibus mallet, in
+accusationis habitum uerteretur, Ipsi quoque improbi, si eis aliqua rimula
+uirtutem relictam fas esset aspicere uitiorumque sordes poenarum
+cruciatibus se deposituros uiderent compensatione adipiscendae probitatis,
+nec hos cruciatus esse ducerent defensorumque operam repudiarent ac se
+totos accusatoribus iudicibusque permitterent. Quo fit ut apud sapientes
+nullus prorsus odio locus relinquatur. Nam bonos quis nisi stultissimus
+oderit? Malos uero odisse ratione caret. Nam si, uti corporum languor, ita
+uitiositas quidam est quasi morbus animorum, cum aegros corpore minime
+dignos odio sed potius miseratione iudicemus, multo magis non insequendi
+sed miserandi sunt quorum mentes omni languore atrocior urget improbitas.
+
+
+[151] Sed puniri ... respondi _quae infra_ (_in pag. 328 l. 73_) _post_
+ultioni puniti _in codicibus habentur huc transponenda esse censuit P.
+Langenus, demonstrauit A. Engelbrecht._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Then said I, "I confess and perceive that thou affirmest not without
+  cause that the vicious, though they keep the outward shape of men, are
+  in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would
+  have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the
+  good, restrained from executing their malice." "They are restrained,"
+  quoth she, "as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this
+  liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is
+  in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible)
+  evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pass
+  their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it
+  be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable
+  to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could not
+  have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar
+  misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness,
+  whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness." "I grant it,"
+  quoth I, "but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this
+  misery, having lost the power to perform their malice." "They will lose
+  it," quoth she, "sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they
+  themselves suppose. For in the short compass of this life there is
+  nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should
+  think it long in coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of
+  the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected
+  end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.
+
+  For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more
+  miserable he must needs be; and I should judge them the most unhappy men
+  that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have
+  concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the
+  wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite." "A strange
+  illation," quoth I, "and hard to be granted; but I see that those things
+  which were granted before agree very well with these." "Thou thinkest
+  aright," quoth she, "but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the
+  conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is
+  false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary
+  conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no
+  reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude
+  now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of
+  those things which are already assumed." "What?" quoth I. "That wicked
+  men," quoth she, "are more happy being punished than if they escaped the
+  hands of justice. Neither do I now go about to show that which may come
+  into every man's mind, that evil customs are corrected by chastisement,
+  and are reduced to virtue by the terror of punishment, and that others
+  may take example to avoid evil, but in another manner also I think
+  vicious men that go unpunished to be more miserable, although we take no
+  account of correction and pay no regard to example." "And what other
+  manner shall this be," quoth I, "besides these?" "Have we not granted,"
+  quoth she, "that the good are happy, and the evil miserable?" "We have,"
+  quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "something that is good be added to one's
+  misery, is he not happier than another whose misery is desolate and
+  solitary, without any participation of goodness?" "So it seemeth," quoth
+  I. "What if there be some other evil annexed to this miserable man who
+  is deprived of all goodness, besides those which make him miserable, is
+  he not to be accounted much more unhappy than he whose misery is
+  lightened by partaking of goodness?" "Why not?" quoth I. "But it is
+  manifest that it is just that the wicked be punished, and unjust that
+  they should go unpunished." "Who can deny that?" "But neither will any
+  man deny this," quoth she, "that whatsoever is just, is good, and
+  contrariwise, that whatsoever is unjust, is evil." "Certainly," I
+  answered. "Then the wicked have some good annexed when they are
+  punished, to wit, the punishment itself, which by reason of justice is
+  good, and when they are not punished, they have a further evil, the very
+  impunity which thou hast deservedly granted to be an evil because of its
+  injustice." "I cannot deny it." "Wherefore the vicious are far more
+  unhappy by escaping punishment unjustly, than by being justly punished."
+  "This followeth," quoth I, "out of that which hath been concluded
+  before.
+
+  But I pray thee, leavest thou no punishments for the souls after the
+  death of the body?" "And those great too," quoth she. "Some of which I
+  think to be executed as sharp punishments, and others as merciful
+  purgations.[152] But I purpose not now to treat of those. But we have
+  hitherto laboured that thou shouldest perceive the power of the wicked,
+  which to thee seemed intolerable, to be none at all, and that thou
+  shouldest see, that those whom thou complainedst went unpunished, do
+  never escape without punishment for their wickedness. And that thou
+  shouldest learn that the licence which thou wishedst might soon end, is
+  not long, and yet the longer the more miserable, and most unhappy if it
+  were everlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being
+  permitted to escape with unjust impunity, than being punished with just
+  severity. Out of which it followeth that they are then more grievously
+  punished, when they are thought to go scot-free."
+
+  "When I consider thy reasons," quoth I, "I think nothing can be said
+  more truly. But if I return to the judgments of men, who is there that
+  will think them worthy to be believed or so much as heard?" "It is
+  true," quoth she, "for they cannot lift up their eyes accustomed to
+  darkness, to behold the light of manifest truth, and they are like those
+  birds whose sight is quickened by the night, and dimmed by the day. For
+  while they look upon, not the order of things, but their own affections,
+  they think that licence and impunity to sin is happy. But see what the
+  eternal law establisheth. If thou apply thy mind to the better, thou
+  needest no judge to reward thee: thou hast joined thyself to the more
+  excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, never expect
+  any other to punish thee: thou hast put thyself in a miserable estate;
+  as if by turns thou lookest down to the miry ground, and up to heaven,
+  setting aside all outward causes, by the very law of sight thou seemest
+  sometime to be in the dirt, and sometime present to the stars. But the
+  common sort considereth not these things. What then? Shall we join
+  ourselves to them whom we have proved to be like beasts? What if one
+  having altogether lost his sight should likewise forget that he ever had
+  any, and should think that he wanted nothing which belongeth to human
+  perfection: should we likewise think them blind, that see as well as
+  they saw before? For they will not grant that neither, which may be
+  proved by as forcible reasons, that they are more unhappy that do injury
+  than they which suffer it." "I would," quoth I, "hear these reasons."
+  "Deniest thou," quoth she, "that every wicked man deserveth punishment?"
+  "No." "And it is many ways clear that the vicious are miserable?" "Yes,"
+  quoth I. "Then you do not doubt that those who deserve punishment are
+  wretched?" "It is true," quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "thou wert to
+  examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that
+  did or that suffered wrong?" "I doubt not," quoth I, "but that I would
+  satisfy him that suffered with the sorrow of him that did it." "The
+  offerer of the injury then would seem to thee more miserable than the
+  receiver?" "It followeth," quoth I. "Hence therefore, and for other
+  causes grounded upon that principle that dishonesty of itself maketh men
+  miserable, it appeareth that the injury which is offered any man is not
+  the receiver's but the doer's misery." "But now-a-days," quoth she,
+  "orators take the contrary course. For they endeavour to draw the judges
+  to commiseration of them who have suffered any grievous afflictions;
+  whereas pity is more justly due to the causers thereof, who should be
+  brought, not by angry, but rather by favourable and compassionate
+  accusers to judgment, as it were sick men to a physician, that their
+  diseases and faults might be taken away by punishments; by which means
+  the defenders' labour would either wholly cease, or if they had rather
+  do their clients some good, they would change their defence into
+  accusations. And the wicked themselves, if they could behold virtue
+  abandoned by them, through some little rift, and perceive that they
+  might be delivered from the filth of sin by the affliction of
+  punishments, obtaining virtue in exchange, they would not esteem of
+  torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly
+  resign themselves to their accusers and judges. By which means it cometh
+  to pass, that in wise men there is no place for hatred. For who but a
+  very fool would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against
+  reason. For as faintness is a disease of the body, so is vice a sickness
+  of the mind. Wherefore, since we judge those that have corporal
+  infirmities to be rather worthy of compassion than of hatred, much more
+  are they to be pitied, and not abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with
+  wickedness, the greatest malady that may be.
+
+
+  [152] See discussion of this passage in _Boethius, An Essay,_ H. F.
+  Stewart (1891), pp. 98 ff.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quod tantos iuuat excitare motus
+  Et propria fatum sollicitare manu?
+Si mortem petitis, propinquat ipsa
+  Sponte sua uolucres nec remoratur equos.
+Quos serpens leo tigris ursus aper                                        5
+  Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt.
+An distant quia dissidentque mores,
+  Iniustas acies et fera bella mouent
+Alternisque uolunt perire telis?
+  Non est iusta satis saeuitiae ratio.                                   10
+Vis aptam meritis uicem referre?
+  Dilige iure bonos et miseresce malis."
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Why should we strive to die so many ways,
+    And slay ourselves with our own hands?
+    If we seek death, she ready stands,
+  She willing comes, her chariot never stays.
+  Those against whom the wild beasts arméd be,
+    Against themselves with weapons rage.[153]
+    Do they such wars unjustly wage,
+  Because their lives and manners disagree,
+  And so themselves with mutual weapons kill?
+    Alas, but this revenge is small.
+    Wouldst thou give due desert to all?
+  Love then the good, and pity thou the ill."
+
+
+  [153] Literally, "Men whom serpent, lion, tiger, bear, and boar attack
+  with tooth, yet attack each other with the sword."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Hic ego: "Video," inquam, "quae sit uel felicitas uel miseria in ipsis
+proborum atque improborum meritis constituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna
+populari non nihil boni maliue inesse perpendo. Neque enim sapientum
+quisquam exul inops ignominiosusque esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus,
+honore reuerendus, potentia ualidus, in sua permanens urbe florere. Sic
+enim clarius testatiusque sapientiae tractatur officium, cum in
+contingentes populos regentium quodam modo beatitudo transfunditur, cum
+praesertim carcer, nex[154] ceteraque legalium tormenta poenarum
+perniciosis potius ciuibus propter quos etiam constituta sunt debeantur.
+Cur haec igitur uersa uice mutentur scelerumque supplicia bonos premant,
+praemia uirtutum mali rapiant, uehementer admiror, quaeque tam iniustae
+confusionis ratio uideatur ex te scire desidero. Minus etenim mirarer, si
+misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector
+exaggerat. Qui cum saepe bonis iucunda, malis aspera contraque bonis dura
+tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehenditur, quid est quod a
+fortuitis casibus differre uideatur?" "Nec mirum," inquit, "si quid ordinis
+ignorata ratione temerarium confusumque credatur. Sed tu quamuis causam
+tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat,
+recte fieri cuncta ne dubites.
+
+
+[154] lex _plerique codd._
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+  "I see," quoth I, "what felicity or misery is placed in the deserts of
+  honest and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good or
+  evil even in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather live in
+  banishment, poverty, and ignominy, than prosper in his own country,
+  being rich, respected, and powerful. For in this manner is the office of
+  wisdom performed with more credit and renown, when the governors'
+  happiness is participated by the people about them; so chiefly because
+  prisons, death, and other torments of legal punishments are rather due
+  to pernicious subjects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I
+  much marvel why these things are thus turned upside down, and the
+  punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while evil men obtain the
+  rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee what may seem to be
+  the reason of so unjust confusion. For I would marvel less if I thought
+  that all things were disordered by casual events. Now God being the
+  Governor, my astonishment is increased. For since that He distributeth
+  oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is
+  distasteful to the bad, and contrariwise adversity to the good, and
+  prosperity to the evil, unless we find out the cause hereof, what
+  difference may there seem to be betwixt this and accidental chances?"
+  "It is no marvel," quoth she, "if anything be thought temerarious and
+  confused, when we know not the order it hath. But although thou beest
+  ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because the world
+  hath a governor, doubt not but all things are well done.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit
+  Propinqua summo cardine labi,
+Cur legat tardus plaustra Bootes
+  Mergatque seras aequore flammas,
+Cum nimis celeres explicet ortus,                                         5
+  Legem stupebit aetheris alti.
+Palleant plenae cornua lunae
+  Infecta metis noctis opacae
+Quaeque fulgenti texerat ore
+  Confusa Phoebe detegat astra,                                          10
+Commouet gentes publicus error
+  Lassantque crebris pulsibus aera.
+Nemo miratur flamina Cori
+  Litus frementi tundere fluctu
+Nec niuis duram frigore molem                                            15
+  Feruente Phoebi soluier aestu.
+Hic enim causas cernere promptum est,
+  Illic latentes pectora turbant.
+Cuncta quae rara prouehit aetas
+  Stupetque subitis mobile uulgus,                                       20
+Cedat inscitiae nubilus error,
+  Cessent profecto mira uideri."
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Who knows not how the stars near to the poles do slide,
+    And how Boötes his slow wain doth guide,
+  And why he sets so late, and doth so early rise,
+    May wonder at the courses of the skies.
+  If when the moon is full her horns seem pale to sight,
+    Infested with the darkness of the night,
+  And stars from which all grace she with her brightness took,
+    Now show themselves, while she doth dimly look,
+  A public error straight through vulgar minds doth pass,
+    And they with many strokes beat upon brass.[155]
+  None wonders why the winds upon the waters blow.
+    Nor why hot Phoebus' beams dissolve the snow.
+  These easy are to know, the other hidden lie,
+    And therefore more our hearts they terrify.
+  All strange events which time to light more seldom brings,
+    And the vain people count as sudden things,
+  If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free,
+    No longer would by us admired be."
+
+
+[155] See Tylor's _Primitive Culture_, pp. 296 ff. Cf "carmina uel caelo
+possunt deducere lunam," Virg. _Ecl._ viii. 69, and Juvenal, _Sat._ vi. 440
+sq.
+
+
+
+
+VI
+
+"Ita est," inquam; "sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas euoluere
+uelatasque caligine explicare rationes, quaeso uti quae hinc decernas.
+quoniam hoc me miraculum maxime perturbat, edisseras." Tum illa paulisper
+arridens: "Ad rem me," inquit, "omnium quaesitu maximam uocas, cui uix
+exhausti quicquam satis sit. Talis namque materia est ut una dubitatione
+succisa innumerabiles aliae uelut hydrae capita succrescant, nec ullus
+fuerit modus, nisi quis eas uiuacissimo mentis igne coerceat. In hac enim
+de prouidentiae simplicitate, de fati serie, de repentinis casibus, de
+cognitione ac praedestinatione diuina, de arbitrii libertate quaeri solet,
+quae quanti oneris sint ipse perpendis. Sed quoniam haec quoque te nosse
+quaedam medicinae tuae portio est, quamquam angusto limite temporis saepti
+tamen aliquid delibare[156] conabimur. Quod si te musici carminis
+oblectamenta delectant, hanc oportet paulisper differas uoluptatem, dum
+nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes." "Vt libet," inquam. Tunc uelut ab alio
+orsa principio ita disseruit: "Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium
+naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo mouetur modo, causas, ordinem,
+formas ex diuinae mentis stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis
+arce composita multiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit. Qui modus cum in
+ipsa diuinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur;
+cum uero ad ea quae mouet atque disponit refertur, fatum a ueteribus
+appellatum est. Quae diuersa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusque uim
+mente conspexerit. Nam prouidentia est ipsa illa diuina ratio in summo
+omnium principe constituta quae cuncta disponit; fatum uero inhaerens rebus
+mobilibus dispositio per quam prouidentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus.
+Prouidentia namque cuncta pariter quamuis diuersa quamuis infinita
+complectitur; fatum uero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac
+temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in diuinae
+mentis adunata prospectum prouidentia sit, eadem uero adunatio digesta
+atque explicata temporibus fatum uocetur. Quae licet diuersa sint, alterum
+tamen pendet ex altero. Ordo namque fatalis ex prouidentiae simplicitate
+procedit. Sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens mouet
+operis effectum, et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat, per
+temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter
+stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa quae disposuit
+multipliciter ac temporaliter administrat. Siue igitur famulantibus
+quibusdam prouidentiae diuinis spiritibus fatum exercetur seu anima seu
+tota inseruiente natura seu caelestibus siderum motibus seu angelica
+uirtute seu daemonum uaria sollertia seu aliquibus horum seu omnibus
+fatalis series texitur, illud certe manifestum est immobilem simplicemque
+gerendarum formam rerum esse prouidentiam, fatum uero eorum quae diuina
+simplicitas gerenda disposuit mobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem. Quo
+fit ut omnia quae fato subsunt prouidentiae quoque subiecta sint cui ipsum
+etiam subiacet fatum, quaedam uero quae sub prouidentia locata sunt fati
+seriem superent. Ea uero sunt quae primae propinqua diuinitati stabiliter
+fixa fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Nam ut orbium circa eundem
+cardinem sese uertentium qui est intimus ad simplicitatem medietatis
+accedit ceterorumque extra locatorum ueluti cardo quidam circa quem
+uersentur exsistit, extimus uero maiore ambitu rotatus quanto a puncti
+media indiuiduitate discedit tanto amplioribus spatiis explicatur, si quid
+uero illi se medio conectat et societ, in simplicitatem cogitur diffundique
+ac diffluere cessat, simili ratione quod longius a prima mente discedit
+maioribus fati nexibus implicatur ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est quanto
+illum rerum cardinem uicinius petit. Quod si supernae mentis haeserit
+firmitati, motu carens fati quoque supergreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti
+est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad
+aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus, ita est fati series
+mobilis ad prouidentiae stabilem simplicitatem. Ea series caelum ac sidera
+mouet, elementa in se inuicem temperat et alterna commutatione transformat;
+eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes fetuum seminumque renouat
+progressus. Haec actus etiam fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum
+conexione constringit, quae cum ab immobilis prouidentiae proficiscatur
+exordiis, ipsas quoque immutabiles esse necesse est. Ita enim res optime
+reguntur, si manens in diuina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum
+ordinem promat. Hic uero ordo res mutabiles et alioquin temere fluituras
+propria incommutabilitate coerceat. Quo fit ut tametsi uobis hunc ordinem
+minime considerare ualentibus confusa omnia perturbataque uideantur, nihilo
+minus tamen suus modus ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat. Nihil est enim
+quod mali causa ne ab ipsis quidem improbis fiat; quos, ut uberrime
+demonstratum est, bonum quaerentes prauus error auertit, nedum ordo de
+summi boni cardine proficiscens a suo quoquam deflectat exordio.
+
+Quae uero, inquies, potest ulla iniquior esse confusio, quam ut bonis tum
+aduersa tum prospera, malis etiam tum optata tum odiosa contingant? Num
+igitur ea mentis integritate homines degunt, ut quos probos improbosue
+censuerunt eos quoque uti existimant esse necesse sit? Atqui in hoc hominum
+iudicia depugnant, et quos alii praemio alii supplicio dignos arbitrantur.
+Sed concedamus ut aliquis possit bonos malosque discernere; num igitur
+potent intueri illam intimam temperiem, uelut in corporibus dici solet,
+animorum?  Non enim dissimile est miraculum nescienti cur sanis corporibus
+his quidem dulcia illis uero amara conueniant, cur aegri etiam quidam
+lenibus quidam uero acribus adiuuentur? At hoc medicus, qui sanitatis
+ipsius atque aegritudinis modum temperamentumque dinoscit, minime miratur.
+Quid uero aliud animorum salus uidetur esse quam probitas? Quid aegritudo
+quam uitia? Quis autem alius uel seruator bonorum uel malorum depulsor quam
+rector ac medicator mentium deus? Qui cum ex alta prouidentiae specula
+respexit, quid unicuique conueniat agnoscit et quod conuenire nouit
+accommodat. Hic iam fit illud fatalis ordinis insigne miraculum, cum ab
+sciente geritur quod stupeant ignorantes. Nam ut pauca quae ratio ualet
+humana de diuina profunditate perstringam, de hoc quem tu iustissimum et
+aequi seruantissimum putas omnia scienti prouidentiae diuersum uidetur; et
+uictricem quidem causam dis, uictam uero Catoni placuisse familiaris noster
+Lucanus admonuit. Hic igitur quidquid citra spem uideas geri, rebus quidem
+rectus ordo est, opinioni uero tuae peruersa confusio. Sed sit aliquis ita
+bene moratus ut de eo diuinum iudicium pariter et humanum consentiat, sed
+est animi uiribus infirmus; cui si quid eueniat aduersi, desinet colere
+forsitan innocentiam per quam non potuit retinere fortunam. Parcit itaque
+sapiens dispensatio ei quem deteriorem facere possit aduersitas, ne cui non
+conuenit laborare patiatur. Est alius cunctis uirtutibus absolutus
+sanctusque ac deo proximus; hunc contingi quibuslibet aduersis nefas
+prouidentia iudicat adeo ut ne corporeis quidem morbis agitari sinat. Nam
+ut quidam me quoque excellentior:
+
+  [Greek: Andros dae ierou demas aitheres oikodomaesan.]
+
+Fit autem saepe, uti bonis summa rerum regenda deferatur, ut exuberans
+retundatur improbitas. Aliis mixta quaedam pro animorum qualitate
+distribuit; quosdam remordet ne longa felicitate luxurient, alios
+duris[157] agitari ut uirtutes animi patientiae usu atque exercitatione
+confirment. Alii plus aequo metuunt quod ferre possunt, alii plus aequo
+despiciunt quod ferre non possunt; hos in experimentum sui tristibus ducit.
+Nonnulli uenerandum saeculi nomen gloriosae pretio mortis emerunt: quidam
+suppliciis inexpugnabiles exemplum ceteris praetulerunt inuictam malis esse
+uirtutem. Quae quam recte atque disposite et ex eorum bono quibus accedere
+uidentur fiant, nulla dubitatio est. Nam illud quoque, quod improbis nunc
+tristia nunc optata proueniunt, ex eisdem ducitur causis; ac de tristibus
+quidem nemo miratur, quod eos male meritos omnes existimant. Quorum quidem
+supplicia tum ceteros ab sceleribus deterrent, tum ipsos quibus inuehuntur
+emendant; laeta uero magnum bonis argumentum loquuntur, quid de huiusmodi
+felicitate debeant iudicare quam famulari saepe improbis cernant.  In qua
+re illud etiam dispensari credo, quod est forsitan alicuius tam praeceps
+atque inportuna natura ut eum in scelera potius exacerbare possit rei
+familiaris inopia; huius morbo prouidentia collatae pecuniae remedio
+medetur. Hic foedatam probris conscientiam exspectans et se cum fortuna sua
+comparans, forsitan pertimescit ne cuius ei iucundus usus est, sit tristis
+amissio. Mutabit igitur mores ac dum fortunam metuit amittere; nequitiam
+derelinquit. Alios in cladem meritam praecipitauit indigne acta felicitas;
+quibusdam permissum puniendi ius, ut exercitii bonis et malis esset causa
+supplicii. Nam ut probis atque improbis nullum foedus est, ita ipsi inter
+se improbi nequeunt conuenire. Quidni, cum a semet ipsis discerpentibus
+conscientiam uitiis quisque dissentiat faciantque saepe, quae cum gesserint
+non fuisse gerenda decernant? Ex quo saepe summa illa prouidentia protulit
+insigne miraculum, ut malos mali bonos facerent. Nam dum iniqua sibi a
+pessimis quidam perpeti uidentur, noxiorum odio flagrantes ad uirtutis
+frugem rediere, dum se eis dissimiles student esse quos oderant. Sola est
+enim diuina uis cui mala quoque bona sint, cum eis competenter utendo
+alicuius boni elicit effectum. Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur, ut
+quod adsignata ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen
+ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno prouidentiae liceat temeritati.
+
+  [Greek: Argaleon de me tauta theon hos pant agoreuein.]
+
+Neque enim fas est homini cunctas diuinae operae machinas uel ingenio
+comprehendere uel explicare sermone. Hoc tantum perspexisse sufficiat, quod
+naturarum omnium proditor deus idem ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat,
+dumque ea quae protulit in sui similitudinem retinere festinat, malum omne
+de reipublicae suae terminis per fatalis seriem necessitatis eliminet. Quo
+fit ut quae in terris abundare creduntur, si disponentem prouidentiam
+spectes, nihil usquam mali esse perpendas. Sed uideo te iam dudum et
+pondere quaestionis oneratum et rationis prolixitate fatigatum aliquam
+carminis exspectare dulcedinem. Accipe igitur haustum quo refectus firmior
+in ulteriora contendas.
+
+
+[156] deliberare _codd._; delibare _coni._ Pulmannus.
+
+[157] _Fortasse_ sinit _post_ duris _addendum est_.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+  "It is true," quoth I, "but since it is thy profession to explicate the
+  causes of hidden things, and to unfold the reasons which are covered
+  with darkness, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare what conclusion thou
+  drawest from these things, for this miracle troubleth me above all
+  others." Then she smiling a little said: "Thou invitest me to a matter
+  which is most hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently
+  declared; for it is such that, one doubt being taken away, innumerable
+  others, like the heads of Hydra, succeed, neither will they have any end
+  unless a man repress them with the most lively fire of his mind. For in
+  this matter are wont to be handled these questions: of the simplicity of
+  Providence; of the course of Fate; of sudden chances; of God's knowledge
+  and predestination, and of free will; which how weighty they are, thou
+  thyself discerneth. But because it is part of thy cure to know these
+  things also, though the time be short, yet we will endeavour to touch
+  them briefly. But if the sweetness of verse delight thee, thou must
+  forbear this pleasure for a while, until I propose unto thee some few
+  arguments." "As it pleaseth thee," quoth I.
+
+  Then taking as it were a new beginning, she discoursed in this manner:
+  "The generation of all things, and all the proceedings of mutable
+  natures, and whatsoever is moved in any sort, take their causes, order,
+  and forms from the stability of the Divine mind. This, placed in the
+  castle of its own simplicity, hath determined manifold ways for doing
+  things; which ways being considered in the purity of God's
+  understanding, are named Providence, but being referred to those things
+  which He moveth and disposeth, they are by the ancients called Fate. The
+  diversity of which will easily appear if we weigh the force of both. For
+  Providence is the very Divine reason itself, seated in the highest
+  Prince, which disposeth all things. But Fate is a disposition inherent
+  in changeable things, by which Providence connecteth all things in their
+  due order. For Providence embraceth all things together, though diverse,
+  though infinite; but Fate putteth every particular thing into motion
+  being distributed by places, forms, and time; so that this unfolding of
+  temporal order being united into the foresight of God's mind is
+  Providence, and the same uniting, being digested and unfolded in time,
+  is called Fate. Which although they be diverse yet the one dependeth on
+  the other. For fatal order proceedeth from the simplicity of Providence.
+  For as a workman conceiving the form of anything in his mind taketh his
+  work in hand, and executeth by order of time that which he had simply
+  and in a moment foreseen, so God by His Providence disposeth whatsoever
+  is to be done with simplicity and stability, and by Fate effecteth by
+  manifold ways and in the order of time those very things which He
+  disposeth. Wherefore, whether Fate be exercised by the subordination of
+  certain Divine spirits to Providence, or this fatal web be woven by a
+  soul or by the service of all nature, or by the heavenly motions of the
+  stars, by angelical virtue, or by diabolical industry, or by some or all
+  of these, that certainly is manifest that Providence is an immoveable
+  and simple form of those things which are to be done, and Fate a
+  moveable connexion and temporal order of those things which the Divine
+  simplicity hath disposed to be done. So that all that is under Fate is
+  also subject to Providence, to which also Fate itself obeyeth. But some
+  things which are placed under Providence are above the course of Fate.
+  And they are those things which nigh to the first Divinity, being stable
+  and fixed, exceed the order of fatal mobility. For as of orbs which turn
+  about the same centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the
+  midst, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without
+  it, about which they are turned, and the outmost, wheeled with a greater
+  compass, by how much it departeth from the middle indivisibility of the
+  centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces, but that which
+  is joined and coupled to that middle approacheth to simplicity, and
+  ceaseth to spread and flow abroad, in like manner that which departeth
+  farthest from the first mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of
+  Fate, and everything is so much the freer from Fate, by how much it
+  draweth nigh to the hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the
+  stability of the Sovereign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also
+  the necessity of Fate. Wherefore in what sort discourse of reason is
+  compared to pure understanding, that which is produced to that which is,
+  time to eternity, a circle to the centre, such is the course of moveable
+  Fate to the stable simplicity of Providence. That course moveth the
+  heaven and stars, tempereth the elements one with another, and
+  transformeth them by mutual changing. The same reneweth all rising and
+  dying things by like proceeding of fruits and seeds. This comprehendeth
+  also the actions and fortunes of men by an unloosable connexion of
+  causes, which since it proceeds from the principles of unmovable
+  Providence, the causes also must needs be immutable. For in this manner
+  things are best governed, if the simplicity which remaineth in the
+  Divine mind produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order
+  restraineth with its own immutability things otherwise mutable, and
+  which would have a confused course. Whereof it ensueth that though all
+  things seem confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider
+  this order, notwithstanding all things are disposed by their own proper
+  measure directing them to good. For there is nothing which is done for
+  the love of evil, even by the wicked themselves: whom, as hath been
+  abundantly proved, lewd error carrieth away while they are seeking after
+  that which is good, so far is it that order proceeding from the hinge of
+  the Sovereign Goodness should avert any from his first beginning.
+
+  But, thou wilt say, what more unjust confusion can there be than that
+  both adversity and prosperity should happen to the good, and in like
+  manner both desired and hateful things to the wicked? But are men so
+  completely wise that whomsoever they judge wicked or honest must needs
+  be so? How then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to
+  divers the same men seem worthy of reward and punishment! But let us
+  grant that some are able to discern the good from the evil. Can they
+  therefore behold, as is wont to be said of bodies, that inward
+  complexion of souls? For he that knoweth not the cause may marvel in
+  like manner why some sound bodies agree better with sweet things and
+  other with tart; and why some sick men are healed with gentle and some
+  with sharper physic. But to a physician who knoweth the manner and
+  temper both of health and sickness this is nothing strange. Now, what is
+  the health of souls but virtue? What sickness have they but vices? And
+  who either conserveth goodness or expelleth evils, but God the Ruler and
+  Governor of men's minds? Who beholding from His high turret of
+  providence seeth what is fitting for everyone, and applieth that which
+  He knoweth to be most convenient. Here ariseth that strange wonder of
+  fatal order, to wit that He that knoweth what is best, doth that which
+  the ignorant admire. For to touch briefly some few things of the divine
+  depth, which human reason is able to attain, he whom thou thinketh most
+  just and most observant of equity, seemeth otherwise in the eyes of
+  Providence which knoweth all. And our disciple Lucan noteth that the
+  cause of conquerers pleased the gods, and that of the conquered,
+  Cato.[158] Wherefore whatsoever thou seest done here against thy
+  expectation is right order in the things themselves, but a perverse
+  confusion in thy opinion. But let there be one so well conditioned that
+  God and men approve and praise him; yet perhaps he is so weak a minded
+  man, that if he falleth into adversity, he will forsake his innocency,
+  which was not able to keep him in prosperity. Wherefore God's wise
+  dispensation spareth him that adversity might make worse, lest he should
+  suffer to whom difficulties are dangerous.
+
+  There is another complete in all virtues, a saint and high to God;
+  Providence judgeth it a sacrilege to lay affliction on him, insomuch
+  that she permitteth him not to be troubled so much as with corporal
+  sickness. For as one that excelleth me saith 'the body of an holy man is
+  builded of pure ether.'[159] It happeneth often also that the chief
+  command is given to good men, that wickedness, which otherwise would
+  overflow all, may be kept down. She mixeth for others sour and sweet
+  according to the disposition of their souls; she troubles some lest they
+  should fall to dissolution by long prosperity, others are vexed with
+  hardships, that they may confirm the forces of their mind with the use
+  and exercise of patience. Some are too much afraid of that which they
+  are able to bear. Others make less account than there is cause of that
+  which they cannot endure. All these she affrayeth with afflictions that
+  they make trial of themselves. Many have bought the renown of this world
+  with a glorious death. Some, overcoming all torments, have showed by
+  their example that virtues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things
+  how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good upon whom
+  they are seen to fall, there can be no doubt. For that sometime
+  grievous, sometime pleasant things befall in like manner the wicked,
+  proceedeth from the same causes. And as for adversity no man marvelleth
+  because all think they deserve ill. Whose punishments do both terrify
+  others from the like courses, and move them to amend themselves. And
+  their prosperity is a great argument to the good, what they ought to
+  judge of this happiness which they see oftentimes bestowed upon the
+  wicked. In which thing also is to be considered that peradventure some
+  have so headlong and untoward a disposition, that poverty would rather
+  make him worse; whose disease is cured by Providence, with giving him
+  store of money. Another, knowing his own guilty conscience, and
+  comparing his character with his own estate, is afraid lest the loss of
+  that should be grievous unto him, the use of which is pleasant.
+  Wherefore he resolveth to change his customs, and whiles he feareth to
+  lose his prosperity, he forsaketh wickedness. The increase of honour
+  undeservedly obtained hath thrown some headlong into their deserved
+  destruction. Others are permitted to have authority to punish others,
+  that they may exercise the good and punish the bad. For as there is no
+  league between virtuous and wicked men, so neither can the wicked agree
+  among themselves. Why not? Since they disagree within themselves by
+  reason of their vices which tear their conscience, so that they many
+  times do that which afterwards they wish undone. From whence that
+  highest Providence often worketh that wonderful miracle, that evil men
+  make those which are evil good. For some, considering the injustice done
+  them by most wicked men, inflamed with hatred of evildoers have returned
+  to the practice of virtue, procuring to be contrary to them whom they
+  hate. For it is only a divine strength to which even evil things are
+  good, when, by using them in due sort, it draweth some good effect out
+  of them. For a certain order embraceth all things, so that even that
+  which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falleth into
+  another, yet that is order also, lest confused rashness should bear any
+  sway in the kingdom of Providence. 'But it is hard for me to rehearse
+  all this as if I were a God.'[160] For it is impossible for any man
+  either to comprehend by his wit or to explicate in speech all the frame
+  of God's work. Be it sufficient that we have seen thus much, that God,
+  the author of all natures, directeth and disposeth all things to
+  goodness, and while He endeavoureth to retain in His own likeness those
+  things which He hath produced, He banisheth all evil from the bounds of
+  His commonwealth, by the course of fatal necessity. So that if thou
+  considerest the disposition of Providence, thou wilt perceive that evil,
+  which is thought so to abound upon earth, hath no place left for it at
+  all. But I see that long since burdened with so weighty a question, and
+  wearied with my long discourse, thou expectest the delight of verses;
+  wherefore take a draught, that, being refreshed, thou mayest be able to
+  go forward.
+
+
+  [158] _Pharsal_. i. 126.
+
+  [159] Source unknown.
+
+  [160] Homer, _Il._ xii. 176.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Si uis celsi iura tonantis
+Pura sollers cernere mente,
+Aspice summi culmina caeli.
+Illic iusto foedere rerum
+Veterem seruant sidera pacem.                                             5
+Non sol rutilo concitus igne
+Gelidum Phoebes impedit axem
+Nec quae summo uertice mundi
+Flectit rapidos Vrsa meatus.
+Numquam occiduo lota profundo                                            10
+Cetera cernens sidera mergi
+Cupit oceano tingere flammas.
+Semper uicibus temporis aequis
+Vesper seras nuntiat umbras
+Reuehitque diem Lucifer almum.                                           15
+Sic aeternos reficit cursus
+Alternus amor, sic astrigeris
+Bellum discors exulat oris.
+Haec concordia temperat aequis
+Elementa modis, ut pugnantia                                             20
+Vicibus cedant umida siccis
+Iungantque fidem frigora flammis
+Pendulus ignis surgat in altum
+Terraeque graues pondere sidant.
+Isdem causis uere tepenti                                                25
+Spirat florifer annus odores,
+Aestas Cererem feruida siccat,
+Remeat pomis grauis autumnus,
+Hiemem defluus inrigat imber.
+Haec temperies alit ac profert                                           30
+Quidquid uitam spirat in orbe.
+Eadem rapiens condit et aufert
+Obitu mergens orta supremo.
+Sedet interea conditor altus
+Rerumque regens flectit habenas                                          35
+Rex et dominus fons et origo
+Lex et sapiens arbiter aequi
+Et quae motu concitat ire,
+Sistit retrahens ac uaga firmat.
+Nam nisi rectos reuocans itus                                            40
+Flexos iterum cogat in orbes,
+Quae nunc stabilis continet ordo
+Dissaepta suo fonte fatiscant.
+Hic est cunctis communis amor
+Repetuntque boni fine teneri,                                            45
+Quia non aliter durare queant,
+Nisi conuerso rursus amore
+Refluant causae quae dedit esse.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+      If thou would'st see
+    God's laws with purest mind,
+    Thy sight on heaven must fixéd be,
+  Whose settled course the stars in peace doth bind.
+      The sun's bright fire
+    Stops not his sister's team,
+    Nor doth the northern bear desire
+  Within the ocean's wave to hide her beam.
+      Though she behold
+    The other stars there couching,
+    Yet she uncessantly is rolled
+  About high heaven, the ocean never touching.
+      The evening light
+    With certain course doth show
+    The coming of the shady night,
+  And Lucifer before the day doth go.
+      This mutual love
+    Courses eternal makes,
+    And from the starry spheres above
+  All cause of war and dangerous discord takes.
+      This sweet consent
+    In equal bands doth tie
+    The nature of each element,
+  So that the moist things yield unto the dry,
+      The piercing cold
+    With flames doth friendship keep,
+    The trembling fire the highest place doth hold,
+  And the gross earth sinks down into the deep.
+      The flowery year
+    Breathes odours in the spring
+    The scorching summer corn doth bear,
+  The autumn fruit from laden trees doth bring.
+      The falling rain
+    Doth winter's moisture give.
+    These rules thus nourish and maintain
+  All creatures which we see on earth to live.
+      And when they die,
+    These bring them to their end,
+    While their Creator sits on high,
+  Whose hand the reins of the whole world doth bend.
+      He as their King
+    Rules them with lordly might.
+    From Him they rise, flourish, and spring,
+  He as their law and judge decides their right.
+      Those things whose course
+    Most swiftly glides away
+    His might doth often backward force,
+  And suddenly their wandering motion stay.
+      Unless His strength
+    Their violence should bound,
+    And them which else would run at length,
+  Should bring within the compass of a round,
+      That firm decree
+    Which now doth all adorn
+    Would soon destroyed and broken be,
+  Things being far from their beginning borne.
+      This powerful love
+    Is common unto all,
+    Which for desire of good do move
+  Back to the springs from whence they first did fall.
+      No worldly thing
+    Can a continuance have
+    Unless love back again it bring
+  Unto the cause which first the essence gave.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Iamne igitur uides quid haec omnia quae diximus consequatur?" "Quidnam?"
+inquam. "Omnem," inquit, "bonam prorsus esse fortunam." "Et qui id,"
+inquam, "fieri potest?" "Attende," inquit. "Cum omnis fortuna uel iucunda
+uel aspera tum remunerandi exercendiue bonos tum puniendi corrigendiue
+improbos causa deferatur, omnis bona quam uel iustam constat esse uel
+utilem." "Nimis quidem," inquam, "uera ratio et si quam paulo ante docuisti
+prouidentiam fatumue considerem, firmis uiribus nixa sententia. Sed eam si
+placet inter eas quas inopinabiles paulo ante posuisti numeremus." "Qui?"
+inquit. "Quia id hominum sermo communis usurpat et quidem crebro quorundam
+malam esse fortunam." "Visne igitur," inquit, "paulisper uulgi sermonibus
+accedamus, ne nimium uelut ab humanitatis usu recessisse uideamur?" "Vt
+placet," inquam. "Nonne igitur bonum censes esse quod prodest?" "Ita est,"
+inquam, "Quae uero aut exercet aut corrigit, prodest?" "Fateor," inquam.
+"Bona igitur?" "Quidni?" "Sed haec eorum est qui uel in uirtute positi
+contra aspera bellum gerunt, uel a uitiis declinantes uirtutis iter
+arripiunt." "Negare," inquam, "nequeo." "Quid uero iucunda, quae in
+praemium tribuitur bonis, num uulgus malam esse decernit?" "Nequaquam;
+uerum uti est ita quoque esse optimam censet." "Quid reliqua, quae cum sit
+aspera, iusto supplicio malos coercet, num bonam populus putat?" "Immo
+omnium," inquam, "quae excogitari possunt, iudicat esse miserrimam." "Vide
+igitur ne opinionem populi sequentes quiddam ualde inopinabile
+confecerimus." "Quid?" inquam. "Ex his enim," ait, "quae concessa sunt,
+euenit eorum quidem qui uel sunt uel in possessione uel in prouectu uel in
+adeptione uirtutis, omnem quaecumque sit bonam, in improbitate uero
+manentibus omnem pessimam esse fortunam." "Hoc," inquam, "uerum est,
+tametsi nemo audeat confiteri." "Quare," inquit, "ita uir sapiens moleste
+ferre non debet, quotiens in fortunae certamen adducitur, ut uirum fortem
+non decet indignari, quotiens increpuit bellicus tumultus; utrique enim,
+huic quidem gloriae propagandae illi uero conformandae sapientiae,
+difficultas ipsa materia est. Ex quo etiam uirtus uocatur quod suis uiribus
+nitens non superetur aduersis. Neque enim uos in prouectu positi uirtutis
+diffluere deliciis et emarcescere uoluptate uenistis. Proelium cum omni
+fortuna nimis[161] acre conseritis, ne uos aut tristis opprimat aut iucunda
+corrumpat. Firmis medium uiribus occupate! Quidquid aut infra subsistit aut
+ultra progreditur, habet contemptum felicitatis, non habet praemium
+laboris. In uestra enim situm manu qualem uobis fortunam formare malitis;
+omnis enim quae uidetur aspera nisi aut exercet aut corrigit punit.
+
+
+[161] animis _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Perceivest thou now what followeth of all that we have hitherto said?"
+  "What?" quoth I. "That," quoth she, "all manner of fortune is good."
+  "How can that be?" quoth I. "Be attentive," quoth she; "since that all
+  fortune, be it pleasing or unpleasing, is directed to the reward or
+  exercise of the good, and to the punishment and direction of the wicked,
+  it is manifest it is all good, since all is just or profitable." "Thy
+  reason is very true," quoth I, "and if I consider Providence and Fate,
+  which thou didst explicate a little before, thy opinion is well
+  grounded. But if thou pleasest let us account it among those which thou
+  not long since supposest incredible." "Why?" quoth she. "Because men
+  commonly use to say and repeat that some have ill fortune." "Shall we,"
+  quoth she, "frame our speech to the vulgar phrase, lest we seem to have
+  as it were forsaken the use of human conversation?" "As it pleaseth
+  thee," quoth I. "Dost thou not think then that that is good which is
+  profitable?" "Yes," quoth I. "But that fortune which either exerciseth
+  or correcteth is profitable?" "It is true," quoth I. "It is good then?"
+  "Why not?" "But this is the estate of them who being either virtuous
+  strive with adversity, or forsaking vices betake themselves to the way
+  of virtue." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Now, what sayest thou to that
+  pleasing fortune which is given in reward to the good, doth the common
+  people account it bad?" "No, but judgeth it exceeding good, as it is
+  indeed." "And what of the other which, being unpleasing, restraineth the
+  evil with just punishment, doth not the people think it good?" "Nay,"
+  quoth I, "they think it the most miserable that can be." "Look then,"
+  quoth she, "how, following the people's opinion, we have concluded a
+  very incredible matter." "What?" quoth I. "For it followeth," quoth she,
+  "out of that which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoever it be,
+  who are either in the possession or increase or entrance of virtue, is
+  good: and theirs, which remain in vices, the worst that may be." "This,"
+  quoth I, "is true, though none dare say so." "Wherefore," quoth she, "a
+  wise man must be no more troubled when he is assaulted with adversity,
+  than a valiant captain dismayed at the sound of an alarum. For
+  difficulties are the matter by which the one must extend his glory, and
+  the other increase his wisdom. For which cause virtue is so called,
+  because it hath sufficient strength to overcome adversity.[162] For
+  you, that are proficients in virtue, are not come hither to be dissolute
+  with dainties or to languish in pleasures. You skirmish fiercely with
+  any fortune, lest either affliction oppress you or prosperity corrupt
+  you. Stay yourselves strongly in the mean! For whatsoever cometh either
+  short, or goeth beyond, may well contemn felicity, but will never obtain
+  any reward of labour. For it is placed in your power to frame to
+  yourselves what fortune you please. For all that seemeth unsavoury
+  either exerciseth or correcteth or punisheth.
+
+
+  [162] Boethius shows his independence in adopting for _uirtus_ a
+  different etymology from that given by Cicero, viz. _uir_ (of. 2
+  _Tusoul._ xviii.).
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Bella bis quinis operatus annis
+Vltor Atrides Phrygiae ruinis
+Fratris amissos thalamos piauit;
+Ille dum Graiae dare uela classi
+Optat et uentos redimit cruore,                                           5
+Exuit patrem miserumque tristis
+Foederat natae iugulum sacerdos.
+Fleuit amissos Ithacus sodales
+Quos ferus uasto recubans in antro
+Mersit inmani Polyphemus aluo;                                           10
+Sed tamen caeco furibundus ore
+Gaudium maestis lacrimis rependit.
+Herculem duri celebrant labores.
+Ille Centauros domuit superbos,
+Abstulit saeuo spolium leoni                                             15
+Fixit et certis uolucres sagittis,
+Poma cernenti rapuit draconi
+Aureo laeuam grauior metallo,
+Cerberum traxit triplici catena.
+Victor immitem posuisse fertur                                           20
+Pabulum saeuis dominum quadrigis.
+Hydra combusto periit ueneno,
+Fronte turpatus Achelous amnis
+Ora demersit pudibunda ripis.
+Strauit Antaeum Libycis harenis,                                         25
+Cacus Euandri satiauit iras
+Quosque pressurus foret altus orbis
+Saetiger spumis umeros notauit.
+Vltimus caelum[163] labor inreflexo
+Sustulit collo pretiumque rursus                                         30
+Vltimi caelum meruit laboris.
+Ite nunc fortes ubi celsa magni
+Ducit exempli uia! Cur inertes
+Terga nudatis? Superata tellus
+Sidera donat."                                                           35
+
+
+[163] caelo _codd. mellores._
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+    Revengeful Atreus' son did ten whole years employ
+  In wars, till he his brother's loss repaid with ransacked Troy.
+    He setting forth the fleet of Greece upon the seas,
+  And knowing well that only blood the angry winds would please,
+    Forgot a father's part, and with his cruel knife
+  Unto the gods did sacrifice his dearest daughter's life.
+    Ulysses wailed the loss of his most faithful men,
+  Whom Polyphemus did devour enclosed in his den
+    But when his hands by sleight had made the Cyclops blind,
+  Most pleasant joy instead of former tears possessed his mind.
+    Hercules famous is for his laborious toil,
+  Who tamed the Centaurs and did take the dreadful lion's spoil.
+    He the Stymphalian birds with piercing arrows strook,
+  And from the watchful dragon's care the golden apples took.[164]
+    He in a threefold chain the hellish porter led,
+  And with their cruel master's flesh the savage horses fed.
+    He did th' increasing heads of poisonous Hydra burn,
+  And breaking Achelous' horns, did make him back return.[165]*
+    He on the Libyan sands did proud Antaeus kill,
+  And with the mighty Cacus' blood Euander's wrath fulfil.
+    That world-uplifting back the boar's white foam did fleck.
+  To hold on high the sphere of heaven with never bending neck
+    Of all his many toils the last was, and most hard,
+  And for this last and greatest toil the heaven was his reward.
+    You gallant men pursue this way of high renown,
+  Why yield you? Overcome the earth, and you the stars shall crown,"
+
+
+  [164] Literally, "his left hand weighted with the golden metal."
+
+  [165] Lit. "The river Achelous dishonoured in his brow (by the loss of
+  his horns) buried his shame-stricken face in his banks."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. EX MAG. OFF. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER QVARTVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER V.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Dixerat orationisque cursum ad alia quaedam tractanda atque expedienda
+uertebat. Tum ego: "Recta quidem," inquam, "exhortatio tuaque prorsus
+auctoritate dignissima, sed quod tu dudum de prouidentia quaestionem
+pluribus aliis implicitam esse dixisti, re experior. Quaero enim an esse
+aliquid omnino et quidnam esse casum arbitrere." Tum illa: "Festino,"
+inquit; "debitum promissionis absoluere uiamque tibi qua patriam reueharis
+aperire. Haec autem etsi perutilia cognitu tamen a propositi nostri tramite
+paulisper auersa sunt, uerendumque est ne deuiis fatigatus ad emetiendum
+rectum iter sufficere non possis." "Ne id," inquam, "prorsus uereare. Nam
+quietis mihi loco fuerit ea quibus maxime delector agnoscere, simul cum
+omne disputationis tuae latus indubitata fide constiterit, nihil de
+sequentibus ambigatur." Tum illa: "Morem," inquit, "geram tibi," simulque
+sic orsa est: "Si quidem," inquit, "aliquis euentum temerario motu nullaque
+causarum conexione productum casum esse definiat, nihil omnino casum esse
+confirmo et praeter subiectae rei significationem inanem prorsus uocem esse
+decerno. Quis enim coercente in ordinem cuncta deo locus esse ullus
+temeritati reliquus potest? Nam nihil ex nihilo exsistere uera sententia
+est cui nemo umquam ueterum refragatus est, quamquam id illi non de
+operante principio, sed de materiali subiecto hoc omnium de natura rationum
+quasi quoddam iecerint fundamentum. At si nullis ex causis aliquid oriatur,
+id de nihilo ortum esse uidebitur. Quod si hoc fieri nequit, ne casum
+quidem huiusmodi esse possibile est qualem paulo ante definiuimus." "Quid
+igitur," inquam, "nihilne est quod uel casus uel fortuitum iure appellari
+queat? An est aliquid, tametsi uulgus lateat, cui uocabula ista
+conueniant?" "Aristoteles meus id," inquit, "in Physicis et breui et ueri
+propinqua ratione definiuit."  "Quonam," inquam "modo?" "Quotiens," ait,
+"aliquid cuiuspiam rei gratia geritur aliudque quibusdam de causis quam
+quod intendebatur obtingit, casus uocatur, ut si quis colendi agri causa
+fodiens humum defossi auri pondus inueniat. Hoc igitur fortuito quidem
+creditur accidisse, uerum non de nihilo est; nam proprias causas habet
+quarum inprouisus inopinatusque concursus casum uidetur operatus.  Nam nisi
+cultor agri humum foderet, nisi eo loci pecuniam suam depositor obruisset,
+aurum non esset inuentum. Haec sunt igitur fortuiti causa compendii, quod
+ex obuiis sibi et confluentibus causis, non ex gerentis intentione
+prouenit. Neque enim uel qui aurum obruit uel qui agrum exercuit ut ea
+pecunia reperiretur intendit; sed uti dixi, quo ille obruit hunc fodisse
+conuenit atque concurrit. Licet igitur definire casum esse inopinatum ex
+confluentibus causis in his quae ob aliquid geruntur euentum; concurrere
+uero atque confluere causas facit ordo ille ineuitabili conexione
+procedens; qui de prouidentiae fonte descendens cuncta suis locis
+temporibusque disponit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FIFTH BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Having said thus, she began to turn her speech to treat and explicate
+  certain other questions, when I interrupted her, saying: "Thy
+  exhortation is very good, and well-seeming thy authority. But I find it
+  true by experience, as thou affirmedst, that the question of Providence
+  is entangled with many other. For I desire to know whether thou thinkest
+  chance to be anything at all, and what it is." "I make haste," quoth
+  she, "to perform my promise, and to show thee the way by which thou
+  mayest return to thy country. But these other questions, though they be
+  very profitable, yet they are somewhat from our purpose, and it is to be
+  feared lest being wearied with digressions thou beest not able to finish
+  thy direct journey." "There is no fear of that," quoth I, "for it will
+  be a great ease to me to understand those things in which I take great
+  delight, and withal, when thy disputation is fenced in on every side
+  with sure conviction, there can be no doubt made of anything thou shalt
+  infer." "I will," quoth she, "do as thou wouldst me have," and withal
+  began in this manner. "If any shall define chance to be an event
+  produced by a confused motion, and without connexion of causes, I affirm
+  that there is no such thing, and that chance is only an empty voice that
+  hath beneath it no real signification. For what place can confusion
+  have, since God disposeth all things in due order? For it is a true
+  sentence that of nothing cometh nothing, which none of the ancients
+  denied, though they held not that principle of the efficient cause, but
+  of the material subject, laying it down as in a manner the ground of all
+  their reasonings concerning nature. But if anything proceedeth from no
+  causes, that will seem to have come from nothing, which if it cannot be,
+  neither is it possible there should be any such chance as is defined a
+  little before." "What then," quoth I, "is there nothing that can rightly
+  be called chance or fortune? Or is there something, though unknown to
+  the common sort, to which these names agree?" "My Aristotle," quoth she,
+  "in his _Books of Nature_[166] declared this point briefly and very
+  near the truth." "How?" quoth I. "When," quoth she, "anything is done
+  for some certain cause, and some other thing happeneth for other reasons
+  than that which was intended, this is called chance; as if one digging
+  his ground with intention to till it, findeth an hidden treasure. This
+  is thought to have fallen thus out by fortune, but it is not of nothing,
+  for it hath peculiar causes whose unexpected and not foreseen concourse
+  seemeth to have brought forth a chance. For unless the husbandman had
+  digged up his ground, and unless the other had hidden his money in that
+  place, the treasure had not been found. These are therefore the causes
+  of this fortunate accident, which proceedeth from the meeting and
+  concourse of causes, and not from the intention of the doer. For neither
+  he that hid the gold nor he that tilled his ground had any intention
+  that the money should be found, but, as I said, it followed and
+  concurred that this man should dig up in the place where the other hid.
+  Wherefore, we may define chance thus: That it is an unexpected event of
+  concurring causes in those things which are done to some end and
+  purpose. Now the cause why causes so concur and meet so together, is
+  that order proceeding with inevitable connexion, which, descending from
+  the fountain of Providence, disposeth all things in their places and
+  times.
+
+
+  [166] _Phys._ ii. 4.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Rupis Achaemeniae scopulis ubi uersa sequentum
+  Pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax,
+Tigris et Euphrates uno se fonte resoluunt
+  Et mox abiunctis dissociantur aquis.
+Si coeant cursumque iterum reuocentur in unum,                            5
+  Confluat alterni quod trahit unda uadi;
+Conuenient puppes et uulsi flumine trunci
+  Mixtaque fortuitos implicet unda modos,
+Quos tamen ipsa uagos terrae decliuia casus
+  Gurgitis et lapsi defluus ordo regit.                                  10
+Sic quae permissis fluitare uidetur habenis
+  Fors patitur frenos ipsaque lege meat."
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  In the Achaemenian rocks, where Parthians with their darts
+  In their dissembled flight do wound their enemies,
+  Tigris from the same head doth with Euphrates rise,
+  And forthwith they themselves divide in several parts;
+  But if they join again, and them one channel bound,
+  Bringing together all that both their waves do bear;
+  The ships and trees, whose roots they from the bank do tear,
+  Will meet, and they their floods will mingle and confound,
+  Yet run this wandering course in places which are low,
+  And in these sliding streams a settled law remains.[167]
+  So fortune, though it seems to run with careless reins,
+  Yet hath it certain rule, and doth in order flow."
+
+
+  [167] Lit. "Yet all these (apparently) random happenings are governed by
+  the shelving ground and the flowing course of the stream as it runs."
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+"Animaduerto," inquam, "idque, uti tu dicis, ita esse consentio. Sed in hac
+haerentium sibi serie causarum estne ulla nostri arbitrii libertas an ipsos
+quoque humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena constringit?" "Est," inquit,
+"neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit
+arbitrii. Nam quod ratione uti naturaliter potest id habet iudicium quo
+quidque discernat; per se igitur fugienda optandaue dinoscit. Quod uero
+quis optandum esse iudicat petit; refugit uero quod aestimat esse
+fugiendum. Quare quibus in ipsis inest ratio, inest etiam uolendi
+nolendique libertas. Sed hanc non in omnibus aequam esse constituo. Nam
+supernis diuinisque substantiis et perspicax iudicium et incorrupta
+uoluntas et efficax optatorum praesto est potestas. Humanas uero animas
+liberiores quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis diuinae speculatione
+conseruant, minus uero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam, cum
+terrenis artubus colligantur. Extrema uero est seruitus, cum uitiis deditae
+rationis propriae possessione ceciderunt. Nam ubi oculos a summae luce
+ueritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa deiecerint, mox inscitiae nube
+caligant, perniciosis turbantur affectibus quibus accedendo consentiendoque
+quam inuexere sibi adiuuant seruitutem et sunt quodam modo propria
+libertate captiuae. Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens
+prouidentiae cernit intuitus et suis quaeque meritis praedestinata
+disponit.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  "I observe it," quoth I, "and I acknowledge it to be as thou sayest. But
+  in this rank of coherent causes, have we any free-will, or doth the
+  fatal chain fasten also the motions of men's minds?" "We have," quoth
+  she, "for there can be no reasonable nature, unless it be endued with
+  free-will. For that which naturally hath the use of reason hath also
+  judgment by which it can discern of everything by itself, wherefore of
+  itself it distinguished betwixt those things which are to be avoided,
+  and those which are to be desired. Now every one seeketh for that which
+  he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his judgment
+  is to be avoided. Wherefore, they which have reason in themselves have
+  freedom to will and nill. But yet I consider not this equal in all. For
+  the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgment and
+  an uncorrupted will, and an effectual power to obtain their desires. But
+  the minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves
+  in the contemplation of God, and less when they come to their bodies,
+  and yet less when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their
+  greatest bondage is when, giving themselves to vices, they lose
+  possession of their own reason. For, having cast their eyes from the
+  light of the sovereign truth to inferior obscurities, forthwith they are
+  blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtful affections,
+  by yielding and consenting to which they increase the bondage which they
+  laid upon themselves, and are, after a certain manner, captives by their
+  own freedom. Which notwithstanding that foresight of Providence which
+  beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeth, and by predestination
+  disposeth of everything by their merits.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+[Greek: Pant' ephoran kai pant' epakouein][168]
+Puro clarum lumine Phoebum
+Melliflui canit oris Homerus:
+Qui tamen intima uiscera terrae
+Non ualet aut pelagi radiorum                                             5
+Infirma perrumpere luce.
+Haud sic magni conditor orbis;
+Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti
+Nulla terrae mole resistunt,
+Non nox atris nubibus obstat.                                            10
+Quae sint, quae fuerint ueniantque
+Vno mentis cernit in ictu;
+Quem, quia respicit omnia solus,
+Verum possis dicere solem."
+
+
+[168] disponit [Greek: Pant' ephoron kai pant' epakogon] _sic Peiper et
+similiter editores priores. Versum in rectum locum Engelbrecht restituit,
+quam quidem emendationem noster interpres uidetur praesensisse._
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+    Sweet Homer[169] sings the praise
+    Of Phoebus clear and bright,
+    And yet his strongest rays
+    Cannot with feeble light
+    Cast through the secret ways
+    Of earth and seas his sight,
+  Though 'all lies open to his eyes.'[170]
+  But He who did this world devise--
+
+    The earth's vast depths unseen
+    From his sight are not free,
+    No clouds can stand between,
+    He at one time doth see
+    What are, and what have been,
+    And what shall after be.
+  Whom, since he only vieweth all,
+  You rightly the true Sun may call."
+
+
+  [169] Cf. _Il._ iv. 277, _Od._ xii. 323.
+
+  [170] This line renders the Greek with which Boethius begins the poem,
+  adapting Homer's phrase "all surveying, all o'erhearing." See the
+  critical note on p. 372.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Tum ego: "En," inquam, "difficiliore rursus ambiguitate confundor."
+"Quaenam," inquit, "ista est? Iam enim quibus perturbere coniecto."
+"Nimium," inquam, "aduersari ac repugnare uidetur praenoscere uniuersa deum
+et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium. Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque
+falli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod prouidentia futurum esse
+praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia
+uoluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas; neque enim uel
+factum aliud ullum uel quaelibet exsistere poterit uoluntas nisi quam
+nescia falli prouidentia diuina praesenserit. Nam si aliorsum quam prouisae
+sunt detorqueri ualent, non iam erit futuri firma praescientia, sed opinio
+potius incerta, quod de deo credere nefas iudico. Neque enim illam probo
+rationem qua se quidam credunt hunc quaestionis nodum posse dissoluere.
+Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse euenturum, quoniam id prouidentia futurum
+esse prospexerit, sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid futurum est, id
+diuinam prouidentiam latere non posse eoque modo necessarium hoc in
+contrariam relabi partem, neque enim necesse esse contingere quae
+prouidentur, sed necesse esse quae futura sunt prouideri--quasi uero quae
+cuius rei causa sit praescientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum
+necessitas prouidentiae laboretur, ac non illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo
+modo sese habeat ordo causarum, necessarium esse euentum praescitarum
+rerum, etiam si praescientia futuris rebus eueniendi necessitatem non
+uideatur inferre. Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere
+coniectat ueram esse necesse est; atque e conuerso rursus, si de quopiam
+uera sit opinio quoniam sedet, eum sedere necesse est. In utroque igitur
+necessitas inest, in hoc quidem sedendi, at uero in altero ueritatis. Sed
+non idcirco quisque sedet quoniam uera est opinio, sed haec potius uera est
+quoniam quempiam sedere praecessit. Ita cum causa ueritatis ex altera parte
+procedat, inest tamen communis in utraque necessitas.
+
+Similia de prouidentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet. Nam etiam si
+idcirco quoniam futura sunt, prouidentur, non uero ideo quoniam prouidentur
+eueniunt, nihilo minus tamen ab deo uel uentura prouideri uel prouisa
+necesse est euenire,[171] quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum
+satis est. Iam uero quam praeposterum est ut aeternae praescientiae
+temporalium rerum euentus causa esse dicatur! Quid est autem aliud
+arbitrari ideo deum futura quoniam sunt euentura prouidere, quam putare
+quae olim acciderunt causam summae illius esse prouidentiae? Ad haec sicuti
+cum quid esse scio, id ipsum esse necesse est, ita cum quid futurum noui,
+id ipsum futurum esse necesse est. Sic fit igitur ut euentus praescitae rei
+nequeat euitari. Postremo si quid aliquis aliorsum atque sese res habet
+existimet, id non modo scientia non est, sed est opinio fallax ab scientiae
+ueritate longe diuersa. Quare si quid ita futurum est ut eius certus ac
+necessarius non sit euentus, id euenturum esse praesciri qui poterit? Sicut
+enim scientia ipsa impermixta est falsitati, ita id quod ab ea concipitur
+esse aliter atque concipitur nequit. Ea namque causa est cur mendacio
+scientia careat, quod se ita rem quamque habere necesse est uti eam sese
+habere scientia comprehendit. Quid igitur? Quonam modo deus haec incerta
+futura praenoscit? Nam si ineuitabiliter euentura censet quae etiam non
+euenire possibile est, fallitur; quod non sentire modo nefas est, sed etiam
+uoce proferre. At si ita uti sunt, ita ea futura esse decernit, ut aeque
+uel fieri ea uel non fieri posse cognoscat, quae est haec praescientia quae
+nihil certum nihil stabile comprehendit? Aut quid hoc refert uaticinio illo
+ridiculo Tiresiae?
+
+  Quidquid dicam, aut erit aut non.
+
+Quid etiam diuina prouidentia humana opinione praestiterit; si uti homines
+incerta iudicat quorum est incertus euentus? Quod si apud illum rerum
+omnium certissimum fontem nihil incerti esse potest, certus eorum est
+euentus quae futura firmiter ille praescierit. Quare nulla est humanis
+consiliis actionibusque libertas quas diuina mens sine falsitatis errore
+cuncta prospiciens ad unum alligat et constringit euentum. Quo semel
+recepto quantus occasus humanarum rerum consequatur liquet. Frustra enim
+bonis malisque praemia poenaeue proponuntur quae nullus meruit liber ac
+uoluntarius motus animorum. Idque omnium uidebitur iniquissimum quod nunc
+aequissimum iudicatur uel puniri improbos uel remunerari probos quos ad
+alterutrum non propria mittit uoluntas, sed futuri cogit certa necessitas.
+Nec uitia igitur nec uirtutes quidquam fuerint, sed omnium meritorum potius
+mixta atque indiscreta confusio. Quoque nihil sceleratius excogitari
+potest, cum ex prouidentia rerum omnis ordo ducatur nihilque consiliis
+liceat humanis, fit ut uitia quoque nostra ad bonorum omnium referantur
+auctorem. Igitur nec sperandi aliquid nec deprecandi ulla ratio est. Quid
+enim uel speret quisque uel etiam deprecetur, quando optanda omnia series
+indeflexa conectit? Auferetur igitur unicum illud inter homines deumque
+commercium sperandi scilicet ac deprecandi. Si quidem iustae humilitatis
+pretio inaestimabilem uicem diuinae gratiae promeremur, qui solus modus est
+quo cum deo colloqui homines posse uideantur illique inaccessae luci prius
+quoque quam impetrent ipsa supplicandi ratione coniungi. Quae si recepta
+futurorum necessitate nihil uirium habere credantur, quid erit quo summo
+illi rerum principi conecti atque adhaerere possimus? Quare necesse erit
+humanum genus, uti paulo ante cantabas, dissaeptum atque disiunctum suo
+fonte fatiscere.
+
+
+[171] euenire prouisa _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Then I complained that I was now in a greater confusion and more
+  doubtful difficulty than before. "What is that?" quoth she, "for I
+  already conjecture what it is that troubleth thee." "It seemeth," quoth
+  I, "to be altogether impossible and repugnant that God foreseeth all
+  things, and that there should be any free-will. For if God beholdeth all
+  things and cannot be deceived, that must of necessity follow which His
+  providence foreseeth to be to come. Wherefore, if from eternity he doth
+  not only foreknow the deeds of men, but also their counsels and wills,
+  there can be no free-will; for there is not any other deed or will, but
+  those which the divine providence, that cannot be deceived, hath
+  foreseen. For if things can be drawn aside to any other end than was
+  foreknown, there will not be any firm knowledge of that which is to
+  come, but rather an uncertain opinion, which in my opinion were impious
+  to believe of God. Neither do I allow of that reason with which some
+  suppose that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question. For they
+  say that nothing is therefore to come to pass because Providence did
+  foresee it, but rather contrariwise, because it shall be, it could not
+  be unknown to Providence, and in this manner the necessity passes over
+  to the other side. For it is not necessary, they argue, that those
+  things should happen which are foreseen, but it is necessary that those
+  things should be foreseen that are to come--as though our problem were
+  this, which of them is the cause of a thing, the foreknowledge of the
+  necessity of things to come, or the necessity of the foreknowledge of
+  things to come, and we were not trying to prove that, howsoever these
+  causes be ordered, the event of the things which are foreknown is
+  necessary, even though the foreknowledge seemeth not to confer necessity
+  of being upon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth the opinion
+  which thinketh so must needs be true, and again on the other side, if
+  the opinion that one sitteth be true, he must needs sit. Wherefore,
+  there is necessity in both, in the one of sitting and in the other of
+  truth. But one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but rather this
+  is true because one hath taken his seat. So that though the cause of
+  truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both.
+
+  And the like is to be inferred of Providence and future things. For even
+  though they be foreseen because they shall be, yet they do not come to
+  pass because they are foreseen, notwithstanding it is necessary that
+  either things to come be foreseen by God, or that things foreseen do
+  fall out, which alone is sufficient to overthrow free-will. But see how
+  preposterous it is that the event of temporal things should be said to
+  be the cause of the everlasting foreknowledge! And what else is it to
+  think that God doth therefore foresee future things, because they are to
+  happen, than to affirm that those things which happened long since, are
+  the cause of that sovereign providence? Furthermore, as when I know
+  anything to be, it must needs be; so when I know that anything shall be,
+  it must needs be to come. And so it followeth that the event of a thing
+  foreknown cannot be avoided. Finally, if any man thinketh otherwise than
+  the thing is, that is not only no knowledge, but it is a deceitful
+  opinion far from the truth of knowledge; wherefore, if anything is to be
+  in such sort that the event of it is not certain or necessary, how can
+  that be foreknown that it shall happen? For as knowledge is without
+  mixture of falsity, so that which is conceived by it cannot be otherwise
+  than it is conceived. For this is the cause why knowledge is without
+  deceit, because everything must needs be so as the knowledge
+  apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth God foreknow that these
+  uncertain things shall be? For if He judgeth that those things shall
+  happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, He is
+  deceived, which is not only impious to think, but also to speak. But if
+  He supposeth that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that He
+  knoweth that they may equally be done and not be done, what
+  foreknowledge is this which comprehendeth no certain or stable thing? Or
+  in what is this better than that ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias
+  "Whatsoever I say shall either be or not be"[172]? or in what shall the
+  divine providence exceed human opinion, if, as men, God judgeth those
+  things to be uncertain the event of which is doubtful? But if nothing
+  can be uncertain to that most certain fountain of all things, the
+  occurrence of those things is certain, which He doth certainly know
+  shall be. Wherefore there is no freedom in human counsels and actions,
+  which the divine mind, foreseeing all things without error or falsehood,
+  tieth and bindeth to one event. Which once admitted, it is evident what
+  ruin of human affairs will ensue. For in vain are rewards and
+  punishments proposed to good and evil, which no free and voluntary
+  motion of their minds hath deserved. And that will seem most unjust
+  which is now judged most just, that either the wicked should be punished
+  or the good rewarded, since their own will leadeth them to neither, but
+  they are compelled by the certain necessity of that which is to come. By
+  which means virtues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will
+  follow a mixed confusion of all deserts. And--than which there can be
+  nothing invented more impious--since that all order of things proceedeth
+  from Providence, and human counsels can do nothing, it followeth that
+  our vices also shall be referred to the author of goodness. Wherefore
+  there is no means left to hope or pray for anything, since an unflexible
+  course connecteth all things that can be desired! Wherefore that only
+  traffic betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall be taken away: if
+  indeed by the price of just humility we deserve the unestimable benefit
+  of God's grace; for this is the only manner by which it seemeth that men
+  may talk with God, and by the very manner of supplication be joined to
+  that inaccessible light before they obtain anything; which if by the
+  admitting the necessity of future things, they be thought to have no
+  force, by what shall we be united and cleave to that Sovereign Prince of
+  all things? Wherefore mankind must needs (as thou saidest in thy verse a
+  little before), being separated and severed from its source, fail and
+  fall away.
+
+
+  [172] Hor. _Sat._ ii. 5. 59.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quaenam discors foedera rerum
+Causa resoluit? Quis tanta deus
+Veris statuit bella duobus,
+Vt quae carptim singula constent
+Eadem nolint mixta iugari?                                                5
+An nulla est discordia ueris
+Semperque sibi certa cohaerent?
+Sed mens caecis obruta membris
+Nequit oppressi luminis igne
+Rerum tenues noscere nexus.                                              10
+Sed cur tanto flagrat amore
+Veri tectas reperire notas?
+Scitne quod appetit anxia nosse?
+Sed quis nota scire laborat?
+At si nescit, quid caeca petit?                                          15
+Quis enim quidquam nescius optet
+Aut quis ualeat nescita sequi?
+Quoue inueniat, quisque[173] repertam
+Queat ignarus noscere formam?
+An cum mentem cerneret altam,                                            20
+Pariter summam et singula norat?
+Nunc membrorum condita nube
+Non in totum est oblita sui
+Summamque tenet singula perdens.
+Igitur quisquis uera requirit,                                           25
+Neutro est habitu; nam neque nouit
+Nec penitus tamen omnia nescit,
+Sed quam retinens meminit summam
+Consulit alte uisa retractans,
+Vt seruatis queat oblitas                                                30
+           Addere partes."
+
+
+[173] quisque _codex Bambergensis_ s. xi.: quis _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  What cause of discord breaks the bands of love?
+  What God between two truths such wars doth move?
+  That things which severally well settled be
+  Yet joined in one will never friendly prove?
+  Or in true things can we no discord see,
+  Because all certainties do still agree?
+  But our dull soul, covered with members blind,
+  Knows not the secret laws which things do bind,
+  By the drowned light of her oppressed fire.
+  Why then, the hidden notes of things to find,
+  Doth she with such a love of truth desire?
+  If she knows that which she doth so require,
+  Why wisheth she known things to know again?
+  If she knows not, why strives she with blind pain?
+  Who after things unknown will strive to go?
+  Or will such ignorant pursuit maintain?
+  How shall she find them out? Or having so,
+  How shall she then their forms and natures know?
+  Because this soul the highest mind did view,
+  Must we needs say that it all nature knew?
+  Now she, though clouds of flesh do her debar,
+  Forgets not all that was her ancient due,
+  But in her mind some general motions are,
+  Though not the skill of things particular.
+  He that seeks truth in neither course doth fall;
+  Not knowing all, nor ignorant of all,
+  He marketh general things which he retains,
+  And matters seen on high doth back recall,
+  And things forgotten to his mind regains,
+  And joins them to that part which there remains."
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum illa: "Vetus," inquit, "haec est de prouidentia querela Marcoque
+Tullio, cum diuinationem distribuit, uehementer agitata tibique ipsi res
+diu prorsus multumque quaesita, sed haud quaquam ab ullo uestrum hactenus
+satis diligenter ac firmiter expedita. Cuius caliginis causa est, quod
+humanae ratiocinationis motus ad diuinae praescientiae simplicitatem non
+potest admoueri, quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil prorsus
+relinquetur ambigui. Quod ita demum patefacere atque expedire temptabo, si
+prius ea quibus moueris expendero. Quaero enim, cur illam soluentium
+rationem minus efficacem putes, quae quia praescientiam non esse futuris
+rebus causam necessitatis existimat, nihil impediri praescientia arbitrii
+libertatem putat. Num enim tu aliunde argumentum futurorum necessitatis
+trahis, nisi quod ea quae praesciuntur non euenire non possunt? Si igitur
+praenotio nullam futuris rebus adicit necessitatem, quod tu etiam paulo
+ante fatebare, quid est quod uoluntarii exitus rerum ad certum cogantur
+euentum? Etenim positionis gratia, ut quid consequatur aduertas, statuamus
+nullam esse praescientiam. Num igitur quantum ad hoc attinet, quae ex
+arbitrio eueniunt ad necessitatem cogantur?" "Minime." "Statuamus iterum
+esse, sed nihil rebus necessitatis iniungere; manebit ut opinor eadem
+uoluntatis integra atque absoluta libertas.
+
+Sed praescientia, inquies, tametsi futuris eueniendi necessitas non est,
+signum tamen est necessario ea esse uentura. Hoc igitur modo, etiam si
+praecognitio non fuisset, necessarios futurorum exitus esse constaret. Omne
+etenim signum tantum quid sit ostendit, non uero efficit quod designat.
+Quare demonstrandum prius est nihil non ex necessitate contingere, ut
+praenotionem signum esse huius necessitatis appareat. Alioquin si haec
+nulla est, ne illa quidem eius rei signum poterit esse quae non est. Iam
+uero probationem firma ratione subnixam constat non ex signis neque petitis
+extrinsecus argumentis sed ex conuenientibus necessariisque causis esse
+ducendam. Sed qui fieri potest ut ea non proueniant quae futura esse
+prouidentur? Quasi uero nos ea quae prouidentia futura esse praenoscit non
+esse euentura credamus ac non illud potius arbitremur, licet eueniant,
+nihil tamen ut euenirent sui natura necessitatis habuisse; quod hinc facile
+perpendas licebit. Plura etenim dum fiunt subiecta oculis intuemur, ut ea
+quae in quadrigis moderandis atque flectendis facere spectantur aurigae
+atque ad hunc modum cetera. Num igitur quidquam illorum ita fieri
+necessitas ulla compellit?" "Minime. Frustra enim esset artis effectus, si
+omnia coacta mouerentur." "Quae igitur cum fiunt carent exsistendi
+necessitate, eadem prius quam fiant sine necessitate futura sunt. Quare
+sunt quaedam euentura quorum exitus ab omni necessitate sit absolutus. Nam
+illud quidem nullum arbitror esse dicturum, quod quae nunc fiunt, prius
+quam fierent, euentura non fuerint. Haec igitur etiam praecognita liberos
+habent euentus. Nam sicut scientia praesentium rerum nihil his quae fiunt,
+ita praescientia futurorum nihil his quae uentura sunt necessitatis
+importat. Sed hoc, inquis, ipsum dubitatur, an earum rerum quae necessarios
+exitus non habent ulla possit esse praenotio. Dissonare etenim uidentur
+putasque si praeuideantur consequi necessitatem, si necessitas desit minime
+praesciri nihilque scientia comprehendi posse nisi certum; quod si quae
+incerti sunt exitus ea quasi certa prouidentur, opinionis id esse caliginem
+non scientiae ueritatem. Aliter enim ac sese res habeat arbitrari ab
+integritate scientiae credis esse diuersum. Cuius erroris causa est, quod
+omnia quae quisque nouit ex ipsorum tantum ui atque natura cognosci
+aestimat quae sciuntur; quod totum contra est Omne enim quod cognoscitur
+non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur
+facultatem. Nam ut hoc breui liqueat exemplo, eandem corporis rotunditatem
+aliter uisus aliter tactus agnoscit. Ille eminus manens totum simul iactis
+radiis intuetur; hic uero cohaerens orbi atque coniunctus circa ipsum motus
+ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. Ipsum quoque hominem aliter
+sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur.
+Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio uero solam
+sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio uero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque
+ipsam quae singularibus inest uniuersali consideratione perpendit.
+Intellegentiae uero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque
+uniuersitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie
+contuetur.
+
+In quo illud maxime considerandum est: nam superior comprehendendi uis
+amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit.
+Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam ualet uel uniuersales species
+imaginatio contuetur uel ratio capit simplicem formam, sed intellegentia
+quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat,
+sed eo modo quo formam ipsam, quae nulli alii nota esse poterat,
+comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuersum et imaginationis figuram et
+materiale sensibile cognoscit nec ratione utens nec imaginatione nec
+sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta
+prospiciens. Ratio quoque cum quid uniuersale respicit, nec imaginatione
+nec sensibus utens imaginabilia uel sensibilia comprehendit. Haec est enim
+quae conceptionis suae uniuersale ita definiuit: homo est animal bipes
+rationale. Quae cum uniuersalis notio sit, tum imaginabilem sensibilemque
+esse rem nullus ignorat, quod illa non imaginatione uel sensu sed in
+rationali conceptione considerat. Imaginatio quoque tametsi ex sensibus
+uisendi formandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente
+sensibilia quaeque conlustrat non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione
+iudicandi. Videsne igitur ut in cognoscendo cuncta sua potius facultate
+quam eorum quae cognoscuntur utantur? Neque id iniuria; nam cum omne
+iudicium iudicantis actus exsistat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non
+ex aliena sed ex propria potestate perficiat.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  "This," quoth she, "is an ancient complaint of providence, vehemently
+  pursued by Marcus Tullius in his _Distribution of Divination_,[174]
+  and a thing which thou thyself hast made great and long search after.
+  But hitherto none of you have used sufficient diligence and vigour in
+  the explication thereof. The cause of which obscurity is for that the
+  motion of human discourse cannot attain to the simplicity of the divine
+  knowledge, which if by any means we could conceive, there would not
+  remain any doubt at all; which I will endeavour to make manifest and
+  plain when I have first explicated that which moveth thee. For I demand
+  why thou thinkest their solution unsufficient, who think that free-will
+  is not hindered by foreknowledge, because they suppose that
+  foreknowledge is not the cause of any necessity in things to come. For
+  fetchest thou any proof for the necessity of future things from any
+  other principle, but only from this, that those things which are
+  foreknown cannot choose but happen? Wherefore if foreknowledge imposeth
+  no necessity upon future events, which thou didst grant not long before,
+  why should voluntary actions be tied to any certain success? For
+  example's sake, that thou mayest see what will follow, let us suppose
+  that there were no providence or foresight at all. Would those things
+  which proceed from free-will be compelled to any necessity by this
+  means?" "No." "Again, let us grant it to be, but that it imposeth no
+  necessity upon anything; no doubt the same freedom of will will remain
+  whole and absolute.
+
+  But thou wilt say, even though foreknowledge be not a necessity for
+  things to happen, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily come to
+  pass. Wherefore now, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the events
+  of future things would have been necessary. For all signs only show what
+  is, but cause not that which they design. And consequently it must first
+  be proved that all things fall out by necessity, that it may appear that
+  foreknowledge is a sign of this necessity. For otherwise, if there be no
+  necessity, neither can foreknowledge be the sign of that which is not.
+  Besides it is manifest that every firm proof must be drawn from
+  intrinsical and necessary causes and not from signs and other farfetched
+  arguments. But how is it possible those things should not happen which
+  are foreseen to be to come? As though we did believe that those things
+  will not be which providence hath foreknown and do not rather judge that
+  although they happen, yet by their own nature they had no necessity of
+  being, which thou mayest easily gather hence. For we see many things
+  with our eyes while they are in doing, as those things which the
+  coachmen do while they drive and turn their coaches and in like manner
+  other things. Now doth necessity compel any of these things to be done
+  in this sort?" "No. For in vain should art labour if all things were
+  moved by compulsion." "Wherefore, as these things are without necessity
+  when they are in doing, so likewise they are to come without necessity
+  before they be done. And consequently there are some things to come
+  whose event is free from all necessity. For I suppose no man will say
+  that those things which are done now were not to come before they were
+  done. Wherefore these things even being foreseen come freely to effect.
+  For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things
+  which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledge in things to come. But
+  thou wilt say: This is the question, whether there can be any
+  foreknowledge of those things whose events are not necessary. For these
+  things seem opposite, and thou thinkest that, if future things be
+  foreseen, there followeth necessity, if there be no necessity, that they
+  that are not foreknown, and that nothing can be perfectly known unless
+  it be certain. But if uncertain events be foreseen as certain, it is
+  manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of
+  knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be far from the integrity of
+  knowledge to judge otherwise than the thing is. The cause of which error
+  is because thou thinkest that all that is known is known only by the
+  force and nature of the things themselves, which is altogether
+  otherwise. For all that is known is not comprehended according to the
+  force which it hath in itself, but rather according to the faculty of
+  them which know it. For to explicate it with a brief example: the sight
+  and the feeling do diversely discern the same roundness of a die. The
+  sight standing aloof beholdeth it altogether by his beams; but the
+  feeling united and joined to the orb, being moved about the compass of
+  it, comprehendeth the roundness by parts. Likewise sense, imagination,
+  reason and understanding do diversely behold a man. For sense looketh
+  upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject, the imagination
+  discerneth it alone without matter, reason passeth beyond this also and
+  considereth universally the species or kind which is in particulars. The
+  eye of the understanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compass of
+  the whole world it beholdeth with the clear eye of the mind that simple
+  form in itself.
+
+  In which that is chiefly to be considered, that the superior force of
+  comprehending embraceth the inferior; but the inferior can by no means
+  attain to the superior; for the sense hath no force out of matter,
+  neither doth the imagination conceive universal species, nor is reason
+  capable of the simple form, but the understanding, as it were looking
+  downward, having conceived that form, discerneth of all things which are
+  under it, but in that sort in which it apprehendeth that form which can
+  be known by none of the other. For it knoweth the universality of
+  reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense,
+  neither using reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were
+  formally beholding all things with that one twinkling of the mind.
+  Likewise reason, when it considereth any universality, comprehendeth
+  both imagination and sensible things without the use of either
+  imagination or senses. For she defineth the universality of her conceit
+  thus: Man is a reasonable, two-footed, living creature, which being an
+  universal knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and
+  sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable conceiving and not
+  by imagination or sense. Imagination also, although it began by the
+  senses of seeing and forming figures, yet when sense is absent it
+  beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary
+  manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how all these in knowing do rather
+  use their own force and faculty than the force of those things which are
+  known? Nor undeservedly; for since all judgment is the act of him who
+  judgeth, it is necessary that every one should perfect his operation by
+  his own power and not by the force of any other.
+
+
+  [174] _De diuin_, ii.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quondam porticus attulit
+Obscuros nimium senes
+Qui sensus et imagines
+E corporibus extimis
+Credant mentibus imprimi,                                                 5
+Vt quondam celeri stilo
+Mos est aequore paginae,
+Quae nullas habeat notas,
+Pressas figere litteras.
+Sed mens si propriis uigens                                              10
+Nihil motibus explicat,
+Sed tantum patiens iacet
+Notis subdita corporum
+Cassasque in speculi uicem
+Rerum reddit imagines,                                                   15
+Vnde haec sic animis uiget
+Cernens omnia notio?
+Quae uis singula perspicit
+Aut quae cognita diuidit?
+Quae diuisa recolligit                                                   20
+Alternumque legens iter
+Nunc summis caput inserit,
+Nunc decedit in infima,
+Tum sese referens sibi
+Veris falsa redarguit?                                                   25
+Haec est efficiens magis
+Longe causa potentior
+Quam quae materiae modo
+Impressas patitur notas.
+Praecedit tamen excitans                                                 30
+Ac uires animi mouens
+Viuo in corpore passio.
+Cum uel lux oculos ferit
+Vel uox auribus instrepit,
+Tum mentis uigor excitus                                                 35
+Quas intus species tenet
+Ad motus similes uocans
+Notis applicat exteris
+Introrsumque reconditis
+Formis miscet imagines.                                                  40
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Cloudy old prophets of the Porch[175] once taught
+  That sense and shape presented to the thought
+    From outward objects their impression take,
+  As when upon a paper smooth and plain
+  On which as yet no marks of ink have lain
+    We with a nimble pen do letters make.
+  But if our minds to nothing can apply
+  Their proper motions, but do patient lie
+    Subject to forms which do from bodies flow,
+  As a glass renders empty[176] shapes of things,
+  Who then can show from whence that motion springs
+    By force of which the mind all things doth know?
+  Or by what skill are several things espied?
+  And being known what power doth them divide,
+    And thus divided doth again unite,
+  And with a various journey oft aspires
+  To highest things, and oft again retires
+    To basest, nothing being out of sight,
+  And when she back unto herself doth move,
+  Doth all the falsehoods by the truth reprove?
+    This vigour needs must be an active cause,
+  And with more powerful forces must be deckt,
+  Than that which from those forms, that do reflect
+    From outward matter, all her virtue draws.
+  And yet in living bodies passion's might
+  Doth go before, whose office is to incite,
+    And the first motions in the mind to make.
+  As when the light unto our eyes appears,
+  Or some loud voice is sounded in our ears,
+    Then doth the strength of the dull mind awake
+  Those phantasies which she retains within;
+  She stirreth up such notions to begin,
+    Whose objects with their natures best agree,
+  And thus applying them to outward things,
+  She joins the external shapes which thence she brings
+    With forms which in herself included be.
+
+
+  [175] The Porch, _i.e._ the Painted Porch ([Greek: stoa poikilae]) at
+  Athens, the great hall adorned with frescoes of the battle of Marathon,
+  which served as lecture-room to Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect.
+
+  [176] Cf. Quin potius noscas rerum simulacra uagari
+            Multa modis multis nulla ui cassaque sensu.
+
+  "But rather you are to know that idols or things wander about many in
+  number in many ways, of no force, powerless to excite sense."--Lucr. iv.
+  127, 128 (trans. Munro).
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamuis afficiant instrumenta sensuum
+forinsecus obiectae qualitates animique agentis uigorem passio corporis
+antecedat quae in se actum mentis prouocet excitetque interim quiescentes
+intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non
+passione insignitur, sed ex sua ui subiectam corpori iudicat passionem,
+quanto magis ea quae cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt, in
+discernendo non obiecta extrinsecus sequuntur, sed actum suae mentis
+expediunt? Hac itaque ratione multiplices cognitiones diuersis ac
+differentibus cessere substantiis. Sensus enim solus cunctis aliis
+cognitionibus destitutus immobilibus animantibus cessit quales sunt conchae
+maris quaeque alia saxis haerentia nutriuntur, imaginatio uero mobilibus
+beluis quibus iam inesse fugiendi appetendiue aliquis uidetur affectus,
+ratio uero humani tantum generis est sicut intellegentia sola diuini. Quo
+fit ut ea notitia ceteris praestet quae suapte natura non modo proprium sed
+ceterarum quoque notitiarum subiecta cognoscit. Quid igitur, si
+ratiocinationi sensus imaginatioque refragentur, nihil esse illud
+uniuersale dicentes quod sese intueri ratio putet? Quod enim sensibile uel
+imaginabile est, id uniuersum esse non posse; aut igitur rationis uerum
+esse iudicium nec quidquam esse sensibile, aut quoniam sibi notum sit plura
+sensibus et imaginationi esse subiecta, inanem conceptionem esse rationis
+quae quod sensibile sit ac singulare quasi quiddam uniuersale consideret.
+Ad haec, si ratio contra respondeat se quidem et quod sensibile et quod
+imaginabile sit in uniuersitatis ratione conspicere, illa uero ad
+uniuersitatis cognitionem adspirare non posse, quoniam eorum notio
+corporales figuras non possit excedere, de rerum uero cognitione firmiori
+potius perfectiorique iudicio esse credendum, in huiusmodi igitur lite nos
+quibus tam ratiocinandi quam imaginandi etiam sentiendique uis inest nonne
+rationis potius causam probaremus? Simile est quod humana ratio diuinam
+intellegentiam futura, nisi ut ipsa cognoscit, non putat intueri. Nam ita
+disseris: Si qua certos ac necessarios habere non uideantur euentus, ea
+certo euentura praesciri nequeunt. Harum igitur rerum nulla est
+praescientia, quam si etiam in his esse credamus, nihil erit quod non ex
+necessitate proueniat. Si igitur uti rationis participes sumus ita diuinae
+iudicium mentis habere possemus, sicut imaginationem sensumque rationi
+cedere oportere iudicauimus, sic diuinae sese menti humanam submittere
+rationem iustissimum censeremus. Quare in illius summae intellegentiae
+cacumen, si possumus, erigamur; illic enim ratio uidebit quod in se non
+potest intueri, id autem est, quonam modo etiam quae certos exitus non
+habent, certa tamen uideat ac definita praenotio neque id sit opinio sed
+summae potius scientiae nullis terminis inclusa simplicitas.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  And if in sentient bodies, although the qualities of outward objects do
+  move the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the
+  vigour of the active mind, provoking her action to itself and exciting
+  the inward forms which before lay quiet; if, I say, in perceiving these
+  corporal objects the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by
+  her own force judgeth of the passion itself, which is objected to the
+  body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their mind
+  and not only follow the outward objects in their judgment, which are
+  free from all affections of the body? Wherefore in this sort have
+  diverse and different substances knowledges of many kinds. For only
+  sense destitute of all other means of knowledge is in those living
+  creatures which are unmovable, as some shell-fish and other which stick
+  to stones and so are nourished; and imagination in movable beasts who
+  seem to have some power to covet and fly. But reason belongeth only to
+  mankind, as understanding to things divine. So that that knowledge is
+  most excellent which of itself doth not only know her own object, but
+  also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination
+  repugn to discourse and reason, affirming that universality to be
+  nothing which reason thinketh herself to see? For that cannot be
+  universal, they argue, which is either sensible or imaginable; wherefore
+  either the judgment of reason must be true and nothing at all sensible,
+  or because they know that many things are subject to the senses and
+  imagination, the conceit of reason is vain, which considereth that which
+  is sensible and singular as if it were universal. Moreover if reason
+  should answer that she beholdeth in her universality all that which is
+  sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of
+  universality, because their knowledge cannot surpass corporal figures
+  and shapes, and that we must give more credit to the firmer and more
+  perfect judgment about the knowledge of things, in this contention
+  should not we, who have the power of discoursing as well as of
+  imagination and sense, rather take reason's part? The very like
+  happeneth when human reason doth not think that the divine understanding
+  doth behold future things otherwise than she herself doth. For thus thou
+  arguest: If any things seem not to have certain and necessary events,
+  they cannot be certainly foreknown to be to come. Wherefore there is no
+  foreknowledge of these things, and if we think that there is any, there
+  shall be nothing which happeneth not of necessity. If, therefore, as we
+  are endued with reason, we could likewise have the judgment proper to
+  the divine mind, as we have judged that imagination and sense must yield
+  to reason, so likewise we would think it most reasonable and just that
+  human reason should submit herself to the divine mind. Wherefore let us
+  be lifted up as much as we can to that height of the highest mind; for
+  there reason shall see that which she cannot behold in herself. And that
+  is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even those things
+  which have no certain issue, and that this is no opinion, but rather the
+  simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed within no bounds.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Quam uariis terras animalia permeant figuris!
+Namque alia extento sunt corpore pulueremque uerrunt
+Continuumque trahunt ui pectoris incitata sulcum
+Sunt quibus alarum leuitas uaga uerberetque uentos
+Et liquido longi spatia aetheris enatet uolatu,                           5
+Haec pressisse solo uestigia gressibusque gaudent
+Vel uirides campos transmittere uel subire siluas.
+Quae uariis uideas licet omnia discrepare formis,
+Prona tamen facies hebetes ualet ingrauare sensus.
+Vnica gens hominum celsum leuat altius cacumen                           10
+Atque leuis recto stat corpore despicitque terras.
+Haec nisi terrenus male desipis, admonet figura,
+Qui recto caelum uultu petis exserisque frontem,
+In sublime feras animum quoque, ne grauata pessum
+Inferior sidat mens corpore celsius leuata.                              15
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  What several figures things that live upon the earth do keep!
+  Some have their bodies stretched in length by which the dust they sweep
+  And do continual furrows make while on their breasts they creep.
+  Some lightly soaring up on high with wings the wind do smite
+  And through the longest airy space pass with an easy flight.
+  Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight,
+  Which through the pleasant fields do pass or to the woods do go,
+  Whose several forms though to our eyes they do a difference show,
+  Yet by their looks cast down on earth their senses heavy grow.
+  Men only with more stately shape to higher objects rise,
+  Who with erected bodies stand and do the earth despise.
+  These figures warn (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eyes)
+  That thou who with an upright face dost look upon the sky,
+  Shouldst also raise thy mind aloft, lest while thou bearest high
+  Thine earthly head, thy soul opprest beneath thy body lie.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Quoniam igitur, uti paulo ante monstratum est, omne quod scitur non ex sua
+sed ex conprehendentium natura cognoscitur, intueamur nunc quantum fas est,
+quis sit diuinae substantiae status, ut quaenam etiam scientia eius sit,
+possimus agnoscere. Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium
+commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur aeternitas consideremus; haec enim
+nobis naturam pariter diuinam scientiamque patefacit. Aeternitas igitur est
+interminabilis uitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, quod ex collatione
+temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid uiuit in tempore id praesens a
+praeteritis in futura procedit nihilque est in tempore constitutum quod
+totum uitae suae spatium pariter possit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem
+nondum adprehendit; hesternum uero iam perdidit; in hodierna quoque uita
+non amplius uiuitis quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod igitur
+temporis patitur condicionem, licet illud, sicuti de mundo censuit
+Aristoteles, nec coeperit umquam esse nec desinat uitaque eius cum temporis
+infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est ut aeternum esse iure credatur.
+Non enim totum simul infinitae licet uitae spatium comprehendit atque
+complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta iam non habet. Quod igitur
+interminabilis uitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet,
+cui neque futuri quidquam absit nec praeteriti fluxerit, id aeternum esse
+iure perhibetur, idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper
+adsistere et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem. Vnde non recte
+quidam, qui cum audiunt uisum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium
+temporis nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum
+fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci uitam, quod
+mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis uitae totam pariter complexum
+esse praesentiam, quod diuinae mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque
+deus conditis rebus antiquior uideri debet temporis quantitate sed
+simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Hunc enim uitae immobilis
+praesentarium statum infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur cumque
+eum effingere atque aequare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum,
+ex simplicitate praesentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac praeteriti
+quantitatem; et cum totam pariter uitae suae plenitudinem nequeat
+possidere, hoc ipso quod aliquo modo numquam esse desinit; illud quod
+implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus uidetur aemulari alligans
+se ad qualemcumque praesentiam huius exigui uolucrisque momenti, quae,
+quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque
+contigerit id praestat ut esse uideantur. Quoniam uero manere non potuit,
+infinitum temporis iter arripuit eoque modo factum est ut continuaret eundo
+uitam cuius plenitudinem complecti non ualuit permanendo. Itaque si digna
+rebus nomina uelimus imponere, Platonem sequentes deum quidem aeternum,
+mundum uero dicamus esse perpetuum. Quoniam igitur omne iudicium secundum
+sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est autem deo semper
+aeternus ac praesentarius status; scientia quoque eius omnem temporis
+supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae infinitaque
+praeteriti ac futuri spatia complectens omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua
+simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praesentiam pensare uelis qua
+cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam
+deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis; unde non praeuidentia sed
+prouidentia potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituta quasi ab
+excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat. Quid igitur postulas ut
+necessaria fiant quae diuino lumine lustrentur, cum ne homines quidem
+necessaria faciant esse quae uideant? Num enim quae praesentia cernis,
+aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus?" "Minime." "Atqui si est
+diuini humanique praesentis digna collatio, uti uos uestro hoc temporario
+praesenti quaedam uidetis, ita ille omnia suo cernit aeterno. Quare haec
+diuina praenotio naturam rerum proprietatemque non mutat taliaque apud se
+praesentia spectat qualia in tempore olim futura prouenient. Nec rerum
+iudicia confundit unoque suae mentis intuitu tam necessarie quam non
+necessarie uentura dinoscit; sicuti uos cum pariter ambulare in terra
+hominem et oriri in caelo solem uidetis, quamquam simul utrumque conspectum
+tamen discernitis et hoc uoluntarium illud esse necessarium iudicatis, ita
+igitur cuncta despiciens diuinus intuitus qualitatem rerum minime perturbat
+apud se quidem praesentium, ad condicionem uero temporis futurarum. Quo fit
+ut hoc non sit opinio sed ueritate potius nixa cognitio, cum exstaturum
+quid esse cognoscit quod idem exsistendi necessitate carere non nesciat.
+Hic si dicas quod euenturum deus uidet id non euenire non posse, quod autem
+non potest non euenire id ex necessitate contingere, meque ad hoc nomen
+necessitatis adstringas; fatebor rem quidem solidissimae ueritatis sed cui
+uix aliquis nisi diuini speculator accesserit. Respondebo namque idem
+futurum, cum ad diuinam notionem refertur, necessarium, cum uero in sua
+natura perpenditur, liberum prorsus atque absolutum uideri. Duae sunt
+etenim necessitates, simplex una, ueluti quod necesse est omnes homines
+esse mortales, altera condicionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum
+ambulare necesse est; quod enim quisque nouit, id esse aliter ac notum est
+nequit, sed haec condicio minime secum illam simplicem trahit. Hanc enim
+necessitatem non propria facit natura sed condicionis adiectio; nulla enim
+necessitas cogit incedere uoluntate gradientem, quamuis eum tum cum
+graditur incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo, si quid prouidentia
+praesens uidet, id esse necesse est, tametsi nullam naturae habeat
+necessitatem. Atqui deus ea futura quae ex arbitrii libertate proueniunt
+praesentia contuetur. Haec igitur ad intuitum relata diuinum necessaria
+fiant per condicionem diuinae notionis; per se uero considerata ab absoluta
+naturae suae libertate non desinunt. Fient igitur procul dubio cuncta quae
+futura deus esse praenoscit, sed eorum quaedam de libero proficiscuntur
+arbitrio; quae quamuis eueniant, exsistendo tamen naturam propriam non
+amittunt, qua priusquam fierent etiam non euenire potuissent. Quid igitur
+refert non esse necessaria, cum propter diuinae scientiae condicionem modis
+omnibus necessitatis instar eueniet? Hoc scilicet quod ea quae paulo ante
+proposui, sol oriens et gradiens homo. Quae dum fiunt, non fieri non
+possunt; eorum tamen unum prius quoque quam fieret, necesse erat exsistere,
+alterum uero minime. Ita etiam quae praesentia deus habet, dubio procul
+exsistent, sed eorum hoc quidem de rerum necessitate descendit, illud uero
+de potestate facientium. Haud igitur iniuria diximus haec si ad diuinam
+notitiam referantur necessaria, si per se considerentur necessitatis esse
+nexibus absoluta; sicuti omne quod sensibus patet, si ad rationem referas,
+uniuersale est, si ad se ipsa respicias, singulare. 'Sed si in mea,'
+inquies, 'potestate situm est mutare propositum, euacuabo prouidentiam, cum
+quae illa praenoscit forte mutauero.' Respondebo: propositum te quidem tuum
+posse deflectere, sed quoniam et id te posse et an facias quoue conuertas
+praesens prouidentiae ueritas intuetur, diuinam te praescientiam non posse
+uitare, sicuti praesentis oculi effugere non possis intuitum, quamuis te in
+uarias actiones libera uoluntate conuerteris. Quid igitur inquies? Ex meane
+dispositione scientia diuina mutabitur, ut cum ego nunc hoc nunc aliud
+uelim, illa quoque noscendi uices alternare uideatur? Minime. Omne namque
+futurum diuinus praecurrit intuitus et ad praesentiam propriae cognitionis
+retorquet ac reuocat nec alternat, ut aestimas, nunc hoc nunc illud
+praenoscendi uice, sed uno ictu mutationes tuas manens praeuenit atque
+complectitur. Quam comprehendendi omnia uisendique praesentiam non ex
+futurarum prouentu rerum, sed ex propria deus simplicitate sortitus est. Ex
+quo illud quoque resoluitur quod paulo ante posuisti indignum esse, si
+scientiae dei causam futura nostra praestare dicantur. Haec enim scientiae
+uis praesentaria notione cuncta complectens rebus modum omnibus ipsa
+constituit, nihil uero posterioribus debet. Quae cum ita sint, manet
+intemerata mortalibus arbitrii libertas nec iniquae leges solutis omni
+necessitate uoluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. Manet etiam spectator
+desuper cunctorum praescius deus uisionisque eius praesens semper
+aeternitas cum nostrorum actuum futura qualitate concurrit bonis praemia
+malis supplicia dispensans. Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque;
+quae cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt. Auersamini igitur
+uitia, colite uirtutes, ad rectas spes animum subleuate, humiles preces in
+excelsa porrigite. Magna uobis est, si dissimulare non uultis, necessitas
+indicta probitatis, cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis."
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  Seeing, therefore, as hath been showed, all that is known is not
+  comprehended by its own nature but by the power of him which
+  comprehendeth it, let us see now, as much as we may, what is the state
+  of the divine substance that we may also know what His knowledge is.
+  Wherefore it is the common judgment of all that live by reason that God
+  is everlasting, and therefore let us consider what eternity is. For this
+  declareth unto us both the divine nature and knowledge. Eternity
+  therefore is a perfect possession altogether of an endless life, which
+  is more manifest by the comparison of temporal things, for whatsoever
+  liveth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past to times
+  to come, and there is nothing placed in time which can embrace all the
+  space of its life at once. But it hath not yet attained to-morrow and
+  hath lost yesterday. And you live no more in this day's life than in
+  that movable and transitory moment. Wherefore, whatsoever suffereth the
+  condition of time, although, as Aristotle thought of the world, it never
+  began nor were ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time,
+  yet it is not such that it ought to be called everlasting. For it doth
+  not comprehend and embrace all the space of its life together, though
+  that life be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to
+  come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fulness of
+  an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is absent,
+  nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be accounted
+  everlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in itself,
+  it may always be present to itself, and have an infinity of movable time
+  present to it. Wherefore they are deceived who, hearing that Plato
+  thought that this world had neither beginning of time nor should ever
+  have any end, think that by this means the created world should be
+  coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be carried through an
+  endless life, which Plato attributed to the world, another thing to
+  embrace the whole presence of an endless life together, which is
+  manifestly proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to seem more
+  ancient than the things created, by the quantity of time, but rather by
+  the simplicity of His divine nature. For that infinite motion of
+  temporal things imitateth the present state of the unmovable life, and
+  since it cannot express nor equal it, it falleth from immobility to
+  motion, and from the simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an
+  infinite quantity of future and past, and since it cannot possess
+  together all the fulness of its life, by never leaving to be in some
+  sort, it seemeth to emulate in part that which it cannot fully obtain
+  and express, tying itself to this small presence of this short and swift
+  moment, which because it carrieth a certain image of that abiding
+  presence, whosoever hath it, seemeth to be. But because it could not
+  stay it undertook an infinite journey of time, and so it came to pass
+  that it continued that life by going whose plenitude it could not
+  comprehend by staying. Wherefore, if we will give things their right
+  names, following Plato, let us say that God is everlasting and the world
+  perpetual. Wherefore, since every judgment comprehendeth those things
+  which are subject unto it, according to its own nature, and God hath
+  always an everlasting and present state, His knowledge also surpassing
+  all motions of time, remaineth in the simplicity of His presence, and
+  comprehending the infinite spaces of that which is past and to come,
+  considereth all things in His simple knowledge as though they were now
+  in doing. So that, if thou wilt weigh His foreknowledge with which He
+  discerneth all things, thou wilt more rightly esteem it to be the
+  knowledge of a never fading instant than a foreknowledge as of a thing
+  to come. For which cause it is not called praevidence or foresight, but
+  rather providence, because, placed far from inferior things, it
+  overlooketh all things, as it were, from the highest top of things. Why,
+  therefore, wilt thou have those things necessary which are illustrated
+  by the divine light, since that not even men make not those things
+  necessary which they see? For doth thy sight impose any necessity upon
+  those things which thou seest present?" "No." "But the present instant
+  of men may well be compared to that of God in this: that as you see some
+  things in your temporal instant, so He beholdeth all things in His
+  eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge doth not change the
+  nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in His
+  presence as they will after come to be, neither doth He confound the
+  judgment of things, and with one sight of His mind He discerneth as well
+  those things which shall happen necessarily as otherwise. As you, when
+  at one time you see a man walking upon the earth and the sun rising in
+  heaven, although they be both seen at once, yet you discern and judge
+  that the one is voluntary, and the other necessary, so likewise the
+  divine sight beholding all things disturbeth not the quality of things
+  which to Him are present, but in respect of time are yet to come. And so
+  this is not an opinion but rather a knowledge grounded upon truth, when
+  He knoweth that such a thing shall be, which likewise He is not ignorant
+  that it hath no necessity of being. Here if thou sayest that cannot
+  choose but happen which God seeth shall happen, and that which cannot
+  choose but happen, must be of necessity, and so tiest me to this name of
+  necessity, I will grant that it is a most solid truth, but whereof
+  scarce any but a contemplator of divinity is capable. For I will answer
+  that the same thing is necessary when it is referred to the Divine
+  knowledge; but when it is weighed in its own nature that it seemeth
+  altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities: the one
+  simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortal; the other
+  conditional, as if thou knowest that any man walketh, he must needs
+  walk. For what a man knoweth cannot be otherwise than it is known. But
+  this conditional draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity.
+  For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding a
+  condition. For no necessity maketh him to go that goeth of his own
+  accord, although it be necessary that he goeth while he goeth. In like
+  manner, if providence seeth anything present, that must needs be,
+  although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future
+  things, which proceed from free-will, present. These things, therefore,
+  being referred to the divine sight are necessary by the condition of the
+  divine knowledge, and, considered by themselves, they lose not absolute
+  freedom of their own nature. Wherefore doubtless all those things come
+  to pass which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceed from
+  free-will, which though they come to pass, yet do not, by coining into
+  being, lose, since before they came to pass, they might also not have
+  happened. But what importeth it that they are not necessary, since that
+  by reason of the condition of the divine knowledge they come to pass in
+  all respects as if they were necessary? It hath the same import as those
+  things which I proposed a little before--the sun rising and the man
+  going. While they are in doing, they cannot choose but be in doing; yet
+  one of them was necessarily to be before it was, and the other not.
+  Likewise those things which God hath present, will have doubtless a
+  being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things, other from
+  the power of the doers. And therefore we said not without cause that
+  these, if they be referred to God's knowledge, are necessary; and if
+  they be considered by themselves, they are free from the bonds of
+  necessity. As whatsoever is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to
+  reason, is universal; if thou considerest the things themselves, it is
+  singular or particular. But thou wilt say, 'If it is in my power to
+  change my purpose, shall I frustrate providence if I chance to alter
+  those things which she foreknoweth?' I answer that thou mayest indeed
+  change thy purpose, but because the truth of providence, being present,
+  seeth that thou canst do so, and whether thou wilt do so or no, and what
+  thou purposest anew, thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge, even
+  as thou canst not avoid the sight of an eye which is present, although
+  thou turnest thyself to divers actions by thy free-will.
+
+  But yet thou wilt inquire whether God's knowledge shall be changed by
+  thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another,
+  it should also seem to have divers knowledges. No. For God's sight
+  preventeth all that is to come and recalleth and draweth it to the
+  presence of His own knowledge; neither doth He vary, as thou imaginest,
+  now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving
+  preventeth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of
+  comprehending and seeing all things, God hath not by the event of future
+  things but by His own simplicity. By which that doubt is also resolved
+  which thou didst put a little before, that it is an unworthy thing that
+  our future actions should be said to cause the knowledge of God. For
+  this force of the divine knowledge comprehending all things with a
+  present notion appointeth to everything its measure and receiveth
+  nothing from ensuing accidents. All which being so, the free-will of
+  mortal men remaineth unviolated, neither are the laws unjust which
+  propose punishments and rewards to our wills, which are free from all
+  necessity. There remaineth also a beholder of all things which is God,
+  who foreseeth all things, and the eternity of His vision, which is
+  always present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions,
+  distributing rewards to the good and punishments to the evil. Neither do
+  we in vain put our hope in God or pray to Him; for if we do this well
+  and as we ought, we shall not lose our labour or be without effect.
+  Wherefore fly vices, embrace virtues, possess your minds with worthy
+  hopes, offer up humble prayers to your highest Prince. There is, if you
+  will not dissemble, a great necessity of doing well imposed upon you,
+  since you live in the sight of your Judge, who beholdeth all things."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SYMMACHI VERSVS
+
+Fortunae et uirtutis opus, Seuerine Boethi,
+  E patria pulsus non tua per scelera,
+Tandem ignotus habes qui te colat, ut tua uirtus
+  Vt tua fortuna promeruitque [Greek: sophos].
+Post obitum dant fata locum, post fata superstes
+  Vxoris propriae te quoque fama colit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+EPIGRAM BY SYMMACHUS[177]
+
+Boethius! model of all weal and worth,
+Unjustly from thy country driven forth,
+Thy fame, unfamed at last, yet one shall praise,
+One voice the cry of approbation raise;
+What life denied, through death kind heaven giveth;
+Thine honour in thy wife's for ever liveth.
+
+
+[177] This epigram was found by Barth in a Merseburg codex, and first
+printed in his _Adversaria_ (1624). If genuine (and the faithful
+reproduction the error SYMMACHIVS for SYMMACHI VS or VR, i.e. VERSVS, is in
+its favour), the author may be either the son or the father-in-law of
+Boethius. Some readers may prefer to rank this poem with the epitaph on
+Elpis, the supposititious first wife of Boethius, on whom see Obbarius, _De
+cons._ p. xii. At any rate it is as old as the times of Hrabanus Maurus,
+who imitated it in a poem also first published by Barth. See Peiper,
+_Cons._ p. xxxviiii.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Aaron.
+Abel.
+Abraham.
+abstraction.
+academical studies.
+Achaemenian rocks.
+Achelous.
+Achilles, statue of.
+Adam.
+[Greek: aeides, to].
+Aemilius Paulus.
+_aequiuocus_.
+_aeternitas_.
+Agamemnon, _see_ Atrides.
+age, the former.
+Agrippina.
+Albinus.
+Alcibiades.
+Alexander Aphrod..
+allegorical method.
+Anaxagoras.
+Anaxarchus.
+angels.
+Antaeus.
+Antoninus (Caracalla).
+Apollodorus.
+Apuleius.
+Arcturus.
+Arians
+Aristotle,
+  on nature;
+  _De physicis_;
+  _Protrepticus_;
+Arius.
+Atrides.
+Augustine, St.
+Auster.
+
+Bacchus.
+baptism.
+Basil, informer.
+Being.
+Boethius,
+  life;
+  the first scholastic;
+  an independent philosopher;
+  his philosophic ambition;
+  his achievement;
+  a Christian;
+  perhaps a martyr;
+  son-in-law of Symmachus;
+  his wife;
+  his sons;
+  early training;
+  youthful poetry;
+  premature old age;
+  his learning;
+  his library;
+  his lofty position;
+  his principles;
+  the champion of the oppressed;
+  of the Senate;
+  his accusers;
+  his accusation;
+  sentence.
+Boötes.
+Boreas.
+Brutus.
+Busiris.
+
+Cacus.
+Caesar, _see_ Gaius.
+Campania.
+Canius.
+Cassiodorus.
+categories, the ten.
+Catholic Church,
+  faith;
+  religion.
+Catholics.
+Cato.
+Catullus.
+Caucasus.
+Centaurs.
+Cerberus.
+Ceres.
+Chremes.
+Christ,
+  advent of;
+  baptism;
+  life and death;
+  resurrection and ascension;
+  nature;
+  person;
+  divinity;
+  humanity;
+  Perfect Man and Perfect God.
+Christian faith,
+  religion.
+Cicero,
+  _De diuinatione_;
+  _Tusc_.
+Circe.
+Claudian.
+Claudianus, Mamertus,
+  _coemptio_.
+Conigastus,
+_consistere_,
+_Consolation of Philosophy_,
+  method and object.
+consulate.
+corollary, see _porisma_.
+Corus.
+Crab.
+Croesus.
+Cyclops.
+Cynthia.
+Cyprian, informer.
+Cyrus.
+
+Dante.
+David.
+Decoratus.
+demons.
+Devil.
+dialectic.
+difference.
+Diogenes Laertius.
+Dionysius.
+divine nature, eternal,
+  substance.
+divinity of Christ, _see_ Christ,
+_diuisio_.
+Dorset, Countess of.
+
+[Greek: Eisagogae], Porphyry's.
+Eleatic studies.
+elements.
+Elpis.
+_Enneades_.
+Epicureans.
+Epicurus.
+_esse_.
+_essentia_.
+eternity.
+Etna.
+Euphrates.
+Euripides.
+Euripus.
+Eurus.
+Eutyches.
+Eutychian error.
+Eutychians.
+Evander.
+Eve.
+evil is nothing.
+
+Fabricius.
+Fame.
+fatal order.
+Fate.
+fire, nature of.
+Flood.
+form.
+Fortune.
+free-will.
+Furies.
+
+Gaius Caesar (Caligula).
+Gaudentius.
+geometricians.
+Germanicus.
+Giants.
+Gilbert de la Porrée.
+Glory.
+God, categories applied to,
+  without difference;
+  is what He is;
+  is Pure Form;
+  is [Greek: ousia, ousiosis, huphistasthai];
+  One;
+  Triune;
+  is good;
+  goodness;
+  happiness;
+  everlasting;
+  omnipresent;
+  just;
+  omnipotent;
+  incomprehensible;
+  one Father;
+  true Sun;
+  Creator;
+  Ruler;
+  Mover;
+  Judge;
+  sees all things;
+  foresees all things;
+  His knowledge;
+  His providence;
+  cannot do evil;
+  wills only good;
+  prayer to Him not vain.
+good, the prime.
+good, all seek.
+goodness is happiness, is God.
+grace.
+Greek.
+
+Happiness is God.
+Hauréau.
+_Hebdomads_.
+Hecuba.
+Hercules.
+heresy, see Arius, Eutyches, Nestorius, Sabellians.
+Hermus.
+Herodotus.
+Hesperus.
+Holder.
+Homer.
+Horace.
+human nature, humanity of Christ, _see_ Christ.
+humanity.
+
+Iamblichus.
+_id quod est_.
+_id quod est esse_.
+Indus.
+_instrumentum_.
+Isaac.
+Ishmael.
+Ixion.
+
+Jacob.
+Jerusalem.
+Jesus.
+Jews.
+Iohannes Scottus.
+John the Deacon.
+Jordan.
+Joshua.
+Judah.
+
+Kanius, _see_ Canius.
+[Greek: kata parathesin].
+
+Latin.
+lethargy.
+Livy.
+Lucan.
+Lucifer.
+Lucretius.
+Lybia.
+Lybian lions.
+Lydians.
+Lynceus.
+
+Macedonius. _see_ Aemilius Paulus.
+Macrobius.
+Mary, the Blessed Virgin,.
+mathematical method.
+mathematics.
+matter.
+Medea.
+Mercury.
+Moses.
+Muses.
+music,
+  Boethius on.
+
+Nature,
+  phenomenal;
+  nature;
+  nature of plants.
+Neoplatonism.
+Neritius, son of, _see_ Ulysses.
+Nero.
+Nestorius.
+Nicocreon.
+Nicomachus.
+_nihilo, ex_..
+Noah.
+Nonius.
+Notus.
+number.
+
+[Greek: oion epei].
+[Greek: onos luras].
+Opilio.
+Orpheus.
+[Greek: ousia].
+[Greek: ousiosis].
+[Greek: ousiosthai].
+
+[Greek: PI].
+_Palatini canes_.
+Papinianus.
+Parmenides.
+Parthiaus.
+Paulinus.
+Paulus, see Aemilius Paulus.
+Pelagius.
+Perses.
+_persona_.
+Person defined.
+Pharaoh.
+Philosophy,
+  appearance of;
+  character;
+  function;
+  power.
+Phoebe.
+Phoebus.
+physics.
+Plato,
+  and Boethius;
+  and S. Thomas;
+  and the Academy;
+  his muse;
+  Reminiscence;
+  quoted or referred to, _Gorg._;
+  _Tim_;
+  _Meno_;
+  _Phaedo_;
+  _Rep_.
+Plotinus.
+Plurality.
+Pluto.
+Polyphemus.
+Porch.
+_porisma_.
+Porphyry.
+praetorship.
+praevidence.
+predicaments, _see_ categories.
+Providence.
+Ptolemy.
+purgation.
+Pythagoras.
+
+Ravenna.
+realism.
+Red Sea.
+_reductio ad absurdum_.
+Regulus.
+relation, category of.
+religion, the Christian.
+Resurrection.
+rhetoric.
+Roman liberty,
+  republic.
+Rusticiana.
+
+Sabellians.
+Sackville, Thomas.
+_sacrilegium_.
+saints.
+Saturn.
+Saul.
+scripture.
+_sempiternitas_.
+senate.
+Seneca.
+Simon.
+Sinai.
+Sirius.
+Socrates.
+Son, the, _see_ Trinity.
+Soranus.
+Spartianus.
+Spirit, Holy, _see_ Trinity,
+  procession of;
+  a substance.
+statue of Achilles.
+Stoics.
+Stymphalian birds.
+_subsisistentia, subsistere_.
+substance, divine.
+_substantia, substare_.
+Suetonius.
+sun, _see_ Phoebus.
+Symmachus, Q. Aurel.,
+  Q. Aur. Memmius;
+  Boethius;
+  Pope.
+Syrtes.
+
+Tacitus.
+Tantalus.
+Tertullian.
+Testament, Old and New.
+[Greek: THETA].
+Theodoric.
+Theology.
+Thomas, St.
+Thorie, J.
+Thrace.
+Thule.
+Tigris.
+_Timaeus_, see Plato.
+Tiresias.
+Tityus.
+triangie.
+Triguilla.
+Trinity,
+  the unity of;
+  cannot be substantially predicated of God.
+
+[Greek: ulae, apoios].
+Ulysses.
+unity.
+unity of Trinity.
+[Greek: upostasis].
+[Greek: upostaenai].
+Usener.
+_ut quia_.
+[Greek: uphistasthai].
+
+_UEL = et_.
+Verona.
+Vesuvius.
+_uia media_.
+Virgil.
+_uirtus_.
+
+Will, _see_ free-will.
+Wulf, H. de.
+
+Zeno.
+Zephyrus.
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Theological Tractates and The
+Consolation of Philosophy, by Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES ***
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Theological Tractates and The
+Consolation of Philosophy, by Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy
+
+Author: Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
+
+Release Date: August 29, 2004 [EBook #13316]
+
+Language: English and Latin
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Ted Garvin, Robert Connal and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+
+WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY H.F. STEWART, D.D.
+
+FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
+
+AND E.K. RAND, PH.D.
+
+PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
+
+
+
+THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+WITH THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF "I.T." (1609)
+
+REVISED BY H.F. STEWART
+
+
+
+1918
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's Note: The paper edition of this book has Latin and English
+pages facing each other. This version of the text uses alternating Latin
+and English sections, with the English text slightly indented.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+  NOTE ON THE TEXT
+
+  INTRODUCTION
+
+  BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+  THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+
+  THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+  SYMMACHI VERSUS
+
+  INDEX
+
+
+
+
+NOTE ON THE TEXT
+
+In preparing the text of the _Consolatio_ I have used the apparatus in
+Peiper's edition (Teubner, 1871), since his reports, as I know in the case
+of the Tegernseensis, are generally accurate and complete; I have depended
+also on my own collations or excerpts from various of the important
+manuscripts, nearly all of which I have at least examined, and I have also
+followed, not always but usually, the opinions of Engelbrecht in his
+admirable article, _Die Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius_ in the
+_Sitzungsberichte_ of the Vienna Academy, cxliv. (1902) 1-60. The
+present text, then, has been constructed from only part of the material
+with which an editor should reckon, though the reader may at least assume
+that every reading in the text has, unless otherwise stated, the authority
+of some manuscript of the ninth or tenth century; in certain orthographical
+details, evidence from the text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ has been used
+without special mention of this fact. We look to August Engelbrecht for the
+first critical edition of the _Consolatio_ at, we hope, no distant
+date.
+
+The text of the _Opuscula Sacra_ is based on my own collations of all
+the important manuscripts of these works. An edition with complete
+_apparatus criticus_ will be ready before long for the Vienna
+_Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum_. The history of the
+text of the _Opuscula Sacra_, as I shall attempt to show elsewhere, is
+intimately connected with that of the _Consolatio_.
+
+E.K.R.
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, of the famous Praenestine family of the
+Anicii, was born about 480 A.D. in Rome. His father was an ex-consul; he
+himself was consul under Theodoric the Ostrogoth in 510, and his two sons,
+children of a great grand-daughter of the renowned Q. Aurelius Symmachus,
+were joint consuls in 522. His public career was splendid and honourable,
+as befitted a man of his race, attainments, and character. But he fell
+under the displeasure of Theodoric, and was charged with conspiring to
+deliver Rome from his rule, and with corresponding treasonably to this end
+with Justin, Emperor of the East. He was thrown into prison at Pavia, where
+he wrote the _Consolation of Philosophy_, and he was brutally put to death
+in 524. His brief and busy life was marked by great literary achievement.
+His learning was vast, his industry untiring, his object unattainable--
+nothing less than the transmission to his countrymen of all the works of
+Plato and Aristotle, and the reconciliation of their apparently divergent
+views. To form the idea was a silent judgment on the learning of his day;
+to realize it was more than one man could accomplish; but Boethius
+accomplished much. He translated the [Greek: Eisagogae] of Porphyry, and
+the whole of Aristotle's _Organon_. He wrote a double commentary on the
+[Greek: Eisagogae] and commentaries on the _Categories_ and the _De
+Interpretatione_ of Aristotle, and on the _Topica_ of Cicero. He also
+composed original treatises on the categorical and hypothetical syllogism,
+on Division and on Topical Differences. He adapted the arithmetic of
+Nicomachus, and his textbook on music, founded on various Greek
+authorities, was in use at Oxford and Cambridge until modern times. His
+five theological _Tractates_ are here, together with the _Consolation of
+Philosophy_, to speak for themselves.
+
+Boethius was the last of the Roman philosophers, and the first of the
+scholastic theologians. The present volume serves to prove the truth of
+both these assertions.
+
+The _Consolation of Philosophy_ is indeed, as Gibbon called it, "a golden
+volume, not unworthy of the leisure of Plato or of Tully." To belittle its
+originality and sincerity, as is sometimes done, with a view to saving the
+Christianity of the writer, is to misunderstand his mind and his method.
+The _Consolatio_ is not, as has been maintained, a mere patchwork of
+translations from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Rather it is the supreme
+essay of one who throughout his life had found his highest solace in the
+dry light of reason. His chief source of refreshment, in the dungeon to
+which his beloved library had not accompanied him, was a memory well
+stocked with the poetry and thought of former days. The development of the
+argument is anything but Neoplatonic; it is all his own.
+
+And if the _Consolation of Philosophy_ admits Boethius to the company of
+Cicero or even of Plato, the theological _Tractates_ mark him as the
+forerunner of St. Thomas. It was the habit of a former generation to regard
+Boethius as an eclectic, the transmitter of a distorted Aristotelianism, a
+pagan, or at best a luke-warm Christian, who at the end cast off the faith
+which he had worn in times of peace, and wrapped himself in the philosophic
+cloak which properly belonged to him. The authenticity of the _Tractates_
+was freely denied. We know better now. The discovery by Alfred Holder, and
+the illuminating discussion by Hermann Usener,[1] of a fragment of
+Cassiodorus are sufficient confirmation of the manuscript tradition, apart
+from the work of scholars who have sought to justify that tradition from
+internal evidence. In that fragment Cassiodorus definitely ascribes to his
+friend Boethius "a book on the Trinity, some dogmatic chapters, and a book
+against Nestorius."[2] Boethius was without doubt a Christian, a Doctor and
+perhaps a martyr. Nor is it necessary to think that, when in prison, he put
+away his faith. If it is asked why the _Consolation of Philosophy_ contains
+no conscious or direct reference to the doctrines which are traced in the
+_Tractates_ with so sure a hand, and is, at most, not out of harmony with
+Christianity, the answer is simple. In the _Consolation_ he is writing
+philosophy; in the _Tractates_ he is writing theology. He observes what
+Pascal calls the orders of things. Philosophy belongs to one order,
+theology to another. They have different objects. The object of philosophy
+is to understand and explain the nature of the world around us; the object
+of theology is to understand and explain doctrines delivered by divine
+revelation. The scholastics recognized the distinction,[3] and the
+corresponding difference in the function of Faith and Reason. Their final
+aim was to co-ordinate the two, but this was not possible before the
+thirteenth century. Meanwhile Boethius helps to prepare the way. In the
+_Consolation_ he gives Reason her range, and suffers her, unaided, to
+vindicate the ways of Providence. In the _Tractates_ Reason is called in to
+give to the claims of Faith the support which it does not really lack.[4]
+Reason, however, has still a right to be heard. The distinction between
+_fides_ and _ratio_ is proclaimed in the first two _Tractates_. In the
+second especially it is drawn with a clearness worthy of St. Thomas
+himself; and there is, of course, the implication that the higher authority
+resides with _fides_. But the treatment is philosophical and extremely
+bold. Boethius comes back to the question of the substantiality of the
+divine Persons which he has discussed in Tr. I. from a fresh point of view.
+Once more he decides that the Persons are predicated relatively; even
+Trinity, he concludes, is not predicated substantially of deity. Does this
+square with catholic doctrine? It is possible to hear a note of challenge
+in his words to John the Deacon, _fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge_.
+Philosophy states the problem in unequivocal terms. Theology is required to
+say whether they commend themselves.
+
+One object of the scholastics, anterior to the final co-ordination of the
+two sciences, was to harmonize and codify all the answers to all the
+questions that philosophy raises. The ambition of Boethius was not so
+soaring, but it was sufficiently bold. He set out, first to translate, and
+then to reconcile, Plato and Aristotle; to go behind all the other systems,
+even the latest and the most in vogue, back to the two great masters, and
+to show that they have the truth, and are in substantial accord. So St.
+Thomas himself, if he cannot reconcile the teaching of Plato and Aristotle,
+at least desires to correct the one by the other, to discover what truth is
+common to both, and to show its correspondence with Christian doctrine. It
+is reasonable to conjecture that Boethius, if he had lived, might have
+attempted something of the kind. Were he alive to-day, he might feel more
+in tune with the best of the pagans than with most contemporary philosophic
+thought.
+
+In yet one more respect Boethius belongs to the company of the schoolmen.
+He not only put into circulation many precious philosophical notions,
+served as channel through which various works of Aristotle passed into the
+schools, and handed down to them a definite Aristotelian method for
+approaching the problem of faith; he also supplied material for that
+classification of the various sciences which is an essential accompaniment
+of every philosophical movement, and of which the Middle Ages felt the
+value.[5] The uniform distribution into natural sciences, mathematics and
+theology which he recommends may be traced in the work of various teachers
+up to the thirteenth century, when it is finally accepted and defended by
+St. Thomas in his commentary on the _De Trinitate_.
+
+A seventeenth-century translation of the _Consolatio Philosophiae_ is here
+presented with such alterations as are demanded by a better text, and the
+requirements of modern scholarship. There was, indeed, not much to do, for
+the rendering is most exact. This in a translation of that date is not a
+little remarkable. We look for fine English and poetry in an Elizabethan;
+but we do not often get from him such loyalty to the original as is here
+displayed.
+
+Of the author "I.T." nothing is known. He may have been John Thorie, a
+Fleming born in London in 1568, and a B.A. of Christ Church, 1586. Thorie
+"was a person well skilled in certain tongues, and a noted poet of his
+times" (Wood, _Athenae Oxon._ ed. Bliss, i. 624), but his known
+translations are apparently all from the Spanish.[6]
+
+Our translator dedicates his "Five books of Philosophical Comfort" to the
+Dowager Countess of Dorset, widow of Thomas Sackville, who was part author
+of _A Mirror for Magistrates_ and _Gorboduc_, and who, we learn from I.T.'s
+preface, meditated a similar work. I.T. does not unduly flatter his
+patroness, and he tells her plainly that she will not understand the
+philosophy of the book, though the theological and practical parts may be
+within her scope.
+
+The _Opuscula Sacra_ have never before, to our knowledge, been translated.
+In reading and rendering them we have been greatly helped by two mediaeval
+commentaries: one by John the Scot (edited by E.K. Rand in Traube's
+_Quellen und Untersuchungen_, vol. i. pt. 2, Munich, 1906); the other by
+Gilbert de la Porree (printed in Migne, _P.L._ lxiv.). We also desire to
+record our indebtedness in many points of scholarship and philosophy to Mr.
+E.J. Thomas of Emmanuel College.
+
+Finally, thanks are due to Mr. Dolson for the suggestion in the footnote on
+the preceding page, and also to Professor Lane Cooper of Cornell University
+for many valuable corrections as this reprint was passing through the
+Press.
+
+H.F.S.
+E.K.R.
+
+_October, 1926._
+
+
+[1] _Anecdoton Holderi_, Leipzig, 1877.
+
+[2] _Scripsit librum de sancta trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica et
+librum contra Nestorium._ On the question of the genuineness of Tr. IV. _De
+fide catholica_ see note _ad loc_.
+
+[3] Cp. H. de Wulf, _Histoire de la Philosophie medievale_ (Louvain and
+Paris 1915), p. 332.
+
+[4] See below, _De Trin_. vi. _ad fin_.
+
+[5] Cp. L. Baur, _Gundissalinus: de divisione_, Muenster, 1905.
+
+[6] Mr. G. Bayley Dolson suggests with greater probability that I.T. was
+John Thorpe (fl. 1570-1610), architect to Thomas Sackville, Earl of Dorset.
+Cf. _American Journal of Philology_, vol. xlii. (1921), p. 266.
+
+
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+_Editio Princeps_:
+
+  Collected Works (except _De fide catholica_). Joh. et Greg. de
+  Gregoriis. Venice, 1491-92.
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_. Coburger. Nuernberg, 1473.
+
+  _De fide catholica_. Ed. Ren. Vallinus. Leyden, 1656.
+
+_Latest Critical Edition_:
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_ and Theological Tractates. R.
+  Peiper. Teubner, 1871.
+
+_Translations_:
+
+  _De consolatione philosophiae_.
+
+  Alfred the Great. Ed. W.J. Sedgefield. Oxford, 1899 and 1900.
+
+  Chaucer. Ed. W.W. Skeat in Chaucer's Complete Works. Vol. ii. Oxford,
+  1894.
+
+  H.R. James. _The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius_. London,
+  1897; reprinted 1906.
+
+  Judicis de Mirandol. _La Consolation philosophique de Boece_.
+  Paris, 1861.
+
+_Illustrative Works_:
+
+  A. Engelbrecht. _Die Consolatio Phil. der B._ Sitzungsberichte der
+  Koen. Akad. Vienna, 1902.
+
+  Bardenhewer, _Patrologie_ (Boethius und Cassiodor, pp. 584 sqq.).
+  Freiburg im Breslau, 1894.
+
+  Haurean. _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique._ Vol. i. Paris,
+  1872.
+
+  Hildebrand. _Boethius und seine Stellung zum Christentum._
+  Regensburg, 1885.
+
+  Hodgkin. _Italy and her Invaders._ Vols. iii. and iv. Oxford, 1885.
+
+  Ch. Jourdain. (1) _De l'origine des traditions sur le christianisme de
+  Boece_; (2) _Des commentaires inedits sur La Consolation de la
+  philosophie_. (Excursions historiques et philosophiques a travers le
+  moyen age.) Paris, 1888.
+
+  Fritz Klingner. _De Boethii consolatione_, Philol. Unters. xxvii.
+  Berlin, 1921.
+
+  F.D. Maurice. _Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy._ Vol. i. London,
+  1872.
+
+  F. Nitzsch. _Das System des B._ Berlin, 1860.
+
+  E.K. Rand. _Der dem B. zugeschriebene Traktat de Fide catholica_
+  (Jahrbuch fuer kl. Phil. xxvi.). 1901.
+
+  Semeria. _Il Cristianesimo di Sev. Boezio rivendicato_, Rome, 1900.
+
+  M. Schanz. _Gesch. der roem. Litteratur._ Teil iv. Boethius. Berlin,
+  1921.
+
+  H.F. Stewart. _Boethius: an Essay._ Edinburgh, 1891.
+
+  Usener. _Anecdoton Holderi._ Leipsic, 1877.
+
+
+
+
+BOETHIUS
+
+
+THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
+AND THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+INCIPIT LIBER QVOMODO
+TRINITAS VNVS DEVS
+AC NON TRES DII
+
+AD Q. AVRELIVM MEMMIVM SYMMACHVM
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. ATQVE PATRICIVM SOCERVM
+
+Investigatam diutissime quaestionem, quantum nostrae mentis igniculum lux
+diuina dignata est, formatam rationibus litterisque mandatam offerendam
+uobis communicandamque curaui tam uestri cupidus iudicii quam nostri
+studiosus inuenti. Qua in re quid mihi sit animi quotiens stilo cogitata
+commendo, tum ex ipsa materiae difficultate tum ex eo quod raris id est
+uobis tantum conloquor, intellegi potest. Neque enim famae iactatione et
+inanibus uulgi clamoribus excitamur; sed si quis est fructus exterior, hic
+non potest aliam nisi materiae similem sperare sententiam. Quocumque igitur
+a uobis deieci oculos, partim ignaua segnities partim callidus liuor
+occurrit, ut contumeliam uideatur diuinis tractatibus inrogare qui talibus
+hominum monstris non agnoscenda haec potius quam proculcanda proiecerit.
+Idcirco stilum breuitate contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae
+disciplinis nouorum uerborum significationibus uelo, ut haec mihi tantum
+uobisque, si quando ad ea conuertitis oculos, conloquantur; ceteros uero
+ita submouimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiuerint ad ea etiam legenda
+uideantur indigni. Sane[7] tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae
+rationis intuitus ad diuinitatis ualet celsa conscendere. Nam ceteris
+quoque artibus idem quasi quidam finis est constitutus, quousque potest uia
+rationis accedere. Neque enim medicina aegris semper affert salutem; sed
+nulla erit culpa medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri oportebat omiserit.
+Idemque in ceteris. At quantum haec difficilior quaestio est, tam facilior
+esse debet ad ueniam. Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est, an ex beati
+Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos uenientia fructus
+extulerint. Ac de proposita quaestione hinc sumamus initium.
+
+
+[7] sed ne _codices optimi_.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE TRINITY IS ONE GOD NOT THREE GODS
+
+  A TREATISE BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE
+  ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO HIS FATHER-IN-LAW, QUINTUS AURELIUS MEMMIUS SYMMACHUS
+  MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  I have long pondered this problem with such mind as I have and all the
+  light that God has lent me. Now, having set it forth in logical order
+  and cast it into literary form, I venture to submit it to your judgment,
+  for which I care as much as for the results of my own research. You will
+  readily understand what I feel whenever I try to write down what I think
+  if you consider the difficulty of the topic and the fact that I discuss
+  it only with the few--I may say with no one but yourself. It is indeed
+  no desire for fame or empty popular applause that prompts my pen; if
+  there be any external reward, we may not look for more warmth in the
+  verdict than the subject itself arouses. For, apart from yourself,
+  wherever I turn my eyes, they fall on either the apathy of the dullard
+  or the jealousy of the shrewd, and a man who casts his thoughts before
+  the common herd--I will not say to consider but to trample under foot,
+  would seem to bring discredit on the study of divinity. So I purposely
+  use brevity and wrap up the ideas I draw from the deep questionings of
+  philosophy in new and unaccustomed words which speak only to you and to
+  myself, that is, if you deign to look at them. The rest of the world I
+  simply disregard: they cannot understand, and therefore do not deserve
+  to read. We should not of course press our inquiry further than man's
+  wit and reason are allowed to climb the height of heavenly knowledge.[8]
+  In all the liberal arts we see the same limit set beyond which reason
+  may not reach. Medicine, for instance, does not always bring health to
+  the sick, though the doctor will not be to blame if he has left nothing
+  undone which he ought to do. So with the other arts. In the present case
+  the very difficulty of the quest claims a lenient judgment. You must
+  however examine whether the seeds sown in my mind by St. Augustine's
+  writings[9] have borne fruit. And now let us begin our inquiry.
+
+
+  [8] Cf. the discussion of human _ratio_ and divine _intellegentia_ in
+  _Cons. v._ pr. 4 and 5.
+
+  [9] e.g. Aug. _De Trin._
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Christianae religionis reuerentiam plures usurpant, sed ea fides pollet
+maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter uniuersalium praecepta regularum,
+quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius
+cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanauit, catholica uel uniuersalis
+uocatur. Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate sententia est: "Pater," inquiunt,
+"deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus." Igitur pater filius spiritus
+sanctus unus non tres dii. Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. Eos
+enim differentia comitatur qui uel augent uel minuunt, ut Arriani qui
+gradibus meritorum trinitatem uariantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem
+diducunt. Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; praeter alteritatem
+enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest. Trium namque rerum uel
+quotlibet tum genere tum specie tum numero diuersitas constat; quotiens
+enim idem dicitur, totiens diuersum etiam praedicatur. Idem uero dicitur
+tribus modis: aut genere ut idem homo quod equus, quia his idem genus ut
+animal; uel specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo;
+uel numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. Quare diuersum etiam
+uel genere uel specie uel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam
+accidentium uarietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque specie sed
+suis accidentibus distant; nam uel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia
+separemus, tamen locus cunctis diuersus est quem unum fingere nullo modo
+possumus; duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens.
+Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  There are many who claim as theirs the dignity of the Christian
+  religion; but that form of faith is valid and only valid which, both on
+  account of the universal character of the rules and doctrines affirming
+  its authority, and because the worship in which they are expressed has
+  spread throughout the world, is called catholic or universal. The belief
+  of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as follows: the
+  Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore Father,
+  Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three Gods. The principle of this
+  union is absence of difference[10]: difference cannot be avoided by
+  those who add to or take from the Unity, as for instance the Arians,
+  who, by graduating the Trinity according to merit, break it up and
+  convert it to Plurality. For the essence of plurality is otherness;
+  apart from otherness plurality is unintelligible. In fact, the
+  difference between three or more things lies in genus or species or
+  number. Difference is the necessary correlative of sameness. Sameness is
+  predicated in three ways: By genus; e.g. a man and a horse, because of
+  their common genus, animal. By species; e.g. Cato and Cicero, because of
+  their common species, man. By number; e.g. Tully and Cicero, because
+  they are numerically one. Similarly difference is expressed by genus,
+  species, and number. Now numerical difference is caused by variety of
+  accidents; three men differ neither by genus nor species but by their
+  accidents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents,[11]
+  still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be
+  regarded as the same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same
+  place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural
+  by their accidents that they are plural in number.
+
+
+  [10] The terms _differentia, numerus, species,_ are used expertly, as
+  would be expected of the author of the _In Isag. Porph. Commenta._ See
+  S. Brandt's edition of that work (in the Vienna _Corpus_, 1906), s.v.
+  _differentia,_ etc.
+
+  [11] This method of mental abstraction is employed more elaborately in
+  _Tr._ iii. (_vide infra_, p. 44) and in _Cons._ v. pr. 4, where the
+  notion of divine foreknowledge is abstracted in imagination.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut intellegi atque capi potest
+dispiciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum uidetur, eruditi est hominis unum
+quodque ut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare.
+
+Nam cum tres sint speculatiuae partes, _naturalis_, in motu
+inabstracta [Greek: anupexairetos] (considerat enim corporum formas cum
+materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu
+sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma
+materiae coniuncta), _mathematica_, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim
+formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae
+cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), _theologica_, sine
+motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu
+caret), in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis
+disciplinaliter, in diuinis intellectualiter uersari oportebit neque diduci
+ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae uere forma neque
+imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex
+forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia, sed secundum
+formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non
+secundum terram quod est eius materia, sed dicitur secundum aeris figuram.
+Terra quoque ipsa non secundum [Greek: apoion hulaen] dicitur, sed secundum
+siccitatem grauitatemque quae sunt formae. Nihil igitur secundum materiam
+esse dicitur sed secundum propriam formam. Sed diuina substantia sine
+materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt
+id quod sunt. Vnum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id
+est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae,
+sed non hoc uel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima
+corporeque, corpus et anima est, non uel corpus uel anima in partem; igitur
+non est id quod est. Quod uero non est ex hoc atque hoc, sed tantum est
+hoc, illud uere est id quod est; et est pulcherrimum fortissimumque quia
+nullo nititur. Quocirca hoc uere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo
+aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque enim subiectum fieri potest; forma
+enim est, formae uero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod ceterae formae
+subiectae accidentibus sunt ut humanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo
+quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est; dum enim materia
+subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere uidetur
+humanitas. Forma uero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subiectum nec
+uero inesse materiae, neque enim esset forma sed imago. Ex his enim formis
+quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae uenerunt quae sunt in materia et
+corpus efficiunt. Nam ceteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur formas
+uocantes, dum imagines sint. Adsimulantur enim formis his quae non sunt in
+materia constitutae. Nulla igitur in eo diuersitas, nulla ex diuersitate
+pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo atque idcirco nec numerus.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  We will now begin a careful consideration of each several point, as far
+  as they can be grasped and understood; for it has been wisely said,[12]
+  in my opinion, that it is a scholar's duty to formulate his belief about
+  anything according to its real nature.
+
+  Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds[13]: Physics,
+  Mathematics, and Theology. Physics deals with motion and is not abstract
+  or separable (i.e. [Greek: anupexairetos]); for it is concerned with the
+  forms of bodies together with their constituent matter, which forms
+  cannot be separated in reality from their bodies.[14] As the bodies are
+  in motion--the earth, for instance, tending downwards, and fire tending
+  upwards, form takes on the movement of the particular thing to which it
+  is annexed.
+
+  Mathematics does not deal with motion and is not abstract, for it
+  investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, and therefore apart from
+  movement, which forms, however, being connected with matter cannot be
+  really separated from bodies.
+
+  Theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable, for
+  the Divine Substance is without either matter or motion. In Physics,
+  then, we are bound to use scientific, in Mathematics, systematical, in
+  Theology, intellectual concepts; and in Theology we will not let
+  ourselves be diverted to play with imaginations, but will simply
+  apprehend that Form which is pure form and no image, which is very Being
+  and the source of Being. For everything owes its being to Form. Thus a
+  statue is not a statue on account of the brass which is its matter, but
+  on account of the form whereby the likeness of a living thing is
+  impressed upon it: the brass itself is not brass because of the earth
+  which is its matter, but because of its form. Likewise earth is not
+  earth by reason of unqualified matter,[15] but by reason of dryness and
+  weight, which are forms. So nothing is said to be because it has matter,
+  but because it has a distinctive form. But the Divine Substance is Form
+  without matter, and is therefore One, and is its own essence. But other
+  things are not simply their own essences, for each thing has its being
+  from the things of which it is composed, that is, from its parts. It is
+  This _and_ That, i.e. it is the totality of its parts in
+  conjunction; it is not This _or_ That taken apart. Earthly man, for
+  instance, since he consists of soul and body, is soul _and_ body,
+  not soul _or_ body, separately; therefore he is not his own
+  essence. That on the other hand which does not consist of This and That,
+  but is only This, is really its own essence, and is altogether beautiful
+  and stable because it is not grounded in anything. Wherefore that is
+  truly One in which is no number, in which nothing is present except its
+  own essence. Nor can it become the substrate of anything, for it is pure
+  Form, and pure Forms cannot be substrates.[16] For if humanity, like
+  other forms, is a substrate for accidents, it does not receive accidents
+  through the fact that it exists, but through the fact that matter is
+  subjected to it. Humanity appears indeed to appropriate the accident
+  which in reality belongs to the matter underlying the conception
+  Humanity. But Form which is without matter cannot be a substrate, and
+  cannot have its essence in matter, else it would not be form but a
+  reflexion. For from those forms which are outside matter come the forms
+  which are in matter and produce bodies. We misname the entities that
+  reside in bodies when we call them forms; they are mere images; they
+  only resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter. In Him,
+  then, is no difference, no plurality arising out of difference, no
+  multiplicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number.
+
+
+  [12] By Cicero (_Tusc_. v. 7. 19).
+
+  [13] Cf. the similar division of philosophy in _Isag. Porph_. ed. Brandt,
+  pp. 7 ff.
+
+  [14] _Sb_. though they may be separated in thought.
+
+  [15] [Greek: Apoios hulae] = [Greek: to amorphon, to aeides] of
+  Aristotle. Cf. [Greek: oute gar hulae to eidos (hae men apoios, to de
+  poiotaes tis) oute ex hulaes] (Alexander Aphrod. _De Anima_, 17. 17);
+  [Greek: ei de touto, apoios de hae hulae, apoion an eiae soma] (id. _De
+  anima libri mantissa_, 124. 7).
+
+  [16] This is Realism. Cf. "Sed si rerum ueritatem atque integritatem
+  perpendas, non est dubium quin uerae sint. Nam cum res omnes quae uerae
+  sunt sine his quinque (i.e. genus species differentia propria
+  accidentia) esse non possint, has ipsas quinque res uere intellectas
+  esse non dubites." _Isag., Porph. ed, pr._ i. (M. _P.L._ lxiv. col. 19,
+  Brandt, pp. 26 ff.). The two passages show that Boethius is definitely
+  committed to the Realistic position, although in his _Comment. in
+  Porphyr. a se translatum_ he holds the scales between Plato and
+  Aristotle, "quorum diiudicare sententias aptum esse non duxi" (cp.
+  Haureau, _Hist. de la philosophie scolastique_, i. 120). As a fact in
+  the _Comment. in Porph._ he merely postpones the question, which in the
+  _De Trin._ he settles. Boethius was ridiculed in the Middle Ages for his
+  caution.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Deus uero a deo nullo differt, ne uel accidentibus uel substantialibus
+differentiis in subiecto positis distent. Vbi uero nulla est differentia,
+nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum. Nam
+quod tertio repetitur deus, cum pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus
+nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsae
+sunt, si aduertamus ad res numerabiles ac non ad ipsum numerum. Illic enim
+unitatum repetitio numerum facit. In eo autem numero qui in rebus
+numerabilibus constat, repetitio unitatum atque pluralitas minime facit
+numerabilium rerum numerosam diuersitatem. Numerus enim duplex est, unus
+quidem quo numeramus, alter uero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat. Etenim
+unum res est; unitas, quo unum dicimus. Duo rursus in rebus sunt ut homines
+uel lapides; dualitas nihil, sed tantum dualitas qua duo homines uel duo
+lapides fiunt. Et in ceteris eodem modo. Ergo in numero quo numeramus
+repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum uero numero non facit
+pluralitatem unitatum repetitio, uel si de eodem dicam "gladius unus mucro
+unus ensis unus." Potest enim unus tot uocabulis gladius agnosci; haec enim
+unitatum iteratio potius est non numeratio, uelut si ita dicamus "ensis
+mucro gladius," repetitio quaedam est eiusdem non numeratio diuersorum,
+uelut si dicam "sol sol sol," non tres soles effecerim, sed de uno totiens
+praedicauerim.
+
+Non igitur si de patre ac filio et spiritu sancto tertio praedicatur deus,
+idcirco trina praedicatio numerum facit. Hoc enim illis ut dictum est
+imminet qui inter eos distantiam faciunt meritorum. Catholicis uero nihil
+in differentia constituentibus ipsamque formam ut est esse ponentibus neque
+aliud esse quam est ipsum quod est opinantibus recte repetitio de eodem
+quam enumeratio diuersi uidetur esse cum dicitur "deus pater deus filius
+deus spiritus sanctus atque haec trinitas unus deus," uelut "ensis atque
+mucro unus gladius," uelut "sol sol sol unus sol."
+
+Sed hoc interim ad eam dictum sit significationem demonstrationemque qua
+ostenditur non omnem unitatum repetitionem numerum pluralitatemque
+perficere. Non uero ita dicitur "pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus" quasi
+multiuocum quiddam; nam mucro et ensis et ipse est et idem, pater uero ac
+filius et spiritus sanctus idem equidem est, non uero ipse. In qua re
+paulisper considerandum est. Requirentibus enim: "Ipse est pater qui
+filius?" "Minime," inquiunt. Rursus: "Idem alter qui alter?" Negatur. Non
+est igitur inter eos in re omni indifferentia; quare subintrat numerus quem
+ex subiectorum diuersitate confici superius explanatum est. De qua re
+breuite*r considerabimus, si prius illud, quem ad modum de deo unum quodque
+praedicatur, praemiserimus.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Now God differs from God in no respect, for there cannot be divine
+  essences distinguished either by accidents or by substantial differences
+  belonging to a substrate. But where there is no difference, there is no
+  sort of plurality and accordingly no number; here, therefore, is unity
+  alone. For whereas we say God thrice when we name the Father, Son, and
+  Holy Spirit, these three unities do not produce a plurality of number in
+  their own essences, if we think of what we count instead of what we
+  count with. For in the case of abstract number a repetition of single
+  items does produce plurality; but in the case of concrete number the
+  repetition and plural use of single items does not by any means produce
+  numerical difference in the objects counted. There are as a fact two
+  kinds of number. There is the number with which we count (abstract) and
+  the number inherent in the things counted (concrete). "One" is a thing--
+  the thing counted. Unity is that by which oneness is denoted. Again
+  "two" belongs to the class of things as men or stones; but not so
+  duality; duality is merely that whereby two men or two stones are
+  denoted; and so on. Therefore a repetition of unities[17] produces
+  plurality when it is a question of abstract, but not when it is a
+  question of concrete things, as, for example, if I say of one and the
+  same thing, "one sword, one brand, one blade."[18]  It is easy to see
+  that each of these names denotes a sword; I am not numbering unities but
+  simply repeating one thing, and in saying "sword, brand, blade," I
+  reiterate the one thing and do not enumerate several different things
+  any more than I produce three suns instead of merely mentioning one
+  thing thrice when I say "Sun, Sun, Sun."
+
+  So then if God be predicated thrice of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
+  threefold predication does not result in plural number. The risk of
+  that, as has been said, attends only on those who distinguish Them
+  according to merit. But Catholic Christians, allowing no difference of
+  merit in God, assuming Him to be Pure Form and believing Him to be
+  nothing else than His own essence, rightly regard the statement "the
+  Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and this Trinity
+  is one God," not as an enumeration of different things but as a
+  reiteration of one and the same thing, like the statement, "blade and
+  brand are one sword" or "sun, sun, and sun are one sun."
+
+  Let this be enough for the present to establish my meaning and to show
+  that not every repetition of units produces number and plurality. Still
+  in saying "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," we are not using synonymous
+  terms. "Brand and blade" are the same and identical, but "Father, Son,
+  and Holy Spirit," though the same, are not identical. This point
+  deserves a moment's consideration. When they ask "Is the Father the same
+  as the Son?" Catholics answer "No." "Is the One the same as the Other?"
+  The answer is in the negative. There is not, therefore, complete
+  indifference between Them; and so number does come in--number which we
+  explained was the result of diversity of substrates. We will briefly
+  debate this point when we have done examining how particular predicates
+  can be applied to God.
+
+
+  [17] e.g. if I say "one, one, one," I enounce three unities.
+
+  [18] The same words are used to illustrate the same matter in the
+  _Comment. in Arist._ [Greek: peri hermaeneias], 2nd ed. (Meiser) 56. 12.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Decem omnino praedicamenta traduntur quae de rebus omnibus uniuersaliter
+praedicantur, id est substantia, qualitas, quantitas, ad aliquid, ubi,
+quando, habere, situm esse, facere, pati. Haec igitur talis sunt qualia
+subiecta permiserint; nam pars eorum in reliquarum rerum praedicatione
+substantia est, pa*rs in accidentium numero est. At haec cum quis i*n
+diuinam uerterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantu*r quae praedicari possunt.
+Ad aliquid uero omnino non potest praedicari, nam substantia in illo non
+est uere substantia sed ultra substantiam; item qualitas et cetera quae
+uenire queunt. Quorum ut amplior fiat intellectus exempla subdenda sunt.
+
+Nam cum dicimus "deus," substantiam quidem significare uidemur, sed eam
+quae sit ultra substantiam; cum uero "iustus," qualitatem quidem sed non
+accidentem, sed eam quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam. Neque enim
+aliud est quod est, aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse deo quod
+iusto. Item cum dicitur "magnus uel maximus," quantitatem quidem
+significare uidemur, sed eam quae sit ipsa substantia, talis qualem esse
+diximus ultra substantiam; idem est enim esse deo quod magno. De forma enim
+eius superius monstratum est quoniam is sit forma et unum uere nec ulla
+pluralitas. Sed haec praedicamenta talia sunt, ut in quo sint ipsum esse
+faciant quod dicitur, diuise quidem in ceteris, in deo uero coniuncte atque
+copulate hoc modo: nam cum dicimus "substantia" (ut homo uel deus), ita
+dicitur quasi illud de quo praedicatur ipsum sit substantia, ut substantia
+homo uel deus. Sed distat, quoniam homo non integre ipsum homo est ac per
+hoc nec substantia; quod enim est, aliis debet quae non sunt homo. Deus
+uero hoc ipsum deus est; nihil enim aliud est nisi quod est, ac per hoc
+ipsum deus est. Rursus "iustus," quod est qualitas, ita dicitur quasi ipse
+hoc sit de quo praedicatur, id est si dicamus "homo iustus uel deus
+iustus," ipsum hominem uel deum iustos esse proponimus; sed differt, quod
+homo alter alter iustus, deus uero idem ipsum est quod est iustum. "Magnus"
+etiam homo uel deus dicitur atque ita quasi ipse sit homo magnus uel deus
+magnus; sed homo tantum magnus, deus uero ipsum magnus exsistit. Reliqua
+uero neque de deo neque de ceteris praedicantur. Nam ubi uel de homine uel
+de deo praedicari potest, de homine ut in foro, de deo ut ubique, sed ita
+ut non quasi ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur de qua dicitur. Non enim ita
+homo dicitur esse in foro quem ad modum esse albus uel longus nec quasi
+circumfusus et determinatus proprietate aliqua qua designari secundum se
+possit, sed tantum quo sit illud aliis informatum rebus per hanc
+praedicationem ostenditur.
+
+De deo uero non ita, nam quod ubique est ita dici uidetur non quod in omni
+sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest) sed quod omnis ei locus
+adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo
+nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est sed non in loco. "Quando"
+uero eodem praedicatur modo, ut de homine heri uenit, de deo semper est.
+Hic quoque non quasi esse aliquid dicitur illud ipsum de quo hesternus
+dicitur aduentus, sed quid ei secundum tempus accesserit praedicatur. Quod
+uero de deo dicitur "semper est," unum quidem significat, quasi omni
+praeterito fuerit, omni quoquo modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit.
+Quod de caelo et de ceteris inmortalibus corporibus secundum philosophos
+dici potest, at de deo non ita. Semper enim est, quoniam "semper"
+praesentis est in eo temporis tantumque inter nostrarum rerum praesens,
+quod est nunc, interest ac diuinarum, quod nostrum "nunc" quasi currens
+tempus facit et sempiternitatem, diuinum uero "nunc" permanens neque mouens
+sese atque consistens aeternitatem facit; cui nomini si adicias "semper,"
+facies eius quod est nunc iugem indefessumque ac per hoc perpetuum cursum
+quod est sempiternitas.
+
+Rursus habere uel facere eodem modo; dicimus enim "uestitus currit" de
+homine, de deo "cuncta possidens regit." Rursus de eo nihil quod est esse
+de utrisque dictum est, sed haec omnis praedicatio exterioribus datur
+omniaque haec quodam modo referuntur ad aliud. Cuius praedicationis
+differentiam sic facilius internoscimus: qui homo est uel deus refertur ad
+substantiam qua est aliquid, id est homo uel deus; qui iustus est refertur
+ad qualitatem qua scilicet est aliquid, id est iustus, qui magnus ad
+quantitatem qua est aliquid, id est magnus. Nam in ceteris praedicationibus
+nihil tale est. Qui enim dicit esse aliquem in foro uel ubique, refert
+quidem ad praedicamentum quod est ubi, sed non quo aliquid est uelut
+iustitia iustus. Item cum dico "currit" uel "regit" uel "nunc est" uel
+"semper est," refertur quidem uel ad facere uel ad tempus--si tamen interim
+diuinum illud semper tempus dici potest--sed non quo aliquo aliquid est
+uelut magnitudine magnum. Nam situm passionemque requiri in deo non
+oportet, neque enim sunt.
+
+Iamne patet quae sit differentia praedicationum? Quod aliae quidem quasi
+rem monstrant aliae uero quasi circumstantias rei quodque illa quidem[19]
+ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa uero ut non esse, sed
+potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Illa igitur, quae aliquid
+esse designant, secundum rem praedicationes uocentur. Quae cum de rebus
+subiectis dicuntur, uocantur accidentia secundum rem; cum uero de deo qui
+subiectus non est, secundum substantiam rei praedicatio nuncupatur.
+
+
+[19] quidem _vulg._; quae _codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  There are in all ten categories which can be universally predicated of
+  things, namely, Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time,
+  Condition, Situation, Activity, Passivity. Their meaning is determined
+  by the contingent subject; for some of them denote substance in making
+  predication of other things, others belong to the class of accidents.
+  But when these categories are applied to God they change their meaning
+  entirely. Relation, for instance, cannot be predicated at all of God;
+  for substance in Him is not really substantial but supersubstantial. So
+  with quality and the other possible attributes, of which we must add
+  examples for the sake of clearness.
+
+  When we say God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance
+  that is supersubstantial. When we say of Him, "He is just," we mention a
+  quality, not an accidental quality--rather a substantial and, in fact, a
+  supersubstantial quality.[20] For God is not one thing because He is,
+  and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be God
+  are one and the same. So when we say, "He is great or the greatest," we
+  seem to predicate quantity, but it is a quantity similar to this
+  substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with Him to
+  be great and to be God are all one. Again, concerning His Form, we have
+  already shown that He is Form, and truly One without Plurality. The
+  categories we have mentioned are such that they give to the thing to
+  which they are applied the character which they express; in created
+  things they express divided being, in God, conjoined and united being--
+  in the following manner. When we name a substance, as man or God, it
+  seems as though that of which the predication is made were substance
+  itself, as man or God is substance. But there is a difference: since a
+  man is not simply and entirely man, and in virtue of this he is not
+  substance. For what man is he owes to other things which are not man.
+  But God is simply and entirely God, for He is nothing else than what He
+  is, and therefore is, through simple existence, God. Again we apply
+  just, a quality, as though it were that of which it is predicated; that
+  is, if we say "a just man or just God," we assert that man or God is
+  just. But there is a difference, for man is one thing, and a just man is
+  another thing. But God is justice itself. So a man or God is said to be
+  great, and it would appear that man is substantially great or that God
+  is substantially great. But man is merely great; God is greatness.
+
+  The remaining categories are not predicable of God nor yet of created
+  things.[21]  For place is predicated of man or of God--a man is in the
+  market-place; God is everywhere--but in neither case is the predicate
+  identical with the object of predication. To say "A man is in the
+  market" is quite a different thing from saying "he is white or long,"
+  or, so to speak, encompassed and determined by some property which
+  enables him to be described in terms of his substance; this predicate of
+  place simply declares how far his substance is given a particular
+  setting amid other things.
+
+  It is otherwise, of course, with God. "He is everywhere" does not mean
+  that He is in every place, for He cannot be in any place at all--but
+  that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, although He
+  Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot anywhere be
+  in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. It is the same with
+  the category of time, as, "A man came yesterday; God is ever." Here
+  again the predicate of "coming yesterday" denotes not something
+  substantial, but something happening in terms of time. But the
+  expression "God is ever" denotes a single Present, summing up His
+  continual presence in all the past, in all the present--however that
+  term be used--and in all the future. Philosophers say that "ever" may be
+  applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal bodies. But as
+  applied to God it has a different meaning. He is ever, because "ever" is
+  with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference
+  between "now," which is our present, and the divine present. Our present
+  connotes changing time and sempiternity; God's present, abiding,
+  unmoved, and immoveable, connotes eternity. Add _semper_ to
+  _eternity_ and you get the constant, incessant and thereby
+  perpetual course of our present time, that is to say, sempiternity.[22]
+
+  It is just the same with the categories of condition and activity. For
+  example, we say "A man runs, clothed," "God rules, possessing all
+  things." Here again nothing substantial is asserted of either subject;
+  in fact all the categories we have hitherto named arise from what lies
+  outside substance, and all of them, so to speak, refer to something
+  other than substance. The difference between the categories is easily
+  seen by an example. Thus, the terms "man" and "God" refer to the
+  substance in virtue of which the subject is--man or God. The term "just"
+  refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz.
+  just; the term "great" to the quantity in virtue of which He is
+  something, viz. great. No other category save substance, quality, and
+  quantity refer to the substance of the subject. If I say of one "he is
+  in the market" or "everywhere," I am applying the category of place,
+  which is not a category of the substance, like "just" in virtue of
+  justice. So if I say, "he runs, He rules, he is now, He is ever," I make
+  reference to activity or time--if indeed God's "ever" can be described
+  as time--but not to a category of substance, like "great" in virtue of
+  greatness.
+
+  Finally, we must not look for the categories of situation and passivity
+  in God, for they simply are not to be found in Him.
+
+  Have I now made clear the difference between the categories? Some denote
+  the reality of a thing; others its accidental circumstances; the former
+  declare that a thing is something; the latter say nothing about its
+  being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak, something
+  external. Those categories which describe a thing in terms of its
+  substance may be called substantial categories; when they apply to
+  things as subjects they are called accidents. In reference to God, who
+  is not a subject at all, it is only possible to employ the category of
+  substance.
+
+
+  [20] Gilbert de la Porree in his commentary on the _De Trin._ makes
+  Boethius's meaning clear. "Quod igitur in illo substantiam nominamus,
+  non est subiectionis ratione quod dicitur, sed ultra omnem quae
+  accidentibus est subiecta substantiam est essentia, absque omnibus quae
+  possunt accidere solitaria omnino." (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 1283). Cf. Aug.
+  _De Trin._ vii. 10.
+
+  [21] i.e. according to their substance.
+
+  [22] The doctrine is Augustine's, cf. _De Ciu. Dei_, xi. 6, xii. 16; but
+  Boethius's use of _sempiternitas_, as well as his word-building, seem to
+  be peculiar to himself. Claudianus Mamertus, speaking of applying the
+  categories to God, uses _sempiternitas_ as Boethius uses _aeternitas_.
+  Cf. _De Statu Animae_ i. 19. Apuleius seems to use both terms
+  interchangeably, e.g. _Asclep._ 29-31. On Boethius's distinction between
+  time and eternity see _Cons._ v. pr. 6, and Rand, _i er dem B. zugeschr.
+  Trakt. de fide_, pp. 425 ff, and Brandt in _Theol. Littzg._, 1902, p.
+  147.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Age nunc de relatiuis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus
+ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non uidentur secundum se facere
+praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno aduentu constare perspiciuntur. Age
+enim, quoniam dominus ac seruus relatiua sunt, uideamus utrumne ita sit ut
+secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas seruum, abstuleris
+et dominum; at non etiam si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque album, sed
+interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata perit nimirum album. At in
+domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non
+accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus
+coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato deperit seruo, constat non eam per se
+domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum.
+
+Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relatiuam quidquam rei de qua dicitur
+secundum se uel addere uel minuere uel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod est
+esse consistit, sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere,
+nec semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei
+igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod
+ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister
+accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter uelut albus ac
+longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me
+est minime uero ex sese.
+
+Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non
+faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare uel mutare queunt nullamque omnino
+uariare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque
+aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio uero non
+praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua
+dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest,
+quo quidem modo id quod uix intellegi potuit interpretatum est, personarum.
+Omnino enim magna regulae est ueritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias
+effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut
+pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis
+quidem ei est productio filii, relatiua uero praedicatio patris. Ac si
+meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus
+processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritum
+sanctum; hos, quoniam incorporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam uero
+pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus uero nullas habet
+differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae
+uero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas.
+Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et in rebus numerabilibus
+repetitio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem.  Trium igitur
+idonee constituta est unitas.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing
+  remarks have been preliminary; for qualities which obviously arise from
+  the association of another term do not appear to predicate anything
+  concerning the substance of a subject. For instance, master and
+  slave[23] are relative terms; let us see whether either of them are
+  predicates of substance. If you suppress the term slave,[24] you
+  simultaneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you
+  suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,[25]
+  though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in
+  the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental
+  quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term
+  slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental
+  quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the
+  power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when
+  the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the
+  substance of master, but is an adventitious augmentation arising from
+  the possession of slaves.
+
+  It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases,
+  decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it
+  is applied. The category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the
+  essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and
+  that not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject
+  itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and
+  stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is
+  left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again,
+  if I come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not
+  because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because
+  he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me,
+  and not in the least on the essence of his being.
+
+  Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of
+  a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way.
+  Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have
+  said, have no other difference but that of relation, and if relation is
+  not asserted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its
+  substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject,
+  but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly
+  understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth
+  that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences
+  and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that God became Father
+  by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to
+  be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very substance;
+  however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in
+  mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous
+  discussion, we shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the
+  Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be
+  spatially different, since They are incorporeal. But since the Father is
+  God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and since there are in
+  God no points of difference distinguishing Him from God, He differs from
+  none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no
+  plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God
+  can be begotten of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the
+  repetition of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the
+  Three is suitably established.
+
+
+  [23] _Dominus_ and _seruus_ are similarly used as illustration, _In
+  Cat._ (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 217).
+
+  [24] i.e. which is external to the master.
+
+  [25] i.e. which is external to the whitened thing.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea
+secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est
+trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, seruata uero
+unitas in eo quod est indifferentia uel substantiae uel operationis uel
+omnino eius quae secundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur substantia
+continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem; atque ideo sola
+singillatim proferuntur atque separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem
+pater qui filius non est nec idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tamen
+deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem
+magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. Sane sciendum est
+non semper talem esse relatiuam praedicationem, ut semper ad differens
+praedicetur, ut est seruus ad dominum; differunt enim. Nam omne aequale
+aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem
+idem est; et similis est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque
+ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem. Quod si id
+in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inueniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus
+alteritas. Nos uero nulla imaginatione diduci sed simplici intellectu erigi
+et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.
+
+Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc uestri normam iudicii
+exspectat subtilitas quaestionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime,
+uestrae statuet pronuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei
+fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitulante gratia diuina idonea argumentorum
+adiumenta praestitimus, illuc perfecti operis laetitia remeabit unde uenit
+effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas nequiuit ascendere, quantum
+inbecillitas subtrahit uota supplebunt.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  But since no relation can be affirmed of one subject alone, since a
+  predication referring to one substance is a predication without
+  relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is secured through the
+  category of relation, and the Unity is maintained through the fact that
+  there is no difference of substance, or operation, or generally of any
+  substantial predicate. So then, the category of substance preserves the
+  Unity, that of relation brings about the Trinity. Hence only terms
+  belonging to relation may be applied singly to Each. For the Father is
+  not the same as the Son, nor is either of Them the same as the Holy
+  Spirit. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each the same God, the same
+  in justice, in goodness, in greatness, and in everything that can be
+  predicated of substance. One must not forget that predicates of
+  relativity do not always involve relation to something other than the
+  subject, as slave involves master, where the two terms are different.
+  For equals are equal, like are like, identicals are identical, each with
+  other, and the relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is
+  a relation of identicals. A relation of this kind is not to be found in
+  created things, but that is because of the difference which we know
+  attaches to transient objects. We must not in speaking of God let
+  imagination lead us astray; we must let the Faculty of pure Knowledge
+  lift us up and teach us to know all things as far as they may be
+  known.[26]
+
+  I have now finished the investigation which I proposed. The exactness of
+  my reasoning awaits the standard of your judgment; your authority will
+  pronounce whether I have seen a straight path to the goal. If, God
+  helping me, I have furnished some support in argument to an article
+  which stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith, I shall render
+  joyous praise for the finished work to Him from whom the invitation
+  comes. But if human nature has failed to reach beyond its limits,
+  whatever is lost through my infirmity must be made good by my intention.
+
+
+  [26] Cf. _Cons._ v. pr. 4 and 5, especially in pr. 5 the passage "quare
+  in illius summae intellegentiae acumen si possumus erigamur."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+AD IOHANNEM DIACONVM
+
+VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS ET SPIRITVS
+SANCTVS DE DIVINITATE SVBSTANTIALITER
+PRAEDICENTVR
+
+Quaero an pater et filius ac spiritus sanctus de diuinitate substantialiter
+praedicentur an alio quolibet modo; uiamque indaginis hinc arbitror esse
+sumendam, unde rerum omnium manifestum constat exordium, id est ab ipsis
+catholicae fidei fundamentis. Si igitur interrogem, an qui dicitur pater
+substantia sit, respondetur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius
+substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo
+dubitauerit. Sed cum rursus colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non
+plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Vna igitur substantia trium nec
+separari ullo modo aut disiungi potest nec uelut partibus in unum coniuncta
+est, sed est una simpliciter. Quaecumque igitur de diuina substantia
+praedicantur, ea tribus oportet esse communia; idque signi erit quae sint
+quae de diuinitatis substantia praedicentur, quod quaecumque hoc modo
+dicuntur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singulariter praedicabuntur.
+Hoc modo si dicimus: "Pater deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus
+deus est," pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una
+deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de diuinitate substantialiter
+praedicari.
+
+Ita pater ueritas est, filius ueritas est, spiritus sanctus ueritas est;
+pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres ueritates sed una ueritas est. Si
+igitur una in his substantia una est ueritas, necesse est ueritatem
+substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incommutabilitate de iustitia de
+omnipotentia ac de ceteris omnibus quae tam de singulis quam de omnibus
+singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substantialiter dici. Vnde apparet
+ea quae cum in singulis separatim dici conuenit nec tamen in omnibus dici
+queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; qui uero iste sit,
+posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc uocabulum non transmittit ad
+filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantiale nomen hoc
+inditum; nam si substantiale esset, ut deus ut ueritas ut iustitia ut ipsa
+quoque substantia, de ceteris diceretur.
+
+Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque cum aliis iungit sicut in deo,
+sicut in ueritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non
+est idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus patrem ac filium
+ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa diuinitate substantialiter dici sed alio
+quodam modo; si enim substantialiter praedicaretur, et de singulis et de
+omnibus singulariter diceretur. Haec uero ad aliquid dici manifestum est;
+nam et pater alicuius pater est et filius alicuius filius est, spiritus
+alicuius spiritus. Quo fit, ut ne trinitas quidem substantialiter de deo
+praedicetur; non enim pater trinitas (qui enim pater est, filius ac
+spiritus sanctus non est) nec trinitas filius nec trinitas spiritus sanctus
+secundum eundem modum, sed trinitas quidem in personarum pluralitate
+consistit, unitas uero in substantiae simplicitate.
+
+Quod si personae diuisae sunt, substantia uero indiuisa sit, necesse est
+quod uocabulum ex personis originem capit id ad substantiam non pertinere;
+at trinitatem personarum diuersitas fecit, trinitas igitur non pertinet ad
+substantiam. Quo fit ut neque pater neque filius neque spiritus sanctus
+neque trinitas de deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed ut dictum est ad
+aliquid. Deus uero ueritas iustitia bonitas omnipotentia substantia
+inmutabilitas uirtus sapientia et quicquid huiusmodi excogitari potest
+substantialiter de diuinitate dicuntur. Haec si se recte et ex fide habent,
+ut me instruas peto; aut si aliqua re forte diuersus es, diligentius
+intuere quae dicta sunt et fidem si poterit rationemque coniunge.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS
+
+  MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO JOHN THE DEACON
+
+  WHETHER FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT MAY BE SUBSTANTIALLY PREDICATED OF
+  THE DIVINITY
+
+  The question before us is whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be
+  predicated of the Divinity substantially or otherwise. And I think that
+  the method of our inquiry must be borrowed from what is admittedly the
+  surest source of all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the
+  catholic faith. If, then, I ask whether He who is called Father is a
+  substance, the answer will be yes. If I ask whether the Son is a
+  substance, the reply will be the same. So, too, no one will hesitate to
+  affirm that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other
+  hand, I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
+  result is not three substances but one substance. The one substance of
+  the Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made up of
+  various parts, combined into one: it is simply one. Everything,
+  therefore, that is affirmed of the divine substance must be common to
+  the Three, and we can recognize what predicates may be affirmed of the
+  substance of the godhead by this sign, that all those which are affirmed
+  of it may also be affirmed severally of each of the Three combined into
+  one. For instance if we say "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the
+  Holy Spirit is God," then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If
+  then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right
+  be predicated substantially of the Divinity.
+
+  Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is
+  truth; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth.
+  If, then, they are one substance and one truth, truth must of necessity
+  be a substantial predicate. So Goodness, Immutability, Justice,
+  Omnipotence and all the other predicates which we apply to the Persons
+  singly and collectively are plainly substantial predicates. Hence it
+  appears that what may be predicated of each single One but not of all
+  Three is not a substantial predicate, but of another kind--of what kind
+  I will examine presently. For He who is Father does not transmit this
+  name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name
+  is not attached to Him as something substantial; for if it were a
+  substantial predicate, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it
+  would be affirmed of the other Persons.
+
+  Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does He associate it
+  with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the
+  other predicates which I have already mentioned. The Spirit too is not
+  the same as the Father and the Son. Hence we gather that Father, Son,
+  and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the Divinity in a substantial
+  manner, but otherwise.[27] For if each term were predicated
+  substantially it would be affirmed of the three Persons both separately
+  and collectively. It is evident that these terms are relative, for the
+  Father is some one's Father, the Son is some one's Son, the Spirit is
+  some one's Spirit. Hence not even Trinity may be substantially[28]
+  predicated of God; for the Father is not Trinity--since He who is Father
+  is not Son and Holy Spirit--nor yet, by parity of reasoning, is the Son
+  Trinity nor the Holy Spirit Trinity, but the Trinity consists in
+  diversity of Persons, the Unity in simplicity of substance.
+
+  Now if the Persons are separate, while the Substance is undivided, it
+  must needs be that that term which is derived from Persons does not
+  belong to Substance. But the Trinity is effected by diversity of
+  Persons, wherefore Trinity does not belong to Substance. Hence neither
+  Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity can be substantially
+  predicated of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, Truth,
+  Justice, Goodness, Omnipotence, Substance, Immutability, Virtue, Wisdom
+  and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are applicable
+  substantially to divinity.
+
+  If I am right and speak in accordance with the Faith, I pray you confirm
+  me. But if you are in any point of another opinion, examine carefully
+  what I have said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason.[29]
+
+
+  [27] i.e. _personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
+
+  [28] i.e. _sed personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
+
+  [29] _Vide supra_, Introduction, p. xii.
+
+
+
+
+ITEM EIVSDEM
+AD EVNDEM
+
+QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE IN EO QVOD
+SINT BONAE SINT CVM NON SINT
+SVBSTANTIALIA BONA
+
+Postulas, ut ex Hebdomadibus nostris eius quaestionis obscuritatem quae
+continet modum quo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, cum non sint
+substantialia bona, digeram et paulo euidentius monstrem; idque eo dicis
+esse faciendum, quod non sit omnibus notum iter huiusmodi scriptionum. Tuus
+uero testis ipse sum quam haec uiuaciter fueris ante complexus. Hebdomadas
+uero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conseruo
+quam cuiquam participo quorum lasciuia ac petulantia nihil a ioco risuque
+patitur esse seiunctum.[30] Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus breuitatis
+aduersus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia tum id habent commodi, quod
+cum his solis qui digni sunt conloquuntur. Vt igitur in mathematica fieri
+solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus
+cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam.
+
+I. Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam.
+Harum duplex modus est. Nam una ita communis est, ut omnium sit hominum,
+ueluti si hanc proponas: "Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae
+relinquantur aequalia esse," nullus id intellegens neget. Alia uero est
+doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus uenit,
+ut est: "Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse," et cetera; quae non
+uulgus sed docti comprobant.
+
+II. Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at uero
+quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.
+
+III. Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo
+participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid,
+cum esse susceperit.
+
+IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum
+uero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
+
+V. Diuersum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic
+enim accidens hic substantia significatur.
+
+VI. Omne quod est[31] participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio uero
+participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est
+esse ut sit; est uero ut participet alio quolibet.
+
+VII. Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet.
+
+VIII. Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est.
+
+IX. Omnis diuersitas discors, similitudo uero appetenda est; et quod
+appetit aliud, tale ipsum esse naturaliter ostenditur quale est illud hoc
+ipsum quod appetit.
+
+Sufficiunt igitur quae praemisimus; a prudente uero rationis interprete
+suis unumquodque aptabitur argumentis.
+
+Quaestio uero huiusmodi est. Ea quae sunt bona sunt; tenet enim communis
+sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne autem tendit ad
+simile. Quae igitur ad bonum tendunt bona ipsa sunt. Sed quemadmodum bona
+sint, inquirendum est, utrumne participatione an substantia? Si
+participatione, per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione
+album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est album non est. Et de ceteris
+qualitatibus eodem modo. Si igitur participatione sunt bona, ipsa per se
+nullo modo bona sunt: non igitur ad bonum tendunt. Sed concessum est. Non
+igitur participatione sunt bona sed substantia. Quorum uero substantia bona
+est, id quod sunt bona sunt; id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse.
+Esse igitur ipsorum bonum est; omnium igitur rerum ipsum esse bonum est.
+Sed si esse bonum est, ea quae sunt in eo quod sunt bona sunt idemque illis
+est esse quod boni esse; substantialia igitur bona sunt, quoniam non
+participant bonitatem. Quod si ipsum esse in eis bonum est, non est dubium
+quin substantialia cum sint bona, primo sint bono similia ac per hoc hoc
+ipsum bonum erunt; nihil enim illi praeter se ipsum simile est. Ex quo fit
+ut omnia quae sunt deus sint, quod dictu nefas est. Non sunt igitur
+substantialia bona ac per hoc non in his est esse bonum; non sunt igitur in
+eo quod sunt bona. Sed nec participant bonitatem; nullo enim modo ad bonum
+tenderent. Nullo modo igitur sunt bona.
+
+Huic quaestioni talis poterit adhiberi solutio. Multa sunt quae cum
+separari actu non possunt, animo tamen et cogitatione separantur; ut cum
+triangulum uel cetera a subiecta materia nullus actu separat, mente tamen
+segregans ipsum triangulum proprietatemque eius praeter materiam
+speculatur. Amoueamus igitur primi boni praesentiam paulisper ex animo,
+quod esse quidem constat idque ex omnium doctorum indoctorumque sententia
+barbararumque gentium religionibus cognosci potest. Hoc igitur paulisper
+amoto ponamus omnia esse quae sunt bona atque ea consideremus quemadmodum
+bona esse possent, si a primo bono minime defluxissent. Hinc intueor aliud
+in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod sunt. Ponatur enim una eademque
+substantia bona esse alba, grauis, rotunda. Tunc aliud esset ipsa illa
+substantia, aliud eius rotunditas, aliud color, aliud bonitas; nam si haec
+singula idem essent quod ipsa substantia, idem esset grauitas quod color,
+quod bonum et bonum quod grauitas--quod fieri natura non sinit. Aliud
+igitur tunc in eis esset esse, aliud aliquid esse, ac tunc bona quidem
+essent, esse tamen ipsum minime haberent bonum. Igitur si ullo modo essent,
+non a bono ac bona essent ac non idem essent quod bona, sed eis aliud esset
+esse aliud bonis esse. Quod si nihil omnino aliud essent nisi bona neque
+grauia neque colorata neque spatii dimensione distenta nec ulla in eis
+qualitas esset, nisi tantum bona essent, tunc non res sed rerum uideretur
+esse principium nec potius uiderentur, sed uideretur; unum enim solumque
+est huiusmodi, quod tantum bonum aliudque nihil sit. Quae quoniam non sunt
+simplicia, nec esse omnino poterant, nisi ea id quod solum bonum est esse
+uoluisset. Idcirco quoniam esse eorum a boni uoluntate defluxit, bona esse
+dicuntur. Primum enim bonum, quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est;
+secundum uero bonum, quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum
+quoque bonum est. Sed ipsum esse omnium rerum ex eo fluxit quod est primum
+bonum et quod bonum tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum.
+Ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum est; tunc enim in eo.
+
+Qua in re soluta quaestio est. Idcirco enim licet in eo quod sint bona
+sint, non sunt tamen similia primo bono, quoniam non quoquo modo sint res
+ipsum esse earum bonum est, sed quoniam non potest esse ipsum esse rerum,
+nisi a primo esse defluxerit, id est bono; idcirco ipsum esse bonum est nec
+est simile ei a quo est. Illud enim quoquo modo sit bonum est in eo quod
+est; non enim aliud est praeterquam bonum. Hoc autem nisi ab illo esset,
+bonum fortasse esse posset, sed bonum in eo quod est esse non posset. Tunc
+enim participaret forsitan bono; ipsum uero esse quod non haberent a bono,
+bonum habere non possent. Igitur sublato ab his bono primo mente et
+cogitatione, ista licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod essent bona esse non
+possent, et quoniam actu non potuere exsistere, nisi illud ea quod uere
+bonum est produxisset, idcirco et esse eorum bonum est et non est simile
+substantiali bono id quod ab eo fluxit; et nisi ab eo fluxissent, licet
+essent bona, tamen in eo quod sunt bona esse non possent, quoniam et
+praeter bonum et non ex bono essent, cum illud ipsum bonum primum est et
+ipsum esse sit et ipsum bonum et ipsum esse bonum. At non etiam alba in eo
+quod sunt alba esse oportebit ea quae alba sunt, quoniam ex uoluntate dei
+fluxerunt ut essent, alba minime. Aliud est enim esse, aliud albis esse;
+hoc ideo, quoniam qui ea ut essent effecit bonus quidem est, minime uero
+albus. Voluntatem igitur boni comitatum est ut essent bona in eo quod sunt;
+uoluntatem uero non albi non est comitata talis eius quod est proprietas ut
+esset album in eo quod est; neque enim ex albi uoluntate defluxerunt.
+Itaque quia uoluit esse ea alba qui erat non albus, sunt alba tantum; quia
+uero uoluit ea esse bona qui erat bonus, sunt bona in eo quod sunt.
+Secundum hanc igitur rationem cuncta oportet esse iusta, quoniam ipse
+iustus est qui ea esse uoluit? Ne hoc quidem. Nam bonum esse essentiam,
+iustum uero esse actum respicit. Idem autem est in eo esse quod agere; idem
+igitur bonum esse quod iustum. Nobis uero non est idem esse quod agere; non
+enim simplices sumus. Non est igitur nobis idem bonis esse quod iustis, sed
+idem nobis est esse omnibus in eo quod sumus. Bona igitur omnia sunt, non
+etiam iusta. Amplius bonum quidem generale est, iustum uero speciale nec
+species descendit in omnia. Idcirco alia quidem iusta alia aliud omnia
+bona.
+
+
+[30] seiunct. _Rand_; coniunct. _codd. opt._; disiunct. _vulg. Vallinus_.
+
+[31] est _codd. inferiores; om. codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME
+
+  HOW SUBSTANCES CAN BE GOOD IN VIRTUE OF THEIR EXISTENCE WITHOUT BEING
+  ABSOLUTE GOODS
+
+  You ask me to state and explain somewhat more clearly that obscure
+  question in my _Hebdomads_[32] concerning the manner in which
+  substances can be good in virtue of existence without being absolute
+  goods.[33] You urge that this demonstration is necessary because the
+  method of this kind of treatise is not clear to all. I can bear witness
+  with what eagerness you have already attacked the subject. But I confess
+  I like to expound my _Hebdomads_ to myself, and would rather bury
+  my speculations in my own memory than share them with any of those pert
+  and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is
+  made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurity that
+  waits on brevity; for obscurity is the sure treasure-house of secret
+  doctrine and has the further advantage that it speaks a language
+  understood only of those who deserve to understand. I have therefore
+  followed the example of the mathematical[34] and cognate sciences and
+  laid down bounds and rules according to which I shall develop all that
+  follows.
+
+  I. A common conception is a statement generally accepted as soon as it
+  is made. Of these there are two kinds. One is universally intelligible;
+  as, for instance, "if equals be taken from equals the remainders are
+  equal." Nobody who grasps that proposition will deny it. The other kind
+  is intelligible only to the learned, but it is derived from the same
+  class of common conceptions; as "Incorporeals cannot occupy space," and
+  the like. This is obvious to the learned but not to the common herd.
+
+  II. Being and a concrete thing[35] are different. Simple Being awaits
+  manifestation, but a thing is and exists[36] as soon as it has received
+  the form which gives it Being.
+
+  III. A concrete thing can participate in something else; but absolute
+  Being can in no wise participate in anything. For participation is
+  effected when a thing already is; but it is something after it has
+  acquired Being.
+
+  IV. That which exists can possess something besides itself. But absolute
+  Being has no admixture of aught besides Itself.
+
+  V. Merely to be something and to be something absolutely are different;
+  the former implies accidents, the latter connotes a substance.
+
+  VI. Everything that is participates in absolute Being[37] through the
+  fact that it exists. In order to be something it participates in
+  something else. Hence that which exists participates in absolute Being
+  through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate
+  in something else.
+
+  VII. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its
+  particular Being.
+
+  VIII. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one
+  and the same.
+
+  IX. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something
+  outside itself is demonstrably of the same nature as that which it
+  seeks.
+
+  These preliminaries are enough then for our purpose. The intelligent
+  interpreter of the discussion will supply the arguments appropriate to
+  each point.
+
+  Now the problem is this. Things which are, are good. For all the learned
+  are agreed that every existing thing tends to good and everything tends
+  to its like. Therefore things which tend to good are good. We must,
+  however, inquire how they are good--by participation or by substance. If
+  by participation, they are in no wise good in themselves; for a thing
+  which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by
+  virtue of absolute Being. So with all other qualities. If then they are
+  good by participation, they are not good in themselves; therefore they
+  do not tend to good. But we have agreed that they do. Therefore they are
+  good not by participation but by substance. But those things whose
+  substance is good are substantially good. But they owe their actual
+  Being to absolute Being. Their absolute Being therefore is good;
+  therefore the absolute Being of all things is good. But if their Being
+  is good, things which exist are good through the fact that they exist
+  and their absolute Being is the same as that of the Good. Therefore they
+  are substantial goods, since they do not merely participate in goodness.
+  But if their absolute Being is good, there is no doubt but that, since
+  they are substantial goods, they are like the First Good and therefore
+  they will have to be that Good. For nothing is like It save Itself.
+  Hence all things that are, are God--an impious assertion. Wherefore
+  things are not substantial goods, and so the essence of the Good does
+  not reside in them. Therefore they are not good through the fact that
+  they exist. But neither do they receive good by participation, for they
+  would in no wise tend to good. Therefore they are in no wise good.[38]
+
+  This problem admits of the following solution.[39] There are many things
+  which can be separated by a mental process, though they cannot be
+  separated in fact. No one, for instance, can actually separate a
+  triangle or other mathematical figure from the underlying matter; but
+  mentally one can consider a triangle and its properties apart from
+  matter. Let us, therefore, remove from our minds for a moment the
+  presence of the Prime Good, whose Being is admitted by the universal
+  consensus of learned and unlearned opinion and can be deduced from the
+  religious beliefs of savage races. The Prime Good having been thus for a
+  moment put aside, let us postulate as good all things that are, and let
+  us consider how they could possibly be good if they did not derive from
+  the Prime Good. This process leads me to perceive that their Goodness
+  and their existence are two different things. For let me suppose that
+  one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, and round. Then it
+  must be admitted that its substance, roundness, colour, and goodness are
+  all different things. For if each of these qualities were the same as
+  its substance, weight would be the same thing as colour or goodness, and
+  goodness would be the same as colour; which is contrary to nature. Their
+  Being then in that case would be one thing, their quality another, and
+  they would be good, but they would not have their absolute Being good.
+  Therefore if they really existed at all, they would not be from good nor
+  good, they would not be the same as good, but Being and Goodness would
+  be for them two different things. But if they were nothing else but good
+  substances, and were neither heavy, nor coloured, and possessed neither
+  spatial dimension nor quality, beyond that of goodness, they (or rather
+  it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things. For there
+  is one thing alone that is by nature good to the exclusion of every
+  other quality. But since they are not simple, they could not even exist
+  at all unless that which is the one sole Good willed them to be. They
+  are called good simply because their Being is derived from the Will of
+  the Good. For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the
+  secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good
+  whose absolute Being is good. But the absolute Being of all things
+  derives from the Prime Good which is such that of It Being and Goodness
+  are rightly predicated as identical. Their absolute Being therefore is
+  good; for thereby it resides in Him.
+
+  Thereby the problem is solved. For though things be good through the
+  fact that they exist, they are not like the Prime Good, for the simple
+  reason that their absolute Being is not good under all circumstances,
+  but that things can have no absolute Being unless it derive from the
+  Prime Being, that is, the Prime Good; their substance, therefore, is
+  good, and yet it is not like that from which it comes. For the Prime
+  Good is good through the fact that it exists, irrespective of all
+  conditions, for it is nothing else than good; but the second good if it
+  derived from any other source might be good, but could not be good
+  through the fact that it exists. For in that case it might possibly
+  participate in good, but their substantial Being, not deriving from the
+  Prime Good, could not have the element of good. Therefore when we have
+  put out of mind the Prime Good, these things, though they might be good,
+  would not be good through the fact that they exist, and since they could
+  not actually exist unless the true good had produced them, therefore
+  their Being is good, and yet that which springs from the substantial
+  Good is not like its source which produces it. And unless they had
+  derived from it, though they were good yet they could not be good
+  through the fact that they exist because they were apart from good and
+  not derived from good, since that very good is the Prime Good and is
+  substantial Being and substantial Good and essential Goodness. But we
+  need not say that white things are white through the fact that they
+  exist; for they drew their existence from the will of God, but not their
+  whiteness. For to be is one thing; to be white is another; and that
+  because He who gave them Being is good, but not white. It is therefore
+  in accordance with the will of the Good that they should be good through
+  the fact that they exist; but it is not in accordance with the will of
+  one who is not white that a thing have a certain property making it
+  white in virtue of its Being; for it was not the will of One who is
+  white that gave them Being. And so they are white simply because One who
+  was not white willed them to be white; but they are good through the
+  fact that they exist because One who was good willed them to be good.
+  Ought, then, by parity of reason, all things to be just because He is
+  just who willed them to be? That is not so either. For to be good
+  involves Being, to be just involves an act. For Him being and action are
+  identical; to be good and to be just are one and the same for Him. But
+  being and action are not identical for us, for we are not simple. For
+  us, then, goodness is not the same thing as justice, but we all have the
+  same sort of Being in virtue of our existence. Therefore all things are
+  good, but all things are not just. Finally, good is a general, but just
+  is a species, and this species does not apply to all. Wherefore some
+  things are just, others are something else, but all things are good.
+
+
+  [32] Similarly Porphyry divided the works of Plotinus into six
+  _Enneades_ or groups of nine.
+
+  [33] Cf. discussion on the nature of good in _Cons._ iii. m. 10 and pr.
+  11 (_infra_, pp. 274 ff.).
+
+  [34] On this mathematical method of exposition cf. _Cons._ iii. pr. 10
+  (_infra_, p. 270).
+
+  [35] _Esse_ = Aristotle's [Greek: to ti esti]; _id quod est_ = [Greek:
+  tode ti].
+
+  [36] _Consistere_ = [Greek: hypostaenai].
+
+  [37] _Id quod est esse_ = [Greek: to ti aen einai].
+
+  [38] Cf. the similar _reductio ad absurdum_ in _Tr._ 5 (_infra_, p. 98)
+  and in _Cons._ v. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).
+
+  [39] _Vide supra_, p. 6, n. _b_.
+
+
+
+
+DE FIDE CATHOLICA
+
+Christianam fidem noui ac ueteris testamenti pandit auctoritas; et quamuis
+nomen ipsum Christi uetus intra semet continuerit instrumentum eumque
+semper signauerit affuturum quem credimus per partum uirginis iam uenisse,
+tamen in orbem terrarum ab ipsius nostri saluatoris mirabili manasse
+probatur aduentu.
+
+Haec autem religio nostra, quae uocatur christiana atque catholica, his
+fundamentis principaliter nititur asserens: ex aeterno, id est ante mundi
+constitutionem, ante omne uidelicet quod temporis potest retinere
+uocabulum, diuinam patris et filii ac spiritus sancti exstitisse
+substantiam, ita ut deum dicat patrem, deum filium, deum spiritum sanctum,
+nec tamen tres deos sed unum: patrem itaque habere filium ex sua substantia
+genitum et sibi nota ratione coaeternum, quem filium eatenus confitetur, ut
+non sit idem qui pater est: neque patrem aliquando fuisse filium, ne rursus
+in infinitum humanus animus diuinam progeniem cogitaret, neque filium in
+eadem natura qua patri coaeternus est aliquando fieri patrem, ne rursus in
+infinitum diuina progenies tenderetur: sanctum uero spiritum neque patrem
+esse neque filium atque ideo in illa natura nec genitum nec generantem sed
+a patre quoque procedentem uel filio; qui sit tamen processionis istius
+modus ita non possumus euidenter dicere, quemadmodum generationem filii ex
+paterna substantia non potest humanus animus aestimare. Haec autem ut
+credantur uetus ac noua informat instructio. De qua uelut arce religionis
+nostrae multi diuersa et humaniter atque ut ita dicam carnaliter sentientes
+aduersa locuti sunt, ut Arrius qui licet deum dicat filium, minorem tamen
+patre multipliciter et extra patris substantiam confitetur. Sabelliani
+quoque non tres exsistentes personas sed unam ausi sunt affirmare, eundem
+dicentes patrem esse qui filius est eundemque filium qui pater est atque
+spiritum sanctum eundem esse qui pater et filius est; ac per hoc unam
+dicunt esse personam sub uocabulorum diuersitate signatam.
+
+Manichaei quoque qui duo principia sibi coaeterna et aduersa profitentur,
+unigenitum dei esse non credunt. Indignum enim iudicant, si deus habere
+filium uideatur, nihil aliud cogitantes nisi carnaliter, ut quia haec
+generatio duorum corporum commixtione procedit, illic quoque indignum esse
+intellectum huiusmodi applicare; quae res eos nec uetus facit recipere
+testamentum neque in integro nouum. Nam sicut illud omnino error eorum non
+recipit ita ex uirgine generationem filii non uult admittere, ne humano
+corpore polluta uideatur dei fuisse natura. Sed de his hactenus; suo enim
+loco ponentur sicut ordo necessarius postularit.
+
+Ergo diuina ex aeterno natura et in aeternum sine aliqua mutabilitate
+perdurans sibi tantum conscia uoluntate sponte mundum uoluit fabricare
+eumque cum omnino non esset fecit ut esset, nec ex sua substantia protulit,
+ne diuinus natura crederetur, neque aliunde molitus est, ne iam exstitisse
+aliquid quod eius uoluntatem exsistentia propriae naturae iuuaret atque
+esset quod neque ab ipso factum esset et tamen esset; sed uerbo produxit
+caelos, terram creauit, ita ut caelesti habitatione dignas caelo naturas
+efficeret ac terrae terrena componeret. De caelestibus autem naturis, quae
+uniuersaliter uocatur angelica, quamuis illic distinctis ordinibus pulchra
+sint omnia, pars tamen quaedam plus appetens quam ei natura atque ipsius
+auctor naturae tribuerat de caelesti sede proiecta est; et quoniam
+angelorum numerum, id est supernae illius ciuitatis cuius ciues angeli
+sunt, imminutum noluit conditor permanere, formauit ex terra hominem atque
+spiritu uitae animauit, ratione composuit, arbitrii libertate decorauit
+eumque praefixa lege paradisi deliciis constituit, ut, si sine peccato
+manere uellet, tam ipsum quam eius progeniem angelicis coetibus sociaret,
+ut quia superior natura per superbiae malum ima petierat, inferior
+substantia per humilitatis bonum ad superna conscenderet. Sed ille auctor
+inuidiae non ferens hominem illuc ascendere ubi ipse non meruit permanere,
+temptatione adhibita fecit etiam ipsum eiusque comparem, quam de eius
+latere generandi causa formator produxerat, inoboedientiae suppliciis
+subiacere, ei quoque diuinitatem affuturam promittens, quam sibi dum
+arroganter usurpat elisus est. Haec autem reuelante deo Moysi famulo suo
+comperta sunt, cui etiam humani generis conditionem atque originem uoluit
+innotescere, sicut ab eo libri prolati testantur. Omnis enim diuina
+auctoritas his modis constare uidetur, ut aut historialis modus sit, qui
+nihil aliud nisi res gestas enuntiet, aut allegoricus, ut non illic possit
+historiae ordo consistere, aut certe ex utrisque compositus, ut et secundum
+historiam et secundum allegoriam manere uideatur. Haec autem pie
+intelligentibus et ueraci corde tenentibus satis abundeque relucent. Sed ad
+ordinem redeamus.
+
+Primus itaque homo ante peccatum cum sua coniuge incola paradisi fuit. At
+ubi aurem praebuit suasori et conditoris praeceptum neglexit attendere,
+exul effectus, terram iussus excolere atque a paradisi sinu seclusus in
+ignotis partibus sui generis posteritatem transposuit atque poenam quam
+ipse primus homo praeuaricationis reus exceperat generando transmisit in
+posteros. Hinc factum est ut et corporum atque animarum corruptio et mortis
+proueniret interitus primusque mortem in Abel filio suo meruit experiri, ut
+quanta esset poena quam ipse exceperit probaret in subole. Quod si ipse
+primus moreretur, nesciret quodam modo ac, si dici fas est, nec sentiret
+poenam suam, sed ideo expertus in altero est, ut quid sibi iure deberetur
+contemptor agnosceret et dum poenam mortis sustinet, ipsa exspectatione
+fortius torqueretur. Hoc autem praeuaricationis malum, quod in posteros
+naturaliter primus homo transfuderat, quidam Pelagius non admittens proprii
+nominis haeresim dedicauit, quam catholica fides a consortio sui mox
+reppulisse probatur. Ab ipso itaque primo homine procedens humanum genus ac
+multiplici numerositate succrescens erupit in lites, commouit bella,
+occupauit terrenam miseriam quia[40] felicitatem paradisi in primo patre
+perdiderat. Nec tamen ex his defuerunt quos sibi conditor gratiae
+sequestraret eiusque placitis inseruirent; quos licet meritum naturae
+damnaret, futuri tamen sacramenti et longe postmodum proferendi faciendo
+participes perditam uoluit reparare naturam. Impletus est ergo mundus
+humano genere atque ingressus est homo uias suas qui malitia propriae
+contumaciae despexerat conditorem. Hinc uolens deus per iustum potius
+hominem reparare genus humanum quam manere proteruum, poenalem multitudinem
+effusa diluuii inundatione excepto Noe iusto homine cum suis liberis atque
+his quae secum in arcam introduxerat interire permisit. Cur autem per arcae
+lignum uoluerit iustos eripere, notum est diuinarum scripturarum mentibus
+eruditis. Et quasi prima quaedam mundi aetas diluuio ultore transacta est.
+
+Reparatur itaque humanum genus atque propriae naturae uitium, quod
+praeuaricationis primus auctor infuderat, amplecti non destitit. Creuitque
+contumacia quam dudum diluuii unda puniuerat et qui numerosam annorum
+seriem permissus fuerat uiuere, in breuitate annorum humana aetas addicta
+est. Maluitque deus non iam diluuio punire genus humanum, sed eodem
+permanente eligere uiros per quorum seriem aliqua generatio commearet, ex
+qua nobis filium proprium uestitum humano corpore mundi in fine concederet.
+Quorum primus est Abraham, qui cum esset aetate confectus eiusque uxor
+decrepita, in senectute sua repromissionis largitione habere filium
+meruerunt. Hic uocatus est Isaac atque ipse genuit Iacob. Idem quoque
+duodecim patriarchas non reputante deo in eorum numero quos more suo natura
+produxerat. Hic ergo Iacob cum filiis ac domo sua transigendi causa
+Aegyptum uoluit habitare atque illic per annorum seriem multitudo
+concrescens coeperunt suspicioni esse[41] Aegyptiacis imperiis eosque
+Pharao magna ponderum mole premi decreuerat et grauibus oneribus
+affligebat. Tandem deus Aegyptii regis dominationem despiciens diuiso mari
+rubro, quod numquam antea natura ulla cognouerat, suum transduxit exercitum
+auctore Moyse et Aaron. Postea igitur pro eorum egressione altis Aegyptus
+plagis uastata est, cum nollet dimittere populum. Transmisso itaque ut
+dictum est mari rubro uenit per deserta eremi ad montem qui uocatur Sinai,
+ibique uniuersorum conditor deus uolens sacramenti futuri gratia populos
+erudire per Moysen data lege constituit, quemadmodum et sacrificiorum ritus
+et populorum mores instruerentur. Et cum multis annis multas quoque gentes
+per uiam debellassent, uenerunt tandem ad fluuium qui uocatur Iordanis duce
+iam Iesu Naue filio atque ad eorum transitum quemadmodum aquae maris rubri
+ita quoque Iordanis fluenta siccata sunt; peruentumque est ad eam ciuitatem
+quae nunc Hierosolyma uocatur. Atque dum ibi dei populus moraretur, post
+iudices et prophetas reges instituti leguntur, quorum post Saulem primatum
+Dauid de tribu Iuda legitur adeptus fuisse. Descendit itaque ab eo per
+singulas successiones regium stemma perductumque est usque ad Herodis
+tempora, qui primus ex gentilibus memoratis populis legitur imperasse. Sub
+quo exstitit beata uirgo Maria quae de Dauidica stirpe prouenerat, quae
+humani generis genuit conditorem. Hoc autem ideo quia multis infectus
+criminibus mundus iacebat in morte, electa est una gens in qua dei mandata
+clarescerent, ibique missi prophetae sunt et alii sancti uiri per quorum
+admonitionem ipse certe populus a tumore peruicaciae reuocaretur. Illi uero
+eosdem occidentes in suae nequitiae peruersitate manere uoluerunt.
+
+Atque iam in ultimis temporibus non prophetas neque alios sibi placitos sed
+ipsum unigenitum suum deus per uirginem nasci constituit, ut humana salus
+quae per primi hominis inoboedientiam deperierat per hominem deum rursus
+repararetur et quia exstiterat mulier quae causam mortis prima uiro
+suaserat, esset haec secunda mulier quae uitae causam humanis uisceribus
+apportaret. Nec uile uideatur quod dei filius ex uirgine natus est, quoniam
+praeter naturae modum conceptus et editus est. Virgo itaque de spiritu
+sancto incarnatum dei filium concepit, uirgo peperit, post eius editionem
+uirgo permansit; atque hominis factus est idemque dei filius, ita ut in eo
+et diuinae naturae radiaret splendor et humanae fragilitatis appareret
+assumptio. Sed huic tam sanae atque ueracissimae fidei exstiterant multi
+qui diuersa garrirent et praeter alios Nestorius et Eutyches repertores
+haereseos exstiterunt, quorum unus hominem solum, alter deum solum putauit
+asserere nec humanum corpus quod Christus induerat de humanae substantiae
+participatione uenisse. Sed haec hactenus.
+
+Creuit itaque secundum carnem Christus, baptizatus est, ut qui baptizandi
+formam erat ceteris tributurus, ipse primus quod docebat exciperet. Post
+baptismum uero elegit duodecim discipulos, quorum unus traditor eius fuit.
+Et quia sanam doctrinam Iudaeorum populus non ferebat, eum inlata manu
+crucis supplicio peremerunt. Occiditur ergo Christus, iacet tribus diebus
+ac noctibus in sepulcro, resurgit a mortuis, sicut ante constitutionem
+mundi ipse cum patre decreuerat, ascendit in caelos ubi, in eo quod dei
+filius est, numquam defuisse cognoscitur, ut assumptum hominem, quem
+diabolus non permiserat ad superna conscendere, secum dei filius caelesti
+habitationi sustolleret. Dat ergo formam discipulis suis baptizandi,
+docendi salutaria, efficientiam quoque miraculorum atque in uniuersum
+mundum ad uitam praecipit introire, ut praedicatio salutaris non iam in una
+tantum gente sed orbi terrarum praedicaretur. Et quoniam humanum genus
+naturae merito, quam ex primo praeuaricatore contraxerat, aeternae poenae
+iaculis fuerat uulneratum nec salutis suae erat idoneum, quod eam in
+parente perdiderat, medicinalia quaedam tribuit sacramenta, ut agnosceret
+aliud sibi deberi per naturae meritum, aliud per gratiae donum, ut natura
+nihil aliud nisi poenae summitteret, gratia uero, quae nullis meritis
+attributa est, quia nec gratia diceretur si meritis tribueretur, totum quod
+est salutis afferret.
+
+Diffunditur ergo per mundum caelestis illa doctrina, adunantur populi,
+instituuntur ecclesiae, fit unum corpus quod mundi latitudinem occuparet,
+cuius caput Christus ascendit in caelos, ut necessario caput suum membra
+sequerentur. Haec itaque doctrina et praesentem uitam bonis informat
+operibus et post consummationem saeculi resurrectura corpora nostra praeter
+corruptionem ad regna caelestia pollicetur, ita ut qui hic bene ipso
+donante uixerit, esset in illa resurrectione beatissimus, qui uero male,
+miser post munus resurrectionis adesset. Et hoc est principale religionis
+nostrae, ut credat non solum animas non perire, sed ipsa quoque corpora,
+quae mortis aduentus resoluerat, in statum pristinum futura de beatitudine
+reparari. Haec ergo ecclesia catholica per orbem diffusa tribus modis
+probatur exsistere: quidquid in ea tenetur, aut auctoritas est scripturarum
+aut traditio uniuersalis aut certe propria et particularis instructio. Sed
+auctoritate tota constringitur, uniuersali traditione maiorum nihilominus
+tota, priuatis uero constitutionibus et propriis informationibus unaquaeque
+uel pro locorum uarietate uel prout cuique bene uisum est subsistit et
+regitur. Sola ergo nunc est fidelium exspectatio qua credimus affuturum
+finem mundi, omnia corruptibilia transitura, resurrecturos homines ad
+examen futuri iudicii, recepturos pro meritis singulos et in perpetuum
+atque in aeternum debitis finibus permansuros; solumque est[42] praemium
+beatitudinis contemplatio conditoris--tanta dumtaxat, quanta a creatura ad
+creatorem fieri potest,--ut ex eis reparato angelico numero superna illa
+ciuitas impleatur, ubi rex est uirginis filius eritque gaudium sempiternum,
+delectatio, cibus, opus, laus perpetua creatoris.
+
+
+[40] qui _uel_ quod _codd._
+
+[41] suspiciones _uel_ suspicione _uel_ suspicio _uel_ subici _codd.
+meliores._
+
+[42] esse _codd_.
+
+
+
+
+  ON THE CATHOLIC FAITH[43]
+
+  The Christian Faith is proclaimed by the authority of the New Testament
+  and of the Old; but although the Old scripture[44] contains within its
+  pages the name of Christ and constantly gives token that He will come
+  who we believe has already come by the birth of the Virgin, yet the
+  diffusion of that faith throughout the world dates from the actual
+  miraculous coming of our Saviour.
+
+  Now this our religion which is called Christian and Catholic is founded
+  chiefly on the following assertions. From all eternity, that is, before
+  the world was established, and so before all that is meant by time
+  began, there has existed one divine substance of Father, Son, and Holy
+  Spirit in such wise that we confess the Father God, the Son God, and the
+  Holy Spirit God, and yet not three Gods but one God. Thus the Father
+  hath the Son, begotten of His substance and coeternal with Himself after
+  a manner that He alone knoweth. Him we confess to be Son in the sense
+  that He is not the same as the Father. Nor has the Father ever been Son,
+  for the human mind must not imagine a divine lineage stretching back
+  into infinity; nor can the Son, being of the same nature in virtue of
+  which He is coeternal with the Father, ever become Father, for the
+  divine lineage must not stretch forward into infinity. But the Holy
+  Spirit is neither Father nor Son, and therefore, albeit of the same
+  divine nature, neither begotten, nor begetting, but proceeding as well
+  from the Father as the Son.[45] Yet what the manner of that Procession
+  is we are no more able to state clearly than is the human mind able to
+  understand the generation of the Son from the substance of the Father.
+  But these articles are laid down for our belief by Old and New
+  Testament. Concerning which fortress and citadel[46] of our religion
+  many men have spoken otherwise and have even impugned it, being moved by
+  human, nay rather by carnal feeling. Arius, for instance, who, while
+  calling the Son God, declares Him to be vastly inferior to the Father
+  and of another substance. The Sabellians also have dared to affirm that
+  there are not three separate Persons but only One, saying that the
+  Father is the same as the Son and the Son the same as the Father and the
+  Holy Spirit the same as the Father and the Son; and so declaring that
+  there is but one divine Person expressed by different names.
+
+  The Manichaeans, too, who allow two coeternal and contrary principles,
+  do not believe in the Only-begotten Son of God. For they consider it a
+  thought unworthy of God that He should have a Son, since they entertain
+  the very carnal reflection that inasmuch as[47] human generation arises
+  from the mingling of two bodies, it is unworthy to hold a notion of this
+  sort in respect of the divine nature; whereas such a view finds no
+  sanction in the Old Testament and absolutely[48] none in the New. Yea,
+  their error which refuses this notion also refuses the Virgin birth of
+  the Son, because they would not have the God's nature defiled by the
+  man's body. But enough of this for the present; the points will be
+  presented in the proper place as the proper arrangement demands.
+
+  The divine nature then, abiding from all eternity and unto all eternity
+  without any change, by the exercise of a will known only to Himself,
+  determined of Himself to form the world, and brought it into being when
+  it was absolutely naught, nor did He produce it from His own substance,
+  lest it should be thought divine by nature, nor did He form it after any
+  model, lest it should be thought that anything had already come into
+  being which helped His will by the existence of an independent nature,
+  and that there should exist something that had not been made by Him and
+  yet existed; but by His Word He brought forth the heavens, and created
+  the earth[49] that so He might make natures worthy of a place in heaven,
+  and also fit earthly things to earth. But although in heaven all things
+  are beautiful and arranged in due order, yet one part of the heavenly
+  creation which is universally termed angelic,[50] seeking more than
+  nature and the Author of Nature had granted them, was cast forth from
+  its heavenly habitation; and because the Creator did not wish the roll
+  of the angels, that is of the heavenly city whose citizens the angels
+  are, to be diminished, He formed man out of the earth and breathed into
+  him the breath of life; He endowed him with reason, He adorned him with
+  freedom of choice and established him in the joys of Paradise, making
+  covenant aforehand that if he would remain without sin He would add him
+  and his offspring to the angelic hosts; so that as the higher nature had
+  fallen low through the curse of pride, the lower substance might ascend
+  on high through the blessing of humility. But the father of envy, loath
+  that man should climb to the place where he himself deserved not to
+  remain, put temptation before him and the consort whom the Creator had
+  brought forth out of his side for the continuance of the race, and laid
+  them open to punishment for disobedience, promising man also the gift of
+  Godhead, the arrogant attempt to seize which had caused his own fall.
+  All this was revealed by God to His servant Moses, whom He vouchsafed to
+  teach the creation and origin of man, as the books written by him
+  declare. For the divine authority is always conveyed in one of the
+  following ways--the historical, which simply announces facts; the
+  allegorical, whence historical matter is excluded; or else the two
+  combined, history and allegory conspiring to establish it. All this is
+  abundantly evident to pious hearers and steadfast believers.
+
+  But to return to the order of our discourse; the first man, before sin
+  came, dwelt with his consort in the Garden. But when he hearkened to the
+  voice of his wife and failed to keep the commandment of his Creator, he
+  was banished, bidden to till the ground, and being shut out from the
+  sheltering garden he carried abroad into unknown regions the children of
+  his loins; by begetting whom he transmitted to those that came after,
+  the punishment which he, the first man, had incurred by the sin of
+  disobedience. Hence it came to pass that corruption both of body and
+  soul ensued, and death; and this he was to taste first in his own son
+  Abel, in order that he might learn through his child the greatness of
+  the punishment that was laid upon him. For if he had died first he would
+  in some sense not have known, and if one may so say not have felt, his
+  punishment; but he tasted it in another in order that he might perceive
+  the due reward of his contempt, and, doomed to death himself, might be
+  the more sensibly touched by the apprehension of it. But this curse that
+  came of transgression which the first man had by natural propagation
+  transmitted to posterity, was denied by one Pelagius who so set up the
+  heresy which goes by his name and which the Catholic faith, as is known,
+  at once banished from its bosom. So the human race that sprang from the
+  first man and mightily increased and multiplied, broke into strife,
+  stirred up wars, and became the heir of earthly misery, because it had
+  lost the joys of Paradise in its first parent. Yet were there not a few
+  of mankind whom the Giver of Grace set apart for Himself and who were
+  obedient to His will; and though by desert of nature they were
+  condemned, yet God by making them partakers in the hidden mystery, long
+  afterwards to be revealed, vouchsafed to recover fallen nature. So the
+  earth was filled by the human race and man who by his own wanton
+  wilfulness had despised his Creator began to walk in his own ways. Hence
+  God willing rather to recover mankind through one just man than that it
+  should remain for ever contumacious, suffered all the guilty multitude
+  to perish by the wide waters of a flood, save only Noah, the just one,
+  with his children and all that he had brought with him into the ark. The
+  reason why He wished to save the just by an ark of wood is known to all
+  hearts learned in the Holy Scriptures. Thus what we may call the first
+  age of the world was ended by the avenging flood.
+
+  Thus the human race was restored, and yet it hastened to make its own
+  the vice of nature with which the first author of transgression had
+  infected it. And the wickedness increased which had once been punished
+  by the waters of the flood, and man who had been suffered to live for a
+  long series of years was reduced to the brief span of ordinary human
+  life. Yet would not God again visit the race by a flood, but rather,
+  letting it continue, He chose from it men of whose line a generation
+  should arise out of which He might in the last days grant us His own Son
+  to come to us, clothed in human form. Of these men Abraham is the first,
+  and although he was stricken in years and his wife past bearing, they
+  had in their old age the reward of a son in fulfilment of promise
+  unconditional. This son was named Isaac and he begat Jacob, who in his
+  turn begat the twelve Patriarchs, God not reckoning in their number
+  those whom nature in its ordinary course produced.[51] This Jacob, then,
+  together with his sons and his household determined to dwell in Egypt
+  for the purpose of trafficking; and the multitude of them increasing
+  there in the course of many years began to be a cause of suspicion to
+  the Egyptian rulers, and Pharaoh ordered them to be oppressed by
+  exceeding heavy tasks[52] and afflicted them with grievous burdens. At
+  length God, minded to set at naught the tyranny of the king of Egypt,
+  divided the Red Sea--a marvel such as nature had never known before--and
+  brought forth His host by the hands of Moses and Aaron. Thereafter on
+  account of their departure Egypt was vexed with sore plagues, because
+  they would not let the people go. So, after crossing the Red Sea, as I
+  have told, they passed through the desert of the wilderness and came to
+  the mount which is called Sinai, where God the Creator of all, wishing
+  to prepare the nations for the knowledge of the sacrament to come, laid
+  down by a law given through Moses how both the rites of sacrifices and
+  the national customs should be ordered. And after fighting down many
+  tribes in many years amidst their journeyings they came at last to the
+  river called Jordan, with Joshua the son of Nun now as their captain,
+  and, for their crossing, the streams of Jordan were dried up as the
+  waters of the Red Sea had been; so they finished their course to that
+  city which is now called Jerusalem. And while the people of God abode
+  there we read that there were set up first judges and prophets and then
+  kings, of whom we read that after Saul, David of the tribe of Judah
+  ascended the throne. So from him the royal race descended from father to
+  son and lasted till the days of Herod who, we read, was the first taken
+  out of the peoples called Gentile to bear sway. In whose days rose up
+  the blessed Virgin Mary, sprung from the stock of David, she who bore
+  the Maker of the human race. But it was just because the whole world lay
+  dead, stained with its many sins, that God chose out one race in which
+  His commands might shine clear; sending it prophets and other holy men,
+  to the end that by their warnings that people at least might be cured of
+  their swollen pride. But they slew these holy men and chose rather to
+  abide in their wanton wickedness.
+
+  And now at the last days of time, in place of prophets and other men
+  well-pleasing to Him, God willed that His only-begotten Son should be
+  born of a Virgin that so the salvation of mankind which had been lost
+  through the disobedience of the first man might be recovered by the God-
+  man, and that inasmuch as it was a woman who had first persuaded man to
+  that which wrought death there should be this second woman who should
+  bring forth from a human womb Him who gives Life. Nor let it be deemed a
+  thing unworthy that the Son of God was born of a Virgin, for it was out
+  of the course of nature that He was conceived and brought to birth.
+  Virgin then she conceived, by the Holy Spirit, the Son of God made
+  flesh, Virgin she bore Him, Virgin she continued after His birth; and He
+  became the Son of Man and likewise the Son of God that in Him the glory
+  of the divine nature might shine forth and at the same time the human
+  weakness be declared which He took upon Him. Yet against this article of
+  Faith so wholesome and altogether true there rose up many who babbled
+  other doctrine, and especially Nestorius and Eutyches, inventors of
+  heresy, of whom the one thought fit to say that He was man alone, the
+  other that He was God alone and that the human body put on by Christ had
+  not come by participation in human substance. But enough on this point.
+
+  So Christ grew after the flesh, and was baptized in order that He who
+  was to give the form of baptism to others should first Himself receive
+  what He taught. But after His baptism He chose twelve disciples, one of
+  whom betrayed Him. And because the people of the Jews would not bear
+  sound doctrine they laid hands upon Him and slew and crucified Him.
+  Christ, then, was slain; He lay three days and three nights in the tomb;
+  He rose again from the dead as He had predetermined with His Father
+  before the foundation of the world; He ascended into heaven whence we
+  know that He was never absent, because He is Son of God, in order that
+  as Son of God He might raise together with Him to the heavenly
+  habitation man whose flesh He had assumed, whom the devil had hindered
+  from ascending to the places on high. Therefore He bestowed on His
+  disciples the form of baptizing, the saving truth of the teaching, and
+  the mighty power of miracles, and bade them go throughout the whole
+  world to give it life, in order that the message of salvation might be
+  preached no longer in one nation only but among all the dwellers upon
+  earth. And because the human race was wounded by the weapon of eternal
+  punishment by reason of the nature which they had inherited from the
+  first transgressor and could not win a full meed of salvation because
+  they had lost it in its first parent, God instituted certain health-
+  giving sacraments to teach the difference between what grace bestowed
+  and human nature deserved, nature simply subjecting to punishment, but
+  grace, which is won by no merit, since it would not be grace if it were
+  due to merit, conferring all that belongs to salvation.
+
+  Therefore is that heavenly instruction spread throughout the world, the
+  peoples are knit together, churches are founded, and, filling the broad
+  earth, one body formed, whose head, even Christ, ascended into heaven in
+  order that the members might of necessity follow where the Head was
+  gone. Thus this teaching both inspires this present life unto good
+  works, and promises that in the end of the age our bodies shall rise
+  incorruptible to the kingdom of heaven, to the end that he who has lived
+  well on earth by God's gift should be altogether blessed in that
+  resurrection, but he who has lived amiss should, with the gift of
+  resurrection, enter upon misery. And this is a firm principle of our
+  religion, to believe not only that men's souls do not perish, but that
+  their very bodies, which the coming of death had destroyed, recover
+  their first state by the bliss that is to be. This Catholic church,
+  then, spread throughout the world, is known by three particular marks:
+  whatever is believed and taught in it has the authority of the
+  Scriptures, or of universal tradition, or at least of its own and proper
+  usage. And this authority is binding on the whole Church as is also the
+  universal tradition of the Fathers, while each separate church exists
+  and is governed by its private constitution and its proper rites
+  according to difference of locality and the good judgment of each. All,
+  therefore, that the faithful now expect is that the end of the world
+  will come, that all corruptible things shall pass away, that men shall
+  rise for future judgement, that each shall receive reward according to
+  his deserts and abide in the lot assigned to him for ever and for aye;
+  and the sole reward of bliss will be the contemplation of the Almighty,
+  so far, that is, as the creature may look on the Creator, to the end
+  that the number of the angels may be made up from these and the heavenly
+  city filled where the Virgin's Son is King and where will be everlasting
+  joy, delight, food, labour, and unending praise of the Creator.
+
+
+  [43] The conclusions adverse to the genuineness of this tractate,
+  reached in the dissertation _Der dem Boethius zugeschriebene Traktat de
+  Fide Catholica (Jahrbuecher fuer kl. Phil._ xxvi. (1901) Supplementband)
+  by one of the editors, now seem to both unsound. The writer of that
+  dissertation intends to return to the subject elsewhere. This fourth
+  tractate, though lacking, in the best MSS., either an ascription to
+  Boethius or a title, is firmly imbedded in two distinct recensions of
+  Boethius's theological works. There is no reason to disturb it. Indeed
+  the _capita dogmatica_ mentioned by Cassiodorus can hardly refer to any
+  of the tractates except the fourth.
+
+  [44] For _instrumentum_=Holy Scripture cf. Tertull. _Apol._ 18, 19,
+  _adv. Hermog._ 19, etc.; for _instrumentum_=any historical writing cf.
+  Tert. _De Spect._ 5.
+
+  [45] Boethius is no heretic. By the sixth century _uel_ had lost its
+  strong separative force. Cp. "Noe cum sua uel trium natorum coniugibus,"
+  Greg. Tur. _H.F._ i. 20. Other examples in Bonnet, _La Latinite de Greg.
+  de Tours_, p. 313, and in Brandt's edition of the _Isag._ Index, s.v.
+  _uel_.
+
+  [46] _Vide Cons._ i. pr. 3 (_infra_, p. 140), and cf. Dante, _De Mon._
+  iii. 16, 117.
+
+  [47] _Ut quia_. A very rare use. Cf. Baehrens, _Beitraege zur lat.
+  Syntaxis_ (_Philologus_, Supplementband xii. 1912). It
+  perhaps=Aristotle's [Greek: oion epei]. Cf. McKinlay, _Harvard Studies
+  in Cl. Philol._ xviii. 153.
+
+  [48] _In integro_=_prorsus_; cf. Brandt, _op. cit._ Index, s.v.
+  _integer_.
+
+  [49] The doctrine is orthodox, but note that Boethius does not say _ex
+  nihilo creauit_. _Vide infra_, p. 366 ll. 24 ff.
+
+  [50] _Vide infra, Cons._ iv. pr. 6, p. 342 l. 54.
+
+  [51] e.g. Ishmael also [Greek: kata sarka gegennaetai] Gal. iv. 23.
+
+  [52] Cf. "populus dei mirabiliter crescens ... quia ... erant
+  suspecta... laboribus premebatur," Aug. _De Ciu. Dei_, 18. 7. For other
+  coincidences see Rand, _op. cit._ pp. 423 ff.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+INCIPIT LIBER
+CONTRA EVTYCHEN ET NESTORIVM
+
+DOMINO SANCTO AC VENERABILI PATRI IOHANNI DIACONO
+BOETHIVS FILIVS
+
+Anxie te quidem diuque sustinui, ut de ea quae in conuentu mota est
+quaestione loqueremur. Sed quoniam et tu quominus uenires occupatione
+distractus es et ego in crastinum constitutis negotiis implicabor, mando
+litteris quae coram loquenda seruaueram. Meministi enim, cum in concilio
+legeretur epistola, recitatum Eutychianos ex duabus naturis Christum
+consistere confiteri, in duabus negare: catholicos uero utrique dicto fidem
+praebere, nam et ex duabus eum naturis consistere et in duabus apud uerae
+fidei sectatores aequaliter credi. Cuius dicti nouitate percussus harum
+coniunctionum quae ex duabus naturis uel in duabus consisterent
+differentias inquirebam, multum scilicet referre ratus nec inerti
+neglegentia praetereundum, quod episcopus scriptor epistolae tamquam ualde
+necessarium praeterire noluisset. Hic omnes apertam esse differentiam nec
+quicquam in eo esse caliginis inconditum confusumque strepere nec ullus in
+tanto tumultu qui leuiter attingeret quaestionem, nedum qui expediret
+inuentus est.
+
+Adsederam ego ab eo quem maxime intueri cupiebam longius atque adeo, si
+situm sedentium recorderis, auersus pluribusque oppositis, ne si aegerrime
+quidem cuperem, uultum nutumque eius aspicere poteram ex quo mihi aliqua
+eius darentur signa iudicii. Atqui ego quidem nihil ceteris amplius
+afferebam, immo uero aliquid etiam minus. Nam de re proposita aeque nihil
+ceteris sentiebam; minus uero quam ceteri ipse afferebam, falsae scilicet
+scientiae praesumptionem. Tuli aegerrime, fateor, compressusque indoctorum
+grege conticui metuens ne iure uiderer insanus, si sanus inter furiosos
+haberi contenderem. Meditabar igitur dehinc omnes animo quaestiones nec
+deglutiebam quod acceperam, sed frequentis consilii iteratione ruminabam.
+Tandem igitur patuere pulsanti animo fores et ueritas inuenta quaerenti
+omnes nebulas Eutychiani reclusit erroris. Vnde mihi maxime subiit
+admirari, quaenam haec indoctorum hominum esset audacia qui inscientiae
+uitium praesumptionis atque inpudentiae nube conentur obducere, cum non
+modo saepe id quod proponatur ignorent, uerum in huiusmodi contentionibus
+ne id quidem quod ipsi loquantur intellegant, quasi non deterior fiat
+inscientiae causa, dum tegitur.
+
+Sed ab illis ad te transeo, cui hoc quantulumcumque est examinandum prius
+perpendendumque transmitto. Quod si recte se habere pronuntiaueris, peto ut
+mei nominis hoc quoque inseras chartis; sin uero uel minuendum aliquid uel
+addendum uel aliqua mutatione uariandum est, id quoque postulo remitti,
+meis exemplaribus ita ut a te reuertitur transcribendum. Quae ubi ad calcem
+ducta constiterint, tum demum eius cuius soleo iudicio censenda
+transmittam. Sed quoniam semel res a conlocutione transfertur ad stilum,
+prius extremi sibique contrarii Nestorii atque Eutychis summoueantur
+errores; post uero adiuuante deo, Christianae medietatem fidei temperabo.
+Quoniam uero in tota quaestione contrariarum sibimet [Greek: haireseon] de
+personis dubitatur atque naturis, haec primitus definienda sunt et propriis
+differentiis segreganda.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  A TREATISE AGAINST EUTYCHES AND NESTORIUS
+
+  BY ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS MOST HONOURABLE, OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS
+  ORDER OF EX-CONSULS, PATRICIAN
+
+  TO HIS SAINTLY MASTER AND REVEREND FATHER JOHN THE DEACON
+  HIS SON BOETHIUS
+
+  I have been long and anxiously waiting for you to discuss with me the
+  problem which was raised at the meeting. But since your duties have
+  prevented your coming and I shall be for some time involved in my
+  business engagements, I am setting down in writing what I had been
+  keeping to say by word of mouth.
+
+  You no doubt remember how, when the letter[53] was read in the assembly,
+  it was asserted that the Eutychians confess that Christ is formed from
+  two natures but does not consist of them--whereas Catholics admit both
+  propositions, for among followers of the true Faith He is equally
+  believed to be of two natures and in two natures. Struck by the novelty
+  of this assertion I began to inquire what difference there can be
+  between unions formed from two natures and unions which consist in two
+  natures, for the point which the bishop who wrote the letter refused to
+  pass over because of its gravity, seemed to me of importance and not one
+  to be idly and carelessly slurred over. On that occasion all loudly
+  protested that the difference was evident, that there was no obscurity,
+  confusion or perplexity, and in the general storm and tumult there was
+  no one who really touched the edge of the problem, much less anyone who
+  solved it.
+
+  I was sitting a long way from the man whom I especially wished to
+  watch,[54] and if you recall the arrangement of the seats, I was turned
+  away from him, with so many between us, that however much I desired it I
+  could not see his face and expression and glean therefrom any sign of
+  his opinion. Personally, indeed, I had nothing more to contribute than
+  the rest, in fact rather less than more. I, no more than the others, had
+  any view about the question at issue, while my possible contribution was
+  less by one thing, namely, the false assumption of a knowledge that I
+  had not got. I was, I admit, much put out, and being overwhelmed by the
+  mob of ignorant speakers, I held my peace, fearing lest I should be
+  rightly set down as insane if I held out for being sane among those
+  madmen.[55] So I continued to ponder all the questions in my mind, not
+  swallowing what I had heard, but rather chewing the cud of constant
+  meditation. At last the door opened to my insistent knocking, and the
+  truth which I found cleared out of my way all the clouds of the
+  Eutychian error. And with this discovery a great wonder came upon me at
+  the vast temerity of unlearned men who use the cloak of impudent
+  presumption to cover up the vice of ignorance, for not only do they
+  often fail to grasp the point at issue, but in a debate of this kind
+  they do not even understand their own statements, forgetting that the
+  case of ignorance is all the worse if it is not honestly admitted.[56]
+
+  I turn from them to you, and to you I submit this little essay for your
+  first judgment and consideration. If you pronounce it to be sound I beg
+  you to place it among the other writings of mine which you possess; but
+  if there is anything to be struck out or added or changed in any way, I
+  would ask you to let me have your suggestions, in order that I may enter
+  them in my copies just as they leave your hands. When this revision has
+  been duly accomplished, then I will send the work on to be judged by the
+  man to whom I always submit everything.[57] But since the pen is now to
+  take the place of the living voice, let me first clear away the extreme
+  and self-contradictory errors of Nestorius and Eutyches; after that, by
+  God's help, I will temperately set forth the middle way of the Christian
+  Faith. But since in this whole question of self-contradictory heresies
+  the matter of debate is Persons and Natures, these terms must first be
+  defined and distinguished by their proper differences.
+
+
+  [53] Evidently the letter addressed to Pope Symmachus by the Oriental
+  bishops (_vide_ Mansi, _Concil_. viii. 221 ff.), in which they inquire
+  concerning the safe middle way between the heresies of Eutyches and
+  Nestorius. The date of the bishops' letter, and consequently, in all
+  probability, of Boethius's tractate was 512.
+
+  [54] Obviously his father-in-law Symmachus. _Vide_ p. 76, _eius cuius
+  soleo iudiclo_, etc.
+
+  [55] Cf. Hor. _Serm_. i. 3. 82; ii. 3. 40.
+
+  [56] Cf. _infra, de Cons._ i. pr. 4 (p. 142) _oportet uulnus detegas.
+
+  [57] _Vide supra_, p. 75, and _De Trin._ p. 3.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Natura igitur aut de solis corporibus dici potest aut de solis substantiis,
+id est corporeis atque incorporeis, aut de omnibus rebus quae quocumque
+modo esse dicuntur. Cum igitur tribus modis natura dici possit, tribus
+modis sine dubio definienda est. Nam si de omnibus rebus naturam dici
+placet, talis definitio dabitur quae res omnes quae sunt possit includere.
+Erit ergo huiusmodi: "natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquo modo
+intellectu capi possunt." In hac igitur definitione et accidentia et
+substantiae definiuntur; haec enim omnia intellectu capi possunt. Additum
+uero est "quoquo modo," quoniam deus et materia integro perfectoque
+intellectu intellegi non possunt, sed aliquo tamen modo ceterarum rerum
+priuatione capiuntur. Idcirco uero adiunximus "quae cum sint," quoniam
+etiam ipsum nihil significat aliquid sed non naturam. Neque enim quod sit
+aliquid sed potius non esse significat; omnis uero natura est. Et si de
+omnibus quidem rebus naturam dici placet, haec sit naturae definitio quam
+superius proposuimus. Sin uero de solis substantiis natura dicitur, quoniam
+substantiae omnes aut corporeae sunt aut incorporeae, dabimus definitionem
+naturae substantias significanti huiusmodi: "natura est uel quod facere uel
+quod pati possit." "Pati" quidem ac "facere," ut omnia corporea atque
+corporeorum anima; haec enim in corpore et a corpore et facit et patitur.
+"Facere" uero tantum ut deus ceteraque diuina. Habes igitur definitionem
+eius quoque significationis naturae quae tantum substantiis applicatur. Qua
+in re substantiae quoque est reddita definitio. Nam si nomen naturae
+substantiam monstrat, cum naturam descripsimus substantiae quoque est
+assignata descriptio. Quod si naturae nomen relictis incorporeis
+substantiis ad corporales usque contrahitur, ut corporeae tantum
+substantiae naturam habere uideantur, sicut Aristoteles ceterique et
+eiusmodi et multimodae philosophiae sectatores putant, definiemus eam, ut
+hi etiam qui naturam non nisi in corporibus esse posuerunt. Est autem eius
+definitio hoc modo: "natura est motus principium per se non per accidens."
+Quod "motus principium" dixi hoc est, quoniam corpus omne habet proprium
+motum, ut ignis sursum, terra deorsum. Item quod "per se principium motus"
+naturam esse proposui et non "per accidens," tale est, quoniam lectum
+quoque ligneum deorsum ferri necesse est, sed non deorsum per accidens
+fertur. Idcirco enim quia lignum est, quod est terra, pondere et grauitate
+deducitur. Non enim quia lectus est, deorsum cadit, sed quia terra est, id
+est quia terrae contigit, ut lectus esset; unde fit ut lignum naturaliter
+esse dicamus, lectum uero artificialiter. Est etiam alia significatio
+naturae per quam dicimus diuersam esse naturam auri atque argenti in hoc
+proprietatem rerum monstrare cupientes, quae significatio naturae
+definietur hoc modo: "natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica
+differentia." Cum igitur tot modis uel dicatur uel definiatur natura, tam
+catholici quam Nestorius secundum ultimam definitionem duas in Christo
+naturas esse constituunt; neque enim easdem in deum atque hominem
+differentias conuenire.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Nature, then, may be affirmed either of bodies alone or of substances
+  alone, that is, of corporeals or incorporeals, or of everything that is
+  in any way capable of affirmation. Since, then, nature can be affirmed
+  in three ways, it must obviously be defined in three ways. For if you
+  choose to affirm nature of the totality of things, the definition will
+  be of such a kind as to include all things that are. It will accordingly
+  be something of this kind: "Nature belongs to those things which, since
+  they exist, can in some measure be apprehended by the mind." This
+  definition, then, includes both accidents and substances, for they all
+  can be apprehended by the mind. But I add "in some measure" because God
+  and matter cannot be apprehended by mind, be it never so whole and
+  perfect, but still they are apprehended in a measure through the removal
+  of accidents. The reason for adding the words, "since they exist," is
+  that the mere word "nothing" denotes something, though it does not
+  denote nature. For it denotes, indeed, not that anything is, but rather
+  non-existence; but every nature exists. And if we choose to affirm
+  "nature" of the totality of things, the definition will be as we have
+  given it above.
+
+  But if "nature" is affirmed of substances alone, we shall, since all
+  substances are either corporeal or incorporeal, give to nature denoting
+  substances a definition of the following kind: "Nature is either that
+  which can act or that which can be acted upon." Now the power to act and
+  to suffer belongs to all corporeals and the soul of corporeals; for it
+  both acts in the body and suffers by the body. But only to act belongs
+  to God and other divine substances.
+
+  Here, then, you have a further definition of what nature is as applied
+  to substances alone. This definition comprises also the definition of
+  substance. For if the word nature signifies substance, when once we have
+  defined nature we have also settled the definition of substance. But if
+  we neglect incorporeal substances and confine the name nature to
+  corporeal substances so that they alone appear to possess the nature of
+  substance--which is the view of Aristotle and the adherents both of his
+  and various other schools--we shall define nature as those do who have
+  only allowed the word to be applied to bodies. Now, in accordance with
+  this view, the definition is as follows: "Nature is the principle of
+  movement properly inherent in and not accidentally attached to bodies."
+  I say "principle of movement" because every body has its proper
+  movement, fire moving upwards, the earth moving downwards. And what I
+  mean by "movement properly inherent and not accidentally attached" is
+  seen by the example of a wooden bed which is necessarily borne downward
+  and is not carried downward by accident. For it is drawn downward by
+  weight and heaviness because it is of wood, i.e. an earthly material.
+  For it falls down not because it is a bed, but because it is earth, that
+  is, because it is an accident of earth that it is a bed; hence we call
+  it wood in virtue of its nature, but bed in virtue of the art that
+  shaped it.
+
+  Nature has, further, another meaning according to which we speak of the
+  different nature of gold and silver, wishing thereby to point the
+  special property of things; this meaning of nature will be defined as
+  follows: "Nature is the specific difference that gives form to
+  anything." Thus, although nature is described or defined in all these
+  different ways, both Catholics and Nestorians firmly hold that there are
+  in Christ two natures of the kind laid down in our last definition, for
+  the same specific differences cannot apply to God and man.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Sed de persona maxime dubitari potest, quaenam ei definitio possit aptari.
+Si enim omnis habet natura personam, indissolubilis nodus est, quaenam
+inter naturam personamque possit esse discretio; aut si non aequatur
+persona naturae, sed infra terminum spatiumque naturae persona subsistit,
+difficile dictu est ad quas usque naturas persona perueniat, id est quas
+naturas conueniat habere personam, quas a personae uocabulo segregari. Nam
+illud quidem manifestum est personae subiectam esse naturam nec praeter
+naturam personam posse praedicari. Vestiganda sunt igitur haec
+inquirentibus hoc modo.
+
+Quoniam praeter naturam non potest esse persona quoniamque naturae aliae
+sunt substantiae, aliae accidentes et uidemus personam in accidentibus non
+posse constitui (quis enim dicat ullam albedinis uel nigredinis uel
+magnitudinis esse personam?), relinquitur ergo ut personam in substantiis
+dici conueniat. Sed substantiarum aliae sunt corporeae, aliae incorporeae.
+Corporearum uero aliae sunt uiuentes, aliae minime; uiuentium aliae sunt
+sensibiles, aliae minime; sensibilium aliae rationales, aliae inrationales.
+Item incorporearum aliae sunt rationales, aliae minime, ut pecudum uitae;
+rationalium uero alia est inmutabilis atque inpassibilis per naturam ut
+deus, alia per creationem mutabilis atque passibilis, nisi inpassibilis
+gratia substantiae ad inpassibilitatis firmitudinem permutetur ut angelorum
+atque animae. Ex quibus omnibus neque in non uiuentibus corporibus personam
+posse dici manifestum est (nullus enim lapidis ullam dicit esse personam),
+neque rursus eorum uiuentium quae sensu carent (neque enim ulla persona est
+arboris), nec uero eius quae intellectu ac ratione deseritur (nulla est
+enim persona equi uel bouis ceterorumque animalium quae muta ac sine
+ratione uitam solis sensibus degunt), at hominis dicimus esse personam,
+dicimus dei, dicimus angeli. Rursus substantiarum aliae sunt uniuersales,
+aliae particulares. Vniuersales sunt quae de singulis praedicantur ut homo,
+animal, lapis, lignum ceteraque huiusmodi quae uel genera uel species sunt;
+nam et homo de singulis hominibus et animal de singulis animalibus lapisque
+ac lignum de singulis lapidibus ac lignis dicuntur. Particularia uero sunt
+quae de aliis minime praedicantur ut Cicero, Plato, lapis hic unde haec
+Achillis statua facta est, lignum hoc unde haec mensa composita est. Sed in
+his omnibus nusquam in uniuersalibus persona dici potest, sed in
+singularibus tantum atque in indiuiduis; animalis enim uel generalis
+hominis nulla persona est, sed uel Ciceronis uel Platonis uel singulorum
+indiuiduorum personae singulae nuncupantur.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  But the proper definition of Person is a matter of very great
+  perplexity. For if every nature has person, the difference between
+  nature and person is a hard knot to unravel; or if person is not taken
+  as the equivalent of nature but is a term of less scope and range, it is
+  difficult to say to what natures it may be extended, that is, to what
+  natures the term person may be applied and what natures are dissociate
+  from it. For one thing is clear, namely that nature is a substrate of
+  Person, and that Person cannot be predicated apart from nature.
+
+  We must, therefore, conduct our inquiry into these points as follows.
+
+  Since Person cannot exist apart from a nature and since natures are
+  either substances or accidents and we see that a person cannot come into
+  being among accidents (for who can say there is any person of white or
+  black or size?), it therefore remains that Person is properly applied to
+  substances. But of substances, some are corporeal and others
+  incorporeal. And of corporeals, some are living and others the reverse;
+  of living substances, some are sensitive and others insensitive; of
+  sensitive substances, some are rational and others irrational.[58]
+  Similarly of incorporeal substances, some are rational, others the
+  reverse (for instance the animating spirits of beasts); but of rational
+  substances there is one which is immutable and impassible by nature,
+  namely God, another which in virtue of its creation is mutable and
+  passible except in that case where the Grace of the impassible substance
+  has transformed it to the unshaken impassibility which belongs to angels
+  and to the soul.
+
+  Now from all the definitions we have given it is clear that Person
+  cannot be affirmed of bodies which have no life (for no one ever said
+  that a stone had a person), nor yet of living things which lack sense
+  (for neither is there any person of a tree), nor finally of that which
+  is bereft of mind and reason (for there is no person of a horse or ox or
+  any other of the animals which dumb and unreasoning live a life of sense
+  alone), but we say there is a person of a man, of God, of an angel.
+  Again, some substances are universal, others are particular. Universal
+  terms are those which are predicated of individuals, as man, animal,
+  stone, stock and other things of this kind which are either genera or
+  species; for the term man is applied to individual men just as animal is
+  to individual animals, and stone and stock to individual stones and
+  stocks. But particulars are terms which are never predicated of other
+  things, as Cicero, Plato, this stone from which this statue of Achilles
+  was hewn, this piece of wood out of which this table was made. But in
+  all these things person cannot in any case be applied to universals, but
+  only to particulars and individuals; for there is no person of a man if
+  animal or general; only the single persons of Cicero, Plato, or other
+  single individuals are termed persons.
+
+  [58] For a similar example of the method of _diuisio_ cf. Cic. _De Off._
+  ii. 3. 11. Cf. also _Isag. Porph. edit. prima_, i. 10 (ed. Brandt, p.
+  29).
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationabilibus
+substantiaque omnis natura est nec in uniuersalibus sed in indiuiduis
+constat, reperta personae est definitio: "naturae rationabilis indiuidua
+substantia." Sed nos hac definitione eam quam Graeci [Greek: hupostasin]
+dicunt terminauimus. Nomen enim personae uidetur aliunde traductum, ex his
+scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque eos quorum interest
+homines repraesentabant. Persona uero dicta est a personando circumflexa
+paenultima. Quod si acuatur antepaenultima, apertissime a sono dicta
+uidebitur; idcirco autem a sono, quia concauitate ipsa maior necesse est
+uoluatur sonus. Graeci quoque has personas [Greek: prosopa] uocant ab eo
+quod ponantur in facie atque ante oculos obtegant uultum: [Greek: para tou
+pros tous opas tithesthai.] Sed quoniam personis inductis histriones
+indiuiduos homines quorum intererat in tragoedia uel in comoedia ut dictum
+est repraesentabant, id est Hecubam uel Medeam uel Simonem uel Chremetem,
+idcirco ceteros quoque homines, quorum certa pro sui forma esset agnitio,
+et Latini personam et Graeci [Greek: prosopa] nuncupauerunt. Longe uero
+illi signatius naturae rationabilis indiuiduam subsistentiam [Greek:
+hupostaseos] nomine uocauerunt, nos uero per inopiam significantium uocum
+translaticiam retinuimus nuncupationem, eam quam illi [Greek: hupostasin]
+dicunt personam uocantes; sed peritior Graecia sermonum [Greek: hupostasin]
+uocat indiuiduam subsistentiam. Atque, uti Graeca utar oratione in rebus
+quae a Graecis agitata Latina interpretatione translata sunt: [Greek: hai
+ousiai en men tois katholou einai dunantai. en de tois atomois kai kata
+meros monois huphistantai], id est: essentiae in uniuersalibus quidem esse
+possunt, in solis uero indiuiduis et particularibus substant. Intellectus
+enim uniuersalium rerum ex particularibus sumptus est. Quocirca cum ipsae
+subsistentiae in uniuersalibus quidem sint, in particularibus uero capiant
+substantiam, iure subsistentias particulariter substantes [Greek:
+hupostaseis] appellauerunt. Neque enim pensius subtiliusque intuenti idem
+uidebitur esse subsistentia quod substantia.
+
+Nam quod Graeci [Greek: ousiosin] uel [Greek: ousiosthai] dicunt, id nos
+subsistentiam uel subsistere appellamus; quod uero illi [Greek: hupostasin]
+uel [Greek: huphistasthai], id nos substantiam uel substare interpretamur.
+Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget.
+Substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse
+ualeant, subministrat; sub illis enim stat, dum subiectum est accidentibus.
+Itaque genera uel species subsistunt tantum; neque enim accidentia
+generibus speciebus*ue contingunt. Indiuidua uero non modo subsistunt uerum
+etiam substant, nam neque ipsa indigent accidentibus ut sint; informata
+enim sunt iam propriis et specificis differentiis et accidentibus ut esse
+possint ministrant, dum sunt scilicet subiecta. Quocirca [Greek: einai]
+atque [Greek: ousiosthai] esse atque subsistere, [Greek: huphistasthai]
+uero substare intellegitur. Neque enim uerborum inops Graecia est, ut
+Marcus Tullius alludit, sed essentiam, subsistentiam, substantiam, personam
+totidem nominibus reddit, essentiam quidem [Greek: ousian], subsistentiam
+uero [Greek: ousiosin], substantiam [Greek: hupostasin], personam [Greek:
+prosopon] appellans. Ideo autem [Greek: hupostaseis] Graeci indiuiduas
+substantias uocauerunt, quoniam ceteris subsunt et quibusdam quasi
+accidentibus subpositae subiectaeque sunt; atque idcirco nos quoque eas
+substantias nuncupamus quasi subpositas, quas illi[59] [Greek:
+hupostaseis], cumque etiam [Greek: prosopa] nuncupent easdem substantias,
+possumus nos quoque nuncupare personas. Idem est igitur [Greek: ousian]
+esse quod essentiam, idem [Greek: ousiosin] quod subsistentiam, idem
+[Greek: hupostasin] quod substantiam, idem [Greek: prosopon] quod personam.
+Quare autem de inrationabilibus animalibus Graecus [Greek: hupostasin] non
+dicat, sicut nos de eisdem nomen substantiae praedicamus, haec ratio est,
+quoniam nomen hoc melioribus applicatum est, ut aliqua id quod est
+excellentius, tametsi non descriptione naturae secundum id quod [Greek:
+huphistasthai] atque substare est, at certe [Greek: hupostaseos] uel
+substantiae uocabulis discerneretur.
+
+Est igitur et hominis quidem essentia, id est [Greek: ousia], et
+subsistentia, id est [Greek: ousiosis], et [Greek: hupostasis], id est
+substantia, et [Greek: prosopon], id est persona; [Greek: ousia], quidem
+atque essentia quoniam est, [Greek: ousiosis] uero atque subsistentia
+quoniam in nullo subiecto est, [Greek: hupostasis] uero atque substantia,
+quoniam subest ceteris quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est [Greek:
+ousioseis]; est [Greek: prosopon] atque persona, quoniam est rationabile
+indiuiduum. Deus quoque et [Greek: ousia] est et essentia, est enim et
+maxime ipse est a quo omnium esse proficiscitur. Est [Greek: ousiosis], id
+est subsistentia (subsistit enim nullo indigens), et [Greek:
+huphistasthai]; substat enim. Vnde etiam dicimus unam esse [Greek: ousian]
+uel [Greek: ousiosin], id est essentiam uel subsistentiam deitatis, sed
+tres [Greek: hupostaseis], id est tres substantias. Et quidem secundum hunc
+modum dixere unam trinitatis essentiam, tres substantias tresque personas.
+Nisi enim tres in deo substantias ecclesiasticus loquendi usus excluderet,
+uideretur idcirco de deo dici substantia, non quod ipse ceteris rebus quasi
+subiectum supponeretur, sed quod idem omnibus uti praeesset ita etiam quasi
+principium subesset rebus, dum eis omnibus [Greek: ousiosthai] uel
+subsistere subministrat.
+
+
+[59] quas illi _Vallinus_; quasi _uel_ quas _codd. meliores_.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Wherefore if Person belongs to substances alone, and these rational, and
+  if every nature is a substance, existing not in universals but in
+  individuals, we have found the definition of Person, viz.: "The
+  individual substance of a rational nature."[60] Now by this definition
+  we Latins have described what the Greeks call [Greek: hupostasis]. For
+  the word person seems to be borrowed from a different source, namely
+  from the masks which in comedies and tragedies used to signify the
+  different subjects of representation. Now _persona_ "mask" is
+  derived from _personare_, with a circumflex on the penultimate. But
+  if the accent is put on the antepenultimate[61] the word will clearly be
+  seen to come from _sonus_ "sound," and for this reason, that the
+  hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound. The Greeks, too, call
+  these masks [Greek: prosopa] from the fact that they are placed over the
+  face and conceal the countenance from the spectator: [Greek: para tou
+  pros tous opas tithesthai]. But since, as we have said, it was by the
+  masks they put on that actors played the different characters
+  represented in a tragedy or comedy--Hecuba or Medea or Simon or
+  Chremes,--so also all other men who could be recognized by their several
+  characteristics were designated by the Latins with the term
+  _persona_ and by the Greeks with [Greek: prosopa]. But the Greeks
+  far more clearly gave to the individual subsistence of a rational nature
+  the name [Greek: hupostasis] while we through want of appropriate words
+  have kept a borrowed term, calling that _persona_ which they call
+  [Greek: hupostasis]; but Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the
+  name [Greek: hupostasis] to the individual subsistence. And, if I may
+  use Greek in dealing with matters which were first mooted by Greeks
+  before they came to be interpreted in Latin: [Greek: hai ousiai en men
+  tois katholou einai dunantai. en de tois atomois kai kata meros monois
+  huphistantai], that is: essences indeed can have potential existence in
+  universals, but they have particular substantial existence in
+  particulars alone. For it is from particulars that all our comprehension
+  of universals is taken. Wherefore since subsistences are present in
+  universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly gave the
+  name [Greek: hupostasis] to subsistences which acquired substance
+  through the medium of particulars. For to no one using his eyes with any
+  care or penetration will subsistence and substance appear identical.
+
+  For our equivalents of the Greek terms [Greek: ousiosis ousiosthai] are
+  respectively _subsistentia_ and _subsistere_, while their
+  [Greek: hupostasis huphistasthai] are represented by our
+  _substantia_ and _substare_. For a thing has subsistence when
+  it does not require accidents in order to be, but that thing has
+  substance which supplies to other things, accidents to wit, a substrate
+  enabling them to be; for it "substands" those things so long as it is
+  subjected to accidents. Thus genera and species have only subsistence,
+  for accidents do not attach to genera and species. But particulars have
+  not only subsistence but substance, for they, no more than generals,
+  depend on accidents for their Being; for they are already provided with
+  their proper and specific differences and they enable accidents to be by
+  supplying them with a substrate. Wherefore _esse_ and
+  _subsistere_ represent [Greek: einai] and [Greek: ousiosthai],
+  while _substare_ represents [Greek: huphistasthai]. For Greece is
+  not, as Marcus Tullius[62] playfully says, short of words, but provides
+  exact equivalents for _essentia, subsistentia, substantia_ and
+  _persona_--[Greek: ousia] for _essentia_, [Greek: ousiosis]
+  for _subsistentia_, [Greek: hupostasis] for _substantia_,
+  [Greek: prosopon] for _persona_. But the Greeks called individual
+  substances [Greek: hupostaseis] because they underlie the rest and offer
+  support and substrate to what are called accidents; and we in our term
+  call them substances as being substrate--[Greek: hupostaseis], and since
+  they also term the same substances [Greek: prosopa], we too may call
+  them persons. So [Greek: ousia] is identical with essence, [Greek:
+  ousiosis] with subsistence, [Greek: hupostasis] with substance, [Greek:
+  prosopon] with person. But the reason why the Greek does not use [Greek:
+  hupostasis] of irrational animals while we apply the term substance to
+  them is this: This term was applied to things of higher value, in order
+  that what is more excellent might be distinguished, if not by a
+  definition of nature answering to the literal meaning of [Greek:
+  huphistasthai]=_substare_, at any rate by the words [Greek:
+  hupostasis]=_substantia_.
+
+  To begin with, then, man is essence, i.e. [Greek: ousia], subsistence,
+  i.e. [Greek: ousiosis, hupostasis], i.e. substance, [Greek: prosopon],
+  i.e. person: [Greek: ousia] or _essentia_ because he is, [Greek:
+  ousiosis], or subsistence because he is not accidental to any subject,
+  [Greek: hupostusis] or substance because he is subject to all the things
+  which are not subsistences or [Greek: ousioseis], while he is [Greek:
+  prosopon] or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is
+  [Greek: ousia], or essence, for He is and is especially that from which
+  proceeds the Being of all things. To Him belong [Greek: ousiosis], i.e.
+  subsistence, for He subsists in absolute independence, and [Greek:
+  huphistasthai], for He is substantial Being. Whence we go on to say that
+  there is one [Greek: ousia] or [Greek: ousiosis], i.e. one essence or
+  subsistence of the Godhead, but three [Greek: hupostaseis] or
+  substances. And indeed, following this use, men have spoken of One
+  essence, three substances and three persons of the Godhead. For did not
+  the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking
+  of God,[63] substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not
+  because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because,
+  just as He excels above all things, so He is the foundation and support
+  of things, supplying them all with [Greek: ousiosthai] or subsistence.
+
+
+  [60] Boethius's definition of _persona_ was adopted by St. Thomas (S. i.
+  29. 1), was regarded as classical by the Schoolmen, and has the approval
+  of modern theologians. Cf. Dorner, _Doctrine of Christ_, iii. p. 311.
+
+  [61] Implying a short penultimate.
+
+  [62] _Tusc._ ii. 15. 35.
+
+  [63] For a similar submission of his own opinion to the usage of the
+  Church cf. the end of _Tr._ i. and of _Tr._ ii.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Sed haec omnia idcirco sint dicta, ut differentiam naturae atque personae
+id est [Greek: ousias] atque [Greek: hupostaseos] monstraremus. Quo uero
+nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari, ecclesiasticae sit locutionis
+arbitrium. Hoc interim constet quod inter naturam personamque differre
+praediximus, quoniam natura est cuiuslibet substantiae specificata
+proprietas, persona uero rationabilis naturae indiuidua substantia. Hanc in
+Christo Nestorius duplicem esse constituit eo scilicet traductus errore,
+quod putauerit in omnibus naturis dici posse personam. Hoc enim praesumpto,
+quoniam in Christo duplicem naturam esse censebat, duplicem quoque personam
+esse confessus est. Qua in re eum falsum esse cum definitio superius dicta
+conuincat, tum haec argumentatio euidenter eius declarabit errorem. Si enim
+non est Christi una persona duasque naturas esse manifestum est, hominis
+scilicet atque dei (nec tam erit insipiens quisquam, utqui utramque earum a
+ratione seiungat), sequitur ut duae uideantur esse personae; est enim
+persona ut dictum est naturae rationabilis indiuidua substantia.
+
+Quae est igitur facta hominis deique coniunctio? Num ita quasi cum duo
+corpora sibimet apponuntur, ut tantum locis iuncta sint et nihil in alterum
+ex alterius qualitate perueniat? Quem coniunctionis Graeci modum [Greek:
+kata parathesin] uocant. Sed si ita humanitas diuinitati coniuncta est,
+nihil horum ex utrisque confectum est ac per hoc nihil est Christus. Nomen
+quippe ipsum unum quiddam significat singularitate uocabuli. At si duabus
+personis manentibus ea coniunctio qualem superius diximus facta est
+naturarum, unum ex duobus effici nihil potuit; omnino enim ex duabus
+personis nihil umquam fieri potest. Nihil igitur unum secundum Nestorium
+Christus est ac per hoc omnino nihil. Quod enim non est unum, nec esse
+omnino potest; esse enim atque unum conuertitur et quodcumque unum est est.
+Etiam ea quae ex pluribus coniunguntur ut aceruus, chorus, unum tamen sunt.
+Sed esse Christum manifeste ac ueraciter confitemur; unum igitur esse
+dicimus Christum. Quod si ita est, unam quoque Christi sine dubitatione
+personam esse necesse est. Nam si duae personae essent, unus esse non
+posset; duos uero esse dicere Christos nihil est aliud nisi praecipitatae
+mentis insania. Cur enim omnino duos audeat Christos uocare, unum hominem
+alium deum? Vel cur eum qui deus est Christum uocat, si eum quoque qui homo
+est Christum est appellaturus, cum nihil simile, nihil habeant ex
+copulatione coniunctum? Cur simili nomine diuersissimis abutatur naturis,
+cum, si Christum definire cogitur, utrisque ut ipse dicit Christis non
+possit unam definitionis adhibere substantiam? Si enim dei atque hominis
+diuersa substantia est unumque in utrisque Christi nomen nec diuersarum
+coniunctio substantiarum unam creditur fecisse personam, aequiuocum nomen
+est Christi et nulla potest definitione concludi. Quibus autem umquam
+scripturis nomen Christi geminatur? Quid uero noui per aduentum saluatoris
+effectum est? Nam catholicis et fidei ueritas et raritas miraculi constat.
+Quam enim magnum est quamque nouum, quam quod semel nec ullo alio saeculo
+possit euenire, ut eius qui solus est deus natura cum humana quae ab eo
+erat diuersissima conueniret atque ita ex distantibus naturis una fieret
+copulatione persona! Secundum Nestorii uero sententiam quid contingit noui?
+"Seruant," inquit, "proprias humanitas diuinitasque personas." Quando enim
+non fuit diuinitatis propria humanitatisque persona? Quando uero non erit?
+Vel quid amplius in Iesu generatione contingit quam in cuiuslibet alterius,
+si discretis utrisque personis discretae etiam fuere naturae? Ita enim
+personis manentibus illic nulla naturarum potuit esse coniunctio, ut in
+quolibet homine, cuius cum propria persona subsistat, nulla est ei
+excellentissimae substantiae coniuncta diuinitas. Sed fortasse Iesum, id
+est personam hominis, idcirco Christum uocet, quoniam per eam mira quaedam
+sit operata diuinitas. Esto. Deum uero ipsum Christi appellatione cur
+uocet? Cur uero non elementa quoque ipsa simili audeat appellare uocabulo
+per quae deus mira quaedam cotidianis motibus operatur? An quia
+inrationabiles substantiae non possunt habere personam qua[64] Christi
+uocabulum excipere possint[65]? Nonne in sanctis hominibus ac pietate
+conspicuis apertus diuinitatis actus agnoscitur? Nihil enim intererit, cur
+non sanctos quoque uiros eadem appellatione dignetur, si in adsumptione
+humanitatis non est una ex coniunctione persona. Sed dicat forsitan, "Illos
+quoque Christos uocari fateor, sed ad imaginem ueri Christi." Quod si nulla
+ex homine atque deo una persona coniuncta est, omnes ita ueros Christos
+arbitrabimur ut hunc qui ex uirgine genitus creditur. Nulla quippe in hoc
+adunata persona est ex dei atque hominis copulatione sicut nec in eis, qui
+dei spiritu de uenturo Christo praedicebant, propter quod etiam ipsi quoque
+appellati sunt Christi. Iam uero sequitur, ut personis manentibus nullo
+modo a diuinitate humanitas credatur adsumpta. Omnino enim disiuncta sunt
+quae aeque personis naturisque separantur, prorsus inquam disiuncta sunt
+nec magis inter se homines bouesque disiuncti quam diuinitas in Christo
+humanitasque discreta est, si mansere personae. Homines quippe ac boues una
+animalis communitate iunguntur; est enim illis secundum genus communis
+substantia eademque in uniuersalitatis collectione natura. Deo uero atque
+homini quid non erit diuersa ratione disiunctum, si sub diuersitate naturae
+personarum quoque credatur mansisse discretio? Non est igitur saluatum
+genus humanum, nulla in nos salus Christi generatione processit, tot
+prophetarum scripturae populum inlusere credentem, omnis ueteris testamenti
+spernatur auctoritas per quam salus mundo Christi generatione promittitur.
+Non autem prouenisse manifestum est, si eadem in persona est quae in natura
+diuersitas. Eundem quippe saluum fecit quem creditur adsumpsisse; nulla
+uero intellegi adsumptio potest, si manet aeque naturae personaeque
+discretio. Igitur qui adsumi manente persona non potuit, iure non uidebitur
+per Christi generationem potuisse saluari. Non est igitur per generationem
+Christi hominum saluata natura,--quod credi nefas est.
+
+Sed quamquam permulta sint quae hunc sensum inpugnare ualeant atque
+perfringere, de argumentorum copia tamen haec interim libasse sufficiat.
+
+
+[64] quae _codd._
+
+[65] possit _Vallinus_.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  You must consider that all I have said so far has been for the purpose
+  of marking the difference between Nature and Person, that is, [Greek:
+  ousia] and [Greek: hupostasis]. The exact terms which should be applied
+  in each case must be left to the decision of ecclesiastical usage. For
+  the time being let that distinction between Nature and Person hold which
+  I have affirmed, viz. that Nature is the specific property of any
+  substance, and Person the individual substance of a rational nature.
+  Nestorius affirmed that in Christ Person was twofold, being led astray
+  by the false notion that Person may be applied to every nature. For on
+  this assumption, understanding that there were in Christ two natures, he
+  declared that there were likewise two persons. And although the
+  definition which we have already given is enough to prove Nestorius
+  wrong, his error shall be further declared by the following argument. If
+  the Person of Christ is not single, and if it is clear that there are in
+  Him two natures, to wit, divine and human (and no one will be so foolish
+  as to fail to include either in the definition), it follows that there
+  must apparently be two persons; for Person, as has been said, is the
+  individual substance of a rational nature.
+
+  What kind of union, then, between God and man has been effected? Is it
+  as when two bodies are laid the one against the other, so that they are
+  only joined locally, and no touch of the quality of the one reaches the
+  other--the kind of union which the Greeks term [Greek: kata parathesin]
+  "by juxtaposition"? But if humanity has been united to divinity in this
+  way no one thing has been formed out of the two, and hence Christ is
+  nothing. The very name of Christ, indeed, denotes by its singular number
+  a unity. But if the two persons continued and such a union of natures as
+  we have above described took place, there could be no unity formed from
+  two things, for nothing could ever possibly be formed out of two
+  persons. Therefore Christ is, according to Nestorius, in no respect one,
+  and therefore He is absolutely nothing. For what is not one cannot exist
+  either; because Being and unity are convertible terms, and whatever is
+  one is. Even things which are made up of many items, such as a heap or
+  chorus, are nevertheless a unity. Now we openly and honestly confess
+  that Christ is; therefore we say that Christ is a Unity. And if this is
+  so, then without controversy the Person of Christ is one also. For if
+  the Persons were two He could not be one; but to say that there are two
+  Christs is nothing else than the madness of a distraught brain. Could
+  Nestorius, I ask, dare to call the one man and the one God in Christ two
+  Christs? Or why does he call Him Christ who is God, if he is also going
+  to call Him Christ who is man, when his combination gives the two no
+  common factor, no coherence? Why does he wrongly use the same name for
+  two utterly different natures, when, if he is compelled to define
+  Christ, he cannot, as he himself admits, apply the substance of one
+  definition to both his Christs? For if the substance of God is different
+  from that of man, and the one name of Christ applies to both, and the
+  combination of different substances is not believed to have formed one
+  Person, the name of Christ is equivocal[66] and cannot be comprised in
+  one definition. But in what Scriptures is the name of Christ ever made
+  double? Or what new thing has been wrought by the coming of the Saviour?
+  For the truth of the faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike
+  remain, for Catholics, unshaken. For how great and unprecedented a thing
+  it is--unique and incapable of repetition in any other age--that the
+  nature of Him who is God alone should come together with human nature
+  which was entirely different from God to form from different natures by
+  conjunction a single Person! But now, if we follow Nestorius, what
+  happens that is new? "Humanity and divinity," quoth he, "keep their
+  proper Persons." Well, when had not divinity and humanity each its
+  proper Person? And when, we answer, will this not be so? Or wherein is
+  the birth of Jesus more significant than that of any other child, if,
+  the two Persons remaining distinct, the natures also were distinct? For
+  while the Persons remained so there could no more be a union of natures
+  in Christ than there could be in any other man with whose substance, be
+  it never so perfect, no divinity was ever united because of the
+  subsistence of his proper person. But for the sake of argument let him
+  call Jesus, i.e. the human person, Christ, because through that person
+  God wrought certain wonders. Agreed. But why should he call God Himself
+  by the name of Christ? Why should he not go on to call the very elements
+  by that name? For through them in their daily movements God works
+  certain wonders. Is it because irrational substances cannot possess a
+  Person enabling them to receive the name of Christ? Is not the operation
+  of God seen plainly in men of holy life and notable piety? There will
+  surely be no reason not to call the saints also by that name, if Christ
+  taking humanity on Him is not one Person through conjunction. But
+  perhaps he will say, "I allow that such men are called Christs, but it
+  is because they are in the image of the true Christ." But if no one
+  Person has been formed of the union of God and man, we shall consider
+  all of them just as true Christs as Him who, we believe, was born of a
+  Virgin. For no Person has been made one by the union of God and man
+  either in Him or in them who by the Spirit of God foretold the coming
+  Christ, for which cause they too were called Christs. So now it follows
+  that so long as the Persons remain, we cannot in any wise believe that
+  humanity has been assumed by divinity. For things which differ alike in
+  persons and natures are certainly separate, nay absolutely separate; man
+  and oxen are not further separate than are divinity and humanity in
+  Christ, if the Persons have remained. Men indeed and oxen are united in
+  one animal nature, for by genus they have a common substance and the
+  same nature in the collection which forms the universal.[67] But God and
+  man will be at all points fundamentally different if we are to believe
+  that distinction of Persons continues under difference of nature. Then
+  the human race has not been saved, the birth of Christ has brought us no
+  salvation, the writings of all the prophets have but beguiled the people
+  that believed in them, contempt is poured upon the authority of the
+  whole Old Testament which promised to the world salvation by the birth
+  of Christ. It is plain that salvation has not been brought us, if there
+  is the same difference in Person that there is in Nature. No doubt He
+  saved that humanity which we believe He assumed; but no assumption can
+  be conceived, if the separation abides alike of Nature and of Person.
+  Hence that human nature which could not be assumed as long as the Person
+  continued, will certainly and rightly appear incapable of salvation by
+  the birth of Christ. Wherefore man's nature has not been saved by the
+  birth of Christ--an impious conclusion.[68]
+
+  But although there are many weapons strong enough to wound and demolish
+  the Nestorian view, let us for the moment be content with this small
+  selection from the store of arguments available.
+
+  [66] Cf. the discussion of _aequiuoca_=[Greek: homonumos] in _Isag.
+  Porph. Vide_ Brandt's Index.
+
+  [67] Vniuersalitas=[Greek: to katholou].
+
+  [68] For a similar _reductio ad absurdum_ ending in _quod nefas est_ see
+  _Tr._ iii. (_supra_, p. 44) and _Cons._ v. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Transeundum quippe est ad Eutychen qui cum a ueterum orbitis esset
+euagatus, in contrarium cucurrit errorem asserens tantum abesse, ut in
+Christo gemina persona credatur, ut ne naturam quidem in eo duplicem
+oporteat confiteri; ita quippe esse adsumptum hominem, ut ea sit adunatio
+facta cum deo, ut natura humana non manserit. Huius error ex eodem quo
+Nestorii fonte prolabitur. Nam sicut Nestorius arbitratur non posse esse
+naturam duplicem quin persona fieret duplex, atque ideo, cum in Christo
+naturam duplicem confiteretur, duplicem credidit esse personam, ita quoque
+Eutyches non putauit naturam duplicem esse sine duplicatione personae et
+cum non confiteretur duplicem esse personam, arbitratus est consequens, ut
+una uideretur esse natura. Itaque Nestorius recte tenens duplicem in
+Christo esse naturam sacrilege confitetur duas esse personas; Eutyches uero
+recte credens unam esse personam impie credit unam quoque esse naturam. Qui
+conuictus euidentia rerum, quandoquidem manifestum est aliam naturam esse
+hominis aliam dei, ait duas se confiteri in Christo naturas ante
+adunationem, unam uero post adunationem. Quae sententia non aperte quod
+uult eloquitur. Vt tamen eius dementiam perscrutemur, adunatio haec aut
+tempore generationis facta est aut tempore resurrectionis. Sed si tempore
+generationis facta est, uidetur putare et ante generationem fuisse humanam
+carnem non a Maria sumptam sed aliquo modo alio praeparatam, Mariam uero
+uirginem appositam ex qua caro nasceretur quae ab ea sumpta non esset,
+illam uero carnem quae antea fuerit esse et diuisam atque a diuinitatis
+substantia separatam; cum ex uirgine natus est, adunatum esse deo, ut una
+uideretur facta esse natura. Vel si haec eius sententia non est, illa esse
+poterit dicentis duas ante adunationem, unam post adunationem, si adunatio
+generatione perfecta est, ut corpus quidem a Maria sumpserit, sed, antequam
+sumeret, diuersam deitatis humanitatisque fuisse naturam; sumptam uero unam
+factam atque in diuinitatis cessisse substantiam. Quod si hanc adunationem
+non putat generatione sed resurrectione factam, rursus id duobus fieri
+arbitrabitur modis; aut enim genito Christo et non adsumente de Maria
+corpus aut adsumente ab eadem carnem, usque dum resurgeret quidem, duas
+fuisse naturas, post resurrectionem unam factam. De quibus illud disiunctum
+nascitur, quod interrogabimus hoc modo: natus ex Maria Christus aut ab ea
+carnem humanam traxit aut minime. Si non confitetur ex ea traxisse, dicat
+quo homine indutus aduenerit, utrumne eo qui deciderat praeuaricatione
+peccati an alio? Si eo de cuius semine ductus est homo, quem uestita
+diuinitas est? Nam si ex semine Abrahae atque Dauid et postremo Mariae non
+fuit caro illa qua natus est, ostendat ex cuius hominis sit carne
+deriuatus, quoniam post primum hominem caro omnis humana ex humana carne
+deducitur. Sed si quem dixerit hominem a quo generatio sumpta sit
+saluatoris praeter Mariam uirginem, et ipse errore confundetur et
+adscribere mendacii notam summae diuinitati inlusus ipse uidebitur, quando
+quod Abrahae atque Dauid promittitur in sanctis diuinationibus, ut ex eorum
+semine toti mundo salus oriatur, aliis distribuit, cum praesertim, si
+humana caro sumpta est, non ab alio sumi potuerit nisi unde etiam
+procreabatur. Si igitur a Maria non est sumptum corpus humanum sed a
+quolibet alio, per Mariam tamen est procreatum quod fuerat praeuaricatione
+corruptum, superius dicto repellitur argumento. Quod si non eo homine
+Christus indutus est qui pro peccati poena sustinuerat mortem, illud
+eueniet ex nullius hominis semine talem potuisse nasci qui fuerit sine
+originalis poena peccati. Ex nullo igitur talis sumpta est caro; unde fit
+ut nouiter uideatur esse formata. Sed haec aut ita hominum uisa est oculis,
+ut humanum putaretur corpus quod reuera non esset humanum, quippe quod
+nulli originali subiaceret poenae, aut noua quaedam uera nec poenae peccati
+subiacens originalis ad tempus hominis natura formata est? Si uerum hominis
+corpus non fuit, aperte arguitur mentita diuinitas, quae ostenderet
+hominibus corpus, quod cum uerum non esset, tum fallerentur ii[69] qui
+uerum esse arbitrarentur. At si noua ueraque non ex homine sumpta caro
+formata est, quo tanta tragoedia generationis? Vbi ambitus passionis? Ego
+quippe ne in homine quidem non stulte fieri puto quod inutiliter factum
+est. Ad quam uero utilitatem facta probabitur tanta humilitas diuinitatis,
+si homo qui periit generatione ac passione Christi saluatus non est,
+quoniam negatur adsumptus? Rursus igitur sicut ab eodem Nestorii fonte
+Eutychis error principium sumpsit, ita ad eundem finem relabitur, ut
+secundum Eutychen quoque non sit saluatum genus humanum, quoniam non is qui
+aeger esset et saluatione curaque egeret, adsumptus est. Traxisse autem
+hanc sententiam uidetur, si tamen huius erroris fuit ut crederet non fuisse
+corpus Christi uere ex homine sed extra atque adeo in caelo formatum,
+quoniam cum eo in caelum creditur ascendisse. Quod exemplum continet tale:
+"non ascendit in caelum, nisi qui de caelo descendit."
+
+
+[69] hii _uel_ hi _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  I must now pass to Eutyches who, wandering from the path of primitive
+  doctrine, has rushed into the opposite error[70] and asserts that so far
+  from our having to believe in a twofold Person in Christ, we must not
+  even confess a double Nature; humanity, he maintains, was so assumed
+  that the union with Godhead involved the disappearance of the human
+  nature. His error springs from the same source as that of Nestorius. For
+  just as Nestorius deems there could not be a double Nature unless the
+  Person were doubled, and therefore, confessing the double Nature in
+  Christ, has perforce believed the Person to be double, so also Eutyches
+  deemed that the Nature was not double unless the Person was double, and
+  since he did not confess a double Person, he thought it a necessary
+  consequence that the Nature should be regarded as single. Thus
+  Nestorius, rightly holding Christ's Nature to be double, sacrilegiously
+  professes the Persons to be two; whereas Eutyches, rightly believing the
+  Person to be single, impiously believes that the Nature also is single.
+  And being confuted by the plain evidence of facts, since it is clear
+  that the Nature of God is different from that of man, he declares his
+  belief to be: two Natures in Christ before the union and only one after
+  the union. Now this statement does not express clearly what he means.
+  However, let us scrutinize his extravagance. It is plain that this union
+  took place either at the moment of conception or at the moment of
+  resurrection. But if it happened at the moment of conception, Eutyches
+  seems to think that even before conception He had human flesh, not taken
+  from Mary but prepared in some other way, while the Virgin Mary was
+  brought in to give birth to flesh that was not taken from her; that this
+  flesh, which already existed, was apart and separate from the substance
+  of divinity, but that when He was born of the Virgin it was united to
+  God, so that the Nature seemed to be made one. Or if this be not his
+  opinion, since he says that there were two Natures before the union and
+  one after, supposing the union to be established by conception, an
+  alternative view may be that Christ indeed took a body from Mary but
+  that before He took it the Natures of Godhead and manhood were
+  different: but the Nature assumed became one with that of Godhead into
+  which it passed. But if he thinks that this union was effected not by
+  conception but by resurrection, we shall have to assume that this too
+  happened in one of two ways; either Christ was conceived and did
+  _not_ assume a body from Mary or He _did_ assume flesh from
+  her, and there were (until indeed He rose) two Natures which became one
+  after the Resurrection. From these alternatives a dilemma arises which
+  we will examine as follows: Christ who was born of Mary either did or
+  did not take human flesh from her. If Eutyches does not admit that He
+  took it from her, then let him say what manhood He put on to come among
+  us--that which had fallen through sinful disobedience or another? If it
+  was the manhood of that man from whom all men descend, what manhood did
+  divinity invest? For if that flesh in which He was born came not of the
+  seed of Abraham and of David and finally of Mary, let Eutyches show from
+  what man's flesh he descended, since, after the first man, all human
+  flesh is derived from human flesh. But if he shall name any child of man
+  beside Mary the Virgin as the cause of the conception of the Saviour, he
+  will both be confounded by his own error, and, himself a dupe, will
+  stand accused of stamping with falsehood the very Godhead for thus
+  transferring to others the promise of the sacred oracles made to Abraham
+  and David[71] that of their seed salvation should arise for all the
+  world, especially since if human flesh was taken it could not be taken
+  from any other but Him of whom it was begotten. If, therefore, His human
+  body was not taken from Mary but from any other, yet that was engendered
+  through Mary which had been corrupted by disobedience, Eutyches is
+  confuted by the argument already stated. But if Christ did not put on
+  that manhood which had endured death in punishment for sin, it will
+  result that of no man's seed could ever one have been born who should
+  be, like Him, without punishment for original sin. Therefore flesh like
+  His was taken from no man, whence it would appear to have been new-
+  formed for the purpose. But did this flesh then either so appear to
+  human eyes that the body was deemed human which was not really human,
+  because it was not subject to any primal penalty, or was some new true
+  human flesh formed as a makeshift, not subject to the penalty for
+  original sin? If it was not a truly human body, the Godhead is plainly
+  convicted of falsehood for displaying to men a body which was not real
+  and thus deceived those who thought it real.  But if flesh had been
+  formed new and real and not taken from man, to what purpose was the
+  tremendous tragedy of the conception? Where the value of His long
+  Passion? I cannot but consider foolish even a human action that is
+  useless. And to what useful end shall we say this great humiliation of
+  Divinity was wrought if ruined man has not been saved by the conception
+  and the Passion of Christ--for they denied that he was taken into
+  Godhead? Once more then, just as the error of Eutyches took its rise
+  from the same source as that of Nestorius, so it hastens to the same
+  goal inasmuch as according to Eutyches also the human race has not been
+  saved,[72] since man who was sick and needed health and salvation was
+  not taken into Godhead. Yet this is the conclusion he seems to have
+  drawn, if he erred so deeply as to believe that Christ's body was not
+  taken really from man but from a source outside him and prepared for the
+  purpose in heaven, for He is believed to have ascended with it up into
+  heaven. Which is the meaning of the text: none hath ascended into heaven
+  save Him who came down from heaven.
+
+
+  [70] The ecclesiastical _uia media_, with the relegation of opposing
+  theories to the extremes, which meet in a common fount of falsity, owes
+  something to Aristotle and to our author. _Vide infra_, p. 118.
+
+  [71] The use of this kind of argument by Boethius allays any suspicion
+  as to the genuineness of _Tr_. iv. which might be caused by the use of
+  allegorical interpretation therein. Note also that in the _Consolatio_
+  the framework is allegory, which is also freely applied in the details.
+
+  [72] Another _reductio ad absurdum_ or _ad impietatem_, cf. _supra_, p.
+  98, note b.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Sed satis de ea parte dictum uidetur, si corpus quod Christus excepit ex
+Maria non credatur adsumptum. Si uero adsumptum est ex Maria neque
+permansit perfecta humana diuinaque natura, id tribus effici potuit modis:
+aut enim diuinitas in humanitatem translata est aut humanitas in
+diuinitatem aut utraeque in se ita temperatae sunt atque commixtae, ut
+neutra substantia propriam formam teneret. Sed si diuinitas in humanitatem
+translata est, factum est, quod credi nefas est, ut humanitate inmutabili
+substantia permanente diuinitas uerteretur et quod passibile atque mutabile
+naturaliter exsisteret, id inmutabile permaneret, quod uero inmutabile
+atque inpassibile naturaliter creditur, id in rem mutabilem uerteretur. Hoc
+igitur fieri nulla ratione contingit. Sed humana forsitan natura in
+deitatem uideatur esse conuersa. Hoc uero qui fieri potest, si diuinitas in
+generatione Christi et humanam animam suscepit et corpus? Non enim omnis
+res in rem omnem uerti ac transmutari potest. Nam cum substantiarum aliae
+sint corporeae, aliae incorporeae, neque corporea in incorpoream neque
+incorporea in eam quae corpus est mutari potest, nec uero incorporea in se
+inuicem formas proprias mutant; sola enim mutari transformarique in se
+possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum, nec haec omnia, sed
+ea quae in se et facere et pati possunt. Id uero probatur hoc modo: neque
+enim potest aes in lapidem permutari nec uero idem aes in herbam nec
+quodlibet aliud corpus in quodlibet aliud transfigurari potest, nisi et
+eadem sit materia rerum in se transeuntium et a se et facere et pati
+possint, ut, cum uinum atque aqua miscentur, utraque sunt talia quae actum
+sibi passionemque communicent. Potest enim aquae qualitas a uini qualitate
+aliquid pati; potest item uini ab aquae qualitate aliquid pati. Atque
+idcirco si multum quidem fuerit aquae, uini uero paululum, non dicuntur
+inmixta, sed alterum alterius qualitate corrumpitur. Si quis enim uinum
+fundat in mare, non mixtum est mari uinum sed in mare corruptum, idcirco
+quoniam qualitas aquae multitudine sui corporis nihil passa est a qualitate
+uini, sed potius in se ipsam uini qualitatem propria multitudine
+commutauit. Si uero sint mediocres sibique aequales uel paulo inaequales
+naturae quae a se facere et pati possunt, illae miscentur et mediocribus
+inter se qualitatibus temperantur. Atque haec quidem in corporibus neque
+his omnibus, sed tantum quae a se, ut dictum est, et facere et pati possunt
+communi atque eadem materia subiecta. Omne enim corpus quod in generatione
+et corruptione subsistit communem uidetur habere materiam, sed non omne ab
+omni uel in omni uel facere aliquid uel pati potest. Corpora uero in
+incorporea nulla ratione poterunt permutari, quoniam nulla communi materia
+subiecta participant quae susceptis qualitatibus in alterutram permutetur.
+Omnis enim natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae nititur
+fundamento; nullum uero corpus est cui non sit materia subiecta. Quod cum
+ita sit cumque ne ea quidem quae communem materiam naturaliter habent in se
+transeant, nisi illis adsit potestas in se et a se faciendi ac patiendi,
+multo magis in se non permutabuntur quibus non modo communis materia non
+est, sed cum alia res materiae fundamento nititur ut corpus, alia omnino
+materiae subiecto non egeat ut incorporeum.
+
+Non igitur fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur, nec
+uero fieri potest, ut incorporalia in sese commixtione aliqua permutentur.
+Quorum enim communis nulla materia est, nec in se uerti ac permutari
+queunt. Nulla autem est incorporalibus materia rebus; non poterunt igitur
+in se inuicem permutari. Sed anima et deus incorporeae substantiae recte
+creduntur; non est igitur humana anima in diuinitatem a qua adsumpta est
+permutata. Quod si neque corpus neque anima in diuinitatem potuit uerti,
+nullo modo fieri potuit, ut humanitas conuerteretur in deum. Multo minus
+uero credi potest, ut utraque in sese confunderentur, quoniam neque
+incorporalitas transire ad corpus potest neque rursus e conuerso corpus ad
+incorporalitatem, quando quidem nulla his materia subiecta communis est
+quae alterutris substantiarum qualitatibus permutetur.
+
+At hi ita aiunt ex duabus quidem naturis Christum consistere, in duabus
+uero minime, hoc scilicet intendentes, quoniam quod ex duabus consistit ita
+unum fieri potest, ut illa ex quibus dicitur constare non maneant; ueluti
+cum mel aquae confunditur neutrum manet, sed alterum alterius copulatione
+corruptum quiddam tertium fecit, ita illud quidem quod ex melle atque aqua
+tertium fit constare ex utrisque dicitur, in utrisque uero negatur. Non
+enim poterit in utrisque constare, quando utrorumque natura non permanet.
+Ex utrisque enim constare potest, licet ea ex quibus coniungitur alterutra
+qualitate corrupta sint; in utrisque uero huiusmodi constare non poterit,
+quoniam ea quae in se transfusa sunt non manent ac non sunt utraque in
+quibus constare uideatur, cum ex utrisque constet in se inuicem qualitatum
+mutatione transfusis.
+
+Catholici uero utrumque rationabiliter confitentur, nam et ex utrisque
+naturis Christum et in utrisque consistere. Sed id qua ratione dicatur,
+paulo posterius explicabo. Nunc illud est manifestum conuictam esse
+Eutychis sententiam eo nomine, quod cum tribus modis fieri possit, ut ex
+duabus naturis una subsistat, ut aut diuinitas in humanitatem translata sit
+aut humanitas in diuinitatem aut utraque permixta sint, nullum horum modum
+fieri potuisse superius dicta argumentatione declaratur.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  I think enough has been said on the supposition that we should believe
+  that the body which Christ received was not taken from Mary. But if it
+  was taken from Mary and the human and divine natures did not continue,
+  each in its perfection, this may have happened in one of three ways.
+  Either Godhead was translated into manhood, or manhood into Godhead, or
+  both were so modified and mingled that neither substance kept its proper
+  form. But if Godhead was translated into manhood, that has happened
+  which piety forbids us to believe, viz. while the manhood continued in
+  unchangeable substance Godhead was changed, and that which was by nature
+  passible and mutable remained immutable, while that which we believe to
+  be by nature immutable and impassible was changed into a mutable thing.
+  This cannot happen on any show of reasoning. But perchance the human
+  nature may seem to be changed into Godhead. Yet how can this be if
+  Godhead in the conception of Christ received both human soul and body?
+  Things cannot be promiscuously changed and interchanged. For since some
+  substances are corporeal and others incorporeal, neither can a corporeal
+  substance be changed into an incorporeal, nor can an incorporeal be
+  changed into that which is body, nor yet incorporeals interchange their
+  proper forms; for only those things can be interchanged and transformed
+  which possess the common substrate of the same matter, nor can all of
+  these so behave, but only those which can act upon and be acted on by
+  each other. Now this is proved as follows: bronze can no more be
+  converted into stone than it can be into grass, and generally no body
+  can be transformed into any other body unless the things which pass into
+  each other have a common matter and can act upon and be acted on by each
+  other, as when wine and water are mingled both are of such a nature as
+  to allow reciprocal action and influence. For the quality of water can
+  be influenced in some degree by that of wine, similarly the quality of
+  wine can be influenced by that of water. And therefore if there be a
+  great deal of water but very little wine, they are not said to be
+  mingled, but the one is ruined by the quality of the other. For if you
+  pour wine into the sea the wine is not mingled with the sea but is lost
+  in the sea, simply because the quality of the water owing to its bulk
+  has been in no way affected by the quality of the wine, but rather by
+  its own bulk has changed the quality of the wine into water. But if the
+  natures which are capable of reciprocal action and influence are in
+  moderate proportion and equal or only slightly unequal, they are really
+  mingled and tempered by the qualities which are in moderate relation to
+  each other. This indeed takes place in bodies but not in all bodies, but
+  only in those, as has been said, which are capable of reciprocal action
+  and influence and have the same matter subject to their qualities. For
+  all bodies which subsist in conditions of birth and decay seem to
+  possess a common matter, but all bodies are not capable of reciprocal
+  action and influence. But corporeals cannot in any way be changed into
+  incorporeals because they do not share in any common underlying matter
+  which can be changed into this or that thing by taking on its qualities.
+  For the nature of no incorporeal substance rests upon a material basis;
+  but there is no body that has not matter as a substrate. Since this is
+  so, and since not even those things which naturally have a common matter
+  can pass over into each other unless they have the power of acting on
+  each other and being acted upon by each other, far more will those
+  things not suffer interchange which not only have no common matter but
+  are different in substance, since one of them, being body, rests on a
+  basis of matter, while the other, being incorporeal, cannot possibly
+  stand in need of a material substrate.
+
+  It is therefore impossible for a body to be changed into an incorporeal
+  species, nor will it ever be possible for incorporeals to be changed
+  into each other by any process of mingling. For things which have no
+  common matter cannot be changed and converted one into another. But
+  incorporeal things have no matter; they can never, therefore, be changed
+  about among themselves. But the soul and God are rightly believed to be
+  incorporeal substances; therefore the human soul has not been converted
+  into the Godhead by which it was assumed. But if neither body nor soul
+  can be turned into Godhead, it could not possibly happen that manhood
+  should be transformed into God. But it is much less credible that the
+  two should be confounded together since neither can incorporality pass
+  over to body, nor again, contrariwise, can body pass over into
+  incorporality when these have no common matter underlying them which can
+  be converted by the qualities of one of two substances.
+
+  But the Eutychians say that Christ consists indeed of two natures, but
+  not in two natures, meaning, no doubt, thereby, that a thing which
+  consists of two elements can so far become one, that the elements of
+  which it is said to be made up disappear; just as, for example, when
+  honey is mixed with water neither remains, but the one thing being
+  spoilt by conjunction with the other produces a certain third thing, so
+  that third thing which is produced by the combination of honey and water
+  is said to consist of both, but not in both. For it can never consist in
+  both so long as the nature of both does not continue. For it can consist
+  of both even though each element of which it is compounded has been
+  spoiled by the quality of the other; but it can never consist in both
+  natures of this kind since the elements which have been transmuted into
+  each other do not continue, and both the elements in which it seems to
+  consist cease to be, since it consists of two things translated into
+  each other by change of qualities.
+
+  But Catholics in accordance with reason confess both, for they say that
+  Christ consists both of and in two natures. How this can be affirmed I
+  will explain a little later. One thing is now clear; the opinion of
+  Eutyches has been confuted on the ground that, although there are three
+  ways by which the one nature can subsist of the two, viz. either the
+  translation of divinity into humanity or of humanity into divinity or
+  the compounding of both together, the foregoing train of reasoning
+  proves that no one of the three ways is a possibility.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Restat ut, quemadmodum catholica fides dicat, et in utrisque naturis
+Christum et ex utrisque consistere doceamus.
+
+Ex utrisque naturis aliquid consistere duo significat: unum quidem, cum ita
+dicimus aliquid ex duabus naturis iungi sicut ex melle atque aqua, id autem
+est ut ex quolibet modo confusis, uel si una uertatur in alteram uel si
+utraeque in se inuicem misceantur, nullo modo tamen utraeque permaneant;
+secundum hunc modum Eutyches ait ex utrisque naturis Christum consistere.
+
+Alter uero modus est ex utrisque consistendi quod ita ex duabus iunctum
+est, ut illa tamen ex quibus iunctum esse dicitur maneant nec in alterutra
+uertantur, ut cum dicimus coronam ex auro gemmisque compositam. Hic neque
+aurum in gemmas translatum est neque in aurum gemma conuersa, sed utraque
+permanent nec formam propriam derelinquunt. Talia ergo ex aliquibus
+constantia et in his constare dicimus ex quibus consistere praedicantur.
+Tunc enim possumus dicere coronam gemmis auroque consistere; sunt enim
+gemmae atque aurum in quibus corona consistat. Nam in priore modo non est
+mel atque aqua in quibus illud quod ex utrisque iungitur constet. Cum
+igitur utrasque manere naturas in Christo fides catholica confiteatur
+perfectasque easdem persistere nec alteram in alteram transmutari, iure
+dicit et in utrisque naturis Christum et ex utrisque consistere: in
+utrisque quidem, quia manent utraeque, ex utrisque uero, quia utrarumque
+adunatione manentium una persona fit Christi. Non autem secundum eam
+significationem ex utrisque naturis Christum iunctum esse fides catholica
+tenet, secundum quam Eutyches pronuntiat. Nam ille talem significationem
+coniunctionis ex utraque natura sumit, ut non confiteatur in utrisque
+consistere, neque enim utrasque manere; catholicus uero eam significationem
+ex utrisque consistendi sumit quae illi sit proxima eamque conseruet quae
+in utrisque consistere confitetur.
+
+Aequiuocum igitur est "ex utrisque consistere" ac potius amphibolum et
+gemina significatione diuersa designans: una quidem significatione non
+manere substantias ex quibus illud quod copulatum est dicatur esse
+coniunctum, alio modo significans ita ex utrisque coniunctum, ut utraque
+permaneant.
+
+Hoc igitur expedito aequiuocationis atque ambiguitatis nodo nihil est ultra
+quod possit opponi, quin id sit quod firma ueraque fides catholica
+continet; eundem Christum hominem esse perfectum, eundem deum eundemque qui
+homo sit perfectus atque deus unum esse deum ac dei filium, nec
+quaternitatem trinitati adstrui, dum homo additur supra perfectum deum, sed
+unam eandemque personam numerum trinitatis explere, ut cum humanitas passa
+sit, deus tamen passus esse dicatur, non quo ipsa deitas humanitas facta
+sit, sed quod a deitate fuerit adsumpta. Item qui homo est, dei filius
+appellatur non substantia diuinitatis sed humanitatis, quae tamen
+diuinitati naturali unitate coniuncta est. Et cum haec ita intellegentia
+discernantur permisceanturque, tamen unus idemque et homo sit perfectus et
+deus: deus quidem, quod ipse sit ex patris substantia genitus, homo uero,
+quod ex Maria sit uirgine procreatus. Itemque qui homo, deus eo quod a deo
+fuerit adsumptus, et qui deus, homo, quoniam uestitus homine sit. Cumque in
+eadem persona aliud sit diuinitas quae suscepit, aliud quam suscepit
+humanitas, idem tamen deus atque homo est. Nam si hominem intellegas, idem
+homo est atque deus, quoniam homo ex natura, deus adsumptione. Si uero deum
+intellegas, idem deus est atque homo, quoniam natura deus est, homo
+adsumptione. Fitque in eo gemina natura geminaque substantia, quoniam homo-
+deus unaque persona, quoniam idem homo atque deus. Mediaque est haec inter
+duas haereses uia sicut uirtutes quoque medium tenent. Omnis enim uirtus in
+medio rerum decore locata consistit. Siquid enim uel ultra uel infra quam
+oportuerit fiat, a uirtute disceditur. Medietatem igitur uirtus tenet.
+
+Quocirca si quattuor haec neque ultra neque infra esse possunt, ut in
+Christo aut duae naturae sint duaeque personae ut Nestorius ait, aut una
+persona unaque natura ut Eutyches ait, aut duae naturae sed una persona ut
+catholica fides credit, aut una natura duaeque personae,[73] cumque duas
+quidem naturas duasque personas in ea quae contra Nestorium dicta est
+responsione conuicerimus (unam uero personam unamque naturam esse non posse
+Eutyche proponente monstrauimus neque tamen tam amens quisquam huc usque
+exstitit, ut unam in eo naturam crederet sed geminas esse personas), restat
+ut ea sit uera quam fides catholica pronuntiat geminam substantiam sed unam
+esse personam. Quia uero paulo ante diximus Eutychen confiteri duas quidem
+in Christo ante adunationem naturas, unam uero post adunationem, cumque
+hunc errorem duplicem interpretaremur celare sententiam, ut haec adunatio
+aut generatione fieret, cum ex Maria corpus hominis minime sumeretur aut ad
+sumptum[74] quidem ex Maria per resurrectionem fieret adunatio, de utrisque
+quidem partibus idonee ut arbitror disputatum est. Nunc quaerendum est
+quomodo fieri potuerit ut duae naturae in unam substantiam miscerentur.
+
+
+[73] quod nullus haereticus adhuc attigit _addunt codices quidam_.
+
+[74] sumptum _codd._; adsumptum _preli diabolus_, ad sumptum _nos_.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  It remains for us to show how in accordance with the affirmation of
+  Catholic belief Christ consists at once in and of both natures.
+
+  The statement that a thing consists of two natures bears two meanings;
+  one, when we say that anything is a union of two natures, as e.g. honey
+  and water, where the union is such that in the combination, however the
+  elements be confounded, whether by one nature changing into the other,
+  or by both mingling with each other, the two entirely disappear. This is
+  the way in which according to Eutyches Christ consists of two natures.
+
+  The other way in which a thing can consist of two natures is when it is
+  so combined of two that the elements of which it is said to be combined
+  continue without changing into each other, as when we say that a crown
+  is composed of gold and gems. Here neither is the gold converted into
+  gems nor is the gem turned into gold, but both continue without
+  surrendering their proper form.
+
+  Things then like this, composed of various elements, we say consist also
+  in the elements of which they are composed. For in this case we can say
+  that a crown is composed of gems and gold, for gems and gold are that in
+  which the crown consists. For in the former mode of composition honey
+  and water is not that in which the resulting union of both consists.
+
+  Since then the Catholic Faith confesses that both natures continue in
+  Christ and that they both remain perfect, neither being transformed into
+  the other, it says with right that Christ consists both in and of the
+  two natures; _in_ the two because both continue, _of_ the two
+  because the One Person of Christ is formed by the union of the two
+  continuing natures.
+
+  But the Catholic Faith does not hold the union of Christ out of two
+  natures according to that sense which Eutyches puts upon it. For the
+  interpretation of the conjunction out of two natures which he adopts
+  forbids him to confess consistence in two or the continuance of the two
+  either; but the Catholic adopts an interpretation of the consistence out
+  of two which comes near to that of Eutyches, yet keeps the
+  interpretation which confesses consistence in two.
+
+  "To consist of two natures" is therefore an equivocal or rather a
+  doubtful term of double meaning denoting different things; according to
+  one of its interpretations the substances out of which the union is said
+  to have been composed do not continue, according to another the union
+  effected of the two is such that both natures continue.
+
+  When once this knot of doubt or ambiguity has been untied, nothing
+  further can be advanced to shake the true and solid content of the
+  Catholic Faith, which is that the same Christ is perfect man and God,
+  and that He who is perfect man and God is One God and Son of Man, that,
+  however, quaternity is not added to the Trinity by the addition of human
+  nature to perfect Godhead, but that one and the same Person completes
+  the number of the Trinity, so that, although it was the manhood which
+  suffered, yet God can be said to have suffered, not by manhood becoming
+  Godhead but by manhood being assumed by Godhead. Further, He who is man
+  is called Son of God not in virtue of divine but of human substance,
+  which latter none the less was conjoined to Godhead in a unity of
+  natures. And although thought is able to distinguish and combine the
+  manhood and the Godhead, yet one and the same is perfect man and God,
+  God because He was begotten of the substance of the Father, but man
+  because He was engendered of the Virgin Mary. And further He who is man
+  is God in that manhood was assumed by God, and He who is God is man in
+  that God was clothed with manhood. And although in the same Person the
+  Godhead which took manhood is different from the manhood which It took,
+  yet the same is God and man. For if you think of man, the same is man
+  and God, being man by nature, God by assumption. But if you think of
+  God, the same is God and man, being God by nature, man by assumption.
+  And in Him nature becomes double and substance double because He is God-
+  man, and One Person since the same is man and God. This is the middle
+  way between two heresies, just as virtues also hold a middle place.[75]
+  For every virtue has a place of honour midway between extremes. For if
+  it stands beyond or below where it should it ceases to be virtue. And so
+  virtue holds a middle place.
+
+  Wherefore if the following four assertions can be said to be neither
+  beyond or below reason, viz. that in Christ are either two Natures and
+  two Persons as Nestorius says, or one Person and one Nature as Eutyches
+  says, or two Natures but one Person as the Catholic Faith believes, or
+  one Nature and two Persons, and inasmuch as we have refuted the doctrine
+  of two Natures and two Persons in our argument against Nestorius and
+  incidentally have shown that the one Person and one Nature suggested by
+  Eutyches is impossible--since there has never been anyone so mad as to
+  believe that His Nature was single but His Person double--it remains
+  that the article of belief must be true which the Catholic Faith
+  affirms, viz. that the Nature is double, but the Person one. But as I
+  have just now remarked that Eutyches confesses two Natures in Christ
+  before the union, but only one after the union, and since I proved that
+  under this error lurked two opposite opinions, one, that the union was
+  brought about by conception although the human body was certainly not
+  taken from Mary; the other, that the body taken from Mary formed part of
+  the union by means of the Resurrection, I have, it seems to me, argued
+  the twofold aspect of the case as completely as it deserves. What we
+  have now to inquire is how it came to pass that two Natures were
+  combined into one Substance.
+
+
+  [75] _Vide supra_, p. 100 note.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Verumtamen est etiam nunc et alia quaestio quae ab his inferri potest qui
+corpus humanum ex Maria sumptum esse non credunt, sed alias fuisse
+sequestratum praeparatumque quod in adunatione ex Mariae utero gigni ac
+proferri uideretur. Aiunt enim: si ex homine sumptum est corpus, homo uero
+omnis ex prima praeuaricatione non solum peccato et morte tenebatur, uerum
+etiam affectibus peccatorum erat implicitus, eaque illi fuit poena peccati,
+ut, cum morte teneretur obstrictus, tamen esset reus etiam uoluntate
+peccandi, cur in Christo neque peccatum fuit neque uoluntas ulla peccandi?
+Et omnino habet animaduertendam dubitationem talis quaestio. Si enim ex
+carne humana Christi corpus adsumptum est, dubitari potest, quaenam caro
+haec quae adsumpta sit esse uideatur. Eum quippe saluauit quem etiam
+adsumpsit; sin uero talem hominem adsumpsit qualis Adam fuit ante peccatum,
+integram quidem uidetur humanam adsumpsisse naturam, sed tamen quae
+medicina penitus non egebat. Quomodo autem fieri potest, ut talem
+adsumpserit hominem qualis Adam fuit, cum in Adam potuerit esse peccandi
+uoluntas atque affectio, unde factum est ut etiam praetergressis diuinis
+praeceptis inoboedientiae delictis teneretur adstrictus? In Christo uero ne
+uoluntas quidem ulla creditur fuisse peccandi, cum praesertim si tale
+corpus hominis adsumpsit quale Adae ante peccatum fuit, non debuerit esse
+mortalis, quoniam Adam, si non peccasset, mortem nulla ratione sensisset.
+Cum igitur Christus non peccauerit, quaerendum est cur senserit mortem, si
+Adae corpus ante quam peccaret adsumpsit. Quod si talem statum suscepit
+hominis qualis Adae post peccatum fuit, uidetur etiam Christo non defuisse
+necessitas, ut et delictis subiceretur et passionibus confunderetur
+obductisque iudicii regulis bonum a malo non sincera integritate
+discerneret, quoniam has omnes poenas Adam delicti praeuaricatione
+suscepit.
+
+Contra quos respondendum est tres intellegi hominum posse status: unum
+quidem Adae ante delictum in quo, tametsi ab eo mors aberat nec adhuc ullo
+se delicto polluerat, poterat tamen in eo uoluntas esse peccandi: alter in
+quo mutari potuisset, si firmiter in dei praeceptis manere uoluisset, tunc
+enim id addendum foret ut non modo non peccaret aut peccare uellet sed ne
+posset quidem aut peccare aut uelle delinquere. Tertius status est post
+delictum in quo mors illum necessario subsecuta est et peccatum ipsum
+uoluntasque peccati. Quorum summitatum atque contrariorum haec loca sunt:
+is status qui praemium esset, si in praeceptis dei Adam manere uoluisset et
+is qui poenae fuit, quoniam manere noluit; in illo enim nec mors esset nec
+peccatum nec uoluntas ulla peccati, in hoc uero et mors et peccatum et
+delinquendi omnis affectio omniaque in perniciem prona nec quicquam in se
+opis habentia, ut post lapsum posset adsurgere. Ille uero medius status in
+quo praesentia quidem mortis uel peccati aberat, potestas uero utriusque
+constabat, inter utrumque statum est conlocatus. Ex his igitur tribus
+statibus Christus corporeae naturae singulas quodam modo indidit causas;
+nam quod mortale corpus adsumpsit ut mortem a genere humano fugaret, in eo
+statu ponendum est quod post Adae praeuaricationem poenaliter inflictum
+est. Quod uero non fuit in eo uoluntas ulla peccati, ex eo sumptum est
+statu qui esse potuisset, nisi uoluntatem insidiantis fraudibus
+applicasset. Restat igitur tertius status id est medius, ille scilicet qui
+eo tempore fuit, cum nec mors aderat et adesse poterat delinquendi
+uoluntas. In hoc igitur Adam talis fuit ut manducaret ac biberet, ut
+accepta digereret, ut laberetur in somnum et alia quae ei non defuerunt
+humana quidem sed concessa et quae nullam poenam mortis inferrent.
+
+Quae omnia habuisse Christum dubium non est; nam et manducauit et bibit et
+humani corporis officio functus est. Neque enim tanta indigentia in Adam
+fuisse credenda est ut nisi manducasset uiuere non potuisset, sed, si ex
+omni quidem ligno escam sumeret, semper uiuere potuisset hisque non mori;
+idcirco paradisi fructibus indigentiam explebat. Quam indigentiam fuisse in
+Christo nullus ignorat, sed potestate non necessitate; et ipsa indigentia
+ante resurrectionem in eo fuit, post resurrectionem uero talis exstitit ut
+ita illud corpus inmutaretur humanum, sicut Adae praeter praeuaricationis
+uinculum mutari potuisset. Quodque nos ipse dominus Iesus Christus uotis
+docuit optare, ut fiat uoluntas eius sicut in caelo et in terra et ut
+adueniat eius regnum et nos liberet a malo. Haec enim omnia illa beatissima
+humani generis fideliter credentium inmutatio deprecatur.
+
+Haec sunt quae ad te de fidei meae credulitate scripsi. Qua in re si quid
+perperam dictum est, non ita sum amator mei, ut ea quae semel effuderim
+meliori sententiae anteferre contendam. Si enim nihil est ex nobis boni,
+nihil est quod in nostris sententiis amare debeamus. Quod si ex illo cuncta
+sunt bona qui solus est bonus, illud potius bonum esse credendum est quod
+illa incommutabilis bonitas atque omnium bonorum causa perscribit.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Nevertheless there remains yet another question which can be advanced by
+  those who do not believe that the human body was taken from Mary, but
+  that the body was in some other way set apart and prepared, which in the
+  moment of union appeared to be conceived and born of Mary's womb. For
+  they say: if the body was taken from man while every man was, from the
+  time of the first disobedience, not only enslaved by sin and death but
+  also involved in sinful desires, and if his punishment for sin was that,
+  although he was held in chains of death, yet at the same time he should
+  be guilty because of the will to sin, why was there in Christ neither
+  sin nor any will to sin? And certainly such a question is attended by a
+  difficulty which deserves attention. For if the body of Christ was
+  assumed from human flesh, it is open to doubt of what kind we must
+  consider that flesh to be which was assumed.
+
+  In truth, the manhood which He assumed He likewise saved; but if He
+  assumed such manhood as Adam had before sin, He appears to have assumed
+  a human nature complete indeed, but one which was in no need of healing.
+  But how can it be that He assumed such manhood as Adam had when there
+  could be in Adam both the will and the desire to sin, whence it came to
+  pass that even after the divine commands had been broken, he was still
+  held captive to sins of disobedience? But we believe that in Christ
+  there was never any will to sin, because especially if He assumed such a
+  human body as Adam had before his sin, He could not be mortal, since
+  Adam, had he not sinned, would in no wise have suffered death. Since,
+  then, Christ never sinned, it must be asked why He suffered death if He
+  assumed the body of Adam before sin. But if He accepted human conditions
+  such as Adam's were after sin, it seems that Christ could not avoid
+  being subject to sin, perplexed by passions, and, since the canons of
+  judgment were obscured, prevented from distinguishing with unclouded
+  reason between good and evil, since Adam by his disobedience incurred
+  all these penalties of crime.
+
+  To whom we must reply[76] that there are three states of man to
+  envisage: one, that of Adam before his sin, in which, though free from
+  death and still unstained by any sin, he could yet have within him the
+  will to sin; the second, that in which he might have suffered change had
+  he chosen to abide steadfastly in the commands of God, for then it could
+  have been further granted him not only not to sin or wish to sin, but to
+  be incapable of sinning or of the will to transgress. The third state is
+  the state after sin, into which man needs must be pursued by death and
+  sin and the sinful will. Now the points of extreme divergence between
+  these states are the following: one state would have been for Adam a
+  reward if he had chosen to abide in God's laws; the other was his
+  punishment because he would not abide in them; for in the former state
+  there would have been no death nor sin nor sinful will, in the latter
+  there was both death and sin and every desire to transgress, and a
+  general tendency to ruin and a condition helpless to render possible a
+  rise after the Fall. But that middle state from which actual death or
+  sin was absent, but the power for both remained, is situate between the
+  other two.
+
+  Each one, then, of these three states somehow supplied to Christ a cause
+  for his corporeal nature; thus His assumption of a mortal body in order
+  to drive death far from the human race belongs properly to that state
+  which was laid on man by way of punishment after Adam's sin, whereas the
+  fact that there was in Christ no sinful will is borrowed from that state
+  which might have been if Adam had not surrendered his will to the frauds
+  of the tempter. There remains, then, the third or middle state, to wit,
+  that which was before death had come and while the will to sin might yet
+  be present. In this state, therefore, Adam was able to eat and drink,
+  digest the food he took, fall asleep, and perform all the other
+  functions which always belonged to him as man, though they were allowed
+  and brought with them no pain of death.
+
+  There is no doubt that Christ was in all points thus conditioned; for He
+  ate and drank and discharged the bodily function of the human body. For
+  we must not think that Adam was at the first subject to such need that
+  unless he ate he could not have lived, but rather that, if he had taken
+  food from every tree, he could have lived for ever, and by that food
+  have escaped death; and so by the fruits of the Garden he satisfied a
+  need.[77] And all know that in Christ the same need dwelt, but lying in
+  His own power and not laid upon Him. And this need was in Him before the
+  Resurrection, but after the Resurrection He became such that His human
+  body was changed as Adam's might have been but for the bands of
+  disobedience. Which state, moreover, our Lord Jesus Christ Himself
+  taught us to desire in our prayers, asking that His Will be done as in
+  heaven so on earth, and that His Kingdom come, and that He may deliver
+  us from evil. For all these things are sought in prayer by those members
+  of the human family who rightly believe and who are destined to undergo
+  that most blessed change of all.[78]
+
+  So much have I written to you concerning what I believe should be
+  believed. In which matter if I have said aught amiss, I am not so well
+  pleased with myself as to try to press my effusions in the face of wiser
+  judgment. For if there is no good thing in us there is nothing we should
+  fancy in our opinions. But if all things are good as coming from Him who
+  alone is good, that rather must be thought good which the Unchangeable
+  Good and Cause of all Good indites.
+
+
+  [76] This _respondendum_ has the true Thomist ring.
+
+  [77] Adam did not need to eat in order to live, but if he had not eaten
+  he would have suffered hunger, etc.
+
+  [78] The whole of this passage might be set in _Tr._ iv. without
+  altering the tone.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. EX MAG. OFF. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER I.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi,
+  Flebilis heu maestos cogor inire modos.
+Ecce mihi lacerae dictant scribenda Camenae
+  Et ueris elegi fletibus ora rigant.
+Has saltem nullus potuit peruincere terror,                               5
+  Ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter.
+Gloria felicis olim uiridisque iuuentae
+  Solantur maesti nunc mea fata senis.
+Venit enim properata malis inopina senectus
+  Et dolor aetatem iussit inesse suam.                                   10
+Intempestiui funduntur uertice cani
+  Et tremit effeto corpore laxa cutis.
+Mors hominum felix quae se nec dulcibus annis
+  Inserit et maestis saepe uocata uenit.
+Eheu quam surda miseros auertitur aure                                   15
+  Et flentes oculos claudere saeua negat.
+Dum leuibus male fida bonis fortuna faueret,
+  Paene caput tristis merserat hora meum.
+Nunc quia fallacem mutauit nubila uultum,
+  Protrahit ingratas impia uita moras.                                   20
+Quid me felicem totiens iactastis amici?
+  Qui cecidit, stabili non erat ille gradu.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FIRST BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+  CONTAINING HIS COMPLAINT AND MISERIES
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  I that with youthful heat did verses write,
+  Must now my woes in doleful tunes indite.
+  My work is framed by Muses torn and rude,
+  And my sad cheeks are with true tears bedewed:
+  For these alone no terror could affray
+  From being partners of my weary way.
+  The art that was my young life's joy and glory
+  Becomes my solace now I'm old and sorry;
+  Sorrow has filched my youth from me, the thief!
+  My days are numbered not by time but Grief.[79]
+  Untimely hoary hairs cover my head,
+  And my loose skin quakes on my flesh half dead.
+  O happy death, that spareth sweetest years,
+  And comes in sorrow often called with tears.
+  Alas, how deaf is he to wretch's cries;
+  And loath he is to close up weeping eyes;
+  While trustless chance me with vain favours crowned,
+  That saddest hour my life had almost drowned:
+  Now she hath clouded her deceitful face,
+  My spiteful days prolong their weary race.
+  My friends, why did you count me fortunate?
+  He that is fallen, ne'er stood in settled state.
+
+
+  [79] Literally "For Old Age, unlooked for, sped by evils, has come, and
+  Grief has bidden her years lie on me."
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili
+officio signarem, adstitisse mihi supra uerticem uisa est mulier reuerendi
+admodum uultus, oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum ualentiam
+perspicacibus colore uiuido atque inexhausti uigoris, quamuis ita aeui
+plena foret ut nullo modo nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis
+ambiguae. Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese hominum mensuram cohibebat, nunc
+uero pulsare caelum summi uerticis cacumine uidebatur; quae cum altius
+caput extulisset, ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum
+frustrabatur intuitum. Vestes erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio,
+indissolubili materia perfectae quas, uti post eadem prodente cognoui, suis
+manibus ipsa texuerat. Quarum speciem, ueluti fumosas imagines solet,
+caligo quaedam neglectae uetustatis obduxerat. Harum in extrema margine
+[Greek: PI] Graecum, in supremo uero [Greek: THETA], legebatur intextum.
+Atque inter utrasque litteras in scalarum modum gradus quidam insigniti
+uidebantur quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus. Eandem
+tamen uestem uiolentorum quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas
+quisque potuit abstulerant. Et dextera quidem eius libellos, sceptrum uero
+sinistra gestabat.
+
+Quae ubi poeticas Musas uidit nostro adsistentes toro fletibusque meis
+uerba dictantes, commota paulisper ac toruis inflammata luminibus: "Quis,"
+inquit, "has scenicas meretriculas ad hunc aegrum permisit accedere quae
+dolores eius non modo nullis remediis fouerent, uerum dulcibus insuper
+alerent uenenis? Hae sunt enim quae infructuosis affectuum spinis uberem
+fructibus rationis segetem necant hominumque mentes assuefaciunt morbo, non
+liberant. At si quem profanum, uti uulgo solitum uobis, blanditiae uestrae
+detraherent, minus moleste ferendum putarem; nihil quippe in eo nostrae
+operae laederentur. Hunc uero Eleaticis atque Academicis studiis
+innutritum? Sed abite potius Sirenes usque in exitium dulces meisque eum
+Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite."
+
+His ille chorus increpitus deiecit humi maestior uultum confessusque rubore
+uerecundiam limen tristis excessit. At ego cuius acies lacrimis mersa
+caligaret nec dinoscere possem, quaenam haec esset mulier tam imperiosae
+auctoritatis, obstipui uisuque in terram defixo quidnam deinceps esset
+actura, exspectare tacitus coepi. Tum illa propius accedens in extrema
+lectuli mei parte consedit meumque intuens uultum luctu grauem atque in
+humum maerore deiectum his uersibus de nostrae mentis perturbatione
+conquesta est.
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  While I ruminated these things with myself, and determined to set forth
+  my woful complaint in writing, methought I saw a woman stand above my
+  head, having a grave countenance, glistening clear eye, and of quicker
+  sight than commonly Nature doth afford; her colour fresh and bespeaking
+  unabated vigour, and yet discovering so many years, that she could not
+  at all be thought to belong to our times; her stature uncertain and
+  doubtful, for sometime she exceeded not the common height of men, and
+  sometime she seemed to touch the heavens with her head, and if she
+  lifted it up to the highest, she pierced the very heavens, so that she
+  could not be seen by the beholders; her garments were made of most fine
+  threads with cunning workmanship into an ever-during stuff, which (as I
+  knew afterward by her own report) she had woven with her own hands. A
+  certain duskishness caused by negligence and time had darkened their
+  colour, as it is wont to happen when pictures stand in a smoky room. In
+  the lower part of them was placed the Greek letter [Greek: PI], and in
+  the upper [Greek: THETA],[80] and betwixt the two letters, in the manner
+  of stairs, there were certain degrees made, by which there was a passage
+  from the lower to the higher letter: this her garment had been cut by
+  the violence of some, who had taken away such pieces as they could get.
+  In her right hand she had certain books, and in her left hand she held a
+  sceptre.
+
+  This woman, seeing the poetical Muses standing about my bed, and
+  suggesting words to my tears, being moved for a little space, and
+  inflamed with angry looks: "Who," saith she, "hath permitted these
+  tragical harlots to have access to this sick man, which will not only
+  not comfort his grief with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them
+  with sugared poison? For these be they which with the fruitless thorns
+  of affections do kill the fruitful crop of reason, and do accustom men's
+  minds to sickness, instead of curing them. But if your flattery did
+  deprive us of some profane fellow,[81] as commonly it happeneth, I
+  should think that it were not so grievously to be taken, for in him our
+  labours should receive no harm. But now have you laid hold of him who
+  hath been brought up in Eleatical and Academical studies?[82] Rather get
+  you gone, you Sirens pleasant even to destruction, and leave him to my
+  Muses to be cured and healed."
+
+  That company being thus checked, overcome with grief, casting their eyes
+  upon the ground, and betraying their bashfulness with blushing, went
+  sadly away. But I, whose sight was dimmed with tears, so that I could
+  not discern what this woman might be, so imperious, and of such
+  authority, was astonished, and, fixing my countenance upon the earth,
+  began to expect with silence what she would do afterward. Then she
+  coming nigher, sat down at my bed's feet, and beholding my countenance
+  sad with mourning, and cast upon the ground with grief, complained of
+  the perturbation of my mind with these verses.
+
+
+  [80] Cf. "est enim philosophia genus, species uero eius duae, una quae
+  [Greek: theoraetikae] dicitur, altera quae [Greek: praktikae], id est
+  speculatiua et actiua." Boeth. _In Porph. Dial._ i.
+
+  [81] This scorn of the _profanum vulgus_ appears again and again in the
+  theological tractates, e.g. _Tr._ iii. (_supra_, p. 4), _Tr._ v.
+  (_supra_, p. 74).
+
+  [82] Zeno of Elea invented Dialectic: Plato was the first to lecture on
+  philosophy in the gymnasium of the Academia.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Heu quam praecipiti mersa profundo
+Mens hebet et propria luce relicta
+Tendit in externas ire tenebras,
+Terrenis quotiens flatibus aucta
+Crescit in inmensum noxia cura.                                           5
+Hic quondam caelo liber aperto
+Suetus in aetherios ire meatus
+Cernebat rosei lumina solis,
+Visebat gelidae sidera lunae
+Et quaecumque uagos stella recursus                                      10
+Exercet uarios flexa per orbes,
+Comprensam numeris uictor habebat.
+Quin etiam causas unde sonora
+Flamina sollicitent aequora ponti,
+Quis uoluat stabilem spiritus orbem                                      15
+Vel cur hesperias sidus in undas
+Casurum rutilo surgat ab ortu,
+Quid ueris placidas temperet horas,
+Vt terram roseis floribus ornet,
+Quis dedit ut pleno fertilis anno                                        20
+Autumnus grauidis influat uuis
+Rimari solitus atque latentis
+Naturae uarias reddere causas,
+Nunc iacet effeto lumine mentis
+Et pressus grauibus colla catenis                                        25
+Decliuemque gerens pondere uultum
+Cogitur, heu, stolidam cernere terram.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  Alas, how thy dull mind is headlong cast
+  In depths of woe, where, all her light once lost,
+  She doth to walk in utter darkness haste,
+  While cares grow great with earthly tempests tost.
+  He that through the opened heavens did freely run,
+  And used to travel the celestial ways,
+  Marking the rosy splendour of the sun,
+  And noting Cynthia's cold and watery rays;
+  He that did bravely comprehend in verse
+  The different spheres and wandering course of stars,
+  He that was wont the causes to rehearse
+  Why sounding winds do with the seas make wars,
+  What spirit moves the world's well-settled frame,
+  And why the sun, whom forth the east doth bring,
+  In western waves doth hide his falling flame,
+  Searching what power tempers the pleasing Spring
+  Which makes the earth her rosy flowers to bear,
+  Whose gift it is that Autumn's fruitful season
+  Should with full grapes flow in a plenteous year,
+  Telling of secret Nature every reason,
+  Now having lost the beauty of his mind
+  Lies with his neck compassed in ponderous chains;
+  His countenance with heavy weight declined,
+  Him to behold the sullen earth constrains.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+"Sed medicinae," inquit, "tempus est quam querelae." Tum uero totis in me
+intenta luminibus: "Tune ille es," ait, "qui nostro quondam lacte nutritus
+nostris educatus alimentis in uirilis animi robur euaseras? Atqui talia
+contuleramus arma quae nisi prior abiecisses, inuicta te firmitate
+tuerentur. Agnoscisne me? Quid taces? Pudore an stupore siluisti? Mallem
+pudore, sed te, ut uideo, stupor oppressit." Cumque me non modo tacitum sed
+elinguem prorsus mutumque uidisset, admouit pectori meo leniter manum et:
+"Nihil," inquit, "pericli est; lethargum patitur communem inlusarum mentium
+morbum. Sui paulisper oblitus est; recordabitur facile, si quidem nos ante
+cognouerit. Quod ut possit, paulisper lumina eius mortalium rerum nube
+caligantia tergamus." Haec dixit oculosque meos fletibus undantes contracta
+in rugam ueste siccauit.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  "But it is rather time," saith she, "to apply remedies, than to make
+  complaints." And then looking wistfully upon me: "Art thou he," saith
+  she, "which, being long since nursed with our milk, and brought up with
+  our nourishments, wert come to man's estate? But we had given thee such
+  weapons as, if thou hadst not cast them away, would have made thee
+  invincible. Dost thou not know me? Why dost thou not speak? Is it
+  shamefastness or insensibleness that makes thee silent? I had rather it
+  were shamefastness, but I perceive thou art become insensible." And
+  seeing me not only silent but altogether mute and dumb, fair and easily
+  she laid her hand upon my breast saying: "There is no danger; he is in a
+  lethargy, the common disease of deceived minds; he hath a little forgot
+  himself, but he will easily remember himself again, if he be brought to
+  know us first. To which end, let us a little wipe his eyes, dimmed with
+  the cloud of mortal things." And having thus said, with a corner of her
+  garment she dried my eyes which were wet with tears.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Tunc me discussa liquerunt nocte tenebrae
+  Luminibusque prior rediit uigor,
+Vt, cum praecipiti glomerantur sidera Coro
+  Nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus,
+Sol latet ac nondum caelo uenientibus astris,                             5
+  Desuper in terram nox funditur;
+Hanc si Threicio Boreas emissus ab antro
+  Verberet et clausam reseret diem,
+Emicat ac subito uibratus lumine Phoebus
+  Mirantes oculos radiis ferit.                                          10
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Then fled the night and darkness did me leave.
+  Mine eyes their wonted strength receive,
+  As when swift Corus spreads the stars with clouds
+    And the clear sky a veil of tempest shrouds
+  The sun doth lurk, the earth receiveth night.
+    Lacking the boon of starry light;
+  But if fierce Boreas, sent from Thrace, make way
+    For the restoring of the day,
+  Phoebus with fresh and sudden beams doth rise,
+    Striking with light our wondering eyes.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis hausi caelum et ad cognoscendam
+medicantis faciem mentem recepi. Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos
+intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam cuius ab adulescentia laribus
+obuersatus fueram Philosophiam. "Et quid," inquam, "tu in has exilii nostri
+solitudines o omnium magistra uirtutum supero cardine delapsa uenisti? An
+ut tu quoque mecum rea falsis criminationibus agiteris?
+
+"An," inquit illa, "te alumne desererem nec sarcinam quam mei nominis
+inuidia sustulisti, communicato tecum labore partirer? Atqui Philosophiae
+fas non erat incomitatum relinquere iter innocentis; meam scilicet
+criminationem uererer et quasi nouum aliquid acciderit, perhorrescerem?
+Nunc enim primum censes apud inprobos mores lacessitam periculis esse
+sapientiam? Nonne apud ueteres quoque ante nostri Platonis aetatem magnum
+saepe certamen cum stultitiae temeritate certauimus eodemque superstite
+praeceptor eius Socrates iniustae uictoriam mortis me adstante promeruit?
+Cuius hereditatem cum deinceps Epicureum uulgus ac Stoicum ceterique pro
+sua quisque parte raptum ire molirentur meque reclamantem renitentemque
+uelut in partem praedae traherent, uestem quam meis texueram manibus,
+disciderunt abreptisque ab ea panniculis totam me sibi cessisse credentes
+abiere. In quibus quoniam quaedam nostri habitus uestigia uidebantur, meos
+esse familiares inprudentia rata nonnullos eorum profanae multitudinis
+errore peruertit.
+
+Quod si nec Anaxagorae fugam nec Socratis uenenum nec Zenonis tormenta
+quoniam sunt peregrina nouisti, at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos quorum
+nec peruetusta nec incelebris memoria est, scire potuisti. Quos nihil aliud
+in cladem detraxit nisi quod nostris moribus instituti studiis improborum
+dissimillimi uidebantur. Itaque nihil est quod admirere, si in hoc uitae
+salo circumflantibus agitemur procellis, quibus hoc maxime propositum est
+pessimis displicere. Quorum quidem tametsi est numerosus exercitus,
+spernendus tamen est, quoniam nullo duce regitur, sed errore tantum temere
+ac passim lymphante raptatur. Qui si quando contra nos aciem struens
+ualentior incubuerit, nostra quidem dux copias suas in arcem contrahit,
+illi uero circa diripiendas inutiles sarcinulas occupantur. At nos desuper
+inridemus uilissima rerum quaeque rapientes securi totius furiosi tumultus
+eoque uallo muniti quo grassanti stultitiae adspirare fas non sit.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  In like manner, the mists of sadness dissolved, I came to myself and
+  recovered my judgment, so that I knew my Physician's face; wherefore
+  casting mine eyes upon her somewhat stedfastly, I beheld my nurse
+  Philosophy, in whose house I had remained from my youth, and I said: "O
+  Mistress of all virtues, for what cause art thou come from heaven into
+  this our solitary banishment? Art thou come to bear me company in being
+  falsely accused?"
+
+  "Should I," saith she, "forsake thee, my disciple, and not divide the
+  burden, which thou bearest through hatred of my name, by partaking of
+  thy labour? But Philosophy never thought it lawful to forsake the
+  innocent in his trouble. Should I fear any accusations, as though this
+  were any new matter? For dost thou think that this is the first time
+  that Wisdom hath been exposed to danger by wicked men? Have we not in
+  ancient times before our Plato's age had oftentimes great conflicts with
+  the rashness of folly? And while he lived, had not his master Socrates
+  the victory of an unjust death in my presence, whose inheritance, when
+  afterward the mob of Epicures, Stoics, and others (every one for his own
+  sect) endeavoured to usurp, and as it were in part of their prey, sought
+  to draw me to them, exclaiming and striving against them; they tore the
+  garment which I had woven with my own hands, and having gotten some
+  little pieces of it, thinking me to be wholly in their possession,
+  departed. Some of whom, because certain signs of my apparel appeared
+  upon them, were rashly supposed to be my familiar friends, and condemned
+  accordingly through the error of the profane multitude.
+
+  But if thou hast not heard of the flight of Anaxagoras, the poison of
+  Socrates, nor the torments of Zeno, because they are foreign examples;
+  yet thou mayst have heard of Canius, of Seneca, of Soranus,[83] whose
+  memory is both fresh and famous, whom nothing else brought to their
+  overthrow but that they had been instructed in our school and were
+  altogether disliking to the humours of wicked men; wherefore thou hast
+  no cause to marvel, if in the sea of this life we be tossed with
+  boisterous storms, whose chiefest purpose is to displease the wicked; of
+  which though there be an huge army, yet it is to be despised, because it
+  is not governed by any captain, but is carried up and down by
+  fantastical error without any order at all. And if at any time they
+  assail us with great force, our captain retireth her band into a
+  castle,[84] leaving them occupied in sacking unprofitable baggage. And
+  from above we laugh them to scorn for seeking so greedily after most
+  vile things, being safe from all their furious assault, and fortified
+  with that defence which aspiring folly cannot prevail against.
+
+
+  [83] On Julius Kanius or Canius the Stoic cf. Seneca, _De Tranq._ xiv.
+  4-9; on Soranus cf. Tac. _Annal._ i. 16.
+
+  [84] Cf. _arce religionis nostrae, Tr._ iv. (_supra_, p. 54).
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quisquis composito serenus aeuo
+Fatum sub pedibus egit[85] superbum
+Fortunamque tuens utramque rectus
+Inuictum potuit tenere uultum,
+Non illum rabies minaeque ponti                                           5
+Versum funditus exagitantis aestum
+Nec ruptis quotiens uagus caminis
+Torquet fumificos Vesaeuus ignes
+Aut celsas soliti ferire turres
+Ardentis uia fulminis mouebit.                                           10
+Quid tantum miseri saeuos tyrannos
+Mirantur sine uiribus furentes?
+Nec speres aliquid nec extimescas,
+Exarmaueris impotentis iram.
+At quisquis trepidus pauet uel optat,                                    15
+Quod non sit stabilis suique iuris,
+Abiecit clipeum locoque motus
+Nectit qua ualeat trahi catenam.
+
+
+[85] _Fortasse_ iecit; cf. Verg. _Georg._ ii. 491 _sq._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Who mildly can his age dispose,
+  And at his feet proud destiny throws:
+  Who stoutly doth each chance behold,
+  Keeping his countenance uncontrolled:
+  Not him the ocean's rage and threat,
+  Stirring the waves with angry heat,
+  Nor hot Vesuvius when he casts
+  From broken hills enflamed blasts,
+  Nor fiery thunder can dismay,
+  Which takes the tops of towers away.
+  Why do fierce tyrants us affright,
+  Whose rage is far beyond their might?
+  For nothing hope, nor fear thou harm,
+  So their weak wrath thou shalt disarm.
+  But he whom hope or terror takes,
+  Being a slave, his shield forsakes,
+  And leaves his place, and doth provide
+  A chain wherewith his hands are tied.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+"Sentisne," inquit, "haec atque animo inlabuntur tuo, an [Greek: onos
+luras]? Quid fles, quid lacrimis manas?
+
+[Greek: Exauda, mae keuthe nooi.]
+
+Si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet uulnus detegas."
+
+Tum ego collecto in uires animo: "Anne adhuc eget admonitione nec per se
+satis eminet fortunae in nos saeuientis asperitas? Nihilne te ipsa loci
+facies mouet? Haecine est bibliotheca, quam certissimam tibi sedem nostris
+in laribus ipsa delegeras? In qua mecum saepe residens de humanarum
+diuinarumque rerum scientia disserebas? Talis habitus talisque uultus erat,
+*cum tecum naturae secreta rimarer, cum mihi siderum uias radio
+describeres, cum mores nostros totiusque uitae rationem ad caelestis
+ordinis exempla formares? Haecine praemia referimus tibi obsequentes? Atqui
+tu hanc sententiam Platonis ore sanxisti: beatas fore res publicas, si eas
+uel studiosi sapientiae regerent uel earum rectores studere sapientiae
+contigisset. Tu eiusdem uiri ore hanc sapientibus capessendae rei publicae
+necessariam causam esse monuisti, ne improbis flagitiosisque ciuibus urbium
+relicta gubernacula pestem bonis ac perniciem ferrent.
+
+Hanc igitur auctoritatem secutus quod a te inter secreta otia didiceram
+transferre in actum publicae administrationis optaui. Tu mihi et qui te
+sapientium mentibus inseruit deus conscii nullum me ad magistratum nisi
+commune bonorum omnium studium detulisse. Inde cum inprobis graues
+inexorabilesque discordiae et quod conscientiae libertas habet, pro tuendo
+iure spreta potentiorum semper offensio.
+
+Quotiens ego Conigastum in inbecilli cuiusque fortunas impetum facientem
+obuius excepi, quotiens Triguillam regiae praepositum domus ab incepta,
+perpetrata iam prorsus iniuria deieci, quotiens miseros quos infinitis
+calumniis inpunita barbarorum semper auaritia uexabat, obiecta periculis
+auctoritate protexi! Numquam me ab iure ad iniuriam quisquam detraxit.
+Prouincialium fortunas tum priuatis rapinis tum publicis uectigalibus
+pessumdari non aliter quam qui patiebantur indolui.
+
+Cum acerbae famis tempore grauis atque inexplicabilis indicta coemptio
+profligatura inopia Campaniam prouinciam uideretur, certamen aduersum
+praefectum praetorii communis commodi ratione suscepi, rege cognoscente
+contendi et ne coemptio exigeretur, euici. Paulinum consularem uirum cuius
+opes Palatinae canes iam spe atque ambitione deuorassent, ab ipsis hiantium
+faucibus traxi. Ne Albinum consularem uirum praeiudicatae accusationis
+poena corriperet, odiis me Cypriani delatoris opposui. Satisne in me magnas
+uideor exaceruasse discordias? Sed esse apud ceteros tutior debui qui mihi
+amore iustitiae nihil apud aulicos quo magis essem tutior reseruaui. Quibus
+autem deferentibus perculsi sumus? Quorum Basilius olim regio ministerio
+depulsus in delationem nostri nominis alieni aeris necessitate compulsus
+est. Opilionem uero atque Gaudentium cum ob innumeras multiplicesque
+fraudes ire in exilium regia censura decreuisset cumque illi parere
+nolentes sacrarum sese aedium defensione tuerentur compertumque id regi
+foret, edixit: uti ni intra praescriptum diem Rauenna urbe decederent,
+notas insigniti frontibus pellerentur. Quid huic seueritati posse astrui
+uidetur? Atqui in eo die deferentibus eisdem nominis nostri delatio
+suscepta est. Quid igitur? Nostraene artes ita meruerunt? An illos
+accusatores iustos fecit praemissa damnatio? Itane nihil fortunam puduit si
+minus accusatae innocentiae, at accusantium uilitatis?[86] At cuius
+criminis arguimur summam quaeris? Senatum dicimur saluum esse uoluisse.
+Modum desideras? Delatorem ne documenta deferret quibus senatum maiestatis
+reum faceret impedisse criminamur.
+
+Quid igitur o magistra censes? Infitiabimur crimen, ne tibi pudor simus? At
+uolui nec umquam uelle desistam. Fatebimur? Sed impediendi delatoris opera
+cessauit. An optasse illius ordinis salutem nefas uocabo? Ille quidem suis
+de me decretis, uti hoc nefas esset, effecerat. Sed sibi semper mentiens
+inprudentia rerum merita non potest inmutare nec mihi Socratico decreto fas
+esse arbitror uel occuluisse ueritatem uel concessisse mendacium. Verum id
+quoquo modo sit, tuo sapientiumque iudicio aestimandum relinquo. Cuius rei
+seriem atque ueritatem, ne latere posteros queat, stilo etiam memoriaeque
+mandaui.
+
+Nam de compositis falso litteris quibus libertatem arguor sperasse Romanam
+quid attinet dicere? Quarum fraus aperta patuisset, si nobis ipsorum
+confessione delatorum, quod in omnibus negotiis maximas uires habet, uti
+licuisset. Nam quae sperari reliqua libertas potest? Atque utinam posset
+ulla! Respondissem Canii uerbo, qui cum a Gaio Caesare Germanici filio
+conscius contra se factae coniurationis fuisse diceretur: 'Si ego,' inquit,
+'scissem, tu nescisses.' Qua in re non ita sensus nostros maeror hebetauit
+ut impios scelerata contra uirtutem querar molitos, sed quae sperauerint
+effecisse uehementer admiror. Nam deteriora uelle nostri fuerit fortasse
+defectus, posse contra innocentiam, quae sceleratus quisque conceperit
+inspectante deo, monstri simile est. Vnde haud iniuria tuorum quidam
+familiarium quaesiuit: 'Si quidem deus,' inquit, 'est, unde mala? Bona uero
+unde, si non est?' Sed fas fuerit nefarios homines qui bonorum omnium
+totiusque senatus sanguinem petunt, nos etiam quos propugnare bonis
+senatuique uiderant, perditum ire uoluisse. Sed num idem de patribus quoque
+merebamur? Meministi, ut opinor, quoniam me dicturum quid facturumue
+praesens semper ipsa dirigebas, meministi, inquam, Veronae cum rex auidus
+exitii communis maiestatis crimen in Albinum delatae ad cunctum senatus
+ordinem transferre moliretur, uniuersi innocentiam senatus quanta mei
+periculi securitate defenderim. Scis me haec et uera proferre et in nulla
+umquam mei laude iactasse. Minuit enim quodam modo se probantis
+conscientiae secretum, quotiens ostentando quis factum recipit famae
+pretium. Sed innocentiam nostram quis exceperit euentus uides; pro uerae
+uirtutis praemiis falsi sceleris poenas subimus. Et cuius umquam facinoris
+manifesta confessio ita iudices habuit in seueritate concordes ut non
+aliquos uel ipse ingenii error humani uel fortunae condicio cunctis
+mortalibus incerta submitteret? Si inflammare sacras aedes uoluisse, si
+sacerdotes impio iugulare gladio, si bonis omnibus necem struxisse
+diceremur, praesentem tamen sententia, confessum tamen conuictumue
+punisset. Nunc quingentis fere passuum milibus procul muti atque indefensi
+ob studium propensius in senatum morti proscriptionique damnamur. O meritos
+de simili crimine neminem posse conuinci!
+
+Cuius dignitatem reatus ipsi etiam qui detulere uiderunt, quam uti alicuius
+sceleris admixtione fuscarent, ob ambitum dignitatis sacrilegio me
+conscientiam polluisse mentiti sunt. Atqui et tu insita nobis omnem rerum
+mortalium cupidinem de nostri animi sede pellebas et sub tuis oculis
+sacrilegio locum esse fas non erat. Instillabas enim auribus
+cogitationibusque cotidie meis Pythagoricum illud [Greek: hepou theoi].[87]
+Nec conueniebat uilissimorum me spirituum praesidia captare quem tu in hanc
+excellentiam componebas ut consimilem deo faceres. Praeterea penetral
+innocens domus, honestissimorum coetus amicorum, socer etiam sanctus et
+aeque ac tu ipsa[88] reuerendus ab omni nos huius criminis suspitione
+defendunt. Sed, o nefas, illi uero de te tanti criminis fidem capiunt atque
+hoc ipso uidebimur affines fuisse maleficio, quod tuis inbuti disciplinis,
+tuis instituti moribus sumus. Ita non est satis nihil mihi tuam profuisse
+reuerentiam, nisi ultro tu mea potius offensione lacereris. At uero hic
+etiam nostris malis cumulus accedit, quod existimatio plurimorum non rerum
+merita sed fortunae spectat euentum eaque tantum iudicat esse prouisa quae
+felicitas commendauerit. Quo fit ut existimatio bona prima omnium deserat
+infelices. Qui nunc populi rumores, quam dissonae multiplicesque
+sententiae, piget reminisci. Hoc tantum dixerim ultimam esse aduersae
+fortunae sarcinam, quod dum miseris aliquod crimen affingitur, quae
+perferunt meruisse creduntur. Et ego quidem bonis omnibus pulsus,
+dignitatibus exutus, existimatione foedatus ob beneficium supplicium tuli.
+
+Videre autem uideor nefarias sceleratorum officinas gaudio laetitiaque
+fluitantes, perditissimum quemque nouis delationum fraudibus imminentem,
+iacere bonos nostri discriminis terrore prostratos, flagitiosum quemque ad
+audendum quidem facinus impunitate, ad efficiendum uero praemiis incitari,
+insontes autem non modo securitate, uerum ipsa etiam defensione priuatos.
+Itaque libet exclamare:
+
+
+[86] uilitatis _Glareanus_; uilitas _codd._
+
+[87] [Greek: theon] _codd._
+
+[88] ipsa _Sitzmannus_; ipso _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  "Understandest thou these things," saith she, "and do they make
+  impression in thy mind? Art thou 'like the ass, deaf to the lyre'? Why
+  weepest thou? Why sheddest thou so many tears? Speak out; hide not thy
+  thoughts.[89] If thou expectest to be cured, thou must discover thy
+  wound.[90]"
+
+  Then I, collecting the forces of my mind together, made her answer in
+  these words: "Doth the cruelty of fortune's rage need further
+  declaration, or doth it not sufficiently appear of itself? Doth not the
+  very countenance of this place move thee? Is this the library which thou
+  thyself hadst chosen to sit in at my house, in which thou hast
+  oftentimes discoursed with me of the knowledge of divine and human
+  things? Had I this attire or countenance when I searched the secrets of
+  nature with thee, when thou describedst unto me the course of the stars
+  with thy geometrical rod, when thou didst frame my conversation and the
+  manner of my whole life according to the pattern of the celestial order?
+  Are these the rewards which thy obedient servants have? But thou didst
+  decree that sentence by the mouth of Plato: That commonwealths should be
+  happy, if either the students of wisdom did govern them, or those which
+  were appointed to govern them would give themselves to the study of
+  wisdom.[91] Thou by the same philosopher didst admonish us that it is a
+  sufficient cause for wise men to take upon themselves the government of
+  the commonwealth, lest, if the rule of cities were left in the hands of
+  lewd and wicked citizens, they should work the subversion and overthrow
+  of the good.
+
+  Wherefore, following this authority, I desired to practise that by
+  public administration which I had learnt of thee in private conference.
+  Thou and God Himself who had inserted thee in the minds of the wise, are
+  my witnesses that nothing but the common desire of all good men brought
+  me to be a magistrate. This hath been the cause of my grievous and
+  irreconcilable disagreements with wicked men, and that which freedom of
+  conscience carrieth with it, of ever contemning the indignation of
+  potentates for the defence of justice.
+
+  How often have I encountered with Conigastus, violently possessing
+  himself with poor men's goods? How often have I put back Triguilla,
+  Provost of the King's house, from injuries which he had begun, yea, and
+  finished also? How often have I protected, by putting my authority in
+  danger, such poor wretches as the unpunished covetousness of the
+  barbarous did vex with infinite reproaches? Never did any man draw me
+  from right to wrong. It grieved me no less than them which suffered it,
+  to see the wealth of our subjects wasted, partly by private pillage, and
+  partly by public tributes.
+
+  When in the time of a great dearth things were set at so excessive and
+  unreasonable a rate that the province of Campania was like to be
+  altogether impoverished, for the common good I stuck not to contend with
+  the chief Praetor himself, and the matter was discussed before the King,
+  and I prevailed so far that it went not forward. I drew Paulinus, who
+  had been Consul, out of the very mouth of the gaping courtiers, who like
+  ravenous curs had already in hope and ambition devoured his riches. That
+  Albinus who had likewise been Consul might not be punished upon
+  presumptuous[92] and false accusation, I exposed myself to the hatred of
+  Cyprian his accuser. May I seem to have provoked enmity enough against
+  myself? But others should so much the more have procured my safety,
+  since that for the love I bear to justice I left myself no way by the
+  means of courtiers to be safe. But by whose accusations did I receive
+  this blow? By theirs who, long since having put Basil out of the King's
+  service, compelled him now to accuse me, by the necessity which he was
+  driven to by debt. Opilio likewise and Gaudentius being banished by the
+  King's decree, for the injuries and manifold deceits which they had
+  committed, because they would not obey, defended themselves by taking
+  sanctuary, of which the King hearing, gave sentence, that unless they
+  departed out of the city of Ravenna within certain days, they should be
+  branded in the foreheads, and put out by force. What could be added to
+  this severity? And yet that very day their accusations against me went
+  for current. What might be the reason of this? Did my dealing deserve
+  it? Or did the condemnation, which went before, make them just accusers?
+  Was not fortune ashamed, if not that innocency was accused, yet at least
+  that it had so vile and base accusers? But what crime was laid to my
+  charge? Wilt thou have it in one word? I am said to have desired the
+  Senate's safety. Wilt thou know the manner how? I am blamed for having
+  hindered their accuser to bring forth evidence by which he should prove
+  the Senate guilty of treason.
+
+  What thinkest thou, O Mistress? Shall I deny this charge, that I may not
+  shame thee? But it is true, I desired it, neither will I ever cease from
+  having that desire. Shall I confess it? But I have already left
+  hindering their accuser. Shall I call it an offence to have wished the
+  safety of that order? Indeed the Senate with their decrees concerning me
+  had made it an offence. But folly, always deceiving herself, cannot
+  change the deserts of things, nor, according to the decree of
+  Socrates,[93] do I think it is lawful either to conceal the truth or
+  grant a lie. But how this may be, I leave to thine and Wisdom's censure.
+  And that posterity may not be ignorant of the course and truth of the
+  matter, I have put it down in writing.
+
+  For why should I speak of those feigned letters, in which I am charged
+  to have hoped for Roman liberty? The deceit of which would manifestly
+  have appeared, if it might have been lawful for me to have used the
+  confession of my very accusers, which in all business is of greatest
+  force. For what liberty remaineth there to be hoped for? I would to God
+  there were any! I would have answered as Canius did, who being charged
+  by Gaius Caesar, son to Germanicus, that he was privy to the conspiracy
+  made against him, answered: 'If I had been made acquainted with it, thou
+  shouldest never have known of it.'[94] Neither hath sorrow so dulled my
+  wits in this matter that I complain of the wicked endeavours of sinful
+  men against virtue, but I exceedingly marvel to see that they have
+  brought to pass the things they hoped to do. For the desire of doing
+  evil may be attributed to our weakness, but that in the sight of God the
+  wicked should be able to compass whatsoever they contrive against the
+  innocent, is altogether monstrous. Whence not without cause one of thy
+  familiar friends[95] demanded: 'If,' saith he, 'there be a God, from
+  whence proceed so many evils? And if there be no God, from whence cometh
+  any good?' But let that pass that wicked men, which seek the blood of
+  all good men, and of the whole Senate, would also have overthrown me,
+  whom they saw to stand in defence of good men and of the Senate. But did
+  I deserve the same of the Senators themselves? I suppose thou
+  rememberest how thou being present didst alway direct me when I went
+  about to say or do anything. Thou rememberest, I say, when at Verona the
+  King, being desirous of a common overthrow, endeavoured to lay the
+  treason, whereof only Albinus was accused, upon the whole order of the
+  Senate, with how great security of my own danger I defended the
+  innocency of the whole Senate. Thou knowest that these things which I
+  say are true, and that I was never delighted in my own praise, for the
+  secret of a good conscience is in some sort diminished when by declaring
+  what he hath done a man receiveth the reward of fame. But thou seest to
+  what pass my innocency is come; instead of the rewards of true virtue, I
+  undergo the punishment of wickedness, wherewith I am falsely charged.
+  Was it ever yet seen that the manifest confession of any crime made the
+  judges so at one in severity, that either the error of man's judgment or
+  the condition of fortune, which is certain to none, did not incline some
+  of them to favour? If I had been accused that I would have burnt the
+  churches, or wickedly have killed the priests, or have sought the death
+  of all good men, yet sentence should have been pronounced against me
+  present, having confessed, and being convicted. Now being conveyed five
+  hundred miles off, dumb and defenceless, I am condemned to death and
+  proscription for bearing the Senate too much good will. O Senate, which
+  deserves that never any may be convicted of the like crime!
+
+  The dignity of which accusation even the very accusers themselves saw,
+  which that they might obscure by adding some sort of fault, they belied
+  me that I defiled my conscience with sacrilege, for an ambitious desire
+  of preferment. But thou, which hadst seated thyself in me, didst repel
+  from the seat of my mind all desire of mortal things, and within thy
+  sight there was no place for sacrilege to harbour; for thou didst instil
+  into my ears and thoughts daily that saying of Pythagoras, 'Follow
+  God.'[96] Neither was it fitting for me to use the aid of most vile
+  spirits when thou wast shaping me into that excellency to make me like
+  to God. Besides the innocency which appeared in the most retired rooms
+  of my house, the assembly of my most honourable friends, my holy father-
+  in-law Symmachus, who is as worthy of reverence as thou thyself art, do
+  clear me from all suspicion of this crime. But O detestable wickedness!
+  they the rather credit thee with so great a crime, and think me the
+  nigher to such mischievous dealing, because I am endued with thy
+  knowledge, and adorned with thy virtues, so that it is not enough that I
+  reap no commodity for thy respect, unless thou beest also dishonoured
+  for the hatred conceived against me. And that my miseries may increase
+  the more, the greatest part do not so much respect the value of things
+  as the event of fortune, and they esteem only that to be providently
+  done which the happy success commends. By which means it cometh to pass
+  that the first loss which miserable men have is their estimation and the
+  good opinion which was had of them. What rumours go now among the
+  people, what dissonant and diverse opinions! I cannot abide to think of
+  them; only this will I say, the last burden of adversity is that when
+  they which are in misery are accused of any crime, they are thought to
+  deserve whatsoever they suffer. And I, spoiled of all my goods, bereaved
+  of my dignities, blemished in my good name, for benefits receive
+  punishments.
+
+  And methinks I see the cursed crews of the wicked abounding with joy and
+  gladness, and every lost companion devising with himself how to accuse
+  others falsely, good men lie prostrate with the terror of my danger, and
+  every lewd fellow is provoked by impunity to attempt any wickedness, and
+  by rewards to bring it to effect; but the innocent are not only deprived
+  of all security, but also of any manner of defence. Wherefore I may well
+  exclaim:
+
+
+  [89] Homer, _Il._ i. 363.
+
+  [90] Cf. _Tr._ v. (_supra_, p. 76), _quasi non deterior fiat
+  inscientiae causa dum tegitur._
+
+  [91] Plato, _Rep._ v. 473.
+
+  [92] Presumptuous=founded on presumption.
+
+  [93] Cp. Plato, _Rep._ vi. 485; the [Greek: philosophos] cannot be
+  [Greek: philopseudaes.]
+
+  [94] _Vide supra_, p. 69. This seems to be the only record of Canius's
+  retort to Caligula.
+
+  [95] i.e. Epicurus, cp. Lact. _De Ira Dei_ xiii.
+
+  [96] Cf. [Greek: ho bios apas suntetaktai pros to akolouthein toi
+  Theoi], Iambl. _De Vita Pyth._ xviii., and Seneca, _De Vita Beata_ xv.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+O stelliferi conditor orbis
+Qui perpetuo nixus solio
+Rapido caelum turbine uersas
+Legemque pati sidera cogis,
+Vt nunc pleno lucida cornu                                                5
+Totis fratris obuia flammis
+Condat stellas luna minores,
+Nunc obscuro pallida cornu
+Phoebo propior lumina perdat,
+Et qui primae tempore noctis                                             10
+Agit algentes Hesperos ortus,
+Solitas iterum mutet habenas
+Phoebi pallens Lucifer ortu.
+Tu frondifluae frigore brumae
+Stringis lucem breuiore mora:                                            15
+Tu, cum feruida uenerit aestas,
+Agiles nocti diuidis horas.
+Tua uis uarium temperat annum
+Vt quas Boreae spiritus aufert
+Reuehat mites Zephyrus frondes                                           20
+Quaeque Arcturus semina uidit
+Sirius altas urat segetes.
+Nihil antiqua lege solutum
+Linquit propriae stationis opus.
+Omnia certo fine gubernans                                               25
+Hominum solos respuis actus
+Merito rector cohibere modo.
+Nam cur tantas lubrica uersat
+Fortuna uices? Premit insontes
+Debita sceleri noxia poena,                                              30
+At peruersi resident celso
+Mores solio sanctaque calcant
+Iniusta uice colla nocentes.
+Latet obscuris condita uirtus
+Clara tenebris iustusque tulit                                           35
+Crimen iniqui.
+Nil periuria, nil nocet ipsis
+Fraus mendaci compta colore.
+Sed cum libuit uiribus uti,
+Quos innumeri metuunt populi                                             40
+Summos gaudent subdere reges.
+O iam miseras respice terras
+Quisquis rerum foedera nectis.
+Operis tanti pars non uilis
+Homines quatimur fortunae salo.                                          45
+Rapidos rector comprime fluctus
+Et quo caelum regis immensum
+Firma stabiles foedere terras."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+    Creator of the Sky,
+  Who sittest on Thine eternal throne on high,
+    Who dost quick motions cause
+  In all the heavens, and givest stars their laws,
+    That the pale Queen of Night,
+  Sometimes receiving all her brother's light,
+    Should shine in her full pride,
+  And with her beams the lesser stars should hide;
+    Sometimes she wants her grace,
+  When the sun's rays are in less distant place;
+    And Hesperus that flies,
+  Driving the cold, before the night doth rise,
+    And oft with sudden change
+  Before the sun as Lucifer doth range.[97]
+    Thou short the days dost make,
+  When Winter from the trees the leaves doth take;
+    Thou, when the fiery sun
+  Doth Summer cause, makest the nights swiftly run.
+    Thy might doth rule the year,
+  As northern winds the leaves away do bear,
+    So Zephyrus from west
+  The plants in all their freshness doth revest;
+    And Syrius burns that corn
+  With which Arcturus did the earth adorn.
+    None from Thy laws are free,
+  Nor can forsake their place ordained by Thee.
+    Thou to that certain end
+  Governest all things; deniest Thou to intend
+    The acts of men alone,
+  Directing them in measure from Thy throne?
+    For why should slippery chance
+  Rule all things with such doubtful governance?
+    Or why should punishments,
+  Due to the guilty, light on innocents?
+    But now the highest place
+  Giveth to naughty manners greatest grace,
+    And wicked people vex
+  Good men, and tread unjustly on their necks;
+    Virtue in darkness lurks,
+  And righteous souls are charged with impious works,
+    Deceits nor perjuries
+  Disgrace not those who colour them with lies,
+    For, when it doth them please
+  To show their force, they to their will with ease
+    The hearts of kings can steer,
+  To whom so many crouch with trembling fear.
+    O Thou that joinest with love
+  All worldly things, look from Thy seat above
+    On the earth's wretched state;
+  We men, not the least work thou didst create,
+    With fortune's blasts do shake;
+  Thou careful ruler, these fierce tempests slake,
+    And for the earth provide
+  Those laws by which Thou heaven in peace dost guide."
+
+
+  [97] Literally, "And that he who as Hesperus, in the early hours of the
+  night, drives the cold stars before him, should change chariot (lit. his
+  accustomed reins) and become Lucifer, growing pale in the first rays of
+  the sun."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Haec ubi continuato dolore delatraui, illa uultu placido nihilque meis
+questibus mota: "Cum te," inquit, "maestum lacrimantemque uidissem, ilico
+miserum exsulemque cognoui. Sed quam id longinquum esset exilium, nisi tua
+prodidisset oratio, nesciebam. Sed tu quam procul a patria non quidem
+pulsus es sed aberrasti; ac si te pulsum existimari mauis, te potius ipse
+pepulisti. Nam id quidem de te numquam cuiquam fas fuisset. Si enim cuius
+oriundo sis patriae reminiscare, non uti Atheniensium quondam multitudinis
+imperio regitur, sed
+
+[Greek: heis koiranos estin, heis basileus]
+
+qui frequentia ciuium non depulsione laetetur; cuius agi frenis atque
+obtemperare iustitiae summa libertas est. An ignoras illam tuae ciuitatis
+antiquissimam legem, qua sanctum est ei ius exulare non esse quisquis in ea
+sedem fundare maluerit? Nam qui uallo eius ac munimine continetur, nullus
+metus est ne exul esse mereatur. At quisquis eam inhabitare uelle desierit,
+pariter desinit etiam mereri. Itaque non tam me loci huius quam tua facies
+mouet nec bibliothecae potius comptos ebore ac uitro parietes quam tuae
+mentis sedem requiro, in qua non libros sed id quod libris pretium facit,
+librorum quondam meorum sententias, collocaui. Et tu quidem de tuis in
+commune bonum meritis uera quidem, sed pro multitudine gestorum tibi pauca
+dixisti. De obiectorum tibi uel honestate uel falsitate cunctis nota
+memorasti. De sceleribus fraudibusque delatorum recte tu quidem strictim
+attingendum putasti, quod ea melius uberiusque recognoscentis omnia uulgi
+ore celebrentur. Increpuisti etiam uehementer iniusti factum senatus. De
+nostra etiam criminatione doluisti, laesae quoque opinionis damna fleuisti.
+Postremus aduersum fortunam dolor incanduit conquestusque non aequa meritis
+praemia pensari. In extremo Musae saeuientis, uti quae caelum terras quoque
+pax regeret, uota posuisti. Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus
+incubuit diuersumque te dolor, ira, maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es,
+nondum te ualidiora remedia contingunt. Itaque lenioribus paulisper utemur,
+ut quae in tumorem perturbationibus influentibus induruerunt, ad acrioris
+uim medicaminis recipiendum tactu blandiore mollescant.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  When I had uttered these speeches with continued grief, she, with an
+  amiable countenance and nothing moved with my complaints, said: "When I
+  first saw thee sad and weeping, I forthwith knew thee to be in misery
+  and banishment. But I had not known how far off thou wert banished, if
+  thy speech had not bewrayed it. O how far art thou gone from thy
+  country, not being driven away, but wandering of thine own accord! Or if
+  thou hadst rather be thought to have been driven out, it hath been only
+  by thyself; for never could any other but thyself have done it; for if
+  thou rememberest of what country thou art, it is not governed as Athens
+  was wont to be, by the multitude, but 'one is its ruler, one its
+  king,'[98] who desires to have abundance of citizens, and not to have
+  them driven away. To be governed by whose authority, and to be subject
+  to her laws, is the greatest freedom that can be. Art thou ignorant of
+  that most ancient law of thy city, by which it is decreed that he may
+  not be banished that hath made choice of it for his dwelling-place;[99]
+  for he that is within her fort or hold need not fear lest he deserve to
+  be banished? But whosoever ceaseth to desire to dwell in it, ceaseth
+  likewise to deserve so great a benefit. Wherefore the countenance of
+  this place moveth me not so much as thy countenance doth. Neither do I
+  much require thy library adorned with ivory adornments, and its crystal
+  walls, as the seat of thy mind, in which I have not placed books, but
+  that which makes books to be esteemed of, I mean the sentences of my
+  books, which were written long since. And that which thou hast said of
+  thy deserts to the common good, is true indeed, but little in respect of
+  the many things which thou hast done. That which thou hast reported,
+  either of the honesty or of the falseness of those things which are
+  objected against thee, is known to all men. Thou didst well to touch but
+  briefly the wickedness and deceit of thy accusers, for that the common
+  people to whose notice they are come do more fitly and largely speak of
+  them. Thou hast also sharply rebuked the unjust Senate's deed. Thou hast
+  also grieved at our accusation, and hast bewailed the loss or
+  diminishing of our good name; and lastly, thy sorrow raged against
+  fortune, and thou complainedst that deserts were not equally rewarded.
+  In the end of thy bitter verse, thou desiredst that the earth might be
+  governed by that peace which heaven enjoyeth. But because thou art
+  turmoiled with the multitude of affections, grief and anger drawing thee
+  to divers parts, in the plight thou art now, the more forcible remedies
+  cannot be applied unto thee; wherefore, for a while, we will use the
+  more easy, that thy affections, which are, as it were, hardened and
+  swollen with perturbations, may by gentle handling be mollified and
+  disposed to receive the force of sharper medicines.
+
+
+  [98] Hom. _Il._ ii. 204.
+
+  [99] Cf. Cicero, _Pro domo sua_. 29. 77.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Cum Phoebi radiis graue
+Cancri sidus inaestuat,
+Tum qui larga negantibus
+Sulcis semina credidit,
+Elusus Cereris fide                                                       5
+Quernas pergat ad arbores.
+Numquam purpureum nemus
+Lecturus uiolas petas
+Cum saeuis aquilonibus
+Stridens campus inhorruit,                                               10
+Nec quaeras auida manu
+Vernos stringere palmites,
+Vuis si libeat frui;
+Autumno potius sua
+Bacchus munera contulit.                                                 15
+Signat tempora propriis
+Aptans officiis deus
+Nec quas ipse coercuit
+Misceri patitur uices.
+Sic quod praecipiti uia                                                  20
+Certum deserit ordinem
+Laetos non habet exitus.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  When hot with Phoebus' beams
+  The Crab casts fiery gleams,
+  He that doth then with seed
+  Th'unwilling furrows feed,
+  Deceived of his bread
+  Must be with acorns fed.
+  Seek not the flowery woods
+  For violets' sweet buds,
+  When fields are overcast
+  With the fierce northern blast,
+  Nor hope thou home to bring
+  Vine-clusters in the Spring
+  If thou in grapes delight:
+  In autumn Bacchus' might
+  With them doth deck our clime.
+  God every several time
+  With proper grace hath crowned
+  Nor will those laws confound
+  Which He once settled hath.
+  He that with headlong path
+  This certain order leaves,
+  An hapless end receives.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Primum igitur paterisne me pauculis rogationibus statum tuae mentis
+attingere atque temptare, ut qui modus sit tuae curationis intellegam?" "Tu
+uero arbitratu," inquam, "tuo quae uoles ut responsurum rogato." Tum illa:
+"Huncine," inquit, "mundum temerariis agi fortuitisque casibus putas, an
+ullum credis ei regimen inesse rationis?" "Atqui," inquam, "nullo
+existimauerim modo ut fortuita temeritate tam certa moueantur, uerum operi
+suo conditorem praesidere deum scio nec umquam fuerit dies qui me ab hac
+sententiae ueritate depellat."
+
+"Ita est," inquit. "Nam id etiam paulo ante cecinisti, hominesque tantum
+diuinae exortes curae esse deplorasti. Nam de ceteris quin ratione
+regerentur, nihil mouebare. Papae autem! Vehementer admiror cur in tam
+salubri sententia locatus aegrotes. Verum altius perscrutemur; nescio quid
+abesse coniecto.
+
+"Sed dic mihi, quoniam deo mundum regi non ambigis, quibus etiam
+gubernaculis regatur aduertis?" "Vix," inquam, "rogationis tuae sententiam
+nosco, nedum ad inquisita respondere queam." "Num me," inquit, "fefellit
+abesse aliquid, per quod, uelut hiante ualli robore, in animum tuum
+perturbationum morbus inrepserit? Sed dic mihi, meministine, quis sit rerum
+finis, quoue totius naturae tendat intentio?" "Audieram," inquam, "sed
+memoriam maeror hebetauit." "Atqui scis unde cuncta processerint?" "Noui,"
+inquam, deumque esse respondi. "Et qui fieri potest, ut principio cognito
+quis sit rerum finis ignores? Verum hi perturbationum mores, ea ualentia
+est, ut mouere quidem loco hominem possint, conuellere autem sibique totum
+exstirpare non possint.
+
+Sed hoc quoque respondeas uelim, hominemne te esse meministi?" "Quidni,"
+inquam, "meminerim?" "Quid igitur homo sit, poterisne proferre?" "Hocine
+interrogas an esse me sciam rationale animal atque mortale? Scio et id me
+esse confiteor." Et illa: "Nihilne aliud te esse nouisti?" "Nihil."
+
+"Iam scio," inquit, "morbi tui aliam uel maximam causam; quid ipse sis,
+nosse desisti. Quare plenissime uel aegritudinis tuae rationem uel aditum
+reconciliandae sospitatis inueni. Nam quoniam tui obliuione confunderis, et
+exsulem te et exspoliatum propriis bonis esse doluisti. Quoniam uero quis
+sit rerum finis ignoras, nequam homines atque nefarios potentes felicesque
+arbitraris. Quoniam uero quibus gubernaculis mundus regatur oblitus es, has
+fortunarum uices aestimas sine rectore fluitare--magnae non ad morbum modo
+uerum ad interitum quoque causae. Sed sospitatis auctori grates, quod te
+nondum totum natura destituit. Habemus maximum tuae fomitem salutis ueram
+de mundi gubernatione sententiam, quod eam non casuum temeritati sed
+diuinae rationi subditam credis. Nihil igitur pertimescas; iam tibi ex hac
+minima scintillula uitalis calor inluxerit. Sed quoniam firmioribus
+remediis nondum tempus est et eam mentium constat esse naturam, ut quotiens
+abiecerint ueras falsis opinionibus induantur ex quibus orta perturbationum
+caligo uerum illum confundit intuitum, hanc paulisper lenibus
+mediocribusque fomentis attenuare temptabo, ut dimotis fallacium
+affectionum tenebris splendorem uerae lucis possis agnoscere.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  First, therefore, wilt thou let me touch and try the state of thy mind
+  by asking thee a few questions, that I may understand how thou art to be
+  cured?" To which I answered: "Ask me what questions thou wilt, and I
+  will answer thee." And then she said: "Thinkest thou that this world is
+  governed by haphazard and chance? Or rather dost thou believe that it is
+  ruled by reason?" "I can," quoth I, "in no manner imagine that such
+  certain motions are caused by rash chance. And I know that God the
+  Creator doth govern His work, nor shall the day ever come to draw me
+  from the truth of that judgment."
+
+  "It is so," saith she, "for so thou saidst in thy verse a little before,
+  and bewailedst that only men were void of God's care; for as for the
+  rest, thou didst not doubt but that they were governed by reason. And
+  surely I cannot choose but exceedingly admire how thou canst be ill
+  affected, holding so wholesome an opinion. But let us search further; I
+  guess thou wantest something, but I know not what.
+
+  Tell me, since thou doubtest not that the world is governed by God,
+  canst thou tell me also by what means it is governed?" "I do scarcely,"
+  quoth I, "understand what thou askest, and much less am I able to make
+  thee a sufficient answer." "Was I," quoth she, "deceived in thinking
+  that thou wantedst something by which, as by the breach of a fortress,
+  the sickness of perturbations hath entered into thy mind? But tell me,
+  dost thou remember what is the end of things? Or to what the whole
+  intention of nature tendeth?" "I have heard it," quoth I, "but grief
+  hath dulled my memory." "But knowest thou from whence all things had
+  their beginning?" "I know," quoth I, and answered, that from God. "And
+  how can it be that, knowing the beginning, thou canst be ignorant of the
+  end? But this is the condition and force of perturbations, that they may
+  alter a man, but wholly destroy, and as it were root him out of himself,
+  they cannot.
+
+  But I would have thee answer me to this also; dost thou remember that
+  thou art a man?" "Why should I not remember it?" quoth I. "Well then,
+  canst thou explicate what man is?" "Dost thou ask me if I know that I am
+  a reasonable and mortal living creature? I know and confess myself to be
+  so." To which she replied: "Dost thou not know thyself to be anything
+  else?" "Not anything."
+
+  "Now I know," quoth she, "another, and that perhaps the greatest, cause
+  of thy sickness: thou hast forgotten what thou art. Wherefore I have
+  fully found out both the manner of thy disease and the means of thy
+  recovery; for the confusion which thou art in, by the forgetfulness of
+  thyself, is the cause why thou art so much grieved at thy exile and the
+  loss of thy goods. And because thou art ignorant what is the end of
+  things, thou thinkest that lewd and wicked men be powerful and happy;
+  likewise, because thou hast forgotten by what means the world is
+  governed, thou imaginest that these alternations of fortune do fall out
+  without any guide, sufficient causes not only of sickness, but also of
+  death itself. But thanks be to the author of thy health, that Nature
+  hath not altogether forsaken thee. We have the greatest nourisher of thy
+  health, the true opinion of the government of the world, in that thou
+  believest that it is not subject to the events of chance, but to divine
+  reason. Wherefore fear nothing; out of this little sparkle will be
+  enkindled thy vital heat. But because it is not yet time to use more
+  solid remedies, and it is manifest that the nature of minds is such that
+  as often as they cast away true opinions they are possessed with false,
+  out of which the darkness of perturbations arising doth make them that
+  they cannot discern things aright, I will endeavour to dissolve this
+  cloud with gentle and moderate fomentations; that having removed the
+  obscurity of deceitful affections, thou mayest behold the splendour of
+  true light.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Nubibus atris
+Condita nullum
+Fundere possunt
+Sidera lumen.
+Si mare uoluens                                                           5
+Turbidus Auster
+Misceat aestum,
+Vitrea dudum
+Parque serenis
+Vnda diebus                                                              10
+Mox resoluto
+Sordida caeno
+Visibus obstat.
+Quique uagatur
+Montibus altis                                                           15
+Defluus amnis,
+Saepe resistit
+Rupe soluti
+Obice saxi.
+Tu quoque si uis                                                         20
+Lumine claro
+Cernere uerum,
+Tramite recto
+Carpere callem,
+Gaudia pelle,                                                            25
+Pelle timorem
+Spemque fugato
+Nec dolor adsit.
+Nubila mens est
+Vinctaque frenis,                                                        30
+Haec ubi regnant."
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  When stars are shrouded
+  With dusky night,
+  They yield no light
+  Being so clouded.
+  When the wind moveth
+  And churneth the sea,
+  The flood, clear as day,
+  Foul and dark proveth.
+  And rivers creeping
+  Down a high hill
+  Stand often still,
+  Rocks them back keeping.
+  If thou wouldst brightly
+  See Truth's clear rays,
+  Or walk those ways
+  Which lead most rightly,
+  All joy forsaking
+  Fear must thou fly,
+  And hopes defy,
+  No sorrow taking.
+  For where these terrors
+  Reign in the mind,
+  They it do bind
+  In cloudy errors."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER PRIMVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER II
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Post haec paulisper obticuit atque ubi attentionem meam modesta
+taciturnitate collegit, sic exorsa est: "Si penitus aegritudinis tuae
+causas habitumque cognovi, fortunae prioris affectu desiderioque tabescis.
+Ea tantum animi tui sicuti tu tibi fingis mutata peruertit. Intellego
+multiformes illius prodigii fucos et eo usque cum his quos eludere nititur
+blandissimam familiaritatem, dum intolerabili dolore confundat quos
+insperata reliquerit. Cuius si naturam mores ac meritum reminiscare, nec
+habuisse te in ea pulchrum aliquid nec amisisse cognosces, sed ut arbitror
+haud multum tibi haec in memoriam reuocare laborauerim. Solebas enim
+praesentem quoque blandientemque uirilibus incessere uerbis eamque de
+nostro adyto prolatis insectabare sententiis. Verum omnis subita mutatio
+rerum non sine quodam quasi fluctu contingit animorum; sic factum est ut tu
+quoque paulisper a tua tranquillitate descisceres. Sed tempus est haurire
+te aliquid ac degustare molle atque iucundum quod ad interiora transmissum
+ualidioribus haustibus uiam fecerit. Adsit igitur Rhetoricae suadela
+dulcedinis quae tum tantum recto calle procedit, cum nostra instituta non
+deserit cumque hac Musica laris nostri uernacula nunc leuiores nunc
+grauiores modos succinat.
+
+Quid est igitur o homo quod te in maestitiam luctumque deiecit? Nouum,
+credo, aliquid inusitatumque uidisti. Tu fortunam putas erga te esse
+mutatam; erras. Hi semper eius mores sunt ista natura. Seruauit circa te
+propriam potius in ipsa sui mutabilitate constantiam. Talis erat cum
+blandiebatur, cum tibi falsae inlecebris felicitatis alluderet.
+Deprehendisti caeci numinis ambiguos uultus. Quae sese adhuc uelat aliis,
+tota tibi prorsus innotuit. Si probas, utere moribus; ne queraris. Si
+perfidiam perhorrescis, sperne atque abice perniciosa ludentem. Nam quae
+nunc tibi est tanti causa maeroris, haec eadem tranquillitatis esse
+debuisset, Reliquit enim te quam non relicturam nemo umquam poterit esse
+securus. An uero tu pretiosam aestimas abituram felicitatem? Et cara tibi
+est fortuna praesens nec manendi fida et cum discesserit adlatura maerorem.
+Quod si nec ex arbitrio retineri potest et calamitosos fugiens facit, quid
+est aliud fugax quam futurae quoddam calamitatis indicium? Neque enim quod
+ante oculos situm est, suffecerit intueri; rerum exitus prudentia metitur
+eademque in alterutro mutabilitas nec formidandas fortunae minas nec
+exoptandas facit esse blanditias.  Postremo aequo animo toleres oportet
+quidquid intra fortunae aream geritur, cum semel iugo eius colla
+submiseris. Quod si manendi abeundique scribere legem uelis ei quam tu tibi
+dominam sponte legisti, nonne iniurius fueris et inpatientia sortem
+exacerbes quam permutare non possis? Si uentis uela committeres, non quo
+uoluntas peteret sed quo flatus impellerent, promoueres; si aruis semina
+crederes, feraces inter se annos sterilesque pensares. Fortunae te regendum
+dedisti; dominae moribus oportet obtemperes.  Tu uero uoluentis rotae
+impetum retinere conaris? At, omnium mortalium stolidissime, si manere
+incipit, fors esse desistit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE SECOND BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  After this she remained silent for a while; and, having by that her
+  modesty made me attentive, began in this wise: "If I be rightly informed
+  of the causes and condition of thy disease, thou languishest with the
+  affection of thy former fortune, and the change of that alone, as thou
+  imaginest, hath overthrown so much of thy mind. I know the manifold
+  illusions of that monster, exercising most alluring familiarity with
+  them whom she meaneth to deceive, to the end she may confound them with
+  intolerable grief, by forsaking them upon the sudden, whose nature,
+  customs, and desert, if thou rememberest, thou shalt know that thou
+  neither didst possess nor hast lost anything of estimation in it; and,
+  as I hope, I shall not need to labour much to bring these things to thy
+  remembrance, for thou wert wont, when she was present, and flattered
+  thee most, to assail her with manful words, and pursue her with
+  sentences taken forth of our most hidden knowledge. But every sudden
+  change of things happeneth not without a certain wavering and
+  disquietness of mind. And this is the cause that thou also for a while
+  hast lost thy former tranquillity and peace. But it is time for thee to
+  take and taste some gentle and pleasant thing which being received may
+  prepare thee for stronger potions. Wherefore let us use the sweetness of
+  Rhetoric's persuasions, which then only is well employed when it
+  forsaketh not our ordinances; and with this, let Music, a little slave
+  belonging to our house, chant sometime lighter and sometime sadder
+  notes.
+
+  Wherefore, O man, what is it that hath cast thee into sorrow and grief?
+  Thou hast, methinks, seen something new and unwonted. If thou thinkest
+  that fortune hath altered her manner of proceeding toward thee, thou art
+  in an error. This was alway her fashion; this is her nature. She hath
+  kept that constancy in thy affairs which is proper to her, in being
+  mutable; such was her condition when she fawned upon thee and allured
+  thee with enticements of feigned happiness. Thou hast discovered the
+  doubtful looks of this blind goddess. She, which concealeth herself from
+  others, is wholly known to thee. If thou likest her, frame thyself to
+  her conditions, and make no complaint. If thou detestest her treachery,
+  despise and cast her off, with her pernicious flattery. For that which
+  hath caused thee so much sorrow should have brought thee to great
+  tranquillity. For she hath forsaken thee, of whom no man can be secure.
+  Dost thou esteem that happiness precious which thou art to lose? And is
+  the present fortune dear unto thee, of whose stay thou art not sure, and
+  whose departure will breed thy grief? And if she can neither be kept at
+  our will, and maketh them miserable whom she at last leaveth, what else
+  is fickle fortune but a token of future calamity? For it is not
+  sufficient to behold that which we have before our eyes; wisdom
+  pondereth the event of things, and this mutability on both sides maketh
+  the threats of fortune not to be feared, nor her flatterings to be
+  desired. Finally, thou must take in good part whatsoever happeneth unto
+  thee within the reach of fortune, when once thou hast submitted thy neck
+  to her yoke. And if to her whom, of thine own accord, thou hast chosen
+  for thy mistress, thou wouldest prescribe a law how long she were to
+  stay, and when to depart, shouldst thou not do her mighty wrong, and
+  with thy impatience make thy estate more intolerable, which thou canst
+  not better? If thou settest up thy sails to the wind, thou shalt be
+  carried not whither thy will desirest, but whither the gale driveth. If
+  thou sowest thy seed, thou considerest that there are as well barren as
+  fertile years. Thou hast yielded thyself to fortune's sway; thou must be
+  content with the conditions of thy mistress. Endeavourest thou to stay
+  the force of the turning wheel? But thou foolishest man that ever was,
+  if it beginneth to stay, it ceaseth to be fortune.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec cum superba uerterit uices dextra
+Et aestuantis more fertur Euripi,
+Dudum tremendos saeua proterit reges
+Humilemque uicti subleuat fallax uultum.
+Non illa miseros audit aut curat fletus                                   5
+Vltroque gemitus dura quos fecit ridet.
+Sic illa ludit, sic suas probat uires
+Magnumque suis demonstrat [100] ostentum, si quis
+Visatur una stratus ac felix hora.
+
+
+[100] monstrat _codd_.
+
+
+
+
+  I
+
+  The pride of fickle fortune spareth none,
+  And, like the floods of swift Euripus borne, [101]
+  Oft casteth mighty princes from their throne,
+  And oft the abject captive doth adorn.
+  She cares not for the wretch's tears and moan,
+  And the sad groans, which she hath caused, doth scorn.
+  Thus doth she play, to make her power more known,
+  Showing her slaves a marvel, when man's state
+  Is in one hour both downcast and fortunate.
+
+
+  [101] Literally, "When fortune with proud right hand plies her changes
+  and ebbs and flows like foaming Euripus." Euripus was proverbial for
+  irregular tides.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Vellem autem pauca tecum fortunae ipsius uerbis agitare. Tu igitur an ius
+postulet, animaduerte. 'Quid tu homo ream me cotidianis agis querelis? Quam
+tibi fecimus iniuriam? Quae tua tibi detraximus bona? Quouis iudice de opum
+dignitatumque mecum possessione contende.  Et si cuiusquam mortalium
+proprium quid horum esse monstraueris, ego iam tua fuisse quae repetis,
+sponte concedam.
+
+Cum te matris utero natura produxit, nudum rebus omnibus inopemque suscepi,
+meis opibus foui et quod te nunc inpatientem nostri facit, fauore prona
+indulgentius educaui, omnium quae mei iuris sunt affluentia et splendore
+circumdedi. Nunc mihi retrahere manum libet. Habes gratiam uelut usus
+alienis, non habes ius querelae tamquam prorsus tua perdideris. Quid igitur
+ingemiscis? Nulla tibi a nobis est allata uiolentia. Opes honores ceteraque
+talium mei sunt iuris. Dominam famulae cognoscunt; mecum ueniunt, me
+abeunte discedunt. Audacter adfirmem, si tua forent quae amissa conquereris
+nullo modo perdidisses. An ego sola meum ius exercere prohibebor? Licet
+caelo proferre lucidos dies eosdemque tenebrosis noctibus condere. Licet
+anno terrae uultum nunc floribus frugibusque redimire, nunc nimbis
+frigoribusque confundere. Ius est mari nunc strato aequore blandiri, nunc
+procellis ac fluctibus inhorrescere. Nos ad constantiam nostris moribus
+alienam inexpleta hominum cupiditas alligabit? Haec nostra uis est, hunc
+continuum ludum ludimus; rotam uolubili orbe uersamus, infima summis summa
+infimis mutare gaudemus. Ascende si placet, sed ea lege ne utique[102] cum
+ludicri mei ratio poscet, descendere iniuriam putes. An tu mores ignorabas
+meos? Nesciebas Croesum regem Lydorum Cyro paulo ante formidabilem mox
+deinde miserandum rogi flammis traditum misso caelitus imbre defensum? Num
+te praeterit Paulum Persi regis a se capti calamitatibus pias inpendisse
+lacrimas? Quid tragoediarum clamor aliud deflet nisi indiscreto ictu
+fortunam felicia regna uertentem? Nonne adulescentulus [Greek: doious
+pithous ton men hena kakon ton d'heteron eaon] in Iouis limine iacere
+didicisti? Quid si uberius de bonorum parte sumpsisti? Quid si a te non
+tota discessi? Quid si haec ipsa mei mutabilitas iusta tibi causa est
+sperandi meliora? Tamen ne animo contabescas et intra commune omnibus
+regnum locatus proprio uiuere iure desideres.
+
+
+[102] utique _Klussmann_; uti _codd._
+
+
+
+
+  II
+
+  But I would urge thee a little with Fortune's own speeches. Wherefore
+  consider thou if she asketh not reason. 'For what cause, O man, chargest
+  thou me with daily complaints? What injury have I done thee? What goods
+  of thine have I taken from thee? Contend with me before any judge about
+  the possession of riches and dignities; and if thou canst show that the
+  propriety of any of these things belong to any mortal wight, I will
+  forthwith willingly grant that those things which thou demandest were
+  thine. When Nature produced thee out of thy mother's womb, I received
+  thee naked and poor in all respects, cherished thee with my wealth, and
+  (which maketh thee now to fall out with me) being forward to favour
+  thee, I had most tender care for thy education, and adorned thee with
+  the abundance and splendour of all things which are in my power. Now it
+  pleaseth me to withdraw my hand, yield thanks, as one that hath had the
+  use of that which was not his own. Thou hast no just cause to complain,
+  as though thou hadst lost that which was fully thine own. Wherefore
+  lamentest thou? I have offered thee no violence. Riches, honours, and
+  the rest of that sort belong to me. They acknowledge me for their
+  mistress, and themselves for my servants, they come with me, and when I
+  go away they likewise depart. I may boldly affirm, if those things which
+  thou complainest to be taken from thee had been thine own, thou shouldst
+  never have lost them. Must I only be forbidden to use my right? It is
+  lawful for the heaven to bring forth fair days, and to hide them again
+  in darksome nights. It is lawful for the year sometime to compass the
+  face of the earth with flowers and fruits, and sometime to cover it with
+  clouds and cold. The sea hath right sometime to fawn with calms, and
+  sometime to frown with storms and waves. And shall the insatiable desire
+  of men tie me to constancy, so contrary to my custom? This is my force,
+  this is the sport which I continually use. I turn about my wheel with
+  speed, and take a pleasure to turn things upside down. Ascend, if thou
+  wilt, but with this condition, that thou thinkest it not an injury to
+  descend when the course of my sport so requireth. Didst thou not know my
+  fashion? Wert thou ignorant how Croesus, King of the Lydians, not long
+  before a terror to Cyrus, within a while after came to such misery that
+  he should have been burnt had he not been saved by a shower sent from
+  heaven?[103] Hast thou forgotten how Paul piously bewailed the
+  calamities of King Perses his prisoner?[104] What other thing doth the
+  outcry of tragedies lament, but that fortune, having no respect,
+  overturneth happy states? Didst thou not learn in thy youth that there
+  lay two barrels, the one of good things and the other of bad,[105] at
+  Jupiter's threshold? But what if thou hast tasted more abundantly of the
+  good? What if I be not wholly gone from thee? What if this mutability of
+  mine be a just cause for thee to hope for better? Notwithstanding, lose
+  not thy courage, and, living in a kingdom which is common to all men,
+  desire not to be governed by peculiar laws proper only to thyself.
+
+
+  [103] Cf. Herod, i. 87.
+
+  [104] Cf. Livy xlv. 8. Paul=Aemilius Paulus surnamed Macedonius for his
+  defeat of Perses last king of Macedonia in 168 B.C.
+
+  [105] _Il._ xxiv. 527.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Si quantas rapidis flatibus incitus
+  Pontus uersat harenas
+Aut quot stelliferis edita noctibus
+  Caelo sidera fulgent
+Tantas fundat opes nec retrahat manum                                     5
+  Pleno copia cornu,
+Humanum miseras haud ideo genus
+  Cesset flere querellas.
+Quamuis uota libens excipiat deus
+  Multi prodigus auri                                                    10
+Et claris auidos ornet honoribus,
+  Nil iam parta uidentur,
+Sed quaesita uorans saeua rapacitas
+  Altos[106] pandit hiatus.
+Quae iam praecipitem frena cupidinem                                     15
+  Certo fine retentent,
+Largis cum potius muneribus fluens
+  Sitis ardescit habendi?
+Numquam diues agit qui trepidus gemens
+  Sese credit egentem.'                                                  20
+
+
+[106] altos _vulg._; alios _codd. opt._
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  If Plenty as much wealth should give, ne'er holding back her hand,
+  As the swift winds in troubled seas do toss up heaps of sand,
+  Or as the stars in lightsome nights shine forth on heaven's face,
+  Yet wretched men would still accuse their miserable case.
+  Should God, too liberal of His gold, their greedy wishes hear,
+  And with bright honour them adorn; yet all that nothing were,
+  Since ravenous minds, devouring all, for more are ready still.
+  What bridle can contain in bounds this their contentless will,
+  When filled with riches they retain the thirst of having more?
+  He is not rich that fears and grieves, and counts himself but poor.'
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+His igitur si pro se tecum fortuna loqueretur, quid profecto contra
+hisceres non haberes, aut si quid est quo querelam tuam iure tuearis,
+proferas oportet. Dabimus dicendi locum." Tum ego: "Speciosa quidem ista
+sunt," inquam, "oblitaque Rhetoricae ac Musicae melle dulcedinis; tum
+tantum, cum audiuntur, oblectant. Sed miseris malorum altior sensus est.
+Itaque cum haec auribus insonare desierint, insitus animum maeror
+praegrauat." Et illa: "Ita est," inquit. "Haec enim nondum morbi tui
+remedia sed adhuc contumacis aduersum curationem doloris fomenta quaedam
+sunt. Nam quae in profundum sese penetrent, cum tempestiuum fuerit
+admouebo. Verumtamen ne te existimari miserum uelis, an numerum modumque
+tuae felicitatis oblitus es?
+
+Taceo quod desolatum parente summorum te uirorum cura suscepit delectusque
+in affinitatem principum ciuitatis, quod pretiosissimum propinquitatis
+genus est, prius carus quam proximus esse coepisti. Quis non te
+felicissimum cum tanto splendore socerorum, cum coniugis pudore, cum
+masculae quoque prolis opportunitate praedicauit? Praetereo, libet enim
+praeterire communia, sumptas in adulescentia negatas senibus dignitates; ad
+singularem felicitatis tuae cumulum uenire delectat. Si quis rerum
+mortalium fructus ullum beatitudinis pondus habet, poteritne illius memoria
+lucis quantalibet ingruentium malorum mole deleri, cum duos pariter
+consules liberos tuos domo prouehi sub frequentia patrum, sub plebis
+alacritate uidisti, cum eisdem in curia curules insidentibus tu regiae
+laudis orator ingenii gloriam facundiaeque meruisti, cum in circo duorum
+medius consulum circumfusae multitudinis expectationem triumphali
+largitione satiasti? Dedisti ut opinor uerba fortunae, dum te illa
+demulcet, dum te ut delicias suas fouet. Munus quod nulli umquam priuato
+commodauerat abstulisti. Visne igitur cum fortuna calculum ponere? Nunc te
+primum liuenti oculo praestrinxit. Si numerum modumque laetorum tristiumue
+consideres, adhuc te felicem negare non possis. Quod si idcirco te
+fortunatum esse non aestimas, quoniam quae tunc laeta uidebantur abierunt,
+non est quod te miserum putes, quoniam quae nunc creduntur maesta
+praetereunt. An tu in hanc uitae scaenam nunc primum subitus hospesque
+uenisti? Vllamne humanis rebus inesse constantiam reris, cum ipsum saepe
+hominem uelox hora dissoluat? Nam etsi rara est fortuitis manendi fides,
+ultimus tamen uitae dies mors quaedam fortunae est etiam manentis. Quid
+igitur referre putas, tune illam moriendo deseras an te illa fugiendo?
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Wherefore if fortune should plead with thee thus in her own defence,
+  doubtless thou wouldst not have a word to answer her. But if there be
+  anything which thou canst allege in thy own defence, thou must utter it.
+  We will give thee full liberty to speak." Then I said: "These things
+  make a fair show and, being set out with pleasant rhetoric and music,
+  delight only so long as they are heard. But those which are miserable
+  have a deeper feeling of their miseries. Therefore, when the sound of
+  these things is past, hidden sorrow oppresseth the mind." "It is so
+  indeed," quoth she, "for these be not the remedies of thy disease, but
+  certain fomentations to assuage thy grief, which as yet resisteth all
+  cure. But when it shall be time, I will apply that which shall pierce to
+  the quick. And yet there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself
+  miserable. Hast thou forgotten how many ways, and in what degree thou
+  art happy?
+
+  I pass over with silence that, having lost thy father, thou wert
+  provided for by men of the best sort, and, being chosen to have affinity
+  with the chiefest of the city, thou begannest sooner to be dear unto
+  them than to be akin, which is the most excellent kind of kindred. Who
+  esteemed thee not most happy, having so noble a father-in-law, so chaste
+  a wife, and so noble sons? I say nothing (for I will not speak of
+  ordinary matters) of the dignities denied to others in their age, and
+  granted to thee in thy youth. I desire to come to the singular top of
+  thy felicity. If any fruit of mortal things hath any weight of
+  happiness, can the remembrance of that light be destroyed with any cloud
+  of miseries that can overcast thee? When thou sawst thy two sons being
+  both Consuls together carried from their house, the Senators
+  accompanying them, and the people rejoicing with them; when, they
+  sitting in the Senate in their chairs of state, thou making an oration
+  in the King's praise deservedst the glory of wit and eloquence. When in
+  public assembly, thou, standing betwixt thy two sons, didst satisfy with
+  thy triumphant liberality the expectation of the multitudes gathered
+  together, I suppose thou flatteredst fortune, while she fawned thus upon
+  thee, as her dearest friend. Thou obtainedst more at her hands than ever
+  private man had before thee. Wilt thou then reckon with fortune? This is
+  the first time that ever she frowned upon thee. If thou considerest the
+  number and measure of thy joyful and sad accidents, thou canst not
+  choose but think thyself fortunate hitherto; and if thou esteemest not
+  thyself fortunate because those things which seemed joyful are past,
+  there is no cause why thou shouldst think thyself miserable, since those
+  things which thou now takest to be sorrowful do pass. Comest thou now
+  first as a pilgrim and stranger into the theatre of this life? Supposest
+  thou to find any constancy in human affairs, since that man himself is
+  soon gone? For although things subject to fortune seldom keep touch in
+  staying, yet the end of life is a certain death, even of that fortune
+  which remaineth. Wherefore, what matter is it whether thou by dying
+  leavest it, or it forsaketh thee by flying?
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Cum polo Phoebus roseis quadrigis
+  Lucem spargere coeperit,
+Pallet albentes hebetata uultus
+  Flammis stella prementibus.
+Cum nemus flatu Zephyri tepentis                                          5
+  Vernis inrubuit rosis,
+Spiret insanum nebulosus Auster:
+  Iam spinis abeat decus.
+Saepe tranquillo radiat sereno
+  Immotis mare fluctibus,                                                10
+Saepe feruentes Aquilo procellas
+  Verso concitat aequore.
+Rara si constat sua forma mundo,
+  Si tantas uariat uices,
+Crede fortunis hominum caducis,                                          15
+  Bonis crede fugacibus.
+Constat aeterna positumque lege est
+  Vt constet genitum nihil."
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  When Phoebus with his rosy team
+    Showeth his lightsome beam,
+  The dull and darkened stars retire
+    Yielding to greater fire.
+  When Zephyrus his warmth doth bring,
+    Sweet roses deck the spring;
+  Let noisome Auster blow apace,
+    Plants soon will lose their grace.
+  The sea hath often quiet stood
+    With an unmoved flood,
+  And often is turmoiled with waves,
+    When boisterous Boreas raves.
+  If thus the world never long tarry
+    The same, but often vary,
+  On fading fortunes then rely,
+    Trust to those goods that fly.
+  An everlasting law is made,
+    That all things born shall fade."
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum ego: "Vera," inquam, "commemoras, o uirtutum omnium nutrix, nec
+infitiari possum prosperitatis meae uelocissimum cursum. Sed hoc est quod
+recolentem uehementius coquit. Nam in omni aduersitate fortunae
+infelicissimum est genus infortunii fuisse felicem." "Sed quod tu," inquit,
+"falsae opinionis supplicium luas, id rebus iure imputare non possis. Nam
+si te hoc inane nomen fortuitae felicitatis mouet, quam pluribus maximisque
+abundes mecum reputes licet. Igitur si quod in omni fortunae tuae censu
+pretiosissimum possidebas, id tibi diuinitus inlaesum adhuc inuiolatumque
+seruatur, poterisne meliora quaeque retinens de infortunio iure causari?
+
+Atqui uiget incolumis illud pretiosissimum generis humani decus Symmachus
+socer et quod uitae pretio non segnis emeres, uir totus ex sapientia
+uirtutibusque factus suarum securus tuis ingemiscit iniuriis. Viuit uxor
+ingenio modesta, pudicitia pudore praecellens et, ut omnes eius dotes
+breuiter includam, patri similis. Viuit inquam tibique tantum uitae huius
+exosa spiritum seruat quoque uno felicitatem minui tuam uel ipsa
+concesserim, tui desiderio lacrimis ac dolore tabescit.
+
+Quid dicam liberos consulares quorum iam, ut in id aetatis pueris, uel
+paterni uel auiti specimen elucet ingenii? Cum igitur praecipua sit
+mortalibus uitae cura retinendae, o te si tua bona cognoscas felicem, cui
+suppetunt etiam nunc quae uita nemo dubitat esse cariora! Quare sicca iam
+lacrimas. Nondum est ad unum omnes exosa fortuna nec tibi nimium ualida
+tempestas incubuit, quando tenaces haerent ancorae quae nec praesentis
+solamen nec futuri spem temporis abesse patiantur."
+
+"Et haereant," inquam, "precor; illis namque manentibus, utcumque se res
+habeant, enatabimus. Sed quantum ornamentis nostris decesserit, uides." Et
+illa: "Promouimus," inquit, "aliquantum, si te nondum totius tuae sortis
+piget. Sed delicias tuas ferre non possum qui abesse aliquid tuae
+beatitudini tam luctuosus atque anxius conqueraris. Quis est enim tam
+conpositae felicitatis ut non aliqua ex parte cum status sui qualitate
+rixetur? Anxia enim res est humanorum condicio bonorum et quae uel numquam
+tota proueniat uel numquam perpetua subsistat. Huic census exuberat, sed
+est pudori degener sanguis; hunc nobilitas notum facit, sed angustia rei
+familiaris inclusus esse mallet ignotus. Ille utroque circumfluus uitam
+caelibem deflet; ille nuptiis felix orbus liberis alieno censum nutrit
+heredi. Alius prole laetatus filii filiaeue delictis maestus inlacrimat.
+Idcirco nemo facile cum fortunae suae condicione concordat; inest enim
+singulis quod inexpertus ignoret, expertus exhorreat. Adde quod felicissimi
+cuiusque delicatissimus sensus est et nisi ad nutum cuncta suppetant, omnis
+aduersitatis insolens minimis quibusque prosternitur; adeo perexigua sunt
+quae fortunatissimis beatitudinis summam detrahunt. Quam multos esse
+coniectas qui sese caelo proximos arbitrentur, si de fortunae tuae
+reliquiis pars eis minima contingat? Hic ipse locus quem tu exilium uocas,
+incolentibus patria est; adeo nihil est miserum nisi cum putes contraque
+beata sors omnis est aequanimitate tolerantis. Quis est ille tam felix qui
+cum dederit inpatientiae manus, statum suum mutare non optet? Quam multis
+amaritudinibus humanae felicitatis dulcedo respersa est! Quae si etiam
+fruenti iucunda esse uideatur, tamen quo minus cum uelit abeat retineri non
+possit. Liquet igitur quam sit mortalium rerum misera beatitudo quae nec
+apud aequanimos perpetua perdurat necanxios tota delectat.
+
+Quid igitur o mortales extra petitis intra uos positam felicitatem? Error
+uos inscitiaque confundit. Ostendam breuiter tibi summae cardinem
+felicitatis. Estne aliquid tibi te ipso pretiosius? Nihil inquies. Igitur
+si tui compos fueris, possidebis quod nec tu amittere umquam uelis nec
+fortuna possit auferre. Atque ut agnoscas in his fortuitis rebus
+beatitudinem constare non posse, sic collige.  Si beatitudo est summum
+naturae bonum ratione degentis nec est summum bonum quod eripi ullo modo
+potest, quoniam praecellit id quod nequeat auferri, manifestum est
+quoniam[107] ad beatitudinem percipiendam fortunae instabilitas adspirare
+non possit. Ad haec quem caduca ista felicitas uehit uel scit eam uel
+nescit esse mutabilem. Si nescit, quaenam beata sors esse potest
+ignorantiae caecitate? Si scit, metuat necesse est, ne amittat quod amitti
+posse non dubitat; quare continuus timor non sinit esse felicem. An uel si
+amiserit, neglegendum putat? Sic quoque perexile bonum est quod aequo animo
+feratur amissum. Et quoniam tu idem es cui persuasum atque insitum
+permultis demonstrationibus scio mentes hominum nullo modo esse mortales
+cumque clarum sit fortuitam felicitatem corporis morte finiri, dubitari
+nequit, si haec afferre beatitudinem potest, quin omne mortalium genus in
+miseriam mortis fine labatur. Quod si multos scimus beatitudinis fructum
+non morte solum uerum etiam doloribus suppliciisque quaesisse, quonam modo
+praesens facere beatos potest quae miseros transacta non efficit?
+
+
+[107] quin _codices_.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  To which I answered: "The things which thou reportest are true, O nurse
+  of all virtues, and I cannot deny the most speedy course of my
+  prosperity. But this is that which vexeth me most, when I remember it.
+  For in all adversity of fortune it is the most unhappy kind of
+  misfortune to have been happy." "But," quoth she, "thou canst not justly
+  impute to the things themselves that thou art punished for thy false
+  opinion. For if this vain name of casual felicity moveth thee, let us
+  make accompt with how many and how great things thou aboundest.
+  Wherefore, if that which in all thy revenues of fortune thou esteemest
+  most precious doth still by God's providence remain safe and untouched,
+  canst thou, retaining the best, justly complain of misfortune?
+
+  But thy father-in-law, Symmachus (that most excellent ornament of
+  mankind) liveth in safety, and for the obtaining of which thou wouldst
+  willingly spend thy life, that man wholly framed to wisdom and virtues,
+  being secure of his own, mourneth for thy injuries. Thy wife liveth,
+  modest in disposition, eminent in chastity, and, to rehearse briefly all
+  her excellent gifts, like her father. She liveth, I say, and weary of
+  her life reserveth her breath only for thee. In which alone even I must
+  grant that thy felicity is diminished, she consumeth herself with tears
+  and grief for thy sake.
+
+  What should I speak of thy children, which have been Consuls, in whom
+  already, as in children of that age, their father's or grandfather's
+  good disposition appeareth? Wherefore, since the greatest care that
+  mortal men have is to save their lives, O happy man that thou art, if
+  thou knowest thine own wealth, who still hast remaining those things
+  which no man doubteth to be dearer than life itself? And therefore cease
+  weeping. Fortune hath not hitherto showed her hatred against you all,
+  neither art thou assailed with too boisterous a storm, since those
+  anchors hold fast which permit neither the comfort of the time present
+  nor the hope of the time to come to be wanting."
+
+  "And I pray God," quoth I, "that they may hold fast, for so long as they
+  remain, howsoever the world goeth we shall escape drowning. But thou
+  seest how great a part of our ornaments is lost." "We have gotten a
+  little ground," quoth she, "if thy whole estate be not irksome unto
+  thee. But I cannot suffer thy daintiness, who with such lamentation and
+  anxiety complaineth that something is wanting to thy happiness. For who
+  hath so entire happiness that he is not in some part offended with the
+  condition of his estate? The nature of human felicity is doubtful and
+  uncertain, and is neither ever wholly obtained, or never lasteth always.
+  One man hath great revenues, but is contemned for his base lineage.
+  Another's nobility maketh him known, but, oppressed with penury, had
+  rather be unknown. Some, abounding with both, bewail their life without
+  marriage. Some other, well married but wanting children, provideth
+  riches for strangers to inherit. Others, finally, having children,
+  mournfully bewail the vices which their sons or daughters are given to.
+  So that scarce any man is pleased with the condition of his fortune. For
+  there is something in every estate, which without experience is not
+  known, and being experienced doth molest and trouble. Besides that,
+  those which are most happy are most sensible,[108] and unless all things
+  fall out to their liking, impatient of all adversity, every little cross
+  overthrows them, so small are the occasions which take from the most
+  fortunate the height of their happiness. How many are there, thinkest
+  thou, which would think themselves almost in Heaven if they had but the
+  least part of the remains of thy fortune? This very place, which thou
+  callest banishment, is to the inhabitants thereof their native land. So
+  true it is that nothing is miserable but what is thought so, and
+  contrariwise, every estate is happy if he that bears it be content. Who
+  is so happy that if he yieldeth to discontent, desireth not to change
+  his estate? How much bitterness is mingled with the sweetness of man's
+  felicity, which, though it seemeth so pleasant while it is enjoyed, yet
+  can it not be retained from going away when it will. And by this it
+  appeareth how miserable is the blessedness of mortal things, which
+  neither endureth alway with the contented, nor wholly delighteth the
+  pensive.
+
+  Wherefore, O mortal men, why seek you for your felicity abroad, which is
+  placed within yourselves? Error and ignorance do confound you. I will
+  briefly show thee the centre of thy chiefest happiness. Is there
+  anything more precious to thee than thyself? I am sure thou wilt say,
+  nothing. Wherefore, if thou enjoyest thyself, thou shalt possess that
+  which neither thou wilt ever wish to lose nor fortune can take away. And
+  that thou mayst acknowledge that blessedness cannot consist in these
+  casual things, gather it thus. If blessedness be the chiefest good of
+  nature endued with reason, and that is not the chiefest good which may
+  by any means be taken away, because that which cannot be taken away is
+  better, it is manifest that the instability of fortune cannot aspire to
+  the obtaining of blessedness. Moreover, he that now enjoyeth this
+  brittle felicity, either knoweth it to be mutable or no. If not, what
+  estate can be blessed by ignorant blindness? And if he knoweth it, he
+  must needs fear lest he lose that which he doubteth not may be lost,
+  wherefore continual fear permitteth him not to be happy. Or though he
+  should lose it, doth he think that a thing of no moment? But so it were
+  a very small good which he would be content to lose. And because thou
+  art one whom I know to be fully persuaded and convinced by innumerable
+  demonstrations that the souls of men are in no wise mortal, and since it
+  is clear that casual felicity is ended by the body's death, there is no
+  doubt, if this can cause blessedness, but that all mankind falleth into
+  misery by death. But if we know many who have sought to reap the fruit
+  of blessedness, not only by death, but also by affliction and torments,
+  how can present happiness make men happy, the loss of which causeth not
+  misery?
+
+
+  [108] _i.e._ sensitive.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quisquis uolet perennem
+  Cautus ponere sedem
+Stabilisque nec sonori
+  Sterni flatibus Euri
+Et fluctibus minantem                                                     5
+  Curat spernere pontum,
+Montis cacumen alti,
+  Bibulas uitet harenas.
+Illud proteruus Auster
+  Totis uiribus urget,                                                   10
+Hae pendulum solutae
+  Pondus ferre recusant.
+Fugiens periculosam
+  Sortem sedis amoenae
+Humili domum memento                                                     15
+  Certus figere saxo.
+Quamuis tonet ruinis
+  Miscens aequora uentus,
+Tu conditus quieti
+  Felix robore ualli                                                     20
+Duces serenus aeuum
+  Ridens aetheris iras.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Who with an heedful care
+  Will an eternal seat prepare,
+  Which cannot be down cast
+  By force of windy blast,
+  And will the floods despise,
+  When threatening billows do arise,
+  He not on hills must stand,
+  Nor on the dangerous sinking sand.
+  For there the winds will threat,
+  And him with furious tempests beat,
+  And here the ground too weak
+  Will with the heavy burden break.[109]
+  Fly then the dangerous case
+  Of an untried delightful place,
+  And thy poor house bestow
+  In stony places firm and low.
+  For though the winds do sound,
+  And waves of troubled seas confound:
+  Yet thou to rest disposed
+  In thy safe lowly vale inclosed,
+  Mayst live a quiet age,
+  Scorning the air's distempered rage.
+
+
+  [109] Literally, "These shifting sands refuse to bear the weight laid
+  upon them."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Sed quoniam rationum iam in te mearum fomenta descendunt, paulo
+ualidioribus utendum puto. Age enim si iam caduca et momentaria fortunae
+dona non essent, quid in eis est quod aut uestrum umquam fieri queat aut
+non perspectum consideratumque uilescat? Diuitiaene uel uestra uel sui
+natura pretiosae sunt? Quid earum potius, aurumne an uis congesta pecuniae?
+Atqui haec effundendo magis quam coaceruando melius nitent, si quidem
+auaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. Quod si manere apud quemque
+non potest quod transfertur in alterum, tunc est pretiosa pecunia cum
+translata in alios largiendi usu desinit possideri. At eadem si apud unum
+quanta est ubique gentium congeratur, ceteros sui inopes fecerit. Et uox
+quidem tota pariter multorum replet auditum; uestrae uero diuitiae nisi
+comminutae in plures transire non possunt. Quod cum factum est, pauperes
+necesse est faciant quos relinquunt. O igitur angustas inopesque diuitias
+quas nec habere totas pluribus licet et ad quemlibet sine ceterorum
+paupertate non ueniunt! An gemmarum fulgor oculos trahit? Sed si quid est
+in hoc splendore praecipui, gemmarum est lux illa non hominum, quas quidem
+mirari homines uehementer admiror. Quid est enim carens animae motu atque
+compage quod animatae rationabilique naturae pulchrum esse iure uideatur?
+Quae tametsi conditoris opera suique distinctione postremae aliquid
+pulchritudinis trahunt, infra uestram tamen excellentiam conlocatae
+admirationem uestram nullo modo merebantur. An uos agrorum pulchritudo
+delectat? Quidni? Est enim pulcherrimi operis pulchra portio. Sic quondam
+sereni maris facie gaudemus; sic caelum sidera lunam solemque miramur. Num
+te horum aliquid attingit? Num audes alicuius talium splendore gloriari? An
+uernis floribus ipse distingueris aut tua in aestiuos fructus intumescit
+ubertas? Quid inanibus gaudiis raperis? Quid externa bona pro tuis
+amplexaris? Numquam tua faciet esse fortuna quae a te natura rerum fecit
+aliena. Terrarum quidem fructus animantium procul dubio debentur alimentis.
+Sed si, quod naturae satis est, replere indigentiam uelis, nihil est quod
+fortunae affluentiam petas. Paucis enim minimisque natura contenta est,
+cuius satietatem si superfluis urgere uelis, aut iniucundum quod infuderis
+fiet aut noxium. Iam uero pulchrum uariis fulgere uestibus putas, quarum si
+grata intuitu species est, aut materiae naturam aut ingenium mirabor
+artificis. An uero te longus ordo famulorum facit esse felicem? Qui si
+uitiosi moribus sint, perniciosa domus sarcina et ipsi domino uehementer
+inimica; sin uero probi, quonam modo in tuis opibus aliena probitas
+numerabitur? Ex quibus omnibus nihil horum quae tu in tuis conputas bonis
+tuum esse bonum liquido monstratur. Quibus si nihil inest appetendae
+pulchritudinis, quid est quod uel amissis doleas uel laeteris retentis?
+Quod si natura pulchra sunt, quid id tua refert? Nam haec per se a tuis
+quoque opibus sequestrata placuissent. Neque enim idcirco sunt pretiosa
+quod in tuas uenere diuitias, sed quoniam pretiosa uidebantur, tuis ea
+diuitiis adnumerare maluisti. Quid autem tanto fortunae strepitu
+desideratis? Fugare credo indigentiam copia quaeritis. Atqui hoc uobis in
+contrarium cedit. Pluribus quippe adminiculis opus est ad tuendam pretiosae
+supellectilis uarietatem, uerumque illud est permultis eos indigere qui
+permulta possideant contraque minimum qui abundantiam suam naturae
+necessitate non ambitus superfluitate metiantur. Itane autem nullum est
+proprium uobis atque insitum bonum ut in externis ac sepositis rebus bona
+uestra quaeratis? Sic rerum uersa condicio est ut diuinum merito rationis
+animal non aliter sibi splendere nisi inanimatae supellectilis possessione
+uideatur? Et alia quidem suis contenta sunt; uos autem deo mente consimiles
+ab rebus infimis excellentis naturae ornamenta captatis nec intellegitis
+quantam conditori uestro faciatis iniuriam. Ille genus humanum terrenis
+omnibus praestare uoluit; uos dignitatem uestram infra infima quaeque
+detruditis. Nam si omne cuiusque bonum eo cuius est constat esse
+pretiosius, cum uilissima rerum uestra bona esse iudicatis, eisdem uosmet
+ipsos uestra existimatione submittitis; quod quidem haud inmerito cadit.
+Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est ut tum tantum ceteris rebus cum se
+cognoscit excellat, eadem tamen infra bestias redigatur, si se nosse
+desierit. Nam ceteris animantibus sese ignorare naturae est; hominibus
+uitio uenit. Quam uero late patet uester hic error qui ornari posse aliquid
+ornamentis existimatis alienis? At id fieri nequit. Nam si quid ex
+appositis luceat, ipsa quidem quae sunt apposita laudantur; illud uero his
+tectum atque uelatum in sua nihilo minus foeditate perdurat. Ego uero nego
+ullum esse bonum quod noceat habenti. Num id mentior? 'Minime,' inquis.
+Atqui diuitiae possidentibus persaepe nocuerunt, cum pessimus quisque eoque
+alieni magis auidus quidquid usquam auri gemmarumque est se solum qui
+habeat dignissimum putat. Tu igitur qui nunc contum gladiumque sollicitus
+pertimescis, si uitae huius callem uacuus uiator intrasses, coram latrone
+cantares. O praeclara opum mortalium beatitudo quam cum adeptus fueris
+securus esse desistis!
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  But since the soothing of my reasons begins to sink into thee, I will
+  use those which are somewhat more forcible. Go to the*n, if the gifts of
+  fortune were not brittle and momentary, what is there in them which can
+  either ever be made your own, or, well weighed and considered, seemeth
+  not vile and of no accompt? Are riches precious in virtue either of
+  their own nature or of yours? What part of them can be so esteemed of?
+  The gold or the heaps of money? But these make a fairer show when they
+  are spent than when they are kept. For covetousness alway maketh men
+  odious, as liberality famous. And if a man cannot have that which is
+  given to another, then money is precious when, bestowed upon others, by
+  the use of liberality it is not possessed any longer. But if all the
+  money in the whole world were gathered into one man's custody, all other
+  men should be poor. The voice at the same time wholly filleth the ears
+  of many, but your riches cannot pass to many, except they be diminished,
+  which being done, they must needs make them poor whom they leave. O
+  scant and poor riches, which neither can be wholly possessed of many,
+  and come to none without the impoverishment of others! Doth the
+  glittering of jewels draw thy eyes after them? But if there be any great
+  matter in this show, not men but the jewels shine, which I exceedingly
+  marvel that men admire. For what is there wanting life and members that
+  may justly seem beautiful to a nature not only endued with life but also
+  with reason? Which, though by their maker's workmanship and their own
+  variety they have some part of basest beauty, yet it is so far inferior
+  to your excellency that it did in no sort deserve your admiration. Doth
+  the pleasant prospect of the fields delight you? Why not? For it is a
+  fair portion of a most fair work. So we are delighted with a calm sea,
+  so we admire the sky, the stars, the sun, and the moon. Do any of these
+  belong to thee? Darest thou boast of the beauty which any of them have?
+  Art thou thyself adorned with May flowers? Or doth thy fertility teem
+  with the fruits of summer? Why rejoicest thou vainly? Why embracest thou
+  outward goods as if they were thine own? Fortune will never make those
+  things thine which by the appointment of Nature belong not to thee. The
+  fruits of the earth are doubtless appointed for the sustenance of living
+  creatures. But if thou wilt only satisfy want, which sufficeth Nature,
+  there is no cause to require the superfluities of fortune. For Nature is
+  contented with little and with the smallest things, and, if, being
+  satisfied, thou wilt overlay it with more than needs, that which thou
+  addest will either become unpleasant or hurtful. But perhaps thou
+  thinkest it a fine thing to go decked in gay apparel, which, if they
+  make a fair show, I will admire either the goodness of the stuff or the
+  invention of the workman. Or doth the multitude of servants make thee
+  happy? Who, if they be vicious, they are a pernicious burden to thy
+  house, and exceedingly troublesome to their master; and if they be
+  honest, how shall other men's honesty be counted amongst thy treasures?
+  By all which is manifestly proved that none of these goods which thou
+  accountest thine, are thine indeed. And if there is nothing in these
+  worthy to be desired, why art thou either glad when thou hast them or
+  sorry when thou losest them? Or what is it to thee, if they be precious
+  by nature? For in this respect they would have pleased thee, though they
+  had belonged to others. For they are not precious because they are come
+  to be thine, but because they seemed precious thou wert desirous to have
+  them. Now, what desire you with such loud praise of fortune? Perhaps you
+  seek to drive away penury with plenty. But this falleth out quite
+  contrary, for you stand in need of many supplies, to protect all this
+  variety of precious ornaments. And it is true that they which have much,
+  need much; and contrariwise, that they need little which measure not
+  their wealth by the superfluity of ambition, but by the necessity of
+  nature. Have you no proper and inward good, that you seek your goods in
+  those things which are outward and separated from you? Is the condition
+  of things so changed that a living creature, deservedly accounted divine
+  for the gift of reason, seemeth to have no other excellency than the
+  possession of a little household stuff without life? All other creatures
+  are content with that they have of their own; and you, who in your mind
+  carry the likeness of God, are content to take the ornaments of your
+  excellent nature from the most base and vile things, neither understand
+  you what injury you do your Creator. He would have mankind to excel all
+  earthly things; you debase your dignity under every meanest creature.
+  For if it be manifest that the good of everything is more precious than
+  that whose good it is, since you judge the vilest things that can be to
+  be your goods, you deject yourselves under them in your own estimation,
+  which questionless cometh not undeservedly to pass; for this is the
+  condition of man's nature, that then only it surpasseth other things
+  when it knoweth itself, and it is worse than beasts when it is without
+  that knowledge. For in other living creatures the ignorance of
+  themselves is nature, but in men it is vice. And how far doth this error
+  of yours extend, who think that any can be adorned with the ornaments of
+  another? Which can in no wise be. For if any adjoined thing seem
+  precious, it is that which is praised, but that which is covered and
+  enwrapped in it remaineth, notwithstanding, with the foul baseness which
+  it hath of itself. Moreover, I deny that to be good which hurteth the
+  possessor. Am I deceived in this? I am sure thou wilt say no. But riches
+  have often hurt their possessors, since every lewdest companion, who are
+  consequently most desirous of that which is not their own, think
+  themselves most worthy to possess alone all the gold and jewels in the
+  world. Wherefore thou, who with much perturbation fearest now to be
+  assailed and slain, if thou hadst entered the path of this life like a
+  poor passenger, needest not be afraid, but mightest rejoice and sing
+  even in the sight of most ravenous thieves.[110] O excellent happiness
+  of mortal riches, which, when thou hast gotten, thou hast lost thy
+  safety!
+
+
+  [110] Cf. Juvenal, _Sat._ x. 19-22.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Felix nimium prior aetas
+Contenta fidelibus aruis
+Nec inerti perdita luxu,
+Facili quae sera solebat
+Ieiunia soluere glande.                                                   5
+Non Bacchica munera norant
+Liquido confundere melle
+Nec lucida uellera Serum
+Tyrio miscere ueneno.
+Somnos dabat herba salubres,                                             10
+Potum quoque lubricus amnis,
+Vmbras altissima pinus.
+Nondum maris alta secabat
+Nec mercibus undique lectis
+Noua litora uiderat hospes.                                              15
+Tunc classica saeua tacebant,
+Odiis neque fusus acerbis
+Cruor horrida tinxerat arua.
+Quid enim furor hosticus ulla
+Vellet prior arma mouere,                                                20
+Cum uulnera saeua uiderent
+Nec praemia sanguinis ulla?
+Vtinam modo nostra redirent
+In mores tempora priscos!
+Sed saeuior ignibus Aetnae                                               25
+Feruens amor ardet habendi.
+Heu primus quis fuit ille
+Auri qui pondera tecti
+Gemmasque latere uolentes
+Pretiosa pericula fodit?                                                 30
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+    Too much the former age was blest,
+  When fields their pleased owners failed not,
+    Who, with no slothful lust opprest,
+  Broke their long fasts with acorns eas'ly got.
+    No wine with honey mixed was,
+  Nor did they silk in purple colours steep;
+    They slept upon the wholesome grass,
+  And their cool drink did fetch from rivers deep.
+    The pines did hide them with their shade,
+  No merchants through the dangerous billows went,
+    Nor with desire of gainful trade
+  Their traffic into foreign countries sent.
+    Then no shrill trumpets did amate
+  The minds of soldiers with their daunting sounds,
+    Nor weapons were with deadly hate
+  Dyed with the dreadful blood of gaping wounds.
+    For how could any fury draw
+  The mind of man to stir up war in vain,
+    When nothing but fierce wounds he saw,
+  And for his blood no recompense should gain?
+    O that the ancient manners would
+  In these our latter hapless times return!
+    Now the desire of having gold
+  Doth like the flaming fires of Aetna burn.
+    Ah, who was he that first did show
+  The heaps of treasure which the earth did hide,
+    And jewels which lay close below,
+  By which he costly dangers did provide?
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Quid autem de dignitatibus potentiaque disseram quae uos uerae dignitatis
+ac potestatis inscii caelo exaequatis? Quae si in improbissimum quemque
+ceciderunt, quae flammis Aetnae eructuantibus, quod diluuium tantas strages
+dederint? Certe, uti meminisse te arbitror, consulare imperium, quod
+libertatis principium fuerat, ob superbiam consulum uestri ueteres abolere
+cupiuerunt, qui ob eandem superbiam prius regium de ciuitate nomen
+abstulerant. At si quando, quod perrarum est, probis deferantur, quid in
+eis aliud quam probitas utentium placet? Ita fit ut non uirtutibus ex
+dignitate sed ex uirtute dignitatibus honor accedat. Quae uero est ista
+uestra expetibilis ac praeclara potentia? Nonne, o terrena animalia,
+consideratis quibus qui praesidere uideamini? Nunc si inter mures uideres
+unum aliquem ius sibi ac potestatem prae ceteris uindicantem, quanto
+mouereris cachinno! Quid uero, si corpus spectes, inbecillius homine
+reperire queas quos saepe muscularum quoque uel morsus uel in secreta
+quaeque reptantium necat introitus? Quo uero quisquam ius aliquod in
+quempiam nisi in solum corpus et quod infra corpus est, fortunam loquor,
+possit exserere? Num quidquam libero imperabis animo? Num mentem firma sibi
+ratione cohaerentem de statu propriae quietis amouebis? Cum liberum quendam
+uirum suppliciis se tyrannus adacturum putaret, ut aduersum se factae
+coniurationis conscios proderet, linguam ille momordit atque abscidit et in
+os tyranni saeuientis abiecit; ita cruciatus, quos putabat tyrannus
+materiam crudelitatis, uir sapiens fecit esse uirtutis. Quid autem est quod
+in alium facere quisquam[111] possit, quod sustinere ab alio ipse non
+possit? Busiridem accipimus necare hospites solitum ab Hercule hospite
+fuisse mactatum. Regulus plures Poenorum bello captos in uincla coniecerat,
+sed mox ipse uictorum catenis manus praebuit. Vllamne igitur eius hominis
+potentiam putas, qui quod ipse in alio potest, ne id in se alter ualeat
+efficere non possit? Ad haec si ipsis dignitatibus ac potestatibus inesset
+aliquid naturalis ac proprii boni, numquam pessimis prouenirent. Neque enim
+sibi solent aduersa sociari; natura respuit ut contraria quaeque iungantur.
+Ita cum pessimos plerumque dignitatibus fungi dubium non sit, illud etiam
+liquet natura sui bona non esse quae se pessimis haerere patiantur. Quod
+quidem de cunctis fortunae muneribus dignius existimari potest, quae ad
+improbissimum quemque uberiora perueniunt. De quibus illud etiam
+considerandum puto, quod nemo dubitat esse fortem, cui fortitudinem inesse
+conspexerit, et cuicumque uelocitas adest manifestum est esse uelocem. Sic
+musica quidem musicos medicina medicos rhetorice rhetores facit. Agit enim
+cuiusque rei natura quod proprium est nec contrariarum rerum miscetur
+effectibus et ultro quae sunt auersa depellit. Atqui nec opes inexpletam
+restinguere auaritiam queunt nec potestas sui compotem fecerit quem
+uitiosae libidines insolubilibus adstrictum retinent catenis, et collata
+improbis dignitas non modo non efficit dignos, sed prodit potius et
+ostentat indignos. Cur ita prouenit? Gaudetis enim res sese aliter habentes
+falsis compellare nominibus quae facile ipsarum rerum redarguuntur effectu;
+itaque nec illae diuitiae nec illa potentia nec haec dignitas iure
+appellari potest. Postremo idem de tota concludere fortuna licet in qua
+nihil expetendum, nihil natiuae bonitatis inesse manifestum est, quae nec
+se bonis semper adiungit et bonos quibus fuerit adiuncta non efficit.
+
+
+[111] quisque _codd. optimi_.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  Now, why should I discourse of dignities and power which you, not
+  knowing what true dignity and power meaneth, exalt to the skies? And if
+  they light upon wicked men, what Aetnas, belching flames, or what deluge
+  can cause so great harms? I suppose thou rememberest how your ancestors,
+  by reason of the consuls' arrogancy, desired to abolish that government
+  which had been the beginning of their freedom, who before, for the same
+  cause, had removed the government of kings from their city. And if
+  sometime, which is very seldom, good men be preferred to honours,[112]
+  what other thing can give contentment in them but the honesty of those
+  which have them? So that virtues are not honoured by dignities, but
+  dignities by virtue. But what is this excellent power which you esteemed
+  so desirable? Consider you not, O earthly wights, whom you seem to
+  excel? For if among mice thou shouldst see one claim jurisdiction and
+  power to himself over the rest, to what a laughter it would move thee!
+  And what, if thou respectest the body, canst thou find more weak than
+  man, whom even the biting of little flies or the entering of creeping
+  worms doth often kill? Now, how can any man exercise jurisdiction upon
+  anybody except upon their bodies, and that which is inferior to their
+  bodies, I mean their fortunes? Canst thou ever imperiously impose
+  anything upon a free mind? Canst thou remove a soul settled in firm
+  reason from the quiet state which it possesseth? When a tyrant thought
+  to compel a certain free man by torments to bewray his confederates of a
+  conspiracy attempted against him, he bit off his tongue, and spit it out
+  upon the cruel tyrant's face,[113] by that means wisely making those
+  tortures, which the tyrant thought matter of cruelty, to be to him
+  occasion of virtue. Now, what is there that any can enforce upon another
+  which he may not himself be enforced to sustain by another? We read that
+  Busiris, wont to kill his guests, was himself slain by his guest
+  Hercules.[114] Regulus had laid fetters upon many Africans taken in war,
+  but ere long he found his own hands environed with his conqueror's
+  chains.[115] Wherefore thinkest thou the power of that man to be
+  anything worth, who cannot hinder another from doing that to him which
+  he can do to another? Moreover, if dignities and power had any natural
+  and proper good in them, they would never be bestowed upon the worst
+  men, for one opposite useth not to accompany another; nature refuseth to
+  have contraries joined. So that, since there is no doubt but that men of
+  the worst sort often enjoy dignities, it is also manifest that they are
+  not naturally good which may follow most naughty men. Which may more
+  worthily be thought of all fortune's gifts which are more plentifully
+  bestowed upon every lewd companion. Concerning which, I take that also
+  to be worthy consideration, that no man doubteth him to be a valiant man
+  in whom he seeth valour, and it is manifest that he which hath swiftness
+  is swift. So, likewise, music maketh musicians, physic physicians, and
+  rhetoric rhetoricians. For the nature of everything doth that which is
+  proper unto it, and is not mixed with contrary effects but repelleth all
+  opposites. But neither can riches extinguish unsatiable avarice, nor
+  power make him master of himself whom vicious lusts keep chained in
+  strongest fetters. And dignity bestowed upon wicked men doth not only
+  not make them worthy but rather bewrayeth and discovereth their
+  unworthiness. How cometh this to pass? Because in miscalling things that
+  are otherwise, you take a pleasure which is easily refuted by the effect
+  of the things themselves. Wherefore, by right, these things are not to
+  be called riches, this is not to be called power, that is not to be
+  called dignity. Lastly, we may conclude the same of all fortunes in
+  which it is manifest there is nothing to be desired, nothing naturally
+  good, which neither are always bestowed upon good men, nor do make them
+  good whom they are bestowed upon.
+
+
+  [112] The subject of _deferantur_ is _dignitates potentiaque_.
+
+  [113] The free man was the philosopher Anaxarchus: the tyrant, Nicocreon
+  the Cypriote. For the story see Diogenes Laertius ix. 59.
+
+  [114] Cf. Apollod. ii. 5. 11; Claudian xviii. 159; Virg. _Georg._ iii. 4.
+
+  [115] Cf. Cicero, _De Off._ iii. 99.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Nouimus quantas dederit ruinas
+Vrbe flammata patribusque caesis
+Fratre qui quondam ferus interempto
+Matris effuso maduit cruore
+Corpus et uisu gelidum pererrans                                          5
+Ora non tinxit lacrimis, sed esse
+Censor extincti potuit decoris.
+Hic tamen sceptro populos regebat
+Quos uidet condens radios sub undas
+Phoebus extremo ueniens ab ortu,                                         10
+Quos premunt septem gelidi triones,
+Quos Notus sicco uiolentus aestu
+Torret ardentes recoquens harenas.
+Celsa num tandem ualuit potestas
+Vertere praui rabiem Neronis?                                            15
+Heu grauem sortem, quotiens iniquus
+Additur saeuo gladius ueneno!"
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+    We know what stirs he made
+  Who did the Senate slay and Rome with fire invade,
+    Who did his brother kill,
+  And with his mother's blood his moistened hand did fill;
+    Who looked on that cold face
+  Tearless, and nicely marked her members' several grace.[116]
+    Yet his dread power controlled
+  Those people whom the sun doth in the east behold,
+    And those who do remain
+  In western lands or dwell under Booetes' wain
+    And those whose skins are tanned
+  With southern winds, which roast and burn the parched sand.
+    What? Could this glorious might
+  Restrain the furious rage of wicked Nero's spite?
+    But oh! mishap most bad,
+  Which doth the wicked sword to cruel poison add!"
+
+
+  [116] Literally, "but could be the critic of her dead beauty." Cf. Suet.
+  _Nero_ 24; Tac. _Ann._ xiv. 9.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Tum ego: "Scis," inquam, "ipsa minimum nobis ambitionem mortalium rerum
+fuisse dominatam. Sed materiam gerendis rebus optauimus quo ne uirtus
+tacita consenesceret." Et illa: "Atqui hoc unum est quod praestantes quidem
+natura mentes sed nondum ad extremam manum uirtutum perfectione perductas
+allicere possit, gloriae scilicet cupido et optimorum in rem publicam fama
+meritorum; quae quam sit exilis et totius uacua ponderis, sic considera.
+Omnem terrae ambitum, sicuti astrologicis demonstrationibus accepisti, ad
+caeli spatium puncti constat obtinere rationem, id est ut, si ad caelestis
+globi magnitudinem conferatur, nihil spatii prorsus habere iudicetur. Huius
+igitur tam exiguae in mundo regionis quarta fere portio est, sicut
+Ptolomaeo probante didicisti, quae nobis cognitis animantibus incolatur.
+Huic quartae, si quantum maria paludesque premunt quantumque siti uasta
+regio distenditur cogitatione subtraxeris, uix angustissima inhabitandi
+hominibus area relinquetur. In hoc igitur minimo puncti quodam puncto
+circumsaepti atque conclusi de peruulganda fama, de proferendo nomine
+cogitatis? Aut quid habeat amplum magnificumque gloria tam angustis
+exiguisque limitibus artata? Adde quod hoc ipsum breuis habitaculi saeptum
+plures incolunt nationes lingua, moribus, totius uitae ratione distantes,
+ad quas tum difficultate itinerum tum loquendi diuersitate tum commercii
+insolentia non modo fama hominum singulorum sed ne urbium quidem peruenire
+queat. Aetate denique Marci Tullii, sicut ipse quodam loco significat,
+nondum Caucasum montem Romanae rei publicae fama transcenderat, et erat
+tunc adulta Parthis etiam ceterisque id locorum gentibus formidolosa.
+Videsne igitur quam sit angusta, quam compressa gloria quam dilatare ac
+propagare laboratis? An ubi Romani nominis transire fama nequit, Romani
+hominis gloria progredietur? Quid quod diuersarum gentium mores inter se
+atque instituta discordant, ut quod apud alios laude apud alios supplicio
+dignum iudicetur. Quo fit ut si quem famae praedicatio delectat, huic in
+plurimos populos nomen proferre nullo modo conducat. Erit igitur peruagata
+inter suos gloria quisque contentus et intra unius gentis terminos
+praeclara illa famae inmortalitas coartabitur.
+
+Sed quam multos clarissimos suis temporibus uiros scriptorum inops deleuit
+obliuio! Quamquam quid ipsa scripta proficiant, quae cum suis auctoribus
+premit longior atque obscura uetustas? Vos uero inmortalitatem uobis
+propagare uidemini, cum futuri famam temporis cogitatis. Quod si
+aeternitatis infinita spatia pertractes, quid habes quod de nominis tui
+diuturnitate laeteris? Vnius etenim mora momenti, si decem milibus
+conferatur annis, quoniam utrumque spatium definitum est, minimam, licet,
+habet tamen aliquam portionem. At hic ipse numerus annorum eiusque
+quamlibet multiplex ad interminabilem diuturnitatem ne comparari quidem
+potest. Etenim finitis ad se inuicem fuerit quaedam, infiniti uero atque
+finiti nulla umquam poterit esse collatio. Ita fit ut quamlibet prolixi
+temporis fama, si cum inexhausta aeternitate cogitetur, non parua sed plane
+nulla esse uideatur. Vos autem nisi ad populares auras inanesque rumores
+recte facere nescitis et relicta conscientiae uirtutisque praestantia de
+alienis praemia sermunculis postulatis. Accipe in huiusmodi arrogantiae
+leuitate quam festiue aliquis inluserit. Nam cum quidam adortus esset
+hominem contumeliis, qui non ad uerae uirtutis usum sed ad superbam gloriam
+falsum sibi philosophi nomen induerat, adiecissetque iam se sciturum, an
+ille philosophus esset, si quidem illatas iniurias leniter patienterque
+tolerasset, ille patientiam paulisper adsumpsit acceptaque contumelia uelut
+insultans: 'Iam tandem,' inquit, 'intellegis me esse philosophum?' Tum ille
+nimium mordaciter: 'Intellexeram,' inquit, 'si tacuisses.' Quid autem est
+quod ad praecipuos uiros, de his enim sermo est, qui uirtute gloriam
+petunt, quid, inquam, est quod ad hos de fama post resolutum morte suprema
+corpus attineat? Nam si, quod nostrae rationes credi uetant, toti moriuntur
+homines, nulla est omnino gloria, cum is cuius ea esse dicitur non exstet
+omnino. Sin uero bene sibi mens conscia terreno carcere resoluta caelum
+libera petit, nonne omne terrenum negotium spernat quae se caelo fruens
+terrenis gaudet exemptam?
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Then I said: "Thou thyself knowest that the ambition of mortal things
+  hath borne as little sway with me as with any, but I desired matter of
+  action, lest old age should come upon me ere I had done anything." To
+  which she answered: "This is the only thing which is able to entice such
+  minds as, being well qualified by nature, are not yet fully brought to
+  full excellence by the perfecting of virtues, I mean desire of glory,
+  and fame of best deserts towards their commonwealth, which how slender
+  it is, and void of all weight, consider this: thou hast learnt by
+  astronomical demonstrations that the compass of the whole earth compared
+  to the scope of heaven is no bigger than a pin's point, which is as much
+  as to say that, if it be conferred with the greatness of the celestial
+  sphere, it hath no bigness at all. And of this so small a region in the
+  world only the fourth part is known to be inhabited by living creatures
+  known to us, as Ptolemy[117] proveth. From which fourth part, if thou
+  takest away in imagination the seas, the marsh grounds, and all other
+  desert places, there will scarcely be left any room at all for men to
+  inhabit. Wherefore, enclosed and shut up in this smallest point of that
+  other point, do you think of extending your fame and enlarging your
+  name? But what great or heroical matter can that glory have, which is
+  pent up in so small and narrow bounds? Besides that the little compass
+  of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, different in
+  language, fashions, and conversation, to which by reason of the
+  difficulties in travelling, the diversity of speech, and the scarcity of
+  traffic, not only the Fame of particular men but even of cities can
+  hardly come. Finally, in the age of Marcus Tullius, as he himself
+  writeth,[118] the fame of the Roman Commonwealth had not passed the
+  mountain Caucasus, and yet it was then in the most flourishing estate,
+  fearful even to the Parthians and to the rest of the nations about.
+  Seest thou therefore how strait and narrow that glory is which you
+  labour to enlarge and increase? Where the fame of the Roman name could
+  not pass, can the glory of a Roman man penetrate? Moreover, the customs
+  and laws of diverse nations do so much differ the one from the other,
+  that the same thing which some commend as laudable, others condemn as
+  deserving punishment. So that if a man be delighted with the praise of
+  fame, it is no way convenient for him to be named in many countries.
+  Wherefore, every man must be content with that glory which he may have
+  at home, and that noble immortality of fame must be comprehended within
+  the compass of one nation.
+
+  Now, how many, most famous while they lived, are altogether forgotten
+  for want of writers! Though what do writings themselves avail which
+  perish, as well as their authors, by continuance and obscurity of time?
+  But you imagine that you make yourselves immortal when you cast your
+  eyes upon future fame. Whereas, if thou weighest attentively the
+  infinite spaces of eternity, what cause hast thou to rejoice at the
+  prolonging of thy name? For if we compare the stay of one moment with
+  ten thousand years, since both be limited, they have some proportion,
+  though it be but very small. But this number of years, how oft so ever
+  it be multiplied, is no way comparable to endless eternity. For limited
+  things may in some sort be compared among themselves, but that which is
+  infinite admitteth no comparison at all with the limited. So that the
+  fame of never so long time, if it be compared with everlasting eternity,
+  seemeth not little but none at all. But without popular blasts and vain
+  rumours you know not how to do well, and, rejecting the excellency of a
+  good conscience and of virtue, you choose to be rewarded with others'
+  tattling. Hear how pleasantly one jested at this vain and contemptible
+  arrogancy. For having assaulted with reproachful speeches a certain
+  fellow who had falsely taken upon him the name of a philosopher, not for
+  the use of virtue but for vainglory, and having added that now he would
+  know whether he were a philosopher or no by his gentle and patient
+  bearing of injuries, the other took all patiently for a while, and
+  having borne his contumely, as it were, triumphing, said: 'Dost thou now
+  at length think me a philosopher?' To which he bitingly replied: 'I
+  would have thought thee one if thou hadst holden thy peace.' But what
+  have excellent men (for of these I speak) who seek for glory by virtue,
+  what have we, I say, to expect for these by fame after final death hath
+  dissolved the body? For if, contrary to our belief, men wholly perish,
+  there is no glory at all, since he to whom it is said to belong is
+  nowhere extant. But if a guiltless mind freed from earthly imprisonment
+  goeth forthwith to heaven, will she not despise all earthly traffic who,
+  enjoying heaven, rejoiceth to see herself exempted from earthly affairs?
+
+
+  [117] Claudius Ptolemaeus, mathematician, astronomer, geographer, fl.
+  A.D. 139-161.
+
+  [118] Cf. _Somn. Scip._ 6. 14 ap. Macr. _Comment._ ii. 10.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Quicumque solam mente praecipiti petit
+  Summumque credit gloriam,
+Late patentes aetheris cernat plagas
+  Artumque terrarum situm.
+Breuem replere non ualentis ambitum                                       5
+  Pudebit aucti nominis.
+Quid o superbi colla mortali iugo
+  Frustra leuare gestiunt?
+Licet remotos fama per populos means
+  Diffusa linguas explicet                                               10
+Et magna titulis fulgeat claris domus,
+  Mors spernit altam gloriam,
+Inuoluit humile pariter et celsum caput
+  Aequatque summis infima.
+Vbi nunc fidelis ossa Fabricii manent,                                   15
+  Quid Brutus aut rigidus Cato?
+Signat superstes fama tenuis pauculis
+  Inane nomen litteris.
+Sed quod decora nouimus uocabula,
+  Num scire consumptos datur?                                            20
+Iacetis ergo prorsus ignorabiles
+  Nec fama notos efficit.
+Quod si putatis longius uitam trahi
+  Mortalis aura nominis,
+Cum sera uobis rapiet hoc etiam dies,                                    25
+  Iam uos secunda mors manet.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  He that to honour only seeks to mount
+    And that his chiefest end doth count,
+  Let him behold the largeness of the skies
+    And on the strait earth cast his eyes;
+  He will despise the glory of his name,
+    Which cannot fill so small a frame.
+  Why do proud men scorn that their necks should bear
+    That yoke which every man must wear?
+  Though fame through many nations fly along
+    And should be blazed by every tongue,
+  And houses shine with our forefathers' stories,
+    Yet Death contemns these stately glories,
+  And, summoning both rich and poor to die,
+    Makes the low equal with the high.
+  Who knows where faithful Fabrice' bones are pressed,
+    Where Brutus and strict Cato rest?[119]
+  A slender fame consigns their titles vain
+    In some few letters to remain.
+  Because their famous names in books we read,
+    Come we by them to know the dead?
+  You dying, then, remembered are by none,
+    Nor any fame can make you known.
+  But if you think that life outstrippeth death,
+    Your names borne up with mortal breath,
+  When length of time takes this away likewise,
+    A second death shall you surprise.
+
+
+  [119] Caius Luscinus Fabricius, Consul 282 B.C., opponent of Pyrrhus;
+  Lucius Iunius Brutus, Consul 509 B.C., founder of the Republic; Marcus
+  Porcius Cato (Cato maior). Consul 195 B.C., great-grandfather of M.
+  Porcius Cato (Uticensis).
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Sed ne me inexorabile contra fortunam gerere bellum putes, est aliquando
+cum de hominibus illa, fallax illa nihil, bene mereatur, tum scilicet cum
+se aperit, cum frontem detegit moresque profitetur. Nondum forte quid
+loquar intellegis. Mirum est quod dicere gestio, eoque sententiam uerbis
+explicare uix queo. Etenim plus hominibus reor aduersam quam prosperam
+prodesse fortunam. Illa enim semper specie felicitatis cum uidetur blanda,
+mentitur; haec semper uera est, cum se instabilem mutatione demonstrat.
+Illa fallit, haec instruit, illa mendacium specie bonorum mentes fruentium
+ligat, haec cognitione fragilis felicitatis absoluit. Itaque illam uideas
+uentosam, fluentem suique semper ignaram, hanc sobriam succinctamque et
+ipsius aduersitatis exercitatione prudentem. Postremo felix a uero bono
+deuios blanditiis trahit, aduersa plerumque ad uera bona reduces unco
+retrahit. An hoc inter minima aestimandum putas quod amicorum tibi fidelium
+mentes haec aspera, haec horribilis fortuna detexit, haec tibi certos
+sodalium uultus ambiguosque secreuit, discedens suos abstulit, tuos
+reliquit? Quanti hoc integer, ut uidebaris tibi fortunatus, emisses! Nunc
+et amissas opes querere; quod pretiosissimum diuitiarum genus est amicos
+inuenisti.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  But lest thou shouldst think that I am at implacable war with Fortune,
+  there is a time when this thy goddess ceasing to deceive deserveth of
+  men, to wit, when she declareth herself, when she discovereth her face
+  and showeth herself in her own colours. Perhaps thou understandest not
+  yet what I say. I would utter a wonderful thing, insomuch as I can
+  scarcely explicate my mind in words. For I think that Fortune, when she
+  is opposite, is more profitable to men than when she is favourable. For
+  in prosperity, by a show of happiness and seeming to caress, she is ever
+  false, but in adversity when she showeth herself inconstant by changing,
+  she is ever true. In that she deceiveth, in this she instructeth; in
+  that she imprisoneth the minds of men with falsely seeming goods, which
+  they enjoy, in this she setteth them at liberty by discovering the
+  uncertainty of them. Wherefore, in that thou shalt alway see her puffed
+  up, and wavering, and blinded with a self-conceit of herself, in this
+  thou shalt find her sober, settled, and, with the very exercise of
+  adversity, wise. Finally, prosperity with her flatterings withdraweth
+  men from true goodness, adversity recalleth and reclaimeth them many
+  times by force[120] to true happiness. Dost thou esteem it a small
+  benefit that this rough and harsh Fortune hath made known unto thee the
+  minds of thy faithful friends? She hath severed thy assured from thy
+  doubtful friends; prosperity at her departure took away with her those
+  which were hers, and left thee thine. How dearly wouldst thou have
+  bought this before thy fall, and when thou seemedst to thyself
+  fortunate! Now thou dost even lament thy lost riches; thou hast found
+  friends, the most precious treasure in the world.
+
+
+  [120] Literally, "pulleth them back with a hook."
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Quod mundus stabili fide
+Concordes uariat uices,
+Quod pugnantia semina
+Foedus perpetuum tenent,
+Quod Phoebus roseum diem                                                  5
+Curru prouehit aureo,
+Vt quas duxerit Hesperos
+Phoebe noctibus imperet,
+Vt fluctus auidum mare
+Certo fine coerceat,                                                     10
+Ne terris liceat uagis
+Latos tendere terminos,
+Hanc rerum seriem ligat
+Terras ac pelagus regens
+Et caelo imperitans amor.                                                15
+Hic si frena remiserit,
+Quidquid nunc amat inuicem
+Bellum continuo geret
+Et quam nunc socia fide
+Pulchris motibus incitant*,                                              20
+Certent soluere machinam.
+Hic sancto populos quoque
+Iunctos foedere continet,
+Hic et coniugii sacrum
+Castis nectit amoribus,                                                  25
+Hic fidis etiam sua
+Dictat iura sodalibus.
+O felix hominum genus,
+Si uestros animos amor
+Quo caelum regitur regat."                                               30
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  That this fair world in settled course her several forms should vary,
+  That a perpetual law should tame the fighting seeds of things,
+  That Phoebus should the rosy day in his bright chariot carry,
+  That Phoebe should govern the nights which Hesperus forth brings,
+  That to the floods of greedy seas are certain bounds assigned,
+  Which them, lest they usurp too much upon the earth, debar,
+  Love ruling heaven, and earth, and seas, them in this course doth bind.
+  And if it once let loose their reins, their friendship turns to war,
+  Tearing the world whose ordered form their quiet motions bear.
+  By it all holy laws are made and marriage rites are tied,
+  By it is faithful friendship joined. How happy mortals were,
+  If that pure love did guide their minds, which heavenly spheres
+    doth guide!"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER SECVNDVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER III.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Iam cantum illa finiuerat, cum me audiendi auidum stupentemque arrectis
+adhuc auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat. Itaque paulo post: "O," inquam,
+"summum lassorum solamen animorum quam tu me uel sententiarum pondere uel
+canendi etiam iucunditate refouisti! Adeo ut iam me post haec inparem
+fortunae ictibus esse non arbitrer. Itaque remedia quae paulo acriora esse
+dicebas, non modo non perhorresco, sed audiendi auidus uehementer
+efflagito." Tum illa "Sensi," inquit, "cum uerba nostra tacitus attentusque
+rapiebas, eumque tuae mentis habitum uel exspectaui uel, quod est uerius,
+ipsa perfeci. Talia sunt quippe quae restant, ut degustata quidem mordeant,
+interius autem recepta dulcescant. Sed quod tu te audiendi cupidum dicis,
+quanto ardore flagrares, si quonam te ducere aggrediamur agnosceres!"
+"Quonam?" inquam. "Ad ueram," inquit, "felicitatem, quam tuus quoque
+somniat animus, sed occupato ad imagines uisu ipsam illam non potest
+intueri." Tum ego: "Fac obsecro et quae illa uera sit, sine cunctatione
+demonstra." "Faciam," inquit illa, "tui causa libenter. Sed quae tibi causa
+notior est, eam prius designare uerbis atque informare conabor ut ea
+perspecta cum in contrariam partem flexeris oculos, uerae beatitudinis
+speciem possis agnoscere.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE THIRD BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Though she had ended her verse, yet the sweetness of it made me remain
+  astonished, attentive, and desirous to hear her longer. Wherefore, after
+  a while, I said: "O most effectual refreshment of wearied minds, how
+  have I been comforted with thy weighty sentences and pleasing music!
+  Insomuch that I begin to think myself not unable to encounter the
+  assaults of Fortune. Wherefore, I am not now afraid, but rather
+  earnestly desire to know those remedies, which before thou toldest me
+  were too sharp." To which she answered: "I perceived as much as thou
+  sayest, when I saw thee hearken to my speeches with so great silence and
+  attention, and I expected this disposition of thy mind, or rather more
+  truly caused it myself. For the remedies which remain are of that sort
+  that they are bitter to the taste, but being inwardly received wax
+  sweet. And whereas thou sayest that thou art desirous to hear; how much
+  would this desire increase if thou knewest whither we go about to bring
+  thee!" "Whither?" quoth I. "To true felicity," quoth she, "which thy
+  mind also dreameth of, but thy sight is so dimmed with phantasies that
+  thou canst not behold it as it is." Then I beseeched her to explicate
+  without delay wherein true happiness consisteth. To which she answered:
+  "I will willingly do so for thy sake, but first I will endeavour to
+  declare in words and to give shape to that which is better known unto
+  thee, that, having thoroughly understood it, by reflecting of the
+  contrary thou mayest discover the type of perfect blessedness.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Qui serere ingenuum uolet agrum,
+Liberat arua prius fruticibus,
+Falce rubos filicemque resecat,
+Vt noua fruge grauis Ceres eat.
+Dulcior est apium mage labor,                                             5
+Si malus ora prius sapor edat.
+Gratius astra nitent ubi Notus
+Desinit imbriferos dare sonos.
+Lucifer ut tenebras pepulerit
+Pulchra dies roseos agit equos.                                          10
+Tu quoque falsa tuens bona prius
+Incipe colla iugo retrahere.
+Vera dehinc animum subierint."
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  He that a fruitful field will sow,
+  Doth first the ground from bushes free,
+  All fern and briars likewise mow,
+  That he his harvest great may see.
+  Honey seems sweeter to our taste,
+  If cloyed with noisome food it be.
+  Stars clearer shine when Notus' blast
+  Hath ceased the rainy storms to breed.
+  When Lucifer hath night defaced,
+  The day's bright horses then succeed.
+  So thou, whom seeming goods do feed,
+  First shake off yokes which so thee press
+  That Truth may then thy mind possess."
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Tum defixo paululum uisu et uelut in augustam suae mentis sedem recepta sic
+coepit: "Omnis mortalium cura quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet,
+diuerso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur
+peruenire. Id autem est bonum quo quis adepto nihil ulterius desiderare
+queat. Quod quidem est omnium summum bonorum cunctaque intra se bona
+continens, cui si quid aforet summum esse non posset, quoniam relinqueretur
+extrinsecus quod posset optari. Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem statum
+bonorum omnium congregatione perfectum. Hunc, uti diximus, diuerso tramite
+mortales omnes conantur adipisci. Est enim mentibus hominum ueri boni
+naturaliter inserta cupiditas, sed ad falsa deuius error abducit. Quorum
+quidem alii summum bonum esse nihilo indigere credentes ut diuitiis
+affluant elaborant; alii uero bonum quod sit dignissimum ueneratione
+iudicantes adeptis honoribus reuerendi ciuibus suis esse nituntur. Sunt qui
+summum bonum in summa potentia esse constituant; hi uel regnare ipsi uolunt
+uel regnantibus adhaerere conantur. At quibus optimum quiddam claritas
+uidetur, hi uel belli uel pacis artibus gloriosum nomen propagare
+festinant. Plurimi uero boni fructum gaudio laetitiaque metiuntur; hi
+felicissimum putant uoluptate diffluere. Sunt etiam qui horum fines
+causasque alterutro permutent, ut qui diuitias ob potentiam uoluptatesque
+desiderant uel qui potentiam seu pecuniae causa seu proferendi nominis
+appetunt. In his igitur ceterisque talibus humanorum actuum uotorumque
+uersatur intentio, ueluti nobilitas fauorque popularis quae uidentur
+quandam claritudinem comparare, uxor ac liberi quae iucunditatis gratia
+petuntur; amicorum uero quod sanctissimum quidem genus est, non in fortuna
+sed in uirtute numeratur, reliquum uero uel potentiae causa uel
+delectationis assumitur. Iam uero corporis bona promptum est ut ad
+superiora referantur. Robur enim magnitudoque uidetur praestare ualentiam,
+pulchritudo atque uelocitas celebritatem, salubritas uoluptatem; quibus
+omnibus solam beatitudinem desiderari liquet. Nam quod quisque prae ceteris
+petit, id summum esse iudicat bonum. Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse
+definiuimus; quare beatum esse iudicat statum quem prae ceteris quisque
+desiderat.
+
+Habes igitur ante oculos propositam fere formam felicitatis humanae--opes,
+honores, potentiam, gloriam, uoluptates. Quae quidem sola considerans
+Epicurus consequenter sibi summum bonum uoluptatem esse constituit, quod
+cetera omnia iucunditatem animo uideantur afferre. Sed ad hominum studia
+reuertor, quorum animus etsi caligante memoria tamen bonum suum repetit,
+sed uelut ebrius domum quo tramite reuertatur ignorat. Num enim uidentur
+errare hi qui nihilo indigere nituntur? Atqui non est aliud quod aeque
+perficere beatitudinem possit quam copiosus bonorum omnium status nec
+alieni egens sed sibi ipse sufficiens. Num uero labuntur hi qui quod sit
+optimum, id etiam reuerentiae cultu dignissimum putent? Minime. Neque enim
+uile quiddam contemnendumque est quod adipisci omnium fere mortalium
+laborat intentio. An in bonis non est numeranda potentia? Quid igitur? Num
+imbecillum ac sine uiribus aestimandum est, quod omnibus rebus constat esse
+praestantius? An claritudo nihili pendenda est? Sed sequestrari nequit quin
+omne quod excellentissimum sit id etiam uideatur esse clarissimum. Nam non
+esse anxiam tristemque beatitudinem nec doloribus molestiisque subiectam
+quid attinet dicere, quando in minimis quoque rebus id appetitur quod
+habere fruique delectet? Atqui haec sunt quae adipisci homines uolunt eaque
+de causa diuitias, dignitates, regna, gloriam uoluptatesque desiderant quod
+per haec sibi sufficientiam, reuerentiam, potentiam, celebritatem,
+laetitiam credunt esse uenturam. Bonum est igitur quod tam diuersis studiis
+homines petunt; in quo quanta sit naturae uis facile monstratur, cum licet
+uariae dissidentesque sententiae tamen in diligendo boni fine consentiunt.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  Then, for a while looking steadfastly upon the ground, and, as it were,
+  retiring herself to the most secret seat of her soul, she began in this
+  manner: "All men's thoughts, which are turmoiled with manifold cares,
+  take indeed divers courses, but yet endeavour to attain the same end of
+  happiness, which is that good which, being once obtained, nothing can be
+  further desired. Which is the chiefest of all goods, and containeth in
+  itself whatsoever is good, and if it wanted anything it could not be the
+  chiefest, because there would something remain besides it which might be
+  wished for. Wherefore, it is manifest that blessedness is an estate
+  replenished with all that is good. This, as we said, all men endeavour
+  to obtain by divers ways. For there is naturally ingrafted in men's
+  minds an earnest desire of that which is truly good; but deceitful error
+  withdraweth it to that which falsely seemeth such. So that some,
+  esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all means to
+  abound with riches; others, deeming that to be good which is most
+  deserving of honour, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their
+  fellow-citizens. Others think it the greatest felicity to have great
+  power and authority, and these will either reign themselves or at least
+  procure to be great with princes. But they who think fame better than
+  all these, make all speed possible to spread their names far and near,
+  by achieving some worthy enterprise either in war or peace. Many measure
+  good by joy and mirth, and their chiefest care is how they may abound
+  with pleasure. Some interchange the ends and means of these things one
+  with the other, wanting now riches for the sake of power and pleasure,
+  now power for the sake of wealth and fame. At these and such other do
+  men's actions and desires aim, as nobility and popularity, which make
+  men esteemed; wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. But
+  friendship, that most sacred thing, is rather to be attributed to virtue
+  than to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for
+  power or pleasure. And it is an easy matter to reduce all corporal goods
+  to the former heads. For strength and greatness give ability; beauty and
+  swiftness, fame; and health yieldeth pleasure. By all which we
+  manifestly seek for nothing else but happiness. For that which every man
+  seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all
+  one with happiness. Wherefore he esteemeth that estate happy which he
+  preferreth before all other.
+
+  And thus thou hast in a manner seen the form of human felicity--riches,
+  honour, power, glory, pleasure. Which Epicurus only considering,
+  consequently took pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest
+  seemed to delight the mind. But I return to the careful thoughts of men,
+  whose minds, though obscured, yet seek after the greatest good, but like
+  a drunken man know not the way home. For seem they to err who endeavour
+  to want nothing? But nothing can cause happiness so much as the
+  plentiful possession of all that is good, needing the help of none, but
+  is sufficient of itself. Or do they err who take that which is best to
+  be likewise most worthy of respect? No. For it is no vile or
+  contemptible thing which almost all men labour to obtain. Or is not
+  power to be esteemed good? Why, then, is that to be accounted feeble and
+  of no force, which manifestly surpasses all other things? Or is fame to
+  be contemned? But it cannot be ignored that the most excellent is also
+  most famous. For to what purpose should I say that happiness is not sad
+  or melancholy, or subject to grief and trouble, when even in smallest
+  matters we desire that which we delight to have and enjoy? And these be
+  the things which men desire to obtain, and to this end procure riches,
+  dignities, kingdoms, glory, and pleasures, because by them they think to
+  have sufficiency, respect, power, fame, delight, and joy. Wherefore,
+  that is good which men seek after by divers desires, in which the force
+  of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different
+  opinions, yet they agree in choosing for their end that which is good.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Quantas rerum flectat habenas
+Natura potens, quibus inmensum
+Legibus orbem prouida seruet
+Stringatque ligans inresoluto
+Singula nexu, placet arguto                                               5
+Fidibus lentis promere cantu.
+Quamuis Poeni pulchra leones
+Vincula gestent manibusque datas
+Captent escas metuantque trucem
+Soliti uerbera ferre magistrum,                                          10
+Si cruor horrida tinxerit ora,
+Resides olim redeunt animi
+Fremituque graui meminere sui;
+Laxant nodis colla solutis
+Primusque lacer dente cruento                                            15
+Domitor rabidas imbuit iras.
+Quae canit altis garrula ramis
+Ales caueae clauditur antro;
+Huic licet inlita pocula melle
+Largasque dapes dulci studio                                             20
+Ludens hominum cura ministret,
+Si tamen arto saliens texto
+Nemorum gratas uiderit umbras,
+Sparsas pedibus proterit escas,
+Siluas tantum maesta requirit,                                           25
+Siluas dulci uoce susurrat.
+Validis quondam uiribus acta
+Pronum flectit uirga cacumen;
+Hanc si curuans dextra remisit,
+Recto spectat uertice caelum.                                            30
+Cadit Hesperias Phoebus in undas,
+Sed secreto tramite rursus
+Currum solitos uertit ad ortus.
+Repetunt proprios quaeque recursus
+Redituque suo singula gaudent                                            35
+Nec manet ulli traditus ordo
+Nisi quod fini iunxerit ortum
+Stabilemque sui fecerit orbem.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  How the first reins of all things guided are
+  By powerful Nature as the chiefest cause,
+  And how she keeps, with a foreseeing care,
+  The spacious world in order by her laws,
+  And to sure knots which nothing can untie,
+  By her strong hand all earthly motions draws--
+  To show all this we purpose now to try
+  Our pliant string, our musick's thrilling sound.
+  Although the Libyan lions often lie
+  Gentle and tame in splendid fetters bound,[121]
+  And fearing their incensed master's wrath,
+  With patient looks endure each blow and wound,
+  Yet if their jaws they once in blood do bathe,
+  They, gaining courage,[122] with fierce noise awake
+  The force which Nature in them seated hath,
+  And from their necks the broken chains do shake;
+  Then he that tamed them first doth feel their rage,
+  And torn in pieces doth their fury slake.
+  The bird shut up in an unpleasing cage,
+  Which on the lofty trees did lately sing,
+  Though men, her want of freedom to assuage,
+  Should unto her with careful labour bring
+  The sweetest meats which they can best devise,
+  Yet when within her prison fluttering
+  The pleasing shadows of the groves she spies,
+  Her hated food she scatters with her feet,
+  In yearning spirit to the woods she flies,
+  The woods' delights do tune her accents sweet.
+  When some strong hand doth tender plant constrain
+  With his debased top the ground to meet,
+  If it let go, the crooked twig again
+  Up toward Heaven itself it straight doth raise.
+  Phoebus doth fall into the western main,
+  Yet doth he back return by secret ways,
+  And to the earth doth guide his chariot's race.
+  Each thing a certain course and laws obeys,
+  Striving to turn back to his proper place;
+  Nor any settled order can be found,
+  But that which doth within itself embrace
+  The births and ends of all things in a round.
+
+
+  [121] Literally, "and take food offered by the hand."
+
+  [122] Literally, "their spirits, hitherto sluggish, return."
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Vos quoque, o terrena animalia, tenui licet imagine uestrum tamen
+principium somniatis uerumque illum beatitudinis finem licet minime
+perspicaci qualicumque tamen cogitatione prospicitis eoque uos et ad uerum
+bonum naturalis ducit intentio et ab eodem multiplex error abducit.
+Considera namque an per ea quibus se homines adepturos beatitudinem putant
+ad destinatum finem ualeant peruenire. Si enim uel pecuniae uel honores
+ceteraque tale quid afferunt cui nihil bonorum abesse uideatur, nos quoque
+fateamur fieri aliquos horum adeptione felices. Quod si neque id ualent
+efficere quod promittunt bonisque pluribus carent, nonne liquido falsa in
+eis beatitudinis species deprehenditur? Primum igitur te ipsum qui paulo
+ante diuitiis affluebas, interrogo: Inter illas abundantissimas opes
+numquamne animum tuum concepta ex qualibet iniuria confudit anxietas?"
+"Atqui," inquam, "libero me fuisse animo quin aliquid semper angerer
+reminisci non queo." "Nonne quia uel aberat quod abesse non uelles uel
+aderat quod adesse noluisses?" "Ita est," inquam. "Illius igitur
+praesentiam huius absentiam desiderabas?" "Confiteor," inquam. "Eget uero,"
+inquit, "eo quod quisque desiderat?" "Eget," inquam. "Qui uero eget aliquo,
+non est usquequaque sibi ipse sufficiens?" "Minime," inquam. "Tu itaque
+hanc insufficientiam plenus," inquit, "opibus sustinebas?" "Quidni?"
+inquam. "Opes igitur nihilo indigentem sufficientemque sibi facere nequeunt
+et hoc erat quod promittere uidebantur. Atqui hoc quoque maxime
+considerandum puto quod nihil habeat suapte natura pecunia ut his a quibus
+possidetur inuitis nequeat auferri." "Fateor," inquam. "Quidni fateare, cum
+eam cotidie ualentior aliquis eripiat inuito? Vnde enim forenses
+querimoniae nisi quod uel ui uel fraude nolentibus pecuniae repetuntur
+ereptae?" "Ita est," inquam. "Egebit igitur," inquit, "extrinsecus petito
+praesidio quo suam pecuniam quisque tueatur?" "Quis id," inquam, "neget?"
+"Atqui non egeret eo, nisi possideret pecuniam quam posset amittere?"
+"Dubitari," inquam, "nequit." "In contrarium igitur relapsa res est; nam
+quae sufficientes sibi facere putabantur opes, alieno potius praesidio
+faciunt indigentes. Quis autem modus est quo pellatur diuitiis indigentia?
+Num enim diuites esurire nequeunt? Num sitire non possunt? Num frigus
+hibernum pecuniosorum membra non sentiunt? Sed adest, inquies, opulentis
+quo famem satient, quo sitim frigusque depellant. Sed hoc modo consolari
+quidem diuitiis indigentia potest, auferri penitus non potest. Nam si haec
+hians semper atque aliquid poscens opibus expletur, maneat necesse est quae
+possit expleri. Taceo quod naturae minimum, quod auaritiae nihil satis est.
+Quare si opes nec submouere possunt indigentiam et ipsae suam faciunt, quid
+est quod eas sufficientiam praestare credatis?
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  You also, O earthly creatures, though slightly and as it were in a dream
+  acknowledge your beginning, and though not perspicuously yet in some
+  sort behold that true end of happiness, so that the intention of nature
+  leadeth you to the true good, and manifold error withdraweth you from
+  it. For consider whether those things, by which men think to obtain
+  happiness, can bring them to their desired end. For if either money, or
+  honour, or any of the rest be of that quality that they want nothing
+  which is good, we will also confess that they are able to make men
+  happy. But if they neither be able to perform that they promise, and
+  want many things which are good, are they not manifestly discovered to
+  have a false appearance of happiness? First then, I ask thee thyself,
+  who not long since didst abound with wealth; in that plenty of riches,
+  was thy mind never troubled with any injuries?" "I cannot remember,"
+  quoth I, "that ever my mind was so free from trouble but that something
+  or other still vexed me." "Was it not because thou either wantedst
+  something which thou wouldst have had, or else hadst something which
+  thou wouldst have wanted?" "It is true," quoth I. "Then thou desiredst
+  the presence of that, and the absence of this?" "I confess I did," quoth
+  I. "And doth not a man want that," quoth she, "which he desireth?" "He
+  doth," quoth I. "But he that wanteth anything is not altogether
+  sufficient of himself?" "He is not," quoth I. "So that thou feltest this
+  insufficiency, even the height of thy wealth?" "Why not?" quoth I. "Then
+  riches cannot make a man wanting nothing nor sufficient of himself, and
+  this was that they seemed to promise. But this is most of all to be
+  considered, that money hath nothing of itself which can keep it from
+  being taken from them which possess it, against their will." "I grant
+  it," quoth I. "Why shouldst thou not grant it, since that every day
+  those which are more potent take it from others perforce? For from
+  whence proceed so many complaints in law, but that money gotten either
+  by violence or deceit is sought to be recovered by that means?" "It is
+  so indeed," quoth I. "So that every man needeth some other help to
+  defend his money?" "Who denies that?" quoth I. "But he should not need
+  that help, unless he had money which he might lose?" "There is no doubt
+  of that," quoth I. "Now then the matter is fallen out quite contrary;
+  for riches, which are thought to suffice of themselves, rather make men
+  stand in need of other helps. And after what manner do riches expel
+  penury? For are not rich men hungry? Are they not thirsty? Or doth much
+  money make the owners senseless of cold in winter? But thou wilt say,
+  wealthy men have wherewithal to satisfy their hunger, slake their
+  thirst, and defend themselves from cold. But in this sort, though want
+  may be somewhat relieved by wealth, yet it cannot altogether be taken
+  away. For if ever gaping and craving it be satiated by riches, there
+  must needs always remain something to be satiated. I omit, that to
+  nature very little, to covetousness nothing is sufficient. Wherefore if
+  riches can neither remove wants, and cause some themselves, why imagine
+  you that they can cause sufficiency?
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quamuis fluente diues auri gurgite
+  Non expleturas cogat auarus opes
+Oneretque bacis colla rubri litoris
+  Ruraque centeno scindat opima boue,
+Nec cura mordax deseret superstitem,                                      5
+  Defunctumque leues non comitantur opes.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Although the rich man from his mines of gold
+  Dig treasure which his mind can never fill,
+  And lofty neck with precious pearls enfold,
+  And his fat fields with many oxen till,
+  Yet biting cares will never leave his head,
+  Nor will his wealth attend him being dead.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Sed dignitates honorabilem reuerendumque cui prouenerint reddunt. Num uis
+ea est magistratibus ut utentium mentibus uirtutes inserant uitia
+depellant? Atqui non fugare sed illustrare potius nequitiam solent; quo fit
+ut indignemur eas saepe nequissimis hominibus contigisse, unde Catullus
+licet in curuli Nonium sedentem strumam tamen appellat. Videsne quantum
+malis dedecus adiciant dignitates? Atqui minus eorum patebit indignitas, si
+nullis honoribus inclarescant. Tu quoque num tandem tot periculis adduci
+potuisti ut cum Decorato gerere magistratum putares, cum in eo mentem
+nequissimi scurrae delatorisque respiceres? Non enim possumus ob honores
+reuerentia dignos iudicare quos ipsis honoribus iudicamus indignos. At si
+quem sapientia praeditum uideres, num posses eum uel reuerentia uel ea qua
+est praeditus sapientia non dignum putare? Minime. Inest enim dignitas
+propria uirtuti, quam protinus in eos quibus fuerit adiuncta transfundit.
+Quod quia populares facere nequeunt honores, liquet eos propriam dignitatis
+pulchritudinem non habere.
+
+In quo illud est animaduertendum magis. Nam si eo abiectior est quo magis a
+pluribus quisque contemnitur, cum reuerendos facere nequeat quos pluribus
+ostentat, despectiores potius improbos dignitas facit. Verum non impune;
+reddunt namque improbi parem dignitatibus uicem quas sua contagione
+commaculant. Atque ut agnoscas ueram illam reuerentiam per has umbratiles
+dignitates non posse contingere; si qui multiplici consulatu functus in
+barbaras nationes forte deuenerit, uenerandumne barbaris honor faciet?
+Atqui si hoc naturale munus dignitatibus foret, ab officio suo quoquo
+gentium nullo modo cessarent, sicut ignis ubique terrarum numquam tamen
+calere desistit, sed quoniam id eis non propria uis sed hominum fallax
+adnectit opinio, uanescunt ilico, cum ad eos uenerint qui dignitates eas
+esse non aestimant.
+
+Sed hoc apud exteras nationes. Inter eos uero apud quos ortae sunt, num
+perpetuo perdurant? Atqui praetura magna olim potestas nunc inane nomen et
+senatorii census grauis sarcina; si quis populi quondam curasset annonam,
+magnus habebatur, nunc ea praefectura quid abiectius? Vt enim paulo ante
+diximus, quod nihil habet proprii decoris, opinione utentium nunc
+splendorem accipit nunc amittit. Si igitur reuerendos facere nequeunt
+dignitates, si ultro improborum contagione sordescunt, si mutatione
+temporum splendere desinunt, si gentium aestimatione uilescunt, quid est
+quod in se expetendae pulchritudinis habeant, nedum aliis praestent?
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  But dignities make him honourable and reverend on whom they light. Have
+  offices that force to plant virtues and expel vices in the minds of
+  those who have them? But they are not wont to banish, but rather to make
+  wickedness splendid. So that we many times complain because most wicked
+  men obtain them. Whereupon Catullus called Nonius a scab or impostume
+  though he sat in his chair of estate.[123] Seest thou what great
+  ignominy dignities heap upon evil men? For their unworthiness would less
+  appear if they were never advanced to any honours. Could so many dangers
+  ever make thee think to bear office with Decoratus,[124] having
+  discovered him to be a very varlet and spy? For we cannot for their
+  honours account them worthy of respect whom we judge unworthy of the
+  honours themselves. But if thou seest any man endued with wisdom, canst
+  thou esteem him unworthy of that respect or wisdom which he hath? No,
+  truly. For virtue hath a proper dignity of her own, which she presently
+  endueth her possessors withal. Which since popular preferments cannot
+  do, it is manifest that they have not the beauty which is proper to true
+  dignity.
+
+  In which we are farther to consider that, if to be contemned of many
+  make men abject, dignities make the wicked to be despised the more by
+  laying them open to the view of the world. But the dignities go not
+  scot-free, for wicked men do as much for them, defiling them with their
+  own infection. And that thou mayst plainly see that true respect cannot
+  be gotten by these painted dignities, let one that hath been often
+  Consul go among barbarous nations; will that honour make those barbarous
+  people respect him? And yet, if this were natural to dignities, they
+  would never forsake their function in any nation whatsoever; as fire,
+  wheresoever it be, always remaineth hot. But because not their own
+  nature, but the deceitful opinion of men attributeth that to them, they
+  forthwith come to nothing, being brought to them who esteem them not to
+  be dignities.
+
+  And this for foreign nations. But do they always last among them where
+  they had their beginning? The Praetorship, a great dignity in time past,
+  is now an idle name, and an heavy burden of the Senate's fortune. If
+  heretofore one had care of the people's provision, he was accounted a
+  great man; now what is more abject than that office? For as we said
+  before, that which hath no proper dignity belonging unto it sometime
+  receiveth and sometime loseth his value at the users' discretion.
+  Wherefore if dignities cannot make us respected, if they be easily
+  defiled with the infection of the wicked, if their worth decays by
+  change of times, if diversities of nations make them contemptible, what
+  beauty have they in themselves, or can they afford to others, worth the
+  desiring?
+
+
+  [123] Cf. Catull. lii.
+
+  [124] Decoratus was quaestor _circa_ 508; cf. Cassiod. _Ep_. v. 3 and 4.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quamuis se Tyrio superbus ostro
+  Comeret et niueis lapillis,
+Inuisus tamen omnibus uigebat
+  Luxuriae Nero saeuientis.
+Sed quondam dabat improbus uerendis                                       5
+  Patribus indecores curules.
+Quis illos igitur putet beatos
+  Quos miseri tribuunt honores?
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Though fierce and lustful Nero did adorn
+  Himself with purple robes, which pearls did grace,
+  He did but gain a general hate and scorn.
+  Yet wickedly he officers most base
+  Over the reverend Senators did place.
+  Who would esteem of fading honours then
+  Which may be given thus by the wickedest men?
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+An uero regna regumque familiaritas efficere potentem ualet? Quidni, quando
+eorum felicitas perpetuo perdurat? Atqui plena est exemplorum uetustas,
+plena etiam praesens aetas, qui reges felicitatem calamitate mutauerint. O
+praeclara potentia quae ne ad conseruationem quidem sui satis efficax
+inuenitur! Quod si haec regnorum potestas beatitudinis auctor est, nonne si
+qua parte defuerit, felicitatem minuat, miseriam inportet? Sed quamuis late
+humana tendantur imperia, plures necesse est gentes relinqui quibus regum
+quisque non imperet. Qua uero parte beatos faciens desinit potestas, hac
+inpotentia subintrat quae miseros facit; hoc igitur modo maiorem regibus
+inesse necesse est miseriae portionem. Expertus sortis suae periculorum
+tyrannus regni metus pendentis supra uerticem gladii terrore simulauit.
+Quae est igitur haec potestas quae sollicitudinum morsus expellere, quae
+formidinum aculeos uitare nequit? Atqui uellent ipsi uixisse securi, sed
+nequeunt; dehinc de potestate gloriantur. An tu potentem censes quem uideas
+uelle quod non possit efficere? Potentem censes qui satellite latus ambit,
+qui quos terret ipse plus metuit, qui ut potens esse uideatur, in
+seruientium manu situm est? Nam quid ego de regum familiaribus disseram,
+cum regna ipsa tantae inbecillitatis plena demonstrem? Quos quidem regia
+potestas saepe incolumis saepe autem lapsa prosternit. Nero Senecam
+familiarem praeceptoremque suum ad eligendae mortis coegit arbitrium.
+Papinianum diu inter aulicos potentem militum gladiis Antoninus obiecit.
+Atqui uterque potentiae suae renuntiare uoluerunt, quorum Seneca opes etiam
+suas tradere Neroni seque in otium conferre conatus est; sed dum ruituros
+moles ipsa trahit, neuter quod uoluit effecit. Quae est igitur ista
+potentia quam pertimescunt habentes, quam nec cum habere uelis tutus sis et
+cum deponere cupias uitare non possis? An praesidio sunt amici quos non
+uirtus sed fortuna conciliat? Sed quem felicitas amicum fecit, infortunium
+faciet inimicum. Quae uero pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris
+inimicus?
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  But can kingdoms and the familiarity of kings make a man mighty? Why
+  not, when their felicity lasteth always? But both former and present
+  times are full of examples that many kings have changed their happiness
+  with misery. O excellent power, which is not sufficient to uphold
+  itself! And if this strength of kingdoms be the author of blessedness,
+  doth it not diminish happiness and bring misery, when it is in any way
+  defective? But though some empires extend themselves far, there will
+  still remain many nations out of their dominions. Now, where the power
+  endeth which maketh them happy, there entereth the contrary which maketh
+  them miserable, so that all kings must needs have less happiness than
+  misery. That Tyrant, knowing by experience the dangers of his estate,
+  signified the fears incident to a kingdom, by the hanging of a drawn
+  sword over a man's head.[125] What power is this, then, which cannot
+  expel nor avoid biting cares and pricking fears? They would willingly
+  have lived securely, but could not, and yet they brag of their power.
+  Thinkest thou him mighty whom thou seest desire that which he cannot do?
+  Thinkest thou him mighty who dareth not go without his guard; who
+  feareth others more than they fear him; who cannot seem mighty, except
+  his servants please? For what should I speak of kings' followers, since
+  I show that kingdoms themselves are so full of weakness? Whom the power
+  of kings often standing, but many times falling, doth overthrow. Nero
+  compelled Seneca, his familiar friend and master, to make choice of his
+  own death.[126] Antoninus called Papinianus, who had been long a gallant
+  courtier, to be cut in pieces with his soldiers' swords.[127] Yet they
+  would both have renounced their power, yea Seneca endeavoured to deliver
+  up his riches also to Nero, and to give himself to a contemplative life.
+  But their very greatness drawing them to their destruction, neither of
+  them could compass that which they desired. Wherefore what power is this
+  that the possessors fear, which when thou wilt have, thou art not
+  secure, and when thou wilt leave, thou canst not avoid? Are we the
+  better for those friends which love us not for our virtue but for our
+  prosperity? But whom prosperity maketh our friend, adversity will make
+  our enemy. And what plague is able to hurt us more than a familiar
+  enemy?
+
+
+  [125] Cic. _Tusc. Disp._ v. 21. 62.
+
+  [126] Cf. Tac. _Ann._ xiv. 53, 54.
+
+  [127] Cf. Spartian. _Caracallus_ 8.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Qui se uolet esse potentem
+Animos domet ille feroces
+Nec uicta libidine colla
+Foedis submittat habenis.
+Etenim licet Indica longe                                                 5
+Tellus tua iura tremescat
+Et seruiat ultima Thyle,
+Tamen atras pellere curas
+Miserasque fugare querelas
+Non posse potentia non est.                                              10
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Who would be powerful, must
+  His own affections check,
+  Nor let foul reins of lust
+  Subdue his conquered neck.
+  For though the Indian land
+  Should tremble at thy beck,
+  And though thy dread command
+  Far Thule's isle obey,
+  Unless thou canst withstand
+  And boldly drive away
+  Black care and wretched moan,
+  Thy might is small or none.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Gloria uero quam fallax saepe, quam turpis est! Vnde non iniuria tragicus
+exclamat:
+
+  [Greek: O doxa doxa murioisi dae broton
+  ouden gegosi bioton onkosas megan.]
+
+Plures enim magnum saepe nomen falsis uulgi opinionibus abstulerunt; quo
+quid turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso praedicantur, suis ipsi
+necesse est laudibus erubescant. Quae si etiam meritis conquisita sit, quid
+tamen sapientis adiecerit conscientiae qui bonum suum non populari rumore,
+sed conscientiae ueritate metitur? Quod si hoc ipsum propagasse nomen
+pulchrum uidetur, consequens est ut foedum non extendisse iudicetur. Sed
+cum, uti paulo ante disserui, plures gentes esse necesse sit ad quas unius
+fama hominis nequeat peruenire, fit ut quem tu aestimas esse gloriosum, pro
+maxima parte terrarum uideatur inglorius. Inter haec uero popularem gratiam
+ne commemoratione quidem dignam puto, quae nec iudicio prouenit nec umquam
+firma perdurat. Iam uero quam sit inane quam futtile nobilitatis nomen,
+quis non uideat? Quae si ad claritudinem refertur, aliena est. Videtur
+namque esse nobilitas quaedam de meritis ueniens laus parentum. Quod si
+claritudinem praedicatio facit, illi sint clari necesse est qui
+praedicantur. Quare splendidum te, si tuam non habes, aliena claritudo non
+efficit. Quod si quid est in nobilitate bonum, id esse arbitror solum, ut
+inposita nobilibus necessitudo uideatur ne a maiorum uirtute degeneret.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  As for glory, how deceitful it is oftentimes, and dishonest! For which
+  cause the tragical poet deservedly exclaimeth: "O glory, glory, thou
+  hast raised to honour and dignity myriads of worthless mortals!"[128]
+  For many have often been much spoken of through the false opinions of
+  the common people. Than which what can be imagined more vile? For those
+  who are falsely commended must needs blush at their own praises. Which
+  glory though it be gotten by deserts, yet what adds it to a wise man's
+  conscience who measureth his own good, not by popular rumours, but by
+  his own certain knowledge? And if it seemeth a fair thing to have
+  dilated our fame, consequently we must judge it a foul thing not to have
+  it extended. But since, as I showed a little before, there must needs be
+  many nations to which the fame of one man cannot arrive, it cometh to
+  pass that he whom thou esteemeth glorious, in the greater part of the
+  world seemeth to have no glory at all. And here now I think popular
+  glory not worth the speaking of, which neither proceedeth from judgment,
+  nor ever hath any firmness. Likewise, who seeth not what a vain and idle
+  thing it is to be called noble? Which insofar as it concerneth fame, is
+  not our own. For nobility seemeth to be a certain praise proceeding from
+  our parents' deserts. But if praising causeth fame, they must
+  necessarily be famous who are praised. Wherefore the fame of others, if
+  thou hast none of thine own, maketh not thee renowned. But if there be
+  anything good in nobility, I judge it only to be this, that it imposeth
+  a necessity upon those which are noble, not to suffer their nobility to
+  degenerate from the virtue of their ancestors.
+
+
+  [128] Eurip. _Androm._ 319.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Omne hominum genus in terris simili surgit ab ortu.
+Vnus enim rerum pater est, unus cuncta ministrat.
+Ille dedit Phoebo radios dedit et cornua lunae,
+Ille homines etiam terris dedit ut sidera caelo,
+Hic clausit membris animos celsa sede petitos.                            5
+Mortales igitur cunctos edit nobile germen.
+Quid genus et proauos strepitis? Si primordia uestra
+Auctoremque deum spectes, nullus degener exstat,
+Ni uitiis peiora fouens proprium deserat ortum.
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  The general race of men from a like birth is born.
+  All things one Father have, Who doth them all adorn,
+  Who gave the sun his rays, and the pale moon her horn,
+  The lofty heaven for stars, low earth for mortals chose;
+  He souls fetched down from high in bodies did enclose;
+  And thus from noble seed all men did first compose.
+  Why brag you of your stock? Since none is counted base,
+  If you consider God the author of your race,
+  But he that with foul vice doth his own birth deface.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Quid autem de corporis uoluptatibus loquar, quarum appetentia quidem plena
+est anxietatis; satietas uero poenitentiae? Quantos illae morbos, quam
+intolerabiles dolores quasi quendam fructum nequitiae fruentium solent
+referre corporibus! Quarum motus quid habeat iucunditatis, ignoro. Tristes
+uero esse uoluptatum exitus, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum uolet,
+intelleget. Quae si beatos explicare possunt, nihil causae est quin pecudes
+quoque beatae esse dicantur quarum omnis ad explendam corporalem lacunam
+festinat intentio. Honestissima quidem coniugis foret liberorumque
+iucunditas, sed nimis e natura dictum est nescio quem filios inuenisse
+tortorem; quorum quam sit mordax quaecumque condicio, neque alias expertum
+te neque nunc anxium necesse est admonere. In quo Euripidis mei sententiam
+probo, qui carentem liberis infortunio dixit esse felicem.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Now what should I speak of bodily pleasures, the desire of which is full
+  of anxiety, and the enjoying of them breeds repentance? How many
+  diseases, how intolerable griefs bring they forth in the bodies of their
+  possessors, as it were the fruits of their own wickedness! I know not
+  what sweetness their beginnings have, but whosoever will remember his
+  lusts shall understand that the end of pleasure is sadness. Which if it
+  be able to cause happiness, there is no reason why beasts should not be
+  thought blessed, whose whole intention is bent to supply their corporal
+  wants. That pleasure which proceedeth from wife and children should be
+  most honest; but it was too naturally spoken, that some tormentor
+  invented children, whose condition, whatsoever it be, how biting it is,
+  I need not tell thee, who hast had experience heretofore, and art not
+  now free from care. In which I approve the opinion of Euripides, who
+  said that they which had no children are happy by being
+  unfortunate.[129]
+
+
+  [129] Cf. _Androm._ 420.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Habet hoc uoluptas omnis,
+Stimulis agit fruentes
+Apiumque par uolantum
+Vbi grata mella fudit,
+Fugit et nimis tenaci                                                     5
+Ferit icta corda morsu.
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  All pleasure hath this property,
+  She woundeth those who have her most.
+  And, like unto the angry bee
+  Who hath her pleasant honey lost,
+  She flies away with nimble wing
+  And in our hearts doth leave her sting.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Nihil igitur dubium est quin hae ad beatitudinem uiae deuia quaedam sint
+nec perducere quemquam eo ualeant ad quod se perducturas esse promittunt.
+Quantis uero implicitae malis sint, breuissime monstrabo. Quid enim?
+Pecuniamne congregare conaberis? Sed eripies habenti. Dignitatibus fulgere
+uelis? Danti supplicabis et qui praeire ceteros honore cupis, poscendi
+humilitate uilesces. Potentiamne desideras? Subiectorum insidiis obnoxius
+periculis subiacebis. Gloriam petas? Sed per aspera quaeque distractus
+securus esse desistis. Voluptariam uitam degas? Sed quis non spernat atque
+abiciat uilissimae fragilissimaeque rei corporis seruum? Iam uero qui bona
+prae se corporis ferunt, quam exigua, quam fragili possessione nituntur!
+Num enim elephantos mole, tauros robore superare poteritis, num tigres
+uelocitate praeibitis? Respicite caeli spatium, firmitudinem, celeritatem
+et aliquando desinite uilia mirari. Quod quidem caelum non his potius est
+quam sua qua regitur ratione mirandum. Formae uero nitor ut rapidus est, ut
+uelox et uernalium florum mutabilitate fugacior! Quod si, ut
+Aristoteles[130] ait, Lynceis oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum uisus
+obstantia penetraret, nonne introspectis uisceribus illud Alcibiadis
+superficie pulcherrimum corpus turpissimum uideretur? Igitur te pulchrum
+uideri non tua natura sed oculorum spectantium reddit infirmitas. Sed
+aestimate quam uultis nimio corporis bona, dum sciatis hoc quodcumque
+miramini triduanae febris igniculo posse dissolui!  Ex quibus omnibus illud
+redigere in summam licet, quod haec quae nec praestare quae pollicentur
+bona possunt nec omnium bonorum congregatione perfecta sunt, ea nec ad
+beatitudinem quasi quidam calles ferunt nec beatos ipsa perficiunt.
+
+
+[130] Probably from the lost _Protrepticus_ of Aristotle. See Bywater,
+_Journal of Philology_, ii. (1869), 59, and Hartlich, _Leipz. Stud._ xi.
+(1889), 250.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Wherefore there is no doubt but that these ways to happiness are only
+  certain by-paths, which can never bring any man thither whither they
+  promise to lead him. And with how great evils they are beset, I will
+  briefly show. For what? Wilt thou endeavour to gather money? But thou
+  shalt take it away from him who hath it. Wilt thou excel in dignities?
+  Thou shalt crouch to the giver, and thou who desirest to surpass others
+  in honour shalt become vile by thy baseness in begging. Wishest thou for
+  power? Thou shalt be in danger of thy subjects' treacheries. Seekest
+  thou for glory? But, drawn into many dangers, thou shalt lose thy
+  safety. Wilt thou live a voluptuous life? But who would not despise and
+  neglect the service of so vile and frail a thing as his body? Now they
+  who boast of the habilities of their body, upon how unsteadfast a
+  possession do they ground themselves! For can you be bigger than
+  elephants, or stronger than bulls? Or swifter than tigers? Look upon the
+  space, firmness, and speedy motion of the heavens, and cease at length
+  to have in admiration these base things. Which heavens are not more to
+  be admired for these qualities than for the manner of their government.
+  As for the glittering of beauty, how soon and swiftly doth it vanish
+  away! As suddenly decaying and changing as the frail flowers in the
+  spring. And if, as Aristotle saith, men had Lynceus's eyes, that they
+  could see through stone walls, would not they judge that body of
+  Alcibiades, seeming outwardly most fair, to be most foul and ugly by
+  discovering his entrails? Wherefore not thy nature but the weakness of
+  the beholders' eyes maketh thee seem fair. But esteem the goods of the
+  body as much as you will, so that you acknowledge this, that whatsoever
+  you admire may be dissolved with the burning of an ague of three days.
+  Out of which we may briefly collect this sum; that these goods, which
+  can neither perform that they promise, nor are perfect by having all
+  that is good, do neither, as so many paths, lead men to happiness, nor
+  make men happy of themselves.
+
+
+
+
+VIII.
+
+Eheu quae miseros tramite deuios
+  Abducit ignorantia!
+Non aurum in uiridi quaeritis arbore
+  Nec uite gemmas carpitis,
+Non altis laqueos montibus abditis                                        5
+  Vt pisce ditetis dapes
+Nec uobis capreas si libeat sequi,
+  Tyrrhena captatis uada.
+Ipsos quin etiam fluctibus abditos
+  Norunt recessus aequoris,                                              10
+Quae gemmis niueis unda feracior
+  Vel quae rubentis purpurae
+Nec non quae tenero pisce uel asperis
+  Praestent echinis litora.
+Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum,                                    15
+  Nescire caeci sustinent,
+Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum,
+  Tellure demersi petunt.
+Quid dignum stolidis mentibus inprecer?
+  Opes honores ambiant;                                                  20
+Et cum falsa graui mole parauerint,
+  Tum uera cognoscant bona.
+
+
+
+
+  VIII.
+
+  Alas, how ignorance makes wretches stray
+        Out of the way!
+  You from green trees expect no golden mines
+        Nor pearls from vines,
+  Nor use you on mountains to lay your net
+        Fishes to get,
+  Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please,
+        Run you to seas.
+  Men will be skilful in the hidden caves
+        Of the ocean waves,
+  And in what coasts the orient pearls are bred,
+        Or purple red,
+  Also, what different sorts of fishes store
+        Each several shore.
+  But when they come their chiefest good to find,
+        Then are they blind,
+  And search for that under the earth, which lies
+        Above the skies.
+  How should I curse these fools? Let thirst them hold
+        Of fame and gold,
+  That, having got false goods with pain, they learn
+        True to discern.
+
+
+
+
+IX.
+
+"Hactenus mendacis formam felicitatis ostendisse suffecerit, quam si
+perspicaciter intueris, ordo est deinceps quae sit uera monstrare." "Atqui
+uideo," inquam, "nec opibus sufficientiam nec regnis potentiam nec
+reuerentiam dignitatibus nec celebritatem gloria nec laetitiam uoluptatibus
+posse contingere." "An etiam causas, cur id ita sit, deprehendisti?" "Tenui
+quidem ueluti rimula mihi uideor intueri, sed ex te apertius cognoscere
+malim."
+
+"Atqui promptissima ratio est. Quod enim simplex est indiuisumque natura,
+id error humanus separat et a uero atque perfecto ad falsum imperfectumque
+traducit. An tu arbitraris quod nihilo indigeat egere potentia?" "Minime,"
+inquam. "Recte tu quidem. Nam si quid est quod in ulla re inbecillioris
+ualentiae sit, in hac praesidio necesse est egeat alieno." "Ita est,"
+inquam. "Igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque una est eademque natura." "Sic
+uidetur." "Quod uero huiusmodi sit, spernendumne esse censes an contra
+rerum omnium ueneratione dignissimum?" "At hoc," inquam, "ne dubitari
+quidem potest." "Addamus igitur sufficientiae potentiaeque reuerentiam, ut
+haec tria unum esse iudicemus." "Addamus, si quidem uera uolumus
+confiteri."
+
+"Quid uero," inquit, "obscurumne hoc atque ignobile censes esse an omni
+celebritate clarissimum? Considera uero, ne quod nihilo indigere, quod
+potentissimum, quod honore dignissimum esse concessum est, egere
+claritudine quam sibi praestare non possit atque ob id aliqua ex parte
+uideatur abiectius." "Non possum," inquam, "quin hoc uti est ita etiam
+celeberrimum esse confitear." "Consequens igitur est ut claritudinem
+superioribus tribus nihil differre fateamur." "Consequitur," inquam. "Quod
+igitur nullius egeat alieni, quod suis cuncta uiribus possit, quod sit
+clarum atque reuerendum, nonne hoc etiam constat esse laetissimum?" "Sed
+unde huic," inquam, "tali maeror ullus obrepat ne cogitare quidem possum;
+quare plenum esse laetitiae, si quidem superiora manebunt, necesse est
+confiteri." "Atqui illud quoque per eadem necessarium est sufficientiae,
+potentiae, claritudinis, reuerentiae, iucunditatis nomina quidem esse
+diuersa, nullo modo uero discrepare substantiam." "Necesse est," inquam.
+"Hoc igitur quod est unum simplexque natura, prauitas humana dispertit et
+dum rei quae partibus caret partem conatur adipisci, nec portionem quae
+nulla est nec ipsam quam minime affectat assequitur." "Quonam," inquam,
+"modo?" "Qui diuitias," inquit, "petit penuriae fuga, de potentia nihil
+laborat, uilis obscurusque esse mauult, multas etiam sibi naturales quoque
+subtrahit uoluptates, ne pecuniam quam parauit amittat. Sed hoc modo ne
+sufficientia quidem contingit ei quem ualentia deserit, quem molestia
+pungit, quem uilitas abicit, quem recondit obscuritas. Qui uero solum posse
+desiderat, profligat opes, despicit uoluptates honoremque potentia carentem
+gloriam quoque nihili pendit. Sed hunc quoque quam multa deficiant uides.
+Fit enim ut aliquando necessariis egeat, ut anxietatibus mordeatur cumque
+haec depellere nequeat, etiam id quod maxime petebat potens esse desistat.
+Similiter ratiocinari de honoribus, gloria, uoluptatibus licet. Nam cum
+unumquodque horum idem quod cetera sit, quisquis horum aliquid sine ceteris
+petit, ne illud quidem quod desiderat apprehendit." "Quid igitur?" inquam.
+"Si qui cuncta simul cupiat adipisci, summam quidem ille beatitudinis
+uelit. Sed num in his eam reperiet, quae demonstrauimus id quod pollicentur
+non posse conferre?" "Minime," inquam. "In his igitur quae singula quaedam
+expetendorum praestare creduntur, beatitudo nullo modo uestiganda est."
+"Fateor," inquam, "et hoc nihil dici uerius potest." "Habes igitur,"
+inquit, "et formam falsae felicitatis et causas. Deflecte nunc in aduersum
+mentis intuitum; ibi enim ueram quam promisimus statim uidebis." "Atqui
+haec," inquam, "uel caeco perspicua est eamque tu paulo ante monstrasti,
+dum falsae causas aperire conaris. Nam nisi fallor ea uera est et perfecta
+felicitas quae sufficientem, potentem, reuerendum, celebrem laetumque
+perficiat. Atque ut me interius animaduertisse cognoscas, quae unum horum,
+quoniam idem cuncta sunt, ueraciter praestare potest hanc esse plenam
+beatitudinem sine ambiguitate cognosco." "O te alumne hac opinione felicem,
+si quidem hoc," inquit, "adieceris...." "Quidnam?" inquam. "Essene aliquid
+in his mortalibus caducisque rebus putas quod huiusmodi statum possit
+afferre?" "Minime," inquam, "puto idque a te, nihil ut amplius desideretur,
+ostensum est." "Haec igitur uel imagines ueri boni uel inperfecta quaedam
+bona dare mortalibus uidentur, uerum autem atque perfectum bonum conferre
+non possunt." "Assentior," inquam. "Quoniam igitur agnouisti quae uera illa
+sit, quae autem beatitudinem mentiantur, nunc superest ut unde ueram hanc
+petere possis agnoscas." "Id quidem," inquam, "iam dudum uehementer
+exspecto." "Sed cum, ut in Timaeo[131] Platoni," inquit, "nostro placet, in
+minimis quoque rebus diuinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc
+faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur?"
+"Inuocandum," inquam, "rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite
+fundatur exordium." "Recte," inquit, ac simul ita modulata est.
+
+
+[131] uti Timaeo _codd. optimi._
+
+
+
+
+  IX.
+
+  "Let it suffice that we have hitherto discovered the form of false
+  felicity, which if thou hast plainly seen, order now requireth that we
+  show thee in what true happiness consisteth." "I see," quoth I, "that
+  neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdoms, nor respect by
+  dignities, nor renown by glory, nor joy can be gotten by pleasures."
+  "Hast thou also understood the causes why it is so?" "Methink I have a
+  little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldst declare them more
+  plainly."
+
+  "The reason is manifest, for that which is simple and undivided of
+  itself, is divided by men's error, and is translated from true and
+  perfect to false and unperfect. Thinkest thou that which needeth
+  nothing, to stand in need of power?" "No," quoth I. "Thou sayest well,
+  for if any power in any respect be weak, in this it must necessarily
+  stand in need of the help of others." "It is true," quoth I. "Wherefore
+  sufficiency and power have one and the same nature." "So it seemeth."
+  "Now thinkest thou, that which is of this sort ought to be despised, or
+  rather that it is worthy to be respected above all other things?" "There
+  can be no doubt of this," quoth I. "Let us add respect then to
+  sufficiency and power, so that we judge these three to be one." "We must
+  add it if we confess the truth."
+
+  "What now," quoth she, "thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or
+  rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether that which thou hast
+  granted to want nothing, to be most potent, and most worthy of honour,
+  may seem to want fame, which it cannot yield itself, and for that cause
+  be in some respect more abject." "I must needs confess," quoth I, "that,
+  being what it is, this is also most famous." "Consequently then we must
+  acknowledge that fame differeth nothing from the former three." "We must
+  so," quoth I. "Wherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can perform
+  all things by its own power, which is famous and respected, is it not
+  manifest that it is also most pleasant?" To which I answered: "How such
+  a man should fall into any grief, I can by no means imagine. Wherefore
+  if that which we have said hitherto be true, we must needs confess that
+  he is most joyful and content." "And by the same reason it followeth
+  that sufficiency, power, fame, respect, pleasure have indeed divers
+  names, but differ not in substance." "It followeth indeed," quoth I.
+  "This then, which is one and simple by nature, man's wickedness
+  divideth, and while he endeavoureth to obtain part of that which hath no
+  parts, he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he
+  seeketh not after." "How is this?" quoth I. "He who seeketh after
+  riches," quoth she, "to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, he had
+  rather be base and obscure, he depriveth himself even of many natural
+  pleasures that he may not lose the money which he hath gotten. But by
+  this means he attaineth not to sufficiency, whom power forsaketh, whom
+  trouble molesteth, whom baseness maketh abject, whom obscurity
+  overwhelmeth. Again, he that only desireth power, consumeth wealth,
+  despiseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not
+  potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For
+  sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and
+  being not able to rid himself, ceaseth to be powerful, which was the
+  only thing he aimed at. The like discourse may be made of honours,
+  glory, pleasures. For since every one of these things is the same with
+  the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth
+  not that which he desireth." "What then?" quoth I. "If one should desire
+  to have them all together, he should wish for the sum of happiness, but
+  shall he find it in these things which we have showed cannot perform
+  what they promise?" "No," quoth I. "Wherefore we must by no means seek
+  for happiness in these things which are thought to afford the several
+  portions of that which is to be desired." "I confess it," quoth I, "and
+  nothing can be more true than this." "Now then," quoth she, "thou hast
+  both the form and causes of false felicity; cast but the eyes of thy
+  mind on the contrary, and thou shalt presently espy true happiness,
+  which we promised to show thee." "This," quoth I, "is evident, even to
+  him that is blind, and thou showedst it a little before, while thou
+  endeavouredst to lay open the causes of the false. For, if I be not
+  deceived, that is true and perfect happiness which maketh a man
+  sufficient, potent, respected, famous, joyful. And that thou mayest know
+  that I understood thee aright, that which can truly perform any one of
+  these because they are all one, I acknowledge to be full and perfect
+  happiness." "O my scholar, I think thee happy by having this opinion, if
+  thou addest this also." "What?" quoth I. "Dost thou imagine that there
+  is any mortal or frail thing which can cause this happy estate?" "I do
+  not," quoth I, "and that hath been so proved by thee, that more cannot
+  be desired." "Wherefore these things seem to afford men the images of
+  the true good, or certain unperfect goods, but they cannot give them the
+  true and perfect good itself." "I am of the same mind," quoth I. "Now
+  then, since thou knowest wherein true happiness consisteth, and what
+  have only a false show of it, it remaineth that thou shouldst learn
+  where thou mayest seek for this which is true." "This is that," quoth I,
+  "which I have long earnestly expected." "But since, as Plato teacheth
+  (in Timaeus),[132] we must implore God's assistance even in our least
+  affairs, what, thinkest thou, must we do now, that we may deserve to
+  find the seat of that sovereign good?" "We must," quoth I, "invocate the
+  Father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good
+  foundation." "Thou sayest rightly," quoth she, and withal sung in this
+  sort.
+
+
+  [132] Cf. _Tim._ 27.
+
+
+
+
+IX.
+
+"O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas
+Terrarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo
+Ire iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moueri.
+Quem non externae pepulerunt fingere causae
+Materiae fluitantis opus, uerum insita summi                              5
+Forma boni liuore carens, tu cuncta superno
+Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
+Mundum mente gerens similique in imagine formans
+Perfectasque iubens perfectum absoluere partes.
+Tu numeris elementa ligas ut frigora flammis                             10
+Arida conueniant liquidis, ne purior ignis
+Euolet aut mersas deducant pondera terras.
+Tu triplicis mediam naturae cuncta mouentem
+Conectens animam per consona membra resoluis.
+Quae cum secta duos motum glomerauit in orbes,                           15
+In semet reditura meat mentemque profundam
+Circuit et simili conuertit imagine caelum.
+Tu causis animas paribus uitasque minores
+Prouehis et leuibus sublimes curribus aptans
+In caelum terramque seris quas lege benigna                              20
+Ad te conuersas reduci facis igne reuerti.
+Da pater augustam menti conscendere sedem,
+Da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta
+In te conspicuos animi defigere uisus.
+Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis                                25
+Atque tuo splendore mica! Tu namque serenum,
+Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,
+Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem.
+
+
+
+
+  IX.[133]
+
+  "O Thou, that dost the world in lasting order guide,
+  Father of heaven and earth, Who makest time swiftly slide,
+  And, standing still Thyself, yet fram'st all moving laws,
+  Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause:
+  But by a sweet desire, where envy hath no place,
+  Thy goodness moving Thee to give each thing his grace,
+  Thou dost all creatures' forms from highest patterns take,
+  From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make.
+  Thus Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame.
+  Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixed with flame
+  And dry things join with moist, lest fire away should fly,
+  Or earth, opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.
+  Thou in consenting parts fitly disposed hast
+  Th'all-moving soul in midst of threefold nature placed,
+  Which, cut in several parts that run a different race,
+  Into itself returns, and circling doth embrace
+  The highest mind, and heaven with like proportion drives.
+  Thou with like cause dost make the souls and lesser lives,
+  Fix them in chariots swift, and widely scatterest
+  O'er heaven and earth; then at Thy fatherly behest
+  They stream, like fire returning, back to Thee, their God.
+  Dear Father, let my mind Thy hallowed seat ascend,
+  Let me behold the spring of grace and find Thy light,
+  That I on Thee may fix my soul's well cleared sight.
+  Cast off the earthly weight wherewith I am opprest,
+  Shine as Thou art most bright, Thou only calm and rest
+  To pious men whose end is to behold Thy ray,
+  Who their beginning art, their guide, their bound, and way.[134]
+
+
+  [133] This poem is a masterly abridgment of the first part of the
+  _Timaeus_, and was eagerly fastened on by commentators of the early
+  Middle Ages whose direct knowledge of Plato was confined to the
+  translation of that dialogue by Chalcidius.
+
+  [134] Cf. the string of nouns in _Tr._ iv. (_supra_, p. 70 _ad fin._).
+
+
+
+
+X.
+
+Quoniam igitur quae sit imperfecti, quae etiam perfecti boni forma uidisti,
+nunc demonstrandum reor quonam haec felicitatis perfectio constituta sit.
+In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum quale
+paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei
+subiectae ueritatem cassa cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin exsistat
+sitque hoc ueluti quidam omnium fons bonorum negari nequit. Omne enim quod
+inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse
+perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere inperfectum quid esse
+uideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim
+perfectione sublata, unde illud quod inperfectum perhibetur exstiterit ne
+fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum
+coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema
+atque effeta dilabitur. Quod si, uti paulo ante monstrauimus, est quaedam
+boni fragilis inperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non
+potest dubitari." "Firmissime," inquam, "uerissimeque conclusum est." "Quo
+uero," inquit, "habitet, ita considera. Deum rerum omnium principem bonum
+esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil deo melius
+excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet? Ita uero
+bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse
+conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit. Erit
+enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius
+atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora
+esse claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est
+summum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Sed perfectum bonum
+ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus; ueram igitur beatitudinem in summo
+deo sitam esse necesse est." "Accipio," inquam, "nec est quod contradici
+ullo modo queat." "Sed quaeso," inquit, "te uide quam id sancte atque
+inuiolabiliter probes quod boni summi summum deum diximus esse
+plenissimum." "Quonam," inquam, "modo?" "Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem illud
+summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur uel extrinsecus accepisse uel ita
+naturaliter habere praesumas, quasi habentis dei habitaeque beatitudinis
+diuersam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes,
+praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis. Sed
+hunc esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur. Quod si
+natura quidem inest, sed est ratione diuersum, cum de rerum principe
+loquamur deo, fingat qui potest: quis haec diuersa coniunxerit? Postremo
+quod a qualibet re diuersum est, id non est illud a quo intellegitur esse
+diuersum. Quare quod a summo bono diuersum est sui natura, id summum bonum
+non est--quod nefas est de eo cogitare quo nihil constat esse praestantius.
+Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit exsistere,
+quare quod omnium principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonum
+uerissima ratione concluserim." "Rectissime," inquam. "Sed summum bonum
+beatitudinem esse concessum est." "Ita est," inquam. "Igitur," inquit,
+"deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri." "Nec propositis,"
+inquam, "prioribus refragari queo et illis hoc inlatum consequens esse
+perspicio."
+
+"Respice," inquit, "an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa
+bona quae a se diuersa sint esse non possunt. Etenim quae discrepant bona,
+non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet; quare neutrum poterit esse
+perfectum, cum alterutri alterum deest. Sed quod perfectum non sit, id
+summum non esse manifestum est; nullo modo igitur quae summa sunt bona ea
+possunt esse diuersa. Atqui et beatitudinem et deum summum bonum esse
+collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinem quae sit summa
+diuinitas." "Nihil," inquam, "nec reapse uerius[135] nec ratiocinatione
+firmius nec deo dignius concludi potest." "Super haec," inquit, "igitur
+ueluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae
+porismata ipsi uocant, ita ego quoque tibi ueluti corollarium dabo. Nam
+quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beatitudo uero est ipsa
+diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione beatos fieri manifestum est: sed uti
+iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatem
+adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus deus,
+sed natura quidem unus; participatione uero nihil prohibet esse quam
+plurimos." "Et pulchrum," inquam, "hoc atque pretiosum, siue porisma siue
+corollarium uocari mauis." "Atqui hoc quoque pulchrius nihil est, quod his
+annectendum esse ratio persuadet." "Quid?" inquam.
+
+"Cum multa," inquit, "beatitudo continere uideatur, utrumne haec omnia unum
+ueluti corpus beatitudinis quadam partium uarietate coniungant an sit eorum
+aliquid quod beatitudinis substantiam compleat, ad hoc uero cetera
+referantur?" "Vellem," inquam, "id ipsarum rerum commemoratione
+patefaceres." "Nonne," inquit, "beatitudinem bonum esse censemus?" "Ac
+summum quidem," inquam. "Addas," inquit, "hoc omnibus licet. Nam eadem
+sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reuerentia quoque, claritas
+ac uoluptas beatitudo esse iudicatur. Quid igitur? Haecine omnia
+bonum--sufficientia potentia ceteraque--ueluti quaedam beatitudinis membra
+sunt an ad bonum ueluti ad uerticem cuncta referuntur?" "Intellego,"
+inquam, "quid inuestigandum proponas, sed quid constituas audire desidero."
+"Cuius discretionem rei sic accipe. Si haec omnia beatitudinis membra
+forent, a se quoque inuicem discreparent. Haec est enim partium natura ut
+unum corpus diuersa componant. Atqui haec omnia idem esse monstrata sunt;
+minime igitur membra sunt. Alioquin ex uno membro beatitudo uidebitur esse
+coniuncta--quod fieri nequit." "Id quidem," inquam, "dubium non est, sed
+id quod restat exspecto." "Ad bonum uero cetera referri palam est. Idcirco
+enim sufficientia petitur quoniam bonum esse iudicatur, idcirco potentia
+quoniam id quoque esse creditur bonum; idem de reuerentia, claritudine,
+iucunditate coniectare licet. Omnium igitur expetendorum summa atque causa
+bonum est. Quod enim neque re neque similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum,
+id expeti nullo modo potest. Contraque etiam quae natura bona non sunt,
+tamen si esse uideantur, quasi uere bona sint appetuntur. Quo fit uti
+summa, cardo atque causa expetendorum omnium bonitas esse iure credatur.
+Cuius uero causa quid expetitur, id maxime uidetur optari, ueluti si
+salutis causa quispiam uelit equitare, non tam equitandi motum desiderat
+quam salutis effectum. Cum igitur omnia boni gratia petantur, non illa
+potius quam bonum ipsum desideratur ab omnibus. Sed propter quod cetera
+optantur, beatitudinem esse concessimus; quare sic quoque sola quaeritur
+beatitudo. Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni et beatitudinis unam atque
+eandem esse substantiam." "Nihil uideo cur dissentire quispiam possit."
+"Sed deum ueramque beatitudinem unum atque idem esse monstrauimus." "Ita,"
+inquam. "Securo igitur concludere licet dei quoque in ipso bono nec usquam
+alio sitam esse substantiam.
+
+
+[135] reapse uerius _Schepss_: re ab seuerius _uel_ re ipsa uerius _codd.
+opt._
+
+
+
+
+  X.
+
+  Wherefore since thou hast seen what is the form of perfect and imperfect
+  good, now I think we must show in what this perfection of happiness is
+  placed. And inquire first whether there can be any such good extant in
+  the world, as thou hast defined; lest, contrary to truth, we be deceived
+  with an empty show of thought. But it cannot be denied that there is
+  some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness.
+  For all that is said to be imperfect is so termed for the want it hath
+  of perfection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something
+  imperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind.
+  For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there
+  should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that
+  which is defective and not complete, but, proceeding from entire and
+  absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and enfeebled. But if, as
+  we showed before, there be a certain imperfect felicity of frail goods,
+  it cannot be doubted but that there is some solid and perfect happiness
+  also." "Thou hast," quoth I, "concluded most firmly and most truly."
+  "Now where this good dwelleth," quoth she, "consider this. The common
+  conceit of men's minds proveth that God the Prince of all things is
+  good. For, since nothing can be imagined better than God, who doubteth
+  but that is good than which is nothing better? And reason doth in such
+  sort demonstrate God to be good that it convinceth Him to be perfectly
+  good. For unless He were so, He could not be the chief of all things.
+  For there would be something better than He, having perfect goodness,
+  which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than He. For it
+  is already manifest that perfect things were before the imperfect.
+  Wherefore, lest our reasoning should have no end, we must confess that
+  the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign and perfect goodness. But we
+  have concluded that perfect goodness is true happiness, wherefore true
+  blessedness must necessarily be placed in the most high God." "I agree,"
+  quoth I, "neither can this be any way contradicted." "But I pray thee,"
+  quoth she, "see how boldly and inviolably thou approvest that which we
+  said, that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign goodness." "How?"
+  quoth I. "That thou presumest not that this Father of all things hath
+  either received from others that sovereign good with which He is said to
+  be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort that thou shouldst
+  think that the substance of the blessedness which is had, and of God who
+  hath it, were diverse. For if thou thinkest that He had it from others,
+  thou mayest also infer that he who gave it was better than the receiver.
+  But we most worthily confess that He is the most excellent of all
+  things. And if He hath it by nature, but as a diverse thing, since we
+  speak of God the Prince of all things, let him that can, invent who
+  united these diverse things. Finally, that which is different from
+  anything, is not that from which it is understood to differ. Wherefore
+  that which is naturally different from the sovereign good, is not the
+  sovereign good itself. Which it were impious to think of God, than whom,
+  we know certainly, nothing is better. For doubtless the nature of
+  nothing can be better than the beginning of it. Wherefore I may most
+  truly conclude that which is the beginning of all things to be also in
+  His own substance the chiefest good." "Most rightly," quoth I. "But it
+  is granted that the chiefest good is blessedness?" "It is," quoth I.
+  "Wherefore," quoth she, "we must needs confess that blessedness itself
+  is God." "I can neither contradict," quoth I, "thy former propositions,
+  and I see this illation followeth from them."
+
+  "Consider," saith she, "if the same be not more firmly proved hence,
+  because there cannot be two chief goods, the one different from the
+  other. For it is manifest that of those goods which differ, the one is
+  not the other, wherefore neither of them can be perfect, wanting the
+  other. But manifestly that which is not perfect, is not the chiefest,
+  wherefore the chief goods cannot be diverse. Now we have proved that
+  both blessedness and God are the chiefest good, wherefore that must
+  needs be the highest blessedness which is the highest divinity." "There
+  can be nothing," quoth I, "concluded more truly than this, nor more
+  firmly in arguing, nor more worthy God himself." "Upon this then," quoth
+  she, "as the geometricians[136] are wont, out of their propositions
+  which they have demonstrated, to infer something which they call
+  _porismata_ (deductions) so will I give thee as it were a
+  _corollarium_. For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining
+  of blessedness, and blessedness is nothing else but divinity, it is
+  manifest that men are made blessed by the obtaining of divinity. And as
+  men are made just by the obtaining of justice, and wise by the obtaining
+  of wisdom, so they who obtain divinity must needs in like manner become
+  gods. Wherefore everyone that is blessed is a god, but by nature there
+  is only one God; but there may be many by participation." "This is,"
+  quoth I, "an excellent and precious _porisma_ or
+  _corollarium_." "But there is nothing more excellent than that
+  which reason persuadeth us to add." "What?" quoth I.
+
+  "Since," quoth she, "blessedness seemeth to contain many things, whether
+  do they all concur as divers parts to the composition of one entire body
+  of blessedness, or doth some one of them form the substance of
+  blessedness to which the rest are to be referred?" "I desire," quoth I,
+  "that thou wouldst declare this point, by the enumeration of the
+  particulars." "Do we not think," quoth she, "that blessedness is good?"
+  "Yea, the chiefest good," quoth I. "Thou mayest," quoth she, "add this
+  to them all. For blessedness is accounted the chiefest sufficiency, the
+  chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? Are all these--
+  sufficiency, power, and the rest--the good, in the sense that they are
+  members of it, or rather are they referred to good as to the head?" "I
+  understand," quoth I, "what thou proposest, but I desire to hear what
+  thou concludest." "This is the decision of this matter. If all these
+  were members of blessedness, they should differ one from another. For
+  this is the nature of parts, that being divers they compose one body.
+  But we have proved that all these are one and the same thing. Wherefore
+  they are no members, otherwise blessedness should be compacted of one
+  member, which cannot be." "There is no doubt of this," quoth I, "but I
+  expect that which is behind." "It is manifest that the rest are to be
+  referred to goodness; for sufficiency is desired, because it is esteemed
+  good, and likewise power, because that likewise is thought to be good.
+  And we may conjecture the same of respect, fame, and pleasure. Wherefore
+  goodness is the sum and cause of all that is desired. For that which is
+  neither good indeed, nor beareth any show of goodness, can by no means
+  be sought after. And contrariwise those things which are not good of
+  their own nature, yet, if they seem such, are desired as if they were
+  truly good. So that the sum, origin, and cause of all that is sought
+  after is rightly thought to be goodness. And that on account of which a
+  thing is sought, seemeth to be the chief object of desire. As if one
+  would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of
+  riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore, since all things are desired
+  in respect of goodness, they are not so much wished for as goodness
+  itself. But we granted that to be blessedness for which other things are
+  desired, wherefore in like manner only blessedness is sought after; by
+  which it plainly appeareth, that goodness and blessedness have one and
+  the self-same substance." "I see not how any man can dissent." "But we
+  have showed that God and true blessedness are one and the self-same
+  thing." "It is so," quoth I. "We may then securely conclude that the
+  substance of God consisteth in nothing else but in goodness.
+
+
+  [136] _Vide supra_, _Tr_. iii. p. 40.
+
+
+
+
+X.
+
+Huc omnes pariter uenite capti
+Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis
+Terrenas habitans libido mentes,
+Haec erit uobis requies laborum,
+Hic portus placida manens quiete,                                         5
+Hoc patens unum miseris asylum,
+Non quidquid Tagus aureis harenis
+Donat aut Hermus rutilante ripa
+Aut Indus calido propinquus orbi
+Candidis miscens uirides lapillos,                                       10
+Inlustrent aciem magisque caecos
+In suas condunt animos tenebras.
+Hoc quidquid placet excitatque mentes,
+Infimis tellus aluit cauernis;
+Splendor quo regitur uigetque caelum,                                    15
+Vitat obscuras animae ruinas.
+Hanc quisquis poterit notare lucem,
+Candidos Phoebi radios negabit."
+
+
+
+
+  X.[137]
+
+    Come hither, all you that are bound,
+    Whose base and earthly minds are drowned
+  By lust which doth them tie in cruel chains:
+    Here is a seat for men opprest,
+    Here is a port of pleasant rest;
+  Here may a wretch have refuge from his pains.
+    No gold, which Tagus' sands bestow,
+    Nor which on Hermus' banks doth flow,
+  Nor precious stones which scorched Indians get[138],
+    Can clear the sharpness of the mind,
+    But rather make it far more blind,
+  And in the farther depth of darkness set.
+    For this that sets our souls on work
+    Buried in caves of earth doth lurk.
+  But heaven is guided by another light,
+    Which causeth us to shun the dark[139],
+    And who this light doth truly mark,
+  Must needs deny that Phoebus' beams are bright."
+
+
+  [137] For the discussion on the nature of good in this poem and the next
+  piece of prose cf. _supra_, pp. 38 ff.
+
+  [138] Literally, "Nor Indus, neighbour of the torrid zone, blending its
+  green and white pebbles."
+
+  [139] Literally, "The light which gives guidance and vigour to the sky
+  shuns the darkness of ruined minds."
+
+
+
+
+XI.
+
+"Assentior," inquam, "cuncta enim firmissimis nexa rationibus constant."
+Tum illa, "Quanti," inquit, "aestimabis, si bonum ipsum quid sit
+agnoueris?" "Infinito," inquam, "si quidem mihi pariter deum quoque qui
+bonum est continget agnoscere." "Atqui hoc uerissima," inquit, "ratione
+patefaciam, maneant modo quae paulo ante conclusa sunt." "Manebunt."
+"Nonne," inquit, "monstrauimus ea quae appetuntur pluribus idcirco uera
+perfectaque bona non esse quoniam a se inuicem discreparent cumque alteri
+abesset alterum, plenum absolutumque bonum afferre non posse? Tum autem
+uerum bonum fieri cum in unam ueluti formam atque efficientiam colliguntur,
+ut quae sufficientia est, eadem sit potentia, reuerentia, claritas atque
+iucunditas, nisi uero unum atque idem omnia sint, nihil habere quo inter
+expetenda numerentur?" "Demonstratum," inquam, "nec dubitari ullo modo
+potest." "Quae igitur cum discrepant minime bona sunt, cum uero unum esse
+coeperint, bona fiunt; nonne haec ut bona sint, unitatis fieri adeptione
+contingit?" "Ita," inquam, "uidetur." "Sed omne quod bonum est boni
+participatione bonum esse concedis an minime?" "Ita est." "Oportet igitur
+idem esse unum atque bonum simili ratione concedas; eadem namque substantia
+est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diuersus effectus." "Negare," inquam,
+"nequeo." "Nostine igitur," inquit, "omne quod est tam diu manere atque
+subsistere quam diu sit unum, sed interire atque dissolui pariter atque
+unum destiterit?" "Quonam modo?" "Vt in animalibus," inquit, "cum in unum
+coeunt ac permanent anima corpusque, id animal uocatur; cum uero haec
+unitas utriusque separatione dissoluitur, interire nec iam esse animal
+liquet. Ipsum quoque corpus cum in una forma membrorum coniunctione
+permanet, humana uisitur species; at si distributae segregataeque partes
+corporis distraxerint unitatem, desinit esse quod fuerat. Eoque modo
+percurrenti cetera procul dubio patebit subsistere unumquodque, dum unum
+est, cum uero unum esse desinit, interire." "Consideranti," inquam, "mihi
+plura minime aliud uidetur." "Estne igitur," inquit, "quod in quantum
+naturaliter agat relicta subsistendi appetentia uenire ad interitum
+corruptionemque desideret?"  "Si animalia," inquam, "considerem quae habent
+aliquam uolendi nolendique naturam, nihil inuenio quod nullis extra
+cogentibus abiciant manendi intentionem et ad interitum sponte festinent.
+Omne namque animal tueri salutem laborat, mortem uero perniciemque deuitat.
+Sed quid de herbis arboribusque, quid de inanimatis omnino consentiam rebus
+prorsus dubito."
+
+"Atqui non est quod de hoc quoque possis ambigere, cum herbas atque arbores
+intuearis primum sibi conuenientibus innasci locis, ubi quantum earum
+natura queat cito exarescere atque interire non possint. Nam aliae quidem
+campis aliae montibus oriuntur, alias ferunt paludes, aliae saxis haerent,
+aliarum fecundae sunt steriles harenae, quas si in alia quispiam loca
+transferre conetur, arescant. Sed dat cuique natura quod conuenit et ne,
+dum manere possunt, intereant, elaborat. Quid quod omnes uelut in terras
+ore demerso trahunt alimenta radicibus ac per medullas robur corticemque
+diffundunt? Quid quod mollissimum quidque, sicuti medulla est, interiore
+semper sede reconditur, extra uero quadam ligni firmitate, ultimus autem
+cortex aduersum caeli intemperiem quasi mali patiens defensor opponitur?
+Iam uero quanta est naturae diligentia, ut cuncta semine multiplicato
+propagentur! Quae omnia non modo ad tempus manendi uerum generatim quoque
+quasi in perpetuum permanendi ueluti quasdam machinas esse quis nesciat? Ea
+etiam quae inanimata esse creduntur nonne quod suum est quaeque simili
+ratione desiderant? Cur enim flammas quidem sursum leuitas uehit, terras
+uero deorsum pondus deprimit, nisi quod haec singulis loca motionesque
+conueniunt? Porro autem quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque
+conseruat, sicuti ea quae sunt inimica corrumpunt. Iam uero quae dura sunt
+ut lapides, adhaerent tenacissime partibus suis et ne facile dissoluantur
+resistunt. Quae uero liquentia ut aer atque aqua, facile quidem
+diuidentibus cedunt, sed cito in ea rursus a quibus sunt abscisa
+relabuntur, ignis uero omnem refugit sectionem. Neque nunc nos de
+uoluntariis animae cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione
+tractamus, sicuti est quod acceptas escas sine cogitatione transigimus,
+quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes; nam ne in animalibus quidem
+manendi amor ex animae uoluntatibus, uerum ex naturae principiis uenit. Nam
+saepe mortem cogentibus causis quam natura reformidat uoluntas amplectitur,
+contraque illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas gignendi opus,
+quod natura semper appetit, interdum coercet uoluntas. Adeo haec sui
+caritas non ex animali motione sed ex naturali intentione procedit. Dedit
+enim prouidentia creatis a se rebus hanc uel maximam manendi causam ut
+quoad possunt naturaliter manere desiderent; quare nihil est quod ullo modo
+queas dubitare cuncta quae sunt appetere naturaliter constantiam
+permanendi, deuitare perniciem."
+
+"Confiteor," inquam, "nunc me indubitato cernere quae dudum incerta
+uidebantur." "Quod autem," inquit, "subsistere ac permanere petit, id unum
+esse desiderat; hoc enim sublato ne esse quidem cuiquam permanebit." "Verum
+est," inquam. "Omnia igitur," inquit, "unum desiderant." Consensi. "Sed
+unum id ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum." "Ita quidem." "Cuncta igitur
+bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas licet: ipsum bonum esse quod
+desideretur ab omnibus." "Nihil," inquam, "uerius excogitari potest. Nam
+uel ad nihil unum cuncta referuntur et uno ueluti uertice destituta sine
+rectore fluitabunt, aut si quid est ad quod uniuersa festinent, id erit
+omnium summum bonorum." Et illa: "Nimium," inquit, "o alumne laetor, ipsam
+enim mediae ueritatis notam mente fixisti. Sed in hoc patuit tibi quod
+ignorare te paulo ante dicebas." "Quid?" inquam. "Quis esset," inquit,
+"rerum omnium finis. Is est enim profecto, quod desideratur ab omnibus,
+quod quia bonum esse collegimus, oportet rerum omnium finem bonum esse
+fateamur.
+
+
+
+
+  XI.
+
+  "I consent," quoth I, "for all is grounded upon most firm reasons." "But
+  what account wilt thou make," quoth she, "to know what goodness itself
+  is?" "I will esteem it infinitely," quoth I, "because by this means I
+  shall come to know God also, who is nothing else but goodness." "I will
+  conclude this," quoth she, "most certainly, if those things be not
+  denied which I have already proved." "They shall not," quoth I. "Have we
+  not proved," quoth she, "that those things which are desired of many,
+  are not true and perfect goods, because they differ one from another
+  and, being separated, cannot cause complete and absolute goodness, which
+  is only found when they are united as it were into one form and
+  causality, that the same may be sufficiency, power, respect, fame, and
+  pleasure? And except they be all one and the same thing, that they have
+  nothing worth the desiring?" "It hath been proved," quoth I, "neither
+  can it be any way doubted of." "Those things, then, which, when they
+  differ, are not good and when they are one, become good, are they not
+  made good by obtaining unity?" "So methink," quoth I. "But dost thou
+  grant that all that is good is good by partaking goodness?" "It is so."
+  "Thou must grant then likewise that unity and goodness are the same. For
+  those things have the same substance, which naturally have not diverse
+  effects." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Knowest thou then," quoth she,
+  "that everything that is doth so long remain and subsist as it is one,
+  and perisheth and is dissolved so soon as it ceaseth to be one?" "How?"
+  "As in living creatures," quoth she, "so long as the body and soul
+  remain united, the living creature remaineth. But when this unity is
+  dissolved by their separation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is
+  no longer a living creature. The body also itself, so long as it
+  remaineth in one form by the conjunction of the parts, appeareth the
+  likeness of a man. But if the members of the body, being separated and
+  sundered, have lost their unity, it is no longer the same. And in like
+  manner it will be manifest to him that will descend to other
+  particulars, that everything continueth so long as it is one, and
+  perisheth when it loseth unity." "Considering more particulars, I find
+  it to be no otherwise." "Is there anything," quoth she, "that in the
+  course of nature, leaving the desire of being, seeketh to come to
+  destruction and corruption?" "If," quoth I, "I consider living creatures
+  which have any nature to will and nill, I find nothing that without
+  extern compulsion forsake the intention to remain, and of their own
+  accord hasten to destruction. For every living creature laboureth to
+  preserve his health, and escheweth death and detriment. But what I
+  should think of herbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am
+  altogether doubtful."
+
+  "But there is no cause why thou shouldst doubt of this, if thou
+  considerest first that herbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their
+  nature, where, so much as their constitution permitteth, they cannot
+  soon wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other upon hills, some
+  in fenny, other in stony places, and the barren sands are fertile for
+  some, which if thou wouldst transplant into other places they die. But
+  nature giveth every one that which is fitting, and striveth to keep them
+  from decaying so long as they can remain. What should I tell thee, if
+  all of them, thrusting as it were their lips into the ground, draw
+  nourishment by their roots, and convey substance and bark by the inward
+  pith? What, that always the softest, as the pith, is placed within, and
+  is covered without by the strength of the wood, and last of all the bark
+  is exposed to the weather, as being best able to bear it off? And how
+  great is the diligence of nature that all things may continue by the
+  multiplication of seed; all which who knoweth not to be, as it were,
+  certain engines, not only to remain for a time, but successively in a
+  manner to endure for ever? Those things also which are thought to be
+  without all life, doth not every one in like manner desire that which
+  appertaineth to their own good? For why doth levity lift up flames, or
+  heaviness weigh down the earth, but because these places and motions are
+  convenient for them? And that which is agreeable to everything
+  conserveth it, as that which is opposite causeth corruption. Likewise
+  those things which are hard, as stones, stick most firmly to their
+  parts, and make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid things,
+  as air and water, are indeed easily divided, but do easily also join
+  again. And fire flieth all division. Neither do we now treat of the
+  voluntary motions of the understanding soul, but only of natural
+  operations. Of which sort is, to digest that which we have eaten,
+  without thinking of it, to breathe in our sleep not thinking what we do.
+  For even in living creatures the love of life proceedeth not from the
+  will of the soul, but from the principles of nature. For the will many
+  times embraceth death upon urgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and
+  contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of
+  mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though
+  nature doth always desire it. So true it is that this self-love
+  proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from natural intention.
+  For providence gave to her creatures this as the greatest cause of
+  continuance, that they naturally desire to continue so long as they may,
+  wherefore there is no cause why thou shouldst any way doubt that all
+  things which are desire naturally stability of remaining, and eschew
+  corruption."
+
+  "I confess," quoth I, "that I now see undoubtedly that which before
+  seemed very doubtful." "Now that," quoth she, "which desireth to
+  continue and remain seeketh to have unity. For if this be taken away,
+  being itself cannot remain." "It is true," quoth I. "All things then,"
+  quoth she, "desire unity." I granted it to be so. "But we have showed
+  that unity is the same as goodness." "You have indeed." "All things then
+  desire goodness, which thou mayest define thus: Goodness is that which
+  is desired of all things." "There can be nothing imagined more true. For
+  either all things have reference to no one principle and, being
+  destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusion without any
+  ruler: or if there be anything to which all things hasten, that must be
+  the chiefest of all goods." "I rejoice greatly O scholar," quoth she,
+  "for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very mark of verity. But in this
+  thou hast discovered that which a little before thou saidest thou wert
+  ignorant of." "What is that?" quoth I. "What the end of all things is,"
+  quoth she. "For certainly it is that which is desired of all things,
+  which since we have concluded to be goodness, we must also confess that
+  goodness is the end of all things.
+
+
+
+
+XI.
+
+Quisquis profunda mente uestigat uerum
+Cupitque nullis ille deuiis falli,
+In se reuoluat intimi lucem uisus
+Longosque in orbem cogat inflectens motus
+Animumque doceat quidquid extra molitur                                   5
+Suis retrusum possidere thesauris.
+Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes
+Lucebit ipso perspicacius Phoebo.
+Non omne namque mente depulit lumen
+Obliuiosam corpus inuehens molem.                                        10
+Haeret profecto semen introrsum ueri
+Quod excitatur uentilante doctrina.
+Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
+Ni mersus alto uiueret fomes corde?
+Quod si Platonis Musa personat uerum,                                    15
+Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur."
+
+
+
+
+  XI.
+
+  He that would seek the truth with thoughts profound
+  And would not stray in ways that are not right,
+  He to himself must turn his inward sight,
+  And guide his motions in a circled round,
+  Teaching his mind that ever she design
+  Herself in her own treasures to possess:
+  So that which late lay hidden in cloudiness
+  More bright and clear than Phoebus' beams shall shine.
+  Flesh hath not quenched all the spirit's light,
+  Though this oblivion's lump holds her opprest.
+  Some seed of truth remaineth in our breast,
+  Which skilful learning eas'ly doth excite.
+  For being askt how can we answer true
+  Unless that grace within our hearts did dwell?
+  If Plato's heavenly muse the truth us tell,
+  We learning things remember them anew."[140]
+
+
+  [140] For Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence cf. _Meno_ 81-86, and
+  _Phaedo_ 72-76.
+
+
+
+XII.
+
+Tum ego: "Platoni," inquam, "uehementer assentior, nam me horum iam secundo
+commemoras, primum quod memoriam corporea contagione, dehinc cum maeroris
+mole pressus amisi." Tum illa: "Si priora," inquit, "concessa respicias, ne
+illud quidem longius aberit quin recorderis quod te dudum nescire confessus
+es." "Quid?" inquam. "Quibus," ait illa, "gubernaculis mundus regatur."
+"Memini," inquam, "me inscitiam meam fuisse confessum, sed quid afferas,
+licet iam prospiciam, planius tamen ex te audire desidero." "Mundum,"
+inquit, "hunc deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas." "Ne nunc
+quidem arbitror," inquam, "nec umquam dubitandum putabo quibusque in hoc
+rationibus accedam breuiter exponam. Mundus hic ex tam diuersis
+contrariisque partibus in unam formam minime conuenisset, nisi unus esset
+qui tam diuersa coniungeret. Coniuncta uero naturarum ipsa diuersitas
+inuicem discors dissociaret atque diuelleret, nisi unus esset qui quod
+nexuit contineret. Non tam uero certus naturae ordo procederet nec tam
+dispositos motus locis, temporibus, efficientia, spatiis, qualitatibus
+explicarent, nisi unus esset qui has mutationum uarietates manens ipse
+disponeret.  Hoc quidquid est quo condita manent atque agitantur, usitato
+cunctis uocabulo deum nomino."
+
+Tum illa: "Cum haec," inquit, "ita sentias, paruam mihi restare operam puto
+ut felicitatis compos patriam sospes reuisas. Sed quae proposuimus
+intueamur. Nonne in beatitudine sufficientiam numerauimus deumque
+beatitudinem ipsam esse consensimus?" "Ita quidem." "Et ad mundum igitur,"
+inquit, "regendum nullis extrinsecus adminiculis indigebit; alioquin si quo
+egeat, plenam sufficientiam non habebit." "Id," inquam, "ita est
+necessarium." "Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit." "Negari," inquam,
+"nequit." "Atqui deus ipsum bonum esse monstratus est." "Memini," inquam.
+"Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit, si quidem per se regit omnia quem bonum
+esse consensimus et hic est ueluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum quo
+mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur." "Vehementer
+assentior," inquam, "et id te paulo ante dicturam tenui licet suspicione
+prospexi." "Credo;" inquit, "iam enim ut arbitror uigilantius ad cernenda
+uera oculos deducis. Sed quod dicam non minus ad contuendum patet." "Quid?"
+inquam. "Cum deus," inquit, "omnia bonitatis clauo gubernare iure credatur
+eademque omnia sicuti docui ad bonum naturali intentione festinent, num
+dubitari potest quin uoluntaria regantur seque ad disponentis nutum ueluti
+conuenientia contemperataque rectori sponte conuertant?" "Ita," inquam,
+"necesse est; nec beatum regimen esse uideretur, si quidem detrectantium
+iugum foret, non obtemperantium salus." "Nihil est igitur quod naturam
+seruans deo contraire conetur." "Nihil," inquam. "Quod si conetur," ait,
+"num tandem proficiet quidquam aduersus eum quem iure beatitudinis
+potentissimum esse concessimus?" "Prorsus," inquam, "nihil ualeret." "Non
+est igitur aliquid quod summo huic bono uel uelit uel possit obsistere."
+"Non," inquam, "arbitror." "Est igitur summum," inquit, "bonum quod regit
+cuncta fortiter suauiterque disponit." Tum ego: "Quam," inquam, "me non
+modo ea quae conclusa est summa rationum, uerum multo magis haec ipsa
+quibus uteris uerba delectant, ut tandem aliquando stultitiam magna
+lacerantem sui pudeat."
+
+"Accepisti," inquit, "in fabulis lacessentes caelum Gigantas; sed illos
+quoque, uti condignum fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit. Sed uisne rationes
+ipsas inuicem collidamus? Forsitan ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulchra
+quaedam ueritatis scintilla dissiliat." "Tuo," inquam, "arbitratu." "Deum,"
+inquit, "esse omnium potentem nemo dubitauerit." "Qui quidem," inquam,
+"mente consistat, nullus prorsus ambigat." "Qui uero est," inquit, "omnium
+potens, nihil est quod ille non possit." "Nihil," inquam. "Num igitur deus
+facere malum potest?" "Minime," inquam. "Malum igitur," inquit, "nihil est,
+cum id facere ille non possit, qui nihil non potest." "Ludisne," inquam,
+"me inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens, quae nunc quidem qua
+egrediaris introeas, nunc uero quo introieris egrediare, an mirabilem
+quendam diuinae simplicitatis orbem complicas? Etenim paulo ante
+beatitudine incipiens eam summum bonum esse dicebas quam in summo deo sitam
+loquebare. Ipsum quoque deum summum esse bonum plenamque beatitudinem
+disserebas; ex quo neminem beatum fore nisi qui pariter deus esset quasi
+munusculum dabas. Rursus ipsam boni formam dei ac beatitudinis loquebaris
+esse substantiam ipsumque unum id ipsum esse bonum docebas quod ab omni
+rerum natura peteretur. Deum quoque bonitatis gubernaculis uniuersitatem
+regere disputabas uolentiaque cuncta parere nec ullam mali esse naturam.
+Atque haec nullis extrinsecus sumptis sed ex altero altero fidem trahente
+insitis domesticisque probationibus explicabas."
+
+Tum illa: "Minime," inquit, "ludimus remque omnium maximam dei munere quem
+dudum deprecabamur exegimus. Ea est enim diuinae forma substantiae ut neque
+in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut
+de ea Parmenides ait:
+
+  [Greek: Pantothen eukuklou sphairaes enalinkion onkoi],
+
+rerum orbem mobilem rotat, dum se immobilem ipsa conseruat. Quod si
+rationes quoque non extra petitas sed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitum
+collocatas agitauimus, nihil est quod admirere, cum Platone sanciente
+didiceris cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones.
+
+
+
+
+  XII.
+
+  Then I said that I did very well like of Plato's doctrine, for thou dost
+  bring these things to my remembrance now the second time, first, because
+  I lost their memory by the contagion of my body, and after when I was
+  oppressed with the burden of grief. "If," quoth she, "thou reflectest
+  upon that which heretofore hath been granted, thou wilt not be far from
+  remembering that which in the beginning thou confessedst thyself to be
+  ignorant of." "What?" quoth I. "By what government," quoth she, "the
+  world is ruled." "I remember," quoth I, "that I did confess my
+  ignorance, but though I foresee what thou wilt say, yet I desire to hear
+  it more plainly from thyself." "Thou thoughtest a little before that it
+  was not to be doubted that this world is governed by God." "Neither do I
+  think now," quoth I, "neither will I ever think, that it is to be
+  doubted of, and I will briefly explicate the reasons which move me to
+  think so. This world could never have been compacted of so many divers
+  and contrary parts, unless there were One that doth unite these so
+  different things; and this disagreeing diversity of natures being united
+  would separate and divide this concord, unless there were One that
+  holdeth together that which He united. Neither would the course of
+  nature continue so certain, nor would the different parts hold so well-
+  ordered motions in due places, times, causality, spaces and qualities,
+  unless there were One who, Himself remaining quiet, disposeth and
+  ordereth this variety of motions. This, whatsoever it be, by which
+  things created continue and are moved, I call God, a name which all men
+  use."[141]
+
+  "Since," quoth she, "thou art of this mind, I think with little labour
+  thou mayest be capable of felicity, and return to thy country in safety.
+  But let us consider what we proposed. Have we not placed sufficiency in
+  happiness, and granted that God is blessedness itself?" "Yes truly."
+  "Wherefore," quoth she, "He will need no outward helps to govern the
+  world, otherwise, if He needed anything, He had not full sufficiency."
+  "That," quoth I, "must necessarily be so." "Wherefore He disposeth all
+  things by Himself." "No doubt He doth," quoth I. "But it hath been
+  proved that God is goodness itself." "I remember it very well," quoth I.
+  "Then He disposeth all things by goodness: since He governeth all things
+  by Himself, whom we have granted to be goodness. And this is as it were
+  the helm and rudder by which the frame of the world is kept steadfast
+  and uncorrupted." "I most willingly agree," quoth I, "and I foresaw a
+  little before, though only with a slender guess, that thou wouldst
+  conclude this." "I believe thee," quoth she, "for now I suppose thou
+  lookest more watchfully about thee to discern the truth. But that which
+  I shall say is no less manifest." "What?" quoth I. "Since that God is
+  deservedly thought to govern all things with the helm of goodness, and
+  all these things likewise, as I have showed, hasten to goodness with
+  their natural contention, can there be any doubt made but that they are
+  governed willingly, and that they frame themselves of their own accord
+  to their disposer's beck, as agreeable and conformable to their ruler?"
+  "It must needs be so," quoth I, "neither would it seem an happy
+  government, if it were an imposed yoke, not a desired health." "There is
+  nothing then which, following nature, endeavoureth to resist God."
+  "Nothing," quoth I. "What if anything doth endeavour," quoth she, "can
+  anything prevail against Him, whom we have granted to be most powerful
+  by reason of His blessedness?" "No doubt," quoth I, "nothing could
+  prevail." "Wherefore there is nothing which either will or can resist
+  this sovereign goodness." "I think not," quoth I. "It is then the
+  sovereign goodness which governeth all things strongly, and disposeth
+  them sweetly." "How much," quoth I, "doth not only the reason which thou
+  allegest, but much more the very words which thou usest, delight me,
+  that folly which so much vexed me may at length be ashamed of herself."
+
+  "Thou hast heard in the poets' fables," quoth she, "how the giants
+  provoked heaven, but this benign fortitude put them also down, as they
+  deserved. But wilt thou have our arguments contend together? Perhaps by
+  this clash there will fly out some beautiful spark of truth." "As it
+  pleaseth thee," quoth I. "No man can doubt," quoth she, "but that God is
+  almighty." "No man," quoth I, "that is well in his wits." "But," quoth
+  she, "there is nothing that He who is almighty cannot do." "Nothing,"
+  quoth I. "Can God do evil?" "No," quoth I, "Wherefore," quoth she, "evil
+  is nothing, since He cannot do it who can do anything." "Dost thou mock
+  me," quoth I, "making with thy reasons an inextricable labyrinth,
+  because thou dost now go in where thou meanest to go out again, and
+  after go out, where thou camest in, or dost thou frame a wonderful
+  circle of the simplicity of God? For a little before taking thy
+  beginning from blessedness, thou affirmedst that to be the chiefest good
+  which thou saidst was placed in God, and likewise thou provedst, that
+  God Himself is the chiefest good and full happiness, out of which thou
+  madest me a present of that inference, that no man shall be happy unless
+  he be also a God. Again thou toldest me that the form of goodness is the
+  substance of God and of blessedness, and that unity is the same with
+  goodness, because it is desired by the nature of all things; thou didst
+  also dispute that God governeth the whole world with the helm of
+  goodness, and that all things obey willingly, and that there is no
+  nature of evil, and thou didst explicate all these things with no
+  foreign or far-fetched proofs, but with those which were proper and
+  drawn from inward principles, the one confirming the other."
+
+  "We neither play nor mock," quoth she, "and we have finished the
+  greatest matter that can be by the assistance of God, whose aid we
+  implored in the beginning. For such is the form of the Divine substance
+  that it is neither divided into outward things, nor receiveth any such
+  into itself, but as Parmenides saith of it:
+
+    In body like a sphere well-rounded on all sides,[142]
+
+  it doth roll about the moving orb of things, while it keepeth itself
+  unmovable. And if we have used no far-fetched reasons, but such as were
+  placed within the compass of the matter we handled, thou hast no cause
+  to marvel, since thou hast learned in Plato's school that our speeches
+  must be like and as it were akin to the things we speak of.
+
+
+  [141] _Vide supra, Tr._ iv. (pp. 56 ff.).
+
+  [142] Cf. _Frag._ 8. 43 (Diels, _Vorsokratiker_, i. p. 158).
+
+
+
+
+XII.
+
+Felix qui potuit boni
+Fontem uisere lucidum,
+Felix qui potuit grauis
+Terrae soluere uincula.
+Quondam funera coniugis                                                   5
+Vates Threicius gemens
+Postquam flebilibus modis
+Siluas currere mobiles,
+Amnes stare coegerat,
+Iunxitque intrepidum latus                                               10
+Saeuis cerua leonibus,
+Nec uisum timuit lepus
+Iam cantu placidum canem,
+Cum flagrantior intima
+Feruor pectoris ureret,                                                  15
+Nec qui cuncta subegerant
+Mulcerent dominum modi,
+Inmites superos querens
+Infernas adiit domos.
+Illic blanda sonantibus                                                  20
+Chordis carmina temperans
+Quidquid praecipuis deae
+Matris fontibus hauserat,
+Quod luctus dabat impotens,
+Quod luctum geminans amor,                                               25
+Deflet Taenara commouens
+Et dulci ueniam prece
+Vmbrarum dominos rogat.
+Stupet tergeminus nouo
+Captus carmine ianitor,                                                  30
+Quae sontes agitant metu
+Vltrices scelerum deae
+Iam maestae lacrimis madent.
+Non Ixionium caput
+Velox praecipitat rota                                                   35
+Et longa site perditus
+Spernit flumina Tantalus.
+Vultur dum satur est modis,
+Non traxit Tityi iecur.
+Tandem, 'Vincimur,' arbiter                                              40
+Vmbrarum miserans ait,
+'Donamus comitem uiro
+Emptam carmine coniugem.
+Sed lex dona coerceat,
+Ne, dum Tartara liquerit,                                                45
+Fas sit lumina flectere.'
+Quis legem det amantibus?
+Maior lex amor est sibi.
+Heu, noctis prope terminos
+Orpheus Eurydicen suam                                                   50
+Vidit, perdidit, occidit.
+Vos haec fabula respicit
+Quicumque in superum diem
+Mentem ducere quaeritis.
+Nam qui Tartareum in specus                                              55
+Victus lumina flexerit,
+Quidquid praecipuum trahit
+Perdit, dum uidet inferos."
+
+
+
+
+  XII.
+
+  Happy is he that can behold
+  The well-spring whence all good doth rise,
+  Happy is he that can unfold
+  The bands with which the earth him ties.
+  The Thracian poet whose sweet song
+  Performed his wife's sad obsequies,
+  And forced the woods to run along
+  When he his mournful tunes did play,
+  Whose powerful music was so strong
+  That it could make the rivers stay;
+  The fearful hinds not daunted were,
+  But with the lions took their way,
+  Nor did the hare behold with fear
+  The dog whom these sweet notes appease.
+  When force of grief drew yet more near,
+  And on his heart did burning seize,
+  Nor tunes which all in quiet bound
+  Could any jot their master ease,
+  The gods above too hard he found,
+  And Pluto's palace visiting.
+  He mixed sweet verses with the sound
+  Of his loud harp's delightful string,
+  All that he drank with thirsty draught
+  From his high mother's chiefest spring,
+  All that his restless grief him taught,
+  And love which gives grief double aid,
+  With this even hell itself was caught,
+  Whither he went, and pardon prayed
+  For his dear spouse (unheard request).
+  The three-head porter was dismayed,
+  Ravished with his unwonted guest,
+  The Furies, which in tortures keep
+  The guilty souls with pains opprest,
+  Moved with his song began to weep.
+  Ixion's wheel now standing still
+  Turns not his head with motions steep.
+  Though Tantalus might drink at will,
+  To quench his thirst he would forbear.
+  The vulture full with music shrill
+  Doth not poor Tityus' liver tear.
+  'We by his verses conquered are,'
+  Saith the great King whom spirits fear.
+  'Let us not then from him debar
+  His wife whom he with songs doth gain.
+  Yet lest our gift should stretch too far,
+  We will it with this law restrain,
+  That when from hell he takes his flight,
+  He shall from looking back refrain.'
+  Who can for lovers laws indite?
+  Love hath no law but her own will.
+  Orpheus, seeing on the verge of night
+  Eurydice, doth lose and kill
+  Her and himself with foolish love.
+  But you this feigned tale fulfil,
+  Who think unto the day above
+  To bring with speed your darksome mind.
+  For if, your eye conquered, you move
+  Backward to Pluto left behind,
+  All the rich prey which thence you took,
+  You lose while back to hell you look."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII
+
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER TERTIVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER IV
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Haec cum Philosophia dignitate uultus et oris grauitate seruata leniter
+suauiterque cecinisset, tum ego nondum penitus insiti maeroris oblitus
+intentionem dicere adhuc aliquid parantis abrupi. Et: "O," inquam, "ueri
+praeuia luminis quae usque adhuc tua fudit oratio, cum sui speculatione
+diuina tum tuis rationibus inuicta patuerunt, eaque mihi etsi ob iniuriae
+dolorem nuper oblita non tamen antehac prorsus ignorata dixisti. Sed ea
+ipsa est uel maxima nostri causa maeroris, quod, cum rerum bonus rector
+exsistat, uel esse omnino mala possint uel impunita praetereant; quod solum
+quanta dignum sit admiratione profecto consideras. At huic aliud maius
+adiungitur.  Nam imperante florenteque nequitia uirtus non solum praemiis
+caret, uerum etiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur et in locum
+facinorum supplicia luit. Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis
+omnia sed bona tantummodo uolentis dei nemo satis potest nec admirari nec
+conqueri."
+
+Tum illa: "Et esset," inquit, "infiniti stuporis omnibusque horribilius
+monstris, si, uti tu aestimas, in tanti uelut patrisfamilias dispositissima
+domo uilia uasa colerentur, pretiosa sordescerent. Sed non ita est. Nam si
+ea quae paulo ante conclusa sunt inconuulsa seruantur, ipso de cuius nunc
+regno loquimur auctore cognosces semper quidem potentes esse bonos, malos
+uero abiectos semper atque inbecillos nec sine poena umquam esse uitia nec
+sine praemio uirtutes, bonis felicia, malis semper infortunata contingere
+multaque id genus quae sopitis querelis firma te soliditate corroborent. Et
+quoniam uerae formam beatitudinis me dudum monstrante uidisti, quo etiam
+sita sit agnouisti, decursis omnibus quae praemittere necessarium puto,
+uiam tibi quae te domum reuehat ostendam. Pennas etiam tuae menti quibus se
+in altum tollere possit adfigam, ut perturbatione depulsa sospes in patriam
+meo ductu, mea semita, meis etiam uehiculis reuertaris.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FOURTH BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  When Philosophy had sung these verses with a soft and sweet voice,
+  observing due dignity and gravity in her countenance and gesture, I, not
+  having altogether forgotten my inward grief, interrupted her speech
+  which she was about to continue, and said: "O thou who bringest us to
+  see true light, those things which hitherto thou hast treated of have
+  manifestly appeared both to be divine when contemplated apart, and
+  invincible when supported by thy reasons, and what thou hast uttered,
+  though the force of grief had made me forget it of late, yet heretofore
+  I was not altogether ignorant of it. But this is the chiefest cause of
+  my sorrow, that since the governor of all things is so good, there can
+  either be any evil at all, or that it pass unpunished. Which alone I
+  beseech thee consider, how much admiration it deserveth. But there is
+  another greater than this; for wickedness bearing rule and sway, virtue
+  is not only without reward, but lieth also trodden under the wicked's
+  feet, and is punished instead of vice. That which things should be done
+  in the kingdom of God, who knoweth all things, can do all things, but
+  will do only that which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor
+  complain."
+
+  To which she answered: "It were indeed infinitely strange, and
+  surpassing all monsters, if, as thou conceivest, in the best-ordered
+  house of so great an householder the vilest vessels were made account of
+  and the precious neglected; but it is not so. For if those things which
+  were a little before concluded be kept unviolated, thou shalt by His
+  help, of whose kingdom we speak, know that the good are always powerful,
+  and the evil always abject and weak, and that vices are never without
+  punishment, nor virtue without reward, and that the good are always
+  prosperous, and the evil unfortunate, and many things of that sort,
+  which will take away all cause of complaint, and give thee firm and
+  solid strength. And since by my means thou hast already seen the form of
+  true blessedness, and known where it is placed, running over all those
+  things which I think necessary to rehearse, I will show thee the way
+  which will carry thee home. And I will also fasten wings upon thy mind,
+  with which she may rouse herself, that, all perturbation being driven
+  away, thou mayest return safely into thy country by my direction, by my
+  path, and with my wings.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Sunt etenim pennae uolucres mihi
+  Quae celsa conscendant poli.
+Quas sibi cum uelox mens induit,
+  Terras perosa despicit,
+Aeris inmensi superat globum,                                             5
+  Nubesque postergum uidet,
+Quique agili motu calet aetheris,
+  Transcendit ignis uerticem,
+Donec in astriferas surgat domos
+  Phoeboque coniungat uias                                               10
+Aut comitetur iter gelidi senis
+  Miles corusci sideris,
+Vel quocumque micans nox pingitur,
+  Recurrat astri circulum
+Atque ubi iam exhausti fuerit satis,                                     15
+  Polum relinquat extimum
+Dorsaque uelocis premat aetheris
+  Compos uerendi luminis.
+Hic regum sceptrum dominus tenet
+  Orbisque habenas temperat                                              20
+Et uolucrem currum stabilis regit
+  Rerum coruscus arbiter.
+Huc te si reducem referat uia,
+  Quam nunc requiris immemor:
+'Haec,' dices, 'memini, patria est mihi,                                 25
+  Hinc ortus; hic sistam gradum."
+Quod si terrarum placeat tibi
+  Noctem relictam uisere,
+Quos miseri toruos populi timent
+  Cernes tyrannos exules."                                               30
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  For I have swift and nimble wings which will ascend the lofty skies,
+  With which when thy quick mind is clad, it will the loathed earth
+      despise,
+  And go beyond the airy globe, and watery clouds behind thee leave,
+  Passing the fire which scorching heat doth from the heavens' swift
+      course receive,
+  Until it reach the starry house, and get to tread bright Phoebus' ways,
+  Following the chilly sire's path,[143] companion of his flashing rays,
+  And trace the circle of the stars which in the night to us appear,
+  And having stayed there long enough go on beyond the farthest sphere,
+  Sitting upon the highest orb partaker of the glorious light,
+  Where the great King his sceptre holds, and the world's reins doth guide
+      aright,
+  And, firm in his swift chariot, doth everything in order set.
+  Unto this seat when thou art brought, thy country, which thou didst
+      forget,
+  Thou then wilt challenge to thyself, saying: 'This is the glorious land
+  Where I was born, and in this soil my feet for evermore shall stand.
+  Whence if thou pleasest to behold the earthly night which thou hast
+      left,
+  Those tyrants which the people fear will seem of their true home
+      bereft.'"
+
+
+  [143] Cf. "frigida Saturni sese quo Stella receptet," Virg. _Georg._ i.
+  336.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Tum ego: "Papae," inquam, "ut magna promittis! Nec dubito quin possis
+efficere; tu modo quem excitaueris ne moreris." "Primum igitur," inquit,
+"bonis semper adesse potentiam, malos cunctis uiribus esse desertos
+agnoscas licebit, quorum quidem alterum demonstratur ex altero. Nam cum
+bonum malumque contraria sint, si bonum potens esse constiterit, liquet
+inbecillitas mali; at si fragilitas clarescat mali, boni firmitas nota est.
+Sed uti nostrae sententiae fides abundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam
+nunc hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans.
+
+Duo sunt quibus omnis humanorum actuum constat effectus, uoluntas scilicet
+ac potestas, quorum si alterutrum desit, nihil est quod explicari queat.
+Deficiente etenim uoluntate ne aggreditur quidem quisque quod non uult; at
+si potestas absit, uoluntas frustra sit. Quo fit ut si quem uideas adipisci
+uelle quod minime adipiscatur, huic obtinendi quod uoluerit defuisse
+ualentiam dubitare non possis." "Perspicuum est," inquam, "nec ullo modo
+negari potest." "Quem uero effecisse quod uoluerit uideas, num etiam
+potuisse dubitabis?" "Minime." "Quod uero quisque potest, in eo ualidus,
+quod uero non potest, in hoc imbecillis esse censendus est." "Fateor,"
+inquam. "Meministine igitur," inquit, "superioribus rationibus esse
+collectum intentionem omnem uoluntatis humanae quae diuersis studiis agitur
+ad beatitudinem festinare?" "Memini," inquam, "illud quoque esse
+demonstratum." "Num recordaris beatitudinem ipsum esse bonum eoque modo,
+cum beatitudo petitur, ab omnibus desiderari bonum?" "Minime," inquam,
+"recordor, quoniam id memoriae fixum teneo." "Omnes igitur homines boni
+pariter ac mali indiscreta intentione ad bonum peruenire nituntur?" "Ita,"
+inquam, "consequens est." "Sed certum est adeptione boni bonos fieri."
+"Certum." "Adipiscuntur igitur boni quod appetunt?" "Sic uidetur." "Mali
+uero si adipiscerentur quod appetunt bonum, mali esse non possent." "Ita
+est." "Cum igitur utrique bonum petant, sed hi quidem adipiscantur, illi
+uero minime, num dubium est bonos quidem potentes esse, qui uero mali sunt
+imbecillos?" "Quisquis," inquam, "dubitat, nec rerum naturam nec
+consequentiam potest considerare rationum." "Rursus," inquit, "si duo sint
+quibus idem secundum naturam propositum sit eorumque unus naturali officio
+id ipsum agat atque perficiat, alter uero naturale illud officium minime
+administrare queat, alio uero modo quam naturae conuenit non quidem impleat
+propositum suum sed imitetur implentem, quemnam horum ualentiorem esse
+decernis?" "Etsi coniecto," inquam, "quid uelis, planius tamen audire
+desidero." "Ambulandi," inquit, "motum secundum naturam esse hominibus num
+negabis?" "Minime," inquam. "Eiusque rei pedum officium esse naturale num
+dubitas?" "Ne hoc quidem," inquam. "Si quis igitur pedibus incedere ualens
+ambulet aliusque cui hoc naturale pedum desit officium, manibus nitens
+ambulare conetur, quis horum iure ualentior existimari potest?" "Contexe,"
+inquam, "cetera; nam quin naturalis officii potens eo qui idem nequeat
+ualentior sit, nullus ambigat." "Sed summum bonum, quod aeque malis
+bonisque propositum, boni quidem naturali officio uirtutum petunt, mali
+uero uariam per cupiditatem, quod adipiscendi boni naturale officium non
+est, idem ipsum conantur adipisci. An tu aliter existimas?"  "Minime,"
+inquam, "nam etiam quod est consequens patet. Ex his enim quae concesserim,
+bonos quidem potentes, malos uero esse necesse est imbecillos."
+
+"Recte," inquit, "praecurris idque, uti medici sperare solent, indicium est
+erectae iam resistentisque naturae. Sed quoniam te ad intellegendum
+promptissimum esse conspicio, crebras coaceruabo rationes. Vide enim quanta
+uitiosorum hominum pateat infirmitas qui ne ad hoc quidem peruenire queunt
+ad quod eos naturalis ducit ac paene compellit intentio. Et quid si hoc tam
+magno ac paene inuicto praeeuntis naturae desererentur auxilio? Considera
+uero quanta sceleratos homines habeat impotentia. Neque enim leuia aut
+ludicra praemia petunt, quae consequi atque obtinere non possunt, sed circa
+ipsam rerum summam uerticemque deficiunt nec in eo miseris contingit
+effectus quod solum dies noctesque moliuntur; in qua re bonorum uires
+eminent. Sicut enim eum qui pedibus incedens ad eum locum usque peruenire
+potuisset, quo nihil ulterius peruium iaceret incessui, ambulandi
+potentissimum esse censeres, ita eum qui expetendorum finem quo nihil ultra
+est apprehendit, potentissimum necesse est iudices. Ex quo fit quod huic
+obiacet, ut idem scelesti, idem uiribus omnibus uideantur esse deserti. Cur
+enim relicta uirtute uitia sectantur? Inscitiane bonorum? Sed quid
+eneruatius ignorantiae caecitate? An sectanda nouerunt? Sed transuersos eos
+libido praecipitat. Sic quoque intemperantia fragiles qui obluctari uitio
+nequeunt. An scientes uolentesque bonum deserunt, ad uitia deflectunt? Sed
+hoc modo non solum potentes esse sed omnino esse desinunt. Nam qui communem
+omnium quae sunt finem relinquunt, pariter quoque esse desistunt. Quod
+quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominum sunt,
+eosdem non esse dicamus; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mali sunt eos
+malos esse non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque simpliciter nego.
+
+Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, simpliciter uero hominem appellare
+non possis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim, sed esse absolute
+nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet seruatque naturam; quod
+uero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sua natura situm est derelinquit.
+'Sed possunt,' inquies, 'mali.' Ne ego quidem negauerim, sed haec eorum
+potentia non a uiribus sed ab imbecillitate descendit. Possunt enim mala
+quae minime ualerent, si in bonorum efficientia manere potuissent. Quae
+possibilitas eos euidentius nihil posse demonstrat. Nam si, uti paulo ante
+collegimus, malum nihil est, cum mala tantummodo possint, nihil posse
+improbos liquet." "Perspicuum est." "Atque ut intellegas quaenam sit huius
+potentiae uis, summo bono nihil potentius esse paulo ante definiuimus."
+"Ita est," inquam. "Sed idem," inquit, "facere malum nequit." "Minime."
+"Est igitur," inquit, "aliquis qui omnia posse homines putet?" "Nisi quis
+insaniat, nemo." "Atqui idem possunt mala." "Vtinam quidem," inquam, "non
+possent." "Cum igitur bonorum tantummodo potens possit omnia, non uero
+queant omnia potentes etiam malorum, eosdem qui mala possunt minus posse
+manifestum est. Huc accedit quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam
+omniaque expetenda referri ad bonum uelut ad quoddam naturae suae cacumen
+ostendimus. Sed patrandi sceleris possibilitas referri ad bonum non potest;
+expetenda igitur non est. Atqui omnis potentia expetenda est; liquet igitur
+malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem
+potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet infirmitas ueramque illam
+Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod desiderent facere posse
+sapientes, improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desiderent
+explere non posse. Faciunt enim quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id
+bonum quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam
+ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt.
+
+
+
+
+  II.[144]
+
+  "Oh!" quoth I. "How great things dost thou promise! And I doubt not but
+  thou canst perform them, wherefore stay me not now that thou hast
+  stirred up my desires." "First then," quoth she, "that good men are
+  always powerful, and evil men of no strength, thou mayest easily know,
+  the one is proved by the other. For since that good and evil are
+  contraries, if it be convinced that goodness is potent, the weakness of
+  evil will be also manifest; and contrariwise if we discern the frailty
+  of evil, we must needs acknowledge the firmness of goodness. But that
+  our opinions may be more certainly embraced, I will take both ways,
+  confirming my propositions, sometime from one part, sometime from
+  another.
+
+  There be two things by which all human actions are effected, will and
+  power, of which if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed.
+  For if there want will, no man taketh anything in hand against his will,
+  and if there be not power, the will is in vain. So that, if thou seest
+  any willing to obtain that which he doth not obtain, thou canst not
+  doubt but that he wanted power to obtain what he would." "It is
+  manifest," quoth I, "and can by no means be denied." "And wilt thou
+  doubt that he could, whom thou seest bring to pass what he desired?"
+  "No." "But every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that
+  which he cannot do." "I confess it," quoth I. "Dost thou remember then,"
+  quoth she, "that it was inferred by our former discourses that all the
+  intentions of man's will doth hasten to happiness, though their courses
+  be divers?" "I remember," quoth I, "that that also was proved." "Dost
+  thou also call to mind that blessedness is goodness itself, and
+  consequently when blessedness is sought after, goodness must of course
+  be desired?" "I call it not to mind, for I have it already fixed in my
+  memory." "Wherefore all men both good and bad without difference of
+  intentions endeavour to obtain goodness." "It followeth," quoth I. "But
+  it is certain that men are made good by the obtaining of goodness." "It
+  is so." "Wherefore good men obtain what they desire." "So it seemeth."
+  "And if evil men did obtain the goodness they desire, they could not be
+  evil." "It is true." "Wherefore since they both desire goodness, but the
+  one obtaineth it and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men
+  are powerful, and the evil weak." "Whosoever doubteth of this," quoth I,
+  "he neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy
+  reasons." "Again," quoth she, "if there be two to whom the same thing is
+  proposed according to nature, and the one of them bringeth it perfectly
+  to pass with his natural function, but the other cannot exercise that
+  natural function but after another manner than is agreeable to nature,
+  and doth not perform that which he had proposed, but imitateth the other
+  who performeth it: which of these two wilt thou judge to be more
+  powerful?" "Though I conjecture," quoth I, "at thy meaning, yet I desire
+  to hear it more plainly." "Wilt thou deny," quoth she, "that the motion
+  of walking is agreeable to the nature of men?" "No," quoth I. "And
+  makest thou any doubt that the function of it doth naturally belong to
+  the feet?" "There is no doubt of this neither," quoth I. "Wherefore if
+  one that can go upon his feet doth walk, and another who hath not this
+  natural function of his feet endeavoureth to walk by creeping upon his
+  hands, which of these two is deservedly to be esteemed the stronger?"
+  "Infer the rest," quoth I, "for no man doubteth but that he which can
+  use that natural function is stronger than he which cannot." "But,"
+  quoth she, "the good seek to obtain the chiefest good, which is equally
+  proposed to bad and good, by the natural function of virtues, but the
+  evil endeavour to obtain the same by divers concupiscences, which are
+  not the natural function of obtaining goodness. Thinkest thou
+  otherwise?" "No," quoth I, "for it is manifest what followeth. For by
+  the force of that which I have already granted, it is necessary that
+  good men are powerful and evil men weak."
+
+  "Thou runnest before rightly," quoth she, "and it is (as physicians are
+  wont to hope) a token of an erected and resisting nature. Wherefore,
+  since I see thee most apt and willing to comprehend, I will therefore
+  heap up many reasons together. For consider the great weakness of
+  vicious men, who cannot come so far as their natural intention leadeth
+  and almost compelleth them. And what if they were destitute of this so
+  great and almost invincible help of the direction of nature? Ponder
+  likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or
+  trifling rewards[145] which they desire, and cannot obtain: but they
+  fail in the very sum and top of things: neither can the poor wretches
+  compass that which they only labour for nights and days: in which thing
+  the forces of the good eminently appear. For as thou wouldst judge him
+  to be most able to walk who going on foot could come as far as there
+  were any place to go in: so must thou of force judge him most powerful
+  who obtaineth the end of all that can be desired, beyond which there is
+  nothing. Hence that which is opposite also followeth, that the same men
+  are wicked and destitute of all forces. For why do they follow vices,
+  forsaking virtues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more
+  devoid of strength than blind ignorance? Or do they know what they
+  should embrace, but passion driveth them headlong the contrary way? So
+  also intemperance makes them frail, since they cannot strive against
+  vice. Or do they wittingly and willingly forsake goodness, and decline
+  to vices? But in this sort they leave not only to be powerful, but even
+  to be at all. For they which leave the common end of all things which
+  are, leave also being. Which may perhaps seem strange to some, that we
+  should say that evil men are not at all, who are the greatest part of
+  men: but yet it is so. For I deny not that evil men are evil, but withal
+  I say that purely and simply they are not.
+
+  For as thou mayest call a carcase a dead man, but not simply a man, so I
+  confess that the vicious are evil, but I cannot grant that they are
+  absolutely. For that is which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but
+  that which faileth from this leaveth also to be that which is in his own
+  nature. But thou wilt say that evil men can do many things, neither will
+  I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces but from
+  weakness. For they can do evil, which they could not do if they could
+  have remained in the performance of that which is good. Which
+  possibility declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if,
+  as we concluded a little before, evil is nothing, since they can only do
+  evil, it is manifest that the wicked can do nothing." "It is most
+  manifest." "And that thou mayest understand what the force of this power
+  is; we determined a little before that there is nothing more powerful
+  than the Sovereign Goodness." "It is true," quoth I. "But He cannot do
+  evil." "No." "Is there any then," quoth she, "that think that men can do
+  all things?" "No man, except he be mad, thinketh so." "But yet men can
+  do evil." "I would to God they could not," quoth I. "Since therefore he
+  that can only do good, can do all things, and they who can do evil,
+  cannot do all things, it is manifest that they which can do evil are
+  less potent. Moreover, we have proved that all power is to be accounted
+  among those things which are to be wished for, and that all such things
+  have reference to goodness, as to the very height of their nature. But
+  the possibility of committing wickedness cannot have reference to
+  goodness. Wherefore it is not to be wished for. Yet all power is to be
+  wished for; and consequently it is manifest, possibility of evil is no
+  power. By all which the power of the good and the undoubted infirmity of
+  evil appeareth. And it is manifest that the sentence of Plato is true:
+  that only wise men can do that which they desire, and that the wicked
+  men practise indeed what they list, but cannot perform what they would.
+  For they do what they list, thinking to obtain the good which they
+  desire by those things which cause them delight; but they obtain it not,
+  because shameful action cannot arrive to happiness.[146]
+
+
+  [144] The whole of this and of the following chapter is a paraphrase of
+  Plato's _Gorgias_.
+
+  [145] Cf. Virgil, _Aen._ xii. 764.
+
+  [146] Cf. Plato, _Gorgias_, 468, 469; _Alcibiades I._ 134 c.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+Quos uides sedere celsos solii culmine reges
+Purpura claros nitente saeptos tristibus armis
+Ore toruo comminantes rabie cordis anhelos,
+Detrahat si quis superbis uani tegmina cultus,
+Iam uidebit intus artas dominos ferre catenas.                            5
+Hinc enim libido uersat auidis corda uenenis,
+Hinc flagellat ira mentem fluctus turbida tollens
+Maeror aut captos fatigat aut spes lubrica torquet
+Ergo cum caput tot unum cernas ferre tyrannos,
+Non facit quod optat ipse dominis pressus iniquis.                       10
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  The kings whom we behold
+  In highest glory placed,
+  And with rich purple graced,
+  Compassed with soldiers bold;
+  Whose countenance shows fierce threats,
+  Who with rash fury chide,
+  If any strip the pride
+  From their vainglorious feats;
+  He'll see them close oppressed
+  Within by galling chains
+  For filthy lust there reigns
+  And poisoneth their breast,
+  Wrath often them perplexeth
+  Raising their minds like waves,
+  Sorrow their power enslaves
+  And sliding hope them vexeth.
+  So many tyrants still
+  Dwelling in one poor heart,
+  Except they first depart
+  She cannot have her will.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Videsne igitur quanto in caeno probra uoluantur, qua probitas luce
+resplendeat? In quo perspicuum est numquam bonis praemia numquam sua
+sceleribus deesse supplicia. Rerum etenim quae geruntur illud propter quod
+unaquaeque res geritur, eiusdem rei praemium esse non iniuria uideri
+potest, uti currendi in stadio propter quam curritur iacet praemium corona.
+Sed beatitudinem esse idem ipsum bonum propter quod omnia geruntur
+ostendimus. Est igitur humanis actibus ipsum bonum ueluti praemium commune
+propositum. Atqui hoc a bonis non potest separari neque enim bonus ultra
+iure uocabitur qui careat bono; quare probos mores sua praemia non
+relinquunt. Quantumlibet igitur saeuiant mali, sapienti tamen corona non
+decidet, non arescet. Neque enim probis animis proprium decus aliena
+decerpit improbitas. Quod si extrinsecus accepto laetaretur, poterat hoc
+uel alius quispiam uel ipse etiam qui contulisset auferre; sed quoniam id
+sua cuique probitas confert, tum suo praemio carebit, cum probus esse
+desierit. Postremo cum omne praemium idcirco appetatur quoniam bonum esse
+creditur, quis boni compotem praemii iudicet expertem? At cuius praemii?
+Omnium pulcherrimi maximique. Memento etenim corollarii illius quod paulo
+ante praecipuum dedi ac sic collige: cum ipsum bonum beatitudo sit, bonos
+omnes eo ipso quod boni sint fieri beatos liquet. Sed qui beati sint deos
+esse conuenit. Est igitur praemium bonorum quod nullus. deterat dies,
+nullius minuat potestas, nullius fuscet improbitas, deos fieri. Quae cum
+ita sint, de malorum quoque inseparabili poena dubitare sapiens nequeat.
+Nam cum bonum malumque item poenae atque praemium aduersa fronte
+dissideant, quae in boni praemio uidemus accedere eadem necesse est in mali
+poena contraria parte respondeant. Sicut igitur probis probitas ipsa fit
+praemium, ita improbis nequitia ipsa supplicium est. Iam uero quisquis
+afficitur poena, malo se affectum esse non dubitat. Si igitur sese ipsi
+aestimare uelint, possuntne sibi supplicii expertes uideri quos omnium
+malorum extrema nequitia non affecit modo uerum etiam uehementer infecit?
+Vide autem ex aduersa parte bonorum, quae improbos poena comitetur. Omne
+namque quod sit unum esse ipsumque unum bonum esse paulo ante didicisti,
+cui consequens est ut omne quod sit id etiam bonum esse uideatur. Hoc
+igitur modo quidquid a bono deficit esse desistit; quo fit ut mali desinant
+esse quod fuerant, sed fuisse homines adhuc ipsa humani corporis reliqua
+species ostentat. Quare uersi in malitiam humanam quoque amisere naturam.
+Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere sola probitas possit, necesse est
+ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit, infra hominis meritum detrudat
+improbitas. Euenit igitur, ut quem transformatum uitiis uideas hominem
+aestimare non possis. Auaritia feruet alienarum opum uiolentus ereptor?
+Lupi similem dixeris. Ferox atque inquies linguam litigiis exercet? Cani
+comparabis. Insidiator occultus subripuisse fraudibus gaudet? Vulpeculis
+exaequetur. Irae intemperans fremit? Leonis animum gestare credatur.
+Pauidus ac fugax non metuenda formidat? Ceruis similis habeatur. Segnis ac
+stupidus torpit? Asinum uiuit. Leuis atque inconstans studia permutat?
+Nihil auibus differt. Foedis inmundisque libidinibus immergitur? Sordidae
+suis uoluptate detinetur. Ita fit ut qui probitate deserta homo esse
+desierit, cum in diuinam condicionem transire non possit, uertatur in
+beluam.
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Seest thou then in what mire wickedness wallows, and how clearly honesty
+  shineth? By which it is manifest that the good are never without
+  rewards, nor the evil without punishments. For in all things that are
+  done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of
+  that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he
+  runneth is proposed as a reward. But we have showed that blessedness is
+  the selfsame goodness for which all things are done. Wherefore this
+  goodness is proposed as a common reward for all human actions, and this
+  cannot be separated from those who are good. For he shall not rightly be
+  any longer called good, who wanteth goodness; wherefore virtuous manners
+  are not left without their due rewards. And how much so ever the evil do
+  rage, yet the wise man's crown will not fade nor wither.  For others'
+  wickedness depriveth not virtuous minds of their proper glory. But if he
+  should rejoice at anything which he hath from others, either he who gave
+  it, or any other might take it away. But because every man's virtue is
+  the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward when he leaveth to
+  be virtuous. Lastly, since every reward is therefore desired because it
+  is thought to be good, who can judge him to be devoid of reward, which
+  hath goodness for his possession?  But what reward hath he? The most
+  beautiful and the greatest that can be. For remember that
+  _corollarium_ [147] which I presented thee with a little before, as
+  with a rare and precious jewel, and infer thus: Since that goodness
+  itself is happiness, it is manifest that all good men even by being good
+  are made happy.  But we agreed that happy men are gods. Wherefore the
+  reward of good men, which no time can waste, no man's power diminish, no
+  man's wickedness obscure, is to become gods. Which things being so, no
+  wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punishment of the evil.
+  For since goodness and evil, punishment and reward, are opposite the one
+  to the other, those things which we see fall out in the reward of
+  goodness must needs be answerable in a contrary manner in the punishment
+  of evil. Wherefore as to honest men honesty itself is a reward, so to
+  the wicked their very wickedness is a punishment. And he that is
+  punished doubteth not but that he is afflicted with the evil. Wherefore
+  if they would truly consider their own estate, can they think themselves
+  free from punishment, whom wickedness, the worst of all evils, doth not
+  only touch but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment which
+  accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the virtuous.
+  For thou learnedst not long before that whatsoever is at all is one, and
+  that unity is goodness, by which it followeth that whatsoever is must
+  also be good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth from goodness
+  ceaseth to be, by which it followeth that evil men leave to be that
+  which they were, but the shape of men, which they still retain, showeth
+  them to have been men: wherefore by embracing wickedness they have lost
+  the nature of men. But since virtue alone can exalt us above men,
+  wickedness must needs cast those under the desert of men, which it hath
+  bereaved of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man
+  whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extorter of other
+  men's goods carried away with his covetous desire? Thou mayest liken him
+  to a wolf. Is the angry and unquiet man always contending and brawling?
+  Thou mayest compare him to a dog. Doth the treacherous fellow rejoice
+  that he hath deceived others with his hidden frauds? Let him be
+  accounted no better than a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let
+  him be thought to have a lion's mind. Is the fearful and timorous afraid
+  without cause? Let him be esteemed like to hares and deer. Is the slow
+  and stupid always idle? He liveth an ass's life. Doth the light and
+  unconstant change his courses? He is nothing different from the birds.
+  Is he drowned in filthy and unclean lusts? He is entangled in the
+  pleasure of a stinking sow. So that he who, leaving virtue, ceaseth to
+  be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the divine condition, is turned
+  into a beast.
+
+
+  [147] _Vide supra, p. 270._
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Vela Neritii ducis
+Et uagas pelago rates
+Eurus appulit insulae,
+Pulchra qua residens dea
+Solis edita semine                                                        5
+Miscet hospitibus nouis
+Tacta carmine pocula.
+Quos ut in uarios modos
+Vertit herbipotens manus,
+Hunc apri facies tegit,                                                  10
+Ille Marmaricus leo
+Dente crescit et unguibus.
+Hic lupis nuper additus,
+Flere dum parat, ululat.
+Ille tigris ut Indica                                                    15
+Tecta mitis obambulat.
+Sed licet uariis malis
+Numen Arcadis alitis
+Obsitum miserans ducem
+Peste soluerit hospitis,                                                 20
+Iam tamen mala remiges
+Ore pocula traxerant,
+Iam sues Cerealia
+Glande pabula uerterant
+Et nihil manet integrum                                                  25
+Voce corpore perditis.
+Sola mens stabilis super
+Monstra quae patitur gemit.
+O leuem nimium manum
+Nec potentia gramina,                                                    30
+Membra quae ualeant licet,
+Corda uertere non ualent!
+Intus est hominum uigor
+Arce conditus abdita.
+Haec uenena potentius                                                    35
+Detrahunt hominem sibi
+Dira quae penitus meant
+Nec nocentia corpori
+Mentis uulnere saeuiunt."
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  The sails which wise Ulysses bore,
+  And ships which in the seas long time did stray
+  The eastern wind drave to that shore
+  Where the fair Goddess Lady Circe lay,
+  Daughter by birth to Phoebus bright,
+  Who with enchanted cups and charms did stay
+  Her guests, deceived with their delight
+  And into sundry figures them did change,
+  Being most skilful in the might
+  And secret force of herbs and simples strange;
+  Some like to savage boars, and some
+  Like lions fierce, which daily use to range
+  Through Libya,[148] in tooth and claw become.
+  Others are changed to the shape and guise
+  Of ravenous wolves, and waxing dumb
+  Use howling in the stead of manly cries.
+  Others like to the tiger rove[149]
+  Which in the scorched Indian desert lies.
+  And though the winged son of Jove[150]
+  From these bewitched cups' delightful taste
+  To keep the famous captain strove,
+  Yet them the greedy mariners embraced
+  With much desire, till turned to swine
+  Instead of bread they fed on oaken mast.
+  Ruined in voice and form, no sign
+  Remains to them of any human grace;
+  Only their minds unchanged repine
+  To see their bodies in such ugly case.
+  O feeble hand and idle art
+  Which, though it could the outward limbs deface,
+  Yet had no force to change the heart.
+  For all the force of men given by God's arm
+  Lies hidden in their inmost part.
+  The poisons therefore which within them swarm
+  More deeply pierce, and with more might,
+  For to the body though they do no harm,
+  Yet on the soul they work their spite."
+
+
+  [148] Literally "Marmaric," i.e. properly, the region between Egypt and
+  the great Syrtis; generally, African, cf. Lucan iii. 293.
+
+  [149] Literally, "rove tame round the house."
+
+  [150] i.e. Mercury who was born in Arcadia; cf. Virg. _Aen._ viii.
+  129-138.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum ego: "Fateor," inquam, "nec iniuria dici uideo uitiosos, tametsi humani
+corporis speciem seruent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari; sed
+quorum atrox scelerataque mens bonorum pernicie saeuit, id ipsum eis licere
+noluissem." "Nec licet," inquit, "uti conuenienti monstrabitur loco. Sed
+tamen si id ipsum quod eis licere creditur auferatur, magna ex parte
+sceleratorum hominum poena releuetur. Etenim quod incredibile cuiquam forte
+uideatur, infeliciores esse necesse est malos, cum cupita perfecerint, quam
+si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint. Nam si miserum est uoluisse praua,
+potuisse miserius est, sine quo uoluntatis miserae langueret effectus.
+Itaque cum sua singulis miseria sit, triplici infortunio necesse est
+urgeantur quos uideas scelus uelle, posse, perficere." "Accedo," inquam,
+"sed uti hoc infortunio cito careant patrandi sceleris possibilitate
+deserti uehementer exopto." "Carebunt," inquit, "ocius quam uel tu forsitan
+uelis uel illi sese aestiment esse carituros. Neque enim est aliquid in tam
+breuibus uitae metis ita serum quod exspectare longum immortalis praesertim
+animus putet: quorum magna spes et excelsa facinorum machina repentino
+atque insperato saepe fine destruitur, quod quidem illis miseriae modum
+statuit.
+
+Nam si nequitia miseros facit, miserior sit necesse est diuturnior nequam;
+quos infelicissimos esse iudicarem, si non eorum malitiam saltem mors
+extrema finiret. Etenim si de prauitatis infortunio uera conclusimus,
+infinitam liquet esse miseriam quam esse constat aeternam." Tum ego: "Mira
+quidem," inquam, "et concessu difficilis inlatio, sed his eam quae prius
+concessa sunt nimium conuenire cognosco." "Recte," inquit, "aestimas. Sed
+qui conclusioni accedere durum putat, aequum est uel falsum aliquid
+praecessisse demonstret uel collocationem propositionum non esse efficacem
+necessariae conclusionis ostendat; alioquin concessis praecedentibus nihil
+prorsus est quod de inlatione causetur. Nam hoc quoque quod dicam non minus
+mirum uideatur, sed ex his quae sumpta sunt aeque est necessarium."
+"Quidnam?" inquam. "Feliciores," inquit, "esse improbos supplicia luentes
+quam si eos nulla iustitiae poena coerceat. Neque id nunc molior quod
+cuiuis ueniat in mentem, corrigi ultione prauos mores et ad rectum
+supplicii terrore deduci, ceteris quoque exemplum esse culpanda fugiendi,
+sed alio quodam modo infeliciores esse improbos arbitror impunitos, tametsi
+nulla ratio correctionis, nullus respectus habeatur exempli." "Et quis
+erit," inquam, "praeter hos alius modus?" Et illa: "Bonos," inquit, "esse
+felices, malos uero miseros nonne concessimus?" "Ita est," inquam. "Si
+igitur," inquit, "miseriae cuiuspiam bonum aliquid addatur, nonne felicior
+est eo cuius pura ac solitaria sine cuiusquam boni admixtione miseria est?"
+"Sic," inquam, "uidetur." "Quid si eidem misero qui cunctis careat bonis,
+praeter ea quibus miser est malum aliud fuerit adnexum, nonne multo
+infelicior eo censendus est cuius infortunium boni participatione
+releuatur?" "Quidni?" inquam. "Sed puniri improbos iustum, impunitos uero
+elabi iniquum esse manifestum est." "Quis id neget?" "Sed ne illud quidem,"
+ait, "quisquam negabit bonum esse omne quod iustum est contraque quod
+iniustum est malum." Liquere, respondi.[151] "Habent igitur improbi, cum
+puniuntur, quidem boni aliquid adnexum poenam ipsam scilicet quae ratione
+iustitiae bona est, idemque cum supplicio carent, inest eis aliquid
+ulterius mali ipsa impunitas quam iniquitatis merito malum esse confessus
+es." "Negare non possum." "Multo igitur infeliciores improbi sunt iniusta
+impunitate donati quam iusta ultione puniti." Tum ego: "Ista quidem
+consequentia sunt eis quae paulo ante conclusa sunt.
+
+Sed quaeso," inquam, "te, nullane animarum supplicia post defunctum morte
+corpus relinquis?" "Et magna quidem," inquit, "quorum alia poenali
+acerbitate, alia uero purgatoria clementia exerceri puto. Sed nunc de his
+disserere consilium non est. Id uero hactenus egimus, ut quae indignissima
+tibi uidebatur malorum potestas eam nullam esse cognosceres quosque
+impunitos querebare, uideres numquam improbitatis suae carere suppliciis,
+licentiam quam cito finiri precabaris nec longam esse disceres
+infelicioremque fore, si diuturnior, infelicissimam uero, si esset aeterna;
+post haec miseriores esse improbos iniusta impunitate dimissos quam iusta
+ultione punitos. Cui sententiae consequens est ut tum demum grauioribus
+suppliciis urgeantur, cum impuniti esse creduntur."
+
+Tum ego: "Cum tuas," inquam, "rationes considero, nihil dici uerius puto.
+At si ad hominum iudicia reuertar, quis ille est cui haec non credenda modo
+sed saltem audienda uideantur?" "Ita est," inquit illa. "Nequeunt enim
+oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae ueritatis attollere,
+similesque auibus sunt quarum intuitum nox inluminat dies caecat. Dum enim
+non rerum ordinem, sed suos intuentur affectus, uel licentiam uel
+impunitatem scelerum putant esse felicem. Vide autem quid aeterna lex
+sanciat. Melioribus animum conformaueris, nihil opus est iudice praemium
+deferente tu te ipse excellentioribus addidisti. Studium ad peiora
+deflexeris, extra ne quaesieris ultorem. Tu te ipse in deteriora trusisti,
+ueluti si uicibus sordidam humum caelumque respicias, cunctis extra
+cessantibus ipsa cernendi ratione nunc caeno nunc sideribus interesse
+uidearis. At uulgus ista non respicit. Quid igitur? Hisne accedamus quos
+beluis similes esse monstrauimus? Quid si quis amisso penitus uisu ipsum
+etiam se habuisse obliuisceretur intuitum nihilque sibi ad humanam
+perfectionem deesse arbitraretur, num uidentes eadem caecos putaremus? Nam
+ne illud quidem adquiescent quod aeque ualidis rationum nititur
+firmamentis: infeliciores eos esse qui faciant quam qui patiantur
+iniuriam." "Vellem," inquam, "has ipsas audire rationes." "Omnem," inquit,
+"improbum num supplicio dignum negas?" "Minime." "Infelices uero esse qui
+sint improbi multipliciter liquet." "Ita," inquam. "Qui igitur supplicio
+digni sunt miseros esse non dubitas?" "Conuenit," inquam. "Si igitur
+cognitor," ait, "resideres, cui supplicium inferendum putares, eine qui
+fecisset an qui pertulisset iniuriam?" "Nec ambigo," inquam, "quin perpesso
+satisfacerem dolore facientis." "Miserior igitur tibi iniuriae inlator quam
+acceptor esse uideretur." "Consequitur," inquam. "Hinc igitur aliis de
+causis ea radice nitentibus, quod turpitudo suapte natura miseros faciat,
+apparet inlatam cuilibet iniuriam non accipientis sed inferentis esse
+miseriam." "Atqui nunc," ait, "contra faciunt oratores. Pro his enim qui
+graue quid acerbumque perpessi sunt miserationem iudicum excitare conantur,
+cum magis admittentibus iustior miseratio debeatur; quos non ab iratis sed
+a propitiis potius miserantibusque accusatoribus ad iudicium ueluti aegros
+ad medicum duci oportebat, ut culpae morbos supplicio resecarent. Quo pacto
+defensorum opera uel tota frigeret, uel si prodesse hominibus mallet, in
+accusationis habitum uerteretur, Ipsi quoque improbi, si eis aliqua rimula
+uirtutem relictam fas esset aspicere uitiorumque sordes poenarum
+cruciatibus se deposituros uiderent compensatione adipiscendae probitatis,
+nec hos cruciatus esse ducerent defensorumque operam repudiarent ac se
+totos accusatoribus iudicibusque permitterent. Quo fit ut apud sapientes
+nullus prorsus odio locus relinquatur. Nam bonos quis nisi stultissimus
+oderit? Malos uero odisse ratione caret. Nam si, uti corporum languor, ita
+uitiositas quidam est quasi morbus animorum, cum aegros corpore minime
+dignos odio sed potius miseratione iudicemus, multo magis non insequendi
+sed miserandi sunt quorum mentes omni languore atrocior urget improbitas.
+
+
+[151] Sed puniri ... respondi _quae infra_ (_in pag. 328 l. 73_) _post_
+ultioni puniti _in codicibus habentur huc transponenda esse censuit P.
+Langenus, demonstrauit A. Engelbrecht._
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Then said I, "I confess and perceive that thou affirmest not without
+  cause that the vicious, though they keep the outward shape of men, are
+  in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would
+  have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the
+  good, restrained from executing their malice." "They are restrained,"
+  quoth she, "as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this
+  liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is
+  in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible)
+  evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pass
+  their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it
+  be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable
+  to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could not
+  have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar
+  misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness,
+  whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness." "I grant it,"
+  quoth I, "but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this
+  misery, having lost the power to perform their malice." "They will lose
+  it," quoth she, "sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they
+  themselves suppose. For in the short compass of this life there is
+  nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should
+  think it long in coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of
+  the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected
+  end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.
+
+  For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more
+  miserable he must needs be; and I should judge them the most unhappy men
+  that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have
+  concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the
+  wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite." "A strange
+  illation," quoth I, "and hard to be granted; but I see that those things
+  which were granted before agree very well with these." "Thou thinkest
+  aright," quoth she, "but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the
+  conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is
+  false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary
+  conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no
+  reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude
+  now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of
+  those things which are already assumed." "What?" quoth I. "That wicked
+  men," quoth she, "are more happy being punished than if they escaped the
+  hands of justice. Neither do I now go about to show that which may come
+  into every man's mind, that evil customs are corrected by chastisement,
+  and are reduced to virtue by the terror of punishment, and that others
+  may take example to avoid evil, but in another manner also I think
+  vicious men that go unpunished to be more miserable, although we take no
+  account of correction and pay no regard to example." "And what other
+  manner shall this be," quoth I, "besides these?" "Have we not granted,"
+  quoth she, "that the good are happy, and the evil miserable?" "We have,"
+  quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "something that is good be added to one's
+  misery, is he not happier than another whose misery is desolate and
+  solitary, without any participation of goodness?" "So it seemeth," quoth
+  I. "What if there be some other evil annexed to this miserable man who
+  is deprived of all goodness, besides those which make him miserable, is
+  he not to be accounted much more unhappy than he whose misery is
+  lightened by partaking of goodness?" "Why not?" quoth I. "But it is
+  manifest that it is just that the wicked be punished, and unjust that
+  they should go unpunished." "Who can deny that?" "But neither will any
+  man deny this," quoth she, "that whatsoever is just, is good, and
+  contrariwise, that whatsoever is unjust, is evil." "Certainly," I
+  answered. "Then the wicked have some good annexed when they are
+  punished, to wit, the punishment itself, which by reason of justice is
+  good, and when they are not punished, they have a further evil, the very
+  impunity which thou hast deservedly granted to be an evil because of its
+  injustice." "I cannot deny it." "Wherefore the vicious are far more
+  unhappy by escaping punishment unjustly, than by being justly punished."
+  "This followeth," quoth I, "out of that which hath been concluded
+  before.
+
+  But I pray thee, leavest thou no punishments for the souls after the
+  death of the body?" "And those great too," quoth she. "Some of which I
+  think to be executed as sharp punishments, and others as merciful
+  purgations.[152] But I purpose not now to treat of those. But we have
+  hitherto laboured that thou shouldest perceive the power of the wicked,
+  which to thee seemed intolerable, to be none at all, and that thou
+  shouldest see, that those whom thou complainedst went unpunished, do
+  never escape without punishment for their wickedness. And that thou
+  shouldest learn that the licence which thou wishedst might soon end, is
+  not long, and yet the longer the more miserable, and most unhappy if it
+  were everlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being
+  permitted to escape with unjust impunity, than being punished with just
+  severity. Out of which it followeth that they are then more grievously
+  punished, when they are thought to go scot-free."
+
+  "When I consider thy reasons," quoth I, "I think nothing can be said
+  more truly. But if I return to the judgments of men, who is there that
+  will think them worthy to be believed or so much as heard?" "It is
+  true," quoth she, "for they cannot lift up their eyes accustomed to
+  darkness, to behold the light of manifest truth, and they are like those
+  birds whose sight is quickened by the night, and dimmed by the day. For
+  while they look upon, not the order of things, but their own affections,
+  they think that licence and impunity to sin is happy. But see what the
+  eternal law establisheth. If thou apply thy mind to the better, thou
+  needest no judge to reward thee: thou hast joined thyself to the more
+  excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, never expect
+  any other to punish thee: thou hast put thyself in a miserable estate;
+  as if by turns thou lookest down to the miry ground, and up to heaven,
+  setting aside all outward causes, by the very law of sight thou seemest
+  sometime to be in the dirt, and sometime present to the stars. But the
+  common sort considereth not these things. What then? Shall we join
+  ourselves to them whom we have proved to be like beasts? What if one
+  having altogether lost his sight should likewise forget that he ever had
+  any, and should think that he wanted nothing which belongeth to human
+  perfection: should we likewise think them blind, that see as well as
+  they saw before? For they will not grant that neither, which may be
+  proved by as forcible reasons, that they are more unhappy that do injury
+  than they which suffer it." "I would," quoth I, "hear these reasons."
+  "Deniest thou," quoth she, "that every wicked man deserveth punishment?"
+  "No." "And it is many ways clear that the vicious are miserable?" "Yes,"
+  quoth I. "Then you do not doubt that those who deserve punishment are
+  wretched?" "It is true," quoth I. "If then," quoth she, "thou wert to
+  examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that
+  did or that suffered wrong?" "I doubt not," quoth I, "but that I would
+  satisfy him that suffered with the sorrow of him that did it." "The
+  offerer of the injury then would seem to thee more miserable than the
+  receiver?" "It followeth," quoth I. "Hence therefore, and for other
+  causes grounded upon that principle that dishonesty of itself maketh men
+  miserable, it appeareth that the injury which is offered any man is not
+  the receiver's but the doer's misery." "But now-a-days," quoth she,
+  "orators take the contrary course. For they endeavour to draw the judges
+  to commiseration of them who have suffered any grievous afflictions;
+  whereas pity is more justly due to the causers thereof, who should be
+  brought, not by angry, but rather by favourable and compassionate
+  accusers to judgment, as it were sick men to a physician, that their
+  diseases and faults might be taken away by punishments; by which means
+  the defenders' labour would either wholly cease, or if they had rather
+  do their clients some good, they would change their defence into
+  accusations. And the wicked themselves, if they could behold virtue
+  abandoned by them, through some little rift, and perceive that they
+  might be delivered from the filth of sin by the affliction of
+  punishments, obtaining virtue in exchange, they would not esteem of
+  torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly
+  resign themselves to their accusers and judges. By which means it cometh
+  to pass, that in wise men there is no place for hatred. For who but a
+  very fool would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against
+  reason. For as faintness is a disease of the body, so is vice a sickness
+  of the mind. Wherefore, since we judge those that have corporal
+  infirmities to be rather worthy of compassion than of hatred, much more
+  are they to be pitied, and not abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with
+  wickedness, the greatest malady that may be.
+
+
+  [152] See discussion of this passage in _Boethius, An Essay,_ H. F.
+  Stewart (1891), pp. 98 ff.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quod tantos iuuat excitare motus
+  Et propria fatum sollicitare manu?
+Si mortem petitis, propinquat ipsa
+  Sponte sua uolucres nec remoratur equos.
+Quos serpens leo tigris ursus aper                                        5
+  Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt.
+An distant quia dissidentque mores,
+  Iniustas acies et fera bella mouent
+Alternisque uolunt perire telis?
+  Non est iusta satis saeuitiae ratio.                                   10
+Vis aptam meritis uicem referre?
+  Dilige iure bonos et miseresce malis."
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Why should we strive to die so many ways,
+    And slay ourselves with our own hands?
+    If we seek death, she ready stands,
+  She willing comes, her chariot never stays.
+  Those against whom the wild beasts armed be,
+    Against themselves with weapons rage.[153]
+    Do they such wars unjustly wage,
+  Because their lives and manners disagree,
+  And so themselves with mutual weapons kill?
+    Alas, but this revenge is small.
+    Wouldst thou give due desert to all?
+  Love then the good, and pity thou the ill."
+
+
+  [153] Literally, "Men whom serpent, lion, tiger, bear, and boar attack
+  with tooth, yet attack each other with the sword."
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Hic ego: "Video," inquam, "quae sit uel felicitas uel miseria in ipsis
+proborum atque improborum meritis constituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna
+populari non nihil boni maliue inesse perpendo. Neque enim sapientum
+quisquam exul inops ignominiosusque esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus,
+honore reuerendus, potentia ualidus, in sua permanens urbe florere. Sic
+enim clarius testatiusque sapientiae tractatur officium, cum in
+contingentes populos regentium quodam modo beatitudo transfunditur, cum
+praesertim carcer, nex[154] ceteraque legalium tormenta poenarum
+perniciosis potius ciuibus propter quos etiam constituta sunt debeantur.
+Cur haec igitur uersa uice mutentur scelerumque supplicia bonos premant,
+praemia uirtutum mali rapiant, uehementer admiror, quaeque tam iniustae
+confusionis ratio uideatur ex te scire desidero. Minus etenim mirarer, si
+misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector
+exaggerat. Qui cum saepe bonis iucunda, malis aspera contraque bonis dura
+tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehenditur, quid est quod a
+fortuitis casibus differre uideatur?" "Nec mirum," inquit, "si quid ordinis
+ignorata ratione temerarium confusumque credatur. Sed tu quamuis causam
+tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat,
+recte fieri cuncta ne dubites.
+
+
+[154] lex _plerique codd._
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+  "I see," quoth I, "what felicity or misery is placed in the deserts of
+  honest and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good or
+  evil even in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather live in
+  banishment, poverty, and ignominy, than prosper in his own country,
+  being rich, respected, and powerful. For in this manner is the office of
+  wisdom performed with more credit and renown, when the governors'
+  happiness is participated by the people about them; so chiefly because
+  prisons, death, and other torments of legal punishments are rather due
+  to pernicious subjects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I
+  much marvel why these things are thus turned upside down, and the
+  punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while evil men obtain the
+  rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee what may seem to be
+  the reason of so unjust confusion. For I would marvel less if I thought
+  that all things were disordered by casual events. Now God being the
+  Governor, my astonishment is increased. For since that He distributeth
+  oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is
+  distasteful to the bad, and contrariwise adversity to the good, and
+  prosperity to the evil, unless we find out the cause hereof, what
+  difference may there seem to be betwixt this and accidental chances?"
+  "It is no marvel," quoth she, "if anything be thought temerarious and
+  confused, when we know not the order it hath. But although thou beest
+  ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because the world
+  hath a governor, doubt not but all things are well done.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit
+  Propinqua summo cardine labi,
+Cur legat tardus plaustra Bootes
+  Mergatque seras aequore flammas,
+Cum nimis celeres explicet ortus,                                         5
+  Legem stupebit aetheris alti.
+Palleant plenae cornua lunae
+  Infecta metis noctis opacae
+Quaeque fulgenti texerat ore
+  Confusa Phoebe detegat astra,                                          10
+Commouet gentes publicus error
+  Lassantque crebris pulsibus aera.
+Nemo miratur flamina Cori
+  Litus frementi tundere fluctu
+Nec niuis duram frigore molem                                            15
+  Feruente Phoebi soluier aestu.
+Hic enim causas cernere promptum est,
+  Illic latentes pectora turbant.
+Cuncta quae rara prouehit aetas
+  Stupetque subitis mobile uulgus,                                       20
+Cedat inscitiae nubilus error,
+  Cessent profecto mira uideri."
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  Who knows not how the stars near to the poles do slide,
+    And how Booetes his slow wain doth guide,
+  And why he sets so late, and doth so early rise,
+    May wonder at the courses of the skies.
+  If when the moon is full her horns seem pale to sight,
+    Infested with the darkness of the night,
+  And stars from which all grace she with her brightness took,
+    Now show themselves, while she doth dimly look,
+  A public error straight through vulgar minds doth pass,
+    And they with many strokes beat upon brass.[155]
+  None wonders why the winds upon the waters blow.
+    Nor why hot Phoebus' beams dissolve the snow.
+  These easy are to know, the other hidden lie,
+    And therefore more our hearts they terrify.
+  All strange events which time to light more seldom brings,
+    And the vain people count as sudden things,
+  If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free,
+    No longer would by us admired be."
+
+
+[155] See Tylor's _Primitive Culture_, pp. 296 ff. Cf "carmina uel caelo
+possunt deducere lunam," Virg. _Ecl._ viii. 69, and Juvenal, _Sat._ vi. 440
+sq.
+
+
+
+
+VI
+
+"Ita est," inquam; "sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas euoluere
+uelatasque caligine explicare rationes, quaeso uti quae hinc decernas.
+quoniam hoc me miraculum maxime perturbat, edisseras." Tum illa paulisper
+arridens: "Ad rem me," inquit, "omnium quaesitu maximam uocas, cui uix
+exhausti quicquam satis sit. Talis namque materia est ut una dubitatione
+succisa innumerabiles aliae uelut hydrae capita succrescant, nec ullus
+fuerit modus, nisi quis eas uiuacissimo mentis igne coerceat. In hac enim
+de prouidentiae simplicitate, de fati serie, de repentinis casibus, de
+cognitione ac praedestinatione diuina, de arbitrii libertate quaeri solet,
+quae quanti oneris sint ipse perpendis. Sed quoniam haec quoque te nosse
+quaedam medicinae tuae portio est, quamquam angusto limite temporis saepti
+tamen aliquid delibare[156] conabimur. Quod si te musici carminis
+oblectamenta delectant, hanc oportet paulisper differas uoluptatem, dum
+nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes." "Vt libet," inquam. Tunc uelut ab alio
+orsa principio ita disseruit: "Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium
+naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo mouetur modo, causas, ordinem,
+formas ex diuinae mentis stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis
+arce composita multiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit. Qui modus cum in
+ipsa diuinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur;
+cum uero ad ea quae mouet atque disponit refertur, fatum a ueteribus
+appellatum est. Quae diuersa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusque uim
+mente conspexerit. Nam prouidentia est ipsa illa diuina ratio in summo
+omnium principe constituta quae cuncta disponit; fatum uero inhaerens rebus
+mobilibus dispositio per quam prouidentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus.
+Prouidentia namque cuncta pariter quamuis diuersa quamuis infinita
+complectitur; fatum uero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac
+temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in diuinae
+mentis adunata prospectum prouidentia sit, eadem uero adunatio digesta
+atque explicata temporibus fatum uocetur. Quae licet diuersa sint, alterum
+tamen pendet ex altero. Ordo namque fatalis ex prouidentiae simplicitate
+procedit. Sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens mouet
+operis effectum, et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat, per
+temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter
+stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa quae disposuit
+multipliciter ac temporaliter administrat. Siue igitur famulantibus
+quibusdam prouidentiae diuinis spiritibus fatum exercetur seu anima seu
+tota inseruiente natura seu caelestibus siderum motibus seu angelica
+uirtute seu daemonum uaria sollertia seu aliquibus horum seu omnibus
+fatalis series texitur, illud certe manifestum est immobilem simplicemque
+gerendarum formam rerum esse prouidentiam, fatum uero eorum quae diuina
+simplicitas gerenda disposuit mobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem. Quo
+fit ut omnia quae fato subsunt prouidentiae quoque subiecta sint cui ipsum
+etiam subiacet fatum, quaedam uero quae sub prouidentia locata sunt fati
+seriem superent. Ea uero sunt quae primae propinqua diuinitati stabiliter
+fixa fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Nam ut orbium circa eundem
+cardinem sese uertentium qui est intimus ad simplicitatem medietatis
+accedit ceterorumque extra locatorum ueluti cardo quidam circa quem
+uersentur exsistit, extimus uero maiore ambitu rotatus quanto a puncti
+media indiuiduitate discedit tanto amplioribus spatiis explicatur, si quid
+uero illi se medio conectat et societ, in simplicitatem cogitur diffundique
+ac diffluere cessat, simili ratione quod longius a prima mente discedit
+maioribus fati nexibus implicatur ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est quanto
+illum rerum cardinem uicinius petit. Quod si supernae mentis haeserit
+firmitati, motu carens fati quoque supergreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti
+est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad
+aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus, ita est fati series
+mobilis ad prouidentiae stabilem simplicitatem. Ea series caelum ac sidera
+mouet, elementa in se inuicem temperat et alterna commutatione transformat;
+eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes fetuum seminumque renouat
+progressus. Haec actus etiam fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum
+conexione constringit, quae cum ab immobilis prouidentiae proficiscatur
+exordiis, ipsas quoque immutabiles esse necesse est. Ita enim res optime
+reguntur, si manens in diuina mente simplicitas indeclinabilem causarum
+ordinem promat. Hic uero ordo res mutabiles et alioquin temere fluituras
+propria incommutabilitate coerceat. Quo fit ut tametsi uobis hunc ordinem
+minime considerare ualentibus confusa omnia perturbataque uideantur, nihilo
+minus tamen suus modus ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat. Nihil est enim
+quod mali causa ne ab ipsis quidem improbis fiat; quos, ut uberrime
+demonstratum est, bonum quaerentes prauus error auertit, nedum ordo de
+summi boni cardine proficiscens a suo quoquam deflectat exordio.
+
+Quae uero, inquies, potest ulla iniquior esse confusio, quam ut bonis tum
+aduersa tum prospera, malis etiam tum optata tum odiosa contingant? Num
+igitur ea mentis integritate homines degunt, ut quos probos improbosue
+censuerunt eos quoque uti existimant esse necesse sit? Atqui in hoc hominum
+iudicia depugnant, et quos alii praemio alii supplicio dignos arbitrantur.
+Sed concedamus ut aliquis possit bonos malosque discernere; num igitur
+potent intueri illam intimam temperiem, uelut in corporibus dici solet,
+animorum?  Non enim dissimile est miraculum nescienti cur sanis corporibus
+his quidem dulcia illis uero amara conueniant, cur aegri etiam quidam
+lenibus quidam uero acribus adiuuentur? At hoc medicus, qui sanitatis
+ipsius atque aegritudinis modum temperamentumque dinoscit, minime miratur.
+Quid uero aliud animorum salus uidetur esse quam probitas? Quid aegritudo
+quam uitia? Quis autem alius uel seruator bonorum uel malorum depulsor quam
+rector ac medicator mentium deus? Qui cum ex alta prouidentiae specula
+respexit, quid unicuique conueniat agnoscit et quod conuenire nouit
+accommodat. Hic iam fit illud fatalis ordinis insigne miraculum, cum ab
+sciente geritur quod stupeant ignorantes. Nam ut pauca quae ratio ualet
+humana de diuina profunditate perstringam, de hoc quem tu iustissimum et
+aequi seruantissimum putas omnia scienti prouidentiae diuersum uidetur; et
+uictricem quidem causam dis, uictam uero Catoni placuisse familiaris noster
+Lucanus admonuit. Hic igitur quidquid citra spem uideas geri, rebus quidem
+rectus ordo est, opinioni uero tuae peruersa confusio. Sed sit aliquis ita
+bene moratus ut de eo diuinum iudicium pariter et humanum consentiat, sed
+est animi uiribus infirmus; cui si quid eueniat aduersi, desinet colere
+forsitan innocentiam per quam non potuit retinere fortunam. Parcit itaque
+sapiens dispensatio ei quem deteriorem facere possit aduersitas, ne cui non
+conuenit laborare patiatur. Est alius cunctis uirtutibus absolutus
+sanctusque ac deo proximus; hunc contingi quibuslibet aduersis nefas
+prouidentia iudicat adeo ut ne corporeis quidem morbis agitari sinat. Nam
+ut quidam me quoque excellentior:
+
+  [Greek: Andros dae ierou demas aitheres oikodomaesan.]
+
+Fit autem saepe, uti bonis summa rerum regenda deferatur, ut exuberans
+retundatur improbitas. Aliis mixta quaedam pro animorum qualitate
+distribuit; quosdam remordet ne longa felicitate luxurient, alios
+duris[157] agitari ut uirtutes animi patientiae usu atque exercitatione
+confirment. Alii plus aequo metuunt quod ferre possunt, alii plus aequo
+despiciunt quod ferre non possunt; hos in experimentum sui tristibus ducit.
+Nonnulli uenerandum saeculi nomen gloriosae pretio mortis emerunt: quidam
+suppliciis inexpugnabiles exemplum ceteris praetulerunt inuictam malis esse
+uirtutem. Quae quam recte atque disposite et ex eorum bono quibus accedere
+uidentur fiant, nulla dubitatio est. Nam illud quoque, quod improbis nunc
+tristia nunc optata proueniunt, ex eisdem ducitur causis; ac de tristibus
+quidem nemo miratur, quod eos male meritos omnes existimant. Quorum quidem
+supplicia tum ceteros ab sceleribus deterrent, tum ipsos quibus inuehuntur
+emendant; laeta uero magnum bonis argumentum loquuntur, quid de huiusmodi
+felicitate debeant iudicare quam famulari saepe improbis cernant.  In qua
+re illud etiam dispensari credo, quod est forsitan alicuius tam praeceps
+atque inportuna natura ut eum in scelera potius exacerbare possit rei
+familiaris inopia; huius morbo prouidentia collatae pecuniae remedio
+medetur. Hic foedatam probris conscientiam exspectans et se cum fortuna sua
+comparans, forsitan pertimescit ne cuius ei iucundus usus est, sit tristis
+amissio. Mutabit igitur mores ac dum fortunam metuit amittere; nequitiam
+derelinquit. Alios in cladem meritam praecipitauit indigne acta felicitas;
+quibusdam permissum puniendi ius, ut exercitii bonis et malis esset causa
+supplicii. Nam ut probis atque improbis nullum foedus est, ita ipsi inter
+se improbi nequeunt conuenire. Quidni, cum a semet ipsis discerpentibus
+conscientiam uitiis quisque dissentiat faciantque saepe, quae cum gesserint
+non fuisse gerenda decernant? Ex quo saepe summa illa prouidentia protulit
+insigne miraculum, ut malos mali bonos facerent. Nam dum iniqua sibi a
+pessimis quidam perpeti uidentur, noxiorum odio flagrantes ad uirtutis
+frugem rediere, dum se eis dissimiles student esse quos oderant. Sola est
+enim diuina uis cui mala quoque bona sint, cum eis competenter utendo
+alicuius boni elicit effectum. Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur, ut
+quod adsignata ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen
+ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno prouidentiae liceat temeritati.
+
+  [Greek: Argaleon de me tauta theon hos pant agoreuein.]
+
+Neque enim fas est homini cunctas diuinae operae machinas uel ingenio
+comprehendere uel explicare sermone. Hoc tantum perspexisse sufficiat, quod
+naturarum omnium proditor deus idem ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat,
+dumque ea quae protulit in sui similitudinem retinere festinat, malum omne
+de reipublicae suae terminis per fatalis seriem necessitatis eliminet. Quo
+fit ut quae in terris abundare creduntur, si disponentem prouidentiam
+spectes, nihil usquam mali esse perpendas. Sed uideo te iam dudum et
+pondere quaestionis oneratum et rationis prolixitate fatigatum aliquam
+carminis exspectare dulcedinem. Accipe igitur haustum quo refectus firmior
+in ulteriora contendas.
+
+
+[156] deliberare _codd._; delibare _coni._ Pulmannus.
+
+[157] _Fortasse_ sinit _post_ duris _addendum est_.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+  "It is true," quoth I, "but since it is thy profession to explicate the
+  causes of hidden things, and to unfold the reasons which are covered
+  with darkness, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare what conclusion thou
+  drawest from these things, for this miracle troubleth me above all
+  others." Then she smiling a little said: "Thou invitest me to a matter
+  which is most hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently
+  declared; for it is such that, one doubt being taken away, innumerable
+  others, like the heads of Hydra, succeed, neither will they have any end
+  unless a man repress them with the most lively fire of his mind. For in
+  this matter are wont to be handled these questions: of the simplicity of
+  Providence; of the course of Fate; of sudden chances; of God's knowledge
+  and predestination, and of free will; which how weighty they are, thou
+  thyself discerneth. But because it is part of thy cure to know these
+  things also, though the time be short, yet we will endeavour to touch
+  them briefly. But if the sweetness of verse delight thee, thou must
+  forbear this pleasure for a while, until I propose unto thee some few
+  arguments." "As it pleaseth thee," quoth I.
+
+  Then taking as it were a new beginning, she discoursed in this manner:
+  "The generation of all things, and all the proceedings of mutable
+  natures, and whatsoever is moved in any sort, take their causes, order,
+  and forms from the stability of the Divine mind. This, placed in the
+  castle of its own simplicity, hath determined manifold ways for doing
+  things; which ways being considered in the purity of God's
+  understanding, are named Providence, but being referred to those things
+  which He moveth and disposeth, they are by the ancients called Fate. The
+  diversity of which will easily appear if we weigh the force of both. For
+  Providence is the very Divine reason itself, seated in the highest
+  Prince, which disposeth all things. But Fate is a disposition inherent
+  in changeable things, by which Providence connecteth all things in their
+  due order. For Providence embraceth all things together, though diverse,
+  though infinite; but Fate putteth every particular thing into motion
+  being distributed by places, forms, and time; so that this unfolding of
+  temporal order being united into the foresight of God's mind is
+  Providence, and the same uniting, being digested and unfolded in time,
+  is called Fate. Which although they be diverse yet the one dependeth on
+  the other. For fatal order proceedeth from the simplicity of Providence.
+  For as a workman conceiving the form of anything in his mind taketh his
+  work in hand, and executeth by order of time that which he had simply
+  and in a moment foreseen, so God by His Providence disposeth whatsoever
+  is to be done with simplicity and stability, and by Fate effecteth by
+  manifold ways and in the order of time those very things which He
+  disposeth. Wherefore, whether Fate be exercised by the subordination of
+  certain Divine spirits to Providence, or this fatal web be woven by a
+  soul or by the service of all nature, or by the heavenly motions of the
+  stars, by angelical virtue, or by diabolical industry, or by some or all
+  of these, that certainly is manifest that Providence is an immoveable
+  and simple form of those things which are to be done, and Fate a
+  moveable connexion and temporal order of those things which the Divine
+  simplicity hath disposed to be done. So that all that is under Fate is
+  also subject to Providence, to which also Fate itself obeyeth. But some
+  things which are placed under Providence are above the course of Fate.
+  And they are those things which nigh to the first Divinity, being stable
+  and fixed, exceed the order of fatal mobility. For as of orbs which turn
+  about the same centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the
+  midst, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without
+  it, about which they are turned, and the outmost, wheeled with a greater
+  compass, by how much it departeth from the middle indivisibility of the
+  centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces, but that which
+  is joined and coupled to that middle approacheth to simplicity, and
+  ceaseth to spread and flow abroad, in like manner that which departeth
+  farthest from the first mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of
+  Fate, and everything is so much the freer from Fate, by how much it
+  draweth nigh to the hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the
+  stability of the Sovereign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also
+  the necessity of Fate. Wherefore in what sort discourse of reason is
+  compared to pure understanding, that which is produced to that which is,
+  time to eternity, a circle to the centre, such is the course of moveable
+  Fate to the stable simplicity of Providence. That course moveth the
+  heaven and stars, tempereth the elements one with another, and
+  transformeth them by mutual changing. The same reneweth all rising and
+  dying things by like proceeding of fruits and seeds. This comprehendeth
+  also the actions and fortunes of men by an unloosable connexion of
+  causes, which since it proceeds from the principles of unmovable
+  Providence, the causes also must needs be immutable. For in this manner
+  things are best governed, if the simplicity which remaineth in the
+  Divine mind produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order
+  restraineth with its own immutability things otherwise mutable, and
+  which would have a confused course. Whereof it ensueth that though all
+  things seem confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider
+  this order, notwithstanding all things are disposed by their own proper
+  measure directing them to good. For there is nothing which is done for
+  the love of evil, even by the wicked themselves: whom, as hath been
+  abundantly proved, lewd error carrieth away while they are seeking after
+  that which is good, so far is it that order proceeding from the hinge of
+  the Sovereign Goodness should avert any from his first beginning.
+
+  But, thou wilt say, what more unjust confusion can there be than that
+  both adversity and prosperity should happen to the good, and in like
+  manner both desired and hateful things to the wicked? But are men so
+  completely wise that whomsoever they judge wicked or honest must needs
+  be so? How then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to
+  divers the same men seem worthy of reward and punishment! But let us
+  grant that some are able to discern the good from the evil. Can they
+  therefore behold, as is wont to be said of bodies, that inward
+  complexion of souls? For he that knoweth not the cause may marvel in
+  like manner why some sound bodies agree better with sweet things and
+  other with tart; and why some sick men are healed with gentle and some
+  with sharper physic. But to a physician who knoweth the manner and
+  temper both of health and sickness this is nothing strange. Now, what is
+  the health of souls but virtue? What sickness have they but vices? And
+  who either conserveth goodness or expelleth evils, but God the Ruler and
+  Governor of men's minds? Who beholding from His high turret of
+  providence seeth what is fitting for everyone, and applieth that which
+  He knoweth to be most convenient. Here ariseth that strange wonder of
+  fatal order, to wit that He that knoweth what is best, doth that which
+  the ignorant admire. For to touch briefly some few things of the divine
+  depth, which human reason is able to attain, he whom thou thinketh most
+  just and most observant of equity, seemeth otherwise in the eyes of
+  Providence which knoweth all. And our disciple Lucan noteth that the
+  cause of conquerers pleased the gods, and that of the conquered,
+  Cato.[158] Wherefore whatsoever thou seest done here against thy
+  expectation is right order in the things themselves, but a perverse
+  confusion in thy opinion. But let there be one so well conditioned that
+  God and men approve and praise him; yet perhaps he is so weak a minded
+  man, that if he falleth into adversity, he will forsake his innocency,
+  which was not able to keep him in prosperity. Wherefore God's wise
+  dispensation spareth him that adversity might make worse, lest he should
+  suffer to whom difficulties are dangerous.
+
+  There is another complete in all virtues, a saint and high to God;
+  Providence judgeth it a sacrilege to lay affliction on him, insomuch
+  that she permitteth him not to be troubled so much as with corporal
+  sickness. For as one that excelleth me saith 'the body of an holy man is
+  builded of pure ether.'[159] It happeneth often also that the chief
+  command is given to good men, that wickedness, which otherwise would
+  overflow all, may be kept down. She mixeth for others sour and sweet
+  according to the disposition of their souls; she troubles some lest they
+  should fall to dissolution by long prosperity, others are vexed with
+  hardships, that they may confirm the forces of their mind with the use
+  and exercise of patience. Some are too much afraid of that which they
+  are able to bear. Others make less account than there is cause of that
+  which they cannot endure. All these she affrayeth with afflictions that
+  they make trial of themselves. Many have bought the renown of this world
+  with a glorious death. Some, overcoming all torments, have showed by
+  their example that virtues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things
+  how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good upon whom
+  they are seen to fall, there can be no doubt. For that sometime
+  grievous, sometime pleasant things befall in like manner the wicked,
+  proceedeth from the same causes. And as for adversity no man marvelleth
+  because all think they deserve ill. Whose punishments do both terrify
+  others from the like courses, and move them to amend themselves. And
+  their prosperity is a great argument to the good, what they ought to
+  judge of this happiness which they see oftentimes bestowed upon the
+  wicked. In which thing also is to be considered that peradventure some
+  have so headlong and untoward a disposition, that poverty would rather
+  make him worse; whose disease is cured by Providence, with giving him
+  store of money. Another, knowing his own guilty conscience, and
+  comparing his character with his own estate, is afraid lest the loss of
+  that should be grievous unto him, the use of which is pleasant.
+  Wherefore he resolveth to change his customs, and whiles he feareth to
+  lose his prosperity, he forsaketh wickedness. The increase of honour
+  undeservedly obtained hath thrown some headlong into their deserved
+  destruction. Others are permitted to have authority to punish others,
+  that they may exercise the good and punish the bad. For as there is no
+  league between virtuous and wicked men, so neither can the wicked agree
+  among themselves. Why not? Since they disagree within themselves by
+  reason of their vices which tear their conscience, so that they many
+  times do that which afterwards they wish undone. From whence that
+  highest Providence often worketh that wonderful miracle, that evil men
+  make those which are evil good. For some, considering the injustice done
+  them by most wicked men, inflamed with hatred of evildoers have returned
+  to the practice of virtue, procuring to be contrary to them whom they
+  hate. For it is only a divine strength to which even evil things are
+  good, when, by using them in due sort, it draweth some good effect out
+  of them. For a certain order embraceth all things, so that even that
+  which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falleth into
+  another, yet that is order also, lest confused rashness should bear any
+  sway in the kingdom of Providence. 'But it is hard for me to rehearse
+  all this as if I were a God.'[160] For it is impossible for any man
+  either to comprehend by his wit or to explicate in speech all the frame
+  of God's work. Be it sufficient that we have seen thus much, that God,
+  the author of all natures, directeth and disposeth all things to
+  goodness, and while He endeavoureth to retain in His own likeness those
+  things which He hath produced, He banisheth all evil from the bounds of
+  His commonwealth, by the course of fatal necessity. So that if thou
+  considerest the disposition of Providence, thou wilt perceive that evil,
+  which is thought so to abound upon earth, hath no place left for it at
+  all. But I see that long since burdened with so weighty a question, and
+  wearied with my long discourse, thou expectest the delight of verses;
+  wherefore take a draught, that, being refreshed, thou mayest be able to
+  go forward.
+
+
+  [158] _Pharsal_. i. 126.
+
+  [159] Source unknown.
+
+  [160] Homer, _Il._ xii. 176.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Si uis celsi iura tonantis
+Pura sollers cernere mente,
+Aspice summi culmina caeli.
+Illic iusto foedere rerum
+Veterem seruant sidera pacem.                                             5
+Non sol rutilo concitus igne
+Gelidum Phoebes impedit axem
+Nec quae summo uertice mundi
+Flectit rapidos Vrsa meatus.
+Numquam occiduo lota profundo                                            10
+Cetera cernens sidera mergi
+Cupit oceano tingere flammas.
+Semper uicibus temporis aequis
+Vesper seras nuntiat umbras
+Reuehitque diem Lucifer almum.                                           15
+Sic aeternos reficit cursus
+Alternus amor, sic astrigeris
+Bellum discors exulat oris.
+Haec concordia temperat aequis
+Elementa modis, ut pugnantia                                             20
+Vicibus cedant umida siccis
+Iungantque fidem frigora flammis
+Pendulus ignis surgat in altum
+Terraeque graues pondere sidant.
+Isdem causis uere tepenti                                                25
+Spirat florifer annus odores,
+Aestas Cererem feruida siccat,
+Remeat pomis grauis autumnus,
+Hiemem defluus inrigat imber.
+Haec temperies alit ac profert                                           30
+Quidquid uitam spirat in orbe.
+Eadem rapiens condit et aufert
+Obitu mergens orta supremo.
+Sedet interea conditor altus
+Rerumque regens flectit habenas                                          35
+Rex et dominus fons et origo
+Lex et sapiens arbiter aequi
+Et quae motu concitat ire,
+Sistit retrahens ac uaga firmat.
+Nam nisi rectos reuocans itus                                            40
+Flexos iterum cogat in orbes,
+Quae nunc stabilis continet ordo
+Dissaepta suo fonte fatiscant.
+Hic est cunctis communis amor
+Repetuntque boni fine teneri,                                            45
+Quia non aliter durare queant,
+Nisi conuerso rursus amore
+Refluant causae quae dedit esse.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+      If thou would'st see
+    God's laws with purest mind,
+    Thy sight on heaven must fixed be,
+  Whose settled course the stars in peace doth bind.
+      The sun's bright fire
+    Stops not his sister's team,
+    Nor doth the northern bear desire
+  Within the ocean's wave to hide her beam.
+      Though she behold
+    The other stars there couching,
+    Yet she uncessantly is rolled
+  About high heaven, the ocean never touching.
+      The evening light
+    With certain course doth show
+    The coming of the shady night,
+  And Lucifer before the day doth go.
+      This mutual love
+    Courses eternal makes,
+    And from the starry spheres above
+  All cause of war and dangerous discord takes.
+      This sweet consent
+    In equal bands doth tie
+    The nature of each element,
+  So that the moist things yield unto the dry,
+      The piercing cold
+    With flames doth friendship keep,
+    The trembling fire the highest place doth hold,
+  And the gross earth sinks down into the deep.
+      The flowery year
+    Breathes odours in the spring
+    The scorching summer corn doth bear,
+  The autumn fruit from laden trees doth bring.
+      The falling rain
+    Doth winter's moisture give.
+    These rules thus nourish and maintain
+  All creatures which we see on earth to live.
+      And when they die,
+    These bring them to their end,
+    While their Creator sits on high,
+  Whose hand the reins of the whole world doth bend.
+      He as their King
+    Rules them with lordly might.
+    From Him they rise, flourish, and spring,
+  He as their law and judge decides their right.
+      Those things whose course
+    Most swiftly glides away
+    His might doth often backward force,
+  And suddenly their wandering motion stay.
+      Unless His strength
+    Their violence should bound,
+    And them which else would run at length,
+  Should bring within the compass of a round,
+      That firm decree
+    Which now doth all adorn
+    Would soon destroyed and broken be,
+  Things being far from their beginning borne.
+      This powerful love
+    Is common unto all,
+    Which for desire of good do move
+  Back to the springs from whence they first did fall.
+      No worldly thing
+    Can a continuance have
+    Unless love back again it bring
+  Unto the cause which first the essence gave.
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Iamne igitur uides quid haec omnia quae diximus consequatur?" "Quidnam?"
+inquam. "Omnem," inquit, "bonam prorsus esse fortunam." "Et qui id,"
+inquam, "fieri potest?" "Attende," inquit. "Cum omnis fortuna uel iucunda
+uel aspera tum remunerandi exercendiue bonos tum puniendi corrigendiue
+improbos causa deferatur, omnis bona quam uel iustam constat esse uel
+utilem." "Nimis quidem," inquam, "uera ratio et si quam paulo ante docuisti
+prouidentiam fatumue considerem, firmis uiribus nixa sententia. Sed eam si
+placet inter eas quas inopinabiles paulo ante posuisti numeremus." "Qui?"
+inquit. "Quia id hominum sermo communis usurpat et quidem crebro quorundam
+malam esse fortunam." "Visne igitur," inquit, "paulisper uulgi sermonibus
+accedamus, ne nimium uelut ab humanitatis usu recessisse uideamur?" "Vt
+placet," inquam. "Nonne igitur bonum censes esse quod prodest?" "Ita est,"
+inquam, "Quae uero aut exercet aut corrigit, prodest?" "Fateor," inquam.
+"Bona igitur?" "Quidni?" "Sed haec eorum est qui uel in uirtute positi
+contra aspera bellum gerunt, uel a uitiis declinantes uirtutis iter
+arripiunt." "Negare," inquam, "nequeo." "Quid uero iucunda, quae in
+praemium tribuitur bonis, num uulgus malam esse decernit?" "Nequaquam;
+uerum uti est ita quoque esse optimam censet." "Quid reliqua, quae cum sit
+aspera, iusto supplicio malos coercet, num bonam populus putat?" "Immo
+omnium," inquam, "quae excogitari possunt, iudicat esse miserrimam." "Vide
+igitur ne opinionem populi sequentes quiddam ualde inopinabile
+confecerimus." "Quid?" inquam. "Ex his enim," ait, "quae concessa sunt,
+euenit eorum quidem qui uel sunt uel in possessione uel in prouectu uel in
+adeptione uirtutis, omnem quaecumque sit bonam, in improbitate uero
+manentibus omnem pessimam esse fortunam." "Hoc," inquam, "uerum est,
+tametsi nemo audeat confiteri." "Quare," inquit, "ita uir sapiens moleste
+ferre non debet, quotiens in fortunae certamen adducitur, ut uirum fortem
+non decet indignari, quotiens increpuit bellicus tumultus; utrique enim,
+huic quidem gloriae propagandae illi uero conformandae sapientiae,
+difficultas ipsa materia est. Ex quo etiam uirtus uocatur quod suis uiribus
+nitens non superetur aduersis. Neque enim uos in prouectu positi uirtutis
+diffluere deliciis et emarcescere uoluptate uenistis. Proelium cum omni
+fortuna nimis[161] acre conseritis, ne uos aut tristis opprimat aut iucunda
+corrumpat. Firmis medium uiribus occupate! Quidquid aut infra subsistit aut
+ultra progreditur, habet contemptum felicitatis, non habet praemium
+laboris. In uestra enim situm manu qualem uobis fortunam formare malitis;
+omnis enim quae uidetur aspera nisi aut exercet aut corrigit punit.
+
+
+[161] animis _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+  Perceivest thou now what followeth of all that we have hitherto said?"
+  "What?" quoth I. "That," quoth she, "all manner of fortune is good."
+  "How can that be?" quoth I. "Be attentive," quoth she; "since that all
+  fortune, be it pleasing or unpleasing, is directed to the reward or
+  exercise of the good, and to the punishment and direction of the wicked,
+  it is manifest it is all good, since all is just or profitable." "Thy
+  reason is very true," quoth I, "and if I consider Providence and Fate,
+  which thou didst explicate a little before, thy opinion is well
+  grounded. But if thou pleasest let us account it among those which thou
+  not long since supposest incredible." "Why?" quoth she. "Because men
+  commonly use to say and repeat that some have ill fortune." "Shall we,"
+  quoth she, "frame our speech to the vulgar phrase, lest we seem to have
+  as it were forsaken the use of human conversation?" "As it pleaseth
+  thee," quoth I. "Dost thou not think then that that is good which is
+  profitable?" "Yes," quoth I. "But that fortune which either exerciseth
+  or correcteth is profitable?" "It is true," quoth I. "It is good then?"
+  "Why not?" "But this is the estate of them who being either virtuous
+  strive with adversity, or forsaking vices betake themselves to the way
+  of virtue." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Now, what sayest thou to that
+  pleasing fortune which is given in reward to the good, doth the common
+  people account it bad?" "No, but judgeth it exceeding good, as it is
+  indeed." "And what of the other which, being unpleasing, restraineth the
+  evil with just punishment, doth not the people think it good?" "Nay,"
+  quoth I, "they think it the most miserable that can be." "Look then,"
+  quoth she, "how, following the people's opinion, we have concluded a
+  very incredible matter." "What?" quoth I. "For it followeth," quoth she,
+  "out of that which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoever it be,
+  who are either in the possession or increase or entrance of virtue, is
+  good: and theirs, which remain in vices, the worst that may be." "This,"
+  quoth I, "is true, though none dare say so." "Wherefore," quoth she, "a
+  wise man must be no more troubled when he is assaulted with adversity,
+  than a valiant captain dismayed at the sound of an alarum. For
+  difficulties are the matter by which the one must extend his glory, and
+  the other increase his wisdom. For which cause virtue is so called,
+  because it hath sufficient strength to overcome adversity.[162] For
+  you, that are proficients in virtue, are not come hither to be dissolute
+  with dainties or to languish in pleasures. You skirmish fiercely with
+  any fortune, lest either affliction oppress you or prosperity corrupt
+  you. Stay yourselves strongly in the mean! For whatsoever cometh either
+  short, or goeth beyond, may well contemn felicity, but will never obtain
+  any reward of labour. For it is placed in your power to frame to
+  yourselves what fortune you please. For all that seemeth unsavoury
+  either exerciseth or correcteth or punisheth.
+
+
+  [162] Boethius shows his independence in adopting for _uirtus_ a
+  different etymology from that given by Cicero, viz. _uir_ (of. 2
+  _Tusoul._ xviii.).
+
+
+
+
+VII.
+
+Bella bis quinis operatus annis
+Vltor Atrides Phrygiae ruinis
+Fratris amissos thalamos piauit;
+Ille dum Graiae dare uela classi
+Optat et uentos redimit cruore,                                           5
+Exuit patrem miserumque tristis
+Foederat natae iugulum sacerdos.
+Fleuit amissos Ithacus sodales
+Quos ferus uasto recubans in antro
+Mersit inmani Polyphemus aluo;                                           10
+Sed tamen caeco furibundus ore
+Gaudium maestis lacrimis rependit.
+Herculem duri celebrant labores.
+Ille Centauros domuit superbos,
+Abstulit saeuo spolium leoni                                             15
+Fixit et certis uolucres sagittis,
+Poma cernenti rapuit draconi
+Aureo laeuam grauior metallo,
+Cerberum traxit triplici catena.
+Victor immitem posuisse fertur                                           20
+Pabulum saeuis dominum quadrigis.
+Hydra combusto periit ueneno,
+Fronte turpatus Achelous amnis
+Ora demersit pudibunda ripis.
+Strauit Antaeum Libycis harenis,                                         25
+Cacus Euandri satiauit iras
+Quosque pressurus foret altus orbis
+Saetiger spumis umeros notauit.
+Vltimus caelum[163] labor inreflexo
+Sustulit collo pretiumque rursus                                         30
+Vltimi caelum meruit laboris.
+Ite nunc fortes ubi celsa magni
+Ducit exempli uia! Cur inertes
+Terga nudatis? Superata tellus
+Sidera donat."                                                           35
+
+
+[163] caelo _codd. mellores._
+
+
+
+
+  VII.
+
+    Revengeful Atreus' son did ten whole years employ
+  In wars, till he his brother's loss repaid with ransacked Troy.
+    He setting forth the fleet of Greece upon the seas,
+  And knowing well that only blood the angry winds would please,
+    Forgot a father's part, and with his cruel knife
+  Unto the gods did sacrifice his dearest daughter's life.
+    Ulysses wailed the loss of his most faithful men,
+  Whom Polyphemus did devour enclosed in his den
+    But when his hands by sleight had made the Cyclops blind,
+  Most pleasant joy instead of former tears possessed his mind.
+    Hercules famous is for his laborious toil,
+  Who tamed the Centaurs and did take the dreadful lion's spoil.
+    He the Stymphalian birds with piercing arrows strook,
+  And from the watchful dragon's care the golden apples took.[164]
+    He in a threefold chain the hellish porter led,
+  And with their cruel master's flesh the savage horses fed.
+    He did th' increasing heads of poisonous Hydra burn,
+  And breaking Achelous' horns, did make him back return.[165]*
+    He on the Libyan sands did proud Antaeus kill,
+  And with the mighty Cacus' blood Euander's wrath fulfil.
+    That world-uplifting back the boar's white foam did fleck.
+  To hold on high the sphere of heaven with never bending neck
+    Of all his many toils the last was, and most hard,
+  And for this last and greatest toil the heaven was his reward.
+    You gallant men pursue this way of high renown,
+  Why yield you? Overcome the earth, and you the stars shall crown,"
+
+
+  [164] Literally, "his left hand weighted with the golden metal."
+
+  [165] Lit. "The river Achelous dishonoured in his brow (by the loss of
+  his horns) buried his shame-stricken face in his banks."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
+
+V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. EX MAG. OFF. PATRICII
+
+PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIONIS
+
+LIBER QVARTVS EXPLICIT
+
+INCIPIT LIBER V.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Dixerat orationisque cursum ad alia quaedam tractanda atque expedienda
+uertebat. Tum ego: "Recta quidem," inquam, "exhortatio tuaque prorsus
+auctoritate dignissima, sed quod tu dudum de prouidentia quaestionem
+pluribus aliis implicitam esse dixisti, re experior. Quaero enim an esse
+aliquid omnino et quidnam esse casum arbitrere." Tum illa: "Festino,"
+inquit; "debitum promissionis absoluere uiamque tibi qua patriam reueharis
+aperire. Haec autem etsi perutilia cognitu tamen a propositi nostri tramite
+paulisper auersa sunt, uerendumque est ne deuiis fatigatus ad emetiendum
+rectum iter sufficere non possis." "Ne id," inquam, "prorsus uereare. Nam
+quietis mihi loco fuerit ea quibus maxime delector agnoscere, simul cum
+omne disputationis tuae latus indubitata fide constiterit, nihil de
+sequentibus ambigatur." Tum illa: "Morem," inquit, "geram tibi," simulque
+sic orsa est: "Si quidem," inquit, "aliquis euentum temerario motu nullaque
+causarum conexione productum casum esse definiat, nihil omnino casum esse
+confirmo et praeter subiectae rei significationem inanem prorsus uocem esse
+decerno. Quis enim coercente in ordinem cuncta deo locus esse ullus
+temeritati reliquus potest? Nam nihil ex nihilo exsistere uera sententia
+est cui nemo umquam ueterum refragatus est, quamquam id illi non de
+operante principio, sed de materiali subiecto hoc omnium de natura rationum
+quasi quoddam iecerint fundamentum. At si nullis ex causis aliquid oriatur,
+id de nihilo ortum esse uidebitur. Quod si hoc fieri nequit, ne casum
+quidem huiusmodi esse possibile est qualem paulo ante definiuimus." "Quid
+igitur," inquam, "nihilne est quod uel casus uel fortuitum iure appellari
+queat? An est aliquid, tametsi uulgus lateat, cui uocabula ista
+conueniant?" "Aristoteles meus id," inquit, "in Physicis et breui et ueri
+propinqua ratione definiuit."  "Quonam," inquam "modo?" "Quotiens," ait,
+"aliquid cuiuspiam rei gratia geritur aliudque quibusdam de causis quam
+quod intendebatur obtingit, casus uocatur, ut si quis colendi agri causa
+fodiens humum defossi auri pondus inueniat. Hoc igitur fortuito quidem
+creditur accidisse, uerum non de nihilo est; nam proprias causas habet
+quarum inprouisus inopinatusque concursus casum uidetur operatus.  Nam nisi
+cultor agri humum foderet, nisi eo loci pecuniam suam depositor obruisset,
+aurum non esset inuentum. Haec sunt igitur fortuiti causa compendii, quod
+ex obuiis sibi et confluentibus causis, non ex gerentis intentione
+prouenit. Neque enim uel qui aurum obruit uel qui agrum exercuit ut ea
+pecunia reperiretur intendit; sed uti dixi, quo ille obruit hunc fodisse
+conuenit atque concurrit. Licet igitur definire casum esse inopinatum ex
+confluentibus causis in his quae ob aliquid geruntur euentum; concurrere
+uero atque confluere causas facit ordo ille ineuitabili conexione
+procedens; qui de prouidentiae fonte descendens cuncta suis locis
+temporibusque disponit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE FIFTH BOOK OF BOETHIUS
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  Having said thus, she began to turn her speech to treat and explicate
+  certain other questions, when I interrupted her, saying: "Thy
+  exhortation is very good, and well-seeming thy authority. But I find it
+  true by experience, as thou affirmedst, that the question of Providence
+  is entangled with many other. For I desire to know whether thou thinkest
+  chance to be anything at all, and what it is." "I make haste," quoth
+  she, "to perform my promise, and to show thee the way by which thou
+  mayest return to thy country. But these other questions, though they be
+  very profitable, yet they are somewhat from our purpose, and it is to be
+  feared lest being wearied with digressions thou beest not able to finish
+  thy direct journey." "There is no fear of that," quoth I, "for it will
+  be a great ease to me to understand those things in which I take great
+  delight, and withal, when thy disputation is fenced in on every side
+  with sure conviction, there can be no doubt made of anything thou shalt
+  infer." "I will," quoth she, "do as thou wouldst me have," and withal
+  began in this manner. "If any shall define chance to be an event
+  produced by a confused motion, and without connexion of causes, I affirm
+  that there is no such thing, and that chance is only an empty voice that
+  hath beneath it no real signification. For what place can confusion
+  have, since God disposeth all things in due order? For it is a true
+  sentence that of nothing cometh nothing, which none of the ancients
+  denied, though they held not that principle of the efficient cause, but
+  of the material subject, laying it down as in a manner the ground of all
+  their reasonings concerning nature. But if anything proceedeth from no
+  causes, that will seem to have come from nothing, which if it cannot be,
+  neither is it possible there should be any such chance as is defined a
+  little before." "What then," quoth I, "is there nothing that can rightly
+  be called chance or fortune? Or is there something, though unknown to
+  the common sort, to which these names agree?" "My Aristotle," quoth she,
+  "in his _Books of Nature_[166] declared this point briefly and very
+  near the truth." "How?" quoth I. "When," quoth she, "anything is done
+  for some certain cause, and some other thing happeneth for other reasons
+  than that which was intended, this is called chance; as if one digging
+  his ground with intention to till it, findeth an hidden treasure. This
+  is thought to have fallen thus out by fortune, but it is not of nothing,
+  for it hath peculiar causes whose unexpected and not foreseen concourse
+  seemeth to have brought forth a chance. For unless the husbandman had
+  digged up his ground, and unless the other had hidden his money in that
+  place, the treasure had not been found. These are therefore the causes
+  of this fortunate accident, which proceedeth from the meeting and
+  concourse of causes, and not from the intention of the doer. For neither
+  he that hid the gold nor he that tilled his ground had any intention
+  that the money should be found, but, as I said, it followed and
+  concurred that this man should dig up in the place where the other hid.
+  Wherefore, we may define chance thus: That it is an unexpected event of
+  concurring causes in those things which are done to some end and
+  purpose. Now the cause why causes so concur and meet so together, is
+  that order proceeding with inevitable connexion, which, descending from
+  the fountain of Providence, disposeth all things in their places and
+  times.
+
+
+  [166] _Phys._ ii. 4.
+
+
+
+
+I.
+
+Rupis Achaemeniae scopulis ubi uersa sequentum
+  Pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax,
+Tigris et Euphrates uno se fonte resoluunt
+  Et mox abiunctis dissociantur aquis.
+Si coeant cursumque iterum reuocentur in unum,                            5
+  Confluat alterni quod trahit unda uadi;
+Conuenient puppes et uulsi flumine trunci
+  Mixtaque fortuitos implicet unda modos,
+Quos tamen ipsa uagos terrae decliuia casus
+  Gurgitis et lapsi defluus ordo regit.                                  10
+Sic quae permissis fluitare uidetur habenis
+  Fors patitur frenos ipsaque lege meat."
+
+
+
+
+  I.
+
+  In the Achaemenian rocks, where Parthians with their darts
+  In their dissembled flight do wound their enemies,
+  Tigris from the same head doth with Euphrates rise,
+  And forthwith they themselves divide in several parts;
+  But if they join again, and them one channel bound,
+  Bringing together all that both their waves do bear;
+  The ships and trees, whose roots they from the bank do tear,
+  Will meet, and they their floods will mingle and confound,
+  Yet run this wandering course in places which are low,
+  And in these sliding streams a settled law remains.[167]
+  So fortune, though it seems to run with careless reins,
+  Yet hath it certain rule, and doth in order flow."
+
+
+  [167] Lit. "Yet all these (apparently) random happenings are governed by
+  the shelving ground and the flowing course of the stream as it runs."
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+"Animaduerto," inquam, "idque, uti tu dicis, ita esse consentio. Sed in hac
+haerentium sibi serie causarum estne ulla nostri arbitrii libertas an ipsos
+quoque humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena constringit?" "Est," inquit,
+"neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit
+arbitrii. Nam quod ratione uti naturaliter potest id habet iudicium quo
+quidque discernat; per se igitur fugienda optandaue dinoscit. Quod uero
+quis optandum esse iudicat petit; refugit uero quod aestimat esse
+fugiendum. Quare quibus in ipsis inest ratio, inest etiam uolendi
+nolendique libertas. Sed hanc non in omnibus aequam esse constituo. Nam
+supernis diuinisque substantiis et perspicax iudicium et incorrupta
+uoluntas et efficax optatorum praesto est potestas. Humanas uero animas
+liberiores quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis diuinae speculatione
+conseruant, minus uero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam, cum
+terrenis artubus colligantur. Extrema uero est seruitus, cum uitiis deditae
+rationis propriae possessione ceciderunt. Nam ubi oculos a summae luce
+ueritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa deiecerint, mox inscitiae nube
+caligant, perniciosis turbantur affectibus quibus accedendo consentiendoque
+quam inuexere sibi adiuuant seruitutem et sunt quodam modo propria
+libertate captiuae. Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens
+prouidentiae cernit intuitus et suis quaeque meritis praedestinata
+disponit.
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+  "I observe it," quoth I, "and I acknowledge it to be as thou sayest. But
+  in this rank of coherent causes, have we any free-will, or doth the
+  fatal chain fasten also the motions of men's minds?" "We have," quoth
+  she, "for there can be no reasonable nature, unless it be endued with
+  free-will. For that which naturally hath the use of reason hath also
+  judgment by which it can discern of everything by itself, wherefore of
+  itself it distinguished betwixt those things which are to be avoided,
+  and those which are to be desired. Now every one seeketh for that which
+  he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his judgment
+  is to be avoided. Wherefore, they which have reason in themselves have
+  freedom to will and nill. But yet I consider not this equal in all. For
+  the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgment and
+  an uncorrupted will, and an effectual power to obtain their desires. But
+  the minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves
+  in the contemplation of God, and less when they come to their bodies,
+  and yet less when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their
+  greatest bondage is when, giving themselves to vices, they lose
+  possession of their own reason. For, having cast their eyes from the
+  light of the sovereign truth to inferior obscurities, forthwith they are
+  blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtful affections,
+  by yielding and consenting to which they increase the bondage which they
+  laid upon themselves, and are, after a certain manner, captives by their
+  own freedom. Which notwithstanding that foresight of Providence which
+  beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeth, and by predestination
+  disposeth of everything by their merits.
+
+
+
+
+II.
+
+[Greek: Pant' ephoran kai pant' epakouein][168]
+Puro clarum lumine Phoebum
+Melliflui canit oris Homerus:
+Qui tamen intima uiscera terrae
+Non ualet aut pelagi radiorum                                             5
+Infirma perrumpere luce.
+Haud sic magni conditor orbis;
+Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti
+Nulla terrae mole resistunt,
+Non nox atris nubibus obstat.                                            10
+Quae sint, quae fuerint ueniantque
+Vno mentis cernit in ictu;
+Quem, quia respicit omnia solus,
+Verum possis dicere solem."
+
+
+[168] disponit [Greek: Pant' ephoron kai pant' epakogon] _sic Peiper et
+similiter editores priores. Versum in rectum locum Engelbrecht restituit,
+quam quidem emendationem noster interpres uidetur praesensisse._
+
+
+
+
+  II.
+
+    Sweet Homer[169] sings the praise
+    Of Phoebus clear and bright,
+    And yet his strongest rays
+    Cannot with feeble light
+    Cast through the secret ways
+    Of earth and seas his sight,
+  Though 'all lies open to his eyes.'[170]
+  But He who did this world devise--
+
+    The earth's vast depths unseen
+    From his sight are not free,
+    No clouds can stand between,
+    He at one time doth see
+    What are, and what have been,
+    And what shall after be.
+  Whom, since he only vieweth all,
+  You rightly the true Sun may call."
+
+
+  [169] Cf. _Il._ iv. 277, _Od._ xii. 323.
+
+  [170] This line renders the Greek with which Boethius begins the poem,
+  adapting Homer's phrase "all surveying, all o'erhearing." See the
+  critical note on p. 372.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Tum ego: "En," inquam, "difficiliore rursus ambiguitate confundor."
+"Quaenam," inquit, "ista est? Iam enim quibus perturbere coniecto."
+"Nimium," inquam, "aduersari ac repugnare uidetur praenoscere uniuersa deum
+et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium. Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque
+falli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod prouidentia futurum esse
+praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia
+uoluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas; neque enim uel
+factum aliud ullum uel quaelibet exsistere poterit uoluntas nisi quam
+nescia falli prouidentia diuina praesenserit. Nam si aliorsum quam prouisae
+sunt detorqueri ualent, non iam erit futuri firma praescientia, sed opinio
+potius incerta, quod de deo credere nefas iudico. Neque enim illam probo
+rationem qua se quidam credunt hunc quaestionis nodum posse dissoluere.
+Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse euenturum, quoniam id prouidentia futurum
+esse prospexerit, sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid futurum est, id
+diuinam prouidentiam latere non posse eoque modo necessarium hoc in
+contrariam relabi partem, neque enim necesse esse contingere quae
+prouidentur, sed necesse esse quae futura sunt prouideri--quasi uero quae
+cuius rei causa sit praescientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum
+necessitas prouidentiae laboretur, ac non illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo
+modo sese habeat ordo causarum, necessarium esse euentum praescitarum
+rerum, etiam si praescientia futuris rebus eueniendi necessitatem non
+uideatur inferre. Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere
+coniectat ueram esse necesse est; atque e conuerso rursus, si de quopiam
+uera sit opinio quoniam sedet, eum sedere necesse est. In utroque igitur
+necessitas inest, in hoc quidem sedendi, at uero in altero ueritatis. Sed
+non idcirco quisque sedet quoniam uera est opinio, sed haec potius uera est
+quoniam quempiam sedere praecessit. Ita cum causa ueritatis ex altera parte
+procedat, inest tamen communis in utraque necessitas.
+
+Similia de prouidentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet. Nam etiam si
+idcirco quoniam futura sunt, prouidentur, non uero ideo quoniam prouidentur
+eueniunt, nihilo minus tamen ab deo uel uentura prouideri uel prouisa
+necesse est euenire,[171] quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum
+satis est. Iam uero quam praeposterum est ut aeternae praescientiae
+temporalium rerum euentus causa esse dicatur! Quid est autem aliud
+arbitrari ideo deum futura quoniam sunt euentura prouidere, quam putare
+quae olim acciderunt causam summae illius esse prouidentiae? Ad haec sicuti
+cum quid esse scio, id ipsum esse necesse est, ita cum quid futurum noui,
+id ipsum futurum esse necesse est. Sic fit igitur ut euentus praescitae rei
+nequeat euitari. Postremo si quid aliquis aliorsum atque sese res habet
+existimet, id non modo scientia non est, sed est opinio fallax ab scientiae
+ueritate longe diuersa. Quare si quid ita futurum est ut eius certus ac
+necessarius non sit euentus, id euenturum esse praesciri qui poterit? Sicut
+enim scientia ipsa impermixta est falsitati, ita id quod ab ea concipitur
+esse aliter atque concipitur nequit. Ea namque causa est cur mendacio
+scientia careat, quod se ita rem quamque habere necesse est uti eam sese
+habere scientia comprehendit. Quid igitur? Quonam modo deus haec incerta
+futura praenoscit? Nam si ineuitabiliter euentura censet quae etiam non
+euenire possibile est, fallitur; quod non sentire modo nefas est, sed etiam
+uoce proferre. At si ita uti sunt, ita ea futura esse decernit, ut aeque
+uel fieri ea uel non fieri posse cognoscat, quae est haec praescientia quae
+nihil certum nihil stabile comprehendit? Aut quid hoc refert uaticinio illo
+ridiculo Tiresiae?
+
+  Quidquid dicam, aut erit aut non.
+
+Quid etiam diuina prouidentia humana opinione praestiterit; si uti homines
+incerta iudicat quorum est incertus euentus? Quod si apud illum rerum
+omnium certissimum fontem nihil incerti esse potest, certus eorum est
+euentus quae futura firmiter ille praescierit. Quare nulla est humanis
+consiliis actionibusque libertas quas diuina mens sine falsitatis errore
+cuncta prospiciens ad unum alligat et constringit euentum. Quo semel
+recepto quantus occasus humanarum rerum consequatur liquet. Frustra enim
+bonis malisque praemia poenaeue proponuntur quae nullus meruit liber ac
+uoluntarius motus animorum. Idque omnium uidebitur iniquissimum quod nunc
+aequissimum iudicatur uel puniri improbos uel remunerari probos quos ad
+alterutrum non propria mittit uoluntas, sed futuri cogit certa necessitas.
+Nec uitia igitur nec uirtutes quidquam fuerint, sed omnium meritorum potius
+mixta atque indiscreta confusio. Quoque nihil sceleratius excogitari
+potest, cum ex prouidentia rerum omnis ordo ducatur nihilque consiliis
+liceat humanis, fit ut uitia quoque nostra ad bonorum omnium referantur
+auctorem. Igitur nec sperandi aliquid nec deprecandi ulla ratio est. Quid
+enim uel speret quisque uel etiam deprecetur, quando optanda omnia series
+indeflexa conectit? Auferetur igitur unicum illud inter homines deumque
+commercium sperandi scilicet ac deprecandi. Si quidem iustae humilitatis
+pretio inaestimabilem uicem diuinae gratiae promeremur, qui solus modus est
+quo cum deo colloqui homines posse uideantur illique inaccessae luci prius
+quoque quam impetrent ipsa supplicandi ratione coniungi. Quae si recepta
+futurorum necessitate nihil uirium habere credantur, quid erit quo summo
+illi rerum principi conecti atque adhaerere possimus? Quare necesse erit
+humanum genus, uti paulo ante cantabas, dissaeptum atque disiunctum suo
+fonte fatiscere.
+
+
+[171] euenire prouisa _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  Then I complained that I was now in a greater confusion and more
+  doubtful difficulty than before. "What is that?" quoth she, "for I
+  already conjecture what it is that troubleth thee." "It seemeth," quoth
+  I, "to be altogether impossible and repugnant that God foreseeth all
+  things, and that there should be any free-will. For if God beholdeth all
+  things and cannot be deceived, that must of necessity follow which His
+  providence foreseeth to be to come. Wherefore, if from eternity he doth
+  not only foreknow the deeds of men, but also their counsels and wills,
+  there can be no free-will; for there is not any other deed or will, but
+  those which the divine providence, that cannot be deceived, hath
+  foreseen. For if things can be drawn aside to any other end than was
+  foreknown, there will not be any firm knowledge of that which is to
+  come, but rather an uncertain opinion, which in my opinion were impious
+  to believe of God. Neither do I allow of that reason with which some
+  suppose that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question. For they
+  say that nothing is therefore to come to pass because Providence did
+  foresee it, but rather contrariwise, because it shall be, it could not
+  be unknown to Providence, and in this manner the necessity passes over
+  to the other side. For it is not necessary, they argue, that those
+  things should happen which are foreseen, but it is necessary that those
+  things should be foreseen that are to come--as though our problem were
+  this, which of them is the cause of a thing, the foreknowledge of the
+  necessity of things to come, or the necessity of the foreknowledge of
+  things to come, and we were not trying to prove that, howsoever these
+  causes be ordered, the event of the things which are foreknown is
+  necessary, even though the foreknowledge seemeth not to confer necessity
+  of being upon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth the opinion
+  which thinketh so must needs be true, and again on the other side, if
+  the opinion that one sitteth be true, he must needs sit. Wherefore,
+  there is necessity in both, in the one of sitting and in the other of
+  truth. But one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but rather this
+  is true because one hath taken his seat. So that though the cause of
+  truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both.
+
+  And the like is to be inferred of Providence and future things. For even
+  though they be foreseen because they shall be, yet they do not come to
+  pass because they are foreseen, notwithstanding it is necessary that
+  either things to come be foreseen by God, or that things foreseen do
+  fall out, which alone is sufficient to overthrow free-will. But see how
+  preposterous it is that the event of temporal things should be said to
+  be the cause of the everlasting foreknowledge! And what else is it to
+  think that God doth therefore foresee future things, because they are to
+  happen, than to affirm that those things which happened long since, are
+  the cause of that sovereign providence? Furthermore, as when I know
+  anything to be, it must needs be; so when I know that anything shall be,
+  it must needs be to come. And so it followeth that the event of a thing
+  foreknown cannot be avoided. Finally, if any man thinketh otherwise than
+  the thing is, that is not only no knowledge, but it is a deceitful
+  opinion far from the truth of knowledge; wherefore, if anything is to be
+  in such sort that the event of it is not certain or necessary, how can
+  that be foreknown that it shall happen? For as knowledge is without
+  mixture of falsity, so that which is conceived by it cannot be otherwise
+  than it is conceived. For this is the cause why knowledge is without
+  deceit, because everything must needs be so as the knowledge
+  apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth God foreknow that these
+  uncertain things shall be? For if He judgeth that those things shall
+  happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, He is
+  deceived, which is not only impious to think, but also to speak. But if
+  He supposeth that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that He
+  knoweth that they may equally be done and not be done, what
+  foreknowledge is this which comprehendeth no certain or stable thing? Or
+  in what is this better than that ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias
+  "Whatsoever I say shall either be or not be"[172]? or in what shall the
+  divine providence exceed human opinion, if, as men, God judgeth those
+  things to be uncertain the event of which is doubtful? But if nothing
+  can be uncertain to that most certain fountain of all things, the
+  occurrence of those things is certain, which He doth certainly know
+  shall be. Wherefore there is no freedom in human counsels and actions,
+  which the divine mind, foreseeing all things without error or falsehood,
+  tieth and bindeth to one event. Which once admitted, it is evident what
+  ruin of human affairs will ensue. For in vain are rewards and
+  punishments proposed to good and evil, which no free and voluntary
+  motion of their minds hath deserved. And that will seem most unjust
+  which is now judged most just, that either the wicked should be punished
+  or the good rewarded, since their own will leadeth them to neither, but
+  they are compelled by the certain necessity of that which is to come. By
+  which means virtues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will
+  follow a mixed confusion of all deserts. And--than which there can be
+  nothing invented more impious--since that all order of things proceedeth
+  from Providence, and human counsels can do nothing, it followeth that
+  our vices also shall be referred to the author of goodness. Wherefore
+  there is no means left to hope or pray for anything, since an unflexible
+  course connecteth all things that can be desired! Wherefore that only
+  traffic betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall be taken away: if
+  indeed by the price of just humility we deserve the unestimable benefit
+  of God's grace; for this is the only manner by which it seemeth that men
+  may talk with God, and by the very manner of supplication be joined to
+  that inaccessible light before they obtain anything; which if by the
+  admitting the necessity of future things, they be thought to have no
+  force, by what shall we be united and cleave to that Sovereign Prince of
+  all things? Wherefore mankind must needs (as thou saidest in thy verse a
+  little before), being separated and severed from its source, fail and
+  fall away.
+
+
+  [172] Hor. _Sat._ ii. 5. 59.
+
+
+
+
+III.
+
+Quaenam discors foedera rerum
+Causa resoluit? Quis tanta deus
+Veris statuit bella duobus,
+Vt quae carptim singula constent
+Eadem nolint mixta iugari?                                                5
+An nulla est discordia ueris
+Semperque sibi certa cohaerent?
+Sed mens caecis obruta membris
+Nequit oppressi luminis igne
+Rerum tenues noscere nexus.                                              10
+Sed cur tanto flagrat amore
+Veri tectas reperire notas?
+Scitne quod appetit anxia nosse?
+Sed quis nota scire laborat?
+At si nescit, quid caeca petit?                                          15
+Quis enim quidquam nescius optet
+Aut quis ualeat nescita sequi?
+Quoue inueniat, quisque[173] repertam
+Queat ignarus noscere formam?
+An cum mentem cerneret altam,                                            20
+Pariter summam et singula norat?
+Nunc membrorum condita nube
+Non in totum est oblita sui
+Summamque tenet singula perdens.
+Igitur quisquis uera requirit,                                           25
+Neutro est habitu; nam neque nouit
+Nec penitus tamen omnia nescit,
+Sed quam retinens meminit summam
+Consulit alte uisa retractans,
+Vt seruatis queat oblitas                                                30
+           Addere partes."
+
+
+[173] quisque _codex Bambergensis_ s. xi.: quis _codd. meliores._
+
+
+
+
+  III.
+
+  What cause of discord breaks the bands of love?
+  What God between two truths such wars doth move?
+  That things which severally well settled be
+  Yet joined in one will never friendly prove?
+  Or in true things can we no discord see,
+  Because all certainties do still agree?
+  But our dull soul, covered with members blind,
+  Knows not the secret laws which things do bind,
+  By the drowned light of her oppressed fire.
+  Why then, the hidden notes of things to find,
+  Doth she with such a love of truth desire?
+  If she knows that which she doth so require,
+  Why wisheth she known things to know again?
+  If she knows not, why strives she with blind pain?
+  Who after things unknown will strive to go?
+  Or will such ignorant pursuit maintain?
+  How shall she find them out? Or having so,
+  How shall she then their forms and natures know?
+  Because this soul the highest mind did view,
+  Must we needs say that it all nature knew?
+  Now she, though clouds of flesh do her debar,
+  Forgets not all that was her ancient due,
+  But in her mind some general motions are,
+  Though not the skill of things particular.
+  He that seeks truth in neither course doth fall;
+  Not knowing all, nor ignorant of all,
+  He marketh general things which he retains,
+  And matters seen on high doth back recall,
+  And things forgotten to his mind regains,
+  And joins them to that part which there remains."
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Tum illa: "Vetus," inquit, "haec est de prouidentia querela Marcoque
+Tullio, cum diuinationem distribuit, uehementer agitata tibique ipsi res
+diu prorsus multumque quaesita, sed haud quaquam ab ullo uestrum hactenus
+satis diligenter ac firmiter expedita. Cuius caliginis causa est, quod
+humanae ratiocinationis motus ad diuinae praescientiae simplicitatem non
+potest admoueri, quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil prorsus
+relinquetur ambigui. Quod ita demum patefacere atque expedire temptabo, si
+prius ea quibus moueris expendero. Quaero enim, cur illam soluentium
+rationem minus efficacem putes, quae quia praescientiam non esse futuris
+rebus causam necessitatis existimat, nihil impediri praescientia arbitrii
+libertatem putat. Num enim tu aliunde argumentum futurorum necessitatis
+trahis, nisi quod ea quae praesciuntur non euenire non possunt? Si igitur
+praenotio nullam futuris rebus adicit necessitatem, quod tu etiam paulo
+ante fatebare, quid est quod uoluntarii exitus rerum ad certum cogantur
+euentum? Etenim positionis gratia, ut quid consequatur aduertas, statuamus
+nullam esse praescientiam. Num igitur quantum ad hoc attinet, quae ex
+arbitrio eueniunt ad necessitatem cogantur?" "Minime." "Statuamus iterum
+esse, sed nihil rebus necessitatis iniungere; manebit ut opinor eadem
+uoluntatis integra atque absoluta libertas.
+
+Sed praescientia, inquies, tametsi futuris eueniendi necessitas non est,
+signum tamen est necessario ea esse uentura. Hoc igitur modo, etiam si
+praecognitio non fuisset, necessarios futurorum exitus esse constaret. Omne
+etenim signum tantum quid sit ostendit, non uero efficit quod designat.
+Quare demonstrandum prius est nihil non ex necessitate contingere, ut
+praenotionem signum esse huius necessitatis appareat. Alioquin si haec
+nulla est, ne illa quidem eius rei signum poterit esse quae non est. Iam
+uero probationem firma ratione subnixam constat non ex signis neque petitis
+extrinsecus argumentis sed ex conuenientibus necessariisque causis esse
+ducendam. Sed qui fieri potest ut ea non proueniant quae futura esse
+prouidentur? Quasi uero nos ea quae prouidentia futura esse praenoscit non
+esse euentura credamus ac non illud potius arbitremur, licet eueniant,
+nihil tamen ut euenirent sui natura necessitatis habuisse; quod hinc facile
+perpendas licebit. Plura etenim dum fiunt subiecta oculis intuemur, ut ea
+quae in quadrigis moderandis atque flectendis facere spectantur aurigae
+atque ad hunc modum cetera. Num igitur quidquam illorum ita fieri
+necessitas ulla compellit?" "Minime. Frustra enim esset artis effectus, si
+omnia coacta mouerentur." "Quae igitur cum fiunt carent exsistendi
+necessitate, eadem prius quam fiant sine necessitate futura sunt. Quare
+sunt quaedam euentura quorum exitus ab omni necessitate sit absolutus. Nam
+illud quidem nullum arbitror esse dicturum, quod quae nunc fiunt, prius
+quam fierent, euentura non fuerint. Haec igitur etiam praecognita liberos
+habent euentus. Nam sicut scientia praesentium rerum nihil his quae fiunt,
+ita praescientia futurorum nihil his quae uentura sunt necessitatis
+importat. Sed hoc, inquis, ipsum dubitatur, an earum rerum quae necessarios
+exitus non habent ulla possit esse praenotio. Dissonare etenim uidentur
+putasque si praeuideantur consequi necessitatem, si necessitas desit minime
+praesciri nihilque scientia comprehendi posse nisi certum; quod si quae
+incerti sunt exitus ea quasi certa prouidentur, opinionis id esse caliginem
+non scientiae ueritatem. Aliter enim ac sese res habeat arbitrari ab
+integritate scientiae credis esse diuersum. Cuius erroris causa est, quod
+omnia quae quisque nouit ex ipsorum tantum ui atque natura cognosci
+aestimat quae sciuntur; quod totum contra est Omne enim quod cognoscitur
+non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur
+facultatem. Nam ut hoc breui liqueat exemplo, eandem corporis rotunditatem
+aliter uisus aliter tactus agnoscit. Ille eminus manens totum simul iactis
+radiis intuetur; hic uero cohaerens orbi atque coniunctus circa ipsum motus
+ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. Ipsum quoque hominem aliter
+sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur.
+Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio uero solam
+sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio uero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque
+ipsam quae singularibus inest uniuersali consideratione perpendit.
+Intellegentiae uero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque
+uniuersitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie
+contuetur.
+
+In quo illud maxime considerandum est: nam superior comprehendendi uis
+amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit.
+Neque enim sensus aliquid extra materiam ualet uel uniuersales species
+imaginatio contuetur uel ratio capit simplicem formam, sed intellegentia
+quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quae subsunt etiam cuncta diiudicat,
+sed eo modo quo formam ipsam, quae nulli alii nota esse poterat,
+comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuersum et imaginationis figuram et
+materiale sensibile cognoscit nec ratione utens nec imaginatione nec
+sensibus, sed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter, ut ita dicam, cuncta
+prospiciens. Ratio quoque cum quid uniuersale respicit, nec imaginatione
+nec sensibus utens imaginabilia uel sensibilia comprehendit. Haec est enim
+quae conceptionis suae uniuersale ita definiuit: homo est animal bipes
+rationale. Quae cum uniuersalis notio sit, tum imaginabilem sensibilemque
+esse rem nullus ignorat, quod illa non imaginatione uel sensu sed in
+rationali conceptione considerat. Imaginatio quoque tametsi ex sensibus
+uisendi formandique figuras sumpsit exordium, sensu tamen absente
+sensibilia quaeque conlustrat non sensibili sed imaginaria ratione
+iudicandi. Videsne igitur ut in cognoscendo cuncta sua potius facultate
+quam eorum quae cognoscuntur utantur? Neque id iniuria; nam cum omne
+iudicium iudicantis actus exsistat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non
+ex aliena sed ex propria potestate perficiat.
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  "This," quoth she, "is an ancient complaint of providence, vehemently
+  pursued by Marcus Tullius in his _Distribution of Divination_,[174]
+  and a thing which thou thyself hast made great and long search after.
+  But hitherto none of you have used sufficient diligence and vigour in
+  the explication thereof. The cause of which obscurity is for that the
+  motion of human discourse cannot attain to the simplicity of the divine
+  knowledge, which if by any means we could conceive, there would not
+  remain any doubt at all; which I will endeavour to make manifest and
+  plain when I have first explicated that which moveth thee. For I demand
+  why thou thinkest their solution unsufficient, who think that free-will
+  is not hindered by foreknowledge, because they suppose that
+  foreknowledge is not the cause of any necessity in things to come. For
+  fetchest thou any proof for the necessity of future things from any
+  other principle, but only from this, that those things which are
+  foreknown cannot choose but happen? Wherefore if foreknowledge imposeth
+  no necessity upon future events, which thou didst grant not long before,
+  why should voluntary actions be tied to any certain success? For
+  example's sake, that thou mayest see what will follow, let us suppose
+  that there were no providence or foresight at all. Would those things
+  which proceed from free-will be compelled to any necessity by this
+  means?" "No." "Again, let us grant it to be, but that it imposeth no
+  necessity upon anything; no doubt the same freedom of will will remain
+  whole and absolute.
+
+  But thou wilt say, even though foreknowledge be not a necessity for
+  things to happen, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily come to
+  pass. Wherefore now, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the events
+  of future things would have been necessary. For all signs only show what
+  is, but cause not that which they design. And consequently it must first
+  be proved that all things fall out by necessity, that it may appear that
+  foreknowledge is a sign of this necessity. For otherwise, if there be no
+  necessity, neither can foreknowledge be the sign of that which is not.
+  Besides it is manifest that every firm proof must be drawn from
+  intrinsical and necessary causes and not from signs and other farfetched
+  arguments. But how is it possible those things should not happen which
+  are foreseen to be to come? As though we did believe that those things
+  will not be which providence hath foreknown and do not rather judge that
+  although they happen, yet by their own nature they had no necessity of
+  being, which thou mayest easily gather hence. For we see many things
+  with our eyes while they are in doing, as those things which the
+  coachmen do while they drive and turn their coaches and in like manner
+  other things. Now doth necessity compel any of these things to be done
+  in this sort?" "No. For in vain should art labour if all things were
+  moved by compulsion." "Wherefore, as these things are without necessity
+  when they are in doing, so likewise they are to come without necessity
+  before they be done. And consequently there are some things to come
+  whose event is free from all necessity. For I suppose no man will say
+  that those things which are done now were not to come before they were
+  done. Wherefore these things even being foreseen come freely to effect.
+  For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things
+  which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledge in things to come. But
+  thou wilt say: This is the question, whether there can be any
+  foreknowledge of those things whose events are not necessary. For these
+  things seem opposite, and thou thinkest that, if future things be
+  foreseen, there followeth necessity, if there be no necessity, that they
+  that are not foreknown, and that nothing can be perfectly known unless
+  it be certain. But if uncertain events be foreseen as certain, it is
+  manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of
+  knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be far from the integrity of
+  knowledge to judge otherwise than the thing is. The cause of which error
+  is because thou thinkest that all that is known is known only by the
+  force and nature of the things themselves, which is altogether
+  otherwise. For all that is known is not comprehended according to the
+  force which it hath in itself, but rather according to the faculty of
+  them which know it. For to explicate it with a brief example: the sight
+  and the feeling do diversely discern the same roundness of a die. The
+  sight standing aloof beholdeth it altogether by his beams; but the
+  feeling united and joined to the orb, being moved about the compass of
+  it, comprehendeth the roundness by parts. Likewise sense, imagination,
+  reason and understanding do diversely behold a man. For sense looketh
+  upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject, the imagination
+  discerneth it alone without matter, reason passeth beyond this also and
+  considereth universally the species or kind which is in particulars. The
+  eye of the understanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compass of
+  the whole world it beholdeth with the clear eye of the mind that simple
+  form in itself.
+
+  In which that is chiefly to be considered, that the superior force of
+  comprehending embraceth the inferior; but the inferior can by no means
+  attain to the superior; for the sense hath no force out of matter,
+  neither doth the imagination conceive universal species, nor is reason
+  capable of the simple form, but the understanding, as it were looking
+  downward, having conceived that form, discerneth of all things which are
+  under it, but in that sort in which it apprehendeth that form which can
+  be known by none of the other. For it knoweth the universality of
+  reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense,
+  neither using reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were
+  formally beholding all things with that one twinkling of the mind.
+  Likewise reason, when it considereth any universality, comprehendeth
+  both imagination and sensible things without the use of either
+  imagination or senses. For she defineth the universality of her conceit
+  thus: Man is a reasonable, two-footed, living creature, which being an
+  universal knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and
+  sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable conceiving and not
+  by imagination or sense. Imagination also, although it began by the
+  senses of seeing and forming figures, yet when sense is absent it
+  beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary
+  manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how all these in knowing do rather
+  use their own force and faculty than the force of those things which are
+  known? Nor undeservedly; for since all judgment is the act of him who
+  judgeth, it is necessary that every one should perfect his operation by
+  his own power and not by the force of any other.
+
+
+  [174] _De diuin_, ii.
+
+
+
+
+IV.
+
+Quondam porticus attulit
+Obscuros nimium senes
+Qui sensus et imagines
+E corporibus extimis
+Credant mentibus imprimi,                                                 5
+Vt quondam celeri stilo
+Mos est aequore paginae,
+Quae nullas habeat notas,
+Pressas figere litteras.
+Sed mens si propriis uigens                                              10
+Nihil motibus explicat,
+Sed tantum patiens iacet
+Notis subdita corporum
+Cassasque in speculi uicem
+Rerum reddit imagines,                                                   15
+Vnde haec sic animis uiget
+Cernens omnia notio?
+Quae uis singula perspicit
+Aut quae cognita diuidit?
+Quae diuisa recolligit                                                   20
+Alternumque legens iter
+Nunc summis caput inserit,
+Nunc decedit in infima,
+Tum sese referens sibi
+Veris falsa redarguit?                                                   25
+Haec est efficiens magis
+Longe causa potentior
+Quam quae materiae modo
+Impressas patitur notas.
+Praecedit tamen excitans                                                 30
+Ac uires animi mouens
+Viuo in corpore passio.
+Cum uel lux oculos ferit
+Vel uox auribus instrepit,
+Tum mentis uigor excitus                                                 35
+Quas intus species tenet
+Ad motus similes uocans
+Notis applicat exteris
+Introrsumque reconditis
+Formis miscet imagines.                                                  40
+
+
+
+
+  IV.
+
+  Cloudy old prophets of the Porch[175] once taught
+  That sense and shape presented to the thought
+    From outward objects their impression take,
+  As when upon a paper smooth and plain
+  On which as yet no marks of ink have lain
+    We with a nimble pen do letters make.
+  But if our minds to nothing can apply
+  Their proper motions, but do patient lie
+    Subject to forms which do from bodies flow,
+  As a glass renders empty[176] shapes of things,
+  Who then can show from whence that motion springs
+    By force of which the mind all things doth know?
+  Or by what skill are several things espied?
+  And being known what power doth them divide,
+    And thus divided doth again unite,
+  And with a various journey oft aspires
+  To highest things, and oft again retires
+    To basest, nothing being out of sight,
+  And when she back unto herself doth move,
+  Doth all the falsehoods by the truth reprove?
+    This vigour needs must be an active cause,
+  And with more powerful forces must be deckt,
+  Than that which from those forms, that do reflect
+    From outward matter, all her virtue draws.
+  And yet in living bodies passion's might
+  Doth go before, whose office is to incite,
+    And the first motions in the mind to make.
+  As when the light unto our eyes appears,
+  Or some loud voice is sounded in our ears,
+    Then doth the strength of the dull mind awake
+  Those phantasies which she retains within;
+  She stirreth up such notions to begin,
+    Whose objects with their natures best agree,
+  And thus applying them to outward things,
+  She joins the external shapes which thence she brings
+    With forms which in herself included be.
+
+
+  [175] The Porch, _i.e._ the Painted Porch ([Greek: stoa poikilae]) at
+  Athens, the great hall adorned with frescoes of the battle of Marathon,
+  which served as lecture-room to Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect.
+
+  [176] Cf. Quin potius noscas rerum simulacra uagari
+            Multa modis multis nulla ui cassaque sensu.
+
+  "But rather you are to know that idols or things wander about many in
+  number in many ways, of no force, powerless to excite sense."--Lucr. iv.
+  127, 128 (trans. Munro).
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamuis afficiant instrumenta sensuum
+forinsecus obiectae qualitates animique agentis uigorem passio corporis
+antecedat quae in se actum mentis prouocet excitetque interim quiescentes
+intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non
+passione insignitur, sed ex sua ui subiectam corpori iudicat passionem,
+quanto magis ea quae cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt, in
+discernendo non obiecta extrinsecus sequuntur, sed actum suae mentis
+expediunt? Hac itaque ratione multiplices cognitiones diuersis ac
+differentibus cessere substantiis. Sensus enim solus cunctis aliis
+cognitionibus destitutus immobilibus animantibus cessit quales sunt conchae
+maris quaeque alia saxis haerentia nutriuntur, imaginatio uero mobilibus
+beluis quibus iam inesse fugiendi appetendiue aliquis uidetur affectus,
+ratio uero humani tantum generis est sicut intellegentia sola diuini. Quo
+fit ut ea notitia ceteris praestet quae suapte natura non modo proprium sed
+ceterarum quoque notitiarum subiecta cognoscit. Quid igitur, si
+ratiocinationi sensus imaginatioque refragentur, nihil esse illud
+uniuersale dicentes quod sese intueri ratio putet? Quod enim sensibile uel
+imaginabile est, id uniuersum esse non posse; aut igitur rationis uerum
+esse iudicium nec quidquam esse sensibile, aut quoniam sibi notum sit plura
+sensibus et imaginationi esse subiecta, inanem conceptionem esse rationis
+quae quod sensibile sit ac singulare quasi quiddam uniuersale consideret.
+Ad haec, si ratio contra respondeat se quidem et quod sensibile et quod
+imaginabile sit in uniuersitatis ratione conspicere, illa uero ad
+uniuersitatis cognitionem adspirare non posse, quoniam eorum notio
+corporales figuras non possit excedere, de rerum uero cognitione firmiori
+potius perfectiorique iudicio esse credendum, in huiusmodi igitur lite nos
+quibus tam ratiocinandi quam imaginandi etiam sentiendique uis inest nonne
+rationis potius causam probaremus? Simile est quod humana ratio diuinam
+intellegentiam futura, nisi ut ipsa cognoscit, non putat intueri. Nam ita
+disseris: Si qua certos ac necessarios habere non uideantur euentus, ea
+certo euentura praesciri nequeunt. Harum igitur rerum nulla est
+praescientia, quam si etiam in his esse credamus, nihil erit quod non ex
+necessitate proueniat. Si igitur uti rationis participes sumus ita diuinae
+iudicium mentis habere possemus, sicut imaginationem sensumque rationi
+cedere oportere iudicauimus, sic diuinae sese menti humanam submittere
+rationem iustissimum censeremus. Quare in illius summae intellegentiae
+cacumen, si possumus, erigamur; illic enim ratio uidebit quod in se non
+potest intueri, id autem est, quonam modo etiam quae certos exitus non
+habent, certa tamen uideat ac definita praenotio neque id sit opinio sed
+summae potius scientiae nullis terminis inclusa simplicitas.
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  And if in sentient bodies, although the qualities of outward objects do
+  move the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the
+  vigour of the active mind, provoking her action to itself and exciting
+  the inward forms which before lay quiet; if, I say, in perceiving these
+  corporal objects the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by
+  her own force judgeth of the passion itself, which is objected to the
+  body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their mind
+  and not only follow the outward objects in their judgment, which are
+  free from all affections of the body? Wherefore in this sort have
+  diverse and different substances knowledges of many kinds. For only
+  sense destitute of all other means of knowledge is in those living
+  creatures which are unmovable, as some shell-fish and other which stick
+  to stones and so are nourished; and imagination in movable beasts who
+  seem to have some power to covet and fly. But reason belongeth only to
+  mankind, as understanding to things divine. So that that knowledge is
+  most excellent which of itself doth not only know her own object, but
+  also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination
+  repugn to discourse and reason, affirming that universality to be
+  nothing which reason thinketh herself to see? For that cannot be
+  universal, they argue, which is either sensible or imaginable; wherefore
+  either the judgment of reason must be true and nothing at all sensible,
+  or because they know that many things are subject to the senses and
+  imagination, the conceit of reason is vain, which considereth that which
+  is sensible and singular as if it were universal. Moreover if reason
+  should answer that she beholdeth in her universality all that which is
+  sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of
+  universality, because their knowledge cannot surpass corporal figures
+  and shapes, and that we must give more credit to the firmer and more
+  perfect judgment about the knowledge of things, in this contention
+  should not we, who have the power of discoursing as well as of
+  imagination and sense, rather take reason's part? The very like
+  happeneth when human reason doth not think that the divine understanding
+  doth behold future things otherwise than she herself doth. For thus thou
+  arguest: If any things seem not to have certain and necessary events,
+  they cannot be certainly foreknown to be to come. Wherefore there is no
+  foreknowledge of these things, and if we think that there is any, there
+  shall be nothing which happeneth not of necessity. If, therefore, as we
+  are endued with reason, we could likewise have the judgment proper to
+  the divine mind, as we have judged that imagination and sense must yield
+  to reason, so likewise we would think it most reasonable and just that
+  human reason should submit herself to the divine mind. Wherefore let us
+  be lifted up as much as we can to that height of the highest mind; for
+  there reason shall see that which she cannot behold in herself. And that
+  is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even those things
+  which have no certain issue, and that this is no opinion, but rather the
+  simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed within no bounds.
+
+
+
+
+V.
+
+Quam uariis terras animalia permeant figuris!
+Namque alia extento sunt corpore pulueremque uerrunt
+Continuumque trahunt ui pectoris incitata sulcum
+Sunt quibus alarum leuitas uaga uerberetque uentos
+Et liquido longi spatia aetheris enatet uolatu,                           5
+Haec pressisse solo uestigia gressibusque gaudent
+Vel uirides campos transmittere uel subire siluas.
+Quae uariis uideas licet omnia discrepare formis,
+Prona tamen facies hebetes ualet ingrauare sensus.
+Vnica gens hominum celsum leuat altius cacumen                           10
+Atque leuis recto stat corpore despicitque terras.
+Haec nisi terrenus male desipis, admonet figura,
+Qui recto caelum uultu petis exserisque frontem,
+In sublime feras animum quoque, ne grauata pessum
+Inferior sidat mens corpore celsius leuata.                              15
+
+
+
+
+  V.
+
+  What several figures things that live upon the earth do keep!
+  Some have their bodies stretched in length by which the dust they sweep
+  And do continual furrows make while on their breasts they creep.
+  Some lightly soaring up on high with wings the wind do smite
+  And through the longest airy space pass with an easy flight.
+  Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight,
+  Which through the pleasant fields do pass or to the woods do go,
+  Whose several forms though to our eyes they do a difference show,
+  Yet by their looks cast down on earth their senses heavy grow.
+  Men only with more stately shape to higher objects rise,
+  Who with erected bodies stand and do the earth despise.
+  These figures warn (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eyes)
+  That thou who with an upright face dost look upon the sky,
+  Shouldst also raise thy mind aloft, lest while thou bearest high
+  Thine earthly head, thy soul opprest beneath thy body lie.
+
+
+
+
+VI.
+
+Quoniam igitur, uti paulo ante monstratum est, omne quod scitur non ex sua
+sed ex conprehendentium natura cognoscitur, intueamur nunc quantum fas est,
+quis sit diuinae substantiae status, ut quaenam etiam scientia eius sit,
+possimus agnoscere. Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium
+commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur aeternitas consideremus; haec enim
+nobis naturam pariter diuinam scientiamque patefacit. Aeternitas igitur est
+interminabilis uitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, quod ex collatione
+temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid uiuit in tempore id praesens a
+praeteritis in futura procedit nihilque est in tempore constitutum quod
+totum uitae suae spatium pariter possit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem
+nondum adprehendit; hesternum uero iam perdidit; in hodierna quoque uita
+non amplius uiuitis quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento. Quod igitur
+temporis patitur condicionem, licet illud, sicuti de mundo censuit
+Aristoteles, nec coeperit umquam esse nec desinat uitaque eius cum temporis
+infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale est ut aeternum esse iure credatur.
+Non enim totum simul infinitae licet uitae spatium comprehendit atque
+complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta iam non habet. Quod igitur
+interminabilis uitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet,
+cui neque futuri quidquam absit nec praeteriti fluxerit, id aeternum esse
+iure perhibetur, idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper
+adsistere et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem. Vnde non recte
+quidam, qui cum audiunt uisum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium
+temporis nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum
+fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci uitam, quod
+mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis uitae totam pariter complexum
+esse praesentiam, quod diuinae mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque
+deus conditis rebus antiquior uideri debet temporis quantitate sed
+simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Hunc enim uitae immobilis
+praesentarium statum infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur cumque
+eum effingere atque aequare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum,
+ex simplicitate praesentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac praeteriti
+quantitatem; et cum totam pariter uitae suae plenitudinem nequeat
+possidere, hoc ipso quod aliquo modo numquam esse desinit; illud quod
+implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus uidetur aemulari alligans
+se ad qualemcumque praesentiam huius exigui uolucrisque momenti, quae,
+quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque
+contigerit id praestat ut esse uideantur. Quoniam uero manere non potuit,
+infinitum temporis iter arripuit eoque modo factum est ut continuaret eundo
+uitam cuius plenitudinem complecti non ualuit permanendo. Itaque si digna
+rebus nomina uelimus imponere, Platonem sequentes deum quidem aeternum,
+mundum uero dicamus esse perpetuum. Quoniam igitur omne iudicium secundum
+sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est autem deo semper
+aeternus ac praesentarius status; scientia quoque eius omnem temporis
+supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae infinitaque
+praeteriti ac futuri spatia complectens omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua
+simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praesentiam pensare uelis qua
+cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam
+deficientis instantiae rectius aestimabis; unde non praeuidentia sed
+prouidentia potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituta quasi ab
+excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat. Quid igitur postulas ut
+necessaria fiant quae diuino lumine lustrentur, cum ne homines quidem
+necessaria faciant esse quae uideant? Num enim quae praesentia cernis,
+aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus?" "Minime." "Atqui si est
+diuini humanique praesentis digna collatio, uti uos uestro hoc temporario
+praesenti quaedam uidetis, ita ille omnia suo cernit aeterno. Quare haec
+diuina praenotio naturam rerum proprietatemque non mutat taliaque apud se
+praesentia spectat qualia in tempore olim futura prouenient. Nec rerum
+iudicia confundit unoque suae mentis intuitu tam necessarie quam non
+necessarie uentura dinoscit; sicuti uos cum pariter ambulare in terra
+hominem et oriri in caelo solem uidetis, quamquam simul utrumque conspectum
+tamen discernitis et hoc uoluntarium illud esse necessarium iudicatis, ita
+igitur cuncta despiciens diuinus intuitus qualitatem rerum minime perturbat
+apud se quidem praesentium, ad condicionem uero temporis futurarum. Quo fit
+ut hoc non sit opinio sed ueritate potius nixa cognitio, cum exstaturum
+quid esse cognoscit quod idem exsistendi necessitate carere non nesciat.
+Hic si dicas quod euenturum deus uidet id non euenire non posse, quod autem
+non potest non euenire id ex necessitate contingere, meque ad hoc nomen
+necessitatis adstringas; fatebor rem quidem solidissimae ueritatis sed cui
+uix aliquis nisi diuini speculator accesserit. Respondebo namque idem
+futurum, cum ad diuinam notionem refertur, necessarium, cum uero in sua
+natura perpenditur, liberum prorsus atque absolutum uideri. Duae sunt
+etenim necessitates, simplex una, ueluti quod necesse est omnes homines
+esse mortales, altera condicionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum
+ambulare necesse est; quod enim quisque nouit, id esse aliter ac notum est
+nequit, sed haec condicio minime secum illam simplicem trahit. Hanc enim
+necessitatem non propria facit natura sed condicionis adiectio; nulla enim
+necessitas cogit incedere uoluntate gradientem, quamuis eum tum cum
+graditur incedere necessarium sit. Eodem igitur modo, si quid prouidentia
+praesens uidet, id esse necesse est, tametsi nullam naturae habeat
+necessitatem. Atqui deus ea futura quae ex arbitrii libertate proueniunt
+praesentia contuetur. Haec igitur ad intuitum relata diuinum necessaria
+fiant per condicionem diuinae notionis; per se uero considerata ab absoluta
+naturae suae libertate non desinunt. Fient igitur procul dubio cuncta quae
+futura deus esse praenoscit, sed eorum quaedam de libero proficiscuntur
+arbitrio; quae quamuis eueniant, exsistendo tamen naturam propriam non
+amittunt, qua priusquam fierent etiam non euenire potuissent. Quid igitur
+refert non esse necessaria, cum propter diuinae scientiae condicionem modis
+omnibus necessitatis instar eueniet? Hoc scilicet quod ea quae paulo ante
+proposui, sol oriens et gradiens homo. Quae dum fiunt, non fieri non
+possunt; eorum tamen unum prius quoque quam fieret, necesse erat exsistere,
+alterum uero minime. Ita etiam quae praesentia deus habet, dubio procul
+exsistent, sed eorum hoc quidem de rerum necessitate descendit, illud uero
+de potestate facientium. Haud igitur iniuria diximus haec si ad diuinam
+notitiam referantur necessaria, si per se considerentur necessitatis esse
+nexibus absoluta; sicuti omne quod sensibus patet, si ad rationem referas,
+uniuersale est, si ad se ipsa respicias, singulare. 'Sed si in mea,'
+inquies, 'potestate situm est mutare propositum, euacuabo prouidentiam, cum
+quae illa praenoscit forte mutauero.' Respondebo: propositum te quidem tuum
+posse deflectere, sed quoniam et id te posse et an facias quoue conuertas
+praesens prouidentiae ueritas intuetur, diuinam te praescientiam non posse
+uitare, sicuti praesentis oculi effugere non possis intuitum, quamuis te in
+uarias actiones libera uoluntate conuerteris. Quid igitur inquies? Ex meane
+dispositione scientia diuina mutabitur, ut cum ego nunc hoc nunc aliud
+uelim, illa quoque noscendi uices alternare uideatur? Minime. Omne namque
+futurum diuinus praecurrit intuitus et ad praesentiam propriae cognitionis
+retorquet ac reuocat nec alternat, ut aestimas, nunc hoc nunc illud
+praenoscendi uice, sed uno ictu mutationes tuas manens praeuenit atque
+complectitur. Quam comprehendendi omnia uisendique praesentiam non ex
+futurarum prouentu rerum, sed ex propria deus simplicitate sortitus est. Ex
+quo illud quoque resoluitur quod paulo ante posuisti indignum esse, si
+scientiae dei causam futura nostra praestare dicantur. Haec enim scientiae
+uis praesentaria notione cuncta complectens rebus modum omnibus ipsa
+constituit, nihil uero posterioribus debet. Quae cum ita sint, manet
+intemerata mortalibus arbitrii libertas nec iniquae leges solutis omni
+necessitate uoluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. Manet etiam spectator
+desuper cunctorum praescius deus uisionisque eius praesens semper
+aeternitas cum nostrorum actuum futura qualitate concurrit bonis praemia
+malis supplicia dispensans. Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque;
+quae cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt. Auersamini igitur
+uitia, colite uirtutes, ad rectas spes animum subleuate, humiles preces in
+excelsa porrigite. Magna uobis est, si dissimulare non uultis, necessitas
+indicta probitatis, cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis."
+
+
+
+
+  VI.
+
+  Seeing, therefore, as hath been showed, all that is known is not
+  comprehended by its own nature but by the power of him which
+  comprehendeth it, let us see now, as much as we may, what is the state
+  of the divine substance that we may also know what His knowledge is.
+  Wherefore it is the common judgment of all that live by reason that God
+  is everlasting, and therefore let us consider what eternity is. For this
+  declareth unto us both the divine nature and knowledge. Eternity
+  therefore is a perfect possession altogether of an endless life, which
+  is more manifest by the comparison of temporal things, for whatsoever
+  liveth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past to times
+  to come, and there is nothing placed in time which can embrace all the
+  space of its life at once. But it hath not yet attained to-morrow and
+  hath lost yesterday. And you live no more in this day's life than in
+  that movable and transitory moment. Wherefore, whatsoever suffereth the
+  condition of time, although, as Aristotle thought of the world, it never
+  began nor were ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time,
+  yet it is not such that it ought to be called everlasting. For it doth
+  not comprehend and embrace all the space of its life together, though
+  that life be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to
+  come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fulness of
+  an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is absent,
+  nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be accounted
+  everlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in itself,
+  it may always be present to itself, and have an infinity of movable time
+  present to it. Wherefore they are deceived who, hearing that Plato
+  thought that this world had neither beginning of time nor should ever
+  have any end, think that by this means the created world should be
+  coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be carried through an
+  endless life, which Plato attributed to the world, another thing to
+  embrace the whole presence of an endless life together, which is
+  manifestly proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to seem more
+  ancient than the things created, by the quantity of time, but rather by
+  the simplicity of His divine nature. For that infinite motion of
+  temporal things imitateth the present state of the unmovable life, and
+  since it cannot express nor equal it, it falleth from immobility to
+  motion, and from the simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an
+  infinite quantity of future and past, and since it cannot possess
+  together all the fulness of its life, by never leaving to be in some
+  sort, it seemeth to emulate in part that which it cannot fully obtain
+  and express, tying itself to this small presence of this short and swift
+  moment, which because it carrieth a certain image of that abiding
+  presence, whosoever hath it, seemeth to be. But because it could not
+  stay it undertook an infinite journey of time, and so it came to pass
+  that it continued that life by going whose plenitude it could not
+  comprehend by staying. Wherefore, if we will give things their right
+  names, following Plato, let us say that God is everlasting and the world
+  perpetual. Wherefore, since every judgment comprehendeth those things
+  which are subject unto it, according to its own nature, and God hath
+  always an everlasting and present state, His knowledge also surpassing
+  all motions of time, remaineth in the simplicity of His presence, and
+  comprehending the infinite spaces of that which is past and to come,
+  considereth all things in His simple knowledge as though they were now
+  in doing. So that, if thou wilt weigh His foreknowledge with which He
+  discerneth all things, thou wilt more rightly esteem it to be the
+  knowledge of a never fading instant than a foreknowledge as of a thing
+  to come. For which cause it is not called praevidence or foresight, but
+  rather providence, because, placed far from inferior things, it
+  overlooketh all things, as it were, from the highest top of things. Why,
+  therefore, wilt thou have those things necessary which are illustrated
+  by the divine light, since that not even men make not those things
+  necessary which they see? For doth thy sight impose any necessity upon
+  those things which thou seest present?" "No." "But the present instant
+  of men may well be compared to that of God in this: that as you see some
+  things in your temporal instant, so He beholdeth all things in His
+  eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge doth not change the
+  nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in His
+  presence as they will after come to be, neither doth He confound the
+  judgment of things, and with one sight of His mind He discerneth as well
+  those things which shall happen necessarily as otherwise. As you, when
+  at one time you see a man walking upon the earth and the sun rising in
+  heaven, although they be both seen at once, yet you discern and judge
+  that the one is voluntary, and the other necessary, so likewise the
+  divine sight beholding all things disturbeth not the quality of things
+  which to Him are present, but in respect of time are yet to come. And so
+  this is not an opinion but rather a knowledge grounded upon truth, when
+  He knoweth that such a thing shall be, which likewise He is not ignorant
+  that it hath no necessity of being. Here if thou sayest that cannot
+  choose but happen which God seeth shall happen, and that which cannot
+  choose but happen, must be of necessity, and so tiest me to this name of
+  necessity, I will grant that it is a most solid truth, but whereof
+  scarce any but a contemplator of divinity is capable. For I will answer
+  that the same thing is necessary when it is referred to the Divine
+  knowledge; but when it is weighed in its own nature that it seemeth
+  altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities: the one
+  simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortal; the other
+  conditional, as if thou knowest that any man walketh, he must needs
+  walk. For what a man knoweth cannot be otherwise than it is known. But
+  this conditional draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity.
+  For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding a
+  condition. For no necessity maketh him to go that goeth of his own
+  accord, although it be necessary that he goeth while he goeth. In like
+  manner, if providence seeth anything present, that must needs be,
+  although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future
+  things, which proceed from free-will, present. These things, therefore,
+  being referred to the divine sight are necessary by the condition of the
+  divine knowledge, and, considered by themselves, they lose not absolute
+  freedom of their own nature. Wherefore doubtless all those things come
+  to pass which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceed from
+  free-will, which though they come to pass, yet do not, by coining into
+  being, lose, since before they came to pass, they might also not have
+  happened. But what importeth it that they are not necessary, since that
+  by reason of the condition of the divine knowledge they come to pass in
+  all respects as if they were necessary? It hath the same import as those
+  things which I proposed a little before--the sun rising and the man
+  going. While they are in doing, they cannot choose but be in doing; yet
+  one of them was necessarily to be before it was, and the other not.
+  Likewise those things which God hath present, will have doubtless a
+  being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things, other from
+  the power of the doers. And therefore we said not without cause that
+  these, if they be referred to God's knowledge, are necessary; and if
+  they be considered by themselves, they are free from the bonds of
+  necessity. As whatsoever is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to
+  reason, is universal; if thou considerest the things themselves, it is
+  singular or particular. But thou wilt say, 'If it is in my power to
+  change my purpose, shall I frustrate providence if I chance to alter
+  those things which she foreknoweth?' I answer that thou mayest indeed
+  change thy purpose, but because the truth of providence, being present,
+  seeth that thou canst do so, and whether thou wilt do so or no, and what
+  thou purposest anew, thou canst not avoid the divine foreknowledge, even
+  as thou canst not avoid the sight of an eye which is present, although
+  thou turnest thyself to divers actions by thy free-will.
+
+  But yet thou wilt inquire whether God's knowledge shall be changed by
+  thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another,
+  it should also seem to have divers knowledges. No. For God's sight
+  preventeth all that is to come and recalleth and draweth it to the
+  presence of His own knowledge; neither doth He vary, as thou imaginest,
+  now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving
+  preventeth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of
+  comprehending and seeing all things, God hath not by the event of future
+  things but by His own simplicity. By which that doubt is also resolved
+  which thou didst put a little before, that it is an unworthy thing that
+  our future actions should be said to cause the knowledge of God. For
+  this force of the divine knowledge comprehending all things with a
+  present notion appointeth to everything its measure and receiveth
+  nothing from ensuing accidents. All which being so, the free-will of
+  mortal men remaineth unviolated, neither are the laws unjust which
+  propose punishments and rewards to our wills, which are free from all
+  necessity. There remaineth also a beholder of all things which is God,
+  who foreseeth all things, and the eternity of His vision, which is
+  always present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions,
+  distributing rewards to the good and punishments to the evil. Neither do
+  we in vain put our hope in God or pray to Him; for if we do this well
+  and as we ought, we shall not lose our labour or be without effect.
+  Wherefore fly vices, embrace virtues, possess your minds with worthy
+  hopes, offer up humble prayers to your highest Prince. There is, if you
+  will not dissemble, a great necessity of doing well imposed upon you,
+  since you live in the sight of your Judge, who beholdeth all things."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+SYMMACHI VERSVS
+
+Fortunae et uirtutis opus, Seuerine Boethi,
+  E patria pulsus non tua per scelera,
+Tandem ignotus habes qui te colat, ut tua uirtus
+  Vt tua fortuna promeruitque [Greek: sophos].
+Post obitum dant fata locum, post fata superstes
+  Vxoris propriae te quoque fama colit.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+EPIGRAM BY SYMMACHUS[177]
+
+Boethius! model of all weal and worth,
+Unjustly from thy country driven forth,
+Thy fame, unfamed at last, yet one shall praise,
+One voice the cry of approbation raise;
+What life denied, through death kind heaven giveth;
+Thine honour in thy wife's for ever liveth.
+
+
+[177] This epigram was found by Barth in a Merseburg codex, and first
+printed in his _Adversaria_ (1624). If genuine (and the faithful
+reproduction the error SYMMACHIVS for SYMMACHI VS or VR, i.e. VERSVS, is in
+its favour), the author may be either the son or the father-in-law of
+Boethius. Some readers may prefer to rank this poem with the epitaph on
+Elpis, the supposititious first wife of Boethius, on whom see Obbarius, _De
+cons._ p. xii. At any rate it is as old as the times of Hrabanus Maurus,
+who imitated it in a poem also first published by Barth. See Peiper,
+_Cons._ p. xxxviiii.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Aaron.
+Abel.
+Abraham.
+abstraction.
+academical studies.
+Achaemenian rocks.
+Achelous.
+Achilles, statue of.
+Adam.
+[Greek: aeides, to].
+Aemilius Paulus.
+_aequiuocus_.
+_aeternitas_.
+Agamemnon, _see_ Atrides.
+age, the former.
+Agrippina.
+Albinus.
+Alcibiades.
+Alexander Aphrod..
+allegorical method.
+Anaxagoras.
+Anaxarchus.
+angels.
+Antaeus.
+Antoninus (Caracalla).
+Apollodorus.
+Apuleius.
+Arcturus.
+Arians
+Aristotle,
+  on nature;
+  _De physicis_;
+  _Protrepticus_;
+Arius.
+Atrides.
+Augustine, St.
+Auster.
+
+Bacchus.
+baptism.
+Basil, informer.
+Being.
+Boethius,
+  life;
+  the first scholastic;
+  an independent philosopher;
+  his philosophic ambition;
+  his achievement;
+  a Christian;
+  perhaps a martyr;
+  son-in-law of Symmachus;
+  his wife;
+  his sons;
+  early training;
+  youthful poetry;
+  premature old age;
+  his learning;
+  his library;
+  his lofty position;
+  his principles;
+  the champion of the oppressed;
+  of the Senate;
+  his accusers;
+  his accusation;
+  sentence.
+Booetes.
+Boreas.
+Brutus.
+Busiris.
+
+Cacus.
+Caesar, _see_ Gaius.
+Campania.
+Canius.
+Cassiodorus.
+categories, the ten.
+Catholic Church,
+  faith;
+  religion.
+Catholics.
+Cato.
+Catullus.
+Caucasus.
+Centaurs.
+Cerberus.
+Ceres.
+Chremes.
+Christ,
+  advent of;
+  baptism;
+  life and death;
+  resurrection and ascension;
+  nature;
+  person;
+  divinity;
+  humanity;
+  Perfect Man and Perfect God.
+Christian faith,
+  religion.
+Cicero,
+  _De diuinatione_;
+  _Tusc_.
+Circe.
+Claudian.
+Claudianus, Mamertus,
+  _coemptio_.
+Conigastus,
+_consistere_,
+_Consolation of Philosophy_,
+  method and object.
+consulate.
+corollary, see _porisma_.
+Corus.
+Crab.
+Croesus.
+Cyclops.
+Cynthia.
+Cyprian, informer.
+Cyrus.
+
+Dante.
+David.
+Decoratus.
+demons.
+Devil.
+dialectic.
+difference.
+Diogenes Laertius.
+Dionysius.
+divine nature, eternal,
+  substance.
+divinity of Christ, _see_ Christ,
+_diuisio_.
+Dorset, Countess of.
+
+[Greek: Eisagogae], Porphyry's.
+Eleatic studies.
+elements.
+Elpis.
+_Enneades_.
+Epicureans.
+Epicurus.
+_esse_.
+_essentia_.
+eternity.
+Etna.
+Euphrates.
+Euripides.
+Euripus.
+Eurus.
+Eutyches.
+Eutychian error.
+Eutychians.
+Evander.
+Eve.
+evil is nothing.
+
+Fabricius.
+Fame.
+fatal order.
+Fate.
+fire, nature of.
+Flood.
+form.
+Fortune.
+free-will.
+Furies.
+
+Gaius Caesar (Caligula).
+Gaudentius.
+geometricians.
+Germanicus.
+Giants.
+Gilbert de la Porree.
+Glory.
+God, categories applied to,
+  without difference;
+  is what He is;
+  is Pure Form;
+  is [Greek: ousia, ousiosis, huphistasthai];
+  One;
+  Triune;
+  is good;
+  goodness;
+  happiness;
+  everlasting;
+  omnipresent;
+  just;
+  omnipotent;
+  incomprehensible;
+  one Father;
+  true Sun;
+  Creator;
+  Ruler;
+  Mover;
+  Judge;
+  sees all things;
+  foresees all things;
+  His knowledge;
+  His providence;
+  cannot do evil;
+  wills only good;
+  prayer to Him not vain.
+good, the prime.
+good, all seek.
+goodness is happiness, is God.
+grace.
+Greek.
+
+Happiness is God.
+Haureau.
+_Hebdomads_.
+Hecuba.
+Hercules.
+heresy, see Arius, Eutyches, Nestorius, Sabellians.
+Hermus.
+Herodotus.
+Hesperus.
+Holder.
+Homer.
+Horace.
+human nature, humanity of Christ, _see_ Christ.
+humanity.
+
+Iamblichus.
+_id quod est_.
+_id quod est esse_.
+Indus.
+_instrumentum_.
+Isaac.
+Ishmael.
+Ixion.
+
+Jacob.
+Jerusalem.
+Jesus.
+Jews.
+Iohannes Scottus.
+John the Deacon.
+Jordan.
+Joshua.
+Judah.
+
+Kanius, _see_ Canius.
+[Greek: kata parathesin].
+
+Latin.
+lethargy.
+Livy.
+Lucan.
+Lucifer.
+Lucretius.
+Lybia.
+Lybian lions.
+Lydians.
+Lynceus.
+
+Macedonius. _see_ Aemilius Paulus.
+Macrobius.
+Mary, the Blessed Virgin,.
+mathematical method.
+mathematics.
+matter.
+Medea.
+Mercury.
+Moses.
+Muses.
+music,
+  Boethius on.
+
+Nature,
+  phenomenal;
+  nature;
+  nature of plants.
+Neoplatonism.
+Neritius, son of, _see_ Ulysses.
+Nero.
+Nestorius.
+Nicocreon.
+Nicomachus.
+_nihilo, ex_..
+Noah.
+Nonius.
+Notus.
+number.
+
+[Greek: oion epei].
+[Greek: onos luras].
+Opilio.
+Orpheus.
+[Greek: ousia].
+[Greek: ousiosis].
+[Greek: ousiosthai].
+
+[Greek: PI].
+_Palatini canes_.
+Papinianus.
+Parmenides.
+Parthiaus.
+Paulinus.
+Paulus, see Aemilius Paulus.
+Pelagius.
+Perses.
+_persona_.
+Person defined.
+Pharaoh.
+Philosophy,
+  appearance of;
+  character;
+  function;
+  power.
+Phoebe.
+Phoebus.
+physics.
+Plato,
+  and Boethius;
+  and S. Thomas;
+  and the Academy;
+  his muse;
+  Reminiscence;
+  quoted or referred to, _Gorg._;
+  _Tim_;
+  _Meno_;
+  _Phaedo_;
+  _Rep_.
+Plotinus.
+Plurality.
+Pluto.
+Polyphemus.
+Porch.
+_porisma_.
+Porphyry.
+praetorship.
+praevidence.
+predicaments, _see_ categories.
+Providence.
+Ptolemy.
+purgation.
+Pythagoras.
+
+Ravenna.
+realism.
+Red Sea.
+_reductio ad absurdum_.
+Regulus.
+relation, category of.
+religion, the Christian.
+Resurrection.
+rhetoric.
+Roman liberty,
+  republic.
+Rusticiana.
+
+Sabellians.
+Sackville, Thomas.
+_sacrilegium_.
+saints.
+Saturn.
+Saul.
+scripture.
+_sempiternitas_.
+senate.
+Seneca.
+Simon.
+Sinai.
+Sirius.
+Socrates.
+Son, the, _see_ Trinity.
+Soranus.
+Spartianus.
+Spirit, Holy, _see_ Trinity,
+  procession of;
+  a substance.
+statue of Achilles.
+Stoics.
+Stymphalian birds.
+_subsisistentia, subsistere_.
+substance, divine.
+_substantia, substare_.
+Suetonius.
+sun, _see_ Phoebus.
+Symmachus, Q. Aurel.,
+  Q. Aur. Memmius;
+  Boethius;
+  Pope.
+Syrtes.
+
+Tacitus.
+Tantalus.
+Tertullian.
+Testament, Old and New.
+[Greek: THETA].
+Theodoric.
+Theology.
+Thomas, St.
+Thorie, J.
+Thrace.
+Thule.
+Tigris.
+_Timaeus_, see Plato.
+Tiresias.
+Tityus.
+triangie.
+Triguilla.
+Trinity,
+  the unity of;
+  cannot be substantially predicated of God.
+
+[Greek: ulae, apoios].
+Ulysses.
+unity.
+unity of Trinity.
+[Greek: upostasis].
+[Greek: upostaenai].
+Usener.
+_ut quia_.
+[Greek: uphistasthai].
+
+_UEL = et_.
+Verona.
+Vesuvius.
+_uia media_.
+Virgil.
+_uirtus_.
+
+Will, _see_ free-will.
+Wulf, H. de.
+
+Zeno.
+Zephyrus.
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Theological Tractates and The
+Consolation of Philosophy, by Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES ***
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