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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1658-h.zip b/1658-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f24af8c --- /dev/null +++ b/1658-h.zip diff --git a/1658-h/1658-h.htm b/1658-h/1658-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5c68e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/1658-h/1658-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5510 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Phaedo, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Phaedo, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Phaedo + The Last Hours Of Socrates + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: October 29, 2008 [EBook #1658] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHAEDO *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + PHAEDO + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> PHAEDO </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + After an interval of some months or years, and at Phlius, a town of + Peloponnesus, the tale of the last hours of Socrates is narrated to + Echecrates and other Phliasians by Phaedo the 'beloved disciple.' The + Dialogue necessarily takes the form of a narrative, because Socrates has + to be described acting as well as speaking. The minutest particulars of + the event are interesting to distant friends, and the narrator has an + equal interest in them. + </p> + <p> + During the voyage of the sacred ship to and from Delos, which has occupied + thirty days, the execution of Socrates has been deferred. (Compare Xen. + Mem.) The time has been passed by him in conversation with a select + company of disciples. But now the holy season is over, and the disciples + meet earlier than usual in order that they may converse with Socrates for + the last time. Those who were present, and those who might have been + expected to be present, are mentioned by name. There are Simmias and Cebes + (Crito), two disciples of Philolaus whom Socrates 'by his enchantments has + attracted from Thebes' (Mem.), Crito the aged friend, the attendant of the + prison, who is as good as a friend—these take part in the + conversation. There are present also, Hermogenes, from whom Xenophon + derived his information about the trial of Socrates (Mem.), the 'madman' + Apollodorus (Symp.), Euclid and Terpsion from Megara (compare Theaet.), + Ctesippus, Antisthenes, Menexenus, and some other less-known members of + the Socratic circle, all of whom are silent auditors. Aristippus, + Cleombrotus, and Plato are noted as absent. Almost as soon as the friends + of Socrates enter the prison Xanthippe and her children are sent home in + the care of one of Crito's servants. Socrates himself has just been + released from chains, and is led by this circumstance to make the natural + remark that 'pleasure follows pain.' (Observe that Plato is preparing the + way for his doctrine of the alternation of opposites.) 'Aesop would have + represented them in a fable as a two-headed creature of the gods.' The + mention of Aesop reminds Cebes of a question which had been asked by + Evenus the poet (compare Apol.): 'Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while + in prison had been putting Aesop into verse?'—'Because several times + in his life he had been warned in dreams that he should practise music; + and as he was about to die and was not certain of what was meant, he + wished to fulfil the admonition in the letter as well as in the spirit, by + writing verses as well as by cultivating philosophy. Tell this to Evenus; + and say that I would have him follow me in death.' 'He is not at all the + sort of man to comply with your request, Socrates.' 'Why, is he not a + philosopher?' 'Yes.' 'Then he will be willing to die, although he will not + take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.' + </p> + <p> + Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be + accounted a good? Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man is a + prisoner, who must not open the door of his prison and run away—this + is the truth in a 'mystery.' Or (2) rather, because he is not his own + property, but a possession of the gods, and has no right to make away with + that which does not belong to him. But why, asks Cebes, if he is a + possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them? For he is + under their protection; and surely he cannot take better care of himself + than they take of him. Simmias explains that Cebes is really referring to + Socrates, whom they think too unmoved at the prospect of leaving the gods + and his friends. Socrates answers that he is going to other gods who are + wise and good, and perhaps to better friends; and he professes that he is + ready to defend himself against the charge of Cebes. The company shall be + his judges, and he hopes that he will be more successful in convincing + them than he had been in convincing the court. + </p> + <p> + The philosopher desires death—which the wicked world will insinuate + that he also deserves: and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which + they are capable of understanding. Enough of them: the real question is, + What is the nature of that death which he desires? Death is the separation + of soul and body—and the philosopher desires such a separation. He + would like to be freed from the dominion of bodily pleasures and of the + senses, which are always perturbing his mental vision. He wants to get rid + of eyes and ears, and with the light of the mind only to behold the light + of truth. All the evils and impurities and necessities of men come from + the body. And death separates him from these corruptions, which in life he + cannot wholly lay aside. Why then should he repine when the hour of + separation arrives? Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that + other death, through which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity? + </p> + <p> + Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike those of + other men. For they are courageous because they are afraid of greater + dangers, and temperate because they desire greater pleasures. But he + disdains this balancing of pleasures and pains, which is the exchange of + commerce and not of virtue. All the virtues, including wisdom, are + regarded by him only as purifications of the soul. And this was the + meaning of the founders of the mysteries when they said, 'Many are the + wand-bearers but few are the mystics.' (Compare Matt. xxii.: 'Many are + called but few are chosen.') And in the hope that he is one of these + mystics, Socrates is now departing. This is his answer to any one who + charges him with indifference at the prospect of leaving the gods and his + friends. + </p> + <p> + Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body may vanish + away like smoke or air. Socrates in answer appeals first of all to the old + Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead are in the world below, and + that the living come from them. This he attempts to found on a + philosophical assumption that all opposites—e.g. less, greater; + weaker, stronger; sleeping, waking; life, death—are generated out of + each other. Nor can the process of generation be only a passage from + living to dying, for then all would end in death. The perpetual sleeper + (Endymion) would be no longer distinguished from the rest of mankind. The + circle of nature is not complete unless the living come from the dead as + well as pass to them. + </p> + <p> + The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a confirmation of + the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of this doctrine are demanded. + One proof given is the same as that of the Meno, and is derived from the + latent knowledge of mathematics, which may be elicited from an unlearned + person when a diagram is presented to him. Again, there is a power of + association, which from seeing Simmias may remember Cebes, or from seeing + a picture of Simmias may remember Simmias. The lyre may recall the player + of the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated with the + higher notion of absolute equality. But here observe that material + equalities fall short of the conception of absolute equality with which + they are compared, and which is the measure of them. And the measure or + standard must be prior to that which is measured, the idea of equality + prior to the visible equals. And if prior to them, then prior also to the + perceptions of the senses which recall them, and therefore either given + before birth or at birth. But all men have not this knowledge, nor have + any without a process of reminiscence; which is a proof that it is not + innate or given at birth, unless indeed it was given and taken away at the + same instant. But if not given to men in birth, it must have been given + before birth—this is the only alternative which remains. And if we + had ideas in a former state, then our souls must have existed and must + have had intelligence in a former state. The pre-existence of the soul + stands or falls with the doctrine of ideas. + </p> + <p> + It is objected by Simmias and Cebes that these arguments only prove a + former and not a future existence. Socrates answers this objection by + recalling the previous argument, in which he had shown that the living + come from the dead. But the fear that the soul at departing may vanish + into air (especially if there is a wind blowing at the time) has not yet + been charmed away. He proceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish + away, let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to + dissolution? Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the + changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense? Clearly the + latter and not the former; and therefore not the soul, which in her own + pure thought is unchangeable, and only when using the senses descends into + the region of change. Again, the soul commands, the body serves: in this + respect too the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the mortal. + And in every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and + immortality, and the body of the human and mortal. And whereas the body is + liable to speedy dissolution, the soul is almost if not quite + indissoluble. (Compare Tim.) Yet even the body may be preserved for ages + by the embalmer's art: how unlikely, then, that the soul will perish and + be dissipated into air while on her way to the good and wise God! She has + been gathered into herself, holding aloof from the body, and practising + death all her life long, and she is now finally released from the errors + and follies and passions of men, and for ever dwells in the company of the + gods. + </p> + <p> + But the soul which is polluted and engrossed by the corporeal, and has no + eye except that of the senses, and is weighed down by the bodily + appetites, cannot attain to this abstraction. In her fear of the world + below she lingers about the sepulchre, loath to leave the body which she + loved, a ghostly apparition, saturated with sense, and therefore visible. + At length entering into some animal of a nature congenial to her former + life of sensuality or violence, she takes the form of an ass, a wolf or a + kite. And of these earthly souls the happiest are those who have practised + virtue without philosophy; they are allowed to pass into gentle and social + natures, such as bees and ants. (Compare Republic, Meno.) But only the + philosopher who departs pure is permitted to enter the company of the + gods. (Compare Phaedrus.) This is the reason why he abstains from fleshly + lusts, and not because he fears loss or disgrace, which is the motive of + other men. He too has been a captive, and the willing agent of his own + captivity. But philosophy has spoken to him, and he has heard her voice; + she has gently entreated him, and brought him out of the 'miry clay,' and + purged away the mists of passion and the illusions of sense which envelope + him; his soul has escaped from the influence of pleasures and pains, which + are like nails fastening her to the body. To that prison-house she will + not return; and therefore she abstains from bodily pleasures—not + from a desire of having more or greater ones, but because she knows that + only when calm and free from the dominion of the body can she behold the + light of truth. + </p> + <p> + Simmias and Cebes remain in doubt; but they are unwilling to raise + objections at such a time. Socrates wonders at their reluctance. Let them + regard him rather as the swan, who, having sung the praises of Apollo all + his life long, sings at his death more lustily than ever. Simmias + acknowledges that there is cowardice in not probing truth to the bottom. + 'And if truth divine and inspired is not to be had, then let a man take + the best of human notions, and upon this frail bark let him sail through + life.' He proceeds to state his difficulty: It has been argued that the + soul is invisible and incorporeal, and therefore immortal, and prior to + the body. But is not the soul acknowledged to be a harmony, and has she + not the same relation to the body, as the harmony—which like her is + invisible—has to the lyre? And yet the harmony does not survive the + lyre. Cebes has also an objection, which like Simmias he expresses in a + figure. He is willing to admit that the soul is more lasting than the + body. But the more lasting nature of the soul does not prove her + immortality; for after having worn out many bodies in a single life, and + many more in successive births and deaths, she may at last perish, or, as + Socrates afterwards restates the objection, the very act of birth may be + the beginning of her death, and her last body may survive her, just as the + coat of an old weaver is left behind him after he is dead, although a man + is more lasting than his coat. And he who would prove the immortality of + the soul, must prove not only that the soul outlives one or many bodies, + but that she outlives them all. + </p> + <p> + The audience, like the chorus in a play, for a moment interpret the + feelings of the actors; there is a temporary depression, and then the + enquiry is resumed. It is a melancholy reflection that arguments, like + men, are apt to be deceivers; and those who have been often deceived + become distrustful both of arguments and of friends. But this unfortunate + experience should not make us either haters of men or haters of arguments. + The want of health and truth is not in the argument, but in ourselves. + Socrates, who is about to die, is sensible of his own weakness; he desires + to be impartial, but he cannot help feeling that he has too great an + interest in the truth of the argument. And therefore he would have his + friends examine and refute him, if they think that he is in error. + </p> + <p> + At his request Simmias and Cebes repeat their objections. They do not go + to the length of denying the pre-existence of ideas. Simmias is of opinion + that the soul is a harmony of the body. But the admission of the + pre-existence of ideas, and therefore of the soul, is at variance with + this. (Compare a parallel difficulty in Theaet.) For a harmony is an + effect, whereas the soul is not an effect, but a cause; a harmony follows, + but the soul leads; a harmony admits of degrees, and the soul has no + degrees. Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is + one soul better than another? Are they more or less harmonized, or is + there one harmony within another? But the soul does not admit of degrees, + and cannot therefore be more or less harmonized. Further, the soul is + often engaged in resisting the affections of the body, as Homer describes + Odysseus 'rebuking his heart.' Could he have written this under the idea + that the soul is a harmony of the body? Nay rather, are we not + contradicting Homer and ourselves in affirming anything of the sort? + </p> + <p> + The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of Simmias, + has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given to the + Theban Cadmus. Socrates recapitulates the argument of Cebes, which, as he + remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or causation; about + this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience. When he was young + he had puzzled himself with physics: he had enquired into the growth and + decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until at last he began to + doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the result of eating and + drinking; and so he arrived at the conclusion that he was not meant for + such enquiries. Nor was he less perplexed with notions of comparison and + number. At first he had imagined himself to understand differences of + greater and less, and to know that ten is two more than eight, and the + like. But now those very notions appeared to him to contain a + contradiction. For how can one be divided into two? Or two be compounded + into one? These are difficulties which Socrates cannot answer. Of + generation and destruction he knows nothing. But he has a confused notion + of another method in which matters of this sort are to be investigated. + (Compare Republic; Charm.) + </p> + <p> + Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind is + the cause of all things. And he said to himself: If mind is the cause of + all things, surely mind must dispose them all for the best. The new + teacher will show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature. How great + had been his hopes and how great his disappointment! For he found that his + new friend was anything but consistent in his use of mind as a cause, and + that he soon introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric notions. + (Compare Arist. Metaph.) It was as if a person had said that Socrates is + sitting here because he is made up of bones and muscles, instead of + telling the true reason—that he is here because the Athenians have + thought good to sentence him to death, and he has thought good to await + his sentence. Had his bones and muscles been left by him to their own + ideas of right, they would long ago have taken themselves off. But surely + there is a great confusion of the cause and condition in all this. And + this confusion also leads people into all sorts of erroneous theories + about the position and motions of the earth. None of them know how much + stronger than any Atlas is the power of the best. But this 'best' is still + undiscovered; and in enquiring after the cause, we can only hope to attain + the second best. + </p> + <p> + Now there is a danger in the contemplation of the nature of things, as + there is a danger in looking at the sun during an eclipse, unless the + precaution is taken of looking only at the image reflected in the water, + or in a glass. (Compare Laws; Republic.) 'I was afraid,' says Socrates, + 'that I might injure the eye of the soul. I thought that I had better + return to the old and safe method of ideas. Though I do not mean to say + that he who contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees only + through a glass darkly, any more than he who contemplates actual effects.' + </p> + <p> + If the existence of ideas is granted to him, Socrates is of opinion that + he will then have no difficulty in proving the immortality of the soul. He + will only ask for a further admission:—that beauty is the cause of + the beautiful, greatness the cause of the great, smallness of the small, + and so on of other things. This is a safe and simple answer, which escapes + the contradictions of greater and less (greater by reason of that which is + smaller!), of addition and subtraction, and the other difficulties of + relation. These subtleties he is for leaving to wiser heads than his own; + he prefers to test ideas by the consistency of their consequences, and, if + asked to give an account of them, goes back to some higher idea or + hypothesis which appears to him to be the best, until at last he arrives + at a resting-place. (Republic; Phil.) + </p> + <p> + The doctrine of ideas, which has long ago received the assent of the + Socratic circle, is now affirmed by the Phliasian auditor to command the + assent of any man of sense. The narrative is continued; Socrates is + desirous of explaining how opposite ideas may appear to co-exist but do + not really co-exist in the same thing or person. For example, Simmias may + be said to have greatness and also smallness, because he is greater than + Socrates and less than Phaedo. And yet Simmias is not really great and + also small, but only when compared to Phaedo and Socrates. I use the + illustration, says Socrates, because I want to show you not only that + ideal opposites exclude one another, but also the opposites in us. I, for + example, having the attribute of smallness remain small, and cannot become + great: the smallness which is in me drives out greatness. + </p> + <p> + One of the company here remarked that this was inconsistent with the old + assertion that opposites generated opposites. But that, replies Socrates, + was affirmed, not of opposite ideas either in us or in nature, but of + opposition in the concrete—not of life and death, but of individuals + living and dying. When this objection has been removed, Socrates proceeds: + This doctrine of the mutual exclusion of opposites is not only true of the + opposites themselves, but of things which are inseparable from them. For + example, cold and heat are opposed; and fire, which is inseparable from + heat, cannot co-exist with cold, or snow, which is inseparable from cold, + with heat. Again, the number three excludes the number four, because three + is an odd number and four is an even number, and the odd is opposed to the + even. Thus we are able to proceed a step beyond 'the safe and simple + answer.' We may say, not only that the odd excludes the even, but that the + number three, which participates in oddness, excludes the even. And in + like manner, not only does life exclude death, but the soul, of which life + is the inseparable attribute, also excludes death. And that of which life + is the inseparable attribute is by the force of the terms imperishable. If + the odd principle were imperishable, then the number three would not + perish but remove, on the approach of the even principle. But the immortal + is imperishable; and therefore the soul on the approach of death does not + perish but removes. + </p> + <p> + Thus all objections appear to be finally silenced. And now the application + has to be made: If the soul is immortal, 'what manner of persons ought we + to be?' having regard not only to time but to eternity. For death is not + the end of all, and the wicked is not released from his evil by death; but + every one carries with him into the world below that which he is or has + become, and that only. + </p> + <p> + For after death the soul is carried away to judgment, and when she has + received her punishment returns to earth in the course of ages. The wise + soul is conscious of her situation, and follows the attendant angel who + guides her through the windings of the world below; but the impure soul + wanders hither and thither without companion or guide, and is carried at + last to her own place, as the pure soul is also carried away to hers. 'In + order that you may understand this, I must first describe to you the + nature and conformation of the earth.' + </p> + <p> + Now the whole earth is a globe placed in the centre of the heavens, and is + maintained there by the perfection of balance. That which we call the + earth is only one of many small hollows, wherein collect the mists and + waters and the thick lower air; but the true earth is above, and is in a + finer and subtler element. And if, like birds, we could fly to the surface + of the air, in the same manner that fishes come to the top of the sea, + then we should behold the true earth and the true heaven and the true + stars. Our earth is everywhere corrupted and corroded; and even the land + which is fairer than the sea, for that is a mere chaos or waste of water + and mud and sand, has nothing to show in comparison of the other world. + But the heavenly earth is of divers colours, sparkling with jewels + brighter than gold and whiter than any snow, having flowers and fruits + innumerable. And the inhabitants dwell some on the shore of the sea of + air, others in 'islets of the blest,' and they hold converse with the + gods, and behold the sun, moon and stars as they truly are, and their + other blessedness is of a piece with this. + </p> + <p> + The hollows on the surface of the globe vary in size and shape from that + which we inhabit: but all are connected by passages and perforations in + the interior of the earth. And there is one huge chasm or opening called + Tartarus, into which streams of fire and water and liquid mud are ever + flowing; of these small portions find their way to the surface and form + seas and rivers and volcanoes. There is a perpetual inhalation and + exhalation of the air rising and falling as the waters pass into the + depths of the earth and return again, in their course forming lakes and + rivers, but never descending below the centre of the earth; for on either + side the rivers flowing either way are stopped by a precipice. These + rivers are many and mighty, and there are four principal ones, Oceanus, + Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Cocytus. Oceanus is the river which encircles + the earth; Acheron takes an opposite direction, and after flowing under + the earth through desert places, at last reaches the Acherusian lake,—this + is the river at which the souls of the dead await their return to earth. + Pyriphlegethon is a stream of fire, which coils round the earth and flows + into the depths of Tartarus. The fourth river, Cocytus, is that which is + called by the poets the Stygian river, and passes into and forms the lake + Styx, from the waters of which it gains new and strange powers. This + river, too, falls into Tartarus. + </p> + <p> + The dead are first of all judged according to their deeds, and those who + are incurable are thrust into Tartarus, from which they never come out. + Those who have only committed venial sins are first purified of them, and + then rewarded for the good which they have done. Those who have committed + crimes, great indeed, but not unpardonable, are thrust into Tartarus, but + are cast forth at the end of a year by way of Pyriphlegethon or Cocytus, + and these carry them as far as the Acherusian lake, where they call upon + their victims to let them come out of the rivers into the lake. And if + they prevail, then they are let out and their sufferings cease: if not, + they are borne unceasingly into Tartarus and back again, until they at + last obtain mercy. The pure souls also receive their reward, and have + their abode in the upper earth, and a select few in still fairer + 'mansions.' + </p> + <p> + Socrates is not prepared to insist on the literal accuracy of this + description, but he is confident that something of the kind is true. He + who has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and rejected the pleasures + of the body, has reason to be of good hope at the approach of death; whose + voice is already speaking to him, and who will one day be heard calling + all men. + </p> + <p> + The hour has come at which he must drink the poison, and not much remains + to be done. How shall they bury him? That is a question which he refuses + to entertain, for they are burying, not him, but his dead body. His + friends had once been sureties that he would remain, and they shall now be + sureties that he has run away. Yet he would not die without the customary + ceremonies of washing and burial. Shall he make a libation of the poison? + In the spirit he will, but not in the letter. One request he utters in the + very act of death, which has been a puzzle to after ages. With a sort of + irony he remembers that a trifling religious duty is still unfulfilled, + just as above he desires before he departs to compose a few verses in + order to satisfy a scruple about a dream—unless, indeed, we suppose + him to mean, that he was now restored to health, and made the customary + offering to Asclepius in token of his recovery. + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + 1. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has sunk deep into the + heart of the human race; and men are apt to rebel against any examination + of the nature or grounds of their belief. They do not like to acknowledge + that this, as well as the other 'eternal ideas; of man, has a history in + time, which may be traced in Greek poetry or philosophy, and also in the + Hebrew Scriptures. They convert feeling into reasoning, and throw a + network of dialectics over that which is really a deeply-rooted instinct. + In the same temper which Socrates reproves in himself they are disposed to + think that even fallacies will do no harm, for they will die with them, + and while they live they will gain by the delusion. And when they consider + the numberless bad arguments which have been pressed into the service of + theology, they say, like the companions of Socrates, 'What argument can we + ever trust again?' But there is a better and higher spirit to be gathered + from the Phaedo, as well as from the other writings of Plato, which says + that first principles should be most constantly reviewed (Phaedo and + Crat.), and that the highest subjects demand of us the greatest accuracy + (Republic); also that we must not become misologists because arguments are + apt to be deceivers. + </p> + <p> + 2. In former ages there was a customary rather than a reasoned belief in + the immortality of the soul. It was based on the authority of the Church, + on the necessity of such a belief to morality and the order of society, on + the evidence of an historical fact, and also on analogies and figures of + speech which filled up the void or gave an expression in words to a + cherished instinct. The mass of mankind went on their way busy with the + affairs of this life, hardly stopping to think about another. But in our + own day the question has been reopened, and it is doubtful whether the + belief which in the first ages of Christianity was the strongest motive of + action can survive the conflict with a scientific age in which the rules + of evidence are stricter and the mind has become more sensitive to + criticism. It has faded into the distance by a natural process as it was + removed further and further from the historical fact on which it has been + supposed to rest. Arguments derived from material things such as the seed + and the ear of corn or transitions in the life of animals from one state + of being to another (the chrysalis and the butterfly) are not 'in pari + materia' with arguments from the visible to the invisible, and are + therefore felt to be no longer applicable. The evidence to the historical + fact seems to be weaker than was once supposed: it is not consistent with + itself, and is based upon documents which are of unknown origin. The + immortality of man must be proved by other arguments than these if it is + again to become a living belief. We must ask ourselves afresh why we still + maintain it, and seek to discover a foundation for it in the nature of God + and in the first principles of morality. + </p> + <p> + 3. At the outset of the discussion we may clear away a confusion. We + certainly do not mean by the immortality of the soul the immortality of + fame, which whether worth having or not can only be ascribed to a very + select class of the whole race of mankind, and even the interest in these + few is comparatively short-lived. To have been a benefactor to the world, + whether in a higher or a lower sphere of life and thought, is a great + thing: to have the reputation of being one, when men have passed out of + the sphere of earthly praise or blame, is hardly worthy of consideration. + The memory of a great man, so far from being immortal, is really limited + to his own generation:—so long as his friends or his disciples are + alive, so long as his books continue to be read, so long as his political + or military successes fill a page in the history of his country. The + praises which are bestowed upon him at his death hardly last longer than + the flowers which are strewed upon his coffin or the 'immortelles' which + are laid upon his tomb. Literature makes the most of its heroes, but the + true man is well aware that far from enjoying an immortality of fame, in a + generation or two, or even in a much shorter time, he will be forgotten + and the world will get on without him. + </p> + <p> + 4. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is + sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith. The + perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the + Phaedo of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form of + the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united with + the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the body as the + ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the + object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means? Shall + we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy or form of an + organized living body? or with Plato, that she has a life of her own? Is + the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer + expression? Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the + boatman to his boat? (Arist. de Anim.) And in another state of being is + the soul to be conceived of as vanishing into infinity, hardly possessing + an existence which she can call her own, as in the pantheistic system of + Spinoza: or as an individual informing another body and entering into new + relations, but retaining her own character? (Compare Gorgias.) Or is the + opposition of soul and body a mere illusion, and the true self neither + soul nor body, but the union of the two in the 'I' which is above them? + And is death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and + the falling away into nothingness of the lower? Or are we vainly + attempting to pass the boundaries of human thought? The body and the soul + seem to be inseparable, not only in fact, but in our conceptions of them; + and any philosophy which too closely unites them, or too widely separates + them, either in this life or in another, disturbs the balance of human + nature. No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or been entirely + consistent with himself in describing their relation to one another. Nor + can we wonder that Plato in the infancy of human thought should have + confused mythology and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal arguments for + real ones. + </p> + <p> + 5. Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the + question of Socrates, 'What is that which we suppose to be immortal?' Is + it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and + universal? Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union + of the two? Is it the mere force of life which is determined to be, or the + consciousness of self which cannot be got rid of, or the fire of genius + which refuses to be extinguished? Or is there a hidden being which is + allied to the Author of all existence, who is because he is perfect, and + to whom our ideas of perfection give us a title to belong? Whatever answer + is given by us to these questions, there still remains the necessity of + allowing the permanence of evil, if not for ever, at any rate for a time, + in order that the wicked 'may not have too good a bargain.' For the + annihilation of evil at death, or the eternal duration of it, seem to + involve equal difficulties in the moral government of the universe. + Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather than by our reason, to think + of the good and wise only as existing in another life. Why should the + mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, the herd of men who have never in + any proper sense the use of reason, reappear with blinking eyes in the + light of another world? But our second thought is that the hope of + humanity is a common one, and that all or none will be partakers of + immortality. Reason does not allow us to suppose that we have any greater + claims than others, and experience may often reveal to us unexpected + flashes of the higher nature in those whom we had despised. Why should the + wicked suffer any more than ourselves? had we been placed in their + circumstances should we have been any better than they? The worst of men + are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they + not be equally such to divine benevolence? Even more than the good they + have need of another life; not that they may be punished, but that they + may be educated. These are a few of the reflections which arise in our + minds when we attempt to assign any form to our conceptions of a future + state. + </p> + <p> + There are some other questions which are disturbing to us because we have + no answer to them. What is to become of the animals in a future state? + Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, and men who + are more stupid and brutal than any animals? Does their life cease at + death, or is there some 'better thing reserved' also for them? They may be + said to have a shadow or imitation of morality, and imperfect moral claims + upon the benevolence of man and upon the justice of God. We cannot think + of the least or lowest of them, the insect, the bird, the inhabitants of + the sea or the desert, as having any place in a future world, and if not + all, why should those who are specially attached to man be deemed worthy + of any exceptional privilege? When we reason about such a subject, almost + at once we degenerate into nonsense. It is a passing thought which has no + real hold on the mind. We may argue for the existence of animals in a + future state from the attributes of God, or from texts of Scripture ('Are + not two sparrows sold for one farthing?' etc.), but the truth is that we + are only filling up the void of another world with our own fancies. Again, + we often talk about the origin of evil, that great bugbear of theologians, + by which they frighten us into believing any superstition. What answer can + be made to the old commonplace, 'Is not God the author of evil, if he + knowingly permitted, but could have prevented it?' Even if we assume that + the inequalities of this life are rectified by some transposition of human + beings in another, still the existence of the very least evil if it could + have been avoided, seems to be at variance with the love and justice of + God. And so we arrive at the conclusion that we are carrying logic too + far, and that the attempt to frame the world according to a rule of divine + perfection is opposed to experience and had better be given up. The case + of the animals is our own. We must admit that the Divine Being, although + perfect himself, has placed us in a state of life in which we may work + together with him for good, but we are very far from having attained to + it. + </p> + <p> + 6. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always prone + to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may serve + to embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we cannot reason + from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the inward. The + progress of physiological science, without bringing us nearer to the great + secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the + relations of body and mind, and in this we have the advantage of the + ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of immortality is to be + discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have been content to rest + their belief in another life on the agreement of the more enlightened part + of mankind, and on the inseparable connection of such a doctrine with the + existence of a God—also in a less degree on the impossibility of + doubting about the continued existence of those whom we love and reverence + in this world. And after all has been said, the figure, the analogy, the + argument, are felt to be only approximations in different forms to an + expression of the common sentiment of the human heart. That we shall live + again is far more certain than that we shall take any particular form of + life. + </p> + <p> + 7. When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further what + we mean by the word immortality. For of the duration of a living being in + countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three years' old + child of the whole of life. The naked eye might as well try to see the + furthest star in the infinity of heaven. Whether time and space really + exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; at any rate the + thought of them when unlimited us so overwhelming to us as to lose all + distinctness. Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human mind, + but what is the mind without them? As then infinite time, or an existence + out of time, which are the only possible explanations of eternal duration, + are equally inconceivable to us, let us substitute for them a hundred or a + thousand years after death, and ask not what will be our employment in + eternity, but what will happen to us in that definite portion of time; or + what is now happening to those who passed out of life a hundred or a + thousand years ago. Do we imagine that the wicked are suffering torments, + or that the good are singing the praises of God, during a period longer + than that of a whole life, or of ten lives of men? Is the suffering + physical or mental? And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or + of many forms of service? Who are the wicked, and who are the good, whom + we venture to divide by a hard and fast line; and in which of the two + classes should we place ourselves and our friends? May we not suspect that + we are making differences of kind, because we are unable to imagine + differences of degree?—putting the whole human race into heaven or + hell for the greater convenience of logical division? Are we not at the + same time describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy + the demands of rhetoric? What is that pain which does not become deadened + after a thousand years? or what is the nature of that pleasure or + happiness which never wearies by monotony? Earthly pleasures and pains are + short in proportion as they are keen; of any others which are both intense + and lasting we have no experience, and can form no idea. The words or + figures of speech which we use are not consistent with themselves. For are + we not imagining Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a + prison, or perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors? And yet to beings + constituted as we are, the monotony of singing psalms would be as great an + infliction as the pains of hell, and might be even pleasantly interrupted + by them. Where are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which + are conferred on the greatest benefactors of mankind? And where are the + crimes which according to Plato's merciful reckoning,—more merciful, + at any rate, than the eternal damnation of so-called Christian teachers,—for + every ten years in this life deserve a hundred of punishment in the life + to come? We should be ready to die of pity if we could see the least of + the sufferings which the writers of Infernos and Purgatorios have + attributed to the damned. Yet these joys and terrors seem hardly to + exercise an appreciable influence over the lives of men. The wicked man + when old, is not, as Plato supposes (Republic), more agitated by the + terrors of another world when he is nearer to them, nor the good in an + ecstasy at the joys of which he is soon to be the partaker. Age numbs the + sense of both worlds; and the habit of life is strongest in death. Even + the dying mother is dreaming of her lost children as they were forty or + fifty years before, 'pattering over the boards,' not of reunion with them + in another state of being. Most persons when the last hour comes are + resigned to the order of nature and the will of God. They are not thinking + of Dante's Inferno or Paradiso, or of the Pilgrim's Progress. Heaven and + hell are not realities to them, but words or ideas; the outward symbols of + some great mystery, they hardly know what. Many noble poems and pictures + have been suggested by the traditional representations of them, which have + been fixed in forms of art and can no longer be altered. Many sermons have + been filled with descriptions of celestial or infernal mansions. But + hardly even in childhood did the thought of heaven and hell supply the + motives of our actions, or at any time seriously affect the substance of + our belief. + </p> + <p> + 8. Another life must be described, if at all, in forms of thought and not + of sense. To draw pictures of heaven and hell, whether in the language of + Scripture or any other, adds nothing to our real knowledge, but may + perhaps disguise our ignorance. The truest conception which we can form of + a future life is a state of progress or education—a progress from + evil to good, from ignorance to knowledge. To this we are led by the + analogy of the present life, in which we see different races and nations + of men, and different men and women of the same nation, in various states + or stages of cultivation; some more and some less developed, and all of + them capable of improvement under favourable circumstances. There are + punishments too of children when they are growing up inflicted by their + parents, of elder offenders which are imposed by the law of the land, of + all men at all times of life, which are attached by the laws of nature to + the performance of certain actions. All these punishments are really + educational; that is to say, they are not intended to retaliate on the + offender, but to teach him a lesson. Also there is an element of chance in + them, which is another name for our ignorance of the laws of nature. There + is evil too inseparable from good (compare Lysis); not always punished + here, as good is not always rewarded. It is capable of being indefinitely + diminished; and as knowledge increases, the element of chance may more and + more disappear. + </p> + <p> + For we do not argue merely from the analogy of the present state of this + world to another, but from the analogy of a probable future to which we + are tending. The greatest changes of which we have had experience as yet + are due to our increasing knowledge of history and of nature. They have + been produced by a few minds appearing in three or four favoured nations, + in a comparatively short period of time. May we be allowed to imagine the + minds of men everywhere working together during many ages for the + completion of our knowledge? May not the science of physiology transform + the world? Again, the majority of mankind have really experienced some + moral improvement; almost every one feels that he has tendencies to good, + and is capable of becoming better. And these germs of good are often found + to be developed by new circumstances, like stunted trees when transplanted + to a better soil. The differences between the savage and the civilized + man, or between the civilized man in old and new countries, may be + indefinitely increased. The first difference is the effect of a few + thousand, the second of a few hundred years. We congratulate ourselves + that slavery has become industry; that law and constitutional government + have superseded despotism and violence; that an ethical religion has taken + the place of Fetichism. There may yet come a time when the many may be as + well off as the few; when no one will be weighed down by excessive toil; + when the necessity of providing for the body will not interfere with + mental improvement; when the physical frame may be strengthened and + developed; and the religion of all men may become a reasonable service. + </p> + <p> + Nothing therefore, either in the present state of man or in the tendencies + of the future, as far as we can entertain conjecture of them, would lead + us to suppose that God governs us vindictively in this world, and + therefore we have no reason to infer that he will govern us vindictively + in another. The true argument from analogy is not, 'This life is a mixed + state of justice and injustice, of great waste, of sudden casualties, of + disproportionate punishments, and therefore the like inconsistencies, + irregularities, injustices are to be expected in another;' but 'This life + is subject to law, and is in a state of progress, and therefore law and + progress may be believed to be the governing principles of another.' All + the analogies of this world would be against unmeaning punishments + inflicted a hundred or a thousand years after an offence had been + committed. Suffering there might be as a part of education, but not + hopeless or protracted; as there might be a retrogression of individuals + or of bodies of men, yet not such as to interfere with a plan for the + improvement of the whole (compare Laws.) + </p> + <p> + 9. But some one will say: That we cannot reason from the seen to the + unseen, and that we are creating another world after the image of this, + just as men in former ages have created gods in their own likeness. And + we, like the companions of Socrates, may feel discouraged at hearing our + favourite 'argument from analogy' thus summarily disposed of. Like + himself, too, we may adduce other arguments in which he seems to have + anticipated us, though he expresses them in different language. For we + feel that the soul partakes of the ideal and invisible; and can never fall + into the error of confusing the external circumstances of man with his + higher self; or his origin with his nature. It is as repugnant to us as it + was to him to imagine that our moral ideas are to be attributed only to + cerebral forces. The value of a human soul, like the value of a man's life + to himself, is inestimable, and cannot be reckoned in earthly or material + things. The human being alone has the consciousness of truth and justice + and love, which is the consciousness of God. And the soul becoming more + conscious of these, becomes more conscious of her own immortality. + </p> + <p> + 10. The last ground of our belief in immortality, and the strongest, is + the perfection of the divine nature. The mere fact of the existence of God + does not tend to show the continued existence of man. An evil God or an + indifferent God might have had the power, but not the will, to preserve + us. He might have regarded us as fitted to minister to his service by a + succession of existences,—like the animals, without attributing to + each soul an incomparable value. But if he is perfect, he must will that + all rational beings should partake of that perfection which he himself is. + In the words of the Timaeus, he is good, and therefore he desires that all + other things should be as like himself as possible. And the manner in + which he accomplishes this is by permitting evil, or rather degrees of + good, which are otherwise called evil. For all progress is good relatively + to the past, and yet may be comparatively evil when regarded in the light + of the future. Good and evil are relative terms, and degrees of evil are + merely the negative aspect of degrees of good. Of the absolute goodness of + any finite nature we can form no conception; we are all of us in process + of transition from one degree of good or evil to another. The difficulties + which are urged about the origin or existence of evil are mere dialectical + puzzles, standing in the same relation to Christian philosophy as the + puzzles of the Cynics and Megarians to the philosophy of Plato. They arise + out of the tendency of the human mind to regard good and evil both as + relative and absolute; just as the riddles about motion are to be + explained by the double conception of space or matter, which the human + mind has the power of regarding either as continuous or discrete. + </p> + <p> + In speaking of divine perfection, we mean to say that God is just and true + and loving, the author of order and not of disorder, of good and not of + evil. Or rather, that he is justice, that he is truth, that he is love, + that he is order, that he is the very progress of which we were speaking; + and that wherever these qualities are present, whether in the human soul + or in the order of nature, there is God. We might still see him + everywhere, if we had not been mistakenly seeking for him apart from us, + instead of in us; away from the laws of nature, instead of in them. And we + become united to him not by mystical absorption, but by partaking, whether + consciously or unconsciously, of that truth and justice and love which he + himself is. + </p> + <p> + Thus the belief in the immortality of the soul rests at last on the belief + in God. If there is a good and wise God, then there is a progress of + mankind towards perfection; and if there is no progress of men towards + perfection, then there is no good and wise God. We cannot suppose that the + moral government of God of which we see the beginnings in the world and in + ourselves will cease when we pass out of life. + </p> + <p> + 11. Considering the 'feebleness of the human faculties and the uncertainty + of the subject,' we are inclined to believe that the fewer our words the + better. At the approach of death there is not much said; good men are too + honest to go out of the world professing more than they know. There is + perhaps no important subject about which, at any time, even religious + people speak so little to one another. In the fulness of life the thought + of death is mostly awakened by the sight or recollection of the death of + others rather than by the prospect of our own. We must also acknowledge + that there are degrees of the belief in immortality, and many forms in + which it presents itself to the mind. Some persons will say no more than + that they trust in God, and that they leave all to Him. It is a great part + of true religion not to pretend to know more than we do. Others when they + quit this world are comforted with the hope 'That they will see and know + their friends in heaven.' But it is better to leave them in the hands of + God and to be assured that 'no evil shall touch them.' There are others + again to whom the belief in a divine personality has ceased to have any + longer a meaning; yet they are satisfied that the end of all is not here, + but that something still remains to us, 'and some better thing for the + good than for the evil.' They are persuaded, in spite of their theological + nihilism, that the ideas of justice and truth and holiness and love are + realities. They cherish an enthusiastic devotion to the first principles + of morality. Through these they see, or seem to see, darkly, and in a + figure, that the soul is immortal. + </p> + <p> + But besides differences of theological opinion which must ever prevail + about things unseen, the hope of immortality is weaker or stronger in men + at one time of life than at another; it even varies from day to day. It + comes and goes; the mind, like the sky, is apt to be overclouded. Other + generations of men may have sometimes lived under an 'eclipse of faith,' + to us the total disappearance of it might be compared to the 'sun falling + from heaven.' And we may sometimes have to begin again and acquire the + belief for ourselves; or to win it back again when it is lost. It is + really weakest in the hour of death. For Nature, like a kind mother or + nurse, lays us to sleep without frightening us; physicians, who are the + witnesses of such scenes, say that under ordinary circumstances there is + no fear of the future. Often, as Plato tells us, death is accompanied + 'with pleasure.' (Tim.) When the end is still uncertain, the cry of many a + one has been, 'Pray, that I may be taken.' The last thoughts even of the + best men depend chiefly on the accidents of their bodily state. Pain soon + overpowers the desire of life; old age, like the child, is laid to sleep + almost in a moment. The long experience of life will often destroy the + interest which mankind have in it. So various are the feelings with which + different persons draw near to death; and still more various the forms in + which imagination clothes it. For this alternation of feeling compare the + Old Testament,—Psalm vi.; Isaiah; Eccles. + </p> + <p> + 12. When we think of God and of man in his relation to God; of the + imperfection of our present state and yet of the progress which is + observable in the history of the world and of the human mind; of the depth + and power of our moral ideas which seem to partake of the very nature of + God Himself; when we consider the contrast between the physical laws to + which we are subject and the higher law which raises us above them and is + yet a part of them; when we reflect on our capacity of becoming the + 'spectators of all time and all existence,' and of framing in our own + minds the ideal of a perfect Being; when we see how the human mind in all + the higher religions of the world, including Buddhism, notwithstanding + some aberrations, has tended towards such a belief—we have reason to + think that our destiny is different from that of animals; and though we + cannot altogether shut out the childish fear that the soul upon leaving + the body may 'vanish into thin air,' we have still, so far as the nature + of the subject admits, a hope of immortality with which we comfort + ourselves on sufficient grounds. The denial of the belief takes the heart + out of human life; it lowers men to the level of the material. As Goethe + also says, 'He is dead even in this world who has no belief in another.' + </p> + <p> + 13. It is well also that we should sometimes think of the forms of thought + under which the idea of immortality is most naturally presented to us. It + is clear that to our minds the risen soul can no longer be described, as + in a picture, by the symbol of a creature half-bird, half-human, nor in + any other form of sense. The multitude of angels, as in Milton, singing + the Almighty's praises, are a noble image, and may furnish a theme for the + poet or the painter, but they are no longer an adequate expression of the + kingdom of God which is within us. Neither is there any mansion, in this + world or another, in which the departed can be imagined to dwell and carry + on their occupations. When this earthly tabernacle is dissolved, no other + habitation or building can take them in: it is in the language of ideas + only that we speak of them. + </p> + <p> + First of all there is the thought of rest and freedom from pain; they have + gone home, as the common saying is, and the cares of this world touch them + no more. Secondly, we may imagine them as they were at their best and + brightest, humbly fulfilling their daily round of duties—selfless, + childlike, unaffected by the world; when the eye was single and the whole + body seemed to be full of light; when the mind was clear and saw into the + purposes of God. Thirdly, we may think of them as possessed by a great + love of God and man, working out His will at a further stage in the + heavenly pilgrimage. And yet we acknowledge that these are the things + which eye hath not seen nor ear heard and therefore it hath not entered + into the heart of man in any sensible manner to conceive them. Fourthly, + there may have been some moments in our own lives when we have risen above + ourselves, or been conscious of our truer selves, in which the will of God + has superseded our wills, and we have entered into communion with Him, and + been partakers for a brief season of the Divine truth and love, in which + like Christ we have been inspired to utter the prayer, 'I in them, and + thou in me, that we may be all made perfect in one.' These precious + moments, if we have ever known them, are the nearest approach which we can + make to the idea of immortality. + </p> + <p> + 14. Returning now to the earlier stage of human thought which is + represented by the writings of Plato, we find that many of the same + questions have already arisen: there is the same tendency to materialism; + the same inconsistency in the application of the idea of mind; the same + doubt whether the soul is to be regarded as a cause or as an effect; the + same falling back on moral convictions. In the Phaedo the soul is + conscious of her divine nature, and the separation from the body which has + been commenced in this life is perfected in another. Beginning in mystery, + Socrates, in the intermediate part of the Dialogue, attempts to bring the + doctrine of a future life into connection with his theory of knowledge. In + proportion as he succeeds in this, the individual seems to disappear in a + more general notion of the soul; the contemplation of ideas 'under the + form of eternity' takes the place of past and future states of existence. + His language may be compared to that of some modern philosophers, who + speak of eternity, not in the sense of perpetual duration of time, but as + an ever-present quality of the soul. Yet at the conclusion of the + Dialogue, having 'arrived at the end of the intellectual world' + (Republic), he replaces the veil of mythology, and describes the soul and + her attendant genius in the language of the mysteries or of a disciple of + Zoroaster. Nor can we fairly demand of Plato a consistency which is + wanting among ourselves, who acknowledge that another world is beyond the + range of human thought, and yet are always seeking to represent the + mansions of heaven or hell in the colours of the painter, or in the + descriptions of the poet or rhetorician. + </p> + <p> + 15. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not new to the Greeks + in the age of Socrates, but, like the unity of God, had a foundation in + the popular belief. The old Homeric notion of a gibbering ghost flitting + away to Hades; or of a few illustrious heroes enjoying the isles of the + blest; or of an existence divided between the two; or the Hesiodic, of + righteous spirits, who become guardian angels,—had given place in + the mysteries and the Orphic poets to representations, partly fanciful, of + a future state of rewards and punishments. (Laws.) The reticence of the + Greeks on public occasions and in some part of their literature respecting + this 'underground' religion, is not to be taken as a measure of the + diffusion of such beliefs. If Pericles in the funeral oration is silent on + the consolations of immortality, the poet Pindar and the tragedians on the + other hand constantly assume the continued existence of the dead in an + upper or under world. Darius and Laius are still alive; Antigone will be + dear to her brethren after death; the way to the palace of Cronos is found + by those who 'have thrice departed from evil.' The tragedy of the Greeks + is not 'rounded' by this life, but is deeply set in decrees of fate and + mysterious workings of powers beneath the earth. In the caricature of + Aristophanes there is also a witness to the common sentiment. The Ionian + and Pythagorean philosophies arose, and some new elements were added to + the popular belief. The individual must find an expression as well as the + world. Either the soul was supposed to exist in the form of a magnet, or + of a particle of fire, or of light, or air, or water; or of a number or of + a harmony of number; or to be or have, like the stars, a principle of + motion (Arist. de Anim.). At length Anaxagoras, hardly distinguishing + between life and mind, or between mind human and divine, attained the pure + abstraction; and this, like the other abstractions of Greek philosophy, + sank deep into the human intelligence. The opposition of the intelligible + and the sensible, and of God to the world, supplied an analogy which + assisted in the separation of soul and body. If ideas were separable from + phenomena, mind was also separable from matter; if the ideas were eternal, + the mind that conceived them was eternal too. As the unity of God was more + distinctly acknowledged, the conception of the human soul became more + developed. The succession, or alternation of life and death, had occurred + to Heracleitus. The Eleatic Parmenides had stumbled upon the modern + thesis, that 'thought and being are the same.' The Eastern belief in + transmigration defined the sense of individuality; and some, like + Empedocles, fancied that the blood which they had shed in another state of + being was crying against them, and that for thirty thousand years they + were to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon the earth.' The desire of + recognizing a lost mother or love or friend in the world below (Phaedo) + was a natural feeling which, in that age as well as in every other, has + given distinctness to the hope of immortality. Nor were ethical + considerations wanting, partly derived from the necessity of punishing the + greater sort of criminals, whom no avenging power of this world could + reach. The voice of conscience, too, was heard reminding the good man that + he was not altogether innocent. (Republic.) To these indistinct longings + and fears an expression was given in the mysteries and Orphic poets: a + 'heap of books' (Republic), passing under the names of Musaeus and Orpheus + in Plato's time, were filled with notions of an under-world. + </p> + <p> + 16. Yet after all the belief in the individuality of the soul after death + had but a feeble hold on the Greek mind. Like the personality of God, the + personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound up with the + reality of his existence. For the distinction between the personal and + impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far less marked to + the Greek than to ourselves. And as Plato readily passes from the notion + of the good to that of God, he also passes almost imperceptibly to himself + and his reader from the future life of the individual soul to the eternal + being of the absolute soul. There has been a clearer statement and a + clearer denial of the belief in modern times than is found in early Greek + philosophy, and hence the comparative silence on the whole subject which + is often remarked in ancient writers, and particularly in Aristotle. For + Plato and Aristotle are not further removed in their teaching about the + immortality of the soul than they are in their theory of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + 17. Living in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought, + Plato naturally cast his belief in immortality into a logical form. And + when we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, it + is not surprising that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies: early + logic is always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of the + matter. It is easy to see that the alternation of opposites is not the + same as the generation of them out of each other; and that the generation + of them out of each other, which is the first argument in the Phaedo, is + at variance with their mutual exclusion of each other, whether in + themselves or in us, which is the last. For even if we admit the + distinction which he draws between the opposites and the things which have + the opposites, still individuals fall under the latter class; and we have + to pass out of the region of human hopes and fears to a conception of an + abstract soul which is the impersonation of the ideas. Such a conception, + which in Plato himself is but half expressed, is unmeaning to us, and + relative only to a particular stage in the history of thought. The + doctrine of reminiscence is also a fragment of a former world, which has + no place in the philosophy of modern times. But Plato had the wonders of + psychology just opening to him, and he had not the explanation of them + which is supplied by the analysis of language and the history of the human + mind. The question, 'Whence come our abstract ideas?' he could only answer + by an imaginary hypothesis. Nor is it difficult to see that his crowning + argument is purely verbal, and is but the expression of an instinctive + confidence put into a logical form:—'The soul is immortal because it + contains a principle of imperishableness.' Nor does he himself seem at all + to be aware that nothing is added to human knowledge by his 'safe and + simple answer,' that beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that he is + merely reasserting the Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean numbers,' + against the Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation. The answer to + the 'very serious question' of generation and destruction is really the + denial of them. For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a system + of ideas, tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, and not + explained by actual causes, but by a higher, that is, a more general + notion. Consistency with themselves is the only test which is to be + applied to them. (Republic, and Phaedo.) + </p> + <p> + 18. To deal fairly with such arguments, they should be translated as far + as possible into their modern equivalents. 'If the ideas of men are + eternal, their souls are eternal, and if not the ideas, then not the + souls.' Such an argument stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and + his age, as the argument from the existence of God to immortality among + ourselves. 'If God exists, then the soul exists after death; and if there + is no God, there is no existence of the soul after death.' For the ideas + are to his mind the reality, the truth, the principle of permanence, as + well as of intelligence and order in the world. When Simmias and Cebes say + that they are more strongly persuaded of the existence of ideas than they + are of the immortality of the soul, they represent fairly enough the order + of thought in Greek philosophy. And we might say in the same way that we + are more certain of the existence of God than we are of the immortality of + the soul, and are led by the belief in the one to a belief in the other. + The parallel, as Socrates would say, is not perfect, but agrees in as far + as the mind in either case is regarded as dependent on something above and + beyond herself. The analogy may even be pressed a step further: 'We are + more certain of our ideas of truth and right than we are of the existence + of God, and are led on in the order of thought from one to the other.' Or + more correctly: 'The existence of right and truth is the existence of God, + and can never for a moment be separated from Him.' + </p> + <p> + 19. The main argument of the Phaedo is derived from the existence of + eternal ideas of which the soul is a partaker; the other argument of the + alternation of opposites is replaced by this. And there have not been + wanting philosophers of the idealist school who have imagined that the + doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a theory of knowledge, and that + in what has preceded Plato is accommodating himself to the popular belief. + Such a view can only be elicited from the Phaedo by what may be termed the + transcendental method of interpretation, and is obviously inconsistent + with the Gorgias and the Republic. Those who maintain it are immediately + compelled to renounce the shadow which they have grasped, as a play of + words only. But the truth is, that Plato in his argument for the + immortality of the soul has collected many elements of proof or + persuasion, ethical and mythological as well as dialectical, which are not + easily to be reconciled with one another; and he is as much in earnest + about his doctrine of retribution, which is repeated in all his more + ethical writings, as about his theory of knowledge. And while we may + fairly translate the dialectical into the language of Hegel, and the + religious and mythological into the language of Dante or Bunyan, the + ethical speaks to us still in the same voice, and appeals to a common + feeling. + </p> + <p> + 20. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the Phaedo. The first + may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state of + being. Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is seeking + to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the things of + the world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in these + aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in modern + times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind, the other + from the progress of the soul towards perfection. In using this argument + Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the body, with the + soul of the good and wise. (Compare Republic.) Such a confusion was + natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of soul and body. The soul + in her own essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with virtues and graces, + were easily interchanged with one another, because on a subject which + passes expression the distinctions of language can hardly be maintained. + </p> + <p> + 21. The ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the + necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off if their evil + deeds came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus, an + Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of their + crimes in this world. The manner in which this retribution is accomplished + Plato represents under the figures of mythology. Doubtless he felt that it + was easier to improve than to invent, and that in religion especially the + traditional form was required in order to give verisimilitude to the myth. + The myth too is far more probable to that age than to ours, and may fairly + be regarded as 'one guess among many' about the nature of the earth, which + he cleverly supports by the indications of geology. Not that he insists on + the absolute truth of his own particular notions: 'no man of sense will be + confident in such matters; but he will be confident that something of the + kind is true.' As in other passages (Gorg., Tim., compare Crito), he wins + belief for his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, + like Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own + creations. + </p> + <p> + The Dialogue must be read in the light of the situation. And first of all + we are struck by the calmness of the scene. Like the spectators at the + time, we cannot pity Socrates; his mien and his language are so noble and + fearless. He is the same that he ever was, but milder and gentler, and he + has in no degree lost his interest in dialectics; he will not forego the + delight of an argument in compliance with the jailer's intimation that he + should not heat himself with talking. At such a time he naturally + expresses the hope of his life, that he has been a true mystic and not a + mere retainer or wand-bearer: and he refers to passages of his personal + history. To his old enemies the Comic poets, and to the proceedings on the + trial, he alludes playfully; but he vividly remembers the disappointment + which he felt in reading the books of Anaxagoras. The return of Xanthippe + and his children indicates that the philosopher is not 'made of oak or + rock.' Some other traits of his character may be noted; for example, the + courteous manner in which he inclines his head to the last objector, or + the ironical touch, 'Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice + of fate calls;' or the depreciation of the arguments with which 'he + comforted himself and them;' or his fear of 'misology;' or his references + to Homer; or the playful smile with which he 'talks like a book' about + greater and less; or the allusion to the possibility of finding another + teacher among barbarous races (compare Polit.); or the mysterious + reference to another science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction + for which he is vainly feeling. There is no change in him; only now he is + invested with a sort of sacred character, as the prophet or priest of + Apollo the God of the festival, in whose honour he first of all composes a + hymn, and then like the swan pours forth his dying lay. Perhaps the + extreme elevation of Socrates above his own situation, and the ordinary + interests of life (compare his jeu d'esprit about his burial, in which for + a moment he puts on the 'Silenus mask'), create in the mind of the reader + an impression stronger than could be derived from arguments that such a + one has in him 'a principle which does not admit of death.' + </p> + <p> + The other persons of the Dialogue may be considered under two heads: (1) + private friends; (2) the respondents in the argument. + </p> + <p> + First there is Crito, who has been already introduced to us in the + Euthydemus and the Crito; he is the equal in years of Socrates, and stands + in quite a different relation to him from his younger disciples. He is a + man of the world who is rich and prosperous (compare the jest in the + Euthydemus), the best friend of Socrates, who wants to know his commands, + in whose presence he talks to his family, and who performs the last duty + of closing his eyes. It is observable too that, as in the Euthydemus, + Crito shows no aptitude for philosophical discussions. Nor among the + friends of Socrates must the jailer be forgotten, who seems to have been + introduced by Plato in order to show the impression made by the + extraordinary man on the common. The gentle nature of the man is indicated + by his weeping at the announcement of his errand and then turning away, + and also by the words of Socrates to his disciples: 'How charming the man + is! since I have been in prison he has been always coming to me, and is as + good as could be to me.' We are reminded too that he has retained this + gentle nature amid scenes of death and violence by the contrasts which he + draws between the behaviour of Socrates and of others when about to die. + </p> + <p> + Another person who takes no part in the philosophical discussion is the + excitable Apollodorus, the same who, in the Symposium, of which he is the + narrator, is called 'the madman,' and who testifies his grief by the most + violent emotions. Phaedo is also present, the 'beloved disciple' as he may + be termed, who is described, if not 'leaning on his bosom,' as seated next + to Socrates, who is playing with his hair. He too, like Apollodorus, takes + no part in the discussion, but he loves above all things to hear and speak + of Socrates after his death. The calmness of his behaviour, veiling his + face when he can no longer restrain his tears, contrasts with the + passionate outcries of the other. At a particular point the argument is + described as falling before the attack of Simmias. A sort of despair is + introduced in the minds of the company. The effect of this is heightened + by the description of Phaedo, who has been the eye-witness of the scene, + and by the sympathy of his Phliasian auditors who are beginning to think + 'that they too can never trust an argument again.' And the intense + interest of the company is communicated not only to the first auditors, + but to us who in a distant country read the narrative of their emotions + after more than two thousand years have passed away. + </p> + <p> + The two principal interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, the disciples of + Philolaus the Pythagorean philosopher of Thebes. Simmias is described in + the Phaedrus as fonder of an argument than any man living; and Cebes, + although finally persuaded by Socrates, is said to be the most incredulous + of human beings. It is Cebes who at the commencement of the Dialogue asks + why 'suicide is held to be unlawful,' and who first supplies the doctrine + of recollection in confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. It is + Cebes who urges that the pre-existence does not necessarily involve the + future existence of the soul, as is shown by the illustration of the + weaver and his coat. Simmias, on the other hand, raises the question about + harmony and the lyre, which is naturally put into the mouth of a + Pythagorean disciple. It is Simmias, too, who first remarks on the + uncertainty of human knowledge, and only at last concedes to the argument + such a qualified approval as is consistent with the feebleness of the + human faculties. Cebes is the deeper and more consecutive thinker, Simmias + more superficial and rhetorical; they are distinguished in much the same + manner as Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Republic. + </p> + <p> + Other persons, Menexenus, Ctesippus, Lysis, are old friends; Evenus has + been already satirized in the Apology; Aeschines and Epigenes were present + at the trial; Euclid and Terpsion will reappear in the Introduction to the + Theaetetus, Hermogenes has already appeared in the Cratylus. No inference + can fairly be drawn from the absence of Aristippus, nor from the omission + of Xenophon, who at the time of Socrates' death was in Asia. The mention + of Plato's own absence seems like an expression of sorrow, and may, + perhaps, be an indication that the report of the conversation is not to be + taken literally. + </p> + <p> + The place of the Dialogue in the series is doubtful. The doctrine of ideas + is certainly carried beyond the Socratic point of view; in no other of the + writings of Plato is the theory of them so completely developed. Whether + the belief in immortality can be attributed to Socrates or not is + uncertain; the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the earlier Dialogues of + Plato, is an argument to the contrary. Yet in the Cyropaedia Xenophon has + put language into the mouth of the dying Cyrus which recalls the Phaedo, + and may have been derived from the teaching of Socrates. It may be fairly + urged that the greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been + wholly ignored by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an + oracle, and who recognized a Divine plan in man and nature. (Xen. Mem.) + And the language of the Apology and of the Crito confirms this view. + </p> + <p> + The Phaedo is not one of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato; nor, on the + other hand, can it be assigned to that later stage of the Platonic + writings at which the doctrine of ideas appears to be forgotten. It + belongs rather to the intermediate period of the Platonic philosophy, + which roughly corresponds to the Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic, Theaetetus. + Without pretending to determine the real time of their composition, the + Symposium, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Phaedo may be conveniently read by us + in this order as illustrative of the life of Socrates. Another chain may + be formed of the Meno, Phaedrus, Phaedo, in which the immortality of the + soul is connected with the doctrine of ideas. In the Meno the theory of + ideas is based on the ancient belief in transmigration, which reappears + again in the Phaedrus as well as in the Republic and Timaeus, and in all + of them is connected with a doctrine of retribution. In the Phaedrus the + immortality of the soul is supposed to rest on the conception of the soul + as a principle of motion, whereas in the Republic the argument turns on + the natural continuance of the soul, which, if not destroyed by her own + proper evil, can hardly be destroyed by any other. The soul of man in the + Timaeus is derived from the Supreme Creator, and either returns after + death to her kindred star, or descends into the lower life of an animal. + The Apology expresses the same view as the Phaedo, but with less + confidence; there the probability of death being a long sleep is not + excluded. The Theaetetus also describes, in a digression, the desire of + the soul to fly away and be with God—'and to fly to him is to be + like him.' The Symposium may be observed to resemble as well as to differ + from the Phaedo. While the first notion of immortality is only in the way + of natural procreation or of posthumous fame and glory, the higher + revelation of beauty, like the good in the Republic, is the vision of the + eternal idea. So deeply rooted in Plato's mind is the belief in + immortality; so various are the forms of expression which he employs. + </p> + <p> + As in several other Dialogues, there is more of system in the Phaedo than + appears at first sight. The succession of arguments is based on previous + philosophies; beginning with the mysteries and the Heracleitean + alternation of opposites, and proceeding to the Pythagorean harmony and + transmigration; making a step by the aid of Platonic reminiscence, and a + further step by the help of the nous of Anaxagoras; until at last we rest + in the conviction that the soul is inseparable from the ideas, and belongs + to the world of the invisible and unknown. Then, as in the Gorgias or + Republic, the curtain falls, and the veil of mythology descends upon the + argument. After the confession of Socrates that he is an interested party, + and the acknowledgment that no man of sense will think the details of his + narrative true, but that something of the kind is true, we return from + speculation to practice. He is himself more confident of immortality than + he is of his own arguments; and the confidence which he expresses is less + strong than that which his cheerfulness and composure in death inspire in + us. + </p> + <p> + Difficulties of two kinds occur in the Phaedo—one kind to be + explained out of contemporary philosophy, the other not admitting of an + entire solution. (1) The difficulty which Socrates says that he + experienced in explaining generation and corruption; the assumption of + hypotheses which proceed from the less general to the more general, and + are tested by their consequences; the puzzle about greater and less; the + resort to the method of ideas, which to us appear only abstract terms,—these + are to be explained out of the position of Socrates and Plato in the + history of philosophy. They were living in a twilight between the sensible + and the intellectual world, and saw no way of connecting them. They could + neither explain the relation of ideas to phenomena, nor their correlation + to one another. The very idea of relation or comparison was embarrassing + to them. Yet in this intellectual uncertainty they had a conception of a + proof from results, and of a moral truth, which remained unshaken amid the + questionings of philosophy. (2) The other is a difficulty which is touched + upon in the Republic as well as in the Phaedo, and is common to modern and + ancient philosophy. Plato is not altogether satisfied with his safe and + simple method of ideas. He wants to have proved to him by facts that all + things are for the best, and that there is one mind or design which + pervades them all. But this 'power of the best' he is unable to explain; + and therefore takes refuge in universal ideas. And are not we at this day + seeking to discover that which Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw? + </p> + <p> + Some resemblances to the Greek drama may be noted in all the Dialogues of + Plato. The Phaedo is the tragedy of which Socrates is the protagonist and + Simmias and Cebes the secondary performers, standing to them in the same + relation as to Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic. No Dialogue has a + greater unity of subject and feeling. Plato has certainly fulfilled the + condition of Greek, or rather of all art, which requires that scenes of + death and suffering should be clothed in beauty. The gathering of the + friends at the commencement of the Dialogue, the dismissal of Xanthippe, + whose presence would have been out of place at a philosophical discussion, + but who returns again with her children to take a final farewell, the + dejection of the audience at the temporary overthrow of the argument, the + picture of Socrates playing with the hair of Phaedo, the final scene in + which Socrates alone retains his composure—are masterpieces of art. + And the chorus at the end might have interpreted the feeling of the play: + 'There can no evil happen to a good man in life or death.' + </p> + <p> + 'The art of concealing art' is nowhere more perfect than in those writings + of Plato which describe the trial and death of Socrates. Their charm is + their simplicity, which gives them verisimilitude; and yet they touch, as + if incidentally, and because they were suitable to the occasion, on some + of the deepest truths of philosophy. There is nothing in any tragedy, + ancient or modern, nothing in poetry or history (with one exception), like + the last hours of Socrates in Plato. The master could not be more fitly + occupied at such a time than in discoursing of immortality; nor the + disciples more divinely consoled. The arguments, taken in the spirit and + not in the letter, are our arguments; and Socrates by anticipation may be + even thought to refute some 'eccentric notions; current in our own age. + For there are philosophers among ourselves who do not seem to understand + how much stronger is the power of intelligence, or of the best, than of + Atlas, or mechanical force. How far the words attributed to Socrates were + actually uttered by him we forbear to ask; for no answer can be given to + this question. And it is better to resign ourselves to the feeling of a + great work, than to linger among critical uncertainties. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PHAEDO + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: + </p> + <p> + Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius. + Socrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Cebes, Crito and an Attendant of the + Prison. + </p> + <p> + SCENE: The Prison of Socrates. + </p> + <p> + PLACE OF THE NARRATION: Phlius. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the + day when he drank the poison? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: Yes, Echecrates, I was. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say in + his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one + knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is a + long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that + we had no clear account. + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial? + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not + understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death, + not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the Athenians + send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he was + tried. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: What is this ship? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus + went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the + saviour of them and of himself. And they were said to have vowed to Apollo + at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to + Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage + to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of + the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be + polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary + winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable. As I + was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was + the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long + after he was condemned. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or + done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities + forbid them to be present—so that he had no friends near him when he + died? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: No; there were several of them with him. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what + passed, as exactly as you can. + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish. To + be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I + speak myself or hear another speak of him. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and + I hope that you will be as exact as you can. + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could + hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore + I did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and + bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed. I + thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine + call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived + there, and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at + such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in + philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). + I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of + pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and this double feeling was + shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the + excitable Apollodorus—you know the sort of man? + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly + moved. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Who were present? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus + and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes; + likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others; + Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Were there any strangers? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; + Euclid and Terpison, who came from Megara. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: No, they were said to be in Aegina. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Any one else? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: I think that these were nearly all. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Well, and what did you talk about? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire + conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling + early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which + is not far from the prison. There we used to wait talking with one another + until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early); then + we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning + we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we + quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from + Delos, and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On + our arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, + came out and told us to stay until he called us. 'For the Eleven,' he + said, 'are now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving + orders that he is to die to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might + come in. On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and + Xanthippe, whom you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her + arms. When she saw us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: 'O + Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your + friends, or they with you.' Socrates turned to Crito and said: 'Crito, let + some one take her home.' Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, + crying out and beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting + up on the couch, bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing: How + singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, + which might be thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never + present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is + generally compelled to take the other; their bodies are two, but they are + joined by a single head. And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had + remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile + their strife, and how, when he could not, he fastened their heads + together; and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows, as + I know by my own experience now, when after the pain in my leg which was + caused by the chain pleasure appears to succeed. + </p> + <p> + Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the + name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by + many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet—he + will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to have + an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him:—he + wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that + you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also + composing that hymn in honour of Apollo. + </p> + <p> + Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth—that I had no idea of + rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. + But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt + about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often + had intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same dream + came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always + saying the same or nearly the same words: 'Cultivate and make music,' said + the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to + exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the + pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was + bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the + competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already + running. But I was not certain of this, for the dream might have meant + music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, + and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that it would be safer for + me to satisfy the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a + few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honour of the god + of the festival, and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a + poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories, and + that I have no invention, I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready + at hand and which I knew—they were the first I came upon—and + turned them into verse. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good + cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and + not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say + that I must. + </p> + <p> + Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent + companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never + take your advice unless he is obliged. + </p> + <p> + Why, said Socrates,—is not Evenus a philosopher? + </p> + <p> + I think that he is, said Simmias. + </p> + <p> + Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to + die, but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful. + </p> + <p> + Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the + ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting. + </p> + <p> + Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, + but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying? + </p> + <p> + Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples + of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this? + </p> + <p> + Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not + repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, it + is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the + pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval + between this and the setting of the sun? + </p> + <p> + Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have + certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm + when he was staying with us at Thebes: and there are others who say the + same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them. + </p> + <p> + Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will + understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are + evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be + the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not + permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another. + </p> + <p> + Very true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native + Boeotian. + </p> + <p> + I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may + not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in + secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run + away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too + believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of + theirs. Do you not agree? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes. + </p> + <p> + And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the + liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation + of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and + would you not punish him if you could? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, replied Cebes. + </p> + <p> + Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a + man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is + now summoning me. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. And + yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our + guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we were + just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be + willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the + best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when + set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of + him. A fool may perhaps think so—he may argue that he had better run + away from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the + end, and not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense + in his running away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is + better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just + now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool + rejoice at passing out of life. + </p> + <p> + The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning + to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily convinced by + the first thing which he hears. + </p> + <p> + And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does + appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly + wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than + himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks + that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom + you acknowledge to be our good masters. + </p> + <p> + Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think + that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court? + </p> + <p> + We should like you to do so, said Simmias. + </p> + <p> + Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did + when before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes, + that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first + place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am + as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not + so sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave + behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have + good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has + been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil. + </p> + <p> + But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said + Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?—for they are a benefit in + which we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing + us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself. + </p> + <p> + I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what + Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me. + </p> + <p> + Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:—the attendant who is to give you + the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are + not to talk much, talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to + interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are + sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose. + </p> + <p> + Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the + poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all. + </p> + <p> + I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to + satisfy him. + </p> + <p> + Never mind him, he said. + </p> + <p> + And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher + has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after + death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how + this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem + that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other + men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and + if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why + when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always + pursuing and desiring? + </p> + <p> + Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me + laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear + your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our + people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire + is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of + the death which they desire. + </p> + <p> + And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the + words 'they have found them out'; for they have not found out either what + is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he + deserves or desires death. But enough of them:—let us discuss the + matter among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death? + </p> + <p> + To be sure, replied Simmias. + </p> + <p> + Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the + completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from + the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death? + </p> + <p> + Just so, he replied. + </p> + <p> + There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present + inquiry if you and I can agree about it:—Ought the philosopher to + care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of + eating and drinking? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, answered Simmias. + </p> + <p> + And what about the pleasures of love—should he care for them? + </p> + <p> + By no means. + </p> + <p> + And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for + example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other + adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather + despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say? + </p> + <p> + I should say that the true philosopher would despise them. + </p> + <p> + Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with + the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and + to turn to the soul. + </p> + <p> + Quite true. + </p> + <p> + In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed + in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has + no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth + having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead. + </p> + <p> + That is also true. + </p> + <p> + What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is + the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I + mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as + the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even + they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other + senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider + anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of + these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any + pleasure,—when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as + possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is + aspiring after true being? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from + his body and desires to be alone and by herself? + </p> + <p> + That is true. + </p> + <p> + Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an + absolute justice? + </p> + <p> + Assuredly there is. + </p> + <p> + And an absolute beauty and absolute good? + </p> + <p> + Of course. + </p> + <p> + But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?—and I speak + not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, + and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them + ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not + the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him + who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception + of the essence of each thing which he considers? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the + mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or + any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind + in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got + rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole + body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they + infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge—who, + if not he, is likely to attain the knowledge of true being? + </p> + <p> + What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias. + </p> + <p> + And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led + to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the + following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which + seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in + the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our + desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body + is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of + food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the + search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, + and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, + takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and + fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the + body? wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be + acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all + these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and + worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some + speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and + confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from + seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would + have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul + in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the + wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not while + we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul + cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows—either + knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For + then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist + in herself alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest + approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or + communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but + keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release + us. And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be + pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear + light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.' For the + impure are not permitted to approach the pure. These are the sort of + words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to + one another, and thinking. You would agree; would you not? + </p> + <p> + Undoubtedly, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that, + going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall + attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on + my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that + his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, replied Simmias. + </p> + <p> + And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as + I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting + herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her + own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the + release of the soul from the chains of the body? + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death? + </p> + <p> + To be sure, he said. + </p> + <p> + And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the + soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their + especial study? + </p> + <p> + That is true. + </p> + <p> + And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction + in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet + repining when it comes upon them. + </p> + <p> + Clearly. + </p> + <p> + And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of + dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at + the matter thus:—if they have been in every way the enemies of the + body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of + theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and + repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when + they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired—and + this was wisdom—and at the same time to be rid of the company of + their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated + by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and + conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is + strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can + worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? + Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have + a firm conviction that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her + purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if + he were afraid of death. + </p> + <p> + He would, indeed, replied Simmias. + </p> + <p> + And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not + his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a + lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money + or power, or both? + </p> + <p> + Quite so, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic + of the philosopher? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist + in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of + superiority to them—is not temperance a virtue belonging to those + only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy? + </p> + <p> + Most assuredly. + </p> + <p> + For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, + are really a contradiction. + </p> + <p> + How so? + </p> + <p> + Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a + great evil. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet + greater evils? + </p> + <p> + That is quite true. + </p> + <p> + Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because + they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and + because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate + because they are intemperate—which might seem to be a contradiction, + but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish + temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and + in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because + they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is + called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in + being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a + sense, they are made temperate through intemperance. + </p> + <p> + Such appears to be the case. + </p> + <p> + Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or + pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, + is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true + coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?—and that is wisdom; + and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly + bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all + true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or + other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue + which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and + exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any + freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a + purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and + courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the + mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking + nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes + unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, + but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell + with the gods. For 'many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'are the + thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'—meaning, as I interpret + the words, 'the true philosophers.' In the number of whom, during my whole + life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;—whether + I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, + I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in + the other world—such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I + am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from + you and my masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find + good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe + this saying; if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than + I did the Athenian judges, it will be well. + </p> + <p> + Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. + But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear + that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the + very day of death she may perish and come to an end—immediately on + her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and + in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be + collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of + which you are speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that + what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and + many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has + any force or intelligence. + </p> + <p> + True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little + of the probabilities of these things? + </p> + <p> + I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion + about them. + </p> + <p> + I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were + one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking + about matters in which I have no concern:—If you please, then, we + will proceed with the inquiry. + </p> + <p> + Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are + or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient + doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and + returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the + living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, + for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be + conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born + from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be + adduced. + </p> + <p> + Very true, replied Cebes. + </p> + <p> + Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but + in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of + which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all + things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such + things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable + other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show + that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean + to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become + greater after being less. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have + become less. + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the + slower. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more + unjust. + </p> + <p> + Of course. + </p> + <p> + And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them + are generated out of opposites? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two + intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other + opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is + also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which + grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, + cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one + another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not + always expressed in words—they are really generated out of one + another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them? + </p> + <p> + Very true, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of + waking? + </p> + <p> + True, he said. + </p> + <p> + And what is it? + </p> + <p> + Death, he answered. + </p> + <p> + And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, + and have there their two intermediate processes also? + </p> + <p> + Of course. + </p> + <p> + Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which + I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you + shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. + The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping + waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of + generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. + Do you agree? + </p> + <p> + I entirely agree. + </p> + <p> + Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is + not death opposed to life? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And they are generated one from the other? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + What is generated from the living? + </p> + <p> + The dead. + </p> + <p> + And what from the dead? + </p> + <p> + I can only say in answer—the living. + </p> + <p> + Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the + dead? + </p> + <p> + That is clear, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below? + </p> + <p> + That is true. + </p> + <p> + And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for surely + the act of dying is visible? + </p> + <p> + Surely, he said. + </p> + <p> + What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? And + shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign + to death some corresponding process of generation? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And what is that process? + </p> + <p> + Return to life. + </p> + <p> + And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead + into the world of the living? + </p> + <p> + Quite true. + </p> + <p> + Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the + living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and + this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead + exist in some place out of which they come again. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of + our previous admissions. + </p> + <p> + And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I + think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there + were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements + into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the + same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more + generation of them. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? he said. + </p> + <p> + A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he + replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and + waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no + meaning, because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not + be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and + no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. + And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life + were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and + did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be + alive—what other result could there be? For if the living spring + from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be + swallowed up in death? (But compare Republic.) + </p> + <p> + There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to + be absolutely true. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not + been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there + truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the + dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good + souls have a better portion than the evil. + </p> + <p> + Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply + recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which + we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible + unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man; + here then is another proof of the soul's immortality. + </p> + <p> + But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged in + favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment + that I remember them. + </p> + <p> + One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a + question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of + himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right + reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to + a diagram or to anything of that sort. (Compare Meno.) + </p> + <p> + But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you + whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another + way;—I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is + recollection. + </p> + <p> + Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of + recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has + said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced; but I should still + like to hear what you were going to say. + </p> + <p> + This is what I would say, he replied:—We should agree, if I am not + mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous + time. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask, + Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived + anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else + which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, + may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception? + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:—The + knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a + garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of + using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image + of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like + manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless + examples of the same thing. + </p> + <p> + Endless, indeed, replied Simmias. + </p> + <p> + And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has + been already forgotten through time and inattention. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre + remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to + remember Cebes? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself? + </p> + <p> + Quite so. + </p> + <p> + And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either + like or unlike? + </p> + <p> + It may be. + </p> + <p> + And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another + consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the likeness in any + degree falls short or not of that which is recollected? + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing + as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, + over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so? + </p> + <p> + Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in + life. + </p> + <p> + And do we know the nature of this absolute essence? + </p> + <p> + To be sure, he said. + </p> + <p> + And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of + material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them + the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will + acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another + way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time + equal, and at another time unequal? + </p> + <p> + That is certain. + </p> + <p> + But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as + of inequality? + </p> + <p> + Impossible, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality? + </p> + <p> + I should say, clearly not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, + you conceived and attained that idea? + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Which might be like, or might be unlike them? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you conceived + another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of + recollection? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other + material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they + equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they + fall short of this perfect equality in a measure? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. + </p> + <p> + And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, + observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but + falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who + makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which + the other, although similar, was inferior? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute + equality? + </p> + <p> + Precisely. + </p> + <p> + Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw + the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive + to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and + can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other + of the senses, which are all alike in this respect? + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the + same as the other. + </p> + <p> + From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim + at an absolute equality of which they fall short? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have + had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to + that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to + that they all aspire, and of that they fall short. + </p> + <p> + No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements. + </p> + <p> + And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon + as we were born? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous + time? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + That is to say, before we were born, I suppose? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born + having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the + instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all + other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, + goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of + essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer + questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the + knowledge before birth? + </p> + <p> + We may. + </p> + <p> + But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we + acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and + shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is + the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not + forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + Quite true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at + birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we + previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a + recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be + rightly termed recollection? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + So much is clear—that when we perceive something, either by the help + of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are + able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is + associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of + two alternatives follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and + continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to + learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection. + </p> + <p> + Yes, that is quite true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our + birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our + birth? + </p> + <p> + I cannot decide at the moment. + </p> + <p> + At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not + be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he will. + </p> + <p> + But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very + matters about which we are speaking? + </p> + <p> + Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this + time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account + of them such as ought to be given. + </p> + <p> + Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were + born as men? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + And therefore, previously? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they + were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence. + </p> + <p> + Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at + the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains. + </p> + <p> + Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in us + when we are born—that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of + receiving them, or if not at what other time? + </p> + <p> + No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense. + </p> + <p> + Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there + is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all + things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our + former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, + finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession—then + our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no + force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have + existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were + born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity + for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to + the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be + separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there + is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the + other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and + absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof. + </p> + <p> + Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too. + </p> + <p> + I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most + incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of + the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will + continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot + get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the + feeling that when the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this + may be the extinction of her. For admitting that she may have been born + elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before + entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again + may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end? + </p> + <p> + Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; about half of what was required has been + proven; to wit, that our souls existed before we were born:—that the + soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of + which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is + given the demonstration will be complete. + </p> + <p> + But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, + if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former + one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For + if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can + be born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to + exist, since she has to be born again?—Surely the proof which you + desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias + would be glad to probe the argument further. Like children, you are + haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may + really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a man should happen to + die in a great storm and not when the sky is calm. + </p> + <p> + Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our + fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there + is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; him too we must + persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark. + </p> + <p> + Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you + have charmed away the fear. + </p> + <p> + And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you + are gone? + </p> + <p> + Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and + there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and + wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of + spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too; for you will + not find others better able to make the search. + </p> + <p> + The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you + please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed. + </p> + <p> + By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please? + </p> + <p> + Very good. + </p> + <p> + Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we + imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear? and what + again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed further + to enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the + nature of soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn + upon the answers to these questions. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as + of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is + uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble. + </p> + <p> + Yes; I should imagine so, said Cebes. + </p> + <p> + And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas + the compound is always changing and never the same. + </p> + <p> + I agree, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or + essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true + existence—whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else—are + these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are + they each of them always what they are, having the same simple + self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, or + in any way, or at any time? + </p> + <p> + They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. + </p> + <p> + And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses + or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may + be called equal or beautiful,—are they all unchanging and the same + always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost + always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with + one another? + </p> + <p> + The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change. + </p> + <p> + And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the + unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are + invisible and are not seen? + </p> + <p> + That is very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Well, then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of + existences—one seen, the other unseen. + </p> + <p> + Let us suppose them. + </p> + <p> + The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging? + </p> + <p> + That may be also supposed. + </p> + <p> + And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul? + </p> + <p> + To be sure. + </p> + <p> + And to which class is the body more alike and akin? + </p> + <p> + Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that. + </p> + <p> + And is the soul seen or not seen? + </p> + <p> + Not by man, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not + visible to the eye of man? + </p> + <p> + Yes, to the eye of man. + </p> + <p> + And is the soul seen or not seen? + </p> + <p> + Not seen. + </p> + <p> + Unseen then? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen? + </p> + <p> + That follows necessarily, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an + instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or + hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the + body is perceiving through the senses)—were we not saying that the + soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, + and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a + drunkard, when she touches change? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the + other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and + unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, + when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from + her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. + And this state of the soul is called wisdom? + </p> + <p> + That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may + be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one? + </p> + <p> + I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the + argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even + the most stupid person will not deny that. + </p> + <p> + And the body is more like the changing? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the + body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the + body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the + divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be + that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is + subject and servant? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And which does the soul resemble? + </p> + <p> + The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal—there can be + no doubt of that, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the + conclusion?—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and + immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and + unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and + mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. + Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied? + </p> + <p> + It cannot. + </p> + <p> + But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and + is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible + part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, + and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not + dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a for some time, nay + even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, + and the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and + embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through + infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as + the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible:—Do + you agree? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the + place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, + and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is + also soon to go,—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and + origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, + as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth + rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no + bodily taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the + body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself;—and + making such abstraction her perpetual study—which means that she has + been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always + engaged in the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the practice of + death?— + </p> + <p> + Certainly— + </p> + <p> + That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to + the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure of + bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and + wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say + of the initiated, in company with the gods (compare Apol.). Is not this + true, Cebes? + </p> + <p> + Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt. + </p> + <p> + But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her + departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in + love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of + the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a + bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the + purposes of his lusts,—the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear + and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and + invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy;—do you suppose + that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed? + </p> + <p> + Impossible, he replied. + </p> + <p> + She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and + constant care of the body have wrought into her nature. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, + and is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged down + again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and + of the world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchres, near which, + as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have + not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible. + </p> + <p> + (Compare Milton, Comus:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'But when lust, + By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk, + But most by lewd and lavish act of sin, + Lets in defilement to the inward parts, + The soul grows clotted by contagion, + Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose, + The divine property of her first being. + Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp + Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres, + Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave, + As loath to leave the body that it lov'd, + And linked itself by carnal sensuality + To a degenerate and degraded state.') +</pre> + <p> + That is very likely, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the + good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in + payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue + to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves + them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be + supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in + their former lives. + </p> + <p> + What natures do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, + and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into + asses and animals of that sort. What do you think? + </p> + <p> + I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable. + </p> + <p> + And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and + violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites;—whither + else can we suppose them to go? + </p> + <p> + Yes, said Cebes; with such natures, beyond question. + </p> + <p> + And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places + answering to their several natures and propensities? + </p> + <p> + There is not, he said. + </p> + <p> + Some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and in + the place to which they go are those who have practised the civil and + social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired + by habit and attention without philosophy and mind. (Compare Republic.) + </p> + <p> + Why are they the happiest? + </p> + <p> + Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind + which is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again into + the form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to spring from + them. + </p> + <p> + Very likely. + </p> + <p> + No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the + time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, but the + lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why + the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and hold + out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them,—not + because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers + of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and + honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds. + </p> + <p> + No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes. + </p> + <p> + No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have any care of their own + souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say + farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and + when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel + that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they + turn and follow. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the + soul was simply fastened and glued to the body—until philosophy + received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a + prison, not in and through herself; she was wallowing in the mire of every + sort of ignorance; and by reason of lust had become the principal + accomplice in her own captivity. This was her original state; and then, as + I was saying, and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, + seeing how terrible was her confinement, of which she was to herself the + cause, received and gently comforted her and sought to release her, + pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of + deception, and persuading her to retire from them, and abstain from all + but the necessary use of them, and be gathered up and collected into + herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of + pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other + channels and is subject to variation; for such things are visible and + tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and + invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not + to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and + desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a + man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, + not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated—as for + example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his + lusts—but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of + all evils, and one of which he never thinks. + </p> + <p> + What is it, Socrates? said Cebes. + </p> + <p> + The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, + every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then + plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of + sight. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the + body? + </p> + <p> + How so? + </p> + <p> + Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and + rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes + that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with + the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same + habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to + the world below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into + another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in + the communion of the divine and pure and simple. + </p> + <p> + Most true, Socrates, answered Cebes. + </p> + <p> + And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are + temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives. + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way; + she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she + may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains, doing + a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her + Penelope's web. But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in + the contemplation of her, beholding the true and divine (which is not + matter of opinion), and thence deriving nourishment. Thus she seeks to + live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred + and to that which is like her, and to be freed from human ills. Never + fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has + had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and + blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing. + </p> + <p> + When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was + silence; he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what + had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. + And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and + whether there was anything wanting? For, said he, there are many points + still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the + matter thoroughly. Should you be considering some other matter I say no + more, but if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what + you think, and let us have anything better which you can suggest; and if + you think that I can be of any use, allow me to help you. + </p> + <p> + Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our + minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the + question which we wanted to have answered and which neither of us liked to + ask, fearing that our importunity might be troublesome under present at + such a time. + </p> + <p> + Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not + very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present + situation as a misfortune, if I cannot even persuade you that I am no + worse off now than at any other time in my life. Will you not allow that I + have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when + they perceive that they must die, having sung all their life long, do then + sing more lustily than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about + to go away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because they are + themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they + sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, + or hungry, or in pain, not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet + the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do + not believe this to be true of them any more than of the swans. But + because they are sacred to Apollo, they have the gift of prophecy, and + anticipate the good things of another world, wherefore they sing and + rejoice in that day more than they ever did before. And I too, believing + myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God, and the + fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from my + master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go + out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be your + only objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the + eleven magistrates of Athens allow. + </p> + <p> + Very good, Socrates, said Simmias; then I will tell you my difficulty, and + Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself, (and I daresay that you have the + same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any + certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I + should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the + uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every + side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: + either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them; or, if this + be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of + human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not + without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will + more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture + to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter + with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the + matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to + me, Socrates, to be not sufficient. + </p> + <p> + Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I + should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient. + </p> + <p> + In this respect, replied Simmias:—Suppose a person to use the same + argument about harmony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is + a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre + which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and + material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one + breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this + view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony + survives and has not perished—you cannot imagine, he would say, that + the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are + mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal + nature and kindred, has perished—perished before the mortal. The + harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay + before anything can happen to that. The thought, Socrates, must have + occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul; and + that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements + of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or due + proportionate admixture of them. But if so, whenever the strings of the + body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other injury, + then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music or of + works of art, of course perishes at once, although the material remains of + the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed + or burnt. And if any one maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the + elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is called death, + how shall we answer him? + </p> + <p> + Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile: + Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is + better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon + me. But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes + has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both + spoken, we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, + or if not, we will maintain our position. Please to tell me then, Cebes, + he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you? + </p> + <p> + Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it + was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am + ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the + bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite + sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, + in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of + Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more + lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul + very far excels the body. Well, then, says the argument to me, why do you + remain unconvinced?—When you see that the weaker continues in + existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting + must also survive during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to + consider whether the objection, which, like Simmias, I will express in a + figure, is of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce is that of an + old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:—He is not + dead, he must be alive;—see, there is the coat which he himself wove + and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to + ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the + coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts + far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of + the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains. But + that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake; any one can see + that he who talks thus is talking nonsense. For the truth is, that the + weaver aforesaid, having woven and worn many such coats, outlived several + of them, and was outlived by the last; but a man is not therefore proved + to be slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the + soul may be expressed in a similar figure; and any one may very fairly say + in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived + in comparison. He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many + bodies, especially if a man live many years. While he is alive the body + deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and + repairs the waste. But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must + have on her last garment, and this will survive her; and then at length, + when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly + decompose and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the argument + from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after + death. For granting even more than you affirm to be possible, and + acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also that + the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, and will + be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in + the soul which will hold out and be born many times—nevertheless, we + may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of + successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and + utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings + destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can + have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain that he who is + confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to + prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he + cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always + have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may + utterly perish. + </p> + <p> + All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant + feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced + before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and + uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one; + either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds + of belief. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: There I feel with you—by heaven I do, Phaedo, and when + you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What + argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than + the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the + soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful + attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own + original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument + which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives. Tell me, + I implore you, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the + unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack? + And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate what passed as exactly as + you can. + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more + than on that occasion. That he should be able to answer was nothing, but + what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving + manner in which he received the words of the young men, and then his quick + sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the + readiness with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general + rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and + return to the field of argument. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: What followed? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated + on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. He + stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck—he had a way of + playing with my hair; and then he said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that + these fair locks of yours will be severed. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied. + </p> + <p> + Not so, if you will take my advice. + </p> + <p> + What shall I do with them? I said. + </p> + <p> + To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we cannot + bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks; and if I were + you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground + against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives, + not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated + them. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two. + </p> + <p> + Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes + down. + </p> + <p> + I summon you rather, I rejoined, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as + Iolaus might summon Heracles. + </p> + <p> + That will do as well, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid a + danger. + </p> + <p> + Of what nature? I said. + </p> + <p> + Lest we become misologists, he replied, no worse thing can happen to a man + than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are + also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, + which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the too great + confidence of inexperience;—you trust a man and think him altogether + true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be + false and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has + happened several times to a man, especially when it happens among those + whom he deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has + often quarreled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no + one has any good in him at all. You must have observed this trait of + character? + </p> + <p> + I have. + </p> + <p> + And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an one + having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of human + nature; for experience would have taught him the true state of the case, + that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in + the interval between them. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? I said. + </p> + <p> + I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small, + that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and + this applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or + swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the + instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the + extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe + this? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, I have. + </p> + <p> + And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, + the worst would be found to be very few? + </p> + <p> + Yes, that is very likely, I said. + </p> + <p> + Yes, that is very likely, he replied; although in this respect arguments + are unlike men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had + intended; but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has + no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards + imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and + another, he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you + know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of + mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of + all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the + Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow. + </p> + <p> + That is quite true, I said. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as + truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge—that a man should + have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and + then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own + want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer + the blame from himself to arguments in general: and for ever afterwards + should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of + realities. + </p> + <p> + Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy. + </p> + <p> + Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of + admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness + in any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to + soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best + to gain health of mind—you and all other men having regard to the + whole of your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death. For at + this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; + like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is + engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but + is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the + difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this—that + whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am + rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary + matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument. For if + what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth, but if + there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I + shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not + last, but will die with me, and therefore no harm will be done. This is + the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. + And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree + with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not, withstand + me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my + enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die. + </p> + <p> + And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I + have in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has + fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing + than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish + first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more + lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the + soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and + leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, which is the + destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of + destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points + which we have to consider? + </p> + <p> + They both agreed to this statement of them. + </p> + <p> + He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, + or of a part only? + </p> + <p> + Of a part only, they replied. + </p> + <p> + And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we + said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the soul + must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the + body? + </p> + <p> + Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the + argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken. Simmias + agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of + his ever thinking differently. + </p> + <p> + But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban + friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the + soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the + body; for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is + prior to the elements which compose it. + </p> + <p> + Never, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul + existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of + elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, + as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist + in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes + first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other? + </p> + <p> + Not at all, replied Simmias. + </p> + <p> + And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which + harmony is the theme. + </p> + <p> + There ought, replied Simmias. + </p> + <p> + But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge + is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you + retain? + </p> + <p> + I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the + first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the + latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable + and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I know too + well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless + great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive—in + geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and + recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds; and the proof + was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because + to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. + Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on + sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others + to argue that the soul is a harmony. + </p> + <p> + Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you + imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other + than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the parts or elements + which make up the harmony, but only follows them. + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality + which is opposed to its parts. + </p> + <p> + That would be impossible, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which + the elements are harmonized? + </p> + <p> + I do not understand you, he said. + </p> + <p> + I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, + and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to + any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a + harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized. + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least + degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another? + </p> + <p> + Not in the least. + </p> + <p> + Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and + to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: + and this is said truly? + </p> + <p> + Yes, truly. + </p> + <p> + But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this + presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—will they say that here is + another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is + harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, + and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her? + </p> + <p> + I cannot tell, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of the sort + would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony. + </p> + <p> + And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another; + which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, + or more or less completely a harmony? + </p> + <p> + Quite true. + </p> + <p> + And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less + harmonized? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of + harmony, but only an equal harmony? + </p> + <p> + Yes, an equal harmony. + </p> + <p> + Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is + not more or less harmonized? + </p> + <p> + Exactly. + </p> + <p> + And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony? + </p> + <p> + She has not. + </p> + <p> + And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no + more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony? + </p> + <p> + Not at all more. + </p> + <p> + Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will + never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no + part in the inharmonical. + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice? + </p> + <p> + How can she have, if the previous argument holds? + </p> + <p> + Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all + living creatures will be equally good? + </p> + <p> + I agree with you, Socrates, he said. + </p> + <p> + And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the + consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a + harmony? + </p> + <p> + It cannot be true. + </p> + <p> + Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature + other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any? + </p> + <p> + Indeed, I do not. + </p> + <p> + And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at + variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does + not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, + against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the + opposition of the soul to the things of the body. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never + utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations + and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can + only follow, she cannot lead them? + </p> + <p> + It must be so, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite—leading + the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost always + opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes + more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more + gently; now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions, fears, as + if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the Odyssee + represents Odysseus doing in the words— + </p> + <p> + 'He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart: Endure, my heart; far + worse hast thou endured!' + </p> + <p> + Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a + harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather + of a nature which should lead and master them—herself a far diviner + thing than any harmony? + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, I quite think so. + </p> + <p> + Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a + harmony, for we should contradict the divine Homer, and contradict + ourselves. + </p> + <p> + True, he said. + </p> + <p> + Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has + graciously yielded to us; but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband + Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him? + </p> + <p> + I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I am + sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could + never have expected. For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I + quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was + surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset + of yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a + similar fate. + </p> + <p> + Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye + should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, + may be left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric + fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:—You + want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, + and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a + vain and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better in + the world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can + prove this; and you say that the demonstration of the strength and + divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does + not necessarily imply her immortality. Admitting the soul to be longlived, + and to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on + that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort + of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after + the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether + the soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you + say, make any difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is + not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no + account of the soul's immortality. This, or something like this, I suspect + to be your notion, Cebes; and I designedly recur to it in order that + nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract + anything. + </p> + <p> + But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or + subtract: I mean what you say that I mean. + </p> + <p> + Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length + he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes, involving the whole + nature of generation and corruption, about which, if you like, I will give + you my own experience; and if anything which I say is likely to avail + towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it. + </p> + <p> + I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say. + </p> + <p> + Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a + prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called + the investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why a thing + is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession; + and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such + as these:—Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which + the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the + element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing + of the kind—but the brain may be the originating power of the + perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may + come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they + have attained fixity. And then I went on to examine the corruption of + them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded + myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries, as I + will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a + degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself, and + also to others, to know quite well; I forgot what I had before thought + self-evident truths; e.g. such a fact as that the growth of man is the + result of eating and drinking; for when by the digestion of food flesh is + added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of + congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man + great. Was not that a reasonable notion? + </p> + <p> + Yes, said Cebes, I think so. + </p> + <p> + Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought + that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I + saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller + than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than + another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is + two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is + the double of one. + </p> + <p> + And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes. + </p> + <p> + I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause + of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when + one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or + that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition. I + cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one + and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere + juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming + two: neither can I understand how the division of one is the way to make + two; for then a different cause would produce the same effect,—as in + the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the + cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other + would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the + reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at + all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can + never admit the other. + </p> + <p> + Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that + mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this + notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is + the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular + in the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the + cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must + find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that + thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and + others, and then he would also know the worse, since the same science + comprehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras + a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined + that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and + whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and the + necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the + best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the + centre, he would further explain that this position was the best, and I + should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other + sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the + sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative + swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and passive, + and how all of them were for the best. For I could not imagine that when + he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account + of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I thought that + when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of + all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was + good for all. These hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of money, + and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to + know the better and the worse. + </p> + <p> + What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As + I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other + principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and + other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by + maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, + but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions + in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of + bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have + joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the + bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which + contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the + contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and + this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture—that is what he + would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, + which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would + assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention + the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn + me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here + and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and + bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia—by + the dog they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what + was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of + playing truant and running away, of enduring any punishment which the + state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and + conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and + muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But + to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in + which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless + and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause + from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always + mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and + steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to + the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging + them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds; + and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to + discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting + and more containing than the good;—of the obligatory and containing + power of the good they think nothing; and yet this is the principle which + I would fain learn if any one would teach me. But as I have failed either + to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I + will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best + mode of enquiring into the cause. + </p> + <p> + I should very much like to hear, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Socrates proceeded:—I thought that as I had failed in the + contemplation of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose + the eye of my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and + gazing on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of + only looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar + medium. So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded + altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them + by the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse + to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say + that the simile is not perfect—for I am very far from admitting that + he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them + only 'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who considers them in + action and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I + first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then + I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to + the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as + untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do not + think that you as yet understand me. + </p> + <p> + No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well. + </p> + <p> + There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only + what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous + discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that + cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those + familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all + assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and + the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of + the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul. + </p> + <p> + Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this. + </p> + <p> + Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the + next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful + other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can be beautiful + only in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and I should say + the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, I agree. + </p> + <p> + He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of + those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the + bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave + all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and + perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a + thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever + way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly + contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears + to me to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to + another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will + never be overthrown, and that to myself or to any one who asks the + question, I may safely reply, That by beauty beautiful things become + beautiful. Do you not agree with me? + </p> + <p> + I do. + </p> + <p> + And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, + and by smallness the less become less? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and B + less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and would + stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, + and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, and by reason + of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the + greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is + the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of + supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is + small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not? + </p> + <p> + Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing. + </p> + <p> + In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and + by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or you + would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by + magnitude?-for there is the same liability to error in all these cases. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to + one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly + asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence + except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as + far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality—this + is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make + one. You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser + heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to + start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up + the sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you + would not mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the + consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are + further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on + to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a + resting-place in the best of the higher; but you would not confuse the + principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics—at + least if you wanted to discover real existence. Not that this confusion + signifies to them, who never care or think about the matter at all, for + they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however great may be + the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if you are a philosopher, will + certainly do as I say. + </p> + <p> + What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting. Any one + who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of + Socrates' reasoning. + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling of the whole + company at the time. + </p> + <p> + ECHECRATES: Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, + and are now listening to your recital. But what followed? + </p> + <p> + PHAEDO: After all this had been admitted, and they had that ideas exist, + and that other things participate in them and derive their names from + them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:— + </p> + <p> + This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater + than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both + greatness and smallness? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I do. + </p> + <p> + But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the + words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size + which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is + Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has + smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, + but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is + comparatively smaller? + </p> + <p> + That is true. + </p> + <p> + And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, + because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one + by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his + smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe + that what I am saying is true. + </p> + <p> + Simmias assented. + </p> + <p> + I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only + that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that + greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of + being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the + greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at + the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if + allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having + received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as + I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot + condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us + cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the + same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or + perishes in the change. + </p> + <p> + That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion. + </p> + <p> + Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of + them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was + admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the + less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; + but now this principle seems to be utterly denied. + </p> + <p> + Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your + courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that + there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of + opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is + affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: + then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are + inherent and which are called after them, but now about the opposites + which are inherent in them and which give their name to them; and these + essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into + or out of one another. At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are + you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection? + </p> + <p> + No, I do not feel so, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am often + disturbed by objections. + </p> + <p> + Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never + in any case be opposed to itself? + </p> + <p> + To that we are quite agreed, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point + of view, and see whether you agree with me:—There is a thing which + you term heat, and another thing which you term cold? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + But are they the same as fire and snow? + </p> + <p> + Most assuredly not. + </p> + <p> + Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is + under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at + the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish? + </p> + <p> + Very true, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; + and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain + as before, fire and cold. + </p> + <p> + That is true, he said. + </p> + <p> + And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in + an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists + only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make + this clearer by an example:—The odd number is always called by the + name of odd? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things + which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not + the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?—that is what I + mean to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the + class of odd. And there are many other examples: would you not say, for + example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called + odd, which is not the same with three? and this may be said not only of + three but also of five, and of every alternate number—each of them + without being oddness is odd, and in the same way two and four, and the + other series of alternate numbers, has every number even, without being + evenness. Do you agree? + </p> + <p> + Of course. + </p> + <p> + Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:—not only do essential + opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although + not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise + reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and + when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; Will + not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be + converted into an even number, while remaining three? + </p> + <p> + Very true, said Cebes. + </p> + <p> + And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number + three? + </p> + <p> + It is not. + </p> + <p> + Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also + there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites. + </p> + <p> + Very true, he said. + </p> + <p> + Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what these + are. + </p> + <p> + By all means. + </p> + <p> + Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have + possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some + opposite? + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that + those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be + three in number, but must also be odd. + </p> + <p> + Quite true. + </p> + <p> + And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the + opposite idea will never intrude? + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + And this impress was given by the odd principle? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And to the odd is opposed the even? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three? + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + Then three has no part in the even? + </p> + <p> + None. + </p> + <p> + Then the triad or number three is uneven? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and yet + do not admit opposites—as, in the instance given, three, although + not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but + always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not + receive the odd, or fire the cold—from these examples (and there are + many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general + conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also + that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that + which it brings, in that to which it is brought. And here let me + recapitulate—for there is no harm in repetition. The number five + will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the + double of five, will admit the nature of the odd. The double has another + opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless rejects + the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3:2, nor any + fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, + admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole: + You will agree? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that. + </p> + <p> + And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question in + the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which + I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be + inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks + you 'what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,' you will + reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, + a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any + one asks you 'why a body is diseased,' you will not say from disease, but + from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd + numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of + things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently + without my adducing any further examples. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, I quite understand you. + </p> + <p> + Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body + alive? + </p> + <p> + The soul, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And is this always the case? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, of course. + </p> + <p> + Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life? + </p> + <p> + Yes, certainly. + </p> + <p> + And is there any opposite to life? + </p> + <p> + There is, he said. + </p> + <p> + And what is that? + </p> + <p> + Death. + </p> + <p> + Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite + of what she brings. + </p> + <p> + Impossible, replied Cebes. + </p> + <p> + And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels + the even? + </p> + <p> + The odd. + </p> + <p> + And that principle which repels the musical, or the just? + </p> + <p> + The unmusical, he said, and the unjust. + </p> + <p> + And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death? + </p> + <p> + The immortal, he said. + </p> + <p> + And does the soul admit of death? + </p> + <p> + No. + </p> + <p> + Then the soul is immortal? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And may we say that this has been proven? + </p> + <p> + Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable? + </p> + <p> + Of course. + </p> + <p> + And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came + attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for + it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the + heat? + </p> + <p> + True, he said. + </p> + <p> + Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when + assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but + would have gone away unaffected? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also + imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the + preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be + dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or + fire or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But + although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may + not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who + makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is + imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been + acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at + the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their + departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and + any other thing. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also + imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but + if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given. + </p> + <p> + No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is + liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable. + </p> + <p> + Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the + essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish. + </p> + <p> + Yes, all men, he said—that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am + not mistaken, as well as men. + </p> + <p> + Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she + is immortal, be also imperishable? + </p> + <p> + Most certainly. + </p> + <p> + Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed + to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved + safe and sound? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and + our souls will truly exist in another world! + </p> + <p> + I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; but + if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to make, + he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know to what + other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he + wants to say or to have said. + </p> + <p> + But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason + for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help + feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the + subject and the feebleness of man. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that + first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully + considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a + sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow + the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be + no need for any further enquiry. + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care + should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which + is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from + this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been + the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for + they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own + evil together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is + manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the + attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her + progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and + education; and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the + departed, at the very beginning of his journey thither. + </p> + <p> + For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he + belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are + gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the + world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from + this world to the other: and when they have there received their due and + remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many + revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus + says in the Telephus, a single and straight path—if that were so no + guide would be needed, for no one could miss it; but there are many + partings of the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and + sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways + meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and + is conscious of her surroundings; but the soul which desires the body, and + which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the + lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many + sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius, + and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if + she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether foul murders or other + crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from + that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no + one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain + times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne + irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every pure and just soul + which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the + gods has also her own proper home. + </p> + <p> + Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and + extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the + authority of one who shall be nameless. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many + descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much like + to know, in which of these you put faith. + </p> + <p> + And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell + you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of + my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I + could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the + argument was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and + regions of the earth according to my conception of them. + </p> + <p> + That, said Simmias, will be enough. + </p> + <p> + Well, then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in + the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any similar + force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or + inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her + own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of + that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, + but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my + first notion. + </p> + <p> + Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias. + </p> + <p> + Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the + region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit + a small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and + that there are other inhabitants of many other like places; for everywhere + on the face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, + into which the water and the mist and the lower air collect. But the true + earth is pure and situated in the pure heaven—there are the stars + also; and it is the heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether, + and of which our own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows + beneath. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion + that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth; which is just as + if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was + on the surface of the water, and that the sea was the heaven through which + he saw the sun and the other stars, he having never come to the surface by + reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his + head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, how much purer and + fairer the world above is than his own. And such is exactly our case: for + we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the + surface; and the air we call the heaven, in which we imagine that the + stars move. But the fact is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness + we are prevented from reaching the surface of the air: for if any man + could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and come + to the top, then like a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees + this world, he would see a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could + sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this other world was the + place of the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For our + earth, and the stones, and the entire region which surrounds us, are + spoilt and corroded, as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine, + neither is there any noble or perfect growth, but caverns only, and sand, + and an endless slough of mud: and even the shore is not to be compared to + the fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world to be + compared with the other. Of that upper earth which is under the heaven, I + can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth hearing. + </p> + <p> + And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen to you. + </p> + <p> + The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:—In the first place, the + earth, when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of + those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked + with various colours, of which the colours used by painters on earth are + in a manner samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them, and + they are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of + wonderful lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the + earth is whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colours the + earth is made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of + man has ever seen; the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with + air and water have a colour of their own, and are seen like light gleaming + amid the diversity of the other colours, so that the whole presents a + single and continuous appearance of variety in unity. And in this fair + region everything that grows—trees, and flowers, and fruits—are + in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are hills, having stones + in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in + colour than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and + other gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there all the + stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still (compare Republic). + The reason is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious stones, + infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among + us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well + as in animals and plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth, which + also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are set in the + light of day and are large and abundant and in all places, making the + earth a sight to gladden the beholder's eye. And there are animals and + men, some in a middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell + about the sea; others in islands which the air flows round, near the + continent: and in a word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea + are by us, and the ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover, the + temperament of their seasons is such that they have no disease, and live + much longer than we do, and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the + other senses, in far greater perfection, in the same proportion that air + is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have temples and + sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their voices + and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse + with them, and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they truly are, and + their other blessedness is of a piece with this. + </p> + <p> + Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around + the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the + globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which we + inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some are + shallower and also wider. All have numerous perforations, and there are + passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them + with one another; and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a + vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and + springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and + streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, + and the lava streams which follow them), and the regions about which they + happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see-saw + in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down, and is due + to the following cause:—There is a chasm which is the vastest of + them all, and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that chasm + which Homer describes in the words,— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;' +</pre> + <p> + and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus. + And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this + chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow. + And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the + watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and surging up and + down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water + up and down, hither and thither, over the earth—just as in the act + of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;—and + the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and + irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower + parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in + those regions, and fill them up like water raised by a pump, and then when + they leave those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows + here, and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and + find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and + rivers, and springs. Thence they again enter the earth, some of them + making a long circuit into many lands, others going to a few places and + not so distant; and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal + lower than that at which they rose, and others not much lower, but all in + some degree lower than the point from which they came. And some burst + forth again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind + round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and + descend as far as they can, but always return and fall into the chasm. The + rivers flowing in either direction can descend only to the centre and no + further, for opposite to the rivers is a precipice. + </p> + <p> + Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four + principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called + Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite + direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert + places into the Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which + the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an + appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they + are sent back to be born again as animals. The third river passes out + between the two, and near the place of outlet pours into a vast region of + fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with + water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the + earth, comes, among other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian + Lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many + coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is + that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire + in different parts of the earth. The fourth river goes out on the opposite + side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all + of a dark-blue colour, like lapis lazuli; and this is that river which is + called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx, and + after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters, + passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction, and comes + near the Acherusian lake from the opposite side to Pyriphlegethon. And the + water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle + and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of the + river, as the poets say, is Cocytus. + </p> + <p> + Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the + place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, + they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously + or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the + river Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are + carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of + their evil deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they + have done to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their + good deeds, each of them according to his deserts. But those who appear to + be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have + committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, + or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable + destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, + which, although great, are not irremediable—who in a moment of + anger, for example, have done violence to a father or a mother, and have + repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who have taken the life of + another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged + into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a + year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere + homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon—and + they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices + and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on + them, and to be kind to them, and let them come out into the lake. And if + they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if + not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the + rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have + wronged: for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. + Those too who have been pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from + this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell + in the purer earth; and of these, such as have duly purified themselves + with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions + fairer still which may not be described, and of which the time would fail + me to tell. + </p> + <p> + Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that + we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the + hope great! + </p> + <p> + A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the + description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly + true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he + may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the + kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort + himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the + tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who + having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him + and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of + knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in + her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, + and truth—in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the + world below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other + men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet + would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I + think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women + may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead. + </p> + <p> + When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us, + Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any other matter in + which we can serve you? + </p> + <p> + Nothing particular, Crito, he replied: only, as I have always told you, + take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering + to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not. But + if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to + the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, + however much you may profess or promise at the moment, it will be of no + avail. + </p> + <p> + We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you? + </p> + <p> + In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that + I do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:—I + cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been + talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other + Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, How shall + he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show + that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of + the blessed,—these words of mine, with which I was comforting you + and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I + want you to be surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to + the judges for me: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was + surety for me to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my surety + to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will + suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being + burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at + the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave + or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they + infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say + that you are burying my body only, and do with that whatever is usual, and + what you think best. + </p> + <p> + When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to bathe; + Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind, talking and + thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our + sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were + about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath + his children were brought to him—(he had two young sons and an elder + one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and + gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed + them and returned to us. + </p> + <p> + Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while + he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, + but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, + entered and stood by him, saying:—To you, Socrates, whom I know to + be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I + will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, + when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed, + I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are + aware, and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear + lightly what must needs be—you know my errand. Then bursting into + tears he turned away and went out. + </p> + <p> + Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as + you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I + have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he + would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how + generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; and + therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let + the attendant prepare some. + </p> + <p> + Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many + a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made + to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do + not hurry—there is time enough. + </p> + <p> + Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so + acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am + right in not following their example, for I do not think that I should + gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be + ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already + forfeit. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me. + </p> + <p> + Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out, + and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying + the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced + in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man + answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then + to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup + to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least + fear or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, + Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say + about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The man + answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I + understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey + from this to the other world—even so—and so be it according to + my prayer. Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully + he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control + our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had + finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself + my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not + for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such + a friend. Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to + restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, + Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and + passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his + calmness: What is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women + mainly in order that they might not misbehave in this way, for I have been + told that a man should die in peace. Be quiet, then, and have patience. + When we heard his words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he + walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on + his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison + now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his + foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his + leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. + And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart, + that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when + he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said—they + were his last words—he said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will + you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there + anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or + two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were + set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth. + </p> + <p> + Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly + say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest + and justest and best. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Phaedo, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHAEDO *** + +***** This file should be named 1658-h.htm or 1658-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/5/1658/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Phaedo + The Last Hours Of Socrates + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: October 29, 2008 [EBook #1658] +Release Date: March, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHAEDO *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +PHAEDO + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +After an interval of some months or years, and at Phlius, a town of +Peloponnesus, the tale of the last hours of Socrates is narrated to +Echecrates and other Phliasians by Phaedo the 'beloved disciple.' The +Dialogue necessarily takes the form of a narrative, because Socrates has +to be described acting as well as speaking. The minutest particulars of +the event are interesting to distant friends, and the narrator has an +equal interest in them. + +During the voyage of the sacred ship to and from Delos, which has +occupied thirty days, the execution of Socrates has been deferred. +(Compare Xen. Mem.) The time has been passed by him in conversation with +a select company of disciples. But now the holy season is over, and the +disciples meet earlier than usual in order that they may converse with +Socrates for the last time. Those who were present, and those who might +have been expected to be present, are mentioned by name. There are +Simmias and Cebes (Crito), two disciples of Philolaus whom Socrates +'by his enchantments has attracted from Thebes' (Mem.), Crito the aged +friend, the attendant of the prison, who is as good as a friend--these +take part in the conversation. There are present also, Hermogenes, +from whom Xenophon derived his information about the trial of Socrates +(Mem.), the 'madman' Apollodorus (Symp.), Euclid and Terpsion from +Megara (compare Theaet.), Ctesippus, Antisthenes, Menexenus, and some +other less-known members of the Socratic circle, all of whom are silent +auditors. Aristippus, Cleombrotus, and Plato are noted as absent. Almost +as soon as the friends of Socrates enter the prison Xanthippe and her +children are sent home in the care of one of Crito's servants. +Socrates himself has just been released from chains, and is led by this +circumstance to make the natural remark that 'pleasure follows pain.' +(Observe that Plato is preparing the way for his doctrine of the +alternation of opposites.) 'Aesop would have represented them in a fable +as a two-headed creature of the gods.' The mention of Aesop reminds +Cebes of a question which had been asked by Evenus the poet (compare +Apol.): 'Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had been +putting Aesop into verse?'--'Because several times in his life he had +been warned in dreams that he should practise music; and as he was about +to die and was not certain of what was meant, he wished to fulfil the +admonition in the letter as well as in the spirit, by writing verses as +well as by cultivating philosophy. Tell this to Evenus; and say that I +would have him follow me in death.' 'He is not at all the sort of man +to comply with your request, Socrates.' 'Why, is he not a philosopher?' +'Yes.' 'Then he will be willing to die, although he will not take his +own life, for that is held to be unlawful.' + +Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be +accounted a good? Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man is +a prisoner, who must not open the door of his prison and run away--this +is the truth in a 'mystery.' Or (2) rather, because he is not his own +property, but a possession of the gods, and has no right to make away +with that which does not belong to him. But why, asks Cebes, if he is a +possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them? For he is +under their protection; and surely he cannot take better care of himself +than they take of him. Simmias explains that Cebes is really referring +to Socrates, whom they think too unmoved at the prospect of leaving the +gods and his friends. Socrates answers that he is going to other gods +who are wise and good, and perhaps to better friends; and he professes +that he is ready to defend himself against the charge of Cebes. +The company shall be his judges, and he hopes that he will be more +successful in convincing them than he had been in convincing the court. + +The philosopher desires death--which the wicked world will insinuate +that he also deserves: and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which +they are capable of understanding. Enough of them: the real question +is, What is the nature of that death which he desires? Death is +the separation of soul and body--and the philosopher desires such +a separation. He would like to be freed from the dominion of bodily +pleasures and of the senses, which are always perturbing his mental +vision. He wants to get rid of eyes and ears, and with the light of the +mind only to behold the light of truth. All the evils and impurities +and necessities of men come from the body. And death separates him from +these corruptions, which in life he cannot wholly lay aside. Why then +should he repine when the hour of separation arrives? Why, if he is dead +while he lives, should he fear that other death, through which alone he +can behold wisdom in her purity? + +Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike those of +other men. For they are courageous because they are afraid of greater +dangers, and temperate because they desire greater pleasures. But he +disdains this balancing of pleasures and pains, which is the exchange +of commerce and not of virtue. All the virtues, including wisdom, are +regarded by him only as purifications of the soul. And this was the +meaning of the founders of the mysteries when they said, 'Many are the +wand-bearers but few are the mystics.' (Compare Matt. xxii.: 'Many are +called but few are chosen.') And in the hope that he is one of these +mystics, Socrates is now departing. This is his answer to any one who +charges him with indifference at the prospect of leaving the gods and +his friends. + +Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body may +vanish away like smoke or air. Socrates in answer appeals first of all +to the old Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead are in the world +below, and that the living come from them. This he attempts to found +on a philosophical assumption that all opposites--e.g. less, greater; +weaker, stronger; sleeping, waking; life, death--are generated out of +each other. Nor can the process of generation be only a passage from +living to dying, for then all would end in death. The perpetual sleeper +(Endymion) would be no longer distinguished from the rest of mankind. +The circle of nature is not complete unless the living come from the +dead as well as pass to them. + +The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a confirmation +of the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of this doctrine are +demanded. One proof given is the same as that of the Meno, and is +derived from the latent knowledge of mathematics, which may be elicited +from an unlearned person when a diagram is presented to him. Again, +there is a power of association, which from seeing Simmias may remember +Cebes, or from seeing a picture of Simmias may remember Simmias. The +lyre may recall the player of the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or +stone may be associated with the higher notion of absolute equality. But +here observe that material equalities fall short of the conception of +absolute equality with which they are compared, and which is the measure +of them. And the measure or standard must be prior to that which is +measured, the idea of equality prior to the visible equals. And if prior +to them, then prior also to the perceptions of the senses which recall +them, and therefore either given before birth or at birth. But all men +have not this knowledge, nor have any without a process of reminiscence; +which is a proof that it is not innate or given at birth, unless indeed +it was given and taken away at the same instant. But if not given to +men in birth, it must have been given before birth--this is the only +alternative which remains. And if we had ideas in a former state, then +our souls must have existed and must have had intelligence in a former +state. The pre-existence of the soul stands or falls with the doctrine +of ideas. + +It is objected by Simmias and Cebes that these arguments only prove a +former and not a future existence. Socrates answers this objection by +recalling the previous argument, in which he had shown that the living +come from the dead. But the fear that the soul at departing may vanish +into air (especially if there is a wind blowing at the time) has not yet +been charmed away. He proceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish +away, let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable +to dissolution? Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the +changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense? Clearly the +latter and not the former; and therefore not the soul, which in her own +pure thought is unchangeable, and only when using the senses descends +into the region of change. Again, the soul commands, the body serves: +in this respect too the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the +mortal. And in every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and +immortality, and the body of the human and mortal. And whereas the +body is liable to speedy dissolution, the soul is almost if not quite +indissoluble. (Compare Tim.) Yet even the body may be preserved for ages +by the embalmer's art: how unlikely, then, that the soul will perish and +be dissipated into air while on her way to the good and wise God! +She has been gathered into herself, holding aloof from the body, and +practising death all her life long, and she is now finally released from +the errors and follies and passions of men, and for ever dwells in the +company of the gods. + +But the soul which is polluted and engrossed by the corporeal, and has +no eye except that of the senses, and is weighed down by the bodily +appetites, cannot attain to this abstraction. In her fear of the world +below she lingers about the sepulchre, loath to leave the body which +she loved, a ghostly apparition, saturated with sense, and therefore +visible. At length entering into some animal of a nature congenial to +her former life of sensuality or violence, she takes the form of an ass, +a wolf or a kite. And of these earthly souls the happiest are those who +have practised virtue without philosophy; they are allowed to pass into +gentle and social natures, such as bees and ants. (Compare Republic, +Meno.) But only the philosopher who departs pure is permitted to enter +the company of the gods. (Compare Phaedrus.) This is the reason why he +abstains from fleshly lusts, and not because he fears loss or disgrace, +which is the motive of other men. He too has been a captive, and the +willing agent of his own captivity. But philosophy has spoken to him, +and he has heard her voice; she has gently entreated him, and brought +him out of the 'miry clay,' and purged away the mists of passion and +the illusions of sense which envelope him; his soul has escaped from the +influence of pleasures and pains, which are like nails fastening her to +the body. To that prison-house she will not return; and therefore she +abstains from bodily pleasures--not from a desire of having more or +greater ones, but because she knows that only when calm and free from +the dominion of the body can she behold the light of truth. + +Simmias and Cebes remain in doubt; but they are unwilling to raise +objections at such a time. Socrates wonders at their reluctance. Let +them regard him rather as the swan, who, having sung the praises of +Apollo all his life long, sings at his death more lustily than ever. +Simmias acknowledges that there is cowardice in not probing truth to the +bottom. 'And if truth divine and inspired is not to be had, then let +a man take the best of human notions, and upon this frail bark let him +sail through life.' He proceeds to state his difficulty: It has been +argued that the soul is invisible and incorporeal, and therefore +immortal, and prior to the body. But is not the soul acknowledged to +be a harmony, and has she not the same relation to the body, as the +harmony--which like her is invisible--has to the lyre? And yet the +harmony does not survive the lyre. Cebes has also an objection, which +like Simmias he expresses in a figure. He is willing to admit that the +soul is more lasting than the body. But the more lasting nature of the +soul does not prove her immortality; for after having worn out many +bodies in a single life, and many more in successive births and +deaths, she may at last perish, or, as Socrates afterwards restates the +objection, the very act of birth may be the beginning of her death, and +her last body may survive her, just as the coat of an old weaver is left +behind him after he is dead, although a man is more lasting than his +coat. And he who would prove the immortality of the soul, must prove not +only that the soul outlives one or many bodies, but that she outlives +them all. + +The audience, like the chorus in a play, for a moment interpret the +feelings of the actors; there is a temporary depression, and then the +enquiry is resumed. It is a melancholy reflection that arguments, like +men, are apt to be deceivers; and those who have been often deceived +become distrustful both of arguments and of friends. But this +unfortunate experience should not make us either haters of men or haters +of arguments. The want of health and truth is not in the argument, but +in ourselves. Socrates, who is about to die, is sensible of his own +weakness; he desires to be impartial, but he cannot help feeling that he +has too great an interest in the truth of the argument. And therefore he +would have his friends examine and refute him, if they think that he is +in error. + +At his request Simmias and Cebes repeat their objections. They do not +go to the length of denying the pre-existence of ideas. Simmias is of +opinion that the soul is a harmony of the body. But the admission of the +pre-existence of ideas, and therefore of the soul, is at variance with +this. (Compare a parallel difficulty in Theaet.) For a harmony is +an effect, whereas the soul is not an effect, but a cause; a harmony +follows, but the soul leads; a harmony admits of degrees, and the soul +has no degrees. Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, +why is one soul better than another? Are they more or less harmonized, +or is there one harmony within another? But the soul does not admit of +degrees, and cannot therefore be more or less harmonized. Further, the +soul is often engaged in resisting the affections of the body, as Homer +describes Odysseus 'rebuking his heart.' Could he have written this +under the idea that the soul is a harmony of the body? Nay rather, are +we not contradicting Homer and ourselves in affirming anything of the +sort? + +The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of +Simmias, has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given +to the Theban Cadmus. Socrates recapitulates the argument of Cebes, +which, as he remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or +causation; about this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience. +When he was young he had puzzled himself with physics: he had enquired +into the growth and decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until +at last he began to doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the +result of eating and drinking; and so he arrived at the conclusion that +he was not meant for such enquiries. Nor was he less perplexed with +notions of comparison and number. At first he had imagined himself to +understand differences of greater and less, and to know that ten is two +more than eight, and the like. But now those very notions appeared to +him to contain a contradiction. For how can one be divided into two? Or +two be compounded into one? These are difficulties which Socrates cannot +answer. Of generation and destruction he knows nothing. But he has a +confused notion of another method in which matters of this sort are to +be investigated. (Compare Republic; Charm.) + +Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind is +the cause of all things. And he said to himself: If mind is the cause +of all things, surely mind must dispose them all for the best. The new +teacher will show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature. How +great had been his hopes and how great his disappointment! For he found +that his new friend was anything but consistent in his use of mind as +a cause, and that he soon introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric +notions. (Compare Arist. Metaph.) It was as if a person had said that +Socrates is sitting here because he is made up of bones and muscles, +instead of telling the true reason--that he is here because the +Athenians have thought good to sentence him to death, and he has thought +good to await his sentence. Had his bones and muscles been left by him +to their own ideas of right, they would long ago have taken themselves +off. But surely there is a great confusion of the cause and condition +in all this. And this confusion also leads people into all sorts of +erroneous theories about the position and motions of the earth. None of +them know how much stronger than any Atlas is the power of the best. But +this 'best' is still undiscovered; and in enquiring after the cause, we +can only hope to attain the second best. + +Now there is a danger in the contemplation of the nature of things, as +there is a danger in looking at the sun during an eclipse, unless the +precaution is taken of looking only at the image reflected in the water, +or in a glass. (Compare Laws; Republic.) 'I was afraid,' says Socrates, +'that I might injure the eye of the soul. I thought that I had better +return to the old and safe method of ideas. Though I do not mean to say +that he who contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees +only through a glass darkly, any more than he who contemplates actual +effects.' + +If the existence of ideas is granted to him, Socrates is of opinion that +he will then have no difficulty in proving the immortality of the soul. +He will only ask for a further admission:--that beauty is the cause of +the beautiful, greatness the cause of the great, smallness of the small, +and so on of other things. This is a safe and simple answer, which +escapes the contradictions of greater and less (greater by reason of +that which is smaller!), of addition and subtraction, and the other +difficulties of relation. These subtleties he is for leaving to wiser +heads than his own; he prefers to test ideas by the consistency of their +consequences, and, if asked to give an account of them, goes back to +some higher idea or hypothesis which appears to him to be the best, +until at last he arrives at a resting-place. (Republic; Phil.) + +The doctrine of ideas, which has long ago received the assent of the +Socratic circle, is now affirmed by the Phliasian auditor to command +the assent of any man of sense. The narrative is continued; Socrates is +desirous of explaining how opposite ideas may appear to co-exist but do +not really co-exist in the same thing or person. For example, Simmias +may be said to have greatness and also smallness, because he is greater +than Socrates and less than Phaedo. And yet Simmias is not really great +and also small, but only when compared to Phaedo and Socrates. I use the +illustration, says Socrates, because I want to show you not only that +ideal opposites exclude one another, but also the opposites in us. I, +for example, having the attribute of smallness remain small, and cannot +become great: the smallness which is in me drives out greatness. + +One of the company here remarked that this was inconsistent with the +old assertion that opposites generated opposites. But that, replies +Socrates, was affirmed, not of opposite ideas either in us or in +nature, but of opposition in the concrete--not of life and death, but +of individuals living and dying. When this objection has been removed, +Socrates proceeds: This doctrine of the mutual exclusion of opposites +is not only true of the opposites themselves, but of things which are +inseparable from them. For example, cold and heat are opposed; and fire, +which is inseparable from heat, cannot co-exist with cold, or snow, +which is inseparable from cold, with heat. Again, the number three +excludes the number four, because three is an odd number and four is +an even number, and the odd is opposed to the even. Thus we are able to +proceed a step beyond 'the safe and simple answer.' We may say, not +only that the odd excludes the even, but that the number three, which +participates in oddness, excludes the even. And in like manner, not only +does life exclude death, but the soul, of which life is the inseparable +attribute, also excludes death. And that of which life is the +inseparable attribute is by the force of the terms imperishable. If the +odd principle were imperishable, then the number three would not perish +but remove, on the approach of the even principle. But the immortal is +imperishable; and therefore the soul on the approach of death does not +perish but removes. + +Thus all objections appear to be finally silenced. And now the +application has to be made: If the soul is immortal, 'what manner of +persons ought we to be?' having regard not only to time but to eternity. +For death is not the end of all, and the wicked is not released from his +evil by death; but every one carries with him into the world below that +which he is or has become, and that only. + +For after death the soul is carried away to judgment, and when she has +received her punishment returns to earth in the course of ages. The wise +soul is conscious of her situation, and follows the attendant angel who +guides her through the windings of the world below; but the impure soul +wanders hither and thither without companion or guide, and is carried +at last to her own place, as the pure soul is also carried away to hers. +'In order that you may understand this, I must first describe to you the +nature and conformation of the earth.' + +Now the whole earth is a globe placed in the centre of the heavens, and +is maintained there by the perfection of balance. That which we call the +earth is only one of many small hollows, wherein collect the mists and +waters and the thick lower air; but the true earth is above, and is in +a finer and subtler element. And if, like birds, we could fly to the +surface of the air, in the same manner that fishes come to the top of +the sea, then we should behold the true earth and the true heaven and +the true stars. Our earth is everywhere corrupted and corroded; and even +the land which is fairer than the sea, for that is a mere chaos or waste +of water and mud and sand, has nothing to show in comparison of the +other world. But the heavenly earth is of divers colours, sparkling with +jewels brighter than gold and whiter than any snow, having flowers and +fruits innumerable. And the inhabitants dwell some on the shore of the +sea of air, others in 'islets of the blest,' and they hold converse +with the gods, and behold the sun, moon and stars as they truly are, and +their other blessedness is of a piece with this. + +The hollows on the surface of the globe vary in size and shape from that +which we inhabit: but all are connected by passages and perforations in +the interior of the earth. And there is one huge chasm or opening called +Tartarus, into which streams of fire and water and liquid mud are ever +flowing; of these small portions find their way to the surface and +form seas and rivers and volcanoes. There is a perpetual inhalation and +exhalation of the air rising and falling as the waters pass into the +depths of the earth and return again, in their course forming lakes +and rivers, but never descending below the centre of the earth; for on +either side the rivers flowing either way are stopped by a precipice. +These rivers are many and mighty, and there are four principal ones, +Oceanus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Cocytus. Oceanus is the river +which encircles the earth; Acheron takes an opposite direction, and +after flowing under the earth through desert places, at last reaches the +Acherusian lake,--this is the river at which the souls of the dead await +their return to earth. Pyriphlegethon is a stream of fire, which coils +round the earth and flows into the depths of Tartarus. The fourth river, +Cocytus, is that which is called by the poets the Stygian river, and +passes into and forms the lake Styx, from the waters of which it gains +new and strange powers. This river, too, falls into Tartarus. + +The dead are first of all judged according to their deeds, and those who +are incurable are thrust into Tartarus, from which they never come out. +Those who have only committed venial sins are first purified of them, +and then rewarded for the good which they have done. Those who have +committed crimes, great indeed, but not unpardonable, are thrust +into Tartarus, but are cast forth at the end of a year by way of +Pyriphlegethon or Cocytus, and these carry them as far as the Acherusian +lake, where they call upon their victims to let them come out of the +rivers into the lake. And if they prevail, then they are let out and +their sufferings cease: if not, they are borne unceasingly into Tartarus +and back again, until they at last obtain mercy. The pure souls also +receive their reward, and have their abode in the upper earth, and a +select few in still fairer 'mansions.' + +Socrates is not prepared to insist on the literal accuracy of this +description, but he is confident that something of the kind is true. +He who has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and rejected the +pleasures of the body, has reason to be of good hope at the approach of +death; whose voice is already speaking to him, and who will one day be +heard calling all men. + +The hour has come at which he must drink the poison, and not much +remains to be done. How shall they bury him? That is a question which he +refuses to entertain, for they are burying, not him, but his dead body. +His friends had once been sureties that he would remain, and they shall +now be sureties that he has run away. Yet he would not die without the +customary ceremonies of washing and burial. Shall he make a libation of +the poison? In the spirit he will, but not in the letter. One request he +utters in the very act of death, which has been a puzzle to after ages. +With a sort of irony he remembers that a trifling religious duty is +still unfulfilled, just as above he desires before he departs to compose +a few verses in order to satisfy a scruple about a dream--unless, +indeed, we suppose him to mean, that he was now restored to health, and +made the customary offering to Asclepius in token of his recovery. + +***** + +1. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has sunk deep into +the heart of the human race; and men are apt to rebel against any +examination of the nature or grounds of their belief. They do not like +to acknowledge that this, as well as the other 'eternal ideas; of +man, has a history in time, which may be traced in Greek poetry or +philosophy, and also in the Hebrew Scriptures. They convert feeling into +reasoning, and throw a network of dialectics over that which is really +a deeply-rooted instinct. In the same temper which Socrates reproves in +himself they are disposed to think that even fallacies will do no harm, +for they will die with them, and while they live they will gain by the +delusion. And when they consider the numberless bad arguments which have +been pressed into the service of theology, they say, like the companions +of Socrates, 'What argument can we ever trust again?' But there is a +better and higher spirit to be gathered from the Phaedo, as well as from +the other writings of Plato, which says that first principles should +be most constantly reviewed (Phaedo and Crat.), and that the highest +subjects demand of us the greatest accuracy (Republic); also that we +must not become misologists because arguments are apt to be deceivers. + +2. In former ages there was a customary rather than a reasoned belief +in the immortality of the soul. It was based on the authority of the +Church, on the necessity of such a belief to morality and the order of +society, on the evidence of an historical fact, and also on analogies +and figures of speech which filled up the void or gave an expression +in words to a cherished instinct. The mass of mankind went on their +way busy with the affairs of this life, hardly stopping to think about +another. But in our own day the question has been reopened, and it is +doubtful whether the belief which in the first ages of Christianity +was the strongest motive of action can survive the conflict with a +scientific age in which the rules of evidence are stricter and the mind +has become more sensitive to criticism. It has faded into the distance +by a natural process as it was removed further and further from the +historical fact on which it has been supposed to rest. Arguments derived +from material things such as the seed and the ear of corn or transitions +in the life of animals from one state of being to another (the chrysalis +and the butterfly) are not 'in pari materia' with arguments from +the visible to the invisible, and are therefore felt to be no longer +applicable. The evidence to the historical fact seems to be weaker than +was once supposed: it is not consistent with itself, and is based upon +documents which are of unknown origin. The immortality of man must be +proved by other arguments than these if it is again to become a living +belief. We must ask ourselves afresh why we still maintain it, and seek +to discover a foundation for it in the nature of God and in the first +principles of morality. + +3. At the outset of the discussion we may clear away a confusion. We +certainly do not mean by the immortality of the soul the immortality of +fame, which whether worth having or not can only be ascribed to a very +select class of the whole race of mankind, and even the interest in +these few is comparatively short-lived. To have been a benefactor to the +world, whether in a higher or a lower sphere of life and thought, is a +great thing: to have the reputation of being one, when men have passed +out of the sphere of earthly praise or blame, is hardly worthy of +consideration. The memory of a great man, so far from being immortal, +is really limited to his own generation:--so long as his friends or his +disciples are alive, so long as his books continue to be read, so long +as his political or military successes fill a page in the history of +his country. The praises which are bestowed upon him at his death hardly +last longer than the flowers which are strewed upon his coffin or the +'immortelles' which are laid upon his tomb. Literature makes the most +of its heroes, but the true man is well aware that far from enjoying an +immortality of fame, in a generation or two, or even in a much shorter +time, he will be forgotten and the world will get on without him. + +4. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is +sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith. The +perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the +Phaedo of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form +of the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united +with the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the +body as the ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the +subject to the object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to +the means? Shall we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy +or form of an organized living body? or with Plato, that she has a life +of her own? Is the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the +monad, the truer expression? Is the soul related to the body as sight to +the eye, or as the boatman to his boat? (Arist. de Anim.) And in +another state of being is the soul to be conceived of as vanishing into +infinity, hardly possessing an existence which she can call her own, +as in the pantheistic system of Spinoza: or as an individual informing +another body and entering into new relations, but retaining her own +character? (Compare Gorgias.) Or is the opposition of soul and body a +mere illusion, and the true self neither soul nor body, but the union +of the two in the 'I' which is above them? And is death the assertion +of this individuality in the higher nature, and the falling away into +nothingness of the lower? Or are we vainly attempting to pass +the boundaries of human thought? The body and the soul seem to be +inseparable, not only in fact, but in our conceptions of them; and any +philosophy which too closely unites them, or too widely separates them, +either in this life or in another, disturbs the balance of human nature. +No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or been entirely consistent with +himself in describing their relation to one another. Nor can we +wonder that Plato in the infancy of human thought should have confused +mythology and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal arguments for real +ones. + +5. Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still +ask the question of Socrates, 'What is that which we suppose to be +immortal?' Is it the personal and individual element in us, or the +spiritual and universal? Is it the principle of knowledge or of +goodness, or the union of the two? Is it the mere force of life which is +determined to be, or the consciousness of self which cannot be got rid +of, or the fire of genius which refuses to be extinguished? Or is there +a hidden being which is allied to the Author of all existence, who is +because he is perfect, and to whom our ideas of perfection give us a +title to belong? Whatever answer is given by us to these questions, +there still remains the necessity of allowing the permanence of evil, if +not for ever, at any rate for a time, in order that the wicked 'may not +have too good a bargain.' For the annihilation of evil at death, or the +eternal duration of it, seem to involve equal difficulties in the moral +government of the universe. Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather +than by our reason, to think of the good and wise only as existing in +another life. Why should the mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, +the herd of men who have never in any proper sense the use of reason, +reappear with blinking eyes in the light of another world? But our +second thought is that the hope of humanity is a common one, and that +all or none will be partakers of immortality. Reason does not allow us +to suppose that we have any greater claims than others, and experience +may often reveal to us unexpected flashes of the higher nature in +those whom we had despised. Why should the wicked suffer any more than +ourselves? had we been placed in their circumstances should we have been +any better than they? The worst of men are objects of pity rather than +of anger to the philanthropist; must they not be equally such to divine +benevolence? Even more than the good they have need of another life; not +that they may be punished, but that they may be educated. These are +a few of the reflections which arise in our minds when we attempt to +assign any form to our conceptions of a future state. + +There are some other questions which are disturbing to us because we +have no answer to them. What is to become of the animals in a future +state? Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, +and men who are more stupid and brutal than any animals? Does their life +cease at death, or is there some 'better thing reserved' also for +them? They may be said to have a shadow or imitation of morality, and +imperfect moral claims upon the benevolence of man and upon the justice +of God. We cannot think of the least or lowest of them, the insect, the +bird, the inhabitants of the sea or the desert, as having any place in +a future world, and if not all, why should those who are specially +attached to man be deemed worthy of any exceptional privilege? When we +reason about such a subject, almost at once we degenerate into nonsense. +It is a passing thought which has no real hold on the mind. We may argue +for the existence of animals in a future state from the attributes of +God, or from texts of Scripture ('Are not two sparrows sold for one +farthing?' etc.), but the truth is that we are only filling up the void +of another world with our own fancies. Again, we often talk about +the origin of evil, that great bugbear of theologians, by which they +frighten us into believing any superstition. What answer can be made +to the old commonplace, 'Is not God the author of evil, if he knowingly +permitted, but could have prevented it?' Even if we assume that the +inequalities of this life are rectified by some transposition of human +beings in another, still the existence of the very least evil if it +could have been avoided, seems to be at variance with the love and +justice of God. And so we arrive at the conclusion that we are carrying +logic too far, and that the attempt to frame the world according to a +rule of divine perfection is opposed to experience and had better be +given up. The case of the animals is our own. We must admit that the +Divine Being, although perfect himself, has placed us in a state of life +in which we may work together with him for good, but we are very far +from having attained to it. + +6. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always prone +to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may serve +to embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we cannot +reason from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the +inward. The progress of physiological science, without bringing us +nearer to the great secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions +respecting the relations of body and mind, and in this we have the +advantage of the ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of +immortality is to be discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have +been content to rest their belief in another life on the agreement of +the more enlightened part of mankind, and on the inseparable connection +of such a doctrine with the existence of a God--also in a less degree +on the impossibility of doubting about the continued existence of those +whom we love and reverence in this world. And after all has been +said, the figure, the analogy, the argument, are felt to be only +approximations in different forms to an expression of the common +sentiment of the human heart. That we shall live again is far more +certain than that we shall take any particular form of life. + +7. When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further +what we mean by the word immortality. For of the duration of a living +being in countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three +years' old child of the whole of life. The naked eye might as well try +to see the furthest star in the infinity of heaven. Whether time and +space really exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; +at any rate the thought of them when unlimited us so overwhelming to us +as to lose all distinctness. Philosophers have spoken of them as forms +of the human mind, but what is the mind without them? As then infinite +time, or an existence out of time, which are the only possible +explanations of eternal duration, are equally inconceivable to us, let +us substitute for them a hundred or a thousand years after death, and +ask not what will be our employment in eternity, but what will happen to +us in that definite portion of time; or what is now happening to those +who passed out of life a hundred or a thousand years ago. Do we imagine +that the wicked are suffering torments, or that the good are singing the +praises of God, during a period longer than that of a whole life, or +of ten lives of men? Is the suffering physical or mental? And does the +worship of God consist only of praise, or of many forms of service? Who +are the wicked, and who are the good, whom we venture to divide by a +hard and fast line; and in which of the two classes should we place +ourselves and our friends? May we not suspect that we are making +differences of kind, because we are unable to imagine differences +of degree?--putting the whole human race into heaven or hell for the +greater convenience of logical division? Are we not at the same time +describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the +demands of rhetoric? What is that pain which does not become deadened +after a thousand years? or what is the nature of that pleasure or +happiness which never wearies by monotony? Earthly pleasures and pains +are short in proportion as they are keen; of any others which are both +intense and lasting we have no experience, and can form no idea. +The words or figures of speech which we use are not consistent with +themselves. For are we not imagining Heaven under the similitude of +a church, and Hell as a prison, or perhaps a madhouse or chamber of +horrors? And yet to beings constituted as we are, the monotony of +singing psalms would be as great an infliction as the pains of hell, +and might be even pleasantly interrupted by them. Where are the actions +worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on the greatest +benefactors of mankind? And where are the crimes which according to +Plato's merciful reckoning,--more merciful, at any rate, than the +eternal damnation of so-called Christian teachers,--for every ten years +in this life deserve a hundred of punishment in the life to come? +We should be ready to die of pity if we could see the least of the +sufferings which the writers of Infernos and Purgatorios have attributed +to the damned. Yet these joys and terrors seem hardly to exercise an +appreciable influence over the lives of men. The wicked man when old, +is not, as Plato supposes (Republic), more agitated by the terrors of +another world when he is nearer to them, nor the good in an ecstasy at +the joys of which he is soon to be the partaker. Age numbs the sense of +both worlds; and the habit of life is strongest in death. Even the dying +mother is dreaming of her lost children as they were forty or fifty +years before, 'pattering over the boards,' not of reunion with them +in another state of being. Most persons when the last hour comes are +resigned to the order of nature and the will of God. They are not +thinking of Dante's Inferno or Paradiso, or of the Pilgrim's Progress. +Heaven and hell are not realities to them, but words or ideas; the +outward symbols of some great mystery, they hardly know what. Many +noble poems and pictures have been suggested by the traditional +representations of them, which have been fixed in forms of art and can +no longer be altered. Many sermons have been filled with descriptions +of celestial or infernal mansions. But hardly even in childhood did the +thought of heaven and hell supply the motives of our actions, or at any +time seriously affect the substance of our belief. + +8. Another life must be described, if at all, in forms of thought +and not of sense. To draw pictures of heaven and hell, whether in the +language of Scripture or any other, adds nothing to our real knowledge, +but may perhaps disguise our ignorance. The truest conception which +we can form of a future life is a state of progress or education--a +progress from evil to good, from ignorance to knowledge. To this we are +led by the analogy of the present life, in which we see different races +and nations of men, and different men and women of the same nation, +in various states or stages of cultivation; some more and some less +developed, and all of them capable of improvement under favourable +circumstances. There are punishments too of children when they are +growing up inflicted by their parents, of elder offenders which are +imposed by the law of the land, of all men at all times of life, +which are attached by the laws of nature to the performance of certain +actions. All these punishments are really educational; that is to say, +they are not intended to retaliate on the offender, but to teach him +a lesson. Also there is an element of chance in them, which is another +name for our ignorance of the laws of nature. There is evil too +inseparable from good (compare Lysis); not always punished here, as good +is not always rewarded. It is capable of being indefinitely diminished; +and as knowledge increases, the element of chance may more and more +disappear. + +For we do not argue merely from the analogy of the present state of this +world to another, but from the analogy of a probable future to which we +are tending. The greatest changes of which we have had experience as yet +are due to our increasing knowledge of history and of nature. They +have been produced by a few minds appearing in three or four favoured +nations, in a comparatively short period of time. May we be allowed to +imagine the minds of men everywhere working together during many ages +for the completion of our knowledge? May not the science of physiology +transform the world? Again, the majority of mankind have really +experienced some moral improvement; almost every one feels that he has +tendencies to good, and is capable of becoming better. And these germs +of good are often found to be developed by new circumstances, like +stunted trees when transplanted to a better soil. The differences +between the savage and the civilized man, or between the civilized +man in old and new countries, may be indefinitely increased. The first +difference is the effect of a few thousand, the second of a few hundred +years. We congratulate ourselves that slavery has become industry; +that law and constitutional government have superseded despotism and +violence; that an ethical religion has taken the place of Fetichism. +There may yet come a time when the many may be as well off as the few; +when no one will be weighed down by excessive toil; when the necessity +of providing for the body will not interfere with mental improvement; +when the physical frame may be strengthened and developed; and the +religion of all men may become a reasonable service. + +Nothing therefore, either in the present state of man or in the +tendencies of the future, as far as we can entertain conjecture of them, +would lead us to suppose that God governs us vindictively in this +world, and therefore we have no reason to infer that he will govern us +vindictively in another. The true argument from analogy is not, 'This +life is a mixed state of justice and injustice, of great waste, of +sudden casualties, of disproportionate punishments, and therefore the +like inconsistencies, irregularities, injustices are to be expected +in another;' but 'This life is subject to law, and is in a state of +progress, and therefore law and progress may be believed to be the +governing principles of another.' All the analogies of this world would +be against unmeaning punishments inflicted a hundred or a thousand years +after an offence had been committed. Suffering there might be as a +part of education, but not hopeless or protracted; as there might be +a retrogression of individuals or of bodies of men, yet not such as to +interfere with a plan for the improvement of the whole (compare Laws.) + +9. But some one will say: That we cannot reason from the seen to the +unseen, and that we are creating another world after the image of this, +just as men in former ages have created gods in their own likeness. And +we, like the companions of Socrates, may feel discouraged at hearing +our favourite 'argument from analogy' thus summarily disposed of. Like +himself, too, we may adduce other arguments in which he seems to have +anticipated us, though he expresses them in different language. For we +feel that the soul partakes of the ideal and invisible; and can never +fall into the error of confusing the external circumstances of man with +his higher self; or his origin with his nature. It is as repugnant to +us as it was to him to imagine that our moral ideas are to be attributed +only to cerebral forces. The value of a human soul, like the value of a +man's life to himself, is inestimable, and cannot be reckoned in earthly +or material things. The human being alone has the consciousness of truth +and justice and love, which is the consciousness of God. And the soul +becoming more conscious of these, becomes more conscious of her own +immortality. + +10. The last ground of our belief in immortality, and the strongest, is +the perfection of the divine nature. The mere fact of the existence of +God does not tend to show the continued existence of man. An evil God +or an indifferent God might have had the power, but not the will, to +preserve us. He might have regarded us as fitted to minister to his +service by a succession of existences,--like the animals, without +attributing to each soul an incomparable value. But if he is perfect, +he must will that all rational beings should partake of that perfection +which he himself is. In the words of the Timaeus, he is good, and +therefore he desires that all other things should be as like himself as +possible. And the manner in which he accomplishes this is by permitting +evil, or rather degrees of good, which are otherwise called evil. +For all progress is good relatively to the past, and yet may be +comparatively evil when regarded in the light of the future. Good and +evil are relative terms, and degrees of evil are merely the negative +aspect of degrees of good. Of the absolute goodness of any finite nature +we can form no conception; we are all of us in process of transition +from one degree of good or evil to another. The difficulties which +are urged about the origin or existence of evil are mere dialectical +puzzles, standing in the same relation to Christian philosophy as the +puzzles of the Cynics and Megarians to the philosophy of Plato. They +arise out of the tendency of the human mind to regard good and evil both +as relative and absolute; just as the riddles about motion are to be +explained by the double conception of space or matter, which the human +mind has the power of regarding either as continuous or discrete. + +In speaking of divine perfection, we mean to say that God is just and +true and loving, the author of order and not of disorder, of good and +not of evil. Or rather, that he is justice, that he is truth, that he +is love, that he is order, that he is the very progress of which we were +speaking; and that wherever these qualities are present, whether in the +human soul or in the order of nature, there is God. We might still see +him everywhere, if we had not been mistakenly seeking for him apart from +us, instead of in us; away from the laws of nature, instead of in +them. And we become united to him not by mystical absorption, but by +partaking, whether consciously or unconsciously, of that truth and +justice and love which he himself is. + +Thus the belief in the immortality of the soul rests at last on the +belief in God. If there is a good and wise God, then there is a progress +of mankind towards perfection; and if there is no progress of men +towards perfection, then there is no good and wise God. We cannot +suppose that the moral government of God of which we see the beginnings +in the world and in ourselves will cease when we pass out of life. + +11. Considering the 'feebleness of the human faculties and the +uncertainty of the subject,' we are inclined to believe that the fewer +our words the better. At the approach of death there is not much said; +good men are too honest to go out of the world professing more than they +know. There is perhaps no important subject about which, at any time, +even religious people speak so little to one another. In the fulness +of life the thought of death is mostly awakened by the sight or +recollection of the death of others rather than by the prospect of our +own. We must also acknowledge that there are degrees of the belief in +immortality, and many forms in which it presents itself to the mind. +Some persons will say no more than that they trust in God, and that they +leave all to Him. It is a great part of true religion not to pretend +to know more than we do. Others when they quit this world are comforted +with the hope 'That they will see and know their friends in heaven.' But +it is better to leave them in the hands of God and to be assured that +'no evil shall touch them.' There are others again to whom the belief in +a divine personality has ceased to have any longer a meaning; yet they +are satisfied that the end of all is not here, but that something still +remains to us, 'and some better thing for the good than for the evil.' +They are persuaded, in spite of their theological nihilism, that the +ideas of justice and truth and holiness and love are realities. They +cherish an enthusiastic devotion to the first principles of morality. +Through these they see, or seem to see, darkly, and in a figure, that +the soul is immortal. + +But besides differences of theological opinion which must ever prevail +about things unseen, the hope of immortality is weaker or stronger in +men at one time of life than at another; it even varies from day to day. +It comes and goes; the mind, like the sky, is apt to be overclouded. +Other generations of men may have sometimes lived under an 'eclipse of +faith,' to us the total disappearance of it might be compared to the +'sun falling from heaven.' And we may sometimes have to begin again and +acquire the belief for ourselves; or to win it back again when it is +lost. It is really weakest in the hour of death. For Nature, like a kind +mother or nurse, lays us to sleep without frightening us; physicians, +who are the witnesses of such scenes, say that under ordinary +circumstances there is no fear of the future. Often, as Plato tells +us, death is accompanied 'with pleasure.' (Tim.) When the end is still +uncertain, the cry of many a one has been, 'Pray, that I may be taken.' +The last thoughts even of the best men depend chiefly on the accidents +of their bodily state. Pain soon overpowers the desire of life; old age, +like the child, is laid to sleep almost in a moment. The long experience +of life will often destroy the interest which mankind have in it. So +various are the feelings with which different persons draw near to +death; and still more various the forms in which imagination clothes it. +For this alternation of feeling compare the Old Testament,--Psalm vi.; +Isaiah; Eccles. + +12. When we think of God and of man in his relation to God; of the +imperfection of our present state and yet of the progress which is +observable in the history of the world and of the human mind; of the +depth and power of our moral ideas which seem to partake of the very +nature of God Himself; when we consider the contrast between the +physical laws to which we are subject and the higher law which raises us +above them and is yet a part of them; when we reflect on our capacity of +becoming the 'spectators of all time and all existence,' and of framing +in our own minds the ideal of a perfect Being; when we see how the +human mind in all the higher religions of the world, including Buddhism, +notwithstanding some aberrations, has tended towards such a belief--we +have reason to think that our destiny is different from that of animals; +and though we cannot altogether shut out the childish fear that the soul +upon leaving the body may 'vanish into thin air,' we have still, so far +as the nature of the subject admits, a hope of immortality with which we +comfort ourselves on sufficient grounds. The denial of the belief takes +the heart out of human life; it lowers men to the level of the material. +As Goethe also says, 'He is dead even in this world who has no belief in +another.' + +13. It is well also that we should sometimes think of the forms of +thought under which the idea of immortality is most naturally presented +to us. It is clear that to our minds the risen soul can no longer be +described, as in a picture, by the symbol of a creature half-bird, +half-human, nor in any other form of sense. The multitude of angels, as +in Milton, singing the Almighty's praises, are a noble image, and may +furnish a theme for the poet or the painter, but they are no longer an +adequate expression of the kingdom of God which is within us. Neither is +there any mansion, in this world or another, in which the departed can +be imagined to dwell and carry on their occupations. When this earthly +tabernacle is dissolved, no other habitation or building can take them +in: it is in the language of ideas only that we speak of them. + +First of all there is the thought of rest and freedom from pain; they +have gone home, as the common saying is, and the cares of this world +touch them no more. Secondly, we may imagine them as they were at +their best and brightest, humbly fulfilling their daily round of +duties--selfless, childlike, unaffected by the world; when the eye was +single and the whole body seemed to be full of light; when the mind was +clear and saw into the purposes of God. Thirdly, we may think of them +as possessed by a great love of God and man, working out His will at a +further stage in the heavenly pilgrimage. And yet we acknowledge that +these are the things which eye hath not seen nor ear heard and therefore +it hath not entered into the heart of man in any sensible manner to +conceive them. Fourthly, there may have been some moments in our own +lives when we have risen above ourselves, or been conscious of our truer +selves, in which the will of God has superseded our wills, and we have +entered into communion with Him, and been partakers for a brief season +of the Divine truth and love, in which like Christ we have been inspired +to utter the prayer, 'I in them, and thou in me, that we may be all made +perfect in one.' These precious moments, if we have ever known them, are +the nearest approach which we can make to the idea of immortality. + +14. Returning now to the earlier stage of human thought which is +represented by the writings of Plato, we find that many of the +same questions have already arisen: there is the same tendency to +materialism; the same inconsistency in the application of the idea of +mind; the same doubt whether the soul is to be regarded as a cause or as +an effect; the same falling back on moral convictions. In the Phaedo the +soul is conscious of her divine nature, and the separation from the body +which has been commenced in this life is perfected in another. Beginning +in mystery, Socrates, in the intermediate part of the Dialogue, attempts +to bring the doctrine of a future life into connection with his theory +of knowledge. In proportion as he succeeds in this, the individual seems +to disappear in a more general notion of the soul; the contemplation of +ideas 'under the form of eternity' takes the place of past and future +states of existence. His language may be compared to that of some modern +philosophers, who speak of eternity, not in the sense of perpetual +duration of time, but as an ever-present quality of the soul. Yet at +the conclusion of the Dialogue, having 'arrived at the end of the +intellectual world' (Republic), he replaces the veil of mythology, +and describes the soul and her attendant genius in the language of the +mysteries or of a disciple of Zoroaster. Nor can we fairly demand of +Plato a consistency which is wanting among ourselves, who acknowledge +that another world is beyond the range of human thought, and yet are +always seeking to represent the mansions of heaven or hell in +the colours of the painter, or in the descriptions of the poet or +rhetorician. + +15. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not new to the +Greeks in the age of Socrates, but, like the unity of God, had a +foundation in the popular belief. The old Homeric notion of a gibbering +ghost flitting away to Hades; or of a few illustrious heroes enjoying +the isles of the blest; or of an existence divided between the two; or +the Hesiodic, of righteous spirits, who become guardian angels,--had +given place in the mysteries and the Orphic poets to representations, +partly fanciful, of a future state of rewards and punishments. (Laws.) +The reticence of the Greeks on public occasions and in some part of +their literature respecting this 'underground' religion, is not to be +taken as a measure of the diffusion of such beliefs. If Pericles in the +funeral oration is silent on the consolations of immortality, the +poet Pindar and the tragedians on the other hand constantly assume the +continued existence of the dead in an upper or under world. Darius +and Laius are still alive; Antigone will be dear to her brethren after +death; the way to the palace of Cronos is found by those who 'have +thrice departed from evil.' The tragedy of the Greeks is not 'rounded' +by this life, but is deeply set in decrees of fate and mysterious +workings of powers beneath the earth. In the caricature of Aristophanes +there is also a witness to the common sentiment. The Ionian and +Pythagorean philosophies arose, and some new elements were added to the +popular belief. The individual must find an expression as well as the +world. Either the soul was supposed to exist in the form of a magnet, or +of a particle of fire, or of light, or air, or water; or of a number or +of a harmony of number; or to be or have, like the stars, a principle +of motion (Arist. de Anim.). At length Anaxagoras, hardly distinguishing +between life and mind, or between mind human and divine, attained +the pure abstraction; and this, like the other abstractions of Greek +philosophy, sank deep into the human intelligence. The opposition of +the intelligible and the sensible, and of God to the world, supplied an +analogy which assisted in the separation of soul and body. If ideas were +separable from phenomena, mind was also separable from matter; if the +ideas were eternal, the mind that conceived them was eternal too. As +the unity of God was more distinctly acknowledged, the conception of the +human soul became more developed. The succession, or alternation of +life and death, had occurred to Heracleitus. The Eleatic Parmenides had +stumbled upon the modern thesis, that 'thought and being are the same.' +The Eastern belief in transmigration defined the sense of individuality; +and some, like Empedocles, fancied that the blood which they had shed +in another state of being was crying against them, and that for thirty +thousand years they were to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon the earth.' +The desire of recognizing a lost mother or love or friend in the world +below (Phaedo) was a natural feeling which, in that age as well as in +every other, has given distinctness to the hope of immortality. Nor were +ethical considerations wanting, partly derived from the necessity of +punishing the greater sort of criminals, whom no avenging power of this +world could reach. The voice of conscience, too, was heard reminding +the good man that he was not altogether innocent. (Republic.) To these +indistinct longings and fears an expression was given in the mysteries +and Orphic poets: a 'heap of books' (Republic), passing under the names +of Musaeus and Orpheus in Plato's time, were filled with notions of an +under-world. + +16. Yet after all the belief in the individuality of the soul after +death had but a feeble hold on the Greek mind. Like the personality of +God, the personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound +up with the reality of his existence. For the distinction between the +personal and impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far +less marked to the Greek than to ourselves. And as Plato readily passes +from the notion of the good to that of God, he also passes almost +imperceptibly to himself and his reader from the future life of the +individual soul to the eternal being of the absolute soul. There has +been a clearer statement and a clearer denial of the belief in modern +times than is found in early Greek philosophy, and hence the comparative +silence on the whole subject which is often remarked in ancient writers, +and particularly in Aristotle. For Plato and Aristotle are not further +removed in their teaching about the immortality of the soul than they +are in their theory of knowledge. + +17. Living in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought, +Plato naturally cast his belief in immortality into a logical form. And +when we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, +it is not surprising that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies: +early logic is always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of +the matter. It is easy to see that the alternation of opposites is +not the same as the generation of them out of each other; and that the +generation of them out of each other, which is the first argument in +the Phaedo, is at variance with their mutual exclusion of each other, +whether in themselves or in us, which is the last. For even if we admit +the distinction which he draws between the opposites and the things +which have the opposites, still individuals fall under the latter class; +and we have to pass out of the region of human hopes and fears to a +conception of an abstract soul which is the impersonation of the ideas. +Such a conception, which in Plato himself is but half expressed, is +unmeaning to us, and relative only to a particular stage in the history +of thought. The doctrine of reminiscence is also a fragment of a former +world, which has no place in the philosophy of modern times. But Plato +had the wonders of psychology just opening to him, and he had not the +explanation of them which is supplied by the analysis of language and +the history of the human mind. The question, 'Whence come our abstract +ideas?' he could only answer by an imaginary hypothesis. Nor is it +difficult to see that his crowning argument is purely verbal, and is +but the expression of an instinctive confidence put into a logical +form:--'The soul is immortal because it contains a principle of +imperishableness.' Nor does he himself seem at all to be aware that +nothing is added to human knowledge by his 'safe and simple answer,' +that beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that he is merely +reasserting the Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean numbers,' +against the Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation. The answer to +the 'very serious question' of generation and destruction is really +the denial of them. For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a +system of ideas, tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, +and not explained by actual causes, but by a higher, that is, a more +general notion. Consistency with themselves is the only test which is to +be applied to them. (Republic, and Phaedo.) + +18. To deal fairly with such arguments, they should be translated as +far as possible into their modern equivalents. 'If the ideas of men are +eternal, their souls are eternal, and if not the ideas, then not the +souls.' Such an argument stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and +his age, as the argument from the existence of God to immortality among +ourselves. 'If God exists, then the soul exists after death; and if +there is no God, there is no existence of the soul after death.' For +the ideas are to his mind the reality, the truth, the principle of +permanence, as well as of intelligence and order in the world. When +Simmias and Cebes say that they are more strongly persuaded of the +existence of ideas than they are of the immortality of the soul, they +represent fairly enough the order of thought in Greek philosophy. And we +might say in the same way that we are more certain of the existence +of God than we are of the immortality of the soul, and are led by the +belief in the one to a belief in the other. The parallel, as Socrates +would say, is not perfect, but agrees in as far as the mind in either +case is regarded as dependent on something above and beyond herself. The +analogy may even be pressed a step further: 'We are more certain of our +ideas of truth and right than we are of the existence of God, and +are led on in the order of thought from one to the other.' Or more +correctly: 'The existence of right and truth is the existence of God, +and can never for a moment be separated from Him.' + +19. The main argument of the Phaedo is derived from the existence of +eternal ideas of which the soul is a partaker; the other argument of the +alternation of opposites is replaced by this. And there have not been +wanting philosophers of the idealist school who have imagined that the +doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a theory of knowledge, and +that in what has preceded Plato is accommodating himself to the popular +belief. Such a view can only be elicited from the Phaedo by what may +be termed the transcendental method of interpretation, and is obviously +inconsistent with the Gorgias and the Republic. Those who maintain +it are immediately compelled to renounce the shadow which they have +grasped, as a play of words only. But the truth is, that Plato in his +argument for the immortality of the soul has collected many elements of +proof or persuasion, ethical and mythological as well as dialectical, +which are not easily to be reconciled with one another; and he is as +much in earnest about his doctrine of retribution, which is repeated +in all his more ethical writings, as about his theory of knowledge. +And while we may fairly translate the dialectical into the language of +Hegel, and the religious and mythological into the language of Dante or +Bunyan, the ethical speaks to us still in the same voice, and appeals to +a common feeling. + +20. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the Phaedo. The +first may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state +of being. Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is +seeking to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the +things of the world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in +these aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in +modern times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind, +the other from the progress of the soul towards perfection. In using +this argument Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the +body, with the soul of the good and wise. (Compare Republic.) Such a +confusion was natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of soul +and body. The soul in her own essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with +virtues and graces, were easily interchanged with one another, because +on a subject which passes expression the distinctions of language can +hardly be maintained. + +21. The ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the +necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off if their +evil deeds came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus, +an Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of +their crimes in this world. The manner in which this retribution is +accomplished Plato represents under the figures of mythology. Doubtless +he felt that it was easier to improve than to invent, and that in +religion especially the traditional form was required in order to give +verisimilitude to the myth. The myth too is far more probable to that +age than to ours, and may fairly be regarded as 'one guess among +many' about the nature of the earth, which he cleverly supports by the +indications of geology. Not that he insists on the absolute truth of +his own particular notions: 'no man of sense will be confident in such +matters; but he will be confident that something of the kind is true.' +As in other passages (Gorg., Tim., compare Crito), he wins belief for +his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, like +Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own creations. + +The Dialogue must be read in the light of the situation. And first of +all we are struck by the calmness of the scene. Like the spectators +at the time, we cannot pity Socrates; his mien and his language are +so noble and fearless. He is the same that he ever was, but milder and +gentler, and he has in no degree lost his interest in dialectics; +he will not forego the delight of an argument in compliance with the +jailer's intimation that he should not heat himself with talking. At +such a time he naturally expresses the hope of his life, that he has +been a true mystic and not a mere retainer or wand-bearer: and he refers +to passages of his personal history. To his old enemies the Comic +poets, and to the proceedings on the trial, he alludes playfully; but he +vividly remembers the disappointment which he felt in reading the books +of Anaxagoras. The return of Xanthippe and his children indicates that +the philosopher is not 'made of oak or rock.' Some other traits of his +character may be noted; for example, the courteous manner in which +he inclines his head to the last objector, or the ironical touch, 'Me +already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls;' or +the depreciation of the arguments with which 'he comforted himself and +them;' or his fear of 'misology;' or his references to Homer; or the +playful smile with which he 'talks like a book' about greater and less; +or the allusion to the possibility of finding another teacher among +barbarous races (compare Polit.); or the mysterious reference to another +science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction for which he is +vainly feeling. There is no change in him; only now he is invested with +a sort of sacred character, as the prophet or priest of Apollo the God +of the festival, in whose honour he first of all composes a hymn, +and then like the swan pours forth his dying lay. Perhaps the extreme +elevation of Socrates above his own situation, and the ordinary +interests of life (compare his jeu d'esprit about his burial, in which +for a moment he puts on the 'Silenus mask'), create in the mind of the +reader an impression stronger than could be derived from arguments that +such a one has in him 'a principle which does not admit of death.' + +The other persons of the Dialogue may be considered under two heads: (1) +private friends; (2) the respondents in the argument. + +First there is Crito, who has been already introduced to us in the +Euthydemus and the Crito; he is the equal in years of Socrates, and +stands in quite a different relation to him from his younger disciples. +He is a man of the world who is rich and prosperous (compare the jest +in the Euthydemus), the best friend of Socrates, who wants to know his +commands, in whose presence he talks to his family, and who performs +the last duty of closing his eyes. It is observable too that, as in the +Euthydemus, Crito shows no aptitude for philosophical discussions. Nor +among the friends of Socrates must the jailer be forgotten, who seems +to have been introduced by Plato in order to show the impression made +by the extraordinary man on the common. The gentle nature of the man +is indicated by his weeping at the announcement of his errand and then +turning away, and also by the words of Socrates to his disciples: 'How +charming the man is! since I have been in prison he has been always +coming to me, and is as good as could be to me.' We are reminded +too that he has retained this gentle nature amid scenes of death and +violence by the contrasts which he draws between the behaviour of +Socrates and of others when about to die. + +Another person who takes no part in the philosophical discussion is the +excitable Apollodorus, the same who, in the Symposium, of which he is +the narrator, is called 'the madman,' and who testifies his grief by the +most violent emotions. Phaedo is also present, the 'beloved disciple' +as he may be termed, who is described, if not 'leaning on his bosom,' +as seated next to Socrates, who is playing with his hair. He too, like +Apollodorus, takes no part in the discussion, but he loves above all +things to hear and speak of Socrates after his death. The calmness +of his behaviour, veiling his face when he can no longer restrain +his tears, contrasts with the passionate outcries of the other. At a +particular point the argument is described as falling before the attack +of Simmias. A sort of despair is introduced in the minds of the company. +The effect of this is heightened by the description of Phaedo, who has +been the eye-witness of the scene, and by the sympathy of his Phliasian +auditors who are beginning to think 'that they too can never trust an +argument again.' And the intense interest of the company is communicated +not only to the first auditors, but to us who in a distant country read +the narrative of their emotions after more than two thousand years have +passed away. + +The two principal interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, the disciples of +Philolaus the Pythagorean philosopher of Thebes. Simmias is described +in the Phaedrus as fonder of an argument than any man living; and +Cebes, although finally persuaded by Socrates, is said to be the most +incredulous of human beings. It is Cebes who at the commencement of +the Dialogue asks why 'suicide is held to be unlawful,' and who +first supplies the doctrine of recollection in confirmation of the +pre-existence of the soul. It is Cebes who urges that the pre-existence +does not necessarily involve the future existence of the soul, as is +shown by the illustration of the weaver and his coat. Simmias, on the +other hand, raises the question about harmony and the lyre, which is +naturally put into the mouth of a Pythagorean disciple. It is Simmias, +too, who first remarks on the uncertainty of human knowledge, and +only at last concedes to the argument such a qualified approval as is +consistent with the feebleness of the human faculties. Cebes is the +deeper and more consecutive thinker, Simmias more superficial and +rhetorical; they are distinguished in much the same manner as Adeimantus +and Glaucon in the Republic. + +Other persons, Menexenus, Ctesippus, Lysis, are old friends; Evenus +has been already satirized in the Apology; Aeschines and Epigenes +were present at the trial; Euclid and Terpsion will reappear in the +Introduction to the Theaetetus, Hermogenes has already appeared in +the Cratylus. No inference can fairly be drawn from the absence of +Aristippus, nor from the omission of Xenophon, who at the time of +Socrates' death was in Asia. The mention of Plato's own absence seems +like an expression of sorrow, and may, perhaps, be an indication that +the report of the conversation is not to be taken literally. + +The place of the Dialogue in the series is doubtful. The doctrine of +ideas is certainly carried beyond the Socratic point of view; in no +other of the writings of Plato is the theory of them so completely +developed. Whether the belief in immortality can be attributed to +Socrates or not is uncertain; the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the +earlier Dialogues of Plato, is an argument to the contrary. Yet in the +Cyropaedia Xenophon has put language into the mouth of the dying Cyrus +which recalls the Phaedo, and may have been derived from the teaching of +Socrates. It may be fairly urged that the greatest religious interest of +mankind could not have been wholly ignored by one who passed his life in +fulfilling the commands of an oracle, and who recognized a Divine plan +in man and nature. (Xen. Mem.) And the language of the Apology and of +the Crito confirms this view. + +The Phaedo is not one of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato; nor, on the +other hand, can it be assigned to that later stage of the Platonic +writings at which the doctrine of ideas appears to be forgotten. It +belongs rather to the intermediate period of the Platonic philosophy, +which roughly corresponds to the Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic, +Theaetetus. Without pretending to determine the real time of their +composition, the Symposium, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Phaedo may be +conveniently read by us in this order as illustrative of the life of +Socrates. Another chain may be formed of the Meno, Phaedrus, Phaedo, +in which the immortality of the soul is connected with the doctrine of +ideas. In the Meno the theory of ideas is based on the ancient belief in +transmigration, which reappears again in the Phaedrus as well as in the +Republic and Timaeus, and in all of them is connected with a doctrine of +retribution. In the Phaedrus the immortality of the soul is supposed to +rest on the conception of the soul as a principle of motion, whereas in +the Republic the argument turns on the natural continuance of the soul, +which, if not destroyed by her own proper evil, can hardly be destroyed +by any other. The soul of man in the Timaeus is derived from the Supreme +Creator, and either returns after death to her kindred star, or descends +into the lower life of an animal. The Apology expresses the same view +as the Phaedo, but with less confidence; there the probability of death +being a long sleep is not excluded. The Theaetetus also describes, in a +digression, the desire of the soul to fly away and be with God--'and to +fly to him is to be like him.' The Symposium may be observed to +resemble as well as to differ from the Phaedo. While the first notion of +immortality is only in the way of natural procreation or of posthumous +fame and glory, the higher revelation of beauty, like the good in the +Republic, is the vision of the eternal idea. So deeply rooted in +Plato's mind is the belief in immortality; so various are the forms of +expression which he employs. + +As in several other Dialogues, there is more of system in the Phaedo +than appears at first sight. The succession of arguments is based on +previous philosophies; beginning with the mysteries and the Heracleitean +alternation of opposites, and proceeding to the Pythagorean harmony and +transmigration; making a step by the aid of Platonic reminiscence, and +a further step by the help of the nous of Anaxagoras; until at last we +rest in the conviction that the soul is inseparable from the ideas, +and belongs to the world of the invisible and unknown. Then, as in +the Gorgias or Republic, the curtain falls, and the veil of mythology +descends upon the argument. After the confession of Socrates that he is +an interested party, and the acknowledgment that no man of sense will +think the details of his narrative true, but that something of the kind +is true, we return from speculation to practice. He is himself more +confident of immortality than he is of his own arguments; and the +confidence which he expresses is less strong than that which his +cheerfulness and composure in death inspire in us. + +Difficulties of two kinds occur in the Phaedo--one kind to be explained +out of contemporary philosophy, the other not admitting of an entire +solution. (1) The difficulty which Socrates says that he experienced in +explaining generation and corruption; the assumption of hypotheses which +proceed from the less general to the more general, and are tested by +their consequences; the puzzle about greater and less; the resort to the +method of ideas, which to us appear only abstract terms,--these are to +be explained out of the position of Socrates and Plato in the history of +philosophy. They were living in a twilight between the sensible and +the intellectual world, and saw no way of connecting them. They +could neither explain the relation of ideas to phenomena, nor their +correlation to one another. The very idea of relation or comparison was +embarrassing to them. Yet in this intellectual uncertainty they had a +conception of a proof from results, and of a moral truth, which remained +unshaken amid the questionings of philosophy. (2) The other is a +difficulty which is touched upon in the Republic as well as in the +Phaedo, and is common to modern and ancient philosophy. Plato is not +altogether satisfied with his safe and simple method of ideas. He wants +to have proved to him by facts that all things are for the best, and +that there is one mind or design which pervades them all. But this +'power of the best' he is unable to explain; and therefore takes refuge +in universal ideas. And are not we at this day seeking to discover that +which Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw? + +Some resemblances to the Greek drama may be noted in all the Dialogues +of Plato. The Phaedo is the tragedy of which Socrates is the protagonist +and Simmias and Cebes the secondary performers, standing to them in the +same relation as to Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic. No Dialogue +has a greater unity of subject and feeling. Plato has certainly +fulfilled the condition of Greek, or rather of all art, which requires +that scenes of death and suffering should be clothed in beauty. The +gathering of the friends at the commencement of the Dialogue, the +dismissal of Xanthippe, whose presence would have been out of place at +a philosophical discussion, but who returns again with her children to +take a final farewell, the dejection of the audience at the temporary +overthrow of the argument, the picture of Socrates playing with the +hair of Phaedo, the final scene in which Socrates alone retains his +composure--are masterpieces of art. And the chorus at the end might have +interpreted the feeling of the play: 'There can no evil happen to a good +man in life or death.' + +'The art of concealing art' is nowhere more perfect than in those +writings of Plato which describe the trial and death of Socrates. Their +charm is their simplicity, which gives them verisimilitude; and yet +they touch, as if incidentally, and because they were suitable to the +occasion, on some of the deepest truths of philosophy. There is nothing +in any tragedy, ancient or modern, nothing in poetry or history (with +one exception), like the last hours of Socrates in Plato. The master +could not be more fitly occupied at such a time than in discoursing of +immortality; nor the disciples more divinely consoled. The arguments, +taken in the spirit and not in the letter, are our arguments; and +Socrates by anticipation may be even thought to refute some 'eccentric +notions; current in our own age. For there are philosophers among +ourselves who do not seem to understand how much stronger is the power +of intelligence, or of the best, than of Atlas, or mechanical force. +How far the words attributed to Socrates were actually uttered by him we +forbear to ask; for no answer can be given to this question. And it +is better to resign ourselves to the feeling of a great work, than to +linger among critical uncertainties. + + + + +PHAEDO + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: + +Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius. +Socrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Cebes, Crito and an Attendant of the +Prison. + +SCENE: The Prison of Socrates. + +PLACE OF THE NARRATION: Phlius. + + + +ECHECRATES: Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on +the day when he drank the poison? + +PHAEDO: Yes, Echecrates, I was. + +ECHECRATES: I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say in +his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no +one knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it +is a long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; +so that we had no clear account. + +PHAEDO: Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial? + +ECHECRATES: Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not +understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death, +not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this? + +PHAEDO: An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the +Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before +he was tried. + +ECHECRATES: What is this ship? + +PHAEDO: It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, +Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was +the saviour of them and of himself. And they were said to have vowed +to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly +mission to Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period +of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo +crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is +not allowed to be polluted by public executions; and when the vessel +is detained by contrary winds, the time spent in going and returning +is very considerable. As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day +before the trial, and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and +was not put to death until long after he was condemned. + +ECHECRATES: What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or +done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities +forbid them to be present--so that he had no friends near him when he +died? + +PHAEDO: No; there were several of them with him. + +ECHECRATES: If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me +what passed, as exactly as you can. + +PHAEDO: I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish. +To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether +I speak myself or hear another speak of him. + +ECHECRATES: You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, +and I hope that you will be as exact as you can. + +PHAEDO: I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I +could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and +therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and +his words and bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared +blessed. I thought that in going to the other world he could not be +without a divine call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, +when he arrived there, and therefore I did not pity him as might have +seemed natural at such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I +usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme +of which we spoke). I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a +strange admixture of pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and +this double feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping +by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus--you know the sort of +man? + +ECHECRATES: Yes. + +PHAEDO: He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly +moved. + +ECHECRATES: Who were present? + +PHAEDO: Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus +and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes; +likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others; +Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill. + +ECHECRATES: Were there any strangers? + +PHAEDO: Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; +Euclid and Terpison, who came from Megara. + +ECHECRATES: And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus? + +PHAEDO: No, they were said to be in Aegina. + +ECHECRATES: Any one else? + +PHAEDO: I think that these were nearly all. + +ECHECRATES: Well, and what did you talk about? + +PHAEDO: I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the +entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of +assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial took +place, and which is not far from the prison. There we used to wait +talking with one another until the opening of the doors (for they were +not opened very early); then we went in and generally passed the day +with Socrates. On the last morning we assembled sooner than usual, +having heard on the day before when we quitted the prison in the evening +that the sacred ship had come from Delos, and so we arranged to meet +very early at the accustomed place. On our arrival the jailer who +answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and told us to stay +until he called us. 'For the Eleven,' he said, 'are now with Socrates; +they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die +to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might come in. On entering we +found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom you know, +sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she +uttered a cry and said, as women will: 'O Socrates, this is the last +time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you.' +Socrates turned to Crito and said: 'Crito, let some one take her home.' +Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating +herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, bent +and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing: How singular is the +thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be +thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at +the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled +to take the other; their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single +head. And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he +would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and +how, when he could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is +the reason why when one comes the other follows, as I know by my own +experience now, when after the pain in my leg which was caused by the +chain pleasure appears to succeed. + +Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the +name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by +many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the +poet--he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like +me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I +should say to him:--he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote +a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables +into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo. + +Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth--that I had no idea of +rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. +But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt +about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have +often had intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same +dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but +always saying the same or nearly the same words: 'Cultivate and make +music,' said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only +intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which +has been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. +The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way +that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he +is already running. But I was not certain of this, for the dream might +have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under +sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that +it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, and, in obedience to +the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. And first I made +a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then considering that a +poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put together words, +but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I took some +fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew--they were +the first I came upon--and turned them into verse. Tell this to Evenus, +Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come +after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely +to be going, for the Athenians say that I must. + +Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent +companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never +take your advice unless he is obliged. + +Why, said Socrates,--is not Evenus a philosopher? + +I think that he is, said Simmias. + +Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to +die, but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful. + +Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the +ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting. + +Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own +life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying? + +Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples +of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this? + +Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates. + +My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not +repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, +it is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of +the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the +interval between this and the setting of the sun? + +Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have +certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm +when he was staying with us at Thebes: and there are others who say the +same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them. + +Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will +understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are +evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to +be the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not +permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of +another. + +Very true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native +Boeotian. + +I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but +there may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine +whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open +the door and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite +understand. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that +we are a possession of theirs. Do you not agree? + +Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes. + +And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took +the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no +intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with +him, and would you not punish him if you could? + +Certainly, replied Cebes. + +Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that +a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as +he is now summoning me. + +Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. And +yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our +guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we +were just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men +should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods +who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man +thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than +the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think so--he may argue that he +had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is +to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there +would be no sense in his running away. The wise man will want to be ever +with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse +of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow +and the fool rejoice at passing out of life. + +The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, +turning to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily +convinced by the first thing which he hears. + +And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does +appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly +wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better +than himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he +thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the +gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters. + +Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think +that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court? + +We should like you to do so, said Simmias. + +Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I +did when before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and +Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in +the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of +which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly +(though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than +those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have +done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the +dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good +than for the evil. + +But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said +Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?--for they are a benefit +in which we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in +convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself. + +I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what +Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me. + +Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:--the attendant who is to give you +the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you +are not to talk much, talking, he says, increases heat, and this is +apt to interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite +themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose. + +Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give +the poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all. + +I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged +to satisfy him. + +Never mind him, he said. + +And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher +has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after +death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And +how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I +deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood +by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and +dying; and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his +life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has +been always pursuing and desiring? + +Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made +me laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they +hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and +our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers +desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be +deserving of the death which they desire. + +And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the +words 'they have found them out'; for they have not found out either +what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, +or how he deserves or desires death. But enough of them:--let us discuss +the matter among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as +death? + +To be sure, replied Simmias. + +Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the +completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released +from the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but +death? + +Just so, he replied. + +There is another question, which will probably throw light on our +present inquiry if you and I can agree about it:--Ought the philosopher +to care about the pleasures--if they are to be called pleasures--of +eating and drinking? + +Certainly not, answered Simmias. + +And what about the pleasures of love--should he care for them? + +By no means. + +And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for +example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other +adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather +despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say? + +I should say that the true philosopher would despise them. + +Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not +with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the +body and to turn to the soul. + +Quite true. + +In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be +observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of +the body. + +Very true. + +Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who +has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not +worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as +dead. + +That is also true. + +What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?--is the +body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean +to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the +poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even +they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other +senses?--for you will allow that they are the best of them? + +Certainly, he replied. + +Then when does the soul attain truth?--for in attempting to consider +anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived. + +True. + +Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all? + +Yes. + +And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of +these things trouble her--neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any +pleasure,--when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as +possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is +aspiring after true being? + +Certainly. + +And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from +his body and desires to be alone and by herself? + +That is true. + +Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an +absolute justice? + +Assuredly there is. + +And an absolute beauty and absolute good? + +Of course. + +But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes? + +Certainly not. + +Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?--and I speak not +of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, +and of the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them +ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not +the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made +by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact +conception of the essence of each thing which he considers? + +Certainly. + +And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the +mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight +or any other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the +mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who +has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the +whole body, these being in his opinion distracting elements which when +they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge--who, +if not he, is likely to attain the knowledge of true being? + +What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias. + +And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be +led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like +the following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought +which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while +we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the +body, our desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. +For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere +requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and +impede us in the search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and +lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and +in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all. +Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body +and the lusts of the body? wars are occasioned by the love of money, and +money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; +and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to +philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and +betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in +upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing +us that we are prevented from seeing the truth. It has been proved to us +by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we +must be quit of the body--the soul in herself must behold things in +themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of +which we say that we are lovers, not while we live, but after death; for +if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, +one of two things follows--either knowledge is not to be attained at +all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul +will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone. In this present +life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we +have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are +not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure until the +hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having got rid +of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with +the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is +no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not permitted to +approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true +lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You +would agree; would you not? + +Undoubtedly, Socrates. + +But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that, +going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall +attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on +my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that +his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified. + +Certainly, replied Simmias. + +And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, +as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting +herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in +her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she +can;--the release of the soul from the chains of the body? + +Very true, he said. + +And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed +death? + +To be sure, he said. + +And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release +the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body +their especial study? + +That is true. + +And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction +in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and +yet repining when it comes upon them. + +Clearly. + +And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice +of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. +Look at the matter thus:--if they have been in every way the enemies of +the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of +theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and +repined, instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, +when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired--and +this was wisdom--and at the same time to be rid of the company of their +enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated +by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and +conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is +strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can +worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? +Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will +have a firm conviction that there and there only, he can find wisdom +in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was +saying, if he were afraid of death. + +He would, indeed, replied Simmias. + +And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not +his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but +a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either +money or power, or both? + +Quite so, he replied. + +And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic +of the philosopher? + +Certainly. + +There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to +consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense +of superiority to them--is not temperance a virtue belonging to those +only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy? + +Most assuredly. + +For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, +are really a contradiction. + +How so? + +Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as +a great evil. + +Very true, he said. + +And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet +greater evils? + +That is quite true. + +Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because +they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and +because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing. + +Very true. + +And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate +because they are intemperate--which might seem to be a contradiction, +but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish +temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and +in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because +they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is +called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in +being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in +a sense, they are made temperate through intemperance. + +Such appears to be the case. + +Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or +pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were +coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not +one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?--and that +is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is +anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. +And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears +or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? +But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed +from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, +nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true +exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, +and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. +The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, +and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago +that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below +will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and +purification will dwell with the gods. For 'many,' as they say in the +mysteries, 'are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'--meaning, +as I interpret the words, 'the true philosophers.' In the number +of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my +ability, to find a place;--whether I have sought in a right way or not, +and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little +while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world--such is my +belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, +in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this +world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends +in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if then I +succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian +judges, it will be well. + +Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. +But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear +that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on +the very day of death she may perish and come to an end--immediately on +her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air +and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be +collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of +which you are speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, +that what you say is true. But surely it requires a great deal of +argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet +exists, and has any force or intelligence. + +True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a +little of the probabilities of these things? + +I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion +about them. + +I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he +were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle +talking about matters in which I have no concern:--If you please, then, +we will proceed with the inquiry. + +Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death +are or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient +doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and +returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that +the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other +world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would +be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only +born from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will +have to be adduced. + +Very true, replied Cebes. + +Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, +but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything +of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all +things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean +such things as good and evil, just and unjust--and there are innumerable +other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show +that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; +I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must +become greater after being less. + +True. + +And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have +become less. + +Yes. + +And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the +slower. + +Very true. + +And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more +unjust. + +Of course. + +And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them +are generated out of opposites? + +Yes. + +And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two +intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other +opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is +also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which +grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane? + +Yes, he said. + +And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, +cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one +another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not +always expressed in words--they are really generated out of one another, +and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them? + +Very true, he replied. + +Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of +waking? + +True, he said. + +And what is it? + +Death, he answered. + +And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, +and have there their two intermediate processes also? + +Of course. + +Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites +which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and +you shall analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other +waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out +of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the +process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the +other waking up. Do you agree? + +I entirely agree. + +Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. +Is not death opposed to life? + +Yes. + +And they are generated one from the other? + +Yes. + +What is generated from the living? + +The dead. + +And what from the dead? + +I can only say in answer--the living. + +Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from +the dead? + +That is clear, he replied. + +Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below? + +That is true. + +And one of the two processes or generations is visible--for surely the +act of dying is visible? + +Surely, he said. + +What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? +And shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather +assign to death some corresponding process of generation? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And what is that process? + +Return to life. + +And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead +into the world of the living? + +Quite true. + +Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the +living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and +this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead +exist in some place out of which they come again. + +Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of +our previous admissions. + +And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, +I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and +there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of +elements into their opposites, then you know that all things would at +last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be +no more generation of them. + +What do you mean? he said. + +A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, +he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping +and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no +meaning, because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not +be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, +and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come +again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook +of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form +of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and +nothing would be alive--what other result could there be? For if the +living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all +things at last be swallowed up in death? (But compare Republic.) + +There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems +to be absolutely true. + +Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have +not been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that +there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring +from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that +the good souls have a better portion than the evil. + +Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply +recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in +which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be +impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the +form of man; here then is another proof of the soul's immortality. + +But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged +in favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the +moment that I remember them. + +One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put +a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of +himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right +reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken +to a diagram or to anything of that sort. (Compare Meno.) + +But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask +you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter +in another way;--I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether +knowledge is recollection. + +Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine +of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has +said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced; but I should still +like to hear what you were going to say. + +This is what I would say, he replied:--We should agree, if I am not +mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous +time. + +Very true. + +And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to +ask, Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived +anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something +else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of +knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the +conception? + +What do you mean? + +I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:--The knowledge +of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man? + +True. + +And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or +a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of +using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an +image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. +In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there +are endless examples of the same thing. + +Endless, indeed, replied Simmias. + +And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has +been already forgotten through time and inattention. + +Very true, he said. + +Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a +lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to +remember Cebes? + +True. + +Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself? + +Quite so. + +And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things +either like or unlike? + +It may be. + +And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another +consideration is sure to arise, which is--whether the likeness in any +degree falls short or not of that which is recollected? + +Very true, he said. + +And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a +thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but +that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so? + +Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence +in life. + +And do we know the nature of this absolute essence? + +To be sure, he said. + +And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of +material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from +them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will +acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another +way:--Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, +and at another time unequal? + +That is certain. + +But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as +of inequality? + +Impossible, Socrates. + +Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of +equality? + +I should say, clearly not, Socrates. + +And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, +you conceived and attained that idea? + +Very true, he said. + +Which might be like, or might be unlike them? + +Yes. + +But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you +conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been +an act of recollection? + +Very true. + +But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other +material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they +equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they +fall short of this perfect equality in a measure? + +Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. + +And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, +observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, +but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he +who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to +which the other, although similar, was inferior? + +Certainly. + +And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of +absolute equality? + +Precisely. + +Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first +saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals +strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it? + +Very true. + +And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, +and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some +other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect? + +Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the +same as the other. + +From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things +aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short? + +Yes. + +Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have +had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to +that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?--for to that +they all aspire, and of that they fall short. + +No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements. + +And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon +as we were born? + +Certainly. + +Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous +time? + +Yes. + +That is to say, before we were born, I suppose? + +True. + +And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born +having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the +instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all +other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, +goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of +essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer +questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the +knowledge before birth? + +We may. + +But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case +we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, +and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts--for knowing +is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not +forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge? + +Quite true, Socrates. + +But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at +birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what +we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a +recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be +rightly termed recollection? + +Very true. + +So much is clear--that when we perceive something, either by the help of +sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are +able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is +associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one +of two alternatives follows:--either we had this knowledge at birth, and +continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to +learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection. + +Yes, that is quite true, Socrates. + +And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at +our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to +our birth? + +I cannot decide at the moment. + +At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not +be able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say? + +Certainly, he will. + +But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very +matters about which we are speaking? + +Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at +this time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an +account of them such as ought to be given. + +Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things? + +Certainly not. + +They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before? + +Certainly. + +But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?--not since we were born +as men? + +Certainly not. + +And therefore, previously? + +Yes. + +Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before +they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence. + +Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at +the very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains. + +Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in +us when we are born--that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of +receiving them, or if not at what other time? + +No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense. + +Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there +is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all +things; and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our +former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, +finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession--then +our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be +no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must +have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we +were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls. + +Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity +for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully +to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be +separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For +there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, +and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most +real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof. + +Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too. + +I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most +incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced +of the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul +will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. +I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was +referring--the feeling that when the man dies the soul will be +dispersed, and that this may be the extinction of her. For admitting +that she may have been born elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, +and was in existence before entering the human body, why after having +entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come +to an end? + +Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; about half of what was required has been +proven; to wit, that our souls existed before we were born:--that the +soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of +which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is +given the demonstration will be complete. + +But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said +Socrates, if you put the two arguments together--I mean this and the +former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the +dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and +being born can be born only from death and dying, must she not after +death continue to exist, since she has to be born again?--Surely the +proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect +that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further. Like +children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the +body, the wind may really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a +man should happen to die in a great storm and not when the sky is calm. + +Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of +our fears--and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there +is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; him too we +must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark. + +Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you +have charmed away the fear. + +And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you +are gone? + +Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and +there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far +and wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way +of spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too; for you +will not find others better able to make the search. + +The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if +you please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we +digressed. + +By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please? + +Very good. + +Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we +imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear? and what +again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed +further to enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not +of the nature of soul--our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn +upon the answers to these questions. + +Very true, he said. + +Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, +as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is +uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble. + +Yes; I should imagine so, said Cebes. + +And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, +whereas the compound is always changing and never the same. + +I agree, he said. + +Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or +essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true +existence--whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else--are +these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or +are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple +self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, +or in any way, or at any time? + +They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. + +And what would you say of the many beautiful--whether men or horses or +garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may +be called equal or beautiful,--are they all unchanging and the same +always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost +always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with +one another? + +The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change. + +And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but +the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind--they are +invisible and are not seen? + +That is very true, he said. + +Well, then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of +existences--one seen, the other unseen. + +Let us suppose them. + +The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging? + +That may be also supposed. + +And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul? + +To be sure. + +And to which class is the body more alike and akin? + +Clearly to the seen--no one can doubt that. + +And is the soul seen or not seen? + +Not by man, Socrates. + +And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not +visible to the eye of man? + +Yes, to the eye of man. + +And is the soul seen or not seen? + +Not seen. + +Unseen then? + +Yes. + +Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen? + +That follows necessarily, Socrates. + +And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an +instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight +or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through +the body is perceiving through the senses)--were we not saying that the +soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, +and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like +a drunkard, when she touches change? + +Very true. + +But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the +other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and +unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, +when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases +from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is +unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom? + +That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied. + +And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may +be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one? + +I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the +argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable--even +the most stupid person will not deny that. + +And the body is more like the changing? + +Yes. + +Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and +the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and +the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to +the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you +to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that +which is subject and servant? + +True. + +And which does the soul resemble? + +The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal--there can be no +doubt of that, Socrates. + +Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the +conclusion?--that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, +and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and +unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, +and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and +changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied? + +It cannot. + +But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? +and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble? + +Certainly. + +And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or +visible part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is +called a corpse, and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and +dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a +for some time, nay even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at +the time of death, and the season of the year favourable? For the body +when shrunk and embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost +entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still +some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically +indestructible:--Do you agree? + +Yes. + +And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the +place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and +noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my +soul is also soon to go,--that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature +and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the +body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. +The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws +after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily during life had +connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered +into herself;--and making such abstraction her perpetual study--which +means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore +has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying? For is not +philosophy the practice of death?-- + +Certainly-- + +That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world--to +the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure of +bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and +wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say +of the initiated, in company with the gods (compare Apol.). Is not this +true, Cebes? + +Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt. + +But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her +departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is +in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures +of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in +a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the +purposes of his lusts,--the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear +and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark +and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy;--do you suppose +that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed? + +Impossible, he replied. + +She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and +constant care of the body have wrought into her nature. + +Very true. + +And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, +and is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged +down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the +invisible and of the world below--prowling about tombs and sepulchres, +near which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions +of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and +therefore visible. + +(Compare Milton, Comus:-- + + 'But when lust, + By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk, + But most by lewd and lavish act of sin, + Lets in defilement to the inward parts, + The soul grows clotted by contagion, + Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose, + The divine property of her first being. + Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp + Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres, + Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave, + As loath to leave the body that it lov'd, + And linked itself by carnal sensuality + To a degenerate and degraded state.') + +That is very likely, Socrates. + +Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the +good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places +in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they +continue to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which +never leaves them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they +may be supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they +have had in their former lives. + +What natures do you mean, Socrates? + +What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony, and +wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, +would pass into asses and animals of that sort. What do you think? + +I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable. + +And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and +violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites;--whither else +can we suppose them to go? + +Yes, said Cebes; with such natures, beyond question. + +And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places +answering to their several natures and propensities? + +There is not, he said. + +Some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and +in the place to which they go are those who have practised the civil and +social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired +by habit and attention without philosophy and mind. (Compare Republic.) + +Why are they the happiest? + +Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind +which is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again +into the form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to +spring from them. + +Very likely. + +No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at +the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, +but the lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias and +Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly +lusts, and hold out against them and refuse to give themselves up to +them,--not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like +the lovers of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of +power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil +deeds. + +No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes. + +No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have any care of their +own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say +farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and +when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they +feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads +they turn and follow. + +What do you mean, Socrates? + +I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that +the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body--until philosophy +received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of +a prison, not in and through herself; she was wallowing in the mire of +every sort of ignorance; and by reason of lust had become the principal +accomplice in her own captivity. This was her original state; and +then, as I was saying, and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, +philosophy, seeing how terrible was her confinement, of which she was +to herself the cause, received and gently comforted her and sought to +release her, pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses +are full of deception, and persuading her to retire from them, and +abstain from all but the necessary use of them, and be gathered up and +collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure +apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her +through other channels and is subject to variation; for such things +are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is +intelligible and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks +that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains +from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is +able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or +desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might +be anticipated--as for example, the loss of his health or property which +he has sacrificed to his lusts--but an evil greater far, which is the +greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks. + +What is it, Socrates? said Cebes. + +The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, +every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be +then plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things +of sight. + +Very true. + +And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the +body? + +How so? + +Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails +and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and +believes that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from +agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to +have the same habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at +her departure to the world below, but is always infected by the body; +and so she sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, +and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and +simple. + +Most true, Socrates, answered Cebes. + +And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are +temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives. + +Certainly not. + +Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another +way; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when +released she may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures +and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of +unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will calm passion, and follow +reason, and dwell in the contemplation of her, beholding the true +and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence deriving +nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she +hopes to go to her own kindred and to that which is like her, and to be +freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which +has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure +from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere +and nothing. + +When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was +silence; he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on +what had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one +another. And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the +argument, and whether there was anything wanting? For, said he, there +are many points still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were +disposed to sift the matter thoroughly. Should you be considering +some other matter I say no more, but if you are still in doubt do not +hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let us have anything better +which you can suggest; and if you think that I can be of any use, allow +me to help you. + +Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our +minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the +question which we wanted to have answered and which neither of us liked +to ask, fearing that our importunity might be troublesome under present +at such a time. + +Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying? I am +not very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present +situation as a misfortune, if I cannot even persuade you that I am no +worse off now than at any other time in my life. Will you not allow that +I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, +when they perceive that they must die, having sung all their life long, +do then sing more lustily than ever, rejoicing in the thought that +they are about to go away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, +because they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the +swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird +sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the nightingale, nor +the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune a lay of +sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any more than +of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo, they have the gift +of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of another world, wherefore +they sing and rejoice in that day more than they ever did before. And I +too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God, and +the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from +my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not +go out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be +your only objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while +the eleven magistrates of Athens allow. + +Very good, Socrates, said Simmias; then I will tell you my difficulty, +and Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself, (and I daresay that you have +the same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of +any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet +I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to +the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them +on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two +things: either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them; +or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most +irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he +sails through life--not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some +word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. And now, as +you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to +reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think. +For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument +does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient. + +Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I +should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient. + +In this respect, replied Simmias:--Suppose a person to use the same +argument about harmony and the lyre--might he not say that harmony is +a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre +which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and +material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one +breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this +view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony +survives and has not perished--you cannot imagine, he would say, that +the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which +are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and +immortal nature and kindred, has perished--perished before the mortal. +The harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay +before anything can happen to that. The thought, Socrates, must have +occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul; +and that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the +elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or +due proportionate admixture of them. But if so, whenever the strings of +the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other +injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music +or of works of art, of course perishes at once, although the material +remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are +either decayed or burnt. And if any one maintains that the soul, being +the harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that +which is called death, how shall we answer him? + +Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile: +Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who +is better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack +upon me. But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what +Cebes has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they +have both spoken, we may either assent to them, if there is truth in +what they say, or if not, we will maintain our position. Please to tell +me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you? + +Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it +was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am +ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into +the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite +sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, +in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of +Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and +more lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects +the soul very far excels the body. Well, then, says the argument to me, +why do you remain unconvinced?--When you see that the weaker continues +in existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more +lasting must also survive during the same period of time? Now I will +ask you to consider whether the objection, which, like Simmias, I will +express in a figure, is of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce +is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody +says:--He is not dead, he must be alive;--see, there is the coat which +he himself wove and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed. And +then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man +lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and wear; and when he is +answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly +demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because +the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to +remark, is a mistake; any one can see that he who talks thus is talking +nonsense. For the truth is, that the weaver aforesaid, having woven and +worn many such coats, outlived several of them, and was outlived by the +last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than +a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a +similar figure; and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the +soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison. He may +argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially +if a man live many years. While he is alive the body deliquesces and +decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the +waste. But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her +last garment, and this will survive her; and then at length, when +the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly +decompose and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the +argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the +soul after death. For granting even more than you affirm to be possible, +and acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also +that the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, +and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a +natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many +times--nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will +weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in +one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of +the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of +us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it: and if so, +then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish +confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether +immortal and imperishable. But if he cannot prove the soul's +immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that +when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish. + +All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant +feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced +before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and +uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future +one; either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no +grounds of belief. + +ECHECRATES: There I feel with you--by heaven I do, Phaedo, and when you +were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What +argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than +the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That +the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful +attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my +own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another +argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul +survives. Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed? Did he +appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he +calmly meet the attack? And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate +what passed as exactly as you can. + +PHAEDO: Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more +than on that occasion. That he should be able to answer was nothing, +but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving +manner in which he received the words of the young men, and then his +quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and +the readiness with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general +rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and +return to the field of argument. + +ECHECRATES: What followed? + +PHAEDO: You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated +on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. +He stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck--he had a way of +playing with my hair; and then he said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose +that these fair locks of yours will be severed. + +Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied. + +Not so, if you will take my advice. + +What shall I do with them? I said. + +To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we +cannot bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks; and +if I were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold +my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like +the Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict +and defeated them. + +Yes, I said, but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two. + +Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes +down. + +I summon you rather, I rejoined, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but +as Iolaus might summon Heracles. + +That will do as well, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid +a danger. + +Of what nature? I said. + +Lest we become misologists, he replied, no worse thing can happen to a +man than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there +are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same +cause, which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the +too great confidence of inexperience;--you trust a man and think him +altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he +turns out to be false and knavish; and then another and another, and +when this has happened several times to a man, especially when it +happens among those whom he deems to be his own most trusted and +familiar friends, and he has often quarreled with them, he at last hates +all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all. You must +have observed this trait of character? + +I have. + +And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an +one having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of +human nature; for experience would have taught him the true state of +the case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great +majority are in the interval between them. + +What do you mean? I said. + +I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small, +that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and +this applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or +swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether +the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the +extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe +this? + +Yes, I said, I have. + +And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in +evil, the worst would be found to be very few? + +Yes, that is very likely, I said. + +Yes, that is very likely, he replied; although in this respect arguments +are unlike men--there I was led on by you to say more than I had +intended; but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who +has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he +afterwards imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and +then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, and great +disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be +the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and +instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the +currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and +flow. + +That is quite true, I said. + +Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as +truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge--that a man should have +lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then +turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want +of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer +the blame from himself to arguments in general: and for ever afterwards +should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of +realities. + +Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy. + +Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of +admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness +in any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to +soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our +best to gain health of mind--you and all other men having regard to the +whole of your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death. For at +this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; +like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is +engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, +but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. +And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely +this--that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is +true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers +is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the +argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of +the truth, but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short +time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, +and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me, and therefore +no harm will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in +which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of +the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be +speaking the truth; or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may +not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, +leave my sting in you before I die. + +And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that +I have in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, +has fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner +thing than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not +perish first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul +was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know +whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish +herself and leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, +which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the +body the work of destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias +and Cebes, the points which we have to consider? + +They both agreed to this statement of them. + +He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding +argument, or of a part only? + +Of a part only, they replied. + +And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which +we said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the +soul must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed +in the body? + +Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the +argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken. Simmias +agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility +of his ever thinking differently. + +But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban +friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the +soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the +body; for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is +prior to the elements which compose it. + +Never, Socrates. + +But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the +soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up +of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like +the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the +sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of +all, and perishes first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this +agree with the other? + +Not at all, replied Simmias. + +And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of +which harmony is the theme. + +There ought, replied Simmias. + +But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge +is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you +retain? + +I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the +first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in +the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on +probable and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I +know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and +unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to +be deceptive--in geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of +knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds; +and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into +the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name +implies existence. Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this +conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to +argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony. + +Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do +you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state +other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded? + +Certainly not. + +Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer? + +He agreed. + +Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the parts or elements +which make up the harmony, but only follows them. + +He assented. + +For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality +which is opposed to its parts. + +That would be impossible, he replied. + +And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which +the elements are harmonized? + +I do not understand you, he said. + +I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a +harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully +harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and +less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized. + +True. + +But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least +degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another? + +Not in the least. + +Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, +and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil +soul: and this is said truly? + +Yes, truly. + +But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this +presence of virtue and vice in the soul?--will they say that here is +another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is +harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, +and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her? + +I cannot tell, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of the sort +would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony. + +And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another; +which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less +harmony, or more or less completely a harmony? + +Quite true. + +And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less +harmonized? + +True. + +And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less +of harmony, but only an equal harmony? + +Yes, an equal harmony. + +Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is +not more or less harmonized? + +Exactly. + +And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony? + +She has not. + +And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul +has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue +harmony? + +Not at all more. + +Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will +never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has +no part in the inharmonical. + +No. + +And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice? + +How can she have, if the previous argument holds? + +Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all +living creatures will be equally good? + +I agree with you, Socrates, he said. + +And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the +consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a +harmony? + +It cannot be true. + +Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature +other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any? + +Indeed, I do not. + +And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she +at variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, +does not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body +is hungry, against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten +thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body. + +Very true. + +But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can +never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and +vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is +composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them? + +It must be so, he replied. + +And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact +opposite--leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; +almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout +life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; +then again more gently; now threatening, now admonishing the desires, +passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer +in the Odyssee represents Odysseus doing in the words-- + +'He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart: Endure, my heart; +far worse hast thou endured!' + +Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a +harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not +rather of a nature which should lead and master them--herself a far +diviner thing than any harmony? + +Yes, Socrates, I quite think so. + +Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a +harmony, for we should contradict the divine Homer, and contradict +ourselves. + +True, he said. + +Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has +graciously yielded to us; but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband +Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him? + +I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I +am sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that +I could never have expected. For when Simmias was mentioning his +difficulty, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and +therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain +the first onset of yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call +Cadmus, may share a similar fate. + +Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye +should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, +may be left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric +fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:--You +want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and +immortal, and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you +to have but a vain and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will +fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of +life, unless he can prove this; and you say that the demonstration of +the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our +becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality. Admitting the +soul to be longlived, and to have known and done much in a former state, +still she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into +the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of +dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in +that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body +once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in +the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of sense, +must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's +immortality. This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, +Cebes; and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, +and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything. + +But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or +subtract: I mean what you say that I mean. + +Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At +length he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes, involving +the whole nature of generation and corruption, about which, if you like, +I will give you my own experience; and if anything which I say is likely +to avail towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it. + +I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say. + +Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a +prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called +the investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why +a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty +profession; and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of +questions such as these:--Is the growth of animals the result of some +decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is +the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or +perhaps nothing of the kind--but the brain may be the originating +power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory +and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and +opinion when they have attained fixity. And then I went on to examine +the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and +at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable +of these enquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was +fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things +which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; I +forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths; e.g. such a fact +as that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when +by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and +whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser +bulk becomes larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable +notion? + +Yes, said Cebes, I think so. + +Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I +thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; +and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one +was taller than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to +be greater than another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to +perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more +than one, because two is the double of one. + +And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes. + +I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause +of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, +when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes +two, or that the two units added together make two by reason of the +addition. I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each +of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, +the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their +becoming two: neither can I understand how the division of one is the +way to make two; for then a different cause would produce the same +effect,--as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one +to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of +one from the other would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied +that I understand the reason why one or anything else is either +generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused +notion of a new method, and can never admit the other. + +Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, +that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this +notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind +is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each +particular in the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to +find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of +anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was +best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best +for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, since the +same science comprehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found +in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, +and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or +round; and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and +the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of +the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was +in the centre, he would further explain that this position was the best, +and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any +other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go on and ask him +about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their +comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active +and passive, and how all of them were for the best. For I could not +imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would +give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was +best; and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause +of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was +best for each and what was good for all. These hopes I would not have +sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as +fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse. + +What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! +As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any +other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and +water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who +began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions +of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my +several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my +body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, +are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, +and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of +flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their +joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able +to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved +posture--that is what he would say, and he would have a similar +explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and +air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the +same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the +Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought +it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for +I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have +gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia--by the dog they would, if they +had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not +chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running +away, of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts. There is +surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may +be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts +of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do +because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and +not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of +speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the +condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always +mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and +steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to +the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging +them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their +minds; and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather +expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more +everlasting and more containing than the good;--of the obligatory and +containing power of the good they think nothing; and yet this is the +principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me. But as I +have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, +the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have +found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause. + +I should very much like to hear, he replied. + +Socrates proceeded:--I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation +of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of +my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing +on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only +looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. +So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether +if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the +help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the +world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that +the simile is not perfect--for I am very far from admitting that he who +contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only +'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who considers them in action +and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first +assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I +affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating +to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded +as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do +not think that you as yet understand me. + +No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well. + +There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but +only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous +discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that +cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those +familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all +assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and +the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of +the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul. + +Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you +this. + +Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me +in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything +beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can +be beautiful only in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty--and I +should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the +cause? + +Yes, he said, I agree. + +He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of +those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that +the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, +I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, +and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing +makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in +whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, +but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become +beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give, +either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion +that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or +to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply, That by beauty +beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me? + +I do. + +And that by greatness only great things become great and greater +greater, and by smallness the less become less? + +True. + +Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and +B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and +would stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is +greater by, and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, +and by reason of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of +saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of +the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous +absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the +head, which is small. You would be afraid to draw such an inference, +would you not? + +Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing. + +In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, +and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or +you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by +magnitude?-for there is the same liability to error in all these cases. + +Very true, he said. + +Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of +one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would +loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes +into existence except by participation in its own proper essence, +and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is +the participation in duality--this is the way to make two, and the +participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I will let +alone puzzles of division and addition--wiser heads than mine may answer +them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, +at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a +principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, +or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow +agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give +an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher +principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of +the higher; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences +in your reasoning, like the Eristics--at least if you wanted to discover +real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never +care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well +pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. +But you, if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say. + +What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at +once. + +ECHECRATES: Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting. Any +one who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of +Socrates' reasoning. + +PHAEDO: Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling of the whole +company at the time. + +ECHECRATES: Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, +and are now listening to your recital. But what followed? + +PHAEDO: After all this had been admitted, and they had that ideas exist, +and that other things participate in them and derive their names from +them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:-- + +This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is +greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of +Simmias both greatness and smallness? + +Yes, I do. + +But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as +the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the +size which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he +is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he +has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias? + +True. + +And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is +Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is +comparatively smaller? + +That is true. + +And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, +because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one +by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his +smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe +that what I am saying is true. + +Simmias assented. + +I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not +only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but +that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or +admit of being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, +either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the +less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but +will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; +even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with +Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the +idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like +manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other +opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but +either passes away or perishes in the change. + +That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion. + +Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of +them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what +was admitted before--that out of the greater came the less and out of +the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from +opposites; but now this principle seems to be utterly denied. + +Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your +courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that +there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of +opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as +is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with +itself: then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites +are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the +opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them; +and these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of +generation into or out of one another. At the same time, turning to +Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's +objection? + +No, I do not feel so, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am often +disturbed by objections. + +Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will +never in any case be opposed to itself? + +To that we are quite agreed, he replied. + +Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point +of view, and see whether you agree with me:--There is a thing which you +term heat, and another thing which you term cold? + +Certainly. + +But are they the same as fire and snow? + +Most assuredly not. + +Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow? + +Yes. + +And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is +under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at +the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish? + +Very true, he replied. + +And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or +perish; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will +not remain as before, fire and cold. + +That is true, he said. + +And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea +in an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, +exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will +try to make this clearer by an example:--The odd number is always called +by the name of odd? + +Very true. + +But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other +things which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, +although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?--that +is what I mean to ask--whether numbers such as the number three are not +of the class of odd. And there are many other examples: would you not +say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also +be called odd, which is not the same with three? and this may be said +not only of three but also of five, and of every alternate number--each +of them without being oddness is odd, and in the same way two and +four, and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even, +without being evenness. Do you agree? + +Of course. + +Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:--not only do essential +opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although +not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise +reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, +and when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; +Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be +converted into an even number, while remaining three? + +Very true, said Cebes. + +And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number +three? + +It is not. + +Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but +also there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites. + +Very true, he said. + +Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what +these are. + +By all means. + +Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have +possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some +opposite? + +What do you mean? + +I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that +those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be +three in number, but must also be odd. + +Quite true. + +And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the +opposite idea will never intrude? + +No. + +And this impress was given by the odd principle? + +Yes. + +And to the odd is opposed the even? + +True. + +Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three? + +No. + +Then three has no part in the even? + +None. + +Then the triad or number three is uneven? + +Very true. + +To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and +yet do not admit opposites--as, in the instance given, three, although +not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but +always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does +not receive the odd, or fire the cold--from these examples (and there +are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general +conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also +that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of +that which it brings, in that to which it is brought. And here let me +recapitulate--for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will +not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the +double of five, will admit the nature of the odd. The double has another +opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless +rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3:2, nor +any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a +third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to +the whole: You will agree? + +Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that. + +And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question +in the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of +which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth +will be inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any +one asks you 'what that is, of which the inherence makes the body +hot,' you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and +stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a +condition to give. Or if any one asks you 'why a body is diseased,' you +will not say from disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that +oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the +cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will +understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples. + +Yes, he said, I quite understand you. + +Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body +alive? + +The soul, he replied. + +And is this always the case? + +Yes, he said, of course. + +Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life? + +Yes, certainly. + +And is there any opposite to life? + +There is, he said. + +And what is that? + +Death. + +Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite +of what she brings. + +Impossible, replied Cebes. + +And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels +the even? + +The odd. + +And that principle which repels the musical, or the just? + +The unmusical, he said, and the unjust. + +And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death? + +The immortal, he said. + +And does the soul admit of death? + +No. + +Then the soul is immortal? + +Yes, he said. + +And may we say that this has been proven? + +Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied. + +Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be +imperishable? + +Of course. + +And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle +came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and +unmelted--for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained +and admitted the heat? + +True, he said. + +Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire +when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, +but would have gone away unaffected? + +Certainly, he said. + +And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also +imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the +preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever +be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, +or fire or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But +although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why +may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to +him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is +imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been +acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that +at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took +their departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and +heat and any other thing. + +Very true. + +And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also +imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; +but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be +given. + +No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, +is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable. + +Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the +essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish. + +Yes, all men, he said--that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not +mistaken, as well as men. + +Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if +she is immortal, be also imperishable? + +Most certainly. + +Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed +to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is +preserved safe and sound? + +True. + +Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and +our souls will truly exist in another world! + +I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; +but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to +make, he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know +to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything +which he wants to say or to have said. + +But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any +reason for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot +help feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of +the subject and the feebleness of man. + +Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that +first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully +considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a +sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow +the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will +be no need for any further enquiry. + +Very true. + +But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what +care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time +which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her +from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had +only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in +dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but +of their own evil together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the +soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil +except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul +when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but +nurture and education; and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly +to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his journey thither. + +For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom +he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are +gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into +the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them +from this world to the other: and when they have there received their +due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after +many revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, as +Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and straight path--if that were +so no guide would be needed, for no one could miss it; but there are +many partings of the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and +sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three +ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight +path and is conscious of her surroundings; but the soul which desires +the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering +about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles +and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her +attendant genius, and when she arrives at the place where the other +souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether +foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the +works of brothers in crime--from that soul every one flees and turns +away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she +wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and +when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting +habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in +the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper +home. + +Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature +and extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the +authority of one who shall be nameless. + +What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many +descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much +like to know, in which of these you put faith. + +And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell +you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth +of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if +I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the +argument was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and +regions of the earth according to my conception of them. + +That, said Simmias, will be enough. + +Well, then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body +in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any +similar force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from +falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven +and by her own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the +centre of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in +any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. +And this is my first notion. + +Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias. + +Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in +the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles +inhabit a small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a +marsh, and that there are other inhabitants of many other like places; +for everywhere on the face of the earth there are hollows of various +forms and sizes, into which the water and the mist and the lower +air collect. But the true earth is pure and situated in the pure +heaven--there are the stars also; and it is the heaven which is commonly +spoken of by us as the ether, and of which our own earth is the sediment +gathering in the hollows beneath. But we who live in these hollows are +deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of +the earth; which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the +sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and that the +sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars, +he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and +sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever +heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world above +is than his own. And such is exactly our case: for we are dwelling in a +hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air +we call the heaven, in which we imagine that the stars move. But the +fact is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented +from reaching the surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the +exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and come to the top, then +like a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees this world, he +would see a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could sustain the +sight, he would acknowledge that this other world was the place of the +true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For our earth, and +the stones, and the entire region which surrounds us, are spoilt and +corroded, as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine, neither +is there any noble or perfect growth, but caverns only, and sand, and an +endless slough of mud: and even the shore is not to be compared to the +fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world to be +compared with the other. Of that upper earth which is under the heaven, +I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth hearing. + +And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen to you. + +The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:--In the first place, the +earth, when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of +those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked +with various colours, of which the colours used by painters on earth are +in a manner samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them, +and they are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of +wonderful lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in +the earth is whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colours +the earth is made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the +eye of man has ever seen; the very hollows (of which I was speaking) +filled with air and water have a colour of their own, and are seen like +light gleaming amid the diversity of the other colours, so that the +whole presents a single and continuous appearance of variety in unity. +And in this fair region everything that grows--trees, and flowers, and +fruits--are in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are hills, +having stones in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent, +and fairer in colour than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and +jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for +there all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still +(compare Republic). The reason is, that they are pure, and not, like +our precious stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements +which coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in +earth and stones, as well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels +of the upper earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like, +and they are set in the light of day and are large and abundant and in +all places, making the earth a sight to gladden the beholder's eye. +And there are animals and men, some in a middle region, others dwelling +about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in islands which the air +flows round, near the continent: and in a word, the air is used by them +as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them what the +air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is such that +they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have +sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater +perfection, in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the +ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the +gods really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, +and are conscious of them and hold converse with them, and they see the +sun, moon, and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is +of a piece with this. + +Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are +around the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the +face of the globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than +that which we inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening +than ours, and some are shallower and also wider. All have numerous +perforations, and there are passages broad and narrow in the interior of +the earth, connecting them with one another; and there flows out of and +into them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean +streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold, and a great fire, +and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like +the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams which follow them), +and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them. +And there is a swinging or see-saw in the interior of the earth which +moves all this up and down, and is due to the following cause:--There is +a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right through the +whole earth; this is that chasm which Homer describes in the words,-- + + 'Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;' + +and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called +Tartarus. And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out +of this chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which +they flow. And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, +is that the watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and +surging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they +follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth--just +as in the act of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation +and exhalation;--and the wind swinging with the water in and out +produces fearful and irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with +a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow +through the earth in those regions, and fill them up like water raised +by a pump, and then when they leave those regions and rush back hither, +they again fill the hollows here, and when these are filled, flow +through subterranean channels and find their way to their several +places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Thence they +again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many +lands, others going to a few places and not so distant; and again fall +into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they +rose, and others not much lower, but all in some degree lower than the +point from which they came. And some burst forth again on the opposite +side, and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one +or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they +can, but always return and fall into the chasm. The rivers flowing in +either direction can descend only to the centre and no further, for +opposite to the rivers is a precipice. + +Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four +principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called +Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite +direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert +places into the Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of +which the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an +appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, +they are sent back to be born again as animals. The third river passes +out between the two, and near the place of outlet pours into a vast +region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, +boiling with water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding +about the earth, comes, among other places, to the extremities of the +Acherusian Lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after +making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper +level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which +throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth. The fourth river +goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and +savage region, which is all of a dark-blue colour, like lapis lazuli; +and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls into +and forms the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving +strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round +in the opposite direction, and comes near the Acherusian lake from the +opposite side to Pyriphlegethon. And the water of this river too mingles +with no other, but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over +against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of the river, as the poets say, is +Cocytus. + +Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the +place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, +they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously +or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to +the river Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are +carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of +their evil deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which +they have done to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of +their good deeds, each of them according to his deserts. But those who +appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes--who +have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and +violent, or the like--such are hurled into Tartarus which is their +suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have +committed crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable--who in +a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a father or a +mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who +have taken the life of another under the like extenuating +circumstances--these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they +are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the +wave casts them forth--mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and +matricides by Pyriphlegethon--and they are borne to the Acherusian lake, +and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they +have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to be kind to them, +and let them come out into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come +forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back +again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until +they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged: for that is the +sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who have been +pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from this earthly prison, +and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; +and of these, such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live +henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer still which +may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell. + +Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do +that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, +and the hope great! + +A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the +description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly +true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, +he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of +the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort +himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out +the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, +who having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to +him and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of +knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but +in her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and +nobility, and truth--in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey +to the world below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all +other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic +poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; +and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that +the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead. + +When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us, +Socrates--anything to say about your children, or any other matter in +which we can serve you? + +Nothing particular, Crito, he replied: only, as I have always told +you, take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever +rendering to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so +or not. But if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk +according to the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the +first time, however much you may profess or promise at the moment, it +will be of no avail. + +We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you? + +In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care +that I do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a +smile:--I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have +been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other +Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body--and he asks, How shall he +bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show +that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys +of the blessed,--these words of mine, with which I was comforting you +and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore +I want you to be surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety +to the judges for me: but let the promise be of another sort; for he +was surety for me to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my +surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then +he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body +being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or +say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to +the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, +but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer, then, my dear +Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that +whatever is usual, and what you think best. + +When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to +bathe; Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind, +talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the +greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being +bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. +When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him--(he had two +young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, +and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of +Crito; then he dismissed them and returned to us. + +Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed +while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after +his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of +the Eleven, entered and stood by him, saying:--To you, Socrates, whom +I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to +this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage +and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink +the poison--indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for +others, as you are aware, and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, +and try to bear lightly what must needs be--you know my errand. Then +bursting into tears he turned away and went out. + +Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do +as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since +I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times +he would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how +generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; and +therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let +the attendant prepare some. + +Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that +many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has +been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his +beloved; do not hurry--there is time enough. + +Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so +acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am +right in not following their example, for I do not think that I should +gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be +ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already +forfeit. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me. + +Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out, +and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer +carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who +are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to +proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk about until your legs +are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same +time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest +manner, without the least fear or change of colour or feature, looking +at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the +cup and said: What do you say about making a libation out of this cup +to any god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, +just so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: but I may +and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other +world--even so--and so be it according to my prayer. Then raising the +cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. +And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now +when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, +we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were +flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at +the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. Nor +was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his +tears, had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who +had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry +which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What +is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order +that they might not misbehave in this way, for I have been told that +a man should die in peace. Be quiet, then, and have patience. When we +heard his words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked +about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his +back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison +now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed +his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then +his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and +stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the +heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the +groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, +and said--they were his last words--he said: Crito, I owe a cock to +Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be +paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to +this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the +attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes +and mouth. + +Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may +truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the +wisest and justest and best. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Phaedo, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHAEDO *** + +***** This file should be named 1658.txt or 1658.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/5/1658/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +PHAEDO + +by Plato + + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +After an interval of some months or years, and at Phlius, a town of +Peloponnesus, the tale of the last hours of Socrates is narrated to +Echecrates and other Phliasians by Phaedo the 'beloved disciple.' The +Dialogue necessarily takes the form of a narrative, because Socrates has to +be described acting as well as speaking. The minutest particulars of the +event are interesting to distant friends, and the narrator has an equal +interest in them. + +During the voyage of the sacred ship to and from Delos, which has occupied +thirty days, the execution of Socrates has been deferred. (Compare Xen. +Mem.) The time has been passed by him in conversation with a select +company of disciples. But now the holy season is over, and the disciples +meet earlier than usual in order that they may converse with Socrates for +the last time. Those who were present, and those who might have been +expected to be present, are mentioned by name. There are Simmias and Cebes +(Crito), two disciples of Philolaus whom Socrates 'by his enchantments has +attracted from Thebes' (Mem.), Crito the aged friend, the attendant of the +prison, who is as good as a friend--these take part in the conversation. +There are present also, Hermogenes, from whom Xenophon derived his +information about the trial of Socrates (Mem.), the 'madman' Apollodorus +(Symp.), Euclid and Terpsion from Megara (compare Theaet.), Ctesippus, +Antisthenes, Menexenus, and some other less-known members of the Socratic +circle, all of whom are silent auditors. Aristippus, Cleombrotus, and +Plato are noted as absent. Almost as soon as the friends of Socrates enter +the prison Xanthippe and her children are sent home in the care of one of +Crito's servants. Socrates himself has just been released from chains, and +is led by this circumstance to make the natural remark that 'pleasure +follows pain.' (Observe that Plato is preparing the way for his doctrine +of the alternation of opposites.) 'Aesop would have represented them in a +fable as a two-headed creature of the gods.' The mention of Aesop reminds +Cebes of a question which had been asked by Evenus the poet (compare +Apol.): 'Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had been +putting Aesop into verse?'--'Because several times in his life he had been +warned in dreams that he should practise music; and as he was about to die +and was not certain of what was meant, he wished to fulfil the admonition +in the letter as well as in the spirit, by writing verses as well as by +cultivating philosophy. Tell this to Evenus; and say that I would have him +follow me in death.' 'He is not at all the sort of man to comply with your +request, Socrates.' 'Why, is he not a philosopher?' 'Yes.' 'Then he will +be willing to die, although he will not take his own life, for that is held +to be unlawful.' + +Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be +accounted a good? Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man is a +prisoner, who must not open the door of his prison and run away--this is +the truth in a 'mystery.' Or (2) rather, because he is not his own +property, but a possession of the gods, and has no right to make away with +that which does not belong to him. But why, asks Cebes, if he is a +possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them? For he is +under their protection; and surely he cannot take better care of himself +than they take of him. Simmias explains that Cebes is really referring to +Socrates, whom they think too unmoved at the prospect of leaving the gods +and his friends. Socrates answers that he is going to other gods who are +wise and good, and perhaps to better friends; and he professes that he is +ready to defend himself against the charge of Cebes. The company shall be +his judges, and he hopes that he will be more successful in convincing them +than he had been in convincing the court. + +The philosopher desires death--which the wicked world will insinuate that +he also deserves: and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which they are +capable of understanding. Enough of them: the real question is, What is +the nature of that death which he desires? Death is the separation of soul +and body--and the philosopher desires such a separation. He would like to +be freed from the dominion of bodily pleasures and of the senses, which are +always perturbing his mental vision. He wants to get rid of eyes and ears, +and with the light of the mind only to behold the light of truth. All the +evils and impurities and necessities of men come from the body. And death +separates him from these corruptions, which in life he cannot wholly lay +aside. Why then should he repine when the hour of separation arrives? +Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that other death, through +which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity? + +Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike those of other +men. For they are courageous because they are afraid of greater dangers, +and temperate because they desire greater pleasures. But he disdains this +balancing of pleasures and pains, which is the exchange of commerce and not +of virtue. All the virtues, including wisdom, are regarded by him only as +purifications of the soul. And this was the meaning of the founders of the +mysteries when they said, 'Many are the wand-bearers but few are the +mystics.' (Compare Matt. xxii.: 'Many are called but few are chosen.') +And in the hope that he is one of these mystics, Socrates is now departing. +This is his answer to any one who charges him with indifference at the +prospect of leaving the gods and his friends. + +Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body may vanish +away like smoke or air. Socrates in answer appeals first of all to the old +Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead are in the world below, and +that the living come from them. This he attempts to found on a +philosophical assumption that all opposites--e.g. less, greater; weaker, +stronger; sleeping, waking; life, death--are generated out of each other. +Nor can the process of generation be only a passage from living to dying, +for then all would end in death. The perpetual sleeper (Endymion) would be +no longer distinguished from the rest of mankind. The circle of nature is +not complete unless the living come from the dead as well as pass to them. + +The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a confirmation of +the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of this doctrine are demanded. +One proof given is the same as that of the Meno, and is derived from the +latent knowledge of mathematics, which may be elicited from an unlearned +person when a diagram is presented to him. Again, there is a power of +association, which from seeing Simmias may remember Cebes, or from seeing a +picture of Simmias may remember Simmias. The lyre may recall the player of +the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated with the +higher notion of absolute equality. But here observe that material +equalities fall short of the conception of absolute equality with which +they are compared, and which is the measure of them. And the measure or +standard must be prior to that which is measured, the idea of equality +prior to the visible equals. And if prior to them, then prior also to the +perceptions of the senses which recall them, and therefore either given +before birth or at birth. But all men have not this knowledge, nor have +any without a process of reminiscence; which is a proof that it is not +innate or given at birth, unless indeed it was given and taken away at the +same instant. But if not given to men in birth, it must have been given +before birth--this is the only alternative which remains. And if we had +ideas in a former state, then our souls must have existed and must have had +intelligence in a former state. The pre-existence of the soul stands or +falls with the doctrine of ideas. + +It is objected by Simmias and Cebes that these arguments only prove a +former and not a future existence. Socrates answers this objection by +recalling the previous argument, in which he had shown that the living come +from the dead. But the fear that the soul at departing may vanish into air +(especially if there is a wind blowing at the time) has not yet been +charmed away. He proceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish away, +let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to +dissolution? Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the +changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense? Clearly the +latter and not the former; and therefore not the soul, which in her own +pure thought is unchangeable, and only when using the senses descends into +the region of change. Again, the soul commands, the body serves: in this +respect too the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the mortal. +And in every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and +immortality, and the body of the human and mortal. And whereas the body is +liable to speedy dissolution, the soul is almost if not quite indissoluble. +(Compare Tim.) Yet even the body may be preserved for ages by the +embalmer's art: how unlikely, then, that the soul will perish and be +dissipated into air while on her way to the good and wise God! She has +been gathered into herself, holding aloof from the body, and practising +death all her life long, and she is now finally released from the errors +and follies and passions of men, and for ever dwells in the company of the +gods. + +But the soul which is polluted and engrossed by the corporeal, and has no +eye except that of the senses, and is weighed down by the bodily appetites, +cannot attain to this abstraction. In her fear of the world below she +lingers about the sepulchre, loath to leave the body which she loved, a +ghostly apparition, saturated with sense, and therefore visible. At length +entering into some animal of a nature congenial to her former life of +sensuality or violence, she takes the form of an ass, a wolf or a kite. +And of these earthly souls the happiest are those who have practised virtue +without philosophy; they are allowed to pass into gentle and social +natures, such as bees and ants. (Compare Republic, Meno.) But only the +philosopher who departs pure is permitted to enter the company of the gods. +(Compare Phaedrus.) This is the reason why he abstains from fleshly lusts, +and not because he fears loss or disgrace, which is the motive of other +men. He too has been a captive, and the willing agent of his own +captivity. But philosophy has spoken to him, and he has heard her voice; +she has gently entreated him, and brought him out of the 'miry clay,' and +purged away the mists of passion and the illusions of sense which envelope +him; his soul has escaped from the influence of pleasures and pains, which +are like nails fastening her to the body. To that prison-house she will +not return; and therefore she abstains from bodily pleasures--not from a +desire of having more or greater ones, but because she knows that only when +calm and free from the dominion of the body can she behold the light of +truth. + +Simmias and Cebes remain in doubt; but they are unwilling to raise +objections at such a time. Socrates wonders at their reluctance. Let them +regard him rather as the swan, who, having sung the praises of Apollo all +his life long, sings at his death more lustily than ever. Simmias +acknowledges that there is cowardice in not probing truth to the bottom. +'And if truth divine and inspired is not to be had, then let a man take the +best of human notions, and upon this frail bark let him sail through life.' +He proceeds to state his difficulty: It has been argued that the soul is +invisible and incorporeal, and therefore immortal, and prior to the body. +But is not the soul acknowledged to be a harmony, and has she not the same +relation to the body, as the harmony--which like her is invisible--has to +the lyre? And yet the harmony does not survive the lyre. Cebes has also +an objection, which like Simmias he expresses in a figure. He is willing +to admit that the soul is more lasting than the body. But the more lasting +nature of the soul does not prove her immortality; for after having worn +out many bodies in a single life, and many more in successive births and +deaths, she may at last perish, or, as Socrates afterwards restates the +objection, the very act of birth may be the beginning of her death, and her +last body may survive her, just as the coat of an old weaver is left behind +him after he is dead, although a man is more lasting than his coat. And he +who would prove the immortality of the soul, must prove not only that the +soul outlives one or many bodies, but that she outlives them all. + +The audience, like the chorus in a play, for a moment interpret the +feelings of the actors; there is a temporary depression, and then the +enquiry is resumed. It is a melancholy reflection that arguments, like +men, are apt to be deceivers; and those who have been often deceived become +distrustful both of arguments and of friends. But this unfortunate +experience should not make us either haters of men or haters of arguments. +The want of health and truth is not in the argument, but in ourselves. +Socrates, who is about to die, is sensible of his own weakness; he desires +to be impartial, but he cannot help feeling that he has too great an +interest in the truth of the argument. And therefore he would have his +friends examine and refute him, if they think that he is in error. + +At his request Simmias and Cebes repeat their objections. They do not go +to the length of denying the pre-existence of ideas. Simmias is of opinion +that the soul is a harmony of the body. But the admission of the pre- +existence of ideas, and therefore of the soul, is at variance with this. +(Compare a parallel difficulty in Theaet.) For a harmony is an effect, +whereas the soul is not an effect, but a cause; a harmony follows, but the +soul leads; a harmony admits of degrees, and the soul has no degrees. +Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is one soul +better than another? Are they more or less harmonized, or is there one +harmony within another? But the soul does not admit of degrees, and cannot +therefore be more or less harmonized. Further, the soul is often engaged +in resisting the affections of the body, as Homer describes Odysseus +'rebuking his heart.' Could he have written this under the idea that the +soul is a harmony of the body? Nay rather, are we not contradicting Homer +and ourselves in affirming anything of the sort? + +The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of Simmias, +has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given to the +Theban Cadmus. Socrates recapitulates the argument of Cebes, which, as he +remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or causation; about +this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience. When he was young +he had puzzled himself with physics: he had enquired into the growth and +decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until at last he began to +doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the result of eating and +drinking; and so he arrived at the conclusion that he was not meant for +such enquiries. Nor was he less perplexed with notions of comparison and +number. At first he had imagined himself to understand differences of +greater and less, and to know that ten is two more than eight, and the +like. But now those very notions appeared to him to contain a +contradiction. For how can one be divided into two? Or two be compounded +into one? These are difficulties which Socrates cannot answer. Of +generation and destruction he knows nothing. But he has a confused notion +of another method in which matters of this sort are to be investigated. +(Compare Republic; Charm.) + +Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind is +the cause of all things. And he said to himself: If mind is the cause of +all things, surely mind must dispose them all for the best. The new +teacher will show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature. How great +had been his hopes and how great his disappointment! For he found that his +new friend was anything but consistent in his use of mind as a cause, and +that he soon introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric notions. +(Compare Arist. Metaph.) It was as if a person had said that Socrates is +sitting here because he is made up of bones and muscles, instead of telling +the true reason--that he is here because the Athenians have thought good to +sentence him to death, and he has thought good to await his sentence. Had +his bones and muscles been left by him to their own ideas of right, they +would long ago have taken themselves off. But surely there is a great +confusion of the cause and condition in all this. And this confusion also +leads people into all sorts of erroneous theories about the position and +motions of the earth. None of them know how much stronger than any Atlas +is the power of the best. But this 'best' is still undiscovered; and in +enquiring after the cause, we can only hope to attain the second best. + +Now there is a danger in the contemplation of the nature of things, as +there is a danger in looking at the sun during an eclipse, unless the +precaution is taken of looking only at the image reflected in the water, or +in a glass. (Compare Laws; Republic.) 'I was afraid,' says Socrates, +'that I might injure the eye of the soul. I thought that I had better +return to the old and safe method of ideas. Though I do not mean to say +that he who contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees only +through a glass darkly, any more than he who contemplates actual effects.' + +If the existence of ideas is granted to him, Socrates is of opinion that he +will then have no difficulty in proving the immortality of the soul. He +will only ask for a further admission:--that beauty is the cause of the +beautiful, greatness the cause of the great, smallness of the small, and so +on of other things. This is a safe and simple answer, which escapes the +contradictions of greater and less (greater by reason of that which is +smaller!), of addition and subtraction, and the other difficulties of +relation. These subtleties he is for leaving to wiser heads than his own; +he prefers to test ideas by the consistency of their consequences, and, if +asked to give an account of them, goes back to some higher idea or +hypothesis which appears to him to be the best, until at last he arrives at +a resting-place. (Republic; Phil.) + +The doctrine of ideas, which has long ago received the assent of the +Socratic circle, is now affirmed by the Phliasian auditor to command the +assent of any man of sense. The narrative is continued; Socrates is +desirous of explaining how opposite ideas may appear to co-exist but do not +really co-exist in the same thing or person. For example, Simmias may be +said to have greatness and also smallness, because he is greater than +Socrates and less than Phaedo. And yet Simmias is not really great and +also small, but only when compared to Phaedo and Socrates. I use the +illustration, says Socrates, because I want to show you not only that ideal +opposites exclude one another, but also the opposites in us. I, for +example, having the attribute of smallness remain small, and cannot become +great: the smallness which is in me drives out greatness. + +One of the company here remarked that this was inconsistent with the old +assertion that opposites generated opposites. But that, replies Socrates, +was affirmed, not of opposite ideas either in us or in nature, but of +opposition in the concrete--not of life and death, but of individuals +living and dying. When this objection has been removed, Socrates proceeds: +This doctrine of the mutual exclusion of opposites is not only true of the +opposites themselves, but of things which are inseparable from them. For +example, cold and heat are opposed; and fire, which is inseparable from +heat, cannot co-exist with cold, or snow, which is inseparable from cold, +with heat. Again, the number three excludes the number four, because three +is an odd number and four is an even number, and the odd is opposed to the +even. Thus we are able to proceed a step beyond 'the safe and simple +answer.' We may say, not only that the odd excludes the even, but that the +number three, which participates in oddness, excludes the even. And in +like manner, not only does life exclude death, but the soul, of which life +is the inseparable attribute, also excludes death. And that of which life +is the inseparable attribute is by the force of the terms imperishable. If +the odd principle were imperishable, then the number three would not perish +but remove, on the approach of the even principle. But the immortal is +imperishable; and therefore the soul on the approach of death does not +perish but removes. + +Thus all objections appear to be finally silenced. And now the application +has to be made: If the soul is immortal, 'what manner of persons ought we +to be?' having regard not only to time but to eternity. For death is not +the end of all, and the wicked is not released from his evil by death; but +every one carries with him into the world below that which he is or has +become, and that only. + +For after death the soul is carried away to judgment, and when she has +received her punishment returns to earth in the course of ages. The wise +soul is conscious of her situation, and follows the attendant angel who +guides her through the windings of the world below; but the impure soul +wanders hither and thither without companion or guide, and is carried at +last to her own place, as the pure soul is also carried away to hers. 'In +order that you may understand this, I must first describe to you the nature +and conformation of the earth.' + +Now the whole earth is a globe placed in the centre of the heavens, and is +maintained there by the perfection of balance. That which we call the +earth is only one of many small hollows, wherein collect the mists and +waters and the thick lower air; but the true earth is above, and is in a +finer and subtler element. And if, like birds, we could fly to the surface +of the air, in the same manner that fishes come to the top of the sea, then +we should behold the true earth and the true heaven and the true stars. +Our earth is everywhere corrupted and corroded; and even the land which is +fairer than the sea, for that is a mere chaos or waste of water and mud and +sand, has nothing to show in comparison of the other world. But the +heavenly earth is of divers colours, sparkling with jewels brighter than +gold and whiter than any snow, having flowers and fruits innumerable. And +the inhabitants dwell some on the shore of the sea of air, others in +'islets of the blest,' and they hold converse with the gods, and behold the +sun, moon and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a +piece with this. + +The hollows on the surface of the globe vary in size and shape from that +which we inhabit: but all are connected by passages and perforations in +the interior of the earth. And there is one huge chasm or opening called +Tartarus, into which streams of fire and water and liquid mud are ever +flowing; of these small portions find their way to the surface and form +seas and rivers and volcanoes. There is a perpetual inhalation and +exhalation of the air rising and falling as the waters pass into the depths +of the earth and return again, in their course forming lakes and rivers, +but never descending below the centre of the earth; for on either side the +rivers flowing either way are stopped by a precipice. These rivers are +many and mighty, and there are four principal ones, Oceanus, Acheron, +Pyriphlegethon, and Cocytus. Oceanus is the river which encircles the +earth; Acheron takes an opposite direction, and after flowing under the +earth through desert places, at last reaches the Acherusian lake,--this is +the river at which the souls of the dead await their return to earth. +Pyriphlegethon is a stream of fire, which coils round the earth and flows +into the depths of Tartarus. The fourth river, Cocytus, is that which is +called by the poets the Stygian river, and passes into and forms the lake +Styx, from the waters of which it gains new and strange powers. This +river, too, falls into Tartarus. + +The dead are first of all judged according to their deeds, and those who +are incurable are thrust into Tartarus, from which they never come out. +Those who have only committed venial sins are first purified of them, and +then rewarded for the good which they have done. Those who have committed +crimes, great indeed, but not unpardonable, are thrust into Tartarus, but +are cast forth at the end of a year by way of Pyriphlegethon or Cocytus, +and these carry them as far as the Acherusian lake, where they call upon +their victims to let them come out of the rivers into the lake. And if +they prevail, then they are let out and their sufferings cease: if not, +they are borne unceasingly into Tartarus and back again, until they at last +obtain mercy. The pure souls also receive their reward, and have their +abode in the upper earth, and a select few in still fairer 'mansions.' + +Socrates is not prepared to insist on the literal accuracy of this +description, but he is confident that something of the kind is true. He +who has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and rejected the pleasures +of the body, has reason to be of good hope at the approach of death; whose +voice is already speaking to him, and who will one day be heard calling all +men. + +The hour has come at which he must drink the poison, and not much remains +to be done. How shall they bury him? That is a question which he refuses +to entertain, for they are burying, not him, but his dead body. His +friends had once been sureties that he would remain, and they shall now be +sureties that he has run away. Yet he would not die without the customary +ceremonies of washing and burial. Shall he make a libation of the poison? +In the spirit he will, but not in the letter. One request he utters in the +very act of death, which has been a puzzle to after ages. With a sort of +irony he remembers that a trifling religious duty is still unfulfilled, +just as above he desires before he departs to compose a few verses in order +to satisfy a scruple about a dream--unless, indeed, we suppose him to mean, +that he was now restored to health, and made the customary offering to +Asclepius in token of his recovery. + +... + +1. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has sunk deep into the +heart of the human race; and men are apt to rebel against any examination +of the nature or grounds of their belief. They do not like to acknowledge +that this, as well as the other 'eternal ideas; of man, has a history in +time, which may be traced in Greek poetry or philosophy, and also in the +Hebrew Scriptures. They convert feeling into reasoning, and throw a +network of dialectics over that which is really a deeply-rooted instinct. +In the same temper which Socrates reproves in himself they are disposed to +think that even fallacies will do no harm, for they will die with them, and +while they live they will gain by the delusion. And when they consider the +numberless bad arguments which have been pressed into the service of +theology, they say, like the companions of Socrates, 'What argument can we +ever trust again?' But there is a better and higher spirit to be gathered +from the Phaedo, as well as from the other writings of Plato, which says +that first principles should be most constantly reviewed (Phaedo and +Crat.), and that the highest subjects demand of us the greatest accuracy +(Republic); also that we must not become misologists because arguments are +apt to be deceivers. + +2. In former ages there was a customary rather than a reasoned belief in +the immortality of the soul. It was based on the authority of the Church, +on the necessity of such a belief to morality and the order of society, on +the evidence of an historical fact, and also on analogies and figures of +speech which filled up the void or gave an expression in words to a +cherished instinct. The mass of mankind went on their way busy with the +affairs of this life, hardly stopping to think about another. But in our +own day the question has been reopened, and it is doubtful whether the +belief which in the first ages of Christianity was the strongest motive of +action can survive the conflict with a scientific age in which the rules of +evidence are stricter and the mind has become more sensitive to criticism. +It has faded into the distance by a natural process as it was removed +further and further from the historical fact on which it has been supposed +to rest. Arguments derived from material things such as the seed and the +ear of corn or transitions in the life of animals from one state of being +to another (the chrysalis and the butterfly) are not 'in pari materia' with +arguments from the visible to the invisible, and are therefore felt to be +no longer applicable. The evidence to the historical fact seems to be +weaker than was once supposed: it is not consistent with itself, and is +based upon documents which are of unknown origin. The immortality of man +must be proved by other arguments than these if it is again to become a +living belief. We must ask ourselves afresh why we still maintain it, and +seek to discover a foundation for it in the nature of God and in the first +principles of morality. + +3. At the outset of the discussion we may clear away a confusion. We +certainly do not mean by the immortality of the soul the immortality of +fame, which whether worth having or not can only be ascribed to a very +select class of the whole race of mankind, and even the interest in these +few is comparatively short-lived. To have been a benefactor to the world, +whether in a higher or a lower sphere of life and thought, is a great +thing: to have the reputation of being one, when men have passed out of +the sphere of earthly praise or blame, is hardly worthy of consideration. +The memory of a great man, so far from being immortal, is really limited to +his own generation:--so long as his friends or his disciples are alive, so +long as his books continue to be read, so long as his political or military +successes fill a page in the history of his country. The praises which are +bestowed upon him at his death hardly last longer than the flowers which +are strewed upon his coffin or the 'immortelles' which are laid upon his +tomb. Literature makes the most of its heroes, but the true man is well +aware that far from enjoying an immortality of fame, in a generation or +two, or even in a much shorter time, he will be forgotten and the world +will get on without him. + +4. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is +sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith. The +perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the +Phaedo of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form of +the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united with +the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the body as the +ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the +object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means? Shall +we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy or form of an +organized living body? or with Plato, that she has a life of her own? Is +the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer +expression? Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the +boatman to his boat? (Arist. de Anim.) And in another state of being is +the soul to be conceived of as vanishing into infinity, hardly possessing +an existence which she can call her own, as in the pantheistic system of +Spinoza: or as an individual informing another body and entering into new +relations, but retaining her own character? (Compare Gorgias.) Or is the +opposition of soul and body a mere illusion, and the true self neither soul +nor body, but the union of the two in the 'I' which is above them? And is +death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and the +falling away into nothingness of the lower? Or are we vainly attempting to +pass the boundaries of human thought? The body and the soul seem to be +inseparable, not only in fact, but in our conceptions of them; and any +philosophy which too closely unites them, or too widely separates them, +either in this life or in another, disturbs the balance of human nature. +No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or been entirely consistent with +himself in describing their relation to one another. Nor can we wonder +that Plato in the infancy of human thought should have confused mythology +and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal arguments for real ones. + +5. Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the +question of Socrates, 'What is that which we suppose to be immortal?' Is +it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and +universal? Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union +of the two? Is it the mere force of life which is determined to be, or the +consciousness of self which cannot be got rid of, or the fire of genius +which refuses to be extinguished? Or is there a hidden being which is +allied to the Author of all existence, who is because he is perfect, and to +whom our ideas of perfection give us a title to belong? Whatever answer is +given by us to these questions, there still remains the necessity of +allowing the permanence of evil, if not for ever, at any rate for a time, +in order that the wicked 'may not have too good a bargain.' For the +annihilation of evil at death, or the eternal duration of it, seem to +involve equal difficulties in the moral government of the universe. +Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather than by our reason, to think +of the good and wise only as existing in another life. Why should the +mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, the herd of men who have never in +any proper sense the use of reason, reappear with blinking eyes in the +light of another world? But our second thought is that the hope of +humanity is a common one, and that all or none will be partakers of +immortality. Reason does not allow us to suppose that we have any greater +claims than others, and experience may often reveal to us unexpected +flashes of the higher nature in those whom we had despised. Why should the +wicked suffer any more than ourselves? had we been placed in their +circumstances should we have been any better than they? The worst of men +are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they +not be equally such to divine benevolence? Even more than the good they +have need of another life; not that they may be punished, but that they may +be educated. These are a few of the reflections which arise in our minds +when we attempt to assign any form to our conceptions of a future state. + +There are some other questions which are disturbing to us because we have +no answer to them. What is to become of the animals in a future state? +Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, and men who +are more stupid and brutal than any animals? Does their life cease at +death, or is there some 'better thing reserved' also for them? They may be +said to have a shadow or imitation of morality, and imperfect moral claims +upon the benevolence of man and upon the justice of God. We cannot think +of the least or lowest of them, the insect, the bird, the inhabitants of +the sea or the desert, as having any place in a future world, and if not +all, why should those who are specially attached to man be deemed worthy of +any exceptional privilege? When we reason about such a subject, almost at +once we degenerate into nonsense. It is a passing thought which has no +real hold on the mind. We may argue for the existence of animals in a +future state from the attributes of God, or from texts of Scripture ('Are +not two sparrows sold for one farthing?' etc.), but the truth is that we +are only filling up the void of another world with our own fancies. Again, +we often talk about the origin of evil, that great bugbear of theologians, +by which they frighten us into believing any superstition. What answer can +be made to the old commonplace, 'Is not God the author of evil, if he +knowingly permitted, but could have prevented it?' Even if we assume that +the inequalities of this life are rectified by some transposition of human +beings in another, still the existence of the very least evil if it could +have been avoided, seems to be at variance with the love and justice of +God. And so we arrive at the conclusion that we are carrying logic too +far, and that the attempt to frame the world according to a rule of divine +perfection is opposed to experience and had better be given up. The case +of the animals is our own. We must admit that the Divine Being, although +perfect himself, has placed us in a state of life in which we may work +together with him for good, but we are very far from having attained to it. + +6. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always prone +to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may serve to +embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we cannot reason +from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the inward. The +progress of physiological science, without bringing us nearer to the great +secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the +relations of body and mind, and in this we have the advantage of the +ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of immortality is to be +discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have been content to rest +their belief in another life on the agreement of the more enlightened part +of mankind, and on the inseparable connection of such a doctrine with the +existence of a God--also in a less degree on the impossibility of doubting +about the continued existence of those whom we love and reverence in this +world. And after all has been said, the figure, the analogy, the argument, +are felt to be only approximations in different forms to an expression of +the common sentiment of the human heart. That we shall live again is far +more certain than that we shall take any particular form of life. + +7. When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further what +we mean by the word immortality. For of the duration of a living being in +countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three years' old +child of the whole of life. The naked eye might as well try to see the +furthest star in the infinity of heaven. Whether time and space really +exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; at any rate the +thought of them when unlimited us so overwhelming to us as to lose all +distinctness. Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human mind, +but what is the mind without them? As then infinite time, or an existence +out of time, which are the only possible explanations of eternal duration, +are equally inconceivable to us, let us substitute for them a hundred or a +thousand years after death, and ask not what will be our employment in +eternity, but what will happen to us in that definite portion of time; or +what is now happening to those who passed out of life a hundred or a +thousand years ago. Do we imagine that the wicked are suffering torments, +or that the good are singing the praises of God, during a period longer +than that of a whole life, or of ten lives of men? Is the suffering +physical or mental? And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or +of many forms of service? Who are the wicked, and who are the good, whom +we venture to divide by a hard and fast line; and in which of the two +classes should we place ourselves and our friends? May we not suspect that +we are making differences of kind, because we are unable to imagine +differences of degree?--putting the whole human race into heaven or hell +for the greater convenience of logical division? Are we not at the same +time describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the +demands of rhetoric? What is that pain which does not become deadened +after a thousand years? or what is the nature of that pleasure or happiness +which never wearies by monotony? Earthly pleasures and pains are short in +proportion as they are keen; of any others which are both intense and +lasting we have no experience, and can form no idea. The words or figures +of speech which we use are not consistent with themselves. For are we not +imagining Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a prison, or +perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors? And yet to beings constituted as +we are, the monotony of singing psalms would be as great an infliction as +the pains of hell, and might be even pleasantly interrupted by them. Where +are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on +the greatest benefactors of mankind? And where are the crimes which +according to Plato's merciful reckoning,--more merciful, at any rate, than +the eternal damnation of so-called Christian teachers,--for every ten years +in this life deserve a hundred of punishment in the life to come? We +should be ready to die of pity if we could see the least of the sufferings +which the writers of Infernos and Purgatorios have attributed to the +damned. Yet these joys and terrors seem hardly to exercise an appreciable +influence over the lives of men. The wicked man when old, is not, as Plato +supposes (Republic), more agitated by the terrors of another world when he +is nearer to them, nor the good in an ecstasy at the joys of which he is +soon to be the partaker. Age numbs the sense of both worlds; and the habit +of life is strongest in death. Even the dying mother is dreaming of her +lost children as they were forty or fifty years before, 'pattering over the +boards,' not of reunion with them in another state of being. Most persons +when the last hour comes are resigned to the order of nature and the will +of God. They are not thinking of Dante's Inferno or Paradiso, or of the +Pilgrim's Progress. Heaven and hell are not realities to them, but words +or ideas; the outward symbols of some great mystery, they hardly know what. +Many noble poems and pictures have been suggested by the traditional +representations of them, which have been fixed in forms of art and can no +longer be altered. Many sermons have been filled with descriptions of +celestial or infernal mansions. But hardly even in childhood did the +thought of heaven and hell supply the motives of our actions, or at any +time seriously affect the substance of our belief. + +8. Another life must be described, if at all, in forms of thought and not +of sense. To draw pictures of heaven and hell, whether in the language of +Scripture or any other, adds nothing to our real knowledge, but may perhaps +disguise our ignorance. The truest conception which we can form of a +future life is a state of progress or education--a progress from evil to +good, from ignorance to knowledge. To this we are led by the analogy of +the present life, in which we see different races and nations of men, and +different men and women of the same nation, in various states or stages of +cultivation; some more and some less developed, and all of them capable of +improvement under favourable circumstances. There are punishments too of +children when they are growing up inflicted by their parents, of elder +offenders which are imposed by the law of the land, of all men at all times +of life, which are attached by the laws of nature to the performance of +certain actions. All these punishments are really educational; that is to +say, they are not intended to retaliate on the offender, but to teach him a +lesson. Also there is an element of chance in them, which is another name +for our ignorance of the laws of nature. There is evil too inseparable +from good (compare Lysis); not always punished here, as good is not always +rewarded. It is capable of being indefinitely diminished; and as knowledge +increases, the element of chance may more and more disappear. + +For we do not argue merely from the analogy of the present state of this +world to another, but from the analogy of a probable future to which we are +tending. The greatest changes of which we have had experience as yet are +due to our increasing knowledge of history and of nature. They have been +produced by a few minds appearing in three or four favoured nations, in a +comparatively short period of time. May we be allowed to imagine the minds +of men everywhere working together during many ages for the completion of +our knowledge? May not the science of physiology transform the world? +Again, the majority of mankind have really experienced some moral +improvement; almost every one feels that he has tendencies to good, and is +capable of becoming better. And these germs of good are often found to be +developed by new circumstances, like stunted trees when transplanted to a +better soil. The differences between the savage and the civilized man, or +between the civilized man in old and new countries, may be indefinitely +increased. The first difference is the effect of a few thousand, the +second of a few hundred years. We congratulate ourselves that slavery has +become industry; that law and constitutional government have superseded +despotism and violence; that an ethical religion has taken the place of +Fetichism. There may yet come a time when the many may be as well off as +the few; when no one will be weighed down by excessive toil; when the +necessity of providing for the body will not interfere with mental +improvement; when the physical frame may be strengthened and developed; and +the religion of all men may become a reasonable service. + +Nothing therefore, either in the present state of man or in the tendencies +of the future, as far as we can entertain conjecture of them, would lead us +to suppose that God governs us vindictively in this world, and therefore we +have no reason to infer that he will govern us vindictively in another. +The true argument from analogy is not, 'This life is a mixed state of +justice and injustice, of great waste, of sudden casualties, of +disproportionate punishments, and therefore the like inconsistencies, +irregularities, injustices are to be expected in another;' but 'This life +is subject to law, and is in a state of progress, and therefore law and +progress may be believed to be the governing principles of another.' All +the analogies of this world would be against unmeaning punishments +inflicted a hundred or a thousand years after an offence had been +committed. Suffering there might be as a part of education, but not +hopeless or protracted; as there might be a retrogression of individuals or +of bodies of men, yet not such as to interfere with a plan for the +improvement of the whole (compare Laws.) + +9. But some one will say: That we cannot reason from the seen to the +unseen, and that we are creating another world after the image of this, +just as men in former ages have created gods in their own likeness. And +we, like the companions of Socrates, may feel discouraged at hearing our +favourite 'argument from analogy' thus summarily disposed of. Like +himself, too, we may adduce other arguments in which he seems to have +anticipated us, though he expresses them in different language. For we +feel that the soul partakes of the ideal and invisible; and can never fall +into the error of confusing the external circumstances of man with his +higher self; or his origin with his nature. It is as repugnant to us as it +was to him to imagine that our moral ideas are to be attributed only to +cerebral forces. The value of a human soul, like the value of a man's life +to himself, is inestimable, and cannot be reckoned in earthly or material +things. The human being alone has the consciousness of truth and justice +and love, which is the consciousness of God. And the soul becoming more +conscious of these, becomes more conscious of her own immortality. + +10. The last ground of our belief in immortality, and the strongest, is +the perfection of the divine nature. The mere fact of the existence of God +does not tend to show the continued existence of man. An evil God or an +indifferent God might have had the power, but not the will, to preserve us. +He might have regarded us as fitted to minister to his service by a +succession of existences,--like the animals, without attributing to each +soul an incomparable value. But if he is perfect, he must will that all +rational beings should partake of that perfection which he himself is. In +the words of the Timaeus, he is good, and therefore he desires that all +other things should be as like himself as possible. And the manner in +which he accomplishes this is by permitting evil, or rather degrees of +good, which are otherwise called evil. For all progress is good relatively +to the past, and yet may be comparatively evil when regarded in the light +of the future. Good and evil are relative terms, and degrees of evil are +merely the negative aspect of degrees of good. Of the absolute goodness of +any finite nature we can form no conception; we are all of us in process of +transition from one degree of good or evil to another. The difficulties +which are urged about the origin or existence of evil are mere dialectical +puzzles, standing in the same relation to Christian philosophy as the +puzzles of the Cynics and Megarians to the philosophy of Plato. They arise +out of the tendency of the human mind to regard good and evil both as +relative and absolute; just as the riddles about motion are to be explained +by the double conception of space or matter, which the human mind has the +power of regarding either as continuous or discrete. + +In speaking of divine perfection, we mean to say that God is just and true +and loving, the author of order and not of disorder, of good and not of +evil. Or rather, that he is justice, that he is truth, that he is love, +that he is order, that he is the very progress of which we were speaking; +and that wherever these qualities are present, whether in the human soul or +in the order of nature, there is God. We might still see him everywhere, +if we had not been mistakenly seeking for him apart from us, instead of in +us; away from the laws of nature, instead of in them. And we become united +to him not by mystical absorption, but by partaking, whether consciously or +unconsciously, of that truth and justice and love which he himself is. + +Thus the belief in the immortality of the soul rests at last on the belief +in God. If there is a good and wise God, then there is a progress of +mankind towards perfection; and if there is no progress of men towards +perfection, then there is no good and wise God. We cannot suppose that the +moral government of God of which we see the beginnings in the world and in +ourselves will cease when we pass out of life. + +11. Considering the 'feebleness of the human faculties and the uncertainty +of the subject,' we are inclined to believe that the fewer our words the +better. At the approach of death there is not much said; good men are too +honest to go out of the world professing more than they know. There is +perhaps no important subject about which, at any time, even religious +people speak so little to one another. In the fulness of life the thought +of death is mostly awakened by the sight or recollection of the death of +others rather than by the prospect of our own. We must also acknowledge +that there are degrees of the belief in immortality, and many forms in +which it presents itself to the mind. Some persons will say no more than +that they trust in God, and that they leave all to Him. It is a great part +of true religion not to pretend to know more than we do. Others when they +quit this world are comforted with the hope 'That they will see and know +their friends in heaven.' But it is better to leave them in the hands of +God and to be assured that 'no evil shall touch them.' There are others +again to whom the belief in a divine personality has ceased to have any +longer a meaning; yet they are satisfied that the end of all is not here, +but that something still remains to us, 'and some better thing for the good +than for the evil.' They are persuaded, in spite of their theological +nihilism, that the ideas of justice and truth and holiness and love are +realities. They cherish an enthusiastic devotion to the first principles +of morality. Through these they see, or seem to see, darkly, and in a +figure, that the soul is immortal. + +But besides differences of theological opinion which must ever prevail +about things unseen, the hope of immortality is weaker or stronger in men +at one time of life than at another; it even varies from day to day. It +comes and goes; the mind, like the sky, is apt to be overclouded. Other +generations of men may have sometimes lived under an 'eclipse of faith,' to +us the total disappearance of it might be compared to the 'sun falling from +heaven.' And we may sometimes have to begin again and acquire the belief +for ourselves; or to win it back again when it is lost. It is really +weakest in the hour of death. For Nature, like a kind mother or nurse, +lays us to sleep without frightening us; physicians, who are the witnesses +of such scenes, say that under ordinary circumstances there is no fear of +the future. Often, as Plato tells us, death is accompanied 'with +pleasure.' (Tim.) When the end is still uncertain, the cry of many a one +has been, 'Pray, that I may be taken.' The last thoughts even of the best +men depend chiefly on the accidents of their bodily state. Pain soon +overpowers the desire of life; old age, like the child, is laid to sleep +almost in a moment. The long experience of life will often destroy the +interest which mankind have in it. So various are the feelings with which +different persons draw near to death; and still more various the forms in +which imagination clothes it. For this alternation of feeling compare the +Old Testament,--Psalm vi.; Isaiah; Eccles. + +12. When we think of God and of man in his relation to God; of the +imperfection of our present state and yet of the progress which is +observable in the history of the world and of the human mind; of the depth +and power of our moral ideas which seem to partake of the very nature of +God Himself; when we consider the contrast between the physical laws to +which we are subject and the higher law which raises us above them and is +yet a part of them; when we reflect on our capacity of becoming the +'spectators of all time and all existence,' and of framing in our own minds +the ideal of a perfect Being; when we see how the human mind in all the +higher religions of the world, including Buddhism, notwithstanding some +aberrations, has tended towards such a belief--we have reason to think that +our destiny is different from that of animals; and though we cannot +altogether shut out the childish fear that the soul upon leaving the body +may 'vanish into thin air,' we have still, so far as the nature of the +subject admits, a hope of immortality with which we comfort ourselves on +sufficient grounds. The denial of the belief takes the heart out of human +life; it lowers men to the level of the material. As Goethe also says, 'He +is dead even in this world who has no belief in another.' + +13. It is well also that we should sometimes think of the forms of thought +under which the idea of immortality is most naturally presented to us. It +is clear that to our minds the risen soul can no longer be described, as in +a picture, by the symbol of a creature half-bird, half-human, nor in any +other form of sense. The multitude of angels, as in Milton, singing the +Almighty 's praises, are a noble image, and may furnish a theme for the +poet or the painter, but they are no longer an adequate expression of the +kingdom of God which is within us. Neither is there any mansion, in this +world or another, in which the departed can be imagined to dwell and carry +on their occupations. When this earthly tabernacle is dissolved, no other +habitation or building can take them in: it is in the language of ideas +only that we speak of them. + +First of all there is the thought of rest and freedom from pain; they have +gone home, as the common saying is, and the cares of this world touch them +no more. Secondly, we may imagine them as they were at their best and +brightest, humbly fulfilling their daily round of duties--selfless, +childlike, unaffected by the world; when the eye was single and the whole +body seemed to be full of light; when the mind was clear and saw into the +purposes of God. Thirdly, we may think of them as possessed by a great +love of God and man, working out His will at a further stage in the +heavenly pilgrimage. And yet we acknowledge that these are the things +which eye hath not seen nor ear heard and therefore it hath not entered +into the heart of man in any sensible manner to conceive them. Fourthly, +there may have been some moments in our own lives when we have risen above +ourselves, or been conscious of our truer selves, in which the will of God +has superseded our wills, and we have entered into communion with Him, and +been partakers for a brief season of the Divine truth and love, in which +like Christ we have been inspired to utter the prayer, 'I in them, and thou +in me, that we may be all made perfect in one.' These precious moments, if +we have ever known them, are the nearest approach which we can make to the +idea of immortality. + +14. Returning now to the earlier stage of human thought which is +represented by the writings of Plato, we find that many of the same +questions have already arisen: there is the same tendency to materialism; +the same inconsistency in the application of the idea of mind; the same +doubt whether the soul is to be regarded as a cause or as an effect; the +same falling back on moral convictions. In the Phaedo the soul is +conscious of her divine nature, and the separation from the body which has +been commenced in this life is perfected in another. Beginning in mystery, +Socrates, in the intermediate part of the Dialogue, attempts to bring the +doctrine of a future life into connection with his theory of knowledge. In +proportion as he succeeds in this, the individual seems to disappear in a +more general notion of the soul; the contemplation of ideas 'under the form +of eternity' takes the place of past and future states of existence. His +language may be compared to that of some modern philosophers, who speak of +eternity, not in the sense of perpetual duration of time, but as an ever- +present quality of the soul. Yet at the conclusion of the Dialogue, having +'arrived at the end of the intellectual world' (Republic), he replaces the +veil of mythology, and describes the soul and her attendant genius in the +language of the mysteries or of a disciple of Zoroaster. Nor can we fairly +demand of Plato a consistency which is wanting among ourselves, who +acknowledge that another world is beyond the range of human thought, and +yet are always seeking to represent the mansions of heaven or hell in the +colours of the painter, or in the descriptions of the poet or rhetorician. + +15. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not new to the Greeks +in the age of Socrates, but, like the unity of God, had a foundation in the +popular belief. The old Homeric notion of a gibbering ghost flitting away +to Hades; or of a few illustrious heroes enjoying the isles of the blest; +or of an existence divided between the two; or the Hesiodic, of righteous +spirits, who become guardian angels,--had given place in the mysteries and +the Orphic poets to representations, partly fanciful, of a future state of +rewards and punishments. (Laws.) The reticence of the Greeks on public +occasions and in some part of their literature respecting this +'underground' religion, is not to be taken as a measure of the diffusion of +such beliefs. If Pericles in the funeral oration is silent on the +consolations of immortality, the poet Pindar and the tragedians on the +other hand constantly assume the continued existence of the dead in an +upper or under world. Darius and Laius are still alive; Antigone will be +dear to her brethren after death; the way to the palace of Cronos is found +by those who 'have thrice departed from evil.' The tragedy of the Greeks +is not 'rounded' by this life, but is deeply set in decrees of fate and +mysterious workings of powers beneath the earth. In the caricature of +Aristophanes there is also a witness to the common sentiment. The Ionian +and Pythagorean philosophies arose, and some new elements were added to the +popular belief. The individual must find an expression as well as the +world. Either the soul was supposed to exist in the form of a magnet, or +of a particle of fire, or of light, or air, or water; or of a number or of +a harmony of number; or to be or have, like the stars, a principle of +motion (Arist. de Anim.). At length Anaxagoras, hardly distinguishing +between life and mind, or between mind human and divine, attained the pure +abstraction; and this, like the other abstractions of Greek philosophy, +sank deep into the human intelligence. The opposition of the intelligible +and the sensible, and of God to the world, supplied an analogy which +assisted in the separation of soul and body. If ideas were separable from +phenomena, mind was also separable from matter; if the ideas were eternal, +the mind that conceived them was eternal too. As the unity of God was more +distinctly acknowledged, the conception of the human soul became more +developed. The succession, or alternation of life and death, had occurred +to Heracleitus. The Eleatic Parmenides had stumbled upon the modern +thesis, that 'thought and being are the same.' The Eastern belief in +transmigration defined the sense of individuality; and some, like +Empedocles, fancied that the blood which they had shed in another state of +being was crying against them, and that for thirty thousand years they were +to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon the earth.' The desire of recognizing +a lost mother or love or friend in the world below (Phaedo) was a natural +feeling which, in that age as well as in every other, has given +distinctness to the hope of immortality. Nor were ethical considerations +wanting, partly derived from the necessity of punishing the greater sort of +criminals, whom no avenging power of this world could reach. The voice of +conscience, too, was heard reminding the good man that he was not +altogether innocent. (Republic.) To these indistinct longings and fears +an expression was given in the mysteries and Orphic poets: a 'heap of +books' (Republic), passing under the names of Musaeus and Orpheus in +Plato's time, were filled with notions of an under-world. + +16. Yet after all the belief in the individuality of the soul after death +had but a feeble hold on the Greek mind. Like the personality of God, the +personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound up with the +reality of his existence. For the distinction between the personal and +impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far less marked to +the Greek than to ourselves. And as Plato readily passes from the notion +of the good to that of God, he also passes almost imperceptibly to himself +and his reader from the future life of the individual soul to the eternal +being of the absolute soul. There has been a clearer statement and a +clearer denial of the belief in modern times than is found in early Greek +philosophy, and hence the comparative silence on the whole subject which is +often remarked in ancient writers, and particularly in Aristotle. For +Plato and Aristotle are not further removed in their teaching about the +immortality of the soul than they are in their theory of knowledge. + +17. Living in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought, +Plato naturally cast his belief in immortality into a logical form. And +when we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, it +is not surprising that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies: early +logic is always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of the +matter. It is easy to see that the alternation of opposites is not the +same as the generation of them out of each other; and that the generation +of them out of each other, which is the first argument in the Phaedo, is at +variance with their mutual exclusion of each other, whether in themselves +or in us, which is the last. For even if we admit the distinction which he +draws between the opposites and the things which have the opposites, still +individuals fall under the latter class; and we have to pass out of the +region of human hopes and fears to a conception of an abstract soul which +is the impersonation of the ideas. Such a conception, which in Plato +himself is but half expressed, is unmeaning to us, and relative only to a +particular stage in the history of thought. The doctrine of reminiscence +is also a fragment of a former world, which has no place in the philosophy +of modern times. But Plato had the wonders of psychology just opening to +him, and he had not the explanation of them which is supplied by the +analysis of language and the history of the human mind. The question, +'Whence come our abstract ideas?' he could only answer by an imaginary +hypothesis. Nor is it difficult to see that his crowning argument is +purely verbal, and is but the expression of an instinctive confidence put +into a logical form:--'The soul is immortal because it contains a principle +of imperishableness.' Nor does he himself seem at all to be aware that +nothing is added to human knowledge by his 'safe and simple answer,' that +beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that he is merely reasserting the +Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean numbers,' against the +Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation. The answer to the 'very +serious question' of generation and destruction is really the denial of +them. For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a system of ideas, +tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, and not explained by +actual causes, but by a higher, that is, a more general notion. +Consistency with themselves is the only test which is to be applied to +them. (Republic, and Phaedo.) + +18. To deal fairly with such arguments, they should be translated as far +as possible into their modern equivalents. 'If the ideas of men are +eternal, their souls are eternal, and if not the ideas, then not the +souls.' Such an argument stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and +his age, as the argument from the existence of God to immortality among +ourselves. 'If God exists, then the soul exists after death; and if there +is no God, there is no existence of the soul after death.' For the ideas +are to his mind the reality, the truth, the principle of permanence, as +well as of intelligence and order in the world. When Simmias and Cebes say +that they are more strongly persuaded of the existence of ideas than they +are of the immortality of the soul, they represent fairly enough the order +of thought in Greek philosophy. And we might say in the same way that we +are more certain of the existence of God than we are of the immortality of +the soul, and are led by the belief in the one to a belief in the other. +The parallel, as Socrates would say, is not perfect, but agrees in as far +as the mind in either case is regarded as dependent on something above and +beyond herself. The analogy may even be pressed a step further: 'We are +more certain of our ideas of truth and right than we are of the existence +of God, and are led on in the order of thought from one to the other.' Or +more correctly: 'The existence of right and truth is the existence of God, +and can never for a moment be separated from Him.' + +19. The main argument of the Phaedo is derived from the existence of +eternal ideas of which the soul is a partaker; the other argument of the +alternation of opposites is replaced by this. And there have not been +wanting philosophers of the idealist school who have imagined that the +doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a theory of knowledge, and that +in what has preceded Plato is accommodating himself to the popular belief. +Such a view can only be elicited from the Phaedo by what may be termed the +transcendental method of interpretation, and is obviously inconsistent with +the Gorgias and the Republic. Those who maintain it are immediately +compelled to renounce the shadow which they have grasped, as a play of +words only. But the truth is, that Plato in his argument for the +immortality of the soul has collected many elements of proof or persuasion, +ethical and mythological as well as dialectical, which are not easily to be +reconciled with one another; and he is as much in earnest about his +doctrine of retribution, which is repeated in all his more ethical +writings, as about his theory of knowledge. And while we may fairly +translate the dialectical into the language of Hegel, and the religious and +mythological into the language of Dante or Bunyan, the ethical speaks to us +still in the same voice, and appeals to a common feeling. + +20. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the Phaedo. The +first may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state of +being. Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is seeking +to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the things of +the world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in these +aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in modern +times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind, the other +from the progress of the soul towards perfection. In using this argument +Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the body, with the +soul of the good and wise. (Compare Republic.) Such a confusion was +natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of soul and body. The soul +in her own essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with virtues and graces, +were easily interchanged with one another, because on a subject which +passes expression the distinctions of language can hardly be maintained. + +21. The ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the +necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off if their evil +deeds came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus, an +Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of their crimes +in this world. The manner in which this retribution is accomplished Plato +represents under the figures of mythology. Doubtless he felt that it was +easier to improve than to invent, and that in religion especially the +traditional form was required in order to give verisimilitude to the myth. +The myth too is far more probable to that age than to ours, and may fairly +be regarded as 'one guess among many' about the nature of the earth, which +he cleverly supports by the indications of geology. Not that he insists on +the absolute truth of his own particular notions: 'no man of sense will be +confident in such matters; but he will be confident that something of the +kind is true.' As in other passages (Gorg., Tim., compare Crito), he wins +belief for his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, +like Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own +creations. + +The Dialogue must be read in the light of the situation. And first of all +we are struck by the calmness of the scene. Like the spectators at the +time, we cannot pity Socrates; his mien and his language are so noble and +fearless. He is the same that he ever was, but milder and gentler, and he +has in no degree lost his interest in dialectics; he will not forego the +delight of an argument in compliance with the jailer's intimation that he +should not heat himself with talking. At such a time he naturally +expresses the hope of his life, that he has been a true mystic and not a +mere retainer or wand-bearer: and he refers to passages of his personal +history. To his old enemies the Comic poets, and to the proceedings on the +trial, he alludes playfully; but he vividly remembers the disappointment +which he felt in reading the books of Anaxagoras. The return of Xanthippe +and his children indicates that the philosopher is not 'made of oak or +rock.' Some other traits of his character may be noted; for example, the +courteous manner in which he inclines his head to the last objector, or the +ironical touch, 'Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of +fate calls;' or the depreciation of the arguments with which 'he comforted +himself and them;' or his fear of 'misology;' or his references to Homer; +or the playful smile with which he 'talks like a book' about greater and +less; or the allusion to the possibility of finding another teacher among +barbarous races (compare Polit.); or the mysterious reference to another +science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction for which he is vainly +feeling. There is no change in him; only now he is invested with a sort of +sacred character, as the prophet or priest of Apollo the God of the +festival, in whose honour he first of all composes a hymn, and then like +the swan pours forth his dying lay. Perhaps the extreme elevation of +Socrates above his own situation, and the ordinary interests of life +(compare his jeu d'esprit about his burial, in which for a moment he puts +on the 'Silenus mask'), create in the mind of the reader an impression +stronger than could be derived from arguments that such a one has in him 'a +principle which does not admit of death.' + +The other persons of the Dialogue may be considered under two heads: (1) +private friends; (2) the respondents in the argument. + +First there is Crito, who has been already introduced to us in the +Euthydemus and the Crito; he is the equal in years of Socrates, and stands +in quite a different relation to him from his younger disciples. He is a +man of the world who is rich and prosperous (compare the jest in the +Euthydemus), the best friend of Socrates, who wants to know his commands, +in whose presence he talks to his family, and who performs the last duty of +closing his eyes. It is observable too that, as in the Euthydemus, Crito +shows no aptitude for philosophical discussions. Nor among the friends of +Socrates must the jailer be forgotten, who seems to have been introduced by +Plato in order to show the impression made by the extraordinary man on the +common. The gentle nature of the man is indicated by his weeping at the +announcement of his errand and then turning away, and also by the words of +Socrates to his disciples: 'How charming the man is! since I have been in +prison he has been always coming to me, and is as good as could be to me.' +We are reminded too that he has retained this gentle nature amid scenes of +death and violence by the contrasts which he draws between the behaviour of +Socrates and of others when about to die. + +Another person who takes no part in the philosophical discussion is the +excitable Apollodorus, the same who, in the Symposium, of which he is the +narrator, is called 'the madman,' and who testifies his grief by the most +violent emotions. Phaedo is also present, the 'beloved disciple' as he may +be termed, who is described, if not 'leaning on his bosom,' as seated next +to Socrates, who is playing with his hair. He too, like Apollodorus, takes +no part in the discussion, but he loves above all things to hear and speak +of Socrates after his death. The calmness of his behaviour, veiling his +face when he can no longer restrain his tears, contrasts with the +passionate outcries of the other. At a particular point the argument is +described as falling before the attack of Simmias. A sort of despair is +introduced in the minds of the company. The effect of this is heightened +by the description of Phaedo, who has been the eye-witness of the scene, +and by the sympathy of his Phliasian auditors who are beginning to think +'that they too can never trust an argument again.' And the intense +interest of the company is communicated not only to the first auditors, but +to us who in a distant country read the narrative of their emotions after +more than two thousand years have passed away. + +The two principal interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, the disciples of +Philolaus the Pythagorean philosopher of Thebes. Simmias is described in +the Phaedrus as fonder of an argument than any man living; and Cebes, +although finally persuaded by Socrates, is said to be the most incredulous +of human beings. It is Cebes who at the commencement of the Dialogue asks +why 'suicide is held to be unlawful,' and who first supplies the doctrine +of recollection in confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. It is +Cebes who urges that the pre-existence does not necessarily involve the +future existence of the soul, as is shown by the illustration of the weaver +and his coat. Simmias, on the other hand, raises the question about +harmony and the lyre, which is naturally put into the mouth of a +Pythagorean disciple. It is Simmias, too, who first remarks on the +uncertainty of human knowledge, and only at last concedes to the argument +such a qualified approval as is consistent with the feebleness of the human +faculties. Cebes is the deeper and more consecutive thinker, Simmias more +superficial and rhetorical; they are distinguished in much the same manner +as Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Republic. + +Other persons, Menexenus, Ctesippus, Lysis, are old friends; Evenus has +been already satirized in the Apology; Aeschines and Epigenes were present +at the trial; Euclid and Terpsion will reappear in the Introduction to the +Theaetetus, Hermogenes has already appeared in the Cratylus. No inference +can fairly be drawn from the absence of Aristippus, nor from the omission +of Xenophon, who at the time of Socrates' death was in Asia. The mention +of Plato's own absence seems like an expression of sorrow, and may, +perhaps, be an indication that the report of the conversation is not to be +taken literally. + +The place of the Dialogue in the series is doubtful. The doctrine of ideas +is certainly carried beyond the Socratic point of view; in no other of the +writings of Plato is the theory of them so completely developed. Whether +the belief in immortality can be attributed to Socrates or not is +uncertain; the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the earlier Dialogues of +Plato, is an argument to the contrary. Yet in the Cyropaedia Xenophon has +put language into the mouth of the dying Cyrus which recalls the Phaedo, +and may have been derived from the teaching of Socrates. It may be fairly +urged that the greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been +wholly ignored by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an +oracle, and who recognized a Divine plan in man and nature. (Xen. Mem.) +And the language of the Apology and of the Crito confirms this view. + +The Phaedo is not one of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato; nor, on the other +hand, can it be assigned to that later stage of the Platonic writings at +which the doctrine of ideas appears to be forgotten. It belongs rather to +the intermediate period of the Platonic philosophy, which roughly +corresponds to the Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic, Theaetetus. Without +pretending to determine the real time of their composition, the Symposium, +Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Phaedo may be conveniently read by us in this +order as illustrative of the life of Socrates. Another chain may be formed +of the Meno, Phaedrus, Phaedo, in which the immortality of the soul is +connected with the doctrine of ideas. In the Meno the theory of ideas is +based on the ancient belief in transmigration, which reappears again in the +Phaedrus as well as in the Republic and Timaeus, and in all of them is +connected with a doctrine of retribution. In the Phaedrus the immortality +of the soul is supposed to rest on the conception of the soul as a +principle of motion, whereas in the Republic the argument turns on the +natural continuance of the soul, which, if not destroyed by her own proper +evil, can hardly be destroyed by any other. The soul of man in the Timaeus +is derived from the Supreme Creator, and either returns after death to her +kindred star, or descends into the lower life of an animal. The Apology +expresses the same view as the Phaedo, but with less confidence; there the +probability of death being a long sleep is not excluded. The Theaetetus +also describes, in a digression, the desire of the soul to fly away and be +with God--'and to fly to him is to be like him.' The Symposium may be +observed to resemble as well as to differ from the Phaedo. While the first +notion of immortality is only in the way of natural procreation or of +posthumous fame and glory, the higher revelation of beauty, like the good +in the Republic, is the vision of the eternal idea. So deeply rooted in +Plato's mind is the belief in immortality; so various are the forms of +expression which he employs. + +As in several other Dialogues, there is more of system in the Phaedo than +appears at first sight. The succession of arguments is based on previous +philosophies; beginning with the mysteries and the Heracleitean alternation +of opposites, and proceeding to the Pythagorean harmony and transmigration; +making a step by the aid of Platonic reminiscence, and a further step by +the help of the nous of Anaxagoras; until at last we rest in the conviction +that the soul is inseparable from the ideas, and belongs to the world of +the invisible and unknown. Then, as in the Gorgias or Republic, the +curtain falls, and the veil of mythology descends upon the argument. After +the confession of Socrates that he is an interested party, and the +acknowledgment that no man of sense will think the details of his narrative +true, but that something of the kind is true, we return from speculation to +practice. He is himself more confident of immortality than he is of his +own arguments; and the confidence which he expresses is less strong than +that which his cheerfulness and composure in death inspire in us. + +Difficulties of two kinds occur in the Phaedo--one kind to be explained out +of contemporary philosophy, the other not admitting of an entire solution. +(1) The difficulty which Socrates says that he experienced in explaining +generation and corruption; the assumption of hypotheses which proceed from +the less general to the more general, and are tested by their consequences; +the puzzle about greater and less; the resort to the method of ideas, which +to us appear only abstract terms,--these are to be explained out of the +position of Socrates and Plato in the history of philosophy. They were +living in a twilight between the sensible and the intellectual world, and +saw no way of connecting them. They could neither explain the relation of +ideas to phenomena, nor their correlation to one another. The very idea of +relation or comparison was embarrassing to them. Yet in this intellectual +uncertainty they had a conception of a proof from results, and of a moral +truth, which remained unshaken amid the questionings of philosophy. (2) +The other is a difficulty which is touched upon in the Republic as well as +in the Phaedo, and is common to modern and ancient philosophy. Plato is +not altogether satisfied with his safe and simple method of ideas. He +wants to have proved to him by facts that all things are for the best, and +that there is one mind or design which pervades them all. But this 'power +of the best' he is unable to explain; and therefore takes refuge in +universal ideas. And are not we at this day seeking to discover that which +Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw? + +Some resemblances to the Greek drama may be noted in all the Dialogues of +Plato. The Phaedo is the tragedy of which Socrates is the protagonist and +Simmias and Cebes the secondary performers, standing to them in the same +relation as to Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic. No Dialogue has a +greater unity of subject and feeling. Plato has certainly fulfilled the +condition of Greek, or rather of all art, which requires that scenes of +death and suffering should be clothed in beauty. The gathering of the +friends at the commencement of the Dialogue, the dismissal of Xanthippe, +whose presence would have been out of place at a philosophical discussion, +but who returns again with her children to take a final farewell, the +dejection of the audience at the temporary overthrow of the argument, the +picture of Socrates playing with the hair of Phaedo, the final scene in +which Socrates alone retains his composure--are masterpieces of art. And +the chorus at the end might have interpreted the feeling of the play: +'There can no evil happen to a good man in life or death.' + +'The art of concealing art' is nowhere more perfect than in those writings +of Plato which describe the trial and death of Socrates. Their charm is +their simplicity, which gives them verisimilitude; and yet they touch, as +if incidentally, and because they were suitable to the occasion, on some of +the deepest truths of philosophy. There is nothing in any tragedy, ancient +or modern, nothing in poetry or history (with one exception), like the last +hours of Socrates in Plato. The master could not be more fitly occupied at +such a time than in discoursing of immortality; nor the disciples more +divinely consoled. The arguments, taken in the spirit and not in the +letter, are our arguments; and Socrates by anticipation may be even thought +to refute some 'eccentric notions; current in our own age. For there are +philosophers among ourselves who do not seem to understand how much +stronger is the power of intelligence, or of the best, than of Atlas, or +mechanical force. How far the words attributed to Socrates were actually +uttered by him we forbear to ask; for no answer can be given to this +question. And it is better to resign ourselves to the feeling of a great +work, than to linger among critical uncertainties. + + +PHAEDO + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett. + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: +Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius. +Socrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Cebes, Crito and an Attendant of the +Prison. + +SCENE: The Prison of Socrates. + +PLACE OF THE NARRATION: Phlius. + + +ECHECRATES: Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the +day when he drank the poison? + +PHAEDO: Yes, Echecrates, I was. + +ECHECRATES: I should so like to hear about his death. What did he say in +his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one +knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is a +long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that +we had no clear account. + +PHAEDO: Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial? + +ECHECRATES: Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not +understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death, +not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this? + +PHAEDO: An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the +Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he +was tried. + +ECHECRATES: What is this ship? + +PHAEDO: It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus +went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the +saviour of them and of himself. And they were said to have vowed to Apollo +at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to +Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage +to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of +the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be +polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary +winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable. As I +was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was +the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long +after he was condemned. + +ECHECRATES: What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or +done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities +forbid them to be present--so that he had no friends near him when he died? + +PHAEDO: No; there were several of them with him. + +ECHECRATES: If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what +passed, as exactly as you can. + +PHAEDO: I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish. +To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I +speak myself or hear another speak of him. + +ECHECRATES: You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and +I hope that you will be as exact as you can. + +PHAEDO: I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could +hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I +did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and +bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed. I +thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine +call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived +there, and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at +such an hour. But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in +philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). +I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of +pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and this double feeling was +shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the +excitable Apollodorus--you know the sort of man? + +ECHECRATES: Yes. + +PHAEDO: He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly +moved. + +ECHECRATES: Who were present? + +PHAEDO: Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus +and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes; +likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others; +Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill. + +ECHECRATES: Were there any strangers? + +PHAEDO: Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; +Euclid and Terpison, who came from Megara. + +ECHECRATES: And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus? + +PHAEDO: No, they were said to be in Aegina. + +ECHECRATES: Any one else? + +PHAEDO: I think that these were nearly all. + +ECHECRATES: Well, and what did you talk about? + +PHAEDO: I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire +conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling +early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which +is not far from the prison. There we used to wait talking with one another +until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early); then +we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning +we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we +quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from Delos, +and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our +arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out +and told us to stay until he called us. 'For the Eleven,' he said, 'are +now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that +he is to die to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might come in. On +entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom +you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw +us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: 'O Socrates, this is the +last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with +you.' Socrates turned to Crito and said: 'Crito, let some one take her +home.' Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and +beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, +bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing: How singular is the +thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be +thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at +the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to +take the other; their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head. +And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have +made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he +could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why +when one comes the other follows, as I know by my own experience now, when +after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to +succeed. + +Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the +name of Aesop. For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by +many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet +--he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to +have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to +him:--he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, +now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also +composing that hymn in honour of Apollo. + +Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth--that I had no idea of +rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. +But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about +the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had +intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same dream came +to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying +the same or nearly the same words: 'Cultivate and make music,' said the +dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort +and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of +my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do +what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is +bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not +certain of this, for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense +of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me +a respite, I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, +and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. +And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then +considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put +together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I +took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew--they +were the first I came upon--and turned them into verse. Tell this to +Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come +after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to +be going, for the Athenians say that I must. + +Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent +companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never +take your advice unless he is obliged. + +Why, said Socrates,--is not Evenus a philosopher? + +I think that he is, said Simmias. + +Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to +die, but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful. + +Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the +ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting. + +Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, +but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying? + +Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples +of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this? + +Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates. + +My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not +repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, it +is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the +pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval +between this and the setting of the sun? + +Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have +certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when +he was staying with us at Thebes: and there are others who say the same, +although I have never understood what was meant by any of them. + +Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will +understand. I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are +evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be +the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted +to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another. + +Very true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native Boeotian. + +I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may +not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in +secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run +away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too +believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of +theirs. Do you not agree? + +Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes. + +And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the +liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation +of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would +you not punish him if you could? + +Certainly, replied Cebes. + +Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a +man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is +now summoning me. + +Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say. And +yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our +guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we were +just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be +willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the +best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when +set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of +him. A fool may perhaps think so--he may argue that he had better run away +from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and +not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his +running away. The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better +than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now +said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at +passing out of life. + +The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning +to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily convinced by +the first thing which he hears. + +And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does +appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly +wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than +himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks +that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom +you acknowledge to be our good masters. + +Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think +that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court? + +We should like you to do so, said Simmias. + +Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did +when before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes, +that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first +place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as +certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so +sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind; +and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope +that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of +old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil. + +But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said +Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?--for they are a benefit in which +we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, +that will be an answer to the charge against yourself. + +I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what +Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me. + +Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:--the attendant who is to give you the +poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not +to talk much, talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to +interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are +sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose. + +Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the +poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all. + +I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to +satisfy him. + +Never mind him, he said. + +And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher +has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after +death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how +this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem +that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other +men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and +if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why +when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always +pursuing and desiring? + +Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me +laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear +your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our +people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is +in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the +death which they desire. + +And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the +words 'they have found them out'; for they have not found out either what +is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he +deserves or desires death. But enough of them:--let us discuss the matter +among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death? + +To be sure, replied Simmias. + +Is it not the separation of soul and body? And to be dead is the +completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from +the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death? + +Just so, he replied. + +There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present +inquiry if you and I can agree about it:--Ought the philosopher to care +about the pleasures--if they are to be called pleasures--of eating and +drinking? + +Certainly not, answered Simmias. + +And what about the pleasures of love--should he care for them? + +By no means. + +And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for +example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments +of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise +anything more than nature needs? What do you say? + +I should say that the true philosopher would despise them. + +Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with +the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and +to turn to the soul. + +Quite true. + +In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed +in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body. + +Very true. + +Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has +no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth +having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead. + +That is also true. + +What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?--is the +body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean +to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the +poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they +are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?--for +you will allow that they are the best of them? + +Certainly, he replied. + +Then when does the soul attain truth?--for in attempting to consider +anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived. + +True. + +Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all? + +Yes. + +And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of +these things trouble her--neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any +pleasure,--when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible +to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring +after true being? + +Certainly. + +And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from +his body and desires to be alone and by herself? + +That is true. + +Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an +absolute justice? + +Assuredly there is. + +And an absolute beauty and absolute good? + +Of course. + +But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes? + +Certainly not. + +Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?--and I speak not of +these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of +the essence or true nature of everything. Has the reality of them ever +been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the +nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who +so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of +the essence of each thing which he considers? + +Certainly. + +And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the +mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any +other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in +her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid, +as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body, +these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the +soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge--who, if not he, is +likely to attain the knowledge of true being? + +What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias. + +And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led +to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the +following? 'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which +seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in +the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our +desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth. For the body +is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of +food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the +search after true being: it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, +and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say, +takes away from us the power of thinking at all. Whence come wars, and +fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the +body? wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be +acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all +these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and +worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some +speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and +confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from +seeing the truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would +have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body--the soul in +herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the +wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not while +we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul +cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows--either knowledge is +not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not +till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself +alone. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to +knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the +body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure +until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And thus having +got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse +with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is +no other than the light of truth.' For the impure are not permitted to +approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true +lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You +would agree; would you not? + +Undoubtedly, Socrates. + +But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that, +going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall +attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on +my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his +mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified. + +Certainly, replied Simmias. + +And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I +was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself +into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place +alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;--the release +of the soul from the chains of the body? + +Very true, he said. + +And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death? + +To be sure, he said. + +And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the +soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their +especial study? + +That is true. + +And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in +men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet +repining when it comes upon them. + +Clearly. + +And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of +dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible. Look at +the matter thus:--if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, +and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is +granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined, +instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they +arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired--and this was +wisdom--and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many +a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of +seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. +And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in +like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still +repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, O my +friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction +that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this +be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of +death. + +He would, indeed, replied Simmias. + +And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his +reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover +of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or +power, or both? + +Quite so, he replied. + +And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of +the philosopher? + +Certainly. + +There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist +in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of +superiority to them--is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who +despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy? + +Most assuredly. + +For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are +really a contradiction. + +How so? + +Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a +great evil. + +Very true, he said. + +And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater +evils? + +That is quite true. + +Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because +they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and +because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing. + +Very true. + +And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate +because they are intemperate--which might seem to be a contradiction, but +is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish +temperance. For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and +in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because +they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is +called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in +being conquered by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that, in a +sense, they are made temperate through intemperance. + +Such appears to be the case. + +Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or +pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, +is not the exchange of virtue. O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true +coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?--and that is wisdom; and +only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly +bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all +true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or +other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue +which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and +exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any +freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a +purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, +and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. The founders of the +mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking +nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes +unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but +that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with +the gods. For 'many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'are the thyrsus- +bearers, but few are the mystics,'--meaning, as I interpret the words, 'the +true philosophers.' In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have +been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;--whether I have +sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall +truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the +other world--such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, +Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my +masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters +and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying; if +then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the +Athenian judges, it will be well. + +Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. +But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear +that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the +very day of death she may perish and come to an end--immediately on her +release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her +flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only be collected +into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you are +speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say +is true. But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs +to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or +intelligence. + +True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little +of the probabilities of these things? + +I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion +about them. + +I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were +one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking +about matters in which I have no concern:--If you please, then, we will +proceed with the inquiry. + +Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are +or are not in the world below. There comes into my mind an ancient +doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and +returning hither, are born again from the dead. Now if it be true that the +living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, +for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be +conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born +from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be +adduced. + +Very true, replied Cebes. + +Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but +in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which +there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things +which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things +as good and evil, just and unjust--and there are innumerable other +opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in +all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say, +for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after +being less. + +True. + +And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have +become less. + +Yes. + +And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the +slower. + +Very true. + +And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more +unjust. + +Of course. + +And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them +are generated out of opposites? + +Yes. + +And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two +intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other +opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also +an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is +said to wax, and that which decays to wane? + +Yes, he said. + +And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, +cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one +another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not +always expressed in words--they are really generated out of one another, +and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them? + +Very true, he replied. + +Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of +waking? + +True, he said. + +And what is it? + +Death, he answered. + +And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and +have there their two intermediate processes also? + +Of course. + +Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which +I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall +analyze the other to me. One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The +state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping +waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of +generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. +Do you agree? + +I entirely agree. + +Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is +not death opposed to life? + +Yes. + +And they are generated one from the other? + +Yes. + +What is generated from the living? + +The dead. + +And what from the dead? + +I can only say in answer--the living. + +Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the +dead? + +That is clear, he replied. + +Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below? + +That is true. + +And one of the two processes or generations is visible--for surely the act +of dying is visible? + +Surely, he said. + +What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process? And +shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only? Must we not rather assign +to death some corresponding process of generation? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And what is that process? + +Return to life. + +And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into +the world of the living? + +Quite true. + +Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living +come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if +true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some +place out of which they come again. + +Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our +previous admissions. + +And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I +think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there +were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements +into their opposites, then you know that all things would at last have the +same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more +generation of them. + +What do you mean? he said. + +A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he +replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and +waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, +because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not be +distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no +division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And +in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to +die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not +come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive--what +other result could there be? For if the living spring from any other +things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in +death? (But compare Republic.) + +There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to +be absolutely true. + +Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion; and we have not +been deluded in making these admissions; but I am confident that there +truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the +dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good +souls have a better portion than the evil. + +Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply +recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we +have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible +unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man; +here then is another proof of the soul's immortality. + +But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged in +favour of this doctrine of recollection. I am not very sure at the moment +that I remember them. + +One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a +question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself, +but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason +already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a +diagram or to anything of that sort. (Compare Meno.) + +But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you +whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another +way;--I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is +recollection. + +Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of +recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, +I am beginning to recollect and be convinced; but I should still like to +hear what you were going to say. + +This is what I would say, he replied:--We should agree, if I am not +mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous +time. + +Very true. + +And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask, +Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived +anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else which +is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may +not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception? + +What do you mean? + +I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:--The knowledge of a +lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man? + +True. + +And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a +garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? +Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the +youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner +any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless examples +of the same thing. + +Endless, indeed, replied Simmias. + +And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has +been already forgotten through time and inattention. + +Very true, he said. + +Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre +remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember +Cebes? + +True. + +Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself? + +Quite so. + +And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either +like or unlike? + +It may be. + +And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another +consideration is sure to arise, which is--whether the likeness in any +degree falls short or not of that which is recollected? + +Very true, he said. + +And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing +as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over +and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so? + +Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in +life. + +And do we know the nature of this absolute essence? + +To be sure, he said. + +And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of +material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them +the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will +acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another +way:--Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and +at another time unequal? + +That is certain. + +But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as of +inequality? + +Impossible, Socrates. + +Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality? + +I should say, clearly not, Socrates. + +And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, +you conceived and attained that idea? + +Very true, he said. + +Which might be like, or might be unlike them? + +Yes. + +But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you conceived +another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of +recollection? + +Very true. + +But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other +material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they +equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they +fall short of this perfect equality in a measure? + +Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. + +And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, +observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but +falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who +makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which +the other, although similar, was inferior? + +Certainly. + +And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute +equality? + +Precisely. + +Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first saw +the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals strive to +attain absolute equality, but fall short of it? + +Very true. + +And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and +can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other +of the senses, which are all alike in this respect? + +Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same +as the other. + +From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim +at an absolute equality of which they fall short? + +Yes. + +Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have +had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that +standard the equals which are derived from the senses?--for to that they +all aspire, and of that they fall short. + +No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements. + +And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as +we were born? + +Certainly. + +Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time? + +Yes. + +That is to say, before we were born, I suppose? + +True. + +And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having +the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of +birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; +for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, +holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the +dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions. Of all +this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth? + +We may. + +But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case we +acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge, and +shall always continue to know as long as life lasts--for knowing is the +acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, +Simmias, just the losing of knowledge? + +Quite true, Socrates. + +But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at +birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what we +previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a +recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be +rightly termed recollection? + +Very true. + +So much is clear--that when we perceive something, either by the help of +sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to +obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with +it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one of two +alternatives follows:--either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued +to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only +remember, and learning is simply recollection. + +Yes, that is quite true, Socrates. + +And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our +birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our +birth? + +I cannot decide at the moment. + +At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge will or will not be +able to render an account of his knowledge? What do you say? + +Certainly, he will. + +But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very +matters about which we are speaking? + +Would that they could, Socrates, but I rather fear that to-morrow, at this +time, there will no longer be any one alive who is able to give an account +of them such as ought to be given. + +Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things? + +Certainly not. + +They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before? + +Certainly. + +But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?--not since we were born as +men? + +Certainly not. + +And therefore, previously? + +Yes. + +Then, Simmias, our souls must also have existed without bodies before they +were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence. + +Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions are given us at the +very moment of birth; for this is the only time which remains. + +Yes, my friend, but if so, when do we lose them? for they are not in us +when we are born--that is admitted. Do we lose them at the moment of +receiving them, or if not at what other time? + +No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense. + +Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is +an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things; +and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former +state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding +these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession--then our souls +must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the +argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed +before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if +not the ideas, then not the souls. + +Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity +for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the +position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated +from the existence of the essence of which you speak. For there is nothing +which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other +notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute +existence; and I am satisfied with the proof. + +Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too. + +I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most +incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of +the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will +continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot +get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring--the +feeling that when the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this +may be the extinction of her. For admitting that she may have been born +elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before +entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may +she not herself be destroyed and come to an end? + +Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; about half of what was required has been +proven; to wit, that our souls existed before we were born:--that the soul +will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which +the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is given the +demonstration will be complete. + +But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, +if you put the two arguments together--I mean this and the former one, in +which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the +soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born +only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, +since she has to be born again?--Surely the proof which you desire has been +already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to +probe the argument further. Like children, you are haunted with a fear +that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away and +scatter her; especially if a man should happen to die in a great storm and +not when the sky is calm. + +Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our +fears--and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a +child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; him too we must +persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark. + +Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you +have charmed away the fear. + +And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are +gone? + +Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and +there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and +wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of +spending your money. And you must seek among yourselves too; for you will +not find others better able to make the search. + +The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you +please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed. + +By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please? + +Very good. + +Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we +imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear? and what again +is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed further to +enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of +soul--our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to +these questions. + +Very true, he said. + +Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as +of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is +uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble. + +Yes; I should imagine so, said Cebes. + +And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas +the compound is always changing and never the same. + +I agree, he said. + +Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or +essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true +existence--whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else--are these +essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each +of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and +unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at +any time? + +They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. + +And what would you say of the many beautiful--whether men or horses or +garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may be +called equal or beautiful,--are they all unchanging and the same always, or +quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always +changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one +another? + +The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change. + +And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the +unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind--they are invisible +and are not seen? + +That is very true, he said. + +Well, then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of +existences--one seen, the other unseen. + +Let us suppose them. + +The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging? + +That may be also supposed. + +And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul? + +To be sure. + +And to which class is the body more alike and akin? + +Clearly to the seen--no one can doubt that. + +And is the soul seen or not seen? + +Not by man, Socrates. + +And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not +visible to the eye of man? + +Yes, to the eye of man. + +And is the soul seen or not seen? + +Not seen. + +Unseen then? + +Yes. + +Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen? + +That follows necessarily, Socrates. + +And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an +instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or +hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body +is perceiving through the senses)--were we not saying that the soul too is +then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and +is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard, when +she touches change? + +Very true. + +But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the +other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and +unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when +she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her +erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And +this state of the soul is called wisdom? + +That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied. + +And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be +inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one? + +I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the +argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable--even the +most stupid person will not deny that. + +And the body is more like the changing? + +Yes. + +Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the +body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the +body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the +divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be +that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is +subject and servant? + +True. + +And which does the soul resemble? + +The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal--there can be no +doubt of that, Socrates. + +Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the +conclusion?--that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and +immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and +unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and +mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. +Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied? + +It cannot. + +But if it be true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and +is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble? + +Certainly. + +And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible +part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, +and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not +dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a for some time, nay +even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, +and the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and +embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through +infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as +the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible:--Do you +agree? + +Yes. + +And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the place +of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on +her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also +soon to go,--that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, +will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the +many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather +is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily +taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body, +which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself;--and making such +abstraction her perpetual study--which means that she has been a true +disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in +the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the practice of death?-- + +Certainly-- + +That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world--to the +divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure of bliss +and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild +passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say of the +initiated, in company with the gods (compare Apol.). Is not this true, +Cebes? + +Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt. + +But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her +departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in +love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of +the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a +bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the +purposes of his lusts,--the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and +avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and +invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy;--do you suppose that +such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed? + +Impossible, he replied. + +She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and +constant care of the body have wrought into her nature. + +Very true. + +And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, and +is that element of sight by which a soul is depressed and dragged down +again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of +the world below--prowling about tombs and sepulchres, near which, as they +tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not +departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible. + +(Compare Milton, Comus:-- + +'But when lust, +By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk, +But most by lewd and lavish act of sin, +Lets in defilement to the inward parts, +The soul grows clotted by contagion, +Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose, +The divine property of her first being. +Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp +Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres, +Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave, +As loath to leave the body that it lov'd, +And linked itself by carnal sensuality +To a degenerate and degraded state.') + +That is very likely, Socrates. + +Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the +good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in +payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue +to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves +them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be +supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in +their former lives. + +What natures do you mean, Socrates? + +What I mean is that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, +and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into +asses and animals of that sort. What do you think? + +I think such an opinion to be exceedingly probable. + +And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and +violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites;--whither else can +we suppose them to go? + +Yes, said Cebes; with such natures, beyond question. + +And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places +answering to their several natures and propensities? + +There is not, he said. + +Some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and in +the place to which they go are those who have practised the civil and +social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by +habit and attention without philosophy and mind. (Compare Republic.) + +Why are they the happiest? + +Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle and social kind which +is like their own, such as bees or wasps or ants, or back again into the +form of man, and just and moderate men may be supposed to spring from them. + +Very likely. + +No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the +time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, but the +lover of knowledge only. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why +the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and hold +out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them,--not because +they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, +and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because +they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds. + +No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes. + +No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have any care of their own +souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say +farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and +when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel +that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they +turn and follow. + +What do you mean, Socrates? + +I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the +soul was simply fastened and glued to the body--until philosophy received +her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison, not +in and through herself; she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of +ignorance; and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her +own captivity. This was her original state; and then, as I was saying, and +as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, seeing how terrible +was her confinement, of which she was to herself the cause, received and +gently comforted her and sought to release her, pointing out that the eye +and the ear and the other senses are full of deception, and persuading her +to retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them, +and be gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself +and her own pure apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever +comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation; for such +things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is +intelligible and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks +that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from +pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; +reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, +he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be +anticipated--as for example, the loss of his health or property which he +has sacrificed to his lusts--but an evil greater far, which is the greatest +and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks. + +What is it, Socrates? said Cebes. + +The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, +every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then +plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of +sight. + +Very true. + +And is not this the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body? + +How so? + +Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and +rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes +that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with +the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same +habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to +the world below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into +another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in +the communion of the divine and pure and simple. + +Most true, Socrates, answered Cebes. + +And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are +temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives. + +Certainly not. + +Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way; +she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she +may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains, doing +a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's +web. But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in the +contemplation of her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of +opinion), and thence deriving nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while +she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to that +which is like her, and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias +and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these +pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away +by the winds and be nowhere and nothing. + +When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence; +he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what had been +said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. And +Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and +whether there was anything wanting? For, said he, there are many points +still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the +matter thoroughly. Should you be considering some other matter I say no +more, but if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what you +think, and let us have anything better which you can suggest; and if you +think that I can be of any use, allow me to help you. + +Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our +minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question +which we wanted to have answered and which neither of us liked to ask, +fearing that our importunity might be troublesome under present at such a +time. + +Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not +very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation +as a misfortune, if I cannot even persuade you that I am no worse off now +than at any other time in my life. Will you not allow that I have as much +of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they perceive +that they must die, having sung all their life long, do then sing more +lustily than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away +to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves +afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament +at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in +pain, not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which +are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to +be true of them any more than of the swans. But because they are sacred to +Apollo, they have the gift of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of +another world, wherefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than they +ever did before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant +of the same God, and the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I +have received from my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to +theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind +then, if this be your only objection, but speak and ask anything which you +like, while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow. + +Very good, Socrates, said Simmias; then I will tell you my difficulty, and +Cebes will tell you his. I feel myself, (and I daresay that you have the +same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any +certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I +should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the +uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every +side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: +either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them; or, if this +be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of +human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life-- +not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will +more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture +to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter +with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the +matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to +me, Socrates, to be not sufficient. + +Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I +should like to know in what respect the argument is insufficient. + +In this respect, replied Simmias:--Suppose a person to use the same +argument about harmony and the lyre--might he not say that harmony is a +thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which +is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, +composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the +lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would +argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has +not perished--you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the +strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet +that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has +perished--perished before the mortal. The harmony must still be somewhere, +and the wood and strings will decay before anything can happen to that. +The thought, Socrates, must have occurred to your own mind that such is our +conception of the soul; and that when the body is in a manner strung and +held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul +is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them. But if so, whenever +the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease +or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of +music or of works of art, of course perishes at once, although the material +remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either +decayed or burnt. And if any one maintains that the soul, being the +harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is +called death, how shall we answer him? + +Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile: +Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is +better able than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon +me. But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes +has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both +spoken, we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, +or if not, we will maintain our position. Please to tell me then, Cebes, +he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you? + +Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is where it +was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am +ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the +bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite +sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in +my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of +Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more +lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul +very far excels the body. Well, then, says the argument to me, why do you +remain unconvinced?--When you see that the weaker continues in existence +after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting must also +survive during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to consider +whether the objection, which, like Simmias, I will express in a figure, is +of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver, +who dies, and after his death somebody says:--He is not dead, he must be +alive;--see, there is the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which +remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of some one who +is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and +wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he +has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more +lasting, because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would +beg you to remark, is a mistake; any one can see that he who talks thus is +talking nonsense. For the truth is, that the weaver aforesaid, having +woven and worn many such coats, outlived several of them, and was outlived +by the last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker +than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in +a similar figure; and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the +soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison. He may +argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially if a +man live many years. While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays, +and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the waste. But of +course, whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and +this will survive her; and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body +will show its native weakness, and quickly decompose and pass away. I +would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to +prove the continued existence of the soul after death. For granting even +more than you affirm to be possible, and acknowledging not only that the +soul existed before birth, but also that the souls of some exist, and will +continue to exist after death, and will be born and die again and again, +and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be +born many times--nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she +will weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in +one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the +body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for +no one of us can have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain +that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless +he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. +But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will +always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also +may utterly perish. + +All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant +feeling at hearing what they said. When we had been so firmly convinced +before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and +uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one; +either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds of +belief. + +ECHECRATES: There I feel with you--by heaven I do, Phaedo, and when you +were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What +argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than +the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the +soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction +for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original +conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which +will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives. Tell me, I +implore you, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the +unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack? +And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Narrate what passed as exactly as +you can. + +PHAEDO: Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more +than on that occasion. That he should be able to answer was nothing, but +what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner +in which he received the words of the young men, and then his quick sense +of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the readiness +with which he healed it. He might be compared to a general rallying his +defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and return to the +field of argument. + +ECHECRATES: What followed? + +PHAEDO: You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated +on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. He +stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck--he had a way of playing +with my hair; and then he said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these +fair locks of yours will be severed. + +Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied. + +Not so, if you will take my advice. + +What shall I do with them? I said. + +To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we cannot +bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks; and if I were +you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground +against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives, +not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated +them. + +Yes, I said, but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two. + +Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes down. + +I summon you rather, I rejoined, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as +Iolaus might summon Heracles. + +That will do as well, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid a +danger. + +Of what nature? I said. + +Lest we become misologists, he replied, no worse thing can happen to a man +than this. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are +also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, +which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises out of the too great +confidence of inexperience;--you trust a man and think him altogether true +and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false +and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened +several times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he +deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has often +quarreled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has +any good in him at all. You must have observed this trait of character? + +I have. + +And is not the feeling discreditable? Is it not obvious that such an one +having to deal with other men, was clearly without any experience of human +nature; for experience would have taught him the true state of the case, +that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in +the interval between them. + +What do you mean? I said. + +I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small, that +nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this +applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and +slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you +select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are +in the mean between them. Did you never observe this? + +Yes, I said, I have. + +And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, +the worst would be found to be very few? + +Yes, that is very likely, I said. + +Yes, that is very likely, he replied; although in this respect arguments +are unlike men--there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; +but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in +dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to +be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has +no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think +at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone +perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, +of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and +down in never-ceasing ebb and flow. + +That is quite true, I said. + +Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as +truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge--that a man should have +lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then +turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of +wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the +blame from himself to arguments in general: and for ever afterwards should +hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities. + +Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy. + +Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of +admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in +any arguments at all. Rather say that we have not yet attained to +soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best +to gain health of mind--you and all other men having regard to the whole of +your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death. For at this +moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the +vulgar, I am only a partisan. Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a +dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious +only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference +between him and me at the present moment is merely this--that whereas he +seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather +seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter +with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument. For if what I +say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth, but if there be +nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not +distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but +will die with me, and therefore no harm will be done. This is the state of +mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask +you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I +seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not, withstand me might and +main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and +like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die. + +And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I +have in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has +fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing +than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish +first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more +lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, +after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her +last body behind her; and that this is death, which is the destruction not +of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is +ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have +to consider? + +They both agreed to this statement of them. + +He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, +or of a part only? + +Of a part only, they replied. + +And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we +said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the soul must +have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body? + +Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the +argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken. Simmias +agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of +his ever thinking differently. + +But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban +friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul +is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for +you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the +elements which compose it. + +Never, Socrates. + +But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul +existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of +elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, +as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist +in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes +first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other? + +Not at all, replied Simmias. + +And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which +harmony is the theme. + +There ought, replied Simmias. + +But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is +recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you +retain? + +I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the +first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the +latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable +and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I know too +well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless +great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive +--in geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and +recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds; and the proof +was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because +to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. +Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on +sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to +argue that the soul is a harmony. + +Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you +imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other +than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded? + +Certainly not. + +Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer? + +He agreed. + +Then a harmony does not, properly speaking, lead the parts or elements +which make up the harmony, but only follows them. + +He assented. + +For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality +which is opposed to its parts. + +That would be impossible, he replied. + +And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which +the elements are harmonized? + +I do not understand you, he said. + +I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, +and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any +extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a +harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized. + +True. + +But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree +more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another? + +Not in the least. + +Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and +to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: +and this is said truly? + +Yes, truly. + +But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this +presence of virtue and vice in the soul?--will they say that here is +another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is +harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and +that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her? + +I cannot tell, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of the sort +would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony. + +And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another; +which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, +or more or less completely a harmony? + +Quite true. + +And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less +harmonized? + +True. + +And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of +harmony, but only an equal harmony? + +Yes, an equal harmony. + +Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not +more or less harmonized? + +Exactly. + +And therefore has neither more nor less of discord, nor yet of harmony? + +She has not. + +And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no +more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony? + +Not at all more. + +Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will +never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no +part in the inharmonical. + +No. + +And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice? + +How can she have, if the previous argument holds? + +Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all +living creatures will be equally good? + +I agree with you, Socrates, he said. + +And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the +consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a +harmony? + +It cannot be true. + +Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature +other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any? + +Indeed, I do not. + +And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at +variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does +not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, +against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the +opposition of the soul to the things of the body. + +Very true. + +But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never +utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations +and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can +only follow, she cannot lead them? + +It must be so, he replied. + +And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite-- +leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost always +opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes +more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more +gently; now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions, fears, as +if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the Odyssee +represents Odysseus doing in the words-- + +'He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart: +Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!' + +Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a +harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather +of a nature which should lead and master them--herself a far diviner thing +than any harmony? + +Yes, Socrates, I quite think so. + +Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a +harmony, for we should contradict the divine Homer, and contradict +ourselves. + +True, he said. + +Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has +graciously yielded to us; but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband +Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him? + +I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I am +sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could +never have expected. For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I +quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was +surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of +yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a +similar fate. + +Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye +should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, +may be left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric +fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:--You want +to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and +the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain +and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better in the +world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove +this; and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of +the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not +necessarily imply her immortality. Admitting the soul to be longlived, and +to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that +account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of +disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the +toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the +soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you say, +make any difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not +devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account +of the soul's immortality. This, or something like this, I suspect to be +your notion, Cebes; and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may +escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything. + +But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or +subtract: I mean what you say that I mean. + +Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length +he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes, involving the whole +nature of generation and corruption, about which, if you like, I will give +you my own experience; and if anything which I say is likely to avail +towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it. + +I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say. + +Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a +prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the +investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why a thing is +and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession; and I +was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as +these:--Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and +cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with +which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of the kind-- +but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing +and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science +may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity. And +then I went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of +heaven and earth, and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and +absolutely incapable of these enquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to +you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind +to things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite +well; I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths; e.g. such a +fact as that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for +when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and +whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk +becomes larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable notion? + +Yes, said Cebes, I think so. + +Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought +that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I +saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller +than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than +another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is +two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is +the double of one. + +And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes. + +I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of +any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when one +is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that +the two units added together make two by reason of the addition. I cannot +understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not +two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or +meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two: neither can I +understand how the division of one is the way to make two; for then a +different cause would produce the same effect,--as in the former instance +the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this +the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. +Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or +anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in +my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can never admit the +other. + +Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that +mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, +which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the +disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in +the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause +of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out +what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing, and +therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and +then he would also know the worse, since the same science comprehended +both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of +the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would +tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and whichever was true, +he would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, +and then he would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was +best; and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would further +explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied with the +explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought +that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and +that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their +returnings and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were +for the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the +disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they +are, except that this was best; and I thought that when he had explained to +me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to +explain to me what was best for each and what was good for all. These +hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the +books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better +and the worse. + +What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As +I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other +principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and +other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by +maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, +but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in +detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones +and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which +divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which +have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; +and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or +relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am +sitting here in a curved posture--that is what he would say, and he would +have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute +to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other +causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, +that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have +thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; +for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have +gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia--by the dog they would, if they had +been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen +the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of +enduring any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a +strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, +indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I +cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, +and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the +best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they +cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling +about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man +makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven; another +gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. +Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best +never enters into their minds; and instead of finding any superior strength +in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is +stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good;--of the +obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing; and yet +this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me. +But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one +else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I +have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause. + +I should very much like to hear, he replied. + +Socrates proceeded:--I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of +true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my +soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the +sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at +the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. So in my own +case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at +things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. +And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek +there the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not perfect-- +for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences +through the medium of thought, sees them only 'through a glass darkly,' any +more than he who considers them in action and operation. However, this was +the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged +to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree +with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that +which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my +meaning more clearly, as I do not think that you as yet understand me. + +No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well. + +There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only +what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion +and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which +has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those familiar words +which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is +an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, +and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the +immortality of the soul. + +Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this. + +Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the +next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful other +than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can be beautiful only in +as far as it partakes of absolute beauty--and I should say the same of +everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause? + +Yes, he said, I agree. + +He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of +those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the +bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave +all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps +foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing +beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or +manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend +that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me +to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another, +and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will never be +overthrown, and that to myself or to any one who asks the question, I may +safely reply, That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not +agree with me? + +I do. + +And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, +and by smallness the less become less? + +True. + +Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and B +less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and would +stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, +and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, and by reason +of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the +greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is +the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing +that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. You +would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not? + +Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing. + +In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and +by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or you would +say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude?-for +there is the same liability to error in all these cases. + +Very true, he said. + +Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to +one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly +asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence +except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far +as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality--this is +the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. +You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition--wiser +heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, +as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure +ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not +mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which +follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to +give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher +principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the +higher; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in +your reasoning, like the Eristics--at least if you wanted to discover real +existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or +think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased +with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. But you, +if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say. + +What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once. + +ECHECRATES: Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting. Any one +who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of +Socrates' reasoning. + +PHAEDO: Certainly, Echecrates; and such was the feeling of the whole +company at the time. + +ECHECRATES: Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, +and are now listening to your recital. But what followed? + +PHAEDO: After all this had been admitted, and they had that ideas exist, +and that other things participate in them and derive their names from them, +Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:-- + +This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater +than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both +greatness and smallness? + +Yes, I do. + +But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the +words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size +which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is +Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has +smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias? + +True. + +And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, +but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is +comparatively smaller? + +That is true. + +And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, +because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by +his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his +smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe +that what I am saying is true. + +Simmias assented. + +I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only +that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that +greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of +being exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the +greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at +the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if +allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having +received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as +I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot +condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us +cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the +same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or perishes +in the change. + +That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion. + +Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of +them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was +admitted before--that out of the greater came the less and out of the less +the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; but +now this principle seems to be utterly denied. + +Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your +courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that +there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of +opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is +affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: +then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent +and which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are +inherent in them and which give their name to them; and these essential +opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of +one another. At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are you at all +disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection? + +No, I do not feel so, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am often +disturbed by objections. + +Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never +in any case be opposed to itself? + +To that we are quite agreed, he replied. + +Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of +view, and see whether you agree with me:--There is a thing which you term +heat, and another thing which you term cold? + +Certainly. + +But are they the same as fire and snow? + +Most assuredly not. + +Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow? + +Yes. + +And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under +the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the +advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish? + +Very true, he replied. + +And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; +and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain +as before, fire and cold. + +That is true, he said. + +And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in +an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists +only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make +this clearer by an example:--The odd number is always called by the name of +odd? + +Very true. + +But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things +which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not +the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?--that is what I mean +to ask--whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of +odd. And there are many other examples: would you not say, for example, +that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which +is not the same with three? and this may be said not only of three but also +of five, and of every alternate number--each of them without being oddness +is odd, and in the same way two and four, and the other series of alternate +numbers, has every number even, without being evenness. Do you agree? + +Of course. + +Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:--not only do essential +opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although +not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject +the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when it +approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; Will not the +number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into +an even number, while remaining three? + +Very true, said Cebes. + +And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number +three? + +It is not. + +Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also +there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites. + +Very true, he said. + +Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what these +are. + +By all means. + +Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have +possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some +opposite? + +What do you mean? + +I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that +those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three +in number, but must also be odd. + +Quite true. + +And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the +opposite idea will never intrude? + +No. + +And this impress was given by the odd principle? + +Yes. + +And to the odd is opposed the even? + +True. + +Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three? + +No. + +Then three has no part in the even? + +None. + +Then the triad or number three is uneven? + +Very true. + +To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and yet +do not admit opposites--as, in the instance given, three, although not +opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always +brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive +the odd, or fire the cold--from these examples (and there are many more of +them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not +only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which +brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in +that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate--for there is no +harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, +any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of +the odd. The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to +the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts +in the ratio 3:2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in +which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are +not opposed to the whole: You will agree? + +Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that. + +And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question in +the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which +I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be +inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks +you 'what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,' you will +reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, +a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any +one asks you 'why a body is diseased,' you will not say from disease, but +from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, +you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in +general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my +adducing any further examples. + +Yes, he said, I quite understand you. + +Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body +alive? + +The soul, he replied. + +And is this always the case? + +Yes, he said, of course. + +Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life? + +Yes, certainly. + +And is there any opposite to life? + +There is, he said. + +And what is that? + +Death. + +Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of +what she brings. + +Impossible, replied Cebes. + +And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the +even? + +The odd. + +And that principle which repels the musical, or the just? + +The unmusical, he said, and the unjust. + +And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death? + +The immortal, he said. + +And does the soul admit of death? + +No. + +Then the soul is immortal? + +Yes, he said. + +And may we say that this has been proven? + +Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied. + +Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable? + +Of course. + +And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came +attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted--for +it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the +heat? + +True, he said. + +Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when +assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but +would have gone away unaffected? + +Certainly, he said. + +And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also +imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the +preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be +dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire +or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But although +the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the +odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who makes +this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; +for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, +there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of +the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and +the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other +thing. + +Very true. + +And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also +imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but +if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given. + +No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is +liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable. + +Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the +essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish. + +Yes, all men, he said--that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not +mistaken, as well as men. + +Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she +is immortal, be also imperishable? + +Most certainly. + +Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to +die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved +safe and sound? + +True. + +Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and +our souls will truly exist in another world! + +I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; but +if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to make, +he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know to what +other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he +wants to say or to have said. + +But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason +for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help +feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the +subject and the feebleness of man. + +Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that +first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully +considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort +of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the +course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no +need for any further enquiry. + +Very true. + +But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care +should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is +called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this +point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the +end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they +would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil +together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly +immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment +of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the +world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; and these are +said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very +beginning of his journey thither. + +For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he +belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are +gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the +world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from +this world to the other: and when they have there received their due and +remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many +revolutions of ages. Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus +says in the Telephus, a single and straight path--if that were so no guide +would be needed, for no one could miss it; but there are many partings of +the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are +offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The +wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her +surroundings; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was +relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the +world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with +violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the +place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done +impure deeds, whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers +of these, and the works of brothers in crime--from that soul every one +flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but +alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, +and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting +habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in +the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper +home. + +Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and +extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the +authority of one who shall be nameless. + +What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many +descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much like +to know, in which of these you put faith. + +And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell +you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of +my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, +I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was +completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the +earth according to my conception of them. + +That, said Simmias, will be enough. + +Well, then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in +the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any similar +force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or +inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her +own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of +that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but +will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my first +notion. + +Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias. + +Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the +region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a +small portion only about the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and +that there are other inhabitants of many other like places; for everywhere +on the face of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into +which the water and the mist and the lower air collect. But the true earth +is pure and situated in the pure heaven--there are the stars also; and it +is the heaven which is commonly spoken of by us as the ether, and of which +our own earth is the sediment gathering in the hollows beneath. But we who +live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling +above on the surface of the earth; which is just as if a creature who was +at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the +water, and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the +other stars, he having never come to the surface by reason of his +feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, +nor ever heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world +above is than his own. And such is exactly our case: for we are dwelling +in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air +we call the heaven, in which we imagine that the stars move. But the fact +is, that owing to our feebleness and sluggishness we are prevented from +reaching the surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the +exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and come to the top, then like +a fish who puts his head out of the water and sees this world, he would see +a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight, he would +acknowledge that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the +true light and the true earth. For our earth, and the stones, and the +entire region which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, as in the sea +all things are corroded by the brine, neither is there any noble or perfect +growth, but caverns only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud: and even +the shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. And +still less is this our world to be compared with the other. Of that upper +earth which is under the heaven, I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, +which is well worth hearing. + +And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen to you. + +The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:--In the first place, the +earth, when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of +those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked +with various colours, of which the colours used by painters on earth are in +a manner samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them, and they +are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of wonderful +lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth is +whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colours the earth is +made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has +ever seen; the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and +water have a colour of their own, and are seen like light gleaming amid the +diversity of the other colours, so that the whole presents a single and +continuous appearance of variety in unity. And in this fair region +everything that grows--trees, and flowers, and fruits--are in a like degree +fairer than any here; and there are hills, having stones in them in a like +degree smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in colour than our +highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other gems, which +are but minute fragments of them: for there all the stones are like our +precious stones, and fairer still (compare Republic). The reason is, that +they are pure, and not, like our precious stones, infected or corroded by +the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us, and which breed +foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well as in animals and +plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth, which also shines with +gold and silver and the like, and they are set in the light of day and are +large and abundant and in all places, making the earth a sight to gladden +the beholder's eye. And there are animals and men, some in a middle +region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in +islands which the air flows round, near the continent: and in a word, the +air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to +them what the air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is +such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have +sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater +perfection, in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the +ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods +really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are +conscious of them and hold converse with them, and they see the sun, moon, +and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with +this. + +Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around +the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the +globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which we +inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some are +shallower and also wider. All have numerous perforations, and there are +passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them +with one another; and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a +vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and +springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and +streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, and +the lava streams which follow them), and the regions about which they +happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see-saw +in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down, and is due +to the following cause:--There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, +and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that chasm which Homer +describes in the words,-- + +'Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;' + +and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus. +And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this +chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow. +And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the +watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and surging up and +down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water +up and down, hither and thither, over the earth--just as in the act of +respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;--and +the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and +irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower +parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in +those regions, and fill them up like water raised by a pump, and then when +they leave those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows +here, and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and +find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and +rivers, and springs. Thence they again enter the earth, some of them +making a long circuit into many lands, others going to a few places and not +so distant; and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower +than that at which they rose, and others not much lower, but all in some +degree lower than the point from which they came. And some burst forth +again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind round +the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend +as far as they can, but always return and fall into the chasm. The rivers +flowing in either direction can descend only to the centre and no further, +for opposite to the rivers is a precipice. + +Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four +principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus, +which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction +flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places into the +Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the +many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is +to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back to be born +again as animals. The third river passes out between the two, and near the +place of outlet pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger +than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud; and proceeding +muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among other places, +to the extremities of the Acherusian Lake, but mingles not with the waters +of the lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into +Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is +called, which throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth. The +fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a +wild and savage region, which is all of a dark-blue colour, like lapis +lazuli; and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls +into and forms the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving +strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the +opposite direction, and comes near the Acherusian lake from the opposite +side to Pyriphlegethon. And the water of this river too mingles with no +other, but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over against +Pyriphlegethon; and the name of the river, as the poets say, is Cocytus. + +Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the +place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, they +have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. +And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river +Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are carried in +them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil +deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done +to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds, +each of them according to his deserts. But those who appear to be +incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes--who have committed +many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the +like--such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and +they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, +although great, are not irremediable--who in a moment of anger, for +example, have done violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for +the remainder of their lives, or, who have taken the life of another under +the like extenuating circumstances--these are plunged into Tartarus, the +pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of +the year the wave casts them forth--mere homicides by way of Cocytus, +parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon--and they are borne to the +Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the +victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to be +kind to them, and let them come out into the lake. And if they prevail, +then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are +carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers +unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged: +for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too +who have been pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from this +earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the +purer earth; and of these, such as have duly purified themselves with +philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer +still which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to +tell. + +Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that +we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the +hope great! + +A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the +description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly +true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he +may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the +kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort +himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the +tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who +having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him +and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of +knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in her +own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and +truth--in these adorned she is ready to go on her journey to the world +below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, +will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would +say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think +that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not +have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead. + +When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us, +Socrates--anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which +we can serve you? + +Nothing particular, Crito, he replied: only, as I have always told you, +take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering +to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not. But +if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to +the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, +however much you may profess or promise at the moment, it will be of no +avail. + +We will do our best, said Crito: And in what way shall we bury you? + +In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that I +do not run away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:--I +cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking +and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom +he will soon see, a dead body--and he asks, How shall he bury me? And +though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have +drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed,-- +these words of mine, with which I was comforting you and myself, have had, +as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety +for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me: but +let the promise be of another sort; for he was surety for me to the judges +that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not +remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, +and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would +not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out +Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words +are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of +good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, +and do with that whatever is usual, and what you think best. + +When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to bathe; +Crito followed him and told us to wait. So we remained behind, talking and +thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our +sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were +about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath +his children were brought to him--(he had two young sons and an elder one); +and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them +a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed them and +returned to us. + +Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while +he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, +but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, +entered and stood by him, saying:--To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the +noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will +not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, +in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison--indeed, I am +sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and +not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what +must needs be--you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away +and went out. + +Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as +you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I +have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he +would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how +generously he sorrows on my account. We must do as he says, Crito; and +therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let +the attendant prepare some. + +Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many +a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made +to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do +not hurry--there is time enough. + +Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so +acting, for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am +right in not following their example, for I do not think that I should gain +anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be ridiculous +in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit. +Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me. + +Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he went out, and +having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup +of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in +these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man +answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then +to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup +to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear +or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, +Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say +about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The +man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. +I understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my +journey from this to the other world--even so--and so be it according to my +prayer. Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he +drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our +sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished +the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own +tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, +but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend. +Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain +his tears, had got up, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who +had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which +made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is +this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that +they might not misbehave in this way, for I have been told that a man +should die in peace. Be quiet, then, and have patience. When we heard his +words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, +as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according +to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked +at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked +him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards and +upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them +himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the +end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his +face, for he had covered himself up, and said--they were his last words--he +said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? +The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no +answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and +the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes +and mouth. + +Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly +say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest +and justest and best. + + + + + +End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of Phaedo, by Plato + diff --git a/old/phado10.zip b/old/phado10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3d068b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/phado10.zip |