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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/22105-8.txt b/22105-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..413fa35 --- /dev/null +++ b/22105-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9867 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Christianity and Ethics, by Archibald B. C. +Alexander + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Christianity and Ethics + A Handbook of Christian Ethics + + +Author: Archibald B. C. Alexander + + + +Release Date: July 19, 2007 [eBook #22105] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS*** + + +E-text prepared by Al Haines + + + +Transcriber's note: + + Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed + in curly braces, e.g. {99}. They have been located where page + breaks occurred in the original book. For its Index, a page + number has been placed only at the start of that section. + + + + + +CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS + +A Handbook of Christian Ethics + +by + +ARCHIBALD B. D. ALEXANDER, M.A., D.D. + +Author of 'A Short History of Philosophy,' + 'The Ethics of St. Paul,' etc. + + + + + + + +London: Duckworth & Co. +3 Henrietta St., Covent Garden +1914 +All rights reserved + + + + +{v} + +PREFACE + +The object of this volume is to present a brief but comprehensive view +of the Christian conception of the moral life. In order to conform +with the requirements of the series to which the volume belongs, the +writer has found the task of compression one of almost insurmountable +difficulty; and some topics, only less important than those dealt with, +have been necessarily omitted. The book claims to be, as its title +indicates, simply a handbook or introduction to Christian Ethics. It +deals with principles rather than details, and suggests lines of +thought instead of attempting an exhaustive treatment of the subject. +At the same time, in the author's opinion, no really vital question has +been overlooked. The treatise is intended primarily for students, but +it is hoped that it may prove serviceable to those who desire a +succinct account of the moral and social problems of the present day. + +A fairly full bibliography has been added, which, along with the +references to authorities in the body of the work, may be helpful to +those who wish to prosecute the study. For the convenience of readers +the book has been divided into four sections, entitled, Postulates, +Personality, Character, and Conduct; and a detailed synopsis of +contents has been supplied. + +To the Rev. W. R. Thomson, B.D. of Bellshill, Scotland, who read the +chapters in type, and generally put at his disposal much valuable +suggestion, the author would record his most sincere thanks. + + + + +{vii} + +CONTENTS + + +INTRODUCTION + + PAGE +A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . 1 + + + +SECTION A--POSTULATES + +CHAPTER I + +THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + + I. General Definition. + II. Distinctive Features--1. Ideal; 2. Norm; 3. Will. + III. Is Ethics a Science? + IV. Relation to--1. Logic; 2. Aesthetics; 3. Politics. + V. Dependence upon--1. Metaphysics; 2. Psychology. + + +CHAPTER II + +THE POSTULATES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + + I. Philosophical Ethics. + II. Dogmatics. + III. Theological Presuppositions-- + 1. Christian Idea of God. + 2. Christian Doctrine of Sin. + 3. Human Responsibility. + IV. Authority and Method. + + +CHAPTER III + +ETHICAL THOUGHT BEFORE CHRIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + + I. In Greece and Rome--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics. + Stoicism and St. Paul. + II. In Israel--1. Law; 2. Prophecy; 3. Poetry. + Preparatory Character of pre-Christian Morality. + + +SECTION B--PERSONALITY + +CHAPTER IV + +THE ESTIMATE OF MAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 + + I. Conflicting Views of Human Nature-- + 1. Man by nature Morally Good. + 2. Man by nature Totally Depraved. + 3. The Christian View. + II. Examination of Man's Psychical Nature-- + 1. The Unity of the Soul. + 2. The Divine in Man. + 3. The Physical and Mental Life. + III. Appeal of Christianity to the Mind. + + +CHAPTER V + +THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 + + I. Treatment of Conscience-- + 1. In Greek Poetry and Philosophy. + 2. In Old Testament. + 3. In New Testament. + II. Nature and Origin of Conscience-- + 1. Intuitionalism. + 2. Evolutionalism. + III. Validity of Conscience-- + 1. The Christian View. + 2. The Moral Imperatives. + 3. The Permanence of Conscience + + +CHAPTER VI + +'THE MIRACLE OF THE WILL' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 + + Is Man free to choose the Good? + Creative Power of Volition. + Aspects of Problem raised. + I. Scientific-- + Man and Physical Necessity. + II. Psychological-- + Determinism and Indeterminism. + Criticism of James and Bergson. + Spontaneity and Necessity. + III. Theological-- + Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. + Jesus and Paul--Challenge to the Will. + Freedom--a Gift and a Task. + + +SECTION C--CHARACTER + +CHAPTER VII + +MODERN THEORIES OF LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 + + I. Naturalistic Tendency-- + 1. Materialistic-- + (1) Idyllic or Poetic--Rousseau. + (2) Philosophic--Feuerbach. + (3) Scientific--Haeckel. + 2. Utilitarian--Hobbes, Bentham, Mill. + 3. Evolutionary--Spencer. + 4. Socialistic--Marx, Engels. + 5. Individualistic-- + (1) Aestheticism--Goethe, Schiller. + (2) Subjectivism-- + (_a_) Pessimism--Schopenhauer. + (_b_) Optimism--Nietzsche. + II. Idealistic Tendency-- + 1. Kant--Categorical Imperative. + 2. Fichte and Hegel--Idea of Personality. + 3. James--Pragmatism. + 4. Bergson--Vitalism. + 5. Eucken--Activism. + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 + + Life, as the highest Good. + I. Life, in its Individual Aspect-- + 1. Its Intensity. + 2. Its Expansion. + 3. 'Eternal Life.' + II. Life, in its Social Aspect-- + 1. 'The Kingdom of God'-- + Eschatological Interpretation. + Untenableness of _Interimsethik_. + 2. Christ's View of Kingdom-- + (1) A Present Reality--a Gift. + (2) A Gradual Development--a Task. + (3) A Future Consummation--a Hope. + III. Life, in its Godward Aspect-- + 1. Holiness. + 2. Righteousness. + 3. Love. + + +CHAPTER IX + +STANDARD AND MOTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 + + I. Christ as Example-- + 1. Portrayal by Synoptists-- + (1) Artlessness of Disciples. + (2) Naturalness of Jesus, + 2. Impression of Power-- + (1) Power of Loyalty to Calling. + (2) Power of Holiness. + (3) Power of Sympathy. + 3. Value of Jesus' Example for Present Life-- + Misconception of Phrase 'Imitation of Christ.' + II. The Christian Motive-- + 1. Analysis of Springs of Conduct-- + (1) Divine Forgiveness. + (2) Fatherhood of God. + (3) Sense of Vocation. + (4) Brevity of Life. + (5) Idea of Immortality. + 2. Question as to Purity of Motive-- + (1) Charge of Asceticism. + (2) Charge of Hedonism. + 3. Doctrine of Rewards-- + (1) In Philosophy. + (2) In Christianity--(_a_) Jesus; (_b_) Paul. + + +CHAPTER X + +THE DYNAMIC OF THE NEW LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 + + I. Divine Power-- + Operative through Christ's + 1. Incarnation and Life. + 2. Death and Sacrifice. + 3. Resurrection and Indwelling Presence. + II. Human Response-- + 1. Repentance-- + (1) Contrition--Confession--Resolution. + (2) Question of 'Sudden Conversion.' + (3) 'Twice Born' or 'Once Born.' + 2. Faith-- + (1) In Ordinary Life. + (2) In Teaching of Jesus. + (3) The Pauline Doctrine. + 3. Obedience-- + (1) Active Appropriation of Grace. + (2) Determination of Whole Personality. + (3) Gradual Assimilation. + + +SECTION D--CONDUCT + +CHAPTER XI + +VIRTUES AND VIRTUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 + + Definition of Virtue. + I. The Natural Basis of the Virtues-- + 'The Cardinal Virtues.' + II. The Christian Transformation of the Virtues-- + 1. The New Testament Account. + 2. Cardinal Virtues, Elements of Christian Character. + 3. Place of Passive Virtues in Life. + III. The Unification of the Virtues-- + 1. Unity in Relation to God. + 2. Love, Spring of all Virtues, + 3. 'Theological Virtues,' Aspects of Love. + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE REALM OF DUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 + + I. Aspects of Duty-- + 1. Duty and Vocation. + 2. Conflict of Duties-- + (1) Competing Obligations. + (2) 'Counsels of Perfection.' + (3) Indifferent Acts. + 3. Rights and Duties-- + (1) Claim of 'Natural Rights.' + (2) Based on Worth of Individual. + (3) Christian Idea of Liberty. + II. Spheres of Duty-- + 1. Duties in Relation to Self-- + (1) Self-Respect. + (2) Self-Preservation. + (3) Self-Development-- + Self-regarding Duties not prominent in Scripture. + Self-Realisation through Self-Sacrifice. + 2. Duties in Relation to Others-- + (1) Regard for Man: Brotherly Love-- + (_a_) Justice. + (_b_) Veracity. + (_c_) Judgment. + (2) Service-- + (_a_) Sympathy. + (_b_) Beneficence. + (_c_) Forgiveness. + (3) Example and Influence. + 3. Duties in Relation to God-- + (1) Recognition. + (2) Obedience--Passive and Active. + (3) Worship--Reverence, Prayer, Thanksgiving. + + +CHAPTER XIII + +SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 + + I. The Family-- + 1. Origin and Evolution of Family. + 2. Christian view-- + (1) Christ's Teaching on Marriage. + (2) State Regulation and Eugenics. + (3) Tendencies to Disparagement. + 3. Family Relationships-- + (1) Parents and Children. + (2) Woman's Place and Rights. + (3) Child Life and Education. + II. The State-- + 1. Basis of Authority-- + Tolstoy and Anarchism. + 'Social Contract.' + 2. State, in New Testament. + 3. Modern Conceptions-- + Views of Augustine and Hegel. + (1) Duty of State to Citizens. + (2) Duty of Citizens to State. + (3) The Democratic Movement-- + Reciprocity of Service and Sense of Brotherhood. + III. The Church-- + 1. Relation of Church and State. + 2. Purpose and Ideal of Church-- + (1) Worship and Edification. + (2) Witness to Christ. + (3) Evangelisation of Mankind. + 3. The Church and the Social Problem-- + (1) Christ's Teaching as to Industry and Wealth. + (2) Attitude of Early Church to Society. + (3) Of Roman and Reformed Churches. + 4. Duty of Christianity to the World-- + The Missionary Imperative and Opportunity. + + +CHAPTER XIV + +CONCLUSION--THE PERMANENCE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . 245 + +BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 + +INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 + + + + +{1} + +CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS + + +INTRODUCTION + +A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +If, as Matthew Arnold says, conduct is three-fourths of life, then a +careful inquiry into the laws of conduct is indispensable to the proper +interpretation of the meaning and purpose of life. Conduct of itself, +however, is merely the outward expression of character; and character +again has its roots in personality; so that if we are to form a just +conception of life we have to examine the forces which shape human +personality and raise it to its highest power and efficiency. In +estimating the value of man all the facts of consciousness and +experience must be considered. Hence no adequate account of the end of +life can be given without regard to that which, if it is true, must be +the most stupendous fact of history--the fact of Christ. + +If the Christian is a man to whom no incident of experience is secular +and no duty insignificant, because all things belong to God and all +life is dominated by the spirit of Christ, then Christian Ethics must +be the application of Christianity to conduct; and its theme must be +the systematic study of the ideals and forces which are alone adequate +to shape character and fit man for the highest conceivable +destiny--fellowship with, and likeness to, the Divine Being in whose +image he has been made. This, of course, may be said to be the aim of +all theology. The theologian must not be content to discuss merely +speculative problems about God and man. He must seek above {2} all +things to bring the truths of revelation to bear upon human practice. +All knowledge has its practical implicate. The dogma which cannot be +translated into duty is apt to be a vague abstraction. + +In all ages there has been a tendency to separate truth and duty. But +knowledge has two sides; it is at once a revelation and a challenge. +There is no truth which has not its corresponding obligation, and no +obligation which has not its corresponding truth. And not until every +truth is rounded into its duty, and every duty is referred back into +its truth shall we attain to that clearness of vision and consistency +of moral life, to promote which is the primary task of Christian Ethics. + +It is this practical element which gives to the study of morals its +justification and makes it specially important for the Christian +teacher. In this sense Ethics is really the crown of theology and +ought to be the end of all previous study. + +As a separate branch of study Christian Ethics dates only from the +Reformation. It was natural, and perhaps inevitable that the first +efforts of the Church should be occupied with the formation and +elaboration of dogma. With a few notable exceptions, among whom may be +mentioned Basil, Clement, Alquin and Thomas Aquinas, the Church fathers +and schoolmen paid but scanty attention to the ethical side of +religion. It was only after the Reformation that theology, Roman and +Protestant alike, was divided into different branches. The Roman +Catholic name for what we style Ethics is 'moral philosophy,' which, +however, consists mainly of directions for father confessors in their +dealing with perplexed souls. Christian Ethics appears for the first +time as the name of a treatise by a French theologian of the +Calvinistic persuasion--Danaeus, whose work, however, is confined to an +exposition of the Decalogue. The first recorded work of the Lutheran +church is the _Theologia Moralis_, written in 1634, by George Calixtus. + +But the modern study of the subject really dates from {3} +Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who divides theology into two sections, +Dogmatics and Ethics, giving to the latter an independent treatment. +Since his time Ethics has been regarded as a separate discipline, and +within the last few decades increasing attention has been devoted to it. + +This strong ethical tendency is one of the most noticeable features of +the present age. Everywhere to-day the personal human interest is in +evidence. We see it in the literature of the age and especially in the +best poetry, beginning already with Coleridge and Wordsworth, and +continued in Tennyson and Browning. It is the inner life of man as +depicted to us by these master singers, the story of the soul, even +more than the delineation of nature which appeals to man's deepest +experience and evokes his finest response. We see it in the art of our +times, which, not content to be a mere expression of sensuous beauty or +lifeless nature, seeks to be instinct with human sympathy and to become +the vehicle of the ideas and aims of man. We see it in modern fiction, +which is no longer the narration of a simple tale, but the subtle +analysis of character, and the intricate study of the passions and +ambitions of common life. History to-day is not concerned so much with +recording the intrigues of kings and the movements of armies as with +scrutinising the motives and estimating the personal forces which have +shaped the ages. Even in the domain of theology itself this tendency +is visible. Our theologians are not content with discussing abstract +doctrines or recounting the decisions of church councils, but are +turning to the gospels and seeking to depict the life of Jesus--to +probe the secret of His divine humanity and to interpret the meaning +for the world of His unique personality. + +Nor is this tendency confined to professional thinkers and theologians, +it is affecting the common mind of the laity. 'Never was there a +time,' says a modern writer, 'when plain people were less concerned +with the metaphysics or the ecclesiasticism of Christianity. The +construction of systems and the contention of creeds which once +appeared the central themes of human interest are now {4} regarded by +millions of busy men and women as mere echoes of ancient controversies, +if not mere mockeries of the problems of the present day.' The Church +under the inspiration of this new feeling for humanity is turning with +fresh interest to the contemplation of the character of Jesus Christ, +and is rising to a more lofty idea of its responsibilities towards the +world. More than ever in the past, it is now felt that Christianity +must vindicate itself as a practical religion; and that in view of the +great problems--scientific, social and industrial, which the new +conditions of an advancing civilisation have created, the Church, if it +is to fulfil its function as the interpreter and guide of thought, must +come down from its heights of calm seclusion and grapple with the +actual difficulties of men, not indeed by assuming a political rôle or +acting as a divider and judge amid conflicting secular aims, but by +revealing the mind of Christ and bringing the principles of the gospel +to bear upon the complex life of society. + +No one who reflects upon the spirit of the times will doubt that there +are reasons of urgent importance why this aspect of Christian life and +duty, which we have been considering, should be specially insisted upon +to-day. Of these the first and foremost is the prevalence of a +materialistic philosophy. Taking its rise in the evolutionary theories +of last century, this view is now being applied with relentless logic +as an interpretation of the problems of society by a school of +socialistic writers. Man, it is said, is the creature of heredity and +environment alone. Condition creates character, and relief from the +woes of humanity is to be sought, not in the transformation of the +individual but in the revolutionising of the circumstances of life. As +a consequence of this philosophy of externalism there is a filtering +down of these materialistic views to the multitude, who care, indeed, +little for theories, but are quick to be affected by a prevailing tone. +Underlying the feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction, so marked a +feature of our present day life, there is distinctly discernible among +the masses a loosening of religious faith and a slackening {5} of moral +obligation. The idea of personality and the sense of duty are not so +vivid and strong as they used to be. A vague sentimentalising about +sin has taken the place of the more robust view of earlier times, and +evil is traced to untoward environment rather than to feebleness of +individual will. And finally, to name no other cause, there is a +tendency in our day among all classes to divorce religion from life--to +separate the sacred from the secular, and to regard worship and work as +belonging to two entirely distinct realms of existence. + +For these reasons, among others, there is a special need, as it seems +to us, for a systematic study of Christian Ethics on the part of those +who are to be the leaders of thought and the teachers of the people. +The materialistic view of life must be met by a more adequate Christian +philosophy. The unfaith and pessimism of the age must be overcome by +the advocacy of an idealistic conception which insists not only upon +the personality and worth of man, involving duties as well as rights, +but also upon the supremacy of conscience in obedience to the law of +Christ. Above all, we need an ethic which will show that religion must +be co-extensive with life, transfiguring and spiritualising all its +activities and relationships. Life is a unity and all duty is one, +whether it be duty to God or duty to man. It must be all of a piece, +like the robe of Christ, woven from the top to the bottom without seam. +It takes its spring from one source and is dominated by one spirit. In +the Christianity of Christ there stand conspicuous two great ideas +bound together, indeed, in a higher--love to God the Father. These are +personal perfection and the service of mankind--the culture of self and +the care of others. 'Be ye perfect' and 'love your neighbour as +yourself.' It is the glory of Christianity to have harmonised these +seemingly competing aims. The disciple of Christ finds that he cannot +realise his own life except as he seeks the good of others; and that he +cannot effectively help his fellows except by giving to them that which +he himself is. This, as we take it, is the Christian conception of the +moral life; and it is {6} the business of Christian Ethics to show that +it is at once reasonable and practical. + + +The present volume will be divided into _four_ main parts, entitled, +_Postulates_, _Personality_, _Character_ and _Conduct_. The _first_ +will deal with the meaning of Ethics generally and its relation to +cognate subjects; and specially with the Philosophical, Psychological +and Theological presuppositions of Christian Ethics. The _second_ part +will be devoted to man as moral subject, and will analyse the +capacities of the soul which respond to the calls and claims of the new +Life. The _third_ Section will involve a consideration of the +formative Principles of Character, the moulding of the soul, the +Ideals, Motives and Forces by means of which the 'New Man' is +'recreated' and fashioned. _Finally_, under Conduct, the Virtues, +Duties and Rights of man will be discussed; and the various spheres of +service and institutions of society examined in relation to which the +moral life in its individual and social aspects is manifested and +developed. + + + + +{7} + +SECTION A + +POSTULATES + +{9} + +CHAPTER I + +THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS + +Philosophy has been defined as 'thinking things together.' Every man, +says Hegel, is a philosopher, and in so far as it is the natural +tendency of the human mind to connect and unify the manifold phenomena +of life, the paradox of the German thinker is not without a measure of +truth. But while this is only the occasional pastime of the ordinary +individual, it is the conscious and habitual aim of the philosopher. +In daily life people are wont to make assumptions which they do not +verify, and employ figures of speech which of necessity are partial and +inadequate. It is the business of philosophy to investigate the +pre-suppositions of common life and to translate into realities the +pictures of ordinary language. It was the method of Socrates to +challenge the current modes of speaking and to ask his fellow-men what +they meant when they used such words as 'goodness,' 'virtue,' +'justice.' Every time you employ any of these terms, he said, you +virtually imply a whole theory of life. If you would have an +intelligent understanding of yourself and the world of which you form a +part, you must cease to live by custom and speak by rote. You must +seek to bring the manifold phenomena of the universe and the various +experiences of life into some kind of unity and see them as +co-ordinated parts of a whole. + +When men thus begin to reflect on the origin and connection of things, +three questions at once suggest themselves--what, how, and why? What +is the world? How do I know it? and why am I here? We might briefly +classify the three great departments of human thought as attempts {10} +to answer these three inquiries. What exists is the problem of +Metaphysics. What am I and how do I know? is the question of +Psychology. What is my purpose, what am I to do? is the subject of +Ethics. These questions are closely related, and the answer given to +one largely determines the solution of the others. The truths gained +by philosophical thought are not confined to the kingdom of abstract +speculation but apply in the last resort to life. The impulse to know +is only a phase of the more general impulse to be and to act. Beneath +all man's activities, as their source and spring, there is ever some +dim perception of an end to be attained. 'The ultimate end,' says +Paulsen, 'impelling men to meditate upon the nature of the universe, +will always be the desire to reach some conclusion concerning the +meaning of the source and goal of their lives.' The origin and aim of +all philosophy is consequently to be sought in Ethics. + +I. If we ask more particularly what Ethics is, definition affords us +some light. It is to Aristotle that we are indebted for the earliest +use of this term, and it was he who gave to the subject its title and +systematic form. The name _ta ethika_ is derived from _êthos_, +character, which again is closely connected with _ethos_, signifying +custom. Ethics, therefore, according to Aristotle is the science of +character, character being understood to mean according to its +etymology, customs or habits of conduct. But while the modern usage of +the term 'character' suggests greater inwardness than would seem to be +implied in the ancient definition, it must be remembered that under the +title of Ethics Aristotle had in view, not only a description of the +outward habits of man, but also that which gives to custom its value, +viz., the sources of action, the motives, and especially the ends which +guide a man in the conduct of life. But since men live before they +reflect, Ethics and Morality are not synonymous. So long as there is a +congruity between the customs of a people and the practical +requirements of life, ethical questions do not occur. It is only when +difficulties arise as to matters of right, for which the {11} existing +usages of society offer no solution, that reflection upon morality +awakens. No longer content with blindly accepting the formulae of the +past, men are prompted to ask, whence do these customs come, and what +is their authority? In the conflict of duties, which a wider outlook +inevitably creates, the inquirer seeks to estimate their relative +values, and to bring his conception of life into harmony with the +higher demands and larger ideals which have been disclosed to him. +This has been the invariable course of ethical inquiry. At different +stages of history--in the age of the Sophists of Ancient Greece, when +men were no longer satisfied with the old forms of life and truth: at +the dawn of the Christian era, when a new ideal was revealed in Christ: +during the period of the Reformation, when men threw off the bondage of +the past and made a stand for the rights of the individual conscience: +and in more recent times, when in the field of political life the +antithesis between individual and social instincts had awakened larger +and more enlightened views of civic and social responsibility--the +study of Ethics, as a science of moral life, has come to the front. + +Ethics may, therefore, be defined as the science of the end of +life--the science which inquires into its meaning and purpose. But +inasmuch as the end or purpose of life involves the idea of some good +which is in harmony with the highest conceivable well-being of +man--some good which belongs to the true fulfilment of life--Ethics may +also be defined as the science of the highest good or _summum bonum_. + +Finally, Ethics may be considered not only as the science of the +highest good or ultimate end of life, but also as the study of all that +conditions that end, the dispositions, desires and motives of the +individual, all the facts and forces which bear upon the will and shape +human life in its various social relationships. + +II. Arising out of this general definition three features may be +mentioned as descriptive of its distinctive character among the +sciences. + +{12} + +1. Ethics is concerned with the _ideal_ of life. By an ideal we mean +a better state of being than has been actually realised. We are +confessedly not as we should be, and there floats before the minds of +men a vision of some higher condition of life and society than that +which exists. Life divorced from an ideal is ethically valueless. +Some conception of the supreme good is the imperative demand and moral +necessity of man's being. Hence the chief business of Ethics is to +answer the question: What is the supreme good? For what should a man +live? What, in short, is the ideal of life? In this respect Ethics as +a science is distinguished from the physical sciences. They explain +facts and trace sequences, but they do not form ideals or endeavour to +move the will in the direction of them. + +2. Ethics again is concerned with a _norm_ of life, and in this sense +it is frequently styled a normative science. That is to say, it is a +science which prescribes rules or maxims according to which life is to +be regulated. This is sometimes expressed by saying that Ethics treats +of what _ought to be_. The ideal must not be one which simply floats +in the air. It must be an ideal which is possible, and, therefore, as +such, obligatory. It is useless to feel the worth of a certain idea, +or even to speak of the desirability of it, if we do not feel also that +it ought to be realised. Moral judgments imply an 'ought,' and that +'ought' implies a norm or standard, in the light of which, as a +criterion, all obligation must be tested, and according to which all +conduct must be regulated. + +3. Ethics, once more, is concerned with the _will_. It is based +specifically on the fact that man is not only an intellectual being +(capable of knowing) and a sensitive being (possessed of feeling) but +also a volitional being; that is, a being endowed with self-determining +activity. It implies that man is responsible for his intentions, +dispositions and actions. The idea of a supreme ideal at which he is +to aim and a norm or standard of conduct according to which he ought to +regulate his life, would have no meaning if we did not presuppose the +power of self-determination. {13} Whatever is not willed has no moral +value. Where there is no freedom of choice, we cannot speak of an +action as either good or evil.[1] When we praise or blame a man's +conduct we do so under the assumption that his action is voluntary. In +all moral action purpose is implied. This is the meaning of the +well-known dictum of Kant, 'There is nothing in the world . . . that +can be called good without qualification except a good will. A good +will is good, not because of what it performs or effects, not by its +aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue +of the volition.'[2] It is the inner aim, the good will which alone +gives moral worth to any endeavour. It is not what I do but the reason +why I do it which is chiefly of ethical value. The essence of virtue +resides in the will, not in the achievement; in the intention or +motive, not in the result. + +III. The propriety of styling Ethics a science has sometimes been +questioned. Science, it is said, has to do with certain necessary and +uniform facts of experience; its object is simply to trace effects from +causes and to formulate laws according to which sequences inevitably +result from certain ascertained causes or observed facts. But is not +character, with which Ethics confessedly deals, just that concerning +which no definite conclusions can be predicted? Is not conduct, +dependent as it is on the human will, just the element in man which +cannot be explained as the resultant of calculable forces? If the will +is free, and is the chief factor in the moulding of life, then you +cannot forecast what line conduct will take or predict what shape +character will assume. The whole conception of Ethics as a science +must, it is contended, fall to the ground, if we admit a variable and +incalculable element in conduct. + +Some writers, on this account, are disposed to regard Ethics as an art +rather than a science, and indeed, like every normative science, it may +be regarded as lying midway between them. A science may be said to +teach us to know {14} and an art to do: but as has been well remarked, +'a normative science teaches to know how to do.'[3] Ethics may indeed +be regarded both as a science and an art. In so far as it examines and +explains certain phenomena of character it is a science: but in so far +as it attempts to regulate human conduct by instruction and advice it +is an art.[4] Yet when all is said, in so far as Ethics has to do with +the volitional side of man,--with decisions and acts of will,--there +must be something indeterminate and problematic in it which precludes +it from being designated an exact science. A certain variableness +belongs to character, and conduct cannot be pronounced good or bad +without reference to the acting subject. Actions cannot be wholly +explained by law, and a large portion of human life (and that the +highest and noblest) eludes analysis. A human being is not simply a +part of the world. He is able to break in upon the sequence of events +and set in motion new forces whose effects neither he himself nor his +fellows can estimate. It is the unique quality of rational beings that +in great things and in small things they act from ideas. The magic +power of thought cannot be exaggerated. Great conceptions have great +consequences, and they rule the world. A new spiritual idea shoots +forth its rays and enlightens to larger issues generations of men. +There is a mystery in every forth-putting of will-power, and every +expression of personality. Character cannot be computed. The art of +goodness, of living nobly, if so unconscious a thing may be called an +art, is one certainly which defies complete scientific treatment. It +is with facts like these that Ethics has to do; and while we may lay +down broad general principles which must underlie the teaching of every +true prophet and the conduct of every good man, there will always be an +element with which science cannot cope. + +IV. It will not be necessary, after what has been said, to trace at +any length the relations between Ethics and the {15} special mental +sciences, such as Logic, Aesthetics, and Politics. + +1. _Logic_ is the science of the formal laws of thought, and is +concerned not with the truth of phenomena, but merely with the laws of +correct reasoning about them. Ethics establishes the laws according to +which we ought to act. Logic legislates for the reason, and decerns +the laws which the intellect must obey if it would think correctly. +Both sciences determine what is valid; but while Logic is confined to +the realm of what is valid in reasoning, Ethics is occupied with what +is valid in action. There is, indeed, a logic of life; and in so far +as all true conduct must have a rational element in it and be guided by +certain intelligible forms, Ethics may be described as a kind of logic +of character. + +2. The connection between Ethics and _Aesthetics_ is closer. +Aesthetics is the science of the laws of beauty, while Ethics is the +science of the laws of the good. But in so far as Aesthetics deals +with the emotions rather than the reason it comes into contact with +Ethics in the psychological field. In its narrower sense Aesthetics +deals with beauty merely in an impersonal way; and its immediate object +is not what is morally beautiful, but rather that which is beautiful in +itself irrespective of moral considerations. Ethics, on the other +hand, is concerned with personal worth as expressed in perfection of +will and action. Conduct may be beautiful and character may afford +Aesthetic satisfaction, but Ethics, in so far as it is concerned with +judgments of virtue, is independent of all thought of the mere beauty +or utility of conduct. Aesthetic consideration may indeed aid +practical morality, but it is not identical with it. It is conceivable +that what is right may not be immediately beautiful, and may indeed in +its pursuit or realisation involve action which contradicts our ideas +of beauty. But though both sciences have different aims they are +occupied largely with the same emotions, and are connected by a common +idealising purpose. In the deepest sense, what is good is beautiful +and what is beautiful is good; and {16} ultimately, in the moral and +spiritual life, goodness and beauty coincide. Indeed, so close is the +connection between the two conceptions that the Greeks used the same +word, _to kalon_, to express beauty of form and nobility of character. +And even in modern times the expression 'a beautiful soul,' indicates +the intimate relation between inner excellence of life and outward +attractiveness. Both Aesthetics and Ethics have regard to that +symmetry or proportion of life which fulfils our ideas at once of +goodness and of beauty. In this sense Schiller sought to remove the +sharpness of Kant's moral theory by claiming a place in the moral life +for beauty. Our actions are, indeed, good when we do our duty because +we ought, but they are beautiful when we do it because we cannot do +otherwise, because they have become our second nature. The purpose of +all culture, says Schiller, is to harmonise reason and sense, and thus +to fulfil the idea of a perfect manhood.[5] + + 'When I dared question: "It is beautiful, + But is it true?" Thy answer was, "In truth lives beauty."'[6] + + +3. _Politics_ is still more closely related to Ethics, and indeed +Ethics may be said to comprehend Politics. Both deal with human action +and institution, and cover largely the same field. For man is not +merely an individual, but is a part of a social organism. We cannot +consider the virtues of the individual life without also considering +the society to which he is related, and the interaction of the whole +and its part. Politics is usually defined as the science of +government, which of course, involves all the institutions and laws +affecting men's relations to each other. But while Politics is +strictly concerned only with the outward condition of the state's +well-being and the external order of {17} the community, Ethics seeks +the internal good or virtue of mankind, and is occupied with an ideal +society in which each individual shall be able to realise the true aim +and meaning of life. But after all, as Aristotle said, Politics is +really a branch of Ethics, and both are inseparable from, and +complementary of each other. On the one hand, Ethics cannot ignore the +material conditions of human welfare nor minimise the economic forces +which shape society and make possible the moral aims of man. On the +other hand, Economics must recognise the service of ethical study, and +keep in view the moral purposes of life, otherwise it is apt to limit +its consideration to merely selfish and material ends. + +V. While Ethics is thus closely connected with the sciences just +named, there are two departments of knowledge, pre-supposed indeed in +all mental studies, which in a very intimate way affect the science of +Ethics. These are Metaphysics on the one hand and Psychology on the +other. + +1. Metaphysics is pre-supposed by all the sciences; and indeed, all +our views of life, even our simplest experiences, involve metaphysical +assumptions. It has been well said that the attempt to construct an +ethical theory without a metaphysical basis issues not in a moral +science without assumptions, but in an Ethics which becomes confused in +philosophical doubts. Leslie Stephen proposes to ignore Metaphysics, +and remarks that he is content 'to build upon the solid earth.' But, +as has been pertinently asked, 'How does he know that the earth is +solid on which he builds?' This is a question of Metaphysics.[7] The +claim is frequently made by a certain class of writers, that we +withdraw ourselves from all metaphysical sophistries, and betake +ourselves to the guidance of commonsense. But what is this commonsense +of which the ordinary man vaunts himself? It is in reality a number of +vague assumptions borrowed unconsciously from old exploded +theories--assertions, opinions, beliefs, accumulated, no one knows how, +{18} and accepted as settled judgments.[8] We do not escape philosophy +by refusing to think. Some kind of theory of life is implied in such +words, 'soul,' 'duty,' 'freedom,' 'power,' 'God,' which the +unreflecting mind is daily using. It is useless to say we can dispense +with philosophy, for that is simply to content ourselves with bad +philosophy. 'To ignore the progress and development in the history of +Philosophy,' says T. H. Green,[9] 'is not to return to the simplicity +of a pre-philosophic age, but to condemn ourselves to grope in the maze +of cultivated opinion, itself the confused result of these past systems +of thought which we will not trouble ourselves to think out.' The aim +of all philosophy, as Plato said, is just to correct the assumptions of +the ordinary mind, and to grasp in their unity and cohesion the +ultimate principles which the mind feels must be at the root of all +reality. We have an ethical interest in determining whether there be +any moral reality beneath the appearances of the world. Ethical +questions, therefore, run back into Metaphysics. If we take +Metaphysics in its widest sense as involving the idea of some ultimate +end, to the realisation of which the whole process of the world as +known to us is somehow a means, we may easily see that metaphysical +inquiry, though distinct from ethical, is its necessary +pre-supposition. The Being or Purpose of God, the great first cause, +the world as fashioned, ordered and interpenetrated by Him, and man as +conditioned by and dependent upon the Deity--are postulates of the +moral life and must be accepted as a basis of all ethical study. The +distinction between Ethics and Philosophy did not arise at once. In +early Greek speculation, almost to the time of Aristotle, Metaphysics +and Morals were not separated. And even in later times, Spinoza and to +some extent Green, though they professedly treat of Ethics, hardly +dissociate metaphysical from ethical considerations. Nor is that to be +wondered at when men are dealing with the first principles of all being +and life. Our view of God and of the {19} world, our fundamental +_Welt-Anschauung_ cannot but determine our view of man and his moral +life. In every philosophical system from Plato to Hegel, in which the +universe is regarded as having a rational meaning and ultimate end, the +good of human beings is conceived as identical with, or at least as +included in the universal good. + +2. But if a sound metaphysical basis be a necessary requisite for the +adequate consideration of Ethics, _Psychology_ as the science of the +human soul is so vitally connected with Ethics, that the two studies +may almost be treated as branches of one subject. An Ethic which takes +no account of psychological assumptions would be impossible. +Consciously or unconsciously every treatment of moral subjects is +permeated by the view of the soul or personality of man which the +writer has adopted, and his meaning of conduct will be largely +determined by the theory of human freedom and responsibility with which +he starts. Questions as to character and duty invariably lead to +inquiries as to certain states of the agent's mind, as to the functions +and possibilities of his natural capacities and powers. We cannot +pronounce an action morally good or bad until we have determined the +extent and limits of his faculties and have investigated the questions +of disposition and purpose, of intention and motive, which lie at the +root of all conduct, and without which actions are neither moral nor +immoral. It is surely a mistake to say, as some do, that as logic +deals with the correctness of reasoning, so Ethics deals only with the +correctness of conduct, and is not directly concerned with the +processes by which we come to act correctly.[10] On the contrary, +merely correct action may be ethically worthless, and conduct obtains +its moral value from the motives or intentions which actuate and +determine it. Ethics cannot, therefore, ignore the psychological +processes of feeling, desiring and willing of the acting subject. It +is indeed true that in ordinary life men are frequently judged to be +good or bad, according to the outward effect of their actions, and +material results are often regarded as the sole {20} measure of good. +But while it may be a point of difficulty in theoretic morality to +determine the comparative worth and mutual relation of good affections +and good actions, all surely will allow that a certain quality of +disposition or motive in the agent is required to constitute an action +morally good, and that it is not enough to measure virtue by its +utility or its beneficial effect alone. Hence all moralists are agreed +that the main object of their investigation must belong to the +psychical side of human life--whether they hold that man's ultimate end +is to be found in the sphere of pleasure or maintain that his +well-being lies in the realisation of virtue for its own sake. The +problems as to the origin and adequacy of conscience, as to the meaning +and validity of voluntary action; the questions concerning motives and +desires, as to the historical evolution of moral customs, and man's +relation at each stage of his history to the social, political and +religious institutions amid which he lives--are subjects which, though +falling within the scope of Ethics, have their roots in the science of +the soul. The very existence of a science of Ethics depends upon the +answers which Psychology gives to such questions. If, for example, it +be decided that there is in man no such faculty or organ as conscience, +and that what men so designate is but a natural manifestation gradually +evolved in and through the physical and social development of man: or +if we deny the self-determining power of human beings and assume that +what we call the freedom of the will is a delusion (or at least, in the +last resort, a negligible element) and that man is but one of the many +phenomena or facts of a physical universe--then we may continue, +indeed, as some evolutionary and naturalistic thinkers do, to speak of +a science of Ethics, but such a science will not be a study of the +moral life as we understand it and have defined it. + +Ethics, therefore, while dependent upon the philosophical sciences, has +its own distinct content and scope. The end of life, that for which a +man should live, with all its implications, forms the subject of moral +inquiry. It is {21} concerned not merely with what a man is or +actually does, but more specifically with what he should be and should +do. Hence, as we have seen, the word 'ought' is the most distinctive +term of Ethics involving a consideration of values and a relation of +the actual and the ideal. The 'ought' of life constitutes at once the +purpose, law, and reason of conduct. It proposes the three great +questions involved in all ethical inquiry--whither? how? and why? and +determines the three great words which are constantly recurring in +every ethical system--end, norm, motive. Moral good is the moral end +considered as realised. The moral norm or rule impelling the will to +the realisation of this end is called Duty. The moral motive +considered as an acquired power of the acting will is called Virtue.[11] + + + +[1] Cf. Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, p. 32; also Wuttke, _Christian +Ethics_ (Eng. Trans.), vol. i. p. 14. + +[2] _Metaph. of Morals_, sect. i. + +[3] Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, p. 8. See also Muirhead, _Elements +of Ethics_. + +[4] Hyslop, _Elements of Ethics_, p. 1. + +[5] Schiller, _Über Anmuth und Würde_. Cf. also Ruskin, _Mod. +Painters_, vol. ii.; Seeley, _Natural Religion_, and Inge, _Faith and +its Psychology_, p. 203 ff. See also Bosanquet _Hist. of Aesthetic_. +We are indebted to _Romanticism_, and especially to Novalis in Germany +and Cousin in France for the thought that the good and the beautiful +meet and amalgamate in God. + +[6] Browning. + +[7] Cf. Newman Smyth, _Christian Ethics_, p. 8. + +[8] See Author's _History of Philosophy_, p. 585. + +[9] Introduction to Hume's _Works_. + +[10] Mackenzie seems to imply this view. _Ethics_, p. 25. + +[11] Cf. Haering, _Ethics of the Christian Life_, p. 9. + + + + +{22} + +CHAPTER II + +THE POSTULATES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +We now proceed to define Christian Ethics and to investigate the +particular postulates, philosophical and theological, upon which it +rests. + +Christian Ethics presupposes the Christian view of life as revealed in +Christ, and its definition must be in harmony with the Christian ideal. +The prime question of Christian Ethics is, How ought Christians to +order their lives? It is therefore the science of morals as +conditioned by Christian faith; and the problems it discusses are, the +nature, meaning and laws of the moral life as dominated by the supreme +good which has been revealed to the world in the Person and Teaching of +Christ. It is based upon an historical event, and presupposes a +particular development and consummation of the world. + + +I + +_The Relation of Christian to Philosophical Ethics_.--Christian Ethics +is a branch of general Ethics. But it is something more; it is Ethics +in its richest and fullest expression--the interpretation of life which +corresponds to the supreme manifestation of the divine will. For if +the revelation of God in Christ is true, then that revelation is not +merely a factor, but the factor, which must dominate and colour man's +whole outlook and give an entirely new value to all his aims and +actions. In Christianity we are confronted with the motive-power of a +great Personality who has entered into the current of human history and +{23} given a new direction to the moral life of man. Man's life at its +highest can only be interpreted in the light of this supreme +revelation, and can only be accounted for as the creation of the +dynamic force of this unique Personality. + +But while this truth gives to Christian Ethics its distinctive +character and pre-eminent worth it does not throw discredit upon +philosophical Ethics, nor indeed separate the two departments by any +hard and fast lines. They have much in common. A large domain of +conduct is covered by both. The so-called pagan virtues have their +value for Christian character and are in the line of Christian virtue. +Even in his natural state man is constituted for the moral life, and, +as St. Paul states, is not without some knowledge of right and wrong. +The moral attainments of the ancients are not to be regarded simply as +'splendid vices,' but as positive achievements of good. Duty may +differ in content, but it is of the same kind under any system. Purity +is purity and benevolence benevolence, whether manifested in a heathen +or a Christian. While, therefore, Christian Ethics takes its point of +departure from the special revelation of God and the unique disclosure +of man's possibilities in Christ, it gladly accepts and freely uses the +results of moral philosophy in so far as they throw light upon the +fundamental facts of human nature. As a system of morals Christianity +claims to be inclusive. It takes cognisance of all the data of +consciousness, and assumes as its own, from whatever quarter it may +come, all ascertained truth. The facts of man's natural history, the +conclusions from philosophy, the manifold lights afforded by previous +speculation--all are gathered up, sifted and tried by one +all-authoritative measure of truth--the mind of Christ. It completes +what is lacking in other systems in so far as their conclusions are +based upon an incomplete survey of facts. It deals, in short, with +personality in its highest ranges of moral power and spiritual +consciousness and seeks to interpret life by its greatest possibilities +and loftiest attainments as they are revealed in Christ. + +But while Christian Ethics is at one with philosophic {24} Ethics in +postulating a natural capacity for spiritual life, it is differentiated +from all non-Christian systems by its distinctive belief in the +possibility of the re-creation of character. Speculative Ethics +prescribes only what ought ideally to be done or avoided. It takes no +account of the foes of the spiritual life; nor does it consider the +remedy by which character, once it is perverted or destroyed, can be +restored and transformed. Christian Ethics, on the other hand, is +concerned primarily with the question, By what power can a man achieve +the right and do the good? It is not enough to postulate the inherent +capacity of man. Experience of human nature shows that there are +hostile elements which too often frustrate his natural development. +Hence the practical problem which Christian Ethics has to face is, How +can the spiritual ideal be made a reality? It regards man as standing +in need of recovery, and it is forced to assume, that which +philosophical Ethics does not recognise, a divine power by which +character can be renewed. Christianity claims to be 'the power of God +unto salvation to every one that believeth.' Christian Ethics +therefore is based upon the twofold assumption that the ideal of +humanity has actually been revealed in Christ, and that in Him also is +the power by which man may realise this ideal. + + +II + +_The relation of Christian Ethics to Dogmatics_.--Within the sphere of +theology proper the two main constituents of Christian teaching are +Dogmatics and Ethics, or Doctrines and Morals. Though it is convenient +to regard these separately they really form a whole, and are but two +aspects of one subject. It is difficult to define their limits, and to +say where Dogmatics ends and Ethics begins. The distinction is +sometimes expressed by saying that Dogmatics is a theoretic science, +whereas Ethics is practical. It is true that Ethics stands nearer to +everyday life and deals with matters of practical conduct, while +Dogmatics is concerned with beliefs and treats of their origin and +elucidation. {25} But, on the other hand, Ethics also takes cognisance +of beliefs as well as actions, and is interested in judgments not less +than achievements. There is a practical side of doctrine and there is +a theoretic side of morals. Even the most theoretic of sciences, +Metaphysics, though, as Novalis said, it bakes no bread, is not without +its direct bearing upon life. Dogmatic theology when divorced from +practical interest is in danger of becoming mere pedantry; and ethical +inquiry, if it has no dogmatic basis, loses scientific value and sinks +into a mere enumeration of duties. Nor is the common statement, that +Dogmatics shows what we should believe and Ethics what we ought to do, +an adequate one. Moral precepts are also objects of faith, and what we +should believe involves moral requirements and pre-supposes a moral +character. Schleiermacher has been charged with ignoring the +difference between the two disciplines, but with scant justice. For, +while he regards the two subjects as but different branches of +Christian theology, and insists upon their intimate connection, he does +not neglect their distinction. There has been a growing tendency to +accentuate the difference, and recent writers such as Jacoby, Haering +and Lemme, not to mention Martensen, Dorner and Wuttke, claim for +Ethics a separate and independent treatment. The ultimate connection +between Dogmatics and Ethics cannot be ignored without loss to both. +It tends only to confusion to speak as some do of 'a creedless +morality.' On the one hand, Ethics saves Dogmatics from evaporating +into unsubstantial speculation, and by affording the test of +workableness, keeps it upon the solid foundation of fact. On the other +hand, Dogmatics supplies to Ethics its formative principles and +normative standards, and preserves the moral life from degenerating +into the vagaries of fanaticism or the apathy of fatalism. But while +both sciences form complementary sides of theology and stand in +relations of mutual service, each deals with the human consciousness in +a different way. Dogmatics regards the Christian life from the +standpoint of divine dependence: Ethics regards it from the {26} +standpoint of human determination. Dogmatics deals with faith in +relation to God, as the receptive organ of grace: Ethics views faith +rather in relation to man, as a human activity or organ of conduct. +The one shows us how our adoption into the kingdom of God is the work +of divine love: the other shows how this knowledge of salvation +manifests itself in love to God and man, and must be worked out through +all the relationships of life. + + +III + +We may define more particularly the relation of Ethics to Dogmatics by +enumerating briefly the doctrinal postulates or assumptions with which +Ethics starts. + +1. Ethics assumes the Christian _idea of God_. God is for Ethics not +an impersonal force, nor even simply the creator of the universe as +philosophy might conceive Him.[1] Creative power is not of course +denied, but it is qualified by what theology calls the 'moral +attributes of God.' We do not ignore His omnipotence, but we look +beyond it, to 'the love that tops the power, the Christ in God.'[2] It +is not necessary here to sketch the Old Testament teaching with regard +to God. It is sufficient to state that the New Testament writers, +while not attempting to proclaim abstract doctrines, took over +generally the Hebrew conception of the Deity as a God who was at once +almighty, holy and righteous. The distinctive note which the New +Testament emphasises is the Personality of God, and personality +includes reason, will and love. The fact that we are His offspring, as +St. Paul argues, is the basis of our true conception of God's nature. +Through that which is highest in man we are enabled to discern +something of His character. But it is specially in and through Jesus +Christ that the distinctive character of the Divine Personality is +declared. Christ reveals Him as our Father, and everywhere the New +{27} Testament writers assume that men stand in the closest filial +relations to him. In the fundamental conception of divine Fatherhood +there are implicitly contained certain elements of ethical +significance.[3] Of these may be mentioned: + +(1) _The Spiritual Perfection of God_.--The Christian doctrine of God +includes not only His personality, but His spiritual perfection. All +that is highest and best in life is attributed to God. What we regard +as having supreme moral worth is eternally realised in Him. It is this +fact that prescribes man's ideal and makes it binding. 'Be ye perfect +even as your Father in heaven is perfect,' says Christ. Because of +what God is, spiritual and moral excellence takes precedence of all +other aims which can be perceived and pursued by man. Morality is the +revelation of an ideal eternally existing in the divine mind. 'The +belief in God,' it has been said, 'is the logical pre-supposition of an +objective or absolute morality.'[4] The moral law, as the norm and +goal of our life, obtains its validity and obligation for us not +because it is an arbitrarily-given command, but because it is of the +very character of God. + +(2) _The Sovereignty of God_.--Not only the spiritual perfection but +the moral sovereignty of God is pre-supposed. He is the supreme +excellence on whom all things depend, and in whom they find their +ultimate explanation. The world is not merely His creation, it is the +expression of His mind. He is not related to the universe as an artist +is related to his work, but rather as a personal being to his own +mental and moral activities.[5] He is immanent in all the phenomena of +nature and movements of life and thought; and in the order and purpose +of the world His character and will are manifested. The fact that the +meaning and order of things are not imposed from without, but +constitute their inner nature, reveals not only the completeness of His +{28} sovereignty, but the purpose of it. The highest end of God, as +moral and spiritual, is fulfilled by the constitution and education of +spiritual beings like Himself, and in laying down the conditions which +are necessary for their existence and perfecting. No definition of +divine sovereignty can exclude the idea of moral freedom and the +consequences bound up with it. Hence God must not only confer the gift +of individual liberty, but respect it throughout the whole course of +His dealings with man. + +(3) _The Supremacy of Love_.--This is the highest and most distinctive +feature of the divine personality. It is the sum of all the others; as +well as the special characteristic of the Fatherhood of God as revealed +by Christ. 'God is love' is the crowning statement of the Gospel and +the fullest expression of the divine nature. The essential of all love +is self-giving; and the peculiarity of God's love is the communication +and imparting of Himself to His creatures. The love of God finds its +highest manifestation in the gift and sacrifice of His Son. He is the +supreme personality in history, revealing God in and to the world. In +the light of what Christ is we know what God is, and from His +revelation there flows a new and ever-deepening experience of the +divine Being. + +2. Christian Ethics presupposes the _Christian doctrine of Sin_. It +is not the province of Ethics to discuss minutely the origin of evil or +propound a theory of sin. But it must see to it that the view it takes +is consistent with the truths of revelation and in harmony with the +facts of life. A false or inadequate conception of sin is as +detrimental to Ethics as it is to Dogmatics; and upon our doctrine of +evil depends very largely our interpretation of life in regard to its +difficulties and purposes, its trials and triumphs. In the meantime it +is enough to remark that considerable vagueness of idea and looseness +of expression exist concerning this subject. + +While some regard sin simply as a _defect_ or shortcoming, a missing of +the mark, as the Greek word _hamartia_ implies, others treat it as a +_disease_, or infirmity of the flesh--a malady affecting the physical +constitution which may be {29} incurred by heredity or induced by +environment. In both cases it is regarded as a misfortune, rather than +a fault, or even as a fate from which the notion of guilt is absent. +While there is an element of truth in these representations, they are +defective in so far as they do not take sufficient account of the +personal and determinative factor in all sinful acts. The Christian +view, though not denying that physical weakness and the influence of +heredity and environment do, in many cases, affect conduct, affirms +that there is a personal element always present which these conditions +do not explain. Sin is not merely negative. It is something positive, +not so much an imperfection as a trespass. It is to be accounted for +not as an inherited or inherent malady, but as a self-chosen +perversity. It belongs to the spirit rather than to the body, and +though it has its seat in the heart and in the emotions, it has to do +principally with the will. 'Every man is tempted when he is drawn away +by his own lust and enticed. Then when lust has conceived it bringeth +forth sin.'[6] The essence of sin is selfishness. It is the +deliberate choice of self in preference to God--personal and wilful +rebellion against the known law of righteousness and truth. There are, +of course, degrees of wrongdoing and undoubtedly extenuating +circumstances which must be taken into account in estimating the +significance and enormity of guilt, but in the last resort Christian +Ethics is compelled to postulate the fact of sin, and to regard it as a +personal rebellion against the holy will of God, the deliberate choice +of self and the wilful perversion of the powers of man into instruments +of unrighteousness. + +3. A third postulate, which is a corollary of the Christian view of +God and of sin, is the _Responsibility of Man_. Christian Ethics +treats every man as accountable for his thoughts and actions, and +therefore, as capable of choosing the good as revealed in Christ. +While not denying the sovereignty of God, nor minimising the mystery of +evil, Christianity firmly maintains the doctrine of human freedom. An +Ethic would be impossible if, on the one side, grace were absolutely +{30} irresistible; or, on the other, sin were unalterably necessitated. +Whatever be the doctrine we formulate on these subjects, Ethics demands +that what we call freedom be safeguarded. An interesting question +emerges at this point as to the possibility, apart from a knowledge of +Christ, of choosing the good. Difficult as this question is, and +though it was answered by Augustine and many of the early Fathers in +the negative, the modern, and probably the more just view, is that we +cannot hold mankind responsible unless we allow to all men the larger +freedom and judge them according to their light and opportunity. If +non-Christians are fated to do evil, then no guilt can be imputed. +History shows that a love of goodness has sometimes existed, and that +many isolated acts of purity and kindness have been done, among people +who have known nothing of the historical Christ. The New Testament +recognises degrees of depravity in nations and individuals, and a +measure of noble aspiration and honest endeavour in ordinary human +nature. St. Paul plainly assumes some knowledge and performance on the +part of the heathen, and though he denounces their immorality in +unsparing terms, he does not affirm that pagan society was so corrupt +that it had lost all knowledge of moral good. + + +IV + +Before concluding this chapter some remarks regarding the authority and +method of Christian Ethics may be not inappropriate. + +1. Christian Ethics is not directly concerned with critical questions +as to the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament writings. +It is sufficient for its purpose that these have been generally +received by the Church, and that they present in the Person of Christ +the highest embodiment of the law and spirit of the moral life. The +writings of the New Testament thus become ethically normative in virtue +of their direct reflection of the mind of Christ and their special +receptivity of His spirit. Their {31} authority, therefore, is +Christ's own authority, and has a value for us as His word is +reproduced by them. It does not detract from the validity of the New +Testament as the reflection of the spirit of Christ that there are +discernible in it distinct signs of development of doctrine, a manifest +growth in clearness and depth of insight and knowledge of the mind of +Jesus. Such evidences of advancement are specially noticeable in the +application of Christian principles to the practical problems of life, +such as the questions of slavery, marriage, work and property. St. +Paul does not disclaim the possibility of development, and he +associates himself with those who know in part and wait for fuller +light. In common with all Christians, Paul was doubtless conscious of +a growing enrichment in spiritual knowledge; and his later epistles +show that he had reached to clearer prospects of Christ and His +redemption, and had obtained a fuller grasp of the world-wide +significance of the Gospel than when he first began to preach. + +One cannot forget that the battle of criticism is raging to-day around +the inner citadel--the very person and words of Jesus. If it can be +shown that the Gospels contain only very imperfect records of the +historical Jesus, and that very few sayings of our Lord can be +definitely pronounced genuine, then, indeed, we might have to give up +some of the particular passages upon which we have based our conception +of truth and duty, but nothing less than a wholesale denial of the +historical existence of Jesus[7] would demand of us a repudiation of +the Christian view of life. The ideals, motives, and sentiments--the +entire outlook and spirit of life which we associate with Christ--are +now a positive possession of the Christian consciousness. There is a +Christian view of the world, a Christian _Welt-Anschauung_, so living +and real in the heart of Christendom that even though we had no more +reliable basis than the 'Nine Foundation Pillars' which Schmiedel +condescends to leave us, we should not be wholly deprived of the +fundamental principles upon which the Christian life might be reared. +{32} If to these we add the list of 'doubly attested sayings' collected +by Burkitt,[8] which even some of the most negative critics have been +constrained to allow, we should at least have a starting-point for the +study of the teaching of Jesus. The most reputable scholars, however, +of Germany, America and Britain acknowledge that no reasonable doubt +can be cast upon the general substance and tone of the Synoptic +Gospels, compiled, as they were, from the ancient Gospel of Mark and +the source commonly called 'Q' (_i.e._ the lost common origin of the +non-Markian portions of Matthew and Luke). To these we should be +disposed to add the Fourth Gospel, which, though a less primary source, +undoubtedly records acts and sayings of our Lord attested by one, who +(whosoever he was) was in close touch with his Master's life, and had +drunk deeply of His spirit. + +In the general tone and trend of these writings we find abundant +materials for what may be called the Ethics of Jesus. It is true, no +sharp line can be drawn between His religious and moral teaching. But, +taking Ethics in its general sense, as the discussion of the ideals, +virtues, duties of man, the relation of man to God and to his +fellow-men, it will at once be seen that a very large portion of +Christ's teaching is distinctly ethical. The facts of His own earthly +existence, all His great miracles, His parables, and above all, the +Sermon on the Mount, have an immediate bearing upon human conduct. +They all deal with character, and are chiefly illustrations and +enforcements of the divine ideal of life and of the value of man as a +child of God which He came to reveal. In the example of Jesus Himself +we have the best possible illustration of the translation of principles +into life. And in so far as we find our highest good embodied in Him, +He becomes for us, as J. S. Mill acknowledged, a kind of personified +conscience. No abstract statement of ethical principles can possibly +influence life so powerfully as the personal incarnation of these +principles; and if the greatest means to the true life is personal +association with the high and noble, then it need not seem strange {33} +that love and admiration for the person of Christ have as a matter of +fact proved the mightiest of historical motives to noble living. + +However imperfectly we may know the person of Jesus, and however +fragmentary may be the record of His teaching, one great truth looms +out of the darkness--the peerlessness of His character and the +incomparableness of His ideal of life. He comes to us with a message +of Good, new to man, based on the great conviction of the Fatherhood of +God. The all-dominating faith that a genuine seeking love is at the +heart of the universe makes Jesus certain that the laws of the world +are the laws of a loving God--laws of life which must be studied, +welcomed, and heartily obeyed. + +2. The Christian ideal, though given in Christ, has to be examined, +analysed, and applied by the very same faculties as are employed in +dealing with speculative problems. All science must be furnished with +facts, and its task generally is to shape its materials to definite +ends. The scientist does not invent. He does not create. He simply +_discovers_ what is already there: he only moulds into form what is +given. In like manner, the Christian moralist deals with the +revelation of life which has been granted to him partly in the human +consciousness, and partly through the sacred scriptures. The +scriptures, however, do not offer a systematic presentation of the life +of Christ, or a formal directory of moral conduct. The data are +supplied, but these data require to be interpreted and unified so as to +form a system of Ethics. The authority to which Christian Ethics +appeals is not an external oracle which imposes its dictates in a +mechanical way. It is an authority embodied in intelligible forms, and +appealing to the rational faculties of man. Christian Ethics, though +deduced from scripture, is not a cut and dry code of rules prescribed +by God which man must blindly obey. It has to be thought out, and +intelligently applied to all the circumstances of life. According to +the Protestant view, at least, Ethics is not a stereotyped compendium +of precepts which {34} the Church supplies to its members to save them +from thinking. Slavish imitation is wholly foreign to the genius of +the Gospel. Christ Himself appeals everywhere to the rational nature +of man, and His words are life and spirit only as they are intelligibly +apprehended and become by inner conviction the principles of action. + +Authoritative, then, as the scriptures are, and containing as they do +the revelation of an unique historical fact, they do not present a +closed or final system of truth. Christ has yet many things to say +unto us, and the Holy Spirit is continually adding new facts to human +experience, and disclosing richer and fuller manifestations of God +through history and providence and the personal consciousness of man. +No progress in thought or life can indeed be made which is inconsistent +with, or foreign to, the fundamental facts which centre in Christ: and +we may be justly suspicious of all advancement in doctrine or morals +which does not flow from the initial truths of the Master's life and +teaching. But, just as progress has been made, both in the increase of +materials of knowledge and in regard to the clearer insight and +appreciation of the meaning of Christian truth, since the apostles' +age, so we may hope that, as the ages go on, we shall acquire a still +fuller conception of the kingdom of God and a richer apprehension of +the divine will. The task and method of Christian Ethics will be, +consequently, the intelligent interpretation and the gradual +application to human life and society, in all their relationships, of +the mind of Christ under the constant illumination and guidance of the +Divine Spirit. + + + +[1] Cf. Dorner, _System der Christl. Ethik_, p. 48. See also Newman +Smyth, _Christian Ethics_, p. 44. + +[2] Cf. Mackintosh, _Christian Ethics_, p. 11. + +[3] Cf. Lidgett, _The Christian Religion_, pp. 106, 485 ff., where the +idea of God's nature is admirably developed. + +[4] Rashdall, _The Theory of Good and Evil_, vol. ii. p. 212. + +[5] Lidgett, _idem_. But see Bosanquet, _Principle of Indiv. and +Value_, p. 380 ff. + +[6] James i. 13, 14. + +[7] As, for example, that of Drew's _Christus Myth_. + +[8] Cf. _Gospel History and its Transmission_. + + + + +{35} + +CHAPTER III + +ETHICAL THOUGHT BEFORE CHRIST + +Apart from the writings of the New Testament, which are the primary +source of Christian Ethics, a comprehensive view of our subject would +include some account of the ethical conceptions of Greece, Rome and +Israel, which were at least contributory to the Christian idea of the +moral life. Whatever view we take of its origin, Christianity did not +come into the world like the goddess Athene, without preparation, but +was the product of many factors. The moral problems of to-day cannot +be rightly appreciated except in the light of certain concepts which +come to us from ancient thought; and Greco-Roman philosophy as well as +Hebrew religion have contributed not a little to the form and trend of +modern ethical inquiry. + +All we can attempt is the briefest outline, first, of the successive +epochs of Greek and Roman Ethics; and second, of the leading moral +ideas of the Hebrews as indicating the preparatory stages in the +evolution of thought which finds its completion in the Ethics of +Christianity. + + +I + +Before the golden age of Greek philosophy there was no Ethics in the +strictest sense. Philosophy proper occupied itself primarily with +ontological questions--questions as to the origin and constitution of +the material world. It was only when mythology and religion had lost +their hold upon the cultured, and the traditions of the poets had come +to be doubted, that inquiries as to the meaning of life and conduct +arose. + +{36} + +The Sophists may be regarded as the pioneers of ethical science. This +body of professional teachers, who appeared about the fifth century in +Greece, drew attention to the vagueness of common opinion and began to +teach the art of conduct. Of these Protagoras is the most famous, and +to him is attributed the saying, 'Man is the measure of all things.' +As applied to conduct, this dictum is commonly interpreted as meaning +that good is entirely subjective, relative to the individual. Viewed +in this light the saying is one-sided and sceptical, subversive of all +objective morality. But the dictum may be regarded as expressing an +important truth, that the good is personal and must ultimately be the +good for man as man, therefore for all men. + +1. It was _Socrates_, however, who, as it was said, first called +philosophy from heaven to the sphere of this earth, and diverted men's +minds from the consideration of natural things to the affairs of human +life. He was indeed the first moral philosopher, inasmuch as that, +while the Sophists merely talked at large about justice and virtue, he +asked what these terms really meant. Living in an age when the old +guides of life--law and custom--were losing their hold upon men, he was +compelled to find a substitute for them by reflection upon the meaning +and object of existence. For him the source of evil is want of +thought, and his aim is to awaken men to the realisation of what they +are, and what they must seek if they would make the best of their +lives. He is the prophet of clear self-consciousness. 'Know thyself' +is his motto, and he maintains that all virtue must be founded on such +knowledge. A life without reflection upon the meaning of existence is +unworthy of a man.[1] Hence the famous Socratic dictum, 'Virtue is +knowledge.' Both negatively and positively Socrates held this +principle to be true. For, on the one hand, he who is not conscious of +the good and does not know in what it consists, cannot possibly pursue +it. And, on the other hand, if a man is once alive to his real good, +how can he do otherwise than pursue it? No one therefore does {37} +wrong willingly. Let a man know what is right, and he will do it. +Knowledge of virtue is not, however, distinct from self-interest. +Every one naturally seeks the good simply because he sees that the good +is identical with his ultimate happiness. The wise man is the happy +man. Hence to know oneself is the secret of well-being. Let each be +master of himself, knowing what he seeks, and seeking what he +knows--that, for Socrates, is the first principle of Ethics, the +condition of all moral life. This view is obviously one-sided and +essentially individualistic, excluding all those forms of morality +which are pursued unconsciously, and are due more to the influence of +intuitive perception and social habit than to clear and definite +knowledge. The merit of Socrates, however, lies in his demand for +ethical reflection, and his insistence upon man not only acting +rightly, but acting from the right motive. + +2. While Socrates was the first to direct attention to the nature of +virtue, it received from _Plato_ a more systematic treatment. Platonic +philosophy may be described as an extension to the universe of the +principles which Socrates applied to the life of the individual. Plato +attempts to define the end of man by his place in the cosmos; and by +bringing Ethics into connection with Metaphysics he asks What is the +idea of man as a part of universal reality? Two main influences +combined to produce his conception of virtue. First, in opposition to +the Heraclitean doctrine of perpetual change, he contended for +something real and permanent. Second, in antagonism to the Sophistic +theory of the conventional origin of the moral law, he maintained that +man's chief end was the good which was fixed in the eternal nature of +things, and did not consist in the pursuit of transient pleasures. +Hence, in two respects, Plato goes beyond Socrates. He puts opinion, +which is his name for ordinary consciousness, between ignorance and +knowledge, ascribing to it a certain measure of truth, and making it +the starting-point for reflection. And further, he transforms the +Socratic idea of morality, rejecting the notion that its principle is +to be found in a mere calculation of pleasures, {38} and maintaining +that particular goods must be estimated by the good of life as a whole. +Plato's philosophy rests upon his doctrine of ideas, which, as the +types of permanent reality, represent the eternal nature of things; and +the problem of life is to rise from opinion to truth, from appearance +to reality, and attain to the ideal principle of unity. The highest +good Plato identifies with God, and man's end is ultimately to be found +in the knowledge of, and communion with, the eternal. + +The human soul he conceived to be a mixture of two elements. In virtue +of its higher spiritual nature it participates in the world of ideas, +the life of God: and in virtue of its lower or animal impulses, in the +corporeal world of decay. These two dissimilar parts are connected by +an intermediate element called by Plato _thymos_ or courage, implying +the emotions or affections of the heart. Hence a threefold +constitution of the soul is conceived--the rational powers, the +emotional desires, and the animal passions. If we ask who is the good +man? Plato answers, it is the man in whom these three elements are +harmonised. On the basis of this psychology Plato classifies and +determines the virtues--adopting the four cardinal virtues of Greek +tradition as the fundamental types of morality. Wisdom is the quality, +or condition of all virtue and the crown of the moral life: courage is +the virtue of the emotional part of man; temperance or moderation, the +virtue of the lower appetites: while justice is the unity and the +principle of the others. Virtue is thus no longer identified with +knowledge simply. Another source of vice besides ignorance is assumed, +viz., the disorder and conflict of the soul; and the well-being of man +lies in the attainment of a well-ordered and harmonious life. As +health is the harmony of the body, so virtue is the harmony of the +soul--a condition of perfection in which every desire is kept in +control and every function performs its part with a view to the good of +the whole. Morality, however, does not belong merely to the +individual, but has its perfect realisation in the state in which the +three elements of the soul have their {39} counterpart in the threefold +rank of society. Man is indeed but a type of a larger cosmos, and it +is not as an individual but as a citizen that he finds his station and +duties, and is capable of realising his true life. + +Thus we see how Plato is led to correct the shortcomings of +Socrates--his abrupt distinction between ignorance and knowledge, his +vagueness as to the meaning of the good, and his tendency to emphasise +the subjective side of virtue and withdraw the individual from the +community of which he is essentially a part. But in developing his +theory of ideas Plato has represented the true life of man as +consisting in the knowledge of, and indeed in absorption in, God, a +state to which man can only attain by the suppression of his natural +impulses and withdrawal from earthly life: and though there is not +wanting in Plato's later teaching the higher conception of the +transformation of the animal passions, he is not wholly successful in +overcoming the dualism between impulse and reason which besets some of +the earlier dialogues. + +It is a striking proof of the vitality of Plato that his teaching has +affected every form of idealism and has helped to shape the history of +religious thought in all ages. Not only many of the early Fathers, +such as Clement and Origen, but the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria, the +Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century, and also the German +theologians, Baur and Schleiermacher, have recognised numerous +coincidences between Christianity and Platonism: as Bishop Westcott has +said, 'Plato points to St. John.'[2] His influence may be detected in +some of the greatest Christian poetry of our own country, especially in +that of Wordsworth and Tennyson. For Plato believes, in common with +the greatest of every age, in 'that inborn passion for perfection,' +that innate though often unconscious yearning after the true, the +beautiful, the good, + + 'Those obstinate questionings + Of sense and outward things,' + +which are the heritage of human nature. + +{40} + +3. The Ethics of _Aristotle_ does not essentially differ from that of +Plato. He is the first to treat of morals formally as a science, +which, however, in his hands becomes a division of politics. Man, says +Aristotle, is really a social animal. Even more decisively than Plato, +therefore, he treats man as a part of society. While in Plato there is +the foreshadowing of the truth that the goal of moral endeavour lies in +godlikeness, with Aristotle the goal is confined to this life and is +conceived simply as the earthly well-being of the moral subject. +'Death,' he declares, 'is the greatest of all evils, for it is the +end.' Aristotle begins his great work on Ethics with the discussion of +the chief good, which he declares to be happiness or well-being. But +happiness does not consist in sensual pleasure, nor even in the pursuit +of honour, but in an 'activity of the soul in accordance with +reason.'[3] There are required for this life of right thinking and +right doing not only suitable environment but proper instruction. +Virtue is not virtuous until it is a habit, and the only way to be +virtuous is to practise virtue. To be virtuous a man's conduct must be +a law for him, the regular expression of his will. Hence the virtues +are habits of deliberate choice, and not natural endowments. Following +Plato, Aristotle sees that there is in man a number of impulses +struggling for the mastery of the soul, hence he is led to assume that +the natural instincts need guidance and control. Moderation is +therefore the one chief virtue; and moral excellence consists in an +activity which at every point seeks to strike a 'mean' between two +opposite excesses. Virtue in general, then, may be defined as the +observation of the due mean in action. Aristotle also follows Plato in +assigning the ideal good to contemplation, and in exalting the life of +reason and speculation above all others. In thus idealising the +contemplative life he was but reflecting the spirit of his race. This +apotheosis of knowledge infected all Greek thought, and found +exaggerated expression in the religious absorption of Neo-Platonism. + +{41} + +Without dwelling further upon the ethical philosophy of Aristotle, a +defect which at once strikes a modern in regard to his scheme of +virtues is that benevolence is not recognised, except obscurely as a +form of magnanimity; and that, in general, the gentler virtues, so +prominent in Christianity, have little place in the list. The virtues +are chiefly aristocratic. Favourable conditions are needed for their +cultivation. They are not possible for a slave, and hardly for those +engaged in 'mercenary occupations.'[4] Further, it may be remarked +that habit of itself does not make a man virtuous. Morality cannot +consist in a mere succession of customary acts. 'One good custom would +corrupt the world,' and habit is frequently a hindrance rather than a +help to the moral life. But the main defect of Aristotle's treatment +of virtue is that he tends to regard the passions as irrational, and he +does not see that passions if wholly evil could have no 'mean.' Reason +pervades all the lower appetites of man: and the instincts and desires, +instead of being treated as elements which must be suppressed, ought to +be regarded rather as powers to be transformed and employed as vehicles +of the moral life. At the same time there are not wanting passages in +Aristotle as well as in Plato which, instead of emphasising the +avoidance of excess, regard virtue as consisting in complementary +elements--the addition of one virtuous characteristic to another--'that +balance of contrasted qualities which meets us at every turn in the +distinguished personalities of the Hellenic race, and which is too +often thought of in a merely negative way, as the avoidance of excess +rather than as the highest outcome of an intense and many-sided +vitality.'[5] + +4. After Aristotle philosophy rapidly declined, and Ethics degenerated +into popular moralising which manifested itself chiefly in a growing +depreciation of good as the end {42} of life. The conflicting elements +of reason and impulse, which neither Plato nor Aristotle succeeded in +harmonising, gave rise ultimately to two opposite interpretations of +the moral life. The _Stoics_ selected the rational nature as the true +guide to an ethical system, but they gave to it a supremacy so rigid as +to threaten the extinction of the affections. The _Epicureans_, on the +other hand, fastening upon the emotions as the measure of truth, +emphasised the happiness of the individual as the chief good--a +doctrine which led some of the followers of Epicurus to justify even +sensual enjoyment. It is not necessary to dwell upon the details of +Epicureanism, for though its description of the 'wise man,' as that of +a person who prudently steered a middle course between passion and +asceticism, was one which exercised considerable influence upon the +morals of the age, it is the doctrines of Stoicism which more +especially have come into contact with Christianity. Without +discussing the Stoic conception of the world as interpenetrated and +controlled by an inherent spirit, and the consequent view of life as +proceeding from God and being in all its parts equally divine, we may +note that the Stoics, under the influence of Platonism, regarded +self-realisation as the true end of man. This idea they expressed in +the formula, 'Life according to nature.' The wise man is he who seeks +to live in all the circumstances of life in agreement with his rational +nature. The law of nature is to avoid what is hurtful and strive for +what is appropriate. Pleasure, though not the immediate object of man, +arises as an accompaniment of a well-ordered life. Pleasure and pain +are, however, really accidents, to be met by the wise man with +indifference. He alone is free who acknowledges the absolute supremacy +of reason and makes himself independent of earthly desires. This life +of freedom is open to all: since all men are members of one body. The +slave may be as free as the consul, and in every station of life each +may make the world serve him by living in harmony with it. + +There is a certain sublimity in the ethics of Stoicism which has always +appealed to noble minds. 'It inspired,' {43} says Mr. Lecky, 'nearly +all the great characters of the early Roman Empire, and nerved every +attempt to maintain the dignity and freedom of the human soul.'[6] But +we cannot close our eyes to its defects. Divine providence, though +frequently dwelt upon, signified little more for the Stoic than destiny +or fate. Harmony with nature was simply a sense of proud +self-sufficiency. Stoicism is the glorification of reason, even to the +extent of suppressing all emotion. Sin is unreason, and salvation lies +in an external control of the passions--in indifference and apathy +begotten of the subordination of desire to reason. + +The chief merit of Stoicism is that in an age of moral degeneracy it +insisted upon the necessity of integrity in all the conditions of life. +In its preference for the joys of the inner life and its scorn of the +delights of sense; in its emphasis upon individual responsibility and +duty; above all, in its advocacy of a common humanity and its belief in +the relation of each human soul to God, Roman Stoicism, as revealed in +the writings of a Seneca, an Epictetus, and a Marcus Aurelius, not only +showed how high Paganism at its best could reach, but proved in a +measure a preparation for Christianity, with whose practical truths it +had much in common. + +The affinities between Stoicism and Paulinism have been frequently +pointed out, and the similarity in language and thought can scarcely be +accounted for by coincidence. There are, however, elements in Stoicism +which St. Paul would never have dreamt of assimilating. The material +conception of the world, the self-conscious pride, the absence of all +sense of sin, the temper of apathy, and unnatural suppression of +feelings were ideas which could not but rouse the apostle's strongest +antagonism. But, on the other hand, there were characteristics of a +nobler order in Stoic morality which, we may well believe, Paul found +ready to his hand and did not hesitate to incorporate in his teaching. +Of these we may mention, the Immanence of God, the idea of Wisdom, the +conception of freedom as {44} the prerogative of the individual, and +the notion of brotherhood as the goal of humanity.[7] + +The Roman Stoics, notwithstanding their theoretic interest in moral +questions, lived in an ideal world, and hardly attempted to bring their +views into connection with the facts of life. Their philosophy was a +refuge from the evil around them rather than an effort to remove it. +They seek to overcome the world by being indifferent to it. In +Neo-Platonism--the last of the Greek schools of philosophy--this +tendency to withdraw from life and its problems becomes still more +marked. Absorption in God is the goal of existence and the essence of +religion. 'Man is left alone with God without any world to mediate +between them, and in the ecstatic vision of the Absolute the light of +reason is extinguished.'[8] + +Meagre as our sketch of ancient thought has necessarily been, it is +perhaps enough to show that the debt of religion to Greek and Roman +Ethics is incalculable. It lifted man above vague wonder, and gave him +courage to define his relation to existence. It caused him to ask +questions of experience, and awakened him to the value of life and the +meaning of freedom, duty, and good. Finally, it brought into view +those contrasted aims of life and society which find their solution in +the Christian ideal.[9] + + +II + +Christianity stands in the closest relation with _Hebrew religion_. +Much as the philosophy of Greece and Rome have contributed to +Christendom, there is no such intimate relation between them as that +which connects Christian Ethics with the morality of Israel. Christ +Himself, and still more the Apostle Paul, assumed as a substratum of +{45} their teaching the revelation which had been granted to the Jews. +The moral and religious doctrines comprehended under the designation of +the 'law' served, as the apostle said, as a _paidagogos_ or usher whose +function it was to lead them to the school of Christ. + +At the outset we are impressed by the fact that the Ethics of Judaeism +was inseparable from its religion. Moral obligations were conceived as +divine commands, and the moral law as a revelation of the divine will. +At first Jehovah was simply a tribal deity, but gradually this +restricted view gave place to the wider conception of God as the +sovereign of all men. The divine commandment is the criterion and +measure of man's obedience. Evil, while it has its source and head in +a hostile but subsidiary power, consists in violation of Jehovah's will. + +There are three main channels of Hebrew revelation, commonly known as +the _Law_, the _Prophecy_, and _Poetry_ of Old Testament. + + +1. LAW + +(1) _The Mosaic Legislation_ centering in the Decalogue[10] is the +first stage of Old Testament Ethic. The ten commandments, whether +derived from Mosaic enactment or representing a later summary of duty, +hold a supreme and formative place in the teaching of the Old +Testament. All, not even excepting the fourth, are purely moral +requirements. They are, however, largely negative; the fifth +commandment only rising to positive duty. They are also merely +external, regulative of outward conduct. The sixth and seventh protect +the rights of persons, while the eighth guards outward property. +Though these laws may be shown to have their roots in the moral +consciousness of mankind, they were at first restricted by Israel in +their scope and practice to its own tribes. + +(2) _The Civil laws_ present a second factor in the ethical education +of Israel. The 'Book of the Covenant'[11] reveals a certain +advancement in political legislation. Still the {46} hard and legal +enactments of retaliation--'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a +tooth'--disclose a barbarous conception of right. Alongside of these +primitive laws must be set those of a more humane nature--laws with +regard to release, the permission of gleaning, the privileges of the +year of jubilee. + +(3) _The Ceremonial laws_ embody a third element in the moral life of +Israel. These had to do chiefly with commands and prohibitions +relative to personal conduct--'Meats and drinks and diverse washings'; +and with sacrifices and forms of ritual worship.[12] + +With regard to the moral value of the commandments two opposite errors +are to be avoided. We must not refuse to recognise in the Old +Testament the record of a true, if elementary and imperfect, revelation +of God. But also we must beware of exalting the commandments of the +Old Dispensation to the level of those of the New; and thus +misunderstanding the nature and relation of both. + +The Christian faith is in a sense the development of Judaeism, though +it is infinitely more. The commandments of Moses, in so far as they +have their roots in the constitution of man, have not been superseded, +but taken up and spiritualised by the Ethic of the Gospel. + + +2. PROPHECY + +The dominant factor of Old Testament Ethics lay in the influence +exerted by the prophets. They, and not the priests, are the great +moralists of Israel. The prophets were speakers for God, the +interpreters of His will. They were the moral guides of the people, +the champions of integrity in political life, not less than witnesses +for individual purity.[13] + +We may sum up the ethical significance of the Hebrew prophets in three +features. + +(1) They were preachers of _personal righteousness_. In {47} times of +falsehood and hypocrisy they were witnesses for integrity and truth, +upholding the personal virtues of justice, sincerity, and mercy against +the idolatry and formalism of the priesthood. 'What doth the Lord +require of thee,' said Micah, 'but to do justly, to love mercy, and to +walk humbly with thy God.'[14] In the same strain Isaiah exclaimed, +'Bring no more vain oblations, but wash you and make you clean.'[15] +And so also Habakkuk has affirmed in words which became the keynote of +Paul's theology and the watchword of the Reformation--'The just shall +live by faith.'[16] + +(2) They were the advocates of the _rights of man_, of equity and +justice between man and man. They denounce the tyranny of kings, and +the luxury of the nobles. They protest against the oppression of the +poor and befriend the toilers of the cities. They proclaim the worth +of man as man. They reveal Jehovah as the God of the common people, +and seek to mitigate the burdens which lie upon the enslaved and +down-trodden. + +(3) They were the apostles of _Hope_. Not only did they seek to lift +their fellow-men above their present calamities, but they proclaimed a +message of peace and triumph which was to be evolved out of trouble. A +great promise gradually loomed on the horizon, and hope began to centre +in an anointed Deliverer. The Hebrew prophets were not probably +conscious of the full significance of their own predictions. Like all +true poets, they uttered greater things than they knew. The prophet +who most clearly outlines this truth is the second Isaiah. As he looks +down the ages he sees that healing is to be brought about through +suffering, the suffering of a Sinless one. Upon this mysterious figure +who is to rise up in the latter days is to be laid the burden of +humanity. No other, not even St. Paul himself, has grasped so clearly +the great secret of atonement or given so touching a picture of the +power of vicarious suffering as this unknown prophet of Israel. + + +{48} + +3. THE POETICAL BOOKS + +Passing from the prophets to the poets of Israel--and especially to the +book of Psalms--the devotional manual of the people, reflecting the +moral and religious life of the nation at the various stages of its +development--we find the same exalted character of God as a God of +Righteousness, hating evil and jealous for devotion, the same profound +sense of sin and the same high vocation of man. The Hebrew nation was +essentially a poetic people,[17] and their literature is full of +poetry. But poetry is not systematic. It is not safe, therefore, to +deduce particular tenets of faith or moral principles from passages +which glow with intensity of feeling. But if a nation's character is +revealed in its songs, the deep spirituality and high moral tone of +Israel are clearly reflected in that body of religious poetry which +extends over a period of a thousand years, from David to the Maccabean +age. It is at once national and personal, and is a wonderful record of +the human heart in its various moods and yearnings. Underlying all +true poetry there is a philosophy of life. God, for the Hebrew +psalmist, is the one pervading presence. He is not a mere +impersonation of the powers of nature, but a personal Being, righteous +and merciful, with whom man stands in the closest relations. Holy and +awful, indeed, hating iniquity and exacting punishment upon the wicked, +He is also tender and pitiful--a Father of the oppressed, who bears +their burdens, forgives their iniquities, and crowns them with tender +mercy.[18] All nature speaks to the Hebrew of God. He is no far-off +creator, but immanent in all His works.[19] He presides over mankind, +and provides for the manifold wants of his creatures. It is this +thought which gives unity to the nation, and binds the tribes into a +common brotherhood. God is their personal friend. In war and peace, +in worship and labour, at home and in exile, it is to Jehovah they look +{49} for strength and light and joy. He is their Shepherd and +Redeemer, under whose wings they trust. Corresponding to this sublime +faith, the virtues of obedience and fidelity are dwelt upon, while the +ideal of personal righteousness and purity is constantly held forth. +It is no doubt largely temporal blessings which the psalmists +emphasise, and the rewards of integrity are chiefly those of material +and earthly prosperity. The hope of the future life is nowhere clearly +expressed in the Old Testament, and while in the Psalter here and there +a dim yearning for a future with God breaks forth, hardly any of these +poems illumine the destiny of man beyond the grave. The hope of Israel +was limited mostly to this earth. The land beyond the shadows does not +come within their purview. Like a child, the psalmist is content to +know that his divine Father is near him here and now. When exactly the +larger hope emerged we cannot say. But gradually, with the breaking up +of the national life and under the pressure of suffering, a clearer +vision dawned. With the limitations named, it is a sublime outlook +upon life and a high-toned morality which the Psalter discloses. +Poetry, indeed, idealises, and no doubt the Israelites did not always +live up to their aspirations; but men who could give utterance to a +faith so clear, to a penitence so deep, and to longings so lofty and +spiritual as these Psalms contain are not the least among the heralds +of the kingdom of Christ. + +We cannot enlarge upon the ethical ideas of the other writings of the +Old Testament, the books of Wisdom, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job. +Their teaching, while not particularly lofty, is generally healthy and +practical, consisting of homely commonplaces and shrewd observations +upon life and conduct. The motives appealed to are not always the +highest, and frequently have regard only to earthly prosperity and +worldly policy. It must not, however, be overlooked that moral +practice is usually allied with the fear of God, and the right choice +of wisdom is represented as the dictate of piety not less than the +sanction of prudence. The writers of the Wisdom literature are the +{50} humanists of their age. As distinguished from the idealism of the +prophets, they are realists who look at life in a somewhat utilitarian +way. With the prophets, however, they are at one in regarding the +inferiority of ceremonial to obedience and sincerity. God is the ruler +of the world, and man's task is to live in obedience to Him. What God +requires is correct outward behaviour, self-restraint, and +consideration of others. + +In estimating the Ethics of Israel the fact that it was a preparatory +stage in the revelation of God's will must not be overlooked. We are +not surprised, therefore, that, judged by the absolute standard of the +New Testament, the morality of the Old Testament must be pronounced +imperfect. In two respects at least, in intent and extent, it is +deficient. + +(1) It is lacking in _Depth_. There is a tendency to dwell upon the +sufficiency of external acts rather than the necessity of inward +disposition. At the same time, in the Psalter and prophecy inward +purity is recognised.[20] Further, the character of Jehovah is +sometimes presented in a repellent aspect; as in the threatenings of +the second commandment; the treatment of the children of Achan and the +Sons of Korah; the seeming injustice of God, implied in the complaint +of Moses, and the protests of Abraham and David. But again there are +not wanting more kindly features of the Divine Being; and the +Fatherhood of God finds frequent expression. Though the penal code is +severe, a gentler spirit shines through many of its provisions, and +protection is afforded to the wage-earner, the dependent, and the poor; +while the care of slaves, foreigners, and even lower animals is not +overlooked.[21] Again, it has been noticed that the motives to which +the Old Testament appeals are often mercenary. Material prosperity +plays an important part as an inducement to well-doing. The good which +the pious patriarch or royal potentate contemplates is something which +is calculated to enrich himself or advance his people. But here we +must not forget that {51} God's revelation is progressive, and His +dealing with man educative. There is naturally a certain accommodation +of the divine law to the various stages of the moral apprehension of +the Jewish people. Gradually the nation is being carried forward by +the promise of material benefits to the deeper and more inward +appreciation of spiritual blessings. + +(2) It is lacking in _Scope_. In regard to universality the Hebrew +ideal, it must be acknowledged, is deficient. God is usually +represented as the God of Israel alone, and not as the God of all men, +and the obligations of veracity, honesty, and mercy are confined within +the limits of the nation. It is true that a prominent commandment +given to Israel and endorsed by our Lord runs thus: 'Thou shalt love +thy neighbour as thyself.'[22] But the extent of the obligation seems +to be restricted by the context: 'Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any +grudge against the children of thy people.' It is contended that the +word translated 'neighbour' bears a wider import than the English term, +and is really applicable to any person. The larger idea is expressed +in vv. 33, 34, where the word 'stranger' or 'foreigner' is substituted +for neighbour. And there are passages in which the stranger is +regarded as the special client of God, and is enjoined to look to Him +for protection. + +The Jews were not in practice, however, faithful to the humanitarianism +of their law, and, in keeping with other nations, showed a tendency to +restrict divine favours within the limits of their own land, and to +maintain throughout their history an attitude of aloofness and +repellent isolation which even amounted to intolerance towards other +races. In early days, however, the obligation of hospitality was +regarded as sacred.[23] Nor must we forget that, whatever may have +been the Jewish practice, the promise enshrined in their revelation +involves the unity of mankind; while several of the prophecies and +Psalms look forward to a world-wide blessing.[24] In Isaiah we even +read, 'God of the whole earth shall He be called.'[25] + +{52} + +The stream of preparation for Christianity thus flowed steadily through +three channels, the Greek, the Roman, and the Jew. Each contributed +something to the fullness of the time. + +The problem of Greek civilisation was the problem of _freedom_, the +realisation of self-dependence and self-determination. In the pursuit +of these ends Greece garnered conclusions which are the undying +possessions of the world. If to the graces of self-abasement, meekness +and charity it remained a stranger, it gave a new worth to the +individual, and showed that without the virtues of wisdom, courage, +steadfastness and justice man could not attain to moral character. + +The Roman's gift was unbending devotion to _duty_. With a genius for +rule he forced men into one polity; and by levelling material barriers +he enabled the nations to commune, and made a highway for the message +of freedom and brotherhood. But, intoxicated with material glory, he +became blind to spiritual good, and in his universal toleration he +emptied all faiths of their content, driving the masses to +superstition, and the few who yearned for a higher life to withdrawal +from the world. + +The Jewish contribution was _righteousness_. Not specially +distinguished by intellectual powers, nor gifted in political +enterprise, his endowment was spiritual insight, and by his dispersion +throughout the world he made others the sharers of his inheritance. +But his tendency was to keep his privilege to himself, or so to load it +with legal restrictions as to bar its acceptance for strangers; and in +his pride of isolation he failed to recognise his Deliverer when He +came. + +Thus, negatively and positively, by failure and by partial attainment, +the world was prepared for Him who was the desire of all nations. In +Christ were gathered up the wisdom of the Greek, the courage of the +Roman, the righteousness of the Jew; and He who came not to destroy but +to fulfil at once interpreted and satisfied the longings of the ages. + + + +[1] _Apologia_, pp. 38-9. + +[2] Cf. Adam, _Vitality of Platonism_, p. 3. + +[3] _Nic. Ethics_, bk. i. chap. 5. + +[4] _histharnikai ergasiai_, Arist., _Politics_, iii. 'There is +nothing common between a master and his slave,' _Nic. Ethics_, viii. + +[5] Butcher, _Harvard Lectures on Greek Subjects_, quoted by Barbour, +_Philos. Study of Christian Ethics_, p. 11. Cf. also Burnet, _Ethics +of Aristotle_, p. 73. 'The "mean" is really the true nature of the +soul when fully developed.' + +[6] _Hist. of Europ. Morals_, vol. i. chap. ii. + +[7] See Author's _Ethics of St. Paul_ for further discussion of +relation of Paul to Stoics. + +[8] Cf. E. Caird, _Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_, +vol. i. p. 48. + +[9] Cf. Caird, idem. Pfleiderer, _Vorbereitung des Christentums in der +Griech. Philos._; Wenley, _Preparation for Christianity_. + +[10] Exod. xx.; Deut. v. + +[11] Ex. xx.-xxiii. + +[12] Amos v. 25; Hos. vi. 6; Isa. i. 11-13. + +[13] Cf. Wallace, _Lectures and Essays on Natural Theol. and Ethics_, +p. 183. + +[14] Micah vi. 8. + +[15] Isa. i. 13-17; Micah vi. 7. + +[16] Hab. ii. 4; cf. Rom. i. 17; Gal. iii. 2. + +[17] Though Houston Chamberlain, in his recent work, _The Foundations +of the Nineteenth Century_, maintains that they were 'a most prosaic, +materialistic people, without any real sense of poetry.' + +[18] Ps. 51. + +[19] Ps. 19. + +[20] Ps. 51; Isa. 1. + +[21] Deut. xxiv. 14, 15; Jer. xxii. 13-17; Matt. iii 5; Deut. xxv. 4. + +[22] Lev. xix. 18. + +[23] Gen. xviii. xix. + +[24] Isa. lxi.; Ps. xxii. 27; xlviii. 2-10; lxxxvii. + +[25] Isa. liv. 5. + + + + +{53} + +SECTION B + +PERSONALITY + +{55} + +CHAPTER IV + +THE ESTIMATE OF MAN + +Having thus far laid the foundations of our study by a discussion of its +presuppositions and sources, we are now prepared to consider man as the +personal subject of the new life. The spirit of God which takes hold of +man and renews his life must not be conceived as a foreign power breaking +the continuity of consciousness. The natural is the basis of the +supernatural. It is not a new personality which is created; it is the +old that is transformed and completed. If there was not already implicit +in man that which predisposed him for the higher life, a consciousness to +which the spirit could appeal, then Christianity would be simply a +mechanical or magical influence without ethical significance and having +no relation to the past history of the individual. But that is not the +teaching of our Lord or of His apostles. We are bound, therefore, to +assume a certain substratum of powers, physical, mental and moral, as +constituting the raw material of which the new personality is formed. +The spirit of God does not quench the natural faculties of man, but works +through and upon them, raising them to a higher value.[1] + +I. But before proceeding to a consideration of these elements of human +consciousness to which Christianity appeals, we must glance at two +opposite theories of human nature, either of which, if the complete view +of man, would be inimical to Christianity.[2] + +{56} + +1. The first view is that man _by nature is morally good_. His natural +impulses are from birth wholly virtuous, and require only to be left to +their own operation to issue in a life of perfection. Those who favour +this contention claim the support of Scripture. Not only does the whole +tone of the Bible imply the inherent goodness of primitive man, but many +texts both in the Old and New Testaments suggest that God made man +upright.[3] Among the Greeks, and especially the Stoics, this view +prevailed. All nature was regarded as the creation of perfect reason, +and the primitive state as one of uncorrupted innocence. Pelagius +espoused this doctrine, and it continued to influence dogmatic theology +not only in the form of Semi-Pelagianism, but even as modifying the +severer tenets of Augustine. The theory received fresh importance during +the revolutionary movement of the eighteenth century, and found a strong +exponent in Rousseau. 'Let us sweep away all conventions and +institutions of man's making and get back to the simplicity of a +primitive age.' The man of nature is guileless, and his natural +instincts would preserve him in uncorrupted purity if they were not +perverted by the artificial usages of society. So profoundly did this +theory dominate the thoughts of men that its influence may be detected +not only in the political fanaticism which found expression in the French +Revolution, but also in the practical views of the Protestant Church +acting as a deterrent to missionary effort.[4] This view of human +nature, though not perhaps formally stated, finds expression in much of +the literature of the present day. Professor James cites Theodore Parker +and other leaders of the liberal movement in New England of last century +as representatives of the tendency.[5] These writers do not wholly +ignore moral effect, but they make light of sin, and regard it not as +something positive, but merely as a stage in the development of man. + +{57} + +2. The other theory of human nature goes to the opposite extreme. Man +by nature is _utterly depraved_, and his natural instincts are wholly +bad. Those who take this view also appeal to Scripture: 'Man is shapen +in iniquity and conceived in sin.' Many passages in the New Testament, +and especially in the writings of St. Paul, seem to emphasise the utter +degradation of man. It was not, however, until the time of Augustine +that this idea of innate depravity was formulated into a doctrine. The +Augustinean dogma has coloured all later theology. In the Roman Catholic +Church, even in such a writer as Pascal, and in Protestantism, under the +influence of Calvin, the complete corruption of man's nature has been +depicted in the blackest hues. + +These theories of human nature represent aspects of truth, and are false +only in their isolation. + +The doctrine that man is innocent by nature is not in agreement with +history. Nowhere is the noble savage to be found. The primitive man +exhibits the same tendencies as his more civilised neighbour, and his +animal passions are indulged without control of reason or consideration +for others. Indeed, Hobbes's view of early society as a state of war and +rapacity is much truer to fact than Rousseau's. The noble savage is +simply a fiction of the imagination, an abstraction obtained by +withdrawing him from all social environment. But even could we conceive +of a human being kept from infancy in isolation, he would not fulfil the +true idea of virtue, but would simply develop into a negative creature, a +mutilated being bereft of all that constitutes our notion of humanity. +Such experiences as are possible only in society--all forms of goodness +as suggested by such words as 'love,' 'sympathy,' 'service'--would never +emerge at all. The native instincts of man are simply potencies or +capacities for morality; they must have a life of opportunity for their +evolution and exercise. The abstract self prior to and apart from all +objective experience is an illusion. It is only in relation to a world +of moral beings that the moral life becomes possible for man. The +innocence which the advocates of this theory contend for is {58} +something not unlike the non-rational existence of the animal. It is +true that the brute is not immoral, but neither is it moral. The whole +significance of the passions as they exist in man lies in the fact that +they are not purely animal, but, since they belong to man, are always +impregnated with reason. It is reason that gives to them their moral +worth, and it is because man must always put his self into every desire +or impulse that it becomes the instrument either of virtue or of vice.[6] + +But if the theory of primitive purity is untenable, not less so is that +of innate depravity. Here, also, its advocates are not consistent with +themselves. Even the systems of theology derived from Augustine do not +contend that man was created with an evil propensity. His sin was the +result of an historical catastrophe. In his paradisiacal condition man +is conceived as possessing a nobility and innocence of nature far beyond +that even which Rousseau depicted. Milton, in spite of his Calvinistic +puritanism, has painted a picture of man's ideal innocence which for +idyllic charm is unequalled in literature.[7] Nor does historical +inquiry bear out the theory of the utter depravity of man. The latest +anthropological research into the condition of primitive man suggests +rather that even the lowest forms of savage life are not without some dim +consciousness of a higher power and some latent capacity for good.[8] +Finally, these writers are not more successful when they claim the +support of the Bible. Not only are there many examples of virtue in +patriarchal times, but, as we have seen, there are not a few texts which +imply the natural goodness of man. Our Lord repeatedly assumes the +affinity with goodness of those who had not hitherto come into contact +with the Gospel, as in the case of Jairus, the rich young ruler, and the +Syrophenician woman. It has been affirmed by Wernle[9] that the Apostle +Paul in the interests of salvation grossly {59} exaggerates the condition +of the natural man. 'He violently extinguished every other light in the +world so that Jesus might shine in it alone.' But this surely is a +misstatement. It is true that no more scathing denunciation of sinful +human nature has ever been presented than the account of heathen +immorality to be found in the first chapter of Romans. Yet the apostle +does not actually affirm, nor even imply, that pagan society was so +utterly corrupt that it had lost all knowledge of moral good. Though so +bad as to be beyond hope of recovery by natural effort, it was not so bad +as to have quenched in utter darkness the light which lighteth every man. + +3. Christianity, while acknowledging the partial truth of both of these +theories, reconciles them. If, on the one hand, man were innately good +and could of himself attain to righteousness, there would be no need of a +gospel of renewal. But history and experience alike show that that is +not the case. If, on the other hand, man were wholly bad, had no +susceptibility for virtue and truth, then there would be nothing in him, +as we have seen, which could respond to the Christian appeal.[10] +Christianity alone offers an answer to the question in which Pascal +presents the great antithesis of human nature: 'If man was not made for +God, how is it that he can be happy only in God? And if he is made for +God, how is he so opposite to God?'[11] However, then, we may account +for the presence of evil in human nature, a true view of Christianity +involves the conception of a latent spiritual element in man, a capacity +for goodness to which his whole being points. Matter itself may be said +not merely to exist for spirit, but to have within it already the potency +of the higher forms of life; and just as nature is making towards +humanity, and in humanity at last finds itself; as + + 'Striving to be man, the worm + Mounts through all the spires of form,'[13] + +{60} so man, even in his most primitive state, has within him the promise +of higher things. No theory of his origin can interfere with the +assumption that he belongs to a moral Sphere, and is capable of a life +which is shaping itself to spiritual ends. Whatever be man's past +history and evolution, he has from the beginning been made in God's +image, and bears the divine impress in all the lineaments of body and +soul. His degradation cannot wholly obliterate his inherent nobility, +and indeed his actual corruption bears witness to his possible holiness. +Granting the hypothesis of evolution, matter even in its crudest +beginnings contains potentially all the rich variety of the natural and +spiritual life. The reality of a growing thing lies in its highest form +of being. In the light of the last we explain the first. If the +universe is, as science pronounces, an organic totality which is ever +converting its promise into actuality, then 'the ultimate interpretation +even of the lowest existence of the world, cannot be given except on +principles which are adequate to explain the highest.'[13] Christian +morality is therefore nothing else than the morality prepared from all +eternity, and is but the highest realisation of that which man even at +his lowest has ever been, though unconsciously, striving after. All that +is best and highest in man, all that he is capable of yet becoming, has +really existed within him from the very first, just as the flower and +leaf and fruit are contained implicitly in the seedling. This is the +Pauline view of human nature. Jesus Christ, according to the apostle, is +the End and Consummation of the whole creation. Everywhere in all men +there is a capacity for Christ. Whatever be his origin, man comes upon +the stage of being bearing within him a great and far-reaching destiny. +There is in him, as Browning says, 'a tendency to God.' He is not simply +what he is now, but all that he is yet to be. + +II. Assuming, then, the inherent spirituality of man, we may now proceed +to examine his moral consciousness with a view to seeing how its various +constituents form what we have called the substratum of the Christian +life. + +{61} + +1. We must guard against seeming to adopt the old and discredited +psychology which divides man into a number of separate and independent +faculties. Man is not made like a machine, of a number of adjusted +parts. _He is a unity_, a living organism, in which every part has +something of all the others; and all together, animated by one spirit, +constitute a Living whole which we call personality. While the Bible is +rich in terms denoting the different constituents of man, neither the Old +Testament nor the New regards human nature as a plurality of powers. A +bind of unity or hierarchy of the natural faculties is assumed, and amid +all the difference of function and variety of operation it is undeniable +that the New Testament writers generally, and particularly St. Paul, +presuppose a unity of consciousness--a single ego, or Soul. It is +unnecessary to discuss the question, much debated by Biblical +psychologists, as to whether the apostle recognises a threefold or a +twofold division of man.[14] Our view is that he recognised only a +twofold division, body and soul, which, however, he always regarded as +constituting a unity, the body itself being psychical or interpenetrated +with spirit, and the spirit always acting upon and working through the +physical powers. + +Man is a unique phenomenon in the world. Even on his physical side he is +not a piece of dead matter, but is instinct through and through with +spirit. And on his psychical side he is not an unsubstantial wraith, but +a being inconceivable apart from outward embodiment. Perhaps the most +general term which we may adopt is _psyche_ or Soul--the living self or +vital and animating principle which is at once the seat of all bodily +sensation and the source of the higher cognitive faculties. + +2. The fact of ethical interest from which we must proceed is that man, +in virtue of his spiritual nature, is _akin to God_, and participates in +the three great elements of the divine Personality--thought, love and +will.[15] Personality has been called 'the culminating fact of the {62} +universe.' And it is the task of man to realise his true personality--to +fulfil the law of his highest self. In this work he has to harmonise and +bring to the unity of his personal life, by means of one dominating +force, the various elements of his nature--his sensuous, emotional, and +rational powers. By the constitution of his being he belongs to a larger +world, and when he is true to himself he is ever reaching out towards it. +From the very beginning of life, and even in the lowest phases of his +nature he has within him the potency of the divine. He carries the +infinite in his soul, and by reason of his very existence shares the life +of God. The value of his soul in this sense is repeatedly emphasised in +scripture. In our Lord's teaching it is perhaps the most distinctive +note. The soul, or self-conscious spiritual ego, is spoken of as capable +of being 'acquired' or 'lost.'[16] It is acquired or possessed when a +man seeks to regain the image in which he was created. It is lost when +he refuses to respond to those spiritual influences by which Christ +besets him, and by means of which the soul is moulded into the likeness +of God. + +3. A full presentation of this subject would involve a reference even to +the physical powers which form an integral part of man and witness to his +eternal destiny. + +(1) The very body is to be redeemed and sanctified, and made an +instrument of the new life in Christ. The extremes of asceticism and +self-indulgence, both of which found advocates in Greek philosophy and +even in the early Church, have no countenance in scripture. Evil does +not reside in the flesh, as the Greeks held, but in the will which uses +the flesh for its base ends. Not mutilation but transformation, not +suppression but consecration is the Christian ideal. The natural is the +basis of the spiritual. Man is the Temple of God, every part of which is +sacred. Christ claims to be King of the body as of every other domain of +life. The secret of spiritual progress does not consist in the +unflinching destruction of the flesh, but in its firm but kindly +discipline for loyal service. It is not, therefore, by {63} leaving the +body behind but by taking it up into our higher self that we become +spiritual. As Browning says, + + 'Let us cry all good things + Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more now + Than flesh helps soul.' + + +Without dwelling further upon the physical elements of man, there are +three constituents or functions of personality prominent in the New +Testament which claim our consideration, reason, conscience and will. It +is just because man possesses, or _is_ mind, conscience and will, that he +is capable of responding to the life which Christ offers, and of sharing +in the divine character which he reveals. + +(2) The term _nous_, or reason, is of frequent occurrence in the New +Testament. Christianity highly honours the intellectual powers of man +and accords to the mind an important rôle in apprehending and entering +into the thoughts and purposes of God. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God +with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind,' says +Jesus. Many are disposed to think that the exercise of faith, the +immediate organ of spiritual apprehension, is checked by the interference +of reason. But so far from faith and reason being opposed, not only are +they necessary to each other, but in all real faith there is an element +of reason. In all religious feeling, as in morality, art, and other +spheres of human activity, there is the underlying element of reason +which is the characteristic of all the activities of a self-conscious +intelligence. To endeavour to elicit that element, to infuse into the +spontaneous and unsifted conceptions of religious experience the +objective clearness, necessity and organic unity of thought--is the +legitimate aim of science, in religion as in other spheres. It would be +strange if in the highest of all provinces of human experience +intelligence must renounce her claim.[17] The Ritschlian value-judgment +theory in its disparagement of philosophy is practically a dethronement +of reason. And the protest of Pragmatism and the voluntarists {64} +generally against what they term 'Intellectualism'[18] and their distrust +of the logical faculty, are virtually an avowal of despair and a resort +to agnosticism, if not to scepticism. If we are to renounce the quest +for objective truth, and accept 'those ideas only which we can +assimilate, validate, corroborate,'[19] those ideas in short which are +'practically useful in guiding us to desirable issues,' then it would +seem we are committed to a world of subjective caprice and confusion and +must give up the belief in a rational view of the universe. + +(3) In spite of the wonderful suggestiveness of M. Bergson's philosophy, +we are unable to accept the distinction which that writer draws between +intuition and intelligence, in which he seems to imply that intuition is +the higher of the two activities. Intelligence, according to this +writer, is at home exclusively in spatial considerations, in solids, in +geometry, but it is to be repelled as a foreign element when it comes to +deal with life. Bergson would exclude rational thought and intelligence +from life, creation, and initiative. The clearest evidence of intuition +is in the works of great artists. 'What is implied is that in artistic +creation, in the work of genius and imagination, we have pure novelty +issuing from no premeditated or rational idea, but simply pure +irrationality and unaccountableness.'[20] The work of art cannot be +predicated; it is beyond reason, as life is beyond logic and law.[21] +But so far from finding life unintelligible, it would be nearer the truth +to say that man's reason can, strictly speaking, understand nothing +else.[22] 'Instinct finds,' says Bergson, 'but does not search. Reason +searches but cannot find.'[23] 'But,' adds Professor Dewey, 'what we +find is meaningless save as measured by searching, and so instincts and +passions must be elevated into reason.'[24] In the lower creatures +instinct does the {65} work of reason--sufficiently for the simple +conditions in which the animal lives. And in the earlier stages of human +life instinct plays an important part. But when man, both as an +individual and as humanity, advances to a more complex life, instinct is +unequal to the new task confronting him. We cannot be content to be +guided by instinct. Reason asserts itself and seeks to permeate all our +experiences, and give unity and purpose to all our thoughts and acts. + +The recent disparagement of intellectualism is probably a reaction +against the extreme absolutism of German idealism which, beginning with +Kant, found fullest expression in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. But the +true way to meet exclusive rationalism is not to discredit the function +of mind, but to give to it a larger domain of experience. We do not +exalt faith by emptying it of all intellectual content and reducing it to +mere subjective feeling; nor do we explain genius by ascribing its acts +to blind, unthinking impulse. 'The real is the rational,' says Hegel. +Truth, in other words, presupposes a rational universe which we, as +rational beings, must assume in all our thought and effort. To set up +faith against reason, or intuition against intelligence is to set the +mind against itself. We cannot set up an order of facts, as Professor +James would have us do, outside the intellectual realm; for what does not +fall within our experience can have for us no meaning, and what for us +has no meaning cannot be an object of faith. An ineradicable belief in +the rationality of the world is the ultimate basis of all art, morality +and religion. To rest in mere intuition or emotion and not to seek +objective truth would be for man to renounce his true prerogative and to +open the door for all kinds of superstition and caprice. + +III. In the truest sense it may be claimed that this is the teaching of +Christianity. When Christ says that we are to love God with our minds He +seems to imply that there is such a thing as intelligent affection. The +distinctive feature of our Lord's claim is that God is not satisfied when +His creatures render a merely implicit obedience; He {66} desires also +the enthusiastic use of their intellect, intent on knowing everything +that it is possible for men to know about His character and ways. And is +there not something sublime in this demand of God that the noblest part +of man should be consecrated to Him? God reveals Himself in Christ to +our highest; and He would have us respond to His manifestations with our +highest. Nor is this the attitude of Christ only. The Apostle Paul also +honours the mind, and gives to it the supreme place as the organ of +apprehending and appropriating divine truth. Mr. Lecky brings the +serious charge against Christianity that it habitually disregards the +virtues of the intellect. If there is any truth in this statement it +refers, not to the genius of the Gospel itself, nor to the earlier +exponents of it, but rather to the Church in those centuries which +followed the conversion of Constantine. No impartial reader of St. +Paul's Epistles can aver that the apostle made a virtue of ignorance and +credulity. These documents, which are the earliest exposition of the +mind of Christ, impress us rather with the intellectual boldness of their +attempt to grapple with the greatest problems of life. Paul was +essentially a thinker; and, as Sabatier says, is to be ranked with Plato +and Aristotle, Augustine and Kant, as one of the mightiest intellectual +forces of the world. But not content with being a thinker himself, he +sought to make his converts thinkers too, and he does not hesitate to +make the utmost demand upon their reasoning faculties. He assumes a +natural capacity in man for apprehending the truth, and appeals to the +mind rather than to the emotions. The Gospel is styled by him 'the word +of truth,' and he bids men 'prove all things.' Worship is not a +meaningless ebullition of feeling or a superstitious ritual, but a form +of self-expression which is to be enlightened and guided by thought. 'I +will pray with the understanding and sing with the understanding.' + +It is indeed a strong and virile Christianity which Paul and the other +apostles proclaim. It is no magic spell they seek to exert. They are +convinced that there is that in {67} the mind of man which is ready to +respond to a thoughtful Gospel. If men will only give their unprejudiced +minds to God's Word, it is able to make them 'wise unto salvation.' It +would lead us beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the peculiar +Pauline significance of faith. It is enough to say that while he does +not identify it with intellectual assent, as little does he confine it to +mere subjective assurance. It is the primary act of the human spirit +when brought into contact with divine truth, and it lies at the root of a +new ethical power, and of a deeper knowledge of God. If the apostle +appears to speak disparagingly of wisdom it is the wisdom of pride, of +'knowledge that puffeth up.' He warns Timothy against 'science falsely +so called.' On the whole St. Paul exalts the intellect and bids men +attain to the full exercise of their mental powers. 'Be not children in +understanding: but in understanding be men.'[25] + +If, as we have seen, the body be an integral part of man, and has its +place and function in the Christian life, not less, but even more, has +the mind a special ethical importance. It is to the intelligence that +Christianity appeals, and it is with the rational faculties that moral +truth is apprehended and applied to life. Reason in its broadest sense +is the most distinctive feature of man, and by means of it he exerts his +mightiest influence upon the world. Mental and moral growth are closely +connected, and personal character is largely moulded by thought. 'As a +man thinketh in his heart so is he.' Not only at the beginning of the +new life, but in all its after stages the mind is an important factor, +and its consecration and cultivation are laid upon us as an obligation by +Him in whose image we have been made, and whom to know and serve is our +highest end. + + + +[1] See Author's _Ethics of St. Paul_. + +[2] Cf. Murray, _Sandbank of Christian Ethics_. See also Hegel, _Phil. +der Religion_, vol. ii. p. 210 ff., where the antithesis is finely worked +out. + +[3] Gen. i. 26; Eccles. vii. 29; Col. iii. 10; James iii. 9. + +[4] See Hugh Miller's _Essays_, quoted by Murray, _op. cit._, p. 137. + +[5] Cf. W. James, _Varieties of Religious Experience_, pp. 81-86. + +[6] Cf. Goethe's _Faust_. See also Nietzsche, _Götzendämmerung_ for +trenchant criticism of Rousseau. + +[7] Murray, _idem_. + +[8] Max Müller, Fraser, _Golden Bough_, and others. + +[9] Anfänge des Christentums. + +[10] Cf. Ottley, _Christian Ideas and Ideals_, p. 52. 'Christianity does +justice both to man's inherent instinct that he has been made for God, +and to his sense of unworthiness and incapacity.' + +[11] _Pensées_, part ii. art. 1. + +[12] Emerson. + +[13] Ed. Caird, _Critical Philosophy of Kant_, p. 35. + +[14] See Author's _Ethics of St. Paul_. + +[15] Ottley, _idem_, p. 55. + +[16] Luke xxi. 19. + +[17] Cf. John Caird, _Introd. to the Philosophy of Religion_. + +[18] Cf. Wm. James's _Pragmatism_ and _A Pluralistic World_. + +[19] _Idem_, p. 201. + +[20] Cf. Bosanquet, _The Principles of Individuality and Value_. + +[21] Bergson, _Evol. Creat._, p. 174 f. + +[22] Cf. E. Caird, _Kant_, vol. ii. pp. 530 and 535. + +[23] _Evol. Creat._, p. 159. + +[24] _Hib. Jour._, July 1911. + +[25] Some sentences in the above are borrowed from the writer's _Ethics +of St. Paul_. + + + + +{68} + +CHAPTER V + +THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE + +Passing from the physical and mental constituents of man, we turn to +the more distinctly moral elements; and in this chapter we shall +consider that aspect of the human consciousness to which mankind has +given the name of 'conscience.' + +No subject has presented greater difficulties to the moralist, and +there are few which require more careful elucidation. From the +earliest period of reflection the question how we came to have moral +ideas has been a disputed one. At first it was thought that there +existed in man a distinct innate faculty or moral sense which was +capable of deciding categorically man's duty without reference to +history or condition. But in modern times the theory of evolution has +discredited the inviolable character of conscience, and sought rather +to determine its nature and significance in the light of its origin and +development. Only the barest outline of the subject can be attempted +here, since our object is simply to show that however we may account +for its presence, there is in man, as we know him, some power or +function which bears witness to divine truth and fits him to respond to +the revelation of Christ. It will be most convenient to consider the +subject under three heads: I. the history of the Conception; II. the +nature and origin of Conscience; and III. its present validity. + +I. _History of the Conception_.--'The name conscience,' says a writer +on the subject, 'appears somewhat late in {69} the history of the +world: that for which it stands is as old as mankind.'[1] + +1. Without pushing our inquiries back into the legendary lore of +savage life, in which we find evidence of the idea in the social +institutions and religious enactments of primitive races, it is among +the Greeks that the word, if not the idea of conscience, first meets +us. Perhaps the earliest trace of the notion is to be found in the +mythological conception of the Furies, whose business it was to avenge +crime--a conception which might be regarded as the reaction of man's +own nature against the violation of better instincts, if not as the +reflection or embodiment of what is popularly called conscience. It +can scarcely be doubted that the Erinnyes of Aeschylus were deities of +remorse, and possess psychological significance as symbols of the +primitive action of conscience.[2] Though Sophocles is less of a +theologian than Aeschylus, and problems of Ethics count less than the +human interest of his story, the law of Nemesis does find in him +dramatic expression, and the noble declaration put into the mouth of +Antigone concerning the unwritten laws of God that 'know no change and +are not of to-day nor yesterday, but must be obeyed in preference to +the temporary commandments of men,'[3] is a protest on behalf of +conscience against human oppression. And even in Euripides, regarded +as an impious scoffer by some scholars,[4] there are not wanting, +especially in the example of Alcestis, evidence of belief in that +divine justice and moral order of which the virtues of self-devotion +and sacrifice in the soul of man are the witness. + +Socrates was among the first teachers of antiquity who led the way to +that self-knowledge which is of the essence of conscience, and in the +'Daemon,' or inner voice, which he claimed to possess, some writers +have detected the trace {70} of the intuitive monitor of man. Plato's +discussion of the question, 'What is the highest good?' involves the +capacity of moral judgment, and his conception of reason regulating +desire suggests a power in the mind whose function it is to point to +the highest good and to subordinate to it all the other impulses of +man. In the ethics of Aristotle there is a reference to a faculty in +man or 'rule within,' which, he says, the beasts lack. + +But it is among the Stoics that the word first appears; and it is to +the Roman moralist, Seneca, that we are indebted for the earlier +definite perception of an abiding consciousness bearing witness +concerning a man's own conduct. The writings of Epictetus, Aurelius, +and Seneca approach in moral sublimity and searching self-analysis the +New Testament Scriptures. It was probably to the Stoics that St. Paul +was indebted for the word _syneidêsis_ to which he has given so +distinctive a meaning that it has coloured and determined the whole +later history of the moral consciousness. + +2. But if the word as used in the New Testament comes from Greek +sources the idea itself was long prevalent in the Jewish conception of +life, which, even more than the Greek, was constitutive of, and +preparatory to, the Christian view. The word does not, indeed, occur +in the Old Testament, but the question of God to Adam, 'Where art +thou?' the story of Cain and the curse he was to suffer for the murder +of his brother; the history of Joseph's dealing with his brethren; the +account of David's sin and conviction, are by implication appeals to +conscience. Indeed, the whole history of Israel, from the time when +the promise was given to Abraham and the law through Moses until the +denunciations of wrong-doing and the predictions of doom of the later +prophets, is one long education of the moral sense. It is the problem +of conscience that imparts its chief interest to the book of Job; and +one reason why the Psalms in all ages have been so highly prized is +because they are the cries of a wounded conscience, and the confessions +of a convicted and contrite heart. + +{71} + +3. If we turn to the New Testament we find, as we might expect, a much +clearer testimony to the reality of the conscience. The word came into +the hands of the New Testament writers ready-made, but they gave to it +a richer meaning, so that it is to them we must go if we would +understand the nature and the supremacy of the conscience. The term +occurs thirty-one times in the New Testament, but it does not appear +once in the Gospels. It is, indeed, principally a Pauline expression, +and to the apostle of the Gentiles more than to any other writer is due +the clear conception and elucidation of the term. It would be a +mistake, however, to assume that the doctrine itself depends entirely +upon the use of the word. Our Lord never, indeed, employs the term, +but surely no teacher ever sounded the depths of the human heart as He +did. It was His mission to reveal men to themselves, to convict them +of sin, and show the need of that life of righteousness and purity +which He came to give. 'Why even of yourselves,' He said, 'judge ye +not what is right?' Christ, indeed, might be called the conscience of +man. To awaken, renew and enlighten the moral sense of individuals, to +make them know what they were and what they were capable of becoming +was the work of the Son of Man, and in contact with Him every one was +morally unveiled. + +The word occurs twice in Acts, five times in Hebrews, three times in +the Epistles of Peter, and more than twenty times in the Pauline +Epistles. St. Paul's doctrine of the conscience is contained in Romans +ii. 14, 15, where he speaks of the Gentiles being 'a law unto +themselves,' inasmuch as they possess a 'law written in their hearts,' +'their conscience bearing witness, therewith accusing or excusing +them.' The idea underlying the passage is the responsibility of all +men for their actions, their condemnation in sin, and their acceptance +in righteousness. This applies to Gentiles as well as Jews, and it +applies to them because, though they have not the explicit revelation +of the law, they have a revelation of the good in their hearts. The +passage therefore teaches two things: (1) That man has received a {72} +revelation of good sufficient at all stages of his history to make him +morally responsible; and (2) That man possesses a moral faculty which +indeed is not a separate power, but the whole moral consciousness or +personality in virtue of which he recognises and approves of the good +which, either as the law written in his heart or as the law +communicated in the Decalogue, has been revealed to him, and by whose +authority he judges himself. + +II. _Nature, and Origin of Conscience_.--While experience seems to +point to the existence of something in man witnessing to the right, +there is great diversity of view as to the nature of this moral +element. The word 'Conscience' stands for a concept whose meaning is +far from well defined, and the lack of definiteness has left its trace +upon ethical theories. While some moralists assign conscience to the +rational or intellectual side of man, and make it wholly a faculty of +judgment; others attribute it to feeling or impulse, and make it a +sense of pleasure or pain; others again associate it more closely with +the will, and regard its function to be legislative or imperative. +These differences of opinion reveal the complexity of the nature of +conscience. The fact is, that it belongs to all these departments--the +intellectual, emotional, and volitional--and ought to be regarded not +as a single faculty distinct from the particular decisions, motives, +and acts of man, not as an activity foreign to the ego, but as the +expression of the whole personality. The question of the origin of +conscience, though closely connected with its nature, is for ethics +only of secondary importance. It is desirable, however, to indicate +the two main theories which have been held regarding its genesis. +While there are several varieties, they may be divided broadly into +two--Intuitionalism and Evolutionalism. + +1. _Nativism_, of which Intuitionalism is the most common form, +regards the conscience as a separate natural endowment, coeval with the +creation of man. Every individual, it is maintained, has been endowed +by nature with a distinct faculty or organ by which he can immediately +and clearly {73} pronounce upon the rightness or wrongness of his own +actions. In its most pronounced form this theory maintains that man +has not merely a general consciousness of moral distinctions, but +possesses from the very first, apart from all experience and education, +a definite and clear knowledge of the particular vices which ought to +be avoided and the particular virtues which ought to be practised. +This theory is usually connected with a form of theism which maintains +that the conscience is particularly a divine gift, and is, indeed, +God's special witness or oracle in the heart of man. + +Though there would seem to be an element of truth in intuitionalism, +since man, to be man at all, must be conceived as made for God and +having that in him which points to the end or ideal of his being, still +in its most extreme form it would not be difficult to show that this +theory is untenable. It is objectionable, because it involves two +assumptions, of which the one conflicts with experience, and the other +with the psychological nature of man. + +(1) Experience gives us no warrant for supposing that duty is always +the same, and that conscience is therefore exempt from change. History +shows rather that moral convictions only gradually emerge, and that the +laws and customs of one age are often repudiated by the next. What may +seem right to one man is no longer so to his descendant. History +records deeds committed in one generation in the name of conscience +which in the same name a later generation has condemned with horror. +Moreover, the possibility of a conflict between duties proves that +unconditional truth exists at no stage of moral development. There is +no law so sacred that it may not in special cases have to yield to the +sacredness of a higher law. When duties conflict, our choice cannot be +determined by any _a priori_ principle residing in ourselves. It must +be governed by that wider conception of the moral life which is to be +gained through one's previous development, and on the basis of a ripe +moral experience.[5] (2) Nor is this theory consistent with {74} the +known nature of man. We know of no separate and independent organ +called conscience. Man must not be divided against himself. Reason +and feeling enter into all acts of will, since these are not processes +different in kind, but elements of voluntary activity itself and +inseparable from it. It is impossible for a man to be determined in +his actions or judgments by a mere external formula of duty, a +'categorical imperative,' as Kant calls it, apart from motives. +Moreover, all endowments may be regarded as divine gifts, and it is a +precarious position to claim for one faculty a spiritually divine or +supernatural origin which is denied to others. Man is related to God +in his whole nature. The view which regards the law of duty as +something foreign to man, stern and unchangeable in its decrees, and in +nowise dependent upon the gradual development and growing content of +the moral life is not consistent either with history or psychology. + +2. _Evolutionalism_, which since the time of Darwin has been applied +by Spencer and others to account for the growth of our moral ideas, +holds that conscience is the result of a process of development, but +does not limit the process to the life of the individual. It extends +to the experience of the race. While admitting the existence of +conscience as a moral faculty in the rational man of to-day, it holds +that it did not exist in his primitive ancestors. Earlier individuals +accumulated a certain amount of experience and moral knowledge, the +result of which, as a habit or acquired capacity, was handed down to +their successors. From the first man has been a member of society, and +is what he is in virtue of his relation to it. All that makes him man, +all his powers of body and mind, are inherited. His instincts and +desires, which are the springs of action, are themselves the creation +of heredity, association and environment. The individual takes its +shape at every point from its relation to the social organism of which +it is a part. What man really seeks from the earliest is satisfaction. +'No school,' says Mr. Spencer, 'can avoid taking for the ultimate moral +aim a desirable {75} state of feeling.'[6] Prolonged experience of +pleasure in connection with actions which serve social ends has +resulted in certain physiological changes in the brain and nervous +system rendering these actions constant. Thus, according to Spencer, +is begotten conscience. + +While acknowledging the service which the evolutionary theory has done +in calling attention to the place and function of experience and social +environment in the development of the moral life, and in showing that +moral judgment, like every other capacity, must participate in the +gradual unfolding of personality, as a conclusive explanation of +conscience it must be pronounced insufficient. Press the analysis of +sensation as far back as we please, and make an analysis of instincts +and feelings as detailed as possible, we never get in man a mere +sensation, as we find it in the lower animal; it is always sensation +related to, and modified by, a self. In the simplest human instincts +there is always a spiritual element which is the basis of the +possibility at once of knowledge and morality. 'That countless +generations,' says Green, 'should have passed during which a +transmitted organism was progressively modified by reaction on its +surroundings, by struggle for existence or otherwise, till its +functions became such that an eternal consciousness could realise or +produce itself through them--might add to the wonder with which the +consideration of what we do and are must always fill us, but it could +not alter the results of that consideration.'[7] + +No process of evolution, even though it draws upon illimitable ages, +can evolve what was not already present in the form of a spiritual +potency. The empiric treatment of conscience as the result of social +environment and culture leads inevitably back to the assumption of some +rudimentary moral consciousness without which the development of a +moral sense would be an impossibility. The history of mankind, +moreover, shows that conscience, so far from being merely the reflex of +the prevailing customs and institutions of a particular age, has +frequently {76} closed its special character by reacting upon and +protesting against the recognised traditions of society. The +individual conscience has often been in advance of its times; and the +progress of man has been secured as much by the champions of liberty as +by those who conform to accepted customs. In all moral advance there +comes a stage when, in the conflict of habit and principle, conscience +asserts itself, not only in revealing a higher ideal, but in urging men +to seek it. + +III. _The Validity and Witness of Conscience_.--It is not, however, +with the origin of conscience, but with its capacities and functions in +its developed state that Ethics is primarily concerned. The beginning +must be interpreted by the end, and the process by the result to which +it tends. + +1. The Christian doctrine is committed neither to the intuitional nor +the evolutionist theory, but rather may be said to reconcile both by +retaining that which is true in each. While it holds to the inherent +ability on the part of a being made in God's image to recognise at the +different stages of his growth and development God's will as it has +been progressively revealed, it avoids the necessity of conceiving man +as possessing from the very beginning a full-fledged organ of +infallible authority. The conscience participates in man's general +progress and enlightenment. Nor can the moral development of the +individual be held separate from the moral development of the race. As +there is a moral solidarity of mankind, so the individual conscience is +conditional by the social conscience. The individual does not start in +life with a full-grown moral apparatus any more than he starts with a +matured physical frame. The most distinctively spiritual attainments +of man have their antecedents in less human and more animal capacities. +As there is a continuity of human life, so individuals and peoples +inherit the moral assets of previous generations, and incorporate in +their experience all past attainments. Conscience is involved in man's +moral history. It suffers in his sin and alienation from God, becoming +clouded in its insight and feeble in its testimony, but it shares also +in his {77} spiritual advancement, growing more sensitive and decisive +in its judgments. + +(1) Conscience, as the New Testament teaches, can be _perverted_ and +debased. It is always open to a free agent to disobey his conscience +and reject its authority. On the intuitional theory, which regards the +conscience as a separable and independent faculty, it would be +difficult to vindicate the terrible consequences of such conduct. It +is because the conscience is the man himself as related to the +consciousness of the divine will that the effects are so injurious. +Conscience may be (_a_) _Stained_, defiled, and polluted in its very +texture (1 Cor. viii. 7); (_b_) _Branded_ or seared (1 Tim. iv. 2), +rendered insensible to all feeling for good; (_c_) _Perverted_, in +which the very light within becomes darkness. In this last stage the +man calls evil good and good evil--the very springs of his nature are +poisoned and the avenues of his soul are closed. + + 'This is death, and the sole death, + When man's loss comes to him from his gain.'[8] + + +(2) But if conscience can be perverted it may also be _improved_. The +education is twofold, social and individual. Through society, says +Green, personality is actualised. 'No individual can make a conscience +for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him.'[9] There +is no such thing as a purely individual conscience. Man can only +realise himself, come to his best, in relation to others. The +conditions amid which a man is born and reared--the home, the school, +the church, the state--are the means by which the conscience is +exercised and educated. But the individual is not passive. He has +also a part to play; and the whole task of man may be regarded as an +endeavour to make his conscience effective in life. The New Testament +writers refrain from speaking of the conscience as an unerring and +perfect organ. Their language implies rather the possibility of its +gradual enlightenment; and St. Paul specially dwells upon the necessity +of 'growing in spiritual {78} knowledge and perception.' As life +advances moral judgment may be modified and corrected by fuller +knowledge, and the perception of a particular form of conduct as good +may yield to the experience of something better. + +2. 'It is one of the most wonderful things,' says Professor Wundt, +'about moral development, that it unites so many conditions of +subordinate value in the accomplishment of higher results,'[10] and the +worth of morality is not endangered because the grounds of its +realisation in special cases do not always correspond in elevation to +the moral ideas. The conscience is not an independent faculty which +issues its mandates irrespective of experience. Its judgments are +always conditioned by motives. The moral imperatives of conscience may +be grouped under four heads:[11] (1) _External constraints_, including +all forms of punishment for immoral actions and the social +disadvantages which such actions involve. These can only produce the +lowest grade of morality, outward propriety, the mere appearance of +virtue which has only a negative value in so far as it avoids what is +morally offensive. (2) _Internal constraints_, consisting of +influences excited by the example of others, by public opinion and +habits formed through education and training. (3) _Self-satisfaction_, +originating in the agent's own consciousness. It may be a sense of +pleasure or feeling of self-approbation: or higher still, the idea of +duty for its own sake, commonly called 'conscientiousness.' (4) _The +ideal of life_, the highest imperative of conscience. Here the +nobility of life, as a whole, the supreme life-purpose, gives meaning +and incentive to each and every action. The ideal of life is not, +however, something static and completed, given once and for all. It +grows with the enlightenment of the individual and the development of +humanity. The consciousness of every age comprehends it in certain +laws and ends of life. The highest form of the ideal finds its +embodiment in what are called noble characters. These ethical heroes +rise, in rare and exceptional circumstances, above the ordinary level +of {79} common morality, gathering up into themselves the entire moral +development of the past, and radiating their influence into the +remotest distances of the future. They are the embodiments of the +conscience of the race, at once the standard and challenge of the moral +life of mankind, whose influence awakens the slumbering aspirations of +men, and whose creative genius affects the whole history of the world, +lifting it to higher levels of thought and endeavour. + +The supreme example--unique, however, both in kind and degree, and +differing by its uniqueness from every other life which has in some +measure approximated to the ideal--is disclosed in Jesus Christ. Thus +it is that the moral consciousness of the world generally and of the +individual in particular, of which the conscience is the organ and +expression, develops from less to more, under the influence of the +successive imperatives of conduct, till finally it attains to the +vision of the greatness of life as it is revealed in its supreme and +all-commanding ideal.[12] + +3. Finally, in this connection the question of the _permanence of +conscience_ may be referred to. Is the ultimate of life a state in +which conscience will pervade every department of a man's being, +dominating all his thoughts and activities? or is the ideal condition +one in which conscience shall be outgrown and its operation rendered +superfluous? A recent writer on Christian ethics[13] makes the +remarkable statement that where there is no sense of sin conscience has +no function, and he draws the inference that where there is complete +normality and perfect moral health conscience will be in abeyance. +Satan, inasmuch as he lacks all moral instinct, can know nothing of +conscience; and, because of His sinlessness, Jesus must also be +pronounced conscienceless. Hence the paradox attributed to +Machiavelli: 'He who is without conscience is either a Christ or a +devil.' But though it is true that the Son of Man had no actual +experience of sin, and could not, indeed, feel remorse or contrition, +yet in so far as He was man there was in Him {80} the possibility of +sin, and in the intimate relation which He bore to the human race He +had a most accurate and clear knowledge both of the meaning and +consequences of evil. So far from saying that Christ had no +conscience, it would be nearer the truth to say that He had a perfect +conscience, a personality and fullness of consciousness which was a +complete reflection of, and harmony with, the highest conceivable good. +The confusion of thought into which Professor Lemme seems to fall is +due, we cannot help thinking, to the too restricted and negative +signification he gives to conscience. Conscience is not merely the +faculty of reproving and approving one's own conduct when brought into +relation with actual sin. It is involved in every moral judgment. A +good conscience is not only the absence of an evil one. It has also a +positive sanctioning value. The 'ought' of life is constantly present. +It is the whole man ever conscious of, and confronted by, his ideal +self. The conscience participates in man's gradual progress and +enlightenment; so far from the individual growing towards a condition +in which self-judgment ceases, he is progressing rather in moral +discernment, and becoming more and more responsive to the will of Him +whose impress and image he bears upon his soul. + +The tendency of modern physiological accounts of conscience has been to +undermine its authority and empty life of its responsibility, but no +theory of the origin of conscience must be permitted to invalidate its +judgments. If conscience has any moral worth it is that it contains +the promise and witness of God. The prime question is, What is the +nature of its testimony? According to the teaching of Scripture it +bears witness to the existence of a higher than man--to a divine Person +with whom he is spiritually akin and to whom he is accountable. + +'God's most intimate presence in the soul.' As the revelation of God's +will grows clearer man's ideal becomes loftier. Hence a man's +conscience is the measure of his moral life. It reveals God, and in +the light of God reveals man to himself. We carry a 'forever' within +our bosom, {81} 'ein Gott in unserer Brust,'[14] as Goethe says, which +reminds us that even while denizens of this earth we are citizens of +heaven and the sharers of an eternal life. Like another John the +Baptist, conscience points to one greater than itself. It emphasises +the discord that exists between the various parts of man's nature, a +discord which it condemns but cannot remove. It can judge, but it +cannot compel. Hence it places man before Christ, and bids him yield +to the sway of a new transforming power. As one has finely said, 'He +who has implanted in every breast such irrefragible testimony to the +right, and such unappeasable yearnings for its complete triumph, now +comes in His own perfect way to reveal Himself as the Lord of +conscience, the Guide of its perplexities, the Strength of its weakness +and the Perfecter of its highest hopes.'[15] + + + +[1] Davidson, _The Christian Conscience_. + +[2] Cf. Symonds, _Studies of Greek Poets_, first series, p. 191. + +[3] _Antigone_, Plumptre's Trans., 455-9. + +[4] Cf. Bunsen, _God in History_, vol. ii. p. 224; also Campbell, +_Religion in Greek Literature_. + +[5] Cf. Wundt, _Ethik_, vol. ii. p. 66. + +[6] _Data of Ethics_, p. 18. + +[7] _Proleg._, section 83. + +[8] Browning. + +[9] _Proleg._, section 321. + +[10] _Ethik_, vol. ii. p. 66. + +[11] _Idem_. + +[12] Cf. Wundt, _Ethik_, vol. ii. pp. 67-74. + +[13] Lemme, _Christliche Ethik_, vol. i. + +[14] _Tasso_, act iii. scene 2. + +[15] Davidson, _The Christian Conscience_, p. 113. + + + + +{82} + +CHAPTER VI + +'THE MIRACLE OF THE WILL' + +Closely connected with the conscience as a moral capacity is the power of +self-determination, or as it is popularly called--free-will. If +conscience is the manifestation of man as knowing, will is more +especially his manifestation as a being who acts. The subject which we +now approach presents at once a problem and a task. The nature of +freedom has been keenly debated from the earliest times, and the history +of the problem of the will is almost the history of philosophy. The +practical question which arises is whether the individual has any power +by which the gulf between the natural and the spiritual can be +transcended. Can man choose and decide for a spiritual world above that +in which he is by nature involved? The revelation of the good must, +indeed, precede the activity of man. But at the same time the change +cannot merely happen to him. He cannot simply be a passive recipient. +The new life must be taken up by his own activity, and be made his by his +own decision and acceptance. This responsive activity on the part of man +is the task which life presents to the will. + +Much obviously depends upon the answer we are able to give to this +question. If man has no power of choice, no capacity of +self-determination, and is nothing more than a part of the natural world, +then the ethical life is at once ruled out of court. + +The difficulties connected with the problem of moral freedom resolve +themselves mainly into three: a scientific, a psychological, and a +theological. + +{83} + +I. On the part of natural science it is claimed that man is subject, +like everything else, to physical necessity. + +II. From the psychological standpoint it is urged that man's actions are +always determined by the strongest motive. + +III. On the theological side it is alleged that human freedom is +incompatible with divine Sovereignty. A complete doctrine of freedom +would require to be examined in the light of these three objections. For +our purpose it will be sufficient to indicate briefly the value of these +difficulties, and the manner in which they may be met. + + +I + +The wonderful progress of the natural sciences in the second half of the +nineteenth century has tended to banish the old idea of freedom from the +realm of experience. Science, it is maintained, clearly shows that man +belongs to a great world-movement, in relation to which his whole life +and work are completely determined. Though even in earlier ages, and +especially in Stoic philosophy, this conception of life was not ignored, +it is more particularly in recent times, under the influence of the +evolutionary theory, that the idea of determination has been applied with +relentless insistence to the structure of the soul. There is, it is +alleged, no room for change or spontaneity. Everything, down to the +minutest impulse, depends upon something else, and proceeds from a +definite cause. The idea of choice is simply the remnant of an +unscientific mode of thinking. It might be sufficient to reply that in +thus reducing life and experience to a necessary part of a world-whole, +more is surrendered than even science is willing to yield. The freedom +which some writers reject in the interests of science they attempt to +introduce in an altered form. Why are these philosophers so anxious to +conserve the ethical consequences of life? Is it not because they feel +that there is something in man which will not fit into a rigid +world-mechanism, and that conduct would cease {84} to have moral worth if +life were reduced to a causal series of happenings? But it may be +further argued that, if the mechanical conception of life, which reduces +the spiritual to the natural, were consistently carried out it would lead +not merely to the destruction of the moral life, but to the destruction +of science itself. If man is merely a part of nature, subject entirely +to nature's law, then the realities of the higher life--love, +self-sacrifice, devotion to ends beyond ourselves--must be radically +re-interpreted or regarded simply as illusions. But it is also true that +from this standpoint science itself is an illusion. For if reality lies +only in the passing impressions of our sensible nature, the claim of +science to find valid truth must end in the denial of the very +possibility of knowledge. Does not the very existence of physical +science imply the priority of thought? While in one sense it may be +conceded that man is a part of nature, does not the truth, which cannot +be gainsaid, that he is aware of the fact, prove a certain priority and +power which differentiates him from all other phenomena of the universe? +If he is a link in the chain of being, he is at least a link which is +conscious of what he is. He is a being who knows himself, indeed, +through the objective world, but also realises himself only as he makes +himself its master and the agent of a divine purpose to which all things +are contributing, and for which all things exist. In all our reasoning +and endeavour we must start from the unity of the self-conscious soul. +Whatever we can either know or achieve, is _our_ truth, _our_ act +presented in and through our self-consciousness. It is impossible for us +to conceive any standard of truth or object of desire outside of our +experience. As a thinking and acting being man pursues ends, and has the +consciousness that they are his own ends, subject to his own choice and +control. It is always the self that the soul seeks; and the will is +nothing else than the man making and finding for himself another world. + +The attempt has recently been made to measure mental states by their +physical stimuli and explain mental {85} processes by cerebral reaction. +It is true that certain physical phenomena seem to be invariably +antecedent to thought, but so far science has been unable to exhibit the +form of nexus between these physical antecedents and ideas. Even if the +knowledge of the topography of the brain were immeasurably more advanced +than it now is, even though we could observe the vast network of +nerve-fibres and filaments of which the brain is composed, and could +discern the actual changes in brain-cells under nerve stimulations, we +should still be a long way off from understanding the nature and genesis +of ideas which can only be known to us as immediate in their own quality. +All that we can ever affirm is that a certain physical excitation is the +antecedent of thought. It is illegitimate to say that it is the 'cause' +of thought; unless, indeed, the word 'cause' be invested with no other +meaning than that which is involved in such a conception. It is, +however, in a very general way only, and within an exceedingly narrow +range, that such measurement is possible. We do not even know at present +what nerves correspond to the sensations of heat and cold, pain and joy; +and all attempts to localise will-centres have proved unavailing. + +The finer and more delicate feelings cannot be gauged. But even though +the alleged parallelism were entirely demonstrated, the immediate and +pertinent question would still remain, Who or what is the investigator? +Is it an ego, a thinking self? or is it only a complex of vibrations or +mechanical impressions bound together in a particular body which, for +convenience, is called an ego? Are the so-called entities--personality, +consciousness, self--but symbols, as Professor Mach says, useful in so +far as they help us to express our physical sensations, but which with +further research must be pronounced illusions?[1] Monistic naturalism, +which would explain all psychical experiences in terms of cerebral +action, must not be allowed to arrogate to itself powers which it does +not possess, and quietly brush {86} aside facts which do not fit into its +system. The moral sanctions so universally and deeply rooted in the +consciousness of mankind, the feelings of responsibility, of guilt and +regret; the soul's fidelities and heroisms, its hopes and fears, its aims +and ideals--the poetry, art, and religion that have made man what he is, +all that has contributed to the uplifting of the world--are, to say the +least, unaccounted for, if it must be held that 'man is born in chains.' +Primary facts must not be surrendered nor ultimate experiences sacrificed +in the interests of theoretic simplicity. In the recent +anti-metaphysical movement of Germany, of which Haeckel, Avenarius, +Oswald and Mach are representatives, there is presented the final +conflict. It is not freedom of will only that is at stake, it is the +very existence of a spiritual world. 'Es ist der Kampf um die Seele.'[2] + +If the world forms a closed and 'given' system in which every particular +is determined completely by its position in the whole, then there can be +no place for spontaneity, initiative, creation, which all investigation +shows to be the distinctive feature in human progress and upward +movement. So far from its being true that the world makes man, it would +be nearer the truth to say that man makes the world. A 'given' world can +never be primary.[3] There must be a mind behind it. We fall back, +therefore, upon the principle which must be postulated in the whole +discussion--the unity and self-determining activity of the self-conscious +mind. + + +II + +We may now proceed to the second problem of the will, the objection that +human action is determined by motives, and that what we call freedom is +nothing else than the necessary result of the pressure of motives upon +the will. In other words, the conduct of the individual is always +determined by the strongest motive. It will be seen on examination that +this objection is just another form of that which we have already +considered. Indeed, the {87} analogy of mechanical power is frequently +applied to the motives of the will. Diverse motives have been compared +to different forces which meet in one centre, and it is supposed that the +result in action is determined by the united pressure of these various +motives. Now it may be freely admitted at the outset that the individual +never acts except under certain influences. An uninfluenced man, an +unbiassed character cannot exist. Not for one moment do we escape the +environment, material and moral, which stimulates our inner life to +reaction and response. It is not contended that a man is independent of +all motives. What we do affirm is that the self-realising potentiality +of personality is present throughout. Much of the confusion of thought +in connection with this subject arises from a false and inadequate notion +of personality. Personality is the whole man, all that his past history, +present circumstances and future aims have made him, the result of all +that the world of which he is a part has contributed to his experience. +His bodily sensations, his mental acts, his desires and motives are not +detached and extraneous forces acting on him from without, but elements +which constitute his whole being. The person, in other words, is the +visible or tangible phenomenon of something inward--the phase or function +by which an individual agent takes his place in the common world of human +intercourse and interaction, and plays his peculiar and definite part in +life.[4] But this totality of consciousness, so far from reducing man to +a 'mere manufactured article,' gives to personality its unique +distinction. By personality all things are dominated. 'Other things +exist, so to speak, for the sake of their kind and for the sake of other +things: a person is never a mere means to something beyond, but always at +the same time an end in himself. He has the royal and divine right of +creating law, of starting by his exception a new law which shall +henceforth be a canon and a standard.'[5] + +{88} + +The objection to the freedom of the will which we are now considering may +be best appreciated if we examine briefly the two extreme theories which +have been maintained on the subject. On the one hand, _determinism_ or, +as it is sometimes called, necessitarianism, holds that all our actions +are conditioned by law--the so-called motive that influences a man's +conduct is simply a link in a chain of occurrences of which his act is +the last. The future has no possibilities hidden in its womb. I am +simply what the past has made me. My circumstances are given, and my +character is simply the necessary resultant of the natural forces that +act upon me. On the other hand, _indeterminism_, or libertarianism, +insists upon absolute liberty of choice of the individual, and denies +that necessity or continuity determines conduct. Of two alternatives +both may now be really possible. You can never predict what will be, nor +lay down absolutely what a man will do. The world is not a finished and +fixed whole. It admits of infinite possibilities, and instead of the +volition I have actually made, I could just as easily have made a +different one. + +Without entering upon a detailed criticism of these two positions, it may +be said that both contain an element of truth and are not so +contradictory as they seem. On the one hand, all the various factors of +the complex will may seem to be determined by something that lies beyond +our control, and thus our will itself be really determined. But, on the +other hand, moral continuity in its last analysis is only a half truth, +and must find its complement in the recognition of the possibilities of +new beginnings. The very nature of moral action implies, as Lotze has +said, that new factors may enter into the stream of causal sequence, and +that even though a man's life may be, and must be, largely conditioned by +his circumstances, his activity may be really originative and free. What +the determinists seem to forget is, as Green says, that 'character is +only formed through a man's conscious presentation to himself of objects +as _his_ good, as that in which his self-satisfaction is found.'[6] {89} +Desires are always for objects which have a value for the individual. A +man's real character is reflected in his desires, and it is not that he +is moved by some outside abstract force, which, being the strongest, he +cannot resist, but it is because he puts _himself_ into the desire or +motive that it becomes the strongest, the one which he chooses to follow. +My motives are really part of myself, of which all my actions are the +outcome. Human desires, in short, are not merely external tendencies +forcing a man this way or that way. They are a part of the man himself, +and are always directed towards objects related to a self; and it is the +satisfaction of self that makes them desirable. + +On the other hand, the fallacy lurking in the libertarian view arises +from the fact that it also makes a hard and fast distinction between the +self and the will. The indeterminists speak as if the self had amongst +its several faculties a will which is free in the sense of being able to +act independently of all desires and motives. But, as a matter of fact, +the will, as we have said, is simply the man, and it cannot be separated +from his history, his character, and the objects which his character +desires. To speak, as people sometimes do in popular language, of being +free to do as they like--that is, to be influenced by no motive whatever, +is not only an idea absurd in itself, but one which, if pushed to its +consequences, would be subversive of all freedom, and consequently of all +moral value. 'The liberty of indifference,' if the phrase means anything +at all, implies not merely that the agent is free from all external +compulsion, but that he is free from himself, not determined even by his +own character. And if we ask what it really is that causes him to act, +it must be answered, some caprice of the moment, some accidental impulse +or arbitrary freak of fancy. The late Professor James makes a valiant +attempt to solve the 'dilemma of determinism' by resorting to the idea of +'chance' which he defines as a 'purely relative term, giving us no +information about that which is predicated, except that it happens to be +disconnected with something else--not controlled, secured or {90} +necessitated by other things in advance of its own actual presence.'[7] +'On my way home,' he says, 'I can choose either of two ways'; and suppose +'the choice is made twice over and each time falls on a different +street.' 'Imagine that I first walk through Divinity Avenue, and then am +set again at the door of this hall just as I was before the choice was +made. Imagine then that, _everything else being the same_,[8] I now make +a different choice and traverse Oxford Street. Looking outwardly at +these universes of which my two acts are a part, can you say which is the +impossible and accidental one and which the rational and necessary one?' +Perhaps an outsider could not say, but Professor James, if he examined +his reasons, could say. He assumes that 'everything else is the same.' +But that is just what cannot be. A new factor has been introduced, it +may be a whim, a sudden impulse, perhaps even a desire to upset +calculation--a something in his character in virtue of which his second +choice is different from his first. It is an utter misnomer to call it +'chance.' Even though he had tossed a coin and acted on the throw, his +action would still be determined by the kind of man he was. + +Let us not seek to defend freedom on inadequate grounds, or contend for a +spurious liberty. No view of the subject should indeed debar us from +acknowledging 'changes in heart and life,' but a misunderstanding of the +doctrine of freedom may tend to paralyse moral initiative. The attempt +to sunder the will and the understanding and discover the source of +freedom in the realm of the emotions, as the voluntarists seek to do, +cannot be regarded as satisfactory or sound philosophy. In separating +faith and knowledge the Ritschlian school tends to make subjective +feeling the measure of truth and life; while recent psychological +experiments in America with the phenomena of faith-healing, hypnotism and +suggestion, claim to have discovered hitherto unsuspected potencies of +the will. This line of thought has been welcomed by many as a relief +from the mechanical theory of life and as a witness to moral {91} freedom +and Christian hope. But so far from proving the sovereignty and autonomy +of the will, it discloses rather the possibilities of its abject bondage +and thraldom. + +No one can doubt the facts which Professor James and others, working from +the side of religious psychology, have recently established, or discredit +the instances of conversion to which the annals of the Christian life so +abundantly testify. But even conversion must not be regarded as a change +without motives. There must be some connection between motive, character +and act, otherwise the new spiritual experience would be simply a magical +happening lacking all moral significance. If there were no continuity of +consciousness, if I could be something to-day irrespective of what I was +yesterday, then all we signify by contrition, penitence, and shame would +have no real meaning. Even the grace of God works through natural +channels and human influences. The past is not so much obliterated, as +taken up into the new life and transfigured with a new value. + +The truth of spontaneity and initiative in life has lately found in M. +Bergson a fresh and vigorous advocacy, and we cannot be too grateful to +that profound thinker for his reassertion of some neglected aspects of +freedom and his philosophical vindication of the doctrine which puts it +in a new position of prominence and security. 'Life is Creation.' +'Reality is a perpetual growth, a Creation pursued without end.' 'Our +will performs this miracle.' 'Every human work in which there is +invention, every movement that manifests spontaneity brings something new +into the world. In the composition of the work of genius, as in a simple +free decision, we create what no mere assemblage of materials could have +given.'[9] But yet he says that 'life cannot create absolutely because +it is confronted with matter. . . . But it seizes upon this matter which +is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the greatest +possible amount of indetermination and liberty.'[10] Even Bergson, +though he emphasises so strongly immediacy and incalculableness in {92} +all human action, cannot deny that the bodily arrangements and mechanisms +are at least the basis of the working of the soul. Man cannot produce +any change in the world except in strict co-ordination with the forces +and qualities of material things. The idea in his consciousness is +powerless save in so far as it is a guide to combinations and +modifications which are latent in reality. The man who works with his +hands does not create out of nothing a new totality. Even genius is +conditioned by the elements he works with and upon. He can do nothing +with his materials beyond what it is in themselves to yield. This sense +of co-operation is strongly marked in the higher grades of activity. The +world may be in the making, as Bergson says, but it is being made of +possibilities already inherent in it. Life may be incalculable, and you +can never know beforehand what a great man, indeed, what any man may +achieve, but even the originality of a Leonardo or a Beethoven cannot +effect the impossible or contradict the order of nature. The sculptor +feels that the statue is already lying in the marble awaiting only his +creative touch to bring it forth. The metal is alive in the worker's +hands, coaxing him to make of it something beautiful.[11] Purpose does +not come out of an empty mind. Freedom and initiative never begin +entirely _de novo_. Life is a 'creation,' but it is also, as M. Bergson +labours to prove, an 'evolution.' Our ideals are made out of realities. +Our heaven must be shaped out of the materials of our earth. + +A moral personality is a self-conscious, self-determining being. But +that is only half the reality. The other half is that it is a +self-determining consciousness _in a world_. As Bergson is careful to +tell us, the shape and extent of self-consciousness are determined by our +relation to a world which acts upon us and upon which we act. Without a +world in which we had personal business we should have no +self-consciousness. + +The co-operation of spontaneity and necessity is implied {93} in every +true idea of freedom. If a man were the subject of necessity alone he +would be merely the creature of mechanical causation. If he had the +power of spontaneity only his so-called freedom would be a thing of +caprice. Necessity means simply that man is conditioned by the world in +which he lives. Spontaneity means, not that he can conjure up at a wish +a dream-world of no conditions, but that he is not determined by anything +outside of himself, since the very conditions amid which he is placed may +be transmuted by him into elements of his own character. Moral decisions +are never isolated from ideals and tasks presented by our surroundings. +The self cannot act on any impulse however external till the impulse has +transplanted itself within and become our motive. + +'Our life,' says Eucken, 'is a conflict between fate and freedom, between +being "given" and spontaneity. Spiritual individuality does not come to +any one, but has first to be won by the work of life, elevating that +which destiny brings. . . . The idea of freedom calls man to independent +co-operation in the conflict of the worlds. It gives to the simply human +and apparently commonplace an incomparable greatness. However powerful +destiny may be, it does not determine man entirely: for even in +opposition to it there is liberation from it.'[12] + + +III + +It will not be necessary to dwell at any length on the third +difficulty--the incompatibility of divine sovereignty and grace with +moral personality. + +How to reconcile divine power and human freedom is the great problem +which meets us on the very threshold of the study of man's relation to +God. The solution, in so far as it is possible for the mind, must be +sought in the divine immanence. God works through man, and man acts +through God. Reason, conscience, and will are equally the testimony to +God's indwelling in man and man's {94} indwelling in God. It is, as St. +Paul says, God who worketh in us both to will and to do. But just +because of that inherent power, it is we who work out our own character +and destiny. The divine is not introduced into human life at particular +points or in exceptional crises only. Every man has something of the +divine in him, and when he is truest to himself he is most at one with +God. The whole meaning of human personality is a growing realisation of +the divine personality. God's sovereignty has no meaning except in +relation to a world of which He is sovereign, and His purposes can only +be fulfilled through human agency. While His thoughts far transcend in +wisdom and sublimity those of His creatures they must be in a sense of +the same kind--thoughts, in other words, which beings made in His image +can receive, love and, in a measure, share. And though God cannot be +conceived as the author of evil, He may permit it and work through it, +bringing order out of chaos, and evolving through suffering and conflict +His sovereign purposes. + +The problem becomes acutest when we endeavour to harmonise the antinomy +of man's moral freedom and the doctrine of grace. However insoluble the +mystery, it is not lessened by denying one side in the interest of unity. +Scripture boldly affirms both truths. No writer insists more strenuously +than the Apostle Paul on the sovereign election of God, yet none presents +with greater fervour the free offer of salvation. In his ethical +teaching, at least, Paul is no determinist. Freedom is the distinctive +note of his conception of life. Life is a great and solemn trust +committed to each by God, for the use or abuse of which every man will be +called to account. His missionary zeal would have no meaning if he did +not believe that men were free to accept or refuse his message. Paul's +own example, indeed, is typical, and while he knew that he was 'called,' +he knew, too, that it lay with him to yield himself and present his life +as a living sacrifice to God. Jesus, too, throughout His ministry, +assumed the ability of man freely to accept His call to righteousness, +and though He speaks {95} of the change as a 'new birth,' a creation from +above, beyond the strength of man to effect, He invariably makes His +appeal to the will--'Follow Me,' 'Come unto Me.' He assumes in all His +dealings with individuals that they have the power of decision. And so +far from admitting that the past could not be undone, and no chain of +habit broken, the whole purpose of His message and lifework was to +proclaim the need and possibility of a radical change in life. So full +of hope was He for man that He despaired of none, not even of those who +had most grievously failed, or most utterly turned their back on purity. +The parables in the Third Gospel of the lost coin, the lost sheep, and +the lost son lay emphasis upon the possibility of recovery, and, in the +case of the prodigal, specially on the ability to return for those who +have gone astray. + +The teaching of Scripture implies that while God is the source of all +spiritual good, and divine grace must be present with and precede all +rightful action of the human will, it rests with man to respond to the +divine love. No human soul is left destitute of the visiting of God's +spirit, and however rudimentary the moral life may be, no bounds can be +set to the growth which may, and which God intends should, result +wherever the human will is consentient. While, therefore, no man can +claim merit in the sight of God, but must acknowledge his absolute +dependency upon divine grace, no one can escape loss or blame if he +wilfully frustrates God's design of mercy. Whatever mystery may attend +the subject of God's sovereign grace, the Bible never presents it as +negating the entire freedom of man to give or withhold response to the +gift and leading of the divine spirit. + +In the deepest New Testament sense to be free is to have the power of +acting according to one's true nature. A man's ideal is his true self, +and all short of that is for him a limitation of freedom. Inasmuch as no +ideal is ever completely realised, true freedom is not so much a +possession as a progressive appropriation. It is at once a gift and a +task. It contains the twofold idea of emancipation {96} and submission. +Mere deliverance from the lower self is not liberty. Freedom must be +completed by the appropriation of the higher self and the acceptance of +the obligations which that self involves. It is to be acquired through +submission to the truth. 'Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall +make you free.' A man is never so free as when he is the bondsman of +Christ. The saying of St. Paul sums up the secret and essence of all +true freedom: 'The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me +free from the law of sin and death.' + + + +[1] Mach, _Erkenntniss und Irrtum_. Vorwort. See also _Die Analyse der +Empfindungen_, p. 20. 'Das Sich ist unrettbar,' he says. + +[2] Cf. W. Schmidt, _Der Kampf um die Seele_, p. 13. + +[3] Cf. Eucken. + +[4] Cf. Wallace, _Logic of Hegel, Proleg._, p. 233. + +[5] Wallace, _Idem_, p. 235. Cf. Aristotle's wise man whose conduct is +not _kata logon_ but _meta logon_. + +[6] _Proleg._, section 108. + +[7] _The Will to Believe_, p. 154. + +[8] _The italics are ours_. + +[9] _Creative Evolution_ (Eng. trans.), p. 252. + +[10] _Idem_, p. 265. + +[11] Cf. Morris, _Lects. on Art_, p. 195; Bosanquet, _Hist. of +Aesthetic_, p. 445; also _Individuality and Value_, p. 166. + +[12] _Life's Basis and Life's Ideals_, p. 181 f. + + + + +{97} + +SECTION C + +CHARACTER + +{99} + +CHAPTER VII + +MODERN THEORIES OF LIFE + +Bearing in mind the three fundamental ideas lying at the root of all +ethical inquiry--End, Norm, and Motive--we have now to deal with the +shaping forces of the Christian life, the making of character. In this +section, therefore, we shall be engaged in a discussion of the ideals, +laws, and springs of moral action. And first, What is the supreme good? +What is the highest for which a man should live? This question +determines the main problem of life. It forces itself irresistibly upon +us to-day, and the answer to it is the test of every system of morals. + +But before endeavouring to determine the distinctively Christian ideal, +as presented in the teaching of Jesus and interpreted by the growing +Christian consciousness of mankind, it may be well to review briefly some +of the main theories of life which are pressing their claims upon our +attention to-day. Many of these modern views have arisen as a reaction +against traditional religion. From the seventeenth century onwards, and +especially during the nineteenth, there has been a growing disposition to +call in question the Christian conception of life. The antagonism +reveals itself not only in a distrust of all forms of religion, but also +in a craving for wider culture. The old certitudes fail to satisfy men +who have acquired new habits of reflection, and there is a disinclination +to accept a scheme of life which seems to narrow human interests and +exclude such departments as science, art, and politics. One reason of +this change is to be found in the wonderful advance of science during the +last century. Men's minds, withdrawn {100} from primary, and fixed upon +secondary causes, have refused to believe that the order of nature can be +disturbed by supernatural intervention. Whether the modern antipathy to +Christianity is justified is not the question at present before us. We +may see in the movements of our day not so much a proof that the old +faith is false, as an indication that if Christianity is to regain its +power a radical re-statement of its truths, and a more comprehensive +application of its principles to life as a whole must be undertaken. + +In the endeavour to find an all-embracing ideal of life two possibilities +present themselves, arising from two different ways of viewing man. +Human life is in one aspect receptive; in another, active. It may be +regarded as dependent upon nature for its maintenance, or as a creative +power whose function is not merely to receive what nature supplies, but +to re-shape nature's materials and create a new spiritual world. +Receptivity and activity are inseparable, and form together the +harmonious rhythm of life. + +But there has ever been a tendency to emphasise one or other of these +aspects. The question has constantly arisen, Which is the more important +for life--what we receive or what we create? Accordingly two contrasted +conceptions of life have appeared--a naturalistic and an idealistic. +Under the first we understand those theories which place man in the realm +of sense and explain life by material conditions; under the second we +group such systems as give to life an independent creative power. + + +I + +NATURALISTIC TENDENCY + +1. Naturalism has usually taken three forms, an idyllic or poetic, a +philosophic, and a scientific, of which Rousseau, Feuerbach, and Haeckel +may be chosen as representatives. + +(1) According to Rousseau, man is really a part of nature, {101} and only +as he conforms to her laws and finds his satisfaction in what she gives +can he be truly happy. Nature is the mother of us all, and only as we +allow her spirit to pervade and nourish our being do we really live. The +watchword, 'back to nature' may be said to have given the first impulse +to the later call of the 'simple life,' which has arisen as a protest +against the luxury, ostentation, and artificiality of modern times. + +(2) The philosophical form of naturalism, as expounded by Feuerbach, +inveighs against an idealistic interpretation of life. The author of +_The Essence of Christianity_ started as a disciple of Hegel, but soon +reversed the Hegelian principle, and pronounced the spiritual world to be +a fiction of the mind. Man belongs essentially to the earth, and is +governed by his senses. Self-interest is his only motive, and egoism his +sole law of life. It was only what might be expected, that the ultimate +consequences of this philosophy of the senses should be drawn by a +disciple of Feuerbach, Max Stirner,[1] in whose work, _The Individual and +His Property_, the virtues of egoism are extolled, and contempt is poured +upon all disinterestedness and altruism. + +(3) The latest form of naturalism is the scientific or monistic, as +represented by Haeckel. It may be described as scientific in so far as +its author professes to deduce the moral life from biological principles. +In the chapter[2] devoted to Ethics in his work, _The Riddle of the +Universe_, his pronouncements upon morality are not scientifically +derived, but simply dogmatically assumed. The underlying principle of +monism is that the universe is a unity in which no distinction exists +between the material and the spiritual. In this world as we know it +there reigns only one kind of law, the invariable law of nature. The +so-called spiritual life of man is not an independent realm having its +own rights and aims; it belongs wholly to nature. The moral world is a +province of the physical, and the key to all the departments of reality +is to be found in science {102} alone. The doctrine of evolution is +brought into the service of monism, and the attempt is made to prove that +in the very process of biological development human thought, moral +sentiment, and social instincts have been evolved. With a curious +sacrifice of consistency, Haeckel does not agree with Feuerbach in +exalting egoism to the place of supremacy in the moral life. He +recognises two kinds of duty--duty to self and duty to society. The +social sense once created is permanent, and rises to ever-fresh +developments. But benevolence, like every other obligation, is, +according to evolutionary monism, a product evolved from the battle of +existence. Traced to its source, it has its spring in the physical +organism, and is but an enlargement of the ego.[3] + +The monistic naturalism of Haeckel offers no high ideal to life. Its +Ethics is but a glorified egoism. Its dictates never rise above the +impulses derived from nature. But not religion only with its kingdom of +God, nor morality only with its imperatives, nor art with its power of +idealising the world of nature, but even science itself, with its claim +to unify and organise facts, proves that man stands apart from, and is +higher than, the material world. The very existence of such activities +in the invisible realm renders vain every attempt to reduce the spiritual +to the natural, and to make truth, goodness and beauty mere outgrowths of +nature. + +2. On its ethical side naturalism is closely associated with the theory +of life which bears the name of _utilitarianism_--the theory which +regards pleasure or profit as the aim of man. In its most independent +form Hedonism can hardly be said to exist now as a reasoned theory. +Carried out to its extreme consequences it reduces man to a mere animal. +Hence a type of reflective egoism has taken the place of animal +gratification, and the idea of ulterior benefit has succeeded to that of +immediate pleasure. + +The names associated with this theory of morals are those of Hobbes, +Bentham, and the two Mills. Hobbes, {103} who preaches undiluted +egoism,[4] may be regarded as the father of utilitarianism. But the +title was first applied to the school of Bentham.[5] Bentham's watchword +was 'utility' expressed in his famous formula--'The greatest happiness of +the greatest number.' While renouncing the abstract ideal of equality, +he yet asserted the equal claim of every individual to happiness. In its +distribution 'each is to count for one, and no one for more than one.' +Hence Bentham insisted upon an exact quantitative calculation of the +consequences of our actions as the only sufficient guide to conduct. The +end is the production of the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain. + +J. S. Mill modified considerably the principle of utility by introducing +the doctrine of the qualitative difference in pleasures.[6] While Bentham +assumed self-interest as the only motive of conduct, Mill affirmed the +possibility of altruism in the motive as well as in the end or criterion +of right actions.[7] Thus the idea of utility was extended to embrace +higher moral ends. But the antithesis between the 'self' and the 'other' +was not overcome. To introduce the notion of sympathy, as Adam Smith and +others did, is to beg the question. Try as you will, you cannot deduce +benevolence from selfishness. The question for the utilitarian must +always arise, 'How far ought I to follow my natural desires, and how far +my altruistic?' There must be a constant conflict, and he can only be at +peace with himself by striking a balance. The utilitarian must be a +legalist. The principle of self-sacrifice does not spring from his inner +being. Truth, love, sacrifice--all that gives to man his true worth as a +being standing in vital relation to God--are only artificial adaptations +based on convenience and general advantage. + +3. Evolutionary ethics, as expounded by Spencer and others, though +employing utilitarian principles, affords an ampler and more plausible +account of life than early {104} Hedonism.[8] The evolutionists have +enriched the idea of happiness by quietly slipping in many ends which +really belong to the idea of the 'good.' As the term 'gravitation' was +the magic word of the eighteenth century, so the word 'evolution' is the +talisman of the present age. It must be admitted that it is a sublime +and fruitful idea. It explains much in nature and history which the old +static notion failed to account for. It has a great deal to teach us +even in the spiritual sphere. But when applied to life as a whole, and +when it is assumed to be the sole explanation of moral action, it is apt +to rob the will of its initiative and reduce all moral achievements to +merely natural factors in an unfolding drama of life. The soul itself, +with all its manifestations and experiences, is treated simply as the +resultant and harmonious effect of adaptation to environment. Man is +regarded as the highest animal, the most richly specialised organism--the +last of a long series in the development of life, the outstanding feature +of which is the acquired power of complete adjustment to the world, of +which it is a part. Strictly speaking, there is no room for a personal +God in this mechanical theory of the universe. The world becomes +inevitably 'the Be all and the End all.' Hence, as might be expected, +while evolutionary Ethics claims to cover the whole range of this present +life, it does not pretend to extend into the regions of the hereafter. +It is concerned only with what it conceives to be the highest earthly +good--the material and social well-being of mankind. But no theory of +life can be pronounced satisfactory which explains man in terms of this +earth alone. The 'Great Unknown' which Mr. Spencer posits[9] as the +ultimate source of all power, is a force to be reckoned with; and, known +or unknown, is the mightiest factor in all life's experiences. Man's +spiritual nature in its whole range cannot be treated as of no account. +'The powers of the world to come' have an essential bearing upon human +{105} conduct in this world. They shape our thoughts and determine our +ideals. Hence any view of life which excludes from consideration the +spiritual side of man, and limits his horizon by the things of this earth +must of necessity be inadequate and unsatisfactory. + +4. Closely connected with, and, indeed, arising out of, the evolutionary +theory, another type of thought, prevalent to-day, falls to be +noted--_the socialistic tendency_. It is now universally recognised that +the individual cannot be treated as an isolated being, but only in +relation to society of which he is a part. The emphasis is laid upon the +solidarity of mankind, and man is explained by such social facts as +heredity and environment. Marx and Engels, the pioneers of the +socialistic movement, accepted in the fullest sense the scientific +doctrine of evolution. So far from being a mere Utopian dream, Marx +contends that Socialism is the inevitable outcome of the movement of +modern society. The aim of the agitation is to bring men to a clear +consciousness of a process which is going forward in all countries where +the modern industrial methods prevail. Democracy must come to itself and +assume its rights. The keynote of the past has been the exploitation of +man by man in the three forms of slavery, serfdom, and wage-labour. The +keynote of the future must be the exploitation of the earth by man +_associated to man_. The practical aim of Socialism is that industry is +to be carried on by associated labourers jointly owning the means of +production. Here, again, the all-pervading ideal is--the general good of +society--the happiness of the greatest number. The reduction of all aims +to a common level, the equalising of social conditions, the direction and +control of all private interests and personal endeavours, are to be means +to one end--the material good of the community. Socialism is not, +however, confined to an agitation for material welfare. The industrial +aspect of it is only a phase of a larger movement. On its ethical side +it is the outcome of a strong aspiration after a higher life.[10] The +world is awakening to {106} the fact that the majority of the human +family has been virtually excluded from all participation in man's +inheritance of knowledge and culture. The labouring classes have been +from time immemorial sunk in drudgery and ignorance, bearing the burden +of society without sharing in its happiness. It is contended that every +man ought to have an opportunity of making the most of his life and +obtaining full freedom for the development of body and mind. The aim to +secure justice for the many, to protect the weak against the strong, to +mitigate the fierceness of competition, to bring about a better +understanding between capital and labour, and to gain for all a more +elevated and expansive existence, is not merely consistent with, but +indispensable to, a true Christian conception of life. But the question +which naturally arises is, how this reformation is to be brought about. +Never before have so many revolutionary schemes been proposed, and so +many social panaceas for a better world set forth. It is, indeed, a +hopeful sign of the times that the age of unconcern is gone and the +temper of cautious inaction has yielded to scientific diagnosis and +courageous treatment. It must not be forgotten, however, that the +exclusively utilitarian position tends to lower the moral ideal, and that +the exaggerated emphasis upon the social aspect of life fails to do +justice to the independence of the individual. The tendency of modern +political thought is to increase the control of government, and to regard +all departments of activity as branches of the state, to be held and +worked for the general good of the community. Thus there is a danger +that the individual may gradually lose all initiative, and life be +impoverished under a coercive mechanical system. + +Socialism in its extreme form might easily become a new kind of tyranny. +By the establishment of collectivism, by making the state the sole owner +of all wealth, the sole employer of labour, and the controller of science +and art, as well as of education and religion, there is a danger of +crushing the spiritual side of man, and giving to all life and endeavour +a merely naturalistic character and content. + +{107} + +5. It was inevitable that an exaggerated insistence upon the importance +of society should provoke an equally one-sided emphasis upon the worth of +the individual, and that as a protest against the demands of Socialism +there should arise a form of subjectivism which aims at complete +self-affirmation. + +(1) This tendency has received the name of _aesthetic-individualism_. As +a conception of life it may be regarded as intermediate between +naturalism and idealism. While rooted in a materialistic view of life, +it is moulded in the hands of its best advocates by spiritual +aspirations. Its standpoint may be characterised as a theory of +existence which seeks the highest value of life in the realm of the +beautiful, and which therefore endeavours to promote the supreme good of +the individual through devotion to art. Not only does the cultivation of +art tend in itself to elevate life by concentrating the soul upon all +that is fairest and noblest in the world, but the best means of enriching +and ennobling life is to regard life itself as a work of art. This view +of existence, it is claimed, widens the scope of experience, and leads us +into ampler worlds of interest and enjoyment. It aims at giving to +personality a rounded completeness, and bringing the manifold powers and +passions of man into harmonious unity. As a theory of life it is not +new. Already Plato, and still more Aristotle, maintained that a true man +must seek his highest satisfaction not in the possession of external +things, but in the most complete manifestation of his faculties. +Individual aestheticism largely animated the Romantic movement of Germany +at the beginning of last century. But probably the best illustration of +it is to be found in Goethe and Schiller; while in our country Matthew +Arnold has given it a powerful and persuasive exposition. It was the aim +of Goethe to mould his life into a work of art, and all his activities +and poetic aspirations were subordinated to this end. The beautiful +harmonious life is the true life, the well-rounded whole from which must +be banished everything narrow, vulgar, and distasteful, and in which +{108} everything fair and noble must find expression. 'Each individual,' +says Schiller, 'is at once fitted and destined for a pure ideal manhood.' +And the attainment of this ideal requires from us the most zealous +self-culture and a concentration of effort upon our own peculiar +gifts.[11] + +A new form of aestheticism has lately appeared which pretends to combine +morality and culture. 'The New Ethic,'[12] as it is called, protests +against the sombreness of religious traditions and the rigidity of moral +restrictions, and assigns to art the function of emancipating man and +idealising life. But what this movement really offers under its new +catchword is simply a subtler form of epicureanism, a finer +self-indulgence. It is the expression of a desire to be free from all +restraint, to close one's eyes to the 'majesty of human suffering,' +allowing one's thoughts to dwell only upon the agreeable and gay in life. +It regards man as simply the sum-total of his natural inclinations, and +conceives duty to be nothing else than the endeavour to bring these into +equilibrium. + +That the aesthetic culture of life is a legitimate element in Christian +morality can hardly be denied by any one who has pondered the meaning in +all its breadth of the natural simplicity and spiritual beauty of the +manifestation of the Son of Man. The beautiful, the good, and the true +are intimately connected, and constitute together all that is conceivably +highest in life. Christian Ethics ought to include everything that is +gracious and fair; and any theory of life that has no room for joy and +beauty, for laughter and song, for appreciation of artistic or poetic +expression, is surely deficient. But it is one thing to acknowledge +these things; it is another to make them the whole of existence. We live +in a world in which much else besides beauty and joy exists, and it is +not by shirking contact with the unlovely phases of experience, but by +resolutely accepting the ministry of sorrow they impose, {109} that we +attain to our highest selves. The narrow Puritanism of a past age may +need the corrective of the broader Humanism of to-day, but not less must +the Ethic of self-culture be reinforced by the Ethic of self-sacrifice. +We may not cultivate the beauty of life at the cost of duty, nor forget +that it is often only through the immolation of self that the self can be +realised. + +(2) While the Romantic movement, of which Goethe was the most illustrious +representative, did much to enlarge life and ennoble the whole expanse of +being, its extreme subjectivism and aristocratic exclusiveness found +ultimate expression (_a_) in the pessimism of Schopenhauer, and the +arrogance of Nietzsche. The alliance between art and morality was +dissolved. The imagination scorned all fetters and, in its craving for +novelty and contempt of convention, became the organ of individual +caprice and licence. In Nietzsche--that strange erratic genius--at once +artist, philosopher, and rhapsodist--this philosophy of life found +brilliant if bizarre utterance. If Schopenhauer reduces existence to +nothing, and finds in oblivion and extinction its solution, (_b_) +Nietzsche seeks rather to magnify life by striking the note of a proud +and defiant optimism. He claims for the individual limitless rights; +and, repudiating all moral ties, asserts the complete sovereignty of the +self-sufficing ego. With a deep-rooted hatred of the prevailing +tendencies of civilisation, he combines a vehement desire for a richer +and unrestrained development of human power. He would not only revalue +all moral values, but reverse all ideas of right and wrong. He would +soar 'beyond good and evil,' declaring that the prevailing judgments of +mankind are pernicious prejudices which have too long tyrannised over the +world. He acknowledges himself to be not a moralist, but an +'immoralist,' and he bids us break in pieces the ancient tables of the +Decalogue. Christianity is the most debasing form of slave-morality. It +has made a merit of weakness and servility, and given the name of virtue +to such imbecilities as meekness and self-sacrifice. He calls upon the +individual to exalt himself. The man of {110} the future is to be the +man of self-mastery and virile force, 'the Superman,' who is to crush +under his heel the cringing herd of weaklings who have hitherto possessed +the world. The earth is for the strong, the capable, the few. A mighty +race, self-assertive, full of vitality and will, is the goal of humanity. +The vital significance of Nietzsche's radicalism lies less in its +positive achievement than in its stimulating effect. Though his account +of Christianity is a caricature, his strong invective has done much to +correct the sentimental rose-water view of the Christian faith which has +been current in some pietistic circles. The Superman, with all its +vagueness, is a noble, inspiring ideal. The problem of the race is to +produce a higher manhood, to realise which there is need for sacrifice +and courage. Nietzsche is the spiritual father and forerunner of the +Eugenics. The Superman is not born, he is bred. Our passions must be +our servants. Obedience and fidelity, self-discipline and courage are +the virtues upon which he insists. 'Be master of life. . . .' 'I call +you to a new nobility. Ye shall become the procreators and sowers of the +future.' + +While there is much that is suggestive in Nietzsche's scathing +criticisms, and many passages of striking beauty in his books, he is +stronger in his denials than his affirmations, and it is the negative +side that his followers have fastened upon and developed. Sudermann, the +novelist, has carried his philosophy of egoism to its extreme. This +writer, in a work entitled _Sodom's End_, affirms that there is nothing +holy and nothing evil. There is no such thing as duty or love. Only +nerves exist. The 'Superman' becomes a monster. Such teaching can +scarcely be taken seriously. It conveys no helpful message. It is the +perversion of life's ideal. + +As a passing phase of thought it is interesting, but it solves no +problems; it advances no truths. It resembles a whirlwind which helps to +clear the air and drive away superfluous leaves, but it does little to +quicken or expand new seeds of life. + +{111} + +II + +IDEALISTIC TENDENCY + +1. Modern Idealism was inaugurated by Kant. Kant's significance for +thought lies in his twofold demand for a new basis of knowledge and +morality. He conceived that both are possible, and that both are +interdependent, and have but one solution. The solution, however, could +only be achieved by a radical change of method, and by the introduction +of new standards of value. Kant's theory of morals was an attempt to +reconcile the two opposing ethical principles which were current in the +eighteenth century. On the one side, the Realists treated man simply as +a natural being, and accordingly demanded a pursuance of his natural +impulses. On the other side, the Dogmatists conceived that conduct must +be governed by divine sanctions. Both theories agreed in regarding +happiness as the end of life; the one the happiness of sensuous +enjoyment; the other, that of divine favour. Both set an end outside of +man himself as the basis of their ethical doctrine. Kant was +dissatisfied with this explanation of the moral life. The question, +therefore, which arises is, Whence comes the idea of duty which is an +undeniable fact of our experience? If it came merely from without, it +could never speak to us with absolute authority, nor claim unquestioning +obedience. That which comes from without depends for its justification +upon some consequence external to our action, and must be based, indeed, +upon some excitement of reward or pain. But that would destroy it as a +moral good; since nothing can be morally good that is not pursued for its +own sake. Kant, therefore, seeks to show that the law of the moral life +must originate within us, must spring from an inherent principle of our +own rational nature. Hence the distinctive feature of Kant's moral +theory is the enunciation of the 'Categorical Imperative'--the supreme +inner demand of reason. From this principle of autonomy there arise at +once the notions of man's freedom and the law's {112} universality. +Self-determination is the presupposition of all morality. But what is +true for one is true for all. Each man is a member of a rational order, +and possesses the inalienable independence and the moral dignity of being +an end in himself. Hence the formula of all duty is, 'Act from a maxim +at all times fit to be a universal law.' + +It is the merit of Kant that he has given clear expression to the majesty +of the moral law. No thinker has more strongly asserted man's spiritual +nature or done more to free the ideal of duty from all individual +narrowness and selfish interest. But Kant's principle of duty labours +under the defect, that while it determines the form, it tells us nothing +of the content of duty. We learn from him the grandeur of the moral law, +but not its essence or motive-power. He does not clearly explain what it +is in the inner nature of man that gives to obligation its universal +validity or even its dominating force. As a recent writer truly says, +'In order that morality may be possible at all, its law must be realised +_in_ me, but while the way in which it is realised is mine, the content +is not mine; otherwise the whole conception of obligation is +destroyed.'[13] If the soul's function is purely formal how can we +attain to a self-contained life? Moreover, if the freedom which Kant +assigns to man is really to achieve a higher ideal and bring forth a new +world, must there not be some spiritual power or energy, some dynamic +force, which, while it is within man, is also without, and independent +of, him? 'Duty for duty's sake' lacks lifting power, and is the essence +of legalism. Love, after all, is the fulfilling of the law. + +2. To overcome the Kantian abstraction, and give content to the formal +law of reason was the aim of the idealistic writers who succeeded him. +Fichte conceived of morality as action--self-consciousness realising +itself in a world of deeds. Hegel started with the _Idea_ as the source +of all reality, and developed the conception of Personality attaining +self-realisation through the growing consciousness of the world and of +God. Personality involves capacity. The {113} law of life, therefore, +is, 'Be a person and respect others as persons.'[14] Man only comes to +himself as he becomes conscious that his life is rooted in a larger self. +Morality is just the gradual unfolding of an eternal purpose whose whole +is the perfection of humanity. It has been objected that the idea of +life as an evolutionary process, which finds its most imposing embodiment +in the system of Hegel, if consistently carried out, destroys all +personal motive and self-determining activity, and reduces the history of +the world to a soulless mechanism. Hegel himself was aware of this +objection, and the whole aim of his philosophy was to show that +personality has no meaning if it be not the growing consciousness of the +infinite. The more recent exponents of his teaching have endeavoured to +prove that the individual, so far from being suppressed, is really +_expressed_ in the process, that, indeed, while the universal life +underlies, unifies, and directs the particular phases of existence, the +individual in realising himself is at the same time determining and +evolving the larger spiritual world--a world already implicitly present +in his earliest consciousness and first strivings. The absolute is +indeed within us from the very beginning, but we have to work it out. +Hence life is achieved through conflict. The universe is not a place for +pleasure or apathy. It is a place for soul-making. No rest is to be +found by an indolent withdrawal from the world of reality. 'In one way +or another, in labour, in learning, and in religion, every man has his +pilgrimage to make, his self to remould and to acquire, his world and +surroundings to transform. . . . It is in this adventure, and not apart +from it, that we find and maintain the personality which we suppose +ourselves to possess _ab initio_.'[15] The soul is a world in itself; but +it is not, and must not be treated as, an isolated personality impervious +to the mind of others. At each stage of its evolution it is the focus +and expression of a larger world. A man does not value himself as a +detached subject, but as the {114} inheritor of gifts which are focused +in him. Man, in short, is a trustee for the world; and suffering and +privation are among his opportunities. The question for each is, How +much can he make of them? Something above us there must be to make us do +and dare and hope, and the important thing is not one's separate destiny, +but the completeness of experience and one's contribution to it.[16] + +3. It was inevitable that there should arise a reaction against the +extreme Intellectualism of Hegel and his school, and that a conception of +existence which lays the emphasis upon the claims of practical life +should grow in favour. The pursuit of knowledge tended to become merely +a means of promoting human well-being. + +The first definite attempt to formulate a specific theory of knowledge +with this practical aim in view takes the form of what is known as +'Pragmatism.' The modern use of this term is chiefly connected with the +name of the late Professor James, to whose brilliant writings we are +largely indebted for the elucidation of its meaning. 'Pragmatism,' says +James, 'represents the empiricist attitude both in a more radical and +less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed.'[17] It agrees +with utilitarianism in explaining practical aspects, and with positivism +in disdaining useless abstractions. It claims to be a method rather than +a system of philosophy. And its method consists in bringing the pursuit +of knowledge into close relationship with life. Nothing is to be +regarded as true which cannot be justified by its value for man. The +hypothesis which on the whole works best, which most aptly fits the +circumstances of a particular case, is true. The emphasis is laid not on +absolute principles, but on consequences. We must not consider things as +they are in themselves, but in their reference to the good of mankind. +It is useless, for example, to speculate about the existence of God. If +the hypothesis of a deity works satisfactorily, if the best results +follow for the moral well-being of humanity by believing in a God, {115} +then the hypothesis may be taken as true. It is true at least for us. +Truth, according to Pragmatism, has no independent existence. It is +wholly subjective, relative, instrumental. Its only test is its utility, +its workableness. + +This view of truth, though supported by much ingenuity and brilliance, +would seem to contradict the very idea of truth, and to be subversive of +all moral values. If truth has no independent validity, if it is not +something to be sought for itself, irrespective of the inclinations and +interests of man, then its pursuit can bring no real enrichment to our +spiritual being. It remains something alien and external, a mere +arbitrary appendix of the self. It is not the essence and standard of +human life. If its sole test is what is advantageous or pleasant it +sinks into a merely utilitarian opinion or selfish bias. 'Truth,' says +Eucken, 'can only exist as an end in itself. Instrumental truth is no +truth at all.'[18] + +According to this theory, moreover, truth is apt to be broken up into a +number of separate fragments without correlation or integrating unity. +There will be as many hypotheses as there are individual interests. The +truth that seems to work best for one man or one age may not be the truth +that serves another. In the collision of opinions who is to arbitrate? +If it be the institutions and customs of to-day, the present state of +morals, that is to be the measure of what is good, then we seem to be +committed to a condition of stagnancy, and involved in the quest of a +doubtful gain. + +As might be expected, Professor James's view of truth determines his view +of the world. It is pluralistic, not monistic; melioristic, not +optimistic. It is characteristic of him that when he discusses the +question, Is life worth living? his answer practically is, 'Yes, if you +believe it is.' Pragmatism is put forward as the mediator between two +opposite tendencies, those of 'tender-mindedness' and 'tough-mindedness.' +'The tendency to rest in the Absolute is the characteristic mark of the +tender-minded; the {116} radically tough-minded, on the other hand, needs +no religion at all.'[19] There is something to be said for both of these +views, James thinks, and a compromise will probably best meet the case. +Hence, against these two ways of accepting the universe, he maintains the +pragmatic faith which is at once theistic, pluralistic, and melioristic. +He accepts a personal power as a workable theory of the universe. But +God need not be infinite or all-inclusive, for 'all that the facts +require is that the power should be both other and larger than our common +selves.'[20] Such a conception of God, even on James's own admission, is +akin to polytheism. And such polytheism implies a pluralistic view of +the universe. The invisible order, in which we hope to realise our +larger life, is a world which does not grow integrally in accordance with +the preconceived plan of a single architect, 'but piecemeal by the +contributions of its several parts.'[21] We make the world to our will, +and 'add our fiat to the fiat of the creator.' With regard to the +supreme question of human destiny Professor James's view is what he calls +'melioristic.' There is a striving for better things, but what the +ultimate outcome will be, no one can say. For the world is still in the +making. Life is a risk. It has many possibilities. Good and evil are +intermingled, and will continue so to be. It is a pluralistic world just +because the will of man is free, and predetermination is excluded. If +good was assured as the final goal of ill, and there was no sense of +venture, no possibility of loss or failure, then life would lack +interest, and moral effort would be shorn of reality and incentive. + +In Professor James's philosophy of life there is much that is original +and stimulating, and it draws attention to facts of experience and modes +of thought which we were in danger of overlooking. It has compelled us +to consider the psychological bases of personality, and to lay more +stress upon the power of the will and individual choice in the +determining of character and destiny. It is pre-eminently {117} a +philosophy of action, and it emphasises an aspect of life which +intellectualism was prone to neglect--the function of personal endeavour +and initiative in the making of the world. It postulates the reality of +a living God who invites our co-operation, and it encourages our belief +in a higher spiritual order which it is within our power to achieve. + +Pragmatism has hitherto made headway chiefly in America and Britain, but +on its activistic side it is akin to a new philosophical movement which +has appeared in France and Germany. The name generally given to this +tendency is 'Activism' or 'Vitalism'--a title chosen probably in order to +emphasise the self-activity of the personal consciousness directed +towards a world which it at once conquers and creates. The authors of +this latest movement are the Frenchman, Henri Bergson, and the German, +Rudolf Eucken. Differing widely in their methods and even in their +conclusions, they agree in making a direct attack both upon the realism +and the intellectualism of the past, and in their conviction that the +world is not a 'strung along universe,' as the late Professor James puts +it, but a world that is being made by the creative power and personal +freedom of man. While Eucken has for many years occupied a position of +commanding influence in the realm of thought, Bergson has only recently +come into notice. The publication of his striking work, _Creative +Evolution_, marks an epoch in speculation, and is awakening the interest +of the philosophical world.[22] + +4. With his passion for symmetry and completeness Bergson has evolved a +whole theory of the universe, {118} resorting, strange to say, to a form +of reasoning that implies the validity of logic, the instrument of the +intellect which he never wearies of impugning. Without entering upon his +merely metaphysical speculations, we fix upon his theory of +consciousness--the relation of life to the material world--as involving +certain ethical consequences bearing upon our subject. The idea of +freedom is the corner-stone of Bergson's system, and his whole philosophy +is a powerful vindication of the independence and self-determination of +the human will. Life is free, spontaneous, creative and incalculable; +determined neither by natural law nor logical sequence. It can break +through all causation and assert its own right. It is not, indeed, +unrelated to matter, since it has to find its exercise in a material +world. Matter plays at once, as he himself says, the rôle of obstacle +and stimulus.[23] But it is not the world of things which legislates for +man; it is man who legislates for it. Bergson's object is to vindicate +the autonomy of consciousness, and his entire philosophy is a protest +against every claim of determinism to dominate life. By introducing the +creative will before all development, he displaces mechanical force, and +makes the whole evolution of life dependent upon the 'vital impulse' +which pushes forward against all obstacles to ever higher and higher +efficiency. Similarly, by drawing a distinction between intellect and +intuition, he shows that the latter is the truly creative power in man +which penetrates to the heart of reality and shapes its own world. +Intellect and instinct have been developed along divergent lines. The +intellect has merely a practical function. It is related to the needs of +action.[24] It is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, +especially tools to make tools.[25] It deals with solids and geometrical +figures, and its instrument is logic. But according to Bergson it has an +inherent incapacity to deal with life.[26] When we contrast the rigidity +and superficiality of intellect with the fluidity, sympathy and intimacy +of intuition, we see at once wherein {119} lies the true creative power +of man. Development, when carried too exclusively along the lines of +intellect, means loss of will-power; and we have seen how, not +individuals alone, but entire nations, may be crushed and destroyed by a +too rigid devotion to mechanical and stereotyped methods of thought. +Only life is adequate to deal with life. Let us give free expression to +the intuitive and sympathetic force within us, 'feel the wild pulsation +of life,' if we would conquer the world and come to our own. 'The +spectacle,' says Bergson, 'of life from the very beginning down to man +suggests to us the image of a current of consciousness which flows down +into matter as into a tunnel, most of whose endeavours to advance . . . +are stopped by a rock that is too hard, but which, in one direction at +least, prove successful, and break out into the light once more.'[27] +But there life does not stop. + + 'All tended to mankind, + But in completed man begins anew + A tendency to God.'[28] + +This creative consciousness still pushes on, giving to matter its own +life, and drawing from matter its nutriment and strength. The effort is +painful, but in making it we feel that it is precious, more precious +perhaps than the particular work it results in, because through it we +have been making ourselves, 'raising ourselves above ourselves.' And in +this there is the true joy of life--the joy which every creator +feels--the joy of achievement and triumph. Thus not only is the self +being created, but the world is being made--original and +incalculable--not according to a preconceived plan or logical sequence, +but by the free spontaneous will of man. + +The soul is the creative force--the real productive agent of novelty in +the world. The strange thing is that the soul creates not the world +only, but itself. Whence comes this mystic power? What is the origin of +the soul? Bergson does not say. But in one passage he suggests that +{120} possibly the world of matter and consciousness have the same +origin--the principle of life which is the great prius of all that is and +is to be. But Bergson's 'élan vital,' though more satisfactory than the +first cause of the naturalist, or the 'great unknown' of the +evolutionist, or even than some forms of the absolute, is itself +admittedly outside the pale of reason--inexplicable, indefinable, and +incalculable. + +The new 'vitalism' unfolds a living self-evolving universe, a restless, +unfinished and never-to-be-finished development--the scope and goal of +which cannot be foreseen or explained. An infinite number of +possibilities open out; which the soul will follow no one can tell; why +it follows this direction rather than that, no one can see. There seems +to be no room here for teleology or purposiveness; and though Bergson has +not yet worked out the theological and ethical implications of his +theory, as far as we can at present say the personality and imminence of +a Divine Being are excluded. Though Bergson never refers to Hegel by +name, he seems to be specially concerned in refuting the philosophy of +the Absolute, according to which the world is conceived as the evolution +of the infinite mind. If 'tout est donné,' says Bergson, if all is given +beforehand, 'why do over again what has already been completed, thus +reducing life and endeavour to a mere sham.' But even allowing the force +of that objection, the idea of a 'world in the making,' though it appeals +to the popular mind, is not quite free from ambiguity. In one sense it +states a platitude--a truth, indeed, which is not excluded from an +absolute or teleological conception of life. But if it is implied that +the world, because it is in process of production, may violate reason and +take some capricious form, the idea is absurdly false, so long as we are +what we are, and the human mind is what it is. The real must always be +the rational. All enterprise and effort are based on the faith that we +belong to a rational world. Though we cannot predict what form the world +will ultimately take, we can at least be sure that it can assume no +character which will {121} contradict the nature of intelligence. Even +in the making of a world, if life has any moral worth and meaning at all, +there must be rational purpose. There are creation and initiative in man +assuredly, but they must not be interpreted as activities which deviate +into paths of grotesque and arbitrary fancy. Our actions and ideas must +issue from our world. Even a poem or work of art must make its appeal to +the universal mind; any other kind of originality would wholly lack human +interest and sever all creation and life from their root in human nature. +But at least we must acknowledge that Bergson has done to the world of +thought the great service of liberating us from the bonds of matter and +the thraldom of a fatalistic necessity. It is his merit that he has +lifted from man the burden of a hard determinism, and vindicated the +freedom, choice, and initiative of the human spirit. If he has no +distinctly Christian message, he has at least disclosed for the soul the +possibility of new beginnings, and has shown that there is room in the +spiritual life, as the basis of all upward striving, for change of heart +and conversion of life. + +5. In the philosophy of Eucken there is much that is in harmony with +that of Bergson; but there are also important differences. Common to +both is a reaction against formalism and intellectualism. Neither claims +that we can gain more than 'the knowledge of a direction' in which the +solution of the problem may be sought. It is not a 'given' or finished +world with which we have to do. 'The triumph of life is expressed by +creation,' says Eucken, 'I mean the creation of self by self.' 'We live +in the conviction,' he says again, 'that the possibilities of the +universe have not yet been played out,[29] but that our spiritual life +still finds itself battling in mid-flood with much of the world's work +still before us.' While Bergson confines himself rigidly to the +metaphysical side of thought, Eucken is chiefly interested in the ethical +and religious aspects of life's problem. Moreover, while there is an +absence of a distinctly teleological aim in Bergson, the purpose and +ideal {122} of life are prominent elements in Eucken. Notwithstanding +his antagonism to intellectualism, the influence of Hegel is evident in +the absolutist tendency of his teaching. Life for Eucken is +fundamentally spiritual. Self-consciousness is the unifying principle. +Personality is the keynote of his philosophy. But we are not +personalities to begin with: we have the potentiality to become such by +our own effort. He bids us therefore forget ourselves, and strive for +our highest ideal--the realisation of spiritual personality. The more +man 'loses his life' in the pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and +beauty the more surely will he 'save it.' He realises himself as a +personality, who becomes conscious of his unity with the universal +spiritual life. + +Hence there are two fundamental principles underlying Eucken's philosophy +which give to it its distinguishing character. The first is the +metaphysical conception of _a realm of Spirit_--an independent spiritual +Reality, not the product of the natural man, but communicating itself to +him as he strives for, and responds to, it. This spiritual reality +underlies and transcends the outward world. It may be regarded as an +absolute or universal life--the deeper reality of which all visible +things are the expression. The second cardinal principle is the +_doctrine of Activism_. Life is action. Human duty lies in a world of +strife. We have to contend for a spiritual life-content. Here Eucken +has much in common with Fichte.[30] But while Fichte starts with +self-analysis, and loses sight of error, care, and sin, Eucken starts +with actual conflict, and ever retains a keen sense of these hampering +elements. The evil of the world is not to be solved simply by looking +down upon the world from some superior optimistic standpoint, and +pronouncing it very good. The only way to solve it is the practical one, +to leave the negative standing, and press on to the deeper +affirmative--the positive truth, that beneath the world of nature there +exists a deeper reality of spirit, of which we become participators by +the freedom and activity of our lives. We are here to acquire a new +spiritual world, but {123} it is a world in which the past is taken up +and transfigured. Against naturalism, which acquiesces in the present +order of the universe, and against mere intellectualism, which simply +investigates it, Eucken never wearies of protesting. He demands, first, +a fundamental cleavage in the inmost being of man, and a deliverance from +the natural view of things; and he contends, secondly, for a spiritual +awakening and an energetic endeavour to realise our spiritual resources. +Not by thought but by action is the problem of life to be solved. Hence +his philosophy is not a mere theory about life, but is itself a factor in +the great work of spiritual redemption which gives to life its meaning +and aim. + +That which makes Eucken's positive idealism specially valuable is his +application of it to religion. Religion has been in all ages the mighty +uplifting power in human life. It stands for a negation of the finite +and fleeting, and an affirmation of the spiritual and the eternal. This +is specially true of the Christian religion. Christianity is the supreme +type of religion because it best answers the question, 'What can religion +do for life?' But the old forms of its manifestation do not satisfy us +to-day. Christianity of the present fails to win conviction principally +for three reasons: (1) because it does not distinguish the eternal +substance of religion from its temporary forms; (2) because it professes +to be the final expression of all truth, thus closing the door against +progress of thought and life; and (3) while emphasising man's redemption +from evil, it forgets the elevation of his nature towards good. There is +a tendency to depreciate human nature, and to overlook the joyousness of +life. What is needed, therefore, is the expression of Christianity in a +new form--a reconstruction which shall emphasise the positiveness, +activity, and joy of Christian morality.[31] + +While every one must feel the sublimity and inspiration in this +conception of a spiritual world, which it is the task of life to realise, +most people will be also conscious of a {124} certain vagueness and +elusiveness in its presentation. We are constrained to ask what is this +independent spiritual life? Is it a personal God, or is it only an +impersonal spirit, which pervades and interpenetrates the universe? The +elusive obscurity of the position and function which Eucken assigns to +his central conception of the _Geistes-Leben_ must strike every reader. +Even more than Hegel, Eucken seems to deal with an abstraction. The +spiritual life, we are told, 'grows,' 'divides,' 'advances'--but it +appears to be as much a 'bloodless category' as the Hegelian 'idea,' +having no connection with any living subject. God, the Spirit, may +exist, indeed Eucken says He does, but there is nowhere any indication of +how the spiritual life follows from, or is the creation of, the Divine +Spirit. Our author speaks with so great appreciation of Christianity +that it seems an ungracious thing to find fault with his interpretation +of it. Yet with so much that is positive and suggestive, there are also +some grave omissions. In a work that professes to deal with the +Christian faith--_The Truth of Religion_--and which indeed presents a +powerful vindication of historical Christianity, we miss any +philosophical interpretation of the nature and power of prayer, +adoration, or worship, or any account, indeed, of the intimacies of the +soul which belong to the very essence of the Christian faith. While he +insists upon the possibility, nay, the necessity, of a new beginning, he +fails to reveal the power by which the great decision is made. While he +affirms with much enthusiasm and frankness the need of personal decision +and surrender, he has nothing to say of the divine authority and power +which creates our choice and wins our obedience. Nowhere does he show +that the creative redemptive force comes not from man's side, but +ultimately from the side of God. And finally, his teaching with regard +to the person and work of Jesus Christ, notwithstanding its tender +sympathy and fine discrimination, does less than justice to the +uniqueness and historical significance of the Son of Man. With profound +appreciation and rare beauty of language he depicts the life of Jesus. +'Seldom,' {125} says a recent writer, 'has the perfect Man been limned +with so persuasive a combination of strenuous thought and gracious +word.'[32] 'He who makes merely a normal man of Jesus,' he says, 'can +never do justice to His greatness.'[33] Yet while he protests rightly +against emptying our Lord's life of all real growth and temptation, and +the claim of practical omniscience for His humanity (conceptions of +Christ's Person surely nowhere entertained by first-class theologians), +he leaves us in no manner of doubt that he does not attach a divine worth +to Jesus, nor regard Him in the scriptural sense as the Supreme +revelation and incarnation of God. And hence, while the peerless +position of Jesus as teacher and religious genius is frankly +acknowledged, and His purity, power, and permanence are extolled--the +mediatorial and redemptive implicates of His personality are overlooked. + +But when all is said, no one can study the spiritual philosophy of Eucken +without realising that he is in contact with a mind which has a sublime +and inspiring message for our age. Probably more than any modern +thinker, Eucken reveals in his works deep affinities with the central +spirit of Christianity. And perhaps his influence may be all the greater +because he maintains an attitude of independence towards dogmatic and +organised Christianity. Professor Eucken does not attempt to satisfy us +with a facile optimism. Life is a conflict, a task, an adventure. And +he who would engage in it must make the break between the higher and the +lower nature. For Eucken, as for Dante, there must be 'the penitence, +the tears, and the plunge into the river of Lethe before the new +transcendent love begins.' There is no evasion of the complexities of +life. He has a profound perception of the contradictions of experience +and the seeming paradoxes of religion. For him true liberty is only +possible through the 'given,' through God's provenience and grace: +genuine self-realisation is only achievable through a continuous +self-dedication to, and {126} incorporation within, the great realm of +spirits; and the Immanence within our lives of the Transcendent.[34] + +In styling the tendencies which we have thus briefly reviewed +non-Christian, we have had no intention of disparagement. No earnest +effort to discover truth, though it may be inadequate and partial, is +ever wholly false. In the light of these theories we are able to see +more clearly the relation between the good and the useful, and to +acknowledge that, just as in nature the laws of economy and beauty have +many intimate correspondences, so in the spiritual realm the good, the +beautiful, and the true may be harmonised in a higher category of the +spirit. We shall see that the Christian ideal is not so much +antagonistic to, as inclusive of, all that is best in the teaching of +science and philosophy. The task therefore now before us is to interpret +these general conceptions of the highest good in the light of Christian +Revelation--to define the chief end of life according to Christianity. + + + +[1] Kasper Schmidt, _Der Einzige und sein Eigentum_. + +[2] Haeckel, _op. cit._, chap. xix. + +[3] Haeckel, _op. cit._, chap. xix. p. 140. + +[4] Hobbes' _Leviathan_, chap. vi. + +[5] Cf. Pringle-Pattison, _Philos. Radicals_, and J. Seth's _Eng. +Philosophers_, p. 240. + +[6] _Utilitarianism_, chap. ii. + +[7] _Idem_, chap. iii. + +[8] Cf. Spencer, _Data of Ethics_, p. 275; also _Social Statics_. In the +former work an attempt is made to exhibit the biological significance of +pleasure and the relation between egoism and altruism. + +[9] See _First Principles_, p. 166 ff. + +[10] See Kirkup, _An Inquiry into Socialism_, p. 19. + +[11] See Lütgert, _Natur und Geist Gottes_, for striking chapter on +Goethe's _Ethik_, p. 121 f. + +[12] Cf. Eucken, _Main Currents of Modern Thought_, p. 401 f. + +[13] Macmillan, _The Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy_, p. 28. + +[14] Hegel, _Phil. of Right_, p. 45. + +[15] Bosanquet, _The Principles of Individuality and Value_. + +[16] Bosanquet, _The Principles of Individuality and Value_. + +[17] _Pragmatism_, p. 51. + +[18] _Main Currents of Thought_, p. 78. + +[19] _Pragmatism_, p. 278 f.; also _Varieties of Relig. Experience_, p. +525 f. + +[20] _Idem_, p. 299. + +[21] _Idem_, p. 290. + +[22] The writer regrets that the work of the Italian, Benedetto Croce, +_Philosophy of the Practical, Economic and Ethic_ (Part II. of +_Philosophy of the Spirit_), came to his knowledge too late to permit a +consideration of its ethical teaching in this volume. Croce is a thinker +of great originality, of whom we are likely to hear much in the future, +and whose philosophy will have to be reckoned with. Though independent +of others, his view of life has affinities with that of Hegel. He +maintains the doctrine of development of opposites, but avoids Hegel's +insistence upon the concept of nature as a mode of reality opposed to the +spirit. Spirit is reality, the whole reality, and therefore the +universal. It has two activities, theoretic and practical. With the +theoretic man understands the universe; with the practical he changes it. +The Will is the man, and freedom is finding himself in the Whole. + +[23] _Hibbert Journal_, April 1912. + +[24] _Evol. Creat._, p. 161. + +[25] _Idem_, p. 146. + +[26] _Idem_, p. 165. + +[27] _Hibbert Journal_. + +[28] Browning. + +[29] _Die Geistigen Strömunyen der Gegenwart_, p. 10. + +[30] Cf. _Problem of Life_. + +[31] Cf. _Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_. + +[32] Hermann, _Bergson und Eucken_, p. 103. + +[33] _The Problem of Life_, p. 152. + +[34] Cf. von Hügel, _Hibbert Journal_, April 1912. + + + + +{127} + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL + +The highest good is not uniformly described in the New Testament, and +modern ethical teachers have not always been in agreement as to the chief +end of life. While some have found in the teaching of Jesus the idea of +social redemption alone, and have seen in Christ nothing more than a +political reformer, others have contended that the Gospel is solely a +message of personal salvation. An impartial study shows that both views +are one-sided. On the one hand, no conception of the life of Jesus can +be more misleading than that which represents Him as a political +revolutionist. But, on the other hand, it would be a distinct narrowing +of His teaching to assume that it was confined to the aspirations of the +individual soul. His care was indeed primarily for the person. His +emphasis was put upon the worth of the individual. And it is not too +much to say that the uniqueness of Jesus' teaching lay in the discovery +of the value of the soul. There was in His ministry a new appreciation +of the possibilities of neglected lives, and a hitherto unknown yearning +to share their confidence. It would be a mistake, however, to represent +Christ's regard for the individual as excluding all consideration of +social relations. The kingdom of God, as we shall see, had a social and +corporate meaning for our Lord. And if the qualifications for its +entrance were personal, its duties were social. The universalism of +Jesus' teaching implied that the soul had a value not for itself alone, +but also for others. The assertion, therefore, that the individual has a +value cannot mean that he has a value in isolation. {128} Rather his +value can only be realised in the life of the community to which he truly +belongs. The effort to help others is the truest way to reveal the +hidden worth of one's own life; and he who withholds his sympathy from +the needy has proved himself unworthy of the kingdom. + +While the writers of the New Testament vary in their mode of presenting +the ultimate goal of man, they are at one in regarding it as an exalted +form of _life_. What they all seek to commend is a condition of being +involving a gradual assimilation to, and communion with, God. The +distinctive gift of the Gospel is the gift of life. 'I am the Life,' +says Christ. And the apostle's confession is in harmony with his +Master's claim--'For me to live is Christ.' Salvation is nothing else +than the restoration, preservation, and exaltation of life. + +Corresponding, therefore, to the three great conceptions of Life in the +New Testament, and especially in the teaching of Jesus--'Eternal Life,' +'the kingdom of God,' and the perfection of the divine Fatherhood, +'Perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect'--there are three aspects, +individual, social, and divine, in which we may view the Christian ideal. + + +I + +Self-realisation is not, indeed, a scriptural word. But rightly +understood it is a true element in the conception of life, and may, we +think, be legitimately drawn from the ethical teaching of the New +Testament.[1] Though the free full development of the individual +personality as we conceive it in modern times does not receive explicit +statement,[2] still one cannot doubt, that before every man our Lord does +present the vision of a possible and perfect self. Christianity does not +destroy 'the will to live,' but only the will to live at all costs. Even +mediaeval piety only inculcated self-mortification as a stage towards a +higher {129} self-affirmation. Christ nowhere condemns the inherent +desire for a complete life. The end, indeed, which each man should place +before himself is self-mastery and freedom from the world;[3] but it is a +mastery and freedom which are to be gained not by asceticism but by +conquest. Christ would awaken in every man the consciousness of the +priceless worth of his soul, and would have him realise in his own person +God's idea of manhood. + +The ideal of self-realisation includes three distinct elements: + +1. _Life as intensity of being_.--'I am come that they might have life, +and that they might have it more abundantly.'[4] 'More life and fuller' +is the passion of every soul that has caught the vision and heard the +call of Jesus. The supreme good consists not in suppressed vitality, but +in power and freedom. Life in Christ is a full, rich existence. The +doctrine of quietism and indifference to joy has no place in the ethic of +Jesus. Life is manifested in inwardness of character, and not in pomp of +circumstance. It consists not in what a man has, but in what he is.[5] +The beatitudes, as the primary qualifications for the kingdom of God, +emphasise the fundamental principle of the subordination of the material +to the spiritual, and the contrast between inward and outward good.[6] +Self-mastery is to extend to the inner life of man--to dominate the +thoughts and words, and the very heart from which they issue. A divided +life is impossible. The severest discipline, even renunciation, may be +needful to secure that singleness of heart and strenuousness of aim which +are for Jesus the very essence of life. 'Ye cannot serve God and +mammon.'[7] In harmony with this saying is the opposition in the +Johannine teaching between 'the world' and 'eternal life.'[8] The +quality of life indeed depends not upon anything contingent or +accidental, but upon an intense inward realisation of blessedness in +Christ in comparison with which even {130} the privations and sufferings +of this world are but as a shadow.[9] At the same time life is not a +mere negation, not simply an escape from evil. It is a positive good, +the enrichment and intensifying of the whole being by the indwelling of a +new spiritual power. 'For me to live is Christ,' says St. Paul. 'This +is life eternal,' says St. John, 'that they may know Thee the only true +God, and Him whom Thou didst send, even Jesus Christ.'[10] + +2. _Life as Expansion of Personality_.--By its inherent power it grows +outwards as well as inwards. The New Testament conception of life is +existence in its fullest expression and fruitfulness. The ideal as +presented by Christ is no anaemic state of reverie or ascetic withdrawal +from human interest. It is by the elevation and consecration of the +natural life, and not by its suppression, that the 'good' is to be +realised. The natural life is to be transformed, and the very body +presented unto God as a living sacrifice.[11] So far from Christianity +being opposed to the aim of the individual to find himself in a world of +larger interests, it is only in the active and progressive realisation of +such a life that blessedness consists. Herein is disclosed, however, the +defect of the modern ideal of culture which has been associated with the +name of Goethe. In Christ's ideal self-sufficiency has no place. While +rightly interpreted the 'good' of life includes everything that enriches +existence and contributes to the efficiency and completeness of manhood, +mere self-culture and artistic expression are apt to become perverted +forms of egoism, if not subordinated to the spirit of service which alone +can give to the human faculties their true function and exercise. Hence +life finds its real utterance not in the isolated development of the +self, but in the fullness of personal relationships. Only in response to +the needs of others can a man realise his own life. In answer to the +young ruler who asked a question 'concerning that which is good,' Christ +replied, 'If thou wilt enter into life keep the {131} commandments'; and +the particular duties He mentioned were those of the second table of the +Decalogue.[11] The abundance of life which Christ offers consists in the +mutual offices of love and the interchange of service. Thus +self-realisation is attained only through self-surrender.[13] The +self-centred life is a barren life. Not by withholding our seed but by +flinging it forth freely upon the broad waters of humanity do we attain +to that rich fruition which is 'life indeed.' + +3. _Life as Eternal Good_.--Whatever may be the accurate signification +of the word 'eternal,' the words 'eternal life,' regarded as the ideal of +man, can mean nothing else than life at its highest, the fulfilment of +all that personality has within it the potency of becoming. In one sense +there is no finality in life. 'It seethes with the morrow for us more +and more.' But in another sense, to say that the moral life is never +attained is only a half truth. It is always being attained because it is +always present as an active reality evolving its own content. In Christ +we have 'eternal life' now. It is not a thing of quantity but of +quality, and is therefore timeless. + + 'We live in deeds not years, in thoughts not breaths, + In feelings, not in figures on a dial.'[14] + +He who has entered into fellowship with God has within him now the +essence of 'life eternal.' + +But the conception of life derived from, and sustained by, God involves +the idea of immortality. 'No work begun shall ever pause for death.'[15] +To live in God is to live as long as God. The spiritual man pursues his +way through conflict and achievement towards a higher and yet a higher +goal, ever manifesting, yet ever seeking, the infinite that dwells in +him. All knowledge and quest and endeavour, nay existence itself, would +be a mockery if man had 'no forever.' Scripture corroborates the +yearnings of the heart and represents life as a growing good which is to +attain to ever higher reaches and fuller realisations in the world to +{132} come. It is the unextinguishable faith of man that the future must +crown the present. No human effort goes to waste, no gift is delusive; +but every gift and every effort has its proper place as a stage in the +endless process.[16] + + 'There shall never be lost one good! What was shall live as + before.'[17] + + +II + +The foregoing discussion leads naturally to the second aspect of the +highest Good, the Ideal in its social or corporate form--_the kingdom of +God_. Properly speaking, there is no such thing as an individual. As +biologically man is only a member of a larger organism, so ethically he +can only realise himself in a life of brotherhood and service. It is +only within the kingdom of God and by recognition of its social relations +that the individual can attain to his own blessedness. Viewed in the +light of the mutual relation of its members the kingdom is a brotherhood +in which none is ignored and all have common privileges and +responsibilities; viewed in the light of its highest good it is the +entire perfection of the whole--a hierarchy of interests subordinated to, +and unified by, the sovereignty of the good in the person of God.[18] + +1. By reason of its comprehensiveness the doctrine of the kingdom has +been regarded by many as the most general conception of the ideal of +Jesus. 'In its unique and unapproachable grandeur it dwarfs all the +lesser heights to which the prophetic hopes had risen, and remains to +this day the transcendent and commanding ideal of the possible exaltation +of our humanity.'[19] The principles implicitly contained in the +teaching of Jesus concerning the kingdom have become the common +possessions of mankind, and are moulding the thoughts and institutions of +the civilised world. Kant's theory of a kingdom of ends, Comte's idea of +Humanity, and the modern conceptions of scientific and {133} historical +evolution are corroborative of the teaching of the New Testament. Within +its conception men have found room for the modern ideas of social and +economic order, and under its inspiration are striving for a fuller +realisation of the aspirations and hopes of humanity.[20] + +Though frequently upon His lips the phrase did not originate with Jesus. +Already the Baptist had employed it as the note of his preaching, and +even before the Baptist it had a long history in the annals of the Jewish +people. Indeed the entire story of the Hebrews is coloured by this +conception, and in the days of their decline it is the idea of the +restoration of their nation as the true kingdom of God that dominates +their hopes. When earthly institutions did not fulfil their promise, and +nothing could be expected by natural means, hope became concentrated upon +supernatural power. Thus before Jesus appeared there had grown up a mass +of apocalyptic literature, the object of which was to encourage the +national expectation of a sudden and supernatural coming of the kingdom +of heaven. Men of themselves could do nothing to hasten its advent. +They could only wait patiently till the set time was accomplished, and +God stretched forth His mighty hand.[21] + +A new school of German interpretation has recently arisen, the aim of +which is to prove that Jesus was largely, if not wholly, influenced by +the current apocalyptic notions of His time. Jesus believed, it is said, +in common with the popular sentiment of the day, that the end of the +world was at hand, and that at the close of the present dispensation +there would come suddenly and miraculously a new order into which would +be gathered the elect of God. Johannes Weiss, the most pronounced +advocate of this view, maintains that Jesus' teaching is entirely +eschatological. The kingdom is supramundane and still to come. Jesus +did not inaugurate it; He only predicted its advent. Consequently there +is no Ethics, strictly so called, in His {134} preaching; there is only +an Ethic of renunciation and watchfulness[22]--an _Interimsethik_. + +The whole problem resolves itself into two crucial questions: (1) Did +Jesus expect a gradual coming of the kingdom, or did He conceive of it as +breaking in suddenly by the immediate act of God? and (2) Did Jesus +regard the kingdom as purely future, or as already begun? + +In answer to the first question, while there are undoubtedly numerous and +explicit sayings, too much neglected in the past and not to be wholly +explained by mere orientalism, suggesting a sudden and miraculous coming, +these must be taken in connection with the many other passages implying a +gradual process--passages of deep ethical import which seem to colour our +Lord's entire view of life and its purposes. And in answer to the second +question, while there are not a few utterances which certainly point to a +future consummation, these are not inconsistent with the immediate +inauguration and gradual development of the kingdom. + +A full discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this volume.[23] +There are, however, two objections which may be taken to the apocalyptic +interpretation of Christ's teaching as a whole. (1) As presented by its +most pronounced champions, this view seems to empty the person and +teaching of Jesus of their originality and universality. It tends to +reduce the Son of Man to the level of a Jewish rhapsodist, whose whole +function was to encourage His countrymen to look away from the present +scene of duty to some future state of felicity, which had no connection +with the world of reality, and no bearing upon their present character. +It would be surely a caricature to interpret the religion of the New +Testament from this standpoint alone to the exclusion of those directly +ethical and spiritual {135} principles in which its originality chiefly +appeared, and on which its permanence depends.[24] As Bousset[25] points +out, not renunciation but joy in life is the characteristic thing in +Jesus' outlook. He does not preach a gloomy asceticism, but proclaims a +new righteousness and a new type of duty. He recognises the worth of the +present life, and teaches that the world's goods are not in themselves +bad. He came as a living man into a dead world, and by inculcating a +living idea of God and proclaiming the divine Fatherhood gave a new +direction and inner elevation to the expectations of His age, showing the +true design of God's revelation and the real meaning of the prophetic +utterances of the past. To interpret the kingdom wholly from an +eschatological point of view would involve a failure to apprehend the +spiritual greatness of the personality with which we are dealing.[26] +(2) This view virtually makes Christ a false prophet. For, as a matter +of fact, the sudden and catastrophic coming of the kingdom as predicted +by the Hebrew apocalyptics did not take place. On the contrary the +kingdom of God came not as the Jews expected in a sudden descent from the +clouds, but in the slow and progressive domination of God over the souls +and social relationships of mankind. In view of the whole spirit of +Jesus, His conception of God, and His relation to human life, as well as +the attitude of St. Paul to the Parousia, it is critically unsound to +deny that Jesus believed in the presence of the kingdom in a real sense +during His lifetime.[27] + +2. If this conception of the kingdom of God be correct we may now +proceed to regard it under three aspects, Present, Progressive, and +Future--as a _Gift_ immediately bestowed by Jesus, as a _Task_ to be +worked out by man in the history of the world, and as a _Hope_ to be +consummated by God in the future. + +{136} + +(1) _The Kingdom as a Present Reality_.--After what has been already said +it will not be necessary to dwell upon this aspect. It might be +supported by direct sayings of our Lord.[28] But the whole tenor and +atmosphere of the Gospels, the uniqueness of Christ's personality, His +claim to heal disease and forgive sin, as well as the conditions of +entrance, imply clearly that in Jesus' own view the kingdom was an actual +fact inaugurated by Him and obtaining its meaning and power from His own +person and influence. Obviously He regarded Himself as the bearer of a +new message of life, and the originator of a new reign of righteousness +and love which was to have immediate application. Christ came to make +God real to men upon the earth, and to win their allegiance to Him at +once. No one can fail to recognise the lofty idealism of the Son of Man. +He carries with Him everywhere a vision of the perfect life as it exists +in the mind of God, and as it will be realised when these earthly scenes +have passed away; yet it would be truer to say that His interests were in +'first things' rather than in 'last things,' and would be more justly +designated Protology than Eschatology.[29] His mission, so far from +having an iconoclastic aim, was really to 'make all things new.' He was +concerned with the initiation of a new religion, therefore with a +movement towards a regeneration of society which would be virtually a +reign of God in the hearts of men. 'The kingdom of God is within you.' +Not in some spot remote from the world, some beautiful land beyond the +skies, but in the hearts and homes, in the daily pursuits and common +relationships of life must God rule. The beatitudes, while they +undoubtedly refer to a future when a fuller realisation of them will be +enjoyed, have a present reference as well. They make the promise of the +kingdom a present reality dependent upon the inner state of the +recipients. Not in change of environment but in change {137} of heart +does the kingdom consist. The lowly and the pure in heart, the merciful +and the meek, the seekers after righteousness and the lovers of peace +are, in virtue of their disposition and aspiration, already members. + +(2) The kingdom as a _gradual development_.--The inward gift prescribes +the outward task. It is a power commanding the hearts of men and +requiring for its realisation their response. It might be argued that +this call to moral effort presented to the first Christians was not a +summons to transform the present world, but to prepare themselves for the +destiny that awaited them in the coming age.[30] It is true that +watchfulness, patience, and readiness are among the great commands of the +New Testament.[31] But admitting the importance of these requirements, +they do not militate against the view that Christians were to work for +the betterment of the world. Christ did not look upon the world as +hopeless and beyond all power of reclaiming; nor did He regard His own or +His disciples' ministry within it as without real and positive effects. +While His contemporaries were expecting some mighty intervention that +would suddenly bring the kingdom ready-made from heaven, He saw it +growing up silently and secretly among men. He took his illustrations +from organic life. Its progress was to be like the seed hidden in the +earth, and growing day and night by its own inherent germinating force. +The object of the parables of the sower, the tares, the mustard seed, the +leaven, was to show that the crude catastrophic conception of the coming +of the kingdom must give place to the deeper and worthier idea of +growth--an idea in harmony with the entire economy of God's working in +the world of nature. In the parable of the fruit-bearing earth Jesus +shows His faith in the growth of the good, and hence in the adaptation of +the truth to the human soul. In the parables of the leaven, the light, +and salt Jesus illustrates the gradual power of truth to pervade, +illumine, and purify the life of humanity. His method of bringing about +this {138} good is the contagion of the good life. His motive is the +sense of the need of men. And His goal is the establishment of the +kingdom of love--a kingdom in which all the problems of ambition, wealth, +and the relationships of the family, of the industrial sphere, and of the +state, are to be transfigured and spiritualised.[32] + +It is surely no illegitimate application of the mind of Christ if we see +in His teaching concerning the kingdom a great social ideal to be +realised by the personal activities and mutual services of its citizens. +It finds its field and opportunity in the realm of human society, and is +a good to be secured in the larger life of humanity. This ideal, though +only dimly perceived by the early Church, has become gradually operative +in the world, and has been creative of all the great liberating movements +in history. It lay behind Dante's vision of a spiritual monarchy, and +has been the inspiring motive of those who, in obedience to Christ, have +wrought for the uplifting of the hapless and the down-trodden. It has +been the soul of all mighty reformations, and is the source of that +conception of a new social order which has begun to mean so much for our +generation. + +Loyalty to the highest and love for the lowest--love to God and +man--these are the marks of the men of all ages who have sought to +interpret the mind of Christ. Mutual service is the law of the kingdom. +Every man has a worth for Christ, therefore reverence for the personality +of man, and the endeavour to procure for each full opportunity of making +the most of his life, are at once the aim and goal of the new spiritual +society of which Christ laid the foundations in His own life and +ministry. Everything that a man is and has, talents and possessions of +every kind, are to be used as instruments for the promotion of the +kingdom of God. + + 'For life, with all it yields of joy and woe, + And hope and fear . . . + Is just our chance o' the prize of learning love.' + +{139} + +(3) But though the reign of God has begun, it has _yet to be +consummated_.--There is not wanting in the New Testament an element of +futurity and expectancy not inconsistent with, but rather complementary +to, the notion of gradual development. The eschatological teaching of +Jesus has its place along with the ethical, and may be regarded not as +annulling, but rather reinforcing the moral ideals which He +proclaimed.[33] There is nothing pessimistic in Christ's outlook. His +teaching concerning the last things, while inculcating solemnity and +earnestness of life as become those to whom has been entrusted a high +destiny, and who know not at what hour they may be called to give an +account of their stewardship,[34] bids men look forward with certainty +and hope to a glorious consummation of the kingdom. Though many of our +Lord's sayings with regard to His second coming are couched in figurative +language, we cannot believe that He intended to teach that the kingdom +itself was to be brought about in a spectacular or material way. He bids +His disciples take heed lest they be deceived by a visible Christ, or led +away by merely outward signs.[35] His coming is to be as 'the lightning +which cometh out of the east and shineth even unto the west'[36]--an +emblem not so much of suddenness as of illuminating and convincing, and +especially, of progressive force. Not in a visible reign or personal +return of the Son of Man does the consummation of the kingdom consist, +but in the complete spiritual sovereignty of Christ over the hearts and +minds of men. When the same love which He Himself manifested in His life +becomes the feature of His disciples; when His spirit of service and +sacrifice pervades the world, and the brotherhood of man and the +federation of nations everywhere prevail; then, indeed, shall the sign of +the Son of Man appear in the heavens, and then shall the tribes of {140} +the earth see Him coming in the clouds with power and glory.[37] + +Jesus does not hesitate to say that there will be a final judgment and an +ingathering of the elect from all quarters of the earth.[38] There will +be, as the parable of the Ten Virgins suggests, a division and a shut +door.[39] But punishment will be automatic. Sin will bring its own +consequences. Those only will be excluded at the last who even now are +excluding themselves. For Christ is already here, and is judging the +world every day. By the common actions of their present life men are +being tried; and that which will determine their final relation to Christ +will not be their mere perception of His bodily presence, but their moral +and spiritual likeness to Him. + +Amidst the imperfections of the present men have ever looked forward to +some glorious consummation, and have lived and worked in the faith of it. +'To the prophets of Israel it was the new age of righteousness; to the +Greek thinkers the world of pure intelligible forms; to Augustine and +Dante the holy theocratic state; to the practical thought of our own time +the renovated social order. Each successive age will frame its own +vision of the great fulfilment; but all the different ideals can find +their place in the message of the kingdom which was proclaimed by +Jesus.'[40] + +There is thus opened to our vision a splendid conception of the future of +humanity. It stands for all that is highest in our expectations because +it is already expressive of all that is best in our present achievements +and endeavours. The final hope of mankind requires for its fulfilment a +progressive moral discipline. Only as Christ's twofold command--love to +God and love to man--is made the all-pervasive rule of men's lives will +the goal of a universally perfected humanity be attained. + +{141} + +III + +The chief good may be regarded finally in its _divine_ aspect--as the +endeavour after God-likeness. In this third form of the ideal the two +others--the personal and the social--are harmonised and completed. To +realise the perfect life as it is revealed in the character and will of +God is the supreme aim of man, and it embraces all that is conceivably +highest for the individual and for humanity as a whole. This aspiration +finds its most explicit expression in the sublime word of Christ--'Be ye +perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect.'[41] This commandment, +unlike so many generalisations of duty, is no cold abstraction. It is +pervaded with the warmth of personality and the inspiration of love. In +the idea of Fatherhood both a standard and motive are implied. Because +God is our Father it is at once natural and possible for us to be like +Him. He who would imitate another must have already within him something +of that other. As there is a community of nature which makes it possible +for the child to grow into the likeness of its parent, so there is a +kinship in man with God to which our Lord here appeals. + +1. Among the ethical qualities of divine perfection set forth in +scripture for man's imitation _Holiness_ stands preeminent. God, the +perfect being, is the type of holiness, and men are holy in proportion as +their lives are Godlike. This conception of holiness is fundamental in +the Old Testament. It is summed up in a command almost identical with +that of our Lord: 'Be ye holy, for I am holy.'[42] Holiness, as +Christianity understands it, is the name for the undimmed lustre of God's +ethical perfection. God is 'the Holy one'--the alone 'good' in the +absolute sense.[43] + +If God's character consists in 'Holiness,' then that quality determines +the moral end of man. But holiness, as the most comprehensive name for +the divine moral perfection--the pure white light of God's Being--breaks +up into the {142} separate rays which we designate the special moral +attributes. These have been grouped under 'Righteousness' (truth, +faithfulness, justice, zeal, etc.), and 'Love' (goodness, pity, mercy, +etc.), though they are really but expressions of one individual life.[44] + +2. In the New Testament _Righteousness_ is almost equivalent to +holiness. It is the attribute of God which determines the nature of His +kingdom and the condition of man's entrance into it. As comprising +obedience to the will of God and the fulfilment of the moral law, it is +the basal and central conception of the Christian ideal.[45] It is the +keynote of the Pauline Epistles. Life has a supreme sacredness for Paul +because the righteousness of God is its end. While righteousness is the +distinctive note of the Pauline conception, it is also fundamental in the +Ethics of Jesus. It is the ruling thought in the Sermon on the Mount. +To be righteous for Jesus simply means to be right and true--to be as one +ought to be. But human standards are insufficient. A man must order his +life by the divine standard. Jesus is as emphatic as any Old Testament +prophet in insisting upon the need of absolute righteousness. That, for +all who would share in the kingdom of the good, is to be their ideal--the +object of their hunger and thirst. It is a 'good' which is essential to +the very satisfaction and blessedness of the soul.[46] It is the supreme +desire of the man who would be at peace with God. It involves poverty of +spirit, for only those who are emptied of self are conscious of their +need. They who, in humility and meekness, acknowledge their sins, are in +the way of holiness and are already partakers of the divine nature. + +Christ's teaching in regard to righteousness has both a negative and a +positive aspect. It was inevitable that He should begin with a criticism +of the morality inculcated by the leaders of His day. The characteristic +feature of Pharisaism was, as Christ shows, its _externalism_. If a man +fulfilled the outward requirements of the law he was {143} regarded as +holy, by himself and others, whatever might be the state of his heart +towards God. This outwardness tended to create certain vices of +character. Foremost amongst these were (1) _Vanity_ or Ostentation. To +appear well in the opinion of others was the aim of pharisaic conduct. +Along with ostentation appears (2) _Self-complacency_. Flattery leads to +self-esteem. He who loves the praise of man naturally begins to praise +himself. As a result of self-esteem arises (3) _Censoriousness_, since +he who thinks well of himself is apt to think ill of others. As a system +Pharisaism was wanton hypocrisy--a character of seeming righteousness, +but too often of real viciousness. + +But Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil the law.[47] His aim was to +proclaim the true principles of righteousness in contrast to the current +notions of it. This He proceeds to do by issuing the law in its ideal +and perfected form.[48] Hence Jesus unfolds its _positive_ content by +bringing into prominence the virtues of the godly character as opposed to +the pharisaic vices. _Modesty_ and _humility_ are set over against +ostentation and self-righteousness.[49] _Single-minded sincerity_ is +commended in opposition to hypocrisy.[50] The vice of censoriousness is +met by the duty of _self-judgment_ rather than the judgment of others.[51] + +The two positive features of the new law of righteousness as expounded by +Jesus are--_inwardness_ and _spontaneity_. The righteousness of the +Gospel, so far from being laxer or easier of fulfilment, was actually to +exceed that of the Pharisees:[52] (_a_) in _depth and inwardness_. It is +not enough not to kill or steal or commit adultery. These commandments +may be outwardly kept yet inwardly broken. Something more radical is +expected of the man who has set before him the doing of God's will, a +righteousness not of appearance but of reality. (_b_) In _freedom and +spontaneity_. It is to have its spring in the heart. It is to be a +righteousness not of servile obedience, but of willing devotion. The aim +of life is no longer the painful effort of the bondsman who {144} strives +to perform a distasteful task, but the gladsome endeavour of the son who +knows and does, because he loves, his father's will. In the Ethics of +the Christian life there is no such thing as mere duty; for a man never +fulfils his duty till he has done more than is legally required of him. +'Whosoever shall compel you to go with him one mile, go with him +twain.'[53] The 'nicely calculated less or more' is alien to the spirit +of him who would do God's will. Love is the fulfilling of the law, and +love knows nothing of limits. + +3. Thus the holiness of God is manifested not in righteousness only, but +in the attribute of Love. The human mind can attain to no higher +conception of the divine character than that which the word 'love' +suggests. The thought is the creation of Christianity. It was the +special contribution of one of the innermost circle of Jesus' disciples +to give utterance to the new vision of the divine nature which Christ had +disclosed--'God is love.'[54] In our Lord's teaching the centre of +gravity is entirely changed. The Jewish idea of God is enriched with a +fuller content. He is still the Holy One, but the sublimity of His +righteousness, though fully recognised, is softened by the gentler +radiance of love.[55] Jehovah the Sovereign is revealed as God the +Father. Divine righteousness is not simply justice, but goodness +manifested in far-reaching activities of mercy and pity and benevolence. +A new note is struck in the Ethics of Jesus. A new relationship is +established between God and man--a personal filial relationship which +entirely alters man's conception of life. To be perfect as our Father in +heaven is perfect, to be, and embody in life all that love means, that is +the sublime aim which Jesus in His own person and teaching sets before +the world. As God's love is universal, and His care and compassion +world-wide, so, says Christ, not by retaliation or even by the +performance of strict justice, but in loving your enemies, in returning +good for evil and extending your acts of helpfulness and charity to those +'who know not, care not, think {145} not, what they do,' shall ye become +the children of your Father, and realise something of that divine pattern +of every man which has been shown him on the holy mount. + +If the view presented in this chapter of the ethical ideal of +Christianity be correct, then the doctrine of an _Interims-ethik_ +advocated by modern eschatologists must be pronounced unsatisfactory as a +complete account of the teaching of Jesus.[56] The three features which +stand out most clearly in the Ethics of Christ are, Absoluteness, +Inwardness, and Universality. It is an ideal for man as man, for all +time, and for all men. The personality of God represents the highest +form of existence we know; and the love of God is the sublimest attribute +we can conceive. But because God is our Father there is a kinship +between the divine and the human; and no higher or grander vision of life +is thinkable than to be like God--to share that which is most distinctive +of the divine Fatherhood--His love of all mankind. Hence Godlikeness +involves Brotherhood.[57] In the ideal of love--high as God, broad as +the world--the other aspects of the chief good, the individual and the +social, are harmonised. In Christian Ethics, the problem of philosophy +how to unite the one and the many, egoism and altruism, has been +practically solved. The individual realises his life only as he finds +himself in others; and this he can only do as he finds himself in God. +The first and last word of all morality and religion is summed up in +Christ's twofold law of love: 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all +thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; and thou shalt +love thy neighbour as thyself.'[58] + + + +[1] Cf. Troeltsch, _Die Sociallehren d. Christl. Kirchen_, vol. i. p. +37, where the idea of self-worth and self-consecration is worked out. + +[2] Wernle, _Beginnings of Christianity_, vol. i. p. 76. + +[3] Wernle, _Beginnings of Christianity_, pp. 76 f. + +[4] John x. 10. + +[5] Luke xii. 15, 16. + +[6] Matt. v. + +[7] Matt. vi. 24. + +[8] 1 John ii. 15. + +[9] Luke x. 21; Matt. xi. 28-30; Mark viii. 35; John iii. 15, x. 28, +xvii. 2. + +[10] John xvii. 3. + +[11] Rom. xii. 1. + +[12] Matt. xix. 17. + +[13] Luke xvii. 33; John xii. 25. + +[14] Bailey, _Festus_. + +[15] Browning. + +[16] Jones, _Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher_, p. 354. + +[17] Abt Vogler. + +[18] Cf. Balch, _Introd. to the Study of Christian Ethics_, p. 150. + +[19] Newman Smyth, _Christian Ethics_, p. 97. + +[20] Balch, _Introd. to the Study of Christian Ethics_, p. 150. + +[21] See Apocalypses of Baruch, Esdras, Enoch, and Pss. of Solomon, and +also Daniel and Ezekiel. Cf. E. F. Scott, _The Kingdom and the Messiah_, +for Apoc. literature. + +[22] J. Weiss, _Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes_. Cf. also Wernle, +_Die Anfänge unsurer Religion_, who is not so pronounced. Bousset +rejects this view, and Titius, in his _N. T. Doctrine of Blessedness_, +regards the kingdom of God as a present good. See also Moffatt, _The +Theology of the Gospels_. + +[23] Cf. Dobschütz, _The Eschatology of the Gospels_, also Schweitzer, +_op. cit._, and Sanday, _The Life of Christ in Recent Research_, E. +Scott, _The Kingdom of God and the Messiah_, and Moffatt, _op. cit._ + +[24] Cf. Barbour, _A Philos. Study of Chr. Ethics_, p. 184. + +[25] 'Jesu predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judenthum.' + +[26] Cairns, _Christianity in the Mod. World_, p. 173. See Schweitzer, +_The Quest of the Historical Jesus_, for advocates and opponents of this +view, pp. 222 ff. Cf. also Troeltsch, _op. cit._, vol. i. p. 35. + +[27] Cf. Moffatt, _op. cit._ + +[28] Luke iv. 21, xvii. 21; Matt. xii. 28, xi. 2-8, xi. 20; Luke xvi. +16. Cf. also Matt. xiii. 16-17. + +[29] Our Lord never uses the word 'final' or 'last' of anything +concerning the kingdom. Only in the fourth Gospel do we find the phrase +'the last day.' See art., _Contemporary Review_, Sept. 1912. + +[30] The view of Weiss. + +[31] Luke xii. 19; Matt xxiv. 13; Mark xiii. 13; 2 Tim. ii. 12. + +[32] King, _The Ethics of Jesus_, p. 143. + +[33] Mark xiii. 7-31 has been called the 'little Apocalypse' and the +hypothesis has been thrown out that a number of verses (fifteen in all) +form a document by themselves, 'a fly leaf put into circulation before +the fall of Jerusalem, and really incorporated by the Evangelist himself. +See Sanday, art., _Hibbert Journal_, Oct. 1911, and _Life of Christ in +Recent Research_. + +[34] Matt. xxiv. 42. + +[35] Matt. xxiv. 23. + +[36] Matt. xxiv. 27. + +[37] Matt. xxiv. 30. + +[38] Matt. xxiv. 31. + +[39] Matt. xxv. + +[40] E. F. Scott, _The Kingdom and the Messiah_, p. 256. + +[41] Matt. v. 48. + +[42] Lev. iv. 11, xix. 2. + +[43] Mark x. 18. + +[44] Cf. Orr, _Sin as a Problem of To-day_, chap. iii. + +[45] Cf. Jacoby, _Neu-testamentliche Ethik_, p. 1. + +[46] Matt. v. 3 f. + +[47] Matt. v. 17. + +[48] Matt. v. 18. + +[49] Matt. vi. 1-6. + +[50] Matt. vi. 16-18. + +[51] Matt. vii. 1-5. + +[52] Matt. v. 20. + +[53] Matt. v. 41. + +[54] 1 John iv. 8, 16. + +[55] John xvii. 11; Heb. x. 31; Rev. xv. 4. + +[56] Cf. E. Digges La Touche, _The Person of Christ in Modern Thought_, +pp. 150 ff. + +[57] 1 John iv. 21. + +[58] Matt. xxii. 37. + + + + +{146} + +CHAPTER IX + +THE STANDARD AND MOTIVE OF THE NEW LIFE + +In every system of Ethics the three ideas of End, Norm, and Motive are +inseparable. Christian Ethics is unique in this respect that it presents +not merely a code of morals, but an ideal of good embodied in a person +who is at once the pattern and inspiration of the new life. In this +chapter we propose to consider these two elements of the good. + +_Christ as Example_.--The value of 'concrete examples' has been +frequently recognised in non-Christian systems. In the 'philosopher +king' of Plato, the 'expert' of Aristotle, and the 'wise man' of the +Stoics we have the imaginary embodiment of the ideal. A similar tendency +is apparent in modern theories. Comte invests the abstract idea of +'Humanity' with certain personal perfections for which he claims homage. +But what other systems have conceived in an imaginative form only, +Christianity has realised in an actual person. + +The example of Christ is not a separate source of authority independent +of His teaching, but rather its witness and illustration. Word and deed +in Jesus are in full agreement. He was what He taught, and every truth +He uttered flowed directly from His inner nature. He is the prototype +and expression of the 'good' as it exists in the mind of God, as well as +the perfect representative and standard of it in human life. In Him is +manifested for all time what is meant by the good. + +{147} + +1. If Christ is the normative standard of life it is extremely important +to obtain a true perception of Him as He dwelt among men. But too often +have theology and art presented a Christ embellished with fantastic +colours or obscured by abstract speculations. Recently, however, there +has been a revival of interest in the actual life of Jesus. Men are +turning wistfully to the life of the Master for guidance in practical +matters, and it is beginning to dawn upon the world that the highest +ideals of manhood were present in the Carpenter of Nazareth. We must +therefore go back to the Gospels if we would know what manner of man +Jesus was. The difficulty of presenting the Man Christ Jesus as the +eternal example to the world must have been almost insurmountable; and we +are at once struck with two remarkable features of the synoptics' +portrayal of Him. (1) The writers make no attempt to produce a work of +art. They never dream that they are drawing a model for all men to copy. +There is no effort to touch up or tone down the portrait. They simply +reflect what they see without admixture of colours of their own. Hence +the paradox of His personality--the intense humanness and yet the mystery +of godliness ever and anon shining through the commonest incidents of His +life. (2) Even more remarkable than the absence of subjectivity on the +part of the evangelists is the unconsciousness of Jesus that He is being +portrayed as an example. We do not receive the impression that the Son +of Man was consciously living for the edification of the world. His +mental attitude is not that of an actor playing a part, but of a true and +genuine man living his own life and fulfilling his own purpose. There is +no seeming or display. Goodness to be effectual as an example must be +unconscious goodness. We are impressed everywhere with the perfect +naturalness and spontaneity of all that Christ did and uttered.[1] + +The character of Jesus has been variously interpreted, and it is one of +the evidences of His moral greatness that each age has emphasised some +new aspect of His {148} personality. In a nature so rich and complex it +is difficult to fix upon a single category from which may be deduced the +manifold attributes of His character. Two conceptions of Jesus have +generally prevailed down the centuries. One view interprets His +character in terms of asceticism; the other in terms of aestheticism.[2] +Some regard Him as the representative of Hebrew sorrow and sacrifice; +others see in Him the type of Hellenic joy and geniality. There are +passages in Scripture confirmatory of both impressions. On the one hand, +there is a whole series of virtues of the passive order which are utterly +alien to the Greek ideal; and, on the other hand, there is equally +prominent a tone of tranquil gladness, of broad sympathy with, and keen +appreciation of, the beautiful in nature and life which contrasts with +the spirit of Hebrew abnegation. But, after all, neither of these traits +reveals the secret of Jesus. Joy and sorrow are but incidents in life. +They have only moral value as the vehicles of a profounder spiritual +purpose. To help every man to realise the fullness and perfection of his +being as a child of God is the aim of His life and ministry, and +everything that furthers this end is gratefully recognised by Him as a +good. He neither courts nor shuns pain. Neither joy nor sorrow is for +Him an end in itself. Both are but incidents upon the way of holiness +and love which He had chosen to travel. + +2. Everywhere there was manifest in the life and teaching of Jesus a +note of _self-mastery and authority_ which impressed His contemporaries +and goes far to explain and unify the various features of His personality +and influence. It is remarkable to notice how often the word 'power' is +applied to Jesus in the New Testament.[3] Whether we regard His attitude +to God, or His relation to others, it is this note of quiet strength, of +vital moral force which arrests our attention. It will be sufficient to +mention in passing three directions in which this quality of power is +manifest. + +{149} + +(1) It is revealed in the consciousness of a _divine mission_. He goes +steadily forward with the calmness of one who knows himself and his work. +He has no fear or hesitancy. Courage, earnestness, and singleness of +purpose mark His career. He is conscious that His task has been given +Him by God, and that He is the chosen instrument of His Father's will. +Life has a greatness and worth for Him because it may be made the +manifestation and vehicle of the divine purpose. + +(2) His power is revealed again in the _realisation of Holiness_. +Holiness is to be differentiated, on the one hand, from innocence; and, +on the other, from sinlessness. Innocence is untried goodness; +sinlessness is negative goodness; holiness is achieved and victorious +goodness. It was not mere absence of sin that distinguished Jesus. His +was a purity won by temptation, an obedience perfected through suffering, +a peace and harmony of soul attained not by self-suppression, but by the +consecration of His unfolding life to the will of God. + +(3) His power is manifested once more in His _Sympathy with man_. His +purity was pervasive. It flowed forth in acts of love. He went about +doing good, invading the world of darkness and sorrow with light and joy. +It is the wealth of His interests and the variety of His sympathy which +give to the ministry of the Son of Man its impressiveness and charm. +With gladness as with grief, with the playfulness of childhood and the +earnestness of maturity, with the innocent festivities and the graver +pursuits of His fellow-men, with the cares of the rich and the trials of +the poor, He disclosed the most intimate and tender feeling. His +parables show that He had an open and observant eye for all the life +around Him. To every appeal He responded with an insight and delicacy of +consideration which betokened that He Himself had sounded the depths of +human experience and knew what was in man. Humour, irony, and pathos in +turn are revealed in His human intercourse. + +But while Jesus delighted to give of Himself freely He knew also how to +withhold Himself. There can be no true {150} sympathy without restraint. +The passive virtues--meekness, patience, forbearance--which appear in the +life of Christ are 'not the signs of mere self-mortification, they are +the signs of power in reserve. They are the marks of one who can afford +to wait, who expects to suffer; and that not because he is simply meek +and lowly, but because he is also strong and calm.'[4] + +The New Testament depicts Jesus as made in the likeness of men, whose +life, though unique in some of its aspects, was in its general conditions +normal, passing through the ordinary stages of growth, and participating +in the common experiences of mankind. He had to submit to the same laws +and limitations of the universe as we have. There was the same call, in +His case as in ours, to obedience and endurance. There was the same +demand for moral decision. Temptation, suffering, and toil, which mean +so much for man in the discipline of character, were factors also in the +spiritual development of Christ. Trust, prayer, thanksgiving were +exercised by the Son of Man as by others; confession alone had no place +in His life. + +3. The question has been seriously asked, Can the example and teaching +of Jesus be really adopted in modern life as the pattern and rule of +conduct? Is there not something strangely impracticable in His Ethics; +and, however admirably suited to meet the needs of His own time, utterly +inapplicable to the complex conditions of society to-day? On the one +hand, Tolstoy would have us follow the example of Jesus to the letter, +and rigidly practise the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount, even to the +extent of refusing to resist wrong and possess property, and of holding +aloof from all culture and enterprise, and the interests of life +generally. On the other hand, philosophers like Paulsen and Bradley, +perceiving the utter impracticableness of Tolstoy's contentions, yet at +the same time recognising his attitude as the only consistent one if the +imitation of Christ is to have vogue at all, are convinced that the +earthly life of Jesus is not the model of our {161} age, and that to +attempt to carry out His precepts consistently would be not only +impossible but injurious to all the higher interests of humanity.[5] + +But this conclusion is based, it seems to us, upon a two-fold +misapprehension. It is founded upon an inadequate interpretation of the +life and teaching of Christ; and also upon a wholly mechanical +understanding of the meaning and value of example. + +(1) What was Christ's ideal of the Christian life? Was it that of the +monk or the citizen?--the recluse who meditates apart on his own +salvation, or the worker who enters the world and contributes to the +betterment of mankind? Is the kingdom of God a realm apart and separate +from all the other domains of activity? Or has Christianity, according +to its essence, room within it for an application of its truth to the +complex relations and manifold interests of modern life? Both views have +found expression in the history of the Church. But there can be little +doubt as to which is the true interpretation of the mind of Jesus.[6] + +(2) But, again, what is meant by the 'imitation of Christ' has been also +misconceived. Imitation is not a literal mechanical copying. To make +the character of another your model does not mean that you are to become +his mimic or echo. In asking us to follow Him, Christ does not desire to +suppress our individuality, but to enrich and ennoble it. When He says, +on the occasion of the feet-washing of His disciples, 'I have given you +an example, that ye should do as I have done to you,'[7] obviously it was +not the outward literal performance, but the spirit of humility and +service embodied in the act which He desired His disciples to emulate. +From another soul we receive incentives rather than rules. No teacher or +master, says Emerson, can {152} realise for us what is good.[8] Within +our own souls alone can the decision be made. We cannot hope to +interpret the character of another until there be within our own breasts +the same moral spirit from which we believe his conduct to proceed. The +very nature of goodness forbids slavish reproduction. Hence there is a +certain sense in which the paradox of Kant is true, that 'imitation finds +no place at all in morality.'[9] The question, 'What would Jesus do?' as +a test of conduct covers a quite inadequate conception of the intimate +and vital relations Christ bears to our humanity. 'It is not to copy +after Christ,' says a modern writer, 'but to receive His spirit and make +it effective--which is the moral task of the Christian.'[10] Christ is +indeed our example, but He is more. And unless He were more He could not +be so much. We could not strive to be like Him if He were not already +within us, the Principle and Spirit of our life, the higher and diviner +self of every man. + +What is meant, then, by saying that Christ is the ideal character or norm +of life is that He represents to us human nature in its typical or ideal +form. As we behold His perfection we feel that this is what we were made +for, this is the true end of our being. Every one may, in short, see in +Him the fulfilment of the divine idea and purpose of man--the conception +and end of himself.[11] + + +II + +_The Christian Motive_.--Rightly regarded Christ is not only the model of +the new life, but its motive as well. All the great appeals of the +Gospel--every persuasion and plea by which God seeks to awaken a +responsive love in the hearts of men--are centred in, and find expression +through, the Person and Passion of Christ. + +1. The question of motive is a primary one in Ethics. {153} If, +therefore, we ask, What is the deepest spring of action, what is the +incentive and motive power for the Christian? The answer is: (1) the +love of God, a love which finds its highest expression in _Forgiveness_. +Of all motives the most powerful is the sense of being pardoned. Even +when it is only one human being who forgives another, nothing strikes so +deep into the human heart or evokes penitence so tender and unreserved, +or brings a joy so pure and lasting. It not only restores the old +relation which wrong had dissolved; it gives the offender a sense of +loyalty unknown before. He is now bound not by law but by honour, and it +would be a disloyalty worse than the original offence if he wounded such +love again. Thus it is that God becomes the object of reverence and +affection, not because He imposes laws upon us but because He pardons and +redeems. The consciousness of forgiveness is far more potent in +producing goodness than the consciousness of law. This psychological +fact lay at the root of Christ's ministry, and was the secret of His hope +for man. This, too, is the key to all that is paradoxical, and, at the +same time, to all that is most characteristic in St Paul's Gospel. What +the Law could not do, forgiveness achieves. It creates the new heart, +and with it the new holiness. 'It is not anything statutory which makes +saints out of sinful men; it is the forgiveness which comes through the +passion of Jesus.'[12] + +(2) Next to the motive of forgiveness, and indeed arising from it, is the +new consciousness of the _Fatherhood of God_, and the corresponding idea +of sonship. This was a motive to which Jesus habitually appealed. He +invariably sought not only to create in men confidence in God by +revealing His fatherly providence, but also to lift them out of their +apathy and thraldom by kindling in their souls a sense of their worth and +liberty as sons of God. The same thought is prominent also in the +epistles both of St. Paul and St. John. As children of God we are no +longer menials and hirelings who do their work merely for pay, and +without {154} intelligent interest, but sons who share our Father's +possessions and co-operate with Him in His purposes.[13] + +(3) Closely connected with the idea of Sonship is that of life as a +_Divine Vocation_. Life is a trust, and as the children of God we are +called to serve Him with all we have and are. The sense of the vocation +and stewardship of life acts as a motive: (_a_) in giving _dignity and +stability_ to character, saving us, on the one hand, from fatalism, and +on the other from fanaticism, and affording definiteness of purpose to +all our endeavours; and (_b_) in promoting _sincerity and fidelity_ in +our life-work. Thoroughness will permeate every department of our +conduct, since whatsoever we do in word or deed we do as unto God. All +duty is felt to be one, and as love to God becomes its motive the +smallest as well as the greatest act is invested with infinite worth. +'All service ranks the same with God.' + +(4) Another motive, prominent in the Pauline Epistles, but present also +in the eschatological passages of the Synoptics, ought to be mentioned, +though it does not now act upon Christians in the same form--_the +Shortness and Uncertainty of life_. Our Lord enjoins men to work while +it is day for the night cometh; and in view of the suddenness and +unexpectedness of the coming of the Son of Man He exhorts to watchfulness +and preparedness. A similar thought forms the background of the +apostle's conception of life. His entire view of duty as well as his +estimate of earthly things are tinged with the idea that 'the time is +short,' and that 'the Lord is at hand.' Christians are exhorted, +therefore, to sit lightly to all worldly considerations. Our true +citizenship is in heaven. But neither the apostle nor his Master ever +urges this fact as a reason for apathy or indifference. Life may be +brief, but it is not worthless. The thought of life's brevity must not +act as an opiate, but rather as a stimulant. If our existence here is +short, then there is all the greater necessity that its days should be +nobly filled, and its transient opportunities seized and turned into +occasions of strenuous service. + +{155} + +(5) To the considerations just mentioned must be added a cognate truth +which has coloured the whole Christian view of life, and has been a most +powerful factor in shaping Christian conduct--_the idea of Immortality_. +It is not quite correct to say that we owe this doctrine to Christianity +alone. Long before the Christian era it was recognised in Egypt, Greece, +and the Orient generally. But it was entertained more as a surmise than +a conviction. And among the Greeks it was little more than the shadowy +speculation of philosophers. Plato, in his _Phaedo_, puts into the mouth +of Socrates utterances of great beauty and far-reaching import; yet, +notwithstanding their sublimity, they scarcely attain to more than a +'perhaps.' Even in Hebrew literature, as we have seen, while isolated +instances of a larger hope are not wanting, there is no confident or +general belief in an after-life. But what was only guessed at by the +ancients was declared as a fact by Christ, and preached as a sublime and +comforting truth by the apostles; and it is not too much to say that +survival after death is at once the most distinctive doctrine of +Christianity and the most precious hope of Christendom. The whole moral +temperature of the world, says Jean Paul Richter, has been raised +immeasurably by the fact that Christ by His Gospel has brought life and +immortality to light. This idea, which has found expression, not only in +all the creeds of Christendom, but also in the higher literature and +poetry of modern times, has given a new motive to action, has founded a +new type of heroism, and nerved common men and women to the discharge of +tasks from which nature recoils. The assurance that death does not end +existence, but that 'man has forever,' has not only exalted and +transfigured the common virtues of humanity; but, held in conjunction +with the belief in the divine Fatherhood and human brotherhood, given to +life itself a new solemnity and pathos.[14] + +2. But if these are the things which actuate men in their service of God +and man, can it be legitimately said that the Christian motive is pure +and disinterested? It is {166} somewhat remarkable that two opposite +charges have been brought against Christian Ethics.[15] In one quarter +the reproach has been made that Christianity suppresses every natural +desire for happiness, and inculcates a life of severe renunciation. And +with equally strong insistence there are others who find fault with it +because of its hedonism, because it rests morality upon an appeal to +selfish interests alone. + +(1) The first charge is sufficiently met, we think, by our view of the +Christian ideal. We have seen that it is a full rich life which Christ +reveals and commends. The kingdom of God finds its realisation, not in a +withdrawal from human interests, but in a larger and fuller participation +in all that makes for the highest good of humanity. It is a caricature +of Christ's whole outlook upon existence to represent Him as teaching +that this life is an outlying waste, forsaken of God and unblessed, and +that the world is so hopelessly bad that it must be wholly renounced. On +the contrary, it is for Him one of the provinces of the divine kingdom, +and the most trivial of our occupations and the most transient of our +joys and sorrows find their place in the divine order. It is not +necessary to endorse Renan's idyllic picture of the Galilean ministry to +believe that for Jesus all life, its ordinary engagements and activities, +had a worth for the discipline and perfecting of character, and were +capable of being consecrated to the highest ends. There are, indeed, not +a few passages in which the call to self-denial is emphasised. But +neither Christ nor His apostles represent pain and want as in themselves +efficacious or meritorious. Renunciation is inculcated not for its own +sake, but always as a means to fuller realisation. Jesus, indeed, +transcends the common antithesis of life. For Him it is not a question +as to whether asceticism or non-asceticism is best. Life is for use. It +is at once a trust and a privilege. It may seem to some that He chose +'the primrose path,' but if he did so it was not due to an easy-going +good-nature. We dare not forget the terrible issues {157} He faced +without flinching. As Professor Sanday has finely said, 'If we are to +draw a lesson in this respect from our Lord's life, it certainly would +not be that + + "He who lets his feelings run + In soft luxurious flow, + Shrinks when hard service must be done, + And faints at every woe." + +It would be rather that the brightest and tenderest human life must have +a stern background, must carry with it the possibility of infinite +sacrifice, of bearing the cross and the crown of thorns.'[16] + +(2) The second charge, the charge of hedonism, though seemingly opposed +to the first, comes into line with it in so far as it is alleged that +Christianity, while inculcating renunciation in this world, does so for +the sake of happiness in the next. It is contended that in regard to +purity of motive the Ethics of Christianity falls below the Ethics of +philosophy.[17] This statement, so often repeated, requires some +examination. + +3. While it may be acknowledged that unselfishness and disinterestedness +are the criterion of moral sublimity, it must be noted at the outset that +considerable confusion of thought exists as to the meaning of motive. +Even in those moral systems in which virtue is represented as wholly +disinterested, the motive may be said to reside in the object itself. +The maxim, 'Virtue for virtue's sake,' really implies what may be called +the 'interest of achievement.' If virtue has any meaning it must be +regarded as a 'good' which is desirable. Perseverance in the pursuit of +any good implies the hope of success; in other words, of the reward which +lies in the attainment of the object desired. The reward sought may not +be foreign to the nature of virtue itself, but none the less, the idea of +reward is present, and, in a sense, is the incentive to all virtuous +endeavour. This is, indeed, implied by a no less rigorous {168} moralist +than Kant. For as he himself teaches, the question, 'What should I do?' +leads inevitably to the further question, 'What may I hope?'[18] The end +striven after cannot be a matter of indifference, if virtue is to have +moral value at all. It must be a real and desirable end--an end which +fulfils the purpose of a man as a moral being. + +(1) But though Kant insists with rigorous logic that reverence for the +majesty of the moral law must be the only motive of duty, and that all +motives springing from personal desire or hope of happiness must be +severely excluded, it is curious to find that in the second part of his +_Critique of Practical Reason_ he proceeds, with a strange inconsistency, +to make room for the other idea, viz., that virtue is not without its +reward, and is indeed united in the end with happiness. Felicity and +holiness shall be ultimately one, he says; and, at the last, virtue shall +be seen 'to be worthy of happiness,' and happiness shall be the crown of +goodness.[19] Thus those philosophers, of whom Kant is typical, who +contend for the purity of the moral motive and the disinterested loyalty +to the good, bring in, at the end, the notion of happiness, which, as a +concomitant or consequence of virtue, cannot fail to be also an active +incentive. + +(2) When we turn to Christian Ethics we find that here, not less than in +philosophical Ethics, the motive lies in the object itself. The end and +the motive are really one, and the highest good is to be sought for +itself and not for the sake of some ulterior gain. It is true, indeed, +that Christianity has not always been presented in its purest form; too +often have prudence, fear, other-worldliness been set forth as +inducements to goodness, as if the Gospel cared nothing for the +disposition of a man, and was concerned only with his ultimate happiness. +Even a moralist so acute as Paley bases morality upon no higher ground +than enlightened self-interest. But the most superficial reader of the +Gospels must see at a glance the wide variance between such a view and +that of Christ. Nothing could be further from the spirit of Jesus than +to estimate the {169} excellence of an action by the magnitude or the +utility of its effects rather than the intrinsic good of its motive. +Otherwise He would not have ranked the widow's mite above the gifts of +vanity, nor esteemed the tribute of the penitent, not so much for the +costliness of her offering, as for the sincerity of affection it +revealed. Christ looked upon the heart alone, and the worth of an action +lay essentially for Him in its inner quality. Sin resided not merely in +the overt act, but even more in the secret desire. A man may be +outwardly blameless, and yet not really good. He who remains sober or +honest simply because of the worldly advantages attaching to such conduct +may obtain a certificate of respectability from society; but, judged by +the standard of Christ, he is not truly a moral man. In an age which is +too prone to make outward propriety the gauge of goodness, it cannot be +sufficiently insisted upon that the Ethic of Christianity is an Ethic of +the inner motive and intention, and that, in this respect, it does not +fall a whit behind the demand of the most rigid system of disinterested +morality. + +(_a_) It must, however, be freely admitted that our Lord frequently +employs the sanctions both of rewards and penalties. In the time of +Christ the idea of reward, so prominent in the Old Testament, still held +an important place in Jewish religion, being specially connected with the +Messianic Hope and the coming of the kingdom. It was not unnatural, +therefore, that Jesus, trained in Hebrew religious modes of thought and +expression, should frequently employ the existing conceptions as vehicles +of His own teaching; but, at the same time, purifying them of their more +materialistic associations and giving to them a richer spiritual content. +While the kingdom of God is spoken of as a gift, and promised, indeed, as +a reward, the word 'reward' in this connection is not used in the +ordinary sense, but 'is rather conceived as belonging to the same order +of spiritual experience as the state of heart and mind which ensures its +bestowal.'[20] Though Jesus does not {160} hesitate to point His +disciples to the blessings of heaven which they will receive in the +future, these are represented for the most part not as material benefits, +but as the intensification and enrichment of life itself.[21] + +It was usually the difficulties rather than the advantages of +discipleship upon which Jesus first laid stress. He would not that any +one should come to Him on false pretences, or without fully counting the +cost.[22] Even when He Himself called His original disciples, it was of +service and not of recompense He spoke. 'Follow Me, and I will make you +fishers of men.'[23] The privilege consisted not in outward éclat, but +in the participation of the Master's own purpose and work. Still, all +service carries with it its own reward, and no one can share the mission +of Christ without also partaking of that satisfaction and joy which are +inseparable from the highest forms of spiritual ministry.[24] + +There is, however, one passage recorded by all the Synoptists which seems +at first sight to point more definitely to a reward of a distinctly +material character, and to one that was to be enjoyed not merely in the +future, but even in this present life. When Peter somewhat boastfully +spoke of the sacrifice which he and his brethren had made for the +Gospel's sake, and asked, 'What shall we have therefor?' Jesus replied, +'Verily, I say unto you, that no man that hath left home, or brethren, or +sisters, or mother, or father, or children, or lands, for My sake and the +Gospel's sake, but shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, houses +and brethren, sisters and mothers, and children and lands, with +persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life.'[25] Now, while +this is a promise of wide sweep and large generosity, it is neither so +arbitrary nor material as it seems. First, the words, 'with +persecutions,' indicate that suffering is not only the very condition of +the promise, but indeed an essential part of the reward--an element which +would of itself be a true test of the sincerity of the sacrifice. {161} +But, second, even the promise, 'An hundredfold now in this time,' is +obviously not intended to be taken in a literal sense, but rather as +suggesting that the gain, while apparently of the same nature as the +sacrifice, will have a larger spiritual import. For, just as Jesus +Himself looked upon all who shared His own devotion as His mother and +brethren; so, in the deepest sense, when a man leaves father and mother, +renouncing home and family ties for the sake of bringing his fellow-men +to God, he seems to be emptying his life of all affectionate +relationships, but in reality he is entering into a wider brotherhood; +and, in virtue of his ministry of love, is being knit in bonds stronger +than those of earthly kinship, with a great and increasing community of +souls which owe to him their lives.[26] The promise is no arbitrary gift +or bribe capriciously bestowed; it is the natural fruition of moral +endeavour. For there is nothing so productive as sacrifice. What the +man who yields himself to the service of Christ actually gives is life; +and what he gets back, increased an hundredfold, is just life again, his +own life, repeated and reflected in the men and women whom he has won to +Christ. + +In some of His parables Christ employs the analogy of the +work-engagement, in which labour and payment seem to correspond. But the +legal element has a very subordinate place in the simile. Jesus lifts +the whole relationship into a higher region of thought, and transforms +the idea of wages into that of a gift of love far transcending the legal +claim which can be made by the worker. He who has the bondsman's mind, +and works only for the hireling's pay, will only get what he works for. +But he who serves from love finds in the service itself that which must +always be its truest recompense--the increased power of service, the +capacity of larger devotion[27]--'The wages of going on.'[28] In his +latest volume Deissmann has pointed out that we can only do justice to +the utterances of the New Testament regarding work and wages by examining +them _in situ_, {162} amidst their natural surroundings. Jesus and St. +Paul spoke with distinct reference to the life and habits of the common +people of their day. 'If you elevate such utterances to the level of the +Kantian moral philosophy, and reproach primitive Christianity with +teaching for the sake of reward, you not only misunderstand the words, +but tear them up by the roots.' . . . 'The sordid ignoble suggestions so +liable to arise in the lower classes are altogether absent from the +sayings of Jesus and His apostles, as shown by the parable of the +Labourers in the Vineyard, and the analogous reliance of St. Paul solely +upon grace.'[29] + +The same inner relation subsists between Sin and Penalty. But here, +again, the award of punishment is not arbitrary, but the natural +consequence of disobedience to the law of the spiritual life. He who +seeks to save his life shall lose it. He who makes this world his all +shall receive as his reward only what this world can give. He who buries +his talent shall, by the natural law of disuse, forfeit it. Not to +believe in Christ is to miss eternal life. To refuse Him who is the +Light of the world is to remain in darkness. + +(6) An examination of the Pauline epistles yields a similar conclusion. +St. Paul does not disdain to employ the sanctions of hope and fear. +'Knowing the terrors of the Lord' he persuades men, and 'because of the +promises' he urges the Corinthians 'to cleanse themselves and perfect +holiness.' But in Paul's case, as in that of our Lord, the charge of +hedonism is meaningless. For not only does the conception hold a most +subordinate place in his teaching, but the idea loses the sense of merit, +and is transmuted into that of a free gift. And in general, in all the +passages where the hope of the future is introduced, the idea of reward +is merged in the yearning for a fuller life, which the Christian, who has +once tasted of its joy here, may well expect in richer measure +hereafter.[30] + +Enough has been said to clear Christianity of the charge of hedonism. So +far from Christian Ethics falling {163} below Philosophical Ethics in +regard to purity of motive, it really surpasses it in the sublimity of +its sanctions. The Kantian idea of virtue tends to empty the obligation +of all moral content. Goodness, as the philosopher himself came to see, +cannot be represented as a mere impersonal abstraction. Virtue has no +meaning except in relation to its ultimate end. And life in union with a +personal God, in whose image we have been made, is the end and purpose of +man's being. Noble as it may be to live morally without the thought of +God, the man who so strives to live does not attain to such a high +conception of life as he who lives with God for his object. Motives +advance with aims, and the higher the ideal the nobler the incentive. +Fear of future punishment and the desire for future happiness may prove +effective aids to the will at certain stages of moral development, but +ultimately the love of God and the beauty of holiness make every other +motive superfluous. Indeed, the reward of the Christian life is such as +can only appeal to one who has come to identify himself with the divine +will. The Christian man is always entering upon his reward. His joy is +his Master's joy. He has no other interest. His reward, both here and +hereafter, is not some external payment, something separable from +himself; it is wholly conditioned by what he is, and is simply his own +growth of character, his increasing power of being good and doing good. +And if it be still asked, What is the great inducement? What is it that +makes the life of the Christian worth living? The answer can only +be--The hope of becoming what Christ has set before man as desirable, of +growing up to the stature of perfect manhood, of attaining to the +likeness of Jesus Christ Himself. But so far from this being a selfish +aim, not to seek one's life in God--to be indifferent to all the inherent +blessings and joys involved--would be not the mark of pure +disinterestedness, but the evidence, rather, of a lack of appreciation of +what life really means. The soul that has caught the vision of God and +been thrilled with the grace of the Son of Man cannot but yield itself to +the best it knows. + + + +[1] Cf. Fairbairn, _The Phil. of the Ch. Religion_, pp. 358 ff. + +[2] Peabody, _Christ and the Christian Character_, p. 44. + +[3] Peabody, _op. cit._, pp. 53 f. + +[4] Peabody, _op. cit._, p. 68. + +[5] See Paulsen, _System der Ethik_, pp. 56 ff.; also Troeltsch, _op. +cit._, vol. ii. p. 847. + +[6] Cf. Ehrhardt, _Der Grundcharacter d. Ethik. Jesu_, p. 110. 'The +ascetic element in the ethics of Jesus is its transient, the service of +God its permanent element.' Cf. also Strauss, _Leben Jesu_, who speaks +of 'the Hellenic quality' in Jesus; also Keim, _Jesus of Nazareth, and +Troeltsch_, _op. cit._, vol. i. pp. 34 ff. + +[7] John xiii. 15. + +[8] _Conduct of Life_. + +[9] _Metaphysics of Ethics_, sect. ii. + +[10] Schultz, _Grundriss d. evang. Ethik_, p. 5. + +[11] Cf. _Ecce Homo_, chap. x. + +[12] This thought has been beautifully worked out by Prof. Denney in +_British Weekly_, Jan. 13, 1912. + +[13] Luke xv. + +[14] Cf. Knight, _The Christian Ethic_, p. 36. + +[15] See Haering, _Ethics of the Christian Life_, p. 190. + +[16] 'Apocalyptic Element in the Gospels,' _Hibbert Journal_, Oct. 1911. + +[17] The question of rewards has been fully discussed by Jacoby, +_Neutestamentliche Ethik_, pp. 41 ff.; also Barbour, _op. cit._, pp. 226 +ff. + +[18] Cf. _Kritik d. prakt. Vernunft_, p. 143. + +[19] Kant, _Idem_. + +[20] Barbour, _op. cit._, p. 231. + +[21] Matt. v. 12, xix. 21, xxv. 34; Luke vi. 23, xviii. 22; Mark x. 21. + +[22] Mark viii. 19; Luke ix. 57. + +[23] Mark i. 17, ii. 14. + +[24] Luke xxii. 29 f. + +[25] Mark x. 28-31; cf. Matt. xix. 27-30. + +[26] This thought is finely elaborated by Barbour. + +[27] Matt. xxv. 21; Luke xix. 17. + +[28] Tennyson, _Wages_. + +[29] Deissmann, _Light from the Ancient East_, pp. 316 ff. + +[30] See also Eph. vi. 5-8; 1 Cor. iii. 14; Rom. v. 2-5, vi. 23, viii. +16. + + + + +{164} + +CHAPTER X + +THE DYNAMIC OF THE NEW LIFE + +In the dynamic power of the new life we reach the central and +distinguishing feature of Christian Ethics. The uniqueness of +Christianity consists in its mode of dealing with a problem which all +non-Christian systems have tended to ignore--the problem of translating +the ideal into life. The Gospel not only sets before men the highest +good, but it imparts the secret of realising it. The ideals of the +ancients were but visions of perfection. They had no objective +reality. Beautiful as these old-time visions of 'Good' were, they +lacked impelling force, the power to change dreams into realities. +They were helpless in the face of the great fact of sin. They could +suggest no remedy for moral disease. + +Christianity is not a philosophical dream nor the imagination of a few +visionaries. It claims to be a new creative force, a power +communicated and received, to be worked out and realised in the actual +life and character of common men and women. + +In this chapter we have to consider the means whereby man is brought +into a new spiritual relation with God, and enabled to live the new +life as it has been revealed in Christ. This reconciliation implies a +twofold movement--a redemptive action on God's part, and an +appropriating and determinative response on the part of man. + + +I + +THE DIVINE POWER + +The urgent problem of the New Testament writers was, How can man +achieve that good which has been embodied {165} in the life and example +of Jesus Christ? A full answer to this question would lead us into the +realm of dogmatic theology. And therefore, without entering upon +details, it may be said at once that the originality of the Gospel lies +in this, that it not only reveals the good in a concrete and living +form, but discloses the power which makes the good possible in the +hitherto unattempted derivation of the new life from a new birth under +the influence of the spirit of God. The power to achieve the moral +life does not lie in the natural man. No readjustment of +circumstances, nor spread of knowledge, is of itself equal to the task +of creating that entirely new phenomenon--the Christian character. +There must be a cause proportionate to the effect. 'Nothing availeth,' +says Paul, 'but a new creature.' This new condition owes its origin to +God. It is a life communicated by an act of divine creative activity. + +But while this regenerative energy is represented generally as the work +of God's spirit, it is more particularly set forth as operating through +Christ who is the power of God unto salvation. + +There are three great facts in Christ's life with which the New +Testament connects the redemptive work of God. + +1. _The Incarnation_.--In Christ God shares man's nature, and thus +makes possible a union of the divine and human. On its divine side the +incarnation is the complete revelation of God in human life, and on the +human side it is the supreme expression of the spiritual meaning of +human nature itself. Christ saves not by a special act of atonement +alone, but emphatically by manifesting in Himself the union of God and +man. In view of the fact of the world's sin, the Incarnation, as the +revelation of the divine life, includes a gracious purpose. It +involves the sacrifice of God, which theologians designate by the +theory of _Kenosis_. The Advent was not only the consummation of the +religious history of the race; it was also the inauguration of a new +era. The Son of Man initiated a new type of humanity, to be realised +in increasing fullness as men entered into the meaning of the great +revelation. 'He {166} recapitulated in Himself the long unfolding of +mankind.'[1] Hence in the very fact of the word becoming flesh +atonement is involved. In Christ God is revealed in the reality of His +love and the persistence of His search for man, while man is disclosed +in the greatness of his vision and vocation. + +2. _The Death of Christ_.--Although already implied in the life, the +atonement culminates in the death of Christ. Even by being made in the +likeness of men Jesus did not escape from, but willingly took up, the +burdens of humanity and bore them as the Son of Man. But His passion +upon the cross, as the supreme instance of suffering borne for others, +at once illuminated and completed all that He suffered and achieved as +man's representative. It is this aspect of Christ's redemptive work +upon which St. Paul delights to dwell. And though naturally not so +prominent in our Lord's own teaching, yet even there the significance +of the Redeemer's death is foreshadowed, and in more than one passage +explicitly stated.[2] Here we are in the region of dogmatics, and we +are not called upon to formulate a doctrine of the atonement. All that +we have to do with is the ethical fact that between man and the new +life there lies the actuality of sin, the real source of man's failure +to achieve righteousness, and the stumbling-block which must be removed +before reconciliation with God the Father can be effected. The act, at +once divine and human, which alone meets the case is represented in +Scripture as the Sacrifice of Christ. In reference to the efficacy of +the sacrifice upon the cross Bishop Butler says: 'How and in what +particular way it had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who +have endeavoured to explain; but I do not find that the Scripture has +explained it.'[3] Though, indeed, the fact is independent of any +theory, the truth for which the cross stands must be brought by us into +some kind of intelligible relation with our view of the world, +otherwise it is a piece of magic lying outside of our experience, and +{167} having no ethical value for life. At the same time no doctrine +has suffered more from shallow theorisings, and particularly by the +employment of mechanical, legal, and commercial analogies, than the +doctrine of the atonement. The very essence of the religious life is +incompatible with the idea of an external transference of goodness from +one being to another. Man can be reconciled to God only by an absolute +surrender of himself to God. To assimilate this spiritual act to a +commercial or legal transaction is to destroy the very idea of the +moral life. No explanation, however, can be considered satisfactory +which does not safeguard two ideas of a deeply ethical nature--the +voluntariness and the vicariousness of Christ's sacrifice. We must be +careful to do justice, on the one hand, to the eternal relations in +which Christ stands to God; and on the other, to the intimate +association with man into which Jesus has entered. It is the task of +theology to bring together the various passages of Scripture, and +exhibit their systematic connection and relative value for a doctrine +of soteriology. For Ethics the one significant fact to be recognised +is that in a human life was fulfilled perfect obedience, even as far as +death, a perfect obedience that completely met and fully satisfied the +demand of the very highest, the divine ideal. + +3. _The Resurrection of Christ_.--If the Incarnation naturally issues +in the sacrifice unto death, that again is crowned and sealed by +Christ's risen life. The Resurrection is the vindication and +completion of the Redeemer's work. He who was born of the seed of +David according to the flesh was declared to be the Son of God by the +Resurrection. It was the certainty that He had risen that gave to His +death, in the apostles' eyes, its sacrificial value. This was the +ground of St. Paul's conviction that the old order had passed away, and +that a new order had been established. 'If Christ be not risen ye are +yet in your sins.' In virtue of His ascended life Christ becomes the +indwelling presence and living power within the regenerate man. It is +in no external way that the Redeemer exerts His influence. He is the +principle of life working within the soul. The key {168} to the new +state is to be found in the mystical union of the Christian with the +risen Lord. The twofold act of death and resurrection has its analogy +in the experience of every redeemed man. Within the secret sanctuary +of the human soul that has passed from death to life, the history of +the Redeemer is re-enacted. In the several passages which refer to +this subject the idea is that the changed life is based upon an ethical +dying and rising again with Christ.[4] The Christ within the heart is +the vital principle and dynamic energy by which the believer lives and +triumphs over every obstacle--the world, sin, sorrow, and death itself. +'I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.'[5] All that makes life, +'life indeed'--an exalted, harmonious, and joyous existence--is derived +from union with the living Lord, who has come to be what He is for man +by the earthly experiences through which He has passed. Thus by His +Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection He is at once the source and goal, +the spring and ideal of the new life. + + 'Yea, thro' life, death, sorrow, and through sinning, + He shall suffice me for He hath sufficed; + Christ is the end, for Christ was the beginning; + Christ the beginning, for the end is Christ.'[6] + + +Theology may seek to analyse the personality of Christ into its +elements--the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus. But after +all it is one and indivisible. It is the whole fact of Christ, and not +any particular experience taken in its isolation, which is the power of +God unto salvation. The question still remains after all our analysis, +What was it that gave to these events in the history of Jesus their +creative and transforming power? And the answer can only be--Because +Christ was what He was. It was the unique character of the Being of +whom these were but the manifestations which wrought the spell. What +bound the New Testament Christians to the cross was that their Master +hung there. They saw in that life lived among {169} men, and in that +sacrifice upon Calvary, the perfect consummation of the ideal manhood +that lived within their own hearts, and of the love, new upon the +earth, which made it possible. The cross stood for the symbol of a +truth that pierced to the inner core of their souls. 'He bore our +sins.' And thus down the centuries, in their hour of shame, and grief, +and death, men have lifted their eyes to the Man of Sorrows, and have +found in His life and sacrifice, apart from all theories of atonement, +their peace and triumph. It is this note of absolute surrender towards +God and of perfect love for man which, because it answers to a deep +yearning of the human heart, has given to the mystery of the +Incarnation and the Cross its lifting and renewing power, + + +II + +THE HUMAN RESPONSE + +Possession of power involves the obligation to use it. The force is +given; it has to be appropriated. The spirit of Christ is not offered +in order to free a man from the duties of the moral life. Man is not +simply the recipient of divine energy. He has to make it his own and +to work it out by his self-determinative activity. Nevertheless the +relation of the divine spirit to the human personality is a subject of +great perplexity, involving the psychological problem of the connection +of the divine and the human in life generally. If in the last resort +God is the ultimate source of all life, the absolute Being, who + + 'Can rejoice in naught + Save only in Himself and what Himself hath wrought'; + +that truth must be held in harmony with the facts of divine immanence +and human experience. The divine spirit holds within His grasp all +reality, and by His self-communicating activity makes the world of +nature and of life possible. But that being granted, how are we to +conceive the relation of that Spirit to man with his distinct +individuality, with {170} his sense of working out a future and a fate +in which the Absolute may indeed be fulfilling its purpose, but which +are none the less man's own achievement? That is the crux of the +problem. The outstanding fact which bears upon this problem is the +general character of our experience, the growth of which is not the +mere laying of additional material upon a passive subject by an +external power, but is a true development, a process in which the +subject is himself operative in the unfolding of his own +potentialities. Without dwelling further upon this question it may be +well to bear in mind two points: (1) The growth of experience is a +gradual entrance into conscious possession of what we implicitly are +and potentially have from the beginning. Duty, for example, is not +something alien from a man, something superimposed by a power not +himself. It lies implicit in his nature as his ideal and vocation. +The moral life is the life in which a man comes to 'know himself,' to +apprehend himself as he truly is. (2) In this development of +experience we ourselves are active and self-organising. We are really +making ourselves, and are conscious, that even while we are the +instruments of a higher power, we are working out our own +individuality, exercising our own freedom and determination.[7] The +teaching of the New Testament is in full accord with this position. +If, on the one hand, St. Paul states that every moral impulse is due to +the inspiration of God, no less emphatic is he in ascribing to man +himself full freedom of action. 'The ethical sense of responsibility,' +says Johannes Weiss,[8] 'the energy for struggle, and the discipline of +the will were not paralysed nor absorbed in Paul's case by his +consciousness of redemption and his profound spiritual experiences.' +Scripture lends no support to the idea which some forms of Augustinian +theology assume, that the divine spirit is an irresistible force acting +from without upon man and superseding his exertions. It acts as an +immanent moral power, not compelling or crushing the will, but +quickening and inspiring its efforts. + +{171} + +If we inquire what constitutes the subjective or human element in the +making of the new life, we find that the New Testament emphasises three +main factors--Repentance, Faith, and Obedience. These are +complementary, and together constitute what is commonly called +'conversion.' + +1. _Repentance_ is a turning away in sorrow and contrition from a life +of sin, a breaking off from evil because a better standard has been +accepted. Our Lord began His ministry with a call to repentance. The +first four beatitudes set forth its elements; while the parable of the +prodigal illustrates its nature. + +Ethical writers distinguish between a negative and a positive aspect of +repentance. On its negative side it is regarded as the emotion of +sorrow excited by reflection upon sin. But sorrow, though accompanying +repentance, must not be identified with it. Mere regret, either in the +form of bitterness over one's folly, or chagrin on account of +discovery, may be but a weak sentiment which exerts little or no +influence upon a man's subsequent conduct. Even remorse following the +commission of wickedness may only deepen into a paralysing despair +which works death rather than repentance unto life. + +(1) On its positive side repentance implies action as well as feeling, +and involves a determination of will to quit the past and start on a +new life. A man repents not merely when he grieves over his misdeed, +but when he confesses it and seeks to make what amendment he can. This +positive outlook upon the future, rather than the passive brooding over +the past, is happily expressed in the New Testament term _metanoia_, +change of mind, and is enforced in the Baptist's counsel, 'Bring forth +fruits meet for repentance.'[9] The change of mind here indicated is +practically equivalent to what is variously called in the New Testament +'Conversion,'[10] 'Renewal,'[11] 'Regeneration,'[12]--words suggestive +of the completeness of the change. + +(2) The variety of terms employed to describe conversion {172} would +seem to imply that the Scriptures recognise a diversity of mode. All +do not enter the kingdom of God by the same way; and the New Testament +offers examples varying from the sudden conversion of a Saul to the +almost imperceptible transformation of a Nathaniel and a Timothy. In +modern life something of the same variety of Christian experience is +manifest. While what is called 'sudden conversion' cannot reasonably +be denied,[13] as little can those cases be ignored in which the truth +seems to pervade the mind gradually and almost unconsciously--cases of +steady spiritual growth from childhood upwards, in which the believer +is unaware of any break in the continuity of his inner history, his +days appearing to be 'bound each to each by natural piety.' + +(3) The question arises, Which is the normal experience? The matter +has been put somewhat bluntly by the late Professor James,[14] as to +whether the 'twice-born' or the 'once-born' present the natural type of +Christian experience. Is it true, he asks, that the experience of St. +Paul, which has so long dominated Christian teaching, is really the +higher or even the healthier mode of approaching religion? Does not +the example of Jesus offer a simpler and more natural ideal? The moral +experience of the Son of Man was not a revolution but an evolution. +His own religion was not that of the twice-born, and all that He asked +of His disciples was the childlike mind.[15] Paul, the man of cities, +feels a kindred turbulence within himself. Jesus, the interpreter of +nature, feels the steady persuasiveness of the sunshine of God, and +grows from childhood in stature, wisdom, and favour with God and man. +It is contended by some that the whole Pauline conception of sin is a +nightmare, and rests upon ideas of God and man which are unworthy and +untrue. 'As a matter of fact,' says Sir Oliver Lodge, 'the higher man +of to-day is not worrying about his sins at all, still less about their +punishment; his mission, if he is good for anything, is to be up and +doing.'[16] {173} This amounts to a claim for the superiority of the +first of the two types of religious consciousness, the type which James +describes as 'sky-blue souls whose affinities are with flowers and +birds and all enchanting innocencies than with dark human passions; +. . . in whom religious gladness, being in possession from the outset, +needs no deliverance from any antecedent burden.'[17] The second type +is marked by a consciousness, similar to St. Paul's, of the divided +self. It starts from radical pessimism. It only attains to religious +peace through great tribulation. It is the religion of the 'sick soul' +as contrasted with that of 'healthy-mindedness.' But, morbid as it may +appear, to be disturbed by past sin, it is really the 'twice-born' who +have sounded the depths of the human heart, and have been the greatest +religious leaders. And so far from the sense of the need of repentance +being the sign of a diseased mind, the decreasing consciousness of sin +in our day may only prove the shallowness of the modern mind. What men +need of religion is power. And there is a danger of people to-day +losing a sense of the dynamic force of the older Gospel.[18] + +But whether Paul's case is abnormal or the reverse, it is surely a +false inference that, because Christ grew up without the need of +conversion, His life affords in this respect a pattern to sinful men. +It is just His perfect union with God which differentiates Him entirely +from ordinary men; and that which may be necessary for sinful creatures +is unthinkable in His case. What He was we are to become. But before +we can follow Him, there is for us, because of sin, a preliminary +step--a breaking with our evil past. And, in all His teaching our Lord +clearly recognises this. His first call is a call to repentance. It +is indeed the childlike mind He requires; but He significantly says +that 'except _ye turn_ and become as little children, ye shall in no +wise enter the kingdom of heaven.'[19] + +The decision of will demanded of Jesus, while it may not {174} +necessarily involve a catastrophe of life or convulsion of nature, must +be none the less a deliberate and decisive turning from evil to good. +By what road a man must travel before he enters the kingdom, through +what convulsion of spirit be must pass, so frequently dwelt upon by St. +Paul and illustrated by his own life, Christ does not say. In the +Fourth Gospel there is one reported saying describing a process of +spiritual agony, like that of physical child-birth, indicative that the +change must be radical, and that at some point of experience the great +decision must be made, a decision which is likely to involve deep +travail of soul. + +There are many ways in which a man may become a Christian. Some men +have to undergo, like Paul, fierce inward conflict. Others glide +quietly, almost imperceptibly, into richer and ampler regions of life. +But when or how the transition is made, whether the renewal be sudden +or gradual, it is the same victory in all cases that must be won, the +victory of the spirit over the flesh, the 'putting off of the old man' +and the 'putting on of the new.' Life cannot be always a compromise. +Sooner or later it must become an alternative. He who has seen the +higher self can be no longer content with the lower. The acts of +contrition, confession, and decision--essential and successive steps in +repentance--are the immediate effects of the vision of Christ. Though +repentance is indeed a human activity, here, as always, the earlier +impulse comes from the divine side. He who truly repents is already in +the grip of Christ. 'We love Him because He first loved us.' + +2. _Faith_.--If repentance looks back and forsakes the old, faith +looks forward and accepts the new. Even in repentance there is already +an element of faith, for a man cannot turn away from his evil past +without having some sense of contrast between the actual and the +possible, some vision of the better life which he feels to be desirable. + +(1) While there is no more characteristic word in the New Testament +than faith, there is none which is used in a greater variety of senses, +or whose import it is more difficult to determine. It must not be +forgotten at the outset {175} that though it is usually regarded as a +theological term, it is a purely human act, and represents an element +in ordinary life without which the world could not hold together for a +single day. We constantly live by faith, and in our common intercourse +with our fellows we daily exercise this function. We have an +irresistible conviction that we live in a rational world in which +effect answers to cause. Faith, it has been said, is the capital of +all reasoning. Break down this principle, and logic itself would be +bankrupt. Those who have denied the intelligibility of the universe +have not been able to dispense with the very organ by which their +argument is conducted. Hence faith in its religious sense is of the +same kind as faith in common life. It is distinguishable only by its +_special object_ and its _moral intensity_. + +(2) The habitual relationship between Christ and His disciples was one +of mutual confidence. While Jesus evidently trusts them, they regard +Him as their Master on whose word they wholly rely. Ever invested with +a deep mystery and awe, He is always for His disciples the embodiment +of all that is highest and holiest, the supreme object of reverence, +the ultimate source of authority. Peter but expresses the mind of the +company when he says, 'To whom can we go but unto Thee, Thou hast the +words of eternal life.' Nor was it only the disciples who manifested +this personal trust. Many others, the Syrophenician woman, the Roman +Centurion, Zacchaeus, Bartimaeus, also evinced it. It was, indeed, to +this element in the human heart that Jesus invariably appealed; and +while He was quick to detect its presence, He was equally sensitive to +its absence. Even among the twelve, when, in the face of some new +emergency, there was evidence of mistrust, He exclaimed, 'O ye of +little faith.' And when, beyond His own immediate circle, He met with +suspicion and unbelief, it caused Him surprise and pain.[20] + +From these and other incidents it is obvious that faith for Jesus had a +variety of meanings and degrees. + +{176} + +(_a_) Sometimes it meant simply _trust in divine providence_; as when +He bids His disciples take no thought for their lives, because He who +feeds the ravens and clothes the lilies cares for them. (_b_) It meant +again _belief in His own divine power_; as when He assures the +recipients of His healing virtue that their faith hath made them whole. +(_c_) It is regarded by Jesus as _a condition of forgiveness and +salvation_. Thus to the woman who had sinned He said, 'Thy faith hath +saved thee,' and to the man who was sick of the palsy, 'Son, thy sins +be forgiven thee.'[21] + +The essential and vital mark in all Christ's references is the personal +appropriation of the good which He Himself had brought to man. In His +various modes of activity--in His discourses, His works of healing and +forgiveness--it is not too much to say that Jesus regarded Himself as +the embodiment of God's message to the world; and to welcome His word +with confidence and joy, and unhesitatingly act upon it, was faith. +Hence it did not mean merely the mental acceptance of some abstract +truth, but, before all else, personal and intimate devotion to Himself. +It seems the more necessary to emphasise this point since Harnack has +affirmed 'that, while Christ was the special object of faith for Paul +and the other apostles, He did not enter as an element into His own +preaching, and did not solicit faith towards Himself.'[22] It is +indeed true that Jesus frequently associated Himself with His Father, +whose immediate representative He claims to be. But no one can doubt +that He also asserts authority and power on His own account, and +solicits faith on His own behalf. Nor does He take pains, even when +challenged, to explain that He was but the agent of another. On the +contrary, as we have seen, He acts in His own right, and pronounces the +blessings of healing and forgiveness in His own name. Even when the +word 'Faith' is not mentioned the whole attitude and spirit of Jesus +impels us to the same conclusion. There was an air of independence and +authority {177} about Him which filled His disciples and others, not +merely with confidence, but with wonder and awe. His repeated word is, +'I say unto you.' And there is a class of sayings which clearly +indicate the supreme significance which He attached to His own +personality as an object of faith. Foremost among these is the great +invitation, 'Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy-laden, and +I will give you rest.' + +(3) If we turn to the epistles, and especially to the Pauline, we are +struck by the apparently changed meaning of faith. It has become more +complex and technical. It is no longer simply the receptive relation +of the soul towards Christ; it is also a justifying principle. Faith +not only unites the believer to Christ, it also translates him into a +new sphere and creates for him a new environment. The past is +cancelled. All things have become new. The man of faith has passed +out of the dominion of law into the kingdom of Grace. + +The Pauline doctrine of Justification by Faith has received in the +history of the Church a twofold interpretation. On the one hand, it +has been maintained that the sole significance of faith is that it +gives to the believer power, by God's supernatural aid, to realise a +goodness of which he is naturally incapable. On the other hand, it is +held that the peculiarity of faith is that, though he himself is a +sinner deserving condemnation, it affords to the believer an assurance +of the favour with which a loving Father regards him, not on account of +his own attainments, but in virtue of the perfect obedience of the Son +of God with whom each is united by faith. The former is the more +distinctively Roman view; the latter that of the Reformed Church. +While the Catholic form of the doctrine gives to 'works' a place not +less important than faith in justification, the Protestant exalts +'faith' to the position of priority as more in harmony with the mystery +of the atoning sacrifice of Christ as expounded by St. Paul. Faith +justifies, because it is for the Christian the vision of an ideal. +What we admire in another is already implicitly within us. We {178} +already possess the righteousness we believe in. The moral beauty of +Christ is ours inasmuch as we are linked to Him by faith, and have +accepted as our true self all that He is and has achieved. Hence faith +is not merely the sight of the ideal in Christ. It is the energy of +the soul as well, by which the believer strives to realise that which +he admires. According to the teaching of Scripture faith has thus a +threefold value. It is a receptive attitude, a justifying principle, +and an energising power. It is that by which the believer accepts and +appropriates the gift of Life offered by God in Christ. + +3. _Obedience_.--Faith contains the power of a new obedience. But +faith worketh by love. The soul's surrender to Christ is the crowning +phase of man's response. The obedience of love is the natural sequel +of repentance and faith, the completing act of consecration. As God +gives Himself in Christ to man, so man yields in Christ to God all he +is and all he has. + +Without enlarging upon the nature of this final act of self-surrender, +three points of ethical value ought not to be overlooked. + +(1) Obedience is an _activity_ of the soul by which the believer +appropriates the life of God. Life is not merely a gift, it is a task, +an achievement. We are not simply passive recipients of the Good, but +free and determinative agents who react upon what is given, taking it +up into our life and working it into the texture of our character. The +obedience of love is the practical side of faith. While God imparts +the energy of the Spirit, we apply it and by strenuous endeavour and +unceasing effort mould our souls and make our world. + +(2) It is a consecration of the _whole personality_. All the powers of +man are engaged in soul-making. Religion is not a detached region of +experience, a province separate from the incidents and occupations of +ordinary existence. Obedience must cover the whole of life, and +demands the exercise and devotion of every gift. Not only is every +thought to be brought into subjection to the mind of {179} Christ, but +every passion and desire, every activity and power of body and mind are +to be consecrated to God and transformed into instruments of service. +'Our wills are ours to make them thine.' But the will is not a +separate faculty; it is the whole man. And the obedience of the will +is nothing less than the response of our entire manhood to the will of +God. + +(3) Finally, obedience is a _growing power of assimilation_ to Christ. +We grow in the Christian life according to the measure of our faith and +the exercise of our love. The spiritual world is potentially ours at +the beginning of the Christian life, but it has to be worked out in +daily experience. Like every other form of existence spiritual life is +a growth which only attains to strength and fruition through continual +conflict and achievement. The soul is not a finished product. In +patience it is to be acquired.[23] By trial and temptation, by toil +and expenditure, through all the hardships and hazards of daily life +its value is determined and its destiny shaped. And according to the +measure in which we use these experiences, and transmute them by +obedience to the will of God into means of good, do we grow in +Christian character and approximate to the full stature of the perfect +Man. + +To this self-determining activity Eucken has given the name of +'Activism.' 'The basis of a true life,' says this writer, 'must be +continually won anew.'[24] Activism acquires ethical character +inasmuch as it involves the taking up of the spiritual world into our +own volition and being. Only by this ceaseless endeavour do we advance +to fresh attainments of the moral life, and are enabled to assimilate +the divine as revealed to us in Christ. Nor is it merely the +individual self that is thus enriched and developed by obedience to the +will of God. By personal fidelity to the highest we are aiding the +moral development of mankind, and are furthering the advancement of all +that is good and true in the world. Not only are we making {180} our +own character, but we are helping to build up the kingdom of God upon +the earth. + +Repentance, Faith, and Obedience are thus the human factors of the new +life. They are the moral counterparts of Grace. God gives and man +appropriates. By repentance we turn from sin and self to the true home +of our soul in the Fatherhood of God. By faith we behold in Christ the +vision of the ideal self. By obedience and the daily surrender of +ourselves to the divine will we transform the vision into the reality. +They are all manifestations of love, the responsive notes of the human +heart to the appeal of divine love. + + + +[1] Irenaeus, _Contra Haereses_, III. xviii. 1. + +[2] Matt. xx. 28; John xi. 51; Matt. xxvi. 28; Mark xiv. 8, 9. + +[3] _The Analogy_, part II. chap. v. + +[4] 2 Cor. v. 14 f.; Rom. vi.; Ephes. iii. 16, 17, v. 8. + +[5] Gal. ii. 20. + +[6] Meyers, _Saint Paul_. + +[7] See Blewett, _The Christian View of the World_, pp. 88 ff., where +this subject is suggestively treated. + +[8] _Christ and Paul_. + +[9] Matt. iii. 8; Luke iii. 8. + +[10] Acts xxvi. 20. + +[11] Rom. xii. 12; Titus iii. 5. + +[12] 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15. + +[13] See Begbie, _Broken Earthenware_. + +[14] _Varieties of Relig. Experience_. + +[15] Mark x. 15. + +[16] _Man and the Universe_, p. 220. + +[17] _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 80. + +[18] Cf. _Foundations: a Statement of Religious Belief by seven Oxford +men_, Essay VI., pp. 274 f. + +[19] Matt. xviii. 3. + +[20] Matt. xiii. 58; Mark vi. 5. + +[21] Cf. Stalker, _The Ethic of Jesus_, p. 179. + +[22] _Das Wesen des Christenthums_, p. 91, quoted by Stalker, _idem_, +p. 176. + +[23] Luke xxi. 19. + +[24] _Life's Basis and life's Ideal_, p. 255. + + + + +{181} + +SECTION D + +CONDUCT + +{183} + +CHAPTER XI + +VIRTUES AND VIRTUE + +So far we have gained some conception of the Christian ideal as the +highest moral good, and have learned also how the Christian character is +brought into being. We now enter upon a new section--the last stage of +our inquiry--and have to consider the 'new man'--his virtues, duties, and +relationships. + +The business lying immediately before us in this chapter is to consider +the accepted standards in which the Christian good is exhibited--the +virtues recognised by the Christian consciousness. + +What, then, are the particular forms or manifestations of character which +result from the Christian interpretation of life? When we think of man +as living in relation to his fellows, and engaging in the common +activities of the world, what are the special traits of character which +distinguish the Christian? These questions suggest one of the most +important, and at the same time one of the most difficult, tasks of +Christian Ethics--the classification of the virtues. The difficulty +arises in the first instance from the ambiguity attaching to the term +'virtue.' It is often loosely used to signify a meritorious act--as in +the phrase, 'making a virtue of a necessity.' It is frequently employed +generally for a moral quality or excellency of character, and in this +respect is contrasted with vice. Finally, virtues are sometimes +identified with duties. Thus we speak of the virtue of veracity. But +obviously we may also refer to the duty of veracity. The word _aretê_; +signifies 'force,' and was originally used as a property of bodies, +plants, or animals. {184} At first it had no ethical import. In Attic +usage it came to signify aptness or fitness of manhood for public life. +And this signification has shaped the future meaning of its Latin +equivalent--_virtus_ (from _vis_, strength, and not from _vir_, a man). + +Plato gave to the term a certain ethical value in connection with his +moral view of the social life, so that Ethics came to be designated the +doctrine of virtues. In general, however, both by the Greek and Roman +moralists, and particularly the Stoics, the word _virtus_ retained +something of the sense of force or capacity--a quality prized in the +citizen. The English word is a direct transcript of the Latin. The +German noun, _Tugend_ (from _taugen_, to fit) means capability, and is +related to worth, honour, manliness. The word _aretê_ does not +frequently occur in the New Testament.[1] In the few passages in which +it appears it is associated with praiseworthiness. In one passage[2] it +has a more distinctly ethical signification--'add to your faith +virtue'--where the idea is that of practical worth or manhood. + +Virtue may be defined as the acquired power or capacity for moral action. +From the Christian point of view virtue is the complement, or rather the +outcome, of grace. Hence virtues are graces. In the Christian sense a +man is not virtuous when he has first appropriated by faith the new +principle of life. He has within him, indeed, the promise and potency of +all forms of goodness, but not until he has consciously brought his +personal impulses and faculties into the service of Christ can he be +called truly virtuous. Hence the Christian character is only +progressively realised. On the divine side virtue is a gift. On the +human side it is an activity. Our Lord's figure of the vine and the +branches represents the relation in which Christian character stands to +Christ. In like manner St. Paul regards the manifestations of the +Christian life as the fruit of the Spirit--the inevitable and natural +outgrowth of the divine seed of life implanted in the heart. Hence +arises the importance of {185} cultivating the inner life of the spirit +which is the root of all moral excellency. On the other hand it must be +remembered that Christian morality is not of a different sort from +natural morality, and the Christian virtues are not merely supernatural +qualities added on, but simply human virtues coloured and transfigured by +grace and raised to a higher value. The power to act morally, the +capacity to bring all our faculties into the service of the spiritual +life, is the ground of Christian virtue just as it is of every natural +excellence. From this it follows that the distinction sometimes made +between natural goodness and Christian goodness is unsound. A virtue is +not a superlative act of merit, implying an excess of excellence beyond +the requirements of duty. From the Christian standpoint there are no +works of supererogation, and there is no room in the Christian life for +excess or margin. As every duty is a bounden duty, so every possible +excellence is demanded of the Christian. Virtues prescribe duties; +ideals become laws; and the measure is, 'Be ye perfect as your Father in +heaven is perfect.' The Stoic maxim, 'Nothing in excess,' is inadequate +in reference to moral excellence, and Aristotle's doctrine of the 'Mean' +can hardly be applied without considerable distortion of facts. The only +virtue which with truth can be described as a form of moderation is +Temperance. It has been objected that by his doctrine of the 'Mean' +Aristotle 'obliterates the awful and absolute difference between right +and wrong.' If we substitute, as Kant suggested, 'law' for 'mean,' some +of the ambiguity is obviated. Still, after all extenuation is made it +may be questioned whether any term implying quantity is a fit expression +for a moral attribute.[3] + +At the same time the virtues must not be regarded as mere abstractions. +Moral qualities cannot be isolated from the circumstances in which they +are exercised. Virtue is character in touch with life, and it is only in +contact with actual events that its quality can be determined. Actions +are not simply good or bad in themselves. They must {186} always be +valued both by their inner motives and intended ends. Courage or +veracity, for example, may be exercised from different causes and for the +most various ends, and occasionally even for those of an immoral +nature.[4] + +For these and similar reasons some modern ethical writers have regarded +the classification of the virtues as unsatisfactory, involving arbitrary +and illogical distinctions in value; and some have even discarded the use +of the word 'virtue' altogether, and substituted the word 'character' as +the subject of ethical study. But inasmuch as character must manifest +itself in certain forms, and approximate at least to certain norms or +ideals of conduct, it may not be altogether superfluous to consider in +their relation and unity those moral qualities (whether we call them +virtues, graces, or norms of excellence) which the Christian aims at +reproducing in his life. + +We shall consider therefore, first, the natural elements of virtue as +they have been disclosed to us by classical teachers. Next, we shall +compare these with the Christian conception of life, showing how +Christianity has given to them a new meaning and value. And finally, we +shall endeavour to reveal the unifying principle of the virtues by +showing that when transformed by the Christian spirit they are the +expressions or implicates of a single spiritual disposition or totality +of character. + + +I + +_The Natural Basis of the Virtues_.--At a certain stage of reflection +there arises an effort not merely to designate, but to co-ordinate the +virtues. For it is soon discovered that all the various aspects of the +good have a unity, and that the idea of virtue as one and conscious is +equivalent to the idea of the good-will or of purity of heart. Thus it +was seen by the followers of Socrates that the virtues are but different +expressions of one principle, and that the ultimate good of character can +only be realised by the actual pursuit {187} of it in the recognised +virtues. We do not sufficiently reflect, says Green, how great was the +service which Greek philosophy rendered to mankind. From Plato and +Aristotle comes the connected scheme of virtues and duties within which +the educated conscience of Christendom still moves when it is impartially +reflecting on what ought to be done.[5] Religious teachers may have +extended the scope of our obligations, and strengthened the motives which +actuate men in the performance of duty, but 'the articulated scheme of +what the virtues and duties are, in their difference and their unity, +remains for us now in its main outlines what the Greek philosophers left +it.'[6] + +Among ancient moralists four virtues, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, +Justice were constantly grouped. They were already traditional in +Plato's time, but he adopts them as fundamental. Aristotle retained +Plato's list, but developed from it some minor excellences. + +Virtue, according to Plato, was the health or harmony of the soul; hence +the principle of classification was determined by the fitness of the soul +for its proper task, which was conceived as the attainment of the good or +the morally beautiful. As man has three functions or aspects, a +cognitive, active, and appetitive, so there are three corresponding +virtues. His function of knowing determines the primal virtue of Wisdom; +his active power constitutes the virtue of Courage; while his appetitive +nature calls for the virtue of Temperance or Self-control. These three +virtues have reference to the individual's personal life. But inasmuch +as a man is a part of a social organism, and has relations to others +beyond himself, justice was conceived by Plato as the social virtue, the +virtue which regulated and harmonised all the others. For the Stoics +these four virtues embraced the whole life according to nature. It may +be noticed that Plato and Aristotle did not profess to have created the +virtues. Wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice were, as they +believed, radical principles of the moral nature; and all they professed +to do was to {188} awaken men to the consciousness of their natural +capacities. If a man was to attain to fitness of life, then these were +the fundamental and essential lines on which his rational life must +develop. In every conceivable world these are the basal elements of +goodness. Related as they are to fundamental functions of personality, +they cannot be less or more. They stand for the irreducible principles +of conduct, to omit any one of which is to present a maimed or only +partial character. In every rational conception of life they must remain +the essential and desirable objects of pursuit. It was not wonderful, +therefore, when we remember the influence of Greek thought upon early +Christianity, that the four classical virtues should pass over into +Christian Ethics. But the Church, recognising that these virtues had +reference to man's life in relation to himself and his fellow-men in this +world alone, added to these the three Pauline Graces, Faith, Hope, and +Charity, as expressive of the divine element in man, his relation to God +and the spiritual world. The first four were called natural, the last +three supernatural: or the 'Cardinal' (_cardo_, a hinge) and the +'Theological' virtues. They make in all seven, the mystic perfect +number, and over against these, to complete the symmetry of life, were +placed the seven deadly sins. + + +II + +_Their Christian Transformation_.--But now if we compare the cardinal +virtues with the conception of goodness revealed in Scripture, we are at +once conscious of a contrast. We seem to move in a new atmosphere, and +to be confronted with a view of life in which entirely different values +hold. + +1. While in the New Testament many virtues are commended, no complete +description occurs in any single passage. The beatitudes may be regarded +as our Lord's catalogue of the typical qualities of life, and a +development of virtuous life might be worked out from the Sermon on the +Mount. Beginning with poverty of spirit, {189} humility, and meekness, +and rising up out of the individual struggle of the inner man, we attain +to mercifulness and peaceableness--the spirit which bears the poverty of +others, and seeks to make others meek and gentle. Next the desire for +righteousness finds expression in a readiness to endure persecution, to +support the burden of duty in the midst of worldly conflict; and finally +in the highest stage the light of virtue shines through the clouds of +struggle and breaks forth spontaneously, irradiating all who come into +contact with it, and constituting man the servant of humanity, the light +of the world.[7] Or we might turn to the apostle Paul, who regards the +virtues as the fruit of the Spirit, describing them in general as 'love, +joy, peace, long-suffering, goodness, faith, gentleness, humility.'[8] A +rich cluster is also mentioned as 'the fruit of light'--goodness, +righteousness, truth. A further enumeration is given in Colossians where +the apostle commends compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, +long-suffering, forbearance, and forgiveness.[9] And once more there is +the often-quoted series in the Epistle to the Philippians, 'Whatsoever +things are true, reverent, just, chaste, lovely, and kindly spoken +of.'[10] Nor must we forget the characteristics of love presented in the +apostle's 'Hymn of Charity.'[11] To these descriptions of St. Paul there +ought to be added the remarkable passage in which St. Peter unfolds the +process of the moral life from its seed to the perfect flower.[12] +Though the authorship of this passage has been disputed, that fact does +not make the representation less trustworthy and typical as an exhibition +of early Christian morality. According to this picture, just as in St. +Paul's view, the whole moral life has its root in faith, and character is +nothing else than the working out of the initial energy of the soul into +virtue, knowledge, temperance, patience, godliness, brotherly kindness, +and charity--all that makes life worthy and excellent. Character is not +built like a house, by the addition of stone to stone. It is evolved as +{190} a plant from a seed. Given faith, there will ultimately emerge all +the successive qualities of true goodness--knowledge, temperance, +patience--the personal virtues, rising upwards to godliness or the love +of God, and widening out to brotherhood, and thence to charity or a love +of mankind--a charity which embraces the whole world, even those who are +not Christian: the enemy, the outcast, and the alien. + +These descriptions are not formal or systematic, but are characterised by +a remarkable similarity in spirit and tone. They all reflect the mind of +Christ, and put the emphasis where Jesus Himself invariably laid it--on +love. But the point to which we desire to draw attention is the contrast +between the classical and the Christian type of virtue. The difference +is commonly expressed by saying that the pagan virtues were of a bold +masculine order, whereas the Christian excellences are of an amiable and +passive nature. + +Yet if we carefully examine the lists as given in Scripture, we shall see +that this is hardly a just distinction. Certainly Christianity brings to +the front some virtues of a gentle type which are apparently wanting in +the Platonic catalogue. But, on the other hand, the pagan virtues are +not excluded from the New Testament. They have an acknowledged place in +Christian morality. Fortitude and temperance, not to speak of wisdom and +justice, are recognised as essential qualities of the Christian +character. Christianity did not come into the world as the negative of +all that was previously noble in human nature; on the contrary, it took +over everything that was good and true, and gave to it a legitimate +place. Whatsoever things, says the apostle, are true and just and fair, +if there be any virtue or praise in them, think of these things. + +Courage is not disparaged by Christianity. In writing to Timothy Paul +gives to this virtue its original significance. He only raises it to a +higher level, and gives to it a nobler end--the determination not to be +ashamed of bearing testimony, and the readiness to suffer hardship for +the Gospel's sake. And though the apostle does not expressly {191} +commend courage in its active form in any other passage, we may gather +from the whole tenor of his life that bravery, fortitude, endurance, +occupied a high place in his esteem. While he made no parade of his +sufferings his life was a continual warfare for the Gospel. The courage +of a man is none the less real because it is evinced not on the +battlefield, but in the conflict of righteousness. He who devotes +himself unnoticed and unrewarded, at the risk of his life and at the +sacrifice of every pleasure, to the service of the sick and the debased, +possesses courage the same in principle as that of the 'brave man' +described by Aristotle. Life is a battle, and there are other objects +for which a man must contend than those peculiar to a military calling. +In all circumstances of his existence the Christian must quit himself as +a man, and without courage no one can fulfil in any tolerable degree the +duties of his station. + +In like manner temperance or self-control is a truly Christian virtue, +and it finds repeated mention in Scripture. When, however, we compare +the conception of temperance as formulated by Aristotle with the demand +of self-denial which the enlightened Christian conscience makes upon +itself we are struck with a difference both in the motive and the scope +of the principle. Temperance as Aristotle conceived it was a virtue +exhibited only in dealing with the animal passions. And the reason why +this indulgence ought to be checked was that the lusts of the flesh +unfitted a man for his discharge of the civic duties. But, in view of +the Greek idea that evil resides in the physical constitution of man, the +logical deduction would be the total suppression of the animal passions +altogether. But from the Christian standpoint the physical instincts are +not an evil to be crushed, but rather a legitimate element in man which +is to be disciplined and brought into the service of the spiritual life. +Temperance covers the whole range of moral activity. It means the +practical mastery of self, and includes the proper control and employment +of hand and eye, tongue and temper, tastes and affections, so that they +may become effective instruments of righteousness. The practice of {192} +asceticism for its own sake, or abstinence dictated merely by fear of +some painful result of indulgence, we do not now regard as a virtue. The +true form of self-denial we deem to be only rendered when we forbid +ourselves the enjoyment of certain legitimate inclinations for the sake +of some higher interest. Thus the scope of the virtue of temperance has +been greatly enlarged, and we present to ourselves objects of moral +loyalty, for the sake of which we are ready to abandon our desires in a +far greater variety of forms than ever occurred to the Greek. An +indulgence, for example, which a man might legitimately allow himself, he +forgoes in consideration of the claims of his family, or fellow-workmen, +or for the good of mankind at large, in a way that the ancient world +could not understand. Christian temperance, while the same in principle +with the ancient virtue, penetrates life more deeply, and is fraught with +a richer and more positive content than was contemplated by the Greek +demand. + +And the same may be said of the virtues of Wisdom and Justice. Wisdom is +a New Testament grace, but mere calculating prudence or worldly +self-regard finds no place in the Christian scheme of life. We are +enjoined, indeed, to be wise as serpents and harmless as doves in our +relations with men; but what we are urged to cultivate is a mind for the +right interpretation of the things of God, that spiritual insight which +discerns the things of the Spirit; and, while recognising life as a +divinely given trust, seeks to obtain a wise understanding of our duties +toward God and man. + +While the other virtues are to a certain extent self-regarding, Justice +is eminently social. At the very lowest it means 'equal consideration' +for all, treating, as Kant would say, every man as an 'end,' and not as a +means. Morally no man may disregard the claims of others. It is said, +indeed, that we must be 'just before we are generous.' But a full and +perfect conception of Justice involves generosity. There is no such +thing as bare justice. Righteousness, which is the New Testament +equivalent, demands more than negative goodness, and in Christian Ethics +{193} passes over into Charity, which finds and fulfils itself in others. +Love here and always is the fulfilling of the law, and mercy, +benevolence, kindness are the implicates of true justice. + +2. It is thus evident that the cardinal virtues are essential elements +of Christian character. Christianity, in taking over the moral +conceptions of the ancient world, gave to them a new value and range by +directing them to new objects and enthusing them with new motives. It +has been truly said that the religion of Jesus so profoundly modified the +character of the moral ideals of the past that they became largely new +creations. The old moral currency was still kept in circulation, but it +was gradually minted anew.[13] Fortitude is still the cool and steady +behaviour of a man in the presence of danger; but its range is widened by +the inclusion of perils of the soul as well as the body. Temperance is +still the control of the physical passions; but it is also the right +placing of new affections, and the consecration of our impulses to nobler +ends. Justice is still the suppression of conflict with the rights of +others; but the source of it lies in giving to God the love which is His +due, and finding in the objects of His thought the subjects also of our +care. Wisdom is still the practical sense which chooses the proper +course of action; but it is no longer a selfish calculation of advantage, +but the wisdom of men who are seeking for themselves and others not +merely temporal good, but a kingdom which is not of this world. + +The real reason, then, why Christianity seems by contrast to accentuate +the gentler graces is not simply as a protest against the spirit of +militarism and the worship of physical power, so prevalent in the ancient +world--not merely that they were neglected--but because they and they +alone, rightly considered, are of the very essence of that perfection of +character which God has revealed to man in Christ. What Christianity has +done is not to give pre-eminence to one class over another, but _to make +human character complete_. Ancient civilisation was one-sided in its +moral {194} development. The pagan conceptions of virtue were merely +materialistic, temporal, and self-regarding. Christ showed that without +the spirit of love even such excellences as courage, temperance, and +justice did not attain to their true meaning or yield their full +implication. Paul, as we have seen, did not disparage heroism, but he +thought that it was exhibited as much, if not more, in patience and +forgiveness as in self-assertion and retaliation. What Christianity +really revealed was a new type of manliness, a fresh application of +temperance, a fuller development of justice. It showed the might of +meekness, the power of gentleness, the heroism of sacrifice. + +3. It is thus misleading to say that Christian Ethics differs from +ancient morality in the prominence it gives to what have been called 'the +passive virtues.' Poverty of spirit, humility, meekness, mercifulness, +and peaceableness are indeed the marks of Christ's teaching. But as +Christ conceived them they were not passive qualities, but intensely +active energies of the soul. It has been well remarked that[14] there +was a poverty of spirit in the creed of the cynic centuries before +Christianity. There was a meekness in the doctrine of the Stoic long +before the advent of Jesus. But these tenets were very far from being +anticipations of Christ's morality. Cynic poverty of spirit was but the +poor-spiritedness of apathy. Stoic meekness was merely the indifference +of oblivion. But the humility and lowliness of heart, the mercifulness +and peace-seeking which Christ inculcated were essentially powers of +self-restraint, not negative but positive attitudes to life. The motive +was not apathy but love. These qualities were based not on the idea that +life was so poor and undesirable that it was not worthy of consideration, +but upon the conviction that it was so grand and noble, something so far +beyond either pleasure or pain, as to demand the devotion of the entire +self--the mastery and consecration of all a man's powers in the +fulfilment and service of its divine end. + +Hence what Christianity did was not so much to institute {195} one type +of character for another as to exhibit for the first time the complete +conception of what human life should be--a new creature, in whom, as in +its great Exemplar, strength and tenderness, courage and meekness, +justice and mercy were alike combined. For, as St. Paul said, in Christ +Jesus there is neither male nor female, but all are as one. And in this +character, as the same apostle finely shows, faith, hope, and charity +have the primary place, not as special virtues which have been added on, +but as the spiritual disposition which penetrates the entire personality +and qualifies its every thought and act. + + +III + +_The Unification of the Virtues_.--While it is desirable, then, to +exhibit the virtues in detail, it is even more important to trace back +the virtues to virtue itself. A man's duties are diverse, as diverse as +the various occasions and circumstances of life, and they can only come +into being with the various institutions of his time, Church and State, +home and country, commerce and culture. But the performance of these may +be slowly building up in him a consistent personality. It is in +character that the unity of the moral life is most clearly expressed. +There must be therefore a unity of character underlying the multiplicity +of characteristics, one single and commanding principle at work in the +formation of life of which every possible virtue is the expression. + +1. A unity of this kind is supplied by man's relation to God. Religion +cannot be separated from conduct. If it were true, as Epicurus said, +that the gods take no concern in human affairs, then not religion only, +but morality itself would be in danger. As men's conceptions of God are +purified and deepened, they tend to exhibit the varied contents of +morality in their connection with a diviner order. It is, then, the +thought of man's relation to God which gives coherence to the moral life, +and brings all its diverse manifestations into unity. + +{196} + +If we examine the Christian consciousness as presented in the New +Testament, we find three words of frequent occurrence repeatedly grouped +together, which may be regarded as the essential marks of Christian +character in relation to God--Faith, Hope, and Love. + +So characteristic are these of the new life that they have been called +the theological virtues, because, as Thomas Aquinas says, 'They have God +for their object: they bring us into true relation to God, and they are +imparted to us by God alone.'[15] + +2. These graces, however, cannot be separated. A man does not exercise +at one time faith, and at another time hope or love. They are all of a +piece. They are but different manifestations of one virtue. Of these +love is the greatest, because it is that without which faith and hope +could not exist. Love is of the very essence of the Christian life. It +is its secret and sign. No other term is so expressive of the spirit of +Christ. It is the first and last word of apostolic Christianity. Love +may be called the discovery of the Gospel. It was practically unknown in +the ancient world. _Eros_, the sensuous instinct and _philia_, the bond +of friendship, did exist, but _agapê_ in its spiritual sense is the +creation of Christ. In Christian Ethics love is primal and central. +Here we have got down to the bedrock of virtue. It is not simply one +virtue among many. It is the quality in which all the virtues have their +setting and unity. From a Christian point of view every excellence of +character springs directly from love and is the manifestation of it. It +is, as St. Paul says, 'the bond of perfectness.' The several virtues of +the Christian life are but facets of this one gem.[16] + +Love, according to the apostle, is indispensable to character. Without +it Faith is an empty profession; {197} Knowledge, a mere parade of +learning; Courage, a boastful confidence; Self-denial, a useless +asceticism. Love is the fruitful source of all else that is beautiful +and noble in life. It not only embraces but produces all the other +graces. It creates fortitude; it begets wisdom; it prompts +self-restraint and temperance; it tempers justice. It manifests itself +in humility, meekness, and forgiveness: + + 'As every hue is light, + So every grace is love.' + +Love is, however, closely associated with faith and hope. Faith, as we +have seen, is theologically the formative and appropriating power by +which man makes his own the spirit of Christ. But ethically it is a form +of love. The Christian character is formed by faith, but it lives and +works by love. A believing act is essentially a loving act. It is a +giving of personal confidence. It implies an outgoing of the self +towards another--which is the very nature of love. Hope, again, is but a +particular form of faith which looks forward to the consummation of the +good. The man of hope knows in whom he believes, and he anticipates the +fulfilment of his longings. Hope is essentially an element of love. +Like faith it is a form of idealism. It believes in, and looks forward +to, a better world because it knows that love is at the heart of the +universe. As faith is the special counteragent against materialism in +the present, so hope is the special corrective of pessimism in regard to +the future. Love supplies both with vision. Christian hope, because +based on faith and prompted by love, is no easy-going complacence which +simply accepts the actual as the best of all possible worlds. The +Christian is a man of hope because in spite of life's sufferings he never +loses faith in the ideal which love has revealed to him. 'Tribulation,' +says St. Paul, 'worketh patience, and patience probation, and probation +hope.' Hope has its social aspect as well as its personal; like faith it +is one of the mighty levers of society. Men of hope are the saviours of +the world. In days of persecution and doubt it is their courage which +rallies the wavering hosts and gives others {198} heart for the struggle. +Every Christian is an optimist not with the reckless assurance that calls +evil good, but with the rational faith, begotten of experience, that good +is yet to be the final goal of ill. 'Thy kingdom come' is the prayer of +faith and hope, and the missionary enterprise is rooted in the confidence +begotten of love, that He who has given to man His world-wide commission +will give also the continual presence and power of His Spirit for its +fulfilment. + +3. Faith, hope, and charity are at once the root and fruit of all the +virtues. They are the attributes of the man whom Christ has redeemed. +The Christian has a threefold outlook. He looks upwards, outwards, and +inwards. His horizon is bounded by neither space nor time. He embraces +all men in his regard, because he believes that every man has infinite +worth in God's eyes. The old barriers of country and caste, which +separated men in the ancient world, are broken down by faith in God and +hope for man which the love of Christ inspires. Faith, hope, and love +have been called the theological virtues. But if they are to be called +virtues at all, it must be in a sense very different from what the +ancients understood by virtue. These apostolic graces are not elements +of the natural man, but states which come into being through a changed +moral character. They connect man with God, and with a new spiritual +order in which his life has come to find its place and purpose. They +were impossible for a Greek, and had no place in ancient Ethics. They +are related to the new ideal which the Gospel has revealed, and obtain +their value as elements of character from the fact that they have their +object in the distinctive truth of Christianity--fellowship with God +through Christ. + +These graces are not outward adornments or optional accomplishments. +They are the essential conditions of the Christian man. They constitute +his inmost and necessary character. They do not, however, supersede or +render superfluous the other virtues. On the contrary they transmute and +transfigure them, giving to them at once their coherence and value. + + + +[1] Phil. iv. 8; 1 Peter ii. 9. + +[2] 2 Peter i. 5. + +[3] Cf. Sir Alex. Grant, _Aristotle's Ethics_. + +[4] Cf. Wundt, _Ethik_, p. 147. + +[5] Green, _Proleg. to Ethics_, section 249. + +[6] _Idem_. + +[7] Matt. v. 1-16. + +[8] Gal. v. 22-3. + +[9] Col. iii. 12, 13. + +[10] Phil. iv. 8. + +[11] 1 Cor. xiii. + +[12] 2 Peter i. 5. + +[13] Strong, _Christian Ethics_. + +[14] Mathieson, _Landmarks of Christian Morality_. + +[15] _Summa_, I. ii. + +[16] An interesting parallel might be drawn between the Pauline +conception of Love as the supreme passion of the soul and lord of the +emotions, and the Platonic view of Justice as the intimate spirit of +order alike in the individual and the state, expressing itself in, and +harmoniously binding together, the virtues of Temperance, Courage, and +Wisdom. + + + + +{199} + +CHAPTER XII + +THE REALM OF DUTY + +We have now to see how the virtues issue in their corresponding duties +and cover the whole field of life. + +Virtues and duties cannot be strictly distinguished. As Paulsen +remarks, 'They are but different modes of presenting the same +subject-matter.'[1] Virtues are permanent traits of character; duties +are particular acts which seek to realise virtues. + +The word 'duty,' borrowed from Stoic philosophy, inadequately +describes, both on the side of its obligation and its joy, the service +which the Christian is pledged to offer to Christ. For the Christian +the two moments of pleasure and duty are united in the higher synthesis +of love. + +In this chapter we shall consider, first, some aspects of Christian +obligation; and, second, the particular duties which arise therefrom in +relation to the self, others, and God. + + +I + +ASPECTS OF DUTY + +1. _Duty and Vocation_.--'While duty stands for a universal element +there is a personal element in moral requirement which may be called +vocation.'[2] As soon as the youth enters upon the larger world he has +to make choice of a profession or life-work. Different principles may +guide him in his selection. First of all, the circumstances {200} of +life will help to decide the individual's career. Our calling and +duties arise immediately out of our station. Already by parental +influence and the action of home-environment character is being shaped, +and tastes and purposes are created which will largely determine the +future. Next to condition and station, individual capacity and +disposition ought to be taken into account. No good work can be +accomplished in uncongenial employment. A man must have not only +fitness for his task, but also a love for it. Proper ambition may also +be a determining factor. We have a right to make the most of +ourselves, and to strive for that position in which our gifts shall +have fullest scope. But the ultimate decision must be made in the +light of conscience. Self-interest should not be our sole motive in +the choice of a vocation. It is not enough to ask what is most +attractive, what line of life will ensure the greatest material gain or +worldly honour? Rather should we ask, Where shall I be safest from +moral danger, and, above all, in what position of life, open to me, can +I do the most good? It is not enough to know that a certain mode of +livelihood is permitted by law; I must decide whether it is permitted +to me as a Christian. For, after all, underlying, and giving purpose +and direction to, our earthly vocation is the deeper calling of God +into His kingdom. These cannot, indeed, be separated. We cannot +divide our life into two sections, a sacred and a secular. Nor must we +restrict the idea of vocation to definite spheres of work. Even those +who are precluded by affliction from the activities of the world are +still God's servants, and may find in suffering itself their divinely +appointed mission. There is a divinity which shapes our ends, and in +every life-calling there is something sacred. 'Saints,' says George +Eliot, 'choose not their tasks, they choose but to do them well.' + +But the decisions of life do not cease with the choice of a calling. +At every moment of our career fresh difficulties arise, and new +opportunities open up which demand careful thought. Our first +obligation is to meet faithfully the claims of our station. But in the +complexity of life we are {201} being constantly brought into wider +relations with our fellow-men, which either modify the old, or create +entirely new situations. While the rule is to do the duty that lies +nearest us, to obey the call of God at each moment, it needs no little +wisdom to discern one's immediate duty, and to know what the will of +God actually is. + +2. _Conflict of Duties_.--In the sphere of duty itself a three-fold +distinction, having the imprimatur of the Romish Church, has been made +by some moralists: (1) the problem of colliding interests; (2) +'counsels of perfection'; and (3) indifferent acts or 'Adiaphora,' +actions which, being neither commanded nor forbidden, fall outwith the +domain of Christian obligation. It will not be necessary to discuss at +length these questions. The Gospel lends no support to such +distinctions, and as Schleiermacher points out they ought to have no +place in Protestant Ethics.[3] + +(1) With regard to the 'conflict of duties,' when the collision is +really, as it often is, a struggle between inclination and duty, the +question answers itself. There are, of course, cases in which +perplexity must occur to an honest man. But the difficulty cannot be +decided by drawing up a list of axiomatic precepts to fit all +conceivable cases. In the dilemma, for example, between +self-preservation and self-sacrifice which may present itself in some +tragic experience of life, a host of considerations relative to the +individual's history and relationships enter in to modify the +situation, and the course to be taken can be _finally_ determined by a +man's _own_ conscience alone. Ultimately there can be no collision of +duties as such. Once a man recognises a certain mode of conduct to be +right for him there is really no choice. In judgment he may err; +passion or desire may obscure the issue; but once he has determined +what he ought to do there is no alternative, 'er kann nicht anders.' + +(2) Again, it is a complete misapprehension of the nature of duty to +distinguish between the irreducible minimum and acts of supererogatory +goodness which outrun duty. {202} Goodness is one, and admits of no +degrees. All duty is absolute. An overplus is unthinkable, since no +man can do more than his duty. A Christian can only do what he +recognises as his obligation, and this he ought to fulfil at every +moment and with all his might. Love, which is the Christian's only +law, knows no limit. Even when we have done our utmost we are still +unprofitable servants. + +(3) Finally, the question as to whether there are any acts which are +indifferent, permissible, but neither enjoined nor forbidden, must also +be answered in the negative. If the Christian can do no more than his +duty, because in every single action he seeks to fulfil the whole will +of God, it is clear that there can be no moment of life that can be +thought of not determined by the divine will. There is no part of life +that is colourless. There must be no dropped stitches in the texture +of the Christian character. + +It is most frequently in the domain of amusement that the notion of the +'Permissible' is applied. It has been contended that as recreation +really lies outwith the Christian sphere, it may be allowed to +Christian people as a concession to human weakness.[4] But can this +position be vindicated? Relaxation is as much a need of man as work, +and must, equally with it, be brought within the scope of Christian +conduct. We have no business to engage in any activity, whether +involving pleasure or pain, that we cannot justify to our conscience. +Are not the joys of life, and even its amusements, among God's gifts +designed for the enriching of character? And may not they, too, be +consecrated to the glory of God? We are to use the world while not +abusing it, for all things are ours if we are Christ's. Over every +department of life the law of Christ is sovereign, and the ultimate +principle applicable to all problems of duty is, 'Whatsoever ye do in +word or deed do all to the glory of God.' + +3. _Rights and Duties_.--The foregoing question as to the scope of +duty leads naturally to the consideration of the relation of duties and +rights. It is usual to distinguish {203} between legal and moral +rights; but at bottom they are one. The rights which I legally claim +for myself I am morally bound to grant to others. A right is expressed +in the form of a permission; a duty, of an imperative. I may or may +not demand my legal rights; morally, I must perform my duties. But, on +the other hand, a right may be secured by legal compulsion; a duty, as +a moral obligation, can never be enforced by external power: it needs +our own assent.[5] + +Strictly speaking rights and duties are correlative. Every right +carries with it an obligation; not merely in the objective sense that +when one man has a right other men are under the obligation to respect +it, but also in the subjective sense that when a man has a right he is +bound to use it for the general good. It is sometimes said, 'A man may +do what he likes with his own.' Legally that may be true, but morally +he is under obligation to employ it for the general good just as +strictly as if it were another's. A man's rights are not merely +decorations or ends in themselves. They are opportunities, +instruments, trusts. And when any man has them, it means that he is +placed on a vantage-ground from which, secure of oppression or +interference, he may begin to do his duty.[6] But this moral aspect of +right is often lost sight of. People are so enamoured of what they +call their rights that they forget that the real value of every right +depends upon the use to which they put it. A man's freedom does not +consist in having rights, but in fulfilling them. 'After all,' says +Mazzini, 'the greatest right a man can possess or recognise--the +greatest gift of all--is simply the privilege and obligation to do his +duty.'[7] This is the only Christian doctrine of rights. It underlies +our Lord's teaching in the parable of the Talents. We only have what +we use. + +(1) Much has been written of the 'Natural rights of Man.'[8] This was +the claim of a school of political philosophy of {204} which Paine was +the most rigorous exponent. The contentions of Paine were met as +vigorously by the negations of Bentham and Burke. And if it be +supposed that the individual is born into the world with certain +ready-made possessions, fixed and unalterable, the claim is untenable. +Such an artificial account of man ignores entirely the evolution of +moral nature, and denies the possibility of development in man's +conception of law and duty. 'It is,' as Wundt says, 'to derive all the +moral postulates that have been produced in our minds by previous moral +development from moral life as it actually exists.'[9] + +(2) But while the 'natural rights of man' cannot be theoretically +vindicated, they may still be regarded as ends or ideals to be striven +after. 'Justifiable or unjustifiable in theory, they may still remain +a convenient form in which to couch the ultimatum of determined +men.'[10] They give expression, at least, to a conviction which has +grown more clear and articulate with the advance of thought--the +conviction of the _dignity and worth of the individual_. This thought +was the keynote of the Reformation. The Enlightenment, with its appeal +to reason, as alike in all men, gave support to the idea of equality. +Descartes claimed it as the philosophical basis of man's nature. +Rousseau and Montesquieu were among its most valiant champions. Kant +made it the point of departure for the enforcement of human right and +duty. Fichte but elaborated Kant's view when he contended for 'the +equality of everything which bears the human visage.'[11] And Hegel +has summed up the conception in what he calls 'the mandate of +right'--'Be a person, and respect others as persons.'[12] Poets +sometimes see what others miss. And in our country, at least, it is to +Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning, and still more, perhaps, to Burns, +that we are indebted for the insistence upon the native worth of man. + +But if this claim has only gradually attained to articulate {205} +expression, and is only now being made the basis of social +reconstruction, it must not be forgotten that it is essentially a +Christian truth. In Harnack's language, 'Jesus Christ was the first to +bring the value of every human soul to light, and what He did no one +can any more undo.'[13] + +When, however, the attempt is made to analyse this ultimate principle +of manhood, opinions differ as to its constituents, and a long list of +'rights' claimed by different political thinkers might be made. The +famous 'Declaration of Rights'[14] included Life, Liberty, Property, +Security, and 'Resistance of Oppression.' To these some have added +'Manhood Suffrage,' 'Free Access to the Soil,' and a common +distribution of the benefits of life and means of production. This is +a large programme, and certainly no community as yet has recognised all +its items without qualification. Obviously they are not all of the +same quality, nor are they of independent validity; and at best they +but roughly describe certain factors, considered by various agitators +as desirable, of an ideal social order. + +(3) We are on safer ground, and for Christian Ethics, at least, more in +consonance with ultimate Christian values, when we describe the primary +realities of human nature in terms of the revelation of life as given +by the Person and teaching of Jesus Christ. The three great verities +upon which He constantly insisted were, man's value for himself, his +value for his fellow-men, and his value for God. These correspond +generally to the three great ethical ideas of life--Personality, +Freedom, and Divine Kinship. But although the sense of independence, +liberty and divine fellowship is the first aspect of a being who has +come to the consciousness of himself, it is incomplete in itself. Man +plants himself upon his individuality in order that he may set out from +thence to take possession, by means of knowledge, action, and service, +of his larger world. Man's rights are but {206} possibilities which +must be transmuted by him into achievements. + + 'This is the honour,--that no thing I know, + Feel, or conceive, but I can make my own + Somehow, by use of hand or head or heart.'[15] + +Rights involve obligations. The right of personality carries with it +the duty of treating life, one's own and that of others, as sacred. +The right of freedom implies the use of one's liberty for the good of +the society of which each is a member. And finally, the sense of +divine kinship involves the obligation of making the most of one's +life, of realising through and for God all that God intends in the gift +of life. + +In these three values lies the Christian doctrine of man.[16] Because +of their fullness of implication they open out to our vision the goal +of humanity--the principle and purpose of the whole process of human +evolution--the perfection of man. Given these three Christian +truths--the Sacredness of Personality, the Brotherhood of Man, and the +Fatherhood of God--and all that is essential in the claim of the +'Natural Rights of Man' is implicitly contained. The one thing needful +is that men become alive to their privileges and go forward to 'possess +their possessions.' + + +II + +SPHERES OF DUTY + +We are thus led to a division, natural if not wholly logical, of duties +which spring from these rights--duties towards self, others, and God. +Though, indeed, self-love implies love of others, and all duty is duty +to God, still it may be permissible to frame a scheme of duties +according as one or other element is prominent in each case. + +1. _Duties in Relation to Self_.--It is obvious that without (1) +_respect_ for self there can be no respect for others. I am {207} a +part of the moral whole, and an element in the kingdom of God. I +cannot make myself of no account. Our Lord's commandment, 'Thou shalt +love thy neighbour as thyself,' makes a rightly conceived self-love the +measure of love to one's neighbour. Self-respect involves (2) +_self-preservation_, the care of health, the culture of body and mind. +Not only is it our duty to see that the efficiency and fitness of the +bodily organism is fully maintained, but we must also guard it against +everything that would defile and disfigure it, or render it an +instrument of sin. Christianity requires the strictest personal +purity, purity of thought and feeling as well as of deed. It demands, +therefore, constant vigilance, self-control, temperance, and even +self-denial, so that the body may be, not, as the ancients thought, the +prison-house of the soul, but the temple of the Holy Spirit. +Christianity is, however, opposed to asceticism. Though Jesus denied +Himself to the uttermost in obedience to the voice of God, there is in +His presentation of life a complete absence of those austerities which +in the history of the Church have been so often regarded as marks of +superior sanctity.[17] It is unnecessary here to dwell upon athletics +and sport which now so largely occupy the attention of the youth of our +land. Physical exercise is necessary to the maintenance of bodily +fitness, yet it may easily become an all-absorbing pursuit, and instead +of being merely a means to an end, may usurp the place in life which +belongs to higher things. + +(3) Self-maintenance involves also the duty of _self-development_, and +that not merely of our physical, but also of our mental life. If the +body has its place and function in the growth of Christian character, +still more has the mind its ethical importance. Our Maker can have no +delight in ignorance. He desires that we should present not a +fragmentary but complete manhood. Specialisation, though a necessity +of the age, is fraught with peril to the individual. The exigencies of +labour require men to concentrate their energies on their own immediate +tasks; but each must seek to be not merely a craftsman, but a man. +Other sides {208} of our nature require to be cultivated besides those +which bring us into contact with the ways and means of existence. +Indeed, it is only by the possession of a well-trained mind that the +fullest capacity, even for special pursuits, can be obtained. It has +become a commonplace to say that every man should have equality of +opportunity to earn a livelihood. But equality of opportunity for +education, as something which ought to be within the reach of every +youth in the land, is not so frequently insisted upon. Beyond the +claims of daily occupation every one should have a chance, and, indeed, +an inducement, to cultivate his mental and spiritual nature. Hence +what is called 'culture,' the all-round development of the human +faculties, is an essential condition of moral excellence. For, as +Goethe has said, the object of education ought to be rather the +formation of tastes than simply the communication of knowledge. But +most important of all the self-regarding aims of life is the obligation +of _Self-discipline_, and the use of every means of moral culture which +the world supplies. It is through the complex conditions of earthly +existence that the character of the individual is developed. It will +only be possible to indicate briefly some of the aids to the culture of +the moral life. Among these may be mentioned: (_a_) _The Providential +Experiences of life_. The world itself, as a sphere of Work, +Temptation, and Suffering, is a school of character. The affections +and cares of the home, the duties and tasks incident to one's calling, +the claims of one's fellow-men, the trials and temptations of one's +lot--these are the universal and common elements in man's moral +education. Not to escape from the world's activities and conflicts, +but to turn them into conditions of self-mastery, is the duty of each. +Men do work, but work makes men. The shopkeeper is not merely selling +wares; the artisan or mechanic is not simply engaged in his handicraft; +the mason and builder are not only erecting a house; each is, in and +through his toil, making his own soul. And so, too, suffering and +temptation are the tools which God commits to His creatures for the +shaping of their own lives. Saints {209} and sinners are made out of +the same material. By what Bosanquet has finely called 'the miracle of +will' the raw stuff of life is taken up and woven into the texture of +the soul. (_b_) The so-called _secular opportunities of culture_. +Innumerable sources of self-enrichment are available. Everything may +be made a vehicle of moral education. Knowledge generally, and +especially the ministry of nature, the influence of art, and the study +of literature, are potent factors in the discipline and development of +Christian character. To these must be added (_c_) _The special +religious aids and means of grace_. From an ethical point of view the +Church is a school of character. It 'guards and keeps alive the +characteristic Christian ideas, and thereby exhibits and promotes the +Christian ideal of life.'[18] Its fellowship, worship, and ordinances; +its opportunities of brotherly service and missionary activity, as well +as the more private spiritual exercises of prayer and meditation--all +are means of discipline and gifts committed to the stewardship of +individuals in order that they may realise the greatness of life's +possibilities, and attain through union with God to the fullness of +their stature in Christ. + +But while the truth that the soul has an inalienable worth is +repeatedly affirmed, the New Testament touches but lightly upon the +duties of self-regard. To be occupied constantly with the thought of +one's self is a symptom of morbid egoism rather than of healthy +personality. The avidity of self-improvement and even zeal for +religion may become a refined form of selfishness. We must be willing +at times to renounce our personal comfort, to restrain our zest for +intellectual and aesthetic enjoyment, to be content to be less cultured +and scholarly, less complete as men, and ready to part with something +of our own immediate good that others may be ministered to. Hence the +chief reason probably why the Scriptures do not enlarge upon the duties +of self-culture is, that according to the spirit of the Gospel the true +realisation of self is achieved through self-sacrifice. Only as a man +loses his life does he find it. To horde [Transcriber's note: hoard?] +one's {210} possessions is to waste them. Growth is the condition of +life. But in all growth there is reciprocity of expenditure and +assimilation, of giving and receiving. Self-realisation is only gained +through self-surrender. Not, therefore, by anxiously standing guard +over one's soul, but by dedicating it freely to the good of others does +one achieve one's true self. + +2. _Duties in Relation to Others_.--We belong to others, and others +belong to us. They and we are alike parts of a larger whole. + +(1) While this is recognised in Scripture, and all men are declared to +be brothers in virtue of their common humanity, Christianity traces the +brotherhood of man to a deeper source. The relation of the individual +to Christ is the true ground of love to others. In Christ all +distinctions which in other respects separate men are dissolved. +Beneath the meanest garb and coarsest features, in spite even of the +defacement of sin, we may detect the vast possibilities of the soul for +whom Christ has died. The law of love is presented by Jesus as the +highest of all the commandments, and the duty to others is summed up +generally in what is known as the golden rule. Of the chief +manifestations of brotherly love mention must be made (_a_) of the +comprehensive duty of _Justice_. The ground upon which justice rests +is the principle that each individual is an end in himself. Hence it +is the duty of each to respect the rights of his neighbours, negatively +refraining from injury and positively rendering that which our +fellow-men have a right to claim. Religion makes a man more sensitive +to the claims of humanity. Mutual respect requires a constant effort +on the part of all to secure for each the fullest freedom to be +himself. Christianity interprets justice to mean emancipation from +every condition which crushes or degrades a man. It seeks to create a +social conscience, and to arouse in each a sense of responsibility for +the good of all. At the same time social justice must not be +identified with charity. Charity has done much to relieve distress, +and it will always form an indispensable element in {211} the +Christian's duty towards his less fortunate brethren; but something +more radical than almsgiving is required if the conditions of life are +to be appreciably bettered. Justice is a demand not for bread alone; +it is a claim of humanity to life, and all that life ought to mean. +Christianity affirms the spirit of human brotherhood--a brotherhood in +which every child will have a chance to grow to a noble manhood, and +every man and woman will have opportunity and encouragement to live a +free, wholesome, and useful life. That is the Christian ideal, and to +help towards its realisation is the duty laid upon every citizen of the +commonwealth. The problems of poverty, housing, unemployment, +intemperance, and all questions of fair wages, legitimate profits, and +just prices, fall under the regulative principle of social justice. +The law is, 'Render to all their dues.' The love which worketh no ill +to his neighbour will also withhold no good.[19] + +(_b_) _Truthfulness_.--Justice is not confined to acts, but extends to +speech and even to thought. We owe to others veracity. Even when the +motive is good, there can be no greater social disservice than to fail +in truthfulness. Falsehood, either in the form of hypocrisy or +equivocation, and even of unsound workmanship, is not only unjust to +others; it is unjust to ourselves, and a wrong to the deeper self--the +new man in Christ.[20] + +Is deception under all circumstances morally wrong? Moralists have +been divided on this question. The instance of war is frequently +referred to, in which it is contended that ruse and subterfuge are +permissible forms of strategy.[21] There are, however, many +distressing cases of conscience, in which the duties of affection and +veracity seemingly conflict. It must be remembered that no command can +be carried out to its extreme, or obeyed literally. Truth is not +always conveyed by verbal accuracy. There may be higher interests at +stake which might be prejudiced, and indeed unfairly represented by a +merely literal statement. {212} The individual conscience must decide +in each case. We are to speak the truth in love. Courage and +kindliness are to commingle. But when all is said it is difficult to +avoid the conclusion that in the last analysis lack of truth argues a +deficient trust in the ultimate veracities of the universe, and rests +upon a practical unbelief in the divine providence which can make 'all +things work together for good to them that love God.' + +(_c_) Connected with truthfulness, and also a form of justice, is the +duty enjoined by St. Paul of forming _just judgments_ of our +fellow-men. If we would avoid petty fault-finding and high-minded +contempt, we must dismiss all prejudice and passion. The two qualities +requisite for proper judgment are knowledge and sympathy. Goethe has a +fine couplet to the effect that 'it is safe in every case to appeal to +the man who knows.'[22] But to understanding must be added +appreciative consideration. We must endeavour to put ourselves in the +position of our brother. Without a finely blended knowledge and +sympathy we grow intolerant and impatient. Fairness is the rarest of +moral qualities. He who would estimate another truly must have what +St. Paul calls 'spiritual discernment'--the 'even-balanced soul' of one +'who saw life steadily and who saw it whole.' + +(2) Brotherly Love evinces itself further in _Service_, which takes the +three forms of Compassion, Beneficence or practical kindness, and +Example. + +(_a_) _Compassion_ or sympathy is a readiness to enter into the +experiences of others. As Christians nothing that concerns our brother +can be a matter of indifference to us. As members of the same +spiritual community we are participators in each other's joys and +sorrows, 'weeping with those that weep, and rejoicing with those that +rejoice.' It is no mere natural instinct, but one which grows out of +the Christian consciousness of organic union with Christ. 'When one +member suffers, all the members suffer with it.'[23] {213} We fulfil +the law of Christ by bearing one another's burdens. + +(6) _Practical Beneficence_ is the natural outcome of sympathy. +Feelings pass into deeds. Those redeemed by the love of Christ become +the agents of His love, gladly dispensing to others what they +themselves have received. The ministry of love, whatever shape it may +take, must, in the last resort, be a giving of self. No one can do a +kindness who does not put something of himself into it. No true +service can be done that does not cost us more than money. + +In modern society it is inevitable that personality should largely find +its expression and exercise in material possessions. Without entering +here upon the question of the institution of private property, it is +enough to say that the possession of material goods may be morally +defended on the twofold ground, that it ensures the security of +existence, and is an essential condition of the development of +individual and national resources. The process of acquisition is a +moralising influence, since it incites the individual to work, and +tends to create and foster among men interchange of service. Property, +says Hegel, is the embodiment and instrument of the will.[24] But in a +civilised community there must be obviously restrictions to the +acquisition and use of wealth. Unbridled appropriation and +irresponsible abuse are alike a peril to society. The State has +therefore the right of interference and control in regard to all +possessions. Even on the lowest ground of expediency the very idea of +property involves on the part of all the principle of co-operation and +reciprocity--the obligation of contributing to the general weal. It +would, however, be most undesirable that the government should +undertake everything for the general good of man that is now left to +spontaneous effort and liberality. But from the standpoint of +Christian Ethics possessions of all kinds are subject to the law of +stewardship.[25] Every gift is {214} bestowed by God for the purpose +of social service. No man can call the things which he +possesses--endowments, wealth, power--his own. He is simply a trustee +of life itself. No one may be an idler or parasite, and society has a +just claim upon the activity of every man. The forms of such service +are various; but the Christian spirit will inspire a sense of 'the +ultimate unity of all pursuits that contribute to the good of man.'[26] + +The ministry of love extends over the whole realm of existence, and +varies with every phase of need. Physical necessities are to be met in +the spirit of charity. St. Paul pleads repeatedly the cause of the +poor, and commends the grace of liberality. Giving is to be cheerful +and without stint. But there are needs which material aid cannot +meet--desolation, anxiety, grief--to which the loving heart alone can +find ways of ministering. And beyond all physical and moral need is +the need of the soul; and it lies as a debt upon those who themselves +have experienced the grace of Christ to seek the renewal and spiritual +enrichment of their brethren. + +(_c_) There is one special form of practical kindness towards others +which a follower of Christ will often be called upon to exercise--the +spirit of _forbearance and forgiveness_. The Christian is to speak +evil of no man, but to be gentle, showing all meekness unto all men; +living peaceably with all men, avoiding everything provocative of +strife; even 'forbearing one another and forgiving one another, if any +have a quarrel against any; even as Christ forgave you so also do ye.' + +(3) Finally, we may serve others by _Example_, by letting the light of +life so shine before men that they seeing our good works shall glorify +God our Father. This duty, however, as Fichte points out, 'has often +been viewed very incorrectly, as if we could be obliged to do this or +that, which otherwise we would not have needed to do, for the sake of a +good example.'[27] That which I am commanded {215} to do I must do for +its own sake without regard to its effect upon others. Esteem can be +neither outwardly compelled nor artistically produced; it manifests +itself voluntarily and spontaneously. A modern novelist[28] ironically +exposes this form of altruism by putting into the mouth of one of her +characters the remark, 'I always make a point of going to church in +order to show a good example to the domestics.' At the same time no +one can withhold one's influence; and while the supreme motive must be, +not to make a display, but to please God, he who is faithful to his +station and its duties cannot fail to affect his fellow-men for good. +The most effective example is given unconsciously, as the rose exhales +its sweetest perfume without effort, or the light sheds its radiance +simply by being what it is. + +3. _Duties in Relation to God_.--Here morality runs up into religion, +and indeed since all duties are in their last analysis duties toward +God, Kant and other moralists have objected to the admission into +Ethics of a special class of religious obligations. It has been well +remarked that the genuine Christian cannot be known by particular +professions or practices, but only by the heavenly spirit of his +life.[29] Hence religious duty cannot be formulated in a number of +precise rules. Love to God finds expression not in mechanical +obedience, but in the spontaneous outflow of the heart. The special +duties to the Divine Being may be briefly described under the main +heads of Recognition, Obedience, and Worship. + +(1) _Recognition_.--The acknowledgment of God rests upon knowledge. +Without some comprehension of what God is there can be no intelligent +allegiance to Him. We cannot, indeed, by logical reasoning demonstrate +the existence of the Deity any more than we can demonstrate our own +being. But He has not left Himself without a witness, and He speaks to +man with many voices. The material creation is the primary word of +God. The beauty, and still more the sublimity, of nature are a +revelation through {216} matter of something beyond itself, a message +of the spiritual, bearing 'authentic tidings of invisible things.' But +nature is symbolic. It is a prophecy rather than an immediate +revelation. Still it warrants the expectation of a yet fuller +manifestation. That fuller utterance we have in man himself. There, +spirit reveals itself to spirit; and in the two primary intuitions of +man--self-consciousness and the sense of moral obligation--the presence +of God is disclosed. But, higher still, the long historic evolution +has culminated in a yet clearer manifestation of the Deity. In Christ, +the God-Man, the mystery underlying and brooding over the world is +unveiled, and to the eye of faith is revealed the Fatherhood of God. + +The first duty, therefore, we owe to God is that of recognition, the +acknowledgment of His presence in the world. To feel that He is +everywhere, sustaining and vitalising all things; to recognise His will +in all the affairs of our daily life, is at once the duty and +blessedness of man. + +(2) _Obedience_ follows acknowledgment. It is partly passive and +partly active. + +(_a_) As _passive_, it takes the form of habitual trust or +_acquiescence_, the submissive acceptance of trials which are +ultimately, we believe, not really evils, because ordained by God and +overruled for good.[30] This spirit of obedience can be maintained by +_constant vigilance_ alone.[31] While connected with the anticipated +coming of the Son of Man, the obligation had a more general +application, and may be regarded as the duty of all in the face of the +unknown and unexpected in life. We are therefore to watch for any +intimation of the divine will, and commit ourselves trustfully to the +absolute disposal of Him in whose hands are the issues of our lives. + +(_b_) But obedience has also an _active_ side. _Faithfulness_ is the +complement of faith. The believer must exercise fidelity, and go +forward with energy and purpose to the tasks committed to him. As +stewards of Christ we are {217} to occupy till He come, employing every +talent entrusted to us in His service. Work may be worship, and we can +glorify God in our daily tasks. No finer tribute can a man give than +simply himself. + +(3) _Worship_.--The special duties of worship belong to the religious +rather than the ethical side of life, and do not demand here more than +a passing reference. The essence of religion lies in the subordination +of the finite self to the infinite; and worship is the conscious +outgoing of the man in his weakness and imperfection to his Maker, and +it attains its fullest exercise in (_a_) _reverence_, humility, and +devotion. The feeling of dependence and sense of need, together with +the consciousness of utter demerit and inability which man realises as +he gazes upon the majesty and grace of God, awaken the (_b_) instinct +of _prayer_. 'It is the sublime significance of prayer,' says Wuttke, +'that it brings into prominence man's great and high destiny, that it +heightens his consciousness of his true moral nature in relation to +God; and as morality depends on our relation to God, prayer is the very +life-blood of morality.'[32] The steadfast aspiration of the soul to +God, whose will is our law and whose blessing is granted to whatsoever +is done in His name, is the habitual temper of the Christian life. But +prayer must also be particular, definite, and expectant. By a law of +our nature, and apart from all supernatural intervention, prayer +exercises a reflex influence of a very beneficial character upon the +mind of the worshippers. But he who offers his petitions expecting +nothing more will not even attain this. 'If prayers,' says Mr. Lecky, +'were offered up solely with a view to this benefit, they would be +absolutely sterile and would speedily cease.'[33] The purely +subjective view of prayer as consisting solely in 'beneficent +self-suggestion' empties the term of significance. Even Frederick +Meyers, who lays so much stress upon the importance of self-suggestion +in other aspects of experience, admits that prayer is something more +than a subjective {218} phenomenon. 'It is not only a calling up of +one's own private resources; it must derive its ultimate efficacy from +the increased flow from the infinite life into the life of the +suppliant.'[34] + +(_c_) Prayer attains its highest expression in _Thanksgiving and Joy_. +Gratitude is the responsive feeling which wells up in the heart of +those who have experienced the goodness of God, and recognise Him as +the great Benefactor. Christians are to abound in thankfulness. We +live in a world where everything speaks to us of divine love. Praise +is the complement of prayer. The grateful heart sees life +transfigured. It discovers everywhere tokens of grace and hope, + + 'Making the springs of time and sense + Sweet with eternal good.' + +Peace, trust, joy, hope are the ultimate notes of the Christian life. +'Rejoice always, pray without ceasing, in everything give thanks.' +Thanksgiving, says St. Bernard, 'is the return of the heart to God in +perpetual benediction.' + + +In the kingdom of love duty is swallowed up in joy. Life is nothing +but the growing realisation of God. With God man's life begins, and to +Him turns back at last in the wrapt contemplation of His perfect being. +In fellowship with God man finds in the end both himself and his +brother. + + 'What is left for us, save, in growth + Of soul, to rise up, far past both, + From the gift looking to the Giver, + From the cistern to the river, + And from the finite to the Infinity + And from man's dust to God's divinity?'[35] + +'God,' says Green, 'is a Being with whom we are in principle one, in +the sense that He is all which the human spirit is capable of +becoming.'[36] In the worship of God, {219} man dies to the temporal +interests and narrow ends of the exclusive self, and lives in an +ever-expanding life in the life of others, manifesting more and more +that spiritual principle which is the life of God, who lives and loves +in all things.[37] + + + +[1] Paulsen, _Ethics_, bk. III. chap. i. Cf. also Wundt, _Ethik_, p. +148. But see also W. Wallace, _Lectures and Essays_, p. 325, on their +confusion. + +[2] Mackintosh, _Chr. ethics_, p. 114. + +[3] Cf. Haering, _Ethics of Chr. Life_, p. 230. + +[4] This seems to be the position of Herrmann; see _Ethik_. + +[5] Cf. Eucken, _Life's Basis_, p. 185. + +[6] Maccunn, _Ethics of Citizenship_, p. 40. + +[7] _Duties of Man_, chap. i. + +[8] See discussion by late W. Wallace in _Lectures and Essays_, pp. 213 +ff. + +[9] _Ethik_, p. 190. + +[10] Maccunn, _op. cit._; p. 42. + +[11] Cf. Eucken, _Main Currents of Modern Thought_, p. 348. + +[12] Hegel, _Philosophy of Right_, p. 45. + +[13] _Das Wesen des Christenthums_; cf. also _Ecce Homo_, p. 345. + +[14] Adopted in Massachusetts in 1773.--'All men have equal rights to +life, liberty, and property.' + +[15] Browning, _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau_. + +[16] Cf. Wheeler Robinson, _The Christian Doctrine of Man_, pp. 281 f. + +[17] Matt. xi. 18; Luke vii. 33. + +[18] Ottley, _Ideas and Ideals_. + +[19] Rom. xiii. 7-10. + +[20] Col. iii. 9, 10. + +[21] See Lecky, _Map of Life_. + +[22] _Vor dem Wissenden sich stellen, sicher ist's in allen Fällen_. + +[23] 1 Cor. xii. 26. + +[24] _Phil. of Right_, pp. 48 ff.; see also Wundt, _Ethik_, pp. 175 f. + +[25] Cf. Ottley, _Idem_, p. 271. + +[26] Green, _Proleg._, p. 173, quoted by Ottley. + +[27] _Science of Ethics_ (trans.), p. 337. + +[28] Miss Fowler, _Concerning Isabel Carnaby_. + +[29] Drummond, _Via, Veritas, Vita_, p. 227. + +[30] Matt. viii. 25 f., x. 26; Luke viii. 23 f. + +[31] Matt. xxv. 1 f.; Mark xxiv. 42; Luke xii. 36 f. + +[32] _Chr. Ethics_ (trans.), vol. ii. p. 221. + +[33] _Hist. of Europ. Morals_, vol. i. p. 36. + +[34] _Human Personality_, vol. ii. p. 313. + +[35] Browning, _Christmas Eve_. + +[36] _Proleg._, p. 198. + +[37] Cf. Jones, _Browning as Philosophical and Religious Teacher_, p. +367. + + + + +{220} + +CHAPTER XIII + +SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS + +In last chapter we dealt with the rights and duties of the individual +as they are conditioned by his relation to himself, others, and to God. +In this chapter it remains to speak more particularly of the organised +institutions of society in which the moral life is manifested, and by +means of which character is moulded. These are the Family, the State, +and the Church. These three types of society, though distinguishable, +are closely allied. At first, indeed, they were identical. Human +society had its origin, most probably, in a primitive condition in +which domestic, political, and religious ends were one. Even in modern +life Family, State, and Church do not stand for separate interests. So +far from their aims colliding they are mutually helpful. An individual +may be a member of all three at one time. From a Christian point of +view each is a divine institution invested with a sacred worth and a +holy function, and ordained of God for the advancement of His kingdom. + + +I + +_The Family_ is the fountain-head of all the other social groups, 'the +cell of the social organism.' Man enters the world not as an isolated +being, but by descent and generation. In the family each is cradled +and nurtured, and by the domestic environment character is developed. +The family has a profound value for the nation. Citizenship rests on +the sanctity of the home. When the fire on the hearth is quenched, the +vigour of a people dies. + +{221} + +1. Investigations of great interest and value have been pursued in +recent years regarding the origin and evolution of the family. However +far back the natural history of the race is carried, it seems scarcely +possible to resist the conclusion that some form of family relationship +is coeval with human life. Widely as social arrangements differ in +detail among savage peoples, arbitrary promiscuity can nowhere be +detected. Certain laws of domestication have been invariably found to +exist, based upon definite social and moral restrictions universally +acknowledged and rigidly enforced. Two primitive conditions are +present wherever man is found--the tribe and the family. If the family +is never present without the tribe, the tribe is never discovered +without 'those intra-tribal distinctions and sexual regulations which +lie at the bottom of the institution of the family.'[1] Westermarck +indeed says that 'the evidence we possess tends to show that among our +earliest human ancestors the family and not the tribe formed the +nucleus of every social group, and in many cases was itself perhaps the +only social group. The tie that kept together husband and wife, +parents and children, was, if not the only, at least the principal +factor in the earliest forms of man's social life.'[2] If the family +had been an artificial convention called into being by human will and +ingenuity, it might conceivably be destroyed by the same factors. But +whatever arguments may be adduced for the abolition of marriage and +family life to-day, the appeal to primitive history is not one of them. +On the contrary the earliest forms of society show that the family is +no invention, that it has existed as long as man himself, and that all +social evolution has been a struggle for the preservation of its most +valuable features.[3] + +2. If, even in early times, and especially among the Hebrews, Greeks, +and Romans, the family was an important factor in national development, +it has been infinitely more so {222} since the advent of Christianity. +Christ did not create this relationship. He found it in existence when +He came to the earth. But He invested it with a new ethical value. He +laid upon it His consecrating touch, and made it the vehicle of all +that is most tender and true in human affection, so that among +Christian people to-day no word is fraught with such hallowed +associations as the word 'home.' This He did both by example and +teaching. As a member of a human family Himself, He participated in +its experiences and duties. He spent His early years in the home of +Nazareth, and was subject unto His parents. He manifested His glory at +a marriage feast. By the grave of Lazarus He mingled His tears with +those of the sorrowing sisters of Bethany. He had a tender regard for +little children, and when mothers brought their infants to Him He +welcomed them with gracious encouragement, and, taking the little ones +in His arms, blessed them, thus consecrating for all time both +childhood and motherhood. Throughout His life there are indications of +His deep reverence and affection for her who was His mother, and with +His latest breath he confided her to the care of His beloved disciple. + +There are passages indeed which seem to indicate a depreciation of +family relationships.[4] The most important of these are the sayings +which deal with the home connections of those whom He called to special +discipleship.[5] Not only are father and mother to be loved less than +He, but even in comparison with Himself are to be hated.[6] Among the +sacrifices His servants must be ready to make is the surrender of the +home.[7] But these references ought to be taken in conjunction with, +and read in the light of, His more general attitude to the claims of +kindred. It was not His indifference to, but His profound regard for, +home ties that drew from Him these words. He knew that affection may +narrow as well as widen the heart, and that our {223} tenderest +intimacies may bring our most dangerous temptations. There are moments +in the history of the heart when the lesser claim must yield to the +greater. For the Son of Man Himself, there were interests higher even +than those of the family. Some men, perhaps even most, are able to +fulfil their vocation without a surrender of the joys of kinship. But +others are called to a wider sphere and a harder task. For the sake of +the larger brotherhood of man, Jesus found it necessary to renounce the +intimacies of home. What it cost Him to do so we, who cannot fathom +the depth of His love, know not. Even such an abandonment did He +demand of His first disciples. And for the follower of Christ still +there must be the same willingness to make the complete sacrifice of +everything, even of home and kindred, if they stand in the way of +devotion to the kingdom of God.[8] + +(1) Our Lord's direct statements regarding the nature of the family +leave us in no doubt as to the high place it holds in His conception of +life. Marriage, upon which the family rests, is, according to Jesus, +the divinely ordained life-union of a man and woman. In His quotation +from Genesis He makes reference to that mysterious attraction, deeply +founded in the very nature of man, by which members of the opposite sex +are drawn to each other. But while acknowledging the sensuous element +in marriage, He lifts it up into the spiritual realm and transmutes it +into a symbol of soul-communion. Our Lord does not derive the sanction +of wedded life from Mosaic legislation. Still less does He permit it +as a concession to human frailty. It has its ground in creation +itself, and while therefore it is the most natural of earthly +relationships it is of God's making. To the true ideal of marriage +there are several features which our Lord regards as indispensable. +(_a_) It must be _monogamous_, the fusion of two distinct +personalities. 'They two shall be one flesh.' Mutual self-impartation +demands that the union should be an exclusive one. (_b_) It is a +_union of equality_. Neither {224} personality is to be suppressed. +The wedded are partners who share one another's inmost thoughts and +most cherished purposes. But this claim of equality does not exclude +but rather include the different functions which, by reason of sex and +constitution, each is enabled to exercise. 'Woman is not undeveloped +man but diverse.' And it is in diversity that true unity consists. +Both will best realise their personality in seeking the perfection of +one another. (_c_) It is a _permanent_ union, indissoluble till the +parting of death. The only exception which Christ acknowledges is that +form of infidelity which _ipso facto_ has already ruptured the sacred +bond.[9] According to Jesus marriage is clearly intended by God to +involve sacred and permanent obligations, a covenant with God, as well +as with one another, which dare not be set aside at the dictate of a +whim or passion. The positive principle underlying this declaration +against divorce is the spirit of universal love that forbids that the +wife should be treated, as was the case among the dissolute of our +Lord's time, as a chattel or slave. Nothing could be more abhorrent to +Christian sentiment than the modern doctrine of 'leasehold marriage' +advocated by some.[10] It has been ingeniously suggested that the +record of marital unrest and divorce in America, shameful as it is, may +not be in many cases altogether an evil. The very demand to annul a +union in which reverence and affection have been forfeited may spring +from a growing desire to realise the true ideal of marriage.[11] (_d_) +Finally, it is a _spiritual_ union. It is something more than a legal +contract, or even an ecclesiastical ordinance. The State must indeed +safeguard the civil rights of the parties to the compact, and the +Church's ceremony ought to be sought as the expression of divine +blessing and approval. But of themselves these do not constitute the +inner tie which makes the twain one, and binds them together amid all +the chances and changes of this earthly life.[12] In the teaching of +both Christ and {225} the apostles marriage is presented as a high +vocation, ordained by God for the enrichment of character, and invested +with a holy symbolism. According to St. Paul it is the emblem of the +mystic union of Christ and His Church, and is overshadowed by the +presence of God, who is the archetype of those sacred ideas which we +associate with the name of fatherhood. + +(2) Though marriage is the most personal of all forms of social +intercourse, there are many varied and intricate interests involved +which require _legal recognition_ and adjustment. Questions as to the +legitimacy of offspring, the inheritance of property, the status and +rights of the contracting parties, come within the domain of law. The +State punishes bigamy, and forbids marriage within certain degrees of +consanguinity. Many contend that the State should go further, and +prevent all unions which endanger the physical vigour and efficiency of +the coming generation. It is undoubtedly true that the government has +a right to protect its people against actions which tend to the +deterioration of the race. To permit those to marry who are suffering +from certain maladies of mind or body is to commit a grave crime +against society. But care must be taken lest we unduly interfere with +the deeper spiritual sympathies and affections upon which a true union +is founded. In agitating for State control in the mating of the +physically fit, the champions of eugenics are apt to exaggerate the +materialistic side of marriage, and overlook those qualities of heart +and mind which are not less important for the well-being of the race. +In the discipline of humanity weakness and suffering are assets which +the world could ill afford to lose.[13] + +(3) In modern times the institution of marriage is menaced by two +opposite forces; on the one hand, by a revolutionary type of socialism, +and on the other, by the reactionary influence of self-interested +individualism. (_a_) It is contended by some advanced socialists that +among {226} the poor and the toiling home life is practically +non-existent; indeed, under present industrial conditions, impossible. +Marriage and separate family life are insuperable barriers, it is said, +to corporate unity and social progress. It is but fair to add that +this extreme view is now largely repudiated by the most enlightened +advocates of a new social order, who are contending, they tell us, not +for the abolition, but for the betterment, of domestic conditions.[14] +(_b_) The stability of social life is being threatened even more +seriously by a self-centred individualism. Marriage is considered as a +merely temporary arrangement which may be terminated at will. It is +contended that divorce should be granted on the easiest terms, and the +most trifling reasons are seriously put forward as legitimate grounds +for the annulling of the holiest of vows. Without discussing these +disintegrating influences, it is enough to say that the trend of +history is against any radical tampering with the institution of +marriage, and any attempt to disparage the sanctity of the home or +belittle domestic obligations would be to poison at its springs the +moral life of man. + +3. The duties of the various members of the family are explicitly, if +briefly, stated in the apostolic epistles. They are valid for all +times and conditions. Though they may be easily elaborated they cannot +well be improved. All home obligations are to be fulfilled _in_ and +_unto_ the Lord. The fear of God is to inspire the nurture of +children, and to sanctify the lowliest services of the household. +Authority is to be blended with affection. (1) _Parents_ are not to +provoke their children by harsh and despotic rule, nor yet to spoil +them by soft indulgence. _Children_ are to render obedience, and, when +able, to contribute to the support of their parents.[15] Masters are +to treat their servants with equity and respect. Servants are exhorted +to show fidelity. In short all the relationships of the household are +to be hallowed by the spirit of Christian love. + +Many questions relative to the family arise, over which {227} we may +not linger. One might speak of the effect of industrial conditions +upon domestic life, the employment of women and children in factories, +the evil of sweating, the problem of our city slums, and, generally, of +the need of improved environment in order that our labouring classes +may have a chance of a healthier and purer home existence. Legislation +can do much. But even law is ineffective to achieve the highest ends +if it is not backed by the public conscience. The final solution of +the problem of the family rests not in conditions but in character, not +in environment but in education, in the kind of men we are rearing. + +(2) This century has been called the _woman's_ century. And certainly +there is an obvious trend to-day towards acknowledgment, in all +departments of life, of women's equality with men. There is, however, +a difference of opinion as to what that equality should mean; and there +seems to be a danger in some quarters of overlooking the essential +difference of the sexes. No people can achieve what it ought while its +wives and mothers are degraded or denied their rights. For her own +sake, as well as for the weal of the race, whatever is needful to +enable woman to attain to her noblest womanhood must be unhesitatingly +granted.[16] + +(3) But this is even more the _children's_ era. A new sense of +reverence for the child is one of the most promising notes of our age, +and the problems arising out of the care and education of the young +have created the new sciences of pedagogy and child-psychology. Regard +for child-life owes its inspiration directly to the teaching of Christ. +The child in the simplicity of its nature and innocence of its +dependence is, according to the Master, the perfect pattern of those +who seek after God. It is true that in the art of antiquity child-life +was frequently represented. But as Burckhardt says it was the drollery +and playfulness, even the quarrelsomeness and stealth, and above all +the lusty health and animal vigour of young life that was depicted. +Ancient art did not behold in the child the prophecy of a new and purer +world. Moreover, it was aesthetic {228} feeling and not real sympathy +with childhood which animated this movement. As time went on the +teaching of Christ on this subject was strangely neglected, and the +history of the treatment of the young is a tragic tale of neglect and +suffering. Only now are we recovering the lost message of Jesus in +regard to the child, and we are beginning to realise that infancy and +youth have their rights, and demand of the world both care and +affection. Ours sons and daughters are the nation's assets. Yet it is +a parent's question even more than the State's. In a deeper sense than +we imagine children are the creation of their parents. It is the +effect of soul upon soul, the mother's touch and look, the father's +words and ways, that kindle into flame the dull material of humanity, +and begin that second birth which should be the anxiety and glory of +parenthood. But if the parent makes the child, scarcely less true is +it that the child makes the parent. In the give and take of home life +a new world is created. When a father really looks into his child's +eye he is not as he was before.[17] Indispensable as is the State's +education of the young, there is an important part which the community +cannot undertake, and there is a danger in curbing individuality by a +stereotyped method of instruction. 'All social enactments,' says +Harnack, 'have a tendency to circumscribe the activities of the +individual. If we unduly fetter the free play of individual effort we +break the mainspring of progress and enterprise, and create a state of +social immobility which is the antecedent of national decay.'[18] +Youth ought to be taught self-reliance and strenuousness of will; and +this is a work which can only be done in the home by the firm yet +kindly influence of the parents. But there is another aspect of the +home problem not less pressing. The want of training in working-class +families is largely answerable for the waifs and strays with which our +cities team. Even in middle-class households there are indications of +a lack not only of discipline, but of {229} that kindly sympathy and +affectionate counsel on the part of parents, and of reverence and +frankness in the children; with the result that the young people, +missing the attachment and interest which the home should supply, seek +their satisfaction outside the domestic circle, often with the most +disastrous results. The problem of the family is thus the problem of +nurturing the very seeds of the moral life. Within the precincts of +the nation's homes the future of the commonwealth is being determined. + + +II + +1. The _State_ is the supreme controller of social relationships. As +distinguished from the family and the Church, it is the realm of +organised force working for social ends. Its purpose is to secure the +conditions of life essential to order and progress, and it can fulfil +its function only as it is endowed with power to enforce its authority. +The interference of the State with the liberty of the individual has +created a reaction in two opposite quarters towards complete abrogation +of all State compulsion. On the one side Tolstoy pleads for the +removal of force, because it violates the principle of love and +subverts the teaching of Jesus--'Resist not evil.' Militant anarchism +as the other extreme demands the abrogation of authority, because it +believes that restraint hinders progress and happiness, and that if +governmental force were abolished individuals would be best able to +take care of themselves. The aim of anarchism is to destroy force by +force; the aim of Tolstoy is to allow force to do its worst. Such a +spirit of non-resistance would mean the overthrow of all security, and +the reversion to wild lawlessness. It is an utter travesty of Christ's +teaching. Extremes meet. Violence and servility join hands. +Anarchism and Tolstoyism reveal the total bankruptcy of unrestricted +individualism. + +The social order for which the State stands is not so much an +interference with the freedom of the subject as the condition under +which alone individual liberty can be preserved. {230} The view, +however, that the State is an artificial relationship into which men +voluntarily enter in order to limit their selfish instincts and to +secure their mutual advantages--the theory of the 'social +contract'--has been discarded in modern times as a fiction of the +imagination. It is not of his own choice that the individual becomes a +member of society. He is born into it. Man is not a whole in himself. +He is only complete in his fellows. As he serves others he serves +himself. But men are not the unconscious functions of a mechanical +system. They are free, living personalities, united by a sense of +human obligation and kindredship. The State is more than a physical +organism. It is a community of moral aims and ideals. Even law, which +is the soul of the State, is itself the embodiment of a moral +principle; and the commonwealth stands for a great ethical idea, to the +fulfilment of which all its citizens are called upon to contribute. + +2. The reciprocal duties of the State and its citizens receive +comparatively little prominence in the New Testament. But they are +never treated with disparagement or contempt. During our Lord's +earthly life the supreme power belonged to the Roman Empire. Though +Jesus had to suffer much at the hands of those in authority, His +habitual attitude was one of respect. He lived in obedience to the +government of the country, and acknowledged the right of Caesar to +legislate and levy taxes in his own province. While giving all +deference to the State officials before whom He was brought, He did not +hesitate to remind them of the ideal of truth and justice of which they +were the chosen representatives.[19] St. Paul's teaching is in harmony +with his Master's, and is indeed an expansion of it.[20] 'The powers +that be are ordained of God. Render therefore to all their dues, +tribute to whom tribute.' Beyond, however, enjoining the necessity of +work as a means of independence, and recommending that each should +remain in the sphere in which he has been placed, and perform +conscientiously the duties of his calling, we {231} find little direct +reference in the Epistles to the matter of citizenship. But as has +been truly said 'the citizen has but to stand in his station, and +perform its duties, in order to fulfil the demands of citizenship.'[21] +St. Paul's insistence therefore upon the personal fidelity of every man +to the duties of his sphere goes far to recognise that spirit of +reciprocal service which is the fundamental idea of the commonwealth. + +3. Of the two extreme views as to the meaning of the State between +which the verdict of history has wavered--that of Augustine, who +regarded the State as the result of man's sinful condition and as the +direct antithesis of the kingdom of God; and that of Hegel, who saw in +it the highest ethical form of society, the realisation of the moral +ideal--the view of St. Paul may be said to have approximated more +nearly to the latter. Writing to the Christians at Rome Paul does not +suggest that it was merely for prudence' sake that they should give to +the Imperial Power unquestioning obedience. He appeals to the loftiest +motives. All authority is of God in its origin and ultimate purpose. +What does it matter to him whether Nero be a devil or a saint? He is +the prince upon the throne. He is the symbol of divine authority, 'the +minister of God to thee for good.' As a Christian Paul looks beyond +the temporal world-power as actually existing. Whatever particular +form it may assume, he sees in the State and its rulers only the +expression of God's will. Rome is His agent, oppressive, and, it may +be, unjust, but still the channel through which for the moment the +Almighty works for the furtherance of His purposes.[22] + +The conception of the State as thus formulated involves a twofold +obligation--of the State towards its citizens, and of its citizens +towards the State. + +(1) As the embodiment of public right the State owes protection to its +subjects, guarding individual privileges and prohibiting such actions +as interfere with the general {232} good. Its functions, however, are +not confined to restrictive measures. Its duty is not only to protect +the rights of the individual, but to create and maintain such +conditions of life as are essential to the development of personality. +In its own interests it is bound to foster the growth of character, and +to promote culture and social well-being. In modern times we look to +the State not only to protect life and property, but to secure for each +individual and for all classes of men that basis of material well-being +on which alone life in its truest sense can be built up. The +government must therefore strike some kind of balance between the +extremes of individualism and socialism. While the old theory of +_laissez-faire_, which would permit every man to follow his own +individual bent without regard to the interests of others, has been +generally repudiated, there is still a class of politicians who +ridicule the 'night watchman' idea of the State as Lassalle calls it. +'Let there be as little State as possible,' exclaims Nietzsche. +According to such thinkers the State has only negative functions. The +best government is that which governs least, and allows the utmost +scope to untrammelled individual enterprise. But if there is a +tendency on the part of some to return to the individualistic +principle, the 'paternal' idea as espoused by others is being carried +to the verge of socialism. The function of the State is stretched +almost to breaking point when it is conceived as the 'guardian angel' +who accompanies and guards with perpetual oversight the whole life of +the individual from the cradle to the grave. Many of the more cautious +writers[23] of the day are exposing the dangers which lurk in the +bureaucratic system of government. This tendency is apt to crush +individual enterprise, and cause men to place entire reliance upon +external aid and centralised power. It is indeed difficult to draw a +fast line of demarcation between purely individual and social ends. +There are obviously primary interests belonging to society as a whole +which the State, if it is to be the instrument of the common good, +ought to control; certain {233} activities which, if permitted as +monopolies, become a menace to the community, and which can be +satisfactorily conducted only as departments of the State. National +life is a unity, and it can only maintain its integrity as it secures +for all its constituents, justice, equity before the law, and freedom +of each to be himself. The State ought to protect those who in the +competitive struggle of the modern industrial system find themselves at +a hopeless disadvantage. It is the duty of the commonwealth to secure +for each the opportunity to become what he is capable of being, and to +fulfil the functions for which he is best fitted. The State cannot +make men moral, but it can interfere with existing conditions so as to +make the moral life easier for its citizens. Criminal law cannot +create saints, but it can punish evil-doers and counteract the forces +of lawlessness which threaten the social order. It cannot legislate +within the domain of motive, but it can encourage self-restraint and +thrift, honesty and temperance. It cannot actually intermeddle with +the sanctity of the home, or assume the rôle of paternal authority, but +it can insist upon the fulfilment of the conditions of decency and +propriety; it can condemn insanitary dwellings, suppress traffic in +vice, supervise unhealthy trades, protect the life and health of +workmen, and, generally, devise means for the culture and the +advancement, intellectually and morally, of the people. The State in +some degree embodies the public conscience, and as such it has the +prerogative of awakening and stimulating the consciences of +individuals. As a divine institution it is one of the channels through +which God makes His will known to man. Law has an ethical import, and +the State which is founded upon just and beneficent laws moulds the +customs and forms the characters of its citizens. + +(2) But if the State is to fulfil its ideal function it must rely upon +the general co-operation of its citizens. The measure of its success +or failure will depend upon the extent to which an enlightened sense of +moral obligation prevails in the community. Men must rise above their +{234} own immediate interests and realise their corporate being. +Government makes its will dominant through the voice of the people. It +cannot legislate beyond the sympathies of its constituents. As the +individuals are, so the commonwealth will be. Civil duties vary +according to the qualifications and opportunities of individuals. But +certain general obligations rest upon all. + +(_a_) It is the duty of all to take an _interest in public affairs_. +What concerns us collectively is the concern of each. Everything that +touches the public good should be made a matter of intelligent and +watchful interest by all. (_b_) It is the duty of all to _conform to +the laws_ of the country. It is possible that a particular enactment +may conflict with the dictates of conscience, and it may be necessary +to protest against what seems to be an injustice. No rule can be laid +down for exceptional cases. Generally it will be best to submit to the +wrong, while at the same time using all legitimate means to secure the +repeal of the obnoxious law. And if they will revolt, martyrs must not +complain nor be unready to submit to the penalties involved. (_c_) It +is the further duty of all to take some _personal part_ in the +government--if not by active service, at least by the conscientious +recording of one's vote. Christians must not leave the direction of +the nation's affairs to non-Christians. The spirit of Christ forbids +moral indifference to anything human. All are not fitted for, or +called upon to take, public office; but it is incumbent upon every man +to maintain an intelligent public spirit, and to exercise all the +duties of good citizenship. It has been truly said that they who give +most to the State get most from the State. It is the men who play +their part as active citizens working for the nation's cause who enrich +their own lives and reap the harvest of a full existence. Not by +withdrawal from social service, but in untiring labour for their +country's weal, shall men win for themselves and their brethren the +fruits of liberty and peace. For nations as for men emancipation may +come with a stroke, but freedom can be earned only by strenuous and +united toil. + +{235} + +(3) Already these ideals have begun to take shape. The most +significant feature of modern times is the growing spirit of democracy. +Men of all classes are awakening to their rights, and are accepting +their share in the task of social reconstruction. 'We know how the +masses,' says Eucken, 'are determined to form a mere dependent body of +the so-called higher classes no longer, but to take the problem of life +independently into their own hands.'[24] But while the modern +democratic movement is not without its hopeful aspects, it is fraught +also with grave perils. It is well that the people should awake to +their obligations, and realise the meaning of life, especially in its +social implications. But there is a danger that culture may not +advance with emancipation, and while the masses demand their rights +they may not at the same time discern their duties. For rights involve +duties, and emancipation, as we have seen, is not liberty. The appeal +of the socialistic party is to the equality of all who bear human +features. It sounds plausible. But there never has been, nor never +can be, such equality. Nature and experience alike reveal a pronounced +and insuperable inequality among men. The law of diversity strikes +deep down into the very origin and constitution of mankind. The +equality proclaimed by the French Revolutionists is now regarded as an +idle dream. Not equality of nature but equity before the law, justice +for all, the opportunity for every man to realise himself and make the +most of the life and the gifts which God has given him--that is the +only claim which can be truly made. 'The only idea,' says Eucken, +'which can give to equality any meaning is the conviction that humanity +has spiritual relations, that each individual has a value for himself +and for the whole because he is a part of a larger spiritual world.' +Hence if democracy is truly to come to its own and fulfil its high +vocation, the Pauline figure of the reciprocal influence of the body +and its members must be proclaimed anew as the ideal of the body +politic--a unity fulfilling itself in difference--an organic life in +which the unit finds its {236} place of security-and-service in the +whole, and the whole lives in and acts through the individual parts. + +If we are to awaken to the high vocation of the Christian state, to +realise the possibilities of our membership one with another, a new +feeling of manhood and of national brotherhood, a new pride in the +community of life, must take possession of our hearts. We need, as one +has said, a baptism of religious feeling in our corporate +consciousness, a new sense that we are serving God in serving our +fellows, which will hallow and hearten the crusade for health and +social happiness, and give to every citizen a sense of spiritual +service. + + +III + +Unlike the family and State the _Church_ is the creation of Jesus +Christ. It is the witness of His Presence in the world. In its ideal +form it is world-wide. The Redemption for which it stands is a good +for all men. Though in practice many do not acknowledge its blessing, +the Church regards no man beyond its pale of grace. It is set in the +midst of the world as the symbol and pledge of God's universal love. + +1. The _Relation of Church and State_ is a difficult question with a +long history, and involving much controversy. Whatever view may be +held as to their legal connection, their interests can never be +regarded as inimical. The Church cannot be indifferent to the action +of the State, nor can the State ignore the work of the Church. But +since their spheres are not identical nor their aims entirely similar, +the trend of modern opinion seems to indicate that, while working in +harmony, it is more satisfactory that they should pursue independent +paths. There are spiritual ends committed to the Church by its Head +over which the civil power has no jurisdiction. On the other hand +there are temporal concerns with which ecclesiastical courts have +neither the vocation nor the qualifications to deal. Still, the +Church, as the organ of Christian thought {237} and activity, has +responsibilities with regard to civil matters. While religion is the +chief agent in the regeneration of man, religion itself is dependent +upon all social means, and the Church must regard with sympathy every +effort made by the community for moral improvement. The main function +of the Church in this connection is to keep before its members a high +ideal of social life, to create a spirit of fidelity in every sphere of +activity, and, particularly, to educate men for the tasks of +citizenship. The State, on the other hand, as the instrument of civic +life, has obligations towards the Church. Its duty is hardly exhausted +by observing an attitude of non-interference. In its own interests it +is bound, not merely to protect, but encourage the Church in the +fulfilment of its immediate aims. Parliament, however, must concede to +ecclesiastical bodies complete liberty to govern themselves. The +Church, as the institution of Christ, claims full autonomy; and the +State goes beyond its province when it imposes hampering restrictions +which interfere with the exercise of its authority and discipline +within its own sphere. + +2. As a religious institution the Church exists for three main +purposes: (1) the _Worship_ of God and the Edification of its members; +(2) the _Witness_ of Christ to Mankind; (3) the _Evangelisation_ of the +World. + +(1) The first of these objects has already been dealt with when +treating of the duties to God. It is only needful to add here that the +Church is more than a centre of worship; it is the home of kindred +souls knit together by a common devotion to Christ. It is the school +of character which seeks the mutual edification of its members 'by +provoking one another to love and to good works.' Hence among +Protestants the duty of _Church Discipline_ is acknowledged, which +deals with such sins or lapses from rectitude as constitute 'offences' +or 'scandals,' and tend to bring into disrepute the Christian name and +profession. In the Roman Church, the Confessional, through which moral +error is avowed, with its system of penances, has in view the same +object--viz., to reprove, correct, and reclaim {238} those who have +lapsed into sin--thus seeking to fulfil Christ's ideal 'to despair of +no man.' + +(2) But the Church is also a rallying place of service. Both in its +corporate capacity, and through the lives of its individual members, +the Church seeks to bear constant _witness to the mind of Christ_. It +proclaims His living example. It reiterates His will and embodies His +judgment, approving of what is good, condemning what is evil, and ever +more confronting the world with the high ideal of the divine Life and +Word. Not all who bear the name of Christ are consistent witnesses. +But still the aim of the Church is to harmonise the profession and +practice of its members, and generally to spiritualise secular life by +the education of public opinion. Before, however, Christians can hope +to make a profound impression upon the outside world, it is not +unnatural to expect that they should exhibit a _spirit of concord_, +among themselves, seeking to heal the unhappy schisms by which the +Church is rent. But while our separations are deplorable--and we ought +not to cease our endeavour for the reunion of Christendom--we must not +forget that there may be harmony of spirit even amid diversity of +operation, and that where there is true brotherly sympathy between +Christians, there already is essential unity.[25] + +(3) The special work of the Church to which it is constrained by the +express terms of its Master's commission, is to _preach the Gospel_ to +every creature and to bring all men into obedience to Christ. A +distinction is commonly made between Home and Foreign Missions. While +the distinction is useful, it is scarcely valid. The work of the +Church at home and abroad is one. The claims of the ignorant and +hapless of our own land do not exempt us from responsibilities to the +heathen world. The Lord's Prayer for the coming of the Kingdom +requires of Christian men that they shall consecrate their gifts along +every line of effort to the fulfilment of the divine will upon the +earth. + +3. While all sections of the Church are convinced that {239} an honest +application of the principles of Jesus to the practical affairs of life +would speedily transform society, there is considerable diversity of +opinion as to the proper attitude of Christianity to _social problems_. +The outward reconstruction of social order was not, it must be +admitted, the primary aim of Jesus: it was rather the spiritual +regeneration of the individual. But such could only become a reality +as it transformed the entire fabric of life. (1) Christ's teaching +could not but affect the organisation of industry as well as every +other section of the social structure. Though Jesus has many warnings +as to the perils of riches, there is no depreciation of wealth (in its +truest sense). It is true He refuses to interfere in a dispute between +two brothers as to worldly property, and repudiates generally the +office of arbiter. It is true also that He warns His disciples against +covetousness, and lays down the principle that 'a man's life consisteth +not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth.' But these +sayings, so far from implying disapproval of earthly possessions, imply +rather that property and trading are the indispensable basis upon which +the outward fabric of the social order is built. Christ does not +counsel withdrawal from the activities of the world. He honours work. +He recognises the legitimacy of trading. Many of His parables would +have no meaning if His attitude to the industrial system of His day had +been one of uncompromising hostility. He has no grudge against riches +in themselves. In the parable of the talents it is the comparatively +poor man who is censured while the rich is commended. To sum up what +Jesus thought about wealth is not easy. Many have thought that He +condemned the holding of property altogether. But such a conclusion +cannot be drawn from His teaching. Possessions, both outward and +inward, are rather to be brought to the test of His judgment. His +influence would rather bring property and commerce under the control of +righteousness and brotherhood. His ideal of life is to be attained +through learning the right use of wealth rather than through the +abolition of it. Wealth {240} can be used for the kingdom of God, and +it is a necessary instrument in the Church's work. It may be +consecrated like every other gift to the service of Christ. But there +are mighty forces enlisted against its best usefulness, and only +through the fullness of Christian grace can its good work be done. +What Jesus does condemn however is the predatory instinct, that greed +of gain which embodies itself everywhere in the spirit of plunder, +exploitation, and the impulse to gambling. He can have nothing but +condemnation for that great wave of money-love which has swept over +Christendom in our time, affecting all classes. It has fostered +self-indulgence, stimulated depraved appetites, corrupted business and +politics, oppressed the poor, materialised our ideals, and weakened +religious influences. 'From this craze of the love of money the voice +of Jesus calls the people back to the sane life in Ethics and religion +in which He is leader.'[26] What then ought to be the attitude of the +Church to the industrial questions of our day? While some contend that +the social question is really a religious question, and that the Church +is untrue to its mission when it holds itself aloof from the economical +problems which are agitating men's minds, others view with suspicion, +if not with hostility, the deflection of religion from its traditional +path of worship, and deem it a mistake for the Church to interfere in +industrial movements. + +A recent writer[27] narrates that in his boyhood he actually heard an +old minister of the Church of Scotland declare in the General Assembly, +'We are not here to make the world better: we have only to pass through +it on the way to glory.' 'No grosser travesty,' adds the author, 'was +ever uttered. We _are_ here to make the world better. We have a +commission to stamp out evil and to prevent men from falling into it. +If this is not Christian work, what is?' + +At the same time a portion of the clergy have gone to the opposite +extreme, identifying the kingdom of God with social propaganda, and +thus losing sight of its spiritual {241} and eternal, as well as its +personal, significance. There has been moreover a tendency on the part +of some to associate themselves with a political party, and to claim +for the Church the office of judge and arbitrator in industrial strife. +But surely it is one thing to degrade the Church to the level of a +secular society, and another, by witness and by effort, to make the law +of Christ dominant over all the relationships of life. Men are +impatiently asking, 'Has the Church no message to the new demands of +the age? Are Christians to stand apart from the coming battle, and +preach only the great salvation to individual souls? _That_ the +Christian minister must never cease to do; but the Gospel, if it is to +meet the needs of men, must be read in the light of history and +experience, and interpreted by the signs of the times. + +(2) The ground idea of Jesus' teaching was, as Troeltsch has pointed +out,[28] the declaration of the kingdom of God. Everything indeed is +relative to union with God, but in God man's earthly life is involved. +Two notes were therefore struck by Jesus, a note of individualism and a +note of universalism--love to God and love to man. These notes do not +really conflict, but they became the two opposite voices of the Church, +and gave rise to different ethical tendencies. The first religious +communities consisted of the poor and the enslaved. It never occurred +to them that they had civic rights: all they desired was freedom to +worship Christ. Not how to transform the social world, but how to +maintain their own religious faith without molestation in the world of +unbelief and evil was their problem. + +(3) In the early Catholic Church the spirit of individualism ruled. +With the Reformation a new type of life was developed, and a new +attitude to the social world was established. But while Lutheranism +sought to exercise its influence upon social life through state +regulation, Calvinism was more individualistic, and sought rather to +{242} enforce its teaching by means of the personal life. The attitude +of the various sects--Baptists, Pietists, Puritans--has been largely +individualistic, and instead of endeavouring to rectify the abuses of +industrial life they have been disposed rather to suffer the ills of +this evil world, finding in faith alone their compensation and solace. + +In modern times the tendency of the Church, Romanist and Protestant +alike, has been toward social regeneration; and a form of Christian +Socialism has even appeared which however lacks unity of principle and +uniformity of action. The mediaeval idea of a Holy Roman Empire, in +which all nations and classes were to be consolidated, is now admitted +to be a dream incapable of realisation, partly because the idea itself +is illusory, but principally because the hold of the Papacy upon the +people has been weakened. The agitation, 'Los von Rom' on the one +hand, and the 'Modernist' movement on the other, have tended to +dissipate the unity and energy of Catholicism. Nevertheless the +Church, which is really the society of Christian people, is coming to +see that it cannot close its eyes to questions which concern the daily +life of man, nor hold aloof from efforts which are working for the +social betterment of the world. To bring in the kingdom of God is the +Church's work, and it is becoming increasingly evident that the +kingdom, if it is to come in any real and living sense, must come where +Jesus Himself founded it--upon the plane of this present life. + +There are two considerations which make this work on the part of the +Church at once imperative and hopeful. The first is that the Church is +specially called upon by the command and example of its Founder to +range itself on the side of the weak and helpless. It is commanded to +bring the principles of brotherly love to bear upon the conditions of +life which press most heavily upon the handicapped. It is called on in +the spirit of its Master to rebuke the greed of gain and the callous +selfishness which uses the toil, and even the degradation of others, +for its own personal enjoyment. The Church only fulfils its function +when {243} it is not only the consoler of the suffering but also the +champion of the oppressed. And the other consideration is that in +virtue of its nature and charter the Church is enabled to appeal to +motives which the State cannot supply. It brings all social obligation +under the comprehensive law of love. It exalts the principle of +brotherhood. It lifts up the sacrifice of Christ, and seeks to make it +potent over the hearts of men. It preaches the doctrine of humanity, +and strives to win a response in all who are willing to acknowledge +their common kinship and equality before God. It appeals to masters +and servants, to employers and labourers, to rich and poor, and bids +them remember that they are sharers alike of the Divine Mercy, +pensioners together upon their Heavenly Father's love. + +4. Whatever shape the obligation of the Church may take in regard to +the social problems of the homeland, the duty of Christianity to the +larger world of Humanity admits of no question. The ethical +significance of the missionary movement of last century has been +pronounced by Wundt,[29] the distinguished historian of morals, as the +mightiest factor in modern civilisation. Speaking of humanity in its +highest sense as having been brought into the world by Christianity, he +mentions as its first manifestation the care of the sick, and then +adds, 'the second great expression of Christian humanity is the +establishment of missions.' It is unnecessary to dwell upon this +modern form of unselfish enthusiasm. It has its roots in the simple +necessity, on the part of the morally awakened, of sharing their best +with other people. 'Man grows with the greatness of his purposes,' and +no greater ideal task has ever presented itself to the imagination of +man than this mighty attempt to conquer the world for Christ, and give +to his brother men throughout the earth that which has raised and +enriched himself.[30] + +'The two great forming agencies in the world's history,' says a +prominent political economist, 'have been the {244} religious and the +economic.'[31] On the one hand the economic is required as the basis +of civilisation, but on the other the supreme factor is religion. The +commercial impulse, carried on independently of any higher motive than +self-interest, has however not infrequently reacted favourably on the +moral life of the race. Mutual understanding, the sense of a common +humanity, the virtues of honesty, fairness, and confidence upon which +all legitimate commerce is founded, have paved the way in no small +degree for the message of brotherhood and mercy. The present hour is +the Church's opportunity. Already the world has been opened up, the +nations of the earth are awakening to the greatness of life's +possibilities. The danger is that the Oriental peoples should become +satisfied with the mere externals of civilisation, and miss that which +will assure their complete emancipation. Christianity was born in the +East, though it has become the inheritance of the West. It is adapted +by its genius to all men. And undoubtedly the West has no better boon +to confer on the East than that on which its own life and hope are +founded--the religion of Jesus Christ. If we do not give that, we are +unfaithful to our Master's call; we falsify our own history, and wholly +miss the purpose for which we have been entrusted with divine +enlightenment and power. + + + +[1] Lofthouse, _Ethics of the Family_, p. 77. + +[2] _Hist. of Human Marriage_, p. 538. + +[3] The literature on this subject is enormous. See specially works of +Westermarck, M'Lennan, Frazer, Hobhouse, Andrew Lang, and Ihering. + +[4] See chap. vii. in Garvie's _Studies in Inner Life of Jesus_. + +[5] Matt. viii. 21, 22; Luke ix. 59-62. + +[6] Luke xiv. 26; Matt. x. 37. + +[7] Mark x. 29, 30. + +[8] Matt. xix. 12. + +[9] Matt. v. 32, xix. 3-10; Mark x. 11, 12. + +[10] See Forsyth, _Marriage: its Ethics and Religion_. + +[11] King, _Ethics of Jesus_, p. 69. + +[12] Stalker, _Ethics of Jesus_, p. 336. + +[13] Though Nietzsche does not use the word he may be regarded as the +father of modern eugenics. + +[14] Cf. Ramsay Macdonald, _Socialism_. + +[15] Mark vii. 9-13. + +[16] Cf. King, _The Moral and Religious Challenge of our Times_, pp. 42 +f. + +[17] Cf. W. Wallace, _Lects. and Addresses_, p. 114. + +[18] _Aus Leben und Wissenschaft_. + +[19] Matt. xii. 18-22; John xviii. 23, xix. 10 f. + +[20] Rom. xiii. + +[21] Sir H. Jones, _Idealism as a Practical Creed_, p. 123. + +[22] Some sentences are here borrowed from author's _Ethics of St. +Paul_. + +[23] _E.g._ Eucken, Kindermann, Mallock, and earlier H. Spencer. + +[24] _Life's Ideal and Life's Basis_. + +[25] Eph. iv. 3. + +[26] Clarke, _Ideal of Jesus_, p. 258. + +[27] Watson, _Social Advance_. + +[28] _Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen_, a recent +work on social ethics of great erudition and importance. + +[29] _Ethik_, vol. ii. + +[30] King, _The Moral and Religious Challenge of our Times_, pp. 44 and +346. + +[31] Marshall, _Principles of Economics_. + + + + +{245} + +CHAPTER XIV + +CONCLUSION--THE PERMANENCE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +In bringing to a close our study of Christian Ethics, we repeat that +the three dominant notes of the Christian Ideal are--Absoluteness, +Inwardness, and Universality. The Gospel claims to be supreme in life +and morals. The uniqueness and originality of the Ethics of +Christianity are to be sought, however, not so much in the range of its +practical application as in the unfolding of an ideal which is at once +the power and pattern of the new life. That ideal is Christ in whom +the perfect life is disclosed, and through whom the power for its +realisation is communicated. Life is a force, and character a growth +arising in and expanding from a hidden seed. Hence in Christian Ethics +apathy and passivity, and even asceticism and quietism, which occupy an +important place in the moral systems of Buddha and Neo-Platonism, in +mediaeval Catholicism and the teaching of Tolstoy, play only a +subsidiary part, and are but preparatory stages towards the realisation +of a fuller life. On the contrary all is life, energy, and unceasing +endeavour. 'I am come that ye may have life, and that ye may have it +more abundantly.' + +There is no finality in Christian Ethics. It is not a mechanical and +completed code. The Ethic of the New Testament, just because it has +its spring in the living Christ, is an inexhaustible fountain of life. +'True Christianity,' says Edward Caird, 'is not something which was +published in Palestine, and which has been handed down by a dead +tradition ever since; it is a living and growing {246} spirit, and +learns the lessons of history, and is ever manifesting new powers and +leading on to new truths.' + +The teaching of Jesus is not merely temporary or local. It is an utter +perversion of the Gospels to make the eschatology present in them the +master-key to their meaning, or to derive the ethical ideal from the +utterances which anticipate an abrupt and immediate end. Jesus spoke +indeed the language of His time and race, and often clothed His +spiritual purpose in the form of national expectation. But to base His +moral maxims on an 'Interim-Ethic' adapted to a transitory world is to +'distort the perspective of His teaching, and to rob it of its unity +and insight.' On the contrary, the Ethics of Jesus are everywhere +characterised by adaptability, universality, and permanence, and in His +attitude to the great problems of life there is a serenity and sympathy +which has nothing in common with the nervous and excited expectation of +sudden catastrophe. + +In like manner it is a misinterpretation of the teaching of Jesus to +represent asceticism as the last word of Christian Ethics. +Renunciation and unworldliness are undoubtedly frequently commended in +the New Testament, but they are urged not as ends in themselves but as +means to a fuller self-realisation. Such was not the habitual temper +and tone of Jesus in His relations to the world, nor was the ultimate +purpose of His mission to create a type of manhood whose perfection lay +in withdrawal from the interests and obligations of life. 'To single +out a teaching of non-resistance as the core of the Gospels, to retreat +from social obligations in the name of one who gladly shared them and +was called a friend of wine-bibbers and publicans--all this, however +heroic it may be, is not only an impracticable discipleship but a +historical perversion. It mistakes the occasionalism of the Gospels +for universalism.'[1] + +Finally, there are many details of modern social well-being with which +the New Testament does not deal, questions of present-day ethics and +economics which cannot be decided by a direct reference to chapter and +{247} verse, either of the Gospels or Epistles. The problems of life +shift with the shifting years, but the nature of life remains +unchanged, and responds to the life and the spirit of Him who was, and +remains down the ages, the Light of men. The individual virtues of +humility, purity of heart, and self-sacrifice are not evanescent, but +are now and always the pillars of Christian Ethics; while the great +principles of human solidarity, of brotherhood and equality in Christ, +of freedom, of love, and service; the New Testament teachings +concerning the family, the State, and the kingdom of God; our Lord's +precepts with regard to the sacredness of the body and the soul, the +duty of work, the stewardship of wealth, and the accountability to God +for life with its variety of gifts and tasks--contain the germ and +potency of all personal and social transformation and renewal. + + + +[1] Prof. Peabody, _Harvard Theological Review_, May 1913. + + + + +{248} + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + +A.--GENERAL WORKS ON ETHICS + +I. ENGLISH WORKS + +1. _Early Idealism and Intuitionalism_. + +Hobbes, 1650; Mandeville, 1714; Cudworth, 1688; Cumberland, 1672; Sam. +Clarke, 1704; Shaftesbury, 1713; Butler, 1729; Hutchison, 1756; Adam +Smith, 1759; R. Price, 1757; Thom. Reid, 1793; Dugald Stewart, 1793; W. +Whewell, 1848; H. Calderwood, _Handbook of Mor. Phil._, 1872; +Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, 1886; Laurie, _Ethics_, 1885; N. +Porter, _Elements of Moral Science_, 1885. + + +2. _Utilitarianism_. + +Locke, _Concerning Human Understanding_, 1690; Hartley, _Observations +on Man_, 1748; Hume, _Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals_, 1751; +_Essays_, 1742; Paley, _Principles of Mor. and Political Phil._, 1785; +Bentham, _Introd. to Principles of Morals and Legislation_, 1789; Jas. +Mill, _Analysis of the Human Mind_, 1829; J. S. Mill, _Utilitarianism_, +1863; A. Bain, _Mental and Moral Science_, 1868; _Mind and Body_, 1876; +H. Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_ (6th ed.), 1901; Shadworth Hodgson, +_Theory of Practice_, 1870; T. Fowler, _Progressive Morality_, 1884; +Grote, _Examination of Utilitarian Ethics_, 1870. + + +3. _Evolutionary Ethics_. + +Chas. Darwin, _Descent of Man_, 1871; Herbert Spencer, _Principles of +Ethics_ and _Data of Ethics_, 1879; W. K. Clifford, _Lectures and +Essays_, 1879; Leslie Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, 1882; S. Alexander, +_Moral Order and Progress_, 1889; Shurman, _Ethical Import of +Darwinism_; Huxley, _Evolution and Ethics_; Hobhouse, _Morals in +Evolution_ (2 vols.), 1906; Westermarck, _Origin and Development of the +Moral Ideas_, 1909. + + +4. _Modern Idealism_. + +T. H. Green, _Proleg. to Ethics_, 1883; F. H. Bradley, _Ethical +Studies_, 1876; _Appearance and Reality_, 1893; E. Caird, _Crit. Phil. +of Kant_, 1890; _Evolution of Religion_, 1903; W. R. Sorley, _Ethics of +Naturalism_, 1885; _Recent Tendencies in Ethics_, 1904; _The Moral +Life_, 1912; W. L. Courtney, _Constructive Ethics_, 1886; J. S. +Mackenzie, _Introd. to Social Philos._, 1890; _Manual of Ethics_ (4th +ed.), 1900; W. Wallace, _Lectures and Essays_, 1898; Muirhead, +_Elements of Ethics_, 1892; Rashdall, _Theory of Good and Evil_; Boyce +Gibson, _A Philos. Introd. to Ethics_, 1904; Ward, _Kingdom of Ends_ +(Gifford Lect.), 1910; Bosanquet, _Principles of Individuality and +Value_, 1912; _Value and Destiny of the Individual_ (Gifford Lects.), +1913; _Psychology of the Moral Self_; D'Arcy, _Short Study of Ethics_; +W. Arthur, _Physical and Moral Law_; Jas. Seth, _Study of Ethical +Principles_ (11th ed.), 1910; Ryland, _Manual of Ethics_; G. E. Moore, +_Principia Ethica_, 1903; _Ethics_ (Home Univ. Lib.), 1912; MacCunn, +_Making of Character_, 1905; _Ethics of Citizenship_, 1907; _Six +Radical Thinkers_, 1907; Bowne, _Principles of Ethics; Immanence of +God_, 1906; Dewey, _Outlines of a Crit. Theory of Ethics_, 1891; +Harris, _Moral Evolution_; Hyslop, _Elements of Ethics_, 1895; Mezes, +_Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory_, 1901; Royce, _Religious Aspects +of Philosophy; Philosophy of Loyalty_, 1908; Taylor, _Problem of +Conduct_; Rand, _The Classical Moralists_ (Selections), 1910. + + +II. FOREIGN WORKS + +Kant's works, specially _Metaphysics of Ethics_, trans. by T. K. +Abbott, under title, _Kant's Theory of Ethics_ (3rd ed.), 1883; Fichte, +_Science of Ethics_ (trans.), 1907; _Science of Rights_ (trans.); +_Popular Works_ (2 vols.); _Vocation of Man_, etc.; Hegel, _Philosophy +of Right_, trans. by S. W. Dyde, 1896; Lotze, _Practical Philosophy, +_1890; Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, trans. by Tufts; Wundt, _Ethics, An +Investigation of the Facts and Laws of the Moral Life_ (3 vols.), +trans. from 2nd German ed., 1892; Dubois, _The Culture of Justice_; +Guyot, _La Morale_; Janet, _Theory of Morals_ (trans.); Nietzsche's +_Works_, translated by Oscar Levy (18 vols.); Eucken, _The Problem of +Human Life_, 1912; _Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_, 1912; _Meaning and +Value of Life_, 1912; _Main Current of Modern Thought_, 1912; _The Life +of the Spirit_, 1909; Hensel, _Hauptproblem der Ethik_, 1903; Lipps, +_Die Ethischen Grundfragen_, 1899; Natorp, _Social-paedagogik_; +Schuppe, _Grundzüge der Ethik_; Wentscher, _Ethik_; Schwarz, _Das +Sittliche Leben_; L. Levy-Bruhl, _Ethics and Moral Science_, trans. by +Eliz. Lee, 1905; Windelband, _Präludien. über Willensfreiheit_; Bauch, +_Glückseligkeit und Persönlichkeit in der krit. Ethik_; {250} +_Sittlichkeit und Kuttur_; Cohen, _Ethik des Reinen Willens_, 1904; +Dilthey, _Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften_; Ihering, _Der Zweck +im Recht_ (2 Bde.), 1886; Cathrein, _Moral. Philosophie_ (2 Bde.), +1904; Tonnies, _Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft_, 1887. + + +B.--CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +I. GENERAL + +Harless, _Christl. Ethik_, 1842 (trans.), 1868; Schleiermacher, _Die +Christl. Sitte_, 1843; Marheineke, _System d. Christl. Moral_, 1847; +Bothe, _Theol. Ethik_, 1845; De Wette, _Lehrbuch d. Christl. +Sittenlehre_, 1853; Ch. F. Schmid, _Christl. Sittenlehre_, 1861; A. +Wuttke, _Handbuch d. Christl. Sittenlehre_, 1861 (trans., 2 vols., J. +P. Lacroix, 1873); F. P. Cobbe, _Religious Duty_, 1864; _Studies +Ethical and Social_, 1865; Seeley, _Ecce Homo_, 1886; Maurice, _Social +Morality_, 1872; _Conscience_, 1872; Wade, _Christianity and Morality_, +1876; Hofmann, _Theol. Ethik_, 1878; Lange, _Grundriss d. Christl. +Ethik_, 1878; Martensen, _Christl. Ethik_ (trans., 3 vols.), 1878; +Gregory Smith, _Characteristics of Christian Morality_, 1876; O. +Pfleiderer, _Grundriss d. Glaubens und Sittenlehre_, 1880; Luthardt, +_Vorträge über die Moral d. Christenthums_, 1882; S. Leathes, +_Foundations of Morality_, 1882; Frank, _System d. Christl. +Sittenlehre_, 1885; Westcott, _Social Aspects of Christianity_, 1887; +W. T. Davidson, _The Christian Conscience_, 1888; Balfour, _The +Religion of Humanity_, 1888; Maccoll, _Christianity in Relation to +Science and Morals_, 1889; Stanton, _Province of Christian Ethics_, +1890; Hughes, _Principles of Natural and Supernatural Morals_, 1890; W. +G. Lilly, _Right and Wrong_, 1890; Bright, _Morality in Doctrine_, +1892; Schultz, _Grundriss d. Evangelischen Ethik_, 1891; Newman Smyth, +_Christian Ethics_, 1892; Dowden, _Relation of Christian Ethics to +Philos. Ethics_, 1892; Jas. Drummond, _Via, Veritas, Vita_ (Hib. +Lect.), 1894; Jacoby, _Neukstamentliche Ethik_, 1889; Salwitz, _Das +Problem d. Ethik_, 1891; Knight, _The Christian Ethic_, 1893; Jas. +Kidd, _Morality and Religion_, 1895; Strong, _Christian Ethics_, 1897; +Troeltsch, _Die Christl. Ethik und die heutige Gesellschaft_, 1904; +_Die Sociallehren d. Christl. Kirchen u. Gruppen_ (2 vols.), 1912; +_Protestantism and Progress_, 1912; Lemme, _Christl. Ethik._ (2 vols.), +1908; Kirn, _Grundriss d. Theol. Ethik_, 1909; _Sitlliche +Lebenanschauungen d. Geigenwart_, 1911; Nash, _Ethics and Revelation_; +Dobschütz, _The Christian Life in the Primitive Church_; Clark, _The +Church and the Changing Order_; Ottley, _Christian Ideas and Ideals_, +1909; Clark Murray, _Handbook of Christian Ethics_, 1908; Henry W. +Clark, _The Christian Method of Ethics_, 1908; Rauschenbusch, +_Christianity and the Social Crisis_, 1908; Geo. Matheson, _Landmarks +of New Testament Morality_, 1888; J. Smith, _Christian Character and +Social Power_; Gladden, _Applied Christianity_; J. R. Campbell, +_Christianity and the Social Order_; Coe, _Education in Religion and +Morals_; Peile, _The Reproach of the Gospel_; Gottschick, _Ethik_, +1907; W. Schmidt, _Der Kampf um die Sittliche Welt_, 1906; Herrmann, +_Ethik_, 1909; _Faith and Morals, Communion of the Christian with God_; +A. E. Balch, _Introduction to the Study of Christian Ethics_; +Kirkpatrick, _Christian Character and Conduct_; Church, _Outlines of +Christian Character_; Paget, _Christian Character_; Illingworth, +_Christian Character; Personality, Human and Divine_; R. Mackintosh, +_Christian Ethics_, 1909; Haering, _The Ethics of the Christian Life_ +(trans.), 1909; Barbour, _A Philos. Study of Christian Ethics_, 1911; +Stubbs, _Christ and Economics_; W. S. Bruce, _Social Aspects of +Christian Morality_, 1905; _Formation of Christian Character_; Harper, +_Christian Ethics and Social Progress_, 1912; T. C. Hall, _Social +Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics_, 1911. + + + +II. SPECIAL SUBJECTS + +1. _Ethics of Jesus_. + +Briggs, _Ethical Teaching of Jesus_; P. Brooks, _Influence of Jesus_; +Dale, _Laws of Christ for Common Life_; Feddersen, _Jesus und die +Socialen Dinge_; Gardner, _Exploratio Evangelica_; Ehrhardt, _Der +Grundcharacter d. Ethik Jesu_, 1895; Grimm, _Die Ethik Jesu_, 1903; +Peabody, _Jesus Christ and the Christian Character_, 1905; _Jesus +Christ and the Social Question_, 1902; _The Approach to the Social +Question_, 1909; King, _The Ethics of Jesus_, 1910; _Moral and Social +Challenge of our Times_, 1912; Rau, _Die Ethik Jesu_; Stalker, _Imago +Christi_, 1888; _The Ethic of Jesus_, 1909; Mathews, _The Social +Teaching of Jesus_; Horton, _The Commandments of Jesus_; W. N. Clarke, +_The Ideal of Jesus_, 1911. + + +2. _Teaching of Jesus and Apostles_. + +_Works_ of A. B. Bruce; Gilbert, _Revelation of Jesus_; Harnack, _What +is Christianity?_ (Das Wesen); _Sayings of Jesus_; Jülicher, +_Gleichnissreden Jesu_; Denney, _Jesus and the Gospel_, 1909; Latham, +_Pastor Pastorum_; Moorhouse, Pullan, Ross, Von Schrenck, Stevens, +Swete; Tolstoy, _My Religion_; Wendt, _Lehre Jesu_ (2 ed.), 1901; +Weizsäcker, _The Apostolic Age_; Hausrath, _History of N. T. Times_; +Fairbairn, _Christ in Modern Thought_; D. La Touche, _The Person of +Christ in Modern Thought_, 1911; Pfanmüller, _Jesus im Urtheil d. +Jahrhunderte_; Bacon, _Jesus, the Son of God_; Dalman, _Words of +Jesus_; Baur, _Paulinismus_; Bosworth, _Teaching of Jesus and +Apostles_; Pfleiderer, _Paulinismus; Primitive Christianity_; +Johan-Weiss, _Paul and Jesus_; Gardner, _Relig. Experience of St. +Paul_; Alexander, _Ethics of St. Paul_. + + +{252} + +C.--HISTORY OF ETHICS + +See Histories of Philosophy: Ueberweg, Erdmann, Windelband, Schwegler, +Maurice, Rogers; Alexander, _A Short History of Philosophy_ (2nd ed.), +1908; Lecky, _Hist. of Europ. Morals_; Luthardt, _History of Ethics_; +Rogers, _A Short History of Ethics_, 1912; Thoma, _Geschichte d. +Christl. Sittenlehre in der Zeit d. N. T._, 1879; Wundt (_Vol. II. of +Ethics_); Wuttke (_Vol. I. of Ethics_); Sidgwick, _History of Ethics_; +Ziegler, _Gesch. d. Ethik_; Jodl, _Gesch. d. Ethik in d. Neueren +Philosophie_; T. C. Hall, _History of Ethics within Organized +Christianity_, 1910. See also Relevant Articles in Bible Dictionaries, +especially Hastings' _Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_. + + + + +{253} + +INDEX + + Activism, 117, 122, 179. + Adiaphora, 201. + Aestheticism, 15 f., 108. + Alquin, 2. + Apocalyptic teaching of Christ, 133. + Aquinas, Thomas, 2, 196. + Aristotle, 10, 17 f., 40 f., 66, 70, 87, 107, 187. + Arnold, Matthew, 1, 107. + Asceticism, 129, 150, 192, 245. + Assimilation to Christ, 179. + Atonement, 166. + Augustine, 30, 57 f., 66, 140, 231. + Aurelius, Marcus, 43, 70. + Avenarius, 86. + + Balch, 132, 133. + Barbour, 41, 135, 157, 159, 161. + Baur, 39. + Beatitudes, 129, 136, 188. + Beneficence, 213. + Bentham, 103, 204. + Bergson, 64, 91 f., 117 f. + Bernard, 218. + Blewett, Christian view of God, 170. + Bosanquet, 16, 27, 64, 92, 113, 114. + Bousset, 134, 135. + Brotherhood, 145, 210, 243, 247. + Browning, 3, 16, 60, 63, 77, 119, 131, 132, 138, 206, 218. + Bunsen, 69. + Burckhardt, 227. + Burke, 204. + Burkitt, 32. + Burnet, 41. + Burns, Robert, 204. + Butcher, 41. + Butler, Bishop, 166. + + Caird, E., 44, 60, 64, 245. + ---- J., 63. + Cairns, 135. + Calixtas, G., 2. + Calvinism, 2, 57, 241. + Cambridge Platonists, 39. + Campbell, 69. + Chamberlain, Houston, 48. + Character, 6, 10, 14, 15, 24, 186; + making of, 208. + Childhood, children, 226 f. + Christ, 1, 4, 5, 11 f., 124; + as example, 146 f.; + character of, 148 f., 150. + Christianity, 123 f. + Church, 4, 209, 236 ff. + Citizenship, 39, 151, 233 f. + Clarke, 240. + Clement, 2, 39. + Coleridge, 3. + Collectivism, 106. + Compassion, 212. + Conduct, 1, 6, 13, 15, 183 f. + Conscience, 68 f. + Conversion, 171. + Courage, 38, 186, 187, 190. + Cousin, 16. + _Creative Evolution_, 117. + Croce, Benedetto, 117. + Culture, 16, 99, 108, 130, 148, 156, 207, 208. + + Daemon of Socrates, 69. + Danaeus, 2. + Dante, 125, 138. + Darwin, 74. + David, Psalms, 48 f., 70. + Davidson, 69, 81. + Death of Christ, 166. + Decalogue, 2, 45, 72. + Deissmann, 162. + Democracy, 235. + Denney on Forgiveness, 163. + Descartes, 204. + Determinism, 88 f. + Dewey, Professor, 64. + Disinterestedness of motive, 156 f. + Divorce, 224. + Dobschütz, 134. + Dogmatics, 3, 24 f. + Dorner, 25 f. + Drew, 31. + Duty, Duties, 8, 21, 52, 196 ff. + Dynamic of new life, 164 f. + + 'Ecce Homo,' 152, 205. + Ecclesiasticism, 3, 49. + Economics, 17, 239. + Ehrhardt, 151. + Emerson on Example, 151. + Empire, Roman, 43; 'Holy,' 242. + Engels, 105. + Epictetus, 43, 70. + Epicureans, 42. + Erinnyes of Aeschylus, 69. + Eschatology, 133 f. + Eternal life, 131. + Ethics, Christian, 1 f., 5, 6, 10 ff; + Philos., 22, 35 f., 168; + permanence of, 245. + ---- of Israel, 44 ff. + Eucken, 86, 93, 108, 115, 117, 121 f., 179, 203, 207, 235. + Eugenics, 110, 255. + Euripides, 69. + Evil, 57 f., 62, 118. + Evolutionalism, 74 f., 103 f. + Example, human, 151, 214 f.; + of Jesus, 140, 222 f. + Externalism, 142 f. + + Fairbairn, A. M., 147. + Faith, 65, 67, 174 f., 196, 216; + Pauline doct., 177. + Faithfulness, 200, 203, 216, 224, 231. + Faith healing, 90. + Family, 220 f.; relationships, 222, 226. + Fatherhood of God, 141, 145, 153, 216. + Feuerbach, 101. + Fichte, 65, 112, 204. + Forgiveness, divine, 153; human, 214. + Forsyth, 224. + 'Foundations,' 173. + Frazer, 29, 221. + + Garvie, 222. + God, idea of, 26; sovereignty of, 27; fatherhood of, 27; + love of, 28; recognition of, 215; obedience to, 216; + worship of, 217. + Godlikeness, 141, 218. + Goethe, 58, 81, 107, 130, 212. + Grace, means of, 209. + Graces, 188. + Grant, Sir A., on 'Mean,' 185. + Greece, Ancient, 11, 35. + Greeks, 16, 28, 69. + Green, T. H., 18, 75, 77, 88, 187, 218. + + Haeckel, 86, 101. + Haering, 21, 25, 156, 201. + Harnack, 176, 205, 228. + Hebrew, 35, 44. + Hedonism, 104. + Hegel, 9, 19, 55, 65, 112 f., 124, 204, 213, 231. + Heraclitus, 37. + Hermann, E., 125. + Herrmann, 202. + Hobbes, 57, 102. + Hobhouse, 221. + Holiness, 141; of Jesus, 149. + Hope, 47, 197 f. + Hügel, von, 126. + Hume, 18. + Hypnotism, 90. + Hyslop, 14. + + Ideals, 6, 12; idealism, 107, 127 f. + Ihering, 221. + Immanence of God, 43, 93. + Immortality, 155. + Incarnation, 165 f. + Indeterminism, 88. + Individualism, 107, 204, 205. + Inge, 16. + Intellect and Intuition, 65, 118. + Intellectualism, 64, 65, 114, 118. + Intensity of life, 129 f. + _Interimsethik_, 134 f., 246. + Intuitionalism, 72. + Irenaeus, 166. + Israel, 35, 44, 70. + + Jacoby, 25, 142, 157. + James, St., 29. + ---- W., 56, 65, 66, 89 f., 114 f., 172. + Jones, Sir H., 132, 219, 231. + Judaeism, Ethics of, 45. + Judgment, final, 140; just judgment, 212. + Justice, 32, 38, 172, 187 f., 210, 233. + Justification by faith, 177. + + Kant, 13, 65 f., 74, 111 f., 152, 158, 162, 185, 204. + Keim, 151. + King, 134, 224, 227, 243. + Kingdom of God, 132 f. + Kirkup, 105. + Knight, 36. + + Lassalle, 232. + Law, Mosaic, 45 f., 70. + Lecky, 43, 66, 211, 217. + Lemme, 25, 79 f. + Leonardo, 92. + Lidgett, 27. + Life, 12, 118; as ideal, 128; as vocation, 200; + regard for, 207; as Godlikeness, 141; sacredness of, 142; + Christ as standard of, 147; brevity of, 154; 'eternal,' 131. + Lodge, Sir O., 172. + Lofthouse, 221. + Logic, 15, 118. + Lotze, 88. + Love, supremacy of, 28, 196 f; divine, 144, 153. + Lütgert, 108. + + Maccabean age, 48. + MacCunn, 203. + Macdonald, Ramsay, 220. + Mach, 85 f. + Machiavelli, 70. + Mackenzie, 13, 14, 19. + Mackintosh, 26, 199. + Macmillan, 112. + Mallock, 232. + Man, estimate of, 55 ff.; primitive, 57. + Mark, St., 32. + Marriage, 223, 225. + Marshall, 224. + Martensen, 25. + Marx, 105. + Massachusetts, 'Declaration of Rights,' 205. + Matheson, Geo., 194. + Mazzini on Rights, 203. + 'Mean' of Aristotle, 40, 185. + Metaphysics, 3, 10, 17 f., 25, 37. + Meyers, St. Paul, 168, 217. + Micah, 47. + Mill, J. S., 32, 103. + Millar, Hugh, 56. + Milton, 58. + Mission of Jesus, 149. + Missionary movement, 243. + Moffatt, 134. + Morality, 10, 37 f. + Morals, 24. See Ethics. + Morris, 92. + Motives, 6, 10; Christian, 152 f. + Muirhead, 14. + Murray, 55, 58. + Müller, Max, 58. + + Nativism, 72. + Naturalism, 100 ff. + Nemesis, 69. + Neo-Platonism, 39 f., 40, 44, 245. + 'New Ethic,' 108. + Nietzsche, 58, 109, 225, 232. + Nine Foundation Pillars of Schmiedel, 31. + Norm, Normative, 12, 146. + Novalis, 16, 25. + + Obedience, 178. + Old Dispensation, 45. + Origin, 39. + Orr, J., 142. + Oswald, 86. + Ottley, 59, 61, 209, 213. + 'Ought,' 12, 21, 80. + + Paine, 204. + Parables of the kingdom, 137. + Parents, 226. + Parker, Theodore, 56. + Pascal, 57, 59. + Passions, 41, 58, 191. + Paul, St., 22, 26, 30 f., 43, 47, 57 f., + 66, 70, 77, 94 f., 162, 173, 177. + Paulsen, 10, 151, 199. + Peabody, 148, 150, 246. + Pelagius, 56. + Penalty, 162. + _Pensées_, 59. + Perfection, spiritual, 27, 141. + Permissible, 202. + Personality, 6, 55 f., 61, 112, 113, 122, 209, 213. + Pfleiderer, 44. + Pharisaism, 143. + Philosophy, 4, 5, 9, 35 f. + Plato, 18 f., 37 ff., 66, 107, 184, 187. + Pluralism, 116. + Poetry of Old Testament, 45 f., 48. + Politics, 15 f. + Postulates, 6, 18, 22, 25, 29. + Power, divine, 164 f. + Pragmatism, 63, 114 f. + Prayer, 217. + Pringle-Pattison, 103. + Property, 213. + + Rashdall, 27. + Realisation of self, 128. + Reformation, 2, 11, 47. + Regeneration, 171. + Regret, 171. + Renewal, 171. + Renunciation of Gospel, 156. + Repentance, 171. + Response, human, 169. + Responsibility of man, 29. See Will. + Resurrection of Christ, 167. + Revolution, French, 56, 235. + Rewards, 157 f. + Richter, Jean Paul, 155. + Righteousness, 46 f., 52, 142, 192. + Risen life, 167. + Ritschlian school, 63, 90. + Romanticism, 107. + Rome, 35; Romanist, 243. + Rousseau, 56 f., 100. + Ruskin, 16. + + Sabatier, 66. + Sacrifice of Christ, 166; self, 131, 191, 194, 209. + Sanday, Professor, 139, 157. + Schelling, 65. + Schiller, 16, 107. + Schleiermacher, 3, 25, 39, 201. + Schmidt, 86. + Schmiedel, 31. + Schopenhauer, 109. + Schultz on copying Christ, 152. + Schweitzer, 134. + Science, 13 f., 83. + Scott, E., 134, 140. + Seeley, 16. + Self-regard, 207. + Self-restraint of Jesus, 150. + Self-sufficiency, 130. + Seneca, 43, 70. + Sermon on (the) Mount, 32. + Seth, Jas., 103. + Sin, 28 f., 140. + Sinlessness of Jesus, 149. + Smith, Adam, 103. + Smyth, Newman, 17, 26, 132. + Socialism, 105; social problems, 225 f., 239. + Society. Social institutions, 220 ff. + Socrates, 9, 36 f., 39, 69, 186. + Sonship, 153. + Sophists, 11, 36, 37. + Sophocles, 69. + Soul, 61, 119. + Sovereignty of God, 27, 93, 144. + Specialisation, 207. + Spencer, 74 f., 103, 232. + Spinoza, 18. + Sport, 207. + Stalker, 176, 224. + Standard of New Life, 146 f. + State, 229 ff. + Stephen, Leslie, 17. + Stoics, 42, 56, 70, 185, 194. + Strauss, 151. + Strong, 193. + Sudermann, 110. + Suffering, 202, 208. + _Summum bonum_, 11. See Ideal. + Symonds, 69. + Sympathy of Jesus, 149. + Synoptic Gospels, 33. + + Tasso, 81. + Temperance, 38, 187, 191. + Temptation, 208. + Tennyson, 3, 39; wages, 161. + Testament, New, 28, 30 f., 35, 57, 71. + ---- Old, 26, 45. + Thanksgiving, 218. + _Theologia Moralis_, 2. + Titius, 134. + Touche, E. D. La, 145. + Troeltsch, 135, 151, 241. + Truthfulness, 211. + + Utilitarianism, 103 f., 114. + + Virtue. Virtues, 69, 21, 38 ff., 183 ff. + Vitalism, 117, 120. + Vocation, 154, 199 f. + + Wages, 161. + Watson, 240. + Wealth, 239. + Weiss, Johannus, 134, 170. + _Welt-Anschauung_, 19, 31. + Wenley, 44. + Wernle, 58, 134. + Westcott, Bishop, 39. + Westermarck, 221. + Will, 12 ff., 82 f. + Wisdom, 38, 43, 49, 187, 192. + Wordsworth, 3, 39. + Work, 208, 239. + Worship, 217, 237. + Wundt, 73, 78 f., 186, 213, 243. + Wuttke, 13, 25, 217. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS*** + + +******* This file should be named 22105-8.txt or 22105-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/2/1/0/22105 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + diff --git a/22105-8.zip b/22105-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..44ff3d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/22105-8.zip diff --git a/22105.txt b/22105.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b3315a --- /dev/null +++ b/22105.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9867 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Christianity and Ethics, by Archibald B. C. +Alexander + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Christianity and Ethics + A Handbook of Christian Ethics + + +Author: Archibald B. C. Alexander + + + +Release Date: July 19, 2007 [eBook #22105] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS*** + + +E-text prepared by Al Haines + + + +Transcriber's note: + + Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed + in curly braces, e.g. {99}. They have been located where page + breaks occurred in the original book. For its Index, a page + number has been placed only at the start of that section. + + + + + +CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS + +A Handbook of Christian Ethics + +by + +ARCHIBALD B. D. ALEXANDER, M.A., D.D. + +Author of 'A Short History of Philosophy,' + 'The Ethics of St. Paul,' etc. + + + + + + + +London: Duckworth & Co. +3 Henrietta St., Covent Garden +1914 +All rights reserved + + + + +{v} + +PREFACE + +The object of this volume is to present a brief but comprehensive view +of the Christian conception of the moral life. In order to conform +with the requirements of the series to which the volume belongs, the +writer has found the task of compression one of almost insurmountable +difficulty; and some topics, only less important than those dealt with, +have been necessarily omitted. The book claims to be, as its title +indicates, simply a handbook or introduction to Christian Ethics. It +deals with principles rather than details, and suggests lines of +thought instead of attempting an exhaustive treatment of the subject. +At the same time, in the author's opinion, no really vital question has +been overlooked. The treatise is intended primarily for students, but +it is hoped that it may prove serviceable to those who desire a +succinct account of the moral and social problems of the present day. + +A fairly full bibliography has been added, which, along with the +references to authorities in the body of the work, may be helpful to +those who wish to prosecute the study. For the convenience of readers +the book has been divided into four sections, entitled, Postulates, +Personality, Character, and Conduct; and a detailed synopsis of +contents has been supplied. + +To the Rev. W. R. Thomson, B.D. of Bellshill, Scotland, who read the +chapters in type, and generally put at his disposal much valuable +suggestion, the author would record his most sincere thanks. + + + + +{vii} + +CONTENTS + + +INTRODUCTION + + PAGE +A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . 1 + + + +SECTION A--POSTULATES + +CHAPTER I + +THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + + I. General Definition. + II. Distinctive Features--1. Ideal; 2. Norm; 3. Will. + III. Is Ethics a Science? + IV. Relation to--1. Logic; 2. Aesthetics; 3. Politics. + V. Dependence upon--1. Metaphysics; 2. Psychology. + + +CHAPTER II + +THE POSTULATES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + + I. Philosophical Ethics. + II. Dogmatics. + III. Theological Presuppositions-- + 1. Christian Idea of God. + 2. Christian Doctrine of Sin. + 3. Human Responsibility. + IV. Authority and Method. + + +CHAPTER III + +ETHICAL THOUGHT BEFORE CHRIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + + I. In Greece and Rome--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics. + Stoicism and St. Paul. + II. In Israel--1. Law; 2. Prophecy; 3. Poetry. + Preparatory Character of pre-Christian Morality. + + +SECTION B--PERSONALITY + +CHAPTER IV + +THE ESTIMATE OF MAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 + + I. Conflicting Views of Human Nature-- + 1. Man by nature Morally Good. + 2. Man by nature Totally Depraved. + 3. The Christian View. + II. Examination of Man's Psychical Nature-- + 1. The Unity of the Soul. + 2. The Divine in Man. + 3. The Physical and Mental Life. + III. Appeal of Christianity to the Mind. + + +CHAPTER V + +THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 + + I. Treatment of Conscience-- + 1. In Greek Poetry and Philosophy. + 2. In Old Testament. + 3. In New Testament. + II. Nature and Origin of Conscience-- + 1. Intuitionalism. + 2. Evolutionalism. + III. Validity of Conscience-- + 1. The Christian View. + 2. The Moral Imperatives. + 3. The Permanence of Conscience + + +CHAPTER VI + +'THE MIRACLE OF THE WILL' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 + + Is Man free to choose the Good? + Creative Power of Volition. + Aspects of Problem raised. + I. Scientific-- + Man and Physical Necessity. + II. Psychological-- + Determinism and Indeterminism. + Criticism of James and Bergson. + Spontaneity and Necessity. + III. Theological-- + Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. + Jesus and Paul--Challenge to the Will. + Freedom--a Gift and a Task. + + +SECTION C--CHARACTER + +CHAPTER VII + +MODERN THEORIES OF LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 + + I. Naturalistic Tendency-- + 1. Materialistic-- + (1) Idyllic or Poetic--Rousseau. + (2) Philosophic--Feuerbach. + (3) Scientific--Haeckel. + 2. Utilitarian--Hobbes, Bentham, Mill. + 3. Evolutionary--Spencer. + 4. Socialistic--Marx, Engels. + 5. Individualistic-- + (1) Aestheticism--Goethe, Schiller. + (2) Subjectivism-- + (_a_) Pessimism--Schopenhauer. + (_b_) Optimism--Nietzsche. + II. Idealistic Tendency-- + 1. Kant--Categorical Imperative. + 2. Fichte and Hegel--Idea of Personality. + 3. James--Pragmatism. + 4. Bergson--Vitalism. + 5. Eucken--Activism. + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 + + Life, as the highest Good. + I. Life, in its Individual Aspect-- + 1. Its Intensity. + 2. Its Expansion. + 3. 'Eternal Life.' + II. Life, in its Social Aspect-- + 1. 'The Kingdom of God'-- + Eschatological Interpretation. + Untenableness of _Interimsethik_. + 2. Christ's View of Kingdom-- + (1) A Present Reality--a Gift. + (2) A Gradual Development--a Task. + (3) A Future Consummation--a Hope. + III. Life, in its Godward Aspect-- + 1. Holiness. + 2. Righteousness. + 3. Love. + + +CHAPTER IX + +STANDARD AND MOTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 + + I. Christ as Example-- + 1. Portrayal by Synoptists-- + (1) Artlessness of Disciples. + (2) Naturalness of Jesus, + 2. Impression of Power-- + (1) Power of Loyalty to Calling. + (2) Power of Holiness. + (3) Power of Sympathy. + 3. Value of Jesus' Example for Present Life-- + Misconception of Phrase 'Imitation of Christ.' + II. The Christian Motive-- + 1. Analysis of Springs of Conduct-- + (1) Divine Forgiveness. + (2) Fatherhood of God. + (3) Sense of Vocation. + (4) Brevity of Life. + (5) Idea of Immortality. + 2. Question as to Purity of Motive-- + (1) Charge of Asceticism. + (2) Charge of Hedonism. + 3. Doctrine of Rewards-- + (1) In Philosophy. + (2) In Christianity--(_a_) Jesus; (_b_) Paul. + + +CHAPTER X + +THE DYNAMIC OF THE NEW LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 + + I. Divine Power-- + Operative through Christ's + 1. Incarnation and Life. + 2. Death and Sacrifice. + 3. Resurrection and Indwelling Presence. + II. Human Response-- + 1. Repentance-- + (1) Contrition--Confession--Resolution. + (2) Question of 'Sudden Conversion.' + (3) 'Twice Born' or 'Once Born.' + 2. Faith-- + (1) In Ordinary Life. + (2) In Teaching of Jesus. + (3) The Pauline Doctrine. + 3. Obedience-- + (1) Active Appropriation of Grace. + (2) Determination of Whole Personality. + (3) Gradual Assimilation. + + +SECTION D--CONDUCT + +CHAPTER XI + +VIRTUES AND VIRTUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 + + Definition of Virtue. + I. The Natural Basis of the Virtues-- + 'The Cardinal Virtues.' + II. The Christian Transformation of the Virtues-- + 1. The New Testament Account. + 2. Cardinal Virtues, Elements of Christian Character. + 3. Place of Passive Virtues in Life. + III. The Unification of the Virtues-- + 1. Unity in Relation to God. + 2. Love, Spring of all Virtues, + 3. 'Theological Virtues,' Aspects of Love. + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE REALM OF DUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 + + I. Aspects of Duty-- + 1. Duty and Vocation. + 2. Conflict of Duties-- + (1) Competing Obligations. + (2) 'Counsels of Perfection.' + (3) Indifferent Acts. + 3. Rights and Duties-- + (1) Claim of 'Natural Rights.' + (2) Based on Worth of Individual. + (3) Christian Idea of Liberty. + II. Spheres of Duty-- + 1. Duties in Relation to Self-- + (1) Self-Respect. + (2) Self-Preservation. + (3) Self-Development-- + Self-regarding Duties not prominent in Scripture. + Self-Realisation through Self-Sacrifice. + 2. Duties in Relation to Others-- + (1) Regard for Man: Brotherly Love-- + (_a_) Justice. + (_b_) Veracity. + (_c_) Judgment. + (2) Service-- + (_a_) Sympathy. + (_b_) Beneficence. + (_c_) Forgiveness. + (3) Example and Influence. + 3. Duties in Relation to God-- + (1) Recognition. + (2) Obedience--Passive and Active. + (3) Worship--Reverence, Prayer, Thanksgiving. + + +CHAPTER XIII + +SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 + + I. The Family-- + 1. Origin and Evolution of Family. + 2. Christian view-- + (1) Christ's Teaching on Marriage. + (2) State Regulation and Eugenics. + (3) Tendencies to Disparagement. + 3. Family Relationships-- + (1) Parents and Children. + (2) Woman's Place and Rights. + (3) Child Life and Education. + II. The State-- + 1. Basis of Authority-- + Tolstoy and Anarchism. + 'Social Contract.' + 2. State, in New Testament. + 3. Modern Conceptions-- + Views of Augustine and Hegel. + (1) Duty of State to Citizens. + (2) Duty of Citizens to State. + (3) The Democratic Movement-- + Reciprocity of Service and Sense of Brotherhood. + III. The Church-- + 1. Relation of Church and State. + 2. Purpose and Ideal of Church-- + (1) Worship and Edification. + (2) Witness to Christ. + (3) Evangelisation of Mankind. + 3. The Church and the Social Problem-- + (1) Christ's Teaching as to Industry and Wealth. + (2) Attitude of Early Church to Society. + (3) Of Roman and Reformed Churches. + 4. Duty of Christianity to the World-- + The Missionary Imperative and Opportunity. + + +CHAPTER XIV + +CONCLUSION--THE PERMANENCE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS . . . . . . . 245 + +BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 + +INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 + + + + +{1} + +CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS + + +INTRODUCTION + +A PLEA FOR THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +If, as Matthew Arnold says, conduct is three-fourths of life, then a +careful inquiry into the laws of conduct is indispensable to the proper +interpretation of the meaning and purpose of life. Conduct of itself, +however, is merely the outward expression of character; and character +again has its roots in personality; so that if we are to form a just +conception of life we have to examine the forces which shape human +personality and raise it to its highest power and efficiency. In +estimating the value of man all the facts of consciousness and +experience must be considered. Hence no adequate account of the end of +life can be given without regard to that which, if it is true, must be +the most stupendous fact of history--the fact of Christ. + +If the Christian is a man to whom no incident of experience is secular +and no duty insignificant, because all things belong to God and all +life is dominated by the spirit of Christ, then Christian Ethics must +be the application of Christianity to conduct; and its theme must be +the systematic study of the ideals and forces which are alone adequate +to shape character and fit man for the highest conceivable +destiny--fellowship with, and likeness to, the Divine Being in whose +image he has been made. This, of course, may be said to be the aim of +all theology. The theologian must not be content to discuss merely +speculative problems about God and man. He must seek above {2} all +things to bring the truths of revelation to bear upon human practice. +All knowledge has its practical implicate. The dogma which cannot be +translated into duty is apt to be a vague abstraction. + +In all ages there has been a tendency to separate truth and duty. But +knowledge has two sides; it is at once a revelation and a challenge. +There is no truth which has not its corresponding obligation, and no +obligation which has not its corresponding truth. And not until every +truth is rounded into its duty, and every duty is referred back into +its truth shall we attain to that clearness of vision and consistency +of moral life, to promote which is the primary task of Christian Ethics. + +It is this practical element which gives to the study of morals its +justification and makes it specially important for the Christian +teacher. In this sense Ethics is really the crown of theology and +ought to be the end of all previous study. + +As a separate branch of study Christian Ethics dates only from the +Reformation. It was natural, and perhaps inevitable that the first +efforts of the Church should be occupied with the formation and +elaboration of dogma. With a few notable exceptions, among whom may be +mentioned Basil, Clement, Alquin and Thomas Aquinas, the Church fathers +and schoolmen paid but scanty attention to the ethical side of +religion. It was only after the Reformation that theology, Roman and +Protestant alike, was divided into different branches. The Roman +Catholic name for what we style Ethics is 'moral philosophy,' which, +however, consists mainly of directions for father confessors in their +dealing with perplexed souls. Christian Ethics appears for the first +time as the name of a treatise by a French theologian of the +Calvinistic persuasion--Danaeus, whose work, however, is confined to an +exposition of the Decalogue. The first recorded work of the Lutheran +church is the _Theologia Moralis_, written in 1634, by George Calixtus. + +But the modern study of the subject really dates from {3} +Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who divides theology into two sections, +Dogmatics and Ethics, giving to the latter an independent treatment. +Since his time Ethics has been regarded as a separate discipline, and +within the last few decades increasing attention has been devoted to it. + +This strong ethical tendency is one of the most noticeable features of +the present age. Everywhere to-day the personal human interest is in +evidence. We see it in the literature of the age and especially in the +best poetry, beginning already with Coleridge and Wordsworth, and +continued in Tennyson and Browning. It is the inner life of man as +depicted to us by these master singers, the story of the soul, even +more than the delineation of nature which appeals to man's deepest +experience and evokes his finest response. We see it in the art of our +times, which, not content to be a mere expression of sensuous beauty or +lifeless nature, seeks to be instinct with human sympathy and to become +the vehicle of the ideas and aims of man. We see it in modern fiction, +which is no longer the narration of a simple tale, but the subtle +analysis of character, and the intricate study of the passions and +ambitions of common life. History to-day is not concerned so much with +recording the intrigues of kings and the movements of armies as with +scrutinising the motives and estimating the personal forces which have +shaped the ages. Even in the domain of theology itself this tendency +is visible. Our theologians are not content with discussing abstract +doctrines or recounting the decisions of church councils, but are +turning to the gospels and seeking to depict the life of Jesus--to +probe the secret of His divine humanity and to interpret the meaning +for the world of His unique personality. + +Nor is this tendency confined to professional thinkers and theologians, +it is affecting the common mind of the laity. 'Never was there a +time,' says a modern writer, 'when plain people were less concerned +with the metaphysics or the ecclesiasticism of Christianity. The +construction of systems and the contention of creeds which once +appeared the central themes of human interest are now {4} regarded by +millions of busy men and women as mere echoes of ancient controversies, +if not mere mockeries of the problems of the present day.' The Church +under the inspiration of this new feeling for humanity is turning with +fresh interest to the contemplation of the character of Jesus Christ, +and is rising to a more lofty idea of its responsibilities towards the +world. More than ever in the past, it is now felt that Christianity +must vindicate itself as a practical religion; and that in view of the +great problems--scientific, social and industrial, which the new +conditions of an advancing civilisation have created, the Church, if it +is to fulfil its function as the interpreter and guide of thought, must +come down from its heights of calm seclusion and grapple with the +actual difficulties of men, not indeed by assuming a political role or +acting as a divider and judge amid conflicting secular aims, but by +revealing the mind of Christ and bringing the principles of the gospel +to bear upon the complex life of society. + +No one who reflects upon the spirit of the times will doubt that there +are reasons of urgent importance why this aspect of Christian life and +duty, which we have been considering, should be specially insisted upon +to-day. Of these the first and foremost is the prevalence of a +materialistic philosophy. Taking its rise in the evolutionary theories +of last century, this view is now being applied with relentless logic +as an interpretation of the problems of society by a school of +socialistic writers. Man, it is said, is the creature of heredity and +environment alone. Condition creates character, and relief from the +woes of humanity is to be sought, not in the transformation of the +individual but in the revolutionising of the circumstances of life. As +a consequence of this philosophy of externalism there is a filtering +down of these materialistic views to the multitude, who care, indeed, +little for theories, but are quick to be affected by a prevailing tone. +Underlying the feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction, so marked a +feature of our present day life, there is distinctly discernible among +the masses a loosening of religious faith and a slackening {5} of moral +obligation. The idea of personality and the sense of duty are not so +vivid and strong as they used to be. A vague sentimentalising about +sin has taken the place of the more robust view of earlier times, and +evil is traced to untoward environment rather than to feebleness of +individual will. And finally, to name no other cause, there is a +tendency in our day among all classes to divorce religion from life--to +separate the sacred from the secular, and to regard worship and work as +belonging to two entirely distinct realms of existence. + +For these reasons, among others, there is a special need, as it seems +to us, for a systematic study of Christian Ethics on the part of those +who are to be the leaders of thought and the teachers of the people. +The materialistic view of life must be met by a more adequate Christian +philosophy. The unfaith and pessimism of the age must be overcome by +the advocacy of an idealistic conception which insists not only upon +the personality and worth of man, involving duties as well as rights, +but also upon the supremacy of conscience in obedience to the law of +Christ. Above all, we need an ethic which will show that religion must +be co-extensive with life, transfiguring and spiritualising all its +activities and relationships. Life is a unity and all duty is one, +whether it be duty to God or duty to man. It must be all of a piece, +like the robe of Christ, woven from the top to the bottom without seam. +It takes its spring from one source and is dominated by one spirit. In +the Christianity of Christ there stand conspicuous two great ideas +bound together, indeed, in a higher--love to God the Father. These are +personal perfection and the service of mankind--the culture of self and +the care of others. 'Be ye perfect' and 'love your neighbour as +yourself.' It is the glory of Christianity to have harmonised these +seemingly competing aims. The disciple of Christ finds that he cannot +realise his own life except as he seeks the good of others; and that he +cannot effectively help his fellows except by giving to them that which +he himself is. This, as we take it, is the Christian conception of the +moral life; and it is {6} the business of Christian Ethics to show that +it is at once reasonable and practical. + + +The present volume will be divided into _four_ main parts, entitled, +_Postulates_, _Personality_, _Character_ and _Conduct_. The _first_ +will deal with the meaning of Ethics generally and its relation to +cognate subjects; and specially with the Philosophical, Psychological +and Theological presuppositions of Christian Ethics. The _second_ part +will be devoted to man as moral subject, and will analyse the +capacities of the soul which respond to the calls and claims of the new +Life. The _third_ Section will involve a consideration of the +formative Principles of Character, the moulding of the soul, the +Ideals, Motives and Forces by means of which the 'New Man' is +'recreated' and fashioned. _Finally_, under Conduct, the Virtues, +Duties and Rights of man will be discussed; and the various spheres of +service and institutions of society examined in relation to which the +moral life in its individual and social aspects is manifested and +developed. + + + + +{7} + +SECTION A + +POSTULATES + +{9} + +CHAPTER I + +THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS + +Philosophy has been defined as 'thinking things together.' Every man, +says Hegel, is a philosopher, and in so far as it is the natural +tendency of the human mind to connect and unify the manifold phenomena +of life, the paradox of the German thinker is not without a measure of +truth. But while this is only the occasional pastime of the ordinary +individual, it is the conscious and habitual aim of the philosopher. +In daily life people are wont to make assumptions which they do not +verify, and employ figures of speech which of necessity are partial and +inadequate. It is the business of philosophy to investigate the +pre-suppositions of common life and to translate into realities the +pictures of ordinary language. It was the method of Socrates to +challenge the current modes of speaking and to ask his fellow-men what +they meant when they used such words as 'goodness,' 'virtue,' +'justice.' Every time you employ any of these terms, he said, you +virtually imply a whole theory of life. If you would have an +intelligent understanding of yourself and the world of which you form a +part, you must cease to live by custom and speak by rote. You must +seek to bring the manifold phenomena of the universe and the various +experiences of life into some kind of unity and see them as +co-ordinated parts of a whole. + +When men thus begin to reflect on the origin and connection of things, +three questions at once suggest themselves--what, how, and why? What +is the world? How do I know it? and why am I here? We might briefly +classify the three great departments of human thought as attempts {10} +to answer these three inquiries. What exists is the problem of +Metaphysics. What am I and how do I know? is the question of +Psychology. What is my purpose, what am I to do? is the subject of +Ethics. These questions are closely related, and the answer given to +one largely determines the solution of the others. The truths gained +by philosophical thought are not confined to the kingdom of abstract +speculation but apply in the last resort to life. The impulse to know +is only a phase of the more general impulse to be and to act. Beneath +all man's activities, as their source and spring, there is ever some +dim perception of an end to be attained. 'The ultimate end,' says +Paulsen, 'impelling men to meditate upon the nature of the universe, +will always be the desire to reach some conclusion concerning the +meaning of the source and goal of their lives.' The origin and aim of +all philosophy is consequently to be sought in Ethics. + +I. If we ask more particularly what Ethics is, definition affords us +some light. It is to Aristotle that we are indebted for the earliest +use of this term, and it was he who gave to the subject its title and +systematic form. The name _ta ethika_ is derived from _ethos_, +character, which again is closely connected with _ethos_, signifying +custom. Ethics, therefore, according to Aristotle is the science of +character, character being understood to mean according to its +etymology, customs or habits of conduct. But while the modern usage of +the term 'character' suggests greater inwardness than would seem to be +implied in the ancient definition, it must be remembered that under the +title of Ethics Aristotle had in view, not only a description of the +outward habits of man, but also that which gives to custom its value, +viz., the sources of action, the motives, and especially the ends which +guide a man in the conduct of life. But since men live before they +reflect, Ethics and Morality are not synonymous. So long as there is a +congruity between the customs of a people and the practical +requirements of life, ethical questions do not occur. It is only when +difficulties arise as to matters of right, for which the {11} existing +usages of society offer no solution, that reflection upon morality +awakens. No longer content with blindly accepting the formulae of the +past, men are prompted to ask, whence do these customs come, and what +is their authority? In the conflict of duties, which a wider outlook +inevitably creates, the inquirer seeks to estimate their relative +values, and to bring his conception of life into harmony with the +higher demands and larger ideals which have been disclosed to him. +This has been the invariable course of ethical inquiry. At different +stages of history--in the age of the Sophists of Ancient Greece, when +men were no longer satisfied with the old forms of life and truth: at +the dawn of the Christian era, when a new ideal was revealed in Christ: +during the period of the Reformation, when men threw off the bondage of +the past and made a stand for the rights of the individual conscience: +and in more recent times, when in the field of political life the +antithesis between individual and social instincts had awakened larger +and more enlightened views of civic and social responsibility--the +study of Ethics, as a science of moral life, has come to the front. + +Ethics may, therefore, be defined as the science of the end of +life--the science which inquires into its meaning and purpose. But +inasmuch as the end or purpose of life involves the idea of some good +which is in harmony with the highest conceivable well-being of +man--some good which belongs to the true fulfilment of life--Ethics may +also be defined as the science of the highest good or _summum bonum_. + +Finally, Ethics may be considered not only as the science of the +highest good or ultimate end of life, but also as the study of all that +conditions that end, the dispositions, desires and motives of the +individual, all the facts and forces which bear upon the will and shape +human life in its various social relationships. + +II. Arising out of this general definition three features may be +mentioned as descriptive of its distinctive character among the +sciences. + +{12} + +1. Ethics is concerned with the _ideal_ of life. By an ideal we mean +a better state of being than has been actually realised. We are +confessedly not as we should be, and there floats before the minds of +men a vision of some higher condition of life and society than that +which exists. Life divorced from an ideal is ethically valueless. +Some conception of the supreme good is the imperative demand and moral +necessity of man's being. Hence the chief business of Ethics is to +answer the question: What is the supreme good? For what should a man +live? What, in short, is the ideal of life? In this respect Ethics as +a science is distinguished from the physical sciences. They explain +facts and trace sequences, but they do not form ideals or endeavour to +move the will in the direction of them. + +2. Ethics again is concerned with a _norm_ of life, and in this sense +it is frequently styled a normative science. That is to say, it is a +science which prescribes rules or maxims according to which life is to +be regulated. This is sometimes expressed by saying that Ethics treats +of what _ought to be_. The ideal must not be one which simply floats +in the air. It must be an ideal which is possible, and, therefore, as +such, obligatory. It is useless to feel the worth of a certain idea, +or even to speak of the desirability of it, if we do not feel also that +it ought to be realised. Moral judgments imply an 'ought,' and that +'ought' implies a norm or standard, in the light of which, as a +criterion, all obligation must be tested, and according to which all +conduct must be regulated. + +3. Ethics, once more, is concerned with the _will_. It is based +specifically on the fact that man is not only an intellectual being +(capable of knowing) and a sensitive being (possessed of feeling) but +also a volitional being; that is, a being endowed with self-determining +activity. It implies that man is responsible for his intentions, +dispositions and actions. The idea of a supreme ideal at which he is +to aim and a norm or standard of conduct according to which he ought to +regulate his life, would have no meaning if we did not presuppose the +power of self-determination. {13} Whatever is not willed has no moral +value. Where there is no freedom of choice, we cannot speak of an +action as either good or evil.[1] When we praise or blame a man's +conduct we do so under the assumption that his action is voluntary. In +all moral action purpose is implied. This is the meaning of the +well-known dictum of Kant, 'There is nothing in the world . . . that +can be called good without qualification except a good will. A good +will is good, not because of what it performs or effects, not by its +aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue +of the volition.'[2] It is the inner aim, the good will which alone +gives moral worth to any endeavour. It is not what I do but the reason +why I do it which is chiefly of ethical value. The essence of virtue +resides in the will, not in the achievement; in the intention or +motive, not in the result. + +III. The propriety of styling Ethics a science has sometimes been +questioned. Science, it is said, has to do with certain necessary and +uniform facts of experience; its object is simply to trace effects from +causes and to formulate laws according to which sequences inevitably +result from certain ascertained causes or observed facts. But is not +character, with which Ethics confessedly deals, just that concerning +which no definite conclusions can be predicted? Is not conduct, +dependent as it is on the human will, just the element in man which +cannot be explained as the resultant of calculable forces? If the will +is free, and is the chief factor in the moulding of life, then you +cannot forecast what line conduct will take or predict what shape +character will assume. The whole conception of Ethics as a science +must, it is contended, fall to the ground, if we admit a variable and +incalculable element in conduct. + +Some writers, on this account, are disposed to regard Ethics as an art +rather than a science, and indeed, like every normative science, it may +be regarded as lying midway between them. A science may be said to +teach us to know {14} and an art to do: but as has been well remarked, +'a normative science teaches to know how to do.'[3] Ethics may indeed +be regarded both as a science and an art. In so far as it examines and +explains certain phenomena of character it is a science: but in so far +as it attempts to regulate human conduct by instruction and advice it +is an art.[4] Yet when all is said, in so far as Ethics has to do with +the volitional side of man,--with decisions and acts of will,--there +must be something indeterminate and problematic in it which precludes +it from being designated an exact science. A certain variableness +belongs to character, and conduct cannot be pronounced good or bad +without reference to the acting subject. Actions cannot be wholly +explained by law, and a large portion of human life (and that the +highest and noblest) eludes analysis. A human being is not simply a +part of the world. He is able to break in upon the sequence of events +and set in motion new forces whose effects neither he himself nor his +fellows can estimate. It is the unique quality of rational beings that +in great things and in small things they act from ideas. The magic +power of thought cannot be exaggerated. Great conceptions have great +consequences, and they rule the world. A new spiritual idea shoots +forth its rays and enlightens to larger issues generations of men. +There is a mystery in every forth-putting of will-power, and every +expression of personality. Character cannot be computed. The art of +goodness, of living nobly, if so unconscious a thing may be called an +art, is one certainly which defies complete scientific treatment. It +is with facts like these that Ethics has to do; and while we may lay +down broad general principles which must underlie the teaching of every +true prophet and the conduct of every good man, there will always be an +element with which science cannot cope. + +IV. It will not be necessary, after what has been said, to trace at +any length the relations between Ethics and the {15} special mental +sciences, such as Logic, Aesthetics, and Politics. + +1. _Logic_ is the science of the formal laws of thought, and is +concerned not with the truth of phenomena, but merely with the laws of +correct reasoning about them. Ethics establishes the laws according to +which we ought to act. Logic legislates for the reason, and decerns +the laws which the intellect must obey if it would think correctly. +Both sciences determine what is valid; but while Logic is confined to +the realm of what is valid in reasoning, Ethics is occupied with what +is valid in action. There is, indeed, a logic of life; and in so far +as all true conduct must have a rational element in it and be guided by +certain intelligible forms, Ethics may be described as a kind of logic +of character. + +2. The connection between Ethics and _Aesthetics_ is closer. +Aesthetics is the science of the laws of beauty, while Ethics is the +science of the laws of the good. But in so far as Aesthetics deals +with the emotions rather than the reason it comes into contact with +Ethics in the psychological field. In its narrower sense Aesthetics +deals with beauty merely in an impersonal way; and its immediate object +is not what is morally beautiful, but rather that which is beautiful in +itself irrespective of moral considerations. Ethics, on the other +hand, is concerned with personal worth as expressed in perfection of +will and action. Conduct may be beautiful and character may afford +Aesthetic satisfaction, but Ethics, in so far as it is concerned with +judgments of virtue, is independent of all thought of the mere beauty +or utility of conduct. Aesthetic consideration may indeed aid +practical morality, but it is not identical with it. It is conceivable +that what is right may not be immediately beautiful, and may indeed in +its pursuit or realisation involve action which contradicts our ideas +of beauty. But though both sciences have different aims they are +occupied largely with the same emotions, and are connected by a common +idealising purpose. In the deepest sense, what is good is beautiful +and what is beautiful is good; and {16} ultimately, in the moral and +spiritual life, goodness and beauty coincide. Indeed, so close is the +connection between the two conceptions that the Greeks used the same +word, _to kalon_, to express beauty of form and nobility of character. +And even in modern times the expression 'a beautiful soul,' indicates +the intimate relation between inner excellence of life and outward +attractiveness. Both Aesthetics and Ethics have regard to that +symmetry or proportion of life which fulfils our ideas at once of +goodness and of beauty. In this sense Schiller sought to remove the +sharpness of Kant's moral theory by claiming a place in the moral life +for beauty. Our actions are, indeed, good when we do our duty because +we ought, but they are beautiful when we do it because we cannot do +otherwise, because they have become our second nature. The purpose of +all culture, says Schiller, is to harmonise reason and sense, and thus +to fulfil the idea of a perfect manhood.[5] + + 'When I dared question: "It is beautiful, + But is it true?" Thy answer was, "In truth lives beauty."'[6] + + +3. _Politics_ is still more closely related to Ethics, and indeed +Ethics may be said to comprehend Politics. Both deal with human action +and institution, and cover largely the same field. For man is not +merely an individual, but is a part of a social organism. We cannot +consider the virtues of the individual life without also considering +the society to which he is related, and the interaction of the whole +and its part. Politics is usually defined as the science of +government, which of course, involves all the institutions and laws +affecting men's relations to each other. But while Politics is +strictly concerned only with the outward condition of the state's +well-being and the external order of {17} the community, Ethics seeks +the internal good or virtue of mankind, and is occupied with an ideal +society in which each individual shall be able to realise the true aim +and meaning of life. But after all, as Aristotle said, Politics is +really a branch of Ethics, and both are inseparable from, and +complementary of each other. On the one hand, Ethics cannot ignore the +material conditions of human welfare nor minimise the economic forces +which shape society and make possible the moral aims of man. On the +other hand, Economics must recognise the service of ethical study, and +keep in view the moral purposes of life, otherwise it is apt to limit +its consideration to merely selfish and material ends. + +V. While Ethics is thus closely connected with the sciences just +named, there are two departments of knowledge, pre-supposed indeed in +all mental studies, which in a very intimate way affect the science of +Ethics. These are Metaphysics on the one hand and Psychology on the +other. + +1. Metaphysics is pre-supposed by all the sciences; and indeed, all +our views of life, even our simplest experiences, involve metaphysical +assumptions. It has been well said that the attempt to construct an +ethical theory without a metaphysical basis issues not in a moral +science without assumptions, but in an Ethics which becomes confused in +philosophical doubts. Leslie Stephen proposes to ignore Metaphysics, +and remarks that he is content 'to build upon the solid earth.' But, +as has been pertinently asked, 'How does he know that the earth is +solid on which he builds?' This is a question of Metaphysics.[7] The +claim is frequently made by a certain class of writers, that we +withdraw ourselves from all metaphysical sophistries, and betake +ourselves to the guidance of commonsense. But what is this commonsense +of which the ordinary man vaunts himself? It is in reality a number of +vague assumptions borrowed unconsciously from old exploded +theories--assertions, opinions, beliefs, accumulated, no one knows how, +{18} and accepted as settled judgments.[8] We do not escape philosophy +by refusing to think. Some kind of theory of life is implied in such +words, 'soul,' 'duty,' 'freedom,' 'power,' 'God,' which the +unreflecting mind is daily using. It is useless to say we can dispense +with philosophy, for that is simply to content ourselves with bad +philosophy. 'To ignore the progress and development in the history of +Philosophy,' says T. H. Green,[9] 'is not to return to the simplicity +of a pre-philosophic age, but to condemn ourselves to grope in the maze +of cultivated opinion, itself the confused result of these past systems +of thought which we will not trouble ourselves to think out.' The aim +of all philosophy, as Plato said, is just to correct the assumptions of +the ordinary mind, and to grasp in their unity and cohesion the +ultimate principles which the mind feels must be at the root of all +reality. We have an ethical interest in determining whether there be +any moral reality beneath the appearances of the world. Ethical +questions, therefore, run back into Metaphysics. If we take +Metaphysics in its widest sense as involving the idea of some ultimate +end, to the realisation of which the whole process of the world as +known to us is somehow a means, we may easily see that metaphysical +inquiry, though distinct from ethical, is its necessary +pre-supposition. The Being or Purpose of God, the great first cause, +the world as fashioned, ordered and interpenetrated by Him, and man as +conditioned by and dependent upon the Deity--are postulates of the +moral life and must be accepted as a basis of all ethical study. The +distinction between Ethics and Philosophy did not arise at once. In +early Greek speculation, almost to the time of Aristotle, Metaphysics +and Morals were not separated. And even in later times, Spinoza and to +some extent Green, though they professedly treat of Ethics, hardly +dissociate metaphysical from ethical considerations. Nor is that to be +wondered at when men are dealing with the first principles of all being +and life. Our view of God and of the {19} world, our fundamental +_Welt-Anschauung_ cannot but determine our view of man and his moral +life. In every philosophical system from Plato to Hegel, in which the +universe is regarded as having a rational meaning and ultimate end, the +good of human beings is conceived as identical with, or at least as +included in the universal good. + +2. But if a sound metaphysical basis be a necessary requisite for the +adequate consideration of Ethics, _Psychology_ as the science of the +human soul is so vitally connected with Ethics, that the two studies +may almost be treated as branches of one subject. An Ethic which takes +no account of psychological assumptions would be impossible. +Consciously or unconsciously every treatment of moral subjects is +permeated by the view of the soul or personality of man which the +writer has adopted, and his meaning of conduct will be largely +determined by the theory of human freedom and responsibility with which +he starts. Questions as to character and duty invariably lead to +inquiries as to certain states of the agent's mind, as to the functions +and possibilities of his natural capacities and powers. We cannot +pronounce an action morally good or bad until we have determined the +extent and limits of his faculties and have investigated the questions +of disposition and purpose, of intention and motive, which lie at the +root of all conduct, and without which actions are neither moral nor +immoral. It is surely a mistake to say, as some do, that as logic +deals with the correctness of reasoning, so Ethics deals only with the +correctness of conduct, and is not directly concerned with the +processes by which we come to act correctly.[10] On the contrary, +merely correct action may be ethically worthless, and conduct obtains +its moral value from the motives or intentions which actuate and +determine it. Ethics cannot, therefore, ignore the psychological +processes of feeling, desiring and willing of the acting subject. It +is indeed true that in ordinary life men are frequently judged to be +good or bad, according to the outward effect of their actions, and +material results are often regarded as the sole {20} measure of good. +But while it may be a point of difficulty in theoretic morality to +determine the comparative worth and mutual relation of good affections +and good actions, all surely will allow that a certain quality of +disposition or motive in the agent is required to constitute an action +morally good, and that it is not enough to measure virtue by its +utility or its beneficial effect alone. Hence all moralists are agreed +that the main object of their investigation must belong to the +psychical side of human life--whether they hold that man's ultimate end +is to be found in the sphere of pleasure or maintain that his +well-being lies in the realisation of virtue for its own sake. The +problems as to the origin and adequacy of conscience, as to the meaning +and validity of voluntary action; the questions concerning motives and +desires, as to the historical evolution of moral customs, and man's +relation at each stage of his history to the social, political and +religious institutions amid which he lives--are subjects which, though +falling within the scope of Ethics, have their roots in the science of +the soul. The very existence of a science of Ethics depends upon the +answers which Psychology gives to such questions. If, for example, it +be decided that there is in man no such faculty or organ as conscience, +and that what men so designate is but a natural manifestation gradually +evolved in and through the physical and social development of man: or +if we deny the self-determining power of human beings and assume that +what we call the freedom of the will is a delusion (or at least, in the +last resort, a negligible element) and that man is but one of the many +phenomena or facts of a physical universe--then we may continue, +indeed, as some evolutionary and naturalistic thinkers do, to speak of +a science of Ethics, but such a science will not be a study of the +moral life as we understand it and have defined it. + +Ethics, therefore, while dependent upon the philosophical sciences, has +its own distinct content and scope. The end of life, that for which a +man should live, with all its implications, forms the subject of moral +inquiry. It is {21} concerned not merely with what a man is or +actually does, but more specifically with what he should be and should +do. Hence, as we have seen, the word 'ought' is the most distinctive +term of Ethics involving a consideration of values and a relation of +the actual and the ideal. The 'ought' of life constitutes at once the +purpose, law, and reason of conduct. It proposes the three great +questions involved in all ethical inquiry--whither? how? and why? and +determines the three great words which are constantly recurring in +every ethical system--end, norm, motive. Moral good is the moral end +considered as realised. The moral norm or rule impelling the will to +the realisation of this end is called Duty. The moral motive +considered as an acquired power of the acting will is called Virtue.[11] + + + +[1] Cf. Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, p. 32; also Wuttke, _Christian +Ethics_ (Eng. Trans.), vol. i. p. 14. + +[2] _Metaph. of Morals_, sect. i. + +[3] Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, p. 8. See also Muirhead, _Elements +of Ethics_. + +[4] Hyslop, _Elements of Ethics_, p. 1. + +[5] Schiller, _Ueber Anmuth und Wuerde_. Cf. also Ruskin, _Mod. +Painters_, vol. ii.; Seeley, _Natural Religion_, and Inge, _Faith and +its Psychology_, p. 203 ff. See also Bosanquet _Hist. of Aesthetic_. +We are indebted to _Romanticism_, and especially to Novalis in Germany +and Cousin in France for the thought that the good and the beautiful +meet and amalgamate in God. + +[6] Browning. + +[7] Cf. Newman Smyth, _Christian Ethics_, p. 8. + +[8] See Author's _History of Philosophy_, p. 585. + +[9] Introduction to Hume's _Works_. + +[10] Mackenzie seems to imply this view. _Ethics_, p. 25. + +[11] Cf. Haering, _Ethics of the Christian Life_, p. 9. + + + + +{22} + +CHAPTER II + +THE POSTULATES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +We now proceed to define Christian Ethics and to investigate the +particular postulates, philosophical and theological, upon which it +rests. + +Christian Ethics presupposes the Christian view of life as revealed in +Christ, and its definition must be in harmony with the Christian ideal. +The prime question of Christian Ethics is, How ought Christians to +order their lives? It is therefore the science of morals as +conditioned by Christian faith; and the problems it discusses are, the +nature, meaning and laws of the moral life as dominated by the supreme +good which has been revealed to the world in the Person and Teaching of +Christ. It is based upon an historical event, and presupposes a +particular development and consummation of the world. + + +I + +_The Relation of Christian to Philosophical Ethics_.--Christian Ethics +is a branch of general Ethics. But it is something more; it is Ethics +in its richest and fullest expression--the interpretation of life which +corresponds to the supreme manifestation of the divine will. For if +the revelation of God in Christ is true, then that revelation is not +merely a factor, but the factor, which must dominate and colour man's +whole outlook and give an entirely new value to all his aims and +actions. In Christianity we are confronted with the motive-power of a +great Personality who has entered into the current of human history and +{23} given a new direction to the moral life of man. Man's life at its +highest can only be interpreted in the light of this supreme +revelation, and can only be accounted for as the creation of the +dynamic force of this unique Personality. + +But while this truth gives to Christian Ethics its distinctive +character and pre-eminent worth it does not throw discredit upon +philosophical Ethics, nor indeed separate the two departments by any +hard and fast lines. They have much in common. A large domain of +conduct is covered by both. The so-called pagan virtues have their +value for Christian character and are in the line of Christian virtue. +Even in his natural state man is constituted for the moral life, and, +as St. Paul states, is not without some knowledge of right and wrong. +The moral attainments of the ancients are not to be regarded simply as +'splendid vices,' but as positive achievements of good. Duty may +differ in content, but it is of the same kind under any system. Purity +is purity and benevolence benevolence, whether manifested in a heathen +or a Christian. While, therefore, Christian Ethics takes its point of +departure from the special revelation of God and the unique disclosure +of man's possibilities in Christ, it gladly accepts and freely uses the +results of moral philosophy in so far as they throw light upon the +fundamental facts of human nature. As a system of morals Christianity +claims to be inclusive. It takes cognisance of all the data of +consciousness, and assumes as its own, from whatever quarter it may +come, all ascertained truth. The facts of man's natural history, the +conclusions from philosophy, the manifold lights afforded by previous +speculation--all are gathered up, sifted and tried by one +all-authoritative measure of truth--the mind of Christ. It completes +what is lacking in other systems in so far as their conclusions are +based upon an incomplete survey of facts. It deals, in short, with +personality in its highest ranges of moral power and spiritual +consciousness and seeks to interpret life by its greatest possibilities +and loftiest attainments as they are revealed in Christ. + +But while Christian Ethics is at one with philosophic {24} Ethics in +postulating a natural capacity for spiritual life, it is differentiated +from all non-Christian systems by its distinctive belief in the +possibility of the re-creation of character. Speculative Ethics +prescribes only what ought ideally to be done or avoided. It takes no +account of the foes of the spiritual life; nor does it consider the +remedy by which character, once it is perverted or destroyed, can be +restored and transformed. Christian Ethics, on the other hand, is +concerned primarily with the question, By what power can a man achieve +the right and do the good? It is not enough to postulate the inherent +capacity of man. Experience of human nature shows that there are +hostile elements which too often frustrate his natural development. +Hence the practical problem which Christian Ethics has to face is, How +can the spiritual ideal be made a reality? It regards man as standing +in need of recovery, and it is forced to assume, that which +philosophical Ethics does not recognise, a divine power by which +character can be renewed. Christianity claims to be 'the power of God +unto salvation to every one that believeth.' Christian Ethics +therefore is based upon the twofold assumption that the ideal of +humanity has actually been revealed in Christ, and that in Him also is +the power by which man may realise this ideal. + + +II + +_The relation of Christian Ethics to Dogmatics_.--Within the sphere of +theology proper the two main constituents of Christian teaching are +Dogmatics and Ethics, or Doctrines and Morals. Though it is convenient +to regard these separately they really form a whole, and are but two +aspects of one subject. It is difficult to define their limits, and to +say where Dogmatics ends and Ethics begins. The distinction is +sometimes expressed by saying that Dogmatics is a theoretic science, +whereas Ethics is practical. It is true that Ethics stands nearer to +everyday life and deals with matters of practical conduct, while +Dogmatics is concerned with beliefs and treats of their origin and +elucidation. {25} But, on the other hand, Ethics also takes cognisance +of beliefs as well as actions, and is interested in judgments not less +than achievements. There is a practical side of doctrine and there is +a theoretic side of morals. Even the most theoretic of sciences, +Metaphysics, though, as Novalis said, it bakes no bread, is not without +its direct bearing upon life. Dogmatic theology when divorced from +practical interest is in danger of becoming mere pedantry; and ethical +inquiry, if it has no dogmatic basis, loses scientific value and sinks +into a mere enumeration of duties. Nor is the common statement, that +Dogmatics shows what we should believe and Ethics what we ought to do, +an adequate one. Moral precepts are also objects of faith, and what we +should believe involves moral requirements and pre-supposes a moral +character. Schleiermacher has been charged with ignoring the +difference between the two disciplines, but with scant justice. For, +while he regards the two subjects as but different branches of +Christian theology, and insists upon their intimate connection, he does +not neglect their distinction. There has been a growing tendency to +accentuate the difference, and recent writers such as Jacoby, Haering +and Lemme, not to mention Martensen, Dorner and Wuttke, claim for +Ethics a separate and independent treatment. The ultimate connection +between Dogmatics and Ethics cannot be ignored without loss to both. +It tends only to confusion to speak as some do of 'a creedless +morality.' On the one hand, Ethics saves Dogmatics from evaporating +into unsubstantial speculation, and by affording the test of +workableness, keeps it upon the solid foundation of fact. On the other +hand, Dogmatics supplies to Ethics its formative principles and +normative standards, and preserves the moral life from degenerating +into the vagaries of fanaticism or the apathy of fatalism. But while +both sciences form complementary sides of theology and stand in +relations of mutual service, each deals with the human consciousness in +a different way. Dogmatics regards the Christian life from the +standpoint of divine dependence: Ethics regards it from the {26} +standpoint of human determination. Dogmatics deals with faith in +relation to God, as the receptive organ of grace: Ethics views faith +rather in relation to man, as a human activity or organ of conduct. +The one shows us how our adoption into the kingdom of God is the work +of divine love: the other shows how this knowledge of salvation +manifests itself in love to God and man, and must be worked out through +all the relationships of life. + + +III + +We may define more particularly the relation of Ethics to Dogmatics by +enumerating briefly the doctrinal postulates or assumptions with which +Ethics starts. + +1. Ethics assumes the Christian _idea of God_. God is for Ethics not +an impersonal force, nor even simply the creator of the universe as +philosophy might conceive Him.[1] Creative power is not of course +denied, but it is qualified by what theology calls the 'moral +attributes of God.' We do not ignore His omnipotence, but we look +beyond it, to 'the love that tops the power, the Christ in God.'[2] It +is not necessary here to sketch the Old Testament teaching with regard +to God. It is sufficient to state that the New Testament writers, +while not attempting to proclaim abstract doctrines, took over +generally the Hebrew conception of the Deity as a God who was at once +almighty, holy and righteous. The distinctive note which the New +Testament emphasises is the Personality of God, and personality +includes reason, will and love. The fact that we are His offspring, as +St. Paul argues, is the basis of our true conception of God's nature. +Through that which is highest in man we are enabled to discern +something of His character. But it is specially in and through Jesus +Christ that the distinctive character of the Divine Personality is +declared. Christ reveals Him as our Father, and everywhere the New +{27} Testament writers assume that men stand in the closest filial +relations to him. In the fundamental conception of divine Fatherhood +there are implicitly contained certain elements of ethical +significance.[3] Of these may be mentioned: + +(1) _The Spiritual Perfection of God_.--The Christian doctrine of God +includes not only His personality, but His spiritual perfection. All +that is highest and best in life is attributed to God. What we regard +as having supreme moral worth is eternally realised in Him. It is this +fact that prescribes man's ideal and makes it binding. 'Be ye perfect +even as your Father in heaven is perfect,' says Christ. Because of +what God is, spiritual and moral excellence takes precedence of all +other aims which can be perceived and pursued by man. Morality is the +revelation of an ideal eternally existing in the divine mind. 'The +belief in God,' it has been said, 'is the logical pre-supposition of an +objective or absolute morality.'[4] The moral law, as the norm and +goal of our life, obtains its validity and obligation for us not +because it is an arbitrarily-given command, but because it is of the +very character of God. + +(2) _The Sovereignty of God_.--Not only the spiritual perfection but +the moral sovereignty of God is pre-supposed. He is the supreme +excellence on whom all things depend, and in whom they find their +ultimate explanation. The world is not merely His creation, it is the +expression of His mind. He is not related to the universe as an artist +is related to his work, but rather as a personal being to his own +mental and moral activities.[5] He is immanent in all the phenomena of +nature and movements of life and thought; and in the order and purpose +of the world His character and will are manifested. The fact that the +meaning and order of things are not imposed from without, but +constitute their inner nature, reveals not only the completeness of His +{28} sovereignty, but the purpose of it. The highest end of God, as +moral and spiritual, is fulfilled by the constitution and education of +spiritual beings like Himself, and in laying down the conditions which +are necessary for their existence and perfecting. No definition of +divine sovereignty can exclude the idea of moral freedom and the +consequences bound up with it. Hence God must not only confer the gift +of individual liberty, but respect it throughout the whole course of +His dealings with man. + +(3) _The Supremacy of Love_.--This is the highest and most distinctive +feature of the divine personality. It is the sum of all the others; as +well as the special characteristic of the Fatherhood of God as revealed +by Christ. 'God is love' is the crowning statement of the Gospel and +the fullest expression of the divine nature. The essential of all love +is self-giving; and the peculiarity of God's love is the communication +and imparting of Himself to His creatures. The love of God finds its +highest manifestation in the gift and sacrifice of His Son. He is the +supreme personality in history, revealing God in and to the world. In +the light of what Christ is we know what God is, and from His +revelation there flows a new and ever-deepening experience of the +divine Being. + +2. Christian Ethics presupposes the _Christian doctrine of Sin_. It +is not the province of Ethics to discuss minutely the origin of evil or +propound a theory of sin. But it must see to it that the view it takes +is consistent with the truths of revelation and in harmony with the +facts of life. A false or inadequate conception of sin is as +detrimental to Ethics as it is to Dogmatics; and upon our doctrine of +evil depends very largely our interpretation of life in regard to its +difficulties and purposes, its trials and triumphs. In the meantime it +is enough to remark that considerable vagueness of idea and looseness +of expression exist concerning this subject. + +While some regard sin simply as a _defect_ or shortcoming, a missing of +the mark, as the Greek word _hamartia_ implies, others treat it as a +_disease_, or infirmity of the flesh--a malady affecting the physical +constitution which may be {29} incurred by heredity or induced by +environment. In both cases it is regarded as a misfortune, rather than +a fault, or even as a fate from which the notion of guilt is absent. +While there is an element of truth in these representations, they are +defective in so far as they do not take sufficient account of the +personal and determinative factor in all sinful acts. The Christian +view, though not denying that physical weakness and the influence of +heredity and environment do, in many cases, affect conduct, affirms +that there is a personal element always present which these conditions +do not explain. Sin is not merely negative. It is something positive, +not so much an imperfection as a trespass. It is to be accounted for +not as an inherited or inherent malady, but as a self-chosen +perversity. It belongs to the spirit rather than to the body, and +though it has its seat in the heart and in the emotions, it has to do +principally with the will. 'Every man is tempted when he is drawn away +by his own lust and enticed. Then when lust has conceived it bringeth +forth sin.'[6] The essence of sin is selfishness. It is the +deliberate choice of self in preference to God--personal and wilful +rebellion against the known law of righteousness and truth. There are, +of course, degrees of wrongdoing and undoubtedly extenuating +circumstances which must be taken into account in estimating the +significance and enormity of guilt, but in the last resort Christian +Ethics is compelled to postulate the fact of sin, and to regard it as a +personal rebellion against the holy will of God, the deliberate choice +of self and the wilful perversion of the powers of man into instruments +of unrighteousness. + +3. A third postulate, which is a corollary of the Christian view of +God and of sin, is the _Responsibility of Man_. Christian Ethics +treats every man as accountable for his thoughts and actions, and +therefore, as capable of choosing the good as revealed in Christ. +While not denying the sovereignty of God, nor minimising the mystery of +evil, Christianity firmly maintains the doctrine of human freedom. An +Ethic would be impossible if, on the one side, grace were absolutely +{30} irresistible; or, on the other, sin were unalterably necessitated. +Whatever be the doctrine we formulate on these subjects, Ethics demands +that what we call freedom be safeguarded. An interesting question +emerges at this point as to the possibility, apart from a knowledge of +Christ, of choosing the good. Difficult as this question is, and +though it was answered by Augustine and many of the early Fathers in +the negative, the modern, and probably the more just view, is that we +cannot hold mankind responsible unless we allow to all men the larger +freedom and judge them according to their light and opportunity. If +non-Christians are fated to do evil, then no guilt can be imputed. +History shows that a love of goodness has sometimes existed, and that +many isolated acts of purity and kindness have been done, among people +who have known nothing of the historical Christ. The New Testament +recognises degrees of depravity in nations and individuals, and a +measure of noble aspiration and honest endeavour in ordinary human +nature. St. Paul plainly assumes some knowledge and performance on the +part of the heathen, and though he denounces their immorality in +unsparing terms, he does not affirm that pagan society was so corrupt +that it had lost all knowledge of moral good. + + +IV + +Before concluding this chapter some remarks regarding the authority and +method of Christian Ethics may be not inappropriate. + +1. Christian Ethics is not directly concerned with critical questions +as to the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament writings. +It is sufficient for its purpose that these have been generally +received by the Church, and that they present in the Person of Christ +the highest embodiment of the law and spirit of the moral life. The +writings of the New Testament thus become ethically normative in virtue +of their direct reflection of the mind of Christ and their special +receptivity of His spirit. Their {31} authority, therefore, is +Christ's own authority, and has a value for us as His word is +reproduced by them. It does not detract from the validity of the New +Testament as the reflection of the spirit of Christ that there are +discernible in it distinct signs of development of doctrine, a manifest +growth in clearness and depth of insight and knowledge of the mind of +Jesus. Such evidences of advancement are specially noticeable in the +application of Christian principles to the practical problems of life, +such as the questions of slavery, marriage, work and property. St. +Paul does not disclaim the possibility of development, and he +associates himself with those who know in part and wait for fuller +light. In common with all Christians, Paul was doubtless conscious of +a growing enrichment in spiritual knowledge; and his later epistles +show that he had reached to clearer prospects of Christ and His +redemption, and had obtained a fuller grasp of the world-wide +significance of the Gospel than when he first began to preach. + +One cannot forget that the battle of criticism is raging to-day around +the inner citadel--the very person and words of Jesus. If it can be +shown that the Gospels contain only very imperfect records of the +historical Jesus, and that very few sayings of our Lord can be +definitely pronounced genuine, then, indeed, we might have to give up +some of the particular passages upon which we have based our conception +of truth and duty, but nothing less than a wholesale denial of the +historical existence of Jesus[7] would demand of us a repudiation of +the Christian view of life. The ideals, motives, and sentiments--the +entire outlook and spirit of life which we associate with Christ--are +now a positive possession of the Christian consciousness. There is a +Christian view of the world, a Christian _Welt-Anschauung_, so living +and real in the heart of Christendom that even though we had no more +reliable basis than the 'Nine Foundation Pillars' which Schmiedel +condescends to leave us, we should not be wholly deprived of the +fundamental principles upon which the Christian life might be reared. +{32} If to these we add the list of 'doubly attested sayings' collected +by Burkitt,[8] which even some of the most negative critics have been +constrained to allow, we should at least have a starting-point for the +study of the teaching of Jesus. The most reputable scholars, however, +of Germany, America and Britain acknowledge that no reasonable doubt +can be cast upon the general substance and tone of the Synoptic +Gospels, compiled, as they were, from the ancient Gospel of Mark and +the source commonly called 'Q' (_i.e._ the lost common origin of the +non-Markian portions of Matthew and Luke). To these we should be +disposed to add the Fourth Gospel, which, though a less primary source, +undoubtedly records acts and sayings of our Lord attested by one, who +(whosoever he was) was in close touch with his Master's life, and had +drunk deeply of His spirit. + +In the general tone and trend of these writings we find abundant +materials for what may be called the Ethics of Jesus. It is true, no +sharp line can be drawn between His religious and moral teaching. But, +taking Ethics in its general sense, as the discussion of the ideals, +virtues, duties of man, the relation of man to God and to his +fellow-men, it will at once be seen that a very large portion of +Christ's teaching is distinctly ethical. The facts of His own earthly +existence, all His great miracles, His parables, and above all, the +Sermon on the Mount, have an immediate bearing upon human conduct. +They all deal with character, and are chiefly illustrations and +enforcements of the divine ideal of life and of the value of man as a +child of God which He came to reveal. In the example of Jesus Himself +we have the best possible illustration of the translation of principles +into life. And in so far as we find our highest good embodied in Him, +He becomes for us, as J. S. Mill acknowledged, a kind of personified +conscience. No abstract statement of ethical principles can possibly +influence life so powerfully as the personal incarnation of these +principles; and if the greatest means to the true life is personal +association with the high and noble, then it need not seem strange {33} +that love and admiration for the person of Christ have as a matter of +fact proved the mightiest of historical motives to noble living. + +However imperfectly we may know the person of Jesus, and however +fragmentary may be the record of His teaching, one great truth looms +out of the darkness--the peerlessness of His character and the +incomparableness of His ideal of life. He comes to us with a message +of Good, new to man, based on the great conviction of the Fatherhood of +God. The all-dominating faith that a genuine seeking love is at the +heart of the universe makes Jesus certain that the laws of the world +are the laws of a loving God--laws of life which must be studied, +welcomed, and heartily obeyed. + +2. The Christian ideal, though given in Christ, has to be examined, +analysed, and applied by the very same faculties as are employed in +dealing with speculative problems. All science must be furnished with +facts, and its task generally is to shape its materials to definite +ends. The scientist does not invent. He does not create. He simply +_discovers_ what is already there: he only moulds into form what is +given. In like manner, the Christian moralist deals with the +revelation of life which has been granted to him partly in the human +consciousness, and partly through the sacred scriptures. The +scriptures, however, do not offer a systematic presentation of the life +of Christ, or a formal directory of moral conduct. The data are +supplied, but these data require to be interpreted and unified so as to +form a system of Ethics. The authority to which Christian Ethics +appeals is not an external oracle which imposes its dictates in a +mechanical way. It is an authority embodied in intelligible forms, and +appealing to the rational faculties of man. Christian Ethics, though +deduced from scripture, is not a cut and dry code of rules prescribed +by God which man must blindly obey. It has to be thought out, and +intelligently applied to all the circumstances of life. According to +the Protestant view, at least, Ethics is not a stereotyped compendium +of precepts which {34} the Church supplies to its members to save them +from thinking. Slavish imitation is wholly foreign to the genius of +the Gospel. Christ Himself appeals everywhere to the rational nature +of man, and His words are life and spirit only as they are intelligibly +apprehended and become by inner conviction the principles of action. + +Authoritative, then, as the scriptures are, and containing as they do +the revelation of an unique historical fact, they do not present a +closed or final system of truth. Christ has yet many things to say +unto us, and the Holy Spirit is continually adding new facts to human +experience, and disclosing richer and fuller manifestations of God +through history and providence and the personal consciousness of man. +No progress in thought or life can indeed be made which is inconsistent +with, or foreign to, the fundamental facts which centre in Christ: and +we may be justly suspicious of all advancement in doctrine or morals +which does not flow from the initial truths of the Master's life and +teaching. But, just as progress has been made, both in the increase of +materials of knowledge and in regard to the clearer insight and +appreciation of the meaning of Christian truth, since the apostles' +age, so we may hope that, as the ages go on, we shall acquire a still +fuller conception of the kingdom of God and a richer apprehension of +the divine will. The task and method of Christian Ethics will be, +consequently, the intelligent interpretation and the gradual +application to human life and society, in all their relationships, of +the mind of Christ under the constant illumination and guidance of the +Divine Spirit. + + + +[1] Cf. Dorner, _System der Christl. Ethik_, p. 48. See also Newman +Smyth, _Christian Ethics_, p. 44. + +[2] Cf. Mackintosh, _Christian Ethics_, p. 11. + +[3] Cf. Lidgett, _The Christian Religion_, pp. 106, 485 ff., where the +idea of God's nature is admirably developed. + +[4] Rashdall, _The Theory of Good and Evil_, vol. ii. p. 212. + +[5] Lidgett, _idem_. But see Bosanquet, _Principle of Indiv. and +Value_, p. 380 ff. + +[6] James i. 13, 14. + +[7] As, for example, that of Drew's _Christus Myth_. + +[8] Cf. _Gospel History and its Transmission_. + + + + +{35} + +CHAPTER III + +ETHICAL THOUGHT BEFORE CHRIST + +Apart from the writings of the New Testament, which are the primary +source of Christian Ethics, a comprehensive view of our subject would +include some account of the ethical conceptions of Greece, Rome and +Israel, which were at least contributory to the Christian idea of the +moral life. Whatever view we take of its origin, Christianity did not +come into the world like the goddess Athene, without preparation, but +was the product of many factors. The moral problems of to-day cannot +be rightly appreciated except in the light of certain concepts which +come to us from ancient thought; and Greco-Roman philosophy as well as +Hebrew religion have contributed not a little to the form and trend of +modern ethical inquiry. + +All we can attempt is the briefest outline, first, of the successive +epochs of Greek and Roman Ethics; and second, of the leading moral +ideas of the Hebrews as indicating the preparatory stages in the +evolution of thought which finds its completion in the Ethics of +Christianity. + + +I + +Before the golden age of Greek philosophy there was no Ethics in the +strictest sense. Philosophy proper occupied itself primarily with +ontological questions--questions as to the origin and constitution of +the material world. It was only when mythology and religion had lost +their hold upon the cultured, and the traditions of the poets had come +to be doubted, that inquiries as to the meaning of life and conduct +arose. + +{36} + +The Sophists may be regarded as the pioneers of ethical science. This +body of professional teachers, who appeared about the fifth century in +Greece, drew attention to the vagueness of common opinion and began to +teach the art of conduct. Of these Protagoras is the most famous, and +to him is attributed the saying, 'Man is the measure of all things.' +As applied to conduct, this dictum is commonly interpreted as meaning +that good is entirely subjective, relative to the individual. Viewed +in this light the saying is one-sided and sceptical, subversive of all +objective morality. But the dictum may be regarded as expressing an +important truth, that the good is personal and must ultimately be the +good for man as man, therefore for all men. + +1. It was _Socrates_, however, who, as it was said, first called +philosophy from heaven to the sphere of this earth, and diverted men's +minds from the consideration of natural things to the affairs of human +life. He was indeed the first moral philosopher, inasmuch as that, +while the Sophists merely talked at large about justice and virtue, he +asked what these terms really meant. Living in an age when the old +guides of life--law and custom--were losing their hold upon men, he was +compelled to find a substitute for them by reflection upon the meaning +and object of existence. For him the source of evil is want of +thought, and his aim is to awaken men to the realisation of what they +are, and what they must seek if they would make the best of their +lives. He is the prophet of clear self-consciousness. 'Know thyself' +is his motto, and he maintains that all virtue must be founded on such +knowledge. A life without reflection upon the meaning of existence is +unworthy of a man.[1] Hence the famous Socratic dictum, 'Virtue is +knowledge.' Both negatively and positively Socrates held this +principle to be true. For, on the one hand, he who is not conscious of +the good and does not know in what it consists, cannot possibly pursue +it. And, on the other hand, if a man is once alive to his real good, +how can he do otherwise than pursue it? No one therefore does {37} +wrong willingly. Let a man know what is right, and he will do it. +Knowledge of virtue is not, however, distinct from self-interest. +Every one naturally seeks the good simply because he sees that the good +is identical with his ultimate happiness. The wise man is the happy +man. Hence to know oneself is the secret of well-being. Let each be +master of himself, knowing what he seeks, and seeking what he +knows--that, for Socrates, is the first principle of Ethics, the +condition of all moral life. This view is obviously one-sided and +essentially individualistic, excluding all those forms of morality +which are pursued unconsciously, and are due more to the influence of +intuitive perception and social habit than to clear and definite +knowledge. The merit of Socrates, however, lies in his demand for +ethical reflection, and his insistence upon man not only acting +rightly, but acting from the right motive. + +2. While Socrates was the first to direct attention to the nature of +virtue, it received from _Plato_ a more systematic treatment. Platonic +philosophy may be described as an extension to the universe of the +principles which Socrates applied to the life of the individual. Plato +attempts to define the end of man by his place in the cosmos; and by +bringing Ethics into connection with Metaphysics he asks What is the +idea of man as a part of universal reality? Two main influences +combined to produce his conception of virtue. First, in opposition to +the Heraclitean doctrine of perpetual change, he contended for +something real and permanent. Second, in antagonism to the Sophistic +theory of the conventional origin of the moral law, he maintained that +man's chief end was the good which was fixed in the eternal nature of +things, and did not consist in the pursuit of transient pleasures. +Hence, in two respects, Plato goes beyond Socrates. He puts opinion, +which is his name for ordinary consciousness, between ignorance and +knowledge, ascribing to it a certain measure of truth, and making it +the starting-point for reflection. And further, he transforms the +Socratic idea of morality, rejecting the notion that its principle is +to be found in a mere calculation of pleasures, {38} and maintaining +that particular goods must be estimated by the good of life as a whole. +Plato's philosophy rests upon his doctrine of ideas, which, as the +types of permanent reality, represent the eternal nature of things; and +the problem of life is to rise from opinion to truth, from appearance +to reality, and attain to the ideal principle of unity. The highest +good Plato identifies with God, and man's end is ultimately to be found +in the knowledge of, and communion with, the eternal. + +The human soul he conceived to be a mixture of two elements. In virtue +of its higher spiritual nature it participates in the world of ideas, +the life of God: and in virtue of its lower or animal impulses, in the +corporeal world of decay. These two dissimilar parts are connected by +an intermediate element called by Plato _thymos_ or courage, implying +the emotions or affections of the heart. Hence a threefold +constitution of the soul is conceived--the rational powers, the +emotional desires, and the animal passions. If we ask who is the good +man? Plato answers, it is the man in whom these three elements are +harmonised. On the basis of this psychology Plato classifies and +determines the virtues--adopting the four cardinal virtues of Greek +tradition as the fundamental types of morality. Wisdom is the quality, +or condition of all virtue and the crown of the moral life: courage is +the virtue of the emotional part of man; temperance or moderation, the +virtue of the lower appetites: while justice is the unity and the +principle of the others. Virtue is thus no longer identified with +knowledge simply. Another source of vice besides ignorance is assumed, +viz., the disorder and conflict of the soul; and the well-being of man +lies in the attainment of a well-ordered and harmonious life. As +health is the harmony of the body, so virtue is the harmony of the +soul--a condition of perfection in which every desire is kept in +control and every function performs its part with a view to the good of +the whole. Morality, however, does not belong merely to the +individual, but has its perfect realisation in the state in which the +three elements of the soul have their {39} counterpart in the threefold +rank of society. Man is indeed but a type of a larger cosmos, and it +is not as an individual but as a citizen that he finds his station and +duties, and is capable of realising his true life. + +Thus we see how Plato is led to correct the shortcomings of +Socrates--his abrupt distinction between ignorance and knowledge, his +vagueness as to the meaning of the good, and his tendency to emphasise +the subjective side of virtue and withdraw the individual from the +community of which he is essentially a part. But in developing his +theory of ideas Plato has represented the true life of man as +consisting in the knowledge of, and indeed in absorption in, God, a +state to which man can only attain by the suppression of his natural +impulses and withdrawal from earthly life: and though there is not +wanting in Plato's later teaching the higher conception of the +transformation of the animal passions, he is not wholly successful in +overcoming the dualism between impulse and reason which besets some of +the earlier dialogues. + +It is a striking proof of the vitality of Plato that his teaching has +affected every form of idealism and has helped to shape the history of +religious thought in all ages. Not only many of the early Fathers, +such as Clement and Origen, but the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria, the +Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century, and also the German +theologians, Baur and Schleiermacher, have recognised numerous +coincidences between Christianity and Platonism: as Bishop Westcott has +said, 'Plato points to St. John.'[2] His influence may be detected in +some of the greatest Christian poetry of our own country, especially in +that of Wordsworth and Tennyson. For Plato believes, in common with +the greatest of every age, in 'that inborn passion for perfection,' +that innate though often unconscious yearning after the true, the +beautiful, the good, + + 'Those obstinate questionings + Of sense and outward things,' + +which are the heritage of human nature. + +{40} + +3. The Ethics of _Aristotle_ does not essentially differ from that of +Plato. He is the first to treat of morals formally as a science, +which, however, in his hands becomes a division of politics. Man, says +Aristotle, is really a social animal. Even more decisively than Plato, +therefore, he treats man as a part of society. While in Plato there is +the foreshadowing of the truth that the goal of moral endeavour lies in +godlikeness, with Aristotle the goal is confined to this life and is +conceived simply as the earthly well-being of the moral subject. +'Death,' he declares, 'is the greatest of all evils, for it is the +end.' Aristotle begins his great work on Ethics with the discussion of +the chief good, which he declares to be happiness or well-being. But +happiness does not consist in sensual pleasure, nor even in the pursuit +of honour, but in an 'activity of the soul in accordance with +reason.'[3] There are required for this life of right thinking and +right doing not only suitable environment but proper instruction. +Virtue is not virtuous until it is a habit, and the only way to be +virtuous is to practise virtue. To be virtuous a man's conduct must be +a law for him, the regular expression of his will. Hence the virtues +are habits of deliberate choice, and not natural endowments. Following +Plato, Aristotle sees that there is in man a number of impulses +struggling for the mastery of the soul, hence he is led to assume that +the natural instincts need guidance and control. Moderation is +therefore the one chief virtue; and moral excellence consists in an +activity which at every point seeks to strike a 'mean' between two +opposite excesses. Virtue in general, then, may be defined as the +observation of the due mean in action. Aristotle also follows Plato in +assigning the ideal good to contemplation, and in exalting the life of +reason and speculation above all others. In thus idealising the +contemplative life he was but reflecting the spirit of his race. This +apotheosis of knowledge infected all Greek thought, and found +exaggerated expression in the religious absorption of Neo-Platonism. + +{41} + +Without dwelling further upon the ethical philosophy of Aristotle, a +defect which at once strikes a modern in regard to his scheme of +virtues is that benevolence is not recognised, except obscurely as a +form of magnanimity; and that, in general, the gentler virtues, so +prominent in Christianity, have little place in the list. The virtues +are chiefly aristocratic. Favourable conditions are needed for their +cultivation. They are not possible for a slave, and hardly for those +engaged in 'mercenary occupations.'[4] Further, it may be remarked +that habit of itself does not make a man virtuous. Morality cannot +consist in a mere succession of customary acts. 'One good custom would +corrupt the world,' and habit is frequently a hindrance rather than a +help to the moral life. But the main defect of Aristotle's treatment +of virtue is that he tends to regard the passions as irrational, and he +does not see that passions if wholly evil could have no 'mean.' Reason +pervades all the lower appetites of man: and the instincts and desires, +instead of being treated as elements which must be suppressed, ought to +be regarded rather as powers to be transformed and employed as vehicles +of the moral life. At the same time there are not wanting passages in +Aristotle as well as in Plato which, instead of emphasising the +avoidance of excess, regard virtue as consisting in complementary +elements--the addition of one virtuous characteristic to another--'that +balance of contrasted qualities which meets us at every turn in the +distinguished personalities of the Hellenic race, and which is too +often thought of in a merely negative way, as the avoidance of excess +rather than as the highest outcome of an intense and many-sided +vitality.'[5] + +4. After Aristotle philosophy rapidly declined, and Ethics degenerated +into popular moralising which manifested itself chiefly in a growing +depreciation of good as the end {42} of life. The conflicting elements +of reason and impulse, which neither Plato nor Aristotle succeeded in +harmonising, gave rise ultimately to two opposite interpretations of +the moral life. The _Stoics_ selected the rational nature as the true +guide to an ethical system, but they gave to it a supremacy so rigid as +to threaten the extinction of the affections. The _Epicureans_, on the +other hand, fastening upon the emotions as the measure of truth, +emphasised the happiness of the individual as the chief good--a +doctrine which led some of the followers of Epicurus to justify even +sensual enjoyment. It is not necessary to dwell upon the details of +Epicureanism, for though its description of the 'wise man,' as that of +a person who prudently steered a middle course between passion and +asceticism, was one which exercised considerable influence upon the +morals of the age, it is the doctrines of Stoicism which more +especially have come into contact with Christianity. Without +discussing the Stoic conception of the world as interpenetrated and +controlled by an inherent spirit, and the consequent view of life as +proceeding from God and being in all its parts equally divine, we may +note that the Stoics, under the influence of Platonism, regarded +self-realisation as the true end of man. This idea they expressed in +the formula, 'Life according to nature.' The wise man is he who seeks +to live in all the circumstances of life in agreement with his rational +nature. The law of nature is to avoid what is hurtful and strive for +what is appropriate. Pleasure, though not the immediate object of man, +arises as an accompaniment of a well-ordered life. Pleasure and pain +are, however, really accidents, to be met by the wise man with +indifference. He alone is free who acknowledges the absolute supremacy +of reason and makes himself independent of earthly desires. This life +of freedom is open to all: since all men are members of one body. The +slave may be as free as the consul, and in every station of life each +may make the world serve him by living in harmony with it. + +There is a certain sublimity in the ethics of Stoicism which has always +appealed to noble minds. 'It inspired,' {43} says Mr. Lecky, 'nearly +all the great characters of the early Roman Empire, and nerved every +attempt to maintain the dignity and freedom of the human soul.'[6] But +we cannot close our eyes to its defects. Divine providence, though +frequently dwelt upon, signified little more for the Stoic than destiny +or fate. Harmony with nature was simply a sense of proud +self-sufficiency. Stoicism is the glorification of reason, even to the +extent of suppressing all emotion. Sin is unreason, and salvation lies +in an external control of the passions--in indifference and apathy +begotten of the subordination of desire to reason. + +The chief merit of Stoicism is that in an age of moral degeneracy it +insisted upon the necessity of integrity in all the conditions of life. +In its preference for the joys of the inner life and its scorn of the +delights of sense; in its emphasis upon individual responsibility and +duty; above all, in its advocacy of a common humanity and its belief in +the relation of each human soul to God, Roman Stoicism, as revealed in +the writings of a Seneca, an Epictetus, and a Marcus Aurelius, not only +showed how high Paganism at its best could reach, but proved in a +measure a preparation for Christianity, with whose practical truths it +had much in common. + +The affinities between Stoicism and Paulinism have been frequently +pointed out, and the similarity in language and thought can scarcely be +accounted for by coincidence. There are, however, elements in Stoicism +which St. Paul would never have dreamt of assimilating. The material +conception of the world, the self-conscious pride, the absence of all +sense of sin, the temper of apathy, and unnatural suppression of +feelings were ideas which could not but rouse the apostle's strongest +antagonism. But, on the other hand, there were characteristics of a +nobler order in Stoic morality which, we may well believe, Paul found +ready to his hand and did not hesitate to incorporate in his teaching. +Of these we may mention, the Immanence of God, the idea of Wisdom, the +conception of freedom as {44} the prerogative of the individual, and +the notion of brotherhood as the goal of humanity.[7] + +The Roman Stoics, notwithstanding their theoretic interest in moral +questions, lived in an ideal world, and hardly attempted to bring their +views into connection with the facts of life. Their philosophy was a +refuge from the evil around them rather than an effort to remove it. +They seek to overcome the world by being indifferent to it. In +Neo-Platonism--the last of the Greek schools of philosophy--this +tendency to withdraw from life and its problems becomes still more +marked. Absorption in God is the goal of existence and the essence of +religion. 'Man is left alone with God without any world to mediate +between them, and in the ecstatic vision of the Absolute the light of +reason is extinguished.'[8] + +Meagre as our sketch of ancient thought has necessarily been, it is +perhaps enough to show that the debt of religion to Greek and Roman +Ethics is incalculable. It lifted man above vague wonder, and gave him +courage to define his relation to existence. It caused him to ask +questions of experience, and awakened him to the value of life and the +meaning of freedom, duty, and good. Finally, it brought into view +those contrasted aims of life and society which find their solution in +the Christian ideal.[9] + + +II + +Christianity stands in the closest relation with _Hebrew religion_. +Much as the philosophy of Greece and Rome have contributed to +Christendom, there is no such intimate relation between them as that +which connects Christian Ethics with the morality of Israel. Christ +Himself, and still more the Apostle Paul, assumed as a substratum of +{45} their teaching the revelation which had been granted to the Jews. +The moral and religious doctrines comprehended under the designation of +the 'law' served, as the apostle said, as a _paidagogos_ or usher whose +function it was to lead them to the school of Christ. + +At the outset we are impressed by the fact that the Ethics of Judaeism +was inseparable from its religion. Moral obligations were conceived as +divine commands, and the moral law as a revelation of the divine will. +At first Jehovah was simply a tribal deity, but gradually this +restricted view gave place to the wider conception of God as the +sovereign of all men. The divine commandment is the criterion and +measure of man's obedience. Evil, while it has its source and head in +a hostile but subsidiary power, consists in violation of Jehovah's will. + +There are three main channels of Hebrew revelation, commonly known as +the _Law_, the _Prophecy_, and _Poetry_ of Old Testament. + + +1. LAW + +(1) _The Mosaic Legislation_ centering in the Decalogue[10] is the +first stage of Old Testament Ethic. The ten commandments, whether +derived from Mosaic enactment or representing a later summary of duty, +hold a supreme and formative place in the teaching of the Old +Testament. All, not even excepting the fourth, are purely moral +requirements. They are, however, largely negative; the fifth +commandment only rising to positive duty. They are also merely +external, regulative of outward conduct. The sixth and seventh protect +the rights of persons, while the eighth guards outward property. +Though these laws may be shown to have their roots in the moral +consciousness of mankind, they were at first restricted by Israel in +their scope and practice to its own tribes. + +(2) _The Civil laws_ present a second factor in the ethical education +of Israel. The 'Book of the Covenant'[11] reveals a certain +advancement in political legislation. Still the {46} hard and legal +enactments of retaliation--'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a +tooth'--disclose a barbarous conception of right. Alongside of these +primitive laws must be set those of a more humane nature--laws with +regard to release, the permission of gleaning, the privileges of the +year of jubilee. + +(3) _The Ceremonial laws_ embody a third element in the moral life of +Israel. These had to do chiefly with commands and prohibitions +relative to personal conduct--'Meats and drinks and diverse washings'; +and with sacrifices and forms of ritual worship.[12] + +With regard to the moral value of the commandments two opposite errors +are to be avoided. We must not refuse to recognise in the Old +Testament the record of a true, if elementary and imperfect, revelation +of God. But also we must beware of exalting the commandments of the +Old Dispensation to the level of those of the New; and thus +misunderstanding the nature and relation of both. + +The Christian faith is in a sense the development of Judaeism, though +it is infinitely more. The commandments of Moses, in so far as they +have their roots in the constitution of man, have not been superseded, +but taken up and spiritualised by the Ethic of the Gospel. + + +2. PROPHECY + +The dominant factor of Old Testament Ethics lay in the influence +exerted by the prophets. They, and not the priests, are the great +moralists of Israel. The prophets were speakers for God, the +interpreters of His will. They were the moral guides of the people, +the champions of integrity in political life, not less than witnesses +for individual purity.[13] + +We may sum up the ethical significance of the Hebrew prophets in three +features. + +(1) They were preachers of _personal righteousness_. In {47} times of +falsehood and hypocrisy they were witnesses for integrity and truth, +upholding the personal virtues of justice, sincerity, and mercy against +the idolatry and formalism of the priesthood. 'What doth the Lord +require of thee,' said Micah, 'but to do justly, to love mercy, and to +walk humbly with thy God.'[14] In the same strain Isaiah exclaimed, +'Bring no more vain oblations, but wash you and make you clean.'[15] +And so also Habakkuk has affirmed in words which became the keynote of +Paul's theology and the watchword of the Reformation--'The just shall +live by faith.'[16] + +(2) They were the advocates of the _rights of man_, of equity and +justice between man and man. They denounce the tyranny of kings, and +the luxury of the nobles. They protest against the oppression of the +poor and befriend the toilers of the cities. They proclaim the worth +of man as man. They reveal Jehovah as the God of the common people, +and seek to mitigate the burdens which lie upon the enslaved and +down-trodden. + +(3) They were the apostles of _Hope_. Not only did they seek to lift +their fellow-men above their present calamities, but they proclaimed a +message of peace and triumph which was to be evolved out of trouble. A +great promise gradually loomed on the horizon, and hope began to centre +in an anointed Deliverer. The Hebrew prophets were not probably +conscious of the full significance of their own predictions. Like all +true poets, they uttered greater things than they knew. The prophet +who most clearly outlines this truth is the second Isaiah. As he looks +down the ages he sees that healing is to be brought about through +suffering, the suffering of a Sinless one. Upon this mysterious figure +who is to rise up in the latter days is to be laid the burden of +humanity. No other, not even St. Paul himself, has grasped so clearly +the great secret of atonement or given so touching a picture of the +power of vicarious suffering as this unknown prophet of Israel. + + +{48} + +3. THE POETICAL BOOKS + +Passing from the prophets to the poets of Israel--and especially to the +book of Psalms--the devotional manual of the people, reflecting the +moral and religious life of the nation at the various stages of its +development--we find the same exalted character of God as a God of +Righteousness, hating evil and jealous for devotion, the same profound +sense of sin and the same high vocation of man. The Hebrew nation was +essentially a poetic people,[17] and their literature is full of +poetry. But poetry is not systematic. It is not safe, therefore, to +deduce particular tenets of faith or moral principles from passages +which glow with intensity of feeling. But if a nation's character is +revealed in its songs, the deep spirituality and high moral tone of +Israel are clearly reflected in that body of religious poetry which +extends over a period of a thousand years, from David to the Maccabean +age. It is at once national and personal, and is a wonderful record of +the human heart in its various moods and yearnings. Underlying all +true poetry there is a philosophy of life. God, for the Hebrew +psalmist, is the one pervading presence. He is not a mere +impersonation of the powers of nature, but a personal Being, righteous +and merciful, with whom man stands in the closest relations. Holy and +awful, indeed, hating iniquity and exacting punishment upon the wicked, +He is also tender and pitiful--a Father of the oppressed, who bears +their burdens, forgives their iniquities, and crowns them with tender +mercy.[18] All nature speaks to the Hebrew of God. He is no far-off +creator, but immanent in all His works.[19] He presides over mankind, +and provides for the manifold wants of his creatures. It is this +thought which gives unity to the nation, and binds the tribes into a +common brotherhood. God is their personal friend. In war and peace, +in worship and labour, at home and in exile, it is to Jehovah they look +{49} for strength and light and joy. He is their Shepherd and +Redeemer, under whose wings they trust. Corresponding to this sublime +faith, the virtues of obedience and fidelity are dwelt upon, while the +ideal of personal righteousness and purity is constantly held forth. +It is no doubt largely temporal blessings which the psalmists +emphasise, and the rewards of integrity are chiefly those of material +and earthly prosperity. The hope of the future life is nowhere clearly +expressed in the Old Testament, and while in the Psalter here and there +a dim yearning for a future with God breaks forth, hardly any of these +poems illumine the destiny of man beyond the grave. The hope of Israel +was limited mostly to this earth. The land beyond the shadows does not +come within their purview. Like a child, the psalmist is content to +know that his divine Father is near him here and now. When exactly the +larger hope emerged we cannot say. But gradually, with the breaking up +of the national life and under the pressure of suffering, a clearer +vision dawned. With the limitations named, it is a sublime outlook +upon life and a high-toned morality which the Psalter discloses. +Poetry, indeed, idealises, and no doubt the Israelites did not always +live up to their aspirations; but men who could give utterance to a +faith so clear, to a penitence so deep, and to longings so lofty and +spiritual as these Psalms contain are not the least among the heralds +of the kingdom of Christ. + +We cannot enlarge upon the ethical ideas of the other writings of the +Old Testament, the books of Wisdom, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job. +Their teaching, while not particularly lofty, is generally healthy and +practical, consisting of homely commonplaces and shrewd observations +upon life and conduct. The motives appealed to are not always the +highest, and frequently have regard only to earthly prosperity and +worldly policy. It must not, however, be overlooked that moral +practice is usually allied with the fear of God, and the right choice +of wisdom is represented as the dictate of piety not less than the +sanction of prudence. The writers of the Wisdom literature are the +{50} humanists of their age. As distinguished from the idealism of the +prophets, they are realists who look at life in a somewhat utilitarian +way. With the prophets, however, they are at one in regarding the +inferiority of ceremonial to obedience and sincerity. God is the ruler +of the world, and man's task is to live in obedience to Him. What God +requires is correct outward behaviour, self-restraint, and +consideration of others. + +In estimating the Ethics of Israel the fact that it was a preparatory +stage in the revelation of God's will must not be overlooked. We are +not surprised, therefore, that, judged by the absolute standard of the +New Testament, the morality of the Old Testament must be pronounced +imperfect. In two respects at least, in intent and extent, it is +deficient. + +(1) It is lacking in _Depth_. There is a tendency to dwell upon the +sufficiency of external acts rather than the necessity of inward +disposition. At the same time, in the Psalter and prophecy inward +purity is recognised.[20] Further, the character of Jehovah is +sometimes presented in a repellent aspect; as in the threatenings of +the second commandment; the treatment of the children of Achan and the +Sons of Korah; the seeming injustice of God, implied in the complaint +of Moses, and the protests of Abraham and David. But again there are +not wanting more kindly features of the Divine Being; and the +Fatherhood of God finds frequent expression. Though the penal code is +severe, a gentler spirit shines through many of its provisions, and +protection is afforded to the wage-earner, the dependent, and the poor; +while the care of slaves, foreigners, and even lower animals is not +overlooked.[21] Again, it has been noticed that the motives to which +the Old Testament appeals are often mercenary. Material prosperity +plays an important part as an inducement to well-doing. The good which +the pious patriarch or royal potentate contemplates is something which +is calculated to enrich himself or advance his people. But here we +must not forget that {51} God's revelation is progressive, and His +dealing with man educative. There is naturally a certain accommodation +of the divine law to the various stages of the moral apprehension of +the Jewish people. Gradually the nation is being carried forward by +the promise of material benefits to the deeper and more inward +appreciation of spiritual blessings. + +(2) It is lacking in _Scope_. In regard to universality the Hebrew +ideal, it must be acknowledged, is deficient. God is usually +represented as the God of Israel alone, and not as the God of all men, +and the obligations of veracity, honesty, and mercy are confined within +the limits of the nation. It is true that a prominent commandment +given to Israel and endorsed by our Lord runs thus: 'Thou shalt love +thy neighbour as thyself.'[22] But the extent of the obligation seems +to be restricted by the context: 'Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any +grudge against the children of thy people.' It is contended that the +word translated 'neighbour' bears a wider import than the English term, +and is really applicable to any person. The larger idea is expressed +in vv. 33, 34, where the word 'stranger' or 'foreigner' is substituted +for neighbour. And there are passages in which the stranger is +regarded as the special client of God, and is enjoined to look to Him +for protection. + +The Jews were not in practice, however, faithful to the humanitarianism +of their law, and, in keeping with other nations, showed a tendency to +restrict divine favours within the limits of their own land, and to +maintain throughout their history an attitude of aloofness and +repellent isolation which even amounted to intolerance towards other +races. In early days, however, the obligation of hospitality was +regarded as sacred.[23] Nor must we forget that, whatever may have +been the Jewish practice, the promise enshrined in their revelation +involves the unity of mankind; while several of the prophecies and +Psalms look forward to a world-wide blessing.[24] In Isaiah we even +read, 'God of the whole earth shall He be called.'[25] + +{52} + +The stream of preparation for Christianity thus flowed steadily through +three channels, the Greek, the Roman, and the Jew. Each contributed +something to the fullness of the time. + +The problem of Greek civilisation was the problem of _freedom_, the +realisation of self-dependence and self-determination. In the pursuit +of these ends Greece garnered conclusions which are the undying +possessions of the world. If to the graces of self-abasement, meekness +and charity it remained a stranger, it gave a new worth to the +individual, and showed that without the virtues of wisdom, courage, +steadfastness and justice man could not attain to moral character. + +The Roman's gift was unbending devotion to _duty_. With a genius for +rule he forced men into one polity; and by levelling material barriers +he enabled the nations to commune, and made a highway for the message +of freedom and brotherhood. But, intoxicated with material glory, he +became blind to spiritual good, and in his universal toleration he +emptied all faiths of their content, driving the masses to +superstition, and the few who yearned for a higher life to withdrawal +from the world. + +The Jewish contribution was _righteousness_. Not specially +distinguished by intellectual powers, nor gifted in political +enterprise, his endowment was spiritual insight, and by his dispersion +throughout the world he made others the sharers of his inheritance. +But his tendency was to keep his privilege to himself, or so to load it +with legal restrictions as to bar its acceptance for strangers; and in +his pride of isolation he failed to recognise his Deliverer when He +came. + +Thus, negatively and positively, by failure and by partial attainment, +the world was prepared for Him who was the desire of all nations. In +Christ were gathered up the wisdom of the Greek, the courage of the +Roman, the righteousness of the Jew; and He who came not to destroy but +to fulfil at once interpreted and satisfied the longings of the ages. + + + +[1] _Apologia_, pp. 38-9. + +[2] Cf. Adam, _Vitality of Platonism_, p. 3. + +[3] _Nic. Ethics_, bk. i. chap. 5. + +[4] _histharnikai ergasiai_, Arist., _Politics_, iii. 'There is +nothing common between a master and his slave,' _Nic. Ethics_, viii. + +[5] Butcher, _Harvard Lectures on Greek Subjects_, quoted by Barbour, +_Philos. Study of Christian Ethics_, p. 11. Cf. also Burnet, _Ethics +of Aristotle_, p. 73. 'The "mean" is really the true nature of the +soul when fully developed.' + +[6] _Hist. of Europ. Morals_, vol. i. chap. ii. + +[7] See Author's _Ethics of St. Paul_ for further discussion of +relation of Paul to Stoics. + +[8] Cf. E. Caird, _Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers_, +vol. i. p. 48. + +[9] Cf. Caird, idem. Pfleiderer, _Vorbereitung des Christentums in der +Griech. Philos._; Wenley, _Preparation for Christianity_. + +[10] Exod. xx.; Deut. v. + +[11] Ex. xx.-xxiii. + +[12] Amos v. 25; Hos. vi. 6; Isa. i. 11-13. + +[13] Cf. Wallace, _Lectures and Essays on Natural Theol. and Ethics_, +p. 183. + +[14] Micah vi. 8. + +[15] Isa. i. 13-17; Micah vi. 7. + +[16] Hab. ii. 4; cf. Rom. i. 17; Gal. iii. 2. + +[17] Though Houston Chamberlain, in his recent work, _The Foundations +of the Nineteenth Century_, maintains that they were 'a most prosaic, +materialistic people, without any real sense of poetry.' + +[18] Ps. 51. + +[19] Ps. 19. + +[20] Ps. 51; Isa. 1. + +[21] Deut. xxiv. 14, 15; Jer. xxii. 13-17; Matt. iii 5; Deut. xxv. 4. + +[22] Lev. xix. 18. + +[23] Gen. xviii. xix. + +[24] Isa. lxi.; Ps. xxii. 27; xlviii. 2-10; lxxxvii. + +[25] Isa. liv. 5. + + + + +{53} + +SECTION B + +PERSONALITY + +{55} + +CHAPTER IV + +THE ESTIMATE OF MAN + +Having thus far laid the foundations of our study by a discussion of its +presuppositions and sources, we are now prepared to consider man as the +personal subject of the new life. The spirit of God which takes hold of +man and renews his life must not be conceived as a foreign power breaking +the continuity of consciousness. The natural is the basis of the +supernatural. It is not a new personality which is created; it is the +old that is transformed and completed. If there was not already implicit +in man that which predisposed him for the higher life, a consciousness to +which the spirit could appeal, then Christianity would be simply a +mechanical or magical influence without ethical significance and having +no relation to the past history of the individual. But that is not the +teaching of our Lord or of His apostles. We are bound, therefore, to +assume a certain substratum of powers, physical, mental and moral, as +constituting the raw material of which the new personality is formed. +The spirit of God does not quench the natural faculties of man, but works +through and upon them, raising them to a higher value.[1] + +I. But before proceeding to a consideration of these elements of human +consciousness to which Christianity appeals, we must glance at two +opposite theories of human nature, either of which, if the complete view +of man, would be inimical to Christianity.[2] + +{56} + +1. The first view is that man _by nature is morally good_. His natural +impulses are from birth wholly virtuous, and require only to be left to +their own operation to issue in a life of perfection. Those who favour +this contention claim the support of Scripture. Not only does the whole +tone of the Bible imply the inherent goodness of primitive man, but many +texts both in the Old and New Testaments suggest that God made man +upright.[3] Among the Greeks, and especially the Stoics, this view +prevailed. All nature was regarded as the creation of perfect reason, +and the primitive state as one of uncorrupted innocence. Pelagius +espoused this doctrine, and it continued to influence dogmatic theology +not only in the form of Semi-Pelagianism, but even as modifying the +severer tenets of Augustine. The theory received fresh importance during +the revolutionary movement of the eighteenth century, and found a strong +exponent in Rousseau. 'Let us sweep away all conventions and +institutions of man's making and get back to the simplicity of a +primitive age.' The man of nature is guileless, and his natural +instincts would preserve him in uncorrupted purity if they were not +perverted by the artificial usages of society. So profoundly did this +theory dominate the thoughts of men that its influence may be detected +not only in the political fanaticism which found expression in the French +Revolution, but also in the practical views of the Protestant Church +acting as a deterrent to missionary effort.[4] This view of human +nature, though not perhaps formally stated, finds expression in much of +the literature of the present day. Professor James cites Theodore Parker +and other leaders of the liberal movement in New England of last century +as representatives of the tendency.[5] These writers do not wholly +ignore moral effect, but they make light of sin, and regard it not as +something positive, but merely as a stage in the development of man. + +{57} + +2. The other theory of human nature goes to the opposite extreme. Man +by nature is _utterly depraved_, and his natural instincts are wholly +bad. Those who take this view also appeal to Scripture: 'Man is shapen +in iniquity and conceived in sin.' Many passages in the New Testament, +and especially in the writings of St. Paul, seem to emphasise the utter +degradation of man. It was not, however, until the time of Augustine +that this idea of innate depravity was formulated into a doctrine. The +Augustinean dogma has coloured all later theology. In the Roman Catholic +Church, even in such a writer as Pascal, and in Protestantism, under the +influence of Calvin, the complete corruption of man's nature has been +depicted in the blackest hues. + +These theories of human nature represent aspects of truth, and are false +only in their isolation. + +The doctrine that man is innocent by nature is not in agreement with +history. Nowhere is the noble savage to be found. The primitive man +exhibits the same tendencies as his more civilised neighbour, and his +animal passions are indulged without control of reason or consideration +for others. Indeed, Hobbes's view of early society as a state of war and +rapacity is much truer to fact than Rousseau's. The noble savage is +simply a fiction of the imagination, an abstraction obtained by +withdrawing him from all social environment. But even could we conceive +of a human being kept from infancy in isolation, he would not fulfil the +true idea of virtue, but would simply develop into a negative creature, a +mutilated being bereft of all that constitutes our notion of humanity. +Such experiences as are possible only in society--all forms of goodness +as suggested by such words as 'love,' 'sympathy,' 'service'--would never +emerge at all. The native instincts of man are simply potencies or +capacities for morality; they must have a life of opportunity for their +evolution and exercise. The abstract self prior to and apart from all +objective experience is an illusion. It is only in relation to a world +of moral beings that the moral life becomes possible for man. The +innocence which the advocates of this theory contend for is {58} +something not unlike the non-rational existence of the animal. It is +true that the brute is not immoral, but neither is it moral. The whole +significance of the passions as they exist in man lies in the fact that +they are not purely animal, but, since they belong to man, are always +impregnated with reason. It is reason that gives to them their moral +worth, and it is because man must always put his self into every desire +or impulse that it becomes the instrument either of virtue or of vice.[6] + +But if the theory of primitive purity is untenable, not less so is that +of innate depravity. Here, also, its advocates are not consistent with +themselves. Even the systems of theology derived from Augustine do not +contend that man was created with an evil propensity. His sin was the +result of an historical catastrophe. In his paradisiacal condition man +is conceived as possessing a nobility and innocence of nature far beyond +that even which Rousseau depicted. Milton, in spite of his Calvinistic +puritanism, has painted a picture of man's ideal innocence which for +idyllic charm is unequalled in literature.[7] Nor does historical +inquiry bear out the theory of the utter depravity of man. The latest +anthropological research into the condition of primitive man suggests +rather that even the lowest forms of savage life are not without some dim +consciousness of a higher power and some latent capacity for good.[8] +Finally, these writers are not more successful when they claim the +support of the Bible. Not only are there many examples of virtue in +patriarchal times, but, as we have seen, there are not a few texts which +imply the natural goodness of man. Our Lord repeatedly assumes the +affinity with goodness of those who had not hitherto come into contact +with the Gospel, as in the case of Jairus, the rich young ruler, and the +Syrophenician woman. It has been affirmed by Wernle[9] that the Apostle +Paul in the interests of salvation grossly {59} exaggerates the condition +of the natural man. 'He violently extinguished every other light in the +world so that Jesus might shine in it alone.' But this surely is a +misstatement. It is true that no more scathing denunciation of sinful +human nature has ever been presented than the account of heathen +immorality to be found in the first chapter of Romans. Yet the apostle +does not actually affirm, nor even imply, that pagan society was so +utterly corrupt that it had lost all knowledge of moral good. Though so +bad as to be beyond hope of recovery by natural effort, it was not so bad +as to have quenched in utter darkness the light which lighteth every man. + +3. Christianity, while acknowledging the partial truth of both of these +theories, reconciles them. If, on the one hand, man were innately good +and could of himself attain to righteousness, there would be no need of a +gospel of renewal. But history and experience alike show that that is +not the case. If, on the other hand, man were wholly bad, had no +susceptibility for virtue and truth, then there would be nothing in him, +as we have seen, which could respond to the Christian appeal.[10] +Christianity alone offers an answer to the question in which Pascal +presents the great antithesis of human nature: 'If man was not made for +God, how is it that he can be happy only in God? And if he is made for +God, how is he so opposite to God?'[11] However, then, we may account +for the presence of evil in human nature, a true view of Christianity +involves the conception of a latent spiritual element in man, a capacity +for goodness to which his whole being points. Matter itself may be said +not merely to exist for spirit, but to have within it already the potency +of the higher forms of life; and just as nature is making towards +humanity, and in humanity at last finds itself; as + + 'Striving to be man, the worm + Mounts through all the spires of form,'[13] + +{60} so man, even in his most primitive state, has within him the promise +of higher things. No theory of his origin can interfere with the +assumption that he belongs to a moral Sphere, and is capable of a life +which is shaping itself to spiritual ends. Whatever be man's past +history and evolution, he has from the beginning been made in God's +image, and bears the divine impress in all the lineaments of body and +soul. His degradation cannot wholly obliterate his inherent nobility, +and indeed his actual corruption bears witness to his possible holiness. +Granting the hypothesis of evolution, matter even in its crudest +beginnings contains potentially all the rich variety of the natural and +spiritual life. The reality of a growing thing lies in its highest form +of being. In the light of the last we explain the first. If the +universe is, as science pronounces, an organic totality which is ever +converting its promise into actuality, then 'the ultimate interpretation +even of the lowest existence of the world, cannot be given except on +principles which are adequate to explain the highest.'[13] Christian +morality is therefore nothing else than the morality prepared from all +eternity, and is but the highest realisation of that which man even at +his lowest has ever been, though unconsciously, striving after. All that +is best and highest in man, all that he is capable of yet becoming, has +really existed within him from the very first, just as the flower and +leaf and fruit are contained implicitly in the seedling. This is the +Pauline view of human nature. Jesus Christ, according to the apostle, is +the End and Consummation of the whole creation. Everywhere in all men +there is a capacity for Christ. Whatever be his origin, man comes upon +the stage of being bearing within him a great and far-reaching destiny. +There is in him, as Browning says, 'a tendency to God.' He is not simply +what he is now, but all that he is yet to be. + +II. Assuming, then, the inherent spirituality of man, we may now proceed +to examine his moral consciousness with a view to seeing how its various +constituents form what we have called the substratum of the Christian +life. + +{61} + +1. We must guard against seeming to adopt the old and discredited +psychology which divides man into a number of separate and independent +faculties. Man is not made like a machine, of a number of adjusted +parts. _He is a unity_, a living organism, in which every part has +something of all the others; and all together, animated by one spirit, +constitute a Living whole which we call personality. While the Bible is +rich in terms denoting the different constituents of man, neither the Old +Testament nor the New regards human nature as a plurality of powers. A +bind of unity or hierarchy of the natural faculties is assumed, and amid +all the difference of function and variety of operation it is undeniable +that the New Testament writers generally, and particularly St. Paul, +presuppose a unity of consciousness--a single ego, or Soul. It is +unnecessary to discuss the question, much debated by Biblical +psychologists, as to whether the apostle recognises a threefold or a +twofold division of man.[14] Our view is that he recognised only a +twofold division, body and soul, which, however, he always regarded as +constituting a unity, the body itself being psychical or interpenetrated +with spirit, and the spirit always acting upon and working through the +physical powers. + +Man is a unique phenomenon in the world. Even on his physical side he is +not a piece of dead matter, but is instinct through and through with +spirit. And on his psychical side he is not an unsubstantial wraith, but +a being inconceivable apart from outward embodiment. Perhaps the most +general term which we may adopt is _psyche_ or Soul--the living self or +vital and animating principle which is at once the seat of all bodily +sensation and the source of the higher cognitive faculties. + +2. The fact of ethical interest from which we must proceed is that man, +in virtue of his spiritual nature, is _akin to God_, and participates in +the three great elements of the divine Personality--thought, love and +will.[15] Personality has been called 'the culminating fact of the {62} +universe.' And it is the task of man to realise his true personality--to +fulfil the law of his highest self. In this work he has to harmonise and +bring to the unity of his personal life, by means of one dominating +force, the various elements of his nature--his sensuous, emotional, and +rational powers. By the constitution of his being he belongs to a larger +world, and when he is true to himself he is ever reaching out towards it. +From the very beginning of life, and even in the lowest phases of his +nature he has within him the potency of the divine. He carries the +infinite in his soul, and by reason of his very existence shares the life +of God. The value of his soul in this sense is repeatedly emphasised in +scripture. In our Lord's teaching it is perhaps the most distinctive +note. The soul, or self-conscious spiritual ego, is spoken of as capable +of being 'acquired' or 'lost.'[16] It is acquired or possessed when a +man seeks to regain the image in which he was created. It is lost when +he refuses to respond to those spiritual influences by which Christ +besets him, and by means of which the soul is moulded into the likeness +of God. + +3. A full presentation of this subject would involve a reference even to +the physical powers which form an integral part of man and witness to his +eternal destiny. + +(1) The very body is to be redeemed and sanctified, and made an +instrument of the new life in Christ. The extremes of asceticism and +self-indulgence, both of which found advocates in Greek philosophy and +even in the early Church, have no countenance in scripture. Evil does +not reside in the flesh, as the Greeks held, but in the will which uses +the flesh for its base ends. Not mutilation but transformation, not +suppression but consecration is the Christian ideal. The natural is the +basis of the spiritual. Man is the Temple of God, every part of which is +sacred. Christ claims to be King of the body as of every other domain of +life. The secret of spiritual progress does not consist in the +unflinching destruction of the flesh, but in its firm but kindly +discipline for loyal service. It is not, therefore, by {63} leaving the +body behind but by taking it up into our higher self that we become +spiritual. As Browning says, + + 'Let us cry all good things + Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more now + Than flesh helps soul.' + + +Without dwelling further upon the physical elements of man, there are +three constituents or functions of personality prominent in the New +Testament which claim our consideration, reason, conscience and will. It +is just because man possesses, or _is_ mind, conscience and will, that he +is capable of responding to the life which Christ offers, and of sharing +in the divine character which he reveals. + +(2) The term _nous_, or reason, is of frequent occurrence in the New +Testament. Christianity highly honours the intellectual powers of man +and accords to the mind an important role in apprehending and entering +into the thoughts and purposes of God. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God +with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind,' says +Jesus. Many are disposed to think that the exercise of faith, the +immediate organ of spiritual apprehension, is checked by the interference +of reason. But so far from faith and reason being opposed, not only are +they necessary to each other, but in all real faith there is an element +of reason. In all religious feeling, as in morality, art, and other +spheres of human activity, there is the underlying element of reason +which is the characteristic of all the activities of a self-conscious +intelligence. To endeavour to elicit that element, to infuse into the +spontaneous and unsifted conceptions of religious experience the +objective clearness, necessity and organic unity of thought--is the +legitimate aim of science, in religion as in other spheres. It would be +strange if in the highest of all provinces of human experience +intelligence must renounce her claim.[17] The Ritschlian value-judgment +theory in its disparagement of philosophy is practically a dethronement +of reason. And the protest of Pragmatism and the voluntarists {64} +generally against what they term 'Intellectualism'[18] and their distrust +of the logical faculty, are virtually an avowal of despair and a resort +to agnosticism, if not to scepticism. If we are to renounce the quest +for objective truth, and accept 'those ideas only which we can +assimilate, validate, corroborate,'[19] those ideas in short which are +'practically useful in guiding us to desirable issues,' then it would +seem we are committed to a world of subjective caprice and confusion and +must give up the belief in a rational view of the universe. + +(3) In spite of the wonderful suggestiveness of M. Bergson's philosophy, +we are unable to accept the distinction which that writer draws between +intuition and intelligence, in which he seems to imply that intuition is +the higher of the two activities. Intelligence, according to this +writer, is at home exclusively in spatial considerations, in solids, in +geometry, but it is to be repelled as a foreign element when it comes to +deal with life. Bergson would exclude rational thought and intelligence +from life, creation, and initiative. The clearest evidence of intuition +is in the works of great artists. 'What is implied is that in artistic +creation, in the work of genius and imagination, we have pure novelty +issuing from no premeditated or rational idea, but simply pure +irrationality and unaccountableness.'[20] The work of art cannot be +predicated; it is beyond reason, as life is beyond logic and law.[21] +But so far from finding life unintelligible, it would be nearer the truth +to say that man's reason can, strictly speaking, understand nothing +else.[22] 'Instinct finds,' says Bergson, 'but does not search. Reason +searches but cannot find.'[23] 'But,' adds Professor Dewey, 'what we +find is meaningless save as measured by searching, and so instincts and +passions must be elevated into reason.'[24] In the lower creatures +instinct does the {65} work of reason--sufficiently for the simple +conditions in which the animal lives. And in the earlier stages of human +life instinct plays an important part. But when man, both as an +individual and as humanity, advances to a more complex life, instinct is +unequal to the new task confronting him. We cannot be content to be +guided by instinct. Reason asserts itself and seeks to permeate all our +experiences, and give unity and purpose to all our thoughts and acts. + +The recent disparagement of intellectualism is probably a reaction +against the extreme absolutism of German idealism which, beginning with +Kant, found fullest expression in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. But the +true way to meet exclusive rationalism is not to discredit the function +of mind, but to give to it a larger domain of experience. We do not +exalt faith by emptying it of all intellectual content and reducing it to +mere subjective feeling; nor do we explain genius by ascribing its acts +to blind, unthinking impulse. 'The real is the rational,' says Hegel. +Truth, in other words, presupposes a rational universe which we, as +rational beings, must assume in all our thought and effort. To set up +faith against reason, or intuition against intelligence is to set the +mind against itself. We cannot set up an order of facts, as Professor +James would have us do, outside the intellectual realm; for what does not +fall within our experience can have for us no meaning, and what for us +has no meaning cannot be an object of faith. An ineradicable belief in +the rationality of the world is the ultimate basis of all art, morality +and religion. To rest in mere intuition or emotion and not to seek +objective truth would be for man to renounce his true prerogative and to +open the door for all kinds of superstition and caprice. + +III. In the truest sense it may be claimed that this is the teaching of +Christianity. When Christ says that we are to love God with our minds He +seems to imply that there is such a thing as intelligent affection. The +distinctive feature of our Lord's claim is that God is not satisfied when +His creatures render a merely implicit obedience; He {66} desires also +the enthusiastic use of their intellect, intent on knowing everything +that it is possible for men to know about His character and ways. And is +there not something sublime in this demand of God that the noblest part +of man should be consecrated to Him? God reveals Himself in Christ to +our highest; and He would have us respond to His manifestations with our +highest. Nor is this the attitude of Christ only. The Apostle Paul also +honours the mind, and gives to it the supreme place as the organ of +apprehending and appropriating divine truth. Mr. Lecky brings the +serious charge against Christianity that it habitually disregards the +virtues of the intellect. If there is any truth in this statement it +refers, not to the genius of the Gospel itself, nor to the earlier +exponents of it, but rather to the Church in those centuries which +followed the conversion of Constantine. No impartial reader of St. +Paul's Epistles can aver that the apostle made a virtue of ignorance and +credulity. These documents, which are the earliest exposition of the +mind of Christ, impress us rather with the intellectual boldness of their +attempt to grapple with the greatest problems of life. Paul was +essentially a thinker; and, as Sabatier says, is to be ranked with Plato +and Aristotle, Augustine and Kant, as one of the mightiest intellectual +forces of the world. But not content with being a thinker himself, he +sought to make his converts thinkers too, and he does not hesitate to +make the utmost demand upon their reasoning faculties. He assumes a +natural capacity in man for apprehending the truth, and appeals to the +mind rather than to the emotions. The Gospel is styled by him 'the word +of truth,' and he bids men 'prove all things.' Worship is not a +meaningless ebullition of feeling or a superstitious ritual, but a form +of self-expression which is to be enlightened and guided by thought. 'I +will pray with the understanding and sing with the understanding.' + +It is indeed a strong and virile Christianity which Paul and the other +apostles proclaim. It is no magic spell they seek to exert. They are +convinced that there is that in {67} the mind of man which is ready to +respond to a thoughtful Gospel. If men will only give their unprejudiced +minds to God's Word, it is able to make them 'wise unto salvation.' It +would lead us beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the peculiar +Pauline significance of faith. It is enough to say that while he does +not identify it with intellectual assent, as little does he confine it to +mere subjective assurance. It is the primary act of the human spirit +when brought into contact with divine truth, and it lies at the root of a +new ethical power, and of a deeper knowledge of God. If the apostle +appears to speak disparagingly of wisdom it is the wisdom of pride, of +'knowledge that puffeth up.' He warns Timothy against 'science falsely +so called.' On the whole St. Paul exalts the intellect and bids men +attain to the full exercise of their mental powers. 'Be not children in +understanding: but in understanding be men.'[25] + +If, as we have seen, the body be an integral part of man, and has its +place and function in the Christian life, not less, but even more, has +the mind a special ethical importance. It is to the intelligence that +Christianity appeals, and it is with the rational faculties that moral +truth is apprehended and applied to life. Reason in its broadest sense +is the most distinctive feature of man, and by means of it he exerts his +mightiest influence upon the world. Mental and moral growth are closely +connected, and personal character is largely moulded by thought. 'As a +man thinketh in his heart so is he.' Not only at the beginning of the +new life, but in all its after stages the mind is an important factor, +and its consecration and cultivation are laid upon us as an obligation by +Him in whose image we have been made, and whom to know and serve is our +highest end. + + + +[1] See Author's _Ethics of St. Paul_. + +[2] Cf. Murray, _Sandbank of Christian Ethics_. See also Hegel, _Phil. +der Religion_, vol. ii. p. 210 ff., where the antithesis is finely worked +out. + +[3] Gen. i. 26; Eccles. vii. 29; Col. iii. 10; James iii. 9. + +[4] See Hugh Miller's _Essays_, quoted by Murray, _op. cit._, p. 137. + +[5] Cf. W. James, _Varieties of Religious Experience_, pp. 81-86. + +[6] Cf. Goethe's _Faust_. See also Nietzsche, _Goetzendaemmerung_ for +trenchant criticism of Rousseau. + +[7] Murray, _idem_. + +[8] Max Mueller, Fraser, _Golden Bough_, and others. + +[9] Anfaenge des Christentums. + +[10] Cf. Ottley, _Christian Ideas and Ideals_, p. 52. 'Christianity does +justice both to man's inherent instinct that he has been made for God, +and to his sense of unworthiness and incapacity.' + +[11] _Pensees_, part ii. art. 1. + +[12] Emerson. + +[13] Ed. Caird, _Critical Philosophy of Kant_, p. 35. + +[14] See Author's _Ethics of St. Paul_. + +[15] Ottley, _idem_, p. 55. + +[16] Luke xxi. 19. + +[17] Cf. John Caird, _Introd. to the Philosophy of Religion_. + +[18] Cf. Wm. James's _Pragmatism_ and _A Pluralistic World_. + +[19] _Idem_, p. 201. + +[20] Cf. Bosanquet, _The Principles of Individuality and Value_. + +[21] Bergson, _Evol. Creat._, p. 174 f. + +[22] Cf. E. Caird, _Kant_, vol. ii. pp. 530 and 535. + +[23] _Evol. Creat._, p. 159. + +[24] _Hib. Jour._, July 1911. + +[25] Some sentences in the above are borrowed from the writer's _Ethics +of St. Paul_. + + + + +{68} + +CHAPTER V + +THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE + +Passing from the physical and mental constituents of man, we turn to +the more distinctly moral elements; and in this chapter we shall +consider that aspect of the human consciousness to which mankind has +given the name of 'conscience.' + +No subject has presented greater difficulties to the moralist, and +there are few which require more careful elucidation. From the +earliest period of reflection the question how we came to have moral +ideas has been a disputed one. At first it was thought that there +existed in man a distinct innate faculty or moral sense which was +capable of deciding categorically man's duty without reference to +history or condition. But in modern times the theory of evolution has +discredited the inviolable character of conscience, and sought rather +to determine its nature and significance in the light of its origin and +development. Only the barest outline of the subject can be attempted +here, since our object is simply to show that however we may account +for its presence, there is in man, as we know him, some power or +function which bears witness to divine truth and fits him to respond to +the revelation of Christ. It will be most convenient to consider the +subject under three heads: I. the history of the Conception; II. the +nature and origin of Conscience; and III. its present validity. + +I. _History of the Conception_.--'The name conscience,' says a writer +on the subject, 'appears somewhat late in {69} the history of the +world: that for which it stands is as old as mankind.'[1] + +1. Without pushing our inquiries back into the legendary lore of +savage life, in which we find evidence of the idea in the social +institutions and religious enactments of primitive races, it is among +the Greeks that the word, if not the idea of conscience, first meets +us. Perhaps the earliest trace of the notion is to be found in the +mythological conception of the Furies, whose business it was to avenge +crime--a conception which might be regarded as the reaction of man's +own nature against the violation of better instincts, if not as the +reflection or embodiment of what is popularly called conscience. It +can scarcely be doubted that the Erinnyes of Aeschylus were deities of +remorse, and possess psychological significance as symbols of the +primitive action of conscience.[2] Though Sophocles is less of a +theologian than Aeschylus, and problems of Ethics count less than the +human interest of his story, the law of Nemesis does find in him +dramatic expression, and the noble declaration put into the mouth of +Antigone concerning the unwritten laws of God that 'know no change and +are not of to-day nor yesterday, but must be obeyed in preference to +the temporary commandments of men,'[3] is a protest on behalf of +conscience against human oppression. And even in Euripides, regarded +as an impious scoffer by some scholars,[4] there are not wanting, +especially in the example of Alcestis, evidence of belief in that +divine justice and moral order of which the virtues of self-devotion +and sacrifice in the soul of man are the witness. + +Socrates was among the first teachers of antiquity who led the way to +that self-knowledge which is of the essence of conscience, and in the +'Daemon,' or inner voice, which he claimed to possess, some writers +have detected the trace {70} of the intuitive monitor of man. Plato's +discussion of the question, 'What is the highest good?' involves the +capacity of moral judgment, and his conception of reason regulating +desire suggests a power in the mind whose function it is to point to +the highest good and to subordinate to it all the other impulses of +man. In the ethics of Aristotle there is a reference to a faculty in +man or 'rule within,' which, he says, the beasts lack. + +But it is among the Stoics that the word first appears; and it is to +the Roman moralist, Seneca, that we are indebted for the earlier +definite perception of an abiding consciousness bearing witness +concerning a man's own conduct. The writings of Epictetus, Aurelius, +and Seneca approach in moral sublimity and searching self-analysis the +New Testament Scriptures. It was probably to the Stoics that St. Paul +was indebted for the word _syneidesis_ to which he has given so +distinctive a meaning that it has coloured and determined the whole +later history of the moral consciousness. + +2. But if the word as used in the New Testament comes from Greek +sources the idea itself was long prevalent in the Jewish conception of +life, which, even more than the Greek, was constitutive of, and +preparatory to, the Christian view. The word does not, indeed, occur +in the Old Testament, but the question of God to Adam, 'Where art +thou?' the story of Cain and the curse he was to suffer for the murder +of his brother; the history of Joseph's dealing with his brethren; the +account of David's sin and conviction, are by implication appeals to +conscience. Indeed, the whole history of Israel, from the time when +the promise was given to Abraham and the law through Moses until the +denunciations of wrong-doing and the predictions of doom of the later +prophets, is one long education of the moral sense. It is the problem +of conscience that imparts its chief interest to the book of Job; and +one reason why the Psalms in all ages have been so highly prized is +because they are the cries of a wounded conscience, and the confessions +of a convicted and contrite heart. + +{71} + +3. If we turn to the New Testament we find, as we might expect, a much +clearer testimony to the reality of the conscience. The word came into +the hands of the New Testament writers ready-made, but they gave to it +a richer meaning, so that it is to them we must go if we would +understand the nature and the supremacy of the conscience. The term +occurs thirty-one times in the New Testament, but it does not appear +once in the Gospels. It is, indeed, principally a Pauline expression, +and to the apostle of the Gentiles more than to any other writer is due +the clear conception and elucidation of the term. It would be a +mistake, however, to assume that the doctrine itself depends entirely +upon the use of the word. Our Lord never, indeed, employs the term, +but surely no teacher ever sounded the depths of the human heart as He +did. It was His mission to reveal men to themselves, to convict them +of sin, and show the need of that life of righteousness and purity +which He came to give. 'Why even of yourselves,' He said, 'judge ye +not what is right?' Christ, indeed, might be called the conscience of +man. To awaken, renew and enlighten the moral sense of individuals, to +make them know what they were and what they were capable of becoming +was the work of the Son of Man, and in contact with Him every one was +morally unveiled. + +The word occurs twice in Acts, five times in Hebrews, three times in +the Epistles of Peter, and more than twenty times in the Pauline +Epistles. St. Paul's doctrine of the conscience is contained in Romans +ii. 14, 15, where he speaks of the Gentiles being 'a law unto +themselves,' inasmuch as they possess a 'law written in their hearts,' +'their conscience bearing witness, therewith accusing or excusing +them.' The idea underlying the passage is the responsibility of all +men for their actions, their condemnation in sin, and their acceptance +in righteousness. This applies to Gentiles as well as Jews, and it +applies to them because, though they have not the explicit revelation +of the law, they have a revelation of the good in their hearts. The +passage therefore teaches two things: (1) That man has received a {72} +revelation of good sufficient at all stages of his history to make him +morally responsible; and (2) That man possesses a moral faculty which +indeed is not a separate power, but the whole moral consciousness or +personality in virtue of which he recognises and approves of the good +which, either as the law written in his heart or as the law +communicated in the Decalogue, has been revealed to him, and by whose +authority he judges himself. + +II. _Nature, and Origin of Conscience_.--While experience seems to +point to the existence of something in man witnessing to the right, +there is great diversity of view as to the nature of this moral +element. The word 'Conscience' stands for a concept whose meaning is +far from well defined, and the lack of definiteness has left its trace +upon ethical theories. While some moralists assign conscience to the +rational or intellectual side of man, and make it wholly a faculty of +judgment; others attribute it to feeling or impulse, and make it a +sense of pleasure or pain; others again associate it more closely with +the will, and regard its function to be legislative or imperative. +These differences of opinion reveal the complexity of the nature of +conscience. The fact is, that it belongs to all these departments--the +intellectual, emotional, and volitional--and ought to be regarded not +as a single faculty distinct from the particular decisions, motives, +and acts of man, not as an activity foreign to the ego, but as the +expression of the whole personality. The question of the origin of +conscience, though closely connected with its nature, is for ethics +only of secondary importance. It is desirable, however, to indicate +the two main theories which have been held regarding its genesis. +While there are several varieties, they may be divided broadly into +two--Intuitionalism and Evolutionalism. + +1. _Nativism_, of which Intuitionalism is the most common form, +regards the conscience as a separate natural endowment, coeval with the +creation of man. Every individual, it is maintained, has been endowed +by nature with a distinct faculty or organ by which he can immediately +and clearly {73} pronounce upon the rightness or wrongness of his own +actions. In its most pronounced form this theory maintains that man +has not merely a general consciousness of moral distinctions, but +possesses from the very first, apart from all experience and education, +a definite and clear knowledge of the particular vices which ought to +be avoided and the particular virtues which ought to be practised. +This theory is usually connected with a form of theism which maintains +that the conscience is particularly a divine gift, and is, indeed, +God's special witness or oracle in the heart of man. + +Though there would seem to be an element of truth in intuitionalism, +since man, to be man at all, must be conceived as made for God and +having that in him which points to the end or ideal of his being, still +in its most extreme form it would not be difficult to show that this +theory is untenable. It is objectionable, because it involves two +assumptions, of which the one conflicts with experience, and the other +with the psychological nature of man. + +(1) Experience gives us no warrant for supposing that duty is always +the same, and that conscience is therefore exempt from change. History +shows rather that moral convictions only gradually emerge, and that the +laws and customs of one age are often repudiated by the next. What may +seem right to one man is no longer so to his descendant. History +records deeds committed in one generation in the name of conscience +which in the same name a later generation has condemned with horror. +Moreover, the possibility of a conflict between duties proves that +unconditional truth exists at no stage of moral development. There is +no law so sacred that it may not in special cases have to yield to the +sacredness of a higher law. When duties conflict, our choice cannot be +determined by any _a priori_ principle residing in ourselves. It must +be governed by that wider conception of the moral life which is to be +gained through one's previous development, and on the basis of a ripe +moral experience.[5] (2) Nor is this theory consistent with {74} the +known nature of man. We know of no separate and independent organ +called conscience. Man must not be divided against himself. Reason +and feeling enter into all acts of will, since these are not processes +different in kind, but elements of voluntary activity itself and +inseparable from it. It is impossible for a man to be determined in +his actions or judgments by a mere external formula of duty, a +'categorical imperative,' as Kant calls it, apart from motives. +Moreover, all endowments may be regarded as divine gifts, and it is a +precarious position to claim for one faculty a spiritually divine or +supernatural origin which is denied to others. Man is related to God +in his whole nature. The view which regards the law of duty as +something foreign to man, stern and unchangeable in its decrees, and in +nowise dependent upon the gradual development and growing content of +the moral life is not consistent either with history or psychology. + +2. _Evolutionalism_, which since the time of Darwin has been applied +by Spencer and others to account for the growth of our moral ideas, +holds that conscience is the result of a process of development, but +does not limit the process to the life of the individual. It extends +to the experience of the race. While admitting the existence of +conscience as a moral faculty in the rational man of to-day, it holds +that it did not exist in his primitive ancestors. Earlier individuals +accumulated a certain amount of experience and moral knowledge, the +result of which, as a habit or acquired capacity, was handed down to +their successors. From the first man has been a member of society, and +is what he is in virtue of his relation to it. All that makes him man, +all his powers of body and mind, are inherited. His instincts and +desires, which are the springs of action, are themselves the creation +of heredity, association and environment. The individual takes its +shape at every point from its relation to the social organism of which +it is a part. What man really seeks from the earliest is satisfaction. +'No school,' says Mr. Spencer, 'can avoid taking for the ultimate moral +aim a desirable {75} state of feeling.'[6] Prolonged experience of +pleasure in connection with actions which serve social ends has +resulted in certain physiological changes in the brain and nervous +system rendering these actions constant. Thus, according to Spencer, +is begotten conscience. + +While acknowledging the service which the evolutionary theory has done +in calling attention to the place and function of experience and social +environment in the development of the moral life, and in showing that +moral judgment, like every other capacity, must participate in the +gradual unfolding of personality, as a conclusive explanation of +conscience it must be pronounced insufficient. Press the analysis of +sensation as far back as we please, and make an analysis of instincts +and feelings as detailed as possible, we never get in man a mere +sensation, as we find it in the lower animal; it is always sensation +related to, and modified by, a self. In the simplest human instincts +there is always a spiritual element which is the basis of the +possibility at once of knowledge and morality. 'That countless +generations,' says Green, 'should have passed during which a +transmitted organism was progressively modified by reaction on its +surroundings, by struggle for existence or otherwise, till its +functions became such that an eternal consciousness could realise or +produce itself through them--might add to the wonder with which the +consideration of what we do and are must always fill us, but it could +not alter the results of that consideration.'[7] + +No process of evolution, even though it draws upon illimitable ages, +can evolve what was not already present in the form of a spiritual +potency. The empiric treatment of conscience as the result of social +environment and culture leads inevitably back to the assumption of some +rudimentary moral consciousness without which the development of a +moral sense would be an impossibility. The history of mankind, +moreover, shows that conscience, so far from being merely the reflex of +the prevailing customs and institutions of a particular age, has +frequently {76} closed its special character by reacting upon and +protesting against the recognised traditions of society. The +individual conscience has often been in advance of its times; and the +progress of man has been secured as much by the champions of liberty as +by those who conform to accepted customs. In all moral advance there +comes a stage when, in the conflict of habit and principle, conscience +asserts itself, not only in revealing a higher ideal, but in urging men +to seek it. + +III. _The Validity and Witness of Conscience_.--It is not, however, +with the origin of conscience, but with its capacities and functions in +its developed state that Ethics is primarily concerned. The beginning +must be interpreted by the end, and the process by the result to which +it tends. + +1. The Christian doctrine is committed neither to the intuitional nor +the evolutionist theory, but rather may be said to reconcile both by +retaining that which is true in each. While it holds to the inherent +ability on the part of a being made in God's image to recognise at the +different stages of his growth and development God's will as it has +been progressively revealed, it avoids the necessity of conceiving man +as possessing from the very beginning a full-fledged organ of +infallible authority. The conscience participates in man's general +progress and enlightenment. Nor can the moral development of the +individual be held separate from the moral development of the race. As +there is a moral solidarity of mankind, so the individual conscience is +conditional by the social conscience. The individual does not start in +life with a full-grown moral apparatus any more than he starts with a +matured physical frame. The most distinctively spiritual attainments +of man have their antecedents in less human and more animal capacities. +As there is a continuity of human life, so individuals and peoples +inherit the moral assets of previous generations, and incorporate in +their experience all past attainments. Conscience is involved in man's +moral history. It suffers in his sin and alienation from God, becoming +clouded in its insight and feeble in its testimony, but it shares also +in his {77} spiritual advancement, growing more sensitive and decisive +in its judgments. + +(1) Conscience, as the New Testament teaches, can be _perverted_ and +debased. It is always open to a free agent to disobey his conscience +and reject its authority. On the intuitional theory, which regards the +conscience as a separable and independent faculty, it would be +difficult to vindicate the terrible consequences of such conduct. It +is because the conscience is the man himself as related to the +consciousness of the divine will that the effects are so injurious. +Conscience may be (_a_) _Stained_, defiled, and polluted in its very +texture (1 Cor. viii. 7); (_b_) _Branded_ or seared (1 Tim. iv. 2), +rendered insensible to all feeling for good; (_c_) _Perverted_, in +which the very light within becomes darkness. In this last stage the +man calls evil good and good evil--the very springs of his nature are +poisoned and the avenues of his soul are closed. + + 'This is death, and the sole death, + When man's loss comes to him from his gain.'[8] + + +(2) But if conscience can be perverted it may also be _improved_. The +education is twofold, social and individual. Through society, says +Green, personality is actualised. 'No individual can make a conscience +for himself. He always needs a society to make it for him.'[9] There +is no such thing as a purely individual conscience. Man can only +realise himself, come to his best, in relation to others. The +conditions amid which a man is born and reared--the home, the school, +the church, the state--are the means by which the conscience is +exercised and educated. But the individual is not passive. He has +also a part to play; and the whole task of man may be regarded as an +endeavour to make his conscience effective in life. The New Testament +writers refrain from speaking of the conscience as an unerring and +perfect organ. Their language implies rather the possibility of its +gradual enlightenment; and St. Paul specially dwells upon the necessity +of 'growing in spiritual {78} knowledge and perception.' As life +advances moral judgment may be modified and corrected by fuller +knowledge, and the perception of a particular form of conduct as good +may yield to the experience of something better. + +2. 'It is one of the most wonderful things,' says Professor Wundt, +'about moral development, that it unites so many conditions of +subordinate value in the accomplishment of higher results,'[10] and the +worth of morality is not endangered because the grounds of its +realisation in special cases do not always correspond in elevation to +the moral ideas. The conscience is not an independent faculty which +issues its mandates irrespective of experience. Its judgments are +always conditioned by motives. The moral imperatives of conscience may +be grouped under four heads:[11] (1) _External constraints_, including +all forms of punishment for immoral actions and the social +disadvantages which such actions involve. These can only produce the +lowest grade of morality, outward propriety, the mere appearance of +virtue which has only a negative value in so far as it avoids what is +morally offensive. (2) _Internal constraints_, consisting of +influences excited by the example of others, by public opinion and +habits formed through education and training. (3) _Self-satisfaction_, +originating in the agent's own consciousness. It may be a sense of +pleasure or feeling of self-approbation: or higher still, the idea of +duty for its own sake, commonly called 'conscientiousness.' (4) _The +ideal of life_, the highest imperative of conscience. Here the +nobility of life, as a whole, the supreme life-purpose, gives meaning +and incentive to each and every action. The ideal of life is not, +however, something static and completed, given once and for all. It +grows with the enlightenment of the individual and the development of +humanity. The consciousness of every age comprehends it in certain +laws and ends of life. The highest form of the ideal finds its +embodiment in what are called noble characters. These ethical heroes +rise, in rare and exceptional circumstances, above the ordinary level +of {79} common morality, gathering up into themselves the entire moral +development of the past, and radiating their influence into the +remotest distances of the future. They are the embodiments of the +conscience of the race, at once the standard and challenge of the moral +life of mankind, whose influence awakens the slumbering aspirations of +men, and whose creative genius affects the whole history of the world, +lifting it to higher levels of thought and endeavour. + +The supreme example--unique, however, both in kind and degree, and +differing by its uniqueness from every other life which has in some +measure approximated to the ideal--is disclosed in Jesus Christ. Thus +it is that the moral consciousness of the world generally and of the +individual in particular, of which the conscience is the organ and +expression, develops from less to more, under the influence of the +successive imperatives of conduct, till finally it attains to the +vision of the greatness of life as it is revealed in its supreme and +all-commanding ideal.[12] + +3. Finally, in this connection the question of the _permanence of +conscience_ may be referred to. Is the ultimate of life a state in +which conscience will pervade every department of a man's being, +dominating all his thoughts and activities? or is the ideal condition +one in which conscience shall be outgrown and its operation rendered +superfluous? A recent writer on Christian ethics[13] makes the +remarkable statement that where there is no sense of sin conscience has +no function, and he draws the inference that where there is complete +normality and perfect moral health conscience will be in abeyance. +Satan, inasmuch as he lacks all moral instinct, can know nothing of +conscience; and, because of His sinlessness, Jesus must also be +pronounced conscienceless. Hence the paradox attributed to +Machiavelli: 'He who is without conscience is either a Christ or a +devil.' But though it is true that the Son of Man had no actual +experience of sin, and could not, indeed, feel remorse or contrition, +yet in so far as He was man there was in Him {80} the possibility of +sin, and in the intimate relation which He bore to the human race He +had a most accurate and clear knowledge both of the meaning and +consequences of evil. So far from saying that Christ had no +conscience, it would be nearer the truth to say that He had a perfect +conscience, a personality and fullness of consciousness which was a +complete reflection of, and harmony with, the highest conceivable good. +The confusion of thought into which Professor Lemme seems to fall is +due, we cannot help thinking, to the too restricted and negative +signification he gives to conscience. Conscience is not merely the +faculty of reproving and approving one's own conduct when brought into +relation with actual sin. It is involved in every moral judgment. A +good conscience is not only the absence of an evil one. It has also a +positive sanctioning value. The 'ought' of life is constantly present. +It is the whole man ever conscious of, and confronted by, his ideal +self. The conscience participates in man's gradual progress and +enlightenment; so far from the individual growing towards a condition +in which self-judgment ceases, he is progressing rather in moral +discernment, and becoming more and more responsive to the will of Him +whose impress and image he bears upon his soul. + +The tendency of modern physiological accounts of conscience has been to +undermine its authority and empty life of its responsibility, but no +theory of the origin of conscience must be permitted to invalidate its +judgments. If conscience has any moral worth it is that it contains +the promise and witness of God. The prime question is, What is the +nature of its testimony? According to the teaching of Scripture it +bears witness to the existence of a higher than man--to a divine Person +with whom he is spiritually akin and to whom he is accountable. + +'God's most intimate presence in the soul.' As the revelation of God's +will grows clearer man's ideal becomes loftier. Hence a man's +conscience is the measure of his moral life. It reveals God, and in +the light of God reveals man to himself. We carry a 'forever' within +our bosom, {81} 'ein Gott in unserer Brust,'[14] as Goethe says, which +reminds us that even while denizens of this earth we are citizens of +heaven and the sharers of an eternal life. Like another John the +Baptist, conscience points to one greater than itself. It emphasises +the discord that exists between the various parts of man's nature, a +discord which it condemns but cannot remove. It can judge, but it +cannot compel. Hence it places man before Christ, and bids him yield +to the sway of a new transforming power. As one has finely said, 'He +who has implanted in every breast such irrefragible testimony to the +right, and such unappeasable yearnings for its complete triumph, now +comes in His own perfect way to reveal Himself as the Lord of +conscience, the Guide of its perplexities, the Strength of its weakness +and the Perfecter of its highest hopes.'[15] + + + +[1] Davidson, _The Christian Conscience_. + +[2] Cf. Symonds, _Studies of Greek Poets_, first series, p. 191. + +[3] _Antigone_, Plumptre's Trans., 455-9. + +[4] Cf. Bunsen, _God in History_, vol. ii. p. 224; also Campbell, +_Religion in Greek Literature_. + +[5] Cf. Wundt, _Ethik_, vol. ii. p. 66. + +[6] _Data of Ethics_, p. 18. + +[7] _Proleg._, section 83. + +[8] Browning. + +[9] _Proleg._, section 321. + +[10] _Ethik_, vol. ii. p. 66. + +[11] _Idem_. + +[12] Cf. Wundt, _Ethik_, vol. ii. pp. 67-74. + +[13] Lemme, _Christliche Ethik_, vol. i. + +[14] _Tasso_, act iii. scene 2. + +[15] Davidson, _The Christian Conscience_, p. 113. + + + + +{82} + +CHAPTER VI + +'THE MIRACLE OF THE WILL' + +Closely connected with the conscience as a moral capacity is the power of +self-determination, or as it is popularly called--free-will. If +conscience is the manifestation of man as knowing, will is more +especially his manifestation as a being who acts. The subject which we +now approach presents at once a problem and a task. The nature of +freedom has been keenly debated from the earliest times, and the history +of the problem of the will is almost the history of philosophy. The +practical question which arises is whether the individual has any power +by which the gulf between the natural and the spiritual can be +transcended. Can man choose and decide for a spiritual world above that +in which he is by nature involved? The revelation of the good must, +indeed, precede the activity of man. But at the same time the change +cannot merely happen to him. He cannot simply be a passive recipient. +The new life must be taken up by his own activity, and be made his by his +own decision and acceptance. This responsive activity on the part of man +is the task which life presents to the will. + +Much obviously depends upon the answer we are able to give to this +question. If man has no power of choice, no capacity of +self-determination, and is nothing more than a part of the natural world, +then the ethical life is at once ruled out of court. + +The difficulties connected with the problem of moral freedom resolve +themselves mainly into three: a scientific, a psychological, and a +theological. + +{83} + +I. On the part of natural science it is claimed that man is subject, +like everything else, to physical necessity. + +II. From the psychological standpoint it is urged that man's actions are +always determined by the strongest motive. + +III. On the theological side it is alleged that human freedom is +incompatible with divine Sovereignty. A complete doctrine of freedom +would require to be examined in the light of these three objections. For +our purpose it will be sufficient to indicate briefly the value of these +difficulties, and the manner in which they may be met. + + +I + +The wonderful progress of the natural sciences in the second half of the +nineteenth century has tended to banish the old idea of freedom from the +realm of experience. Science, it is maintained, clearly shows that man +belongs to a great world-movement, in relation to which his whole life +and work are completely determined. Though even in earlier ages, and +especially in Stoic philosophy, this conception of life was not ignored, +it is more particularly in recent times, under the influence of the +evolutionary theory, that the idea of determination has been applied with +relentless insistence to the structure of the soul. There is, it is +alleged, no room for change or spontaneity. Everything, down to the +minutest impulse, depends upon something else, and proceeds from a +definite cause. The idea of choice is simply the remnant of an +unscientific mode of thinking. It might be sufficient to reply that in +thus reducing life and experience to a necessary part of a world-whole, +more is surrendered than even science is willing to yield. The freedom +which some writers reject in the interests of science they attempt to +introduce in an altered form. Why are these philosophers so anxious to +conserve the ethical consequences of life? Is it not because they feel +that there is something in man which will not fit into a rigid +world-mechanism, and that conduct would cease {84} to have moral worth if +life were reduced to a causal series of happenings? But it may be +further argued that, if the mechanical conception of life, which reduces +the spiritual to the natural, were consistently carried out it would lead +not merely to the destruction of the moral life, but to the destruction +of science itself. If man is merely a part of nature, subject entirely +to nature's law, then the realities of the higher life--love, +self-sacrifice, devotion to ends beyond ourselves--must be radically +re-interpreted or regarded simply as illusions. But it is also true that +from this standpoint science itself is an illusion. For if reality lies +only in the passing impressions of our sensible nature, the claim of +science to find valid truth must end in the denial of the very +possibility of knowledge. Does not the very existence of physical +science imply the priority of thought? While in one sense it may be +conceded that man is a part of nature, does not the truth, which cannot +be gainsaid, that he is aware of the fact, prove a certain priority and +power which differentiates him from all other phenomena of the universe? +If he is a link in the chain of being, he is at least a link which is +conscious of what he is. He is a being who knows himself, indeed, +through the objective world, but also realises himself only as he makes +himself its master and the agent of a divine purpose to which all things +are contributing, and for which all things exist. In all our reasoning +and endeavour we must start from the unity of the self-conscious soul. +Whatever we can either know or achieve, is _our_ truth, _our_ act +presented in and through our self-consciousness. It is impossible for us +to conceive any standard of truth or object of desire outside of our +experience. As a thinking and acting being man pursues ends, and has the +consciousness that they are his own ends, subject to his own choice and +control. It is always the self that the soul seeks; and the will is +nothing else than the man making and finding for himself another world. + +The attempt has recently been made to measure mental states by their +physical stimuli and explain mental {85} processes by cerebral reaction. +It is true that certain physical phenomena seem to be invariably +antecedent to thought, but so far science has been unable to exhibit the +form of nexus between these physical antecedents and ideas. Even if the +knowledge of the topography of the brain were immeasurably more advanced +than it now is, even though we could observe the vast network of +nerve-fibres and filaments of which the brain is composed, and could +discern the actual changes in brain-cells under nerve stimulations, we +should still be a long way off from understanding the nature and genesis +of ideas which can only be known to us as immediate in their own quality. +All that we can ever affirm is that a certain physical excitation is the +antecedent of thought. It is illegitimate to say that it is the 'cause' +of thought; unless, indeed, the word 'cause' be invested with no other +meaning than that which is involved in such a conception. It is, +however, in a very general way only, and within an exceedingly narrow +range, that such measurement is possible. We do not even know at present +what nerves correspond to the sensations of heat and cold, pain and joy; +and all attempts to localise will-centres have proved unavailing. + +The finer and more delicate feelings cannot be gauged. But even though +the alleged parallelism were entirely demonstrated, the immediate and +pertinent question would still remain, Who or what is the investigator? +Is it an ego, a thinking self? or is it only a complex of vibrations or +mechanical impressions bound together in a particular body which, for +convenience, is called an ego? Are the so-called entities--personality, +consciousness, self--but symbols, as Professor Mach says, useful in so +far as they help us to express our physical sensations, but which with +further research must be pronounced illusions?[1] Monistic naturalism, +which would explain all psychical experiences in terms of cerebral +action, must not be allowed to arrogate to itself powers which it does +not possess, and quietly brush {86} aside facts which do not fit into its +system. The moral sanctions so universally and deeply rooted in the +consciousness of mankind, the feelings of responsibility, of guilt and +regret; the soul's fidelities and heroisms, its hopes and fears, its aims +and ideals--the poetry, art, and religion that have made man what he is, +all that has contributed to the uplifting of the world--are, to say the +least, unaccounted for, if it must be held that 'man is born in chains.' +Primary facts must not be surrendered nor ultimate experiences sacrificed +in the interests of theoretic simplicity. In the recent +anti-metaphysical movement of Germany, of which Haeckel, Avenarius, +Oswald and Mach are representatives, there is presented the final +conflict. It is not freedom of will only that is at stake, it is the +very existence of a spiritual world. 'Es ist der Kampf um die Seele.'[2] + +If the world forms a closed and 'given' system in which every particular +is determined completely by its position in the whole, then there can be +no place for spontaneity, initiative, creation, which all investigation +shows to be the distinctive feature in human progress and upward +movement. So far from its being true that the world makes man, it would +be nearer the truth to say that man makes the world. A 'given' world can +never be primary.[3] There must be a mind behind it. We fall back, +therefore, upon the principle which must be postulated in the whole +discussion--the unity and self-determining activity of the self-conscious +mind. + + +II + +We may now proceed to the second problem of the will, the objection that +human action is determined by motives, and that what we call freedom is +nothing else than the necessary result of the pressure of motives upon +the will. In other words, the conduct of the individual is always +determined by the strongest motive. It will be seen on examination that +this objection is just another form of that which we have already +considered. Indeed, the {87} analogy of mechanical power is frequently +applied to the motives of the will. Diverse motives have been compared +to different forces which meet in one centre, and it is supposed that the +result in action is determined by the united pressure of these various +motives. Now it may be freely admitted at the outset that the individual +never acts except under certain influences. An uninfluenced man, an +unbiassed character cannot exist. Not for one moment do we escape the +environment, material and moral, which stimulates our inner life to +reaction and response. It is not contended that a man is independent of +all motives. What we do affirm is that the self-realising potentiality +of personality is present throughout. Much of the confusion of thought +in connection with this subject arises from a false and inadequate notion +of personality. Personality is the whole man, all that his past history, +present circumstances and future aims have made him, the result of all +that the world of which he is a part has contributed to his experience. +His bodily sensations, his mental acts, his desires and motives are not +detached and extraneous forces acting on him from without, but elements +which constitute his whole being. The person, in other words, is the +visible or tangible phenomenon of something inward--the phase or function +by which an individual agent takes his place in the common world of human +intercourse and interaction, and plays his peculiar and definite part in +life.[4] But this totality of consciousness, so far from reducing man to +a 'mere manufactured article,' gives to personality its unique +distinction. By personality all things are dominated. 'Other things +exist, so to speak, for the sake of their kind and for the sake of other +things: a person is never a mere means to something beyond, but always at +the same time an end in himself. He has the royal and divine right of +creating law, of starting by his exception a new law which shall +henceforth be a canon and a standard.'[5] + +{88} + +The objection to the freedom of the will which we are now considering may +be best appreciated if we examine briefly the two extreme theories which +have been maintained on the subject. On the one hand, _determinism_ or, +as it is sometimes called, necessitarianism, holds that all our actions +are conditioned by law--the so-called motive that influences a man's +conduct is simply a link in a chain of occurrences of which his act is +the last. The future has no possibilities hidden in its womb. I am +simply what the past has made me. My circumstances are given, and my +character is simply the necessary resultant of the natural forces that +act upon me. On the other hand, _indeterminism_, or libertarianism, +insists upon absolute liberty of choice of the individual, and denies +that necessity or continuity determines conduct. Of two alternatives +both may now be really possible. You can never predict what will be, nor +lay down absolutely what a man will do. The world is not a finished and +fixed whole. It admits of infinite possibilities, and instead of the +volition I have actually made, I could just as easily have made a +different one. + +Without entering upon a detailed criticism of these two positions, it may +be said that both contain an element of truth and are not so +contradictory as they seem. On the one hand, all the various factors of +the complex will may seem to be determined by something that lies beyond +our control, and thus our will itself be really determined. But, on the +other hand, moral continuity in its last analysis is only a half truth, +and must find its complement in the recognition of the possibilities of +new beginnings. The very nature of moral action implies, as Lotze has +said, that new factors may enter into the stream of causal sequence, and +that even though a man's life may be, and must be, largely conditioned by +his circumstances, his activity may be really originative and free. What +the determinists seem to forget is, as Green says, that 'character is +only formed through a man's conscious presentation to himself of objects +as _his_ good, as that in which his self-satisfaction is found.'[6] {89} +Desires are always for objects which have a value for the individual. A +man's real character is reflected in his desires, and it is not that he +is moved by some outside abstract force, which, being the strongest, he +cannot resist, but it is because he puts _himself_ into the desire or +motive that it becomes the strongest, the one which he chooses to follow. +My motives are really part of myself, of which all my actions are the +outcome. Human desires, in short, are not merely external tendencies +forcing a man this way or that way. They are a part of the man himself, +and are always directed towards objects related to a self; and it is the +satisfaction of self that makes them desirable. + +On the other hand, the fallacy lurking in the libertarian view arises +from the fact that it also makes a hard and fast distinction between the +self and the will. The indeterminists speak as if the self had amongst +its several faculties a will which is free in the sense of being able to +act independently of all desires and motives. But, as a matter of fact, +the will, as we have said, is simply the man, and it cannot be separated +from his history, his character, and the objects which his character +desires. To speak, as people sometimes do in popular language, of being +free to do as they like--that is, to be influenced by no motive whatever, +is not only an idea absurd in itself, but one which, if pushed to its +consequences, would be subversive of all freedom, and consequently of all +moral value. 'The liberty of indifference,' if the phrase means anything +at all, implies not merely that the agent is free from all external +compulsion, but that he is free from himself, not determined even by his +own character. And if we ask what it really is that causes him to act, +it must be answered, some caprice of the moment, some accidental impulse +or arbitrary freak of fancy. The late Professor James makes a valiant +attempt to solve the 'dilemma of determinism' by resorting to the idea of +'chance' which he defines as a 'purely relative term, giving us no +information about that which is predicated, except that it happens to be +disconnected with something else--not controlled, secured or {90} +necessitated by other things in advance of its own actual presence.'[7] +'On my way home,' he says, 'I can choose either of two ways'; and suppose +'the choice is made twice over and each time falls on a different +street.' 'Imagine that I first walk through Divinity Avenue, and then am +set again at the door of this hall just as I was before the choice was +made. Imagine then that, _everything else being the same_,[8] I now make +a different choice and traverse Oxford Street. Looking outwardly at +these universes of which my two acts are a part, can you say which is the +impossible and accidental one and which the rational and necessary one?' +Perhaps an outsider could not say, but Professor James, if he examined +his reasons, could say. He assumes that 'everything else is the same.' +But that is just what cannot be. A new factor has been introduced, it +may be a whim, a sudden impulse, perhaps even a desire to upset +calculation--a something in his character in virtue of which his second +choice is different from his first. It is an utter misnomer to call it +'chance.' Even though he had tossed a coin and acted on the throw, his +action would still be determined by the kind of man he was. + +Let us not seek to defend freedom on inadequate grounds, or contend for a +spurious liberty. No view of the subject should indeed debar us from +acknowledging 'changes in heart and life,' but a misunderstanding of the +doctrine of freedom may tend to paralyse moral initiative. The attempt +to sunder the will and the understanding and discover the source of +freedom in the realm of the emotions, as the voluntarists seek to do, +cannot be regarded as satisfactory or sound philosophy. In separating +faith and knowledge the Ritschlian school tends to make subjective +feeling the measure of truth and life; while recent psychological +experiments in America with the phenomena of faith-healing, hypnotism and +suggestion, claim to have discovered hitherto unsuspected potencies of +the will. This line of thought has been welcomed by many as a relief +from the mechanical theory of life and as a witness to moral {91} freedom +and Christian hope. But so far from proving the sovereignty and autonomy +of the will, it discloses rather the possibilities of its abject bondage +and thraldom. + +No one can doubt the facts which Professor James and others, working from +the side of religious psychology, have recently established, or discredit +the instances of conversion to which the annals of the Christian life so +abundantly testify. But even conversion must not be regarded as a change +without motives. There must be some connection between motive, character +and act, otherwise the new spiritual experience would be simply a magical +happening lacking all moral significance. If there were no continuity of +consciousness, if I could be something to-day irrespective of what I was +yesterday, then all we signify by contrition, penitence, and shame would +have no real meaning. Even the grace of God works through natural +channels and human influences. The past is not so much obliterated, as +taken up into the new life and transfigured with a new value. + +The truth of spontaneity and initiative in life has lately found in M. +Bergson a fresh and vigorous advocacy, and we cannot be too grateful to +that profound thinker for his reassertion of some neglected aspects of +freedom and his philosophical vindication of the doctrine which puts it +in a new position of prominence and security. 'Life is Creation.' +'Reality is a perpetual growth, a Creation pursued without end.' 'Our +will performs this miracle.' 'Every human work in which there is +invention, every movement that manifests spontaneity brings something new +into the world. In the composition of the work of genius, as in a simple +free decision, we create what no mere assemblage of materials could have +given.'[9] But yet he says that 'life cannot create absolutely because +it is confronted with matter. . . . But it seizes upon this matter which +is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the greatest +possible amount of indetermination and liberty.'[10] Even Bergson, +though he emphasises so strongly immediacy and incalculableness in {92} +all human action, cannot deny that the bodily arrangements and mechanisms +are at least the basis of the working of the soul. Man cannot produce +any change in the world except in strict co-ordination with the forces +and qualities of material things. The idea in his consciousness is +powerless save in so far as it is a guide to combinations and +modifications which are latent in reality. The man who works with his +hands does not create out of nothing a new totality. Even genius is +conditioned by the elements he works with and upon. He can do nothing +with his materials beyond what it is in themselves to yield. This sense +of co-operation is strongly marked in the higher grades of activity. The +world may be in the making, as Bergson says, but it is being made of +possibilities already inherent in it. Life may be incalculable, and you +can never know beforehand what a great man, indeed, what any man may +achieve, but even the originality of a Leonardo or a Beethoven cannot +effect the impossible or contradict the order of nature. The sculptor +feels that the statue is already lying in the marble awaiting only his +creative touch to bring it forth. The metal is alive in the worker's +hands, coaxing him to make of it something beautiful.[11] Purpose does +not come out of an empty mind. Freedom and initiative never begin +entirely _de novo_. Life is a 'creation,' but it is also, as M. Bergson +labours to prove, an 'evolution.' Our ideals are made out of realities. +Our heaven must be shaped out of the materials of our earth. + +A moral personality is a self-conscious, self-determining being. But +that is only half the reality. The other half is that it is a +self-determining consciousness _in a world_. As Bergson is careful to +tell us, the shape and extent of self-consciousness are determined by our +relation to a world which acts upon us and upon which we act. Without a +world in which we had personal business we should have no +self-consciousness. + +The co-operation of spontaneity and necessity is implied {93} in every +true idea of freedom. If a man were the subject of necessity alone he +would be merely the creature of mechanical causation. If he had the +power of spontaneity only his so-called freedom would be a thing of +caprice. Necessity means simply that man is conditioned by the world in +which he lives. Spontaneity means, not that he can conjure up at a wish +a dream-world of no conditions, but that he is not determined by anything +outside of himself, since the very conditions amid which he is placed may +be transmuted by him into elements of his own character. Moral decisions +are never isolated from ideals and tasks presented by our surroundings. +The self cannot act on any impulse however external till the impulse has +transplanted itself within and become our motive. + +'Our life,' says Eucken, 'is a conflict between fate and freedom, between +being "given" and spontaneity. Spiritual individuality does not come to +any one, but has first to be won by the work of life, elevating that +which destiny brings. . . . The idea of freedom calls man to independent +co-operation in the conflict of the worlds. It gives to the simply human +and apparently commonplace an incomparable greatness. However powerful +destiny may be, it does not determine man entirely: for even in +opposition to it there is liberation from it.'[12] + + +III + +It will not be necessary to dwell at any length on the third +difficulty--the incompatibility of divine sovereignty and grace with +moral personality. + +How to reconcile divine power and human freedom is the great problem +which meets us on the very threshold of the study of man's relation to +God. The solution, in so far as it is possible for the mind, must be +sought in the divine immanence. God works through man, and man acts +through God. Reason, conscience, and will are equally the testimony to +God's indwelling in man and man's {94} indwelling in God. It is, as St. +Paul says, God who worketh in us both to will and to do. But just +because of that inherent power, it is we who work out our own character +and destiny. The divine is not introduced into human life at particular +points or in exceptional crises only. Every man has something of the +divine in him, and when he is truest to himself he is most at one with +God. The whole meaning of human personality is a growing realisation of +the divine personality. God's sovereignty has no meaning except in +relation to a world of which He is sovereign, and His purposes can only +be fulfilled through human agency. While His thoughts far transcend in +wisdom and sublimity those of His creatures they must be in a sense of +the same kind--thoughts, in other words, which beings made in His image +can receive, love and, in a measure, share. And though God cannot be +conceived as the author of evil, He may permit it and work through it, +bringing order out of chaos, and evolving through suffering and conflict +His sovereign purposes. + +The problem becomes acutest when we endeavour to harmonise the antinomy +of man's moral freedom and the doctrine of grace. However insoluble the +mystery, it is not lessened by denying one side in the interest of unity. +Scripture boldly affirms both truths. No writer insists more strenuously +than the Apostle Paul on the sovereign election of God, yet none presents +with greater fervour the free offer of salvation. In his ethical +teaching, at least, Paul is no determinist. Freedom is the distinctive +note of his conception of life. Life is a great and solemn trust +committed to each by God, for the use or abuse of which every man will be +called to account. His missionary zeal would have no meaning if he did +not believe that men were free to accept or refuse his message. Paul's +own example, indeed, is typical, and while he knew that he was 'called,' +he knew, too, that it lay with him to yield himself and present his life +as a living sacrifice to God. Jesus, too, throughout His ministry, +assumed the ability of man freely to accept His call to righteousness, +and though He speaks {95} of the change as a 'new birth,' a creation from +above, beyond the strength of man to effect, He invariably makes His +appeal to the will--'Follow Me,' 'Come unto Me.' He assumes in all His +dealings with individuals that they have the power of decision. And so +far from admitting that the past could not be undone, and no chain of +habit broken, the whole purpose of His message and lifework was to +proclaim the need and possibility of a radical change in life. So full +of hope was He for man that He despaired of none, not even of those who +had most grievously failed, or most utterly turned their back on purity. +The parables in the Third Gospel of the lost coin, the lost sheep, and +the lost son lay emphasis upon the possibility of recovery, and, in the +case of the prodigal, specially on the ability to return for those who +have gone astray. + +The teaching of Scripture implies that while God is the source of all +spiritual good, and divine grace must be present with and precede all +rightful action of the human will, it rests with man to respond to the +divine love. No human soul is left destitute of the visiting of God's +spirit, and however rudimentary the moral life may be, no bounds can be +set to the growth which may, and which God intends should, result +wherever the human will is consentient. While, therefore, no man can +claim merit in the sight of God, but must acknowledge his absolute +dependency upon divine grace, no one can escape loss or blame if he +wilfully frustrates God's design of mercy. Whatever mystery may attend +the subject of God's sovereign grace, the Bible never presents it as +negating the entire freedom of man to give or withhold response to the +gift and leading of the divine spirit. + +In the deepest New Testament sense to be free is to have the power of +acting according to one's true nature. A man's ideal is his true self, +and all short of that is for him a limitation of freedom. Inasmuch as no +ideal is ever completely realised, true freedom is not so much a +possession as a progressive appropriation. It is at once a gift and a +task. It contains the twofold idea of emancipation {96} and submission. +Mere deliverance from the lower self is not liberty. Freedom must be +completed by the appropriation of the higher self and the acceptance of +the obligations which that self involves. It is to be acquired through +submission to the truth. 'Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall +make you free.' A man is never so free as when he is the bondsman of +Christ. The saying of St. Paul sums up the secret and essence of all +true freedom: 'The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me +free from the law of sin and death.' + + + +[1] Mach, _Erkenntniss und Irrtum_. Vorwort. See also _Die Analyse der +Empfindungen_, p. 20. 'Das Sich ist unrettbar,' he says. + +[2] Cf. W. Schmidt, _Der Kampf um die Seele_, p. 13. + +[3] Cf. Eucken. + +[4] Cf. Wallace, _Logic of Hegel, Proleg._, p. 233. + +[5] Wallace, _Idem_, p. 235. Cf. Aristotle's wise man whose conduct is +not _kata logon_ but _meta logon_. + +[6] _Proleg._, section 108. + +[7] _The Will to Believe_, p. 154. + +[8] _The italics are ours_. + +[9] _Creative Evolution_ (Eng. trans.), p. 252. + +[10] _Idem_, p. 265. + +[11] Cf. Morris, _Lects. on Art_, p. 195; Bosanquet, _Hist. of +Aesthetic_, p. 445; also _Individuality and Value_, p. 166. + +[12] _Life's Basis and Life's Ideals_, p. 181 f. + + + + +{97} + +SECTION C + +CHARACTER + +{99} + +CHAPTER VII + +MODERN THEORIES OF LIFE + +Bearing in mind the three fundamental ideas lying at the root of all +ethical inquiry--End, Norm, and Motive--we have now to deal with the +shaping forces of the Christian life, the making of character. In this +section, therefore, we shall be engaged in a discussion of the ideals, +laws, and springs of moral action. And first, What is the supreme good? +What is the highest for which a man should live? This question +determines the main problem of life. It forces itself irresistibly upon +us to-day, and the answer to it is the test of every system of morals. + +But before endeavouring to determine the distinctively Christian ideal, +as presented in the teaching of Jesus and interpreted by the growing +Christian consciousness of mankind, it may be well to review briefly some +of the main theories of life which are pressing their claims upon our +attention to-day. Many of these modern views have arisen as a reaction +against traditional religion. From the seventeenth century onwards, and +especially during the nineteenth, there has been a growing disposition to +call in question the Christian conception of life. The antagonism +reveals itself not only in a distrust of all forms of religion, but also +in a craving for wider culture. The old certitudes fail to satisfy men +who have acquired new habits of reflection, and there is a disinclination +to accept a scheme of life which seems to narrow human interests and +exclude such departments as science, art, and politics. One reason of +this change is to be found in the wonderful advance of science during the +last century. Men's minds, withdrawn {100} from primary, and fixed upon +secondary causes, have refused to believe that the order of nature can be +disturbed by supernatural intervention. Whether the modern antipathy to +Christianity is justified is not the question at present before us. We +may see in the movements of our day not so much a proof that the old +faith is false, as an indication that if Christianity is to regain its +power a radical re-statement of its truths, and a more comprehensive +application of its principles to life as a whole must be undertaken. + +In the endeavour to find an all-embracing ideal of life two possibilities +present themselves, arising from two different ways of viewing man. +Human life is in one aspect receptive; in another, active. It may be +regarded as dependent upon nature for its maintenance, or as a creative +power whose function is not merely to receive what nature supplies, but +to re-shape nature's materials and create a new spiritual world. +Receptivity and activity are inseparable, and form together the +harmonious rhythm of life. + +But there has ever been a tendency to emphasise one or other of these +aspects. The question has constantly arisen, Which is the more important +for life--what we receive or what we create? Accordingly two contrasted +conceptions of life have appeared--a naturalistic and an idealistic. +Under the first we understand those theories which place man in the realm +of sense and explain life by material conditions; under the second we +group such systems as give to life an independent creative power. + + +I + +NATURALISTIC TENDENCY + +1. Naturalism has usually taken three forms, an idyllic or poetic, a +philosophic, and a scientific, of which Rousseau, Feuerbach, and Haeckel +may be chosen as representatives. + +(1) According to Rousseau, man is really a part of nature, {101} and only +as he conforms to her laws and finds his satisfaction in what she gives +can he be truly happy. Nature is the mother of us all, and only as we +allow her spirit to pervade and nourish our being do we really live. The +watchword, 'back to nature' may be said to have given the first impulse +to the later call of the 'simple life,' which has arisen as a protest +against the luxury, ostentation, and artificiality of modern times. + +(2) The philosophical form of naturalism, as expounded by Feuerbach, +inveighs against an idealistic interpretation of life. The author of +_The Essence of Christianity_ started as a disciple of Hegel, but soon +reversed the Hegelian principle, and pronounced the spiritual world to be +a fiction of the mind. Man belongs essentially to the earth, and is +governed by his senses. Self-interest is his only motive, and egoism his +sole law of life. It was only what might be expected, that the ultimate +consequences of this philosophy of the senses should be drawn by a +disciple of Feuerbach, Max Stirner,[1] in whose work, _The Individual and +His Property_, the virtues of egoism are extolled, and contempt is poured +upon all disinterestedness and altruism. + +(3) The latest form of naturalism is the scientific or monistic, as +represented by Haeckel. It may be described as scientific in so far as +its author professes to deduce the moral life from biological principles. +In the chapter[2] devoted to Ethics in his work, _The Riddle of the +Universe_, his pronouncements upon morality are not scientifically +derived, but simply dogmatically assumed. The underlying principle of +monism is that the universe is a unity in which no distinction exists +between the material and the spiritual. In this world as we know it +there reigns only one kind of law, the invariable law of nature. The +so-called spiritual life of man is not an independent realm having its +own rights and aims; it belongs wholly to nature. The moral world is a +province of the physical, and the key to all the departments of reality +is to be found in science {102} alone. The doctrine of evolution is +brought into the service of monism, and the attempt is made to prove that +in the very process of biological development human thought, moral +sentiment, and social instincts have been evolved. With a curious +sacrifice of consistency, Haeckel does not agree with Feuerbach in +exalting egoism to the place of supremacy in the moral life. He +recognises two kinds of duty--duty to self and duty to society. The +social sense once created is permanent, and rises to ever-fresh +developments. But benevolence, like every other obligation, is, +according to evolutionary monism, a product evolved from the battle of +existence. Traced to its source, it has its spring in the physical +organism, and is but an enlargement of the ego.[3] + +The monistic naturalism of Haeckel offers no high ideal to life. Its +Ethics is but a glorified egoism. Its dictates never rise above the +impulses derived from nature. But not religion only with its kingdom of +God, nor morality only with its imperatives, nor art with its power of +idealising the world of nature, but even science itself, with its claim +to unify and organise facts, proves that man stands apart from, and is +higher than, the material world. The very existence of such activities +in the invisible realm renders vain every attempt to reduce the spiritual +to the natural, and to make truth, goodness and beauty mere outgrowths of +nature. + +2. On its ethical side naturalism is closely associated with the theory +of life which bears the name of _utilitarianism_--the theory which +regards pleasure or profit as the aim of man. In its most independent +form Hedonism can hardly be said to exist now as a reasoned theory. +Carried out to its extreme consequences it reduces man to a mere animal. +Hence a type of reflective egoism has taken the place of animal +gratification, and the idea of ulterior benefit has succeeded to that of +immediate pleasure. + +The names associated with this theory of morals are those of Hobbes, +Bentham, and the two Mills. Hobbes, {103} who preaches undiluted +egoism,[4] may be regarded as the father of utilitarianism. But the +title was first applied to the school of Bentham.[5] Bentham's watchword +was 'utility' expressed in his famous formula--'The greatest happiness of +the greatest number.' While renouncing the abstract ideal of equality, +he yet asserted the equal claim of every individual to happiness. In its +distribution 'each is to count for one, and no one for more than one.' +Hence Bentham insisted upon an exact quantitative calculation of the +consequences of our actions as the only sufficient guide to conduct. The +end is the production of the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain. + +J. S. Mill modified considerably the principle of utility by introducing +the doctrine of the qualitative difference in pleasures.[6] While Bentham +assumed self-interest as the only motive of conduct, Mill affirmed the +possibility of altruism in the motive as well as in the end or criterion +of right actions.[7] Thus the idea of utility was extended to embrace +higher moral ends. But the antithesis between the 'self' and the 'other' +was not overcome. To introduce the notion of sympathy, as Adam Smith and +others did, is to beg the question. Try as you will, you cannot deduce +benevolence from selfishness. The question for the utilitarian must +always arise, 'How far ought I to follow my natural desires, and how far +my altruistic?' There must be a constant conflict, and he can only be at +peace with himself by striking a balance. The utilitarian must be a +legalist. The principle of self-sacrifice does not spring from his inner +being. Truth, love, sacrifice--all that gives to man his true worth as a +being standing in vital relation to God--are only artificial adaptations +based on convenience and general advantage. + +3. Evolutionary ethics, as expounded by Spencer and others, though +employing utilitarian principles, affords an ampler and more plausible +account of life than early {104} Hedonism.[8] The evolutionists have +enriched the idea of happiness by quietly slipping in many ends which +really belong to the idea of the 'good.' As the term 'gravitation' was +the magic word of the eighteenth century, so the word 'evolution' is the +talisman of the present age. It must be admitted that it is a sublime +and fruitful idea. It explains much in nature and history which the old +static notion failed to account for. It has a great deal to teach us +even in the spiritual sphere. But when applied to life as a whole, and +when it is assumed to be the sole explanation of moral action, it is apt +to rob the will of its initiative and reduce all moral achievements to +merely natural factors in an unfolding drama of life. The soul itself, +with all its manifestations and experiences, is treated simply as the +resultant and harmonious effect of adaptation to environment. Man is +regarded as the highest animal, the most richly specialised organism--the +last of a long series in the development of life, the outstanding feature +of which is the acquired power of complete adjustment to the world, of +which it is a part. Strictly speaking, there is no room for a personal +God in this mechanical theory of the universe. The world becomes +inevitably 'the Be all and the End all.' Hence, as might be expected, +while evolutionary Ethics claims to cover the whole range of this present +life, it does not pretend to extend into the regions of the hereafter. +It is concerned only with what it conceives to be the highest earthly +good--the material and social well-being of mankind. But no theory of +life can be pronounced satisfactory which explains man in terms of this +earth alone. The 'Great Unknown' which Mr. Spencer posits[9] as the +ultimate source of all power, is a force to be reckoned with; and, known +or unknown, is the mightiest factor in all life's experiences. Man's +spiritual nature in its whole range cannot be treated as of no account. +'The powers of the world to come' have an essential bearing upon human +{105} conduct in this world. They shape our thoughts and determine our +ideals. Hence any view of life which excludes from consideration the +spiritual side of man, and limits his horizon by the things of this earth +must of necessity be inadequate and unsatisfactory. + +4. Closely connected with, and, indeed, arising out of, the evolutionary +theory, another type of thought, prevalent to-day, falls to be +noted--_the socialistic tendency_. It is now universally recognised that +the individual cannot be treated as an isolated being, but only in +relation to society of which he is a part. The emphasis is laid upon the +solidarity of mankind, and man is explained by such social facts as +heredity and environment. Marx and Engels, the pioneers of the +socialistic movement, accepted in the fullest sense the scientific +doctrine of evolution. So far from being a mere Utopian dream, Marx +contends that Socialism is the inevitable outcome of the movement of +modern society. The aim of the agitation is to bring men to a clear +consciousness of a process which is going forward in all countries where +the modern industrial methods prevail. Democracy must come to itself and +assume its rights. The keynote of the past has been the exploitation of +man by man in the three forms of slavery, serfdom, and wage-labour. The +keynote of the future must be the exploitation of the earth by man +_associated to man_. The practical aim of Socialism is that industry is +to be carried on by associated labourers jointly owning the means of +production. Here, again, the all-pervading ideal is--the general good of +society--the happiness of the greatest number. The reduction of all aims +to a common level, the equalising of social conditions, the direction and +control of all private interests and personal endeavours, are to be means +to one end--the material good of the community. Socialism is not, +however, confined to an agitation for material welfare. The industrial +aspect of it is only a phase of a larger movement. On its ethical side +it is the outcome of a strong aspiration after a higher life.[10] The +world is awakening to {106} the fact that the majority of the human +family has been virtually excluded from all participation in man's +inheritance of knowledge and culture. The labouring classes have been +from time immemorial sunk in drudgery and ignorance, bearing the burden +of society without sharing in its happiness. It is contended that every +man ought to have an opportunity of making the most of his life and +obtaining full freedom for the development of body and mind. The aim to +secure justice for the many, to protect the weak against the strong, to +mitigate the fierceness of competition, to bring about a better +understanding between capital and labour, and to gain for all a more +elevated and expansive existence, is not merely consistent with, but +indispensable to, a true Christian conception of life. But the question +which naturally arises is, how this reformation is to be brought about. +Never before have so many revolutionary schemes been proposed, and so +many social panaceas for a better world set forth. It is, indeed, a +hopeful sign of the times that the age of unconcern is gone and the +temper of cautious inaction has yielded to scientific diagnosis and +courageous treatment. It must not be forgotten, however, that the +exclusively utilitarian position tends to lower the moral ideal, and that +the exaggerated emphasis upon the social aspect of life fails to do +justice to the independence of the individual. The tendency of modern +political thought is to increase the control of government, and to regard +all departments of activity as branches of the state, to be held and +worked for the general good of the community. Thus there is a danger +that the individual may gradually lose all initiative, and life be +impoverished under a coercive mechanical system. + +Socialism in its extreme form might easily become a new kind of tyranny. +By the establishment of collectivism, by making the state the sole owner +of all wealth, the sole employer of labour, and the controller of science +and art, as well as of education and religion, there is a danger of +crushing the spiritual side of man, and giving to all life and endeavour +a merely naturalistic character and content. + +{107} + +5. It was inevitable that an exaggerated insistence upon the importance +of society should provoke an equally one-sided emphasis upon the worth of +the individual, and that as a protest against the demands of Socialism +there should arise a form of subjectivism which aims at complete +self-affirmation. + +(1) This tendency has received the name of _aesthetic-individualism_. As +a conception of life it may be regarded as intermediate between +naturalism and idealism. While rooted in a materialistic view of life, +it is moulded in the hands of its best advocates by spiritual +aspirations. Its standpoint may be characterised as a theory of +existence which seeks the highest value of life in the realm of the +beautiful, and which therefore endeavours to promote the supreme good of +the individual through devotion to art. Not only does the cultivation of +art tend in itself to elevate life by concentrating the soul upon all +that is fairest and noblest in the world, but the best means of enriching +and ennobling life is to regard life itself as a work of art. This view +of existence, it is claimed, widens the scope of experience, and leads us +into ampler worlds of interest and enjoyment. It aims at giving to +personality a rounded completeness, and bringing the manifold powers and +passions of man into harmonious unity. As a theory of life it is not +new. Already Plato, and still more Aristotle, maintained that a true man +must seek his highest satisfaction not in the possession of external +things, but in the most complete manifestation of his faculties. +Individual aestheticism largely animated the Romantic movement of Germany +at the beginning of last century. But probably the best illustration of +it is to be found in Goethe and Schiller; while in our country Matthew +Arnold has given it a powerful and persuasive exposition. It was the aim +of Goethe to mould his life into a work of art, and all his activities +and poetic aspirations were subordinated to this end. The beautiful +harmonious life is the true life, the well-rounded whole from which must +be banished everything narrow, vulgar, and distasteful, and in which +{108} everything fair and noble must find expression. 'Each individual,' +says Schiller, 'is at once fitted and destined for a pure ideal manhood.' +And the attainment of this ideal requires from us the most zealous +self-culture and a concentration of effort upon our own peculiar +gifts.[11] + +A new form of aestheticism has lately appeared which pretends to combine +morality and culture. 'The New Ethic,'[12] as it is called, protests +against the sombreness of religious traditions and the rigidity of moral +restrictions, and assigns to art the function of emancipating man and +idealising life. But what this movement really offers under its new +catchword is simply a subtler form of epicureanism, a finer +self-indulgence. It is the expression of a desire to be free from all +restraint, to close one's eyes to the 'majesty of human suffering,' +allowing one's thoughts to dwell only upon the agreeable and gay in life. +It regards man as simply the sum-total of his natural inclinations, and +conceives duty to be nothing else than the endeavour to bring these into +equilibrium. + +That the aesthetic culture of life is a legitimate element in Christian +morality can hardly be denied by any one who has pondered the meaning in +all its breadth of the natural simplicity and spiritual beauty of the +manifestation of the Son of Man. The beautiful, the good, and the true +are intimately connected, and constitute together all that is conceivably +highest in life. Christian Ethics ought to include everything that is +gracious and fair; and any theory of life that has no room for joy and +beauty, for laughter and song, for appreciation of artistic or poetic +expression, is surely deficient. But it is one thing to acknowledge +these things; it is another to make them the whole of existence. We live +in a world in which much else besides beauty and joy exists, and it is +not by shirking contact with the unlovely phases of experience, but by +resolutely accepting the ministry of sorrow they impose, {109} that we +attain to our highest selves. The narrow Puritanism of a past age may +need the corrective of the broader Humanism of to-day, but not less must +the Ethic of self-culture be reinforced by the Ethic of self-sacrifice. +We may not cultivate the beauty of life at the cost of duty, nor forget +that it is often only through the immolation of self that the self can be +realised. + +(2) While the Romantic movement, of which Goethe was the most illustrious +representative, did much to enlarge life and ennoble the whole expanse of +being, its extreme subjectivism and aristocratic exclusiveness found +ultimate expression (_a_) in the pessimism of Schopenhauer, and the +arrogance of Nietzsche. The alliance between art and morality was +dissolved. The imagination scorned all fetters and, in its craving for +novelty and contempt of convention, became the organ of individual +caprice and licence. In Nietzsche--that strange erratic genius--at once +artist, philosopher, and rhapsodist--this philosophy of life found +brilliant if bizarre utterance. If Schopenhauer reduces existence to +nothing, and finds in oblivion and extinction its solution, (_b_) +Nietzsche seeks rather to magnify life by striking the note of a proud +and defiant optimism. He claims for the individual limitless rights; +and, repudiating all moral ties, asserts the complete sovereignty of the +self-sufficing ego. With a deep-rooted hatred of the prevailing +tendencies of civilisation, he combines a vehement desire for a richer +and unrestrained development of human power. He would not only revalue +all moral values, but reverse all ideas of right and wrong. He would +soar 'beyond good and evil,' declaring that the prevailing judgments of +mankind are pernicious prejudices which have too long tyrannised over the +world. He acknowledges himself to be not a moralist, but an +'immoralist,' and he bids us break in pieces the ancient tables of the +Decalogue. Christianity is the most debasing form of slave-morality. It +has made a merit of weakness and servility, and given the name of virtue +to such imbecilities as meekness and self-sacrifice. He calls upon the +individual to exalt himself. The man of {110} the future is to be the +man of self-mastery and virile force, 'the Superman,' who is to crush +under his heel the cringing herd of weaklings who have hitherto possessed +the world. The earth is for the strong, the capable, the few. A mighty +race, self-assertive, full of vitality and will, is the goal of humanity. +The vital significance of Nietzsche's radicalism lies less in its +positive achievement than in its stimulating effect. Though his account +of Christianity is a caricature, his strong invective has done much to +correct the sentimental rose-water view of the Christian faith which has +been current in some pietistic circles. The Superman, with all its +vagueness, is a noble, inspiring ideal. The problem of the race is to +produce a higher manhood, to realise which there is need for sacrifice +and courage. Nietzsche is the spiritual father and forerunner of the +Eugenics. The Superman is not born, he is bred. Our passions must be +our servants. Obedience and fidelity, self-discipline and courage are +the virtues upon which he insists. 'Be master of life. . . .' 'I call +you to a new nobility. Ye shall become the procreators and sowers of the +future.' + +While there is much that is suggestive in Nietzsche's scathing +criticisms, and many passages of striking beauty in his books, he is +stronger in his denials than his affirmations, and it is the negative +side that his followers have fastened upon and developed. Sudermann, the +novelist, has carried his philosophy of egoism to its extreme. This +writer, in a work entitled _Sodom's End_, affirms that there is nothing +holy and nothing evil. There is no such thing as duty or love. Only +nerves exist. The 'Superman' becomes a monster. Such teaching can +scarcely be taken seriously. It conveys no helpful message. It is the +perversion of life's ideal. + +As a passing phase of thought it is interesting, but it solves no +problems; it advances no truths. It resembles a whirlwind which helps to +clear the air and drive away superfluous leaves, but it does little to +quicken or expand new seeds of life. + +{111} + +II + +IDEALISTIC TENDENCY + +1. Modern Idealism was inaugurated by Kant. Kant's significance for +thought lies in his twofold demand for a new basis of knowledge and +morality. He conceived that both are possible, and that both are +interdependent, and have but one solution. The solution, however, could +only be achieved by a radical change of method, and by the introduction +of new standards of value. Kant's theory of morals was an attempt to +reconcile the two opposing ethical principles which were current in the +eighteenth century. On the one side, the Realists treated man simply as +a natural being, and accordingly demanded a pursuance of his natural +impulses. On the other side, the Dogmatists conceived that conduct must +be governed by divine sanctions. Both theories agreed in regarding +happiness as the end of life; the one the happiness of sensuous +enjoyment; the other, that of divine favour. Both set an end outside of +man himself as the basis of their ethical doctrine. Kant was +dissatisfied with this explanation of the moral life. The question, +therefore, which arises is, Whence comes the idea of duty which is an +undeniable fact of our experience? If it came merely from without, it +could never speak to us with absolute authority, nor claim unquestioning +obedience. That which comes from without depends for its justification +upon some consequence external to our action, and must be based, indeed, +upon some excitement of reward or pain. But that would destroy it as a +moral good; since nothing can be morally good that is not pursued for its +own sake. Kant, therefore, seeks to show that the law of the moral life +must originate within us, must spring from an inherent principle of our +own rational nature. Hence the distinctive feature of Kant's moral +theory is the enunciation of the 'Categorical Imperative'--the supreme +inner demand of reason. From this principle of autonomy there arise at +once the notions of man's freedom and the law's {112} universality. +Self-determination is the presupposition of all morality. But what is +true for one is true for all. Each man is a member of a rational order, +and possesses the inalienable independence and the moral dignity of being +an end in himself. Hence the formula of all duty is, 'Act from a maxim +at all times fit to be a universal law.' + +It is the merit of Kant that he has given clear expression to the majesty +of the moral law. No thinker has more strongly asserted man's spiritual +nature or done more to free the ideal of duty from all individual +narrowness and selfish interest. But Kant's principle of duty labours +under the defect, that while it determines the form, it tells us nothing +of the content of duty. We learn from him the grandeur of the moral law, +but not its essence or motive-power. He does not clearly explain what it +is in the inner nature of man that gives to obligation its universal +validity or even its dominating force. As a recent writer truly says, +'In order that morality may be possible at all, its law must be realised +_in_ me, but while the way in which it is realised is mine, the content +is not mine; otherwise the whole conception of obligation is +destroyed.'[13] If the soul's function is purely formal how can we +attain to a self-contained life? Moreover, if the freedom which Kant +assigns to man is really to achieve a higher ideal and bring forth a new +world, must there not be some spiritual power or energy, some dynamic +force, which, while it is within man, is also without, and independent +of, him? 'Duty for duty's sake' lacks lifting power, and is the essence +of legalism. Love, after all, is the fulfilling of the law. + +2. To overcome the Kantian abstraction, and give content to the formal +law of reason was the aim of the idealistic writers who succeeded him. +Fichte conceived of morality as action--self-consciousness realising +itself in a world of deeds. Hegel started with the _Idea_ as the source +of all reality, and developed the conception of Personality attaining +self-realisation through the growing consciousness of the world and of +God. Personality involves capacity. The {113} law of life, therefore, +is, 'Be a person and respect others as persons.'[14] Man only comes to +himself as he becomes conscious that his life is rooted in a larger self. +Morality is just the gradual unfolding of an eternal purpose whose whole +is the perfection of humanity. It has been objected that the idea of +life as an evolutionary process, which finds its most imposing embodiment +in the system of Hegel, if consistently carried out, destroys all +personal motive and self-determining activity, and reduces the history of +the world to a soulless mechanism. Hegel himself was aware of this +objection, and the whole aim of his philosophy was to show that +personality has no meaning if it be not the growing consciousness of the +infinite. The more recent exponents of his teaching have endeavoured to +prove that the individual, so far from being suppressed, is really +_expressed_ in the process, that, indeed, while the universal life +underlies, unifies, and directs the particular phases of existence, the +individual in realising himself is at the same time determining and +evolving the larger spiritual world--a world already implicitly present +in his earliest consciousness and first strivings. The absolute is +indeed within us from the very beginning, but we have to work it out. +Hence life is achieved through conflict. The universe is not a place for +pleasure or apathy. It is a place for soul-making. No rest is to be +found by an indolent withdrawal from the world of reality. 'In one way +or another, in labour, in learning, and in religion, every man has his +pilgrimage to make, his self to remould and to acquire, his world and +surroundings to transform. . . . It is in this adventure, and not apart +from it, that we find and maintain the personality which we suppose +ourselves to possess _ab initio_.'[15] The soul is a world in itself; but +it is not, and must not be treated as, an isolated personality impervious +to the mind of others. At each stage of its evolution it is the focus +and expression of a larger world. A man does not value himself as a +detached subject, but as the {114} inheritor of gifts which are focused +in him. Man, in short, is a trustee for the world; and suffering and +privation are among his opportunities. The question for each is, How +much can he make of them? Something above us there must be to make us do +and dare and hope, and the important thing is not one's separate destiny, +but the completeness of experience and one's contribution to it.[16] + +3. It was inevitable that there should arise a reaction against the +extreme Intellectualism of Hegel and his school, and that a conception of +existence which lays the emphasis upon the claims of practical life +should grow in favour. The pursuit of knowledge tended to become merely +a means of promoting human well-being. + +The first definite attempt to formulate a specific theory of knowledge +with this practical aim in view takes the form of what is known as +'Pragmatism.' The modern use of this term is chiefly connected with the +name of the late Professor James, to whose brilliant writings we are +largely indebted for the elucidation of its meaning. 'Pragmatism,' says +James, 'represents the empiricist attitude both in a more radical and +less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed.'[17] It agrees +with utilitarianism in explaining practical aspects, and with positivism +in disdaining useless abstractions. It claims to be a method rather than +a system of philosophy. And its method consists in bringing the pursuit +of knowledge into close relationship with life. Nothing is to be +regarded as true which cannot be justified by its value for man. The +hypothesis which on the whole works best, which most aptly fits the +circumstances of a particular case, is true. The emphasis is laid not on +absolute principles, but on consequences. We must not consider things as +they are in themselves, but in their reference to the good of mankind. +It is useless, for example, to speculate about the existence of God. If +the hypothesis of a deity works satisfactorily, if the best results +follow for the moral well-being of humanity by believing in a God, {115} +then the hypothesis may be taken as true. It is true at least for us. +Truth, according to Pragmatism, has no independent existence. It is +wholly subjective, relative, instrumental. Its only test is its utility, +its workableness. + +This view of truth, though supported by much ingenuity and brilliance, +would seem to contradict the very idea of truth, and to be subversive of +all moral values. If truth has no independent validity, if it is not +something to be sought for itself, irrespective of the inclinations and +interests of man, then its pursuit can bring no real enrichment to our +spiritual being. It remains something alien and external, a mere +arbitrary appendix of the self. It is not the essence and standard of +human life. If its sole test is what is advantageous or pleasant it +sinks into a merely utilitarian opinion or selfish bias. 'Truth,' says +Eucken, 'can only exist as an end in itself. Instrumental truth is no +truth at all.'[18] + +According to this theory, moreover, truth is apt to be broken up into a +number of separate fragments without correlation or integrating unity. +There will be as many hypotheses as there are individual interests. The +truth that seems to work best for one man or one age may not be the truth +that serves another. In the collision of opinions who is to arbitrate? +If it be the institutions and customs of to-day, the present state of +morals, that is to be the measure of what is good, then we seem to be +committed to a condition of stagnancy, and involved in the quest of a +doubtful gain. + +As might be expected, Professor James's view of truth determines his view +of the world. It is pluralistic, not monistic; melioristic, not +optimistic. It is characteristic of him that when he discusses the +question, Is life worth living? his answer practically is, 'Yes, if you +believe it is.' Pragmatism is put forward as the mediator between two +opposite tendencies, those of 'tender-mindedness' and 'tough-mindedness.' +'The tendency to rest in the Absolute is the characteristic mark of the +tender-minded; the {116} radically tough-minded, on the other hand, needs +no religion at all.'[19] There is something to be said for both of these +views, James thinks, and a compromise will probably best meet the case. +Hence, against these two ways of accepting the universe, he maintains the +pragmatic faith which is at once theistic, pluralistic, and melioristic. +He accepts a personal power as a workable theory of the universe. But +God need not be infinite or all-inclusive, for 'all that the facts +require is that the power should be both other and larger than our common +selves.'[20] Such a conception of God, even on James's own admission, is +akin to polytheism. And such polytheism implies a pluralistic view of +the universe. The invisible order, in which we hope to realise our +larger life, is a world which does not grow integrally in accordance with +the preconceived plan of a single architect, 'but piecemeal by the +contributions of its several parts.'[21] We make the world to our will, +and 'add our fiat to the fiat of the creator.' With regard to the +supreme question of human destiny Professor James's view is what he calls +'melioristic.' There is a striving for better things, but what the +ultimate outcome will be, no one can say. For the world is still in the +making. Life is a risk. It has many possibilities. Good and evil are +intermingled, and will continue so to be. It is a pluralistic world just +because the will of man is free, and predetermination is excluded. If +good was assured as the final goal of ill, and there was no sense of +venture, no possibility of loss or failure, then life would lack +interest, and moral effort would be shorn of reality and incentive. + +In Professor James's philosophy of life there is much that is original +and stimulating, and it draws attention to facts of experience and modes +of thought which we were in danger of overlooking. It has compelled us +to consider the psychological bases of personality, and to lay more +stress upon the power of the will and individual choice in the +determining of character and destiny. It is pre-eminently {117} a +philosophy of action, and it emphasises an aspect of life which +intellectualism was prone to neglect--the function of personal endeavour +and initiative in the making of the world. It postulates the reality of +a living God who invites our co-operation, and it encourages our belief +in a higher spiritual order which it is within our power to achieve. + +Pragmatism has hitherto made headway chiefly in America and Britain, but +on its activistic side it is akin to a new philosophical movement which +has appeared in France and Germany. The name generally given to this +tendency is 'Activism' or 'Vitalism'--a title chosen probably in order to +emphasise the self-activity of the personal consciousness directed +towards a world which it at once conquers and creates. The authors of +this latest movement are the Frenchman, Henri Bergson, and the German, +Rudolf Eucken. Differing widely in their methods and even in their +conclusions, they agree in making a direct attack both upon the realism +and the intellectualism of the past, and in their conviction that the +world is not a 'strung along universe,' as the late Professor James puts +it, but a world that is being made by the creative power and personal +freedom of man. While Eucken has for many years occupied a position of +commanding influence in the realm of thought, Bergson has only recently +come into notice. The publication of his striking work, _Creative +Evolution_, marks an epoch in speculation, and is awakening the interest +of the philosophical world.[22] + +4. With his passion for symmetry and completeness Bergson has evolved a +whole theory of the universe, {118} resorting, strange to say, to a form +of reasoning that implies the validity of logic, the instrument of the +intellect which he never wearies of impugning. Without entering upon his +merely metaphysical speculations, we fix upon his theory of +consciousness--the relation of life to the material world--as involving +certain ethical consequences bearing upon our subject. The idea of +freedom is the corner-stone of Bergson's system, and his whole philosophy +is a powerful vindication of the independence and self-determination of +the human will. Life is free, spontaneous, creative and incalculable; +determined neither by natural law nor logical sequence. It can break +through all causation and assert its own right. It is not, indeed, +unrelated to matter, since it has to find its exercise in a material +world. Matter plays at once, as he himself says, the role of obstacle +and stimulus.[23] But it is not the world of things which legislates for +man; it is man who legislates for it. Bergson's object is to vindicate +the autonomy of consciousness, and his entire philosophy is a protest +against every claim of determinism to dominate life. By introducing the +creative will before all development, he displaces mechanical force, and +makes the whole evolution of life dependent upon the 'vital impulse' +which pushes forward against all obstacles to ever higher and higher +efficiency. Similarly, by drawing a distinction between intellect and +intuition, he shows that the latter is the truly creative power in man +which penetrates to the heart of reality and shapes its own world. +Intellect and instinct have been developed along divergent lines. The +intellect has merely a practical function. It is related to the needs of +action.[24] It is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, +especially tools to make tools.[25] It deals with solids and geometrical +figures, and its instrument is logic. But according to Bergson it has an +inherent incapacity to deal with life.[26] When we contrast the rigidity +and superficiality of intellect with the fluidity, sympathy and intimacy +of intuition, we see at once wherein {119} lies the true creative power +of man. Development, when carried too exclusively along the lines of +intellect, means loss of will-power; and we have seen how, not +individuals alone, but entire nations, may be crushed and destroyed by a +too rigid devotion to mechanical and stereotyped methods of thought. +Only life is adequate to deal with life. Let us give free expression to +the intuitive and sympathetic force within us, 'feel the wild pulsation +of life,' if we would conquer the world and come to our own. 'The +spectacle,' says Bergson, 'of life from the very beginning down to man +suggests to us the image of a current of consciousness which flows down +into matter as into a tunnel, most of whose endeavours to advance . . . +are stopped by a rock that is too hard, but which, in one direction at +least, prove successful, and break out into the light once more.'[27] +But there life does not stop. + + 'All tended to mankind, + But in completed man begins anew + A tendency to God.'[28] + +This creative consciousness still pushes on, giving to matter its own +life, and drawing from matter its nutriment and strength. The effort is +painful, but in making it we feel that it is precious, more precious +perhaps than the particular work it results in, because through it we +have been making ourselves, 'raising ourselves above ourselves.' And in +this there is the true joy of life--the joy which every creator +feels--the joy of achievement and triumph. Thus not only is the self +being created, but the world is being made--original and +incalculable--not according to a preconceived plan or logical sequence, +but by the free spontaneous will of man. + +The soul is the creative force--the real productive agent of novelty in +the world. The strange thing is that the soul creates not the world +only, but itself. Whence comes this mystic power? What is the origin of +the soul? Bergson does not say. But in one passage he suggests that +{120} possibly the world of matter and consciousness have the same +origin--the principle of life which is the great prius of all that is and +is to be. But Bergson's 'elan vital,' though more satisfactory than the +first cause of the naturalist, or the 'great unknown' of the +evolutionist, or even than some forms of the absolute, is itself +admittedly outside the pale of reason--inexplicable, indefinable, and +incalculable. + +The new 'vitalism' unfolds a living self-evolving universe, a restless, +unfinished and never-to-be-finished development--the scope and goal of +which cannot be foreseen or explained. An infinite number of +possibilities open out; which the soul will follow no one can tell; why +it follows this direction rather than that, no one can see. There seems +to be no room here for teleology or purposiveness; and though Bergson has +not yet worked out the theological and ethical implications of his +theory, as far as we can at present say the personality and imminence of +a Divine Being are excluded. Though Bergson never refers to Hegel by +name, he seems to be specially concerned in refuting the philosophy of +the Absolute, according to which the world is conceived as the evolution +of the infinite mind. If 'tout est donne,' says Bergson, if all is given +beforehand, 'why do over again what has already been completed, thus +reducing life and endeavour to a mere sham.' But even allowing the force +of that objection, the idea of a 'world in the making,' though it appeals +to the popular mind, is not quite free from ambiguity. In one sense it +states a platitude--a truth, indeed, which is not excluded from an +absolute or teleological conception of life. But if it is implied that +the world, because it is in process of production, may violate reason and +take some capricious form, the idea is absurdly false, so long as we are +what we are, and the human mind is what it is. The real must always be +the rational. All enterprise and effort are based on the faith that we +belong to a rational world. Though we cannot predict what form the world +will ultimately take, we can at least be sure that it can assume no +character which will {121} contradict the nature of intelligence. Even +in the making of a world, if life has any moral worth and meaning at all, +there must be rational purpose. There are creation and initiative in man +assuredly, but they must not be interpreted as activities which deviate +into paths of grotesque and arbitrary fancy. Our actions and ideas must +issue from our world. Even a poem or work of art must make its appeal to +the universal mind; any other kind of originality would wholly lack human +interest and sever all creation and life from their root in human nature. +But at least we must acknowledge that Bergson has done to the world of +thought the great service of liberating us from the bonds of matter and +the thraldom of a fatalistic necessity. It is his merit that he has +lifted from man the burden of a hard determinism, and vindicated the +freedom, choice, and initiative of the human spirit. If he has no +distinctly Christian message, he has at least disclosed for the soul the +possibility of new beginnings, and has shown that there is room in the +spiritual life, as the basis of all upward striving, for change of heart +and conversion of life. + +5. In the philosophy of Eucken there is much that is in harmony with +that of Bergson; but there are also important differences. Common to +both is a reaction against formalism and intellectualism. Neither claims +that we can gain more than 'the knowledge of a direction' in which the +solution of the problem may be sought. It is not a 'given' or finished +world with which we have to do. 'The triumph of life is expressed by +creation,' says Eucken, 'I mean the creation of self by self.' 'We live +in the conviction,' he says again, 'that the possibilities of the +universe have not yet been played out,[29] but that our spiritual life +still finds itself battling in mid-flood with much of the world's work +still before us.' While Bergson confines himself rigidly to the +metaphysical side of thought, Eucken is chiefly interested in the ethical +and religious aspects of life's problem. Moreover, while there is an +absence of a distinctly teleological aim in Bergson, the purpose and +ideal {122} of life are prominent elements in Eucken. Notwithstanding +his antagonism to intellectualism, the influence of Hegel is evident in +the absolutist tendency of his teaching. Life for Eucken is +fundamentally spiritual. Self-consciousness is the unifying principle. +Personality is the keynote of his philosophy. But we are not +personalities to begin with: we have the potentiality to become such by +our own effort. He bids us therefore forget ourselves, and strive for +our highest ideal--the realisation of spiritual personality. The more +man 'loses his life' in the pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and +beauty the more surely will he 'save it.' He realises himself as a +personality, who becomes conscious of his unity with the universal +spiritual life. + +Hence there are two fundamental principles underlying Eucken's philosophy +which give to it its distinguishing character. The first is the +metaphysical conception of _a realm of Spirit_--an independent spiritual +Reality, not the product of the natural man, but communicating itself to +him as he strives for, and responds to, it. This spiritual reality +underlies and transcends the outward world. It may be regarded as an +absolute or universal life--the deeper reality of which all visible +things are the expression. The second cardinal principle is the +_doctrine of Activism_. Life is action. Human duty lies in a world of +strife. We have to contend for a spiritual life-content. Here Eucken +has much in common with Fichte.[30] But while Fichte starts with +self-analysis, and loses sight of error, care, and sin, Eucken starts +with actual conflict, and ever retains a keen sense of these hampering +elements. The evil of the world is not to be solved simply by looking +down upon the world from some superior optimistic standpoint, and +pronouncing it very good. The only way to solve it is the practical one, +to leave the negative standing, and press on to the deeper +affirmative--the positive truth, that beneath the world of nature there +exists a deeper reality of spirit, of which we become participators by +the freedom and activity of our lives. We are here to acquire a new +spiritual world, but {123} it is a world in which the past is taken up +and transfigured. Against naturalism, which acquiesces in the present +order of the universe, and against mere intellectualism, which simply +investigates it, Eucken never wearies of protesting. He demands, first, +a fundamental cleavage in the inmost being of man, and a deliverance from +the natural view of things; and he contends, secondly, for a spiritual +awakening and an energetic endeavour to realise our spiritual resources. +Not by thought but by action is the problem of life to be solved. Hence +his philosophy is not a mere theory about life, but is itself a factor in +the great work of spiritual redemption which gives to life its meaning +and aim. + +That which makes Eucken's positive idealism specially valuable is his +application of it to religion. Religion has been in all ages the mighty +uplifting power in human life. It stands for a negation of the finite +and fleeting, and an affirmation of the spiritual and the eternal. This +is specially true of the Christian religion. Christianity is the supreme +type of religion because it best answers the question, 'What can religion +do for life?' But the old forms of its manifestation do not satisfy us +to-day. Christianity of the present fails to win conviction principally +for three reasons: (1) because it does not distinguish the eternal +substance of religion from its temporary forms; (2) because it professes +to be the final expression of all truth, thus closing the door against +progress of thought and life; and (3) while emphasising man's redemption +from evil, it forgets the elevation of his nature towards good. There is +a tendency to depreciate human nature, and to overlook the joyousness of +life. What is needed, therefore, is the expression of Christianity in a +new form--a reconstruction which shall emphasise the positiveness, +activity, and joy of Christian morality.[31] + +While every one must feel the sublimity and inspiration in this +conception of a spiritual world, which it is the task of life to realise, +most people will be also conscious of a {124} certain vagueness and +elusiveness in its presentation. We are constrained to ask what is this +independent spiritual life? Is it a personal God, or is it only an +impersonal spirit, which pervades and interpenetrates the universe? The +elusive obscurity of the position and function which Eucken assigns to +his central conception of the _Geistes-Leben_ must strike every reader. +Even more than Hegel, Eucken seems to deal with an abstraction. The +spiritual life, we are told, 'grows,' 'divides,' 'advances'--but it +appears to be as much a 'bloodless category' as the Hegelian 'idea,' +having no connection with any living subject. God, the Spirit, may +exist, indeed Eucken says He does, but there is nowhere any indication of +how the spiritual life follows from, or is the creation of, the Divine +Spirit. Our author speaks with so great appreciation of Christianity +that it seems an ungracious thing to find fault with his interpretation +of it. Yet with so much that is positive and suggestive, there are also +some grave omissions. In a work that professes to deal with the +Christian faith--_The Truth of Religion_--and which indeed presents a +powerful vindication of historical Christianity, we miss any +philosophical interpretation of the nature and power of prayer, +adoration, or worship, or any account, indeed, of the intimacies of the +soul which belong to the very essence of the Christian faith. While he +insists upon the possibility, nay, the necessity, of a new beginning, he +fails to reveal the power by which the great decision is made. While he +affirms with much enthusiasm and frankness the need of personal decision +and surrender, he has nothing to say of the divine authority and power +which creates our choice and wins our obedience. Nowhere does he show +that the creative redemptive force comes not from man's side, but +ultimately from the side of God. And finally, his teaching with regard +to the person and work of Jesus Christ, notwithstanding its tender +sympathy and fine discrimination, does less than justice to the +uniqueness and historical significance of the Son of Man. With profound +appreciation and rare beauty of language he depicts the life of Jesus. +'Seldom,' {125} says a recent writer, 'has the perfect Man been limned +with so persuasive a combination of strenuous thought and gracious +word.'[32] 'He who makes merely a normal man of Jesus,' he says, 'can +never do justice to His greatness.'[33] Yet while he protests rightly +against emptying our Lord's life of all real growth and temptation, and +the claim of practical omniscience for His humanity (conceptions of +Christ's Person surely nowhere entertained by first-class theologians), +he leaves us in no manner of doubt that he does not attach a divine worth +to Jesus, nor regard Him in the scriptural sense as the Supreme +revelation and incarnation of God. And hence, while the peerless +position of Jesus as teacher and religious genius is frankly +acknowledged, and His purity, power, and permanence are extolled--the +mediatorial and redemptive implicates of His personality are overlooked. + +But when all is said, no one can study the spiritual philosophy of Eucken +without realising that he is in contact with a mind which has a sublime +and inspiring message for our age. Probably more than any modern +thinker, Eucken reveals in his works deep affinities with the central +spirit of Christianity. And perhaps his influence may be all the greater +because he maintains an attitude of independence towards dogmatic and +organised Christianity. Professor Eucken does not attempt to satisfy us +with a facile optimism. Life is a conflict, a task, an adventure. And +he who would engage in it must make the break between the higher and the +lower nature. For Eucken, as for Dante, there must be 'the penitence, +the tears, and the plunge into the river of Lethe before the new +transcendent love begins.' There is no evasion of the complexities of +life. He has a profound perception of the contradictions of experience +and the seeming paradoxes of religion. For him true liberty is only +possible through the 'given,' through God's provenience and grace: +genuine self-realisation is only achievable through a continuous +self-dedication to, and {126} incorporation within, the great realm of +spirits; and the Immanence within our lives of the Transcendent.[34] + +In styling the tendencies which we have thus briefly reviewed +non-Christian, we have had no intention of disparagement. No earnest +effort to discover truth, though it may be inadequate and partial, is +ever wholly false. In the light of these theories we are able to see +more clearly the relation between the good and the useful, and to +acknowledge that, just as in nature the laws of economy and beauty have +many intimate correspondences, so in the spiritual realm the good, the +beautiful, and the true may be harmonised in a higher category of the +spirit. We shall see that the Christian ideal is not so much +antagonistic to, as inclusive of, all that is best in the teaching of +science and philosophy. The task therefore now before us is to interpret +these general conceptions of the highest good in the light of Christian +Revelation--to define the chief end of life according to Christianity. + + + +[1] Kasper Schmidt, _Der Einzige und sein Eigentum_. + +[2] Haeckel, _op. cit._, chap. xix. + +[3] Haeckel, _op. cit._, chap. xix. p. 140. + +[4] Hobbes' _Leviathan_, chap. vi. + +[5] Cf. Pringle-Pattison, _Philos. Radicals_, and J. Seth's _Eng. +Philosophers_, p. 240. + +[6] _Utilitarianism_, chap. ii. + +[7] _Idem_, chap. iii. + +[8] Cf. Spencer, _Data of Ethics_, p. 275; also _Social Statics_. In the +former work an attempt is made to exhibit the biological significance of +pleasure and the relation between egoism and altruism. + +[9] See _First Principles_, p. 166 ff. + +[10] See Kirkup, _An Inquiry into Socialism_, p. 19. + +[11] See Luetgert, _Natur und Geist Gottes_, for striking chapter on +Goethe's _Ethik_, p. 121 f. + +[12] Cf. Eucken, _Main Currents of Modern Thought_, p. 401 f. + +[13] Macmillan, _The Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy_, p. 28. + +[14] Hegel, _Phil. of Right_, p. 45. + +[15] Bosanquet, _The Principles of Individuality and Value_. + +[16] Bosanquet, _The Principles of Individuality and Value_. + +[17] _Pragmatism_, p. 51. + +[18] _Main Currents of Thought_, p. 78. + +[19] _Pragmatism_, p. 278 f.; also _Varieties of Relig. Experience_, p. +525 f. + +[20] _Idem_, p. 299. + +[21] _Idem_, p. 290. + +[22] The writer regrets that the work of the Italian, Benedetto Croce, +_Philosophy of the Practical, Economic and Ethic_ (Part II. of +_Philosophy of the Spirit_), came to his knowledge too late to permit a +consideration of its ethical teaching in this volume. Croce is a thinker +of great originality, of whom we are likely to hear much in the future, +and whose philosophy will have to be reckoned with. Though independent +of others, his view of life has affinities with that of Hegel. He +maintains the doctrine of development of opposites, but avoids Hegel's +insistence upon the concept of nature as a mode of reality opposed to the +spirit. Spirit is reality, the whole reality, and therefore the +universal. It has two activities, theoretic and practical. With the +theoretic man understands the universe; with the practical he changes it. +The Will is the man, and freedom is finding himself in the Whole. + +[23] _Hibbert Journal_, April 1912. + +[24] _Evol. Creat._, p. 161. + +[25] _Idem_, p. 146. + +[26] _Idem_, p. 165. + +[27] _Hibbert Journal_. + +[28] Browning. + +[29] _Die Geistigen Stroemunyen der Gegenwart_, p. 10. + +[30] Cf. _Problem of Life_. + +[31] Cf. _Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_. + +[32] Hermann, _Bergson und Eucken_, p. 103. + +[33] _The Problem of Life_, p. 152. + +[34] Cf. von Huegel, _Hibbert Journal_, April 1912. + + + + +{127} + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL + +The highest good is not uniformly described in the New Testament, and +modern ethical teachers have not always been in agreement as to the chief +end of life. While some have found in the teaching of Jesus the idea of +social redemption alone, and have seen in Christ nothing more than a +political reformer, others have contended that the Gospel is solely a +message of personal salvation. An impartial study shows that both views +are one-sided. On the one hand, no conception of the life of Jesus can +be more misleading than that which represents Him as a political +revolutionist. But, on the other hand, it would be a distinct narrowing +of His teaching to assume that it was confined to the aspirations of the +individual soul. His care was indeed primarily for the person. His +emphasis was put upon the worth of the individual. And it is not too +much to say that the uniqueness of Jesus' teaching lay in the discovery +of the value of the soul. There was in His ministry a new appreciation +of the possibilities of neglected lives, and a hitherto unknown yearning +to share their confidence. It would be a mistake, however, to represent +Christ's regard for the individual as excluding all consideration of +social relations. The kingdom of God, as we shall see, had a social and +corporate meaning for our Lord. And if the qualifications for its +entrance were personal, its duties were social. The universalism of +Jesus' teaching implied that the soul had a value not for itself alone, +but also for others. The assertion, therefore, that the individual has a +value cannot mean that he has a value in isolation. {128} Rather his +value can only be realised in the life of the community to which he truly +belongs. The effort to help others is the truest way to reveal the +hidden worth of one's own life; and he who withholds his sympathy from +the needy has proved himself unworthy of the kingdom. + +While the writers of the New Testament vary in their mode of presenting +the ultimate goal of man, they are at one in regarding it as an exalted +form of _life_. What they all seek to commend is a condition of being +involving a gradual assimilation to, and communion with, God. The +distinctive gift of the Gospel is the gift of life. 'I am the Life,' +says Christ. And the apostle's confession is in harmony with his +Master's claim--'For me to live is Christ.' Salvation is nothing else +than the restoration, preservation, and exaltation of life. + +Corresponding, therefore, to the three great conceptions of Life in the +New Testament, and especially in the teaching of Jesus--'Eternal Life,' +'the kingdom of God,' and the perfection of the divine Fatherhood, +'Perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect'--there are three aspects, +individual, social, and divine, in which we may view the Christian ideal. + + +I + +Self-realisation is not, indeed, a scriptural word. But rightly +understood it is a true element in the conception of life, and may, we +think, be legitimately drawn from the ethical teaching of the New +Testament.[1] Though the free full development of the individual +personality as we conceive it in modern times does not receive explicit +statement,[2] still one cannot doubt, that before every man our Lord does +present the vision of a possible and perfect self. Christianity does not +destroy 'the will to live,' but only the will to live at all costs. Even +mediaeval piety only inculcated self-mortification as a stage towards a +higher {129} self-affirmation. Christ nowhere condemns the inherent +desire for a complete life. The end, indeed, which each man should place +before himself is self-mastery and freedom from the world;[3] but it is a +mastery and freedom which are to be gained not by asceticism but by +conquest. Christ would awaken in every man the consciousness of the +priceless worth of his soul, and would have him realise in his own person +God's idea of manhood. + +The ideal of self-realisation includes three distinct elements: + +1. _Life as intensity of being_.--'I am come that they might have life, +and that they might have it more abundantly.'[4] 'More life and fuller' +is the passion of every soul that has caught the vision and heard the +call of Jesus. The supreme good consists not in suppressed vitality, but +in power and freedom. Life in Christ is a full, rich existence. The +doctrine of quietism and indifference to joy has no place in the ethic of +Jesus. Life is manifested in inwardness of character, and not in pomp of +circumstance. It consists not in what a man has, but in what he is.[5] +The beatitudes, as the primary qualifications for the kingdom of God, +emphasise the fundamental principle of the subordination of the material +to the spiritual, and the contrast between inward and outward good.[6] +Self-mastery is to extend to the inner life of man--to dominate the +thoughts and words, and the very heart from which they issue. A divided +life is impossible. The severest discipline, even renunciation, may be +needful to secure that singleness of heart and strenuousness of aim which +are for Jesus the very essence of life. 'Ye cannot serve God and +mammon.'[7] In harmony with this saying is the opposition in the +Johannine teaching between 'the world' and 'eternal life.'[8] The +quality of life indeed depends not upon anything contingent or +accidental, but upon an intense inward realisation of blessedness in +Christ in comparison with which even {130} the privations and sufferings +of this world are but as a shadow.[9] At the same time life is not a +mere negation, not simply an escape from evil. It is a positive good, +the enrichment and intensifying of the whole being by the indwelling of a +new spiritual power. 'For me to live is Christ,' says St. Paul. 'This +is life eternal,' says St. John, 'that they may know Thee the only true +God, and Him whom Thou didst send, even Jesus Christ.'[10] + +2. _Life as Expansion of Personality_.--By its inherent power it grows +outwards as well as inwards. The New Testament conception of life is +existence in its fullest expression and fruitfulness. The ideal as +presented by Christ is no anaemic state of reverie or ascetic withdrawal +from human interest. It is by the elevation and consecration of the +natural life, and not by its suppression, that the 'good' is to be +realised. The natural life is to be transformed, and the very body +presented unto God as a living sacrifice.[11] So far from Christianity +being opposed to the aim of the individual to find himself in a world of +larger interests, it is only in the active and progressive realisation of +such a life that blessedness consists. Herein is disclosed, however, the +defect of the modern ideal of culture which has been associated with the +name of Goethe. In Christ's ideal self-sufficiency has no place. While +rightly interpreted the 'good' of life includes everything that enriches +existence and contributes to the efficiency and completeness of manhood, +mere self-culture and artistic expression are apt to become perverted +forms of egoism, if not subordinated to the spirit of service which alone +can give to the human faculties their true function and exercise. Hence +life finds its real utterance not in the isolated development of the +self, but in the fullness of personal relationships. Only in response to +the needs of others can a man realise his own life. In answer to the +young ruler who asked a question 'concerning that which is good,' Christ +replied, 'If thou wilt enter into life keep the {131} commandments'; and +the particular duties He mentioned were those of the second table of the +Decalogue.[11] The abundance of life which Christ offers consists in the +mutual offices of love and the interchange of service. Thus +self-realisation is attained only through self-surrender.[13] The +self-centred life is a barren life. Not by withholding our seed but by +flinging it forth freely upon the broad waters of humanity do we attain +to that rich fruition which is 'life indeed.' + +3. _Life as Eternal Good_.--Whatever may be the accurate signification +of the word 'eternal,' the words 'eternal life,' regarded as the ideal of +man, can mean nothing else than life at its highest, the fulfilment of +all that personality has within it the potency of becoming. In one sense +there is no finality in life. 'It seethes with the morrow for us more +and more.' But in another sense, to say that the moral life is never +attained is only a half truth. It is always being attained because it is +always present as an active reality evolving its own content. In Christ +we have 'eternal life' now. It is not a thing of quantity but of +quality, and is therefore timeless. + + 'We live in deeds not years, in thoughts not breaths, + In feelings, not in figures on a dial.'[14] + +He who has entered into fellowship with God has within him now the +essence of 'life eternal.' + +But the conception of life derived from, and sustained by, God involves +the idea of immortality. 'No work begun shall ever pause for death.'[15] +To live in God is to live as long as God. The spiritual man pursues his +way through conflict and achievement towards a higher and yet a higher +goal, ever manifesting, yet ever seeking, the infinite that dwells in +him. All knowledge and quest and endeavour, nay existence itself, would +be a mockery if man had 'no forever.' Scripture corroborates the +yearnings of the heart and represents life as a growing good which is to +attain to ever higher reaches and fuller realisations in the world to +{132} come. It is the unextinguishable faith of man that the future must +crown the present. No human effort goes to waste, no gift is delusive; +but every gift and every effort has its proper place as a stage in the +endless process.[16] + + 'There shall never be lost one good! What was shall live as + before.'[17] + + +II + +The foregoing discussion leads naturally to the second aspect of the +highest Good, the Ideal in its social or corporate form--_the kingdom of +God_. Properly speaking, there is no such thing as an individual. As +biologically man is only a member of a larger organism, so ethically he +can only realise himself in a life of brotherhood and service. It is +only within the kingdom of God and by recognition of its social relations +that the individual can attain to his own blessedness. Viewed in the +light of the mutual relation of its members the kingdom is a brotherhood +in which none is ignored and all have common privileges and +responsibilities; viewed in the light of its highest good it is the +entire perfection of the whole--a hierarchy of interests subordinated to, +and unified by, the sovereignty of the good in the person of God.[18] + +1. By reason of its comprehensiveness the doctrine of the kingdom has +been regarded by many as the most general conception of the ideal of +Jesus. 'In its unique and unapproachable grandeur it dwarfs all the +lesser heights to which the prophetic hopes had risen, and remains to +this day the transcendent and commanding ideal of the possible exaltation +of our humanity.'[19] The principles implicitly contained in the +teaching of Jesus concerning the kingdom have become the common +possessions of mankind, and are moulding the thoughts and institutions of +the civilised world. Kant's theory of a kingdom of ends, Comte's idea of +Humanity, and the modern conceptions of scientific and {133} historical +evolution are corroborative of the teaching of the New Testament. Within +its conception men have found room for the modern ideas of social and +economic order, and under its inspiration are striving for a fuller +realisation of the aspirations and hopes of humanity.[20] + +Though frequently upon His lips the phrase did not originate with Jesus. +Already the Baptist had employed it as the note of his preaching, and +even before the Baptist it had a long history in the annals of the Jewish +people. Indeed the entire story of the Hebrews is coloured by this +conception, and in the days of their decline it is the idea of the +restoration of their nation as the true kingdom of God that dominates +their hopes. When earthly institutions did not fulfil their promise, and +nothing could be expected by natural means, hope became concentrated upon +supernatural power. Thus before Jesus appeared there had grown up a mass +of apocalyptic literature, the object of which was to encourage the +national expectation of a sudden and supernatural coming of the kingdom +of heaven. Men of themselves could do nothing to hasten its advent. +They could only wait patiently till the set time was accomplished, and +God stretched forth His mighty hand.[21] + +A new school of German interpretation has recently arisen, the aim of +which is to prove that Jesus was largely, if not wholly, influenced by +the current apocalyptic notions of His time. Jesus believed, it is said, +in common with the popular sentiment of the day, that the end of the +world was at hand, and that at the close of the present dispensation +there would come suddenly and miraculously a new order into which would +be gathered the elect of God. Johannes Weiss, the most pronounced +advocate of this view, maintains that Jesus' teaching is entirely +eschatological. The kingdom is supramundane and still to come. Jesus +did not inaugurate it; He only predicted its advent. Consequently there +is no Ethics, strictly so called, in His {134} preaching; there is only +an Ethic of renunciation and watchfulness[22]--an _Interimsethik_. + +The whole problem resolves itself into two crucial questions: (1) Did +Jesus expect a gradual coming of the kingdom, or did He conceive of it as +breaking in suddenly by the immediate act of God? and (2) Did Jesus +regard the kingdom as purely future, or as already begun? + +In answer to the first question, while there are undoubtedly numerous and +explicit sayings, too much neglected in the past and not to be wholly +explained by mere orientalism, suggesting a sudden and miraculous coming, +these must be taken in connection with the many other passages implying a +gradual process--passages of deep ethical import which seem to colour our +Lord's entire view of life and its purposes. And in answer to the second +question, while there are not a few utterances which certainly point to a +future consummation, these are not inconsistent with the immediate +inauguration and gradual development of the kingdom. + +A full discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this volume.[23] +There are, however, two objections which may be taken to the apocalyptic +interpretation of Christ's teaching as a whole. (1) As presented by its +most pronounced champions, this view seems to empty the person and +teaching of Jesus of their originality and universality. It tends to +reduce the Son of Man to the level of a Jewish rhapsodist, whose whole +function was to encourage His countrymen to look away from the present +scene of duty to some future state of felicity, which had no connection +with the world of reality, and no bearing upon their present character. +It would be surely a caricature to interpret the religion of the New +Testament from this standpoint alone to the exclusion of those directly +ethical and spiritual {135} principles in which its originality chiefly +appeared, and on which its permanence depends.[24] As Bousset[25] points +out, not renunciation but joy in life is the characteristic thing in +Jesus' outlook. He does not preach a gloomy asceticism, but proclaims a +new righteousness and a new type of duty. He recognises the worth of the +present life, and teaches that the world's goods are not in themselves +bad. He came as a living man into a dead world, and by inculcating a +living idea of God and proclaiming the divine Fatherhood gave a new +direction and inner elevation to the expectations of His age, showing the +true design of God's revelation and the real meaning of the prophetic +utterances of the past. To interpret the kingdom wholly from an +eschatological point of view would involve a failure to apprehend the +spiritual greatness of the personality with which we are dealing.[26] +(2) This view virtually makes Christ a false prophet. For, as a matter +of fact, the sudden and catastrophic coming of the kingdom as predicted +by the Hebrew apocalyptics did not take place. On the contrary the +kingdom of God came not as the Jews expected in a sudden descent from the +clouds, but in the slow and progressive domination of God over the souls +and social relationships of mankind. In view of the whole spirit of +Jesus, His conception of God, and His relation to human life, as well as +the attitude of St. Paul to the Parousia, it is critically unsound to +deny that Jesus believed in the presence of the kingdom in a real sense +during His lifetime.[27] + +2. If this conception of the kingdom of God be correct we may now +proceed to regard it under three aspects, Present, Progressive, and +Future--as a _Gift_ immediately bestowed by Jesus, as a _Task_ to be +worked out by man in the history of the world, and as a _Hope_ to be +consummated by God in the future. + +{136} + +(1) _The Kingdom as a Present Reality_.--After what has been already said +it will not be necessary to dwell upon this aspect. It might be +supported by direct sayings of our Lord.[28] But the whole tenor and +atmosphere of the Gospels, the uniqueness of Christ's personality, His +claim to heal disease and forgive sin, as well as the conditions of +entrance, imply clearly that in Jesus' own view the kingdom was an actual +fact inaugurated by Him and obtaining its meaning and power from His own +person and influence. Obviously He regarded Himself as the bearer of a +new message of life, and the originator of a new reign of righteousness +and love which was to have immediate application. Christ came to make +God real to men upon the earth, and to win their allegiance to Him at +once. No one can fail to recognise the lofty idealism of the Son of Man. +He carries with Him everywhere a vision of the perfect life as it exists +in the mind of God, and as it will be realised when these earthly scenes +have passed away; yet it would be truer to say that His interests were in +'first things' rather than in 'last things,' and would be more justly +designated Protology than Eschatology.[29] His mission, so far from +having an iconoclastic aim, was really to 'make all things new.' He was +concerned with the initiation of a new religion, therefore with a +movement towards a regeneration of society which would be virtually a +reign of God in the hearts of men. 'The kingdom of God is within you.' +Not in some spot remote from the world, some beautiful land beyond the +skies, but in the hearts and homes, in the daily pursuits and common +relationships of life must God rule. The beatitudes, while they +undoubtedly refer to a future when a fuller realisation of them will be +enjoyed, have a present reference as well. They make the promise of the +kingdom a present reality dependent upon the inner state of the +recipients. Not in change of environment but in change {137} of heart +does the kingdom consist. The lowly and the pure in heart, the merciful +and the meek, the seekers after righteousness and the lovers of peace +are, in virtue of their disposition and aspiration, already members. + +(2) The kingdom as a _gradual development_.--The inward gift prescribes +the outward task. It is a power commanding the hearts of men and +requiring for its realisation their response. It might be argued that +this call to moral effort presented to the first Christians was not a +summons to transform the present world, but to prepare themselves for the +destiny that awaited them in the coming age.[30] It is true that +watchfulness, patience, and readiness are among the great commands of the +New Testament.[31] But admitting the importance of these requirements, +they do not militate against the view that Christians were to work for +the betterment of the world. Christ did not look upon the world as +hopeless and beyond all power of reclaiming; nor did He regard His own or +His disciples' ministry within it as without real and positive effects. +While His contemporaries were expecting some mighty intervention that +would suddenly bring the kingdom ready-made from heaven, He saw it +growing up silently and secretly among men. He took his illustrations +from organic life. Its progress was to be like the seed hidden in the +earth, and growing day and night by its own inherent germinating force. +The object of the parables of the sower, the tares, the mustard seed, the +leaven, was to show that the crude catastrophic conception of the coming +of the kingdom must give place to the deeper and worthier idea of +growth--an idea in harmony with the entire economy of God's working in +the world of nature. In the parable of the fruit-bearing earth Jesus +shows His faith in the growth of the good, and hence in the adaptation of +the truth to the human soul. In the parables of the leaven, the light, +and salt Jesus illustrates the gradual power of truth to pervade, +illumine, and purify the life of humanity. His method of bringing about +this {138} good is the contagion of the good life. His motive is the +sense of the need of men. And His goal is the establishment of the +kingdom of love--a kingdom in which all the problems of ambition, wealth, +and the relationships of the family, of the industrial sphere, and of the +state, are to be transfigured and spiritualised.[32] + +It is surely no illegitimate application of the mind of Christ if we see +in His teaching concerning the kingdom a great social ideal to be +realised by the personal activities and mutual services of its citizens. +It finds its field and opportunity in the realm of human society, and is +a good to be secured in the larger life of humanity. This ideal, though +only dimly perceived by the early Church, has become gradually operative +in the world, and has been creative of all the great liberating movements +in history. It lay behind Dante's vision of a spiritual monarchy, and +has been the inspiring motive of those who, in obedience to Christ, have +wrought for the uplifting of the hapless and the down-trodden. It has +been the soul of all mighty reformations, and is the source of that +conception of a new social order which has begun to mean so much for our +generation. + +Loyalty to the highest and love for the lowest--love to God and +man--these are the marks of the men of all ages who have sought to +interpret the mind of Christ. Mutual service is the law of the kingdom. +Every man has a worth for Christ, therefore reverence for the personality +of man, and the endeavour to procure for each full opportunity of making +the most of his life, are at once the aim and goal of the new spiritual +society of which Christ laid the foundations in His own life and +ministry. Everything that a man is and has, talents and possessions of +every kind, are to be used as instruments for the promotion of the +kingdom of God. + + 'For life, with all it yields of joy and woe, + And hope and fear . . . + Is just our chance o' the prize of learning love.' + +{139} + +(3) But though the reign of God has begun, it has _yet to be +consummated_.--There is not wanting in the New Testament an element of +futurity and expectancy not inconsistent with, but rather complementary +to, the notion of gradual development. The eschatological teaching of +Jesus has its place along with the ethical, and may be regarded not as +annulling, but rather reinforcing the moral ideals which He +proclaimed.[33] There is nothing pessimistic in Christ's outlook. His +teaching concerning the last things, while inculcating solemnity and +earnestness of life as become those to whom has been entrusted a high +destiny, and who know not at what hour they may be called to give an +account of their stewardship,[34] bids men look forward with certainty +and hope to a glorious consummation of the kingdom. Though many of our +Lord's sayings with regard to His second coming are couched in figurative +language, we cannot believe that He intended to teach that the kingdom +itself was to be brought about in a spectacular or material way. He bids +His disciples take heed lest they be deceived by a visible Christ, or led +away by merely outward signs.[35] His coming is to be as 'the lightning +which cometh out of the east and shineth even unto the west'[36]--an +emblem not so much of suddenness as of illuminating and convincing, and +especially, of progressive force. Not in a visible reign or personal +return of the Son of Man does the consummation of the kingdom consist, +but in the complete spiritual sovereignty of Christ over the hearts and +minds of men. When the same love which He Himself manifested in His life +becomes the feature of His disciples; when His spirit of service and +sacrifice pervades the world, and the brotherhood of man and the +federation of nations everywhere prevail; then, indeed, shall the sign of +the Son of Man appear in the heavens, and then shall the tribes of {140} +the earth see Him coming in the clouds with power and glory.[37] + +Jesus does not hesitate to say that there will be a final judgment and an +ingathering of the elect from all quarters of the earth.[38] There will +be, as the parable of the Ten Virgins suggests, a division and a shut +door.[39] But punishment will be automatic. Sin will bring its own +consequences. Those only will be excluded at the last who even now are +excluding themselves. For Christ is already here, and is judging the +world every day. By the common actions of their present life men are +being tried; and that which will determine their final relation to Christ +will not be their mere perception of His bodily presence, but their moral +and spiritual likeness to Him. + +Amidst the imperfections of the present men have ever looked forward to +some glorious consummation, and have lived and worked in the faith of it. +'To the prophets of Israel it was the new age of righteousness; to the +Greek thinkers the world of pure intelligible forms; to Augustine and +Dante the holy theocratic state; to the practical thought of our own time +the renovated social order. Each successive age will frame its own +vision of the great fulfilment; but all the different ideals can find +their place in the message of the kingdom which was proclaimed by +Jesus.'[40] + +There is thus opened to our vision a splendid conception of the future of +humanity. It stands for all that is highest in our expectations because +it is already expressive of all that is best in our present achievements +and endeavours. The final hope of mankind requires for its fulfilment a +progressive moral discipline. Only as Christ's twofold command--love to +God and love to man--is made the all-pervasive rule of men's lives will +the goal of a universally perfected humanity be attained. + +{141} + +III + +The chief good may be regarded finally in its _divine_ aspect--as the +endeavour after God-likeness. In this third form of the ideal the two +others--the personal and the social--are harmonised and completed. To +realise the perfect life as it is revealed in the character and will of +God is the supreme aim of man, and it embraces all that is conceivably +highest for the individual and for humanity as a whole. This aspiration +finds its most explicit expression in the sublime word of Christ--'Be ye +perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect.'[41] This commandment, +unlike so many generalisations of duty, is no cold abstraction. It is +pervaded with the warmth of personality and the inspiration of love. In +the idea of Fatherhood both a standard and motive are implied. Because +God is our Father it is at once natural and possible for us to be like +Him. He who would imitate another must have already within him something +of that other. As there is a community of nature which makes it possible +for the child to grow into the likeness of its parent, so there is a +kinship in man with God to which our Lord here appeals. + +1. Among the ethical qualities of divine perfection set forth in +scripture for man's imitation _Holiness_ stands preeminent. God, the +perfect being, is the type of holiness, and men are holy in proportion as +their lives are Godlike. This conception of holiness is fundamental in +the Old Testament. It is summed up in a command almost identical with +that of our Lord: 'Be ye holy, for I am holy.'[42] Holiness, as +Christianity understands it, is the name for the undimmed lustre of God's +ethical perfection. God is 'the Holy one'--the alone 'good' in the +absolute sense.[43] + +If God's character consists in 'Holiness,' then that quality determines +the moral end of man. But holiness, as the most comprehensive name for +the divine moral perfection--the pure white light of God's Being--breaks +up into the {142} separate rays which we designate the special moral +attributes. These have been grouped under 'Righteousness' (truth, +faithfulness, justice, zeal, etc.), and 'Love' (goodness, pity, mercy, +etc.), though they are really but expressions of one individual life.[44] + +2. In the New Testament _Righteousness_ is almost equivalent to +holiness. It is the attribute of God which determines the nature of His +kingdom and the condition of man's entrance into it. As comprising +obedience to the will of God and the fulfilment of the moral law, it is +the basal and central conception of the Christian ideal.[45] It is the +keynote of the Pauline Epistles. Life has a supreme sacredness for Paul +because the righteousness of God is its end. While righteousness is the +distinctive note of the Pauline conception, it is also fundamental in the +Ethics of Jesus. It is the ruling thought in the Sermon on the Mount. +To be righteous for Jesus simply means to be right and true--to be as one +ought to be. But human standards are insufficient. A man must order his +life by the divine standard. Jesus is as emphatic as any Old Testament +prophet in insisting upon the need of absolute righteousness. That, for +all who would share in the kingdom of the good, is to be their ideal--the +object of their hunger and thirst. It is a 'good' which is essential to +the very satisfaction and blessedness of the soul.[46] It is the supreme +desire of the man who would be at peace with God. It involves poverty of +spirit, for only those who are emptied of self are conscious of their +need. They who, in humility and meekness, acknowledge their sins, are in +the way of holiness and are already partakers of the divine nature. + +Christ's teaching in regard to righteousness has both a negative and a +positive aspect. It was inevitable that He should begin with a criticism +of the morality inculcated by the leaders of His day. The characteristic +feature of Pharisaism was, as Christ shows, its _externalism_. If a man +fulfilled the outward requirements of the law he was {143} regarded as +holy, by himself and others, whatever might be the state of his heart +towards God. This outwardness tended to create certain vices of +character. Foremost amongst these were (1) _Vanity_ or Ostentation. To +appear well in the opinion of others was the aim of pharisaic conduct. +Along with ostentation appears (2) _Self-complacency_. Flattery leads to +self-esteem. He who loves the praise of man naturally begins to praise +himself. As a result of self-esteem arises (3) _Censoriousness_, since +he who thinks well of himself is apt to think ill of others. As a system +Pharisaism was wanton hypocrisy--a character of seeming righteousness, +but too often of real viciousness. + +But Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil the law.[47] His aim was to +proclaim the true principles of righteousness in contrast to the current +notions of it. This He proceeds to do by issuing the law in its ideal +and perfected form.[48] Hence Jesus unfolds its _positive_ content by +bringing into prominence the virtues of the godly character as opposed to +the pharisaic vices. _Modesty_ and _humility_ are set over against +ostentation and self-righteousness.[49] _Single-minded sincerity_ is +commended in opposition to hypocrisy.[50] The vice of censoriousness is +met by the duty of _self-judgment_ rather than the judgment of others.[51] + +The two positive features of the new law of righteousness as expounded by +Jesus are--_inwardness_ and _spontaneity_. The righteousness of the +Gospel, so far from being laxer or easier of fulfilment, was actually to +exceed that of the Pharisees:[52] (_a_) in _depth and inwardness_. It is +not enough not to kill or steal or commit adultery. These commandments +may be outwardly kept yet inwardly broken. Something more radical is +expected of the man who has set before him the doing of God's will, a +righteousness not of appearance but of reality. (_b_) In _freedom and +spontaneity_. It is to have its spring in the heart. It is to be a +righteousness not of servile obedience, but of willing devotion. The aim +of life is no longer the painful effort of the bondsman who {144} strives +to perform a distasteful task, but the gladsome endeavour of the son who +knows and does, because he loves, his father's will. In the Ethics of +the Christian life there is no such thing as mere duty; for a man never +fulfils his duty till he has done more than is legally required of him. +'Whosoever shall compel you to go with him one mile, go with him +twain.'[53] The 'nicely calculated less or more' is alien to the spirit +of him who would do God's will. Love is the fulfilling of the law, and +love knows nothing of limits. + +3. Thus the holiness of God is manifested not in righteousness only, but +in the attribute of Love. The human mind can attain to no higher +conception of the divine character than that which the word 'love' +suggests. The thought is the creation of Christianity. It was the +special contribution of one of the innermost circle of Jesus' disciples +to give utterance to the new vision of the divine nature which Christ had +disclosed--'God is love.'[54] In our Lord's teaching the centre of +gravity is entirely changed. The Jewish idea of God is enriched with a +fuller content. He is still the Holy One, but the sublimity of His +righteousness, though fully recognised, is softened by the gentler +radiance of love.[55] Jehovah the Sovereign is revealed as God the +Father. Divine righteousness is not simply justice, but goodness +manifested in far-reaching activities of mercy and pity and benevolence. +A new note is struck in the Ethics of Jesus. A new relationship is +established between God and man--a personal filial relationship which +entirely alters man's conception of life. To be perfect as our Father in +heaven is perfect, to be, and embody in life all that love means, that is +the sublime aim which Jesus in His own person and teaching sets before +the world. As God's love is universal, and His care and compassion +world-wide, so, says Christ, not by retaliation or even by the +performance of strict justice, but in loving your enemies, in returning +good for evil and extending your acts of helpfulness and charity to those +'who know not, care not, think {145} not, what they do,' shall ye become +the children of your Father, and realise something of that divine pattern +of every man which has been shown him on the holy mount. + +If the view presented in this chapter of the ethical ideal of +Christianity be correct, then the doctrine of an _Interims-ethik_ +advocated by modern eschatologists must be pronounced unsatisfactory as a +complete account of the teaching of Jesus.[56] The three features which +stand out most clearly in the Ethics of Christ are, Absoluteness, +Inwardness, and Universality. It is an ideal for man as man, for all +time, and for all men. The personality of God represents the highest +form of existence we know; and the love of God is the sublimest attribute +we can conceive. But because God is our Father there is a kinship +between the divine and the human; and no higher or grander vision of life +is thinkable than to be like God--to share that which is most distinctive +of the divine Fatherhood--His love of all mankind. Hence Godlikeness +involves Brotherhood.[57] In the ideal of love--high as God, broad as +the world--the other aspects of the chief good, the individual and the +social, are harmonised. In Christian Ethics, the problem of philosophy +how to unite the one and the many, egoism and altruism, has been +practically solved. The individual realises his life only as he finds +himself in others; and this he can only do as he finds himself in God. +The first and last word of all morality and religion is summed up in +Christ's twofold law of love: 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all +thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; and thou shalt +love thy neighbour as thyself.'[58] + + + +[1] Cf. Troeltsch, _Die Sociallehren d. Christl. Kirchen_, vol. i. p. +37, where the idea of self-worth and self-consecration is worked out. + +[2] Wernle, _Beginnings of Christianity_, vol. i. p. 76. + +[3] Wernle, _Beginnings of Christianity_, pp. 76 f. + +[4] John x. 10. + +[5] Luke xii. 15, 16. + +[6] Matt. v. + +[7] Matt. vi. 24. + +[8] 1 John ii. 15. + +[9] Luke x. 21; Matt. xi. 28-30; Mark viii. 35; John iii. 15, x. 28, +xvii. 2. + +[10] John xvii. 3. + +[11] Rom. xii. 1. + +[12] Matt. xix. 17. + +[13] Luke xvii. 33; John xii. 25. + +[14] Bailey, _Festus_. + +[15] Browning. + +[16] Jones, _Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher_, p. 354. + +[17] Abt Vogler. + +[18] Cf. Balch, _Introd. to the Study of Christian Ethics_, p. 150. + +[19] Newman Smyth, _Christian Ethics_, p. 97. + +[20] Balch, _Introd. to the Study of Christian Ethics_, p. 150. + +[21] See Apocalypses of Baruch, Esdras, Enoch, and Pss. of Solomon, and +also Daniel and Ezekiel. Cf. E. F. Scott, _The Kingdom and the Messiah_, +for Apoc. literature. + +[22] J. Weiss, _Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes_. Cf. also Wernle, +_Die Anfaenge unsurer Religion_, who is not so pronounced. Bousset +rejects this view, and Titius, in his _N. T. Doctrine of Blessedness_, +regards the kingdom of God as a present good. See also Moffatt, _The +Theology of the Gospels_. + +[23] Cf. Dobschuetz, _The Eschatology of the Gospels_, also Schweitzer, +_op. cit._, and Sanday, _The Life of Christ in Recent Research_, E. +Scott, _The Kingdom of God and the Messiah_, and Moffatt, _op. cit._ + +[24] Cf. Barbour, _A Philos. Study of Chr. Ethics_, p. 184. + +[25] 'Jesu predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judenthum.' + +[26] Cairns, _Christianity in the Mod. World_, p. 173. See Schweitzer, +_The Quest of the Historical Jesus_, for advocates and opponents of this +view, pp. 222 ff. Cf. also Troeltsch, _op. cit._, vol. i. p. 35. + +[27] Cf. Moffatt, _op. cit._ + +[28] Luke iv. 21, xvii. 21; Matt. xii. 28, xi. 2-8, xi. 20; Luke xvi. +16. Cf. also Matt. xiii. 16-17. + +[29] Our Lord never uses the word 'final' or 'last' of anything +concerning the kingdom. Only in the fourth Gospel do we find the phrase +'the last day.' See art., _Contemporary Review_, Sept. 1912. + +[30] The view of Weiss. + +[31] Luke xii. 19; Matt xxiv. 13; Mark xiii. 13; 2 Tim. ii. 12. + +[32] King, _The Ethics of Jesus_, p. 143. + +[33] Mark xiii. 7-31 has been called the 'little Apocalypse' and the +hypothesis has been thrown out that a number of verses (fifteen in all) +form a document by themselves, 'a fly leaf put into circulation before +the fall of Jerusalem, and really incorporated by the Evangelist himself. +See Sanday, art., _Hibbert Journal_, Oct. 1911, and _Life of Christ in +Recent Research_. + +[34] Matt. xxiv. 42. + +[35] Matt. xxiv. 23. + +[36] Matt. xxiv. 27. + +[37] Matt. xxiv. 30. + +[38] Matt. xxiv. 31. + +[39] Matt. xxv. + +[40] E. F. Scott, _The Kingdom and the Messiah_, p. 256. + +[41] Matt. v. 48. + +[42] Lev. iv. 11, xix. 2. + +[43] Mark x. 18. + +[44] Cf. Orr, _Sin as a Problem of To-day_, chap. iii. + +[45] Cf. Jacoby, _Neu-testamentliche Ethik_, p. 1. + +[46] Matt. v. 3 f. + +[47] Matt. v. 17. + +[48] Matt. v. 18. + +[49] Matt. vi. 1-6. + +[50] Matt. vi. 16-18. + +[51] Matt. vii. 1-5. + +[52] Matt. v. 20. + +[53] Matt. v. 41. + +[54] 1 John iv. 8, 16. + +[55] John xvii. 11; Heb. x. 31; Rev. xv. 4. + +[56] Cf. E. Digges La Touche, _The Person of Christ in Modern Thought_, +pp. 150 ff. + +[57] 1 John iv. 21. + +[58] Matt. xxii. 37. + + + + +{146} + +CHAPTER IX + +THE STANDARD AND MOTIVE OF THE NEW LIFE + +In every system of Ethics the three ideas of End, Norm, and Motive are +inseparable. Christian Ethics is unique in this respect that it presents +not merely a code of morals, but an ideal of good embodied in a person +who is at once the pattern and inspiration of the new life. In this +chapter we propose to consider these two elements of the good. + +_Christ as Example_.--The value of 'concrete examples' has been +frequently recognised in non-Christian systems. In the 'philosopher +king' of Plato, the 'expert' of Aristotle, and the 'wise man' of the +Stoics we have the imaginary embodiment of the ideal. A similar tendency +is apparent in modern theories. Comte invests the abstract idea of +'Humanity' with certain personal perfections for which he claims homage. +But what other systems have conceived in an imaginative form only, +Christianity has realised in an actual person. + +The example of Christ is not a separate source of authority independent +of His teaching, but rather its witness and illustration. Word and deed +in Jesus are in full agreement. He was what He taught, and every truth +He uttered flowed directly from His inner nature. He is the prototype +and expression of the 'good' as it exists in the mind of God, as well as +the perfect representative and standard of it in human life. In Him is +manifested for all time what is meant by the good. + +{147} + +1. If Christ is the normative standard of life it is extremely important +to obtain a true perception of Him as He dwelt among men. But too often +have theology and art presented a Christ embellished with fantastic +colours or obscured by abstract speculations. Recently, however, there +has been a revival of interest in the actual life of Jesus. Men are +turning wistfully to the life of the Master for guidance in practical +matters, and it is beginning to dawn upon the world that the highest +ideals of manhood were present in the Carpenter of Nazareth. We must +therefore go back to the Gospels if we would know what manner of man +Jesus was. The difficulty of presenting the Man Christ Jesus as the +eternal example to the world must have been almost insurmountable; and we +are at once struck with two remarkable features of the synoptics' +portrayal of Him. (1) The writers make no attempt to produce a work of +art. They never dream that they are drawing a model for all men to copy. +There is no effort to touch up or tone down the portrait. They simply +reflect what they see without admixture of colours of their own. Hence +the paradox of His personality--the intense humanness and yet the mystery +of godliness ever and anon shining through the commonest incidents of His +life. (2) Even more remarkable than the absence of subjectivity on the +part of the evangelists is the unconsciousness of Jesus that He is being +portrayed as an example. We do not receive the impression that the Son +of Man was consciously living for the edification of the world. His +mental attitude is not that of an actor playing a part, but of a true and +genuine man living his own life and fulfilling his own purpose. There is +no seeming or display. Goodness to be effectual as an example must be +unconscious goodness. We are impressed everywhere with the perfect +naturalness and spontaneity of all that Christ did and uttered.[1] + +The character of Jesus has been variously interpreted, and it is one of +the evidences of His moral greatness that each age has emphasised some +new aspect of His {148} personality. In a nature so rich and complex it +is difficult to fix upon a single category from which may be deduced the +manifold attributes of His character. Two conceptions of Jesus have +generally prevailed down the centuries. One view interprets His +character in terms of asceticism; the other in terms of aestheticism.[2] +Some regard Him as the representative of Hebrew sorrow and sacrifice; +others see in Him the type of Hellenic joy and geniality. There are +passages in Scripture confirmatory of both impressions. On the one hand, +there is a whole series of virtues of the passive order which are utterly +alien to the Greek ideal; and, on the other hand, there is equally +prominent a tone of tranquil gladness, of broad sympathy with, and keen +appreciation of, the beautiful in nature and life which contrasts with +the spirit of Hebrew abnegation. But, after all, neither of these traits +reveals the secret of Jesus. Joy and sorrow are but incidents in life. +They have only moral value as the vehicles of a profounder spiritual +purpose. To help every man to realise the fullness and perfection of his +being as a child of God is the aim of His life and ministry, and +everything that furthers this end is gratefully recognised by Him as a +good. He neither courts nor shuns pain. Neither joy nor sorrow is for +Him an end in itself. Both are but incidents upon the way of holiness +and love which He had chosen to travel. + +2. Everywhere there was manifest in the life and teaching of Jesus a +note of _self-mastery and authority_ which impressed His contemporaries +and goes far to explain and unify the various features of His personality +and influence. It is remarkable to notice how often the word 'power' is +applied to Jesus in the New Testament.[3] Whether we regard His attitude +to God, or His relation to others, it is this note of quiet strength, of +vital moral force which arrests our attention. It will be sufficient to +mention in passing three directions in which this quality of power is +manifest. + +{149} + +(1) It is revealed in the consciousness of a _divine mission_. He goes +steadily forward with the calmness of one who knows himself and his work. +He has no fear or hesitancy. Courage, earnestness, and singleness of +purpose mark His career. He is conscious that His task has been given +Him by God, and that He is the chosen instrument of His Father's will. +Life has a greatness and worth for Him because it may be made the +manifestation and vehicle of the divine purpose. + +(2) His power is revealed again in the _realisation of Holiness_. +Holiness is to be differentiated, on the one hand, from innocence; and, +on the other, from sinlessness. Innocence is untried goodness; +sinlessness is negative goodness; holiness is achieved and victorious +goodness. It was not mere absence of sin that distinguished Jesus. His +was a purity won by temptation, an obedience perfected through suffering, +a peace and harmony of soul attained not by self-suppression, but by the +consecration of His unfolding life to the will of God. + +(3) His power is manifested once more in His _Sympathy with man_. His +purity was pervasive. It flowed forth in acts of love. He went about +doing good, invading the world of darkness and sorrow with light and joy. +It is the wealth of His interests and the variety of His sympathy which +give to the ministry of the Son of Man its impressiveness and charm. +With gladness as with grief, with the playfulness of childhood and the +earnestness of maturity, with the innocent festivities and the graver +pursuits of His fellow-men, with the cares of the rich and the trials of +the poor, He disclosed the most intimate and tender feeling. His +parables show that He had an open and observant eye for all the life +around Him. To every appeal He responded with an insight and delicacy of +consideration which betokened that He Himself had sounded the depths of +human experience and knew what was in man. Humour, irony, and pathos in +turn are revealed in His human intercourse. + +But while Jesus delighted to give of Himself freely He knew also how to +withhold Himself. There can be no true {150} sympathy without restraint. +The passive virtues--meekness, patience, forbearance--which appear in the +life of Christ are 'not the signs of mere self-mortification, they are +the signs of power in reserve. They are the marks of one who can afford +to wait, who expects to suffer; and that not because he is simply meek +and lowly, but because he is also strong and calm.'[4] + +The New Testament depicts Jesus as made in the likeness of men, whose +life, though unique in some of its aspects, was in its general conditions +normal, passing through the ordinary stages of growth, and participating +in the common experiences of mankind. He had to submit to the same laws +and limitations of the universe as we have. There was the same call, in +His case as in ours, to obedience and endurance. There was the same +demand for moral decision. Temptation, suffering, and toil, which mean +so much for man in the discipline of character, were factors also in the +spiritual development of Christ. Trust, prayer, thanksgiving were +exercised by the Son of Man as by others; confession alone had no place +in His life. + +3. The question has been seriously asked, Can the example and teaching +of Jesus be really adopted in modern life as the pattern and rule of +conduct? Is there not something strangely impracticable in His Ethics; +and, however admirably suited to meet the needs of His own time, utterly +inapplicable to the complex conditions of society to-day? On the one +hand, Tolstoy would have us follow the example of Jesus to the letter, +and rigidly practise the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount, even to the +extent of refusing to resist wrong and possess property, and of holding +aloof from all culture and enterprise, and the interests of life +generally. On the other hand, philosophers like Paulsen and Bradley, +perceiving the utter impracticableness of Tolstoy's contentions, yet at +the same time recognising his attitude as the only consistent one if the +imitation of Christ is to have vogue at all, are convinced that the +earthly life of Jesus is not the model of our {161} age, and that to +attempt to carry out His precepts consistently would be not only +impossible but injurious to all the higher interests of humanity.[5] + +But this conclusion is based, it seems to us, upon a two-fold +misapprehension. It is founded upon an inadequate interpretation of the +life and teaching of Christ; and also upon a wholly mechanical +understanding of the meaning and value of example. + +(1) What was Christ's ideal of the Christian life? Was it that of the +monk or the citizen?--the recluse who meditates apart on his own +salvation, or the worker who enters the world and contributes to the +betterment of mankind? Is the kingdom of God a realm apart and separate +from all the other domains of activity? Or has Christianity, according +to its essence, room within it for an application of its truth to the +complex relations and manifold interests of modern life? Both views have +found expression in the history of the Church. But there can be little +doubt as to which is the true interpretation of the mind of Jesus.[6] + +(2) But, again, what is meant by the 'imitation of Christ' has been also +misconceived. Imitation is not a literal mechanical copying. To make +the character of another your model does not mean that you are to become +his mimic or echo. In asking us to follow Him, Christ does not desire to +suppress our individuality, but to enrich and ennoble it. When He says, +on the occasion of the feet-washing of His disciples, 'I have given you +an example, that ye should do as I have done to you,'[7] obviously it was +not the outward literal performance, but the spirit of humility and +service embodied in the act which He desired His disciples to emulate. +From another soul we receive incentives rather than rules. No teacher or +master, says Emerson, can {152} realise for us what is good.[8] Within +our own souls alone can the decision be made. We cannot hope to +interpret the character of another until there be within our own breasts +the same moral spirit from which we believe his conduct to proceed. The +very nature of goodness forbids slavish reproduction. Hence there is a +certain sense in which the paradox of Kant is true, that 'imitation finds +no place at all in morality.'[9] The question, 'What would Jesus do?' as +a test of conduct covers a quite inadequate conception of the intimate +and vital relations Christ bears to our humanity. 'It is not to copy +after Christ,' says a modern writer, 'but to receive His spirit and make +it effective--which is the moral task of the Christian.'[10] Christ is +indeed our example, but He is more. And unless He were more He could not +be so much. We could not strive to be like Him if He were not already +within us, the Principle and Spirit of our life, the higher and diviner +self of every man. + +What is meant, then, by saying that Christ is the ideal character or norm +of life is that He represents to us human nature in its typical or ideal +form. As we behold His perfection we feel that this is what we were made +for, this is the true end of our being. Every one may, in short, see in +Him the fulfilment of the divine idea and purpose of man--the conception +and end of himself.[11] + + +II + +_The Christian Motive_.--Rightly regarded Christ is not only the model of +the new life, but its motive as well. All the great appeals of the +Gospel--every persuasion and plea by which God seeks to awaken a +responsive love in the hearts of men--are centred in, and find expression +through, the Person and Passion of Christ. + +1. The question of motive is a primary one in Ethics. {153} If, +therefore, we ask, What is the deepest spring of action, what is the +incentive and motive power for the Christian? The answer is: (1) the +love of God, a love which finds its highest expression in _Forgiveness_. +Of all motives the most powerful is the sense of being pardoned. Even +when it is only one human being who forgives another, nothing strikes so +deep into the human heart or evokes penitence so tender and unreserved, +or brings a joy so pure and lasting. It not only restores the old +relation which wrong had dissolved; it gives the offender a sense of +loyalty unknown before. He is now bound not by law but by honour, and it +would be a disloyalty worse than the original offence if he wounded such +love again. Thus it is that God becomes the object of reverence and +affection, not because He imposes laws upon us but because He pardons and +redeems. The consciousness of forgiveness is far more potent in +producing goodness than the consciousness of law. This psychological +fact lay at the root of Christ's ministry, and was the secret of His hope +for man. This, too, is the key to all that is paradoxical, and, at the +same time, to all that is most characteristic in St Paul's Gospel. What +the Law could not do, forgiveness achieves. It creates the new heart, +and with it the new holiness. 'It is not anything statutory which makes +saints out of sinful men; it is the forgiveness which comes through the +passion of Jesus.'[12] + +(2) Next to the motive of forgiveness, and indeed arising from it, is the +new consciousness of the _Fatherhood of God_, and the corresponding idea +of sonship. This was a motive to which Jesus habitually appealed. He +invariably sought not only to create in men confidence in God by +revealing His fatherly providence, but also to lift them out of their +apathy and thraldom by kindling in their souls a sense of their worth and +liberty as sons of God. The same thought is prominent also in the +epistles both of St. Paul and St. John. As children of God we are no +longer menials and hirelings who do their work merely for pay, and +without {154} intelligent interest, but sons who share our Father's +possessions and co-operate with Him in His purposes.[13] + +(3) Closely connected with the idea of Sonship is that of life as a +_Divine Vocation_. Life is a trust, and as the children of God we are +called to serve Him with all we have and are. The sense of the vocation +and stewardship of life acts as a motive: (_a_) in giving _dignity and +stability_ to character, saving us, on the one hand, from fatalism, and +on the other from fanaticism, and affording definiteness of purpose to +all our endeavours; and (_b_) in promoting _sincerity and fidelity_ in +our life-work. Thoroughness will permeate every department of our +conduct, since whatsoever we do in word or deed we do as unto God. All +duty is felt to be one, and as love to God becomes its motive the +smallest as well as the greatest act is invested with infinite worth. +'All service ranks the same with God.' + +(4) Another motive, prominent in the Pauline Epistles, but present also +in the eschatological passages of the Synoptics, ought to be mentioned, +though it does not now act upon Christians in the same form--_the +Shortness and Uncertainty of life_. Our Lord enjoins men to work while +it is day for the night cometh; and in view of the suddenness and +unexpectedness of the coming of the Son of Man He exhorts to watchfulness +and preparedness. A similar thought forms the background of the +apostle's conception of life. His entire view of duty as well as his +estimate of earthly things are tinged with the idea that 'the time is +short,' and that 'the Lord is at hand.' Christians are exhorted, +therefore, to sit lightly to all worldly considerations. Our true +citizenship is in heaven. But neither the apostle nor his Master ever +urges this fact as a reason for apathy or indifference. Life may be +brief, but it is not worthless. The thought of life's brevity must not +act as an opiate, but rather as a stimulant. If our existence here is +short, then there is all the greater necessity that its days should be +nobly filled, and its transient opportunities seized and turned into +occasions of strenuous service. + +{155} + +(5) To the considerations just mentioned must be added a cognate truth +which has coloured the whole Christian view of life, and has been a most +powerful factor in shaping Christian conduct--_the idea of Immortality_. +It is not quite correct to say that we owe this doctrine to Christianity +alone. Long before the Christian era it was recognised in Egypt, Greece, +and the Orient generally. But it was entertained more as a surmise than +a conviction. And among the Greeks it was little more than the shadowy +speculation of philosophers. Plato, in his _Phaedo_, puts into the mouth +of Socrates utterances of great beauty and far-reaching import; yet, +notwithstanding their sublimity, they scarcely attain to more than a +'perhaps.' Even in Hebrew literature, as we have seen, while isolated +instances of a larger hope are not wanting, there is no confident or +general belief in an after-life. But what was only guessed at by the +ancients was declared as a fact by Christ, and preached as a sublime and +comforting truth by the apostles; and it is not too much to say that +survival after death is at once the most distinctive doctrine of +Christianity and the most precious hope of Christendom. The whole moral +temperature of the world, says Jean Paul Richter, has been raised +immeasurably by the fact that Christ by His Gospel has brought life and +immortality to light. This idea, which has found expression, not only in +all the creeds of Christendom, but also in the higher literature and +poetry of modern times, has given a new motive to action, has founded a +new type of heroism, and nerved common men and women to the discharge of +tasks from which nature recoils. The assurance that death does not end +existence, but that 'man has forever,' has not only exalted and +transfigured the common virtues of humanity; but, held in conjunction +with the belief in the divine Fatherhood and human brotherhood, given to +life itself a new solemnity and pathos.[14] + +2. But if these are the things which actuate men in their service of God +and man, can it be legitimately said that the Christian motive is pure +and disinterested? It is {166} somewhat remarkable that two opposite +charges have been brought against Christian Ethics.[15] In one quarter +the reproach has been made that Christianity suppresses every natural +desire for happiness, and inculcates a life of severe renunciation. And +with equally strong insistence there are others who find fault with it +because of its hedonism, because it rests morality upon an appeal to +selfish interests alone. + +(1) The first charge is sufficiently met, we think, by our view of the +Christian ideal. We have seen that it is a full rich life which Christ +reveals and commends. The kingdom of God finds its realisation, not in a +withdrawal from human interests, but in a larger and fuller participation +in all that makes for the highest good of humanity. It is a caricature +of Christ's whole outlook upon existence to represent Him as teaching +that this life is an outlying waste, forsaken of God and unblessed, and +that the world is so hopelessly bad that it must be wholly renounced. On +the contrary, it is for Him one of the provinces of the divine kingdom, +and the most trivial of our occupations and the most transient of our +joys and sorrows find their place in the divine order. It is not +necessary to endorse Renan's idyllic picture of the Galilean ministry to +believe that for Jesus all life, its ordinary engagements and activities, +had a worth for the discipline and perfecting of character, and were +capable of being consecrated to the highest ends. There are, indeed, not +a few passages in which the call to self-denial is emphasised. But +neither Christ nor His apostles represent pain and want as in themselves +efficacious or meritorious. Renunciation is inculcated not for its own +sake, but always as a means to fuller realisation. Jesus, indeed, +transcends the common antithesis of life. For Him it is not a question +as to whether asceticism or non-asceticism is best. Life is for use. It +is at once a trust and a privilege. It may seem to some that He chose +'the primrose path,' but if he did so it was not due to an easy-going +good-nature. We dare not forget the terrible issues {157} He faced +without flinching. As Professor Sanday has finely said, 'If we are to +draw a lesson in this respect from our Lord's life, it certainly would +not be that + + "He who lets his feelings run + In soft luxurious flow, + Shrinks when hard service must be done, + And faints at every woe." + +It would be rather that the brightest and tenderest human life must have +a stern background, must carry with it the possibility of infinite +sacrifice, of bearing the cross and the crown of thorns.'[16] + +(2) The second charge, the charge of hedonism, though seemingly opposed +to the first, comes into line with it in so far as it is alleged that +Christianity, while inculcating renunciation in this world, does so for +the sake of happiness in the next. It is contended that in regard to +purity of motive the Ethics of Christianity falls below the Ethics of +philosophy.[17] This statement, so often repeated, requires some +examination. + +3. While it may be acknowledged that unselfishness and disinterestedness +are the criterion of moral sublimity, it must be noted at the outset that +considerable confusion of thought exists as to the meaning of motive. +Even in those moral systems in which virtue is represented as wholly +disinterested, the motive may be said to reside in the object itself. +The maxim, 'Virtue for virtue's sake,' really implies what may be called +the 'interest of achievement.' If virtue has any meaning it must be +regarded as a 'good' which is desirable. Perseverance in the pursuit of +any good implies the hope of success; in other words, of the reward which +lies in the attainment of the object desired. The reward sought may not +be foreign to the nature of virtue itself, but none the less, the idea of +reward is present, and, in a sense, is the incentive to all virtuous +endeavour. This is, indeed, implied by a no less rigorous {168} moralist +than Kant. For as he himself teaches, the question, 'What should I do?' +leads inevitably to the further question, 'What may I hope?'[18] The end +striven after cannot be a matter of indifference, if virtue is to have +moral value at all. It must be a real and desirable end--an end which +fulfils the purpose of a man as a moral being. + +(1) But though Kant insists with rigorous logic that reverence for the +majesty of the moral law must be the only motive of duty, and that all +motives springing from personal desire or hope of happiness must be +severely excluded, it is curious to find that in the second part of his +_Critique of Practical Reason_ he proceeds, with a strange inconsistency, +to make room for the other idea, viz., that virtue is not without its +reward, and is indeed united in the end with happiness. Felicity and +holiness shall be ultimately one, he says; and, at the last, virtue shall +be seen 'to be worthy of happiness,' and happiness shall be the crown of +goodness.[19] Thus those philosophers, of whom Kant is typical, who +contend for the purity of the moral motive and the disinterested loyalty +to the good, bring in, at the end, the notion of happiness, which, as a +concomitant or consequence of virtue, cannot fail to be also an active +incentive. + +(2) When we turn to Christian Ethics we find that here, not less than in +philosophical Ethics, the motive lies in the object itself. The end and +the motive are really one, and the highest good is to be sought for +itself and not for the sake of some ulterior gain. It is true, indeed, +that Christianity has not always been presented in its purest form; too +often have prudence, fear, other-worldliness been set forth as +inducements to goodness, as if the Gospel cared nothing for the +disposition of a man, and was concerned only with his ultimate happiness. +Even a moralist so acute as Paley bases morality upon no higher ground +than enlightened self-interest. But the most superficial reader of the +Gospels must see at a glance the wide variance between such a view and +that of Christ. Nothing could be further from the spirit of Jesus than +to estimate the {169} excellence of an action by the magnitude or the +utility of its effects rather than the intrinsic good of its motive. +Otherwise He would not have ranked the widow's mite above the gifts of +vanity, nor esteemed the tribute of the penitent, not so much for the +costliness of her offering, as for the sincerity of affection it +revealed. Christ looked upon the heart alone, and the worth of an action +lay essentially for Him in its inner quality. Sin resided not merely in +the overt act, but even more in the secret desire. A man may be +outwardly blameless, and yet not really good. He who remains sober or +honest simply because of the worldly advantages attaching to such conduct +may obtain a certificate of respectability from society; but, judged by +the standard of Christ, he is not truly a moral man. In an age which is +too prone to make outward propriety the gauge of goodness, it cannot be +sufficiently insisted upon that the Ethic of Christianity is an Ethic of +the inner motive and intention, and that, in this respect, it does not +fall a whit behind the demand of the most rigid system of disinterested +morality. + +(_a_) It must, however, be freely admitted that our Lord frequently +employs the sanctions both of rewards and penalties. In the time of +Christ the idea of reward, so prominent in the Old Testament, still held +an important place in Jewish religion, being specially connected with the +Messianic Hope and the coming of the kingdom. It was not unnatural, +therefore, that Jesus, trained in Hebrew religious modes of thought and +expression, should frequently employ the existing conceptions as vehicles +of His own teaching; but, at the same time, purifying them of their more +materialistic associations and giving to them a richer spiritual content. +While the kingdom of God is spoken of as a gift, and promised, indeed, as +a reward, the word 'reward' in this connection is not used in the +ordinary sense, but 'is rather conceived as belonging to the same order +of spiritual experience as the state of heart and mind which ensures its +bestowal.'[20] Though Jesus does not {160} hesitate to point His +disciples to the blessings of heaven which they will receive in the +future, these are represented for the most part not as material benefits, +but as the intensification and enrichment of life itself.[21] + +It was usually the difficulties rather than the advantages of +discipleship upon which Jesus first laid stress. He would not that any +one should come to Him on false pretences, or without fully counting the +cost.[22] Even when He Himself called His original disciples, it was of +service and not of recompense He spoke. 'Follow Me, and I will make you +fishers of men.'[23] The privilege consisted not in outward eclat, but +in the participation of the Master's own purpose and work. Still, all +service carries with it its own reward, and no one can share the mission +of Christ without also partaking of that satisfaction and joy which are +inseparable from the highest forms of spiritual ministry.[24] + +There is, however, one passage recorded by all the Synoptists which seems +at first sight to point more definitely to a reward of a distinctly +material character, and to one that was to be enjoyed not merely in the +future, but even in this present life. When Peter somewhat boastfully +spoke of the sacrifice which he and his brethren had made for the +Gospel's sake, and asked, 'What shall we have therefor?' Jesus replied, +'Verily, I say unto you, that no man that hath left home, or brethren, or +sisters, or mother, or father, or children, or lands, for My sake and the +Gospel's sake, but shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, houses +and brethren, sisters and mothers, and children and lands, with +persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life.'[25] Now, while +this is a promise of wide sweep and large generosity, it is neither so +arbitrary nor material as it seems. First, the words, 'with +persecutions,' indicate that suffering is not only the very condition of +the promise, but indeed an essential part of the reward--an element which +would of itself be a true test of the sincerity of the sacrifice. {161} +But, second, even the promise, 'An hundredfold now in this time,' is +obviously not intended to be taken in a literal sense, but rather as +suggesting that the gain, while apparently of the same nature as the +sacrifice, will have a larger spiritual import. For, just as Jesus +Himself looked upon all who shared His own devotion as His mother and +brethren; so, in the deepest sense, when a man leaves father and mother, +renouncing home and family ties for the sake of bringing his fellow-men +to God, he seems to be emptying his life of all affectionate +relationships, but in reality he is entering into a wider brotherhood; +and, in virtue of his ministry of love, is being knit in bonds stronger +than those of earthly kinship, with a great and increasing community of +souls which owe to him their lives.[26] The promise is no arbitrary gift +or bribe capriciously bestowed; it is the natural fruition of moral +endeavour. For there is nothing so productive as sacrifice. What the +man who yields himself to the service of Christ actually gives is life; +and what he gets back, increased an hundredfold, is just life again, his +own life, repeated and reflected in the men and women whom he has won to +Christ. + +In some of His parables Christ employs the analogy of the +work-engagement, in which labour and payment seem to correspond. But the +legal element has a very subordinate place in the simile. Jesus lifts +the whole relationship into a higher region of thought, and transforms +the idea of wages into that of a gift of love far transcending the legal +claim which can be made by the worker. He who has the bondsman's mind, +and works only for the hireling's pay, will only get what he works for. +But he who serves from love finds in the service itself that which must +always be its truest recompense--the increased power of service, the +capacity of larger devotion[27]--'The wages of going on.'[28] In his +latest volume Deissmann has pointed out that we can only do justice to +the utterances of the New Testament regarding work and wages by examining +them _in situ_, {162} amidst their natural surroundings. Jesus and St. +Paul spoke with distinct reference to the life and habits of the common +people of their day. 'If you elevate such utterances to the level of the +Kantian moral philosophy, and reproach primitive Christianity with +teaching for the sake of reward, you not only misunderstand the words, +but tear them up by the roots.' . . . 'The sordid ignoble suggestions so +liable to arise in the lower classes are altogether absent from the +sayings of Jesus and His apostles, as shown by the parable of the +Labourers in the Vineyard, and the analogous reliance of St. Paul solely +upon grace.'[29] + +The same inner relation subsists between Sin and Penalty. But here, +again, the award of punishment is not arbitrary, but the natural +consequence of disobedience to the law of the spiritual life. He who +seeks to save his life shall lose it. He who makes this world his all +shall receive as his reward only what this world can give. He who buries +his talent shall, by the natural law of disuse, forfeit it. Not to +believe in Christ is to miss eternal life. To refuse Him who is the +Light of the world is to remain in darkness. + +(6) An examination of the Pauline epistles yields a similar conclusion. +St. Paul does not disdain to employ the sanctions of hope and fear. +'Knowing the terrors of the Lord' he persuades men, and 'because of the +promises' he urges the Corinthians 'to cleanse themselves and perfect +holiness.' But in Paul's case, as in that of our Lord, the charge of +hedonism is meaningless. For not only does the conception hold a most +subordinate place in his teaching, but the idea loses the sense of merit, +and is transmuted into that of a free gift. And in general, in all the +passages where the hope of the future is introduced, the idea of reward +is merged in the yearning for a fuller life, which the Christian, who has +once tasted of its joy here, may well expect in richer measure +hereafter.[30] + +Enough has been said to clear Christianity of the charge of hedonism. So +far from Christian Ethics falling {163} below Philosophical Ethics in +regard to purity of motive, it really surpasses it in the sublimity of +its sanctions. The Kantian idea of virtue tends to empty the obligation +of all moral content. Goodness, as the philosopher himself came to see, +cannot be represented as a mere impersonal abstraction. Virtue has no +meaning except in relation to its ultimate end. And life in union with a +personal God, in whose image we have been made, is the end and purpose of +man's being. Noble as it may be to live morally without the thought of +God, the man who so strives to live does not attain to such a high +conception of life as he who lives with God for his object. Motives +advance with aims, and the higher the ideal the nobler the incentive. +Fear of future punishment and the desire for future happiness may prove +effective aids to the will at certain stages of moral development, but +ultimately the love of God and the beauty of holiness make every other +motive superfluous. Indeed, the reward of the Christian life is such as +can only appeal to one who has come to identify himself with the divine +will. The Christian man is always entering upon his reward. His joy is +his Master's joy. He has no other interest. His reward, both here and +hereafter, is not some external payment, something separable from +himself; it is wholly conditioned by what he is, and is simply his own +growth of character, his increasing power of being good and doing good. +And if it be still asked, What is the great inducement? What is it that +makes the life of the Christian worth living? The answer can only +be--The hope of becoming what Christ has set before man as desirable, of +growing up to the stature of perfect manhood, of attaining to the +likeness of Jesus Christ Himself. But so far from this being a selfish +aim, not to seek one's life in God--to be indifferent to all the inherent +blessings and joys involved--would be not the mark of pure +disinterestedness, but the evidence, rather, of a lack of appreciation of +what life really means. The soul that has caught the vision of God and +been thrilled with the grace of the Son of Man cannot but yield itself to +the best it knows. + + + +[1] Cf. Fairbairn, _The Phil. of the Ch. Religion_, pp. 358 ff. + +[2] Peabody, _Christ and the Christian Character_, p. 44. + +[3] Peabody, _op. cit._, pp. 53 f. + +[4] Peabody, _op. cit._, p. 68. + +[5] See Paulsen, _System der Ethik_, pp. 56 ff.; also Troeltsch, _op. +cit._, vol. ii. p. 847. + +[6] Cf. Ehrhardt, _Der Grundcharacter d. Ethik. Jesu_, p. 110. 'The +ascetic element in the ethics of Jesus is its transient, the service of +God its permanent element.' Cf. also Strauss, _Leben Jesu_, who speaks +of 'the Hellenic quality' in Jesus; also Keim, _Jesus of Nazareth, and +Troeltsch_, _op. cit._, vol. i. pp. 34 ff. + +[7] John xiii. 15. + +[8] _Conduct of Life_. + +[9] _Metaphysics of Ethics_, sect. ii. + +[10] Schultz, _Grundriss d. evang. Ethik_, p. 5. + +[11] Cf. _Ecce Homo_, chap. x. + +[12] This thought has been beautifully worked out by Prof. Denney in +_British Weekly_, Jan. 13, 1912. + +[13] Luke xv. + +[14] Cf. Knight, _The Christian Ethic_, p. 36. + +[15] See Haering, _Ethics of the Christian Life_, p. 190. + +[16] 'Apocalyptic Element in the Gospels,' _Hibbert Journal_, Oct. 1911. + +[17] The question of rewards has been fully discussed by Jacoby, +_Neutestamentliche Ethik_, pp. 41 ff.; also Barbour, _op. cit._, pp. 226 +ff. + +[18] Cf. _Kritik d. prakt. Vernunft_, p. 143. + +[19] Kant, _Idem_. + +[20] Barbour, _op. cit._, p. 231. + +[21] Matt. v. 12, xix. 21, xxv. 34; Luke vi. 23, xviii. 22; Mark x. 21. + +[22] Mark viii. 19; Luke ix. 57. + +[23] Mark i. 17, ii. 14. + +[24] Luke xxii. 29 f. + +[25] Mark x. 28-31; cf. Matt. xix. 27-30. + +[26] This thought is finely elaborated by Barbour. + +[27] Matt. xxv. 21; Luke xix. 17. + +[28] Tennyson, _Wages_. + +[29] Deissmann, _Light from the Ancient East_, pp. 316 ff. + +[30] See also Eph. vi. 5-8; 1 Cor. iii. 14; Rom. v. 2-5, vi. 23, viii. +16. + + + + +{164} + +CHAPTER X + +THE DYNAMIC OF THE NEW LIFE + +In the dynamic power of the new life we reach the central and +distinguishing feature of Christian Ethics. The uniqueness of +Christianity consists in its mode of dealing with a problem which all +non-Christian systems have tended to ignore--the problem of translating +the ideal into life. The Gospel not only sets before men the highest +good, but it imparts the secret of realising it. The ideals of the +ancients were but visions of perfection. They had no objective +reality. Beautiful as these old-time visions of 'Good' were, they +lacked impelling force, the power to change dreams into realities. +They were helpless in the face of the great fact of sin. They could +suggest no remedy for moral disease. + +Christianity is not a philosophical dream nor the imagination of a few +visionaries. It claims to be a new creative force, a power +communicated and received, to be worked out and realised in the actual +life and character of common men and women. + +In this chapter we have to consider the means whereby man is brought +into a new spiritual relation with God, and enabled to live the new +life as it has been revealed in Christ. This reconciliation implies a +twofold movement--a redemptive action on God's part, and an +appropriating and determinative response on the part of man. + + +I + +THE DIVINE POWER + +The urgent problem of the New Testament writers was, How can man +achieve that good which has been embodied {165} in the life and example +of Jesus Christ? A full answer to this question would lead us into the +realm of dogmatic theology. And therefore, without entering upon +details, it may be said at once that the originality of the Gospel lies +in this, that it not only reveals the good in a concrete and living +form, but discloses the power which makes the good possible in the +hitherto unattempted derivation of the new life from a new birth under +the influence of the spirit of God. The power to achieve the moral +life does not lie in the natural man. No readjustment of +circumstances, nor spread of knowledge, is of itself equal to the task +of creating that entirely new phenomenon--the Christian character. +There must be a cause proportionate to the effect. 'Nothing availeth,' +says Paul, 'but a new creature.' This new condition owes its origin to +God. It is a life communicated by an act of divine creative activity. + +But while this regenerative energy is represented generally as the work +of God's spirit, it is more particularly set forth as operating through +Christ who is the power of God unto salvation. + +There are three great facts in Christ's life with which the New +Testament connects the redemptive work of God. + +1. _The Incarnation_.--In Christ God shares man's nature, and thus +makes possible a union of the divine and human. On its divine side the +incarnation is the complete revelation of God in human life, and on the +human side it is the supreme expression of the spiritual meaning of +human nature itself. Christ saves not by a special act of atonement +alone, but emphatically by manifesting in Himself the union of God and +man. In view of the fact of the world's sin, the Incarnation, as the +revelation of the divine life, includes a gracious purpose. It +involves the sacrifice of God, which theologians designate by the +theory of _Kenosis_. The Advent was not only the consummation of the +religious history of the race; it was also the inauguration of a new +era. The Son of Man initiated a new type of humanity, to be realised +in increasing fullness as men entered into the meaning of the great +revelation. 'He {166} recapitulated in Himself the long unfolding of +mankind.'[1] Hence in the very fact of the word becoming flesh +atonement is involved. In Christ God is revealed in the reality of His +love and the persistence of His search for man, while man is disclosed +in the greatness of his vision and vocation. + +2. _The Death of Christ_.--Although already implied in the life, the +atonement culminates in the death of Christ. Even by being made in the +likeness of men Jesus did not escape from, but willingly took up, the +burdens of humanity and bore them as the Son of Man. But His passion +upon the cross, as the supreme instance of suffering borne for others, +at once illuminated and completed all that He suffered and achieved as +man's representative. It is this aspect of Christ's redemptive work +upon which St. Paul delights to dwell. And though naturally not so +prominent in our Lord's own teaching, yet even there the significance +of the Redeemer's death is foreshadowed, and in more than one passage +explicitly stated.[2] Here we are in the region of dogmatics, and we +are not called upon to formulate a doctrine of the atonement. All that +we have to do with is the ethical fact that between man and the new +life there lies the actuality of sin, the real source of man's failure +to achieve righteousness, and the stumbling-block which must be removed +before reconciliation with God the Father can be effected. The act, at +once divine and human, which alone meets the case is represented in +Scripture as the Sacrifice of Christ. In reference to the efficacy of +the sacrifice upon the cross Bishop Butler says: 'How and in what +particular way it had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who +have endeavoured to explain; but I do not find that the Scripture has +explained it.'[3] Though, indeed, the fact is independent of any +theory, the truth for which the cross stands must be brought by us into +some kind of intelligible relation with our view of the world, +otherwise it is a piece of magic lying outside of our experience, and +{167} having no ethical value for life. At the same time no doctrine +has suffered more from shallow theorisings, and particularly by the +employment of mechanical, legal, and commercial analogies, than the +doctrine of the atonement. The very essence of the religious life is +incompatible with the idea of an external transference of goodness from +one being to another. Man can be reconciled to God only by an absolute +surrender of himself to God. To assimilate this spiritual act to a +commercial or legal transaction is to destroy the very idea of the +moral life. No explanation, however, can be considered satisfactory +which does not safeguard two ideas of a deeply ethical nature--the +voluntariness and the vicariousness of Christ's sacrifice. We must be +careful to do justice, on the one hand, to the eternal relations in +which Christ stands to God; and on the other, to the intimate +association with man into which Jesus has entered. It is the task of +theology to bring together the various passages of Scripture, and +exhibit their systematic connection and relative value for a doctrine +of soteriology. For Ethics the one significant fact to be recognised +is that in a human life was fulfilled perfect obedience, even as far as +death, a perfect obedience that completely met and fully satisfied the +demand of the very highest, the divine ideal. + +3. _The Resurrection of Christ_.--If the Incarnation naturally issues +in the sacrifice unto death, that again is crowned and sealed by +Christ's risen life. The Resurrection is the vindication and +completion of the Redeemer's work. He who was born of the seed of +David according to the flesh was declared to be the Son of God by the +Resurrection. It was the certainty that He had risen that gave to His +death, in the apostles' eyes, its sacrificial value. This was the +ground of St. Paul's conviction that the old order had passed away, and +that a new order had been established. 'If Christ be not risen ye are +yet in your sins.' In virtue of His ascended life Christ becomes the +indwelling presence and living power within the regenerate man. It is +in no external way that the Redeemer exerts His influence. He is the +principle of life working within the soul. The key {168} to the new +state is to be found in the mystical union of the Christian with the +risen Lord. The twofold act of death and resurrection has its analogy +in the experience of every redeemed man. Within the secret sanctuary +of the human soul that has passed from death to life, the history of +the Redeemer is re-enacted. In the several passages which refer to +this subject the idea is that the changed life is based upon an ethical +dying and rising again with Christ.[4] The Christ within the heart is +the vital principle and dynamic energy by which the believer lives and +triumphs over every obstacle--the world, sin, sorrow, and death itself. +'I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.'[5] All that makes life, +'life indeed'--an exalted, harmonious, and joyous existence--is derived +from union with the living Lord, who has come to be what He is for man +by the earthly experiences through which He has passed. Thus by His +Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection He is at once the source and goal, +the spring and ideal of the new life. + + 'Yea, thro' life, death, sorrow, and through sinning, + He shall suffice me for He hath sufficed; + Christ is the end, for Christ was the beginning; + Christ the beginning, for the end is Christ.'[6] + + +Theology may seek to analyse the personality of Christ into its +elements--the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus. But after +all it is one and indivisible. It is the whole fact of Christ, and not +any particular experience taken in its isolation, which is the power of +God unto salvation. The question still remains after all our analysis, +What was it that gave to these events in the history of Jesus their +creative and transforming power? And the answer can only be--Because +Christ was what He was. It was the unique character of the Being of +whom these were but the manifestations which wrought the spell. What +bound the New Testament Christians to the cross was that their Master +hung there. They saw in that life lived among {169} men, and in that +sacrifice upon Calvary, the perfect consummation of the ideal manhood +that lived within their own hearts, and of the love, new upon the +earth, which made it possible. The cross stood for the symbol of a +truth that pierced to the inner core of their souls. 'He bore our +sins.' And thus down the centuries, in their hour of shame, and grief, +and death, men have lifted their eyes to the Man of Sorrows, and have +found in His life and sacrifice, apart from all theories of atonement, +their peace and triumph. It is this note of absolute surrender towards +God and of perfect love for man which, because it answers to a deep +yearning of the human heart, has given to the mystery of the +Incarnation and the Cross its lifting and renewing power, + + +II + +THE HUMAN RESPONSE + +Possession of power involves the obligation to use it. The force is +given; it has to be appropriated. The spirit of Christ is not offered +in order to free a man from the duties of the moral life. Man is not +simply the recipient of divine energy. He has to make it his own and +to work it out by his self-determinative activity. Nevertheless the +relation of the divine spirit to the human personality is a subject of +great perplexity, involving the psychological problem of the connection +of the divine and the human in life generally. If in the last resort +God is the ultimate source of all life, the absolute Being, who + + 'Can rejoice in naught + Save only in Himself and what Himself hath wrought'; + +that truth must be held in harmony with the facts of divine immanence +and human experience. The divine spirit holds within His grasp all +reality, and by His self-communicating activity makes the world of +nature and of life possible. But that being granted, how are we to +conceive the relation of that Spirit to man with his distinct +individuality, with {170} his sense of working out a future and a fate +in which the Absolute may indeed be fulfilling its purpose, but which +are none the less man's own achievement? That is the crux of the +problem. The outstanding fact which bears upon this problem is the +general character of our experience, the growth of which is not the +mere laying of additional material upon a passive subject by an +external power, but is a true development, a process in which the +subject is himself operative in the unfolding of his own +potentialities. Without dwelling further upon this question it may be +well to bear in mind two points: (1) The growth of experience is a +gradual entrance into conscious possession of what we implicitly are +and potentially have from the beginning. Duty, for example, is not +something alien from a man, something superimposed by a power not +himself. It lies implicit in his nature as his ideal and vocation. +The moral life is the life in which a man comes to 'know himself,' to +apprehend himself as he truly is. (2) In this development of +experience we ourselves are active and self-organising. We are really +making ourselves, and are conscious, that even while we are the +instruments of a higher power, we are working out our own +individuality, exercising our own freedom and determination.[7] The +teaching of the New Testament is in full accord with this position. +If, on the one hand, St. Paul states that every moral impulse is due to +the inspiration of God, no less emphatic is he in ascribing to man +himself full freedom of action. 'The ethical sense of responsibility,' +says Johannes Weiss,[8] 'the energy for struggle, and the discipline of +the will were not paralysed nor absorbed in Paul's case by his +consciousness of redemption and his profound spiritual experiences.' +Scripture lends no support to the idea which some forms of Augustinian +theology assume, that the divine spirit is an irresistible force acting +from without upon man and superseding his exertions. It acts as an +immanent moral power, not compelling or crushing the will, but +quickening and inspiring its efforts. + +{171} + +If we inquire what constitutes the subjective or human element in the +making of the new life, we find that the New Testament emphasises three +main factors--Repentance, Faith, and Obedience. These are +complementary, and together constitute what is commonly called +'conversion.' + +1. _Repentance_ is a turning away in sorrow and contrition from a life +of sin, a breaking off from evil because a better standard has been +accepted. Our Lord began His ministry with a call to repentance. The +first four beatitudes set forth its elements; while the parable of the +prodigal illustrates its nature. + +Ethical writers distinguish between a negative and a positive aspect of +repentance. On its negative side it is regarded as the emotion of +sorrow excited by reflection upon sin. But sorrow, though accompanying +repentance, must not be identified with it. Mere regret, either in the +form of bitterness over one's folly, or chagrin on account of +discovery, may be but a weak sentiment which exerts little or no +influence upon a man's subsequent conduct. Even remorse following the +commission of wickedness may only deepen into a paralysing despair +which works death rather than repentance unto life. + +(1) On its positive side repentance implies action as well as feeling, +and involves a determination of will to quit the past and start on a +new life. A man repents not merely when he grieves over his misdeed, +but when he confesses it and seeks to make what amendment he can. This +positive outlook upon the future, rather than the passive brooding over +the past, is happily expressed in the New Testament term _metanoia_, +change of mind, and is enforced in the Baptist's counsel, 'Bring forth +fruits meet for repentance.'[9] The change of mind here indicated is +practically equivalent to what is variously called in the New Testament +'Conversion,'[10] 'Renewal,'[11] 'Regeneration,'[12]--words suggestive +of the completeness of the change. + +(2) The variety of terms employed to describe conversion {172} would +seem to imply that the Scriptures recognise a diversity of mode. All +do not enter the kingdom of God by the same way; and the New Testament +offers examples varying from the sudden conversion of a Saul to the +almost imperceptible transformation of a Nathaniel and a Timothy. In +modern life something of the same variety of Christian experience is +manifest. While what is called 'sudden conversion' cannot reasonably +be denied,[13] as little can those cases be ignored in which the truth +seems to pervade the mind gradually and almost unconsciously--cases of +steady spiritual growth from childhood upwards, in which the believer +is unaware of any break in the continuity of his inner history, his +days appearing to be 'bound each to each by natural piety.' + +(3) The question arises, Which is the normal experience? The matter +has been put somewhat bluntly by the late Professor James,[14] as to +whether the 'twice-born' or the 'once-born' present the natural type of +Christian experience. Is it true, he asks, that the experience of St. +Paul, which has so long dominated Christian teaching, is really the +higher or even the healthier mode of approaching religion? Does not +the example of Jesus offer a simpler and more natural ideal? The moral +experience of the Son of Man was not a revolution but an evolution. +His own religion was not that of the twice-born, and all that He asked +of His disciples was the childlike mind.[15] Paul, the man of cities, +feels a kindred turbulence within himself. Jesus, the interpreter of +nature, feels the steady persuasiveness of the sunshine of God, and +grows from childhood in stature, wisdom, and favour with God and man. +It is contended by some that the whole Pauline conception of sin is a +nightmare, and rests upon ideas of God and man which are unworthy and +untrue. 'As a matter of fact,' says Sir Oliver Lodge, 'the higher man +of to-day is not worrying about his sins at all, still less about their +punishment; his mission, if he is good for anything, is to be up and +doing.'[16] {173} This amounts to a claim for the superiority of the +first of the two types of religious consciousness, the type which James +describes as 'sky-blue souls whose affinities are with flowers and +birds and all enchanting innocencies than with dark human passions; +. . . in whom religious gladness, being in possession from the outset, +needs no deliverance from any antecedent burden.'[17] The second type +is marked by a consciousness, similar to St. Paul's, of the divided +self. It starts from radical pessimism. It only attains to religious +peace through great tribulation. It is the religion of the 'sick soul' +as contrasted with that of 'healthy-mindedness.' But, morbid as it may +appear, to be disturbed by past sin, it is really the 'twice-born' who +have sounded the depths of the human heart, and have been the greatest +religious leaders. And so far from the sense of the need of repentance +being the sign of a diseased mind, the decreasing consciousness of sin +in our day may only prove the shallowness of the modern mind. What men +need of religion is power. And there is a danger of people to-day +losing a sense of the dynamic force of the older Gospel.[18] + +But whether Paul's case is abnormal or the reverse, it is surely a +false inference that, because Christ grew up without the need of +conversion, His life affords in this respect a pattern to sinful men. +It is just His perfect union with God which differentiates Him entirely +from ordinary men; and that which may be necessary for sinful creatures +is unthinkable in His case. What He was we are to become. But before +we can follow Him, there is for us, because of sin, a preliminary +step--a breaking with our evil past. And, in all His teaching our Lord +clearly recognises this. His first call is a call to repentance. It +is indeed the childlike mind He requires; but He significantly says +that 'except _ye turn_ and become as little children, ye shall in no +wise enter the kingdom of heaven.'[19] + +The decision of will demanded of Jesus, while it may not {174} +necessarily involve a catastrophe of life or convulsion of nature, must +be none the less a deliberate and decisive turning from evil to good. +By what road a man must travel before he enters the kingdom, through +what convulsion of spirit be must pass, so frequently dwelt upon by St. +Paul and illustrated by his own life, Christ does not say. In the +Fourth Gospel there is one reported saying describing a process of +spiritual agony, like that of physical child-birth, indicative that the +change must be radical, and that at some point of experience the great +decision must be made, a decision which is likely to involve deep +travail of soul. + +There are many ways in which a man may become a Christian. Some men +have to undergo, like Paul, fierce inward conflict. Others glide +quietly, almost imperceptibly, into richer and ampler regions of life. +But when or how the transition is made, whether the renewal be sudden +or gradual, it is the same victory in all cases that must be won, the +victory of the spirit over the flesh, the 'putting off of the old man' +and the 'putting on of the new.' Life cannot be always a compromise. +Sooner or later it must become an alternative. He who has seen the +higher self can be no longer content with the lower. The acts of +contrition, confession, and decision--essential and successive steps in +repentance--are the immediate effects of the vision of Christ. Though +repentance is indeed a human activity, here, as always, the earlier +impulse comes from the divine side. He who truly repents is already in +the grip of Christ. 'We love Him because He first loved us.' + +2. _Faith_.--If repentance looks back and forsakes the old, faith +looks forward and accepts the new. Even in repentance there is already +an element of faith, for a man cannot turn away from his evil past +without having some sense of contrast between the actual and the +possible, some vision of the better life which he feels to be desirable. + +(1) While there is no more characteristic word in the New Testament +than faith, there is none which is used in a greater variety of senses, +or whose import it is more difficult to determine. It must not be +forgotten at the outset {175} that though it is usually regarded as a +theological term, it is a purely human act, and represents an element +in ordinary life without which the world could not hold together for a +single day. We constantly live by faith, and in our common intercourse +with our fellows we daily exercise this function. We have an +irresistible conviction that we live in a rational world in which +effect answers to cause. Faith, it has been said, is the capital of +all reasoning. Break down this principle, and logic itself would be +bankrupt. Those who have denied the intelligibility of the universe +have not been able to dispense with the very organ by which their +argument is conducted. Hence faith in its religious sense is of the +same kind as faith in common life. It is distinguishable only by its +_special object_ and its _moral intensity_. + +(2) The habitual relationship between Christ and His disciples was one +of mutual confidence. While Jesus evidently trusts them, they regard +Him as their Master on whose word they wholly rely. Ever invested with +a deep mystery and awe, He is always for His disciples the embodiment +of all that is highest and holiest, the supreme object of reverence, +the ultimate source of authority. Peter but expresses the mind of the +company when he says, 'To whom can we go but unto Thee, Thou hast the +words of eternal life.' Nor was it only the disciples who manifested +this personal trust. Many others, the Syrophenician woman, the Roman +Centurion, Zacchaeus, Bartimaeus, also evinced it. It was, indeed, to +this element in the human heart that Jesus invariably appealed; and +while He was quick to detect its presence, He was equally sensitive to +its absence. Even among the twelve, when, in the face of some new +emergency, there was evidence of mistrust, He exclaimed, 'O ye of +little faith.' And when, beyond His own immediate circle, He met with +suspicion and unbelief, it caused Him surprise and pain.[20] + +From these and other incidents it is obvious that faith for Jesus had a +variety of meanings and degrees. + +{176} + +(_a_) Sometimes it meant simply _trust in divine providence_; as when +He bids His disciples take no thought for their lives, because He who +feeds the ravens and clothes the lilies cares for them. (_b_) It meant +again _belief in His own divine power_; as when He assures the +recipients of His healing virtue that their faith hath made them whole. +(_c_) It is regarded by Jesus as _a condition of forgiveness and +salvation_. Thus to the woman who had sinned He said, 'Thy faith hath +saved thee,' and to the man who was sick of the palsy, 'Son, thy sins +be forgiven thee.'[21] + +The essential and vital mark in all Christ's references is the personal +appropriation of the good which He Himself had brought to man. In His +various modes of activity--in His discourses, His works of healing and +forgiveness--it is not too much to say that Jesus regarded Himself as +the embodiment of God's message to the world; and to welcome His word +with confidence and joy, and unhesitatingly act upon it, was faith. +Hence it did not mean merely the mental acceptance of some abstract +truth, but, before all else, personal and intimate devotion to Himself. +It seems the more necessary to emphasise this point since Harnack has +affirmed 'that, while Christ was the special object of faith for Paul +and the other apostles, He did not enter as an element into His own +preaching, and did not solicit faith towards Himself.'[22] It is +indeed true that Jesus frequently associated Himself with His Father, +whose immediate representative He claims to be. But no one can doubt +that He also asserts authority and power on His own account, and +solicits faith on His own behalf. Nor does He take pains, even when +challenged, to explain that He was but the agent of another. On the +contrary, as we have seen, He acts in His own right, and pronounces the +blessings of healing and forgiveness in His own name. Even when the +word 'Faith' is not mentioned the whole attitude and spirit of Jesus +impels us to the same conclusion. There was an air of independence and +authority {177} about Him which filled His disciples and others, not +merely with confidence, but with wonder and awe. His repeated word is, +'I say unto you.' And there is a class of sayings which clearly +indicate the supreme significance which He attached to His own +personality as an object of faith. Foremost among these is the great +invitation, 'Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy-laden, and +I will give you rest.' + +(3) If we turn to the epistles, and especially to the Pauline, we are +struck by the apparently changed meaning of faith. It has become more +complex and technical. It is no longer simply the receptive relation +of the soul towards Christ; it is also a justifying principle. Faith +not only unites the believer to Christ, it also translates him into a +new sphere and creates for him a new environment. The past is +cancelled. All things have become new. The man of faith has passed +out of the dominion of law into the kingdom of Grace. + +The Pauline doctrine of Justification by Faith has received in the +history of the Church a twofold interpretation. On the one hand, it +has been maintained that the sole significance of faith is that it +gives to the believer power, by God's supernatural aid, to realise a +goodness of which he is naturally incapable. On the other hand, it is +held that the peculiarity of faith is that, though he himself is a +sinner deserving condemnation, it affords to the believer an assurance +of the favour with which a loving Father regards him, not on account of +his own attainments, but in virtue of the perfect obedience of the Son +of God with whom each is united by faith. The former is the more +distinctively Roman view; the latter that of the Reformed Church. +While the Catholic form of the doctrine gives to 'works' a place not +less important than faith in justification, the Protestant exalts +'faith' to the position of priority as more in harmony with the mystery +of the atoning sacrifice of Christ as expounded by St. Paul. Faith +justifies, because it is for the Christian the vision of an ideal. +What we admire in another is already implicitly within us. We {178} +already possess the righteousness we believe in. The moral beauty of +Christ is ours inasmuch as we are linked to Him by faith, and have +accepted as our true self all that He is and has achieved. Hence faith +is not merely the sight of the ideal in Christ. It is the energy of +the soul as well, by which the believer strives to realise that which +he admires. According to the teaching of Scripture faith has thus a +threefold value. It is a receptive attitude, a justifying principle, +and an energising power. It is that by which the believer accepts and +appropriates the gift of Life offered by God in Christ. + +3. _Obedience_.--Faith contains the power of a new obedience. But +faith worketh by love. The soul's surrender to Christ is the crowning +phase of man's response. The obedience of love is the natural sequel +of repentance and faith, the completing act of consecration. As God +gives Himself in Christ to man, so man yields in Christ to God all he +is and all he has. + +Without enlarging upon the nature of this final act of self-surrender, +three points of ethical value ought not to be overlooked. + +(1) Obedience is an _activity_ of the soul by which the believer +appropriates the life of God. Life is not merely a gift, it is a task, +an achievement. We are not simply passive recipients of the Good, but +free and determinative agents who react upon what is given, taking it +up into our life and working it into the texture of our character. The +obedience of love is the practical side of faith. While God imparts +the energy of the Spirit, we apply it and by strenuous endeavour and +unceasing effort mould our souls and make our world. + +(2) It is a consecration of the _whole personality_. All the powers of +man are engaged in soul-making. Religion is not a detached region of +experience, a province separate from the incidents and occupations of +ordinary existence. Obedience must cover the whole of life, and +demands the exercise and devotion of every gift. Not only is every +thought to be brought into subjection to the mind of {179} Christ, but +every passion and desire, every activity and power of body and mind are +to be consecrated to God and transformed into instruments of service. +'Our wills are ours to make them thine.' But the will is not a +separate faculty; it is the whole man. And the obedience of the will +is nothing less than the response of our entire manhood to the will of +God. + +(3) Finally, obedience is a _growing power of assimilation_ to Christ. +We grow in the Christian life according to the measure of our faith and +the exercise of our love. The spiritual world is potentially ours at +the beginning of the Christian life, but it has to be worked out in +daily experience. Like every other form of existence spiritual life is +a growth which only attains to strength and fruition through continual +conflict and achievement. The soul is not a finished product. In +patience it is to be acquired.[23] By trial and temptation, by toil +and expenditure, through all the hardships and hazards of daily life +its value is determined and its destiny shaped. And according to the +measure in which we use these experiences, and transmute them by +obedience to the will of God into means of good, do we grow in +Christian character and approximate to the full stature of the perfect +Man. + +To this self-determining activity Eucken has given the name of +'Activism.' 'The basis of a true life,' says this writer, 'must be +continually won anew.'[24] Activism acquires ethical character +inasmuch as it involves the taking up of the spiritual world into our +own volition and being. Only by this ceaseless endeavour do we advance +to fresh attainments of the moral life, and are enabled to assimilate +the divine as revealed to us in Christ. Nor is it merely the +individual self that is thus enriched and developed by obedience to the +will of God. By personal fidelity to the highest we are aiding the +moral development of mankind, and are furthering the advancement of all +that is good and true in the world. Not only are we making {180} our +own character, but we are helping to build up the kingdom of God upon +the earth. + +Repentance, Faith, and Obedience are thus the human factors of the new +life. They are the moral counterparts of Grace. God gives and man +appropriates. By repentance we turn from sin and self to the true home +of our soul in the Fatherhood of God. By faith we behold in Christ the +vision of the ideal self. By obedience and the daily surrender of +ourselves to the divine will we transform the vision into the reality. +They are all manifestations of love, the responsive notes of the human +heart to the appeal of divine love. + + + +[1] Irenaeus, _Contra Haereses_, III. xviii. 1. + +[2] Matt. xx. 28; John xi. 51; Matt. xxvi. 28; Mark xiv. 8, 9. + +[3] _The Analogy_, part II. chap. v. + +[4] 2 Cor. v. 14 f.; Rom. vi.; Ephes. iii. 16, 17, v. 8. + +[5] Gal. ii. 20. + +[6] Meyers, _Saint Paul_. + +[7] See Blewett, _The Christian View of the World_, pp. 88 ff., where +this subject is suggestively treated. + +[8] _Christ and Paul_. + +[9] Matt. iii. 8; Luke iii. 8. + +[10] Acts xxvi. 20. + +[11] Rom. xii. 12; Titus iii. 5. + +[12] 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15. + +[13] See Begbie, _Broken Earthenware_. + +[14] _Varieties of Relig. Experience_. + +[15] Mark x. 15. + +[16] _Man and the Universe_, p. 220. + +[17] _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 80. + +[18] Cf. _Foundations: a Statement of Religious Belief by seven Oxford +men_, Essay VI., pp. 274 f. + +[19] Matt. xviii. 3. + +[20] Matt. xiii. 58; Mark vi. 5. + +[21] Cf. Stalker, _The Ethic of Jesus_, p. 179. + +[22] _Das Wesen des Christenthums_, p. 91, quoted by Stalker, _idem_, +p. 176. + +[23] Luke xxi. 19. + +[24] _Life's Basis and life's Ideal_, p. 255. + + + + +{181} + +SECTION D + +CONDUCT + +{183} + +CHAPTER XI + +VIRTUES AND VIRTUE + +So far we have gained some conception of the Christian ideal as the +highest moral good, and have learned also how the Christian character is +brought into being. We now enter upon a new section--the last stage of +our inquiry--and have to consider the 'new man'--his virtues, duties, and +relationships. + +The business lying immediately before us in this chapter is to consider +the accepted standards in which the Christian good is exhibited--the +virtues recognised by the Christian consciousness. + +What, then, are the particular forms or manifestations of character which +result from the Christian interpretation of life? When we think of man +as living in relation to his fellows, and engaging in the common +activities of the world, what are the special traits of character which +distinguish the Christian? These questions suggest one of the most +important, and at the same time one of the most difficult, tasks of +Christian Ethics--the classification of the virtues. The difficulty +arises in the first instance from the ambiguity attaching to the term +'virtue.' It is often loosely used to signify a meritorious act--as in +the phrase, 'making a virtue of a necessity.' It is frequently employed +generally for a moral quality or excellency of character, and in this +respect is contrasted with vice. Finally, virtues are sometimes +identified with duties. Thus we speak of the virtue of veracity. But +obviously we may also refer to the duty of veracity. The word _arete_; +signifies 'force,' and was originally used as a property of bodies, +plants, or animals. {184} At first it had no ethical import. In Attic +usage it came to signify aptness or fitness of manhood for public life. +And this signification has shaped the future meaning of its Latin +equivalent--_virtus_ (from _vis_, strength, and not from _vir_, a man). + +Plato gave to the term a certain ethical value in connection with his +moral view of the social life, so that Ethics came to be designated the +doctrine of virtues. In general, however, both by the Greek and Roman +moralists, and particularly the Stoics, the word _virtus_ retained +something of the sense of force or capacity--a quality prized in the +citizen. The English word is a direct transcript of the Latin. The +German noun, _Tugend_ (from _taugen_, to fit) means capability, and is +related to worth, honour, manliness. The word _arete_ does not +frequently occur in the New Testament.[1] In the few passages in which +it appears it is associated with praiseworthiness. In one passage[2] it +has a more distinctly ethical signification--'add to your faith +virtue'--where the idea is that of practical worth or manhood. + +Virtue may be defined as the acquired power or capacity for moral action. +From the Christian point of view virtue is the complement, or rather the +outcome, of grace. Hence virtues are graces. In the Christian sense a +man is not virtuous when he has first appropriated by faith the new +principle of life. He has within him, indeed, the promise and potency of +all forms of goodness, but not until he has consciously brought his +personal impulses and faculties into the service of Christ can he be +called truly virtuous. Hence the Christian character is only +progressively realised. On the divine side virtue is a gift. On the +human side it is an activity. Our Lord's figure of the vine and the +branches represents the relation in which Christian character stands to +Christ. In like manner St. Paul regards the manifestations of the +Christian life as the fruit of the Spirit--the inevitable and natural +outgrowth of the divine seed of life implanted in the heart. Hence +arises the importance of {185} cultivating the inner life of the spirit +which is the root of all moral excellency. On the other hand it must be +remembered that Christian morality is not of a different sort from +natural morality, and the Christian virtues are not merely supernatural +qualities added on, but simply human virtues coloured and transfigured by +grace and raised to a higher value. The power to act morally, the +capacity to bring all our faculties into the service of the spiritual +life, is the ground of Christian virtue just as it is of every natural +excellence. From this it follows that the distinction sometimes made +between natural goodness and Christian goodness is unsound. A virtue is +not a superlative act of merit, implying an excess of excellence beyond +the requirements of duty. From the Christian standpoint there are no +works of supererogation, and there is no room in the Christian life for +excess or margin. As every duty is a bounden duty, so every possible +excellence is demanded of the Christian. Virtues prescribe duties; +ideals become laws; and the measure is, 'Be ye perfect as your Father in +heaven is perfect.' The Stoic maxim, 'Nothing in excess,' is inadequate +in reference to moral excellence, and Aristotle's doctrine of the 'Mean' +can hardly be applied without considerable distortion of facts. The only +virtue which with truth can be described as a form of moderation is +Temperance. It has been objected that by his doctrine of the 'Mean' +Aristotle 'obliterates the awful and absolute difference between right +and wrong.' If we substitute, as Kant suggested, 'law' for 'mean,' some +of the ambiguity is obviated. Still, after all extenuation is made it +may be questioned whether any term implying quantity is a fit expression +for a moral attribute.[3] + +At the same time the virtues must not be regarded as mere abstractions. +Moral qualities cannot be isolated from the circumstances in which they +are exercised. Virtue is character in touch with life, and it is only in +contact with actual events that its quality can be determined. Actions +are not simply good or bad in themselves. They must {186} always be +valued both by their inner motives and intended ends. Courage or +veracity, for example, may be exercised from different causes and for the +most various ends, and occasionally even for those of an immoral +nature.[4] + +For these and similar reasons some modern ethical writers have regarded +the classification of the virtues as unsatisfactory, involving arbitrary +and illogical distinctions in value; and some have even discarded the use +of the word 'virtue' altogether, and substituted the word 'character' as +the subject of ethical study. But inasmuch as character must manifest +itself in certain forms, and approximate at least to certain norms or +ideals of conduct, it may not be altogether superfluous to consider in +their relation and unity those moral qualities (whether we call them +virtues, graces, or norms of excellence) which the Christian aims at +reproducing in his life. + +We shall consider therefore, first, the natural elements of virtue as +they have been disclosed to us by classical teachers. Next, we shall +compare these with the Christian conception of life, showing how +Christianity has given to them a new meaning and value. And finally, we +shall endeavour to reveal the unifying principle of the virtues by +showing that when transformed by the Christian spirit they are the +expressions or implicates of a single spiritual disposition or totality +of character. + + +I + +_The Natural Basis of the Virtues_.--At a certain stage of reflection +there arises an effort not merely to designate, but to co-ordinate the +virtues. For it is soon discovered that all the various aspects of the +good have a unity, and that the idea of virtue as one and conscious is +equivalent to the idea of the good-will or of purity of heart. Thus it +was seen by the followers of Socrates that the virtues are but different +expressions of one principle, and that the ultimate good of character can +only be realised by the actual pursuit {187} of it in the recognised +virtues. We do not sufficiently reflect, says Green, how great was the +service which Greek philosophy rendered to mankind. From Plato and +Aristotle comes the connected scheme of virtues and duties within which +the educated conscience of Christendom still moves when it is impartially +reflecting on what ought to be done.[5] Religious teachers may have +extended the scope of our obligations, and strengthened the motives which +actuate men in the performance of duty, but 'the articulated scheme of +what the virtues and duties are, in their difference and their unity, +remains for us now in its main outlines what the Greek philosophers left +it.'[6] + +Among ancient moralists four virtues, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, +Justice were constantly grouped. They were already traditional in +Plato's time, but he adopts them as fundamental. Aristotle retained +Plato's list, but developed from it some minor excellences. + +Virtue, according to Plato, was the health or harmony of the soul; hence +the principle of classification was determined by the fitness of the soul +for its proper task, which was conceived as the attainment of the good or +the morally beautiful. As man has three functions or aspects, a +cognitive, active, and appetitive, so there are three corresponding +virtues. His function of knowing determines the primal virtue of Wisdom; +his active power constitutes the virtue of Courage; while his appetitive +nature calls for the virtue of Temperance or Self-control. These three +virtues have reference to the individual's personal life. But inasmuch +as a man is a part of a social organism, and has relations to others +beyond himself, justice was conceived by Plato as the social virtue, the +virtue which regulated and harmonised all the others. For the Stoics +these four virtues embraced the whole life according to nature. It may +be noticed that Plato and Aristotle did not profess to have created the +virtues. Wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice were, as they +believed, radical principles of the moral nature; and all they professed +to do was to {188} awaken men to the consciousness of their natural +capacities. If a man was to attain to fitness of life, then these were +the fundamental and essential lines on which his rational life must +develop. In every conceivable world these are the basal elements of +goodness. Related as they are to fundamental functions of personality, +they cannot be less or more. They stand for the irreducible principles +of conduct, to omit any one of which is to present a maimed or only +partial character. In every rational conception of life they must remain +the essential and desirable objects of pursuit. It was not wonderful, +therefore, when we remember the influence of Greek thought upon early +Christianity, that the four classical virtues should pass over into +Christian Ethics. But the Church, recognising that these virtues had +reference to man's life in relation to himself and his fellow-men in this +world alone, added to these the three Pauline Graces, Faith, Hope, and +Charity, as expressive of the divine element in man, his relation to God +and the spiritual world. The first four were called natural, the last +three supernatural: or the 'Cardinal' (_cardo_, a hinge) and the +'Theological' virtues. They make in all seven, the mystic perfect +number, and over against these, to complete the symmetry of life, were +placed the seven deadly sins. + + +II + +_Their Christian Transformation_.--But now if we compare the cardinal +virtues with the conception of goodness revealed in Scripture, we are at +once conscious of a contrast. We seem to move in a new atmosphere, and +to be confronted with a view of life in which entirely different values +hold. + +1. While in the New Testament many virtues are commended, no complete +description occurs in any single passage. The beatitudes may be regarded +as our Lord's catalogue of the typical qualities of life, and a +development of virtuous life might be worked out from the Sermon on the +Mount. Beginning with poverty of spirit, {189} humility, and meekness, +and rising up out of the individual struggle of the inner man, we attain +to mercifulness and peaceableness--the spirit which bears the poverty of +others, and seeks to make others meek and gentle. Next the desire for +righteousness finds expression in a readiness to endure persecution, to +support the burden of duty in the midst of worldly conflict; and finally +in the highest stage the light of virtue shines through the clouds of +struggle and breaks forth spontaneously, irradiating all who come into +contact with it, and constituting man the servant of humanity, the light +of the world.[7] Or we might turn to the apostle Paul, who regards the +virtues as the fruit of the Spirit, describing them in general as 'love, +joy, peace, long-suffering, goodness, faith, gentleness, humility.'[8] A +rich cluster is also mentioned as 'the fruit of light'--goodness, +righteousness, truth. A further enumeration is given in Colossians where +the apostle commends compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, +long-suffering, forbearance, and forgiveness.[9] And once more there is +the often-quoted series in the Epistle to the Philippians, 'Whatsoever +things are true, reverent, just, chaste, lovely, and kindly spoken +of.'[10] Nor must we forget the characteristics of love presented in the +apostle's 'Hymn of Charity.'[11] To these descriptions of St. Paul there +ought to be added the remarkable passage in which St. Peter unfolds the +process of the moral life from its seed to the perfect flower.[12] +Though the authorship of this passage has been disputed, that fact does +not make the representation less trustworthy and typical as an exhibition +of early Christian morality. According to this picture, just as in St. +Paul's view, the whole moral life has its root in faith, and character is +nothing else than the working out of the initial energy of the soul into +virtue, knowledge, temperance, patience, godliness, brotherly kindness, +and charity--all that makes life worthy and excellent. Character is not +built like a house, by the addition of stone to stone. It is evolved as +{190} a plant from a seed. Given faith, there will ultimately emerge all +the successive qualities of true goodness--knowledge, temperance, +patience--the personal virtues, rising upwards to godliness or the love +of God, and widening out to brotherhood, and thence to charity or a love +of mankind--a charity which embraces the whole world, even those who are +not Christian: the enemy, the outcast, and the alien. + +These descriptions are not formal or systematic, but are characterised by +a remarkable similarity in spirit and tone. They all reflect the mind of +Christ, and put the emphasis where Jesus Himself invariably laid it--on +love. But the point to which we desire to draw attention is the contrast +between the classical and the Christian type of virtue. The difference +is commonly expressed by saying that the pagan virtues were of a bold +masculine order, whereas the Christian excellences are of an amiable and +passive nature. + +Yet if we carefully examine the lists as given in Scripture, we shall see +that this is hardly a just distinction. Certainly Christianity brings to +the front some virtues of a gentle type which are apparently wanting in +the Platonic catalogue. But, on the other hand, the pagan virtues are +not excluded from the New Testament. They have an acknowledged place in +Christian morality. Fortitude and temperance, not to speak of wisdom and +justice, are recognised as essential qualities of the Christian +character. Christianity did not come into the world as the negative of +all that was previously noble in human nature; on the contrary, it took +over everything that was good and true, and gave to it a legitimate +place. Whatsoever things, says the apostle, are true and just and fair, +if there be any virtue or praise in them, think of these things. + +Courage is not disparaged by Christianity. In writing to Timothy Paul +gives to this virtue its original significance. He only raises it to a +higher level, and gives to it a nobler end--the determination not to be +ashamed of bearing testimony, and the readiness to suffer hardship for +the Gospel's sake. And though the apostle does not expressly {191} +commend courage in its active form in any other passage, we may gather +from the whole tenor of his life that bravery, fortitude, endurance, +occupied a high place in his esteem. While he made no parade of his +sufferings his life was a continual warfare for the Gospel. The courage +of a man is none the less real because it is evinced not on the +battlefield, but in the conflict of righteousness. He who devotes +himself unnoticed and unrewarded, at the risk of his life and at the +sacrifice of every pleasure, to the service of the sick and the debased, +possesses courage the same in principle as that of the 'brave man' +described by Aristotle. Life is a battle, and there are other objects +for which a man must contend than those peculiar to a military calling. +In all circumstances of his existence the Christian must quit himself as +a man, and without courage no one can fulfil in any tolerable degree the +duties of his station. + +In like manner temperance or self-control is a truly Christian virtue, +and it finds repeated mention in Scripture. When, however, we compare +the conception of temperance as formulated by Aristotle with the demand +of self-denial which the enlightened Christian conscience makes upon +itself we are struck with a difference both in the motive and the scope +of the principle. Temperance as Aristotle conceived it was a virtue +exhibited only in dealing with the animal passions. And the reason why +this indulgence ought to be checked was that the lusts of the flesh +unfitted a man for his discharge of the civic duties. But, in view of +the Greek idea that evil resides in the physical constitution of man, the +logical deduction would be the total suppression of the animal passions +altogether. But from the Christian standpoint the physical instincts are +not an evil to be crushed, but rather a legitimate element in man which +is to be disciplined and brought into the service of the spiritual life. +Temperance covers the whole range of moral activity. It means the +practical mastery of self, and includes the proper control and employment +of hand and eye, tongue and temper, tastes and affections, so that they +may become effective instruments of righteousness. The practice of {192} +asceticism for its own sake, or abstinence dictated merely by fear of +some painful result of indulgence, we do not now regard as a virtue. The +true form of self-denial we deem to be only rendered when we forbid +ourselves the enjoyment of certain legitimate inclinations for the sake +of some higher interest. Thus the scope of the virtue of temperance has +been greatly enlarged, and we present to ourselves objects of moral +loyalty, for the sake of which we are ready to abandon our desires in a +far greater variety of forms than ever occurred to the Greek. An +indulgence, for example, which a man might legitimately allow himself, he +forgoes in consideration of the claims of his family, or fellow-workmen, +or for the good of mankind at large, in a way that the ancient world +could not understand. Christian temperance, while the same in principle +with the ancient virtue, penetrates life more deeply, and is fraught with +a richer and more positive content than was contemplated by the Greek +demand. + +And the same may be said of the virtues of Wisdom and Justice. Wisdom is +a New Testament grace, but mere calculating prudence or worldly +self-regard finds no place in the Christian scheme of life. We are +enjoined, indeed, to be wise as serpents and harmless as doves in our +relations with men; but what we are urged to cultivate is a mind for the +right interpretation of the things of God, that spiritual insight which +discerns the things of the Spirit; and, while recognising life as a +divinely given trust, seeks to obtain a wise understanding of our duties +toward God and man. + +While the other virtues are to a certain extent self-regarding, Justice +is eminently social. At the very lowest it means 'equal consideration' +for all, treating, as Kant would say, every man as an 'end,' and not as a +means. Morally no man may disregard the claims of others. It is said, +indeed, that we must be 'just before we are generous.' But a full and +perfect conception of Justice involves generosity. There is no such +thing as bare justice. Righteousness, which is the New Testament +equivalent, demands more than negative goodness, and in Christian Ethics +{193} passes over into Charity, which finds and fulfils itself in others. +Love here and always is the fulfilling of the law, and mercy, +benevolence, kindness are the implicates of true justice. + +2. It is thus evident that the cardinal virtues are essential elements +of Christian character. Christianity, in taking over the moral +conceptions of the ancient world, gave to them a new value and range by +directing them to new objects and enthusing them with new motives. It +has been truly said that the religion of Jesus so profoundly modified the +character of the moral ideals of the past that they became largely new +creations. The old moral currency was still kept in circulation, but it +was gradually minted anew.[13] Fortitude is still the cool and steady +behaviour of a man in the presence of danger; but its range is widened by +the inclusion of perils of the soul as well as the body. Temperance is +still the control of the physical passions; but it is also the right +placing of new affections, and the consecration of our impulses to nobler +ends. Justice is still the suppression of conflict with the rights of +others; but the source of it lies in giving to God the love which is His +due, and finding in the objects of His thought the subjects also of our +care. Wisdom is still the practical sense which chooses the proper +course of action; but it is no longer a selfish calculation of advantage, +but the wisdom of men who are seeking for themselves and others not +merely temporal good, but a kingdom which is not of this world. + +The real reason, then, why Christianity seems by contrast to accentuate +the gentler graces is not simply as a protest against the spirit of +militarism and the worship of physical power, so prevalent in the ancient +world--not merely that they were neglected--but because they and they +alone, rightly considered, are of the very essence of that perfection of +character which God has revealed to man in Christ. What Christianity has +done is not to give pre-eminence to one class over another, but _to make +human character complete_. Ancient civilisation was one-sided in its +moral {194} development. The pagan conceptions of virtue were merely +materialistic, temporal, and self-regarding. Christ showed that without +the spirit of love even such excellences as courage, temperance, and +justice did not attain to their true meaning or yield their full +implication. Paul, as we have seen, did not disparage heroism, but he +thought that it was exhibited as much, if not more, in patience and +forgiveness as in self-assertion and retaliation. What Christianity +really revealed was a new type of manliness, a fresh application of +temperance, a fuller development of justice. It showed the might of +meekness, the power of gentleness, the heroism of sacrifice. + +3. It is thus misleading to say that Christian Ethics differs from +ancient morality in the prominence it gives to what have been called 'the +passive virtues.' Poverty of spirit, humility, meekness, mercifulness, +and peaceableness are indeed the marks of Christ's teaching. But as +Christ conceived them they were not passive qualities, but intensely +active energies of the soul. It has been well remarked that[14] there +was a poverty of spirit in the creed of the cynic centuries before +Christianity. There was a meekness in the doctrine of the Stoic long +before the advent of Jesus. But these tenets were very far from being +anticipations of Christ's morality. Cynic poverty of spirit was but the +poor-spiritedness of apathy. Stoic meekness was merely the indifference +of oblivion. But the humility and lowliness of heart, the mercifulness +and peace-seeking which Christ inculcated were essentially powers of +self-restraint, not negative but positive attitudes to life. The motive +was not apathy but love. These qualities were based not on the idea that +life was so poor and undesirable that it was not worthy of consideration, +but upon the conviction that it was so grand and noble, something so far +beyond either pleasure or pain, as to demand the devotion of the entire +self--the mastery and consecration of all a man's powers in the +fulfilment and service of its divine end. + +Hence what Christianity did was not so much to institute {195} one type +of character for another as to exhibit for the first time the complete +conception of what human life should be--a new creature, in whom, as in +its great Exemplar, strength and tenderness, courage and meekness, +justice and mercy were alike combined. For, as St. Paul said, in Christ +Jesus there is neither male nor female, but all are as one. And in this +character, as the same apostle finely shows, faith, hope, and charity +have the primary place, not as special virtues which have been added on, +but as the spiritual disposition which penetrates the entire personality +and qualifies its every thought and act. + + +III + +_The Unification of the Virtues_.--While it is desirable, then, to +exhibit the virtues in detail, it is even more important to trace back +the virtues to virtue itself. A man's duties are diverse, as diverse as +the various occasions and circumstances of life, and they can only come +into being with the various institutions of his time, Church and State, +home and country, commerce and culture. But the performance of these may +be slowly building up in him a consistent personality. It is in +character that the unity of the moral life is most clearly expressed. +There must be therefore a unity of character underlying the multiplicity +of characteristics, one single and commanding principle at work in the +formation of life of which every possible virtue is the expression. + +1. A unity of this kind is supplied by man's relation to God. Religion +cannot be separated from conduct. If it were true, as Epicurus said, +that the gods take no concern in human affairs, then not religion only, +but morality itself would be in danger. As men's conceptions of God are +purified and deepened, they tend to exhibit the varied contents of +morality in their connection with a diviner order. It is, then, the +thought of man's relation to God which gives coherence to the moral life, +and brings all its diverse manifestations into unity. + +{196} + +If we examine the Christian consciousness as presented in the New +Testament, we find three words of frequent occurrence repeatedly grouped +together, which may be regarded as the essential marks of Christian +character in relation to God--Faith, Hope, and Love. + +So characteristic are these of the new life that they have been called +the theological virtues, because, as Thomas Aquinas says, 'They have God +for their object: they bring us into true relation to God, and they are +imparted to us by God alone.'[15] + +2. These graces, however, cannot be separated. A man does not exercise +at one time faith, and at another time hope or love. They are all of a +piece. They are but different manifestations of one virtue. Of these +love is the greatest, because it is that without which faith and hope +could not exist. Love is of the very essence of the Christian life. It +is its secret and sign. No other term is so expressive of the spirit of +Christ. It is the first and last word of apostolic Christianity. Love +may be called the discovery of the Gospel. It was practically unknown in +the ancient world. _Eros_, the sensuous instinct and _philia_, the bond +of friendship, did exist, but _agape_ in its spiritual sense is the +creation of Christ. In Christian Ethics love is primal and central. +Here we have got down to the bedrock of virtue. It is not simply one +virtue among many. It is the quality in which all the virtues have their +setting and unity. From a Christian point of view every excellence of +character springs directly from love and is the manifestation of it. It +is, as St. Paul says, 'the bond of perfectness.' The several virtues of +the Christian life are but facets of this one gem.[16] + +Love, according to the apostle, is indispensable to character. Without +it Faith is an empty profession; {197} Knowledge, a mere parade of +learning; Courage, a boastful confidence; Self-denial, a useless +asceticism. Love is the fruitful source of all else that is beautiful +and noble in life. It not only embraces but produces all the other +graces. It creates fortitude; it begets wisdom; it prompts +self-restraint and temperance; it tempers justice. It manifests itself +in humility, meekness, and forgiveness: + + 'As every hue is light, + So every grace is love.' + +Love is, however, closely associated with faith and hope. Faith, as we +have seen, is theologically the formative and appropriating power by +which man makes his own the spirit of Christ. But ethically it is a form +of love. The Christian character is formed by faith, but it lives and +works by love. A believing act is essentially a loving act. It is a +giving of personal confidence. It implies an outgoing of the self +towards another--which is the very nature of love. Hope, again, is but a +particular form of faith which looks forward to the consummation of the +good. The man of hope knows in whom he believes, and he anticipates the +fulfilment of his longings. Hope is essentially an element of love. +Like faith it is a form of idealism. It believes in, and looks forward +to, a better world because it knows that love is at the heart of the +universe. As faith is the special counteragent against materialism in +the present, so hope is the special corrective of pessimism in regard to +the future. Love supplies both with vision. Christian hope, because +based on faith and prompted by love, is no easy-going complacence which +simply accepts the actual as the best of all possible worlds. The +Christian is a man of hope because in spite of life's sufferings he never +loses faith in the ideal which love has revealed to him. 'Tribulation,' +says St. Paul, 'worketh patience, and patience probation, and probation +hope.' Hope has its social aspect as well as its personal; like faith it +is one of the mighty levers of society. Men of hope are the saviours of +the world. In days of persecution and doubt it is their courage which +rallies the wavering hosts and gives others {198} heart for the struggle. +Every Christian is an optimist not with the reckless assurance that calls +evil good, but with the rational faith, begotten of experience, that good +is yet to be the final goal of ill. 'Thy kingdom come' is the prayer of +faith and hope, and the missionary enterprise is rooted in the confidence +begotten of love, that He who has given to man His world-wide commission +will give also the continual presence and power of His Spirit for its +fulfilment. + +3. Faith, hope, and charity are at once the root and fruit of all the +virtues. They are the attributes of the man whom Christ has redeemed. +The Christian has a threefold outlook. He looks upwards, outwards, and +inwards. His horizon is bounded by neither space nor time. He embraces +all men in his regard, because he believes that every man has infinite +worth in God's eyes. The old barriers of country and caste, which +separated men in the ancient world, are broken down by faith in God and +hope for man which the love of Christ inspires. Faith, hope, and love +have been called the theological virtues. But if they are to be called +virtues at all, it must be in a sense very different from what the +ancients understood by virtue. These apostolic graces are not elements +of the natural man, but states which come into being through a changed +moral character. They connect man with God, and with a new spiritual +order in which his life has come to find its place and purpose. They +were impossible for a Greek, and had no place in ancient Ethics. They +are related to the new ideal which the Gospel has revealed, and obtain +their value as elements of character from the fact that they have their +object in the distinctive truth of Christianity--fellowship with God +through Christ. + +These graces are not outward adornments or optional accomplishments. +They are the essential conditions of the Christian man. They constitute +his inmost and necessary character. They do not, however, supersede or +render superfluous the other virtues. On the contrary they transmute and +transfigure them, giving to them at once their coherence and value. + + + +[1] Phil. iv. 8; 1 Peter ii. 9. + +[2] 2 Peter i. 5. + +[3] Cf. Sir Alex. Grant, _Aristotle's Ethics_. + +[4] Cf. Wundt, _Ethik_, p. 147. + +[5] Green, _Proleg. to Ethics_, section 249. + +[6] _Idem_. + +[7] Matt. v. 1-16. + +[8] Gal. v. 22-3. + +[9] Col. iii. 12, 13. + +[10] Phil. iv. 8. + +[11] 1 Cor. xiii. + +[12] 2 Peter i. 5. + +[13] Strong, _Christian Ethics_. + +[14] Mathieson, _Landmarks of Christian Morality_. + +[15] _Summa_, I. ii. + +[16] An interesting parallel might be drawn between the Pauline +conception of Love as the supreme passion of the soul and lord of the +emotions, and the Platonic view of Justice as the intimate spirit of +order alike in the individual and the state, expressing itself in, and +harmoniously binding together, the virtues of Temperance, Courage, and +Wisdom. + + + + +{199} + +CHAPTER XII + +THE REALM OF DUTY + +We have now to see how the virtues issue in their corresponding duties +and cover the whole field of life. + +Virtues and duties cannot be strictly distinguished. As Paulsen +remarks, 'They are but different modes of presenting the same +subject-matter.'[1] Virtues are permanent traits of character; duties +are particular acts which seek to realise virtues. + +The word 'duty,' borrowed from Stoic philosophy, inadequately +describes, both on the side of its obligation and its joy, the service +which the Christian is pledged to offer to Christ. For the Christian +the two moments of pleasure and duty are united in the higher synthesis +of love. + +In this chapter we shall consider, first, some aspects of Christian +obligation; and, second, the particular duties which arise therefrom in +relation to the self, others, and God. + + +I + +ASPECTS OF DUTY + +1. _Duty and Vocation_.--'While duty stands for a universal element +there is a personal element in moral requirement which may be called +vocation.'[2] As soon as the youth enters upon the larger world he has +to make choice of a profession or life-work. Different principles may +guide him in his selection. First of all, the circumstances {200} of +life will help to decide the individual's career. Our calling and +duties arise immediately out of our station. Already by parental +influence and the action of home-environment character is being shaped, +and tastes and purposes are created which will largely determine the +future. Next to condition and station, individual capacity and +disposition ought to be taken into account. No good work can be +accomplished in uncongenial employment. A man must have not only +fitness for his task, but also a love for it. Proper ambition may also +be a determining factor. We have a right to make the most of +ourselves, and to strive for that position in which our gifts shall +have fullest scope. But the ultimate decision must be made in the +light of conscience. Self-interest should not be our sole motive in +the choice of a vocation. It is not enough to ask what is most +attractive, what line of life will ensure the greatest material gain or +worldly honour? Rather should we ask, Where shall I be safest from +moral danger, and, above all, in what position of life, open to me, can +I do the most good? It is not enough to know that a certain mode of +livelihood is permitted by law; I must decide whether it is permitted +to me as a Christian. For, after all, underlying, and giving purpose +and direction to, our earthly vocation is the deeper calling of God +into His kingdom. These cannot, indeed, be separated. We cannot +divide our life into two sections, a sacred and a secular. Nor must we +restrict the idea of vocation to definite spheres of work. Even those +who are precluded by affliction from the activities of the world are +still God's servants, and may find in suffering itself their divinely +appointed mission. There is a divinity which shapes our ends, and in +every life-calling there is something sacred. 'Saints,' says George +Eliot, 'choose not their tasks, they choose but to do them well.' + +But the decisions of life do not cease with the choice of a calling. +At every moment of our career fresh difficulties arise, and new +opportunities open up which demand careful thought. Our first +obligation is to meet faithfully the claims of our station. But in the +complexity of life we are {201} being constantly brought into wider +relations with our fellow-men, which either modify the old, or create +entirely new situations. While the rule is to do the duty that lies +nearest us, to obey the call of God at each moment, it needs no little +wisdom to discern one's immediate duty, and to know what the will of +God actually is. + +2. _Conflict of Duties_.--In the sphere of duty itself a three-fold +distinction, having the imprimatur of the Romish Church, has been made +by some moralists: (1) the problem of colliding interests; (2) +'counsels of perfection'; and (3) indifferent acts or 'Adiaphora,' +actions which, being neither commanded nor forbidden, fall outwith the +domain of Christian obligation. It will not be necessary to discuss at +length these questions. The Gospel lends no support to such +distinctions, and as Schleiermacher points out they ought to have no +place in Protestant Ethics.[3] + +(1) With regard to the 'conflict of duties,' when the collision is +really, as it often is, a struggle between inclination and duty, the +question answers itself. There are, of course, cases in which +perplexity must occur to an honest man. But the difficulty cannot be +decided by drawing up a list of axiomatic precepts to fit all +conceivable cases. In the dilemma, for example, between +self-preservation and self-sacrifice which may present itself in some +tragic experience of life, a host of considerations relative to the +individual's history and relationships enter in to modify the +situation, and the course to be taken can be _finally_ determined by a +man's _own_ conscience alone. Ultimately there can be no collision of +duties as such. Once a man recognises a certain mode of conduct to be +right for him there is really no choice. In judgment he may err; +passion or desire may obscure the issue; but once he has determined +what he ought to do there is no alternative, 'er kann nicht anders.' + +(2) Again, it is a complete misapprehension of the nature of duty to +distinguish between the irreducible minimum and acts of supererogatory +goodness which outrun duty. {202} Goodness is one, and admits of no +degrees. All duty is absolute. An overplus is unthinkable, since no +man can do more than his duty. A Christian can only do what he +recognises as his obligation, and this he ought to fulfil at every +moment and with all his might. Love, which is the Christian's only +law, knows no limit. Even when we have done our utmost we are still +unprofitable servants. + +(3) Finally, the question as to whether there are any acts which are +indifferent, permissible, but neither enjoined nor forbidden, must also +be answered in the negative. If the Christian can do no more than his +duty, because in every single action he seeks to fulfil the whole will +of God, it is clear that there can be no moment of life that can be +thought of not determined by the divine will. There is no part of life +that is colourless. There must be no dropped stitches in the texture +of the Christian character. + +It is most frequently in the domain of amusement that the notion of the +'Permissible' is applied. It has been contended that as recreation +really lies outwith the Christian sphere, it may be allowed to +Christian people as a concession to human weakness.[4] But can this +position be vindicated? Relaxation is as much a need of man as work, +and must, equally with it, be brought within the scope of Christian +conduct. We have no business to engage in any activity, whether +involving pleasure or pain, that we cannot justify to our conscience. +Are not the joys of life, and even its amusements, among God's gifts +designed for the enriching of character? And may not they, too, be +consecrated to the glory of God? We are to use the world while not +abusing it, for all things are ours if we are Christ's. Over every +department of life the law of Christ is sovereign, and the ultimate +principle applicable to all problems of duty is, 'Whatsoever ye do in +word or deed do all to the glory of God.' + +3. _Rights and Duties_.--The foregoing question as to the scope of +duty leads naturally to the consideration of the relation of duties and +rights. It is usual to distinguish {203} between legal and moral +rights; but at bottom they are one. The rights which I legally claim +for myself I am morally bound to grant to others. A right is expressed +in the form of a permission; a duty, of an imperative. I may or may +not demand my legal rights; morally, I must perform my duties. But, on +the other hand, a right may be secured by legal compulsion; a duty, as +a moral obligation, can never be enforced by external power: it needs +our own assent.[5] + +Strictly speaking rights and duties are correlative. Every right +carries with it an obligation; not merely in the objective sense that +when one man has a right other men are under the obligation to respect +it, but also in the subjective sense that when a man has a right he is +bound to use it for the general good. It is sometimes said, 'A man may +do what he likes with his own.' Legally that may be true, but morally +he is under obligation to employ it for the general good just as +strictly as if it were another's. A man's rights are not merely +decorations or ends in themselves. They are opportunities, +instruments, trusts. And when any man has them, it means that he is +placed on a vantage-ground from which, secure of oppression or +interference, he may begin to do his duty.[6] But this moral aspect of +right is often lost sight of. People are so enamoured of what they +call their rights that they forget that the real value of every right +depends upon the use to which they put it. A man's freedom does not +consist in having rights, but in fulfilling them. 'After all,' says +Mazzini, 'the greatest right a man can possess or recognise--the +greatest gift of all--is simply the privilege and obligation to do his +duty.'[7] This is the only Christian doctrine of rights. It underlies +our Lord's teaching in the parable of the Talents. We only have what +we use. + +(1) Much has been written of the 'Natural rights of Man.'[8] This was +the claim of a school of political philosophy of {204} which Paine was +the most rigorous exponent. The contentions of Paine were met as +vigorously by the negations of Bentham and Burke. And if it be +supposed that the individual is born into the world with certain +ready-made possessions, fixed and unalterable, the claim is untenable. +Such an artificial account of man ignores entirely the evolution of +moral nature, and denies the possibility of development in man's +conception of law and duty. 'It is,' as Wundt says, 'to derive all the +moral postulates that have been produced in our minds by previous moral +development from moral life as it actually exists.'[9] + +(2) But while the 'natural rights of man' cannot be theoretically +vindicated, they may still be regarded as ends or ideals to be striven +after. 'Justifiable or unjustifiable in theory, they may still remain +a convenient form in which to couch the ultimatum of determined +men.'[10] They give expression, at least, to a conviction which has +grown more clear and articulate with the advance of thought--the +conviction of the _dignity and worth of the individual_. This thought +was the keynote of the Reformation. The Enlightenment, with its appeal +to reason, as alike in all men, gave support to the idea of equality. +Descartes claimed it as the philosophical basis of man's nature. +Rousseau and Montesquieu were among its most valiant champions. Kant +made it the point of departure for the enforcement of human right and +duty. Fichte but elaborated Kant's view when he contended for 'the +equality of everything which bears the human visage.'[11] And Hegel +has summed up the conception in what he calls 'the mandate of +right'--'Be a person, and respect others as persons.'[12] Poets +sometimes see what others miss. And in our country, at least, it is to +Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning, and still more, perhaps, to Burns, +that we are indebted for the insistence upon the native worth of man. + +But if this claim has only gradually attained to articulate {205} +expression, and is only now being made the basis of social +reconstruction, it must not be forgotten that it is essentially a +Christian truth. In Harnack's language, 'Jesus Christ was the first to +bring the value of every human soul to light, and what He did no one +can any more undo.'[13] + +When, however, the attempt is made to analyse this ultimate principle +of manhood, opinions differ as to its constituents, and a long list of +'rights' claimed by different political thinkers might be made. The +famous 'Declaration of Rights'[14] included Life, Liberty, Property, +Security, and 'Resistance of Oppression.' To these some have added +'Manhood Suffrage,' 'Free Access to the Soil,' and a common +distribution of the benefits of life and means of production. This is +a large programme, and certainly no community as yet has recognised all +its items without qualification. Obviously they are not all of the +same quality, nor are they of independent validity; and at best they +but roughly describe certain factors, considered by various agitators +as desirable, of an ideal social order. + +(3) We are on safer ground, and for Christian Ethics, at least, more in +consonance with ultimate Christian values, when we describe the primary +realities of human nature in terms of the revelation of life as given +by the Person and teaching of Jesus Christ. The three great verities +upon which He constantly insisted were, man's value for himself, his +value for his fellow-men, and his value for God. These correspond +generally to the three great ethical ideas of life--Personality, +Freedom, and Divine Kinship. But although the sense of independence, +liberty and divine fellowship is the first aspect of a being who has +come to the consciousness of himself, it is incomplete in itself. Man +plants himself upon his individuality in order that he may set out from +thence to take possession, by means of knowledge, action, and service, +of his larger world. Man's rights are but {206} possibilities which +must be transmuted by him into achievements. + + 'This is the honour,--that no thing I know, + Feel, or conceive, but I can make my own + Somehow, by use of hand or head or heart.'[15] + +Rights involve obligations. The right of personality carries with it +the duty of treating life, one's own and that of others, as sacred. +The right of freedom implies the use of one's liberty for the good of +the society of which each is a member. And finally, the sense of +divine kinship involves the obligation of making the most of one's +life, of realising through and for God all that God intends in the gift +of life. + +In these three values lies the Christian doctrine of man.[16] Because +of their fullness of implication they open out to our vision the goal +of humanity--the principle and purpose of the whole process of human +evolution--the perfection of man. Given these three Christian +truths--the Sacredness of Personality, the Brotherhood of Man, and the +Fatherhood of God--and all that is essential in the claim of the +'Natural Rights of Man' is implicitly contained. The one thing needful +is that men become alive to their privileges and go forward to 'possess +their possessions.' + + +II + +SPHERES OF DUTY + +We are thus led to a division, natural if not wholly logical, of duties +which spring from these rights--duties towards self, others, and God. +Though, indeed, self-love implies love of others, and all duty is duty +to God, still it may be permissible to frame a scheme of duties +according as one or other element is prominent in each case. + +1. _Duties in Relation to Self_.--It is obvious that without (1) +_respect_ for self there can be no respect for others. I am {207} a +part of the moral whole, and an element in the kingdom of God. I +cannot make myself of no account. Our Lord's commandment, 'Thou shalt +love thy neighbour as thyself,' makes a rightly conceived self-love the +measure of love to one's neighbour. Self-respect involves (2) +_self-preservation_, the care of health, the culture of body and mind. +Not only is it our duty to see that the efficiency and fitness of the +bodily organism is fully maintained, but we must also guard it against +everything that would defile and disfigure it, or render it an +instrument of sin. Christianity requires the strictest personal +purity, purity of thought and feeling as well as of deed. It demands, +therefore, constant vigilance, self-control, temperance, and even +self-denial, so that the body may be, not, as the ancients thought, the +prison-house of the soul, but the temple of the Holy Spirit. +Christianity is, however, opposed to asceticism. Though Jesus denied +Himself to the uttermost in obedience to the voice of God, there is in +His presentation of life a complete absence of those austerities which +in the history of the Church have been so often regarded as marks of +superior sanctity.[17] It is unnecessary here to dwell upon athletics +and sport which now so largely occupy the attention of the youth of our +land. Physical exercise is necessary to the maintenance of bodily +fitness, yet it may easily become an all-absorbing pursuit, and instead +of being merely a means to an end, may usurp the place in life which +belongs to higher things. + +(3) Self-maintenance involves also the duty of _self-development_, and +that not merely of our physical, but also of our mental life. If the +body has its place and function in the growth of Christian character, +still more has the mind its ethical importance. Our Maker can have no +delight in ignorance. He desires that we should present not a +fragmentary but complete manhood. Specialisation, though a necessity +of the age, is fraught with peril to the individual. The exigencies of +labour require men to concentrate their energies on their own immediate +tasks; but each must seek to be not merely a craftsman, but a man. +Other sides {208} of our nature require to be cultivated besides those +which bring us into contact with the ways and means of existence. +Indeed, it is only by the possession of a well-trained mind that the +fullest capacity, even for special pursuits, can be obtained. It has +become a commonplace to say that every man should have equality of +opportunity to earn a livelihood. But equality of opportunity for +education, as something which ought to be within the reach of every +youth in the land, is not so frequently insisted upon. Beyond the +claims of daily occupation every one should have a chance, and, indeed, +an inducement, to cultivate his mental and spiritual nature. Hence +what is called 'culture,' the all-round development of the human +faculties, is an essential condition of moral excellence. For, as +Goethe has said, the object of education ought to be rather the +formation of tastes than simply the communication of knowledge. But +most important of all the self-regarding aims of life is the obligation +of _Self-discipline_, and the use of every means of moral culture which +the world supplies. It is through the complex conditions of earthly +existence that the character of the individual is developed. It will +only be possible to indicate briefly some of the aids to the culture of +the moral life. Among these may be mentioned: (_a_) _The Providential +Experiences of life_. The world itself, as a sphere of Work, +Temptation, and Suffering, is a school of character. The affections +and cares of the home, the duties and tasks incident to one's calling, +the claims of one's fellow-men, the trials and temptations of one's +lot--these are the universal and common elements in man's moral +education. Not to escape from the world's activities and conflicts, +but to turn them into conditions of self-mastery, is the duty of each. +Men do work, but work makes men. The shopkeeper is not merely selling +wares; the artisan or mechanic is not simply engaged in his handicraft; +the mason and builder are not only erecting a house; each is, in and +through his toil, making his own soul. And so, too, suffering and +temptation are the tools which God commits to His creatures for the +shaping of their own lives. Saints {209} and sinners are made out of +the same material. By what Bosanquet has finely called 'the miracle of +will' the raw stuff of life is taken up and woven into the texture of +the soul. (_b_) The so-called _secular opportunities of culture_. +Innumerable sources of self-enrichment are available. Everything may +be made a vehicle of moral education. Knowledge generally, and +especially the ministry of nature, the influence of art, and the study +of literature, are potent factors in the discipline and development of +Christian character. To these must be added (_c_) _The special +religious aids and means of grace_. From an ethical point of view the +Church is a school of character. It 'guards and keeps alive the +characteristic Christian ideas, and thereby exhibits and promotes the +Christian ideal of life.'[18] Its fellowship, worship, and ordinances; +its opportunities of brotherly service and missionary activity, as well +as the more private spiritual exercises of prayer and meditation--all +are means of discipline and gifts committed to the stewardship of +individuals in order that they may realise the greatness of life's +possibilities, and attain through union with God to the fullness of +their stature in Christ. + +But while the truth that the soul has an inalienable worth is +repeatedly affirmed, the New Testament touches but lightly upon the +duties of self-regard. To be occupied constantly with the thought of +one's self is a symptom of morbid egoism rather than of healthy +personality. The avidity of self-improvement and even zeal for +religion may become a refined form of selfishness. We must be willing +at times to renounce our personal comfort, to restrain our zest for +intellectual and aesthetic enjoyment, to be content to be less cultured +and scholarly, less complete as men, and ready to part with something +of our own immediate good that others may be ministered to. Hence the +chief reason probably why the Scriptures do not enlarge upon the duties +of self-culture is, that according to the spirit of the Gospel the true +realisation of self is achieved through self-sacrifice. Only as a man +loses his life does he find it. To horde [Transcriber's note: hoard?] +one's {210} possessions is to waste them. Growth is the condition of +life. But in all growth there is reciprocity of expenditure and +assimilation, of giving and receiving. Self-realisation is only gained +through self-surrender. Not, therefore, by anxiously standing guard +over one's soul, but by dedicating it freely to the good of others does +one achieve one's true self. + +2. _Duties in Relation to Others_.--We belong to others, and others +belong to us. They and we are alike parts of a larger whole. + +(1) While this is recognised in Scripture, and all men are declared to +be brothers in virtue of their common humanity, Christianity traces the +brotherhood of man to a deeper source. The relation of the individual +to Christ is the true ground of love to others. In Christ all +distinctions which in other respects separate men are dissolved. +Beneath the meanest garb and coarsest features, in spite even of the +defacement of sin, we may detect the vast possibilities of the soul for +whom Christ has died. The law of love is presented by Jesus as the +highest of all the commandments, and the duty to others is summed up +generally in what is known as the golden rule. Of the chief +manifestations of brotherly love mention must be made (_a_) of the +comprehensive duty of _Justice_. The ground upon which justice rests +is the principle that each individual is an end in himself. Hence it +is the duty of each to respect the rights of his neighbours, negatively +refraining from injury and positively rendering that which our +fellow-men have a right to claim. Religion makes a man more sensitive +to the claims of humanity. Mutual respect requires a constant effort +on the part of all to secure for each the fullest freedom to be +himself. Christianity interprets justice to mean emancipation from +every condition which crushes or degrades a man. It seeks to create a +social conscience, and to arouse in each a sense of responsibility for +the good of all. At the same time social justice must not be +identified with charity. Charity has done much to relieve distress, +and it will always form an indispensable element in {211} the +Christian's duty towards his less fortunate brethren; but something +more radical than almsgiving is required if the conditions of life are +to be appreciably bettered. Justice is a demand not for bread alone; +it is a claim of humanity to life, and all that life ought to mean. +Christianity affirms the spirit of human brotherhood--a brotherhood in +which every child will have a chance to grow to a noble manhood, and +every man and woman will have opportunity and encouragement to live a +free, wholesome, and useful life. That is the Christian ideal, and to +help towards its realisation is the duty laid upon every citizen of the +commonwealth. The problems of poverty, housing, unemployment, +intemperance, and all questions of fair wages, legitimate profits, and +just prices, fall under the regulative principle of social justice. +The law is, 'Render to all their dues.' The love which worketh no ill +to his neighbour will also withhold no good.[19] + +(_b_) _Truthfulness_.--Justice is not confined to acts, but extends to +speech and even to thought. We owe to others veracity. Even when the +motive is good, there can be no greater social disservice than to fail +in truthfulness. Falsehood, either in the form of hypocrisy or +equivocation, and even of unsound workmanship, is not only unjust to +others; it is unjust to ourselves, and a wrong to the deeper self--the +new man in Christ.[20] + +Is deception under all circumstances morally wrong? Moralists have +been divided on this question. The instance of war is frequently +referred to, in which it is contended that ruse and subterfuge are +permissible forms of strategy.[21] There are, however, many +distressing cases of conscience, in which the duties of affection and +veracity seemingly conflict. It must be remembered that no command can +be carried out to its extreme, or obeyed literally. Truth is not +always conveyed by verbal accuracy. There may be higher interests at +stake which might be prejudiced, and indeed unfairly represented by a +merely literal statement. {212} The individual conscience must decide +in each case. We are to speak the truth in love. Courage and +kindliness are to commingle. But when all is said it is difficult to +avoid the conclusion that in the last analysis lack of truth argues a +deficient trust in the ultimate veracities of the universe, and rests +upon a practical unbelief in the divine providence which can make 'all +things work together for good to them that love God.' + +(_c_) Connected with truthfulness, and also a form of justice, is the +duty enjoined by St. Paul of forming _just judgments_ of our +fellow-men. If we would avoid petty fault-finding and high-minded +contempt, we must dismiss all prejudice and passion. The two qualities +requisite for proper judgment are knowledge and sympathy. Goethe has a +fine couplet to the effect that 'it is safe in every case to appeal to +the man who knows.'[22] But to understanding must be added +appreciative consideration. We must endeavour to put ourselves in the +position of our brother. Without a finely blended knowledge and +sympathy we grow intolerant and impatient. Fairness is the rarest of +moral qualities. He who would estimate another truly must have what +St. Paul calls 'spiritual discernment'--the 'even-balanced soul' of one +'who saw life steadily and who saw it whole.' + +(2) Brotherly Love evinces itself further in _Service_, which takes the +three forms of Compassion, Beneficence or practical kindness, and +Example. + +(_a_) _Compassion_ or sympathy is a readiness to enter into the +experiences of others. As Christians nothing that concerns our brother +can be a matter of indifference to us. As members of the same +spiritual community we are participators in each other's joys and +sorrows, 'weeping with those that weep, and rejoicing with those that +rejoice.' It is no mere natural instinct, but one which grows out of +the Christian consciousness of organic union with Christ. 'When one +member suffers, all the members suffer with it.'[23] {213} We fulfil +the law of Christ by bearing one another's burdens. + +(6) _Practical Beneficence_ is the natural outcome of sympathy. +Feelings pass into deeds. Those redeemed by the love of Christ become +the agents of His love, gladly dispensing to others what they +themselves have received. The ministry of love, whatever shape it may +take, must, in the last resort, be a giving of self. No one can do a +kindness who does not put something of himself into it. No true +service can be done that does not cost us more than money. + +In modern society it is inevitable that personality should largely find +its expression and exercise in material possessions. Without entering +here upon the question of the institution of private property, it is +enough to say that the possession of material goods may be morally +defended on the twofold ground, that it ensures the security of +existence, and is an essential condition of the development of +individual and national resources. The process of acquisition is a +moralising influence, since it incites the individual to work, and +tends to create and foster among men interchange of service. Property, +says Hegel, is the embodiment and instrument of the will.[24] But in a +civilised community there must be obviously restrictions to the +acquisition and use of wealth. Unbridled appropriation and +irresponsible abuse are alike a peril to society. The State has +therefore the right of interference and control in regard to all +possessions. Even on the lowest ground of expediency the very idea of +property involves on the part of all the principle of co-operation and +reciprocity--the obligation of contributing to the general weal. It +would, however, be most undesirable that the government should +undertake everything for the general good of man that is now left to +spontaneous effort and liberality. But from the standpoint of +Christian Ethics possessions of all kinds are subject to the law of +stewardship.[25] Every gift is {214} bestowed by God for the purpose +of social service. No man can call the things which he +possesses--endowments, wealth, power--his own. He is simply a trustee +of life itself. No one may be an idler or parasite, and society has a +just claim upon the activity of every man. The forms of such service +are various; but the Christian spirit will inspire a sense of 'the +ultimate unity of all pursuits that contribute to the good of man.'[26] + +The ministry of love extends over the whole realm of existence, and +varies with every phase of need. Physical necessities are to be met in +the spirit of charity. St. Paul pleads repeatedly the cause of the +poor, and commends the grace of liberality. Giving is to be cheerful +and without stint. But there are needs which material aid cannot +meet--desolation, anxiety, grief--to which the loving heart alone can +find ways of ministering. And beyond all physical and moral need is +the need of the soul; and it lies as a debt upon those who themselves +have experienced the grace of Christ to seek the renewal and spiritual +enrichment of their brethren. + +(_c_) There is one special form of practical kindness towards others +which a follower of Christ will often be called upon to exercise--the +spirit of _forbearance and forgiveness_. The Christian is to speak +evil of no man, but to be gentle, showing all meekness unto all men; +living peaceably with all men, avoiding everything provocative of +strife; even 'forbearing one another and forgiving one another, if any +have a quarrel against any; even as Christ forgave you so also do ye.' + +(3) Finally, we may serve others by _Example_, by letting the light of +life so shine before men that they seeing our good works shall glorify +God our Father. This duty, however, as Fichte points out, 'has often +been viewed very incorrectly, as if we could be obliged to do this or +that, which otherwise we would not have needed to do, for the sake of a +good example.'[27] That which I am commanded {215} to do I must do for +its own sake without regard to its effect upon others. Esteem can be +neither outwardly compelled nor artistically produced; it manifests +itself voluntarily and spontaneously. A modern novelist[28] ironically +exposes this form of altruism by putting into the mouth of one of her +characters the remark, 'I always make a point of going to church in +order to show a good example to the domestics.' At the same time no +one can withhold one's influence; and while the supreme motive must be, +not to make a display, but to please God, he who is faithful to his +station and its duties cannot fail to affect his fellow-men for good. +The most effective example is given unconsciously, as the rose exhales +its sweetest perfume without effort, or the light sheds its radiance +simply by being what it is. + +3. _Duties in Relation to God_.--Here morality runs up into religion, +and indeed since all duties are in their last analysis duties toward +God, Kant and other moralists have objected to the admission into +Ethics of a special class of religious obligations. It has been well +remarked that the genuine Christian cannot be known by particular +professions or practices, but only by the heavenly spirit of his +life.[29] Hence religious duty cannot be formulated in a number of +precise rules. Love to God finds expression not in mechanical +obedience, but in the spontaneous outflow of the heart. The special +duties to the Divine Being may be briefly described under the main +heads of Recognition, Obedience, and Worship. + +(1) _Recognition_.--The acknowledgment of God rests upon knowledge. +Without some comprehension of what God is there can be no intelligent +allegiance to Him. We cannot, indeed, by logical reasoning demonstrate +the existence of the Deity any more than we can demonstrate our own +being. But He has not left Himself without a witness, and He speaks to +man with many voices. The material creation is the primary word of +God. The beauty, and still more the sublimity, of nature are a +revelation through {216} matter of something beyond itself, a message +of the spiritual, bearing 'authentic tidings of invisible things.' But +nature is symbolic. It is a prophecy rather than an immediate +revelation. Still it warrants the expectation of a yet fuller +manifestation. That fuller utterance we have in man himself. There, +spirit reveals itself to spirit; and in the two primary intuitions of +man--self-consciousness and the sense of moral obligation--the presence +of God is disclosed. But, higher still, the long historic evolution +has culminated in a yet clearer manifestation of the Deity. In Christ, +the God-Man, the mystery underlying and brooding over the world is +unveiled, and to the eye of faith is revealed the Fatherhood of God. + +The first duty, therefore, we owe to God is that of recognition, the +acknowledgment of His presence in the world. To feel that He is +everywhere, sustaining and vitalising all things; to recognise His will +in all the affairs of our daily life, is at once the duty and +blessedness of man. + +(2) _Obedience_ follows acknowledgment. It is partly passive and +partly active. + +(_a_) As _passive_, it takes the form of habitual trust or +_acquiescence_, the submissive acceptance of trials which are +ultimately, we believe, not really evils, because ordained by God and +overruled for good.[30] This spirit of obedience can be maintained by +_constant vigilance_ alone.[31] While connected with the anticipated +coming of the Son of Man, the obligation had a more general +application, and may be regarded as the duty of all in the face of the +unknown and unexpected in life. We are therefore to watch for any +intimation of the divine will, and commit ourselves trustfully to the +absolute disposal of Him in whose hands are the issues of our lives. + +(_b_) But obedience has also an _active_ side. _Faithfulness_ is the +complement of faith. The believer must exercise fidelity, and go +forward with energy and purpose to the tasks committed to him. As +stewards of Christ we are {217} to occupy till He come, employing every +talent entrusted to us in His service. Work may be worship, and we can +glorify God in our daily tasks. No finer tribute can a man give than +simply himself. + +(3) _Worship_.--The special duties of worship belong to the religious +rather than the ethical side of life, and do not demand here more than +a passing reference. The essence of religion lies in the subordination +of the finite self to the infinite; and worship is the conscious +outgoing of the man in his weakness and imperfection to his Maker, and +it attains its fullest exercise in (_a_) _reverence_, humility, and +devotion. The feeling of dependence and sense of need, together with +the consciousness of utter demerit and inability which man realises as +he gazes upon the majesty and grace of God, awaken the (_b_) instinct +of _prayer_. 'It is the sublime significance of prayer,' says Wuttke, +'that it brings into prominence man's great and high destiny, that it +heightens his consciousness of his true moral nature in relation to +God; and as morality depends on our relation to God, prayer is the very +life-blood of morality.'[32] The steadfast aspiration of the soul to +God, whose will is our law and whose blessing is granted to whatsoever +is done in His name, is the habitual temper of the Christian life. But +prayer must also be particular, definite, and expectant. By a law of +our nature, and apart from all supernatural intervention, prayer +exercises a reflex influence of a very beneficial character upon the +mind of the worshippers. But he who offers his petitions expecting +nothing more will not even attain this. 'If prayers,' says Mr. Lecky, +'were offered up solely with a view to this benefit, they would be +absolutely sterile and would speedily cease.'[33] The purely +subjective view of prayer as consisting solely in 'beneficent +self-suggestion' empties the term of significance. Even Frederick +Meyers, who lays so much stress upon the importance of self-suggestion +in other aspects of experience, admits that prayer is something more +than a subjective {218} phenomenon. 'It is not only a calling up of +one's own private resources; it must derive its ultimate efficacy from +the increased flow from the infinite life into the life of the +suppliant.'[34] + +(_c_) Prayer attains its highest expression in _Thanksgiving and Joy_. +Gratitude is the responsive feeling which wells up in the heart of +those who have experienced the goodness of God, and recognise Him as +the great Benefactor. Christians are to abound in thankfulness. We +live in a world where everything speaks to us of divine love. Praise +is the complement of prayer. The grateful heart sees life +transfigured. It discovers everywhere tokens of grace and hope, + + 'Making the springs of time and sense + Sweet with eternal good.' + +Peace, trust, joy, hope are the ultimate notes of the Christian life. +'Rejoice always, pray without ceasing, in everything give thanks.' +Thanksgiving, says St. Bernard, 'is the return of the heart to God in +perpetual benediction.' + + +In the kingdom of love duty is swallowed up in joy. Life is nothing +but the growing realisation of God. With God man's life begins, and to +Him turns back at last in the wrapt contemplation of His perfect being. +In fellowship with God man finds in the end both himself and his +brother. + + 'What is left for us, save, in growth + Of soul, to rise up, far past both, + From the gift looking to the Giver, + From the cistern to the river, + And from the finite to the Infinity + And from man's dust to God's divinity?'[35] + +'God,' says Green, 'is a Being with whom we are in principle one, in +the sense that He is all which the human spirit is capable of +becoming.'[36] In the worship of God, {219} man dies to the temporal +interests and narrow ends of the exclusive self, and lives in an +ever-expanding life in the life of others, manifesting more and more +that spiritual principle which is the life of God, who lives and loves +in all things.[37] + + + +[1] Paulsen, _Ethics_, bk. III. chap. i. Cf. also Wundt, _Ethik_, p. +148. But see also W. Wallace, _Lectures and Essays_, p. 325, on their +confusion. + +[2] Mackintosh, _Chr. ethics_, p. 114. + +[3] Cf. Haering, _Ethics of Chr. Life_, p. 230. + +[4] This seems to be the position of Herrmann; see _Ethik_. + +[5] Cf. Eucken, _Life's Basis_, p. 185. + +[6] Maccunn, _Ethics of Citizenship_, p. 40. + +[7] _Duties of Man_, chap. i. + +[8] See discussion by late W. Wallace in _Lectures and Essays_, pp. 213 +ff. + +[9] _Ethik_, p. 190. + +[10] Maccunn, _op. cit._; p. 42. + +[11] Cf. Eucken, _Main Currents of Modern Thought_, p. 348. + +[12] Hegel, _Philosophy of Right_, p. 45. + +[13] _Das Wesen des Christenthums_; cf. also _Ecce Homo_, p. 345. + +[14] Adopted in Massachusetts in 1773.--'All men have equal rights to +life, liberty, and property.' + +[15] Browning, _Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau_. + +[16] Cf. Wheeler Robinson, _The Christian Doctrine of Man_, pp. 281 f. + +[17] Matt. xi. 18; Luke vii. 33. + +[18] Ottley, _Ideas and Ideals_. + +[19] Rom. xiii. 7-10. + +[20] Col. iii. 9, 10. + +[21] See Lecky, _Map of Life_. + +[22] _Vor dem Wissenden sich stellen, sicher ist's in allen Faellen_. + +[23] 1 Cor. xii. 26. + +[24] _Phil. of Right_, pp. 48 ff.; see also Wundt, _Ethik_, pp. 175 f. + +[25] Cf. Ottley, _Idem_, p. 271. + +[26] Green, _Proleg._, p. 173, quoted by Ottley. + +[27] _Science of Ethics_ (trans.), p. 337. + +[28] Miss Fowler, _Concerning Isabel Carnaby_. + +[29] Drummond, _Via, Veritas, Vita_, p. 227. + +[30] Matt. viii. 25 f., x. 26; Luke viii. 23 f. + +[31] Matt. xxv. 1 f.; Mark xxiv. 42; Luke xii. 36 f. + +[32] _Chr. Ethics_ (trans.), vol. ii. p. 221. + +[33] _Hist. of Europ. Morals_, vol. i. p. 36. + +[34] _Human Personality_, vol. ii. p. 313. + +[35] Browning, _Christmas Eve_. + +[36] _Proleg._, p. 198. + +[37] Cf. Jones, _Browning as Philosophical and Religious Teacher_, p. +367. + + + + +{220} + +CHAPTER XIII + +SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS + +In last chapter we dealt with the rights and duties of the individual +as they are conditioned by his relation to himself, others, and to God. +In this chapter it remains to speak more particularly of the organised +institutions of society in which the moral life is manifested, and by +means of which character is moulded. These are the Family, the State, +and the Church. These three types of society, though distinguishable, +are closely allied. At first, indeed, they were identical. Human +society had its origin, most probably, in a primitive condition in +which domestic, political, and religious ends were one. Even in modern +life Family, State, and Church do not stand for separate interests. So +far from their aims colliding they are mutually helpful. An individual +may be a member of all three at one time. From a Christian point of +view each is a divine institution invested with a sacred worth and a +holy function, and ordained of God for the advancement of His kingdom. + + +I + +_The Family_ is the fountain-head of all the other social groups, 'the +cell of the social organism.' Man enters the world not as an isolated +being, but by descent and generation. In the family each is cradled +and nurtured, and by the domestic environment character is developed. +The family has a profound value for the nation. Citizenship rests on +the sanctity of the home. When the fire on the hearth is quenched, the +vigour of a people dies. + +{221} + +1. Investigations of great interest and value have been pursued in +recent years regarding the origin and evolution of the family. However +far back the natural history of the race is carried, it seems scarcely +possible to resist the conclusion that some form of family relationship +is coeval with human life. Widely as social arrangements differ in +detail among savage peoples, arbitrary promiscuity can nowhere be +detected. Certain laws of domestication have been invariably found to +exist, based upon definite social and moral restrictions universally +acknowledged and rigidly enforced. Two primitive conditions are +present wherever man is found--the tribe and the family. If the family +is never present without the tribe, the tribe is never discovered +without 'those intra-tribal distinctions and sexual regulations which +lie at the bottom of the institution of the family.'[1] Westermarck +indeed says that 'the evidence we possess tends to show that among our +earliest human ancestors the family and not the tribe formed the +nucleus of every social group, and in many cases was itself perhaps the +only social group. The tie that kept together husband and wife, +parents and children, was, if not the only, at least the principal +factor in the earliest forms of man's social life.'[2] If the family +had been an artificial convention called into being by human will and +ingenuity, it might conceivably be destroyed by the same factors. But +whatever arguments may be adduced for the abolition of marriage and +family life to-day, the appeal to primitive history is not one of them. +On the contrary the earliest forms of society show that the family is +no invention, that it has existed as long as man himself, and that all +social evolution has been a struggle for the preservation of its most +valuable features.[3] + +2. If, even in early times, and especially among the Hebrews, Greeks, +and Romans, the family was an important factor in national development, +it has been infinitely more so {222} since the advent of Christianity. +Christ did not create this relationship. He found it in existence when +He came to the earth. But He invested it with a new ethical value. He +laid upon it His consecrating touch, and made it the vehicle of all +that is most tender and true in human affection, so that among +Christian people to-day no word is fraught with such hallowed +associations as the word 'home.' This He did both by example and +teaching. As a member of a human family Himself, He participated in +its experiences and duties. He spent His early years in the home of +Nazareth, and was subject unto His parents. He manifested His glory at +a marriage feast. By the grave of Lazarus He mingled His tears with +those of the sorrowing sisters of Bethany. He had a tender regard for +little children, and when mothers brought their infants to Him He +welcomed them with gracious encouragement, and, taking the little ones +in His arms, blessed them, thus consecrating for all time both +childhood and motherhood. Throughout His life there are indications of +His deep reverence and affection for her who was His mother, and with +His latest breath he confided her to the care of His beloved disciple. + +There are passages indeed which seem to indicate a depreciation of +family relationships.[4] The most important of these are the sayings +which deal with the home connections of those whom He called to special +discipleship.[5] Not only are father and mother to be loved less than +He, but even in comparison with Himself are to be hated.[6] Among the +sacrifices His servants must be ready to make is the surrender of the +home.[7] But these references ought to be taken in conjunction with, +and read in the light of, His more general attitude to the claims of +kindred. It was not His indifference to, but His profound regard for, +home ties that drew from Him these words. He knew that affection may +narrow as well as widen the heart, and that our {223} tenderest +intimacies may bring our most dangerous temptations. There are moments +in the history of the heart when the lesser claim must yield to the +greater. For the Son of Man Himself, there were interests higher even +than those of the family. Some men, perhaps even most, are able to +fulfil their vocation without a surrender of the joys of kinship. But +others are called to a wider sphere and a harder task. For the sake of +the larger brotherhood of man, Jesus found it necessary to renounce the +intimacies of home. What it cost Him to do so we, who cannot fathom +the depth of His love, know not. Even such an abandonment did He +demand of His first disciples. And for the follower of Christ still +there must be the same willingness to make the complete sacrifice of +everything, even of home and kindred, if they stand in the way of +devotion to the kingdom of God.[8] + +(1) Our Lord's direct statements regarding the nature of the family +leave us in no doubt as to the high place it holds in His conception of +life. Marriage, upon which the family rests, is, according to Jesus, +the divinely ordained life-union of a man and woman. In His quotation +from Genesis He makes reference to that mysterious attraction, deeply +founded in the very nature of man, by which members of the opposite sex +are drawn to each other. But while acknowledging the sensuous element +in marriage, He lifts it up into the spiritual realm and transmutes it +into a symbol of soul-communion. Our Lord does not derive the sanction +of wedded life from Mosaic legislation. Still less does He permit it +as a concession to human frailty. It has its ground in creation +itself, and while therefore it is the most natural of earthly +relationships it is of God's making. To the true ideal of marriage +there are several features which our Lord regards as indispensable. +(_a_) It must be _monogamous_, the fusion of two distinct +personalities. 'They two shall be one flesh.' Mutual self-impartation +demands that the union should be an exclusive one. (_b_) It is a +_union of equality_. Neither {224} personality is to be suppressed. +The wedded are partners who share one another's inmost thoughts and +most cherished purposes. But this claim of equality does not exclude +but rather include the different functions which, by reason of sex and +constitution, each is enabled to exercise. 'Woman is not undeveloped +man but diverse.' And it is in diversity that true unity consists. +Both will best realise their personality in seeking the perfection of +one another. (_c_) It is a _permanent_ union, indissoluble till the +parting of death. The only exception which Christ acknowledges is that +form of infidelity which _ipso facto_ has already ruptured the sacred +bond.[9] According to Jesus marriage is clearly intended by God to +involve sacred and permanent obligations, a covenant with God, as well +as with one another, which dare not be set aside at the dictate of a +whim or passion. The positive principle underlying this declaration +against divorce is the spirit of universal love that forbids that the +wife should be treated, as was the case among the dissolute of our +Lord's time, as a chattel or slave. Nothing could be more abhorrent to +Christian sentiment than the modern doctrine of 'leasehold marriage' +advocated by some.[10] It has been ingeniously suggested that the +record of marital unrest and divorce in America, shameful as it is, may +not be in many cases altogether an evil. The very demand to annul a +union in which reverence and affection have been forfeited may spring +from a growing desire to realise the true ideal of marriage.[11] (_d_) +Finally, it is a _spiritual_ union. It is something more than a legal +contract, or even an ecclesiastical ordinance. The State must indeed +safeguard the civil rights of the parties to the compact, and the +Church's ceremony ought to be sought as the expression of divine +blessing and approval. But of themselves these do not constitute the +inner tie which makes the twain one, and binds them together amid all +the chances and changes of this earthly life.[12] In the teaching of +both Christ and {225} the apostles marriage is presented as a high +vocation, ordained by God for the enrichment of character, and invested +with a holy symbolism. According to St. Paul it is the emblem of the +mystic union of Christ and His Church, and is overshadowed by the +presence of God, who is the archetype of those sacred ideas which we +associate with the name of fatherhood. + +(2) Though marriage is the most personal of all forms of social +intercourse, there are many varied and intricate interests involved +which require _legal recognition_ and adjustment. Questions as to the +legitimacy of offspring, the inheritance of property, the status and +rights of the contracting parties, come within the domain of law. The +State punishes bigamy, and forbids marriage within certain degrees of +consanguinity. Many contend that the State should go further, and +prevent all unions which endanger the physical vigour and efficiency of +the coming generation. It is undoubtedly true that the government has +a right to protect its people against actions which tend to the +deterioration of the race. To permit those to marry who are suffering +from certain maladies of mind or body is to commit a grave crime +against society. But care must be taken lest we unduly interfere with +the deeper spiritual sympathies and affections upon which a true union +is founded. In agitating for State control in the mating of the +physically fit, the champions of eugenics are apt to exaggerate the +materialistic side of marriage, and overlook those qualities of heart +and mind which are not less important for the well-being of the race. +In the discipline of humanity weakness and suffering are assets which +the world could ill afford to lose.[13] + +(3) In modern times the institution of marriage is menaced by two +opposite forces; on the one hand, by a revolutionary type of socialism, +and on the other, by the reactionary influence of self-interested +individualism. (_a_) It is contended by some advanced socialists that +among {226} the poor and the toiling home life is practically +non-existent; indeed, under present industrial conditions, impossible. +Marriage and separate family life are insuperable barriers, it is said, +to corporate unity and social progress. It is but fair to add that +this extreme view is now largely repudiated by the most enlightened +advocates of a new social order, who are contending, they tell us, not +for the abolition, but for the betterment, of domestic conditions.[14] +(_b_) The stability of social life is being threatened even more +seriously by a self-centred individualism. Marriage is considered as a +merely temporary arrangement which may be terminated at will. It is +contended that divorce should be granted on the easiest terms, and the +most trifling reasons are seriously put forward as legitimate grounds +for the annulling of the holiest of vows. Without discussing these +disintegrating influences, it is enough to say that the trend of +history is against any radical tampering with the institution of +marriage, and any attempt to disparage the sanctity of the home or +belittle domestic obligations would be to poison at its springs the +moral life of man. + +3. The duties of the various members of the family are explicitly, if +briefly, stated in the apostolic epistles. They are valid for all +times and conditions. Though they may be easily elaborated they cannot +well be improved. All home obligations are to be fulfilled _in_ and +_unto_ the Lord. The fear of God is to inspire the nurture of +children, and to sanctify the lowliest services of the household. +Authority is to be blended with affection. (1) _Parents_ are not to +provoke their children by harsh and despotic rule, nor yet to spoil +them by soft indulgence. _Children_ are to render obedience, and, when +able, to contribute to the support of their parents.[15] Masters are +to treat their servants with equity and respect. Servants are exhorted +to show fidelity. In short all the relationships of the household are +to be hallowed by the spirit of Christian love. + +Many questions relative to the family arise, over which {227} we may +not linger. One might speak of the effect of industrial conditions +upon domestic life, the employment of women and children in factories, +the evil of sweating, the problem of our city slums, and, generally, of +the need of improved environment in order that our labouring classes +may have a chance of a healthier and purer home existence. Legislation +can do much. But even law is ineffective to achieve the highest ends +if it is not backed by the public conscience. The final solution of +the problem of the family rests not in conditions but in character, not +in environment but in education, in the kind of men we are rearing. + +(2) This century has been called the _woman's_ century. And certainly +there is an obvious trend to-day towards acknowledgment, in all +departments of life, of women's equality with men. There is, however, +a difference of opinion as to what that equality should mean; and there +seems to be a danger in some quarters of overlooking the essential +difference of the sexes. No people can achieve what it ought while its +wives and mothers are degraded or denied their rights. For her own +sake, as well as for the weal of the race, whatever is needful to +enable woman to attain to her noblest womanhood must be unhesitatingly +granted.[16] + +(3) But this is even more the _children's_ era. A new sense of +reverence for the child is one of the most promising notes of our age, +and the problems arising out of the care and education of the young +have created the new sciences of pedagogy and child-psychology. Regard +for child-life owes its inspiration directly to the teaching of Christ. +The child in the simplicity of its nature and innocence of its +dependence is, according to the Master, the perfect pattern of those +who seek after God. It is true that in the art of antiquity child-life +was frequently represented. But as Burckhardt says it was the drollery +and playfulness, even the quarrelsomeness and stealth, and above all +the lusty health and animal vigour of young life that was depicted. +Ancient art did not behold in the child the prophecy of a new and purer +world. Moreover, it was aesthetic {228} feeling and not real sympathy +with childhood which animated this movement. As time went on the +teaching of Christ on this subject was strangely neglected, and the +history of the treatment of the young is a tragic tale of neglect and +suffering. Only now are we recovering the lost message of Jesus in +regard to the child, and we are beginning to realise that infancy and +youth have their rights, and demand of the world both care and +affection. Ours sons and daughters are the nation's assets. Yet it is +a parent's question even more than the State's. In a deeper sense than +we imagine children are the creation of their parents. It is the +effect of soul upon soul, the mother's touch and look, the father's +words and ways, that kindle into flame the dull material of humanity, +and begin that second birth which should be the anxiety and glory of +parenthood. But if the parent makes the child, scarcely less true is +it that the child makes the parent. In the give and take of home life +a new world is created. When a father really looks into his child's +eye he is not as he was before.[17] Indispensable as is the State's +education of the young, there is an important part which the community +cannot undertake, and there is a danger in curbing individuality by a +stereotyped method of instruction. 'All social enactments,' says +Harnack, 'have a tendency to circumscribe the activities of the +individual. If we unduly fetter the free play of individual effort we +break the mainspring of progress and enterprise, and create a state of +social immobility which is the antecedent of national decay.'[18] +Youth ought to be taught self-reliance and strenuousness of will; and +this is a work which can only be done in the home by the firm yet +kindly influence of the parents. But there is another aspect of the +home problem not less pressing. The want of training in working-class +families is largely answerable for the waifs and strays with which our +cities team. Even in middle-class households there are indications of +a lack not only of discipline, but of {229} that kindly sympathy and +affectionate counsel on the part of parents, and of reverence and +frankness in the children; with the result that the young people, +missing the attachment and interest which the home should supply, seek +their satisfaction outside the domestic circle, often with the most +disastrous results. The problem of the family is thus the problem of +nurturing the very seeds of the moral life. Within the precincts of +the nation's homes the future of the commonwealth is being determined. + + +II + +1. The _State_ is the supreme controller of social relationships. As +distinguished from the family and the Church, it is the realm of +organised force working for social ends. Its purpose is to secure the +conditions of life essential to order and progress, and it can fulfil +its function only as it is endowed with power to enforce its authority. +The interference of the State with the liberty of the individual has +created a reaction in two opposite quarters towards complete abrogation +of all State compulsion. On the one side Tolstoy pleads for the +removal of force, because it violates the principle of love and +subverts the teaching of Jesus--'Resist not evil.' Militant anarchism +as the other extreme demands the abrogation of authority, because it +believes that restraint hinders progress and happiness, and that if +governmental force were abolished individuals would be best able to +take care of themselves. The aim of anarchism is to destroy force by +force; the aim of Tolstoy is to allow force to do its worst. Such a +spirit of non-resistance would mean the overthrow of all security, and +the reversion to wild lawlessness. It is an utter travesty of Christ's +teaching. Extremes meet. Violence and servility join hands. +Anarchism and Tolstoyism reveal the total bankruptcy of unrestricted +individualism. + +The social order for which the State stands is not so much an +interference with the freedom of the subject as the condition under +which alone individual liberty can be preserved. {230} The view, +however, that the State is an artificial relationship into which men +voluntarily enter in order to limit their selfish instincts and to +secure their mutual advantages--the theory of the 'social +contract'--has been discarded in modern times as a fiction of the +imagination. It is not of his own choice that the individual becomes a +member of society. He is born into it. Man is not a whole in himself. +He is only complete in his fellows. As he serves others he serves +himself. But men are not the unconscious functions of a mechanical +system. They are free, living personalities, united by a sense of +human obligation and kindredship. The State is more than a physical +organism. It is a community of moral aims and ideals. Even law, which +is the soul of the State, is itself the embodiment of a moral +principle; and the commonwealth stands for a great ethical idea, to the +fulfilment of which all its citizens are called upon to contribute. + +2. The reciprocal duties of the State and its citizens receive +comparatively little prominence in the New Testament. But they are +never treated with disparagement or contempt. During our Lord's +earthly life the supreme power belonged to the Roman Empire. Though +Jesus had to suffer much at the hands of those in authority, His +habitual attitude was one of respect. He lived in obedience to the +government of the country, and acknowledged the right of Caesar to +legislate and levy taxes in his own province. While giving all +deference to the State officials before whom He was brought, He did not +hesitate to remind them of the ideal of truth and justice of which they +were the chosen representatives.[19] St. Paul's teaching is in harmony +with his Master's, and is indeed an expansion of it.[20] 'The powers +that be are ordained of God. Render therefore to all their dues, +tribute to whom tribute.' Beyond, however, enjoining the necessity of +work as a means of independence, and recommending that each should +remain in the sphere in which he has been placed, and perform +conscientiously the duties of his calling, we {231} find little direct +reference in the Epistles to the matter of citizenship. But as has +been truly said 'the citizen has but to stand in his station, and +perform its duties, in order to fulfil the demands of citizenship.'[21] +St. Paul's insistence therefore upon the personal fidelity of every man +to the duties of his sphere goes far to recognise that spirit of +reciprocal service which is the fundamental idea of the commonwealth. + +3. Of the two extreme views as to the meaning of the State between +which the verdict of history has wavered--that of Augustine, who +regarded the State as the result of man's sinful condition and as the +direct antithesis of the kingdom of God; and that of Hegel, who saw in +it the highest ethical form of society, the realisation of the moral +ideal--the view of St. Paul may be said to have approximated more +nearly to the latter. Writing to the Christians at Rome Paul does not +suggest that it was merely for prudence' sake that they should give to +the Imperial Power unquestioning obedience. He appeals to the loftiest +motives. All authority is of God in its origin and ultimate purpose. +What does it matter to him whether Nero be a devil or a saint? He is +the prince upon the throne. He is the symbol of divine authority, 'the +minister of God to thee for good.' As a Christian Paul looks beyond +the temporal world-power as actually existing. Whatever particular +form it may assume, he sees in the State and its rulers only the +expression of God's will. Rome is His agent, oppressive, and, it may +be, unjust, but still the channel through which for the moment the +Almighty works for the furtherance of His purposes.[22] + +The conception of the State as thus formulated involves a twofold +obligation--of the State towards its citizens, and of its citizens +towards the State. + +(1) As the embodiment of public right the State owes protection to its +subjects, guarding individual privileges and prohibiting such actions +as interfere with the general {232} good. Its functions, however, are +not confined to restrictive measures. Its duty is not only to protect +the rights of the individual, but to create and maintain such +conditions of life as are essential to the development of personality. +In its own interests it is bound to foster the growth of character, and +to promote culture and social well-being. In modern times we look to +the State not only to protect life and property, but to secure for each +individual and for all classes of men that basis of material well-being +on which alone life in its truest sense can be built up. The +government must therefore strike some kind of balance between the +extremes of individualism and socialism. While the old theory of +_laissez-faire_, which would permit every man to follow his own +individual bent without regard to the interests of others, has been +generally repudiated, there is still a class of politicians who +ridicule the 'night watchman' idea of the State as Lassalle calls it. +'Let there be as little State as possible,' exclaims Nietzsche. +According to such thinkers the State has only negative functions. The +best government is that which governs least, and allows the utmost +scope to untrammelled individual enterprise. But if there is a +tendency on the part of some to return to the individualistic +principle, the 'paternal' idea as espoused by others is being carried +to the verge of socialism. The function of the State is stretched +almost to breaking point when it is conceived as the 'guardian angel' +who accompanies and guards with perpetual oversight the whole life of +the individual from the cradle to the grave. Many of the more cautious +writers[23] of the day are exposing the dangers which lurk in the +bureaucratic system of government. This tendency is apt to crush +individual enterprise, and cause men to place entire reliance upon +external aid and centralised power. It is indeed difficult to draw a +fast line of demarcation between purely individual and social ends. +There are obviously primary interests belonging to society as a whole +which the State, if it is to be the instrument of the common good, +ought to control; certain {233} activities which, if permitted as +monopolies, become a menace to the community, and which can be +satisfactorily conducted only as departments of the State. National +life is a unity, and it can only maintain its integrity as it secures +for all its constituents, justice, equity before the law, and freedom +of each to be himself. The State ought to protect those who in the +competitive struggle of the modern industrial system find themselves at +a hopeless disadvantage. It is the duty of the commonwealth to secure +for each the opportunity to become what he is capable of being, and to +fulfil the functions for which he is best fitted. The State cannot +make men moral, but it can interfere with existing conditions so as to +make the moral life easier for its citizens. Criminal law cannot +create saints, but it can punish evil-doers and counteract the forces +of lawlessness which threaten the social order. It cannot legislate +within the domain of motive, but it can encourage self-restraint and +thrift, honesty and temperance. It cannot actually intermeddle with +the sanctity of the home, or assume the role of paternal authority, but +it can insist upon the fulfilment of the conditions of decency and +propriety; it can condemn insanitary dwellings, suppress traffic in +vice, supervise unhealthy trades, protect the life and health of +workmen, and, generally, devise means for the culture and the +advancement, intellectually and morally, of the people. The State in +some degree embodies the public conscience, and as such it has the +prerogative of awakening and stimulating the consciences of +individuals. As a divine institution it is one of the channels through +which God makes His will known to man. Law has an ethical import, and +the State which is founded upon just and beneficent laws moulds the +customs and forms the characters of its citizens. + +(2) But if the State is to fulfil its ideal function it must rely upon +the general co-operation of its citizens. The measure of its success +or failure will depend upon the extent to which an enlightened sense of +moral obligation prevails in the community. Men must rise above their +{234} own immediate interests and realise their corporate being. +Government makes its will dominant through the voice of the people. It +cannot legislate beyond the sympathies of its constituents. As the +individuals are, so the commonwealth will be. Civil duties vary +according to the qualifications and opportunities of individuals. But +certain general obligations rest upon all. + +(_a_) It is the duty of all to take an _interest in public affairs_. +What concerns us collectively is the concern of each. Everything that +touches the public good should be made a matter of intelligent and +watchful interest by all. (_b_) It is the duty of all to _conform to +the laws_ of the country. It is possible that a particular enactment +may conflict with the dictates of conscience, and it may be necessary +to protest against what seems to be an injustice. No rule can be laid +down for exceptional cases. Generally it will be best to submit to the +wrong, while at the same time using all legitimate means to secure the +repeal of the obnoxious law. And if they will revolt, martyrs must not +complain nor be unready to submit to the penalties involved. (_c_) It +is the further duty of all to take some _personal part_ in the +government--if not by active service, at least by the conscientious +recording of one's vote. Christians must not leave the direction of +the nation's affairs to non-Christians. The spirit of Christ forbids +moral indifference to anything human. All are not fitted for, or +called upon to take, public office; but it is incumbent upon every man +to maintain an intelligent public spirit, and to exercise all the +duties of good citizenship. It has been truly said that they who give +most to the State get most from the State. It is the men who play +their part as active citizens working for the nation's cause who enrich +their own lives and reap the harvest of a full existence. Not by +withdrawal from social service, but in untiring labour for their +country's weal, shall men win for themselves and their brethren the +fruits of liberty and peace. For nations as for men emancipation may +come with a stroke, but freedom can be earned only by strenuous and +united toil. + +{235} + +(3) Already these ideals have begun to take shape. The most +significant feature of modern times is the growing spirit of democracy. +Men of all classes are awakening to their rights, and are accepting +their share in the task of social reconstruction. 'We know how the +masses,' says Eucken, 'are determined to form a mere dependent body of +the so-called higher classes no longer, but to take the problem of life +independently into their own hands.'[24] But while the modern +democratic movement is not without its hopeful aspects, it is fraught +also with grave perils. It is well that the people should awake to +their obligations, and realise the meaning of life, especially in its +social implications. But there is a danger that culture may not +advance with emancipation, and while the masses demand their rights +they may not at the same time discern their duties. For rights involve +duties, and emancipation, as we have seen, is not liberty. The appeal +of the socialistic party is to the equality of all who bear human +features. It sounds plausible. But there never has been, nor never +can be, such equality. Nature and experience alike reveal a pronounced +and insuperable inequality among men. The law of diversity strikes +deep down into the very origin and constitution of mankind. The +equality proclaimed by the French Revolutionists is now regarded as an +idle dream. Not equality of nature but equity before the law, justice +for all, the opportunity for every man to realise himself and make the +most of the life and the gifts which God has given him--that is the +only claim which can be truly made. 'The only idea,' says Eucken, +'which can give to equality any meaning is the conviction that humanity +has spiritual relations, that each individual has a value for himself +and for the whole because he is a part of a larger spiritual world.' +Hence if democracy is truly to come to its own and fulfil its high +vocation, the Pauline figure of the reciprocal influence of the body +and its members must be proclaimed anew as the ideal of the body +politic--a unity fulfilling itself in difference--an organic life in +which the unit finds its {236} place of security-and-service in the +whole, and the whole lives in and acts through the individual parts. + +If we are to awaken to the high vocation of the Christian state, to +realise the possibilities of our membership one with another, a new +feeling of manhood and of national brotherhood, a new pride in the +community of life, must take possession of our hearts. We need, as one +has said, a baptism of religious feeling in our corporate +consciousness, a new sense that we are serving God in serving our +fellows, which will hallow and hearten the crusade for health and +social happiness, and give to every citizen a sense of spiritual +service. + + +III + +Unlike the family and State the _Church_ is the creation of Jesus +Christ. It is the witness of His Presence in the world. In its ideal +form it is world-wide. The Redemption for which it stands is a good +for all men. Though in practice many do not acknowledge its blessing, +the Church regards no man beyond its pale of grace. It is set in the +midst of the world as the symbol and pledge of God's universal love. + +1. The _Relation of Church and State_ is a difficult question with a +long history, and involving much controversy. Whatever view may be +held as to their legal connection, their interests can never be +regarded as inimical. The Church cannot be indifferent to the action +of the State, nor can the State ignore the work of the Church. But +since their spheres are not identical nor their aims entirely similar, +the trend of modern opinion seems to indicate that, while working in +harmony, it is more satisfactory that they should pursue independent +paths. There are spiritual ends committed to the Church by its Head +over which the civil power has no jurisdiction. On the other hand +there are temporal concerns with which ecclesiastical courts have +neither the vocation nor the qualifications to deal. Still, the +Church, as the organ of Christian thought {237} and activity, has +responsibilities with regard to civil matters. While religion is the +chief agent in the regeneration of man, religion itself is dependent +upon all social means, and the Church must regard with sympathy every +effort made by the community for moral improvement. The main function +of the Church in this connection is to keep before its members a high +ideal of social life, to create a spirit of fidelity in every sphere of +activity, and, particularly, to educate men for the tasks of +citizenship. The State, on the other hand, as the instrument of civic +life, has obligations towards the Church. Its duty is hardly exhausted +by observing an attitude of non-interference. In its own interests it +is bound, not merely to protect, but encourage the Church in the +fulfilment of its immediate aims. Parliament, however, must concede to +ecclesiastical bodies complete liberty to govern themselves. The +Church, as the institution of Christ, claims full autonomy; and the +State goes beyond its province when it imposes hampering restrictions +which interfere with the exercise of its authority and discipline +within its own sphere. + +2. As a religious institution the Church exists for three main +purposes: (1) the _Worship_ of God and the Edification of its members; +(2) the _Witness_ of Christ to Mankind; (3) the _Evangelisation_ of the +World. + +(1) The first of these objects has already been dealt with when +treating of the duties to God. It is only needful to add here that the +Church is more than a centre of worship; it is the home of kindred +souls knit together by a common devotion to Christ. It is the school +of character which seeks the mutual edification of its members 'by +provoking one another to love and to good works.' Hence among +Protestants the duty of _Church Discipline_ is acknowledged, which +deals with such sins or lapses from rectitude as constitute 'offences' +or 'scandals,' and tend to bring into disrepute the Christian name and +profession. In the Roman Church, the Confessional, through which moral +error is avowed, with its system of penances, has in view the same +object--viz., to reprove, correct, and reclaim {238} those who have +lapsed into sin--thus seeking to fulfil Christ's ideal 'to despair of +no man.' + +(2) But the Church is also a rallying place of service. Both in its +corporate capacity, and through the lives of its individual members, +the Church seeks to bear constant _witness to the mind of Christ_. It +proclaims His living example. It reiterates His will and embodies His +judgment, approving of what is good, condemning what is evil, and ever +more confronting the world with the high ideal of the divine Life and +Word. Not all who bear the name of Christ are consistent witnesses. +But still the aim of the Church is to harmonise the profession and +practice of its members, and generally to spiritualise secular life by +the education of public opinion. Before, however, Christians can hope +to make a profound impression upon the outside world, it is not +unnatural to expect that they should exhibit a _spirit of concord_, +among themselves, seeking to heal the unhappy schisms by which the +Church is rent. But while our separations are deplorable--and we ought +not to cease our endeavour for the reunion of Christendom--we must not +forget that there may be harmony of spirit even amid diversity of +operation, and that where there is true brotherly sympathy between +Christians, there already is essential unity.[25] + +(3) The special work of the Church to which it is constrained by the +express terms of its Master's commission, is to _preach the Gospel_ to +every creature and to bring all men into obedience to Christ. A +distinction is commonly made between Home and Foreign Missions. While +the distinction is useful, it is scarcely valid. The work of the +Church at home and abroad is one. The claims of the ignorant and +hapless of our own land do not exempt us from responsibilities to the +heathen world. The Lord's Prayer for the coming of the Kingdom +requires of Christian men that they shall consecrate their gifts along +every line of effort to the fulfilment of the divine will upon the +earth. + +3. While all sections of the Church are convinced that {239} an honest +application of the principles of Jesus to the practical affairs of life +would speedily transform society, there is considerable diversity of +opinion as to the proper attitude of Christianity to _social problems_. +The outward reconstruction of social order was not, it must be +admitted, the primary aim of Jesus: it was rather the spiritual +regeneration of the individual. But such could only become a reality +as it transformed the entire fabric of life. (1) Christ's teaching +could not but affect the organisation of industry as well as every +other section of the social structure. Though Jesus has many warnings +as to the perils of riches, there is no depreciation of wealth (in its +truest sense). It is true He refuses to interfere in a dispute between +two brothers as to worldly property, and repudiates generally the +office of arbiter. It is true also that He warns His disciples against +covetousness, and lays down the principle that 'a man's life consisteth +not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth.' But these +sayings, so far from implying disapproval of earthly possessions, imply +rather that property and trading are the indispensable basis upon which +the outward fabric of the social order is built. Christ does not +counsel withdrawal from the activities of the world. He honours work. +He recognises the legitimacy of trading. Many of His parables would +have no meaning if His attitude to the industrial system of His day had +been one of uncompromising hostility. He has no grudge against riches +in themselves. In the parable of the talents it is the comparatively +poor man who is censured while the rich is commended. To sum up what +Jesus thought about wealth is not easy. Many have thought that He +condemned the holding of property altogether. But such a conclusion +cannot be drawn from His teaching. Possessions, both outward and +inward, are rather to be brought to the test of His judgment. His +influence would rather bring property and commerce under the control of +righteousness and brotherhood. His ideal of life is to be attained +through learning the right use of wealth rather than through the +abolition of it. Wealth {240} can be used for the kingdom of God, and +it is a necessary instrument in the Church's work. It may be +consecrated like every other gift to the service of Christ. But there +are mighty forces enlisted against its best usefulness, and only +through the fullness of Christian grace can its good work be done. +What Jesus does condemn however is the predatory instinct, that greed +of gain which embodies itself everywhere in the spirit of plunder, +exploitation, and the impulse to gambling. He can have nothing but +condemnation for that great wave of money-love which has swept over +Christendom in our time, affecting all classes. It has fostered +self-indulgence, stimulated depraved appetites, corrupted business and +politics, oppressed the poor, materialised our ideals, and weakened +religious influences. 'From this craze of the love of money the voice +of Jesus calls the people back to the sane life in Ethics and religion +in which He is leader.'[26] What then ought to be the attitude of the +Church to the industrial questions of our day? While some contend that +the social question is really a religious question, and that the Church +is untrue to its mission when it holds itself aloof from the economical +problems which are agitating men's minds, others view with suspicion, +if not with hostility, the deflection of religion from its traditional +path of worship, and deem it a mistake for the Church to interfere in +industrial movements. + +A recent writer[27] narrates that in his boyhood he actually heard an +old minister of the Church of Scotland declare in the General Assembly, +'We are not here to make the world better: we have only to pass through +it on the way to glory.' 'No grosser travesty,' adds the author, 'was +ever uttered. We _are_ here to make the world better. We have a +commission to stamp out evil and to prevent men from falling into it. +If this is not Christian work, what is?' + +At the same time a portion of the clergy have gone to the opposite +extreme, identifying the kingdom of God with social propaganda, and +thus losing sight of its spiritual {241} and eternal, as well as its +personal, significance. There has been moreover a tendency on the part +of some to associate themselves with a political party, and to claim +for the Church the office of judge and arbitrator in industrial strife. +But surely it is one thing to degrade the Church to the level of a +secular society, and another, by witness and by effort, to make the law +of Christ dominant over all the relationships of life. Men are +impatiently asking, 'Has the Church no message to the new demands of +the age? Are Christians to stand apart from the coming battle, and +preach only the great salvation to individual souls? _That_ the +Christian minister must never cease to do; but the Gospel, if it is to +meet the needs of men, must be read in the light of history and +experience, and interpreted by the signs of the times. + +(2) The ground idea of Jesus' teaching was, as Troeltsch has pointed +out,[28] the declaration of the kingdom of God. Everything indeed is +relative to union with God, but in God man's earthly life is involved. +Two notes were therefore struck by Jesus, a note of individualism and a +note of universalism--love to God and love to man. These notes do not +really conflict, but they became the two opposite voices of the Church, +and gave rise to different ethical tendencies. The first religious +communities consisted of the poor and the enslaved. It never occurred +to them that they had civic rights: all they desired was freedom to +worship Christ. Not how to transform the social world, but how to +maintain their own religious faith without molestation in the world of +unbelief and evil was their problem. + +(3) In the early Catholic Church the spirit of individualism ruled. +With the Reformation a new type of life was developed, and a new +attitude to the social world was established. But while Lutheranism +sought to exercise its influence upon social life through state +regulation, Calvinism was more individualistic, and sought rather to +{242} enforce its teaching by means of the personal life. The attitude +of the various sects--Baptists, Pietists, Puritans--has been largely +individualistic, and instead of endeavouring to rectify the abuses of +industrial life they have been disposed rather to suffer the ills of +this evil world, finding in faith alone their compensation and solace. + +In modern times the tendency of the Church, Romanist and Protestant +alike, has been toward social regeneration; and a form of Christian +Socialism has even appeared which however lacks unity of principle and +uniformity of action. The mediaeval idea of a Holy Roman Empire, in +which all nations and classes were to be consolidated, is now admitted +to be a dream incapable of realisation, partly because the idea itself +is illusory, but principally because the hold of the Papacy upon the +people has been weakened. The agitation, 'Los von Rom' on the one +hand, and the 'Modernist' movement on the other, have tended to +dissipate the unity and energy of Catholicism. Nevertheless the +Church, which is really the society of Christian people, is coming to +see that it cannot close its eyes to questions which concern the daily +life of man, nor hold aloof from efforts which are working for the +social betterment of the world. To bring in the kingdom of God is the +Church's work, and it is becoming increasingly evident that the +kingdom, if it is to come in any real and living sense, must come where +Jesus Himself founded it--upon the plane of this present life. + +There are two considerations which make this work on the part of the +Church at once imperative and hopeful. The first is that the Church is +specially called upon by the command and example of its Founder to +range itself on the side of the weak and helpless. It is commanded to +bring the principles of brotherly love to bear upon the conditions of +life which press most heavily upon the handicapped. It is called on in +the spirit of its Master to rebuke the greed of gain and the callous +selfishness which uses the toil, and even the degradation of others, +for its own personal enjoyment. The Church only fulfils its function +when {243} it is not only the consoler of the suffering but also the +champion of the oppressed. And the other consideration is that in +virtue of its nature and charter the Church is enabled to appeal to +motives which the State cannot supply. It brings all social obligation +under the comprehensive law of love. It exalts the principle of +brotherhood. It lifts up the sacrifice of Christ, and seeks to make it +potent over the hearts of men. It preaches the doctrine of humanity, +and strives to win a response in all who are willing to acknowledge +their common kinship and equality before God. It appeals to masters +and servants, to employers and labourers, to rich and poor, and bids +them remember that they are sharers alike of the Divine Mercy, +pensioners together upon their Heavenly Father's love. + +4. Whatever shape the obligation of the Church may take in regard to +the social problems of the homeland, the duty of Christianity to the +larger world of Humanity admits of no question. The ethical +significance of the missionary movement of last century has been +pronounced by Wundt,[29] the distinguished historian of morals, as the +mightiest factor in modern civilisation. Speaking of humanity in its +highest sense as having been brought into the world by Christianity, he +mentions as its first manifestation the care of the sick, and then +adds, 'the second great expression of Christian humanity is the +establishment of missions.' It is unnecessary to dwell upon this +modern form of unselfish enthusiasm. It has its roots in the simple +necessity, on the part of the morally awakened, of sharing their best +with other people. 'Man grows with the greatness of his purposes,' and +no greater ideal task has ever presented itself to the imagination of +man than this mighty attempt to conquer the world for Christ, and give +to his brother men throughout the earth that which has raised and +enriched himself.[30] + +'The two great forming agencies in the world's history,' says a +prominent political economist, 'have been the {244} religious and the +economic.'[31] On the one hand the economic is required as the basis +of civilisation, but on the other the supreme factor is religion. The +commercial impulse, carried on independently of any higher motive than +self-interest, has however not infrequently reacted favourably on the +moral life of the race. Mutual understanding, the sense of a common +humanity, the virtues of honesty, fairness, and confidence upon which +all legitimate commerce is founded, have paved the way in no small +degree for the message of brotherhood and mercy. The present hour is +the Church's opportunity. Already the world has been opened up, the +nations of the earth are awakening to the greatness of life's +possibilities. The danger is that the Oriental peoples should become +satisfied with the mere externals of civilisation, and miss that which +will assure their complete emancipation. Christianity was born in the +East, though it has become the inheritance of the West. It is adapted +by its genius to all men. And undoubtedly the West has no better boon +to confer on the East than that on which its own life and hope are +founded--the religion of Jesus Christ. If we do not give that, we are +unfaithful to our Master's call; we falsify our own history, and wholly +miss the purpose for which we have been entrusted with divine +enlightenment and power. + + + +[1] Lofthouse, _Ethics of the Family_, p. 77. + +[2] _Hist. of Human Marriage_, p. 538. + +[3] The literature on this subject is enormous. See specially works of +Westermarck, M'Lennan, Frazer, Hobhouse, Andrew Lang, and Ihering. + +[4] See chap. vii. in Garvie's _Studies in Inner Life of Jesus_. + +[5] Matt. viii. 21, 22; Luke ix. 59-62. + +[6] Luke xiv. 26; Matt. x. 37. + +[7] Mark x. 29, 30. + +[8] Matt. xix. 12. + +[9] Matt. v. 32, xix. 3-10; Mark x. 11, 12. + +[10] See Forsyth, _Marriage: its Ethics and Religion_. + +[11] King, _Ethics of Jesus_, p. 69. + +[12] Stalker, _Ethics of Jesus_, p. 336. + +[13] Though Nietzsche does not use the word he may be regarded as the +father of modern eugenics. + +[14] Cf. Ramsay Macdonald, _Socialism_. + +[15] Mark vii. 9-13. + +[16] Cf. King, _The Moral and Religious Challenge of our Times_, pp. 42 +f. + +[17] Cf. W. Wallace, _Lects. and Addresses_, p. 114. + +[18] _Aus Leben und Wissenschaft_. + +[19] Matt. xii. 18-22; John xviii. 23, xix. 10 f. + +[20] Rom. xiii. + +[21] Sir H. Jones, _Idealism as a Practical Creed_, p. 123. + +[22] Some sentences are here borrowed from author's _Ethics of St. +Paul_. + +[23] _E.g._ Eucken, Kindermann, Mallock, and earlier H. Spencer. + +[24] _Life's Ideal and Life's Basis_. + +[25] Eph. iv. 3. + +[26] Clarke, _Ideal of Jesus_, p. 258. + +[27] Watson, _Social Advance_. + +[28] _Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen_, a recent +work on social ethics of great erudition and importance. + +[29] _Ethik_, vol. ii. + +[30] King, _The Moral and Religious Challenge of our Times_, pp. 44 and +346. + +[31] Marshall, _Principles of Economics_. + + + + +{245} + +CHAPTER XIV + +CONCLUSION--THE PERMANENCE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +In bringing to a close our study of Christian Ethics, we repeat that +the three dominant notes of the Christian Ideal are--Absoluteness, +Inwardness, and Universality. The Gospel claims to be supreme in life +and morals. The uniqueness and originality of the Ethics of +Christianity are to be sought, however, not so much in the range of its +practical application as in the unfolding of an ideal which is at once +the power and pattern of the new life. That ideal is Christ in whom +the perfect life is disclosed, and through whom the power for its +realisation is communicated. Life is a force, and character a growth +arising in and expanding from a hidden seed. Hence in Christian Ethics +apathy and passivity, and even asceticism and quietism, which occupy an +important place in the moral systems of Buddha and Neo-Platonism, in +mediaeval Catholicism and the teaching of Tolstoy, play only a +subsidiary part, and are but preparatory stages towards the realisation +of a fuller life. On the contrary all is life, energy, and unceasing +endeavour. 'I am come that ye may have life, and that ye may have it +more abundantly.' + +There is no finality in Christian Ethics. It is not a mechanical and +completed code. The Ethic of the New Testament, just because it has +its spring in the living Christ, is an inexhaustible fountain of life. +'True Christianity,' says Edward Caird, 'is not something which was +published in Palestine, and which has been handed down by a dead +tradition ever since; it is a living and growing {246} spirit, and +learns the lessons of history, and is ever manifesting new powers and +leading on to new truths.' + +The teaching of Jesus is not merely temporary or local. It is an utter +perversion of the Gospels to make the eschatology present in them the +master-key to their meaning, or to derive the ethical ideal from the +utterances which anticipate an abrupt and immediate end. Jesus spoke +indeed the language of His time and race, and often clothed His +spiritual purpose in the form of national expectation. But to base His +moral maxims on an 'Interim-Ethic' adapted to a transitory world is to +'distort the perspective of His teaching, and to rob it of its unity +and insight.' On the contrary, the Ethics of Jesus are everywhere +characterised by adaptability, universality, and permanence, and in His +attitude to the great problems of life there is a serenity and sympathy +which has nothing in common with the nervous and excited expectation of +sudden catastrophe. + +In like manner it is a misinterpretation of the teaching of Jesus to +represent asceticism as the last word of Christian Ethics. +Renunciation and unworldliness are undoubtedly frequently commended in +the New Testament, but they are urged not as ends in themselves but as +means to a fuller self-realisation. Such was not the habitual temper +and tone of Jesus in His relations to the world, nor was the ultimate +purpose of His mission to create a type of manhood whose perfection lay +in withdrawal from the interests and obligations of life. 'To single +out a teaching of non-resistance as the core of the Gospels, to retreat +from social obligations in the name of one who gladly shared them and +was called a friend of wine-bibbers and publicans--all this, however +heroic it may be, is not only an impracticable discipleship but a +historical perversion. It mistakes the occasionalism of the Gospels +for universalism.'[1] + +Finally, there are many details of modern social well-being with which +the New Testament does not deal, questions of present-day ethics and +economics which cannot be decided by a direct reference to chapter and +{247} verse, either of the Gospels or Epistles. The problems of life +shift with the shifting years, but the nature of life remains +unchanged, and responds to the life and the spirit of Him who was, and +remains down the ages, the Light of men. The individual virtues of +humility, purity of heart, and self-sacrifice are not evanescent, but +are now and always the pillars of Christian Ethics; while the great +principles of human solidarity, of brotherhood and equality in Christ, +of freedom, of love, and service; the New Testament teachings +concerning the family, the State, and the kingdom of God; our Lord's +precepts with regard to the sacredness of the body and the soul, the +duty of work, the stewardship of wealth, and the accountability to God +for life with its variety of gifts and tasks--contain the germ and +potency of all personal and social transformation and renewal. + + + +[1] Prof. Peabody, _Harvard Theological Review_, May 1913. + + + + +{248} + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + +A.--GENERAL WORKS ON ETHICS + +I. ENGLISH WORKS + +1. _Early Idealism and Intuitionalism_. + +Hobbes, 1650; Mandeville, 1714; Cudworth, 1688; Cumberland, 1672; Sam. +Clarke, 1704; Shaftesbury, 1713; Butler, 1729; Hutchison, 1756; Adam +Smith, 1759; R. Price, 1757; Thom. Reid, 1793; Dugald Stewart, 1793; W. +Whewell, 1848; H. Calderwood, _Handbook of Mor. Phil._, 1872; +Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, 1886; Laurie, _Ethics_, 1885; N. +Porter, _Elements of Moral Science_, 1885. + + +2. _Utilitarianism_. + +Locke, _Concerning Human Understanding_, 1690; Hartley, _Observations +on Man_, 1748; Hume, _Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals_, 1751; +_Essays_, 1742; Paley, _Principles of Mor. and Political Phil._, 1785; +Bentham, _Introd. to Principles of Morals and Legislation_, 1789; Jas. +Mill, _Analysis of the Human Mind_, 1829; J. S. Mill, _Utilitarianism_, +1863; A. Bain, _Mental and Moral Science_, 1868; _Mind and Body_, 1876; +H. Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_ (6th ed.), 1901; Shadworth Hodgson, +_Theory of Practice_, 1870; T. Fowler, _Progressive Morality_, 1884; +Grote, _Examination of Utilitarian Ethics_, 1870. + + +3. _Evolutionary Ethics_. + +Chas. Darwin, _Descent of Man_, 1871; Herbert Spencer, _Principles of +Ethics_ and _Data of Ethics_, 1879; W. K. Clifford, _Lectures and +Essays_, 1879; Leslie Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, 1882; S. Alexander, +_Moral Order and Progress_, 1889; Shurman, _Ethical Import of +Darwinism_; Huxley, _Evolution and Ethics_; Hobhouse, _Morals in +Evolution_ (2 vols.), 1906; Westermarck, _Origin and Development of the +Moral Ideas_, 1909. + + +4. _Modern Idealism_. + +T. H. Green, _Proleg. to Ethics_, 1883; F. H. Bradley, _Ethical +Studies_, 1876; _Appearance and Reality_, 1893; E. Caird, _Crit. Phil. +of Kant_, 1890; _Evolution of Religion_, 1903; W. R. Sorley, _Ethics of +Naturalism_, 1885; _Recent Tendencies in Ethics_, 1904; _The Moral +Life_, 1912; W. L. Courtney, _Constructive Ethics_, 1886; J. S. +Mackenzie, _Introd. to Social Philos._, 1890; _Manual of Ethics_ (4th +ed.), 1900; W. Wallace, _Lectures and Essays_, 1898; Muirhead, +_Elements of Ethics_, 1892; Rashdall, _Theory of Good and Evil_; Boyce +Gibson, _A Philos. Introd. to Ethics_, 1904; Ward, _Kingdom of Ends_ +(Gifford Lect.), 1910; Bosanquet, _Principles of Individuality and +Value_, 1912; _Value and Destiny of the Individual_ (Gifford Lects.), +1913; _Psychology of the Moral Self_; D'Arcy, _Short Study of Ethics_; +W. Arthur, _Physical and Moral Law_; Jas. Seth, _Study of Ethical +Principles_ (11th ed.), 1910; Ryland, _Manual of Ethics_; G. E. Moore, +_Principia Ethica_, 1903; _Ethics_ (Home Univ. Lib.), 1912; MacCunn, +_Making of Character_, 1905; _Ethics of Citizenship_, 1907; _Six +Radical Thinkers_, 1907; Bowne, _Principles of Ethics; Immanence of +God_, 1906; Dewey, _Outlines of a Crit. Theory of Ethics_, 1891; +Harris, _Moral Evolution_; Hyslop, _Elements of Ethics_, 1895; Mezes, +_Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory_, 1901; Royce, _Religious Aspects +of Philosophy; Philosophy of Loyalty_, 1908; Taylor, _Problem of +Conduct_; Rand, _The Classical Moralists_ (Selections), 1910. + + +II. FOREIGN WORKS + +Kant's works, specially _Metaphysics of Ethics_, trans. by T. K. +Abbott, under title, _Kant's Theory of Ethics_ (3rd ed.), 1883; Fichte, +_Science of Ethics_ (trans.), 1907; _Science of Rights_ (trans.); +_Popular Works_ (2 vols.); _Vocation of Man_, etc.; Hegel, _Philosophy +of Right_, trans. by S. W. Dyde, 1896; Lotze, _Practical Philosophy, +_1890; Paulsen, _System of Ethics_, trans. by Tufts; Wundt, _Ethics, An +Investigation of the Facts and Laws of the Moral Life_ (3 vols.), +trans. from 2nd German ed., 1892; Dubois, _The Culture of Justice_; +Guyot, _La Morale_; Janet, _Theory of Morals_ (trans.); Nietzsche's +_Works_, translated by Oscar Levy (18 vols.); Eucken, _The Problem of +Human Life_, 1912; _Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_, 1912; _Meaning and +Value of Life_, 1912; _Main Current of Modern Thought_, 1912; _The Life +of the Spirit_, 1909; Hensel, _Hauptproblem der Ethik_, 1903; Lipps, +_Die Ethischen Grundfragen_, 1899; Natorp, _Social-paedagogik_; +Schuppe, _Grundzuege der Ethik_; Wentscher, _Ethik_; Schwarz, _Das +Sittliche Leben_; L. Levy-Bruhl, _Ethics and Moral Science_, trans. by +Eliz. Lee, 1905; Windelband, _Praeludien. ueber Willensfreiheit_; Bauch, +_Glueckseligkeit und Persoenlichkeit in der krit. Ethik_; {250} +_Sittlichkeit und Kuttur_; Cohen, _Ethik des Reinen Willens_, 1904; +Dilthey, _Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften_; Ihering, _Der Zweck +im Recht_ (2 Bde.), 1886; Cathrein, _Moral. Philosophie_ (2 Bde.), +1904; Tonnies, _Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft_, 1887. + + +B.--CHRISTIAN ETHICS + +I. GENERAL + +Harless, _Christl. Ethik_, 1842 (trans.), 1868; Schleiermacher, _Die +Christl. Sitte_, 1843; Marheineke, _System d. Christl. Moral_, 1847; +Bothe, _Theol. Ethik_, 1845; De Wette, _Lehrbuch d. Christl. +Sittenlehre_, 1853; Ch. F. Schmid, _Christl. Sittenlehre_, 1861; A. +Wuttke, _Handbuch d. Christl. Sittenlehre_, 1861 (trans., 2 vols., J. +P. Lacroix, 1873); F. P. Cobbe, _Religious Duty_, 1864; _Studies +Ethical and Social_, 1865; Seeley, _Ecce Homo_, 1886; Maurice, _Social +Morality_, 1872; _Conscience_, 1872; Wade, _Christianity and Morality_, +1876; Hofmann, _Theol. Ethik_, 1878; Lange, _Grundriss d. Christl. +Ethik_, 1878; Martensen, _Christl. Ethik_ (trans., 3 vols.), 1878; +Gregory Smith, _Characteristics of Christian Morality_, 1876; O. +Pfleiderer, _Grundriss d. Glaubens und Sittenlehre_, 1880; Luthardt, +_Vortraege ueber die Moral d. Christenthums_, 1882; S. Leathes, +_Foundations of Morality_, 1882; Frank, _System d. Christl. +Sittenlehre_, 1885; Westcott, _Social Aspects of Christianity_, 1887; +W. T. Davidson, _The Christian Conscience_, 1888; Balfour, _The +Religion of Humanity_, 1888; Maccoll, _Christianity in Relation to +Science and Morals_, 1889; Stanton, _Province of Christian Ethics_, +1890; Hughes, _Principles of Natural and Supernatural Morals_, 1890; W. +G. Lilly, _Right and Wrong_, 1890; Bright, _Morality in Doctrine_, +1892; Schultz, _Grundriss d. Evangelischen Ethik_, 1891; Newman Smyth, +_Christian Ethics_, 1892; Dowden, _Relation of Christian Ethics to +Philos. Ethics_, 1892; Jas. Drummond, _Via, Veritas, Vita_ (Hib. +Lect.), 1894; Jacoby, _Neukstamentliche Ethik_, 1889; Salwitz, _Das +Problem d. Ethik_, 1891; Knight, _The Christian Ethic_, 1893; Jas. +Kidd, _Morality and Religion_, 1895; Strong, _Christian Ethics_, 1897; +Troeltsch, _Die Christl. Ethik und die heutige Gesellschaft_, 1904; +_Die Sociallehren d. Christl. Kirchen u. Gruppen_ (2 vols.), 1912; +_Protestantism and Progress_, 1912; Lemme, _Christl. Ethik._ (2 vols.), +1908; Kirn, _Grundriss d. Theol. Ethik_, 1909; _Sitlliche +Lebenanschauungen d. Geigenwart_, 1911; Nash, _Ethics and Revelation_; +Dobschuetz, _The Christian Life in the Primitive Church_; Clark, _The +Church and the Changing Order_; Ottley, _Christian Ideas and Ideals_, +1909; Clark Murray, _Handbook of Christian Ethics_, 1908; Henry W. +Clark, _The Christian Method of Ethics_, 1908; Rauschenbusch, +_Christianity and the Social Crisis_, 1908; Geo. Matheson, _Landmarks +of New Testament Morality_, 1888; J. Smith, _Christian Character and +Social Power_; Gladden, _Applied Christianity_; J. R. Campbell, +_Christianity and the Social Order_; Coe, _Education in Religion and +Morals_; Peile, _The Reproach of the Gospel_; Gottschick, _Ethik_, +1907; W. Schmidt, _Der Kampf um die Sittliche Welt_, 1906; Herrmann, +_Ethik_, 1909; _Faith and Morals, Communion of the Christian with God_; +A. E. Balch, _Introduction to the Study of Christian Ethics_; +Kirkpatrick, _Christian Character and Conduct_; Church, _Outlines of +Christian Character_; Paget, _Christian Character_; Illingworth, +_Christian Character; Personality, Human and Divine_; R. Mackintosh, +_Christian Ethics_, 1909; Haering, _The Ethics of the Christian Life_ +(trans.), 1909; Barbour, _A Philos. Study of Christian Ethics_, 1911; +Stubbs, _Christ and Economics_; W. S. Bruce, _Social Aspects of +Christian Morality_, 1905; _Formation of Christian Character_; Harper, +_Christian Ethics and Social Progress_, 1912; T. C. Hall, _Social +Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics_, 1911. + + + +II. SPECIAL SUBJECTS + +1. _Ethics of Jesus_. + +Briggs, _Ethical Teaching of Jesus_; P. Brooks, _Influence of Jesus_; +Dale, _Laws of Christ for Common Life_; Feddersen, _Jesus und die +Socialen Dinge_; Gardner, _Exploratio Evangelica_; Ehrhardt, _Der +Grundcharacter d. Ethik Jesu_, 1895; Grimm, _Die Ethik Jesu_, 1903; +Peabody, _Jesus Christ and the Christian Character_, 1905; _Jesus +Christ and the Social Question_, 1902; _The Approach to the Social +Question_, 1909; King, _The Ethics of Jesus_, 1910; _Moral and Social +Challenge of our Times_, 1912; Rau, _Die Ethik Jesu_; Stalker, _Imago +Christi_, 1888; _The Ethic of Jesus_, 1909; Mathews, _The Social +Teaching of Jesus_; Horton, _The Commandments of Jesus_; W. N. Clarke, +_The Ideal of Jesus_, 1911. + + +2. _Teaching of Jesus and Apostles_. + +_Works_ of A. B. Bruce; Gilbert, _Revelation of Jesus_; Harnack, _What +is Christianity?_ (Das Wesen); _Sayings of Jesus_; Juelicher, +_Gleichnissreden Jesu_; Denney, _Jesus and the Gospel_, 1909; Latham, +_Pastor Pastorum_; Moorhouse, Pullan, Ross, Von Schrenck, Stevens, +Swete; Tolstoy, _My Religion_; Wendt, _Lehre Jesu_ (2 ed.), 1901; +Weizsaecker, _The Apostolic Age_; Hausrath, _History of N. T. Times_; +Fairbairn, _Christ in Modern Thought_; D. La Touche, _The Person of +Christ in Modern Thought_, 1911; Pfanmueller, _Jesus im Urtheil d. +Jahrhunderte_; Bacon, _Jesus, the Son of God_; Dalman, _Words of +Jesus_; Baur, _Paulinismus_; Bosworth, _Teaching of Jesus and +Apostles_; Pfleiderer, _Paulinismus; Primitive Christianity_; +Johan-Weiss, _Paul and Jesus_; Gardner, _Relig. Experience of St. +Paul_; Alexander, _Ethics of St. Paul_. + + +{252} + +C.--HISTORY OF ETHICS + +See Histories of Philosophy: Ueberweg, Erdmann, Windelband, Schwegler, +Maurice, Rogers; Alexander, _A Short History of Philosophy_ (2nd ed.), +1908; Lecky, _Hist. of Europ. Morals_; Luthardt, _History of Ethics_; +Rogers, _A Short History of Ethics_, 1912; Thoma, _Geschichte d. +Christl. Sittenlehre in der Zeit d. N. T._, 1879; Wundt (_Vol. II. of +Ethics_); Wuttke (_Vol. I. of Ethics_); Sidgwick, _History of Ethics_; +Ziegler, _Gesch. d. Ethik_; Jodl, _Gesch. d. Ethik in d. Neueren +Philosophie_; T. C. Hall, _History of Ethics within Organized +Christianity_, 1910. See also Relevant Articles in Bible Dictionaries, +especially Hastings' _Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_. + + + + +{253} + +INDEX + + Activism, 117, 122, 179. + Adiaphora, 201. + Aestheticism, 15 f., 108. + Alquin, 2. + Apocalyptic teaching of Christ, 133. + Aquinas, Thomas, 2, 196. + Aristotle, 10, 17 f., 40 f., 66, 70, 87, 107, 187. + Arnold, Matthew, 1, 107. + Asceticism, 129, 150, 192, 245. + Assimilation to Christ, 179. + Atonement, 166. + Augustine, 30, 57 f., 66, 140, 231. + Aurelius, Marcus, 43, 70. + Avenarius, 86. + + Balch, 132, 133. + Barbour, 41, 135, 157, 159, 161. + Baur, 39. + Beatitudes, 129, 136, 188. + Beneficence, 213. + Bentham, 103, 204. + Bergson, 64, 91 f., 117 f. + Bernard, 218. + Blewett, Christian view of God, 170. + Bosanquet, 16, 27, 64, 92, 113, 114. + Bousset, 134, 135. + Brotherhood, 145, 210, 243, 247. + Browning, 3, 16, 60, 63, 77, 119, 131, 132, 138, 206, 218. + Bunsen, 69. + Burckhardt, 227. + Burke, 204. + Burkitt, 32. + Burnet, 41. + Burns, Robert, 204. + Butcher, 41. + Butler, Bishop, 166. + + Caird, E., 44, 60, 64, 245. + ---- J., 63. + Cairns, 135. + Calixtas, G., 2. + Calvinism, 2, 57, 241. + Cambridge Platonists, 39. + Campbell, 69. + Chamberlain, Houston, 48. + Character, 6, 10, 14, 15, 24, 186; + making of, 208. + Childhood, children, 226 f. + Christ, 1, 4, 5, 11 f., 124; + as example, 146 f.; + character of, 148 f., 150. + Christianity, 123 f. + Church, 4, 209, 236 ff. + Citizenship, 39, 151, 233 f. + Clarke, 240. + Clement, 2, 39. + Coleridge, 3. + Collectivism, 106. + Compassion, 212. + Conduct, 1, 6, 13, 15, 183 f. + Conscience, 68 f. + Conversion, 171. + Courage, 38, 186, 187, 190. + Cousin, 16. + _Creative Evolution_, 117. + Croce, Benedetto, 117. + Culture, 16, 99, 108, 130, 148, 156, 207, 208. + + Daemon of Socrates, 69. + Danaeus, 2. + Dante, 125, 138. + Darwin, 74. + David, Psalms, 48 f., 70. + Davidson, 69, 81. + Death of Christ, 166. + Decalogue, 2, 45, 72. + Deissmann, 162. + Democracy, 235. + Denney on Forgiveness, 163. + Descartes, 204. + Determinism, 88 f. + Dewey, Professor, 64. + Disinterestedness of motive, 156 f. + Divorce, 224. + Dobschuetz, 134. + Dogmatics, 3, 24 f. + Dorner, 25 f. + Drew, 31. + Duty, Duties, 8, 21, 52, 196 ff. + Dynamic of new life, 164 f. + + 'Ecce Homo,' 152, 205. + Ecclesiasticism, 3, 49. + Economics, 17, 239. + Ehrhardt, 151. + Emerson on Example, 151. + Empire, Roman, 43; 'Holy,' 242. + Engels, 105. + Epictetus, 43, 70. + Epicureans, 42. + Erinnyes of Aeschylus, 69. + Eschatology, 133 f. + Eternal life, 131. + Ethics, Christian, 1 f., 5, 6, 10 ff; + Philos., 22, 35 f., 168; + permanence of, 245. + ---- of Israel, 44 ff. + Eucken, 86, 93, 108, 115, 117, 121 f., 179, 203, 207, 235. + Eugenics, 110, 255. + Euripides, 69. + Evil, 57 f., 62, 118. + Evolutionalism, 74 f., 103 f. + Example, human, 151, 214 f.; + of Jesus, 140, 222 f. + Externalism, 142 f. + + Fairbairn, A. M., 147. + Faith, 65, 67, 174 f., 196, 216; + Pauline doct., 177. + Faithfulness, 200, 203, 216, 224, 231. + Faith healing, 90. + Family, 220 f.; relationships, 222, 226. + Fatherhood of God, 141, 145, 153, 216. + Feuerbach, 101. + Fichte, 65, 112, 204. + Forgiveness, divine, 153; human, 214. + Forsyth, 224. + 'Foundations,' 173. + Frazer, 29, 221. + + Garvie, 222. + God, idea of, 26; sovereignty of, 27; fatherhood of, 27; + love of, 28; recognition of, 215; obedience to, 216; + worship of, 217. + Godlikeness, 141, 218. + Goethe, 58, 81, 107, 130, 212. + Grace, means of, 209. + Graces, 188. + Grant, Sir A., on 'Mean,' 185. + Greece, Ancient, 11, 35. + Greeks, 16, 28, 69. + Green, T. H., 18, 75, 77, 88, 187, 218. + + Haeckel, 86, 101. + Haering, 21, 25, 156, 201. + Harnack, 176, 205, 228. + Hebrew, 35, 44. + Hedonism, 104. + Hegel, 9, 19, 55, 65, 112 f., 124, 204, 213, 231. + Heraclitus, 37. + Hermann, E., 125. + Herrmann, 202. + Hobbes, 57, 102. + Hobhouse, 221. + Holiness, 141; of Jesus, 149. + Hope, 47, 197 f. + Huegel, von, 126. + Hume, 18. + Hypnotism, 90. + Hyslop, 14. + + Ideals, 6, 12; idealism, 107, 127 f. + Ihering, 221. + Immanence of God, 43, 93. + Immortality, 155. + Incarnation, 165 f. + Indeterminism, 88. + Individualism, 107, 204, 205. + Inge, 16. + Intellect and Intuition, 65, 118. + Intellectualism, 64, 65, 114, 118. + Intensity of life, 129 f. + _Interimsethik_, 134 f., 246. + Intuitionalism, 72. + Irenaeus, 166. + Israel, 35, 44, 70. + + Jacoby, 25, 142, 157. + James, St., 29. + ---- W., 56, 65, 66, 89 f., 114 f., 172. + Jones, Sir H., 132, 219, 231. + Judaeism, Ethics of, 45. + Judgment, final, 140; just judgment, 212. + Justice, 32, 38, 172, 187 f., 210, 233. + Justification by faith, 177. + + Kant, 13, 65 f., 74, 111 f., 152, 158, 162, 185, 204. + Keim, 151. + King, 134, 224, 227, 243. + Kingdom of God, 132 f. + Kirkup, 105. + Knight, 36. + + Lassalle, 232. + Law, Mosaic, 45 f., 70. + Lecky, 43, 66, 211, 217. + Lemme, 25, 79 f. + Leonardo, 92. + Lidgett, 27. + Life, 12, 118; as ideal, 128; as vocation, 200; + regard for, 207; as Godlikeness, 141; sacredness of, 142; + Christ as standard of, 147; brevity of, 154; 'eternal,' 131. + Lodge, Sir O., 172. + Lofthouse, 221. + Logic, 15, 118. + Lotze, 88. + Love, supremacy of, 28, 196 f; divine, 144, 153. + Luetgert, 108. + + Maccabean age, 48. + MacCunn, 203. + Macdonald, Ramsay, 220. + Mach, 85 f. + Machiavelli, 70. + Mackenzie, 13, 14, 19. + Mackintosh, 26, 199. + Macmillan, 112. + Mallock, 232. + Man, estimate of, 55 ff.; primitive, 57. + Mark, St., 32. + Marriage, 223, 225. + Marshall, 224. + Martensen, 25. + Marx, 105. + Massachusetts, 'Declaration of Rights,' 205. + Matheson, Geo., 194. + Mazzini on Rights, 203. + 'Mean' of Aristotle, 40, 185. + Metaphysics, 3, 10, 17 f., 25, 37. + Meyers, St. Paul, 168, 217. + Micah, 47. + Mill, J. S., 32, 103. + Millar, Hugh, 56. + Milton, 58. + Mission of Jesus, 149. + Missionary movement, 243. + Moffatt, 134. + Morality, 10, 37 f. + Morals, 24. See Ethics. + Morris, 92. + Motives, 6, 10; Christian, 152 f. + Muirhead, 14. + Murray, 55, 58. + Mueller, Max, 58. + + Nativism, 72. + Naturalism, 100 ff. + Nemesis, 69. + Neo-Platonism, 39 f., 40, 44, 245. + 'New Ethic,' 108. + Nietzsche, 58, 109, 225, 232. + Nine Foundation Pillars of Schmiedel, 31. + Norm, Normative, 12, 146. + Novalis, 16, 25. + + Obedience, 178. + Old Dispensation, 45. + Origin, 39. + Orr, J., 142. + Oswald, 86. + Ottley, 59, 61, 209, 213. + 'Ought,' 12, 21, 80. + + Paine, 204. + Parables of the kingdom, 137. + Parents, 226. + Parker, Theodore, 56. + Pascal, 57, 59. + Passions, 41, 58, 191. + Paul, St., 22, 26, 30 f., 43, 47, 57 f., + 66, 70, 77, 94 f., 162, 173, 177. + Paulsen, 10, 151, 199. + Peabody, 148, 150, 246. + Pelagius, 56. + Penalty, 162. + _Pensees_, 59. + Perfection, spiritual, 27, 141. + Permissible, 202. + Personality, 6, 55 f., 61, 112, 113, 122, 209, 213. + Pfleiderer, 44. + Pharisaism, 143. + Philosophy, 4, 5, 9, 35 f. + Plato, 18 f., 37 ff., 66, 107, 184, 187. + Pluralism, 116. + Poetry of Old Testament, 45 f., 48. + Politics, 15 f. + Postulates, 6, 18, 22, 25, 29. + Power, divine, 164 f. + Pragmatism, 63, 114 f. + Prayer, 217. + Pringle-Pattison, 103. + Property, 213. + + Rashdall, 27. + Realisation of self, 128. + Reformation, 2, 11, 47. + Regeneration, 171. + Regret, 171. + Renewal, 171. + Renunciation of Gospel, 156. + Repentance, 171. + Response, human, 169. + Responsibility of man, 29. See Will. + Resurrection of Christ, 167. + Revolution, French, 56, 235. + Rewards, 157 f. + Richter, Jean Paul, 155. + Righteousness, 46 f., 52, 142, 192. + Risen life, 167. + Ritschlian school, 63, 90. + Romanticism, 107. + Rome, 35; Romanist, 243. + Rousseau, 56 f., 100. + Ruskin, 16. + + Sabatier, 66. + Sacrifice of Christ, 166; self, 131, 191, 194, 209. + Sanday, Professor, 139, 157. + Schelling, 65. + Schiller, 16, 107. + Schleiermacher, 3, 25, 39, 201. + Schmidt, 86. + Schmiedel, 31. + Schopenhauer, 109. + Schultz on copying Christ, 152. + Schweitzer, 134. + Science, 13 f., 83. + Scott, E., 134, 140. + Seeley, 16. + Self-regard, 207. + Self-restraint of Jesus, 150. + Self-sufficiency, 130. + Seneca, 43, 70. + Sermon on (the) Mount, 32. + Seth, Jas., 103. + Sin, 28 f., 140. + Sinlessness of Jesus, 149. + Smith, Adam, 103. + Smyth, Newman, 17, 26, 132. + Socialism, 105; social problems, 225 f., 239. + Society. Social institutions, 220 ff. + Socrates, 9, 36 f., 39, 69, 186. + Sonship, 153. + Sophists, 11, 36, 37. + Sophocles, 69. + Soul, 61, 119. + Sovereignty of God, 27, 93, 144. + Specialisation, 207. + Spencer, 74 f., 103, 232. + Spinoza, 18. + Sport, 207. + Stalker, 176, 224. + Standard of New Life, 146 f. + State, 229 ff. + Stephen, Leslie, 17. + Stoics, 42, 56, 70, 185, 194. + Strauss, 151. + Strong, 193. + Sudermann, 110. + Suffering, 202, 208. + _Summum bonum_, 11. See Ideal. + Symonds, 69. + Sympathy of Jesus, 149. + Synoptic Gospels, 33. + + Tasso, 81. + Temperance, 38, 187, 191. + Temptation, 208. + Tennyson, 3, 39; wages, 161. + Testament, New, 28, 30 f., 35, 57, 71. + ---- Old, 26, 45. + Thanksgiving, 218. + _Theologia Moralis_, 2. + Titius, 134. + Touche, E. D. La, 145. + Troeltsch, 135, 151, 241. + Truthfulness, 211. + + Utilitarianism, 103 f., 114. + + Virtue. Virtues, 69, 21, 38 ff., 183 ff. + Vitalism, 117, 120. + Vocation, 154, 199 f. + + Wages, 161. + Watson, 240. + Wealth, 239. + Weiss, Johannus, 134, 170. + _Welt-Anschauung_, 19, 31. + Wenley, 44. + Wernle, 58, 134. + Westcott, Bishop, 39. + Westermarck, 221. + Will, 12 ff., 82 f. + Wisdom, 38, 43, 49, 187, 192. + Wordsworth, 3, 39. + Work, 208, 239. + Worship, 217, 237. + Wundt, 73, 78 f., 186, 213, 243. + Wuttke, 13, 25, 217. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS*** + + +******* This file should be named 22105.txt or 22105.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/2/1/0/22105 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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