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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/2412-h.zip b/2412-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..cabc67a --- /dev/null +++ b/2412-h.zip diff --git a/2412-h/2412-h.htm b/2412-h/2412-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2d05c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/2412-h/2412-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,2290 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<HTML> +<HEAD> + +<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> + +<TITLE> +The Project Gutenberg E-text of The Categories, by Aristotle +</TITLE> + +<STYLE TYPE="text/css"> +BODY { color: Black; + background: White; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; + text-align: justify } + +P {text-indent: 4% } + +P.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +P.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: small } + +P.letter {text-indent: 0%; + font-size: small ; + margin-left: 10% ; + margin-right: 10% } + +P.finis { text-align: center ; + text-indent: 0% ; + margin-left: 0% ; + margin-right: 0% } + +</STYLE> + +</HEAD> + +<BODY> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Categories, by Aristotle + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Categories + +Author: Aristotle + +Translator: E. M. Edghill + +Posting Date: October 23, 2008 [EBook #2412] +Release Date: November, 2000 +[Last updated: February 24, 2014] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CATEGORIES *** + + + + +Produced by Glyn Hughes. HTML version by Al Haines. + + + + + +</pre> + + +<BR><BR> + +<H1 ALIGN="center"> +The Categories +</H1> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +By +</H3> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +Aristotle +</H2> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Translated by E. M. Edghill +</H3> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H2> +CONTENTS +</H2> + +<H4> +Section 1 +<BR> + <A HREF="#part01">Part 1</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part02">Part 2</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part03">Part 3</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part04">Part 4</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part05">Part 5</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part06">Part 6</A><BR> +<BR><BR> +Section 2<BR> + <A HREF="#part07">Part 7</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part08">Part 8</A><BR> +<BR><BR> +Section 3<BR> + <A HREF="#part09">Part 9</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part10">Part 10</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part11">Part 11</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part12">Part 12</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part13">Part 13</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part14">Part 14</A><BR> + <A HREF="#part15">Part 15</A><BR> +</H4> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part01"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Section 1 +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 1 +</H3> + +<P> +Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a +common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for +each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to +the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they +have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs +for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, +his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. +</P> + +<P> +On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have +both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man +and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, +inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in +both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, +the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. +</P> + +<P> +Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name +from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the +grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous +man from the word 'courage'. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part02"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 2 +</H3> + +<P> +Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter +are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former +'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. +</P> + +<P> +Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never +present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, +and is never present in a subject. +</P> + +<P> +By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are +present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the +said subject. +</P> + +<P> +Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable +of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is +present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a +certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a +material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything. +</P> + +<P> +Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a +subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is +predicable of grammar. +</P> + +<P> +There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a +subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the +individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is +individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a +subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being +present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is +present in a subject. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part03"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 3 +</H3> + +<P> +When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable +of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is +predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; +it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the +individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'. +</P> + +<P> +If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are +themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' +and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', +'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are +not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge +does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'. +</P> + +<P> +But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to +prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is +predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate +will be differentiae also of the subject. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part04"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 4 +</H3> + +<P> +Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, +quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. +To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the +horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits +long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', +'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in the +market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last +year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating +position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; +'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection. +</P> + +<P> +No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is +by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements +arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or +false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as +'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part05"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 5 +</H3> + +<P> +Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the +word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a +subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary +sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the +primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include +the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the +species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; +these, therefore—that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus +'animal,-are termed secondary substances. +</P> + +<P> +It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the +definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For +instance, 'man' is predicated of the individual man. Now in this case +the name of the species 'man' is applied to the individual, for we use +the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of +'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual +man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of +the species are predicable of the individual. +</P> + +<P> +With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a +subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their +definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, +however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in +certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white' +being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, +for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour +'white' is never predicable of the body. +</P> + +<P> +Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary +substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by +reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated +of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there +were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be +predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in +body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual +body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. +Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of +primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not +exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. +</P> + +<P> +Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the +genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one +should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would +render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, +by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a +more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was +man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is +peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too +general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an +individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the +species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'. +</P> + +<P> +Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in +virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything +else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present +in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance +and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: +for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the +genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be +predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting +that the species is more truly substance than the genus. +</P> + +<P> +Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one +is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more +appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to +which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting +the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, +no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not +more truly substance than an individual ox. +</P> + +<P> +It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude +primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name +'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a +knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the +genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall +make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating +the latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white, +that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is +just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called +substances. +</P> + +<P> +Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they +underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation +that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists +also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance +belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included +within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If +we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is +applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. +This law holds good in all cases. +</P> + +<P> +It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present +in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor +predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it +is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are +not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual +man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in +the individual man. In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the +individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is +present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that +in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of +secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, +applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the +species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. +Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. +</P> + +<P> +Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that +differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics +'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but +not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of +the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia +itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' +is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that +characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': +for 'man' is terrestrial. +</P> + +<P> +The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the +whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should +have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the +phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant +'otherwise than as parts in a whole'. +</P> + +<P> +It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all +propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated +univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either the +individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary +substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the +predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species +is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of +the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the +species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species +and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that +of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the +predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the +definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to +the individuals. But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was +applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. +It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which +either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are +predicated univocally. +</P> + +<P> +All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case +of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a +unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, +of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we +are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression +is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, +but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single +as a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of +more than one subject. +</P> + +<P> +Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term +'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and +genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify +substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification +covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the +species: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider +extension than he who uses the word 'man'. +</P> + +<P> +Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the +contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or +animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. +Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of +many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the +contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', +or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of +'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative terms no +contrary exists. +</P> + +<P> +Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do +not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly +substance than another, for it has already been stated that this is +the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within +itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more +or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other +man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white +may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that +which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other +beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a +thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is +said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is +said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance +is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more +truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is +substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of +variation of degree. +</P> + +<P> +The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting +contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should +find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. +Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the +same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything +that is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while +retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. +The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at +one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This +capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a +statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement, +it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement 'he is +sitting' is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same +statement will be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one +thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, +this same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this +exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the +manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing +that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which +was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. +Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad +good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it +is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary +qualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in +all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the +contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' +remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, +according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies +also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing +takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be +capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing +that it does so. +</P> + +<P> +If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements +and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his +contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have +this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but +because this modification occurs in the case of something else. The +truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power +on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In +short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and +opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot +be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. +</P> + +<P> +But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the +substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting +contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease +or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said +to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. +</P> + +<P> +To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining +numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary +qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the +substance itself. +</P> + +<P> +Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part06"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 6 +</H3> + +<P> +Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities +are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the +other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. +</P> + +<P> +Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, +lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place. +</P> + +<P> +In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at +which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives +have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven +also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be +possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary +among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a +discrete quantity. +</P> + +<P> +The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for +it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech +which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have +no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables +join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest. +</P> + +<P> +A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible +to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the +line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it +is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary. +Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a +solid, namely either a line or a plane. +</P> + +<P> +Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, +present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a +continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, +and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space +also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same +common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but +space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common +boundary. +</P> + +<P> +Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each +to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative +position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be +possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the +plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was +contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could +similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of +parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to +space. But it would be impossible to show that the parts of a number had +a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state +what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, +for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which +does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that +such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to +another. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one' is prior to 'two', +and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of number may be said to +possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any +distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech. +None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is +pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the +parts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities +consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not. +</P> + +<P> +Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the +category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a +quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one +of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative +terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the +surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or +a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things +cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, +should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be +made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, +or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size +of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area +which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, +are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the +name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. +</P> + +<P> +Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this +is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits +long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any such +quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of +'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not quantitative, but +relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called +rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain +is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter +is greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a +reference here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and +'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or +a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, +and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as +numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in +it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those +in the house. The terms 'two cubits long', 'three cubits long', and so +on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation, +for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, +plain that these are to be classed as relative. +</P> + +<P> +Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no +contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is +not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to +something external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it +will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at +one and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to +themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both small +and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one +thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same thing +comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of +such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same +moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that +nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For +though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one +is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time +both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in +contrary ways at one and the same time. +</P> + +<P> +Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary +to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same +thing is both great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great' +is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term 'great', +therefore, is not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of +'little'. And even though a man should call these terms not relative +but quantitative, they would not have contraries. +</P> + +<P> +It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to +admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of +'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and +this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the +universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in +defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial +metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within +the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance. +</P> + +<P> +Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing +cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly +with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than +what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than +another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly +time than another. Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that +have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be +predicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of +variation of degree. +</P> + +<P> +The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality +are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be +equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or +unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied +to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been +mentioned. +</P> + +<P> +That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed +equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one +particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with +another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of +similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be +called equal and unequal. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part07"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Section 2 +</H3> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 7 +</H3> + +<P> +Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of +something else or related to something else, are explained by reference +to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by +reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else +that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external +reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it +is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other +relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and +attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to +something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of +something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the +attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been +mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which +is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or +some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one +mountain is called great in comparison with another; for the +mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, +that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all +other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted +that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but +attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are +not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid +attitudes. +</P> + +<P> +It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a +contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a +contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; +'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term. +</P> + +<P> +It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For +'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications +'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in +character: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear a +reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative +term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as 'double' +admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the +term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the +master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its half; by 'half', the +half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by +'less', less than that which is greater. +</P> + +<P> +So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express +the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean +knowledge of the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be +apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; +by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception. +</P> + +<P> +Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to +exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the +relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a +wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two +will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird +is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original +statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to +the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but +qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the +connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having +reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as +being such because of its wings. +</P> + +<P> +Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists +by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a +rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will +not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a +boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot +use the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find +its explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our +definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like +'ruddered' as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus +accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the +'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all +other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative +of that which is 'headed', than as that of an animal, for the animal +does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head. +</P> + +<P> +Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is +related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we +derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is +reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived +the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'. +</P> + +<P> +All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add +this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as +haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be +interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case +of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there +will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that +name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant +significance. The term 'slave', if defined as related, not to a master, +but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally +connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the +statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to be correlative +with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all +irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute +left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with +that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative +of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant +attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of +knowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' +alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave +will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be +the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not +correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that +alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the +stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. +</P> + +<P> +For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the +man', or the correlative of 'the wing' is 'the bird'; if the attribute +'master' be withdrawn from 'the man', the correlation between 'the man' +and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, +the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be +withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative; for +if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' +has no correlative. +</P> + +<P> +Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly +designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if +not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology +is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. +</P> + +<P> +Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is +for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The +existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is +a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence +of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are +merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; +for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice +versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not +appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence +simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before +knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge +of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, +to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which +was contemporaneous with that of its object. +</P> + +<P> +Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at +the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of +this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not +exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything +to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object +does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in +the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an +object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, +yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all +animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might +yet be many objects of knowledge. +</P> + +<P> +This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of +perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the +perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but +the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the +perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in +which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is +annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a +perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that +perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the +perceptible involves that of perception. +</P> + +<P> +But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the +perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that +perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, +sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. +</P> + +<P> +Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving +subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. +But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water +and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist +before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it +would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. +</P> + +<P> +It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, +as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case +of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it +is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor +parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is +not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the +parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or +head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular +person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of +secondary substances; the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not +defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is +only relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as +it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is +not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a +difference of opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are +defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a +part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative +character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was +complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no +substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if +those things only are properly called relative in the case of which +relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, +perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found. +</P> + +<P> +The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact +that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not +make it essentially relative. +</P> + +<P> +From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative +thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. +Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular +thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of +which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he +knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all +that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is +relative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man +knows definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also +forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there +is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not +know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more +beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely +know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know +indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less +beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does +not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no +longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than +something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing +was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends +some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also +definitely to which it is related. +</P> + +<P> +Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is +possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not +necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. +It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus +these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to +say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a +difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without +more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard +to details is not without advantage. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part08"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 8 +</H3> + +<P> +By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such +and such. +</P> + +<P> +Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let +us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in +being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of +knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired +only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character +and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes +place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as +justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or +dismissed, so as to give place to vice. +</P> + +<P> +By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily +changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, +disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in +one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, +becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all +other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has +itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which +case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit. +</P> + +<P> +It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which +are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for +those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to +have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are +disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus +habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in +ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter. +</P> + +<P> +Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not +necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said +also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those +who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the +corresponding habit. +</P> + +<P> +Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we +call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it +includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. +Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his +disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do +something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called +good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a +disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish +something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn +capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may +ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. +Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated +of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it +to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing +by reason of the lack of that capacity. +</P> + +<P> +A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and +affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort +of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, +and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is +evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them +are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. +Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called +white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases. +</P> + +<P> +The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those +things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is +not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this +what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called +affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are +affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of +producing an 'affection' in the way of perception. For sweetness has +the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so +it is with the rest of these qualities. +</P> + +<P> +Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said +to be affective qualities in this sense, but because they themselves +are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of +colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he +blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is +this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising +from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a +probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. +For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former +instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, +might be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the +corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All +conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and +lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and +duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said +to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in +natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease +or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout +life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of +these. +</P> + +<P> +Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be +rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, +but affections: for we are not said to be such in virtue of them. The man +who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, +nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be +constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. +</P> + +<P> +Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. In like +manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That +temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain +deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as +insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or +irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states +which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other +elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are +called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and +such. +</P> + +<P> +Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are +called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when +vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such +circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be +affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but +affections. +</P> + +<P> +The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a +thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other +qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and +such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have +a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in +fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it. +</P> + +<P> +Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms +indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a +class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain +relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified +which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is +dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one +another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, +because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts +project beyond others. +</P> + +<P> +There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly +so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. +</P> + +<P> +These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from +them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are +said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost +all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of +the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us +the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on. +</P> + +<P> +There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under +consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it +should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to +the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, +is not derived from that of any quality; for both those capacities have +no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from +the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or +wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, +and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name +given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the +science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that +which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a +derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the +possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not +derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur often. +</P> + +<P> +We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of +some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the +aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it. +</P> + +<P> +One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the +contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, +also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, +may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is +contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is +black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such +colours, though qualities, have no contraries. +</P> + +<P> +If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a +quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply +the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted +that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, +injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor +place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be +applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries +falling under the category of quality. +</P> + +<P> +Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one +thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the +case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may +exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is +white, it may become whiter. +</P> + +<P> +Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we +should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties +might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which +are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility +of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very +well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in +the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the +case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are +classed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible +fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be +what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one +man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, +than another, and so on. +</P> + +<P> +The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do +not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have +to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the +triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or +circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not +applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the +square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the +definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of +the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be +compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of +degree. +</P> + +<P> +Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to +quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with +reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive +feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in +virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark +of quality. +</P> + +<P> +We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though +proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it +many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were +relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the +individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference +to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular +branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar +is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, +but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their +genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the +grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, +not the music of something. +</P> + +<P> +Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is +because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are +said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are +called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. +Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which +we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, +and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within +both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be +nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part09"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Section 3 +</H3> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 9 +</H3> + +<P> +Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of +degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being +cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They +also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a +greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. +Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, +then, is stated with regard to these categories. +</P> + +<P> +We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing +with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names +from those of the corresponding attitudes. +</P> + +<P> +As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily +intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, +that in the category of state are included such states as 'shod', +'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained +before. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part10"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 10 +</H3> + +<P> +The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. We must +next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite' is used. +Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to +one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to +positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. +</P> + +<P> +Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word +'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the +expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' +and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are +'blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the +propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'. +</P> + +<P> +(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are +explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being +indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition. Thus, +double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the +double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing +known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its +relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained +as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such +things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of +being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. +</P> + +<P> +(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way +interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not +spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad, nor +is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of +the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those +contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally +present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain +either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in +the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an +intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body +of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other +should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are +predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other +should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the +terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those +contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an +intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the +body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should +be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that +everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are +predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary +that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of +which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that +may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of +contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and +black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; +the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one +nor the other. +</P> + +<P> +Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all +the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, +however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it +as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is +neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust. +</P> + +<P> +(iii) 'privatives' and 'positives' have reference to the same subject. +Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal +rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to +that to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that is +capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation +when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that +in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We +do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has +not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time +when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth +are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless +or blind. +</P> + +<P> +To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the +corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', +'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to +'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness is a +'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a +'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', +both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said +to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. +</P> + +<P> +To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of being +in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' +themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both +cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind +opposed to having sight. +</P> + +<P> +That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. +By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a +negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or +denial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in +the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the +type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to +the denial, as in the two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so +also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one +case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to +his not sitting. +</P> + +<P> +It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to +each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by +reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any +other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is +not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. +Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a +relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that +with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not +called the sight of blindness. +</P> + +<P> +That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and +'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is +plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they +have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the +subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are +predicated; for it is those, as we proved, in the case of which this +necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health +and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which +have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not +necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be +either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between +these contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, +moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of +which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two +contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a +constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is +necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the +other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or +snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must +needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but +only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. +Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and +not either the one or the other, which must be present. +</P> + +<P> +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, neither +of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a +subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or +the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is +natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives' and +'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists +of those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not +belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an +intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either +the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every +appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the stage when it is +by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be +blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity +may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it +should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in +the one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries +which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that +either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate +subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be +present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that +'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of +the senses in which contraries are opposed. +</P> + +<P> +Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be +changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its +identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive +property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that +that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, +black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is +bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of +life and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he +should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might +change completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man +becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the +improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he +will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as +this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him +in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In +the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change in both +directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession to +privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become +blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not +regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new +set.</p> + +<p>(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong +manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this +case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the +other false. +</P> + +<P> +Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor +in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one to +be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither +of them is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other +as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the +same, of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as +'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of +combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the +opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. +</P> + +<P> +At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements +are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem +to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of +'Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it +true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other +false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, +but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither 'Socrates is +ill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all. +</P> + +<P> +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not +exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject +exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false. +For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the +sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation. +Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and +the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of +vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent. +</P> + +<P> +But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists +or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if +Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', +'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is likewise +the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he +is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the +case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which +the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the +rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part11"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 11 +</H3> + +<P> +That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the +contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But +the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For +defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being +an evil, and the mean, which is a good, is equally the contrary of the +one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see +instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good. +</P> + +<P> +In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one +exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there +will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, +there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates +is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two +contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual +at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if +that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not +possibly be one. +</P> + +<P> +It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects +which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require +as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, +without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their +subject the human soul. +</P> + +<P> +Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases +either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be +themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; +justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good +and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, +with terms under them. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part12"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 12 +</H3> + +<P> +There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior' to +another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in +this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more +ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' +imply greater length of time. +</P> + +<P> +Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence +of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to +'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist, +but if 'one' exists, it does not follow necessarily that 'two' exists: +thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, +that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one +on which the other depends is called 'prior' to that other. +</P> + +<P> +In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to any +order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which +use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is +posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the +propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are +prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the +exordium is prior in order to the narrative. +</P> + +<P> +Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is +better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In +common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as 'coming +first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most +far-fetched. +</P> + +<P> +Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is used. +</P> + +<P> +Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another. +For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the +other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be +by nature 'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are instances +of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of +the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a +man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and +conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then +he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the +being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to +be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity +of the proposition depends on the fact of the man's being or not being. +</P> + +<P> +Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part13"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 13 +</H3> + +<P> +The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied to +those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that +of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the +other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those +things, again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each +of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is +the cause of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the +double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if +there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there +is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the +being of the other. +</P> + +<P> +Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and +opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be +'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished +each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the +'winged' species is simultaneous with the 'terrestrial' and the 'water' +species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed +each to each, for the genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the +'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one of these is prior or +posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be +'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the +winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies. +Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' in point of nature, +which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by +one and the same method of differentiation. +</P> + +<P> +But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot +be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will be the +genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it does +not follow necessarily that there will be the species 'water-animal'. +</P> + +<P> +Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature, the +being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same +time neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those +species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed +within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in +the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same +time. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part14"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 14 +</H3> + +<P> +There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, +diminution, alteration, and change of place. +</P> + +<P> +It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are +distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, +increase and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the +case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily +implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not +true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us +an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for +that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or +any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of +motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be +altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution +or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter +of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the +process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, +if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be +subject to alteration also. But there are some things which undergo +increase but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon +is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is +with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, +therefore, are distinct. +</P> + +<P> +Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different +forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus +destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest +in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse +direction would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards +is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. +</P> + +<P> +In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that +have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It +appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here +also either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in the direction of +the contrary quality', just as we defined the contrary of change of +place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. +For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore +either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary +may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this +way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is +alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative +nature takes place. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="part15"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Part 15 +</H3> + +<P> +The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place it is +used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for +we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it +has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's +height; for he is said to 'have' a height of three or four cubits. It +is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a +coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of +ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a +part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the +case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to +'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has +reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we +are said to 'have' a house or a field. A man is also said to 'have' a +wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote +meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the +husband lives with the wife. +</P> + +<P> +Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary +ones have all been enumerated. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR><BR> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Categories, by Aristotle + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CATEGORIES *** + +***** This file should be named 2412-h.htm or 2412-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/1/2412/ + +Produced by Glyn Hughes. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Categories + +Author: Aristotle + +Translator: E. M. Edghill + +Posting Date: October 23, 2008 [EBook #2412] +Release Date: November, 2000 +[Last updated: February 24, 2014] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CATEGORIES *** + + + + +Produced by Glyn Hughes. HTML version by Al Haines. + + + + + + + + + +The Categories + + +By + +Aristotle + + +Translated by E. M. Edghill + + + +Section 1 + +Part 1 + +Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a +common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for +each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to +the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they +have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs +for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, +his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. + +On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have +both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man +and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, +inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in +both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, +the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. + +Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name +from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the +grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous +man from the word 'courage'. + + + +Part 2 + +Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter +are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former +'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. + +Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never +present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, +and is never present in a subject. + +By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are +present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the +said subject. + +Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable +of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is +present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a +certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a +material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything. + +Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a +subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is +predicable of grammar. + +There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a +subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the +individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is +individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a +subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being +present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is +present in a subject. + + + +Part 3 + +When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable +of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is +predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; +it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the +individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'. + +If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are +themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' +and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', +'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are +not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge +does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'. + +But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to +prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is +predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate +will be differentiae also of the subject. + + + +Part 4 + +Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, +quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. +To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the +horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits +long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', +'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in the +market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last +year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating +position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; +'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection. + +No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is +by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements +arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or +false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as +'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false. + + + +Part 5 + +Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the +word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a +subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary +sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the +primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include +the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the +species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; +these, therefore--that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus +'animal,-are termed secondary substances. + +It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the +definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For +instance, 'man' is predicated of the individual man. Now in this case +the name of the species 'man' is applied to the individual, for we use +the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of +'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual +man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of +the species are predicable of the individual. + +With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a +subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their +definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, +however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in +certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white' +being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, +for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour +'white' is never predicable of the body. + +Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary +substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by +reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated +of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there +were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be +predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in +body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual +body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. +Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of +primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not +exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. + +Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the +genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one +should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would +render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, +by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a +more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was +man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is +peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too +general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an +individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the +species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'. + +Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in +virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything +else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present +in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance +and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: +for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the +genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be +predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting +that the species is more truly substance than the genus. + +Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one +is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more +appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to +which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting +the same method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, +no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man is not +more truly substance than an individual ox. + +It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude +primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name +'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a +knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the +genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall +make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating +the latter. All other things that we state, such as that he is white, +that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is +just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called +substances. + +Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they +underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation +that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists +also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance +belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included +within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If +we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is +applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. +This law holds good in all cases. + +It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present +in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor +predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it +is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are +not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual +man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in +the individual man. In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the +individual man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is +present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that +in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of +secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, +applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the +species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. +Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. + +Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that +differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics +'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but +not present in it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of +the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia +itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' +is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that +characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': +for 'man' is terrestrial. + +The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the +whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should +have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the +phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant +'otherwise than as parts in a whole'. + +It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all +propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated +univocally. For all such propositions have for their subject either the +individual or the species. It is true that, inasmuch as primary +substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the +predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the species +is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of +the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the +species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species +and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that +of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the +predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the +definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to +the individuals. But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was +applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. +It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which +either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are +predicated univocally. + +All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case +of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a +unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, +of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we +are here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression +is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, +but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single +as a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of +more than one subject. + +Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term +'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and +genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify +substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification +covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the +species: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider +extension than he who uses the word 'man'. + +Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the +contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or +animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. +Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of +many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the +contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', +or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of +'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative terms no +contrary exists. + +Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do +not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly +substance than another, for it has already been stated that this is +the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within +itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more +or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other +man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white +may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that +which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other +beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a +thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is +said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is +said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance +is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more +truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is +substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit of +variation of degree. + +The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting +contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should +find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. +Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the +same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything +that is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance, while +retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. +The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at +one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This +capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a +statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement, +it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement 'he is +sitting' is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same +statement will be false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one +thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, +this same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this +exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the +manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing +that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which +was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. +Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad +good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it +is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary +qualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in +all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the +contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' +remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, +according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies +also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing +takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be +capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing +that it does so. + +If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements +and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his +contention is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have +this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but +because this modification occurs in the case of something else. The +truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power +on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In +short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and +opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot +be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. + +But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the +substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting +contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease +or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said +to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. + +To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining +numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary +qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the +substance itself. + +Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance. + + + +Part 6 + +Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities +are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the +other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. + +Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, +lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place. + +In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at +which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives +have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven +also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be +possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary +among the parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a +discrete quantity. + +The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for +it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech +which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have +no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables +join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest. + +A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible +to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the +line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it +is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary. +Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a +solid, namely either a line or a plane. + +Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, +present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a +continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, +and these have a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space +also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same +common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but +space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common +boundary. + +Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each +to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative +position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be +possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the +plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was +contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could +similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of +parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid and to +space. But it would be impossible to show that the parts of a number had +a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state +what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, +for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which +does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that +such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to +another. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one' is prior to 'two', +and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of number may be said to +possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any +distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech. +None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is +pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the +parts do not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities +consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not. + +Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the +category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a +quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one +of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative +terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the +surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or +a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things +cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, +should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be +made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, +or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size +of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area +which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, +are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the +name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. + +Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this +is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits +long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any such +quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of +'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not quantitative, but +relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called +rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain +is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter +is greater than others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a +reference here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and +'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or +a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people in a village, +and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as +numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in +it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those +in the house. The terms 'two cubits long', 'three cubits long', and so +on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation, +for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, +plain that these are to be classed as relative. + +Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no +contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is +not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to +something external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it +will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at +one and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to +themselves. For it happens at times that the same thing is both small +and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one +thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the same thing +comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of +such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same +moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that +nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For +though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one +is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time +both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in +contrary ways at one and the same time. + +Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary +to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same +thing is both great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great' +is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term 'great', +therefore, is not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of +'little'. And even though a man should call these terms not relative +but quantitative, they would not have contraries. + +It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to +admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of +'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and +this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the +universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in +defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial +metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within +the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance. + +Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing +cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly +with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than +what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than +another set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly +time than another. Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that +have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be +predicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of +variation of degree. + +The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality +are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be +equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or +unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied +to them, indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been +mentioned. + +That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed +equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one +particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with +another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of +similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be +called equal and unequal. + + + +Section 2 + + +Part 7 + +Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of +something else or related to something else, are explained by reference +to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by +reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else +that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external +reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it +is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other +relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and +attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to +something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of +something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the +attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been +mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which +is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or +some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one +mountain is called great in comparison with another; for the +mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, +that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all +other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted +that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but +attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are +not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid +attitudes. + +It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a +contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a +contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; +'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term. + +It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For +'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications +'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in +character: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear a +reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative +term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as 'double' +admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the +term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the +master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its half; by 'half', the +half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by +'less', less than that which is greater. + +So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express +the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean +knowledge of the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be +apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; +by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception. + +Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to +exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the +relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a +wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two +will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird +is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original +statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to +the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but +qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the +connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having +reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as +being such because of its wings. + +Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists +by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a +rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will +not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a +boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot +use the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find +its explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our +definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like +'ruddered' as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus +accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the +'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all +other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative +of that which is 'headed', than as that of an animal, for the animal +does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head. + +Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is +related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we +derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is +reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived +the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'. + +All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add +this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as +haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be +interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case +of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there +will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that +name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant +significance. The term 'slave', if defined as related, not to a master, +but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally +connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the +statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to be correlative +with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all +irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute +left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with +that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative +of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant +attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of +knowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' +alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave +will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be +the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not +correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that +alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the +stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. + +For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the +man', or the correlative of 'the wing' is 'the bird'; if the attribute +'master' be withdrawn from 'the man', the correlation between 'the man' +and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, +the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be +withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative; for +if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' +has no correlative. + +Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly +designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if +not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology +is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. + +Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is +for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The +existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is +a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence +of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are +merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; +for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice +versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not +appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence +simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before +knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge +of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, +to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which +was contemporaneous with that of its object. + +Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at +the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of +this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not +exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything +to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object +does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in +the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an +object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, +yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all +animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might +yet be many objects of knowledge. + +This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of +perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the +perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but +the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the +perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in +which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is +annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a +perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that +perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the +perceptible involves that of perception. + +But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the +perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that +perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, +sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. + +Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving +subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. +But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water +and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist +before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it +would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. + +It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, +as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case +of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it +is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor +parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is +not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the +parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or +head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular +person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of +secondary substances; the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not +defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is +only relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as +it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is +not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a +difference of opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are +defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a +part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative +character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was +complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no +substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if +those things only are properly called relative in the case of which +relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, +perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found. + +The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact +that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not +make it essentially relative. + +From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative +thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. +Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular +thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of +which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he +knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all +that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is +relative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man +knows definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also +forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there +is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not +know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more +beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely +know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know +indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less +beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does +not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no +longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than +something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing +was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends +some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also +definitely to which it is related. + +Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is +possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not +necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. +It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus +these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to +say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a +difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without +more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard +to details is not without advantage. + + + +Part 8 + +By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such +and such. + +Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let +us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in +being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of +knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired +only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character +and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes +place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as +justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or +dismissed, so as to give place to vice. + +By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily +changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, +disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in +one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, +becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all +other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has +itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which +case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit. + +It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which +are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for +those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to +have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are +disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus +habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in +ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter. + +Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not +necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said +also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those +who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the +corresponding habit. + +Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we +call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it +includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. +Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his +disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do +something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called +good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a +disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish +something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn +capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may +ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. +Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated +of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it +to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing +by reason of the lack of that capacity. + +A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and +affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort +of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, +and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is +evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them +are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. +Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called +white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases. + +The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those +things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is +not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this +what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called +affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are +affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of +producing an 'affection' in the way of perception. For sweetness has +the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so +it is with the rest of these qualities. + +Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said +to be affective qualities in this sense, but because they themselves +are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of +colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he +blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is +this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising +from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a +probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. +For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former +instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, +might be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the +corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All +conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and +lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and +duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said +to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in +natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease +or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout +life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of +these. + +Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be +rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, +but affections: for we are not said to be such in virtue of them. The man +who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, +nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be +constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected. + +Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. In like +manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That +temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain +deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as +insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or +irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states +which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other +elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are +called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and +such. + +Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are +called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when +vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such +circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be +affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but +affections. + +The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a +thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other +qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and +such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have +a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in +fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it. + +Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms +indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a +class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain +relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified +which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is +dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one +another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, +because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts +project beyond others. + +There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly +so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. + +These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from +them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are +said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost +all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of +the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us +the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on. + +There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under +consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it +should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to +the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, +is not derived from that of any quality; for both those capacities have +no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from +the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or +wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, +and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name +given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the +science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that +which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a +derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the +possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not +derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur often. + +We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of +some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the +aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it. + +One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the +contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, +also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, +may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is +contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is +black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such +colours, though qualities, have no contraries. + +If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a +quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply +the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted +that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, +injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor +place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be +applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries +falling under the category of quality. + +Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one +thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the +case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may +exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is +white, it may become whiter. + +Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we +should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties +might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which +are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility +of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very +well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in +the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the +case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are +classed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible +fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be +what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one +man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, +than another, and so on. + +The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do +not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have +to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the +triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or +circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not +applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the +square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the +definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of +the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be +compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of +degree. + +Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to +quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with +reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive +feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in +virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark +of quality. + +We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though +proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it +many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were +relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the +individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference +to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular +branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar +is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, +but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their +genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the +grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, +not the music of something. + +Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is +because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are +said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are +called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. +Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which +we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, +and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within +both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be +nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads. + + + +Section 3 + + +Part 9 + +Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of +degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being +cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They +also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a +greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. +Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, +then, is stated with regard to these categories. + +We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing +with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names +from those of the corresponding attitudes. + +As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily +intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, +that in the category of state are included such states as 'shod', +'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained +before. + + + +Part 10 + +The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. We must +next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite' is used. +Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to +one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to +positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. + +Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word +'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the +expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' +and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are +'blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the +propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'. + +(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are +explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being +indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition. Thus, +double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the +double of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing +known, in the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its +relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained +as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such +things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of +being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. + +(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way +interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not +spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad, nor +is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of +the black. These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those +contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally +present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain +either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in +the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an +intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body +of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other +should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are +predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other +should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the +terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those +contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an +intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the +body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should +be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that +everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are +predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary +that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of +which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that +may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of +contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and +black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; +the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one +nor the other. + +Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all +the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, +however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it +as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is +neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust. + +(iii) 'privatives' and 'positives' have reference to the same subject. +Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal +rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to +that to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that is +capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation +when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that +in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We +do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has +not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time +when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth +are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless +or blind. + +To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the +corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', +'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to +'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness is a +'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a +'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', +both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said +to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. + +To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of being +in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' +themselves are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both +cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind +opposed to having sight. + +That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial. +By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a +negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or +denial are not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in +the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the +type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to +the denial, as in the two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so +also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one +case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to +his not sitting. + +It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to +each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by +reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any +other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is +not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. +Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a +relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that +with which it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not +called the sight of blindness. + +That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and +'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is +plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they +have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the +subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are +predicated; for it is those, as we proved, in the case of which this +necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health +and disease, odd and even, as instances. But those contraries which +have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity. It is not +necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be +either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between +these contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, +moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of +which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two +contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a +constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is +necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the +other, should be present in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or +snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must +needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but +only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. +Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and +not either the one or the other, which must be present. + +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, neither +of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a +subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or +the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is +natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives' and +'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists +of those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not +belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an +intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either +the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every +appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the stage when it is +by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be +blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity +may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it +should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in +the one state or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries +which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that +either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate +subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be +present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that +'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of +the senses in which contraries are opposed. + +Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be +changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its +identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive +property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that +that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, +black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is +bad, good. The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of +life and thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he +should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might +change completely, or at any rate make very great progress; for a man +becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the +improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he +will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as +this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him +in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time. In +the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change in both +directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession to +privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become +blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not +regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new +set. + +(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong +manifestly to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this +case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the +other false. + +Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor +in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one to +be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither +of them is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other +as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the +same, of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as +'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of +combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the +opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. + +At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements +are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem +to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of +'Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it +true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other +false. For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, +but if he does not exist, both will be false; for neither 'Socrates is +ill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all. + +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not +exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject +exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false. +For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the +sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation. +Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and +the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of +vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent. + +But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists +or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly, if +Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', +'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is likewise +the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he +is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the +case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which +the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the +rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false. + + + +Part 11 + +That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the +contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But +the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For +defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being +an evil, and the mean, which is a good, is equally the contrary of the +one and of the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see +instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good. + +In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one +exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there +will be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, +there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates +is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two +contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual +at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if +that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not +possibly be one. + +It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects +which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require +as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, +without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their +subject the human soul. + +Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases +either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be +themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; +justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good +and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, +with terms under them. + + + +Part 12 + +There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior' to +another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in +this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more +ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' +imply greater length of time. + +Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence +of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to +'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist, +but if 'one' exists, it does not follow necessarily that 'two' exists: +thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, +that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one +on which the other depends is called 'prior' to that other. + +In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to any +order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which +use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is +posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the +propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are +prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the +exordium is prior in order to the narrative. + +Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is +better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In +common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as 'coming +first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most +far-fetched. + +Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is used. + +Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another. +For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the +other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be +by nature 'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are instances +of this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of +the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a +man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and +conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then +he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the +being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to +be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the truth or falsity +of the proposition depends on the fact of the man's being or not being. + +Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses. + + + +Part 13 + +The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied to +those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that +of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the +other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those +things, again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each +of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is +the cause of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the +double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if +there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there +is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the +being of the other. + +Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and +opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be +'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished +each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the +'winged' species is simultaneous with the 'terrestrial' and the 'water' +species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed +each to each, for the genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the +'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one of these is prior or +posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be +'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the +winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies. +Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' in point of nature, +which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by +one and the same method of differentiation. + +But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being cannot +be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will be the +genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it does +not follow necessarily that there will be the species 'water-animal'. + +Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature, the +being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same +time neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those +species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed +within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in +the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same +time. + + + +Part 14 + +There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, +diminution, alteration, and change of place. + +It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are +distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, +increase and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the +case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily +implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion. This is not +true, for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us +an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for +that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or +any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of +motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be +altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution +or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter +of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the +process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, +if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be +subject to alteration also. But there are some things which undergo +increase but yet not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon +is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is +with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, +therefore, are distinct. + +Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different +forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus +destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest +in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse +direction would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards +is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. + +In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that +have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It +appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here +also either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in the direction of +the contrary quality', just as we defined the contrary of change of +place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. +For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore +either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary +may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this +way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is +alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative +nature takes place. + + + +Part 15 + +The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place it is +used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for +we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it +has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's +height; for he is said to 'have' a height of three or four cubits. It +is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a +coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of +ourselves, as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a +part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the +case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to +'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such cases has +reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we +are said to 'have' a house or a field. A man is also said to 'have' a +wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most remote +meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean simply that the +husband lives with the wife. + +Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary +ones have all been enumerated. + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Categories, by Aristotle + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CATEGORIES *** + +***** This file should be named 2412.txt or 2412.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/1/2412/ + +Produced by Glyn Hughes. 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If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon + University" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". + +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + +The Categories + +By Aristotle + +Translated by E. M. Edghill + + +Section 1 + +Part 1 + +Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have +a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs +for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay +claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, +for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding +with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what +sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be +appropriate to that case only. + +On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which +have both the name and the definition answering to the name in +common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are +univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the +definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state +in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case +would be identical with that in the other. + +Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their +name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. +Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and +the courageous man from the word 'courage'. + +Part 2 + +Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the +latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of +the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'. + +Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are +never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the +individual man, and is never present in a subject. + +By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts +are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart +from the said subject. + +Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never +predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of +grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not +predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be +present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet +it is never predicable of anything. + +Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present +in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, +it is predicable of grammar. + +There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in +a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man +or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which +is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable +of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such +being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical +knowledge is present in a subject. + +Part 3 + +When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is +predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the +subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but +'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be +predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is +both 'man' and 'animal'. + +If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are +themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus +'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', +'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of +knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One +species of knowledge does not differ from another in being +'two-footed'. + +But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing +to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater +class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae +of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject. + +Part 4 + +Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, +quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, +action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of +substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as +'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such +attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', +'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market +place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last +year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms +indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to +cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', +affection. + +No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; +it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative +statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be +either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any +way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be +either true or false. + +Part 5 + +Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of +the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor +present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. +But in a secondary sense those things are called substances +within which, as species, the primary substances are included; +also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, +the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the +genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, +therefore-that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus +'animal,-are termed secondary substances. + +It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the +definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. +For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in +this case the name of the species man' is applied to the +individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the +individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated +of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and +animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are +predicable of the individual. + +With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present +in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name +nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are +present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, +there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. +For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of +that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the +definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of +the body. + +Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a +primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes +evident by reference to particular instances which occur. +'Animal' is predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the +individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it +could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species +'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in +individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which +it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus +everything except primary substances is either predicated of +primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did +not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. + +Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than +the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if +any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, +he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper +to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. +Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual +man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was +animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual +in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the +man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will +give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' +than by mentioning the genus 'plant'. + +Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances +in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie +every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of +them or present in them. Now the same relation which subsists +between primary substance and everything else subsists also +between the species and the genus: for the species is to the +genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated +of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the +genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the +species is more truly substance than the genus. + +Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, +no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a +more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the +species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual +horse by adopting the same method of definition. In the same way, +of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than +another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an +individual ox. + +It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we +exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera +alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the +predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by +stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any +individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by +stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things +that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, +are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these +alone, apart from primary substances, should be called +substances. + +Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because +they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the +same relation that subsists between primary substance and +everything else subsists also between the species and the genus +to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and +every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. +For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual +man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the +species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good +in all cases. + +It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never +present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in +a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to +secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments +(apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For +'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in +any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In +the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, +but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a +subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in +which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of +secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, +applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the +species and that of the genus with reference to the individual +man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject. + +Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case +that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The +characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of +the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in +man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be +predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. +For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated +of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic +may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' +is terrestrial. + +The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the +whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we +should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in +explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' +that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'. + +It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all +propositions of which they form the predicate, they are +predicated univocally. For all such propositions have for their +subject either the individual or the species. It is true that, +inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it +can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary +substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the +genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly the +differentiae are predicated of the species and of the +individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of +the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of +the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the +predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the +definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species +and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word +'univocal' was applied to those things which had both name and +definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every +proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the +predicate, these are predicated univocally. + +All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the +case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the +thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we +speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech +gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which +is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a +secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a +certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary +substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more +than one subject. + +Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the +term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but +species and genus determine the quality with reference to a +substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. +The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case +of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word +'animal' is herein using a word of wider extension than he who +uses the word 'man'. + +Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could +be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual +man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have +a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, +but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is +nothing that forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three +cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend +that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', +but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists. + +Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of +degree. I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more +or less truly substance than another, for it has already been +stated' that this is the case; but that no single substance +admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one +particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either +than himself at some other time or than some other man. One man +cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be +more or less white than some other white object, or as that which +is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other +beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist +in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being +white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, +being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other +time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it +is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, +nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. +Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree. + +The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of +admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than +substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any +which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot +be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: +this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But +one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is +yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual +person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, +at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This capacity +is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a +statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same +statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the +statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet, when the person in +question has risen, the same statement will be false. The same +applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is +sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if +still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be +allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in +which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that +substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which +was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. +Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was +bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all +other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of +admitting contrary qualities. But statements and opinions +themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the +alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality +comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' remains +unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, +according to circumstances. What has been said of statements +applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which +the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that +it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is +by itself changing that it does so. + +If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that +statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary +qualities, his contention is unsound. For statements and opinions +are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves +undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the +case of something else. The truth or falsity of a statement +depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the +statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there +is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. +As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot be +said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities. + +But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within +the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of +admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within +itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in +this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary +qualities. + +To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while +remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of +admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place +through a change in the substance itself. + +Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance. + +Part 6 + +Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some +quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative +position to the other parts: others have within them no such +relation of part to part. + +Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of +continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and +place. + +In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary +at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two +fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three +and seven also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, +would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should +be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate. +Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity. + +The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: +for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that +speech which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for +its parts have no common boundary. There is no common boundary at +which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from +the rest. + +A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is +possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In +the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the +case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane +have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common +boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a +line or a plane. + +Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, +past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, +likewise, is a continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid +occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary; it +follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the +parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of +the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous +quantity, for its parts have a common boundary. + +Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position +each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear +a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and +it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the +position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part +among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a +plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was +the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The +same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would +be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative +position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what +parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of +time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and +that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be +better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of +one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, +'one' is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts +of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it +would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each. +This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has +an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is +not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do +not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities +consist of parts which have position, and some of those which +have not. + +Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong +to the category of quantity: everything else that is called +quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we +have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, +that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of +what is white as large, because the surface over which the white +extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, +because the time covered is long; these things cannot in their +own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should +any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be +made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a +year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would +explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he +would state the area which it covered. Thus the things already +mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature +quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, +but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. + +Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities +this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of +'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or +of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' +was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these +are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small +absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of +comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain +large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than +others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference +here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and +'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called +small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people +in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are +many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a +house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the +theatre far outnumber those in the house. The terms 'two cubits +long, "three cubits long,' and so on indicate quantity, the terms +'great' and 'small' indicate relation, for they have reference to +an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to +be classed as relative. + +Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have +no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute +which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by +reference to something external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' +are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can +admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that +things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens +at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the +same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great +in comparison with another, so that the same thing comes to be +both small and great at one and the same time, and is of such a +nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment. +Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that +nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For +though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet +no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at +the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which +is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. + +Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be +contrary to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of +'small', and the same thing is both great and small at the same +time, then 'small' or 'great' is the contrary of itself. But this +is impossible. The term 'great', therefore, is not the contrary +of the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even though a +man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they +would not have contraries. + +It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears +to admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the +contrary of 'below', when it is the region at the centre they +mean by 'below'; and this is so, because nothing is farther from +the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. +Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men +have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those +things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated +by the greatest possible distance. + +Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One +thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. +Similarly with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more +truly three than what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three +more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time is +not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any +other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with +regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The +category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of +degree. + +The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and +inequality are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities +is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said +to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have +these terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds of +quantity that have been mentioned. + +That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be +termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular +disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by +no means compared with another in terms of equality and +inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the +distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and +unequal. + +Section 2 + +Part 7 + +Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be +of something else or related to something else, are explained by +reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' +is explained by reference to something else, for it is +superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the +expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the +double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything +else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. +habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The +significance of all these is explained by a reference to +something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of +something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the +attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that +have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the +nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the +preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate +the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison +with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by +comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar +must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes +have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and +standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is +itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not +themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid +attitudes. + +It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has +a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has +a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; +'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such +term. + +It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. +For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the +modifications 'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of +these is relative in character: for the terms 'like' and +'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a reference to something external. +Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of +variation of degree. No term such as 'double' admits of this +modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the term +'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the +master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its hall; by +'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that +which is less; by 'less,' less than that which is greater. + +So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to +express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by +knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that +which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, +perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is +apprehended by perception. + +Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to +exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which +the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states +that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion +between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be +possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The +reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the +wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many +creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, +then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be +reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference +necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as +being such because of its wings. + +Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word +exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we +define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our +definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have +this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have +no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the +word 'boat' cannot be said to find its explanation in the word +'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our definition would +perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' +as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus +accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for +the 'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it +is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as +the correlative of that which is 'headed', than as that of an +animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since +many animals have no head. + +Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing +is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a +name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the +first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, +when we derived the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'. + +All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I +add this condition because, if that to which they are related is +stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to +be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in +the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for +each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is +denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, +but by one of irrelevant significance. The term 'slave,' if +defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or +anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in +relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. +Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and +the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant +attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in +virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with +that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the +correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, +though all irrelevant attributes of the said 'master', such as +'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', 'human', should be removed, +and the attribute 'master' alone left, the stated correlation +existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it +is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other +hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, +when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in +virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated +correlation will be found to have disappeared. + +For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be +'the man', or the correlative of 'the wing"the bird'; if the +attribute 'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation +between 'the man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the +man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the +attribute 'winged' be withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will +no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not +winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no correlative. + +Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly +designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be +easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When +the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all +correlatives are interdependent. + +Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. +This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and +the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of +that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master +necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave +implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general +rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no +double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this +rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not +appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into +existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to +exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we +acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be +difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the +beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that +of its object. + +Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, +cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, +the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object +of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there +will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, +if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may +nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring +of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, +though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the +knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all +animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there +might yet be many objects of knowledge. + +This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the +object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of +perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also +will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not +cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a +body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if +that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the +body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if +the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases +to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that +of perception. + +But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the +perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that +perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, +heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. + +Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving +subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the +animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for +fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is +itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and +before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists +before perception. + +It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is +relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be +made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to +primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such +possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances +are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with +reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a +particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or +head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a +particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, +in the case of secondary substances; the species 'man' and the +species 'ox' are not defined with reference to anything outside +themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some +one's property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, +that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with +regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of +opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with +reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and +so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. +Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, +it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no +substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not +complete, if those things only are properly called relative in +the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary +condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma +may be found. + +The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the +fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else +does not make it essentially relative. + +>From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a +relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which +it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows +that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call +that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a +necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it +is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is +related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is +clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows +definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also +forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if +there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, +he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows +that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he +will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more +beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more +beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would +be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely +that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to +know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else +which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less +beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends +some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also +definitely to which it is related. + +Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is +possible to know their essential character definitely, but it +does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which +they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head +or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being +the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative +in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to +make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, +but to have raised questions with regard to details is not +without advantage. + +Part 8 + +By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be +such and such. + +Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of +quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from +disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. +The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for +knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it +is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, +unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or +any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, +self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, +so as to give place to vice. + +By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is +easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, +heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a +man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, +but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead +of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless +through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate +and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should +perhaps go so far as to call it a habit. + +It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits +which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to +displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but +volatile, are not said to have such and such a 'habit' as regards +knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or +worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in +this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent +and difficult to alter. + +Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are +not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit +may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus +disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have +not in all cases the corresponding habit. + +Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, +we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact +it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or +incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue +of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or +incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any +kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in +virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn +capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called +healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to +those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, +in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to +softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because +it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand +disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by +reason of the lack of that capacity. + +A third class within this category is that of affective qualities +and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of +this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; +heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective +qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those +things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such +by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it +contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains +whiteness; and so in all other cases. + +The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those +things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey +is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor +is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and +cold are called affective qualities, not because those things +which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said +qualities are capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of +perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of +taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these +qualities. + +Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not +said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they +themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many +changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is +ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so +on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such +affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his +constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the +corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of +bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily +present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a +man's natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding +colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, +therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and +lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor +and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we +are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they +originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about +through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or +indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to +be such and such because of these. + +Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may +easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, +not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such +virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to +be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale +through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather +to have been affected. + +Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. +In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of +the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its +origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I +mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for +people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. +Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but +arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are +difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called +qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and +such. + +Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered +ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a +man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a +bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper +somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are +therefore termed, not qualities, but affections. + +The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs +to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any +other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as +being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a +thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it +is straight or curved; in fact a thing's shape in every case +gives rise to a qualification of it. + +Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms +indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to +a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a +certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus +qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. +A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely +combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices +between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, +evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others. + +There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most +properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. + +These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name +from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on +them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, +indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified +is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', +'grammar', 'justice', give us the adjectives 'white', +'grammatical', 'just', and so on. + +There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under +consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed +of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the +name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of +an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for +lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the +inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to +which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is +classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called 'boxing' +or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name given to those +disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. +Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which +takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a +derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character +from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name +given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does +not occur often. + +We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed +of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of +the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent +on it. + +One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the +contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The +things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of +these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that +which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is +white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the +case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no +contraries. + +If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a +quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we +apply the names used to denote the other categories; for +instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and +justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither +quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category +but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So +it is with all other contraries falling under the category of +quality. + +Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated +of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is +also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the +same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did +before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter. + +Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if +we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, +difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all +those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, +who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that +justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree +themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they +possess these qualities, and that this is the case with +grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as +dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact +that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be +what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for +one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy +or just, than another, and so on. + +The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and +'quadrangular' do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor +indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to +which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are +all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to +which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to +differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle +than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the +circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term +proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be +compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation +of degree. + +Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar +to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be +predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category +its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with +reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus +this forms the peculiar mark of quality. + +We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though +proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in +it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions +were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is +relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is +explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge +of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus +explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything +external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative +at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar +is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of +something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the +music of something. + +Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is +because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we +are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually +possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in +some particular branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of +knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such +and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. +Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the +category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing +extraordinary in classing it under both these heads. + +Section 3 + +Part 9 + +Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of +variation of degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being +heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they +admit of contraries. They also admit of variation of degree: for +it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be +heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and affection +also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with +regard to these categories. + +We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were +dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived +their names from those of the corresponding attitudes. + +As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily +intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the +beginning, that in the category of state are included such states +as 'shod', 'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, +as was explained before. + +Part 10 + +The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. +We must next explain the various senses in which the term +'opposite' is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: +(i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one +another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives +to negatives. + +Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of +the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by +the expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries +by 'bad' and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and +'positives' are' blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of +affirmatives and negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does +not sit'. + +(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation +are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the +reference being indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some +other preposition. Thus, double is a relative term, for that +which is double is explained as the double of something. +Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same +sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to +its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that +which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, +then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being +correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the +other. + +(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way +interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good +is not spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of +the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as +the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition are +therefore distinct. Those contraries which are such that the +subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they +are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the +other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of +which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. +Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an +animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other +should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, +are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the +other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate +between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other +hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity +obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are +naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that +either the one or the other should be present in the body, +inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or +black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of +many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one +quality or the other should be present in that of which they are +predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be +good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries +have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are +grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the +intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the +one nor the other. + +Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow +and all the other colours that come between white and black; in +other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, +but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in +the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor +unjust. + +(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same +subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It +is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type +has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is +natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty +or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or +possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and +at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not +call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has +not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the +time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which +from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not +called toothless or blind. + +To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as +the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a +'positive', 'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is +not equivalent to 'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to +'blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in +a state of privation, but is not a 'privative'. Moreover, if +'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', both would be +predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be +blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. + +To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of +being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and +'privatives' themselves are opposite. There is the same type of +antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to +sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight. + +That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or +denial. By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by +'denial' a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of +the affirmation or denial are not propositions; yet these two are +said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and +denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same. +For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two +propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which +constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed +to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not +sitting. + +It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed +each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not +explained by reference to the other; sight is not sight of +blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the +relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of +sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover, +reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there +would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which +it was correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called +the sight of blindness. + +That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and +'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, +is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such +that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be +present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of +which they are predicated; for it is those, as we proved,' in the +case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. +Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as +instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are +not subject to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every +substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or +white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these +contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, +moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case +of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the +two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it +is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be +white, it is necessary determinately that one of the two +contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the +subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not +the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every +subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of +which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such +cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either +the one or the other, which must be present. + +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, +neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not +necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always +have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced +to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind +or to see. Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to +that class of contraries which consists of those which have no +intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong either to +that class which consists of contraries which have an +intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that +either the one or the other should form part of the constitution +of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached the +stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said +either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, +signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for +it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should +be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the +other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an +intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the +one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, +but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be +present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain +that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in +either of the senses in which contraries are opposed. + +Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there +should be changes from either into the other, while the subject +retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a +constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it +is possible that that that which is healthy should become +diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, +that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if +he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may +make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, +even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, +or at any rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more +and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement +was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will +make yet greater progress than he has made in the past; and as +this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish +him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of +time. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, +change in both directions is impossible. There may be a change +from possession to privation, but not from privation to +possession. The man who has become blind does not regain his +sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the +man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set. (iv) +Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly +to a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case +only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the +other false. + +Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of +correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is +it necessary for one to be true and the other false. Health and +disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false. +'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other as correlatives: +neither of them is true or false. The case is the same, of +course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as +'sight' and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of +combination of words, truth and falsity have no place, and all +the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. + +At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed +statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of +opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is +ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is well', but not even of such +composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must +always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists, one +will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both +will be false; for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is +well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all. + +In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does +not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the +subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and +the other false. For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of +'Socrates is blind' in the sense of the word 'opposite' which +applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it +is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for +when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are +false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent. + +But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject +exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For +manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions +'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other +false. This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he +does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is +not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, +which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with +reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, +that one of the pair must be true and the other false. + +Part 11 + +That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the +contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. +But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an +evil. For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, +this also being an evil, and the mean. which is a good, is +equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a +few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the +contrary of an evil is a good. + +In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one +exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy +there will be health and no disease, and again, if everything +turns white, there will be white, but no black. Again, since the +fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that +Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain +in one and the same individual at the same time, both these +contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well +was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one. + +It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in +subjects which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and +health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and +black require a body, without further qualification; justice and +injustice require as their subject the human soul. + +Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all +cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary +genera or be themselves genera. White and black belong to the +same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, +virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but +are themselves actual genera, with terms under them. + +Part 12 + +There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be +'prior' to another. Primarily and most properly the term has +reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate +that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the +expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply greater length of +time. + +Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the +sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' +is 'prior' to 'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly +that 'one' must exist, but if 'one' exists, it does not follow +necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the sequence subsisting +cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of +two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other +depends is called 'prior' to that other. + +In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to +any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in +sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and +that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are +prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of +the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case +of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative. + +Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which +is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. +In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love +as 'coming first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps +the most far-fetched. + +Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is +used. + +Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet +another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies +that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may +reasonably be said to be by nature 'prior' to the effect. It is +plain that there are instances of this. The fact of the being of +a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, +and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the +proposition wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if +the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is. +The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the +being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem +somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition, for the +truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the +man's being or not being. + +Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses. + +Part 13 + +The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately +applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is +simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is +prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be +simultaneous in point of time. Those things, again, are +'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each of which +involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the +cause of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the +double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, +if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a +half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is +the cause of the being of the other. + +Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and +opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be +'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are +distinguished each from each by one and the same method of +division. Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous with the +'terrestrial' and the 'water' species. These are distinguished +within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the +genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the 'terrestrial', and the +'water' species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to +another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be +'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, +the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into +subspecies. Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' +point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are +distinguished each from each by one and the same method of +differentiation. + +But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being +cannot be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there +will be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus +'animal', it does not follow necessarily that there will be the +species 'water-animal'. + +Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature, +the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at +the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other's +being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from +each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, +are 'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense of the word which +come into being at the same time. + +Part 14 + +There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, +increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. + +It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of +movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from +destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so +on. But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the +process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts +of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections, +or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from +all other sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not +suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of +motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it +were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would +forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one +of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of +fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the +process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion +would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, +necessarily be subject to alteration also. But there are some +things which undergo increase but yet not alteration. The square, +for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase +but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this +sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct. + +Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the +different forms of motion have their own contraries in other +forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution +of increase, rest in a place, of change of place. As for this +last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly +its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion +downwards and vice versa. + +In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those +that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its +contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should +define the contrary here also either as 'rest in its quality' or +as 'change in the direction of the contrary quality', just as we +defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place +or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is altered +when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its +quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called +the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way +becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is +alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a +qualitative nature takes place. + +Part 15 + +The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place +it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other +quality, for we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a +virtue. Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for +instance, in the case of a man's height; for he is said to 'have' +a height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with +regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a coat or tunic; or +in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as +a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of +us, as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the +case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said +to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat. The expression in such +cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that which has +been acquired; we are said to 'have' a house or a field. A man is +also said to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband, and this +appears to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use +of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife. + +Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most +ordinary ones have all been enumerated. + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's etext, The Categories, by Aristotle + diff --git a/old/arist10.zip b/old/arist10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..fab4d3b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/arist10.zip |