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+Project Gutenberg's Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by W. Basil Worsfold
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Lord Milner's Work in South Africa
+       From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902
+
+Author: W. Basil Worsfold
+
+Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26490]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by A www.PGDP.net Volunteer, Christine P. Travers
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+http://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected,
+all other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's
+spelling has been maintained.]
+
+
+
+
+LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA
+
+FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT IN 1897 TO
+THE PEACE OF VEREENIGING IN 1902
+
+
+CONTAINING HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED INFORMATION
+
+
+BY W. BASIL WORSFOLD
+
+
+WITH PORTRAITS AND MAP
+
+
+
+
+     "What would have been the position to-day in South Africa if
+     there had not been a man prepared to take upon himself
+     responsibility; a man whom difficulties could not conquer, whom
+     disasters could not cow, and whom obloquy could never
+     move?"--LORD GOSCHEN _in the House of Lords, March 29th, 1906_
+
+
+
+
+  LONDON
+  JOHN MURRAY ALBEMARLE STREET W
+  1906
+
+
+_This Edition enjoys copyright in all countries signatory to the Berne
+Convention, as well as in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and all British
+Colonies and Dependencies._
+
+
+_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In sending this book to press I have only two remarks to make by way
+of preface.
+
+The first is wholly personal. It has been my good fortune to reside
+twice for a considerable period in South Africa--first in the
+neighbourhood of Capetown (1883-5), and afterwards in Johannesburg
+(1904-5). During these periods of residence, and also during the long
+interval between them, I have been brought into personal contact with
+many of the principal actors in the events which are related in this
+book. While, therefore, no pains have been spared to secure accuracy
+by a careful study of official papers and other reliable publications,
+my information is not derived by any means exclusively from these
+sources.
+
+My second remark is the expression of a hope that the contents of this
+book may be regarded not merely as a chapter of history, but also as a
+body of facts essential to the full understanding of the circumstances
+and conditions of South Africa, as it is to-day. Since the restoration
+of peace--an event not yet five years old--a great change has been
+wrought in the political and economic framework of this province of
+the empire. None the less, with a few conspicuous exceptions, almost
+all of the principal actors in these pages are still there; and,
+presumably, they are very much the same men now as they were before,
+and during, the war. And in this connection it remains to notice an
+aspect of the South African struggle which transcends all others in
+fruitfulness and importance. It was a struggle to keep South Africa
+not a dependency of Great Britain, but a part of the empire. The
+over-sea Britains, understanding it in this sense, took their share in
+it. They made their voices heard in the settlement. The service which
+they thus collectively performed was great. It would have been
+infinitely greater if they had been directly represented in an
+administration nominally common to them and the mother country. No
+political system can be endowed with effective unity--with that
+organic unity which is the only effective unity--unless it is
+possessed of a single vehicle of thought and action. To create this
+vehicle--an administrative body in which all parts of the empire would
+be duly represented--is difficult to-day. The forces of disunion,
+which are at work both at home and beyond the seas, may make it
+impossible to-morrow.
+
+                                   W. B. W.
+
+  RIDGE, NEAR CAPEL, SURREY,
+  _October 19th, 1906_
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+CHAPTER I                                               Page
+
+  DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT.................. 1
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+  THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS............... 48
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+  A YEAR OF OBSERVATION.................................. 75
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+  UNDER WHICH FLAG?..................................... 130
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+  PLAYING FOR TIME...................................... 188
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+  THE ULTIMATUM......................................... 253
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+  THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS............................. 300
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+  THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY...................... 341
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+  THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT........................... 373
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+  THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION............... 413
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+  PREPARING FOR PEACE................................... 470
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+  THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING.......................... 536
+
+
+INDEX................................................... 585
+
+
+
+
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+
+  PORTRAIT OF LORD MILNER                      _Frontispiece_
+    _From a photograph by Elliott & Fry (Photogravure)_
+
+                                            FACING PAGE
+
+  LORD MILNER AT SUNNYSIDE.............................. 473
+
+  MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA........................... _At the End_
+
+
+
+
+LORD MILNER
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT
+
+
+The failure of British administration in South Africa during the
+nineteenth century forms a blemish upon the record of the Victorian
+era that is at first sight difficult to understand. If success could
+be won in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in India and in Egypt,
+why failure in South Africa? For failure it was. A century of wars,
+missionary effort, British expansion, industrial development, of lofty
+administrative ideals and great men sacrificed, had left the two
+European races with political ambitions so antagonistic, and social
+differences so bitter, that nothing less than the combined military
+resources of the colonies and the mother-country sufficed to compel
+the Dutch to recognise the British principle of "equal rights for all
+white men south of the Zambesi." Among the many contributory causes of
+failure that can be distinguished, the two most prominent are the
+nationality difficulty and the native question. But these are problems
+of administration that have been solved elsewhere: the former in
+Canada and the latter in India. Or, to turn to agencies of a
+different order, is the cause of failure to be found in a grudging
+nature--the existence of physical conditions that made it difficult
+for the white man, or for the white and coloured man together, to
+wring a livelihood from the soil? The answer is that the like material
+disadvantages have been conquered in Australia, India, and in Egypt,
+by Anglo-Saxon energy. We might apply the Socratic method throughout,
+traversing the entire range of our distinguishable causes; but in
+every case the inquiry would reveal success in some other portion of
+the Anglo-Saxon domain to darken failure in South Africa.
+
+Nevertheless, in so far as any single influence can be assigned to
+render intelligible a result brought about by many agencies, various
+in themselves and operating from time to time in varying degrees, the
+explanation is to be found in a little incident that happened in the
+second year of the Dutch East India Company's settlement at the Cape
+of Good Hope. The facts are preserved for us by the diary which
+Commander Van Riebeck was ordered to keep for the information of his
+employers. Under the date October 19th, 1653, we read that David
+Janssen, a herdsman, was found lying dead of assegai wounds, inflicted
+by the Beechranger Hottentots, while the cattle placed under his
+charge were seen disappearing round the curve of the Lion's Head. The
+theft had been successfully accomplished through the perfidy of a
+certain "Harry," a Hottentot chief, who was living on terms of
+friendship with the Dutch--a circumstance which was sufficiently
+apparent from the fact that the raid was timed to take place at an
+hour on Sunday morning when the whole of the little community, with
+the exception of two sentinels and a second herdsman, were assembled
+to hear a sermon from the "Sick-Comforter," Wylant. It was the first
+conflict between the Dutch and the natives; for Van Riebeck had been
+bidden, for various excellent reasons, to keep on good terms with the
+Hottentots, and to treat them kindly. But the murder of a white man
+was a serious matter. Kindness scarcely seemed to meet the case; and
+so Van Riebeck applied to the Directors, the famous Chamber of
+Seventeen, for definite instructions as to the course which he must
+pursue.
+
+[Sidenote: Van Riebeck's difficulty.]
+
+He was told that only the actual murderer of David Janssen (if
+apprehended) was to be put to death; that cattle equal in amount to
+the cattle stolen were to be recovered, but only from the actual
+robbers; and that "Harry," if necessary, should be sent to prison at
+Batavia. But he was not otherwise to molest or injure the offending
+Hottentots. Excellent advice, and such as we should expect from the
+countrymen of Grotius in their most prosperous era. But unfortunately
+it was quite impossible for Van Riebeck, with his handful of soldiers
+and sailors, planted at the extremity of the great barbaric continent
+of Africa, to think of putting it into effect. He replied that he had
+no means of identifying the individual wrong-doers, and that the
+institution of private property was unknown among the Hottentots. The
+only method by which the individual could be punished was by punishing
+the tribe, and he therefore proposed to capture the tribe and their
+cattle. But this was a course of action which was repugnant to the
+Directors' sense of justice. It aroused, besides, a vision of
+reinforcements ordered from Batavia, and of disbursements quite
+disproportionate to the practical utility of the Cape station as an
+item in the system of the Company. In vain Van Riebeck urged that a
+large body of slaves and ten or twelve hundred head of cattle would be
+a great addition to the resources of the settlement. The Chamber of
+Seventeen refused to sanction the proposals of the commander, and, as
+its own were impracticable, nothing was done. The Beechranger tribe
+escaped with impunity, and the Hottentots, as a whole, were emboldened
+to make fresh attacks upon the European settlers.
+
+[Sidenote: The Afrikander stock.]
+
+This simple narrative is a lantern that sheds a ray of light upon an
+obscure subject. Two points are noticeable in the attitude of the home
+authority. First, there is its inability to grasp the local
+conditions; and second, the underlying assumption that a moral
+judgment based upon the conditions of the home country, if valid, must
+be equally valid in South Africa. By the time that the home authority
+had become Downing Street instead of the peripatetic Chamber of
+Seventeen, the field of mischievous action over which these
+misconceptions operated had become enlarged. The natives were there,
+as before; but, in addition to the natives, there had grown up a
+population of European descent, some thirty thousand in number, whose
+manner of life and standards of thought and conduct were scarcely more
+intelligible to the British, or indeed to the European mind, than
+those of the yellow-skinned Hottentot or the brown-skinned Kafir. A
+century and a half of the Dutch East India Company's government--a
+government "in all things political purely despotic, in all things
+commercial purely monopolist"--had produced a people unlike any other
+European community on the face of the earth. Of the small original
+stock from which the South African Dutch are descended, one-quarter
+were Huguenot refugees from France, an appreciable section were
+German, and the institution of slavery had added to this admixture the
+inevitable strain of non-Aryan blood. But this racial change was by no
+means all that separated the European population in the Cape Colony
+from the Dutch of Holland. A more potent agency had been at work. The
+corner-stone of the policy of the Dutch East India Company was the
+determination to debar the settlers from all intercourse--social,
+intellectual, commercial, and political--with their kinsmen in Europe.
+One fact will suffice to show how perfectly this object was attained.
+Incredible as it may seem, it is the case that at the end of the
+eighteenth century no printing-press was to be found in the Cape
+Colony, nor had this community of twenty thousand Europeans the means
+of knowing the nature of the laws and regulations of the Government by
+which it was ruled. So long and complete an isolation from European
+civilisation produced a result which is as remarkable in itself as it
+is significant to the student of South African history. This
+phenomenon was the existence, in the nineteenth century, of a
+community of European blood whose moral and intellectual standards
+were those of the seventeenth.
+
+[Sidenote: The nationality difficulty.]
+
+Our dip into the early history of South Africa is not purposeless. It
+does not, of course, explain the failure of British administration;
+but it brings us into touch with circumstances that were bound to make
+the task of governing the Cape Colony--a task finally undertaken by
+England in 1806--one of peculiar difficulty. The native population was
+strange, but the European population was even more strange and
+abnormal. If we had been left to deal with the native population alone
+we should have experienced no serious difficulty in rendering them
+harmless neighbours, and have been able to choose our own time for
+entering upon the responsibilities involved in the administration of
+their territories. But, coming second on the field, we were bound to
+modify our native policy to suit the conditions of a preexisting
+relationship between the white and black races that was not of our
+creation, and one, moreover, that was in many respects repugnant to
+British ideas of justice. Nor was this all. The old European
+population, which should have been, naturally, our ally and
+fellow-worker in the task of native administration, gradually changed
+from its original position of a subject nationality to that of a
+political rival; and, as such, openly bid against us for the
+mastership of the native African tribes.
+
+Now when two statesmen are pitted against each other, of whom one is a
+man whose methods of attack are limited by nineteenth-century ideas,
+while the morality of the other, being that of the seventeenth
+century, permits him greater freedom of action, it is obvious that the
+first will be at a disadvantage. And this would be the case more than
+ever if the nineteenth-century statesman was under the impression that
+his political antagonist was a man whose code of morals was identical
+with his own. When once he had learnt that the moral standard of the
+other was lower than, or different from, his own, he would of course
+make allowance for the circumstance, and he would then be able to
+contest the position with him upon equal terms. But until he had
+grasped this fact he would be at a disadvantage.
+
+Generally speaking, the representatives of the British Government,
+both Governors and High Commissioners, soon learnt that neither the
+natives nor the Dutch population could be dealt with on the same
+footing as a Western European. But the British Government cannot be
+said to have thoroughly learnt the same lesson until, in almost the
+last week of the nineteenth century, the three successive defeats of
+Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso aroused it to a knowledge of the
+fact that we had been within an ace of losing South Africa. Many,
+indeed, would question whether even now the lesson had been thoroughly
+learnt. But, however this may be, it is certain that throughout the
+nineteenth century the Home Government wished to treat both the
+natives and the Dutch in South Africa on a basis of British ideas; and
+that by so doing it constantly found itself in conflict with its own
+local representatives, who knew that the only hope of success lay in
+dealing with both alike on a basis of South African ideas.
+
+As the result of this chronic inability of British statesmen to
+understand South Africa, it follows that the most instructive manner
+of regarding our administration of that country during the nineteenth
+century is to get a clear conception of the successive divergences of
+opinion between the home and the local authorities.
+
+At the very outset of British administration--during the temporary
+occupation of the Cape from 1795 to 1808--we find a theoretically
+perfect policy laid down for the guidance of the early English
+Governors in their treatment of the Boers, or Dutch frontier farmers.
+It is just as admirable, in its way, as were the instructions for the
+treatment of the Hottentots furnished by the Directors of the Dutch
+East India Company to Van Riebeck. In a despatch of July, 1800, the
+third Duke of Portland, who was then acting as Secretary for the
+Colonies, writes:
+
+[Sidenote: Non-interference.]
+
+     "Considering the tract of country over which these border
+     inhabitants are dispersed, the rude and uncultivated state in
+     which they live, and the wild notions of independence which
+     prevail among them, I am afraid any attempts to introduce
+     civilisation and a strict administration of justice will be slow
+     in their progress, and likely, if not proceeded upon with caution
+     and management, rather to create a spirit of resistance, or to
+     occasion them to emigrate still further from the seat of
+     government, than answer the beneficent views with which they
+     might be undertaken. In fact, it seems to me the proper system of
+     policy to observe to them is to interfere as little as possible
+     in their domestic concerns and interior economy; to consider them
+     rather as distant communities dependent upon the Government than
+     as subjects necessarily amenable to the laws and regulations
+     established within the precincts of Government. Mutual advantages
+     arising from barter and commerce, and a strict adherence to good
+     faith and justice in all arrangements with them, joined to
+     efficient protection and occasional acts of kindness on the part
+     of the Government, seem likely to be the best means of securing
+     their attachment."
+
+Who would have thought that this statement of policy, admirable as it is
+at first sight, contained in itself the germ of a political heresy of
+the first magnitude? Yet so it was. The principle of non-interference,
+here for the first time enunciated and subsequently followed with fatal
+effect, could not be applied by a nineteenth-century administration to
+the case of a seventeenth-century community without its virtually
+renouncing the functions of government. Obviously this was not the
+intention of the home authority. There remained the difficulty of
+knowing when to apply, and when not to apply, the principle; and
+directly a specific case arose there was the possibility that, while the
+local authority, with a full knowledge of the local conditions, might
+think interference necessary, the home authority, without such
+knowledge, might take an opposite view.
+
+[Sidenote: Slaghter's Nek.]
+
+A very few years sufficed to show that the most ordinary exercise of
+the functions of government might be regarded as an "interference with
+the domestic concerns and interior economy" of the European subjects
+of the British Crown in South Africa. At the time of the permanent
+occupation of the Cape (1806) the population of the colony consisted
+of three classes: 26,720 persons of European descent, 17,657
+Hottentots, and 29,256 returned as slaves. One of the first measures
+of the British Governor, Lord Caledon, was the enactment of a series
+of regulations intended to confer civil rights on the Hottentots,
+while at the same time preventing them from using their freedom at the
+expense of the European population. From the British, or even
+European point of view, this was a piece of elementary justice to
+which no man could possibly take exception. As applied to the
+conditions of the Franco-Dutch population in the Cape Colony it was,
+in fact, a serious interference with their "domestic concerns and
+internal economy." And as such it produced the extraordinary protest
+known to history as the "Rebellion" of Slaghter's Nek. There was no
+question as to the facts. Booy, the Hottentot, had completed his term
+of service with Frederick Bezuidenhout, the Boer, and was therefore
+entitled, under the Cape law, to leave his master's farm, and to
+remove his property. All this Bezuidenhout admitted; but when it came
+to a question of yielding obedience to the magistrate's order, the
+Boer said "No." In the words of Pringle, "He boldly declared that he
+considered this interference between him (a free burgher) and _his_
+Hottentot to be a presumptuous innovation upon his rights, and an
+intolerable usurpation of tyrannical authority."
+
+And the danger of allowing the Boers to pursue their
+seventeenth-century dealings with the natives became rapidly greater
+when the European Colonists, Dutch and English, were brought, by their
+natural eastward expansion, into direct contact with the masses of
+military Bantu south and east of the Drakenberg chain of
+mountains--the actual dark-skinned "natives" of South Africa as it is
+known to the people of Great Britain. The Boer frontiersman, with his
+aggressive habits and ingrained contempt for a dark-skin,
+disintegrated the Bantu mass before we were ready to undertake the
+work of reconstruction. And therefore the local British authority soon
+learnt that non-interference in the case of the Boer generally meant
+the necessity of a much more serious interference at a subsequent date
+with both Boer and Kafir. And so non-interference, in the admirable
+spirit of the Duke of Portland's despatch, came to bear one meaning in
+Downing Street and quite another in Capetown.
+
+[Sidenote: D'Urban's policy.]
+
+The earliest of the three crucial "divergences of opinion," to which
+collectively the history of our South African administration owes its
+sombre hue, was that which led to the reversal of Sir Benjamin
+D'Urban's frontier policy by Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg)
+at the end of the year 1835. The circumstances were these. On
+Christmas Day, 1834, the Kafirs (without any declaration of war,
+needless to say) invaded the Cape Colony, murdering the settlers in
+the isolated farms, burning their homesteads, and driving off their
+cattle. After a six months' campaign, in which the Dutch and British
+settlers fought by the side of the regular troops, a treaty was made
+with the Kafir chiefs which, in the opinion of D'Urban and his local
+advisers, would render the eastern frontier of the Colony secure from
+further inroads. The Kafirs were to retire to the line of the Kei
+River, thus surrendering part of their territory to the European
+settlers who had suffered most severely from the invasion; while a
+belt of loyal Kafirs, supported by a chain of forts, was to be
+interposed between the defeated tribes and the colonial farmsteads. In
+addition to these measures, D'Urban proposed to compensate the
+settlers for the enormous losses[1] which they had incurred; since, as
+a contemporary and not unfriendly writer[2] puts it, the British
+Government had exposed them for fourteen years to Kafir depredations,
+rather than acknowledge the existence of a state of affairs that must
+plainly have compelled it to make active exertions for their
+protection.
+
+         [Footnote 1: The official returns showed that 456 farm-houses
+         had been wholly, and 350 partially, destroyed; and that 60
+         waggons, 5,715 horses, 111,930 head of horned cattle, and
+         161,930 sheep had been carried off by the Kafirs. And this
+         apart from the remuneration claimed by the settlers for
+         services in the field, and commandeered cattle and supplies.]
+
+         [Footnote 2: Cloete. See note, p. 16.]
+
+The view of the home authority was very different. In the opinion of
+His Majesty's ministers at Downing Street the Kafir invasion was the
+result of a long series of unjustifiable encroachments on the part of
+the European settlers. D'Urban was instructed, therefore, to reinstate
+the Kafirs in the districts from which they had retired under the
+treaty of September, 1835, and to cancel all grants of land beyond the
+Fish River--the original eastern boundary of the Colony--which the
+Colonial Government had made to its European subjects from 1817
+onwards; while, as for compensation, any indemnity was altogether out
+of the question, since the colonists had only themselves to thank for
+the enmity of the natives--if, indeed, they had not deliberately
+provoked the war with a view to the acquisition of fresh territory.
+
+The divergence between these two opinions is sufficiently well marked.
+To trace the precise agencies through which two diametrically opposed
+views were evolved on this occasion from the same groundwork of facts
+would be too lengthy a business; but, by way of comment, we may recall
+two statements, each significant and authentic. Cloete, writing while
+the events in question were still fresh in his mind, says of Lord
+Glenelg's despatch: "A communication more cruel, unjust, and insulting
+to the feelings not only of Sir Benjamin D'Urban ... but of the
+inhabitants ... could hardly have been penned by a declared enemy of
+the country and its Governor." And Sir George Napier, by whom D'Urban
+was superseded, stated in evidence given before the House of Commons:
+"My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes, have confirmed me
+that I was wrong and Sir Benjamin D'Urban was perfectly right; that if
+he meant to keep Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing
+so was by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them."
+
+[Sidenote: The Great Trek.]
+
+This settlement of a South African question upon a basis of British,
+or rather non-South African, ideas was followed by events as notorious
+as they were disastrous. It must be remembered that in 1819-20 the
+first and only effort to introduce a considerable British population
+into South Africa had been successfully carried out when the "Albany"
+settlers, to the number of some five thousand, were established in
+this and other districts upon the eastern border of the Cape Colony.
+The colonial farmers who suffered from the Kafir invasion of 1834-5
+were not exclusively Boers. Among them there were many members of the
+new British population, and the divergence of opinion between D'Urban
+and Lord Glenelg was all the more significant, since in this case the
+British settlers were in agreement with the Boers. It was no longer
+merely a divergence of views as between the local and the home
+authority, but as between the British in Britain and the British in
+South Africa. It must also be remembered that, in the same year as the
+Kafir invasion, a social revolution--the emancipation of slaves--had
+been accomplished in the Cape Colony by an Act of the British
+Parliament, in comparison with which the nationalisation of the
+railways or of the mines in England would seem a comparatively
+trifling disturbance of the system of private property to the
+Englishman of to-day. The reversal of D'Urban's arrangements for the
+safety of the eastern frontier was not only bad in itself, but it came
+at a bad time. Whether the secession of the Emigrant Farmers would in
+any case have taken place as the result of the emancipation of slaves
+is a matter which cannot now be decided. But, however this may be, the
+fact remains that two men so well qualified to give an opinion on the
+subject as Judge Cloete and Sir John Robinson, the first Prime
+Minister of Natal, unhesitatingly ascribe the determining influence
+which drove the Boers to seek a home beyond the jurisdiction of the
+British Government to the sense of injustice created by the measures
+dictated by Lord Glenelg, and by the whole spirit of his despatch.[3]
+And this judgment is supported by the fact that the wealthier Dutch of
+the Western Province were much more seriously affected by the
+emancipation of slaves than the "Boers" of the eastern districts of
+the Colony; yet it was these latter, of course, who provided the bulk
+of the emigrants who crossed the Orange River in the years of the
+Great Trek (1835-8) We shall not therefore be drawing an extravagantly
+improbable conclusion, if we decide that the movement which divided
+European South Africa was due to a well-ascertained divergence of
+opinion between the home and local authorities--both British.
+
+         [Footnote 3: For the benefit of those who may desire to read
+         the passages in which these opinions are expressed, I append
+         the references. Cloete's opinion is to be found in his "Five
+         Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers," delivered
+         before the Natal Society and published at Capetown in 1856. A
+         reprint of this work was published by Mr. Murray in 1899. Sir
+         John Robinson's opinion, which endorses the views of Mrs.
+         Anna Elizabeth Steenekamp as expressed in _The Cape Monthly
+         Magazine_ for September, 1876, is to be found at pp. 46, 47
+         of his "A Lifetime in South Africa" (Smith, Elder, 1900).]
+
+[Sidenote: The birth of the republic.]
+
+[Sidenote: Sir George Grey.]
+
+The results of this secession of something like one-fourth of the
+Franco-Dutch population are common knowledge. Out of the scattered
+settlements founded by the Emigrant Farmers beyond the borders of the
+Colony were created, in 1852 (Sand River Convention) and 1854
+(Bloemfontein Convention), the two Boer Republics, which half a century
+later withstood for two years and eight months the whole available
+military force of the British Empire. The first effect of the secession
+was to erect the republican Dutch into a rival power which bid against
+the British Government for the territory and allegiance of the natives.
+Secession, therefore, made the inevitable task of establishing the
+supremacy of the white man in South Africa infinitely more costly both
+in blood and treasure. The British nation accepted the task, which fell
+to it as paramount power, with the greatest reluctance. The endless and
+apparently aimless Kafir wars exhausted the patience of the country, and
+the destruction of an entire British regiment by Ketshwayo's[4] _impis_
+created a feeling of deep resentment against the great High
+Commissioner, whose policy was held--unreasonably enough--responsible
+for the military disaster of Isandlhwana. Two opportunities of
+recovering the lost solidarity of the Europeans were presented before
+the republican Dutch had set themselves definitely to work for the
+supremacy of South Africa through reunion with their colonial kinsfolk.
+That both were lost was due at bottom to the disgust of the British
+people at the excessive cost and burden of establishing a civilised
+administration over the native population in South Africa. But in both
+cases the immediate agency of disaster was the refusal of the Home
+Government to listen to the advice of its local representative. Sir
+George Grey would have regained the lost solidarity of the Europeans by
+taking advantage of the natural recoil manifested among the Free State
+Dutch from independence and responsibility towards the more settled and
+prosperous life assured by British rule. His proposal was to unite the
+Cape Colony, Natal, and the Free State in a federal legislature,
+consisting of representatives chosen by popular vote in the several
+states. In urging this measure he took occasion to combat the
+pessimistic views of South African affairs which were prevalent in
+England. The country was not commercially useless, but of "great and
+increasing value." Its people did not desire Kafir wars, but were well
+aware of the much greater advantages which they derived from the
+peaceful pursuits of industry. The colonists were themselves willing to
+contribute to the defence of that part of the Queen's dominions in which
+they lived. And, finally, the condition of the natives was not hopeless,
+for the missionaries were producing most beneficial effects upon the
+tribes of the interior. But the most powerful argument which Grey used
+was his ruthless exposure of the futility of the Conventions. By
+allowing the Boer emigrants to grow into independent communities the
+British Government believed that not only had they relieved themselves
+of responsibility for the republican Dutch, but that they had secured,
+in addition, the unfaltering allegiance of the larger Dutch population
+which remained behind in the Cape Colony. Grey assured the Home
+Government that in both respects it was the victim of a delusion bred of
+its complete ignorance of South African conditions. The Boer Republics
+would give trouble. Apart from the bad draftsmanship of the
+conventions--a fertile source of disagreement--these small states would
+be centres of intrigue and "internal commotions," while at the same time
+their revenues would be too small to provide efficiently for their
+protection against the warlike tribes. The policy of _divide et
+impera_--or, as Grey called it, the "dismemberment" policy--would fail,
+since the political barrier which had been erected was wholly
+artificial.
+
+         [Footnote 4: Cetewayo.]
+
+     "Although these European countries are treated as separate
+     nations," he wrote, "their inhabitants bear the same family names
+     as the inhabitants of this Colony, and maintain with them ties of
+     the closest intimacy and relationship. They speak generally the
+     same language--not English, but Dutch. They are for the most part
+     of the same religion, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church.
+     They have the same laws--the Roman Dutch. They have the same
+     sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and frequently
+     the same feelings regarding the native races....
+
+     "I think that there can be no doubt that, in any great public, or
+     popular, or national question or movement, the mere fact of
+     calling these people different nations would not make them so,
+     nor would the fact of a mere fordable stream running between them
+     sever their sympathies or prevent them from acting in unison....
+     Many questions might arise in which, if the Government on the
+     south side of the Orange River took a different view from that on
+     the north side of the river, it might be very doubtful which of
+     the two Governments the great mass of the people would obey."[5]
+
+         [Footnote 5: Despatch of November 19th, 1858, to Sir E. B.
+         Lytton.]
+
+The "divergence of opinion" between Capetown and Downing Street was
+complete. Grey was charged with "direct disobedience" for listening to
+the offers of the Free State inhabitants. Recalled by a despatch of
+June 4th, 1859, he was reinstated in August on condition that "he felt
+himself sufficiently free and uncompromised," both with the Cape
+Legislature and the people of the Free State, to be able personally to
+carry out the policy of the Home Government, which, said the despatch,
+
+     "is entirely opposed to those measures, tending to the resumption
+     of sovereignty over that State, of which you have publicly
+     expressed your approval in your speech to the Cape Parliament,
+     and in your answers to the address from the State in question."
+
+Nor was that all. In his endeavours to establish a simple but
+effective system of European magistrates over the Kafirs beyond the
+eastern border of the Colony, he was hampered by the short-sighted
+economy of the Home Government. It seems incredible that a Colonial
+Governor, even at that epoch, should have been looked upon by Downing
+Street as a sort of importunate mendicant. But Grey's language shows
+that this was the attitude against which he had to defend himself.
+
+[Sidenote: The burden of the empire.]
+
+     "I would now only urge upon Her Majesty's Government," he writes
+     on September 8th, 1858, "that they should not distress me more
+     than is absolutely necessary for the government and control of
+     the people of the country which lies beyond the Colony of the
+     Cape of Good Hope. Stripping the country as I am of troops [to
+     serve in putting down the Indian Mutiny], some great disaster
+     will take place if necessary funds are at the same time cut off
+     from me. I am sure, if the enormous reductions I have effected in
+     military expenditure are considered, the most rigid economists
+     will feel that the money paid by Great Britain for the control of
+     this country has been advantageously laid out."
+
+These extracts are not pleasant reading. They were written at the time
+when the Imperial spirit was at its nadir. In the plain language of
+the Secretary of State for the Colonies[6] in 1858, it was a time when
+ministers were "compelled to recognise as fact the increased and
+increasing dislike of Parliament to the maintenance of large military
+establishments in our colonies at Imperial cost." Yet one more passage
+must be cited, not so much because it is tinged by a certain grim
+humour--although this is a valuable quality in such a context--as
+because it affords an eminently pertinent illustration in support of
+the contention that the refusal of the Home Government to follow the
+advice of the "man on the spot" has been the operative cause of the
+failure of British administration in South Africa. The reply to the
+charge of "direct disobedience," which Grey formulates in one
+leisurely sentence, runs as follows:
+
+         [Footnote 6: Sir E. B. Lytton.]
+
+     "With regard to any necessity which might exist for my removal on
+     the ground of not holding the same views upon essential points of
+     policy as Her Majesty's Government hold, I can only make the
+     general remark that, during the five years which have elapsed
+     since I was appointed to my present office, there have been at
+     least seven Secretaries of State for the Colonial Department,
+     each of whom held different views upon some important points of
+     policy connected with this country."
+
+[Sidenote: The discovery of diamonds.]
+
+Grey was not by any means the only Governor of the Cape to show the
+home authorities how impossible it was to govern South Africa from
+Downing Street, and to urge upon them the necessity of allowing their
+representative, the one man who was familiar with local conditions, to
+decide by what methods the objects of British policy could be most
+effectively advanced. But it was not until some considerable time
+after the Colonial Department had been placed under a separate
+Secretary of State, and the Colonial Office had been constituted on
+its present basis, with a staff of permanent officials, that these
+protests produced any appreciable effect. What really aroused an
+interest in South Africa--that is to say a practical interest, as
+distinct from the interest created by the stories of missionary
+enterprise and travel, and by the records of Kafir warfare--was the
+discovery of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1870, and the subsequent
+establishment of the diamond industry at Kimberley. It was the first
+time that anything certain had occurred to show that the vast
+"hinterland" of the Cape might prove to be a territory of industrial
+possibilities. The earnings of the diamond mines provided the Cape
+Colony with a revenue sufficient to enable it to link together its
+main towns by a tolerable railway system. The industry, once
+established, attracted British capital and British population, and by
+so doing it did what Blue-books and missionary reports had failed to
+do: it brought the every-day life of the British Colonist in South
+Africa within the purview of the nation. Thanks to the Kimberley mines
+the Cape ceased to be thought of as a country whose resources were
+exclusively pastoral and agricultural.
+
+The epoch of the next great divergence of opinion was a more hopeful
+time from an Imperialist point of view. Lord Beaconsfield, who was the
+first statesman to give practical expression to the belief that the
+maintenance of empire was not inconsistent with the welfare of the
+masses of the home population, was in power. British statesmen, and
+the class from which British statesmen are drawn, had begun to study
+Colonial questions in a more hopeful and intelligent spirit. Something
+had been learnt, too, of the actual conditions of South Africa. And
+yet it was at this epoch that what was, perhaps, the most ruinous of
+all the divergences of opinion between Capetown and Downing Street
+occurred.
+
+[Sidenote: Sir Bartle Frere.]
+
+When Sir Bartle Frere was sent out to South Africa to carry out a
+definite scheme for the union of the Republics with the British
+colonies in a federal system, British statesmen and the educated
+classes in general had adopted the views expressed by Grey twenty
+years before. Tardily they had learnt to recognise both the essential
+unity of the Dutch population and the value of the country as an
+industrial asset of the empire. But, in the meantime, the centre of
+political power had shifted in England. The extension of the franchise
+had placed the ultimate control of British policy in South Africa in
+the hands of a class of electors who were, as yet, wholly uneducated
+in the political and economic conditions of that country. The
+divergence of opinion between the home and the local authority became
+in this case wider than ever. In short, it was the will of the nation
+that caused Frere to be arrested midway in the accomplishment of his
+task, and gave a mandate in 1880 to the Liberal party to administer
+South Africa upon the lines of a policy shaped in contemptuous
+indifference of the profoundest convictions and most solemn warnings
+of a great proconsul and most loyal servant of the Crown.
+
+The facts of Frere's supersession and recall are notorious: the story
+is too recent to need telling at length. We know now that, apart from
+the actual discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-mines, all that he
+foresaw and foretold has been realised in the events which culminated,
+twenty years later, in the great South African War. The military power
+which at that time (1877-80) stood in the way of South African unity
+under the British flag was the Zulu people. The whole adult male
+population of the tribe had been trained for war, and organised by
+Ketshwayo into a fighting machine. With this formidable military
+instrument at his command Ketshwayo proposed to emulate the sanguinary
+career of conquest pursued by his grandfather Tshaka;[7] and he had
+prepared the way for the half-subdued military Bantu throughout South
+Africa to co-operate with him in a general revolt against the growing
+supremacy of the white man. Frere removed this obstacle. But in doing
+so he, or rather the general entrusted with the command of the
+military operations, lost a British regiment at Isandlhwana. This
+revelation of the strength of the Zulu army was, in fact, a complete
+confirmation of the correctness of Frere's diagnosis of the South
+African situation. His contention was that England must give evidence
+of both her capacity and her intention to control the native
+population of South Africa before she could reasonably ask the
+republican Dutch to surrender their independence and reunite with the
+British colonies in a federal system under the British flag. A native
+power, organised solely for aggressive warfare against one of two
+possible white neighbours, constituted therefore, in his opinion, not
+only a perpetual menace to the safety of Natal, but an insuperable
+obstacle to the effective discharge of a duty by the paramount Power,
+the successful performance of which was a condition precedent to the
+reunion of the European communities. The only point in dispute was the
+question whether the powers of Ketshwayo's _impis_ had been
+exaggerated. To this question the disaster of Isandlhwana returned an
+emphatic "No."
+
+         [Footnote 7: Chaka.]
+
+[Sidenote: The recall of Frere.]
+
+The divergence of opinion between Frere and Lord Beaconsfield's
+cabinet was trivial as compared with the profound gulf which separated
+his policy from the South African policy of Mr. Gladstone. After the
+return of the Liberal party to power in the spring of 1880, Frere was
+allowed to remain in office until August 1st, when he was recalled by
+a telegraphic despatch. But, as Lord Kimberley pointed out to him,
+there had been "so much divergence" between his views and those of the
+Home Government that he would not have been allowed to remain at the
+Cape, "had it not been for the special reason that there was a
+prospect of his being able materially to forward the policy of
+confederation." This prospect, of course, had then been removed by the
+failure of the Cape Government, on June 29th, to bring about the
+conference of delegates from the several States, which was the initial
+step towards the realisation of Lord Carnarvon's scheme of federal
+union.
+
+The vindication of Frere's statesmanship has been carried, by the
+inexorable logic of events, far beyond the sphere of Blue-book
+arguments. But it is impossible to read this smug despatch without
+recalling the words which Mr. Krüger wrote to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney
+on June 26th of the same year: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere will ...
+be useful.... We have done our duty and used all legitimate influence
+to cause the conference proposals to fail." That is to say, it was
+known to these faithful confederates of that section of the Liberal
+party of which Mr. Courtney was the head, that the Gladstone
+Government had determined to recall Sir Bartle Frere three days before
+"the special reason" for maintaining him at the Cape had disappeared.
+
+[Sidenote: Frere's forecast.]
+
+But what we are really concerned with is the nature of the opinions
+upon the central question of South African administration which Frere
+put forward at this critical period. With these before us, the most
+elementary acquaintance with the events of the last ten years will
+suffice to indicate the profound degree in which his knowledge of
+South African conditions surpassed the knowledge of those who took
+upon themselves to reverse his policy. What, above all, Frere realised
+was, that a point had been reached at which the whole of South Africa
+must be gathered under the British flag without delay. He had noted
+the disintegrating influences at work in the Cape Colony and the
+strength of the potential antagonism of the republican Dutch. The
+annexation of the Transvaal was not his deed, nor did either the time
+or the manner in which it was done command his approval. But he
+asserted that British rule, once established there, must be maintained
+at all costs. With this end in view, he urged that every
+responsibility incurred by England in the act of annexation must be
+fulfilled to the letter. Utilising the information which he had gained
+by personal observation during his visit to the Transvaal in 1879, and
+availing himself of the co-operation of President Brand, of the Free
+State, and Chief Justice de Villiers, in the Cape Colony, he drafted a
+scheme of administrative reform sufficient to satisfy the legitimate
+aspirations of the Boers for self-government without endangering the
+permanency of British rule. It included proposals for administrative
+and financial reforms framed with a view of reducing the cost of
+government to the lowest point consistent with efficiency, for the
+reorganisation of the courts of law, for the survey of the proposed
+railway line to Delagoa Bay, and full details of a system of
+representative government. This measure he urged upon the Colonial
+Office as one of immediate necessity, since it embodied the fulfilment
+of the definite promises of an early grant of self-government made to
+the Boers at the time of annexation.[8]
+
+         [Footnote 8: The receipt of the despatch in which these
+         valuable recommendations were made was not even acknowledged
+         by the Colonial Office. Frere himself gives the outlines of
+         his proposals in an article published in _The Nineteenth
+         Century_ for February, 1881.]
+
+He recognised the value of Delagoa Bay as an essential factor in the
+political and commercial system of a united South Africa, and he
+earnestly recommended its acquisition by purchase from the Portuguese
+Government. His perception of the extreme importance of satisfying all
+legitimate claims of the Boers, and his acute realisation of the
+danger of allowing the Transvaal to become a "jumping-off ground"
+either for foreign powers or Afrikander Nationalists, are exhibited in
+due relationship in a private memorandum which he wrote from the Cape
+at the end of July, 1879:
+
+     "Any reliance on mere force in the Transvaal must react
+     dangerously down here in the old colony, and convert the Dutch
+     Country party, now as loyal and prosperous a section of the
+     population as any under the Crown, into dangerous allies of the
+     small anti-English Republican party, who are for separation, thus
+     paralysing the efforts of the loyal English party now in power,
+     who aim at making the country a self-defending integral portion
+     of the British Empire. Further, any attempt to give back or
+     restore the Boer Republic in the Transvaal must lead to anarchy
+     and failure, and probably, at no distant period, to a vicious
+     imitation of some South American Republics, in which the more
+     uneducated and misguided Boers, dominated and led by better
+     educated foreign adventurers--Germans, Hollanders, Irish Home
+     Rulers, and other European Republicans and Socialists--will
+     become a pest to the whole of South Africa, and a most dangerous
+     fulcrum to any European Power bent on contesting our naval
+     supremacy, or injuring us in our colonies.
+
+     "There is no escaping from the responsibility which has already
+     been incurred, ever since the British flag was planted on the
+     Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still
+     arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility....
+     If you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always
+     to be heavily paid for in both blood and treasure.... Your object
+     is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This
+     will have to be asserted some day, and the assertion will not
+     become easier by delay. The trial of strength will be forced on
+     you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by
+     postponing the trial if we start with a good cause."
+
+Could not the man who foresaw these dangers have prevented them? It is
+impossible to resist the momentum of this thought.
+
+[Sidenote: The retrocession.]
+
+The events by which this forecast was so closely realised are not
+likely to be effaced from the memory of this generation. Frere had
+scarcely left the Colony from which he had been recalled by the joint
+efforts of Mr. Krüger and Lord (then Mr.) Courtney before the former,
+with his fellow triumvirs, had raised the Vier-kleur upon the still
+desolate uplands of the Witwatersrand. The attempt to put down by
+force the Boer revolt of 1880-81 failed. Mr. Gladstone's cabinet
+recoiled before the prospect of a war in which the Boers might have
+been supported by their kinsmen in the Free State and the Cape Colony.
+The retrocession of the Transvaal under the terms of the Pretoria
+Convention (1881) was followed by further concessions embodied in the
+London Convention of 1884. It is absolutely established as fact that
+Mr. Gladstone's Government intended, by certain articles contained in
+both conventions, to secure to all actual and potential British
+residents in the Transvaal the enjoyment of all the political rights
+of citizenship possessed by the Boers. But it is equally certain that
+the immediate contravention of Article XVI. of the Pretoria
+Convention, when in 1882 the period of residence necessary to qualify
+for the franchise was raised from two to five years, was allowed to
+pass without protest from the Imperial Government. And thus a breach
+of the Convention, which the discovery of the Witwatersrand
+gold-fields (1886) and the subsequent establishment of a great British
+industrial community made a matter of vital importance, was condoned.
+A few years more and the country which prided itself upon being the
+home of liberty and of free institutions was confounded by the
+spectacle of a South Africa of its own making, in which a British
+majority denied the franchise in a Dutch Republic, contrasted with a
+Dutch minority dominating and controlling the machinery of responsible
+government in a British colony.
+
+This situation brings us (to use a military phrase) within striking
+distance of the objective of the present work--the personality and
+efforts of the man who administered South Africa in the momentous
+years of the struggle for equal rights for all white men from the
+Zambesi to Capetown.
+
+If the records set out in the preceding pages leave any impression
+upon the mind, it is one that must produce a sense of amazement,
+almost exasperation, at the thought of the many mistakes and disasters
+that might have been avoided, if only greater weight had been attached
+to the advice tendered to the British Government by its local
+representative in South Africa. And with this sense of amazement a
+generous mind will associate inevitably a feeling of regret for the
+injustice unwittingly, but none the less irreparably, inflicted upon
+loyal and capable servants of the Crown--an injustice so notorious
+that it has made South Africa the "grave of reputations." Apart from
+the pre-eminence with which the period of Lord Milner's administration
+is invested by the occurrence within it of a military conflict of
+unparalleled magnitude, Lord Milner stands out in the annals of South
+Africa as the first High Commissioner whose knowledge of South African
+conditions was allowed to inspire the policy of the Home Government,
+and who himself was recognised by the Government and people of Great
+Britain as voicing the convictions and aspirations of all loyal
+subjects of the Crown in that province of the empire.
+
+The state of affairs with which Lord Milner was called upon to deal
+was in its essence the situation sketched by Frere twenty years before
+in the memorable forecast to which reference has been made. But the
+working of the forces indicated by Frere as destined, if unchecked, to
+drive England one day to a life-and-death struggle for her supremacy
+in South Africa, had been complicated by an event which cannot be
+omitted altogether from a chapter intended, like a Euripidean
+prologue, to prepare the mind of the spectator for the proper
+understanding of the characters and action of the drama. This event is
+the Jameson Raid.
+
+[Sidenote: The Jameson raid.]
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes.]
+
+In order to see the Jameson Raid in its true perspective, it is not
+sufficient to place it in relationship to those familiar and notorious
+events by which it was followed. It must also be placed in relationship
+to the no less clearly defined events by which it was preceded. Thus
+placed it becomes the direct outcome of the refusal of the Imperial
+Government to use the advice of its local representative--or, more
+precisely, of the refusal to base its policy on South African instead
+of British conditions: and, as such, it convinced the Imperial
+Government of the need of reviving the power of its local
+representative. In other words, it is a connecting link between the High
+Commissionerships of Frere and Milner. The events which followed the
+recall of Frere were accepted by the British inhabitants of South Africa
+as a practical demonstration of the inherent viciousness of the system
+under which the decision of cardinal questions of South African
+administration was left in the hands of the House of Commons, a body in
+which they were not represented; which met 6,000 miles away; whose
+judgment was liable to be warped by irrelevant considerations of English
+party politics; and one which was admittedly unfamiliar with the country
+and peoples whose interests were vitally affected by the manner in which
+these questions were decided. The lesson of the retrocession was taken
+to heart so earnestly that, fifteen years later, the majority of the
+British residents in the Transvaal refused to support a movement for
+reform which involved the re-establishment of Imperial authority, while
+among those who were loyal to the British connection throughout South
+Africa its effect was to make them think, as did Rhodes, that the
+machinery of the various local British governments must be dissociated
+as much as possible from the principles and methods of the Home
+Government. Hence the necessity for what Rhodes called the "elimination
+of the Imperial factor." The expression, as he afterwards explained,
+was in no way inconsistent with attachment to the British connection. As
+read in the context in which it was originally used, it meant merely
+that the European population of Bechuanaland,[9] being mainly Boer
+immigrants, could be administered more successfully by officers
+responsible to a government which, like that of the Cape Colony, was
+well versed in South African conditions, than by officers directly
+responsible to the Imperial Government. The phrase was a criticism of
+Downing Street, and still more of English party government. In short,
+Rhodes was convinced that if a system of British administration, based
+on South African conditions, was ever to be carried on successfully, the
+local British authority, and not the Home Government, must be the
+machine employed; and in order to allow it to work freely, its action
+must be made as independent as possible of Downing Street. For Downing
+Street was an authority which blew hot or cold, in accordance with the
+views of the party for the time being in power.[10]
+
+         [Footnote 9: The Crown Colony--not the Protectorate--annexed
+         by the Cape Colony in 1895.]
+
+         [Footnote 10: Rhodes's words were: "If we do not settle this
+         [_i.e._ the question of Bechuanaland] ourselves, we shall see
+         it taken up in the House of Commons on one side or the other,
+         not from any real interest in the question, but simply
+         because of its consequences to those occupying the
+         Ministerial benches. We want to get rid of Downing Street in
+         this question, and to deal with it ourselves, as a
+         self-governing colony."]
+
+[Sidenote: New forces.]
+
+And, in point of fact, both parties in England acquiesced in this
+judgment of the South African British. During the years between
+Frere's recall and the appointment of Lord Milner (1880-1897) the High
+Commissioner was a decreasing force. Both Lord Rosmead and Lord Loch
+did little to mould the destiny of South Africa: not because they
+lacked capacity, but because it was the determination of the Home
+Government to leave the difficult problem of South African unity to
+local initiative. On the other hand, the progress which was made in
+this direction by local initiative, aided as it was by the fortuitous
+discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, was considerable. The
+highlands of South Central Africa were acquired for the British race,
+and the Boer was effectively prevented from carrying the Vier-kleur
+beyond the Limpopo; the railway, drawn through the Free State by the
+magnet of the Rand, disturbed the retirement of the republican Dutch;
+and finally the Cape Colony and Natal were linked together with the
+Free State in a Customs Union. But the development of the mineral
+resources of the country led to the appearance of a new factor in
+South African politics. The comparative decline in the activity of the
+High Commissioner had been accompanied by the establishment and growth
+of powerful industrial corporations. It is easy to understand how a
+man like Rhodes, with the wealth and influence of De Beers and the
+Chartered Company at his command, might seek, by an alliance with the
+"great houses" of the Rand, to find in private effort an instrument
+for remedying the deficiencies of the Imperial Government even more
+appropriate than the local governmental action upon which he had
+previously relied. For the work of these industrial corporations had
+powerfully enlisted the interest and sympathy of the British public.
+The Jameson Raid was an illegitimate and disastrous application of an
+otherwise meritorious and successful effort to strengthen the British
+hold upon South Africa by private enterprise. It was at once the
+measure of Imperial inefficiency, and its cure.
+
+One other circumstance must be recalled in estimating the extent to
+which the Home Government had earned the distrust of the British
+population in South Africa. Only eighteen months[11] before the Raid
+the High Commissioner, Lord Loch, had gone to Pretoria carrying a
+despatch in which the grant of a five years' franchise was advocated
+on behalf of the Uitlanders. His instructions were to present this
+despatch, and press upon President Krüger personally the necessity for
+giving effect to its recommendations. These instructions were
+cancelled at the last moment by Lord Ripon, because the German
+Ambassador had made representations in London that such action would
+be regarded as an interference with the _status quo_ in South Africa,
+and, as such, detrimental to German interests in that country. And six
+months later[12] President Krüger, in attending a "Kommers" given by
+the German Club at Pretoria in honour of the Kaiser Wilhelm II.'s
+birthday, alluded to Germany as a grown-up power that would stop
+England from "kicking" the child Republic.
+
+         [Footnote 11: June, 1894.]
+
+         [Footnote 12: January 28th, 1895.]
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes's Plan.]
+
+The Raid was, therefore, a short cut to baffle German intrigue and
+solve the problem of South African unity at one blow. For to Rhodes
+the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders meant the withdrawal of the
+Transvaal Government from its opposition to his scheme of commercial
+federation. It is obvious that one ground of justification, and one
+only, can be found for the usurpation of the functions of government
+by a private individual, or group of individuals. This justification
+is success. It has been the custom to represent Dr. Jameson's decision
+to "ride in" as "an act of monumental folly," alike from a political
+and a military point of view. But this opinion overlooks the fact that
+the affair may have been so planned in Rhodes's mind that success did
+not depend upon the victory of the Uitlanders, aided by Jameson's
+troopers, but on the presence of the High Commissioner in the
+Transvaal under such conditions as would make the intervention of the
+Imperial Government at once imperative and effectual. The
+representative of the Imperial Government, backed by a Johannesburg in
+armed revolt against the Boer oligarchy, would find himself--so Rhodes
+thought--in a position highly favourable to the successful prosecution
+of the demands which had already been put forward on behalf of
+British subjects resident in the Transvaal. And in order that this
+essential part of the plan might be carried out without a moment of
+unnecessary delay, Rhodes kept a train, with steam up, in the station
+at Capetown ready to speed Lord Rosmead northwards directly the news
+of Dr. Jameson's arrival at Johannesburg should have reached him. Once
+Jameson's force had "got through," he relied upon the Reform
+Committee, however incomplete its preparations, being able to hold
+Johannesburg for a couple of days against any force the Boers could
+bring.[13] Nor in the light of what happened, during the war, both at
+Mafeking and Kimberley, can this expectation be thought extravagant.
+Here his responsibilities would have ended. The High Commissioner and
+the Imperial Government would have done the rest. To indulge in
+metaphor, the Imperial locomotive was to be set going, but the lines
+on which it was to run were those laid down by Mr. Rhodes.
+
+         [Footnote 13: It is worth noticing that even the presence of
+         the German Marines at Delagoa Bay was
+         counterbalanced--whether by chance or design--by the
+         coincidence of the arrival of a British troopship with
+         time-expired men from the Indian garrison, off Durban.]
+
+If this was the essence of Rhodes's plan, it would matter
+comparatively little whether the Reformers had, or had not, completed
+their preparations, or whether Dr. Jameson had 1,200 or 500 men.
+Certainly some such assumption is necessary to account for the fact
+that Rhodes treated his confederates at Johannesburg as so many pawns
+on a chess-board. It is equally necessary to account for Dr. Jameson's
+action. "Twenty years friends, and now he goes in and ruins me," was
+Rhodes's comment on the news that Dr. Jameson had "ridden in," in
+spite of his own orders to the contrary and the message to the same
+effect which Captain Heany had delivered on behalf of the Reformers.
+But what if Dr. Jameson knew, or thought that he knew, that Rhodes's
+object in forcing the insurrection was not to make the Uitlanders
+reduce Krüger, but to compel the Imperial Government to step in? In
+this case he may well have thought that what was essential was not
+that the rising should be successful, but that there should be a
+rising of any kind; provided that it was sufficiently grave to arrest
+the attention of the world, and claim the interference of the Imperial
+Government.
+
+According to Mr. Chamberlain the continued inaction of the Imperial
+Government in the eighteen months that had passed since Lord Loch's
+visit to Pretoria in June, 1894, was due to two circumstances. In the
+first place, "the Uitlanders and their organs had always deprecated
+the introduction into the dispute of what is called in South Africa
+the 'Imperial factor'"; and in the second, the "rumours" of violent
+measures "were continually falsified by the event." Obviously, if
+Rhodes forced an insurrection with the intention of removing these
+obstacles--if, that is to say, the intervention of the Imperial
+Government, and not the success of the insurrection, was his primary
+object--the temerity of Dr. Jameson's invasion is materially
+diminished. Now Mr. Chamberlain's statement, made under date February
+4th, 1896, _i.e._ five weeks after the Raid, is perfectly consistent
+with the view of the attitude of the Reformers expressed by Rhodes on
+the day before the Raid took place.
+
+[Sidenote: The reformers divided.]
+
+Dr. Jameson's force, it will be remembered, started on the evening of
+Sunday, December 29th, 1895. Up to three days before--the
+26th--nothing had occurred to interfere with the final arrangement,
+telegraphed to Dr. Jameson from Capetown, that the movement in
+Johannesburg would take place on Saturday, the 28th. The circumstances
+which caused the Reformers to alter their plans were explained by
+Rhodes in an interview with Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary,
+at Capetown on the same Saturday, the 28th, with his accustomed
+vivacity. The Johannesburg insurrection, he said--
+
+     "had fizzled out as a damp squib. The capitalists financing the
+     movement had made the hoisting of the British flag a _sine quâ
+     non_. This the National Union rejected, and issued a manifesto
+     declaring for a republic. The division had led to the complete
+     collapse of the movement, and it was thought that the leaders
+     would make the best terms they could with President Krüger."
+
+The telegrams which reached Dr. Jameson between the 26th and 29th
+contained the same facts, with the further information that Captain
+Heany was travelling by special train to him with a message direct
+from the Reformers. In these circumstances it is said that Rhodes at
+Capetown imagined as little as the Reform leaders at Johannesburg that
+Dr. Jameson would cross the frontier. That, however, there was another
+point of view from which the situation might present itself to Dr.
+Jameson is shown by the fact that Mr. Chamberlain, in reply to the
+High Commissioner's telegram reporting the substance of Rhodes's
+statement to Sir Graham Bower, at once[14] inquired of Lord Rosmead,
+"Are you sure Jameson has not moved in consequence of the collapse?"
+
+         [Footnote 14: Afternoon of Monday, December 30th.]
+
+Was Mr. Chamberlain right? Did Dr. Jameson see in the fact that the
+Reformers were divided on such an issue only an additional reason for
+carrying out a plan which had for its object to compel the Imperial
+Government to intervene in the affairs of the Transvaal before it was
+too late; that is to say, before the British population had definitely
+committed itself to the policy of a purged republic, but a republic
+under any flag but that of Great Britain? Such a policy was not merely
+possible. It seemed inevitable to the vivacious French observer who
+wrote, not from hearsay, but "with his eyes upon the object," in
+December, 1893:
+
+     "The Transvaal will never be an English colony. The English of
+     the Transvaal, as well as those of Cape Colony and Natal, would
+     be as firmly opposed to it as the Boers themselves, for they have
+     never forgiven England for letting herself be beaten by the Boers
+     at Majuba Hill and accepting her defeat, a proceeding which has
+     rendered them ridiculous in the eyes of the Dutch population of
+     South Africa.... With me this is not a simple impression, but a
+     firm conviction."[15]
+
+         [Footnote 15: "John Bull & Co.," by "Max O'Rell," 1894.]
+
+[Sidenote: Jameson's decision.]
+
+If these were the considerations which weighed with Dr. Jameson, his
+decision to "ride in" was inconsistent neither with friendship nor
+with patriotism. When Captain Heany had read from his pocket-book the
+message from the Reformers, Jameson paced for twenty minutes outside
+his tent. Having re-entered it, he announced his determination to
+disregard Heany's message no less than Rhodes's telegram. It was a
+momentous decision to take after twenty minutes' thought. Had he a
+reasonable expectation of carrying out the plan as Rhodes conceived
+it, in spite of the change in the position of affairs at Johannesburg?
+Had he any reason to believe that Rhodes desired him to force the
+insurrection in spite of his telegrams to the contrary? It is the
+answers to these questions that make the Raid, as far as Dr. Jameson
+is concerned, an "act of monumental folly," or a legitimate assumption
+of personal responsibility that is part of the empire-builder's
+stock-in-trade. The answer to the second question remains a matter of
+speculation. The answer to the first is to be found in the record of
+the expedition. Dr. Jameson reached Krügersdorp at three o'clock on
+Wednesday, January 1st. A few hours before a cyclist had brought him
+congratulatory messages from the Reform leaders. The goal was almost
+within sight. What prevented Sir John Willoughby from taking his
+little force safely over the remaining twenty miles from Krügersdorp
+to Johannesburg was the merest accident: the few hours' delay caused,
+naturally enough, by Dr. Jameson's desire that his force should be met
+and escorted by a small body of volunteers from the Rand. He did not
+want, as he said, to go to Johannesburg as "a pirate." Sir John
+Willoughby's evidence is perfectly definite and conclusive on the
+point. If the force had pushed on by road from Krügersdorp to
+Johannesburg on Wednesday evening--had not, in Willoughby's words,
+"messed about" at Krügersdorp in expectation of the welcoming
+escort--Johannesburg would have been reached in safety on Thursday
+morning. With Dr. Jameson in Johannesburg and Lord Rosmead speeding
+northwards in his special train, the way would have been prepared for
+that decisive and successful action on the part of the Imperial
+Government which Rhodes had desired to bring about.
+
+[Sidenote: Why the raid failed.]
+
+But, unsuccessful as was the actual expedition, the decision to "ride
+in" had secured the intervention of the Imperial Government. If
+intervention could have done what Rhodes expected of it, Dr. Jameson's
+decision to "ride in" would have gained, at the cost of few lives and
+no increase of the national debt, what the war gained four years later
+at the cost of twenty thousand lives and £220,000,000. As it was, it
+failed to win the franchise for the Uitlanders. Why did not Lord
+Rosmead, with so strong a Colonial Secretary as Mr. Chamberlain at his
+back, brush the Raid aside, and address himself to the removal of the
+greater wrong that gave it birth? If Lord Rosmead had acted in the
+spirit of Mr. Chamberlain's despatches; if he had reminded the
+Government of the Republic from the first "that the danger from which
+they had just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which led
+up to it were not removed, might recur, although in a different form";
+if he had used "plain language" to President Krüger; and if, above
+all, he had remembered--as Mr. Chamberlain reminded him--that "the
+people of Johannesburg had surrendered in the belief that reasonable
+concessions would have been arranged through his intervention, and
+until these were granted, or were definitely promised to him by the
+President, the root-causes of the recent troubles would
+remain,"--might he not yet have saved South Africa for the empire
+without subjecting her to the dread arbitrament of the sword?
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain.]
+
+It is in the answer to this question that we find the actual cause of
+the utter failure of Rhodes's plan. The truth is that success in any
+real sense--that is to say, success which would have strengthened
+British supremacy and promoted the union of European South Africa--was
+impossible. The sole response which Lord Rosmead returned to Mr.
+Chamberlain's counsels was the weary confession: "The question of
+concessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between President
+Krüger and myself." The methods employed by Rhodes were so
+questionable that no High Commissioner could have allowed the Imperial
+Government to have derived any advantage from them. To have gained the
+franchise for the Uitlanders as the result of violent and unscrupulous
+action, would have inflicted an enduring injury upon the British cause
+in South Africa for which the enfranchisement itself would have been
+small compensation. The disclosure of these methods and, with them, of
+the hollowness of Rhodes's alliance with the Afrikander Bond, alarmed
+and incensed the whole Dutch population of South Africa. What this
+meant Lord Rosmead knew, and Mr. Chamberlain did not know. The ten
+years' truce between the forces of the Afrikander nationalists and the
+paramount Power was at an end. To combat these forces something better
+than the methods of the Raid was required. _Non tali auxilio, nec
+defensoribus istis!_ No modern race have excelled the Dutch in courage
+and endurance. In Europe they had successfully defended their
+independence against the flower of the armies of Spain, Austria, and
+France. The South African Dutch were not inferior in these qualities
+to the people of the parent stock. If such a race, embarked upon what
+it conceived to be a struggle for national existence, was to be
+overcome, the hands of the conqueror must be clean as well as strong.
+None the less the active sympathy with the Uitlanders exhibited in Mr.
+Chamberlain's despatches was welcomed by the British as evidence that
+the new Colonial Secretary was more alert and determined than his
+predecessors. For the first time in the history of British
+administration in South Africa, Downing Street had shown itself more
+zealous than Capetown. It was the solitary ray of light that broke the
+universal gloom in which South Africa was enshrouded by the
+catastrophe of the Raid.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS[16]
+
+         [Footnote 16: "This is our Afrikander character. The
+         descendants of Hollanders, Germans and Frenchmen
+         inter-married, and are only known at present by their
+         surnames. They form the Afrikander nationality, and call
+         themselves Afrikanders. The Afrikanders are no more
+         Hollanders than Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans. They have
+         their own language, own morals and customs; they are just as
+         much a nation as any other."--_De Patriot_, in the course of
+         an article headed "A Common but Dangerous Error"--the error
+         in question being the assertion that "the Cape Colony is an
+         English colony" (translated and reproduced in _The Cape
+         Times_, September 3th, 1884).]
+
+
+In the face of the colossal resistance offered to the British arms by
+the Boers and their colonial kinsmen in the South African War, it may
+seem unnecessary to produce any evidence in support of the contention
+that the military strength then displayed by the Dutch in South Africa
+was the result of long and careful preparation. But the same inability
+to grasp the facts of the South African situation which kept the Army
+Corps in England three months after it should have been sent to the
+Cape, is still to be met with. This attitude of mind--whether it be a
+consciousness of moral rectitude, or a mere insular disdain of looking
+at things from any but a British point of view--is still to be
+observed in the statements of those politicians who will even now deny
+that any trace of a definite plan of action, or of a concerted
+purpose, which could properly be described as a "conspiracy" against
+British supremacy was to be found among the Dutch population of South
+Africa as a whole, prior to the outbreak of the war. It is for the
+benefit of such politicians in part, and still more with a view of
+bringing the mind of the reader into something approaching a direct
+contact with the actual working of the Afrikander mind, that I
+transcribe a statement of the pure doctrine of the Bond, as it was
+expounded by the German, Borckenhagen, and his followers in the Free
+State. It will, however, be convenient to preface the quotation with a
+word of explanation in respect both of the text and the personality of
+Borckenhagen.
+
+[Sidenote: Carl Borckenhagen.]
+
+The passage, which is taken _verbatim_ from a work entitled, "The
+Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed," is a collection of sentences
+gathered from Dutch pamphlets and articles "emanating from Holland,"
+and translated literally into the somewhat uncouth English of the
+text. The author of the work, Mr. C. H. Thomas, was for many years a
+burgher of the Free State, where he shared the opinions of President
+Brand, and subsequently supported Mr. J. G. Fraser in opposing the
+policy of "closer union" with the South African Republic, advocated by
+Brand's successor, Mr. F. W. Reitz. The point of view from which the
+Dutch of Holland regarded the nationalist movement in South Africa was
+succinctly stated in an article published by the Amsterdam
+_Handelsblad_ in 1881.
+
+     "The future of England lies in India, and the future of Holland
+     in South Africa.... When our capitalists vigorously develop this
+     trade, and, for example, form a syndicate to buy Delagoa Bay from
+     Portugal, then a railway from Capetown to Bloemfontein,
+     Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Delagoa Bay will be a lucrative
+     investment. And when, in course of time, the Dutch language shall
+     universally prevail in South Africa, this most extensive
+     territory will become a North America for Holland, and enable us
+     to balance the Anglo-Saxon race."[17]
+
+         [Footnote 17: Quoted by Du Toit in _De Patriot_: translation
+         from the English reprint of _De Transvaalse Oorlog_.]
+
+Carl Borckenhagen, who, with Mr. Reitz,[18] advocated the
+establishment of the Bond in 1881, was a German republican. His name
+has been associated with Mr. Thomas's summary of the Bond propaganda
+in the Free State, because, as editor of _The Bloemfontein Express_ up
+to the time of his death, early in 1898, he was probably the most
+consistent of all the South African exponents of the nationalist
+creed. Certainly it is no exaggeration to say that he converted the
+Free State of Brand into the Free State of Steyn.
+
+         [Footnote 18: Then Judge, afterwards President of the Free
+         State, and State-Secretary of the South African Republic in
+         succession to Dr. Leyds.]
+
+[Sidenote: The doctrine of the Bond.]
+
+     "THE BOND PROGRAMME
+
+     "The Afrikander Bond has as final object what is summed up in its
+     motto of 'Afrika voor de Afrikaners.' The whole of South Africa
+     belongs by just right to the Afrikander nation. It is the
+     privilege and duty of every Afrikander to contribute all in his
+     power towards the expulsion of the English usurper. The States of
+     South Africa to be federated in one independent Republic.
+
+     The Afrikander Bond prepares for this consummation.
+
+     Argument in justification:--
+
+     (_a_) The transfer of the Cape Colony to the British Government
+     took place by circumstances of _force majeure_ and without the
+     consent of the Dutch nation, who renounced all claim in favour of
+     the Afrikander or Boer nation.
+
+     (_b_) Natal is territory which accrued to a contingent of the
+     Boer nation by purchase from the Zulu king, who received the
+     consideration agreed for.
+
+     (_c_) The British authorities expelled the rightful owners from
+     Natal by force of arms without just cause.
+
+     The task of the Afrikander Bond consists in:
+
+     (_a_) Procuring the staunch adhesion and co-operation of every
+     Afrikander and other real friend of the cause.
+
+     (_b_) To obtain the sympathy, the moral and effective aid, of one
+     or more of the world's Powers.
+
+     The means to accomplish those tasks are:
+
+     Personal persuasion, Press propaganda, legislation and diplomacy.
+
+     The direction of the application of these means is entrusted to a
+     select body of members eligible for their loyalty to the cause
+     and their abilities and position. That body will conduct such
+     measures as need the observance of special secrecy. Upon the rest
+     of the members will devolve activities of a general character
+     under the direction of the selected chiefs.
+
+     One of the indispensable requisites is the proper organisation of
+     an effective fund, which is to be regularly sustained. Bond
+     members will aid each other in all relations of public life in
+     preference to non-members.
+
+     In the efforts of gaining adherence to the cause it is of
+     importance to distinguish three categories of persons:
+
+     (1) The class of Afrikanders who are to some extent deteriorated
+     by assimilative influences with the English race, whose
+     restoration to patriotism will need great efforts, discretion,
+     and patience.
+
+     (2) The apparently unthinking and apathetic class who prefer to
+     relegate all initiative to leaders whom they will loyally follow.
+     This class is the most numerous by far.
+
+     (3) The warmly patriotic class, including men gifted with
+     intelligence, energy, and speech, qualified as leaders, and apt
+     to exercise influence over the rest.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+     Among these three classes many exist whose views and religious
+     scruples need to be corrected. Scripture abounds in proofs and
+     salient analogies applying to the situation and justifying our
+     cause. In this, as well as in other directions, the members who
+     work in circulating written propaganda will supply the correct
+     and conclusive arguments accessible to all.
+
+     Upon the basis of our just rights the British Government, if not
+     the entire nation, is the usurping enemy of the Boer nation.
+
+     In dealing with an enemy it is justifiable to employ, besides
+     force, also means of a less open character, such as diplomacy and
+     stratagem.
+
+[Sidenote: Anti-british methods.]
+
+     The greatest danger to Afrikanderdom is the English policy of
+     Anglicising the Boer nation--to submerge it by the process of
+     assimilation.
+
+     A distinct attitude of holding aloof from English influences is
+     the only remedy against that peril and for thwarting that
+     insidious policy.
+
+     It is only such an attitude that will preserve the nation in its
+     simple faith and habits of morality, and provide safety against
+     the dangers of contamination and pernicious examples, with all
+     their fateful consequences to body and soul.
+
+     Let the Dutch language have the place of honour in schools and
+     homes.
+
+     Let alliances of marriage with the English be stamped as
+     unpatriotic.
+
+     Let every Afrikander see that he is at all times well armed with
+     the best possible weapons, and maintains the expert use of the
+     rifle among young and old, so as to be ready when duty calls, and
+     the time is ripe for asserting the nation's rights and being rid
+     of English thraldom.
+
+     Employ teachers only who are animated with truly patriotic
+     sentiments.
+
+     Let it be well understood that English domination will also bring
+     English intolerance and servitude, for it is only a very frail
+     link which separates the English State Church from actual
+     Romanism, and its proselytism _en bloc_ is only a matter of short
+     time.
+
+     Equally repugnant and dangerous is England's policy towards the
+     coloured races, whom she aims, for the sake of industrial profit,
+     at elevating to equal rank with whites, in direct conflict with
+     spiritual authority--a policy which incites coloured people to
+     rivalry with their superiors, and can only end in common
+     disaster.
+
+     Whilst remaining absolutely independent, the ties of blood,
+     relationship, and language point to Holland for a domestic base.
+
+     As to commerce, Germany, America, and other industrial nations
+     could more than fill the gap left by England, and such
+     connections should be cultivated as a potent means towards
+     obtaining foreign support to our cause and identification with
+     it.
+
+     If the mineral wealth of the Transvaal and Orange Free State
+     becomes established--as appears certain from discoveries already
+     made--England will not rest until these are also hers.
+
+     The leopard will retain its spots. The independence of both
+     Republics is at stake on that account alone, with the risk that
+     the rightful owners of the land will become the hewers of wood
+     and drawers of water for the usurpers.
+
+     There is no alternative hope for the peace and progress of South
+     Africa except by the total excision of the British ulcer.
+
+     Reliable signs are not wanting to show that our nation is
+     designed by Providence as the instrument for the recovery of its
+     rights, and for the chastisement of proud, perfidious
+     Albion."[19]
+
+         [Footnote 19: P. 64 _et seq._ of _The Origin of the
+         Anglo-Boer War Revealed_ (Hodder & Stoughton).]
+
+These brief and disjointed sentences present in their shortest form
+arguments and exhortations with which the Dutch population of the Free
+State, the Transvaal, and the Cape Colony, were familiarised through
+the Press, the pulpit, the platform, and through individual
+intercourse and advocacy, from the time of the Retrocession in 1881
+onwards. It is in effect the scheme of a Bond "worked out more in
+detail by some friends at Bloemfontein," as published by Borckenhagen
+in his paper, _The Bloemfontein Express_, on April 7th, 1881, to which
+Du Toit, the founder of the Bond in the Cape Colony, referred in the
+pamphlet, _De Transvaalse Oorlog_ (The Transvaal War), which he issued
+from his press at the Paarl later on in the same year. The nationalist
+creed, as thus formulated, was preached consistently in the Free
+State; but in the Cape Colony it was modified by Hofmeyr to meet the
+exigencies of Colonial politics.
+
+None the less it was in the Cape Colony that the Bond, as a political
+organisation, was destined to find its chief sphere of action. In the
+Free State it was discouraged by President Brand, and in point of fact
+the British population was too insignificant a factor in the politics
+of the central republic to make it necessary to maintain a distinct
+organisation for the promotion of nationalist sentiment. In the
+Transvaal, again, the Bond maintained no regular organisation. And
+this for two reasons. Every burgher of the northern Republic was
+sufficiently animated by the anti-British sentiments which it was
+intended to promote; and the only "constitution" which the Transvaal
+Dutch would accept was one which embodied principles so flagrantly
+inconsistent with submission to British authority that it could not be
+adopted by the branches of the Bond in the Cape Colony without
+exposing its members to immediate prosecution for high treason.[20]
+
+         [Footnote 20: Under the changed conditions of to-day the Boer
+         population is organised in the Transvaal into _Het Volk_, and
+         in the Orange River Colony into the _Oranjie Unie_; both
+         practically identical with the Bond in the Cape Colony.]
+
+[Sidenote: The origin of the Bond.]
+
+In the politics of the Cape Colony, however, the Bond became the
+predominant force; and any picture, however briefly sketched, of South
+Africa as it was when Lord Milner's administration commenced, must
+include some account of the origin and methods of this remarkable
+organisation.
+
+The origin of the Afrikander Bond is to be found in the articles
+written by the Rev. S. J. du Toit, a Dutch predikant, in _De Patriot_,
+a newspaper published at the Paarl, of which he was the editor. Mr. du
+Toit's political standpoint is sufficiently revealed by the fact that
+in 1881 he claimed that _De Patriot_ had done more than any other
+single agency to secure the successful revolt of the Boers from
+British authority accomplished in that year. The inspiration which
+drove his pen to advocate the founding of a political organisation,
+that should serve to prepare the way for a more general and complete
+"war of independence," was the defeat of the British troops by the
+Transvaal burghers.
+
+     "This is now our time," he wrote, in the same year, "to establish
+     the Bond, while a national consciousness has been awakened
+     through the Transvaal War. And the Bond must be our preparation
+     for the future confederation of all the States and Colonies of
+     South Africa. The English Government keeps talking of a
+     confederation under the British flag. That will never happen. We
+     can assure them of that. We have often said it: there is just one
+     hindrance to confederation, and that is the English flag. Let
+     them take that away, and the confederation under the free
+     Afrikander flag would be established. But so long as the English
+     flag remains here the Afrikander Bond must be our confederation.
+     And the British will, after a while, realise that Froude's advice
+     is the best for them: they must just have Simon's Bay as a naval
+     and military station on the road to India, and give over all the
+     rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders."[21]
+
+         [Footnote 21: Reprint of a pamphlet (found with the first
+         leaf torn) containing an English translation of _De
+         Transvaalse Oorlog_, p. 8.]
+
+This general statement of the purpose of the Bond was supported by
+reiterated appeals to racial passion:
+
+     "The little respect which the Afrikander had for British troops
+     and cannons [up to the Majuba defeat]," he writes, "is utterly
+     done away. And England has learnt so much respect for us
+     Afrikanders that she will take care not to be so ready to make
+     war with us again.... The Englishman has made himself hated,
+     language and all. And this is well."
+
+[Sidenote: The objects of the Bond.]
+
+When, by the use of these and even more violent expressions, the mind
+of the Dutch population had been sufficiently aroused, Du Toit
+proceeded to unfold his plan of campaign. His _modus operandi_ is
+similar to that of Borckenhagen in its main features. The Bond, says
+_De Patriot_, must boycott all English traders, except only those who
+are ready to adopt its principles. English signboards, advertisements,
+shops and book-keepers, must be abolished. The English banks must be
+replaced by a National Bank. No land must be sold to Englishmen. The
+Republics must "make their own ammunition, and be well supplied with
+cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery to work them." And he
+cheerfully notices that "at Heidelberg there are already 4,000
+cartridges made daily, and a few skilful Afrikanders have begun to
+make shells, too. This is right: so must we become a nation." For the
+Cape Colony, however, "such preparations are not so especially
+necessary." But, most of all, Du Toit insists upon the need of
+combating the growing use of the English language. "English
+education," he laments, "has done more mischief to our country and
+nation than we can express." And, therefore, he urges "war" against
+the English language. In the schools, in the Church, and "in our
+family life above all," it must be considered a "disgrace to speak
+English.... Who will join the war? All true Afrikanders, we hope."
+
+Thus was the Bond, the child of Majuba, quickened into conscious being
+by the fiery pen of the predikant, Du Toit. Poor Du Toit! His after
+life was a strange commentary upon this early triumph of his brain,
+won in the drowsy solitudes of the Paarl. Summoned to be Director of
+Education in the Transvaal, he was quickly disillusioned of his love
+of his Dutch mother-country by actual intercourse with the
+contemptuous Hollanders whom Krüger had invited to serve the Republic.
+Later, again, he was rejected by the Bond which he had himself
+created, and driven to find comfort in the broad freedom of allegiance
+to an Empire-state.
+
+The object of the Bond, as stated by Du Toit in _De Transvaalse
+Oorlog_, was the "creation of a South African nationality ... through
+the establishment of this Bond in all states and colonies of South
+Africa." Its organisation was to consist of a central governing body
+(_bestuur_), with provincial, district, and ward _besturen_. The
+central _bestuur_ was to be composed of five members, two for the Cape
+Colony, and one each for the Transvaal, Natal, and Free State, who
+were "to meet yearly in one or other of the chief towns of the
+component states." The provincial _besturen_, consisting of one
+representative from each of the district _besturen_, were to meet
+every six months at their respective colonial or state capitals.[22]
+
+         [Footnote 22: _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, pp. 7 and 8.]
+
+The first Congress of the Afrikander Bond was held at Graaf Reinet in
+1882. In the draft constitution then drawn up for the approval of its
+members, the relationship of the Bond to the British Government in
+South Africa was defined with commendable frankness. In the "Programme
+of Principles" was the article:
+
+     In itself acknowledging no single form of government as the only
+     suitable form, and whilst acknowledging the form of government
+     existing at present, [the Bond] means that the aim of our
+     national development must be a united South Africa under its own
+     flag.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's influence.]
+
+And it was upon the basis of this "Programme of Principles" that the
+earliest Bond organisations were formed in the Transvaal, the Free
+State, and the Cape Colony. In the year following the Graaf Reinet
+Congress, however, the "Farmers' Protection Association" was
+amalgamated with the Bond in the Cape Colony, and the influence of Mr.
+J. H. Hofmeyr led the joint organisation to adopt a modified
+"programme." Mr. Hofmeyr, who was destined afterwards to assume the
+undisputed headship of the Bond, was an economist as well as a
+nationalist. He was intensely interested in the development of the
+country districts, and he saw that the conditions of agriculture could
+hardly be improved without the co-operation of the British and more
+progressive section of the farming class. He also knew that an
+organisation, professing to forward aims of avowed disloyalty, would
+rapidly find itself in collision with the Cape Government. With the
+growth of Mr. Hofmeyr's influence the policy, though not the aims, of
+the Bond was changed. All declarations, such as the clause "under its
+own flag," inconsistent with allegiance to the British Crown were
+omitted from the official constitution, and its individual members
+were exhorted to avoid any behaviour or expressions likely to prevent
+Englishmen from joining the organisation. As early as 1884 the Bond
+secured the return of twenty-five members to the Cape Parliament, and
+it was their support that enabled the Upington Ministry to maintain
+itself in office against an opposition which consisted of the main
+body of the representatives elected by the British population; and
+from this date onwards it was the recognised aim of Mr. Hofmeyr to
+control the Legislature of the Colony by making it impossible for any
+ministry to dispense with the support of the Bond members, although he
+refrained from putting a ministry of Bondsmen into office. To have
+done this latter might have united the British population and their
+representatives in a solid phalanx, and endangered the success of the
+effort to separate the British settlers in the country districts from
+the more recent arrivals from England--mostly townsmen--which remained
+a fruitful source of Afrikander influence up to the time of the
+Jameson Raid. By representing the new British population, which
+followed in the wake of the mineral discoveries, as "fortune-seekers"
+and adventurers and not genuine colonists, the Bond endeavoured, not
+merely to widen the natural line of cleavage between the townsman and
+the countryman, but actually to detach the older British settlers from
+sympathy with the mother country, and, by drawing them within the
+sphere of Afrikander nationalist aspirations, to make them share its
+own antagonism to British supremacy.
+
+[Sidenote: Merriman and the Bond.]
+
+But, in spite of the change of policy due to Mr. Hofmeyr, the old
+leaven of stalwart Bondsmen remained sufficiently in evidence to draw
+from Mr. J. X. Merriman--then a strong Imperialist in close
+association with Mr. J. W. Leonard--a striking rebuke. The speech in
+question was made, fittingly enough, at Grahamstown, the most
+"English" town in South Africa, in 1885. It was reprinted with
+complete appropriateness, in _The Cape Times_ of July 10th, 1899. The
+struggle which Mr. Merriman had foreseen fourteen years before was
+then near at hand; while Mr. Merriman himself had become a member of a
+ministry placed in power by the Bond for the avowed purpose of
+"combating the British Government."
+
+     "The situation is a grave one," he said. "It is not a question of
+     localism; it is not a question of party politics; but it is a
+     question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral
+     part of the British Empire.... You will have to keep public men
+     up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind
+     whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the
+     British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as
+     privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the
+     Bond. From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison
+     began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come
+     to this--Is England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in
+     South Africa?... Since then that institution has made a show of
+     loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty.... Some people, who
+     should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the
+     idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole
+     teaching of history goes to show that when the conflict was
+     between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent
+     section triumphed. And so we see that some moderate men are in
+     the power of an institution whose avowed object is to combat the
+     British Government. In any other country such an organisation
+     could not have grown; but here, among a scattered population, it
+     has insidiously and successfully worked.... No one who wishes
+     well for the British Government could have read the leading
+     articles of the _Zuid Africaan_, and _Express_, and _De Patriot_,
+     in expounding the Bond principles, without seeing that the
+     maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the
+     object they have in view are absolutely different things. My
+     quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its
+     main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount
+     power in South Africa."
+
+This was plain speaking. The rare insight revealed in such a sentence
+as this--"in any other country such an organisation could not have
+grown, but here, _among a scattered population_, it has insidiously
+and successfully worked"; the piquant incident of the reproduction of
+the speech on the eve of the war; the fact that the man who made this
+diagnosis was to drink the poison whose fatal effects he described so
+faithfully, was indeed to become the most bitter opponent of the great
+statesman that "kept South Africa a part of the British
+Empire,"--these things together make Mr. Merriman's Grahamstown speech
+one of the most curious and instructive of the political utterances of
+the period.
+
+[Sidenote: Change of Bond policy.]
+
+In the year following (1886) the Bond met officially, for the first
+and only time, as an inter-state organisation. Bloemfontein was the
+place of assemblage, and in the Central Bestuur, or Committee, the
+South African Republic, the Free State, and the Cape Colony were each
+represented by two delegates. This meeting revealed the practical
+difficulties which prevented the Cape nationalists from adopting the
+definitely anti-British programme of the Bond leaders in the
+Republics; and the conflict of commercial interests between the Cape
+Colony and the Transvaal, already initiated by the attempt of the
+latter to secure Bechuanaland in 1884-5, confirmed the Cape delegates
+in their decision to develop the Bond in the Cape Colony upon colonial
+rather than inter-state lines. The result of the divergences of aim
+manifested at Bloemfontein was speedily made apparent in the Cape
+Colony. In 1887 Mr. T. P. Theron, then Secretary of the Bond,
+delivered an address in which the new, or Hofmeyr, programme was
+formulated and officially adopted. In recommending the new policy to
+the members of the Bond, Mr. Theron made no secret of the nature of
+the considerations by which its leaders had been chiefly influenced.
+
+     "You must remember," he said, "that the eyes of all are directed
+     towards you. The Press will cause your actions, expressions, and
+     resolutions to be known everywhere. You cannot but feel how much
+     depends on us for our nation and our country. If we must plead
+     guilty in the past of many an unguarded expression, let us be
+     more cautious and guarded for the future."
+
+And he then proceeded to sketch a picture of racial conciliation, when
+all "differences and disagreements" between Dutch and English would be
+merged in the consciousness of a new and common nationality--pointing
+out, however, that the advent of that day depended on "you and me, my
+fellow Bond members."
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes and Hofmeyr.]
+
+Assuming that the predominance of Afrikander ideals could be secured
+only by the complete separation of the local governments from the
+Government of Great Britain, nothing could be more masterly than the
+manner in which the Bond approached the task of reuniting the European
+communities of South Africa--the task which the Imperial Government
+had abandoned as hopeless. As inspired and controlled by Hofmeyr
+during the years between this date (1887) and the Jameson Raid, the
+Bond embodied a volume of effort in which the most sincere supporter
+of the British connection could co-operate. It was the assistance
+afforded by the Bond in moulding British administration in South
+Africa upon South African lines that provided the common ground upon
+which Rhodes and Hofmeyr met in their long alliance. Hofmeyr probably
+never abandoned his belief that a republican form of government was
+the inevitable _dénouement_ to which the administration of South
+Africa on a basis of South African ideas must lead. Rhodes never
+wavered in his loyalty to the British connection. But there was a
+great body of useful work which both men could accomplish in common,
+which each desired to see accomplished, which, when accomplished,
+would leave each free to choose the path--Republican or Imperial--by
+which the last stage was to be traversed and the goal of South
+African unity finally attained.
+
+The character and career of Rhodes afford material for a study of such
+peculiar and engrossing interest that any adequate treatment of the
+subject would require a separate volume. Fortunately, the broad facts
+of his life are sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to
+attempt the almost impossible task of condensing a volume within the
+limits of a few pages. None the less, there is one incident in his
+political career which must be recalled here, and that for the simple
+reason that it establishes two facts, each of which is essential to
+the complete understanding of the situation in the Cape Colony as it
+developed immediately after the Raid. First, that all through the
+years of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance the Bond remained at heart true
+to the aim which it had at first openly avowed--the aim of
+establishing a united South Africa under its own flag. And second,
+that Rhodes was equally staunch in maintaining his ideal of a united
+South Africa under the British flag. The incident which exhibits both
+these facts in the clearest light is the refusal by Rhodes of the
+overtures made to him by Borckenhagen. At the time when these
+overtures were made Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the
+Chartered Company had been successfully launched, and the alliance
+between himself and Hofmeyr was in full operation. The occasion which
+led to them was the opening of the railway at Bloemfontein in 1890--a
+railway constructed by the Cape Government under a friendly
+arrangement with the Free State. And it was one, therefore, which
+afforded a conspicuous example of the value of the Bond influence as a
+means of securing progress in the direction of South African unity.
+The story was told by Rhodes himself in a speech which he made in the
+Cape Colony on March 12th, 1898.
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes and Borckenhagen.]
+
+     "I remember," he said, "that we had a great meeting at
+     Bloemfontein, and in the usual course I had to make a speech. I
+     think I was your Prime Minister. And this speech pleased many
+     there, and especially--and I speak of him with the greatest
+     respect--a gentleman who is dead, Mr. Borckenhagen. He came to me
+     and asked me to dictate to him the whole of my speech. I said, 'I
+     never wrote a speech, and I don't know what I said; but I will
+     tell you what I know about it.' He wrote it down, and afterwards
+     came to Capetown with me.... He spoke very nicely to me about my
+     speech. 'Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa.' And I said,
+     'So do I; I am with you entirely. We must have a united South
+     Africa.' He said, 'There is nothing in the way.' And I said, 'No;
+     there is nothing in the way. Well,' I said, 'we are one.' 'Yes,'
+     he said, 'and I will tell you: we will take you as our leader,'
+     he said. 'There is only one small thing, and that is, we must, of
+     course, be independent to the rest of the world.' I said, 'No;
+     you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to
+     forget all my history and traditions; and I would be a fool,
+     because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by
+     yours.' From that day he assumed a most acrid tone in his
+     _Express_ towards myself, and I was made full sorry at times by
+     the tone. But that was the overpowering thought in his mind--an
+     independent South Africa."[23]
+
+         [Footnote 23: _Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and
+         Speeches._ By Vindex; p. 533. Borckenhagen had just died.]
+
+The facts here disclosed explain how it was that the apparently
+satisfactory situation in South Africa before the Raid so rapidly
+developed into the dangerous situation of the years that followed it.
+The Raid tore aside the veil which the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance had
+cast over the eyes alike of Dutch and British, and left them free to
+see the essential antagonism of aim between the two men in its naked
+truth.[24] From that moment Rhodes was recognised by the Bond as its
+chief and most dangerous enemy; and as such he was pursued by its
+bitterest hostility to the day of his death; while Rhodes, on the
+other hand, was driven to seek support solely in the people of his own
+nationality. From that moment the Bond fell back upon the policy of
+1881. The Dutch Press, pulpit, and platform commenced an active
+nationalist propaganda on the old racial lines; and the advocacy of
+anti-British aims increased in boldness and in definiteness as the
+Transvaal grew strong with its inflowing armaments.
+
+         [Footnote 24: _Ons Land_, reputed to be controlled by Hofmeyr
+         himself, and certainly the recognised organ of the Bond,
+         published a pæan of triumph over the surrender of Dr.
+         Jameson's troopers at Doornkop. "Afrikanderdom has awakened
+         to a sense of earnestness which we have not observed since
+         the heroic war of liberty in 1881. From the Limpopo, as far
+         as Capetown, the second Majuba has given birth to a new
+         inspiration and a new movement amongst our people in South
+         Africa.... The flaccid and cowardly imperialism that had
+         already begun to dilute and weaken our national blood,
+         gradually turned aside before the new current that permeated
+         our people.... Now or never the foundation of a
+         wide-embracing nationalism must be laid.... The partition
+         wall has disappeared ... never has the necessity for a policy
+         of a colonial and republican union been greater; now the
+         psychological moment has arrived; now our people have
+         awakened all over South Africa; a new glow illumines our
+         hearts; let us lay the foundation-stone of a real United
+         South Africa on the soil of a pure and all-comprehensive
+         national sentiment."]
+
+[Sidenote: Effects of the raid.]
+
+We are now in a position to sum up the main features of the situation
+in South Africa as Lord Milner found it. British administration,
+controlled from Downing Street, had quickly led to what Sir George
+Grey called the dismemberment of European South Africa. The Imperial
+Government, having found out its mistake, had endeavoured to regain
+the lost solidarity of the European communities and its authority over
+them, by bringing the Republics into a federal system under the
+British Crown. It had been thwarted in this endeavour by the military
+resistance of the Boers in the Transvaal, and the fear of a like
+resistance on the part of the Dutch population throughout South
+Africa. Its impotency had invited, and in part justified, the efforts
+made by local British initiative to solve the problem of South African
+unity on South African lines, but in a manner consistent with the
+maintenance of British supremacy. The early success of these efforts,
+prosecuted mainly through the agency of Rhodes, had been obliterated
+by the Jameson Raid. All attempts to secure the reunion of South
+Africa under the British flag having failed alike under Imperial and
+local British initiative, the way was open for the Afrikander
+nationalists once more to put forward the alternative plan of a united
+South Africa under its own flag, which they had formulated in the year
+immediately following the retrocession of the Transvaal.
+
+In proportion as the friends and supporters of British supremacy were
+discredited and depressed by the catastrophe of the Raid, the
+advocates and promoters of Afrikander nationalism were emboldened and
+encouraged. It was not Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the
+Cape who succeeded the discredited Rhodes (January 13th, 1896), but
+Mr. Hofmeyr, the veteran leader of the Afrikander Bond, that dictated
+the policy which Lord Rosmead must pursue to re-establish the
+integrity of the Imperial Government in the minds of its Dutch
+subjects. At the next presidential election in the Free State (March
+4th, 1896), Mr. J. G. Fraser, the head of the moderate party which
+followed in the steps of President Brand, was hopelessly beaten by Mr.
+Marthinus Steyn, an Afrikander nationalist of the scientific school of
+Borckenhagen, and a politician whose immediate programme included the
+"closer union" of that state with the South African Republic, the
+terms of which were finally settled at Bloemfontein on March 9th,
+1897. In the Cape Colony the Bond organised its resources with a view
+of securing even more complete control of the Cape Legislature at the
+general election of 1898. And lastly, President Krüger, who had
+ceased to rely upon Holland for administrative talent, and opened the
+lucrative offices of the South African Republic to the ambitious and
+educated Afrikander youth of the Free State and Cape Colony, commenced
+methodically and secretly to supply arms and ammunition to the
+adherents of the nationalist cause in the British Colonies.
+
+[Sidenote: Situation in 1896.]
+
+But disastrous as was the Jameson Raid in its method of execution and
+immediate effects, it produced certain results that cannot be held to
+have been prejudicial to the British cause in South Africa, if once we
+recognise the fact that the English people as a whole were totally
+ignorant, at the time of its occurrence, of the extent to which the
+sub-continent had already slipped from their grasp. Something of the
+long advance towards the goal of nationalist ambition, achieved by the
+Bond, was revealed. The emphatic cry of "Hands off" to Germany, for
+which the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation provided the occasion,
+was undoubtedly the means of arresting the progress of that power, at
+a point when further progress would have gained her a foot-hold in
+South Africa from which nothing short of actual hostilities could have
+dislodged her. And more important still was the fact that the Raid,
+with its train of dramatic incidents, had published, once and for all,
+the humiliating position of the British population in the Transvaal
+throughout the length and breadth of the Anglo-Saxon world, and
+compelled the Imperial Government to pledge itself to obtain the
+redress of the "admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's policy.]
+
+Against the rallying forces of Afrikander nationalism Mr. Chamberlain,
+for the moment, had nothing to oppose but the vague and as yet unknown
+power of an awakened Imperial sentiment. Lord Rosmead's attitude at
+Pretoria had convinced him of the uselessness of expecting that any
+satisfactory settlement of the franchise question could be brought
+about through the agency of the High Commissioner. He, therefore,
+invited President Krüger to visit England in the hope that his own
+personal advocacy of the cause of the Uitlanders, backed up by the
+weight of the Salisbury Government, might remove the "root causes" of
+Transvaal unrest. But President Krüger refused to confer with the
+Colonial Secretary upon any other than the wholly inadmissible basis
+of the conversion of the London Convention into a treaty of amity such
+as one independent power might conclude with another. Mr. Chamberlain,
+therefore, having put upon record that the purpose of the proposed
+conference was to give effect to the London Convention and not to
+destroy it, proceeded to formulate a South African policy that would
+enable him to make the most effective use of the authority of Great
+Britain as paramount Power. His purpose was to win Dutch opinion in
+the Free State and the Cape Colony to the side of the Imperial
+Government, and then to use this more progressive Dutch opinion as
+the fulcrum by which the lever of Imperial remonstrance was to be
+successfully applied to the Transvaal Government. In the speech[25] in
+which he sketched the main lines of this policy he declared
+emphatically that the paramount power of England was to be maintained
+at all costs, that foreign intervention would not be permitted under
+any pretence, and that the admitted grievances of the Uitlanders were
+to be redressed:
+
+         [Footnote 25: 1896.]
+
+     "We have," he continued, "a confident hope that we shall be able
+     in the course of no lengthened time to restore the situation as
+     it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, to have at our backs
+     the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population
+     in South Africa, and if we have that, the opinion--the united
+     opinion--which that will constitute, will be an opinion which no
+     power in Africa can resist."
+
+With the record of the last ten years before us it seems strange that
+Mr. Chamberlain should ever have believed in the efficacy of such a
+policy: still more strange that he should have spoken of his
+"confident hope" of winning the Afrikander nationalists to support the
+paramount Power. But it must be remembered that the evidence of the
+real sentiments and purposes of the nationalists here set forth in the
+preceding pages, and now the common property of all educated
+Englishmen, was then known only to perhaps a dozen journalists and
+politicians in England; and if these men had attempted to impart
+their knowledge to the general public, they would have failed from the
+sheer inability of the average Englishman to believe that "British
+subjects" under responsible government could be anything but loyal to
+the Imperial tie.
+
+But little as Mr. Chamberlain knew of the real strength of the forces
+of Afrikander nationalism, he discerned enough of the South African
+situation to realise that this policy would have no chance of success,
+unless the maintenance of the British cause in South Africa was placed
+in the hands of a personality of exceptional vigour and capacity.
+When, therefore, Lord Rosmead intimated his desire to be relieved of
+the heavy responsibility of the joint offices of High Commissionship
+for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony no attempt to
+dissuade him was made. His health had been enfeebled for some time
+past, and he did not long survive his return to England. Both in
+Australia and at the Cape he had devoted his strength and ability to
+the service of the Empire. In the years 1883-5 he had resolutely and
+successfully opposed the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize
+Bechuanaland. His failure to control his powerful and impatient Prime
+Minister is mitigated by the circumstance that it was solely on the
+ground of public interest that, upon the retirement of Lord Loch in
+1895, he had allowed himself, in spite of his advanced years and
+indifferent health, to assume the office of High Commissioner for a
+third time.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+A YEAR OF OBSERVATION
+
+
+Lord Rosmead retired early in 1897. It is said that three men so
+different in character as Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr.
+Stead, each separately fixed upon the same name as being that of the
+man most capable of undertaking the position of High Commissioner in
+South Africa--a position always difficult, but now more than ever
+arduous and responsible. To nine out of every ten men with whom he had
+been brought into contact there was little in Sir Alfred Milner--as he
+then was--to distinguish him from other high-principled, capable, and
+pleasant-mannered heads of departments in the Civil Service. His
+_métier_ was finance, and his accomplishment literature. Commencing
+with journalism and an unsuccessful contest (in the Liberal interest)
+for the Harrow division of Middlesex, he had been private secretary to
+Lord Goschen, Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and Head of the
+Inland Revenue. In this latter office he had given invaluable
+assistance to Sir William Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
+in respect of what is perhaps the most successful of recent methods
+of raising revenue--the death duties. The principle of the graduated
+death duties was Harcourt's; but it was Milner who worked out the
+elaborate system which rendered his ideas coherent, and enabled them
+eventually to be put into effect. Academic distinctions, however
+ample, cannot be said to-day to afford a definite assurance of
+pre-eminent capacity for the service of the State. Yet it was
+certainly no disadvantage to Sir Alfred Milner to have been a scholar
+of Balliol, or a President of the Oxford Union.[26] Whatever direct
+knowledge the educated public had of him was based probably upon the
+impression created by his book _England in Egypt_. This was a work
+which indicated that its author had formed high ideals of English
+statesmanship, and that his experience of a complex administrative
+system, working in a political society full of intrigue and
+international jealousy, had developed in him the rare qualities of
+insight and humour. Some of his readers might have reflected that an
+active association with so accomplished a master of financial and
+administrative method as Lord Cromer was in itself a useful equipment
+for a colonial administrator.
+
+         [Footnote 26: Mr. Bodley, in his _Coronation of King Edward
+         VII._, remarks that of the seventy Balliol scholars elected
+         during the mastership of Jowett (1870-1893) only three had at
+         that time (1902) "attained eminence in any branch of public
+         life." These three were Mr. H. H. Asquith, Dr. Charles Gore
+         (then Bishop of Worcester), and Lord Milner.]
+
+[Sidenote: Sir Alfred Milner.]
+
+But the British public, both in England and South Africa, took their
+view of the appointment from the opinions expressed by the many
+prominent men to whom Sir Alfred Milner was personally known. The
+leaders and the Press of both parties were unstinted in approval of
+the choice which Mr. Chamberlain had made. The banquet given to Sir
+Alfred Milner three weeks before his departure to the Cape (March
+28th, 1897) provided an occasion for an expression of unrestrained
+admiration and confidence unique in the annals of English public life.
+"He has the union of intellect with fascination that makes men mount
+high," wrote Lord Rosebery. And Sir William Harcourt, "the most
+grateful and obliged" of Milner's "many friends and admirers,"
+pronounced him to be "a man deserving of all praise and all
+affection." Mr. Asquith, who presided, stated in a speech marked
+throughout by a note of intimate friendliness that "no appointment of
+our time has been received with a larger measure both of the
+approbation of experienced men and of the applause of the public." The
+office itself was "at the present moment the most arduous and
+responsible in the administrative service of the country." Not only
+"embarrassing problems," but "formidable personalities" would confront
+the new High Commissioner for South Africa:
+
+     "But," he added, "we know that he takes with him as clear an
+     intellect and as sympathetic an imagination, and, if need should
+     arise, a power of resolution as tenacious and as inflexible as
+     belongs to any man of our acquaintance."
+
+Milner's reply is significant of the spirit in which he had undertaken
+his task. Like Rhodes, he had found in his Oxford studies the reasoned
+basis for an enlightened Imperialism. Chief among his earliest
+political convictions was the belief that--
+
+     "there was no political object comparable in importance with that
+     of preventing a repetition of such a disaster [as the loss of the
+     United States]: the severance of another link in the great
+     Imperial chain.... It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill
+     any position in the character of what I may be, perhaps, allowed
+     to call a 'civilian soldier of the Empire.' To succeed in it, to
+     render any substantial service to any part of our world-wide
+     State, would be all that in any of my most audacious dreams I had
+     ever ventured to aspire to. But in a cause in which one
+     absolutely believes, even failure--personal failure, I mean, for
+     the cause itself is not going to fail--would be preferable to an
+     easy life of comfortable prosperity in another sphere."
+
+[Sidenote: Personal traits.]
+
+This was the man who was sent to maintain the interests of the
+paramount Power in a South Africa shaken by racial antagonism, and
+already feverish with political intrigue and commercial rivalry. Of
+all the tributes of the farewell banquet, Sir William Harcourt's was
+closest to the life--"worthy of all praise and all affection." The
+quality of inspiring affection to which this impressive phrase bore
+witness was one which had made itself felt among the humblest of those
+who were fortunate enough to have been associated with Lord Milner in
+any public work. Long after Milner had left Egypt, the face of the
+Syrian or Coptic Effendi of the Finance Department in Cairo would
+light up at the chance mention of the genial Englishman who had once
+been his chief. And in remote English counties revenue officials still
+hang his portrait upon the walls of their lodgings. Such men had no
+claim to appraise his professional merit or his gifts of intellect;
+but their feelings were responsive to the charm of his nature. "He was
+so considerate": that was their excuse for retaining his name and
+personality among the pleasant memories of the past. But the other
+side of Milner's character, the power of "tenacious and inflexible
+resolution," of which Mr. Asquith spoke, was destined to be brought
+into play so prominently during the "eight dusky years" of his South
+African administration, that to the distant on-looker it came to be
+accepted as the characterising quality of the man. To some Milner
+became the "man of blood and iron"; determined, like Bismarck, to
+secure the unity of a country by trampling with iron-shod boots upon
+the liberties of its people: even as in the view of others his clear
+mental vision--never more clear than in South Africa--became clouded
+by an adopted partisanship, and he was a "lost mind." Nothing could be
+further from the truth. If the man lived who could have turned the
+Boer and Afrikander from hatred and distrust of England and English
+ideas by personal charm and honourable dealing, it was the man who
+had universally inspired all his former associates, whether equals or
+subordinates, with admiration and affection. Whatever bitterness was
+displayed against Lord Milner personally by the Boer and Afrikander
+leaders after the issue of the war was decided was due to their
+perception that he was then--as always--a source of strength and an
+inspiration for renewed effort to those whom they regarded as their
+rivals or opponents. They hated him just as the French hated
+Bismarck--because he was the strong man on the other side.
+
+Lord Milner's inflexibility was, in its essence, a keener perception
+of duty than the ordinary: it was a determination to do what he
+believed to be for the good of South Africa and the Empire,
+irrespective of any consideration of personal or party relationship.
+It was in no sense the incapacity to measure the strength of an
+opponent, still less did it arise from any failure to perceive the
+cogency of an opinion in conflict with his own. Before the eight years
+of his administration had passed, Lord Milner's knowledge of the needs
+of South Africa and the Empire had become so profound that it carried
+him ahead of the most enlightened and patriotic of the home statesmen
+who supported him loyally to the end. Through the period of the war,
+when the issues were simple and primitive, they were wholly with him.
+But afterwards they supported him not so much because they understood
+the methods which he employed and the objects at which he aimed, as
+because they were by this time convinced of his complete mastery of
+the political and economic problems of South Africa. It is to this
+inability to understand the facts of the South African situation, as
+he had learnt them, that we must attribute the comparative feebleness
+shown by the Unionist leaders in resisting the perverse attempt which
+was made by the Liberal party, after the General Election of 1906, to
+revoke the final arrangements of his administration. The interval that
+separated Lord Milner's knowledge of South Africa from that of the
+Liberal ministers was profound; but even the Unionist chiefs showed
+but slight appreciation of the unassailable validity of the
+administrative decisions with which they had identified themselves,
+when the "swing of the pendulum" brought these decisions again, and
+somewhat unexpectedly, before the great tribunal of the nation.
+
+[Sidenote: Arrival at Cape Town.]
+
+Lord Milner sailed for the Cape on April 17th, 1897. At the actual
+moment of his arrival the relations between the Home Government and
+the South African Republic were strained almost to the breaking point.
+In a peremptory despatch of March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain had demanded
+the repeal of the Aliens Immigration and Aliens Expulsion Laws of
+1896--the former of which constituted a flagrant violation of the
+freedom of entry secured to British subjects by Article XIV. of the
+London Convention. This virtual ultimatum was emphasised by the
+appearance of a British squadron at Delagoa Bay, and by the despatch
+of reinforcements to the South African garrisons. The evident
+determination of the Imperial Government induced the Volksraad to
+repeal the Immigration Law and to pass a resolution in favour of
+amending the Expulsion Law. The crisis was over in June, and during
+the next few months the Pretoria Executive showed a somewhat more
+conciliatory temper towards the Government of Great Britain. And in
+this connection two other facts must be recorded. In August, 1896, Sir
+Jacobus de Wet had been succeeded as British Agent at Pretoria by Sir
+William (then Mr.) Conyngham Greene, and the Imperial Government was
+assured, by this appointment, of the services of an able man and a
+trained diplomatist. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the
+Raid, promised in July, 1896, met on February 16th, 1897, and reported
+on July 13th of the same year. Its report did little more than
+reassert the findings of the Cape Parliamentary Inquiry, which had
+been before the British public for the last year. It was otherwise
+remarkable for the handle which it gave (by the failure to insist upon
+the production of certain telegrams) to some extreme Radicals to
+assert Mr. Chamberlain's "complicity" in the "invasion" of the
+Transvaal as originally planned by Mr. Rhodes.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's thoroughness.]
+
+Lord Milner had expressed his intention of acquainting himself with
+the conditions of South Africa by personal observation before he
+attempted to take any definite action for the solution of the
+problems awaiting his attention. Nor, after the first month of
+anxious diplomatic controversy with the Pretoria Executive, was there
+anything either in the political situation in the Cape Colony, or in
+the attitude of the Transvaal Government, to prevent him from putting
+his purpose into effect. Apart from the circumstance that the
+reorganisation of the Chartered Company's Administration--a question
+in which the political future of Mr. Rhodes was largely involved--was
+a matter upon which his observation and advice were urgently required
+by the Colonial Office, Lord Milner had no intention, as he said, of
+"being tied to an office chair at Capetown." He had resolved,
+therefore, to visit at the earliest opportunity, first, the country
+districts of the colony which formed the actual seat of the Dutch
+population, and, second, the two protectorates of Bechuanaland and
+Basutoland, which were administered by officers directly responsible
+to the High Commissioner, as the representative of the Imperial
+Government. In point of fact he did more than this. Within a year of
+his arrival he had travelled through the Cape Colony (August and
+September, 1897), through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia
+(November and December, 1897), and visited Basutoland (April, 1898).
+And with characteristic thoroughness he set himself to learn both the
+Dutch of Holland and the "Taal"--the former in order that he might
+read the newspapers which the Afrikanders read, and the latter to
+open the way to that intercourse of eye and ear which most helps a
+man to know the character of his neighbour.
+
+Lord Milner's year of observation may be said to have ended with the
+speech at Graaf Reinet (March 3rd, 1898), which held his first clear
+and emphatic public utterance. During the greater part of this period
+he was by no means exclusively occupied with the shortcomings of
+President Krüger. The discharge of his official duties as Governor of
+the Cape Colony required more than ordinary care and watchfulness in
+view of the disturbed state of South African politics. And as High
+Commissioner he was called upon to deal with a number of questions
+relative to the affairs of Rhodesia and the Protectorates, of which
+some led him into the new and unfamiliar field of native law and
+custom, while others involved the exercise of his judgment on delicate
+matters of personal fitness and official etiquette. But an account of
+these questions--questions which he handled with equal insight and
+decision--must yield to the commanding interest of the actual steps by
+which he approached the two central problems upon the solution of
+which the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa
+depended--the removal of the pernicious system of race oligarchy in
+the Transvaal, and the preservation of the Cape Colony in its
+allegiance to the British Crown.
+
+[Sidenote: His friendliness to the Boers.]
+
+The position which Lord Milner took up in his relations with the
+Transvaal Government was one that was consistent alike with his
+personal characteristics and with the dictates of a high and
+enlightened statesmanship. Within the first few weeks of his arrival
+he let it be known, both through the British Agent at Pretoria, and
+through those of the Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony who were on
+terms of intimacy with President Krüger, that he desired, as it were,
+to open an entirely new account between the two governments. He, a new
+High Commissioner with no South African past, with no errors to
+retrieve, no failures to rankle, could afford to bury the diplomatic
+hatchet. There was nothing to prevent him from approaching the
+discussion of any questions that might arise in a spirit of perfect
+friendliness, or from believing that the President would be inspired,
+on his side, by the same friendly feelings. It was his hope,
+therefore, that much of the friction incidental to formal diplomatic
+controversy might be avoided through the settlement of all lesser
+matters by amicable and informal discussion between President Krüger
+and himself.
+
+This was no mere official pose. Milner never posed. He, too, desired
+to eliminate the Imperial factor in his own way. He saw from the first
+the advantage of limiting the area of dispute between Downing Street
+and Pretoria; and he made it his object to settle as many matters as
+possible by friendly discussion on the spot. The desire to avoid
+unnecessary diplomatic friction, and to make the best of President
+Krüger, was manifested in all he did at this time. In the course of
+the preparations for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee by the
+British community on the Rand, the new High Commissioner was asked to
+decide whether the toast of Queen Victoria, or that of President
+Krüger, should come first upon the list at the public banquet. He
+replied unhesitatingly that the courtesy due to President Krüger, as
+the head of the State, must be fully accorded. On this occasion, of
+all others, British subjects, he said, "should be most careful to
+avoid anything which might be regarded as a slight to the South
+African Republic or its chief magistrate."[27]
+
+         [Footnote 27: The incident is otherwise interesting as
+         affording the first sign of that confidence of the British
+         population in Lord Milner, which, steadily increasing as the
+         final and inevitable struggle approached, earned for him at
+         length the unfaltering support of British South Africa. After
+         the Rand celebrations were over, he was informed that his
+         advice had been put into effect with "very considerable
+         difficulty." The argument which had prevailed was this: "The
+         new High Commissioner is a tested man of affairs; we all look
+         to him to put British interests on a solid basis; and as we
+         do this, let us obey him in a matter like this."]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner and the Conventions.]
+
+While to President Krüger Lord Milner said, "Let us see if we cannot
+arrange matters by friendly discussion between ourselves"; to the
+Colonial Office he said, "Give them time; don't hurry them. Reform
+there must be: if by no other means, then by our intervention. But
+before we intervene, let us be sure that they either cannot, or will
+not, reform themselves. Therefore let us wait patiently, and make
+things as easy as possible for President Krüger." More than this, he
+had almost as little belief in the utility of the Conventions[28] as
+Grey had in those of his epoch. Whether the Boers did, or did not,
+call the Queen "Suzerain" seemed to him to be a small matter--an
+etymological question, as he afterwards called it. What was essential
+was that men of British blood should not be kept under the heel of the
+Dutch. Moreover, the grievances for which the observance of the London
+Convention, however strictly enforced, could provide a remedy, were
+insignificant as compared with the more real grievances, such as the
+attack upon the independence of the law courts, the injury to
+industrial life caused by a corrupt and incompetent administration,
+and the denial of elementary political rights, which no technical
+observance of the Convention would remove. Nor did it escape Lord
+Milner's notice that a policy of rigid insistence upon the letter of
+the Conventions might place the Imperial Government in a position of
+grave disadvantage. If any breach of the Conventions was once made the
+subject of earnest diplomatic complaint, the demand of the Imperial
+Government must be enforced even at the cost of war. The Conventions,
+therefore, should be invoked as little as possible. For, if the Boers
+denied the British Law Officers' interpretation of the text, the
+Imperial Government might find itself on the horns of a dilemma.
+Either it must beat an undignified retreat, or it must make war upon
+the Transvaal for a mere technicality, a proceeding which would gain
+for the Republic a maximum, and for the Imperial Government a minimum
+of sympathy and support. Therefore, he said, "Keep the Conventions in
+the background. If we are to fight let it be about something that is
+essential to the peace and well-being of South Africa, and not a mere
+diplomatic wrangle between the Pretoria Executive and the British
+Government."
+
+         [Footnote 28: Apart from the question of the validity of the
+         preamble to the Pretoria Convention (1881), two
+         Conventions--the London Convention (1884), and the Swaziland
+         Convention (1894)--were in force between the South African
+         Republic and Great Britain. The relations of the Imperial
+         Government to the Free State were regulated by the
+         Bloemfontein Convention (1854). This latter and the Sand
+         River Convention (1852), were the Conventions of Grey's
+         time.]
+
+[Sidenote: Transvaal affairs.]
+
+Lord Milner's hope that President Krüger might meet him half-way,
+although it was shown by subsequent events to have been devoid of
+foundation, had for the moment superficial appearances in its favour.
+After their retreat on the question of the Aliens Immigration Law the
+attitude of the Pretoria Executive remained for some time outwardly
+less hostile to the Imperial Government. Woolls-Sampson and "Karri"
+Davies were released from Pretoria gaol in honour of Queen Victoria's
+Jubilee,[29] and at the same period the first and only step was taken
+that offered a genuine promise of reform from within. The Industrial
+Commission, appointed earlier in the year by the Executive at the
+request of President Krüger, surprised the Uitlander community by
+conducting its inquiry with a thoroughness and impartiality that left
+no ground for complaint. Its report, reviewing in detail the
+conditions of the mining industry, was published in July. It afforded
+a complete confirmation of the fiscal and administrative complaints
+put forward by the Uitlanders against the Government; and as Mr.
+Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was both a member of
+the Executive and the leader of the more progressive section of the
+Boers, there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the recommendations
+of the Report being carried into effect. Scarcely more than six months
+later President Krüger proved conclusively that the hope of these, or
+of any other, reforms was entirely unfounded; but so long as there
+remained any prospect of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government
+being able to settle their differences by themselves, Lord Milner
+consistently pursued his intention of "making things easy" for the
+Transvaal Government. And this although the Pretoria Executive soon
+began to make heavy drafts upon his patience in other respects.[30]
+
+         [Footnote 29: These two men, now Colonel Sir Aubrey
+         Woolls-Sampson and Major W. D. "Karri" Davies, had refused to
+         sign the petition of appeal--an act of submission which
+         President Krüger required of the Johannesburg Reformers,
+         before he released them from Pretoria gaol. They did so on
+         the ground that the Imperial Government had made itself
+         responsible for their safety; since they and the other
+         Reformers, with the town of Johannesburg, had laid down their
+         arms on the faith of Lord Rosmead's declaration that he would
+         obtain reasonable reforms from President Krüger for the
+         Uitlanders.]
+
+         [Footnote 30: In the question of the Swaziland border, the
+         affair of Bunu, and the continued and increasing
+         ill-treatment of the Cape Boys, the Boer Government
+         manifested its old spirit of aggression and duplicity. All
+         these matters involved Lord Milner in anxious and wearisome
+         negotiations, which, however, he contrived by mingled
+         firmness and address to keep within the limits of friendly
+         discussion.]
+
+If Lord Milner was prepared to make the most of Paul Krüger and the
+Boers, he showed himself no less ready to see the best side of the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony. As we have already had occasion to notice,
+the year of his appointment was that of the Diamond Jubilee
+celebration; and on June 23rd he sent home a brief despatch in which
+he dwelt with evident satisfaction upon the share taken by the Dutch
+in the general demonstrations of loyalty called forth by the occasion
+in the Cape Colony. After a reference to the number of loyal addresses
+or congratulatory telegrams which had been sent to the Colonial
+Secretary for transmission to the Queen, he continued:
+
+     "The enthusiasm evoked here ... seems to me to be of peculiar
+     interest ... in view of recent events, which, as you are aware,
+     have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different
+     sections of the community. All I can say is that, so far as I am
+     able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the
+     loyalty of any portion of the community to Her Majesty the Queen.
+     People of all races, the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as
+     well as the African natives, have vied with one another in
+     demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the
+     throne. When every allowance is made for the exaggeration of
+     feeling caused by the unparalleled scale and prolonged duration
+     of the present festivities, and for the contagious excitement
+     which they have produced, it is impossible to doubt that the
+     feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much
+     stronger than has sometimes been believed. In my opinion, the
+     impression made by the world-wide celebration of Her Majesty's
+     Jubilee has strengthened that feeling throughout South Africa,
+     and is likely to have a permanent value."[31]
+
+         [Footnote 31: This short despatch has been given practically
+         _in extenso_. It was not published in the Blue-books, but it
+         was communicated to the Press some three months after it had
+         been received.]
+
+[Sidenote: First impressions of the Dutch.]
+
+It has been urged that the opinion here recorded is inconsistent with
+the charge of anti-British sentiment subsequently brought by Lord
+Milner against the Dutch leaders in the Cape Colony, and the despatch
+itself has been cited as affording evidence of the contention that the
+unfavourable view subsequently expressed in the Graaf Reinet speech,
+and more definitely in the despatch of May 4th, 1899, was not the
+result of independent investigation, but was a view formed to support
+the Imperial Government in a coercive policy towards the Transvaal.
+This criticism, which is a perfectly natural one, only serves to
+establish the fact that Lord Milner actually did approach the study of
+the nationality difficulty in complete freedom from any preconceived
+notions on the subject. As he said, he went to South Africa with an
+"open mind." So far from having any prejudice against the Dutch, his
+first impression was distinctly favourable, and as such he recorded
+it, suitably enough, in this Jubilee despatch. But it must be
+remembered that the opinion here recorded was based upon a very
+limited field of observation. At the time when this despatch was
+written Lord Milner had not yet been quite two months in South
+Africa, and his experience of the Dutch of the Cape Colony had been
+confined to intercourse with the Dutch of the Cape peninsula; that is
+to say, he had only come into contact with that section of the Cape
+Dutch which is, as indeed it has been for a century, closely
+identified, from a social point of view, with the official and
+mercantile British population of Capetown and its suburbs.
+
+What the Jubilee despatch really shows is that Lord Milner was
+prepared to make the best of the Dutch. The contrast between its tone
+of ready appreciation and the note of earnest remonstrance in the
+Graaf Reinet speech is apparent enough. The despatch is dated June
+23rd, 1897; the speech was delivered on March 3rd, 1898. What had
+happened in this interval of nine months to produce so marked a change
+in the mind of the genial, clear-sighted Englishman, who, as Mr.
+Asquith said, took with him to South Africa "as sympathetic an
+imagination" as any man of his acquaintance? _Nemo repente fuit
+turpissimus._ Whether the diagnosis of his Graaf Reinet speech was
+right or wrong, something must have happened to turn Lord Milner from
+ready appreciation to grave remonstrance.
+
+The circumstances which provide the answer to this question form an
+element of vital importance in the volume of evidence upon which
+posterity will pronounce the destruction of the Dutch Republics in
+South Africa to have been a just and necessary, or a needless and
+aggressive, act. But to see them in true perspective, the reader must
+first be possessed of some more precise information of the political
+situation in the Cape Colony at this time.
+
+[Sidenote: The Sprigg ministry.]
+
+At the period of Lord Milner's appointment the political forces set in
+motion by the Raid were operating already to prepare the way for the
+new and significant combinations of persons and parties in the Cape
+Colony that took definite form in the parliamentary crisis of May,
+1898. The Ministry now in office was that formed by Sir Gordon Sprigg
+upon Mr. Rhodes's resignation of the premiership after the Raid
+(January 6th, 1896). Like every other Cape Ministry of the last
+thirteen years, it was dependent upon the support of the Afrikander
+Bond, which supplied two out of the six members of the cabinet--Mr.
+Pieter Faure, Minister of Agriculture, and a moderate Bondsman, and
+Dr. Te Water, the intimate friend of Mr. Hofmeyr, and his direct
+representative in the Ministry. Another minister, Sir Thomas Upington,
+who had succeeded Mr. Philip Schreiner as Attorney-General, had been
+himself Prime Minister in the period 1884-6, when he and Sir Gordon
+Sprigg (then Treasurer-General), had opposed the demand for the
+intervention of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, successfully
+and strenuously advocated by Mr. J. W. Leonard and Mr. Merriman. It
+was, therefore, eminently, what would be called in France "a Ministry
+of the Centre." Sir Gordon Sprigg's regard for British interests was
+too lukewarm to command the confidence of the more decided advocates
+of British supremacy; while, on the other hand, his more or less
+friendly relations with Mr. Rhodes aroused the suspicions of the Dutch
+extremists. But Dr. Te Water's presence in the Ministry, offering in
+itself a sufficient assurance that no measures deemed by Mr. Hofmeyr
+to be contrary to the interests of the Bond would be adopted, had
+secured for the Government the votes of the majority of the Dutch
+members of the Legislative Assembly. An example of the subserviency of
+the Sprigg Ministry to the Bond at this date was afforded upon Lord
+Milner's arrival. As we have seen, the Home Government determined to
+reinforce the South African garrison, in order to strengthen its
+demand upon the Transvaal Government for the repeal of the Aliens
+Immigration Law. Although no direct opposition was offered by the
+Ministry to this measure, the insufficiency of barrack accommodation
+in the Cape Colony was used as a pretext for placing obstacles in the
+way of its accomplishment. These difficulties were successfully
+overcome by Lord Milner, and in the end the reinforcements arrived
+without giving rise to any political excitement.[32]
+
+         [Footnote 32: By August the South African garrison had been
+         raised to the very moderate strength of rather more than
+         8,000 troops.]
+
+[Sidenote: Navy contribution bill.]
+
+A more disagreeable incident was the covert attempt made by the Bond
+to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, in order that Sir
+Gordon Sprigg might be prevented from taking his place among the other
+prime ministers of the self-governing colonies at the Colonial
+Conference, and representing the Cape in the Jubilee celebrations in
+England.[33] This was the beginning of a disagreement between the
+Ministry and the Bond, which gradually increased in seriousness after
+Sir Gordon's return from England, until it culminated in the
+resignation of Dr. Te Water (May, 1898). The offer of an annual
+contribution to the cost of the British Navy, which was affirmed in
+principle by the Cape Parliament at this time, was understood in
+England to be a mark of Afrikander attachment to the British
+connection. In point of fact the measure received practically no
+support from the Bondsmen in Parliament; while, outside of Parliament,
+on Bond platforms and in the Bond Press, the Government's action in
+the matter was employed as an effective argument to stimulate
+disaffection in the ranks of its Dutch supporters. Mr. Hofmeyr,
+however, was careful not to allow the Bond, as an organisation, to
+commit itself to any overt opposition to the principle of a
+contribution to the British Navy--an attitude which would have been
+obviously inconsistent with the Bond's profession of loyalty--and with
+characteristic irony the third reading of the Navy Contribution Bill
+was eventually passed, a year later, without a division in the
+Legislative Assembly by a Ministry[34] placed in office by Bond votes
+for the declared purpose of opposing the policy of the Imperial
+Government on the one question--the reform of the Transvaal
+Administration--upon the issue of which depended the maintenance of
+British supremacy in South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 33: Sir Gordon Sprigg's long service as a minister
+         of the Crown fully entitled him to this honour; nor was his
+         presence rendered any the less desirable by the fact that Sir
+         Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice, was also attending the
+         Jubilee in England.]
+
+         [Footnote 34: The Schreiner Ministry.]
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes's position.]
+
+But circumstances of deeper significance contributed to deprive the
+Sprigg Ministry of the support of the Bond, causing its majority to
+dwindle, and driving Sir Gordon himself, in an increasing degree, into
+the opposite camp. The British population for the first time showed a
+tendency to organise itself in direct opposition to the Bond. As Sir
+Gordon Sprigg grew more Imperialist, the Progressive party was formed
+for parliamentary purposes; while for the purpose of combating the
+Afrikander nationalist movement in general an Imperialist
+organisation, called the South African League, was established with
+the avowed object of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa.
+Mr. Cecil Rhodes, immediately after the Raid, announced his intention
+of taking no further part in the politics of the Cape Colony, and of
+devoting himself, for the future, to the development of Rhodesia. But
+upon his return from England, after giving evidence before the
+Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, he was received with so much
+warmth by the British population at Capetown in July, 1897, that he
+had retracted this decision, and determined to assume the same
+position of real, though not nominal, leadership of what was
+afterwards the Progressive party as Mr. Hofmeyr held in the Bond. Mr.
+Rhodes's return to political life, following, as it did, upon the
+report of the Committee of Inquiry, aroused the most bitter hostility
+against him on the part of his former associates in the Bond. And the
+Sprigg Ministry, by their increasing reliance upon the new party of
+which he was the leader, incurred the distrust of its Dutch supporters
+to a corresponding extent. In the meantime the Bond leaders had
+adopted Mr. Philip Schreiner, who was not a member of the Bond, as
+their parliamentary chief in the place of Rhodes, and this new
+combination was strengthened by the accession of Mr. J. X. Merriman
+and Mr. J. W. Sauer. Thus the opening months of the new year, 1898,
+found the population of the Cape Colony grouping itself roughly, for
+the first time, into two parties with definite and mutually
+destructive aims. On the one side there was the Sprigg Ministry, now
+almost exclusively supported by the British section of the Cape
+electorate, soon to be organised on the question of "redistribution"
+into the Progressive party, with Rhodes as its real, though not its
+recognised, leader; and on the other there was the Bond party, with
+Schreiner as its parliamentary chief and Hofmeyr as its real leader,
+depending in no less a degree upon the Dutch population of the
+Colony, and naturally opposed to an electoral reform that threatened
+to deprive this population of its parliamentary preponderance. And in
+a few months' time, as we shall see, the Schreiner-Bond coalition took
+for its immediate aim the prevention of British interference in the
+Transvaal; while the Progressive party came, no less openly, to avow
+its determination to promote and support the action of the Imperial
+Government in seeking to obtain redress for the Uitlander grievances.
+
+The movements here briefly indicated were, of course, perfectly well
+known to Lord Milner as constitutional Governor of the Colony. But at
+Graaf Reinet he probes the situation too deeply, and speaks with too
+authoritative a tone, to allow us to suppose that the remonstrance
+which he then addressed to the Cape Dutch was based upon any sources
+of knowledge less assured than his own observation and experience. For
+the Graaf Reinet speech is not an affair of ministers' minutes or
+party programmes; it is the straight talk of a man taught by eye and
+ear, and informed by direct relationships with the persons and
+circumstances that are envisaged in his words. To restate our
+question, which among these facts of personal observation and
+experience produced the change from the ready appreciation of the Cape
+Dutch, shown in the Jubilee despatch, to the earnest remonstrance of
+the Graaf Reinet speech? The historian cannot claim, like the writer
+of creative literature, to exhibit the working of the human mind. In
+the terms of the Aristotelian formula, he can relate only what "has"
+happened, leaving to the craftsman whose pen is enlarged and ennobled
+by the universal truth of art to tell what "must" happen. But such
+satisfaction as the lesser branch of literature can afford is at the
+disposal of the reader, in "good measure, pressed down, and running
+over." Without assuming, then, the philosophic certainty of poetry, we
+know that between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech the
+development of the great South African drama reached its
+"turning-point" in the Transvaal; while in the Cape Colony Lord Milner
+was learning daily more of the "formidable personalities" and the
+"embarrassing problems" to which Mr. Asquith had referred.
+
+[Sidenote: No reform in the Transvaal.]
+
+The more hopeful situation in the Transvaal that followed upon the
+determined action of the Imperial Government in May was succeeded by a
+period punctuated by events which, taken collectively, obliterated all
+prospect of "reform from within." The treatment accorded to the report
+of the Industrial Commission, which, as we have noticed, established
+the truth of practically all the fiscal and administrative complaints
+of the Uitlanders, was a matter of especial significance. The
+Commission was created by President Krüger; it was in effect the
+fulfilment of his promises, made after the Raid, to redress the
+grievances of the Uitlanders. The Commissioners were his own
+officials, Boers and Hollanders; men who had no prejudice against the
+Government, and no sympathy with the new population, yet their
+recommendations, if carried into effect, would have removed the most
+serious of the industrial grievances of the British community. The
+Report had raised great expectations. It was thought that, not all,
+but a substantial proportion of its recommendations would be put into
+effect. Here, then, was an opportunity for reform which involved no
+loss of prestige, entailed no danger to the independence of the
+Republic, and held not the slightest threat to the stability of
+burgher predominance. If what President Krüger was waiting for was a
+convenient opportunity, he had such an opportunity now. This
+reasonable forecast was utterly falsified by the event. Mr. Schalk
+Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was denounced by Mr. Krüger in
+the Volksraad as a traitor to the Republic, because he had dared to
+set his hand to so distasteful a document. The report itself was
+thrown contemptuously by the grim old President from the Volksraad to
+the customary committee of true-blue "doppers," whose ignorance of the
+industrial conditions of the Rand was equalled only by their personal
+devotion to himself. Here the adverse findings of the commissioners on
+the dynamite and railway monopolies were reversed; and the
+recommendation for a Local Board for the Rand was condemned as
+subversive of the authority of the State. At length, after the report
+had been tossed about from Volksraad to committee, and from committee
+to Volksraad, until very little of the original recommendations
+remained, the Government took action. In addition to an immaterial
+reduction of the exorbitant rates charged by the Netherlands Railway
+Company--a concession subsequently alleged to have been the price paid
+by the Hollander Corporation to avoid further inquiry into its
+affairs--it was announced that, with the object of lessening the cost
+of living on the Rand, the import duties upon certain necessaries in
+common use would be reduced, in accordance with the recommendations of
+the Commissioners on this point; but that, since it was obviously
+inexpedient to diminish the revenue of the Republic, the duties upon
+certain other articles of the same class would be raised to an extent
+more than counterbalancing the loss upon the reduction. _Parturiunt
+montes; nascitur ridiculus mus._
+
+[Sidenote: Krüger re-elected president.]
+
+This singular display of mingled effrontery and duplicity marked the
+closing months of the year (1897). In the February following Mr.
+Krüger was elected to the presidency of the South African Republic for
+the fourth time. It was generally recognised that the success of his
+candidature was inevitable, but few, within or without the Transvaal,
+had expected him to secure so decisive a victory over his competitors.
+The figures--Krüger 12,858, Schalk Burger 3,750, and Joubert
+(Commandant-General) 2,001--were additional evidence of the impotency
+or lukewarmness of the reform party among the burghers. The first act
+of President Krüger, on his return to power, was to dismiss Chief
+Justice Kotzé. Mr. Kotzé's struggle for the independence of the law
+courts, thus summarily closed, had commenced a year before with what
+was known as the "High Court crisis." At that time President Krüger
+had obtained power from the Volksraad by the notorious law No. 1 of
+1897 to compel the judges, on pain of dismissal, to renounce the
+right, recently exercised, to declare laws, which were in their
+opinion inconsistent with the Grondwet (Constitution), to be, to that
+extent, invalid. As a protest against this autocratic proceeding the
+entire bench of judges threatened to resign, and the courts were
+adjourned. The deadlock continued until a compromise was arranged
+through the intervention of Chief Justice de Villiers. The President
+undertook to introduce a new law providing satisfactorily for the
+independence of the Courts, and the judges, on their side, pledged
+themselves not to exercise the "testing" right in the meantime. In
+February, 1898, Chief Justice Kotzé wrote to remind President Krüger
+that his promise remained unfulfilled,[35] withdrawing at the same
+time the conditional pledge not to exercise the "testing" right given
+by himself. The President then dismissed Mr. Kotzé under Law No. 1,
+compelled a second judge, Mr. Justice Amershof (who had supported the
+Chief Justice in the position he had taken up) to resign, and
+appointed, as the new Chief Justice, Mr. Gregorowski, who, as Chief
+Justice of the Free State, had presided at the trial of the Reformers
+in 1896, and at the time of the crisis a year before had declared that
+"no honourable man could possibly accept the position of a judge so
+long as Law No. 1 remained in force." The judicature was now rendered
+subservient to the Executive, and the Uitlanders were thus deprived of
+their last constitutional safeguard against the injustice of the Boer
+and Hollander oligarchy.
+
+         [Footnote 35: There appears to have been some question as to
+         whether the terms of the President's undertaking bound him to
+         introduce the proposed measure into the Volksraad in 1897, or
+         in 1898. Chief Justice de Villiers held that the latter date
+         was contemplated by the President. But the point is
+         immaterial, since President Krüger denied in the Volksraad,
+         after the dismissal of Mr. Kotzé, that he had ever given an
+         undertaking at all to Chief Justice de Villiers or to anybody
+         else.]
+
+[Sidenote: His reactionary policy.]
+
+This was the position in the Transvaal in February, 1898. President
+Krüger had demonstrated by his refusal to carry out the
+recommendations of the Industrial Commission, and by the dismissal of
+Chief Justice Kotzé, that he was determined not merely to set himself
+against all measures of reform, but to increase the disabilities under
+which the Uitlanders had hitherto lived. He had been placed, for the
+fourth time, at the head of the Republic by an overwhelming majority;
+he had refused to sacrifice a penny of revenue, and he was in
+possession of ample resources, which were being sedulously applied in
+increasing his already disproportionate supply of munitions of war.
+Through Dr. Leyds, who had returned from his mission to Europe, he
+had opened up communications with European Powers, that placed him in
+a position to avail himself to the full of the possible embarrassment
+of Great Britain through international rivalries or disagreements. In
+South Africa he had carried through a treaty of offensive and
+defensive alliance with the Free State, and he had received more than
+one recent assurance that the flame of Afrikander nationalism had been
+kindled anew by the Bond in the Cape Colony.
+
+These events were disquieting enough in themselves; but what made the
+disappearance of any prospect of spontaneous reform in the Transvaal
+still more serious to the High Commissioner for South Africa, was the
+complaisance with which President Krüger's reactionary policy was
+regarded by the Dutch subjects of the Crown. It was just here that
+Lord Milner's observations must have yielded the most startling
+results. We know that the days which had passed since the Jubilee
+despatch was written had brought him constant and varied opportunities
+for seeing "things as they really were" in South Africa; we know that
+he was keenly alert in the accomplishment of his mission, and we may
+presume, therefore, that few, if any, of these opportunities were
+lost.
+
+In September Lord Milner had travelled right round the Colony. At
+every little town and _dorp_--wherever, in fact, he went--he conversed
+with the Dutch, whom his pleasant manner quickly won to friendliness;
+and all the speeches that he made in reply to the addresses of
+welcome were extremely conciliatory in tone. This was the time when
+there were hopeful anticipations of the good results that were to come
+from the Industrial Commission; and Lord Milner often began his speech
+with an expression of the sense of relief which he felt--a feeling
+which his audience must share--that now there was to be peace in South
+Africa. These conciliatory utterances of the new High Commissioner
+were almost completely ignored by the Dutch Press. An exception to
+this rule of silence was significant. The High Commissioner was
+accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. (now Sir Pieter)
+Faure. On one occasion Mr. Faure made some remarks in the same spirit
+as that in which Lord Milner had spoken. "People," he said, "talk of
+Africa for the Afrikanders; but what I say is, Africa for all." The
+expression of this moderate sentiment drew down upon Mr. Faure a sharp
+reproof from _Ons Land_. From this and many other such incidents it
+must have begun to dawn upon Lord Milner's mind that what the Dutch of
+the Cape Colony wanted was not conciliation but domination.
+
+[Sidenote: Attitude of the Cape Dutch.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Hands off" the Transvaal.]
+
+And so it came about that in the months that President Krüger was busy
+shutting the door against reform, Lord Milner was learning to realise
+that on this all-important matter there was nothing to hope from the
+Cape Dutch. When once the question of reform, or no reform, in the
+Transvaal came up, all conciliatory speeches were useless. It made no
+difference whether the Transvaal was right or wrong; it was always,
+"_Our_ Transvaal, good or bad." In short, all that happened both in
+the Transvaal and the Cape Colony during this (South African) spring
+and summer was of the nature to impress conclusively upon Lord
+Milner's mind that on the crucial issue between the Imperial
+Government and the Transvaal, the leaders of Dutch opinion in the Cape
+Colony were against the British cause. The rank and file of the Dutch
+population, if left to themselves, might be indifferent, possibly
+friendly; but the Bond organisation had placed them under the control
+of the Bond leaders; and the Bond was hostile. What, more than
+anything else, would serve to confirm this impression was Lord
+Milner's constant study of the Dutch Press. Among these journals, _Ons
+Land_ presented the most authoritative and significant expression of
+the Bond policy, as directed by Mr. Hofmeyr's astute brain and
+unrivalled experience. The editorial columns of _Ons Land_ rarely
+contained a sentence that, standing alone, could be quoted as evidence
+of its advocacy of anti-British action. Its method was far more
+subtle. In everything in which Great Britain was concerned the
+attitude which it adopted was one of profound alienation, rather than
+of aggressive hostility. England's position in the world was presented
+and discussed as though "Afrikanders" were no more interested in it
+than they were in that of any foreign country. And, in South African
+matters, the tone of the Dutch Press, and of the Bond leaders, was not
+merely discouraging; at any hint of possible British action for the
+improvement of the administrative conditions of the Transvaal, it took
+a note of menace. "Hands off" the Transvaal: that was the sum and
+substance of Bond policy.
+
+Between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech, then, the
+Transvaal Government had shown that it had set its face definitely
+against reform, and Lord Milner had had time to realise the true state
+of political feeling in the Colony of which he was Governor. While
+there was anger among the British at the hopeless situation in the
+Transvaal, among the Dutch was a fixed determination not to allow the
+Transvaal to be interfered with. And there was something else that
+Lord Milner would have observed during his travels throughout the
+Colony. It was the utter despondency of the British population, and
+the condition of abasement to which they had been reduced. Nor can he
+have failed to observe that everywhere among the British there was a
+constant apology for the Raid; while, on the part of the Dutch, there
+was no recognition of all that the British had done to wipe out its
+stain and to mitigate its effects: in a word, that the moral conquest
+of the Colony by the Dutch was practically complete.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner at Graaf Reinet.]
+
+It was with this accumulated evidence in his mind that Lord Milner
+travelled down, on March 2nd, 1898, from Capetown to Graaf Reinet,
+expecting to take part in a Governor's function of the ordinary sort
+at the opening of the railway on the following day. The conventional
+expressions of loyalty to the Queen, and the scarcely veiled hypocrisy
+and defiance with which the Dutch reiterated them, at the time when
+the whole weight of their influence was thrown against Great Britain
+on the only South African question that really mattered, had become
+nauseating even to his serene temper and generous disposition. He was
+wearied, too, of receiving a frivolous or unfriendly reply from the
+Pretoria Executive to the most reasonable proposals of the Imperial
+Government. Late at night there was brought to him, in the train, a
+copy of an address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander
+Bond, which was to be presented to him on the morrow. It contained, in
+more than usually pointed language, a protest against "the charges of
+disloyalty made against the Bond," and a request that the High
+Commissioner would "convey to the Queen the expression of its
+unswerving loyalty." As he read on we can imagine how, in ominous
+contrast to the superficial protestations of the text, something
+exceptionally aggressive in the tone of the address, something which
+emphasised the inconsistency of these formal professions of attachment
+to the throne with the very practical hostility of their authors to
+British policy, struck the High Commissioner with peculiar force. The
+Dutch, who, under British rule, enjoyed--one might almost say
+abused--every privilege of citizenship in the Cape Colony, were quite
+prepared to see the British excluded, under Dutch rule, from these
+same privileges in the Transvaal. More than that, they were determined
+to employ all the agencies at their command to prevent any effective
+interference with the Transvaal oligarchy. Lord Milner evidently felt
+that the time had come for remonstrance, so, gathering up the
+impressions which had been accumulating in his mind, he wrote down
+then and there his answer, which was delivered on the following day.
+
+     "Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her
+     Majesty's subjects is loyal, but I should be much more glad to be
+     allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason
+     could there be for any disloyalty? You have thriven wonderfully
+     well under Her Majesty's Government. This country, despite its
+     great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural
+     disadvantages to contend against, and yet let any one compare the
+     position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her
+     Majesty's reign, or even thirty years ago. The progress in
+     material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress
+     are greater still. And you have other blessings which by no means
+     always accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely
+     free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging
+     the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of
+     law manned by men of the highest ability and integrity, and
+     secure in the discharge of their high functions from all external
+     interference. You have--at least as regards the white
+     races--perfect equality of citizenship. And these things have not
+     been won from a reluctant sovereign. They have been freely and
+     gladly bestowed upon you, because freedom and self-government,
+     justice and equality, are the first principles of British policy.
+     And they are secured to you by the strength of the power that
+     gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack
+     without your being asked to contribute one pound to that
+     protection unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of
+     course you are loyal; it would be monstrous if you were not.
+
+     "And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have
+     to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may
+     put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or
+     less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to
+     shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the
+     population of the Colony--Dutch as well as English--are, I firmly
+     believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know they live
+     under a good constitution, and have no wish to change it, and
+     regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august lady at
+     the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to consider; if
+     political controversy were confined to the internal affairs of
+     the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of hard
+     language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among the
+     usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody
+     else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd--so obviously
+     absurd--that nobody would take it seriously, and the charges
+     would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.
+
+[Sidenote: The loyalty of the Bond.]
+
+     "What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case,
+     what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under it, is the
+     fact that the political controversies of this country at present
+     unfortunately turn largely upon another question--I mean the
+     relations of Her Majesty's Government to the South African
+     Republic--and that, whenever there is any prospect of any
+     difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once
+     vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality,
+     espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that
+     they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the
+     politician--often the best of men, though singularly
+     injudicious--who, whenever any disputes arise with another
+     country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be
+     in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very
+     much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his
+     fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly
+     opposite assumption. And so I do not take it that in this case
+     people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy
+     with the Government of the Transvaal--which, seeing the close tie
+     of relationship which unites a great portion of the population
+     here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly
+     natural--to a point which gives some ground for the assertion
+     that they seem to care much more for the independence of the
+     Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to
+     which they themselves belong.
+
+     "For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in
+     espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open
+     rupture between that country and the British Government. They
+     loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they
+     think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government
+     that in case of war with the Transvaal it would have a great
+     number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, that
+     is a way to prevent such a calamity.
+
+     "But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the
+     assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the
+     independence of the Transvaal--that independence which it has
+     itself given--and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order
+     to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact
+     opposite of the truth. So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it
+     is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes
+     of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they
+     are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the
+     Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the
+     semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that
+     country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only
+     on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly
+     reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of
+     the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain's
+     moderate attitude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is
+     not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government
+     which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at
+     all. It is that unprogressiveness--I will not say the
+     retrogressiveness--of the Government of the Transvaal and its
+     deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it
+     devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every
+     impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers
+     which threaten it are internal.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's appeal to the Dutch.]
+
+     "Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that
+     this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all
+     that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation
+     that at the present moment any advice that I could tender, or
+     that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender in that
+     quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, would be
+     instantly rejected because it was British. But the same does not
+     apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and especially to
+     those who have gone so far in the expression of their sympathy
+     for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these charges of
+     disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least cannot be
+     suspected across the border; and if all they desire--and I
+     believe it is what they desire--is to preserve the South African
+     Republic, and to promote good relations between it and the
+     British Colonies and Government, then let them use all their
+     influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming the
+     Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its
+     Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing
+     it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and, what is even
+     more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its
+     administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa,
+     such as this Colony or the Orange Free State. That is the
+     direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate
+     troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than
+     thirty years, is to be found."[36]
+
+         [Footnote 36: _Cape Times_, March 4th, 1898.]
+
+Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No
+such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High
+Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now
+eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action
+and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect,
+and grew uneasy.
+
+The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable. What is
+the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch, if you
+refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one thing of
+all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should feel--that the
+Transvaal should "assimilate its institutions ... and the tone and
+temper of its administration, to those of the free communities of
+South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free State."
+
+The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was
+the weight of inevitable truth.
+
+A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to
+urge President Krüger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he
+says:
+
+     "You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner's speech at
+     Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in _The
+     Cape Times_. Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled
+     hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble
+     ahead....
+
+     "Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the
+     future lies in the attitude of President Krüger and his vain hope
+     of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened
+     minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using
+     the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true
+     Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent
+     discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their
+     mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs
+     cannot last. It must break down from inherent rottenness, and it
+     will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all
+     of us.
+
+     "I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in
+     the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and
+     good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between
+     the South African Republic and a catastrophe."[37]
+
+         [Footnote 37: Cd. 369.]
+
+[Sidenote: Sprigg and the Bond.]
+
+Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the
+British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased
+by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had
+been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the
+essential morality of England's dealings with the Dutch been
+vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had
+done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to
+do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was
+unassailable. We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the
+different sections of the British population were manifesting a
+tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this
+movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge
+the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time
+past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population
+of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by
+any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary
+representatives. In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the
+Cape electoral system was brought before the Ministry. The
+indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotzé, and the
+growing evidence of President Krüger's determination to ride
+rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed
+to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of
+the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the
+common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of
+British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid
+British party thus formed adopted the title of "Progressives." The
+Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing
+to Mr. Hofmeyr; but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now assured of the almost
+united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament,
+resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was
+approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr.
+Hofmeyr's representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.[38]
+
+         [Footnote 38: He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship
+         by Dr. Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a
+         Progressive, and at the same time Sir Thomas Upington, who
+         had resigned from ill-health, was succeeded by Mr. T.
+         Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.]
+
+[Sidenote: Redistribution.]
+
+Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the
+parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He
+had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his
+Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to
+throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes was
+the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in doubt. On the
+resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was at once turned
+on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr. Schreiner gave notice of a vote of
+"no confidence." It was put off until June 13th, and in the meantime
+the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was met by the "previous
+question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of the Provincial Council
+of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in Parliament or in the
+Press, to conceal the fact that, under the question of redistribution,
+wider and more momentous issues were at stake. The counts in the
+Bond's indictment of the Ministry, as set out in _Ons Land_, were (1)
+its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the proposed gift of a
+warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of sympathy with the
+South African Republic. Against these crimes it had nothing to place,
+except that it had permitted the employment of the captured Bechuanas,
+as indentured labourers[39]--its sole merit, in the opinion of the
+Bond journal. _The Cape Times_, on the other hand, declared with equal
+frankness that the real point to be decided was, whether the interests
+of President Krüger and the South African Republic, or those of the
+Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire, had the greater claim upon
+the Government and Parliament of the Colony. And Mr. Schreiner, when,
+on June 13th, he introduced the "no confidence" motion, asked the
+House to condemn the Ministry on the ground that it had not shown any
+"sympathy" with, or made any "conciliatory approach" towards, the
+"sister Republic." On Monday, June 20th, the second reading of the
+Redistribution Bill was carried by a majority of seven, but two days
+later, June 22nd, the Ministry found itself in a minority of five on
+Mr. Schreiner's motion of "no confidence."[40] In these circumstances
+Sir Gordon Sprigg determined not to resign, but to appeal to the
+electorate--a course justified by constitutional usage--and Parliament
+was dissolved.
+
+         [Footnote 39: These were prisoners taken in the suppression
+         of the revolt in Bechuanaland in 1897.]
+
+         [Footnote 40: The little group of six, of which Sir James
+         Innes was the head--including Sir R. Solomon and four
+         others--voted _with_ the Ministry for the Redistribution
+         Bill, but _against_ it on the "no confidence" motion (with
+         the exception of Sir James himself). Also one moderate
+         Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the
+         Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.]
+
+[Sidenote: The general election, 1898.]
+
+The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no
+little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were
+supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and
+other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by
+President Krüger and his agents from the revenues of the
+Transvaal.[41] Mr. Schreiner's election utterances were studiously
+moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the
+Malmesbury division, by whom he was returned to Parliament, contained
+a reference to "the noble empire which was theirs, and to which they
+belonged." But such pronouncements by no means represented the
+sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself. The
+objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive
+form by _Ons Land_, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to
+oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in
+politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation
+of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words,
+to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the
+diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general
+preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise. The
+under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch
+population may be understood from the fact that the following frank
+appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was
+published in the columns of _Ons Land_:
+
+         [Footnote 41: Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a
+         candidate financed from Pretoria.]
+
+     "When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it
+     must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The
+     majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go
+     bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two
+     Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the
+     stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at
+     least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape
+     Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The two
+     Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the stranger
+     [_i.e._ British] are unable to continue the fight. One day the
+     question of who is to be master will have to be referred to the
+     arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend upon
+     the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our side
+     we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince matters.
+     This is the real point at issue; and in this light every
+     Afrikander must learn to see it. And what assistance can we
+     expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority
+     of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on
+     the sword when God's time comes."[42]
+
+         [Footnote 42: As translated in _South Africa_, October 15th,
+         1898.]
+
+At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become
+what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of
+rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander
+nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from
+certain extracts from the _Studenten Blad_ of the Theological Seminary
+of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by _The Albert
+Times_. The passage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by
+November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students
+had at that date joined the Boer forces:
+
+[Sidenote: Anti-british sentiment.]
+
+     "Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors
+     of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as
+     their heart's blood--a people that followed our fathers to the
+     new fatherland which they had bought with their blood and
+     snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their freedom?
+     Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and retook the
+     land with God's aid and with their blood. But England is not
+     satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same people,
+     and not only our freedom, but our language, our nationality, our
+     religion! Must we surrender everything, and disown our fathers? I
+     cannot agree with this. The thought is hateful to me--the thought
+     of trampling on the bodies of our fathers as we extend the hand
+     of friendship to those who have slain our fathers in an
+     unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say that the Bible teaches
+     us to love our enemies. I think, however, that the text cannot be
+     here applied. Race hatred is something quite distinct from
+     personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as a private
+     individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if, however,
+     I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander, must
+     regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion--as a wolf
+     that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the chief
+     reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the
+     enemies of our religion."
+
+At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were
+over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned.
+Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned
+both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former
+constituency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus
+vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return
+of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take
+place until the 15th. As all three constituencies were expected to
+elect Progressives--an expectation which was fulfilled--the result of
+the general election was to give the Bond a bare majority of one, and
+this in spite of the fact that a considerably larger total of votes
+had been cast for the Progressive than for the Bond candidates.[43]
+
+         [Footnote 43: In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39
+         Progressive members were returned. A very careful and
+         reliable calculation showed that, of an aggregate of 82,304
+         votes polled, 44,403 were cast for Progressive, and 37,901
+         for Afrikander candidates. More than this, while no
+         Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than
+         137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective
+         majorities, of two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives,
+         therefore, were entitled, on their aggregate vote, to a
+         majority of six.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's impartiality.]
+
+These somewhat unusual circumstances gave rise to an incident which is
+significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner
+discharged the duties of his office as constitutional Governor of the
+Cape Colony. In view of the circumstance that the Progressives had
+polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a
+minority in the Assembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry
+should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until
+the Namaqualand election had been held. He believed, further, that in
+the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce
+one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the
+Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution
+of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The
+partial appropriation made by Parliament before the dissolution was
+exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be provided
+without the authority of Parliament was the issue of Governor's
+warrants on the Treasury. Lord Milner was willing to sign warrants to
+enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during the
+unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last appropriation
+and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of the
+constitutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain supply
+is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to issue
+warrants for any longer period. He held, moreover, that as the
+Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be
+completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as
+the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was,
+no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair
+prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to
+put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have
+failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question. A
+loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with
+or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run
+the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and
+of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might
+otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But,
+as Governor of the Colony, he refused to allow any considerations of
+party interest, on this or on any subsequent occasion, to influence
+his judgment. While he conceived it to be his duty to give advice and
+criticism to public men of all shades of political opinion, he showed
+himself inexorably opposed to the thought of straining his
+constitutional powers in the slightest degree for the benefit of one
+side or the other.[44] Accordingly provision for the expenses of
+administration was made by Governor's warrants up to September 30th,
+and on the day following the Vryburg election (September 16th), a
+proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th was issued.
+
+         [Footnote 44: Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord
+         Milner for the purpose of laying his views before him. But,
+         it is said, the unwonted sternness of the Governor's
+         expression at once convinced him of the hopelessness of his
+         mission; and he withdrew without any attempt to argue his
+         case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal magnetism, the
+         incident is not without significance.]
+
+[Sidenote: Schreiner, prime minister.]
+
+On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no
+confidence" by a majority of two.[45] On the 17th the House assembled
+with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to
+the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members
+of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close
+association with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The
+latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided
+with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The
+Progressives continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon Sprigg.
+Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an "independent," since
+he had found himself unable to work in association with a party in
+which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence. The new Ministry was not
+strong enough to resist the continued demand of the Progressives for a
+measure of electoral reform; but the Redistribution Bill, as now
+passed, took the form of a compromise so disastrous to the British
+population that the Bond majority was increased to eight by the new
+elections held in April, 1899.[46]
+
+         [Footnote 45: Both sides were one short of their full
+         strength, but a Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was
+         chosen Speaker of the House.]
+
+         [Footnote 46: The second reading of the Navy Contribution
+         Bill, giving effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg's pledge, was
+         carried on December 2nd, 1898, without a division.]
+
+Mr. Chamberlain's policy, as we have seen, was based upon the belief
+that it was possible to win over the Dutch in the Cape Colony and the
+Free State to the side of the Imperial Government. But here, in
+October, 1898, was an Afrikander ministry in power in the Cape Colony
+pledged to prevent the intervention of the Imperial Government in the
+affairs of the Transvaal. From that moment the issue became more and
+more one not of right, but of might. In the Free State, as we have
+seen, what was virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with the
+northern Republic had been ratified by the Volksraad. In the Transvaal
+the work of armament was proceeding apace, and Dr. Leyds had been
+despatched to Europe, as Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic, with
+authority and funds calculated to enable him to enlist the active
+sympathy of the Continental powers on behalf of the Pretoria
+Executive. His place as State Secretary had been filled, in July, by
+Mr. Reitz, the former President of the Free State, and one of the
+actual founders of the Afrikander Bond; and Mr. Smuts, a younger and
+even more enthusiastic believer in the nationalist creed, was
+appointed to the office of State Attorney.[47] With the exception of
+Rhodesia and Natal and the native territories immediately under the
+control of the Imperial Government, the Afrikander nationalists
+dominated the whole of South Africa. Nor is it surprising that, in
+these circumstances, the tone of the communications passing between
+the Transvaal Government and the paramount Power should have become
+increasingly unsatisfactory.[48]
+
+         [Footnote 47: The State-Secretaryship was offered first to
+         Mr. Abraham Fischer, of the Free State, by whom it was
+         declined (_Memoirs of Paul Krüger_, vol. ii., p. 297). The
+         Cape Afrikanders desired the appointment of Mr. Smuts.]
+
+         [Footnote 48: On May 7th, 1897, President Krüger had formally
+         requested the Imperial Government to allow all questions at
+         issue between the two Governments under the Convention to be
+         submitted to the arbitration of the President of the Swiss
+         Republic. To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain replied, on
+         October 10th, that the relationship of Great Britain to the
+         South African Republic being that of a suzerain Power, it
+         would be impossible for the Imperial Government to permit the
+         intervention of a foreign Power. On April 16th, 1898, in a
+         despatch embodying the legal opinions of Mr. Farelly,
+         President Krüger claims that the South African Republic is an
+         independent State, and denies the existence of any
+         "suzerainty" on the part of Great Britain. In forwarding this
+         despatch Lord Milner made the apposite comment that the
+         propriety of employing the term suzerainty to express the
+         rights possessed by Great Britain is an "etymological
+         question," and Mr. Chamberlain, replying on December 15th,
+         accepts President Krüger's declaration that he is willing to
+         abide by the articles of the Convention, reasserts the claim
+         of suzerainty, declines to allow foreign arbitration, and
+         demands the immediate fulfilment of Article IV. In a despatch
+         of May 9th, 1899, Mr. Reitz asserts that the Republic is "a
+         sovereign international State"; and on June 13th Mr.
+         Chamberlain replies that he has no intention of continuing
+         the discussion.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's visit to England.]
+
+In the (English) winter of 1898-9 Lord Milner paid a visit to England.
+Sir William Greene, who had left Pretoria on a holiday on June 29th,
+was also at home during the same period. Lord Milner's visit was due
+in part to the necessity for medical treatment;[49] but, in any case,
+it had become desirable that he should be able to communicate fully to
+Mr. Chamberlain the grave views which he had formed on the South
+African situation. He left for England on November 2nd, landed on the
+19th, sailed on January 28th, and reached Capetown again on February
+14th. During the whole of the two months that he was in England he was
+engaged in an endeavour to impress upon Mr. Chamberlain, and everybody
+else with whom he could converse, that the existing state of affairs
+was one which, if allowed to remain unchanged, would end in the loss
+of South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 49: Owing to a slight affection of the eye.]
+
+During nineteen months of close observation and earnest, patient
+study, Lord Milner had grasped the situation in its completeness. What
+he saw was the demoralising effect of the spectacle of the Dutch
+ruling in the Cape Colony, and the British being tyrannised over in
+the Transvaal. Looking at South Africa as a whole, there was the fact,
+as indisputable as it was grotesque, that the British inhabitant was
+in a position of distinct inferiority to the Dutch; and this although
+the Cape and Natal were British colonies, while the Transvaal and the
+Free State were states subject to the authority of Great Britain as
+paramount Power. It was an impossible position. What Lord Milner urged
+upon the Imperial Government was the plain necessity of putting an end
+to an intolerable state of things which showed no capacity of righting
+itself; of pressing for justice to the British population of the
+Transvaal, with an absolute determination to obtain it. That such a
+policy might result in war, he knew; though neither he nor any one
+else realised, in the beginning of 1899, how near war actually was.
+The reliance of the Transvaal oligarchy on the Orange Free State, now
+bound to them by a formal alliance, and on the party of the Bond now
+in power at the Cape, might tempt them to resist even the most
+moderate demands. But Milner no doubt hoped that, if the British
+Government grasped the nettle firmly, and, while treating the
+Transvaal with all possible diplomatic courtesy, yet left no doubt
+whatever of its inflexible resolution, war might still be avoided. And
+in any case he felt that there was no option for the British
+Government but to take up the case of the Transvaal British, if a
+shred of respect for the power and name of Britain was to be preserved
+in South Africa. To embark on such a policy involved two dangers: the
+danger of war, and what in Milner's eyes was perhaps even greater,
+the danger that, by advancing just claims and then, letting ourselves
+be "bluffed" out of them, we might yet further lessen, and indeed
+totally destroy, what hold we still possessed upon the affection of
+the South African British or on the respect either of British or
+Dutch. In the light of past experience the second danger may well have
+seemed to him the greater of the two. But, with perils on both hands,
+he still felt that there was nothing for it but to go forward, to make
+one supreme effort to save a situation which was rapidly becoming a
+hopeless one. To have remained quiescent, with the forces which were
+gradually edging us out of the Sub-Continent growing on every side,
+could only have ended in the overthrow, or at best, the euthanasia of
+British dominion in South Africa.
+
+[Sidenote: His verdict.]
+
+It was in the course of this visit that Lord Milner realised the
+magnitude of the task that lay before him. To save England in spite of
+herself; to keep South Africa a part of the Empire in spite of
+ignorance at home, in the teeth of an armed Republic and an Afrikander
+ministry, required not merely an iron will and mastership in
+statecraft, but a reasoned and unfaltering belief in the justice of
+the British cause. "Certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my
+might," he said long afterwards in his farewell speech at
+Johannesburg, "because I was, from head to foot, one mass of glowing
+conviction of the rightness of our cause."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+UNDER WHICH FLAG?
+
+
+Upon his return Lord Milner found that the storm clouds had gathered
+in the Transvaal. In a despatch of January 13th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain
+had informed the Pretoria Executive that the proposed extension of the
+dynamite contract in its new form (_i.e._ as, in effect, a "privileged
+importation by one firm," although nominally "a State undertaking")
+was held by the law officers of the Crown to be as much a violation of
+the Convention as the original monopoly, which had been cancelled on
+the representations of the Imperial Government in 1892. Mr. Reitz's
+reply, which Lord Milner transmitted to the Colonial Office not long
+after his arrival at Capetown, was a blunt assertion that, in the
+opinion of his Government, the Imperial Government had no right to
+interfere. But in the meantime the whole question of the position of
+the British residents in the Transvaal had been raised directly by the
+agitation which had arisen out of the shooting of Edgar at
+Johannesburg on December 18th, 1898.[50] This event was followed by
+the petition for protection, which Sir William Butler (who was
+General-in-Command, and during Lord Milner's absence Acting High
+Commissioner) refused to transmit to the Secretary of State (January
+4th, 1899); by the arrest of Messrs. Webb and Dodd and the breaking up
+of the Amphitheatre meeting (January 14th); by the attempt of the
+Pretoria Executive to buy off the capitalists (February 27th-April
+14th); by the presentation of the second petition to the Queen (March
+24th); by the agitation on the Rand in favour of the reforms for which
+it prayed; and lastly by the public meetings held in the Cape Colony
+and Natal for, and against, the intervention of the Imperial
+Government.[51]
+
+         [Footnote 50: "On the Sunday night before Christmas, a
+         British subject named Tom Jackson Edgar was shot dead in his
+         own house by a Boer policeman. Edgar, who was a man of
+         singularly fine physique, and both able and accustomed to
+         take care of himself, was returning home at about midnight,
+         when one of three men standing by, who, as it afterwards
+         transpired, was both ill and intoxicated, made an offensive
+         remark. Edgar resented it with a blow which dropped the other
+         insensible to the ground. The man's friends called for the
+         police, and Edgar, meanwhile, entered his own house a few
+         yards off. There was no attempt at concealment or escape;
+         Edgar was an old resident and perfectly well known. Four
+         policemen came.... The fact, however, upon which all
+         witnesses agree is that, as the police burst open the door,
+         Constable Jones [there are scores of Boers unable to speak a
+         word of English who, nevertheless, own very characteristic
+         English, Scotch, and Irish names] fired at Edgar and dropped
+         him dead in the arms of his wife, who was standing in the
+         passage a foot or so behind him."--FITZPATRICK'S _The
+         Transvaal from Within_.]
+
+         [Footnote 51: For particulars of these events the reader is
+         referred to _The Transvaal from Within_.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Uitlanders' petition.]
+
+Within three months of his return Lord Milner cabled the masterly
+statement in which he endorsed the petition of the Uitlanders[52] with
+the memorable words: "The case for intervention is overwhelming."
+Like the Graaf Reinet speech, this despatch of May 4th was written at
+white heat, but the opinions which it expressed were in no less a
+degree the mature and measured judgments of a mind fully informed upon
+every detail germane to the issue. So much is this the fact that all
+that is essential for the full comprehension of the second Reform
+Movement at Johannesburg--the salient features of which have been
+outlined above--is to be found within the limits of this brief and
+notable State document:
+
+         [Footnote 52: The petition, with its 21,684 signatures,
+         reached Lord Milner through Sir W. (then Mr.) Greene, the
+         British Agent at Pretoria, on March 27th. It was forwarded by
+         the High Commissioner to England in the mail of March 29th.
+         The same ship, the _Carisbrook Castle_, carried Dr. Leyds,
+         who was returning to Europe after a visit to Pretoria. Sir W.
+         Greene had returned to South Africa in the same ship with
+         Lord Milner (February 14th), and had stayed at Government
+         Cottage (Newlands) with him for some days, discussing
+         Transvaal matters, before proceeding to Pretoria on February
+         19th.]
+
+[Sidenote: The intervention despatch.]
+
+     "Having regard to the critical character of the South African
+     situation and the likelihood of an early reply by Her Majesty's
+     Government to the Petition, I am telegraphing remarks which under
+     ordinary circumstances I should have made by despatch. Events of
+     importance have followed so fast on each other since my return to
+     South Africa, and my time has been so occupied in dealing with
+     each incident severally, that I have had no time for reviewing
+     the whole position.
+
+     "The present crisis undoubtedly arises out of the Edgar incident.
+     But that incident merely precipitated a struggle which was
+     certain to come. It is possible to make too much of the killing
+     of Edgar. It was a shocking and, in my judgment, a criminal
+     blunder, such as would have caused a popular outcry anywhere. It
+     was made much worse by the light way in which it was first dealt
+     with by the Public Prosecutor and then by the judge at the
+     trial. By itself, however, it would not have justified, nor, in
+     fact, provoked the present storm. But it happened to touch a
+     particularly sore place. There is no grievance which rankles more
+     in the breasts of the Uitlander population than the conduct of
+     the police, who, while they have proved singularly incompetent to
+     deal with gross scandals like the illicit liquor trade, are harsh
+     and arbitrary in their treatment of individuals whom they happen
+     to dislike, as must have become evident to you from the recurrent
+     ill-treatment of coloured people. There are absolutely no grounds
+     for supposing that the excitement which the death of Edgar caused
+     was factitious. It has been laid to the door of the South African
+     League, but the officials of the League were forced into action
+     by Edgar's fellow-workmen. And, the consideration of grievances
+     once started by the police grievance, it was inevitable that the
+     smouldering but profound discontent of the population who
+     constantly find their affairs mismanaged, their protests
+     disregarded, and their attitude misunderstood, by a Government on
+     which they have absolutely no means of exercising any influence,
+     should once more break into flame.
+
+     "We have, therefore, simply to deal with a popular movement of a
+     similar kind to that of 1894 and 1895 before it was perverted and
+     ruined by a conspiracy of which the great body of the Uitlanders
+     were totally innocent. None of the grievances then complained of,
+     and which then excited universal sympathy, have been remedied,
+     and others have been added. The case is much stronger. It is
+     impossible to overlook the tremendous change for the worse, which
+     has been effected by the lowering of the status of the High Court
+     of Judicature and by the establishment of the principle embodied
+     in the new draft Grondwet that any resolution of the Volksraad
+     is equivalent to a law. The instability of the laws has always
+     been one of the most serious grievances. The new Constitution
+     provides for their permanent instability, the judges being bound
+     by their oath to accept every Volksraad resolution as equally
+     binding with a law passed in the regular form, and with the
+     provisions of the Constitution itself. The law prescribing this
+     oath is one of which the present Chief Justice said that no
+     self-respecting man could sit on the Bench while it was on the
+     Statute Book. Formerly the foreign population, however bitterly
+     they might resent the action of the Legislature and of the
+     Administration, had yet confidence in the High Court of
+     Judicature. It cannot be expected that they should feel the same
+     confidence to-day. Seeing no hope in any other quarter, a number
+     of Uitlanders who happen to be British subjects have addressed a
+     petition to Her Majesty the Queen. I have already expressed my
+     opinion of its substantial genuineness and the absolute _bona
+     fides_ of its promoters. But the petition is only one proof among
+     many of the profound discontent of the unenfranchised population,
+     who are a great majority of the white inhabitants of the State."
+
+     "The public meeting of the 14th January was indeed broken up by
+     workmen, many of them poor burghers, in the employment of the
+     Government and instigated by Government officials, and it is
+     impossible at present to hold another meeting of a great size.
+     Open-air meetings are prohibited by law, and by one means or
+     another all large public buildings have been rendered
+     unavailable. But smaller meetings are being held almost nightly
+     along the Rand, and are unanimous in their demand for
+     enfranchisement. The movement is steadily growing in force and
+     extent.
+
+[Sidenote: The movement not artificial.]
+
+     "With regard to the attempt to represent that movement as
+     artificial, the work of scheming capitalists or professional
+     agitators, I regard it as a wilful perversion of the truth. The
+     defenceless people who are clamouring for a redress of grievances
+     are doing so at great personal risk. It is notorious that many
+     capitalists regard political agitation with disfavour because of
+     its effect on the markets. It is equally notorious that the
+     lowest class of Uitlanders, and especially the illicit liquor
+     dealers, have no sympathy whatever with the cause of reform.
+     Moreover, there are in all classes a considerable number who only
+     want to make money and clear out, and who, while possibly
+     sympathising with reform, feel no great interest in a matter
+     which may only concern them temporarily. But a very large and
+     constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders are not birds
+     of passage; they contemplate a long residence in the country, or
+     to make it their permanent home. These people are the mainstay of
+     the reform movement as they are of the prosperity of the country.
+     They would make excellent citizens if they had the chance.
+
+     "A busy industrial community is not naturally prone to political
+     unrest. But they bear the chief burden of taxation; they
+     constantly feel in their business and daily lives the effects of
+     chaotic local legislation and of incompetent and unsympathetic
+     administration; they have many grievances, but they believe all
+     these could gradually be removed if they had only a fair share of
+     political power. This is the meaning of their vehement demand for
+     enfranchisement. Moreover, they are mostly British subjects,
+     accustomed to a free system and equal rights; they feel deeply
+     the personal indignity involved in a position of permanent
+     subjection to the ruling caste, which owes its wealth and power
+     to their exertion. The political turmoil in the Transvaal
+     Republic will never end till the permanent Uitlander population
+     is admitted to a share in the government, and while that turmoil
+     lasts there will be no tranquillity or adequate progress in Her
+     Majesty's South African dominions.
+
+     "The relations between the British Colonies and the two Republics
+     are intimate to a degree which one must live in South Africa in
+     order fully to realise. Socially, economically, ethnologically,
+     they are all one country. The two principal white races are
+     everywhere inextricably mixed up; it is absurd for either to
+     dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they
+     can live in harmony, and the country progress, is equality all
+     round. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six
+     Governments; but not under two absolutely conflicting social and
+     political systems--perfect equality for Dutch and British in the
+     British Colonies side by side with the permanent subjection of
+     the British to the Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to
+     talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs.
+
+     "It is this which makes the internal condition of the Transvaal
+     Republic a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty's Government.
+     No merely local question affects so deeply the welfare and peace
+     of her own South African possessions. And the right of Great
+     Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment to the Uitlanders
+     is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The
+     majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect.
+     But the enormous number of British subjects, the endless series
+     of their grievances, and the nature of those grievances, which
+     are not less serious because they are not individually
+     sensational, makes protection by the ordinary diplomatic means
+     impossible. We are, as you know, for ever remonstrating about
+     this, that, and the other injury to British subjects. Only in
+     rare cases, and only when we are very emphatic, do we obtain any
+     redress. The sore between us and the Transvaal Republic is thus
+     inevitably kept up, while the result in the way of protection to
+     our subjects is lamentably small. For these reasons it has been,
+     as you know, my constant endeavour to reduce the number of our
+     complaints. I may sometimes have abstained when I ought to have
+     protested from my great dislike of ineffectual nagging. But I
+     feel that the attempt to remedy the hundred-and-one wrongs
+     springing from a hopeless system by taking up isolated cases, is
+     perfectly vain. It may easily lead to war, but will never lead to
+     real improvement."
+
+[Sidenote: Enfranchisement the remedy.]
+
+     "The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these
+     injuries--the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic
+     protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of Uitlander
+     representation would gradually but surely bring about. It seems a
+     paradox, but it is true, that the only effective way of
+     protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our
+     subjects. The admission of the Uitlanders to a fair share of
+     political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic.
+     But it would, at the same time, remove most of our causes of
+     difference with it, and modify and, in the long run, entirely
+     remove that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great
+     Britain which at present dominates its internal and external
+     policy.
+
+     "The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted
+     answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But,
+     in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for
+     years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not
+     true that this is owing to the Raid. They were going from bad to
+     worse before the Raid. We were on the verge of war before the
+     Raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The
+     effect of the Raid has been to give the policy of leaving things
+     alone a new lease of life, and with the old consequences.
+
+     "The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently
+     in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted
+     grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for
+     redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of
+     Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government within
+     the Queen's dominions. A certain section of the Press, not in the
+     Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a
+     republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing
+     references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with
+     the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of
+     war, it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I
+     regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a
+     ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the
+     British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large
+     number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used
+     which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right,
+     even in this Colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth.
+     Thousands of men peacefully disposed, and, if left alone,
+     perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are
+     being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding
+     exasperation on the side of the British.
+
+     "I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous
+     propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of Her
+     Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South
+     Africa. And the best proof alike of its power and its justice
+     would be to obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair
+     share in the government of the country which owes everything to
+     their exertions. It could be made perfectly clear that our
+     action was not directed against the existence of the Republic. We
+     should only be demanding the re-establishment of rights which now
+     exist in the Orange Free State, and which existed in the
+     Transvaal itself at the time of, and long after, the withdrawal
+     of British sovereignty. It would be no selfish demand, as other
+     Uitlanders besides those of British birth would benefit by it. It
+     is asking for nothing from others which we do not give ourselves.
+     And it would certainly go to the root of the political unrest in
+     South Africa, and, though temporarily it might aggravate, it
+     would ultimately extinguish the race feud, which is the great
+     bane of the country."[53]
+
+         [Footnote 53: C. 9,345.]
+
+It was Lord Milner's intention that the text of this despatch should
+have been made public upon its receipt in England. It contained the
+essential facts of the South African situation; and, what is more, it
+exhibited with perfect frankness the connection between Dutch
+ascendancy in the Cape Colony and Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal--a
+matter which was very imperfectly understood. The circumstance that
+these essential facts were before the British people, and, moreover,
+the circumstance that President Krüger knew that they were before the
+British people, would, he believed, greatly increase the effect of the
+strong demand for reforms which the Imperial Government had determined
+to address to the Pretoria Executive in response to the petition to
+the Queen.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's intervention.]
+
+Nor was he alone in this opinion. Mr. Hofmeyr knew that a despatch of
+grave importance had gone home. He had gathered, no doubt, a fairly
+accurate notion of its tenor from Mr. Schreiner, whom Lord Milner had
+warned some time before of "the gravity of the situation."[54] It is
+not going beyond the limits of probability to assume that the Master
+of the Bond realised the effect which the publication of these plain
+truths, backed by the authority of the High Commissioner, would
+produce upon the mind of the English people, and that he thereupon
+determined to take steps to prevent a turn of affairs which, as he
+conceived, would be most unfavourable to the nationalist cause.
+Surmises apart, it is certain, at least, that five days sufficed to
+place Mr. Hofmeyr in a position to ask Lord Milner if he would
+favourably consider an invitation to meet President Krüger in
+conference at Bloemfontein; and that within three days more (May 12th)
+a definite proposal to this effect had been made through the agency of
+President Steyn and accepted by Mr. Chamberlain. Nor, is it any less
+certain that, in view of the friendly discussion which was to take
+place so soon, the Secretary of State decided to postpone the
+publication of Lord Milner's despatch. This is the short history of
+the Bloemfontein Conference. It was a counter-stroke dealt by one of
+those "formidable personalities" of which Mr. Asquith spoke, and in
+all respects worthy of Mr. Hofmeyr's statesmanship. Indeed, the
+methods which he employed for paralysing the machinery of British
+administration in South Africa were always subtle: infinitely more
+subtle than those which Parnell adopted in the not very dissimilar
+circumstances of the Home Rule campaign.
+
+         [Footnote 54: C. 9,345. See forward, p. 155.]
+
+The decision to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch of
+May 4th was a serious mistake, the injurious effect of which was felt
+both at the Conference and afterwards. But before we observe the
+incidents by which this central event was immediately preceded, it is
+necessary to examine more fully the political environment in which
+Lord Milner found himself established now that the April elections[55]
+had given the Afrikander party an assured tenure of power, and, at the
+same time, the moment had arrived for the Imperial Government to
+fulfil the pledge given on February 4th, 1896, for the redress of the
+"admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.
+
+         [Footnote 55: See p. 125.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Bond and the ministry.]
+
+The Schreiner Ministry was the agent of the Bond; it could not exist
+for a day if the Bond withdrew its support. The Bond majority in the
+Legislative Assembly had been returned by the Dutch inhabitants of the
+Colony for the avowed purpose of preventing the intervention of the
+Imperial Government in the affairs of the Transvaal. The Ministry and
+its supporters had begun by ranging themselves definitely on the side
+of the Transvaal. And, therefore, in all that was done by either
+party from the Bloemfontein Conference to the Ultimatum, it followed,
+_ex hypothesi_, that, in their opinion, the Transvaal was right, and
+England was wrong. Twice, as we shall see, Mr. Schreiner, on behalf of
+the Cape Ministry, hastened to declare publicly that the proposals of
+the Transvaal were all that was satisfactory, before he even knew what
+those proposals were. The Cape nationalists represented themselves as
+"mediators." They had as little intention of mediating between the
+Pretoria Executive and the British Government as a barrister, heavily
+feed and primed with his client's case, has of mediating between his
+client and his client's opponent at the hearing of a case in court.
+
+But the Bond was "loyal." The Bond members of the Cabinet--T. Nicholas
+German Te Water, and Albertus Johannes Herholdt, no less than William
+Philip Schreiner, John Xavier Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, and
+Richard Solomon--had sworn, upon taking office, "to be faithful and
+bear true allegiance to Her Majesty."
+
+[Sidenote: The Schreiner ministry.]
+
+The situation in which Lord Milner now found himself was thus one of
+so extraordinary a character that it would be difficult to find a
+parallel to it in the annals of our colonial administration. As High
+Commissioner, he had advocated in the most emphatic terms the exercise
+of the authority of Great Britain, as paramount Power, in the
+Transvaal. As Governor of the Cape Colony, he was bound to administer
+the affairs of the Colony in accordance with the advice tendered by
+his ministers. And the advice which ministers were pledged to give him
+was the direct opposite of that which he himself, as High
+Commissioner, had given to the Imperial Government. To dismiss his
+ministers--the alternative to accepting this advice--would have been
+an extreme measure, to be justified only upon clear evidence that they
+had failed in the duty which they, no less than he himself, owed to
+the Crown. Whether Mr. Schreiner's Cabinet did so fail is a matter
+that the reader must determine for himself; possibly it would be
+difficult to show that, collectively or individually, the Cape
+ministers did anything more injurious to British interests than was
+done by the Liberal Opposition--again collectively or individually--in
+England. One thing is certain: the action of the Afrikander Cabinet,
+whether within or beyond the letter of its allegiance, lessened--and
+was intended to lessen--the force of an effort on the part of the
+Imperial Government, which might otherwise have averted the necessity
+for war.
+
+And here certain questions which will arise inevitably to the mind
+that pursues the narrative of the next few months, must be
+anticipated. What was the position of Mr. Schreiner? What was his real
+standpoint, and what was his relationship to Lord Milner? How was it
+that two Englishmen, Mr. Merriman and Sir (then Mr.) Richard Solomon,
+came to be in this Afrikander Cabinet, and what were their respective
+motives in thus associating themselves with the objects of the Bond?
+
+[Sidenote: The prime minister.]
+
+Mr. Philip Schreiner was the son of a German by birth, a missionary of
+the London Missionary Society, who had married an Englishwoman, and
+afterwards settled in the Orange Free State. He had himself married a
+sister of Mr. F. W. Reitz, formerly President of the Free State, and
+now State Secretary of the South African Republic. The Schreiner
+family was remarkable for intellectual power. Of his sisters one is
+the authoress of _The Story of an African Farm_, and a second, Mrs.
+Lewis, like her brother Theophilus, was an active Imperialist and a
+determined opponent of the Bond. Mr. Schreiner himself was educated at
+the South African College at Capetown, and subsequently at Cambridge,
+where he was placed first in the First Class of the Law Tripos, and
+afterwards elected a Fellow of Downing. After a successful career at
+the Cape Bar he was appointed Attorney-General in Mr. Rhodes's
+Ministry, a position which he held at the time of the Raid. He was
+prevented by his strong disapproval of the part then played by Mr.
+Rhodes from joining the Progressive party; and, having accepted the
+position of Parliamentary leader of the Bond, he had become, as we
+have seen, Prime Minister through the Bond victory in the Cape General
+Election of 1898. It is characteristic alike of Mr. Schreiner and of
+his political position that the only word of sympathy with the British
+connection, uttered from first to last during this election by the
+Bond candidates or their supporters, was the conventional reference to
+the greatness of the British Empire which, as we have noticed,
+occurred in his address to the electors of Malmesbury. With these
+political and social ties, Mr. Schreiner was compelled to be a South
+African first and a British subject second. His is precisely the kind
+of case where true allegiance can be expected only when a federal
+constitution has been created for the Empire.
+
+     "See," said Lord Milner, in his farewell speech at Johannesburg,
+     "how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone
+     solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of
+     South Africa; how it would unite its white races as nothing else
+     can. The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great
+     Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept
+     allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland.
+     But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of integrity,
+     without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal
+     devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South
+     Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for
+     the good of South Africa as a member of that greater whole."[56]
+
+         [Footnote 56: _The Johannesburg Star_, April 1st, 1905.]
+
+With Schreiner, and such as he, loyalty to the Crown was for the
+moment the product of intellectual judgment or considerations of
+policy. All, or almost all, the instinctive feelings, born of
+pleasant associations with persons and places, which enter so largely
+into the sentiment of patriotism seem to have drawn him, as they drew
+his sister, Mrs. Cronwright-Schreiner, into sympathy with the cause of
+Afrikander nationalism. What his view was upon the particular issue
+now agitating South Africa may be gathered from an answer which he
+gave to a question put to him by Mr. Chamberlain in the course of the
+inquiry into the Raid (1897):
+
+     MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I suppose your view is that the Imperial
+     Government should adopt the same policy as the Cape Government,
+     and should refrain from even friendly representations as not
+     being calculated to advance the cause of the Uitlanders?
+
+     MR. SCHREINER: Yes, decidedly, so far as purely internal concerns
+     are concerned.[57]
+
+         [Footnote 57: Proceedings of the Select Committee on British
+         South Africa (Q. 4,385).]
+
+In other words, Mr. Schreiner was a consistent and convinced opponent
+of Imperial intervention. But there was a difference between his
+motive and that of the Bond leaders. Schreiner desired to prevent
+intervention, not because he did not recognise the justice of the
+claims of the Uitlanders, but because he believed that the Imperial
+Government was devoid of any right to intervene under the Conventions;
+while, at the same time, his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander
+nationalists made him blind to the existence of any moral right of
+interference that England might possess, as the Power responsible for
+the well-being of South Africa as a whole. And so, partly by force of
+environment and partly by a narrow and erroneous interpretation of the
+principles of international law,[58] the Boer and Hollander oligarchy
+in the Transvaal, with all its moral obliquity and administrative
+incompetence, had become, as it were, a thing sacrosanct in his eyes.
+Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond leaders, on the other hand, desired to
+prevent intervention because they were perfectly satisfied to see the
+British Uitlanders in a position of political inferiority, and
+perfectly content with the whole situation, the continuance of which,
+as they knew, was directly calculated to bring about the supremacy of
+the Dutch race in South Africa. Therefore Hofmeyr made no effort to
+improve the state of affairs in the Transvaal until he saw the storm
+bursting. And when, at a later stage, he set himself to work in
+earnest to induce President Krüger to grant reforms, he did so to save
+the cause of Afrikander nationalism and not to assist the British
+Government in winning justice for the Uitlanders.
+
+         [Footnote 58: For the position of Great Britain from the
+         point of view of international law see some remarks in the
+         note on page 580 (Chapter XII.).]
+
+[Sidenote: Sir Richard Solomon.]
+
+Sir Richard Solomon, who was a nephew of Saul Solomon, the prominent
+radical politician chiefly instrumental in carrying the vote for
+Responsible Government through the Legislative Council of the Cape
+Colony (1872), was the leader of the Bar at Kimberley. His presence,
+at first sight, formed a wholly incongruous element in such a
+ministry. On the native question, in his fiscal views, as a supporter
+of the Redistribution Bill, and in his sympathy with the Uitlanders,
+he was in direct conflict with the characteristic principles of the
+Bond. His one link with the Afrikander party was his distrust of
+Rhodes; and in view of his unquestioned loyalty to the British
+connection, his decision to join the Schreiner Ministry is probably to
+be attributed to his personal friendship for the Prime Minister. On
+the other hand, his ability, detachment from local parties, and the
+respect which he commanded, made him a valuable asset to Mr.
+Schreiner.
+
+[Sidenote: Messrs. Merriman and Sauer.]
+
+Mr. Merriman, whose close political associate was Mr. Sauer, had twice
+held office under Mr. Rhodes (1890-96); but his separation from
+Rhodes, consequent upon the Raid, had thrown him into the arms of the
+Bond. Some of the more striking incidents in Mr. Merriman's political
+career have been already mentioned.[59] Fifteen years ago more
+Imperialist than Rhodes, he was soon to show himself more Bondsman
+than the Bond. Once the resolute, almost inspired, castigator of the
+separatist aims of that organisation, he was now in close and
+sympathetic association with the leaders of Afrikander nationalism in
+the Republics and the Cape Colony. The denunciations of "capitalism"
+and "capitalists" with which he now regaled his Afrikander allies, had
+an ill savour in the mouth of the man who had tried to amalgamate the
+Diamond Mines at Kimberley--failing where Rhodes and Beit afterwards
+succeeded--and who, attracted by the magnet of gold discovery, for a
+short time had acted as manager of the Langlaagte Estate and Mr. J. B.
+Robinson's interests at Johannesburg. With political principles thus
+unstable and a mind strangely sensitive to any emotional appeal, it is
+not surprising that Mr. Merriman displayed the proverbial enthusiasm
+of the convert in his new political creed. His original perception of
+the imprudence and administrative incompetency of President Krüger's
+_régime_ was rapidly obliterated by a growing partizanship, which in
+turn gave place to an unreasoning sympathy with the Boer cause,
+combined with a bitter antipathy against all who were concerned,
+whether in a civil or military capacity, in giving effect to the
+intervention of the Imperial Government on behalf of the British
+industrial community in the Transvaal. Mr. J. W. Sauer was destined to
+exhibit his political convictions in a manner so demonstrative that
+his words and acts, as recorded in the sequel, will leave the reader
+in no doubt as to the reality of his sympathy with the Boer and
+Afrikander cause. For the moment, therefore, it is sufficient to
+notice that, although he shared Mr. Merriman's present abhorrence of
+"capitalism" and "capitalists," he was for many years of his life a
+promoter and director of mining and other companies.
+
+         [Footnote 59: See pp. 61, 69, and 93.]
+
+Of the two Bondsmen in the Cabinet, Mr. Herholdt was a member of the
+Legislative Council, and a Dutch farmer of moderate views and good
+repute; while Dr. Te Water was the friend and confidant of Mr.
+Hofmeyr, and, as such, the intermediary between the Bond and the
+Afrikander nationalists in the Free State and in the Transvaal.
+
+The Schreiner Cabinet was the velvet glove which covered the mailed
+hand of Mr. Hofmeyr. Dr. Te Water had been Colonial Secretary in the
+Sprigg Ministry up to the crisis of May, 1898. He was now "minister
+without portfolio" in the Schreiner Ministry. His presence was the
+sign and instrument of the domination of the Bond; and the domination
+of the Bond was as yet the permanent and controlling factor in the
+administration of the Colony under Responsible Government. The fact
+that only two out of six members of the Ministry were Bondsmen, is to
+be referred to the circumstance that the actual business of
+administration had been hitherto mainly in the hands of a small group
+of British colonial politicians, who were prepared to bid against each
+other for the all-important support of the Dutch vote. With the
+majority of these men, to be in office was an object for the
+attainment of which they were prepared to make a considerable
+sacrifice in respect of their somewhat elastic political principles.
+The denial of political rights to the British population in the
+Transvaal, by threatening the maintenance of British supremacy in
+South Africa, had now for the first time created a British party in
+the Cape Colony--the Progressives--strong enough to act in
+independence of the Bond. The existence of this British party, not
+only free from the Bond, but determined (although it was in a
+minority) to challenge the Bond predominance, was a new phenomenon in
+Cape politics. In itself it constituted an appreciable improvement
+upon the previously existing state of affairs; since the British
+population was thus no longer hopelessly weakened by being divided
+into two parties of almost equal strength, nor were its leaders any
+longer obliged to subordinate their regard for British interests to
+the primary necessity of obtaining office by Bond support.
+
+[Sidenote: Policy of the ministry.]
+
+Mr. Schreiner's Ministry, however, in spite of a difference of motives
+on the part of its individual members, was unanimous in its desire to
+prevent that intervention of the Imperial Government for which, in
+Lord Milner's judgment, there was "overwhelming" necessity. The idea
+of inducing President Krüger to grant such a "colourable measure of
+reform"[60] as would satisfy the Imperial Government, or at least
+deprive it of any justification for interference by force of arms,
+was in contemplation some months before the Bloemfontein Conference
+took place. On January 1st, 1899, Mr. Merriman wrote to President
+Steyn with this object in view. "Is there no opportunity," he
+said,[61] "of bringing about a _rapprochement_ between us, in which
+the Free State might play the part of honest broker? We, _i.e._, the
+Colony and Free State, have common material interests in our railway,
+apart from our anxiety to see the common welfare of South Africa
+increase from the removal of the one great cause of unrest and the
+pretext for outside interference."
+
+         [Footnote 60: Mr. Merriman's expression. See his letter to
+         Mr. Fischer at p. 161.]
+
+         [Footnote 61: Cd. 369.]
+
+And Lord Milner, very soon after his return from England, was sounded
+by Mr. Schreiner as to the possibility of settling the franchise
+question by means of a South African Conference. Early in March--when
+Mr. Smuts was in Capetown, and the Pretoria Executive was engaged in
+the abortive attempt to separate the leaders of the mining industry
+from the rank and file of the Uitlander population by offering them
+certain fiscal and industrial reforms, if only they would undertake to
+discourage the agitation for political rights--the same subject was
+brought before the High Commissioner by Mr. Merriman himself. In
+pursuance of the real purpose of the Afrikander Ministry--_i.e._ to
+obtain a fictitious concession from President Krüger, instead of the
+"fair share in the government of the country" required by the
+Imperial Government--it was proposed originally to exclude Lord Milner
+altogether from the negotiations by arranging that the Transvaal
+Government should bring forward proposals for reform at an inter-State
+Conference consisting of representatives of the governments of the two
+Republics and the self-governing British Colonies. But Lord Milner
+was, happily, High Commissioner as well as Governor of the Cape. As
+High Commissioner, he declared that at any such Conference the
+Imperial Government must be separately represented. Neither the
+Transvaal nor the Free State was willing to enter a Conference on
+these terms, although they were acceptable to the Cape Government; and
+the plan fell to the ground.
+
+It was then that Mr. Hofmeyr intervened, in view of Lord Milner's
+despatch of May 4th; and President Steyn, persuaded with dramatic
+swiftness to accept the rôle of peace-maker, which his predecessor,
+Sir John Brand, had played with such success in 1881, secured the
+grudging consent of President Krüger to meet the High Commissioner at
+Bloemfontein.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's _tour de force_.]
+
+The incidents which led to the accomplishment of Hofmeyr's _tour de
+force_ are singularly instructive. Lord Milner's despatch was
+telegraphed from Capetown about midday on May 4th. It was soon
+apparent that there was a leakage, legitimate or illegitimate, from
+the Colonial Office. On Saturday, the 6th, Mr. Schreiner received
+warning telegrams from trusted sources in London, including "Hofmeyr's
+best friends"; and on this day he wrote a letter to President Steyn
+containing a "proposition" of so confidential a character that it
+could not be telegraphed in spite of the urgent need of haste.[62] On
+Monday, the 8th, Mr. Schreiner received more warning telegrams, and
+Dr. Te Water, in writing to President Steyn, expressed his hope that
+the proposition, made by Schreiner in his letter of Saturday, might by
+this time "have been accepted, or that something had been done which
+would achieve the same purpose."[63] On the same day the Cape papers
+published an alarming telegram reproducing from _The Daily
+Chronicle_[64] a statement that the South African situation was very
+serious, and that the British Government was prepared to "take some
+risk of war." On Tuesday, the 9th, Lord Milner was present at a dinner
+given by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly; and Mr. Hofmeyr, who
+was among the guests, in the course of a long conversation with him
+after dinner, broached the idea of his meeting President Krüger at
+Bloemfontein. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Milner sent for Mr. Hofmeyr
+and discussed the subject more at length; and, a little later, when he
+had gone to the Governor's Office, Mr. Schreiner came in with a
+telegram from President Steyn, in which the Cape Prime Minister was
+requested to ascertain formally whether the High Commissioner would be
+willing to accept an invitation to meet President Krüger. This
+telegram Lord Milner forwarded to Mr. Chamberlain, adding that the
+Cape Cabinet was "strongly" in favour of acceptance, and that
+Schreiner himself had declared that the invitation was the result of
+the "influence which he (Schreiner) had been using with the Transvaal
+Government ever since I had warned him of the gravity of the
+situation."[65] Mr. Chamberlain's reply (May 12th), authorised Lord
+Milner to accept President Steyn's invitation, and in doing so, to
+state that a despatch was already on its way which contained a similar
+proposal made by the Imperial Government--
+
+         [Footnote 62: Letter of Te Water to Steyn. See forward, p.
+         162, where this letter is given.]
+
+         [Footnote 63: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 64: Then under the editorship of Mr. Massingham.]
+
+         [Footnote 65: C. 9,345.]
+
+[Sidenote: The conference arranged.]
+
+     "in the hope that, in concert with the President, you may arrive
+     at such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept
+     and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable
+     concession to their just demands and a settlement of the
+     difficulties which have threatened the good relations"
+
+between the two Governments. This was the famous despatch of May 10th,
+in which Mr. Chamberlain reviewed carefully and exhaustively the whole
+situation as between the Transvaal and the Imperial Government, and
+formally accepted the Uitlanders' Petition to the Queen. It was not
+published until June 14th, _i.e._, after the Bloemfontein Conference
+had been held. It was then issued, together with Lord Milner's
+despatch of May 4th, in a Blue-book containing the complete record of
+all discussions of Transvaal affairs subsequent to Lord Milner's
+appointment.
+
+In the course of the next few days communications passed rapidly
+between Lord Milner, Mr. Chamberlain, President Steyn, and President
+Krüger, with the result that, on May 18th, President Steyn's
+invitation was formally accepted, and on the following day it was
+arranged that the Conference should begin on May 31st. Never was
+intervention more effective, or less obtrusive. Mr. Hofmeyr's part in
+the affair was confined apparently to an after-dinner conversation
+with the High Commissioner. Nor was the directing hand of the Master
+of the Bond revealed more fully until Lord Roberts's occupation of
+Bloemfontein placed the British authorities in possession of part of
+the communications which passed at this time, and during the four
+succeeding months, between the Cape nationalists and their republican
+confederates. And even in these documents Hofmeyr's name is rarely
+found at the end of a letter or telegram. It is Schreiner or Te Water
+who writes or telegraphs to Steyn or Fischer, adding sometimes, by way
+of emphasis, "Hofmeyr says" this or that. In the meantime (May 22nd),
+Lord Milner had telegraphed, for "an indication of the line" which Mr.
+Chamberlain wished him to take at the Conference. He himself
+suggested that the franchise question should be put in the foreground;
+since it would be useless to discuss other matters in dispute until a
+satisfactory settlement of this all-important question had been
+achieved. Mr. Chamberlain replied (May 24th), agreeing with the line
+indicated by Lord Milner:
+
+     "I think personally that you should lay all the stress," he
+     telegraphed, "on the question of the franchise in the first
+     instance. Other reforms are less pressing, and will come in time
+     if this can be arranged satisfactorily, and the form of oath
+     modified."
+
+Mr. Chamberlain at the same time authorised Lord Milner to inform the
+Uitlander petitioners that they might rely upon obtaining the general
+sympathy of the Imperial Government in the prayers which they had
+addressed to the Queen.
+
+[Sidenote: Motives of Afrikander leaders.]
+
+There was no doubt in Lord Milner's mind as to the real motives which
+had prompted the Afrikander nationalist leaders to make this effort.
+They recognised at length that he was in earnest, and that Mr.
+Chamberlain was in earnest, and they desired, above all things, to
+avoid a crisis which would force a conflict before their ultimate
+plans had fully matured. Lord Milner knew that any delay which
+involved the continuance of the present position--a position which was
+one of moral superiority for the Dutch--would unite the whole of the
+Dutch, with a section of the British population, against Great Britain
+within a measurable period. He recognised that the franchise question
+was the one issue which could be raised between the paramount Power
+and the South African Republic in which the whole of the Cape Dutch
+would not throw in their lot bodily with their republican kinsmen.
+This very anxiety on the part of Mr. Hofmeyr to prevent the decisive
+action of the Imperial Government was evidence of the truth of his
+estimate. But as a response to the appeal of the Graaf Reinet speech,
+this Afrikander mediation came too late. "Hands off" the Transvaal was
+the first plank in the platform of the Schreiner Ministry; "reform"
+was a second and subsidiary plank, adopted in place of the first only
+when they had been driven to abandon it by Lord Milner's resolution
+and statesmanship. But the purpose of the Ministry now, no less than
+before, was to hinder, and not to help, the British Government in
+obtaining justice for the Uitlanders. Moreover, the Transvaal
+armaments were well advanced, and the Pretoria Executive was too
+deeply committed to a policy of defiance to allow it to draw back
+without humiliation. Nevertheless, Lord Milner felt bound to avail
+himself of any prospect of peace that the Conference might afford.
+When, however, Mr. Schreiner, in bringing President Steyn's telegram,
+had said that he regarded the proposal as "a great step in advance on
+the part of President Krüger," Lord Milner had replied that he could
+"hardly take that view, as the invitation did not emanate from
+President Krüger himself," and contained no indication of "the basis
+or subject of discussion."
+
+[Sidenote: Krüger's obduracy.]
+
+The High Commissioner was right. The slight degree in which any appeal
+adequate to the occasion was likely to prove acceptable to President
+Krüger may be gathered from a passage in a letter of Sir Henry de
+Villiers to President Steyn (May 21st), in which the Chief Justice of
+the Cape refers to his recent experience in Pretoria when he was on
+this very errand of "mediation":
+
+     "On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President, as
+     I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on
+     him; but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I thought,
+     would be amenable to argument: but I fear that either my advice
+     had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with
+     the President.
+
+     "I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad
+     with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms.
+
+     "It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily
+     from the Government, instead of being gradually forced from them.
+     In the former case, they would rally the greater number of the
+     malcontents around them; in the latter case, no gratitude will be
+     felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides,
+     there can be no doubt that, as the alien population increases, as
+     it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their
+     discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be
+     conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal made
+     by the President seems to be simply ridiculous.
+
+     "I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my
+     fellow-Commissioners that the President would adopt his
+     retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever
+     have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would
+     have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the
+     condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other
+     words, to recommence the war....
+
+     "I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly,
+     but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object
+     in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are,
+     of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President's
+     position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience
+     will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can
+     reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used
+     your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will
+     also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace
+     successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make
+     his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the
+     arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide
+     over immediate difficulties."
+
+And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief
+Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in
+allusion to this same visit to Pretoria:
+
+     "From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw,
+     three months ago, that if President Krüger did not voluntarily
+     yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the
+     whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Krüger's friends
+     to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is
+     war with England; on the other side there are concessions which
+     will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now, decide at once
+     how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years'
+     franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders, make them your
+     friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority
+     of the Uitlanders with you when they become burghers. The answer
+     I got was: We have done too much already, and cannot do more. Yet
+     afterwards they did a great deal more. The same policy of doing
+     nothing except under pressure is still being pursued. The longer
+     the delay, the more they will have to yield."
+
+[Sidenote: Afrikander advice.]
+
+This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr.
+Merriman's appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir
+Henry's letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed
+to Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Free State Executive and a
+convinced nationalist; and it is otherwise remarkable for an estimate
+of the economic conditions of the Boers which subsequent experience
+has completely justified:
+
+     "I most strongly urge you," he writes, "to use your utmost
+     influence to bear on President Krüger to concede some colourable
+     measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as
+     in those of his own State. Granted that he does nothing. What is
+     the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing
+     off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless
+     hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should
+     recruit his Republic with new blood--and the sands are running
+     out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The
+     fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is
+     done.... A moderate franchise reform and municipal privileges
+     would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a
+     maintenance of the oath ought to be sufficient safeguard against
+     the swamping of the old population."[66]
+
+         [Footnote 66: All these letters are in Cd. 369.]
+
+But the Schreiner Cabinet contained, as we have seen, a representative
+of Mr. Hofmeyr in the person of Dr. Te Water. Mr. Merriman could see
+that the position in the Transvaal was one that could not go on
+indefinitely--that "the fabric would go to pieces of its own accord,
+unless something was done." Dr. Te Water was blind even to this aspect
+of the question. The correspondence found after the occupation of
+Bloemfontein (March 13th, 1900), from which these letters are taken,
+contains also certain letters to President Steyn that disclose both
+the nature of the Afrikander mediation, as it was understood by the
+nationalist leaders of the Cape Colony, and the faithfulness with
+which Dr. Te Water served them.
+
+The Te Water correspondence, as we have it,[67] consists of three
+letters written respectively on May 8th, 17th, and 27th, from "the
+Colonial Secretary's Office, Capetown," to President Steyn. The
+replies of the latter have been withheld, not unnaturally, from the
+public eye. In the first of these letters Dr. Te Water "hopes
+heartily" that Schreiner's "proposition" for the Conference has been
+accepted, and then proceeds to impress upon him the advisability of
+President Krüger's yielding on the ground, not of justice, but of
+temporary expediency. In so doing, this Minister of the Crown
+completely identifies himself with the aspirations of the Afrikander
+nationalists, and he concludes by asking for "a private telegraphic
+code. The absence thereof was badly felt on Saturday, when Schreiner
+was obliged to write instead of telegraphing."
+
+         [Footnote 67: Cd. 369.]
+
+     "Circumstances appear to me now," he writes, "to be such that our
+     friends in Pretoria must be yielding; with their friends at the
+     head of the Government here, they have a better chance that
+     reasonable propositions made by them will be accepted than they
+     would have had if we had been unsuccessful at the late elections
+     and our enemies were advisers.
+
+[Sidenote: "Play to win time".]
+
+     "Schreiner, who knows more than any one of us, feels strongly
+     that things are extremely critical.
+
+     "Telegrams from people in London, whom he thoroughly trusts, such
+     as J. H.'s[68] best friends, received by him on Saturday and this
+     morning, strengthen him in his opinion. We must now play to win
+     time. Governments are not perpetual, and I pray that the present
+     team, so unjustly disposed towards us, may receive their reward
+     before long. Their successors, I am certain, will follow a less
+     hateful policy towards us. When we hear that you have succeeded
+     in Pretoria, then we must bring influence to bear here."
+
+         [Footnote 68: Mr. Hofmeyr.]
+
+In the second letter Dr. Te Water regrets that he cannot share
+President Steyn's view that "all the noise about war is bluff." Then
+there follows a passage showing that Mr. Steyn had entertained
+expectations of assistance from the Schreiner Cabinet that even Dr. Te
+Water could not reconcile with his ideas of ministerial allegiance:
+
+     "But now I should like a few words of explanation," he writes,
+     "as to what you mean by saying that 'The Cape Ministry will be
+     able to do much more good.' In what respect do you think that we
+     can be of more use than before?"
+
+Assuming, for the moment, that President Steyn had written, "In the
+event of war becoming inevitable, or having broken out, the Cape
+Ministry will be able to do much more good than it is doing now," or
+words to this effect, it would appear that he shared the erroneous
+views of Mr. Reitz, against which Sir Henry de Villiers had protested
+during his visit to Pretoria. In the letter to Mr. Melius de Villiers,
+from which we have quoted above, Sir Henry writes:
+
+     "When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz
+     and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and
+     duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are ministers of
+     the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible
+     assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions, a
+     responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of
+     internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all
+     the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown;
+     at least if they did not do so they would be liable to
+     dismissal."
+
+Dr. Te Water then continues:
+
+     "I would very much like to know your views, and if we are not
+     already working in that direction I will try, as far as possible,
+     to do what I can to give effect to your wishes, which may be for
+     the welfare of all. Please let me hear immediately and fully
+     about this."
+
+[Sidenote: Te Water and Steyn.]
+
+The last letter, written on the eve of the Conference, opens with a
+curiously significant passage. There were some things discussed
+between Steyn and Te Water that Mr. Schreiner was not to know.
+President Steyn has been getting nervous. Dr. Te Water, therefore,
+reassures him:
+
+     "Yours received on my return this morning from Aberdeen. Telegram
+     also reached me. I keep all your communications strictly private:
+     naturally you do not exclude my colleagues and our friend
+     Hofmeyr. I have often read extracts to them, but do not be
+     afraid; I shall not give you away."
+
+It also contains the information that, as President Steyn had no
+private code available, Dr. Te Water has borrowed the private
+telegraphic code of the Cabinet for President Steyn's use.
+
+     "To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic
+     code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and
+     I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of
+     weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself _only_. It
+     is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and
+     the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am
+     afraid that things leak out there in one way or another."
+
+And he then drives home the advice given before: "It is honestly now
+the time to yield a little, however one may later again tighten the
+rope."
+
+One other letter must be given to complete this view of the
+circumstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th,
+1899--that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord
+Milner that he should accept President Steyn's good offices to arrange
+the conference with President Krüger. It is addressed to President
+Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows:
+
+                    "DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
+                         "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA.
+                                   "_May 9th_, 1899.
+
+     "DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,--
+
+     "I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the
+     ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the
+     Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could
+     consequently not get the desired information earlier.
+
+     "The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser
+     and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will
+     be able to supply you with any of either sort.
+
+     "On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest.
+
+     "The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet
+     officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come
+     in it through your proposed plan. The copies _re_ dynamite will
+     be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting,
+
+     "Your humble servant and friend,
+                                   "P. GROEBLER."[69]
+
+         [Footnote 69: The original of this letter is now in the
+         possession of Mr. E. B. Iwan Müller, by whom it was published
+         in his work, _Lord Milner and South Africa_. The translation
+         is that of the Department of Military Intelligence.]
+
+The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for time,"
+because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal party to
+power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of their
+policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics were
+"playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until
+their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them
+to defy the British Government.
+
+[Sidenote: The Bloemfontein conference.]
+
+It was in these circumstances that the High Commissioner met President
+Krüger in conference at Bloemfontein (May 31st--June 5th). He was
+accompanied only by his staff: Mr. G. V. Fiddes (Imperial Secretary),
+Mr. M. S. O. Walrond (Private Secretary), Colonel Hanbury Williams
+(Military Secretary) and Lord Belgrave (A.D.C.),[70] with Mr.
+Silberbauer (the interpreter) and a shorthand writer. Mr. Schreiner
+had been very solicitous to attend the Conference; but Lord Milner,
+following his usual practice, had determined to keep the affairs of
+the High Commissionership completely distinct from those in which he
+was concerned as Governor of the Cape Colony. The absence both of the
+Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr was not unnaturally a matter of
+"sincere regret" to Dr. Te Water, as he informed President Steyn on
+the eve of the Conference.[71] Nor did Lord Milner avail himself of
+President Steyn's willingness to take part in the proceedings; but, at
+the High Commissioner's suggestion, Mr. Fischer (who was a member of
+the Free State Executive) was invited to act as interpreter--a duty
+which he discharged to the satisfaction of both parties. With
+President Krüger there went to Bloemfontein Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr.
+A. D. Wolmarans (members of the Transvaal Executive), Mr. J. C. Smuts
+(the State Attorney), and two other officials. All of these, the High
+Commissioner's Staff, and Mr. Fischer were present at the meetings of
+the Conference; but the actual discussion was confined to Lord Milner
+and President Krüger.[72] As regards the business in hand, the
+failure to publish the despatch of May 4th had deprived Lord Milner of
+what would have proved a helpful influence. Mr. Hofmeyr's action had
+procured an opportunity for "friendly discussion." But the
+friendliness was to be all on the side of the Imperial Government. For
+the purpose of the Afrikander leaders was, as we have seen, to secure
+a fictitious concession on the part of President Krüger. Lord Milner's
+aim was to obtain by friendly discussion a genuine and substantial
+measure of reform; and the prospect of his success would have been
+greatly increased if this despatch and Mr. Chamberlain's reply to it
+had been before the public when the Conference took place. It was
+written with the object of making the British people and President
+Krüger alike aware how grave was the judgment which he had formed of
+the existing situation. With England alive to the near danger which
+threatened her supremacy in South Africa, and President Krüger brought
+to understand that the man with whom he had to deal was one who held
+these opinions, Lord Milner could have been "friendly" without the
+risk of having his friendliness mistaken for a readiness to accept the
+illusory concession which was all that the Afrikander mediation was
+intended to secure.
+
+         [Footnote 70: 2nd. Lieut. Royal Horse Guards. Exactly one
+         year after the last day of the Conference (June 5th), he
+         (then A.D.C. to Lord Roberts and Duke of Westminster) ran up
+         the British flag over the Raadzaal at Pretoria.]
+
+         [Footnote 71: Letter of May 27th (in Cd. 369).]
+
+         [Footnote 72: Lord Milner left Capetown by special train at
+         8.30 a.m. on Monday, May 29th, and reached Bloemfontein
+         punctually at 5 p.m. on Tuesday. Here he was met by President
+         Steyn and various officials of the Free State; and an address
+         of welcome was presented to him by the Mayor of Bloemfontein
+         upon his arrival at the private house which had been provided
+         for his accommodation during the Conference. At eleven
+         o'clock on the following morning, Wednesday, the 31st, the
+         High Commissioner went to the Presidency, where he was
+         introduced by Mr. Steyn to President Krüger, Mr. Schalk
+         Burger and Mr. Wolmarans. The first meeting of the Conference
+         took place in the afternoon at 2.30, in the new offices of
+         the Railway Department. In the evening a largely attended
+         reception was given by President Steyn, at which Mr. Krüger
+         was present for a short time and Lord Milner for about an
+         hour. The Conference closed on the afternoon of Monday, June
+         5th, and Lord Milner then paid a farewell visit to President
+         Steyn. The High Commissioner's special train left
+         Bloemfontein on the following morning at 10.30, and reached
+         Capetown at 6.45 on the evening of Wednesday, the 7th, where
+         he was received by a large crowd, including three of the Cape
+         Ministers and a number of Progressive Members of Parliament.
+         President Steyn, who was present at the station on Tuesday
+         morning to see the High Commissioner off, did everything
+         possible for the comfort and convenience of his state guest
+         during the week that he was in Bloemfontein. The proceedings
+         of the Conference, with the High Commissioner's report upon
+         them, are published in C. 9,404.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's attitude.]
+
+As it was, Lord Milner was placed in a position of great
+embarrassment. If he "used plain language" he exposed himself to the
+charge of entering upon the discussion in an aggressive spirit,
+calculated to make agreement difficult. If he adopted a conciliatory
+tone, his arguments seemed to be nothing more than the abortive
+protests with which the grim old President had cheerfully filled the
+republican waste-paper basket for the last ten years. It has been
+suggested that Lord Milner might have obtained a better result if he
+had shown himself less "inflexible"; if, in short, he had been willing
+to accept a "compromise." But any such criticism is based upon an
+entire misunderstanding of the method which the High Commissioner did,
+in fact, adopt. The five years' franchise--the Bloemfontein
+minimum--was in itself a compromise. What Lord Milner said, in effect,
+to President Krüger was this: "I have a whole sheaf of grievances
+against you: the dynamite monopoly, excessive railway rates,
+interference with the independence of the judiciary, a vicious police
+system, administrative corruption, municipal abuses, and the rest. I
+will let all these go in exchange for one thing--a franchise reform
+which will give at once to a fair proportion of the Uitlander
+population some appreciable representation in the government of the
+Republic." Lord Milner not only offered a compromise, but a compromise
+that enormously reduced the area of dispute. His "inflexibility" arose
+from the simple fact that, having readily and frankly yielded all that
+could be yielded without sacrificing the paramount object of securing
+a permanent settlement of the Uitlander question, he had nothing
+further to concede, and said so.
+
+[Sidenote: President Krüger.]
+
+No two men more characteristic of the two utterly unlike and
+antagonistic political systems, which they respectively represented,
+could have been found. At the evening reception given by President
+Steyn on the opening day of the Conference, a big man, in a tightly
+buttoned frock-coat, stood just inside the door for ten minutes, and
+then moved awkwardly away. Above the frock-coat was a peasant's face,
+half-shrewd, half-furtive, with narrow eyes and a large, crooked mouth
+which somehow gave the man a look of power. This was President Krüger,
+_ætat._ 74. Once, doubtless, Paul Krüger's large and powerful frame
+had made him an impressive figure among a race of men as stalwart as
+the Boers. But he was now an old man: the powerful body had become
+shapeless and unwieldy; he had given up walking, and only left his
+stoep to drag himself clumsily into his carriage, and although he
+retained all his old tenacity of purpose, his mind had lost much of
+its former alertness. It needed all Mr. Smuts' mental resources--all
+that the young Afrikander had so recently learnt at Cambridge and the
+Temple--to enable the old President to maintain, even by the aid of
+his State-Attorney's ingenious paper pleadings, a decent show of
+defence against the perfect moderation and relentless logic with which
+the High Commissioner presented the British case. Lord Milner went to
+the Conference to make "one big straightforward effort to avert a
+great disaster"; Krüger to drive a "Kafir bargain." The end was as
+Lord Milner had foreseen. To yield the necessary instalment of reform
+seemed to President Krüger, in this mind, "worse than annexation"; and
+on June 5th Lord Milner declared, "The Conference is absolutely at an
+end, and there is no obligation on either side arising out of it."
+
+The Bloemfontein Conference made retreat for ever impossible. Lord
+Milner himself was perfectly conscious that in holding President
+Krüger to the franchise question he had made the conference the
+pivotal occasion upon which turned the issue of peace or war. He knew,
+when he closed the proceedings with a declaration that his meeting
+with President Krüger had utterly failed to provide a solution of the
+franchise question, that from this day forward there could be no
+turning back for him or for the Imperial Government. But he knew, too,
+that poor as was the prospect of obtaining the minimum reforms by any
+subsequent negotiation, nothing could contribute more to the
+attainment of this object than the blunt rejection of the makeshift
+proposals put forward by President Krüger at Bloemfontein.
+
+[Sidenote: After the conference.]
+
+The result of the Conference, from this point of view, and its effect
+upon the British population in South Africa, may be gathered from the
+address presented to Lord Milner on his return to Capetown, and from
+his reply to it. By the mouth of Mr. Alfred Ebden, a veteran colonist,
+the British population of the Colony then (June 12th) expressed their
+"admiration" of Lord Milner's "firm stand" on behalf of the
+Uitlanders, offered him their "earnest support," and declared their
+"entire confidence in his fairness and ability to bring these unhappy
+differences to a satisfactory settlement." The essence of Lord
+Milner's reply lies in the words, "some remedy has still to be found."
+The nationality problem would be solved if the principle of equality
+could be established all round. The Transvaal is "the one State where
+inequality is the rule, which keeps the rest of South Africa in a
+fever." It is inconsistent, he says, with the position of Great
+Britain as paramount Power, and with the dignity of the white race,
+that a great community of white men "should continue in that state of
+subjection which is the lot of the immigrant white population of the
+Transvaal." And he concludes:
+
+     "I see it is suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her
+     Majesty's Government is one of aggression. I know better than any
+     man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has
+     been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will
+     continue. But it cannot relapse into indifference. Can any one
+     desire that it should? It would be disastrous that the present
+     period of stress and strain should not result in some settlement
+     to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in the future. Of
+     that I am still hopeful. It may be that the Government of the
+     South African Republic will yet see its way to adopt a measure
+     of reform more liberal than that proposed at Bloemfontein. If
+     not, there may be other means of achieving the desired result. In
+     any case, it is a source of strength to those who are fighting
+     the battle of reform, and will, I believe, contribute more than
+     anything else to a peaceful victory, to feel that they have
+     behind them, as they perhaps never had before, the unanimous
+     sympathy of the British people throughout the world."[73]
+
+         [Footnote 73: C. 9,415.]
+
+In the four months that followed the Bloemfontein Conference a burden
+of toil and responsibility was laid upon Lord Milner which would have
+crushed any lesser man into utter passivity or resignation. An
+Afrikander Cabinet, with a nationalist element reporting its
+confidential councils with the Governor to Mr. Hofmeyr, the Bond
+Master, and President Steyn, the secret ally of President Krüger,
+would have been sufficient in itself to paralyse the faculties of any
+ordinary administrator at such a crisis. But this was not the only
+adverse influence with which circumstances brought Lord Milner into
+collision. Incredible as it may seem, it is none the less the fact
+that Sir William Butler, the General-in-Command of the British forces
+in South Africa, and the military adviser of the High Commissioner,
+was in close political sympathy with Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, and
+in complete agreement with their views. For General Butler held that a
+war to compel the Boer oligarchy to grant the elementary political
+rights to the British in the Transvaal, which even Mr. Gladstone's
+Cabinet intended to secure for them, would be the "greatest calamity
+that ever occurred in South Africa." And more than this, that if the
+Home Government did make war, it would be merely playing the game of
+"the party of the Raid, the South African League."[74]
+
+         [Footnote 74: Evidence before War Commission. Cd. 1,791.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner and Butler.]
+
+It is generally supposed that Lord Milner's disagreement with General
+Butler had its origin in the conduct of the latter, when Acting High
+Commissioner, in refusing the first Uitlander petition. This is quite
+untrue. Lord Milner's view of the Uitlander grievances was, of course,
+different from that of General Butler, who treated the appeal to the
+Queen as an unnecessary and artificial agitation against the Transvaal
+Government, and thereby placed the Acting British Agent, Mr. Edmund
+Fraser, in a position of extreme difficulty; since Mr. Fraser was, of
+course, desirous of carrying out his duties upon the general lines
+followed by Sir William Greene in accordance with the instructions of
+the Home Government. But the Transvaal question had never been
+discussed between Lord Milner and General Butler; and at the time of
+the Edgar incident Lord Milner was in England, and he had no means,
+therefore, of forming an opinion as to the significance which attached
+to this event, or the agitation to which it gave rise. On this
+particular point there was no opportunity for a conflict of opinion.
+Had Lord Milner been in South Africa he would, no doubt, have accepted
+the first petition to the Queen; but he made no complaint of General
+Butler's refusal to receive it. For the moment it was General Butler's
+business, as Acting High Commissioner, and not Lord Milner's. From a
+wider point of view, General Butler's action was injurious. It was one
+of the many instances in which their English sympathisers have led the
+Boers to destruction. But there was no friction, or argument, or
+unfriendliness between him and the High Commissioner on this account.
+This arose at a much later period; and arose, not on the general
+question of policy, but on the question of the necessity of military
+precautions in view of the imminence of war.
+
+[Sidenote: Reinforcements requested.]
+
+The friction between the High Commissioner and the General-in-Command
+in South Africa was the most disastrous manifestation of a disregard
+of the necessity for timely military preparations on the part of the
+Imperial Government, which, when war broke out, jeopardised the
+success of the British arms. For quite distinct reasons both General
+Butler and the Imperial Government were opposed to any preparations
+for war. The Salisbury Cabinet were reluctant to take any step that
+might seem to indicate that they considered that the door to a
+peaceful solution of the dispute was closed. In thus subordinating the
+needs of the military situation to those of the political, they acted
+in direct opposition to the maxim _si pacem vis, bellum para_. They
+carried this policy to such a point that they disregarded the advice
+of Lord Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, and that of the Intelligence
+Department,[75] with the result that when the war did break out the
+available British forces in South Africa were found to be in a
+position of grave disadvantage. The motive of General Butler's
+opposition was entirely different. His view was that what made the
+situation dangerous was not President Krüger's obduracy, but what he
+called the "persistent effort" to "produce war" made by the British
+inhabitants who desired Imperial intervention in the Transvaal. And
+he, therefore, held that any reinforcements sent by the Home
+Government would "add largely to the ferment which he (General Butler)
+was endeavouring to reduce by every means."[76] The position in June
+and July, from a military point of view, was as extraordinary as it
+was harassing to Lord Milner. In England the civil authority, the
+Cabinet, was refusing to make the preparations which its military
+adviser declared to be necessary. In South Africa the civil authority,
+the High Commissioner, was provided with a military adviser who cabled
+to the Home Government political reasons for not sending the
+reinforcements which the High Commissioner then urgently required. In
+these circumstances it is obvious that nothing but the supreme efforts
+of Lord Milner could have saved England from an overwhelming military
+defeat, or from a moral catastrophe even more injurious to the
+interests of the empire.
+
+         [Footnote 75: See p. 319 (note 2).]
+
+         [Footnote 76: Cd. 1,791.]
+
+When Lord Milner saw, before the Bloemfontein Conference, that the
+situation was becoming dangerous--and still more after the
+Conference--he desired that preparations for war should be made by the
+Imperial Government as a precautionary measure. Between December 1st,
+1896, and December, 1898, the South African garrison had been raised
+from 5,409 to 9,593 men.[77] It remained at a little under 10,000 up
+to the end of August, 1899. Lord Milner had repeatedly impressed upon
+the Home Government, from the middle of 1897 onwards, that 10,000 men
+was the minimum force consistent with safety. In view of the increased
+tension after Bloemfontein and of the enormous armament of the South
+African Republic, he felt that this minimum had become inadequate, and
+that it was desirable, and would strengthen the chance of a peaceful
+submission of the Boers, to steadily but unostentatiously increase the
+garrison. And what he desired especially was that the general on the
+spot should do, locally and quietly, all that could be done to advance
+these preparations. The measures which he urged were that plans should
+be prepared for the defence of Kimberley and other towns on the
+colonial borders, and that all supplies and material of war necessary
+to put these plans into effect should be accumulated, and, as far as
+possible, distributed.
+
+         [Footnote 77: War Commission, Cd. 1,791.]
+
+[Sidenote: General Butler's objections.]
+
+General Butler, as we have seen, was opposed to all preparations for
+war; and it is not surprising, therefore, that everybody who offered
+assistance, or advice on the military situation, was coldly received
+by him. Mr. (now Sir) Aubrey Wools-Sampson, who, after the failure of
+the Bloemfontein Conference, threw up lucrative civil employment in
+Rhodesia in order to come to the Cape and place himself, as a
+volunteer, at the service of the military authorities in the event of
+war, was so completely discouraged that he went to Natal to form the
+nucleus of the splendid fighting force afterwards known as the
+Imperial Light Horse. When Colonel Nicholson, then head of the British
+South Africa Police in Rhodesia, suggested that, in the same event, an
+attack on the Transvaal, launched from the north, might prove valuable
+as a means of diverting a portion of the Burgher forces from
+employment against the Cape Colony and Natal, General Butler is said
+to have looked upon his proposal as another Jameson Raid.[78] And
+when, after the Bloemfontein Conference had been held, the Home
+Government, in response to Lord Milner's repeated appeals, proposed to
+send out the very inadequate reinforcements which formed its first
+effort to strengthen the British military position in South Africa,
+General Butler immediately represented to the War Office that these
+additional troops were unnecessary, and protested against their being
+despatched.
+
+         [Footnote 78: This was precisely the _rôle_ played by
+         Mafeking, only defensively, not offensively.]
+
+General Butler's action at this crisis is so remarkable, and so
+unprecedented, that the circumstances must be related with some
+precision. In 1896, and again in 1897, General Goodenough had
+submitted to the War Office schemes for the defence of the British
+colonies, in which both the enormous extent of the frontiers to be
+protected and the great numerical superiority of the burgher forces to
+the then existing British garrison were fully exhibited. A memorandum
+of the Department of Military Intelligence, dated September 21st,
+1898, urged "that defence schemes should be drawn up locally for the
+Cape and Natal"; that "the arrangements which would be made for the
+despatch of reinforcements from England, and for the provision of
+supplies and transport, be worked out fully in the War Office; and
+that the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what
+action under these arrangements would be required of him on the
+outbreak of war."[79] On December 21st, 1898, General Butler, upon
+succeeding to the South African command, was requested to furnish, at
+an early date, a fresh scheme of defence embodying his own proposals
+for the distribution of the 9,500 British troops then in South Africa
+in the event of war. At the same time the latest information as to
+the military strength of the two Republics--showing, among other
+things, a total of 40,000 burghers[80]--was forwarded to him, and his
+attention was directed to the fact that the troops under his command
+must be considered as a purely defensive force, whose _rôle_ would be
+to repel invasion pending the arrival of reinforcements from England.
+In the absence of any reply to this communication General Butler was
+again requested, on June 6th, 1899 (_i.e._ after the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference), to report on the defence of the British
+colonies. He then sent his scheme of defence, cabling the substance in
+cipher, on June 9th, and sending the text by despatch on June 14th. On
+June 21st he received a War Office telegram informing him that it had
+been decided to "increase the efficiency of the existing force" in
+South Africa. And to this communication was added the question: "Do
+you desire to make any observations?"
+
+         [Footnote 79: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission).]
+
+         [Footnote 80: These were the figures of the D. M. I.
+         "Military Notes" of June, 1898; in the revised "Military
+         Notes" of June, 1899, the estimated total of the Boer force
+         was considerably greater--some 50,000 exclusive of colonial
+         rebels.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Ringing the War Office bell".]
+
+The sequel can be given in General Butler's words: "I looked on the
+one side," he said, in giving evidence before the War Commission, "and
+I saw what seemed to me a very serious political agitation going on
+with a Party that I had not alluded to yet, whom I had always looked
+upon as a Third Party; they were pressing on all they knew. The
+Government did not seem to be aware of that, and this telegram
+brought matters to such a point that I thought it gave me the
+opportunity to speak. So I took these words 'any observations,' and
+answered in a way which I thought would at least ring the War Office
+bell."
+
+The telegram with which General Butler "rang the War Office bell" was
+this:
+
+     "You ask for my observations: present condition of opinion here
+     is highly excited, and doubtless the news _quoting_ preparations
+     referred to in your telegram, if it transpires, will add largely
+     to the ferment which I am endeavouring to reduce by every means.
+     Persistent effort of a party to produce war forms, in my
+     estimation, gravest elements in situation here. Believe war
+     between white races, coming as sequel to Jameson Raid, and
+     subsequent events of last three years, would be greatest calamity
+     that ever occurred in South Africa."
+
+This telegram elicited the following reply from the Home Government:
+
+     "You cannot understand too clearly that, whatever your private
+     opinions, it is your duty to be guided in all questions of policy
+     by the High Commissioner, who is fully aware of our views, and
+     whom you will, of course, loyally support."
+
+In the course of his evidence before the War Commission General Butler
+gave some further explanation of the motives which had prompted his
+reply to the telegram of June 21st. In response to the question, "It
+was never in your contemplation that Mr. Krüger would declare war?"
+he replied:
+
+[Sidenote: General Butler's view.]
+
+     "My view was this, that as long as I held the neck of the bottle,
+     so to speak, there would be no war ... but to my mind the minute
+     there was the least indication of the Imperial Government coming
+     in, in front of, or behind, that party [_i.e._ "the party of the
+     Raid, the South African League"], there would be a serious state
+     of things. Until then there was, to my mind, no probability--no
+     possibility--of an invasion. That was the state of my mind at the
+     time ... [and] I wished to point it out before final decisions
+     were arrived at."
+
+And in a note which he desired to be appended to his evidence before
+the War Commission, General Butler wrote with reference to his failure
+to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements, that in
+his opinion "such a demand at such a time would be to force the hands
+of the Government, play into the hands of the 'Third Party,' and
+render [himself] liable to the accusation in the future that [he] had
+by this premature action produced or hastened hostilities."[81]
+
+         [Footnote 81: All of these extracts will be found in Cd.
+         1,791.]
+
+Here was an impasse from which obviously there was but one method of
+extrication. Either the High Commissioner or his military adviser must
+be recalled. That the Imperial Government did not recall General
+Butler then and there cannot be attributed to any ignorance on their
+part of Lord Milner's extreme anxiety for adequate military
+preparations. It arose, no doubt, from the circumstance that General
+Butler was known to be favourably inclined to the Boer cause, and
+that, therefore, his removal at this juncture would have been
+represented by the friends of the Boers in England, and by the
+official leader of the Opposition, as evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's
+alleged determination to force a war upon the Transvaal. General
+Butler was allowed, in these circumstances, to remain at the Cape
+until the latter part of August, when fresh employment was found for
+him, and Lieutenant-General Forestier-Walker was appointed to the Cape
+command. How General Butler was able to reconcile the opinions which
+he had expressed to the War Office with the discharge of his duties as
+military adviser to Lord Milner during these two critical months is a
+matter which need not be discussed. The decision to retain him in the
+South African command would seem, on the face of it, to have been a
+grave administrative error. It is enough for us to record the
+undoubted facts that Lord Milner was supremely dissatisfied with the
+action of General Butler as his military adviser, and that whereas the
+High Commissioner had requested the Home Government to provide him
+with a new military adviser in June, General Butler did in fact remain
+at the Cape until the latter part of August.
+
+General Butler is reputed to be both an able man and a good soldier.
+It is interesting, therefore, to know what was his view, and to
+compare it with that of Lord Milner. In these opinions, which
+dominated General Butler during the period in question (May to August,
+1899), there was only one point in which he and Lord Milner found
+themselves at one. This was the danger of the war; that is to say, the
+seriousness of the military task which would await Great Britain in
+the event of war with the Dutch in South Africa.
+
+[Sidenote: What Lord Milner thought.]
+
+As a great deal has been written on the subject of the military
+unpreparedness of England, and it has, moreover, been frequently
+stated in this connection that Sir William Butler was the only man to
+form a just estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces,
+it is very desirable to place on record what was really in Lord
+Milner's mind at this time. He agreed with General Butler in his
+estimate of the formidable character of the Boers; but he differed
+from him in everything else. To Lord Milner's mind the situation
+presented itself primarily from a political, and not from a military
+point of view. He believed that England was bound to struggle at least
+for political equality between the British and Dutch throughout South
+Africa. He felt that, after our bad record in the past, it would be
+absolutely fatal to begin to struggle for this equality unless we were
+prepared to carry our efforts to a successful issue. He thought that
+such a claim as this for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders was one
+that admitted of only two alternatives--it must never be made, or,
+being made, it must never be abandoned. The whole weakness of our
+position in South Africa was a moral weakness. The contempt which the
+Dutch had learnt for England was writ large over the whole social and
+political fabric of South Africa. Englishmen could not look the Dutch
+in the face as equals. If, after all our previous humiliations and
+failures; after Majuba, and after the Raid, we were going to commence
+a struggle for equality--nothing more, and then not to get it, the
+shame would be too grave for any great Power to support, or for those
+who sympathised with us in South Africa to endure. We had raised the
+British party in South Africa from the dust by the stand which we had
+made against Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal. If we were going to
+retreat from that position, the discredit of our action would compel
+England to resign her claim to be paramount Power, and with the
+resignation of that claim England's rights in South Africa would
+inevitably shrink to the narrow limits of a naval base at Simon's
+Town, and a sub-tropical plantation in Natal. What was fundamental was
+not the possibility of war, but the impossibility of retreat.
+
+[Sidenote: Retreat impossible.]
+
+Lord Milner still thought it possible, though not probable, that, if
+the British Government took a perfectly strong and unwavering line,
+the Dutch would yield, not indeed everything, but something
+substantial. He also foresaw that it was possible, perhaps probable,
+that they would not yield, and that in this case a state of tension
+would be created which must end in war. His position was, therefore,
+definite and consistent from the first. As we are pursuing a policy
+from which we cannot retreat--a policy that may lead to war--it is
+wholly unjustifiable, he said, to remain unprepared, unarmed, without
+a plan, as if war were quite out of the question. And so far from
+thinking that the preparations which he urged upon the Imperial
+Government, and more especially upon General Butler, would make war
+more likely, he believed that they would make it less likely. But even
+if they did lead the Dutch to fight, it was not war but "retreat" that
+must be avoided at all costs.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+PLAYING FOR TIME
+
+
+On June 8th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons,
+that with the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, a "new
+situation" had arisen. If the Imperial Government had translated this
+remark into action, the South African War would have been less
+disastrous, less protracted, and less costly. But the same order of
+considerations which prevented the Salisbury Cabinet from recalling
+General Butler in June, caused it to withhold its sanction from the
+preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. From
+the political point of view it was held to be desirable that the
+British Government should have an absolutely good case as before the
+world--a case which would not only ensure the whole-hearted support of
+the great bulk of the nation, and the active sympathy of the over-sea
+British communities; but one that would be so strong in justice as to
+overcome, or at least mitigate, the natural repugnance with which
+international opinion regards a great and powerful state that imposes
+its will upon a small and weak people by force of arms. Above all, it
+had become a cardinal principle in Mr. Chamberlain's South African
+policy to refrain to the last moment from any step which would
+necessarily close the door to a peaceful solution of the differences
+which had arisen between the South African Republic and the Imperial
+Government.
+
+[Sidenote: Policy of Home Government.]
+
+Influenced by these considerations, the Government refused to give
+effect to the measures demanded by the military situation, as it
+existed after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, except in so
+far as these demands could be satisfied without prejudice to the
+dominating political objects which it had in view. As to the nature of
+these measures there could be no reasonable doubt. It was necessary to
+raise the British forces in the Cape Colony and Natal to a point
+sufficient for defensive purposes, and to prepare an additional
+force--an army corps--for any offensive movement against one or both
+of the Republics. And as 6,000 miles of sea separated the seat of war
+from the chief base of the army, the United Kingdom, it was obvious
+that the defensive force should be despatched at once, and the
+offensive force prepared no less speedily, in order that it might be
+held in readiness to embark at the earliest moment that its services
+were required.
+
+To Lord Milner's reiterated warnings of the last two years, there was
+now added the definite advice of Lord Wolseley and the Department of
+Military Intelligence. In a memorandum dated June 8th, 1899,[82] and
+addressed to the Secretary of State for War, the Commander-in-Chief
+advised the mobilisation in England of a force consisting of one
+complete army corps, one cavalry division, one battalion mounted
+infantry, and four infantry battalions for lines of communication; the
+collection of transport in South Africa; and the immediate initiation
+of all subsidiary arrangements necessary for conveying these
+additional troops and their equipment to the seat of war. This advice
+was disregarded; but in place of the immediate mobilisation of the
+Army Corps the Cabinet decided to increase the efficiency of the
+existing force in South Africa, and General Butler was informed of
+this decision, as we have seen, on June 21st. On July 7th,[83] Lord
+Wolseley recommended, in addition to the mobilisation of the offensive
+force--which he still deemed necessary--that "the South African
+garrisons should be strengthened by the despatch of 10,000 men at a
+very early date." Instead of adopting these measures, the Government
+confined itself to doing just the few necessary things, both for
+defence and offence, that could be done without creating any belief in
+its warlike intentions, and without involving any appreciable
+expenditure of the public funds. Undoubtedly this latter
+consideration--the desire to avoid any expenditure that might
+afterwards prove to have been unnecessary--added weight to the purely
+political argument against immediate military preparation.
+
+         [Footnote 82: Cd. 1,789.]
+
+         [Footnote 83: Cd. 1,789.]
+
+[Sidenote: Preparations delayed.]
+
+The course actually taken by the Salisbury Cabinet was this. Instead
+of the immediate mobilisation of the offensive force, Lord Wolseley
+was instructed to prepare a scheme for the "constitution,
+organisation, and mobilisation" of such a force; and to do this in
+consultation with Sir Redvers Buller, the General Officer commanding
+at Aldershot, who had been selected to lead the British forces in
+South Africa in the event of war. Instead of the immediate despatch of
+additional troops sufficient to render the South African garrisons
+capable of repelling invasion--which was what Lord Milner had
+especially desired--the actual deficiencies of the existing Cape
+garrison[84] were made good by the despatch in July of small additions
+of artillery and engineers, and by directing General Butler to provide
+the fresh transport without which even this diminutive force was
+unable to mobilise. At the same time certain special service
+officers,[85] including engineers and officers of the Army Service
+Corps, were sent out to organise the materials, locally existing, for
+the defence of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and the
+southern districts of Rhodesia; and generally to make preliminary
+preparations for the provisioning, transport, and distribution of any
+British forces that might be despatched subsequently to the Cape
+Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 84: Three battalions, 6 guns, and a company of
+         Royal Engineers were all the troops available for the defence
+         of the Cape frontiers at this time (_i.e._ June).]
+
+         [Footnote 85: Most of these came by mail boats on July 18th
+         and 25th. Col. Baden-Powell (who was entrusted with the
+         important duty of organising a force for the defence of
+         Southern Rhodesia, and subsequently of raising the mounted
+         infantry corps which held Mafeking) arrived on the latter
+         date.]
+
+These were the utterly inadequate reinforcements sent in response to
+Lord Milner's urgent appeal, and in disregard of General Butler's
+protest that they were wholly undesirable--an opinion which was
+endorsed in England by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, when, on June 17th,
+1899, he declared that there was nothing in the South African
+situation to justify even preparations for war.
+
+During the interval between the Bloemfontein Conference and General
+Butler's recall in the latter part of August Lord Milner's position
+was one of unparalleled difficulty. The Cape and Natal garrisons were
+maintained in a state of perilous weakness by the policy of the Home
+Government. The measures to be undertaken locally for the defence of
+the colonies, which the Cabinet had sanctioned, were wholly
+insufficient in Lord Milner's opinion. And the general execution of
+these wholly insufficient local measures was left in the hands of a
+General Officer who had told the Secretary of State that he absolutely
+disapproved of them on political grounds, since the mere announcement
+of their being made would "add largely to the ferment," which he "was
+[then] endeavouring to reduce by every means." The Cape Ministry,
+with whom rested the disposal of the colonial forces, was a ministry
+placed in office by the Bond for the especial purpose of opposing
+British intervention in the Transvaal. In these circumstances it
+needed all Lord Milner's mastery of South African conditions, and all
+his tact and address, to make the relations between himself and his
+Afrikander Cabinet tolerable; and, above all, in view of the refusal
+of the Imperial Government to sanction the military preparations
+advised by the Commander-in-Chief, it required ceaseless vigilance on
+his part to prevent the acceptance of an illusory settlement which
+would have sounded the death-knell of British supremacy in South
+Africa.
+
+[Sidenote: President Krüger's proposals.]
+
+On the last day of the Conference President Krüger had put in a
+memorandum in which he expressed his intention of introducing his
+franchise scheme to the Volksraad, and his hope that the High
+Commissioner would be able to recommend this, and a further proposal
+for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, to the favourable
+consideration of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had replied that
+any such proposals would be considered on their merits; but that the
+President must not expect them to be connected in any way with the
+proceedings of the Conference, out of which, as he then declared, no
+obligation had arisen on either side.
+
+The Raad met on Friday, June 9th; and on Monday, the 12th--the day on
+which Lord Milner received the Ebden address[86]--President Krüger
+laid the draft Franchise law, containing his revised Bloemfontein
+scheme, before it. On Tuesday, 13th, Mr. Chamberlain's despatch of May
+10th, on the position of the Uitlanders and the petition to the Queen,
+was delivered to the Transvaal Government by the British Agent; and on
+Wednesday, June 14th, as we have already noticed, the Blue-book
+containing this despatch, Lord Milner's despatch of May 4th, and the
+whole story of the franchise controversy up to the Bloemfontein
+Conference, was published in England. As the conditions under which
+Lord Milner's despatch had been telegraphed to England were now
+changed, it would have been better if it had remained unpublished, and
+the stage of fighting diplomacy, reached through the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference, had been at once opened--and opened in
+another way. What Lord Milner had learnt at Bloemfontein was not
+merely that President Krüger was unwilling to yield, but that he was
+psychologically incapable of yielding. He had learnt, that is to say,
+not that Krüger was determined to refuse the particular reform which
+the Imperial Government demanded, but that his whole system of thought
+was irreconcilably opposed to that of any English statesman. It is the
+knowledge which can be obtained only by personal dealings with the
+Boers, and no one who has had such personal dealings can fail to
+remember the sense of hopelessness that such an experience brings with
+it. The Boer may be faithful to his own canons of morality; but his
+whole manner of life and thought is one that makes his notion of the
+obligations of truth and justice very different from that of the
+ordinary educated European. He is not devoid of the conception of
+duty, but he applies this conception in methods adapted to the narrow
+and illiberal conditions of his isolated and self-centred life.
+
+         [Footnote 86: Expressing approval of the position Lord Milner
+         had taken up at Bloemfontein. See p. 173.]
+
+As for the mediation of the Cape Afrikanders, Lord Milner estimated it
+at its real value. The Cape nationalists believed that war would
+result in disaster to their cause; the Republican nationalists did
+not. They both hated the British in an equal degree. But the
+Afrikander leaders at the Cape knew that they had the game in their
+own hands. "For goodness' sake," they said, "keep quiet until we have
+got rid of this creature, Milner; and the Salisbury Cabinet--the
+'present team so unjustly disposed to us'--is replaced by a Liberal
+Government."
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's task.]
+
+That was the meaning of their mediation--nothing more. Lord Milner
+acquiesced in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, but what he wanted
+was a polite but absolutely inflexible insistence upon the
+Bloemfontein minimum, and at the same time such military preparations
+as, in view of the clear possibility of a failure of negotiations,
+seemed to him absolutely vital. This, however, was not the course
+which the Salisbury Cabinet thought right to adopt; and the problem
+that now lay before him was to convert the illusory concessions, which
+were all that Afrikander mediation was able or even desirous to wring
+from President Krüger, into the genuine reform that the British
+Government had twice pledged itself to secure.
+
+But Lord Milner had also grasped the fact that the one issue which
+could drive a wedge into Dutch solidarity was the franchise question.
+He had determined, therefore, that nothing that transpired at the
+Bloemfontein Conference should permit President Krüger to change the
+ground of dispute from this central issue. During the negotiations
+between the Home Government and the Pretoria Executive that followed
+the Conference, and especially during the period of Mr. Hofmeyr's
+active intervention, his most necessary and pressing task was to
+prevent the Salisbury Cabinet from being "jockeyed" by Boer diplomacy
+out of the advantageous position which he had then taken up on its
+behalf. The pressure of the Hofmeyr mediation increased the difficulty
+of this task by driving President Krüger into a series of franchise
+proposals of the utmost complexity. The danger was that Mr.
+Chamberlain and his colleagues in the Cabinet, in their earnest desire
+to avoid war, might recognise some illusory measures of reform as
+satisfactory, and then, after further consideration, finding them to
+be worthless, be driven by their previous admission to make war, after
+all, not on the single issue of "equality all round," but on an issue
+that might be plausibly represented to South Africa and the world as
+the independence of the Boers.
+
+[Sidenote: The Draft Franchise Law.]
+
+The period is crowded with demonstrations, despatches, mediations,
+petitions, and incidents of all kinds. A tithe of these--disentangled
+from the Blue-books, but vitalised by a knowledge of the master facts
+that lie behind the official pen--will serve, however, to present the
+play of the mingling, conflicting, and then frankly opposing forces.
+The "formidable personalities" are all in motion. At first it seemed
+as though the whole weight of the Schreiner Cabinet, acting in
+conjunction with General Butler's political objection to military
+preparation on the part of the Imperial Government, was to be thrown
+into the scale against Lord Milner's efforts. On June 12th President
+Krüger laid the draft of his new Franchise Law before the Raad, which
+then (the 15th) adjourned, in order that the feeling of the burghers
+might be ascertained. On the 17th a great assemblage of Boers met at
+Paardekraal, and, among the warlike speeches then delivered was that
+of Judge Kock,[87] a member of the Transvaal Executive, who "dwelt
+upon the doctrine of 'what he called Afrikanderdom,' and said that he
+'regarded the Afrikanders, from the Cape to the Zambesi as one great
+family. If the Republics are lost,' he continued, 'the Afrikanders
+would lose. The independence of the country was to them a question of
+life and death. The Free State would stand by the Transvaal, even to
+the death. Not only the Free State, but also the Cape Colony.'" Nor
+was this boast without some foundation. A week before (June 10th), Mr.
+Schreiner had requested Lord Milner to inform Mr. Chamberlain that, in
+ministers' opinion, President Krüger's franchise proposal was
+"practical, reasonable, and a considerable step in the right
+direction."[88] Four days later (June 14th) he further informed the
+Governor that, in ministers' opinion, there was nothing in the
+existing situation to justify "the active interference of the Imperial
+Government in what were the internal affairs of the Transvaal."[89]
+And this expression of opinion the Prime Minister also desired Lord
+Milner, as the only constitutional medium of communication between the
+Cape Ministry and the Secretary of State, to convey to Mr.
+Chamberlain. On the day (June 10th) on which the first of these
+interviews between Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner took place, a meeting
+of five thousand persons--in Sir William Greene's words, "the largest
+and most enthusiastic ever held at Johannesburg"--passed three
+resolutions which sufficiently exhibit the extent to which the views
+of the Cape Ministry differed from those of the Transvaal British.
+After affirming the principle of equal political rights for all white
+inhabitants of South Africa, and declaring that President Krüger's
+Bloemfontein proposals were "wholly inadequate," this great meeting
+proceeded to place on record its "deep sense of obligation" to Lord
+Milner for his endeavour to secure the redress of the Uitlander
+grievances, and its willingness, in order to "support his Excellency
+in his efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement," to endorse "his very
+moderate proposals on the franchise question as the irreducible
+minimum that could be accepted."
+
+         [Footnote 87: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 88: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 89: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Action of Schreiner ministry.]
+
+In other words, the Schreiner Cabinet, immediately after the failure
+of the Conference, used its influence unreservedly to assist the
+Pretoria Executive in refusing the franchise reform put forward by the
+High Commissioner--a reform which, in the opinion of the community
+most concerned and most capable of judging of its effect, constituted
+an "irreducible minimum" only to be accepted in deference to Lord
+Milner's judgment, and in the hope of avoiding war. Mr. Schreiner's
+action on this occasion was characteristic of the blind partizanship
+of the Cape Ministry. On June 10th, when the Prime Minister pressed
+his and his colleagues' favourable view of President Krüger's
+proposals upon Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, the draft Franchise
+Law, with its intricate provisions, had not been laid before the
+Volksraad. Mr. Schreiner, therefore, had made haste to bless before
+he knew what he was blessing. And a few weeks later, as we shall
+notice, he let his zeal for the Boer oligarchy outrun his discretion
+in an even more amazing manner.
+
+In these difficult circumstances Lord Milner displayed the highest
+address in his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet. Thanks to his
+mingled tact and firmness, aided by the outspoken support which he
+received from Mr. Chamberlain, his intercourse with his ministers
+remained outwardly friendly, while at the same time he had the
+satisfaction of seeing that during the next few weeks the
+considerations of policy, which he laid before them with absolute
+frankness, appreciably modified their original attitude. He had at
+once availed himself of the one point on which he and they were in
+agreement. With reference to the first interview with Mr. Schreiner
+(June 10th), he telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary:
+
+     "In reply I told him [Mr. Schreiner] I was prepared to
+     communicate this expression of his opinion, although I strongly
+     held an opposite view, as he was aware.
+
+     "He admitted, in subsequent conversation, that the President of
+     the South African Republic's scheme could, in his opinion, be
+     improved in detail; for instance, by immediately admitting men
+     who had entered the country previous to 1890, and by making
+     optional the period of naturalisation....
+
+     "In reply, I told him that these were points of first-rate
+     importance and not of detail, especially the latter; and that,
+     since after all he seemed to agree with me more than with the
+     President of the South African Republic, he had better address
+     his advice to the latter, and not to Her Majesty's Government."
+
+And at the long and rather unpleasant interview of June 14th,
+although, as we have seen, Mr. Schreiner desired Lord Milner to inform
+Mr. Chamberlain that the Cape Ministry considered the "active
+interference" of the British Government unjustified, yet he also said
+"that he and his colleagues were agreed that there were two respects
+in which the Government of the South African Republic might better
+their franchise scheme: (1) By admitting to the full franchise at once
+persons who had entered the country before 1890; and (2) By making it
+optional to obtain the full franchise without previous naturalisation
+after seven years' residence."[90]
+
+         [Footnote 90: C. 9,415.]
+
+Mr. Chamberlain's reply (June 16th), contained a more direct
+admonition. Lord Milner was instructed to inform the Cape Ministers
+that the Government trusted that they would "use all the influence
+they could to induce the Transvaal Government to take such action as
+would relieve Her Majesty's Government from the necessity of
+considering the question of being obliged to have recourse to
+interference of such a nature."[91]
+
+         [Footnote 91: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's speech.]
+
+This was admirable backing, and precisely what Lord Milner required to
+aid him in his two-fold task of bringing both the Cape Ministry and
+the Pretoria Executive to a more reasonable frame of mind. But Mr.
+Chamberlain's next step was one of questionable utility.
+
+In his speech at Birmingham (June 26th), after reviewing the relations
+of Great Britain with the Transvaal Boers during the last twenty
+years, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the Imperial Government, although
+deeply anxious not to use force, must somehow see that things were put
+right in South Africa.
+
+     "We have tried waiting, patience, and trusting to promises which
+     are never kept," he said; "we can wait no more. It is our duty,
+     not only to the Uitlanders, but to the English throughout South
+     Africa, to the native races, and to our own prestige in that part
+     of the world, and in the world at large, to insist that the
+     Transvaal falls into line with the other states in South Africa,
+     and no longer menaces the peace and prosperity of the whole."
+
+This was the kind of speech which would have been suitable and
+effective, if the South African garrison had been 20,000 instead of
+10,000 strong, and the expeditionary force had been mobilised on
+Salisbury Plain. It was unsuitable and ineffective under the existing
+circumstances; when, that is to say, the British Government, by
+refusing to sanction the measures advised by the Commander-in-Chief,
+had elected to put themselves at a military disadvantage for the sake
+of prolonging the stage of friendly discussion and in the hope of
+gaining their point by diplomatic means. In these circumstances such
+speeches were merely food for President Krüger to use in feeding the
+enthusiasm of his burghers. What Lord Milner desired of the Home
+Government was, as we have seen, a polite but inflexible demand for
+the Bloemfontein minimum, coupled with unostentatious, but effective,
+military preparations. The Home Government, as the sequel will show,
+were driven by the unpatriotic attitude of the Liberal Opposition into
+a precisely opposite course in both these respects. Their demand was
+vague in substance, and irritating in manner; while their inadequate
+defensive preparations were more than neutralised by the loudness with
+which, in deference to the views of the Liberal Opposition, they
+proclaimed their reluctance to undertake military measures on a scale
+that would really have made an impression on the Boers.[92]
+
+         [Footnote 92: _E.g._ Mr. Balfour's statement in the House of
+         Commons that the object of the despatch of the special
+         service officers, and the small additions of engineers and
+         artillery was "to complete the existing garrison." The
+         purchase of transport, he said, had been long ago decided
+         upon.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Fischer-Hofmeyr mission.]
+
+One result which Mr. Chamberlain's speech produced was to bring Mr.
+Hofmeyr once more upon the scene. Before this date (June 26th) Mr.
+Fischer, apparently considering that the failure of the Bloemfontein
+Conference cast a reflection upon the statesmanship and influence of
+the Free State Government, had commenced a second essay in mediation.
+Early in June he had paid a visit to Capetown, where he was in close
+communication with Mr. Hofmeyr and the Cape Ministers, and had twice
+called upon the High Commissioner. He had left Capetown on the 19th
+for Bloemfontein; and then proceeded to Pretoria, which he reached on
+the 25th. At the Transvaal capital he entered into negotiations with
+the Executive, calling upon the British Agent on the 26th, and again
+on the 28th, and maintaining communication, through him, with Lord
+Milner. From Pretoria Mr. Fischer returned to Bloemfontein in company
+with Mr. Smuts and Mr. Groebler,[93] on July 1st. Here he met Mr.
+Hofmeyr, who, leaving Capetown with Mr. Herholdt, on the same day
+(July 1st), reached Bloemfontein early on the following morning.
+
+         [Footnote 93: Under State-Secretary of the Transvaal.]
+
+Mr. Hofmeyr was in Bloemfontein, because the events of the last few
+days had convinced him that the only hope of saving the
+situation--saving it, that is, from the Afrikander nationalist point
+of view--lay in prompt and energetic action on his part. On June 23rd
+Mr. Schreiner had been informed by the High Commissioner of the
+intention of the Home Government to "complete" the Cape garrison; and
+shortly afterwards the despatch of the special service officers was
+publicly announced in England. Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham
+on the 26th, cabled almost _in extenso_ to the High Commissioner, was
+communicated to the local press on the 28th. On the same evening a
+mass meeting, held in the Good Hope Hall at Capetown, declared its
+strong approval of the action of the Imperial Government on behalf of
+the British population in the Transvaal. With these signs of an
+approaching Armageddon before his eyes, Mr. Hofmeyr had overcome his
+objection to personal dealings with President Krüger, and had resolved
+to go to Pretoria to confer with the leaders of the Boer oligarchy.
+But, in order to protect himself from the risk of a useless rebuff, he
+had first arranged to meet Mr. Fischer at Bloemfontein, and obtain
+through him and President Steyn some definite assurance that his
+counsels would be treated with respect, before finally proceeding to
+the Transvaal.
+
+On Sunday, July 2nd, and in these circumstances, a conference was held
+between the Master of the Bond and Mr. Fischer and Mr. Smuts--two men
+not unworthy to represent the cause of Afrikander nationalism in their
+respective republics. As the result of their discussions, carried on
+almost uninterruptedly from the early morning until nearly midnight,
+Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr. Groebler, in the words of _Ons Land_,
+"knew precisely what had to be done, in the opinion of the Colonial
+representatives, to gain the moral support of Colonial Afrikanders and
+to lead in the direction of peace."[94]
+
+         [Footnote 94: Article on "The Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and
+         Herholdt" in _Ons Land_, of July 11th, 1899, as reproduced in
+         the _South African News_ of the same date. This account of
+         Mr. Hofmeyr's proceedings is presumed to have been published
+         with his approval. C. 9,518.]
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr at Bloemfontein.]
+
+On the following day (Monday, the 3rd) Mr. Fischer and his companions
+arrived again in Pretoria; but Mr. Hofmeyr remained at Bloemfontein,
+since he had decided not to go to the Transvaal capital, unless "he
+was assured of achieving something of importance there." Up to the
+afternoon of Tuesday (the 4th) no such assurance had been received;
+and, says _Ons Land_, "as it seemed the assurance was almost in a
+contrary direction, preparations were already made for the homeward
+journey." But a little later on in the day Mr. Hofmeyr and his
+companion "received a hint that, although their chances of success at
+Pretoria were but slight, they were not altogether hopeless." The
+facts thus far provided by _Ons Land_ must now be supplemented by a
+reference to the telegrams which fell into the hands of the British
+authorities a year later upon the occupation of Bloemfontein. From
+these documents we know that President Krüger at first telegraphed to
+President Steyn a polite refusal of Mr. Hofmeyr's mediation. This was
+followed, on Tuesday morning, by a telegram from Mr. Fischer himself,
+informing President Steyn that the Transvaal Government "would be glad
+to meet Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt, but that he could not say what
+chance there was of their mission succeeding until the Volksraad had
+been consulted." This, as we have seen, was by no means sufficient for
+Mr. Hofmeyr. But later on there came a second telegram--the telegram
+which _Ons Land_ delicately calls a "hint"--in which Mr. Fischer said
+that President Krüger "was willing to see Mr. Hofmeyr before he
+brought the matter before the Raad," and that he himself "hoped to
+obtain certain concessions from the Executive Council, with the
+members of which he was in consultation."
+
+Thus encouraged, Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt at once left
+Bloemfontein by special train, and, travelling all night, reached
+Pretoria on Wednesday, the 5th, at seven o'clock.
+
+"From the station," says _Ons Land_, "they were escorted by various
+officials and friends to the Transvaal Hotel, where rooms had been
+engaged for them as guests of the State. Even before they had taken
+breakfast they had an audience with President Krüger. On the
+invitation of His Honour they accompanied Mr. Fischer to three
+meetings of the Executive Council--two on Wednesday and one on
+Thursday. They had the opportunity, too, of meeting the greater part
+of the Volksraad members, and of conversing with them. What occurred
+on this occasion is, of course, private, and not for publication."
+
+Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt left Pretoria on Friday, the 7th, and
+reached Capetown on Monday, the 10th.
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner and the mission.]
+
+[Sidenote: Bid for "moral support".]
+
+Lord Milner did everything possible to secure the success of the
+Fischer-Hofmeyr mission. Provided President Krüger was induced to give
+the Uitlanders an appreciable share in the government of the
+Transvaal, it made no difference to the Imperial Government whether he
+did so from a desire to secure the "moral support" of the Cape
+Afrikander party, or from any other motive of political expediency.
+What was essential was that the existing franchise scheme should be so
+far improved as to become a genuine, and no longer a fictitious,
+measure of reform. On the understanding that the "mission" had no less
+an object in view--an understanding which he gained from conversation
+with Mr. Fischer himself as well as from Mr. Schreiner and Mr.
+Hofmeyr--Lord Milner placed the British Government code at the
+disposal of Mr. Fischer and the Prime Minister, and further arranged
+with the former to communicate with him (Lord Milner) through the
+British Agent at Pretoria. But Lord Milner especially impressed, alike
+upon Mr. Fischer, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. Schreiner, the necessity of
+urging President Krüger to discuss any proposed modifications in the
+Draft Law with the Imperial Government or its representatives, before
+they were submitted to the Raad. The objection to the adoption of this
+course, which, according to Mr. Fischer's statement,[95] the Pretoria
+Executive did in fact make, was their inability to "recognise the
+right of the British Government to be consulted on the franchise,
+which was an internal matter." This objection, however, as Lord Milner
+pointed out to the members of the Pretoria Executive, both directly
+through Sir William Greene,[96] and indirectly through Mr. Hofmeyr and
+Mr. Fischer, was a mere pretext. "The whole world," he said in
+effect, "knows that whatever alterations you make in the Draft
+Law--and indeed the Law itself--will be the result of the pressure
+brought to bear upon you by the British Government. That being so, to
+refuse to discuss these alterations with us privately, and in a
+friendly manner, because the franchise is an 'internal matter,' is to
+strain at a gnat while you are all the while swallowing a camel." But
+neither at this time, nor at any other period in the three months'
+negotiations, did President Krüger desire to come to an agreement with
+the British Government at the price of granting a genuine measure of
+reform. As a bid for the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, but
+without the slightest attempt to consult with the British Government
+or its representatives, he recommended to the Volksraad, on July 7th,
+certain amendments, the effect of which was to confer the franchise
+upon a very small body of Uitlanders, and that only if they succeeded
+in complying with certain cumbersome and protracted formalities.[97]
+On the following morning the Bond Press announced, with a great
+flourish of trumpets, that Mr. Hofmeyr's mission had been remarkably
+successful, and set out the amendments of "The Great Reform Act" as
+representing the fruit of his and Mr. Fischer's efforts. This was for
+the public. To Mr. Fischer, Hofmeyr himself telegraphed on his return
+journey to Capetown, that he "deplored the failure" of his mission,
+when he "thought he had reason to expect success." Mr. Schreiner, on
+the other hand, was no less ready to bless the "Hofmeyr compromise"
+than Krüger's original scheme. Upon receiving by telegram the bare
+heads of the proposed amendments, and without waiting to learn what
+practical effect they would have upon the position of the Uitlanders,
+he hastily authorised _The South African News_ to announce (July 8th)
+that the Cape Government considered the proposals of the amended law
+"adequate, satisfactory, and such as should secure a peaceful
+settlement."[98] This opinion he subsequently modified; and, at Lord
+Milner's request, he advised Mr. Fischer (July 11th) to urge his
+friends at Pretoria to delay the passage of the bill through the
+Volksraad. And Lord Milner was authorised by Mr. Chamberlain to
+instruct Sir William Greene to offer the same advice to the Transvaal
+Government, with the more precise intimation that "full particulars of
+the new scheme" ought to be furnished officially to the Imperial
+Government, if the proposals which it embodied were to form "any
+element in the settlement of the differences between the two
+Governments."[99] The High Commissioner's object was, of course, to
+reduce the area of formal negotiations, and therefore the risk of
+official friction, to its narrowest limits. But this was not President
+Krüger's object. His principle was the very opposite of that of the
+Imperial Government. They abstained from preparations for war in
+order to improve the prospect of a peaceable settlement. The force
+upon which he relied was the warlike temper of his burghers, and the
+answering enthusiasm which the spectacle of the Republic, prepared to
+defy the British Empire, would arouse among the whole Dutch population
+of South Africa. Mr. Reitz was, therefore, instructed to decline Mr.
+Chamberlain's request on the ground that "the whole matter was out of
+the hands of the Government";[100] meaning, thereby, that it had
+already been submitted to the Volksraad. This, again, was the thinnest
+of excuses, since President Krüger had never yet shown any scruple in
+modifying or withdrawing proposals already laid before the Volksraad,
+when it suited him to do so.
+
+         [Footnote 95: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 96: Then Mr. Conyngham Greene.]
+
+         [Footnote 97: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 98: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 99: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 100: C. 9,415.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Bogus Conspiracy.]
+
+[Sidenote: War fever in the Transvaal.]
+
+It may be questioned, however, whether, even at this time, the "whole
+matter" had not passed, in another and more serious sense, "out of the
+hands" both of the Pretoria Executive and the British Government. The
+political atmosphere of South Africa had become electric. The
+Uitlanders themselves cherished no illusion on the subject of
+President Krüger's proposals. Amended and re-amended, the Franchise
+Law, as the Uitlander Council then and there declared, left the
+granting of the franchise at the discretion of the Boer officials or
+the Pretoria Executive, and as such it was "a most dangerous measure,
+and apparently framed with the object of defeating the end it was
+presumed to have in view."[101] Further and convincing evidence of the
+utterly vicious and depraved character of the _personnel_ of the Boer
+administration was afforded by the proceedings arising out of the
+alleged "conspiracy" against the Republic, of which the unfortunate
+Englishman Nicholls was the innocent victim (May 18th to July
+25th).[102] In this disgraceful affair the gravest offences against
+international comity were committed; high officials, including Mr.
+Tjaart Krüger, the President's youngest son, were implicated in a
+gross and scandalous prostitution of the machinery of justice; and yet
+no apology was offered to the Imperial Government, nor any
+compensation awarded to Nicholls for the two months' imprisonment and
+continuous persecution by the agents-provocateurs, to which he had
+been subjected. The impassioned speeches delivered at the Paardekraal
+meeting was only one among many signs of the dangerous hostility to
+England and everything English that had taken possession of the
+Republic. The British residents who had petitioned the Queen were
+denounced as "revolutionaries," and threatened with the vengeance of
+the burghers. "If war breaks out," wrote _De Rand Post_,"[103] the
+Johannesburg agitators are the real instigators, and to these
+ringleaders capital punishment should be meted out." In the Volksraad
+discussion of the Franchise Law the same passionate hatred of the
+Uitlanders was manifested. "Is it the English only who have the right
+to make conditions?" asked Mr. Lombard on July 15th. "If it comes to
+be a question of war, there will be a great destruction. And who will
+be destroyed if it comes to a collision? Why, the subjects of Her
+Majesty in Johannesburg."[104]
+
+         [Footnote 101: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 102: On May 15th, 1899--_i.e._ a fortnight before
+         the Bloemfontein Conference met--five persons alleged to be
+         British subjects were arrested on a warrant, signed by Mr.
+         Smuts as State-Attorney, on a charge of high treason. All of
+         them, except one man--Nicholls, who was innocent--were agents
+         of the secret service. The statement that the men were
+         ex-British officers, and that one of them alleged that he was
+         acting under direct instructions from the War Office, was
+         disseminated through the Press by the Transvaal Government,
+         with the object of discrediting (1) the South African League,
+         and (2) the British Government, in the eyes of the civilised
+         world. The whole of the alleged "conspiracy against the
+         independence of the Republic," thanks to the endurance of
+         Nicholls and the persistence of the Imperial authorities in
+         South Africa, was shown to be the work of the Transvaal
+         police, favoured by the negligence or political bad faith of
+         certain Government officials. The prosecution was abandoned
+         on July 25th. Mr. Duxbury, the counsel for the defence
+         retained by the British Government, in reviewing the case and
+         the proceedings, wrote (August 9th): "It seems abundantly
+         clear, from all the facts which have come to light, that the
+         whole of this disgraceful prosecution found its inception in
+         the minds of Mr. Schutte, the Commissioner of Police, and
+         Acting Chief Detective Beatty.... I must direct your
+         attention to the very grave accusation contained in Thomas
+         Dashwood Bundy's affidavit against Mr. Tjaart Krüger. This
+         gentleman is the son of President Krüger, and is the Chief of
+         the Secret Service department of this State." And of Mr.
+         Smuts he writes: "I believe he was deceived by the
+         detectives, and yet at the same time I fail to understand
+         why, in a matter of such-magnitude, he allowed himself to
+         sign warrants for the arrest of persons charged with such a
+         serious crime as high treason on the strength of an affidavit
+         signed by a detective, who, on the very day such affidavit
+         was signed, had been denounced by the Chief Justice from the
+         Bench of the High Court as a perjurer." C. 9,521 (which
+         contains a full record of the whole affair).]
+
+         [Footnote 103: The words are quoted by Mr. M. P. C. Walter,
+         the editor, in a letter of protest published in the Transvaal
+         _Leader_ of July 7th, 1899. C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 104: _Ibid._]
+
+These expressions scarcely do justice to the spirit of vindictiveness
+with which certain of the republican leaders regarded the British
+population of the Rand. On May 22nd, 1900, less than a year after the
+date of the Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Bill, and when Lord
+Roberts was advancing rapidly upon Johannesburg, a conversation took
+place with Mr. Smuts in Pretoria, which was reported in _The Times_.
+In the course of this conversation the State Attorney said, with
+reference to the proposed destruction of the mines, that "he greatly
+regretted that Johannesburg should suffer, but that the Government had
+no choice in the matter, as the popular pressure upon them was too
+great to be resisted." This determination is rightly characterised by
+Mr. Farrelly, the late legal adviser to the Government of the South
+African Republic, as the "fiendish project of wrecking the mines and
+plunging into hopeless misery for years tens of thousands of innocent
+men, women, and children." But that is not all. He has put upon
+record[105] the sinister fact that the man entrusted with the
+execution of this infamous design was Mr. Smuts himself. The mines
+were saved, therefore, not by the Boer Government, but in spite of it,
+and solely through the independent action of Dr. Krause, the
+Acting-Commandant of Johannesburg, who "arrested the leader of the
+wreckers, sent by Mr. Smuts, the day before the surrender to Lord
+Roberts."[106]
+
+         [Footnote 105: _The Settlement after the War_, p. 218.]
+
+         [Footnote 106: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Action of the British.]
+
+The British population, although it provided no such displays of
+racial passion, was in an equally determined mood. Undismayed by the
+threats of the Boers, the Uitlander Council continued calmly to
+analyse the Franchise Bill in each successive phase--an unostentatious
+but very useful service, which materially assisted Lord Milner in
+following the windings and doublings of Boer diplomacy. After the
+great meeting at Johannesburg (June 10th), the British centres in the
+Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia gave similar demonstrations of their
+confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, and their conviction of the
+justice and necessity of the five years' franchise demanded by the
+Imperial Government. On the other hand, the irritation against British
+intervention was growing daily in the Free State; and the Dutch
+Reformed Church and the Bond had organised a counter-demonstration in
+the Cape Colony. The Synod of the former, meeting on June 30th, drew
+up an address protesting that the differences between Lord Milner's
+franchise proposals and those of President Krüger were not sufficient
+to justify the "horrors of war," and requested the Governor to forward
+it to the Queen. At Capetown (July 12th) and in the Dutch districts
+throughout the Colony, Bond meetings were held at which resolutions
+were passed in favour of a "compromise" as between Lord Milner's five
+years' franchise and the scheme embodied in President Krüger's law.
+More sinister was the circumstance that the information, that a
+consignment of 500 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges, landed at Port
+Elizabeth on July 8th, had been permitted by the Cape Government to be
+forwarded through the Colony to the Free State, only came to the ears
+of the High Commissioner by an accident. In the meantime, more
+definite evidence of the almost unanimous approval of Lord Milner's
+policy by the British population in South Africa was forthcoming. In
+all three British colonies petitions to the Queen praying for justice
+to the Uitlanders, and affirming absolute confidence in Lord Milner,
+were signed. The Natal petition contained the names of three-fourths
+of the adult male population of the Colony, while the signatures to
+the joint petition of the Cape and Rhodesia had already reached a
+total of 40,500 before the end of July. In other respects the
+testimony of Natal was clear and unmistakable. In this predominantly
+English Colony identical resolutions supporting the action and policy
+of the Imperial Government, were carried unanimously in both Chambers
+of the Legislature.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's warning.]
+
+In the middle of July the situation improved in a slight degree
+through the influence which Lord Milner had exercised upon the
+Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony. On the 14th the Cape Parliament
+met, and on this day Mr. Hofmeyr, chagrined at a suggestion for
+further support which he had received from the republican
+nationalists at Pretoria, despatched a telegram to Mr. Smuts, in which
+he, as the recognised head of the Afrikander Bond, reminded the
+members of President Krüger's Executive that the promised co-operation
+of the Cape Government with them had been definitely limited to "moral
+support." And he plainly hinted that, unless greater deference was
+shown to his advice, even this "moral support" might be withdrawn.
+
+     "The most important suggestions sent from here will apparently
+     not be adopted. The independence of the Republics is in danger.
+     As to the Colony, the utmost prospect held out was moral support.
+     The Ministry and the Bond have acted up to that. If Parliament
+     [_i.e._ the Cape Parliament] goes too strongly in the same
+     direction, there may be a change of Ministry, with Sprigg or
+     Rhodes backed by Milner. Would your interests be benefited
+     thereby? _Verb. sat. sap._"[107]
+
+         [Footnote 107: Secured by the Intelligence Department. The
+         telegrams thus referred to, in this and the following
+         chapter, have not been published in the Blue-Books. They were
+         published, however, in _The Times History of the War_. Their
+         authenticity is undoubted. Sir Gordon Sprigg had held a
+         conversation with the Governor on the 13th.]
+
+As President Krüger wanted to retain the "moral support" of the Cape
+Government for a few weeks longer, he listened to Mr. Fischer's
+advice[108] to humour their prejudices, and forthwith recommended a
+further modification of the Franchise Bill to the Volksraad. This
+final amendment, under which a uniform seven years' retrospective
+franchise was substituted for a nine years' retrospective franchise,
+alternate with a seven years' retrospective franchise taking effect
+five years after the passing of the law (_i.e._ in 1904), was accepted
+on July 18th, and the new Franchise Law was passed on the 19th and
+promulgated on the 26th. Its provisions were so obscure that it was
+accompanied by an explanatory memorandum furnished by the State
+Attorney, Mr. Smuts. But even assuming that the legal pitfalls could
+be removed, and the law, thus simplified, would be worked in the most
+liberal spirit by the officials of the Republic, President Krüger's
+proposals failed to provide the essential reform which Lord Milner had
+pledged himself and the Imperial Government to obtain. That reform was
+the immediate endowment of a substantial proportion of the British
+residents in the Transvaal with the rights of citizenship. To use his
+own words,[109] "the whole point" of his Bloemfontein proposal was "to
+put the Uitlanders in a position to fight their own battles, and so to
+avoid the necessity of pressing for the redress of specific
+grievances."
+
+         [Footnote 108: Mr. Fischer was still at Pretoria. C. 9, 415.]
+
+         [Footnote 109: C. 9,415.]
+
+No one in South Africa had any doubt as to the entire inadequacy of
+the Franchise Bill to fulfil this essential object. In the opinion of
+the Uitlander Council it was[110] "expressly designed to exclude
+rather than admit the newcomer." Sir Henry de Villiers complained[111]
+to Mr. Fischer:
+
+         [Footnote 110: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 111: On July 31st, Cd. 369.]
+
+     "Then there is the Franchise Bill, which is so obscure that the
+     State Attorney had to issue an explanatory memorandum to remove
+     the obscurities. But surely a law should be clear enough to speak
+     for itself, and no Government or court of law will be bound by
+     the State Attorney's explanations. I do not know what those
+     explanations are, but the very fact that they are required
+     condemns the Bill. That Bill certainly does not seem quite to
+     carry out the promises made to you, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr.
+     Herholdt."
+
+[Sidenote: An illusory measure.]
+
+And Lord Milner, in his final analysis of the law on July 26th,
+concludes[112] that "the Bill as it stands leaves it practically in
+the hands of the Government to enfranchise, or not to enfranchise, the
+Uitlanders as it chooses." And he then draws attention to the very
+grave consideration that if the paramount Power once accepts this
+illusory measure, it will deprive itself of any future right of
+intervention on the franchise question.
+
+         [Footnote 112: C. 9,518.]
+
+     "And the worst of it," he wrote, "is that should the Bill,
+     through a literal interpretation of its complicated provisions,
+     fail to secure the object at which it avowedly aims, no one will
+     be able to protest against the result."
+
+For one moment it seemed to the anxious warden of British interests in
+South Africa as though the Home Government might be caught in
+President Krüger's legislative net. The incident is one that well
+exhibits the tireless effort and unflinching resolution with which
+Lord Milner discharged the duties of his office.
+
+President Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme was a maze of legal pitfalls.
+What these pitfalls were the reader may learn from the analysis of the
+scheme which was published in _The Cape Times_ of June 10th, 1899.
+When the Franchise Bill was before the Volksraad this complicated
+scheme, as we have seen, was amended and re-amended; and each new
+provision was as intricate in its working as the parent scheme. It is
+obvious that nothing short of a commission of inquiry could have
+determined with certainty the manner in which the representation of
+the Uitlanders was affected by each successive amendment. While these
+changes were in progress in the Raadzaal at Pretoria--changes so
+"numerous and so rapid," as Lord Milner said,[113] that it was
+"absolutely impossible at any given moment to know what the effect of
+the scheme, as existing at that moment, was likely to be"--Lord Milner
+himself at Capetown was at one and the same time overwhelmed with
+detailed criticisms from Uitlanders, anxious that no legal pitfall or
+administrative obstacle should remain undetected, and besieged with
+cables from the Colonial Office requesting precise information upon
+any point upon which an energetic member of the House of Commons might
+have chosen to interrogate the Secretary of State. And, in addition to
+this rain of telegrams, people on the spot were constantly calling at
+Government House to ask if the High Commissioner had observed this or
+that defect or trap in clauses, the text of which he had not yet had
+time to receive, still less to read or comprehend. All this, too, was
+over and above the heavy administrative and official duties of the
+Governor and High Commissioner--duties which Lord Milner was called
+upon to perform with more than usual care, in view of the political
+ascendancy of the Dutch party in the Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 113: August 23rd, C. 9,521.]
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's assumption.]
+
+On July 13th, Lord Milner sent warning telegrams to Mr.
+Chamberlain,[114] pointing out specific defects in the Franchise Bill,
+and showing how seriously President Krüger's proposals fell short of
+the Bloemfontein minimum. Five days later the Volksraad accepted the
+final amendments. The face value of the Bill, as it now stood to be
+converted into law, was a seven years' franchise, prospective and
+retrospective. When, therefore, Mr. Chamberlain heard this same day
+(July 18th) that the Volksraad had accepted the bill in this form with
+only five dissentients, he seems to have assumed that a really
+considerable concession had been made by President Krüger at the last
+moment, and that, with the President and the Volksraad in this mood,
+still further concessions would be forthcoming. Under this impression
+he informed the House of Commons lobby correspondent of _The Times_
+that "the crisis might be regarded as at an end." His words were
+reproduced in _The Times_ on the day following (July 19th), and at
+once cabled to South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 114: C. 9,415.]
+
+It is impossible for any one who has not lived in South Africa to
+realise the sickening distrust and dread produced in the minds of the
+loyal subjects of the Crown by this statement. War they were ready to
+face. But to go back to every-day life once again bowed down with the
+shame of a moral Majuba, to meet the eyes of the Dutch once more
+aflame with the light of victory, to hear their words of insolent
+contempt--was ignominy unspeakable and unendurable. The Uitlander
+Council at once cabled an emphatic message of protest[115] to Mr.
+Chamberlain, and every loyalist that had a friend in England
+telegraphed to beg him to use all his influence to prevent the
+surrender of the Government. How near the British population in South
+Africa were to this ignominy may be gathered from the fact that on
+this day Lord Milner received a telegram in which Mr. Chamberlain
+congratulated him upon the successful issue of his efforts. Lord
+Milner's reply was one that could have left no doubt in Mr.
+Chamberlain's mind as to the gravity of the misconception under which
+he laboured. It was, of course, beyond the High Commissioner's power
+to prevent the Home Government from accepting the Franchise Bill; but
+he could at least remove the impression that he was anxious to
+participate in an act, which would have made the breach between the
+loyalists of South Africa and the mother country final and
+irrevocable.
+
+         [Footnote 115: "The Uitlander Council is keenly disappointed
+         at the _Times_' announcement that the seven years' franchise
+         is acceptable to the Imperial Government. We fear few will
+         accept the franchise on this condition, so the result is not
+         likely to abate unrest and discontent, nor redress pressing
+         grievances. Such a settlement would not even approximate to
+         the conditions obtaining in the Orange Free State and the
+         [British] colonies, and would fail to secure the recognition
+         of the principle of racial equality. We earnestly implore you
+         not to depart from the High Commissioner's five years'
+         compromise, which the Uitlanders accepted with great
+         reluctance. The absolute necessity for a satisfactory
+         settlement with an Imperial guarantee is emphasised by the
+         insincerity and bad faith persistently shown during the
+         Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Law."--C. 9,415.]
+
+[Sidenote: The relapse in England.]
+
+It is scarcely possible to believe that Mr. Chamberlain, with Lord
+Milner's telegrams before him, was himself prepared to accept
+President Krüger's illusory franchise scheme. The source of the
+weakness of the Government in the conduct of the negotiations, no less
+than in its refusal to make adequate preparations for war, is to be
+found in the inability of the mass of the people of England to
+understand how completely British power in South Africa had been
+undermined by the Afrikander nationalists during the last twenty
+years. How could the average elector know that the refusal or
+acceptance of the Volksraad Bill, differing only from the Bloemfontein
+minimum in an insignificant--as it seemed--particular of two years,
+would, in fact, make known to all European South Africa whether
+President Krüger or the British Government was master of the
+sub-continent? In view of this profound ignorance of South African
+conditions, and the consequent uncertainty of any assured support,
+even from the members of their own party, the Salisbury Cabinet may
+well have argued: "Here is something at last that we can represent as
+a genuine concession. Let us take it, and have done with this
+troublesome South African question; or leave it to the next Liberal
+Government to settle."
+
+If the Cabinet did so reason to themselves, what English statesman
+could have "cast the first stone" at them? But how profound is the
+interval between the spirit of the policy of "the man on the spot,"
+with his eyes upon the object, and the spirit of the policy of the
+island statesman with one eye upon the hustings and the other strained
+to catch an intermittent glimpse of an unfamiliar and distant Africa!
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's anxiety.]
+
+This 19th of July was a dark day for the High Commissioner. In the
+morning came Mr. Chamberlain's telegram with its ominous suggestion of
+a change for the worse in the attitude of the Home Government. And
+this change in the Cabinet was, as Lord Milner knew, only the natural
+reflection of a wider change, which had manifested itself among the
+supporters of the Government and in the country at large since the
+publication, on June 14th, of his despatch of May 4th. Private letters
+had made him aware that to men to whom Dutch ascendancy at the Cape
+and Boer tyranny in the Transvaal, Afrikander nationalism and Boer
+armaments, were meaningless expressions, his resolute advocacy of the
+Uitlanders' cause and his frank presentation of the weakness of Great
+Britain had seemed the work of a disordered imagination or a violent
+partisanship. Nor was his knowledge of the relapse in England limited
+to the warnings or protests of his private friends. _The South African
+News_, the ministerial organ, which of late had filled its columns
+with adverse criticisms taken from the London Press, this morning
+contained a bitter article on him reprinted from _Punch_, which had
+arrived by the yesterday's mail. After all, it seemed, the long
+struggle against mis-government in the Transvaal was going to end in
+failure; and the British people would once more be befooled. With such
+thoughts in his mind, Lord Milner must have found the work of making
+up the weekly despatches for the Colonial Office--for it was a
+Wednesday[116]--a wearisome and depressing task. The mail was detained
+until long past the customary hour. But before it left, in spite of
+discouragement and anxiety, Lord Milner had gathered together into a
+brief compass all the documents necessary to put Mr. Chamberlain in
+possession of every material fact relative to the new law--passed only
+on the day before--and to the proceedings of the Transvaal Executive
+and the Volksraad between the 12th and the 19th. And, in addition to
+this, he had written a fresh estimate of the Franchise Bill in its
+latest form, in which he emphasised his former verdict that the
+proposals which it contained were not such as the Uitlanders would be
+likely to accept. And in particular he pointed out that the fact of
+the final amendment being thus readily adopted by the Volksraad
+disposed of the contention, upon which President Krüger had laid so
+much stress at Bloemfontein, that his "burghers" would not permit him
+to make the concessions which the British Government required. He
+wrote:
+
+         [Footnote 116: The English outward mail-boat arrived on
+         Tuesday, and the homeward boat left on Wednesday.]
+
+     "On July 12th Her Majesty's Government requested the Government
+     of the South African Republic to give them time to consider the
+     measure and communicate their views before it was proceeded with.
+     To this the Government of the South African Republic replied, on
+     July 13th, with a polite negative, saying that 'the whole matter
+     was out of the hands of the Government, and it was no longer
+     possible for the Government to satisfy the demands of the
+     Secretary of State.' The State-Attorney informed Mr. Greene[117]
+     at the same time that 'the present proposals represented
+     absolutely the greatest concession that could be got from the
+     Volksraad, and could not be enlarged. He personally had tried
+     hard for seven years' retrospective franchise, but the Raad would
+     not hear of it, and it was only with difficulty that the present
+     proposals were obtained.' This was on the 12th, but within a week
+     the seven years' retrospective franchise had been adopted.
+     Indeed, the statement of the absolute impossibility of obtaining
+     more than a particular measure of enfranchisement from the
+     Volksraad or the burghers has been made over and over again in
+     the history of this question--never more emphatically than by the
+     President himself at Bloemfontein--and has over and over again
+     been shown to be a delusion."[118]
+
+         [Footnote 117: Sir W. Greene became a K.C.B. after the war
+         had broken out.]
+
+         [Footnote 118: C. 9,518.]
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's statement.]
+
+But this full record of the shifts and doublings of Boer diplomacy
+would not reach London for another two weeks and a half. It was
+necessary, therefore, to use the cable. Early the next morning Lord
+Milner sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, in which he warned
+the Home Government of the extreme discouragement produced among all
+who were attached to the British connection by _The Times_ statement
+of their readiness to accept the Franchise Bill. On that afternoon
+(July 20th), Mr. Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons
+in which he took up a much more satisfactory position. The Government,
+he said, were led to hope that the new law "might prove to be a basis
+of settlement on the lines laid down" by Lord Milner at the
+Bloemfontein Conference. They observed, however, that "a number of
+conditions" which might be used "to take away with one hand what had
+been given with the other" were still retained. But they--
+
+     "felt assured that the President, having accepted the principle
+     for which they had contended, would be prepared to reconsider any
+     detail of his schemes which could be shown to be a possible
+     hindrance to the full accomplishment of the objects in view, and
+     that he would not allow them to be nullified or reduced in value
+     by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of
+     administration."
+
+That is to say, Mr. Chamberlain was no longer willing to take the bill
+at its face value, but in accordance with his determination to exhaust
+every possible resource of diplomacy before he turned to force, he
+gave President Krüger credit for a genuine desire to promote a
+peaceable settlement. A week later he formulated the method by which
+the President was to be allowed an opportunity of justifying this
+generous estimate of his intentions. In the meantime Lord Milner had
+sent lengthy telegrams to the Secretary of State on the 23rd, and
+again on the 26th, and the Salisbury Cabinet had determined to make a
+definite pronouncement of its South African policy, and to endeavour
+to arouse the country to a sense of the seriousness of the situation
+with which President Krüger's continued obduracy would bring it face
+to face. On July 27th Mr. Balfour declared, in addressing the Union of
+Conservative Associations, that--
+
+     "If endless patience, endless desire to prevent matters coming to
+     extremities, if all the resources of diplomacy, were utterly
+     ineffectual to untie the knot, other means must inevitably be
+     found by which that knot must be loosened."
+
+On the day following (July 28th) the Transvaal question was debated in
+both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Lords the Prime Minister,
+Lord Salisbury, delivered a moderate and almost sympathetic speech.
+After making all allowance for the natural apprehension experienced by
+President Krüger at the sudden inrush of population caused by the
+discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, he expressed the opinion
+that an attempt "to put the two races fairly and honestly on the same
+footing" would bring a peaceful solution of the crisis. But, he
+added--
+
+     "How long we are to consider that solution, and what patience we
+     are bound to show, these things I will not discuss. We have to
+     consider not only the feelings of the inhabitants of the
+     Transvaal, but, what is more important, the feelings of our
+     fellow-subjects.... Whatever happens, when the validity of the
+     Conventions is impeached, they belong from that time entirely to
+     history. I am quite sure that if this country has to make
+     exertions in order to secure the most elementary justice for
+     British subjects,--I am quite sure [it] will not reinstate a
+     state of things that will bring back the old difficulties in all
+     their formidable character at the next turn of the wheel. Without
+     intruding on his thoughts, I do not think President Krüger has
+     sufficiently considered this."
+
+[Sidenote: The Joint Commission.]
+
+In the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain announced that he had proposed
+to the Transvaal Government that a joint commission should be
+appointed to test the efficacy of the scheme of electoral reform
+embodied in the new Franchise Law. This proposal was set out in detail
+in a despatch already addressed to the High Commissioner, the
+substance of which had been telegraphed[119] to him on the preceding
+day (July 27th). The British Government assumed that "the concessions
+now made to the Uitlanders were intended in good faith to secure to
+them some approach to the equality which was promised in 1881"; they
+proposed that the "complicated details and questions of a technical
+nature" involved in the new law should be discussed in the first
+instance by delegates appointed by the High Commissioner and by the
+South African Republic; and if, and when, a "satisfactory agreement"
+had been reached on these points, they further proposed that all
+disputes as to the terms of the Convention should be settled by a
+"judicial authority, whose independence ... would be above suspicion,"
+and all remaining matters in respect of the political representation
+of the Uitlanders by "another personal Conference" between the High
+Commissioner and President Krüger.
+
+         [Footnote 119: C. 9,518.]
+
+Although the position which the Salisbury Cabinet had now taken up was
+one which placed them beyond the danger of accepting an illusory
+franchise scheme in lieu of an adequate measure of reform, it was not
+the course of action which was best to follow, except from the point
+of view of opening the eyes of the British public. In itself further
+delay was dangerous. It gave the Boers more time to arm, while we, for
+this very reason for which it was necessary to protract the
+negotiations, were prevented from arming vigorously. It discouraged
+our friends in South Africa, and made them even begin to doubt whether
+Great Britain "meant business." It was good policy to offer the Joint
+Inquiry, given the truth of the assumption upon which this offer was
+based--namely, that the Bill represented an honest desire on the part
+of President Krüger to provide a peaceable settlement of the Uitlander
+question. Lord Milner knew, within the limits of human intelligence,
+that this assumption was wholly unwarranted. The Home Government
+apparently did not. As the result of this difference, Lord Milner's
+policy was again deflected to the extent that two months of
+negotiation were devoted to a purely futile endeavour to persuade the
+Pretoria Executive to prove the good faith of a proposal, which was
+never intended to be anything more than a pretext for delay. And, as
+before, the injury to British interests lay in the fact that, while
+the Home Government was prevented from making any adequate use of this
+delay by its determination not to make preparations for war until war
+was in sight, the period was fully utilised by President Krüger, who
+since Bloemfontein had been resolutely hastening the arrangements
+necessary for attacking the British colonies at a given moment with
+the entire burgher forces of the two Republics.
+
+[Sidenote: Krüger urged to accept.]
+
+The offer of the Joint Inquiry was formally communicated to the
+Pretoria Executive in an eminently friendly telegram[120] from Lord
+Milner on August 1st. Efforts were made on all sides to induce
+President Krüger to accept it. Chief Justice de Villiers wrote
+strongly in this sense to Mr. Fischer,[121] and to his brother Melius,
+the Chief Justice of the Free State. Mr. Schreiner telegraphed to Mr.
+Fischer, and Mr. Hofmeyr to President Steyn, both urging that the
+influence of the Free State should be used in favour of the proposal.
+The Dutch Government advised the Republic "not to refuse the English
+proposal";[122] and further informed Dr. Leyds that, in the opinion of
+the German Government, "every approach to one of the Great Powers in
+this very critical moment will be without any results whatever, and
+very dangerous to the Republic."[123] Even the English sympathisers of
+the Boers were in favour of acceptance. Mr. Montagu White, the
+Transvaal Consul-General in London, cabled that "Courtney, Labouchere,
+both our friends, and friendly papers without exception," recommended
+this course; and that "refusal meant war and would estrange friends."
+The letter which he wrote to Mr. Reitz on the same day (August 4th),
+possesses an independent interest, as revealing the degree in which
+the friends of the Boers in England had identified themselves with the
+policy of the Afrikander party in the Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 120: C. 9,518.]
+
+         [Footnote 121: See p. 218 for this letter.]
+
+         [Footnote 122: Cd. 547.]
+
+         [Footnote 123: _Ibid._]
+
+     "The essence of friendly advice," said Mr. White,[124] "is:
+     Accept the proposal in principle, point out how difficult it will
+     be to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to statistics, etc.,
+     and how undesirable it would be to have a miscarriage of the
+     Commission. In other words: Gain as much time as you can, and
+     give the public time here to get out of the dangerous frame of
+     mind which Chamberlain's speeches have created.... Labouchere
+     said to me this morning: 'Don't, for goodness' sake, let Mr.
+     Krüger make his first mistake by refusing this; a little skilful
+     management, and he will give Master Joe another fall.' He further
+     said: 'You are such past-masters of the art of gaining time; here
+     is an opportunity; you surely haven't let your right hands lose
+     their cunning, and you ought to spin out the negotiations for
+     quite two or three months.'"
+
+         [Footnote 124: Cd. 369.]
+
+A week later (August 11th), President Krüger received a telegram[125]
+in which fifty Afrikander members of the Cape Parliament advanced the
+same argument. The acceptance of the Joint Commission, they pointed
+out, would provide a way out of a crisis "which might prove fatal to
+the best interests, not only of our Transvaal and Free State brethren,
+but also of the Afrikander party." They, therefore, begged his Honour
+to "lay their words privately" before the Executive and the Volksraad.
+
+         [Footnote 125: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+[Sidenote: Krüger resolved on war.]
+
+But President Krüger, like Lord Milner, had his eyes fixed upon the
+object. He looked beyond the Afrikander leaders to the rank and file
+of the Dutch population in the British colonies, with whom he had been
+in direct communication through his agents for many months past.[126]
+He knew that any such inquiry as Mr. Chamberlain proposed would
+expose the flagrant insincerity of the Franchise Bill. On August 2nd
+he had telegraphed to President Steyn that compliance with the Joint
+Commission was "tantamount to the destruction of the independence of
+the Republic."[127] To the Dutch Consul-General[128] he was perfectly
+frank: "Defeats such as the English had suffered in the war for
+freedom, and later under Jameson, had never been suffered by the
+Boers." His burghers were ready to "go on the _battue_ of Englishmen,"
+when he gave the word.[129]
+
+         [Footnote 126: It was known to the Intelligence Department
+         that Krüger's secret agents had been in the Cape Colony for
+         two years before the outbreak of war, and that they had
+         distributed arms in certain districts of the Colony.]
+
+         [Footnote 127: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+         [Footnote 128: Cd. 547.]
+
+         [Footnote 129: The expression "Ons wil nou Engelse schiet"
+         was actually used. See Thomas's _Origin of the Anglo-Boer War
+         Revealed_, p. 110.]
+
+[Sidenote: Fischer ceases to "mediate".]
+
+The burghers of the Free State could be counted upon with almost equal
+certainty. Mr. Fischer, a more potent influence than President Steyn,
+had by this time openly dissociated himself from the "mediation"
+policy of the Cape nationalists, and was again (August 4th to 9th) at
+Pretoria. Here he threw himself heart and soul into the work of
+completing the military preparations of the two Republics. On the 6th
+he telegraphed to President Steyn that the draft reply was prepared;
+that it "invited discussion and asked questions to gain time," and
+that, therefore, it "was not yet necessary to deliberate as to calling
+together the Volksraad" for the final decision of peace or war.
+"Military matters, especially artillery," he added, "seem to me very
+faulty. Care will be taken to make all necessary preparations."[130]
+Nor did he leave the Transvaal capital until he had settled the
+details of the invasion of Natal with General Joubert. Indeed, from
+this time onwards to the despatch of the ultimatum--a document which
+came, in its final form, from his pen--Mr. Fischer's part in the
+conduct of the negotiations was second only to that of President
+Krüger. In all he did he displayed the same reasoned determination to
+oppose British supremacy in South Africa which he has exhibited since
+the war in his control of the Bloemfontein _Friend_. Orders for the
+inspection of the commando organisation in the Free State had been
+given before Mr. Fischer had left Bloemfontein; and on his return from
+Pretoria he responded to Mr. Schreiner's urgent and continued
+representations of the desirability of inducing President Krüger to
+accept Mr. Chamberlain's offer, by a request to be informed of any
+probable movements of British forces. Mr. Schreiner's reply, that the
+Free State must ask for such information from the High Commissioner,
+caused him to apply to Mr. Hofmeyr for an explanation of the Cape
+Premier's attitude. The inquiry produced a notable analysis of Mr.
+Schreiner's position.
+
+         [Footnote 130: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+     "Hofmeyr says," Dr. Te Water telegraphed, "that whatever the
+     Premier's feelings or relations to our people are, he is at the
+     same time a minister of the Crown. As such he has on him claims
+     in two directions, of which he is acquitting himself to the best
+     of his ability. He has no control over the movement of troops.
+     You had better come and have a quiet talk. Meanwhile the Free
+     State should surely refrain from an aggressive step."[131]
+
+         [Footnote 131: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+This well-meant advice was somewhat belated. In reply to a telegram
+from President Steyn, asking whether it was true that the Imperial
+Government was going to send 1,000 men to Bethulie Bridge, Lord Milner
+replied on August 16th, that, "as a matter of fact, no despatch of
+Imperial troops to the borders of the Orange Free State was in
+contemplation." But he added that in view of the much more substantial
+reports of the "importation of large quantities of munitions of war"
+into that State and "the general arming of the burghers," it "would
+not have been unnatural, if such military preparations had been
+responded to by a defensive movement" on the part of the British
+Government.[132] Indeed, the circumstances which had led to Mr.
+Fischer's co-operation in Mr. Hofmeyr's "mediation" were rapidly
+disappearing. The Port Elizabeth Mausers and ammunition were safely
+through the Cape Colony; a further consignment of Mauser ammunition
+arrived at Delagoa Bay (August 16th) in the German steamship
+_Reichstag_ at the very time that these telegrams were passing; and
+both this and other enormous consignments were forwarded to Pretoria a
+fortnight later in spite of an abortive attempt on the part of the
+British Foreign Office to induce the Portuguese authorities to retain
+them. The possession of an adequate supply of ammunition was a matter
+of cardinal importance to which, as we have seen, President Steyn had
+drawn the attention of the Pretoria Executive nearly a month before
+the Bloemfontein Conference. It was these Mauser cartridges that were
+wanted especially, since, without them, the new arm--the splendid
+Mauser magazine rifle--must have been rejected in place of the
+inferior Martini-Henry for which the Boers had long been provided with
+an ample reserve of ammunition.
+
+         [Footnote 132: C. 9,521.]
+
+[Sidenote: Smuts-Greene negotiations.]
+
+[Sidenote: Boer diplomacy.]
+
+In the meantime the British Government was still waiting for a reply
+to its offer of a Joint Inquiry. On August 7th the Volksraad discussed
+the question, and on the 12th a despatch was written by Mr. Reitz
+refusing the offer on the ground that such a proposal was inconsistent
+with the independence of the Republic. It was held back, however,
+until September 1st; that is to say, until the Portuguese authorities
+had allowed the Transvaal ammunition to leave Lorenzo Marques. Then,
+as we shall see, it was forwarded in conjunction with a second
+despatch of September 2nd. The delay was won by a characteristic
+display of "the art of gaining time," in which, as Mr. Labouchere
+remarked, the Boers were past-masters. On the same day that Mr. Reitz
+wrote his despatch (August 12th), Mr. Smuts approached Sir William
+Greene[133] with the offer of a still further simplified seven years'
+franchise in lieu of the Joint Commission. When, however, Sir William
+Greene assured him that the British Government would not accept
+anything less than the Bloemfontein minimum, he subsequently agreed to
+an arrangement of which the main items were: A five years' franchise;
+the workable character of the new law to be secured by the submission
+of its provisions to the British Agent with a legal adviser; and
+increased representation in the Volksraad, together with the use of
+the English language. After communications had passed between Sir
+William Greene, Lord Milner, and Mr. Chamberlain, these proposals,
+with certain reservations, were formally communicated to the British
+Government by Mr. Reitz on August 19th. Two days later a second note
+was forwarded in which the offer contained in the previous note
+(August 19th) was declared to be subject to the acceptance by the
+British Government of two conditions. These conditions--an undertaking
+not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic in the future
+and a specific withdrawal of the claim of suzerainty--amounted in
+effect to a formal renunciation by Great Britain of its position as
+paramount Power in South Africa. In other words, the Pretoria
+Executive had repudiated the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir
+William Greene. Mr. Chamberlain, noticing the material variation
+between the original offer as initialled by Mr. Smuts and forwarded by
+Sir William Greene, and Mr. Reitz's note of August 19th, instructed
+Sir William Greene to obtain an explanation of the discrepancy from
+the Transvaal Government. The reply was a curt rejoinder that there
+was not "the slightest chance of an alteration or an amplification" of
+the terms of the arrangement as set out in the note of the 19th.[134]
+In these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed a reply on August
+28th, in which he accepted the original offer, and rejected the
+impossible conditions subsequently attached to it.[135] The terms of
+settlement thus proposed were in substance the same as those of the
+despatch of July 27th, with the exception that an inquiry by the
+British Agent was substituted for the Joint Commission, and the five
+years' franchise of the Smuts-Greene arrangement was accepted in lieu
+of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad law. The Transvaal
+reply was a further essay in the same useful "art of gaining time." It
+was dated September 2nd, and contained a definite withdrawal of the
+Smuts-Greene offer as embodied in the notes of August 19th and 21st,
+and a vague return to the Joint Commission.
+
+         [Footnote 133: Then Mr. Conyngham Greene. C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 134: C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 135: _Ibid._]
+
+     "Under certain conditions," wrote Mr. Reitz,[136] "this
+     Government would be glad to learn from Her Majesty's Government
+     how they propose that the Commission should be constituted, and
+     what place and time for meeting is suggested."[137]
+
+         [Footnote 136: The despatch was presented to the British
+         Agent, and telegraphed, through the High Commissioner, to the
+         Home Government. Its diplomatic ambiguity was due to Mr.
+         Fischer's influence.]
+
+         [Footnote 137: C. 9,521.]
+
+And this with the consoling promise of a "further reply" to other
+questions arising out of the despatch of July 27th, which the
+Transvaal Government had not yet been able to consider.
+
+The response to this astute document was the last effort of the
+Salisbury Cabinet to arrange a settlement upon the basis of the
+"friendly discussion" inaugurated at Bloemfontein. The British
+Government, Mr. Chamberlain wrote, had "absolutely repudiated" the
+claim, made in the notes of April 16th and May 9th, that the South
+African Republic was a "sovereign international state," and they could
+not, therefore, consider a proposal which was conditional on the
+acceptance of this view of the status of the Republic. They "could not
+now consent to go back to the proposals for which those of the note of
+August 19th were intended as a substitute," since they were "satisfied
+that the law of 1899, in which these proposals were finally embodied,
+was insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial
+representation" of the Uitlanders. They were "still prepared to accept
+the offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the note of August 19th,"
+provided that an inquiry, joint or unilateral as the Transvaal
+Government might prefer, showed that "the new scheme of representation
+would not be encumbered by conditions which would nullify the
+intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the
+Uitlanders." They assumed that "the new members of the Raad would be
+permitted to use their own language." They expressed their belief that
+"the acceptance of these terms would at once remove the tension
+between the two Governments, and would in all probability render
+unnecessary any further intervention" on the franchise question, and
+their readiness--
+
+[Sidenote: A definite demand.]
+
+     "to make immediate arrangements for a further conference between
+     the President of the South African Republic and the High
+     Commissioner to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal
+     of Arbitration, and the questions ... which were neither
+     Uitlander grievances nor questions of interpretation"
+
+of the Convention. And they added that if the reply of the Republic
+was negative or inconclusive, "they would reserve to themselves the
+right to reconsider the situation _de novo_, and to formulate their
+own proposals for a final settlement."[138]
+
+         [Footnote 138: C. 9,521.]
+
+The text of this despatch was telegraphed to Lord Milner late at night
+on September 8th. It was presented to the Transvaal Government on the
+12th, with a request that the reply might reach the British Agent not
+later than midday on the 14th. This limit of time was fixed by Sir
+William Greene on his own initiative, and it was withdrawn by Lord
+Milner's instructions, in order that the Pretoria Executive might not
+be unduly hurried. The Transvaal reply, which was delivered on the
+15th, was a refusal to accept the Smuts-Greene arrangement, re-stated
+by the British Government, as the basis of the franchise reform,
+coupled with a charge of bad faith against Sir William Greene.
+
+It was a cleverly composed document, which owed its diplomatic effect
+in no small degree to Mr. Fischer, who had revised it. It was written
+for publication, since, in Mr. Fischer's opinion, the time had come to
+write despatches which would "justify the Republic in the eyes of the
+world"; and with this end in view it contained the suggestion that the
+British Government was bent upon worrying the Pretoria Executive into
+war.
+
+     "This Government," it explains, "continues to cherish the hope
+     that Her Majesty's Government, on further consideration, will
+     feel itself free to abandon the idea of making the new proposals
+     more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions,
+     and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal
+     for a Joint Commission at first proposed by the Secretary of
+     State for the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, and
+     subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by
+     it."[139]
+
+         [Footnote 139: C. 9,530.]
+
+[Sidenote: Reinforcements sanctioned.]
+
+The British despatch of September 8th represented the united opinion
+of the Cabinet Council which had met on that day to consider the South
+African situation. In sending it, the Government also decided to raise
+the strength of the Natal and Cape forces to the total of 22,000,
+estimated by the War Office as sufficient for defensive purposes, by
+the immediate addition of 10,000 men, of whom nearly 6,000 were to be
+provided by the Indian Army.[140] The despatch itself, definite in
+contents and resolute in tone, was the sort of communication which, in
+Lord Milner's judgment, should have been forwarded to the Transvaal
+Government after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference; and the
+additional troops now ordered out were nothing more than the
+substantial reinforcements for which he had applied in June. The three
+months' negotiations had led the Salisbury Cabinet to the precise
+conclusion which Lord Milner had formed at Bloemfontein. The only hope
+of a peaceable settlement lay in a definite demand, backed by
+preparations for war. But to do this in June, and to do it in
+September, were two very different things. Assuming that diplomatic
+pressure could in any case have availed to secure the necessary
+reforms, it is obvious that, whatever prospect of success attached to
+this course of action--Policy No. 2, as Lord Milner called it--in
+June, was materially diminished in September. During the interval the
+British Government had done practically nothing to improve its
+military position. That of President Krüger had been conspicuously
+improved. He had carried the Free State with him; he had got his
+Mauser ammunition and additional artillery, and he had completed his
+arrangements for the simultaneous mobilisation of the burghers of the
+two Republics. Even now the military action of the British Government
+was confined to preparations for defence; for the order to mobilise
+the army corps was not given until the next Cabinet Council had been
+held on September 22nd. The spirit of Pretoria was very different. The
+commandos were on their way to the Natal border before the reply to
+this British despatch of September 8th was delivered to the British
+Agent. That was President Krüger's real answer--not the diplomatic
+fencing of September 15th.
+
+         [Footnote 140: The despatch of 2,000 additional troops to
+         Natal had been sanctioned on August 2nd, in response to the
+         earnest appeal of the Natal Government. Hence at this time
+         there were (roughly) 12,000 Imperial troops in South Africa.
+         It is noticeable that, although the despatch only reached
+         Lord Milner on the morning of the 9th, the _Cape Argus_ had
+         contained a telegram, giving an account of the troops warned
+         in India and England, on the evening of the 8th.]
+
+[Sidenote: Violence of the Boers.]
+
+More than this, the three months' negotiations had embittered the
+relations of the British and Dutch factions in every South African
+state to such a degree that any compromise of the sort proposed by
+Lord Milner at Bloemfontein was no longer sufficient to effect a
+settlement. The moderate measure of representation then suggested
+would have been rejected now by the Uitlanders as wholly inadequate
+for their protection, in view of the violent antipathy to them and the
+gold industry which the diplomatic struggle had evoked among all
+classes of the Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal. The particulars of
+the outrageous treatment, and still more outrageous threats, to which
+the British Uitlanders were subjected from this time onwards up to
+the ultimatum are to be found in the Blue-books. As early as the
+middle of August, when the Smuts-Greene negotiations had just been
+commenced, Mr. Monypenny, the editor of the Johannesburg _Star_, was
+warned that the Transvaal Government intended to issue a warrant for
+his arrest on a charge of high treason. This intention, postponed
+during the fortnight of delay won by these negotiations, was carried
+out on September 1st, on which day Mr. Pakeman, the editor of the
+_Transvaal Leader_, was secured, while Mr. Monypenny succeeded in
+effecting his escape. This indefensible act was followed by a
+characteristic attempt to disown it, made by Mr. Smuts, the State
+Attorney, the nature of which is sufficiently exhibited in the
+following telegram, despatched by the High Commissioner on September
+4th to the Secretary of State:
+
+     "The charge against Pakeman has been reduced to one under the
+     Press Law of 1896, and he has been admitted to bail. There have
+     been no further arrests. Greene telegraphs as follows:
+
+     "_Begins._--A statement has been published through the Press this
+     morning by the State Attorney 'that no instructions had ever been
+     issued from Pretoria for the arrest of the editors of the
+     _Leader_ or the _Star_.' The facts are as follows: On Friday
+     morning the Public Prosecutor of Johannesburg and Captain Vandam,
+     who had come over from Johannesburg to Pretoria, were interviewed
+     by the State Attorney in his office here. In the afternoon these
+     two officers returned to Johannesburg, and arrested the editor
+     of the _Leader_ the same evening, failing to capture the editor
+     of the _Star_.--_Ends._
+
+     "There is no doubt that the arrest of both editors was decided by
+     the Government and other arrests contemplated, intimidation of
+     Uitlander leaders being the object. The exodus from Johannesburg
+     is taking formidable proportions. Many refugees of all classes
+     have come to Capetown. In Natal there are an even larger number.
+     A good deal of money is being spent on relief."[141]
+
+         [Footnote 141: C. 9,521.]
+
+The violence of the Boers culminated a week before the Ultimatum
+(October 9th-11th) in the wholesale expulsion of the British subjects
+still remaining in the two Republics. Assuming that this measure was
+justifiable on military grounds, there can be no excuse for the brutal
+precipitancy with which it was enforced. It crowded the colonial ports
+with homeless and impoverished fugitives; it inflicted unnecessary
+suffering and pecuniary loss upon inoffensive and innocent
+non-combatants, both European and native; and it was accompanied in
+some instances by displays of wanton cruelty and deliberate spite
+utterly unworthy of a people of European descent.
+
+[Sidenote: Anxiety of High Commissioner.]
+
+Thus it was only when Lord Milner's foresight had been unmistakably
+confirmed by the stern logic of facts that the British Government
+ordered these 10,000 troops to South Africa, 6,000 of whom--the Indian
+contribution--arrived just in time to save Natal from being overrun by
+the Boers. The three weeks preceding the Cabinet Council of September
+8th, at which this decision was arrived at, had been a period of
+intense anxiety for the High Commissioner. With the spectacle of the
+increasing activity of England's enemies, and the increasing dismay of
+England's friends, before his eyes, his protests against the
+inactivity of the Home Government had become more urgent. In the
+middle of August he declared that he could no longer be responsible
+for the administration of South Africa unless he were provided
+immediately with another military adviser. General Forestier-Walker
+was then appointed, and after the departure of General Butler the
+Imperial Government intervened at length to check the further passage
+of munitions of war through the Colony to the Free State.[142] The
+_Norman_, the mail-boat of August 23rd in which Sir William Butler
+sailed for England, took home the masterly despatch[143] in which Lord
+Milner explained the position taken up by him at the Bloemfontein
+Conference, and showed how completely the proposals of the Transvaal
+Government differed from the spirit of the settlement which he had
+then invited President Krüger to accept. In doing so he reviewed the
+whole course of the subsequent negotiations, pointed out the insidious
+character of the last Transvaal proposal (August 19th and 21st), and
+emphatically protested against the suggestion that the Imperial
+Government should barter its rights as paramount Power for "another
+hastily framed franchise scheme," on account of its "superficial
+conformity" with what, after all, was only a single item in the long
+list of questions that must be adjusted before the peaceful progress
+of South Africa would be assured.[144] On August 28th Mr. Schreiner,
+when called to account in the Cape Parliament for having allowed, "in
+the usual course," the Mausers and ammunition for the Free State to
+pass through the Colony, made the strange declaration that in the
+event of war--
+
+         [Footnote 142: Cd. 43.]
+
+         [Footnote 143: C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 144: This despatch was received on September 8th.
+         Cd. 43.]
+
+     "he would do his very best to maintain [for the Cape Colony] the
+     position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with
+     regard to its forces and with regard to its people."
+
+Three days later (August 31st) Lord Milner sent a still more
+impressive appeal for "prompt and decisive action" on the part of the
+Home Government. The despatch, which was telegraphed, is otherwise
+significant for its account of the situation in Johannesburg:
+
+     "I am receiving representations from many quarters," he said, "to
+     urge Her Majesty's Government to terminate the state of suspense.
+     Hitherto I have hesitated to address you on the subject, lest Her
+     Majesty's Government should think me impatient. But I feel bound
+     to let you know that I am satisfied, from inquiries made in
+     various reliable quarters, that the distress is now really
+     serious. The most severe suffering is at Johannesburg. Business
+     there is at a standstill; many traders have become insolvent, and
+     others are only kept on their legs by the leniency of their
+     creditors. Even the mines, which have been less affected
+     hitherto, are now suffering, owing to the withdrawal of workmen,
+     both European and native. The crisis also affects the trading
+     centres in the Colony. In spite of this, the purport of all the
+     representations made to me is to urge prompt and decided action,
+     not to deprecate further interference on the part of Her
+     Majesty's Government. British South Africa is prepared for
+     extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in order to see the
+     vindication of British authority. It is a prolongation of the
+     negotiations, endless and indecisive of result, that is dreaded.
+     I fear seriously that there will be a strong reaction of feeling
+     against the policy of Her Majesty's Government if matters drag.
+     Please to understand that I invariably preach confidence and
+     patience--not without effect. But if I did not inform you of the
+     increasing difficulty in doing this, and of the unmistakable
+     growth of uneasiness about the present situation, and of a desire
+     to see it terminated at any cost, I should be failing in my
+     duty."[145]
+
+         [Footnote 145: C. 9,521.]
+
+[Sidenote: The crisis in South Africa.]
+
+Indeed, while in England Mr. Chamberlain was remarking (at Highbury,
+August 27th) that he "could not truly say that the crisis was passed,"
+and picturesquely complaining of President Krüger "dribbling out
+reforms like water from a squeezed sponge," every loyalist in South
+Africa knew that the time for words had gone by. On September 6th and
+7th public meetings were held respectively at Maritzburg and
+Capetown, at which resolutions were passed affirming the uselessness
+of continuing the negotiations and the necessity for the prompt action
+of the Imperial Government.
+
+Even this did not exhaust the evidence which was needed to persuade
+the Salisbury Cabinet to make effective preparations for the defence
+of the British colonies. The Cabinet Council of September 8th had
+before it, in addition to the Transvaal note of September 2nd, a
+direct and urgent request[146] for immediate reinforcements from the
+Government of Natal--the loyal colony which, as Lord Milner had
+declared, was to be defended "by the whole force of the empire."
+
+         [Footnote 146: Received on September 6th. Cd. 44.]
+
+These were the circumstances in which the Salisbury Cabinet did in
+September what Lord Milner had advised them to do in June. It is
+impossible to maintain that the British Government had gained anything
+in the way of political results comparable with the fatal loss of
+military strength incurred by the three months' delay. The over-sea
+British did not need to be taught either the justice or the necessity
+of securing citizen rights for the industrial population of the
+Transvaal. Before Lord Milner had been authorised to state that the
+petition of the Uitlanders had been favourably received by the Home
+Government, the citizens of Sydney had recorded in a public meeting
+their "sympathy with their fellow-countrymen in the Transvaal," and
+expressed their hope "that Her Majesty might be pleased to grant the
+prayer of her subjects." Queensland, Victoria, and New South Wales had
+all three offered military contingents by July 21st;[147] the other
+colonies refrained only from a desire not to embarrass the Home
+Government in its negotiations with the Transvaal. Whatever good
+effect was produced upon the public opinion of the continent of Europe
+and the United States of America by the obvious reluctance of the
+British Government to make war upon a puny enemy, was more than
+counterbalanced by the spectacle of a great Power prevented from
+employing the most elementary military precautions by a nice regard
+for the susceptibilities of its political and commercial rivals. The
+idea that the sentiment either of the world at large or of the
+over-sea British would be favourably impressed by the three months of
+futile negotiations was a sheer delusion. It was the people of England
+who had to be educated.
+
+         [Footnote 147: Cd. 18.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Manchester meeting.]
+
+How little they knew of the actual situation in South Africa, and of
+the real character of the Boers may be seen from what happened on
+September 15th. On this day a meeting was held at Manchester to
+protest against the mere idea of England having to make war upon the
+Transvaal. Lord (then Mr.) Courtney "hailed with satisfaction" the
+British despatch of September 8th, which, having been published in the
+Continental papers on the 13th, had appeared a day later (14th) in
+those of Great Britain. "It was a rebuke to the fire-eaters," he
+said, "and a rebuke most of all to one whom I must designate as a lost
+man, a lost mind--I mean Sir Alfred Milner." And Mr. John Morley, like
+Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was convinced that there was no need of
+any preparations for war; the Transvaal Government "could not withdraw
+from the five years' franchise." The day on which these words were
+uttered was the day on which the note containing President Krüger's
+determination to "withdraw" from the five years' franchise, and his
+refusal even to consider the British offer of September 8th--hailed
+with satisfaction by his old ally, Lord Courtney--was handed to Sir
+William Greene.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE ULTIMATUM
+
+
+The British people were destined to pay a heavy penalty for the
+ignorance and irresolution that caused them to withhold, from June to
+September, the mandate without which the Government was unable to
+prepare for war. What that penalty was will be made sufficiently clear
+when we come to consider the position of grave disadvantage in which
+the British forces designated for the South African campaign were
+placed at the outbreak of the war. For the moment it is enough to
+notice that, just as the real source of the military weakness of
+England in the war was the fact that only a very small proportion of
+her adult male population had received an elementary training in arms,
+so the futility of her peace strategy must be traced to the general
+ignorance of the bitter hatred with which British supremacy was
+regarded, not only by the Boers, but also by the Dutch subjects of the
+Crown in the Cape Colony and Natal. In a world-wide and composite
+State such as the British Empire, it is, of course, natural that the
+people of one component part should be unfamiliar, in a greater or
+lesser degree, with the conditions of any other part. What makes this
+mutual unfamiliarity dangerous is the circumstance that the control of
+the foreign relations, and of the effective military and naval forces,
+of the Empire as a whole, remains exclusively in the hands of the
+people of one part--the United Kingdom. In the absence of any
+administrative body in which the over-sea Britains are represented,
+the power, thus possessed, of moulding the destiny of any one province
+of the Empire lays upon the island people the duty of informing
+themselves adequately upon the circumstances and conditions of all its
+component parts. It is obvious that the likelihood of this duty being
+efficiently performed has been diminished greatly by the extension of
+the franchise. Fortunately, however, in the case of Canada, Australia,
+and New Zealand, questions involving a decision to employ the Army or
+Navy which Great Britain maintains for the defence of the Empire have
+arisen rarely in recent years. It is in regard to India and South
+Africa that these decisions have been constantly required; and for
+half a century past each of these two countries in turn has been the
+battlefield of English parties. But while the efficiency of British
+administration has suffered in both cases by variations of policy due
+to party oscillations, infinitely greater injury has been done in
+South Africa than in India.
+
+[Sidenote: Attitude of the island people.]
+
+In respect of South Africa, while, speaking broadly, Liberal
+Governments have sought to escape from existing responsibilities, or
+to decline new ones, Conservative Governments have sought to
+discharge these responsibilities with the object of making this
+country a homogeneous and self-supporting unit of the empire. To
+persuade the nation to accept a policy which might, and probably
+would, involve it in an immediate sacrifice both of men and money, was
+plainly a more difficult task than to persuade it that no need existed
+for any such sacrifices. The "long view" of the Imperialist statesmen
+was supported in the present instance by past experience and by the
+judgment of the great majority of the British population actually
+resident in South Africa. The home English, remembering that the
+recall of Sir Bartle Frere had been followed by Majuba and the
+Retrocession, were anxious to maintain British supremacy unimpaired in
+South Africa. What kept them irresolute was the uncertainty as to
+whether this supremacy really was, or was not, in danger. Lord Milner
+had told them that the establishment of a Dutch Republic, embracing
+all South Africa, was being openly advocated, and that nothing but a
+striking proof of Great Britain's intention to remain the paramount
+Power--such as would be afforded by insisting upon the grant of equal
+rights to the British population in the Transvaal--could arrest the
+growth of the nationalist movement. He had pointed out also that the
+conversion of the Boer Republic into an arsenal of munitions of war,
+when, as in the case of Ketshwayo, there was no enemy against whom
+these arms could be turned other than Great Britain, was in itself a
+definite and unmistakable menace to British supremacy. This, moreover,
+was the deliberate and reasoned verdict of a man who had been
+commissioned, with almost universal approval, to ascertain the real
+state of affairs in South Africa. If the nation had believed Lord
+Milner in June, the British Government would have received the
+political support that would have enabled it to make the preparations
+for war in that month which, as we have seen, it was now making in
+September.
+
+[Sidenote: The Liberal opposition.]
+
+The agency which, by playing upon the ignorance of the public,
+prevented the nation from accepting at once the truth of Lord Milner's
+verdict, was the Liberal Opposition. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the
+official leader of the Liberal party, maintained throughout the three
+months in question that no reason existed for military preparation.
+Mr. Labouchere wrote, on the eve of the war: "The Boers invade Natal!
+You might just as well talk of their invading England." When Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman maintained that there was no need for the
+Government to make any military preparations, we must presume that he
+believed one of two things: either that President Krüger would yield,
+or that, if President Krüger did not yield, there was nothing in the
+condition of South Africa to make it necessary for Great Britain to
+give any proof of her ability to maintain her position as paramount
+Power by force of arms. The action of the Liberal Opposition resolves
+itself, therefore, into a declaration, on its own authority as against
+Lord Milner's, that neither the republican nor the colonial Dutch had
+any intention of making war upon Great Britain in South Africa, or any
+resources which would enable them to carry out such an intention with
+any hope of success. Now, apart from the overwhelming testimony to the
+utter falsity of this assertion which is afforded by the facts of the
+campaign, and apart from such documents as the manifestos issued by
+both Republics upon the outbreak of the war, we possess--thanks to the
+exertions of the Intelligence Department--a mass of evidence, in the
+shape of private and official correspondence, which enables us to
+learn what was actually passing in the minds of the Dutch at this
+time. On the 15th of this month of September, 1899, the meeting to
+which we have referred[148] was held at Manchester, with the object,
+not of strengthening the hands of the Government in the military
+preparations which they were making thus tardily, but of protesting
+against the very idea that there was anything in the attitude of the
+Dutch in South Africa to make war necessary. A perusal of two of these
+captured documents will enable the reader to judge for himself in what
+degree this Liberal view of the situation corresponded with the facts.
+The first is a letter written on September 25th--that is to say, ten
+days after Lord Courtney was denouncing Lord Milner as "a lost mind"
+at Manchester--by Mr. Blignaut, brother to the State Secretary of the
+Free State. It is concerned with the safe arrival in the Free State of
+a Colonial Afrikander, who has left his home in the Western Province
+of the Cape Colony to join the republican forces:
+
+         [Footnote 148: p. 251.]
+
+[Translation.]
+
+                         "KROONSTADT, ORANGE FREE STATE,
+                              "_September 25th_, 1899.
+
+    "Your wire to hand this morning, to which I
+    replied. ---- has arrived.
+
+    "I never gave the youngster credit for such plans
+    to dodge Mr. ----, and not to be trapped and
+    taken back. I think he owes his friend ---- something
+    for his advice how to proceed. As he is here
+    now, he can remain. I see myself he will never be
+    satisfied to stay there [_i.e._ in the colony] while there
+    is war going on.
+
+    "The only thing we are afraid of now is that
+    Chamberlain, with his admitted fitfulness of temper,
+    will cheat us out of the war, and consequently the
+    opportunity of annexing the Cape Colony and
+    Natal, and forming the Republican United States
+    of South Africa; for, in spite of [S. J. du Toit],
+    we have forty-six thousand fighting men who have
+    pledged themselves to die shoulder to shoulder in
+    defence of our liberty, and to secure the independence
+    of South Africa.
+
+    "Please forward ----'s luggage.
+                                   "J. N. BLIGNAUT."[149]
+
+         [Footnote 149: Cd. 420. The Blue-book points out that in the
+         original "a well-known nick-name" is used for Mr. S. J. du
+         Toit.]
+
+[Sidenote: Afrikander aspirations.]
+
+This is not an isolated or exceptional expression of opinion. It is a
+typical statement of what was in the mind of ninety-nine out of every
+hundred republican nationalists at this time. The aspirations it
+contains were proclaimed a fortnight later to the world by President
+Krüger himself in the boast that his Republic would "stagger
+humanity." They appeared in the nonchalant remarks made a few days
+later by Mr. Gregorowski, the Chief Justice of the Transvaal, in
+bidding farewell to Canon Farmer,[150] who was preparing to leave his
+cure at Pretoria in view of the certainty of war.
+
+         [Footnote 150: As reported by Reuter.]
+
+     "Is it really necessary for you to go? The war will be over in a
+     fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the
+     English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace."
+
+War, then, for the Boer meant "an opportunity of annexing the Cape
+Colony and Natal, and forming the Republican United States of South
+Africa." When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, Lord
+Courtney, Mr. James Bryce, and other Liberal leaders saw no reason why
+the British Government should make military preparations--did, in
+fact, do all in their power to induce the English people to withhold
+the support necessary to allow the British Government to make these
+preparations--there were, twelve thousand British troops in South
+Africa to oppose the "forty-six thousand fighting men who had pledged
+themselves to die shoulder to shoulder" to secure the independence,
+not of the Transvaal but of "South Africa".
+
+And what of the Dutch in the Cape Colony? Our second document will
+enlighten us on this point. It is an invitation, composed in doggerel
+rhyme, to the Boer forces to invade Griqualand West, signed by the
+chairman of a district branch of the Afrikander Bond. The date is not
+given; but as the proclamation under which Head-Commandant C. J.
+Wessels annexed the districts in question is dated November 11th,
+1899, it was obviously written during the first three or four weeks of
+the war.
+
+[Translation.]
+
+     "Dear countrymen of the Transvaal: Brothers of our religion and
+     language: Our hearts are burning for you all: when your brave men
+     fall, we pray to God night and day to help you with His might; we
+     are powerless by ourselves--the English are so angry with us that
+     they have taken away our ammunition, all our powder and
+     cartridges; if you can provide us each with a packet of ten and a
+     Mauser, you will see what we can do; Englishmen won't stand
+     before us, they will go to the devil. There are a few English
+     here, but we count them amongst the dead; for the rest we are all
+     Boers, and only wait for you to move us. Englishmen are not our
+     friends, and we will not serve under their flag; so we all shout
+     together, as Transvaal subjects, 'God save President Krüger, and
+     the Transvaal army; God save President Steyn, and all Free
+     Staters great and small!'"[151]
+
+         [Footnote 151: Cd. 420.]
+
+[Sidenote: Ignorance of Liberal leaders.]
+
+But, apart from this profound misconception of the real feeling and
+intentions of the Afrikander nationalists in South Africa, manifested
+with such disastrous effect during these critical months--June to
+September, 1899--the leaders of the Liberal Opposition otherwise
+displayed in their public utterances an ignorance of this province of
+the Empire that can only be characterised as "wanton." For what
+expression other than "wanton ignorance" can be used to describe the
+habit of mind which permits public men to make statements in direct
+conflict with the facts of South African history, as established by
+ascertainable evidence, or to state as facts allegations which proper
+inquiry would have shown to be untrue? Here again, from a mass of
+material provided by the utterances which came from the Liberal
+Opposition leaders on South African affairs, a few instances only can
+be brought to the notice of the reader, and these in the briefest form
+consistent with precision. On September 5th Mr. John Morley, speaking
+at Arbroath, stated that Sir Bartle Frere had "annexed the Transvaal."
+The present baronet, the late High Commissioner's son, called him to
+account at once; but it required three successive letters[152] to
+wring from Mr. John Morley a specific acknowledgement of his error.
+The evidence which establishes the fact that Frere did not annex the
+Transvaal is the following statement, bearing his signature and
+published in February, 1881:[153]
+
+         [Footnote 152: Published in _The Times_, September 30th,
+         1899.]
+
+         [Footnote 153: In _The Nineteenth Century_ for that month.]
+
+     "It was an act which in no way originated with me, over which I
+     had no control, and with which I was only subsequently
+     incidentally connected.... It was a great question then, as now,
+     whether the annexation was justifiable."
+
+This was on the 5th. On the 27th a letter was published in _The Times_
+in which Sir William Harcourt wrote, in respect of the suzerainty
+question:
+
+     "All further argument is now superfluous, as the matter is
+     decisively disposed of by the publication at Pretoria of Lord
+     Derby's telegram of February 27th, 1884, in which the effect of
+     the London Convention of that date was stated in the following
+     words: 'There will be the same complete independence in the
+     Transvaal as in the Orange Free State.'"
+
+In a letter written on the day following, and published in _The Times_
+of October 2nd, the writer of the present work pointed out, among
+other inaccuracies, that the words actually telegraphed by Lord Derby
+were: "same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in
+Orange Free State." That is to say, before the word "independence" the
+word "internal"--vitally important to the present issue--was inserted
+in the original, and omitted in the Boer version, from which Sir
+William Harcourt had quoted without referring to the Blue-book, Cd.
+4,036.
+
+[Sidenote: Its injurious effect.]
+
+The third instance occurred some three months later. Mr. James Bryce,
+speaking on December 14th, 1899, stated that Sir Bartle Frere "sent
+to govern the Transvaal Sir Owen Lanyon, an officer unfitted by
+training and character for so delicate and difficult a task."[154] The
+following passage, which the present writer subsequently published,
+affords precise and overwhelming evidence of the absolute untruth of
+Mr. Bryce's assertion. It appears in a letter written by Sir Bartle
+Frere on December 13th, 1878, to Mr. (now Sir) Gordon Sprigg, then
+Premier of Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 154: _The Times_, December 15th. Mr. Bryce was
+         taking the chair at the last of a series of six lectures on
+         "England in South Africa," given by the present writer in the
+         great hall of the (then) Imperial Institute.]
+
+     "The Secretary of State has nominated Lanyon to take Shepstone's
+     place whenever he leaves [_i.e._ when Lanyon leaves Kimberley,
+     where he was Administrator of Griqualand West]. This was not my
+     arrangement, and had it been left to me I think I should have
+     arranged otherwise, for while I believe Lanyon to be one of the
+     most right-minded, hardworking, and able men in South Africa, I
+     know he does not fancy the work in the Transvaal, and I think I
+     could have done better. However, it does not rest with me, and
+     all I have to do is to find a man fit to take his place when he
+     leaves."[155]
+
+         [Footnote 155: _Cornhill Magazine_, July, 1900. "The South
+         African Policy of Sir Bartle Frere." By W. Basil Worsfold.]
+
+All of these three men were of Cabinet rank. Two of them, Mr. Morley
+and Mr. Bryce, enjoyed a great and deserved reputation as men of
+letters; and their public utterances on the South African question,
+accepted in large measure on the strength of this literary
+reputation, were responsible in an appreciable degree for the distrust
+and coldness manifested by the people of the United States of America
+towards Great Britain during the first year of the war. But this is a
+consideration of secondary importance. The vital point to recognise is
+that, so long as the Empire remains without a common representative
+council, a knowledge of the conditions of the over-sea Britains must
+be considered as necessary a part of the political equipment of any
+English statesman as a knowledge of Lancashire or of Kent. After the
+war had broken out, Lord Rosebery, almost alone among Liberal
+statesmen, did something to support the Government. This distinguished
+advocate of Imperial unity and national efficiency then recommended
+the English people to educate themselves by reading Sir Percy
+FitzPatrick's _The Transvaal from Within_, and encouraged them by
+declaring his belief that England would "muddle through" this, as
+other wars. It does not seem, however, to have occurred to Lord
+Rosebery that, if he had used his undoubted influence in time to
+prevent his party from making it impossible for the Salisbury Cabinet
+to carry out in June the effective peace strategy long recommended by
+Lord Milner, the prospect of a "muddle" would have been materially
+diminished, if not altogether removed.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's proposal.]
+
+There is one other fact that cannot be overlooked in estimating the
+degree in which the Liberal leaders are answerable to the nation for
+the fatal error of postponing effective military preparations from June
+to September. After the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference Lord
+Milner, as we have seen, asked for immediate and substantial
+reinforcements. Mr. Chamberlain then approached Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman
+with a proposal that the Government should inform the Opposition leaders
+of the circumstances that made military preparations necessary, and of
+the precise measures which they might deem advisable to adopt from time
+to time, on the understanding that the Opposition, on their part, should
+refrain from raising any public discussion as to the expediency of these
+measures. The object of this proposal was, of course, to enable the
+Government to make effective preparations for war, without lessening the
+prospect of achieving a peaceful settlement by the negotiations in
+progress. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's reply to this overture was a
+refusal to make the Opposition a party to any such arrangement. If the
+Government chose to make military preparations they must do so, he said,
+entirely on their own responsibility.
+
+The significance of this refusal of Mr. Chamberlain's offer appears
+from the answer which was subsequently put forward by the Prime
+Minister, the late Lord Salisbury, to the charge of "military
+unpreparedness" brought against the British Government after the early
+disasters of the campaign. What prevented the Cabinet, according to
+the Premier, from taking the measures required by the military
+situation in June was the British system of popular government. Any
+preparations on the scale demanded by Lord Milner and Lord Wolseley
+could not have been set on foot without provoking the fullest
+discussion in Parliament and the Press. The leaders of the Opposition
+would have contested fiercely the proposals of the Government, and the
+perversion of these opportunities for discussion into an anti-war
+propaganda might have exhibited England as a country divided against
+itself. It may be questioned whether, in point of fact, the Liberal
+leaders could have done anything more calculated to injure the
+interests of their country if the Government had mobilised the army
+corps, and despatched the ten thousand defensive troops in June, than
+they did when these measures were postponed until September. But,
+however this may be, the circumstance that this proposal was made by
+Mr. Chamberlain, and refused by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, is
+noteworthy both as an indication of the spirit of lofty patriotism of
+which the Salisbury Cabinet, in spite of its initial error, was
+destined to give more than one proof in the course of the war and as
+an example of a method of escaping from the injurious results of a
+well-recognised defect in the democratic system of government--a
+method which, it is not unreasonable to hope, may be employed with
+success should the like occasion arise at any future time.
+
+This, then, was the state of affairs in England. The Opposition
+throughout the negotiations was proclaiming that war was out of the
+question, and that preparations for war were altogether unnecessary.
+The people, being ignorant of the progress which the nationalist
+movement in South Africa had made, were irresolute, and withheld from
+the Government the support without which it could not make adequate
+military preparations, except at the risk of defeat in Parliament and
+possible loss of office.
+
+[Sidenote: Objects of Afrikander policy.]
+
+What was the position in South Africa? Above all, what was the
+position of the man whose duty it was "to take all such measures and
+do all such things" as were necessary for the safety of the subjects
+of the Crown and for the maintenance of British interests? The
+ignorance of South Africa that led to the partial paralysis of the
+Government was in no sense attributable to him. The broad fact that
+the Afrikander nationalist[156] movement had made the moral supremacy
+of the Dutch complete was declared by Lord Milner, during his visit to
+England in the winter of 1898-9, to the Colonial Secretary and other
+members of the Salisbury Cabinet. His verdict that nothing but prompt
+and energetic action on the part of the Imperial Government could keep
+South Africa a part of the Empire was publicly made known (so far as
+he was concerned) in his despatch of May 4th, 1899, which was
+withheld, however, from publication until June 14th. The Bloemfontein
+Conference was a device of the Afrikander nationalists at the Cape to
+avert a military conflict between the South African Republic and Great
+Britain, which, they believed, would result not merely in the
+destruction of the Republics, but in the loss of the prospect--which
+they then enjoyed--of achieving through the existence of the Republics
+the independence of the Afrikander nation as a whole. All this Lord
+Milner made perfectly clear to Mr. Chamberlain. The illusory
+concessions embodied in President Krüger's Franchise Law were yielded
+by the Republics with the object of securing the "moral support" of
+the Cape Afrikanders in the negotiations, and thereby obtaining the
+delay which was required to complete their military preparations;
+since the Republican nationalists, unlike those of the Cape, believed
+that the independence of the Afrikander nation could be wrested from
+Great Britain by force of arms. The efforts made by the Cape
+nationalists, first to secure these concessions, and then to induce
+the republican nationalists to grant the further concessions which
+would have satisfied the British Government, were made for the same
+purpose as the Bloemfontein Conference had been arranged--namely, to
+avert a conflict which, being premature, would be disastrous to the
+nationalist cause, not only in the Republics but in the Cape Colony.
+The respective objects both of the republican and Cape nationalists
+had been divined by Lord Milner, and, therefore, immediately after the
+failure of the Conference, he had urged the Home Government to send
+reinforcements to South Africa sufficient to defend British territory
+from attack, and to check any incipient rebellion in the Cape Colony.
+The negotiations might, or might not, result in a peaceful settlement;
+but it was futile, nay more, it was dangerous, he said, for Great
+Britain to go on as though war were out of the question.
+
+         [Footnote 156: The reader is referred to p. 5 in Chap. I. for
+         the racial characteristics of the South African Dutch, and to
+         the note on p. 48 in Chap. II. for the political significance
+         of the word "Afrikander," as stated by Mr. S. J. du Toit.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's position.]
+
+This was the view of the South African situation which Lord Milner
+laid before the Home Government in June. We have seen what was done by
+them in response to these representations. Some special service
+officers were sent out to organise locally the defences of the Cape
+Colony and Rhodesia. The Cape and Natal garrisons were strengthened by
+a few very inadequate reinforcements arriving in the course of the
+next two months. General Butler was not recalled until the latter part
+of August; his successor, General Forestier-Walker, did not arrive
+until September 6th. We have traced the causes which made it
+impossible for the Imperial Government, as they conceived, to do more
+than this; and when in due course we come to consider the broad phases
+of the war, the nature of the penalty which the British Army, and the
+British nation, had to pay for the partial paralysis of the Government
+will become sufficiently apparent.
+
+The man who suffered most by all this was Lord Milner. When he asked
+for military preparations, he was told that he could not have them.
+When he asked for the removal of a military adviser with whom he was
+supremely dissatisfied, he was told that he must put up with General
+Butler for a little longer. He put up with him for two months. His
+Colonial ministers, whose advice on many points he was bound to accept
+so long as he did not dismiss them, were men placed in office by the
+Dutch subjects of the Crown for the very purpose of frustrating, by
+constitutional means, the successful intervention in the Transvaal, by
+which alone, in his opinion, British supremacy could be made a
+reality.
+
+Indeed, the odds were heavily against Lord Milner in his task of
+saving England, in spite of herself and in spite of the enemies of
+whose power she was wholly ignorant, and to whose very existence she
+remained contemptuously indifferent. To the great mass of the British
+population in South Africa, he stood for England and English justice.
+To them he seemed the representative man, for whom they had waited
+many a long year. They felt that he was fighting their battle and
+doing their work; and, making allowance for local jealousies and
+accidental partialities, they never ceased to regard him thus. This
+was his one and only source of assured support. But he was far removed
+from the active British centres: from the group of towns formed by
+the Albany settlers and their descendants in the Eastern Province, and
+from Kimberley, Durban and Maritzburg, and Johannesburg. In the Cape
+peninsula, of course, there was a considerable British population of
+professional and commercial men; but this population had been so
+closely related by business and social ties with the preponderant
+Dutch population of the Western Province that many among them
+hesitated to declare themselves openly against the Dutch party. All
+who were members of the Progressive party, from the time of the Graaf
+Reinet speech, had given unswerving support to Lord Milner's policy;
+but the strength of the influence created by years of alternate
+political co-operation with the Bond leaders may be gathered from the
+fact that even so staunch a supporter of the British connection as Sir
+James (then Mr.) Rose Innes did not publicly declare his adhesion to
+the intervention policy until after the failure of the Bloemfontein
+Conference. Moreover, the increasing political solidarity of the
+British population in the Cape Colony augmented the bitterness with
+which the few English politicians, who had remained in alliance with
+the Dutch party, regarded the man whose resolution and insight had
+penetrated and exposed the designs of the Bond.
+
+[Sidenote: Intrigues and disaffection.]
+
+It is difficult to convey any adequate impression of the atmosphere of
+suspicion and intrigue by which Lord Milner was surrounded. The Dutch
+party was in the ascendant in the Colony. The Cape Civil Service was
+tainted throughout with disaffection. Even the _personnel_ of the
+Government offices at Capetown, although it contained many excellent
+and loyal men, included also many who were disaffected or lukewarm. It
+is characteristic of the situation that during the most critical
+period of the negotiations with the Transvaal, the ministerial organ,
+_The South African News_, permitted itself to indulge, where Lord
+Milner, was concerned, not only in the bitterest criticisms but in
+outspoken personal abuse. To have abused the representative of the
+Sovereign in a British colony of which one-half of the population was
+seething with sedition, while a part had been actually armed for
+rebellion by the secret emissaries of a state with which Great Britain
+was on the verge of war, is an act which admits of only one
+interpretation. Lord Milner was to be got rid of at all costs; for the
+policy which _The South African News_ was intended to promote was that
+not of Great Britain, but of the Transvaal. The paper was directly
+inspired--it is indeed not unlikely that the articles themselves were
+written--by some of the members of the Ministry, Lord Milner's
+"constitutional advisers," whom throughout he himself treated with the
+respect to which their position entitled them.
+
+But nothing, perhaps, shows more vividly how extraordinary was the
+position in which Lord Milner found himself than the fact, which we
+have already noted, that the passage of the large consignment of 500
+Mauser rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges for the Free State, to which
+the Prime Minister's attention was "drawn specially, because it was
+large," on July 15th, was not made known to him, the Governor of the
+Cape Colony, until August 9th, and then only by accident.[157] There
+is only one explanation of this remarkable incident: the interests of
+the Dutch party were different from those of the British Government.
+The Cape Colony was only in name a British colony. Under the guise of
+constitutional forms it had attained independence--virtual, though not
+nominal. If Lord Milner had contracted the habit of Biblical quotation
+from the Afrikander leaders, he might well have quoted the words of
+the psalmist: "Many bulls have compassed me; strong bulls of Bashan
+have beset me round."[158] Even the approaches to Government House
+were watched by spies in President Krüger's pay, who carefully noted
+all who came and went. Members of the Uitlander community were the
+special subjects of this system of espionage.
+
+         [Footnote 157: See letters between Lord Milner and Mr.
+         Schreiner in Cd. 43, p. 13.]
+
+         [Footnote 158: Psalm xxii. 12.]
+
+[Sidenote: Spies round Government House.]
+
+     "When on a visit to Capetown," writes Sir Percy FitzPatrick, "I
+     called several times upon the High Commissioner, and learning, by
+     private advice, that my movements were being reported in detail
+     through the Secret Service Department, I informed Sir Alfred
+     Milner of the fact. Sir Alfred admitted that the idea of secret
+     agents in British territory and spies round or in Government
+     House was not pleasant, but expressed the hope that those things
+     should not deter those who wished to call on him, as he was there
+     as the representative of Her Majesty for the benefit of British
+     subjects, and very desirous of ascertaining for himself the facts
+     of the case."[159]
+
+         [Footnote 159: _The Transvaal from Within_, p. 287.]
+
+The Afrikander leaders in the Cape never identified themselves with
+the British cause. To them the Salisbury Cabinet was a "team most
+unjustly disposed towards us"; a team, moreover, which they earnestly,
+and not without reason, hoped might be replaced by a Liberal
+Government that would allow them undisturbed to carry forward their
+plans to full fruition. The motive of their "mediation," such as it
+was, was political expediency. It was not from any belief in the
+justice of the British claims that they endeavoured to persuade the
+republican nationalists to give way; still less from any feeling that
+England's cause was their cause. When, at length, they became really
+earnest in pressing President Krüger to grant a "colourable" measure
+of franchise reform--to use Mr. Merriman's adjective--it was for their
+own sake, and not for England's, that they worked. This motive runs
+through the whole of their correspondence; but it emerges more frankly
+in the urgent messages sent during the three days (September 12th to
+15th) in which the Transvaal reply to the British despatch of
+September 8th was being prepared. "Mind," telegraphs Mr. Hofmeyr to
+Mr. Fischer on September 13th, "war will probably have a fatal effect
+on the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Afrikander party." And
+when, from Mr. Fischer's reply, war was seen to have come in spite of
+all his counsels of prudence, the racial tie asserted itself, and he
+found consolation for his impotence in an expression of his hatred
+against England. On September 14th Mr. Hofmeyr telegraphed to
+President Steyn:
+
+     "I suppose you have seen our wires to Fischer and his replies,
+     which latter I deeply regret. The 'to be or not to be' of the
+     Transvaal, Free State, and our party at the Cape, depends upon
+     this decision. The trial is a severe one, but hardly so severe as
+     the outrageous despatches received by Brand from [Sir Philip]
+     Wodehouse and [Sir Henry] Barkly. The enemy then hoped that Brand
+     would refuse, as the Transvaal's enemy now hopes Krüger will do;
+     but Brand conceded, and saved the State. Follow Brand's example.
+     Future generations of your and my people will praise you."
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's "bitter feelings".]
+
+And on the 15th:
+
+     "You have no conception of my bitter feelings, which can hardly
+     be surpassed by that of our and your people, but the stronger my
+     feelings the more I am determined to repress them, when
+     considering questions of policy affecting the future weal or woe
+     of our people. May the Supreme Being help you, me, and them. Have
+     not seen the High Commissioner for weeks."
+
+The reply of the republican nationalists, addressed to Mr. Hofmeyr
+and forwarded through President Steyn, contains a characteristically
+distorted version of the course of the negotiations. They have made
+concession after concession, but all in vain. "However much we
+recognise and value your kind intentions," they write, "we regret that
+it is no longer possible for us to comply with the extravagant and
+brutal requests of the British Government." Thus the Pretoria
+Executive declared themselves on September 15th, 1899, to the Master
+of the Bond, when they were in the act of refusing Mr. Chamberlain's
+offer to accept a five years' franchise bill, provided it was shown by
+due inquiry to be a genuine measure of reform. Very different was the
+account of the same transaction given by Mr. Smuts, when, in urging
+the remnant of the burghers of both Republics to surrender, he said,
+on May 30th, 1902, at Vereeniging, "I am one of those who, as members
+of the Government of the South African Republic, _provoked the war
+with England_". But the passage in this document which is most useful
+to the historian is that in which the republican nationalists remind
+the Afrikander leaders at the Cape of the insincerity of their
+original "mediation." In dialectics Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr.
+Reitz are quite able to hold their own with Mr. Hofmeyr, Dr. Te Water,
+and Mr. Schreiner. They have not forgotten the Cape Prime Minister's
+precipitate benediction alike of President Krüger's Bloemfontein
+scheme and of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad proposals.
+They remember also how the "Hofmeyr compromise" was proclaimed in the
+Bond and the ministerial press as affording conclusive evidence of the
+"sweet reasonableness" of President Krüger and his Executive. And so
+they remark, "We are sorry not to be able to follow your advice; but
+we point out that you yourself let it be known that we had your whole
+approval, if we gave the present franchise as we were doing."[160]
+Here we have the kernel of the whole matter. A nine years', seven
+years', or a five years' franchise was all one to the Cape
+Nationalists, provided only that England was kept a little longer from
+claiming her position as paramount Power in South Africa. For these
+men knew, or thought they knew, that for England "a little longer"
+would be "too late."
+
+         [Footnote 160: This document was among those secured by the
+         Intelligence Department, and published in _The Times History
+         of the War_.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner.]
+
+It was a greater achievement to have frustrated so subtle a
+combination, directed by the astute mind of Mr. Hofmeyr--the man who
+refused to allow his passions to interfere with his policy--than to
+have prevented the British Government from falling a victim to the
+coarse duplicity of President Krüger. Tireless effort and consummate
+statesmanship alone would not have accomplished this purpose. To these
+qualities Lord Milner added a personal charm, elusive, and yet
+irresistible; and it was this "union of intellect with fascination,"
+of which Lord Rosebery had spoken,[161] that enabled him to transcend
+the infinite difficulty of his official relationship to Mr. Schreiner.
+Even so that relationship must have broken down under the strain of
+the negotiations and the war, had not Mr. Schreiner's complex
+political creed included the saving clause of allegiance to his
+sovereign. When once the British troops had begun to land Mr.
+Schreiner accepted the new situation. No longer merely the
+parliamentary head of the Dutch party and the agent of the Bond, he
+realised also his responsibility as a minister of the Crown. None the
+less there were matters of the gravest concern in which, both before
+and after the ultimatum, the Prime Minister used all the
+constitutional means at his disposal to oppose Lord Milner. When, upon
+the arrival (August 5th) of the small additions to the Cape garrison
+ordered out in June, Lord Milner determined to draw the attention of
+the Ministry to the exposed condition of the Colony, he found that the
+Prime Minister's views differed completely from his own. A few days
+later he addressed a minute to his ministers on the subject of the
+defence of Kimberley and other military questions. From this time
+onwards, in almost daily battles, Mr. Schreiner resisted the plans of
+local military preparation which Lord Milner deemed necessary for the
+protection of the Colony. His object, as he said, was to keep the Cape
+Colony out of the struggle.[162] On Friday, September 8th, when in
+London the Cabinet Council was held at which it was decided to send
+out the 10,000 troops to reinforce the South African garrison, at
+Capetown Lord Milner was engaged in a long endeavour to persuade his
+Prime Minister that it was necessary to do something for the defence
+of Kimberley.[163] Up to the very day on which the Free State
+commandos crossed the border, Mr. Schreiner relied upon the definite
+pledge given him by President Steyn that the territory of the Cape
+Colony would not be invaded; and not until that day was he undeceived.
+
+         [Footnote 161: See p. 77.]
+
+         [Footnote 162: In the House of Assembly, August 28th.]
+
+         [Footnote 163: One of the earliest measures of precaution
+         which Lord Milner desired was a plan for the defence of
+         Kimberley. But when, on June 12th, the people of Kimberley
+         requested the Government of the Colony to take steps for the
+         protection of their town, the reply which they received,
+         through the Civil Commissioner, was this: "There is no reason
+         whatever for apprehending that Kimberley is, or in any
+         contemplated event will be, in danger of attack, and Mr.
+         Schreiner is of opinion that your fears are groundless and
+         your anticipations without foundation."]
+
+[Sidenote: Schreiner and Steyn.]
+
+     "I said to the President," he declared in the Cape Parliament a
+     year later,[164] "that I would not believe he would invade south
+     of the Orange River.[165] President Steyn's reply was, 'Can you
+     give me a guarantee that no troops will come to the border?' Of
+     course, I could give no such guarantee, and I did not then
+     believe that, although such a guarantee could not be given, the
+     Free State would invade British territory with the object of
+     endeavouring to promote the establishment of one Republic in
+     South Africa, as the Prime Minister[166] has said."
+
+         [Footnote 164: September 24th, 1900.]
+
+         [Footnote 165: This was on October 11th, 1899--the day on
+         which the ultimatum expired.]
+
+         [Footnote 166: Sir Gordon Sprigg--Mr. Schreiner's Ministry
+         was replaced by a Progressive Ministry in June, 1900.]
+
+As the Boer invasion spread further into the Colony Mr. Schreiner
+receded proportionately from his original standpoint of neutrality.
+Indeed, three distinct phases in the Prime Minister's progress can be
+distinguished. In the first stage, which lasted until the actual
+invasion of the Colony by the Boer commandos, he used all his
+constitutional power to prevent the people of the Colony, British and
+Dutch alike, from being involved in the war: and it was only after a
+severe struggle that Lord Milner prevailed upon him even to call out
+the Kimberley Volunteers on October 2nd, _i.e._, a week before the
+Ultimatum. This, "the neutrality" stage, lasted up to the invasion.
+After the invasion came the second stage, in which Mr. Schreiner seems
+to have argued to himself in this manner: "As the Boers have invaded
+this colony, I, as Prime Minister, cannot refuse that the local forces
+should be called out to protect its territory." And so on October
+16th, after Vryburg had gone over to the Boers, after Kimberley had
+been cut off, and the whole country from Kimberley to Orange River was
+in the hands of the enemy, he consented to the issue of a proclamation
+calling out 2,000 volunteers for garrison duty within the Colony.[167]
+But in making this tardy concession he was careful to point out to
+Lord Milner that the British cause would lose more than it would gain.
+"I warn you," he said in effect, "that it is not to your advantage;
+because you are the weaker party. In the Cape Colony more men will
+fight for the Boers than will fight for you." The third stage in Mr.
+Schreiner's conversion was reached when, in November, 1899, the
+invading Boers had advanced to the Tembuland border, in the extreme
+east of the Colony. Then Mr. Schreiner allowed the natives to be
+called out for the defence of their own territory. In making this
+final concession the Prime Minister yielded to the logic of facts in a
+matter concerning which he had previously offered a most stubborn
+resistance to the Governor's arguments.
+
+         [Footnote 167: With this may be compared the fact that in
+         Natal the whole of the local forces were mobilised on
+         September 29th for active service. The dates upon which
+         further units of the Cape local forces were called out are as
+         follows: Uitenhage Rifles and Komgha Mounted Rifles, November
+         10th; Cape Medical Staff Corps, November 16th; and Frontier
+         Mounted Rifles, November 24th.]
+
+[Sidenote: Schreiner and local forces.]
+
+For in the discussion of the measures urged by Lord Milner as
+necessary for the protection of the Colony, the question of arming the
+natives and coloured people had necessarily arisen. The Bastards in
+the west and the Tembus in the east were known to be eager to defend
+the Queen's country against invasion. Mr. Schreiner declared that to
+arm the natives was to do violence to the central principle upon which
+the maintenance of civilisation in South Africa was based--the
+principle that the black man must never be used to fight against the
+white. Lord Milner did not question the validity of this principle;
+but he maintained--and rightly, as Mr. Schreiner admitted subsequently
+by his action in the case of the Tembu frontier--that it could not be
+applied to the case in question. "If white men," he said, "will go and
+invade the territory of the blacks, then the blacks must be armed to
+repel the invasion."
+
+The change which came over Mr. Schreiner's attitude, due, no doubt,
+partly to his gradual enlightenment as to the real aims of the
+republican nationalists, but also to the skilful use which Lord Milner
+made of that enlightenment, may be traced in the following contrasts.
+Before the Boer invasion he refused to call out the local forces of
+the Colony even for purposes of defence;[168] afterwards he not only
+sanctioned the employment of these forces in the Colony, but allowed
+them to take part in Lord Roberts' advance upon Bloemfontein and
+Pretoria. Before the invading Boers, having already possessed
+themselves of the north-eastern districts of Cape Colony, began to
+threaten the purely native territories to the south, he would not hear
+of the natives being armed for their own protection. But when the
+Boers had actually reached the borders of Tembuland he consented. In
+his advice to the Cape Government, no less than in that which he gave
+to the Home Government, Lord Milner was shown to be in the right. In
+both cases he urged an effective preparation for war. In both the
+measures which he advised were ultimately taken; but taken only when
+they had lost all their power as a means of promoting peace, and half
+of their efficacy as a contribution to the rapid and successful
+prosecution of the war. In both cases Lord Milner was able, in the
+face of unparalleled obstacles, to secure just the minimum preparation
+for war which stood between the British Empire and overwhelming
+military disaster.
+
+[Footnote 168: The Kimberley and Mafeking Volunteers were called out
+at the last moment, but actually before the war broke out; but the
+safety of both these places was imperilled by the refusal, or delay,
+of the colonial Government to supply them with guns.]
+
+We have observed the position in Great Britain, and found that the
+root cause of the impotence of the Home Government was the nation's
+ignorance of South Africa. In the Cape Colony the evil was of a
+different order. Lord Milner, although High Commissioner for South
+Africa, had within the Colony only the strictly limited powers of a
+constitutional governor. The British population were keenly alive to
+the necessity for active preparations for the defence of their
+country; were, indeed, indignant at the refusal of the Schreiner
+Cabinet to allow the local forces to be called out: but the Dutch
+party was in office, the Bond was "loyal," Mr. Schreiner was a
+minister of the Crown, and the most that the Governor could do was to
+urge upon his ministers the measures upon the execution of which he
+had no power to insist.
+
+[Sidenote: Seven years after.]
+
+The best comment upon this strange situation is that which is afforded
+by a passage in Lord Milner's speech in the House of Lords on February
+26th, 1906. Seven years have gone by, and the great proconsul has
+returned to England. He is drawn from his much-needed rest by a sudden
+danger to the country which he has kept a part of the Empire. The
+Unionist Government has fallen, and a Liberal Government has been
+placed in power. He is warning this Government of the danger of a
+premature grant of responsible government to the Orange River Colony.
+
+     "What is going to happen under responsible government? It is more
+     than probable, it is, humanly speaking, certain, that the persons
+     to whom I have referred will form a large majority, if not almost
+     the whole, of that first elected Parliament of the Orange River
+     Colony to which, from the first hour of its existence, the whole
+     legislative and executive power in that colony is to be
+     entrusted. I do not suggest that they will begin by doing
+     anything sinister. All forms will be duly observed; as why should
+     they not be? It will be perfectly possible for them, with the
+     most complete constitutional propriety, little by little to
+     reverse all that has been done, and gradually to get rid of the
+     British officials, the British teachers, the bulk of the British
+     settlers, and any offensive British taint which may cling to the
+     statute-book or the administration. I can quite understand that,
+     from the point of view of what are known as the pro-Boers, such a
+     result is eminently desirable. They thought the war was a crime,
+     the annexation a blunder, and they think to-day that the sooner
+     you can get back to the old state of things the better. I say I
+     quite understand that view, though I do not suppose it is shared
+     by His Majesty's ministers, or, at any rate, by all of them. What
+     I cannot understand is how any human being, not being a pro-Boer,
+     can regard with equanimity the prospect that the very hand which
+     drafted the ultimatum of October, 1899,[169] may within a year be
+     drafting 'Ministers' Minutes' for submission to a British
+     Governor who will have virtually no option but to obey them. What
+     will be the contents of those minutes, I wonder? As time goes on
+     it may be a proposal for dispensing with English as an official
+     language, or a proposal for the distribution to every country
+     farmer of a military rifle and so many hundred cartridges, in
+     view of threatened danger from the Basutos."
+
+         [Footnote 169: Mr. Fischer. See forward, p. 291.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Just reminiscences".]
+
+So far Lord Milner had dealt with the Orange River Colony. Then he let
+his thoughts range back to these months of his great ordeal.
+
+     "I think I can see the Governor just hesitating a little to put
+     his hand to such a document. In that case I think I can hear the
+     instant low growl of menace from Press and platform and pulpit,
+     the hints of the necessity of his recall, and the answering
+     scream from the pro-Boer Press of Britain against the ruthless
+     satrap, ignorant of constitutional usage and wholly
+     misunderstanding his own position, who dared to trample upon the
+     rights of a free people. I may be told, I know I shall be told,
+     that such notions are the wild imaginings of a disordered brain,
+     that these are theoretical possibilities having no relation to
+     fact or to probability. _My Lords, they are not imaginings. They
+     are just reminiscences._
+
+     "I know what it is to be Governor of a self-governing colony,
+     with the disaffected element in the ascendant. I was bitterly
+     attacked for not being sufficiently submissive under the
+     circumstances. Yet, even with the least submissive Governor, the
+     position is so weak that strange things happen. It was under
+     responsible government, and in the normal working of responsible
+     government, that 1,000,000 cartridges were passed through Cape
+     Colony, on the eve of the war, to arm the people who were just
+     going to attack us, and that some necessary cannon were stopped
+     from being sent to a defenceless border town,[170] which directly
+     afterwards was besieged, and which, from want of these cannon,
+     was nearly taken."[171]
+
+         [Footnote 170: Kimberley.]
+
+         [Footnote 171: _The Times_, February 27th, 1906.]
+
+Thus, six and a half years later, Lord Milner spoke of these months of
+_Sturm und Drang_ in the calm and passionless atmosphere of the House
+of Lords.
+
+From Bloemfontein to the ultimatum, the British flag in South Africa
+was stayed upon the "inflexible resolution" of one man. Two months
+later, when the army corps was all but landed, the English at the Cape
+gave speech. Then Sir David Gill's words at the St. Andrew's Day
+celebration of November 30th, 1890 came as a fresh breeze dispersing
+the miasmic humours of some low-lying, ill-drained plain.
+
+[Sidenote: What the loyalists thought.]
+
+     "In the history of the British colonies," he said, "no Governor
+     has ever been placed in greater difficulties. In spite of a
+     support of the most shamelessly feeble character, and in spite of
+     a want of understanding at home, His Excellency has not only had
+     to originate and carry out a policy, but he has had to instruct
+     the whole nation in the dangers which threatened; and the means
+     which were necessary to remove that danger.
+
+     "When His Excellency came to this colony he found it honeycombed
+     with sedition. He found a canting loyalty, which aimed at the
+     overthrow of British supremacy in this colony, and not only in
+     this colony, but in South Africa as well.... There have been a
+     mighty lot of misunderstandings in this country, a mighty lot of
+     mealy-mouthed loyalty, that did not mean loyalty at all, and a
+     mighty working to overthrow the power of Englishmen (and
+     Scotchmen) in this country--first of all to bring them into
+     contempt with the native population; secondly, to deprive them of
+     all political power; and thirdly, to deprive them of all material
+     power.... We have a minister who has gone to the front,[172] but
+     it is a remarkable fact that since that minister has gone to the
+     front the accessions of colonists to the ranks of the rebels have
+     been tenfold greater than they were before he went. It is in the
+     face of these innumerable difficulties that Sir Alfred Milner has
+     carried out his work."
+
+         [Footnote 172: Mr. J. W. Sauer. The reference is (in Lord
+         Milner's words) to Mr. Sauer's "well-meant but unsuccessful
+         mission to Dordrecht, which was immediately followed by
+         rebellion in that district." The facts, as fully disclosed a
+         year later, are these. On November 23rd, 1899, Mr. Sauer held
+         a meeting at Dordrecht to dissuade the Dutch subjects of the
+         Crown in the Wodehouse Division of the Colony from joining in
+         the rebellion. As the result of this meeting a deputation was
+         sent to the Commandant of the Boer invading-force, Olivier,
+         who was at Barkly East, desiring him not to come to
+         Dordrecht. On November 27th another meeting was held (also
+         addressed by Mr. Sauer) and a second deputation of the
+         inhabitants waited upon Olivier. The sequel is revealed in
+         the telegram despatched the following day (November 28th) by
+         the Boer Commandant to the Secretary, the War Commission,
+         Bloemfontein: "... To-day already I received the second
+         deputation from Dordrecht not to come to Dordrecht. This is
+         asked officially, but privately they say that this is also a
+         blind, and that we must come at once...." On December 2nd
+         Olivier was received with open arms at Dordrecht. It was in a
+         district where, in the Boer Commandant's words, "the
+         Afrikanders were rejoicing, and joining the commandos was
+         universal."--Cd. 420, p. 108 and p. 96; Cd. 43, p. 221; and
+         Cd. 261, p. 126.]
+
+This is how it struck a distinguished man of science, and one who was
+qualified, moreover, by a residence at the Cape which dated back to
+the days of the Zulu War, to understand the full significance of what
+was going on around him.
+
+In July and August, President Krüger was winning all along the line.
+The Home Government was kept harmless and inactive by the Franchise
+Bill; the Cape Government tied the hands of the High Commissioner;
+supplies of arms and ammunition were pouring in, the temper of the
+burghers in both republics was rising, foreign military officers and
+M. Léon of the Creuzot Works had arrived; in short, the military
+preparations of four years were consummated without let or hindrance.
+September was less exclusively favourable to the republican cause. On
+September 8th, as we have seen, the Salisbury Cabinet determined to
+send out the defensive forces for which Lord Milner had asked three
+months before. Sir William Butler had been recalled; and General
+Forestier-Walker did all in his power to carry out the measures urged,
+and in most cases actually devised, by Lord Milner for the effective
+employment of the few thousand Imperial troops at his disposal. On the
+18th and 19th the Lancashire regiment was sent up-country from
+Capetown--half to garrison Kimberley, and half to hold the bridge that
+carried the main trunk line over the Orange River on its way
+northwards to Kimberley and then past the Transvaal border to
+Rhodesia. In doing this, however, Lord Milner was careful to point out
+to President Steyn that no menace was intended to the Free State,
+which, "in case of war with the Transvaal Her Majesty's Government
+hoped would remain neutral, and the neutrality of which would be most
+strictly respected." Such excellent use was made by Lord Milner of the
+six weeks which elapsed between the recall of General Butler and the
+ultimatum (October 9th-11th), that the handful of regulars dotted down
+before the Free State border of the colony, and skilfully distributed
+at strategic points upon the railways, sufficed to keep President
+Steyn's commandos from penetrating south of the Orange River, until
+the army corps had begun to disembark at the Cape ports. On this, as
+on another occasion to be subsequently noted, it is difficult to
+withhold a tribute of admiration to the gifted personality of the man
+who, himself a civilian, could thus readily apply his unique knowledge
+of South African conditions to the uses of the art of war. At the same
+time, the promptitude and efficiency displayed by the Indian military
+authorities provided Natal, by October 8th, with a force that proved
+just--and only just--sufficient to prevent the Boer commandos from
+sweeping right through that colony down to Durban.
+
+[Sidenote: The negotiations closed.]
+
+In the meantime the negotiations, having served their purpose, were
+being brought rapidly to a conclusion by the Pretoria Executive. On
+September 15th, as we have seen, the Republic notified its refusal to
+accept the terms offered in the British despatch of the 8th; and
+before that date, as we have also noted, some of the Transvaal
+commandos had been ordered to take up their positions on the Natal
+border. On the 22nd a meeting of the Cabinet was held in London, at
+which it was decided to mobilise the army corps--a measure advised by
+Lord Wolseley in June. At the same time Lord Milner was instructed by
+telegraph to communicate to the South African Republic a despatch[173]
+in which the British Government "absolutely denied and repudiated" the
+claim of the South African Republic to be a "sovereign international
+state," and informed the Pretoria Executive that its refusal to
+entertain the offer made on September 8th--
+
+         [Footnote 173: C. 9,530.]
+
+     "coming as it did at the end of nearly four months of protracted
+     negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation extending
+     over a period of more than five years, made it useless to further
+     pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and that Her
+     Majesty's Government were now compelled to consider the situation
+     afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final
+     settlement"
+
+of the questions at issue. The result of these deliberations was to be
+communicated to Lord Milner in a later despatch.
+
+[Sidenote: The Burghers mobilised.]
+
+This note of September 22nd, together with a second communication of
+the same date, in which Mr. Chamberlain warmly repudiated the charges
+of bad faith brought against Sir William Greene, reached the Pretoria
+Executive on the 25th, and on the same day it was known that a British
+force had entrained at Ladysmith for Glencoe. On the 26th intelligence
+of so serious a nature reached Lord Milner, that he telegraphed to
+warn the Home Government that the Transvaal and Free State were likely
+to take the initiative. According to Mr. Amery,[174] an ultimatum had
+been drafted upon receipt of the British note, and telegraphed on the
+following day to President Steyn for his approval. At Bloemfontein,
+however, the document was entirely recast by Mr. Fischer. Even so, in
+its amended form, it was ready on the 27th. On that day the Free State
+Raad, after six days of secret session, determined to join the sister
+Republic in declaring war upon Great Britain, and on the 28th the
+Transvaal commandos were mobilised. The ultimatum, according to the
+same authority, would have been delivered to Sir William Greene on
+Monday, October 2nd, had not deficiencies in the Boer transport and
+commissariat arrangements made it impossible for the burgher forces to
+advance immediately upon the British troops in Natal. At the last
+moment, also, President Steyn seems to have had some misgivings. On
+September 26th, together with the draft ultimatum from Pretoria, a
+suggestive telegram from Capetown, signed "Micaiah," and bidding him
+"Read chapter xxii. 1st Book of Kings, and accept warning," had
+reached him;[175] and a few days later he received, through Mr.
+Fischer, a powerful appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers.
+
+         [Footnote 174: _Times_ correspondent and editor of _The Times
+         History of the War_. Mr. Amery arrived at the Cape in the
+         second week of September, and was at Pretoria from September
+         24th to October 13th.]
+
+         [Footnote 175: Secured by Intelligence Department.]
+
+However this may be, the few administrative acts that remained to be
+taken were quickly accomplished in both Republics. In the Transvaal
+the remnant of the British population was already in flight; the law
+courts were suspended; the control of the railways was assumed by the
+Government and, in order to protect colonial recruits from the legal
+penalties attached to rebellion, on September 29th the Executive was
+empowered by the Volksraad to confer citizen rights on all aliens
+serving in the forces of the Republic. Not content with their
+barbarous expulsion of the British population, the Governments of both
+Republics for a week before the expiry of the ultimatum treated those
+of them who still remained as though a state of war had already been
+in existence. During these last days telegrams and letters praying for
+protection against some act of violence or spoliation were constantly
+arriving at Government House. But what could the High Commissioner do?
+The Army Corps was 6,000 miles away; the 10,000 defensive troops were
+most of them still on the water. The Free State, in Mr. Fischer's
+words, "did not recognise international law, and claimed to commandeer
+all persons whatsoever" under its own. In the Transvaal, Mr. Reitz
+(after consultation with Mr. Smuts) was coolly replying to the
+British Agent's protest against the seizure of the property of British
+subjects, including £150,000 worth of bar gold, that "the property of
+private individuals of whatever nationality could be, and was being,
+commandeered to the value of £15 a head."[176] On October 2nd the
+Transvaal Raads adjourned, and on the same day President Steyn
+informed the High Commissioner that the Free State burghers had been
+summoned for commando service. An interchange of telegrams then
+ensued, of which one, despatched on October 6th, is important as
+showing how earnestly Lord Milner seconded Mr. Chamberlain's endeavour
+to keep the door open for a peaceful settlement up to the last moment.
+
+         [Footnote 176: C. 9,530.]
+
+[Sidenote: Last words.]
+
+     "I have the honour," he said, "to acknowledge Your Honour's long
+     telegram of yesterday afternoon [the 5th], the substance of which
+     I have communicated to Her Majesty's Government. There is, I
+     think, a conclusive reply to Your Honour's accusation against the
+     policy of Her Majesty's Government, but no good purpose would be
+     served by recrimination. The present position is that burgher
+     forces are assembled in very large numbers in immediate proximity
+     to the frontiers of Natal, while the British troops occupy
+     certain defensive positions well within those borders. The
+     question is whether the burgher forces will invade British
+     territory, thus closing the door to any possibility of a pacific
+     solution. I cannot believe that the South African Republic will
+     take such aggressive action, or that Your Honour would
+     countenance such a course, which there is nothing to justify.
+     Prolonged negotiations have hitherto failed to bring about a
+     satisfactory understanding, and no doubt such understanding is
+     more difficult than ever to-day, after the expulsion of British
+     subjects with great loss and suffering; but until the threatened
+     act of aggression is committed I shall not despair of peace, and
+     I feel sure that any reasonable proposal, from whatever quarter
+     proceeding, would be favourably considered by Her Majesty's
+     Government if it offered an immediate termination of present
+     tension and a prospect of permanent tranquillity."[177]
+
+         [Footnote 177: C. 9,530.]
+
+With this--practically the final communication of the British
+Government--it is instructive to compare the "last words" of the two
+other protagonists. The Pretoria Executive, true to its policy of
+playing for time, sends through Mr. Reitz two long and argumentative
+replies to the British despatches of July 27th (the Joint Commission),
+and May 10th (Mr. Chamberlain's reply to the petition to the Queen).
+The Afrikander nationalists having failed to "mediate" in Pretoria and
+Bloemfontein, consoled themselves with a final effort in the shape of
+a direct appeal to the Queen. In a petition signed by the fifty-eight
+Afrikander members of both Houses of the Cape Parliament, including,
+of course, the members of the Schreiner Cabinet, they declare their
+earnest belief that the South African Republic "is fully awakened to
+the wisdom and discretion of making liberal provision for the
+representation of the Uitlanders," and urge Her Majesty's Government
+to appoint a Joint Commission--a proposal to which the British
+Government had declared that it was impossible to return. The effect
+of this somewhat half-hearted effort was, however, on this occasion
+appreciably diminished by the fact that the nationalist petition was
+accompanied by a resolution presented by fifty-three Progressive
+members of the Cape Parliament, embodying their entire disapproval of
+the opinion put forward by the petitioners, and containing the
+assurance that Her Majesty's Government might rely upon their
+strongest support.
+
+[Sidenote: The ultimatum delivered.]
+
+The ultimatum was delivered to Sir William Greene on the afternoon of
+Monday, October 9th, and forthwith telegraphed to the High
+Commissioner at Capetown. Although it was a week behind time at
+Pretoria, its arrival was somewhat unexpected at Government House.
+Saturday and Sunday had been days of quite unusual calm. The
+Secretary, whose business it was to decode the official telegrams,
+commenced his task with but languid interest. He had decoded so many
+apparently unnecessary and inconclusive despatches of late. At first
+this seemed very much like the others. But, as he worked on, he came
+upon words that startled him to a sudden attention:
+
+     "This Government ... in the interest not only of this Republic,
+     but also of all South Africa,... feels itself called upon and
+     obliged ... to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the
+     assurance:
+
+     "(_a_) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by
+     the friendly course of arbitration, or by whatever amicable way
+     may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's
+     Government.
+
+     "(_b_) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be
+     instantly withdrawn.
+
+     "(_c_) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in
+     South Africa since June 1st, 1899, shall be removed from South
+     Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this
+     Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee upon the
+     part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities
+     against any portion of the possessions of the British Government
+     shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within
+     a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the
+     Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith,
+     be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from
+     the borders.
+
+     "(_d_) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas
+     shall not be landed in any part of South Africa.
+
+     "This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative
+     answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her
+     Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon
+     Wednesday, October 11th, 1899, not later than five o'clock p.m.,
+     and it desires further to add that, in the event of unexpectedly
+     no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval,
+     it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of
+     Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will
+     not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and
+     that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place
+     within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our
+     borders, the Government will be compelled to regard that also as
+     a formal declaration of war.
+
+     "I have, etc.,
+                              "F. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_."[178]
+
+         [Footnote 178: C. 9,530.]
+
+[Sidenote: An appeal to Afrikanders.]
+
+The war had come; and come in the almost incredible form of a naked
+assertion of the intention of the South African Republic to oust Great
+Britain from its position of paramount Power in South Africa. And the
+declaration of war,[179] published two days later by President Steyn,
+was no less definite. It referred to Great Britain's "unfounded claim
+to paramountcy for the whole of South Africa, and thus also over this
+State," and exhorted the burghers of the Free State to "stand up as
+one man against the oppressor and violator of right." Even greater
+frankness characterised the appeal to "Free Staters and Brother
+Afrikanders" issued by Mr. Reitz. In this document[180] not only was
+the entire Dutch population of South Africa invited to rid themselves,
+by force of arms, of British supremacy, but the statement of the Boer
+case took the form of an impeachment that covered the whole period of
+British administration. Great Britain--
+
+         [Footnote 179: Cd. 43.]
+
+         [Footnote 180: _Ibid._]
+
+     "has, ever since the birth of our nation, been the oppressor of
+     the Afrikander and the native alike.
+
+     "From Slagter's Nek to Laing's Nek, from the Pretoria Convention
+     to the Bloemfontein Conference--they have ever been the
+     treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and
+     the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they
+     want the gold-fields of the Witwatersrand.
+
+     "Where is Waterboer to-day? He who had to be defended against the
+     Free State is to-day without an inch of ground. Where lies
+     Lobengula in his unknown grave to-day, and what fillibusters and
+     fortune-hunters are possessors of his country?
+
+     "Where are the native chiefs of Bechuanaland now, and who owns
+     their land?
+
+     "Read the history of South Africa, and ask yourselves: Has the
+     British Government been a blessing or a curse to this
+     sub-continent?
+
+     "Brother Afrikanders! I repeat, the day is at hand on which great
+     deeds are expected of us. WAR has broken out. What is it to be? A
+     wasted and enslaved South Africa, or--a Free, United South
+     Africa?
+
+     "Come, let us stand shoulder to shoulder and do our holy duty!
+     The Lord of Hosts will be our Leader.
+
+     "Be of good cheer.
+                                   "F. W. REITZ."
+
+That Monday night, besides repeating the ultimatum to the Home
+Government, Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the British authorities in
+Natal, Rhodesia, Basutoland, and the frontier towns.
+
+The ultimatum reached the Colonial Office at 6.45 a.m. on Tuesday. The
+reply, which was cabled to Lord Milner at 10.45 p.m. on the same day,
+was not unworthy of the occasion:
+
+[Sidenote: The British reply.]
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the
+     peremptory demands of the Government of the South African
+     Republic. You will inform the Government of the South African
+     Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the South
+     African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it
+     impossible to discuss."[181]
+
+         [Footnote 181: C. 9,530.]
+
+The High Commissioner was further desired to instruct Sir William
+Greene, in delivering the British reply, to ask for his passports.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS
+
+
+With the presentation of the Boer ultimatum the first and most
+difficult part of Lord Milner's task was accomplished. The actual
+pretensions of President Krüger and his republican confederates in the
+Free State and the Cape Colony were declared in a manner that could
+not fail to make them understood by the British people at home. The
+nationalists were unmasked. To what assurance of victory their
+military preparations had led them may be seen from the story of Mr.
+Amery's meeting with Mr. Reitz, two days before October 2nd, the
+Monday originally fixed for the delivery of the ultimatum. On the
+afternoon of this day, September 30th, Mr. Amery was walking with the
+State Secretary in Pretoria. Mr. Reitz, he tells us,[182] "suddenly
+turned round and said, 'Have you read _Treasure Island_? 'Yes.' 'Then
+you may remember the passage where they "tip the black spot" to Long
+John Silver?' 'Yes.' 'Well, I expect it will fall to my lot on Monday
+to "tip the black spot" to Long John Greene.' And hereupon the State
+Secretary cheerily detailed to his astounded listener the terms of the
+ultimatum, compliance with which might yet save the British Empire
+from war."
+
+         [Footnote 182: _Times History of the War in South Africa_,
+         vol. i., p. 360. It must be remembered that in the Transvaal
+         all telegrams had been strictly censored from the end of
+         August.]
+
+[Sidenote: Effect of the ultimatum.]
+
+Very different was the position at Capetown. Here there was no room
+either for levity or the insolence of anticipated triumph. Knowing
+what Lord Milner did--what he, of all men, had most cause to
+know--both of our unreadiness, and of the preparedness and confidence
+of the enemy, he could scarcely have looked forward to the future
+without the very gravest apprehension. None the less the ultimatum
+brought with it a certain sense of relief. The negotiations, which had
+degenerated long since into a diplomatic farce, were terminated. The
+situation had become once more clear. It has been the duty of few men
+to bear so heavy and so prolonged a burden of responsibility as that
+from which Lord Milner was thus set free. The danger that the Home
+Government, in its earnest desire for peace, might accept a settlement
+that would leave undecided the central issue of Boer or British
+supremacy in South Africa had never been wholly absent from his mind
+during the harassing negotiations that succeeded the Conference. Up to
+the very end there had been a haunting dread lest, in spite of his
+ceaseless vigilance and unstinted toil, a manifestation of British
+loyalty that would never be repeated should be coldly discouraged, and
+the nationalist movement allowed to proceed unchecked, until every
+colonist of British blood had surrendered the hope of remaining a
+citizen of the Empire for the degrading necessity of securing for
+himself and his children a tolerable position in the United States of
+South Africa by a timely alliance with the more progressive Dutch.
+From the presence of this danger Lord Milner was now relieved, since,
+as he instantly foresaw, the whip-lash of this frank appeal to force
+brought conviction where marshalled arguments were powerless to move.
+He had done what the religious enthusiasm of Livingstone, the
+political sagacity of Grey, the splendid devotion and prescience of
+Frere, and the Elizabethan statecraft of Rhodes, had failed to do. _He
+had made the Boer speak out._
+
+England was far from knowing all that these Boer aspirations meant, or
+the progress already achieved in the direction of their realisation.
+But this ignorance made the demands of the ultimatum seem the more
+insolent. To Mr. Balfour it was as though President Krüger had gone
+mad. But madness or insolence, the effect was the same. With the mass
+of the nation all hesitation, all balancing of arguments, were at an
+end. The one thing that was perceived was that any further attempt to
+treat with a people so minded would be an admission to the world that
+British supremacy had disappeared from South Africa. On this point,
+outside the narrow influence of a few professional partisans and
+peace-makers, there had never been any doubt: the only question was
+whether British supremacy was, or was not, in danger. The Boer
+challenge having resolved this question, the mind of the nation was
+made up. The army, as the instrument of its will, was called upon to
+give effect to its decision.
+
+[Sidenote: An anxious situation.]
+
+Two years and eight months elapsed between the expiration of the two
+days' grace allowed by the ultimatum and the surrender of Vereeniging.
+During the first twelve months of this period Lord Milner's
+initiative, though his position remained arduous, anxious, and
+responsible, and his activity unceasing, was necessarily subordinated
+to that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South
+Africa. But during the second period of the war--that is to say, from
+November 29th, 1900, when Lord Kitchener succeeded Lord Roberts--the
+constructive statesmanship of the High Commissioner was called forth
+in an increasing degree as the area secured for peaceable occupation
+became widened, and the problems involved in the settlement and future
+administration of the new colonies emerged into increasing prominence
+and importance. But even during the first period, when the task of the
+army was the comparatively simple one of overcoming the organised
+resistance of the Republics and subduing the rebellion in the Cape
+Colony, Lord Milner's unshaken confidence and perfect mastery of South
+African conditions proved of inestimable value.
+
+[Sidenote: Results and unpreparedness.]
+
+Five years later he described himself as an "incorrigible optimist."
+Optimist or not, at this time he harboured no illusions. He knew that
+the postponement or neglect of military preparations had left
+thousands of loyal subjects of the Crown in a position of entire
+defencelessness, and made rebellion easy for thousands of the
+disaffected Dutch. The first days of war, like the last days of peace,
+were punctuated by appeals for the troops that should have been in
+South Africa, but were in England; or for guns, rifles, and ammunition
+which Mr. Schreiner had kept idle in the colonial armouries until it
+was too late. On Friday, October 13th, he held a long and anxious
+consultation over the wires with Colonel Kekewich at Kimberley. A
+thousand rifles were wanted, and wanted instantly. The Cape Artillery
+15-pounders, reluctantly conceded at the last moment by Mr. Schreiner,
+had not come. They never came, for the next day Kimberley was cut off,
+and by Sunday morning Capetown had lost count of the border districts
+from Kimberley southward to Orange River. On this Friday the first
+definite piece of bad news reached the High Commissioner. An armoured
+train, trying to run back to Mafeking, had been captured by the Boers.
+In proportion as Lord Milner had urged the need of preparation for
+war, so now he was the first to realise how grave would be the results
+of unpreparedness. Fortunately, his comments upon the events of these
+first three months of the war have been preserved; and the record of
+what was passing in his mind from day to day reveals a burden of
+anxiety that contrasts sharply with the easy tolerance with which the
+first bad news was received in England. On Wednesday, the 18th, a week
+after the ultimatum had expired, he wrote of Natal: "We are being
+slowly surrounded, and our force unwisely split up." He was gravely
+concerned for the safety of Kimberley, and he "doubted the ability of
+Mafeking to hold out." On November 1st, the day after General Buller
+had landed at Capetown, he wrote: "Things are going from bad to worse
+to-day. In Natal the Orange Free State Boers are making a move on
+Colenso, while in the Colony they have crossed in force at Bethulie;
+and there is also some suspicion of an attack on the line between
+Orange River bridge and De Aar." On November 9th, the arrival of the
+_Rosslyn Castle_, the first of the Army Corps transports, brought a
+gleam of brightness. She was a little late, as she had been warned to
+go out of her course after leaving Las Palmas, to avoid a suspicious
+vessel. But Methuen's first engagements seemed to him to be Pyrrhic
+victories. It was "the old story of charging positions from which the
+enemy simply clears, after having shot a lot of our men." On December
+5th "alarming rumours came pouring in from all over the Colony," and
+two days later Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the Secretary of State
+that the war was now aggravated by rebellion. On Saturday, December
+16th, the day after Colenso, he wrote: "This has been a week of
+disasters, to-day being the worst of all. News was received this
+morning that Buller had been severely defeated yesterday in attempting
+to force the passage of the Tugela."
+
+It was a time when he was receiving the panic outcry for the immediate
+relief of Kimberley, in which Rhodes vented his rage at the military
+impotence to which for the moment England had allowed herself to be
+reduced in South Africa; when his councils with his ministers were
+"gloomy functions," and his Prime Minister's arguments against the
+measures which he deemed necessary for the defence of the Colony and
+the protection of the native territories had become not merely
+wearisome but embittered. His main resource lay in his intense
+activity. It was his custom, during this critical period, to begin the
+day by seeing Mr. Eliot and Mr. Price, the heads of the railways, and
+Mr. French, the Postmaster-General. In this way he received
+information of every movement of any significance that had occurred
+within the range of the railway and post-office systems during the
+preceding twenty-four hours--information which was of the highest
+utility both to him and to the military authorities. Then followed an
+endless succession of visitors, from the Prime Minister to the most
+recent newspaper correspondent out from home, and a long afternoon
+and evening of concentrated and unbroken labour upon despatches,
+proclamations, minutes, and other official documents. A short ride or
+walk was sometimes interpolated, but his days were a dead round of
+continuous occupation. "One day is so like another--crowded with work;
+all hateful, but with no very special feature," he wrote. But of
+another he says: "Worked very hard all day; the usual interviews. It
+was very difficult to take one's mind off the absorbing subject of the
+ill success of our military operations."
+
+Mr. Balfour called the insolence of the ultimatum "madness." But Lord
+Milner knew that it was no madness, but an assured belief in victory;
+a confidence founded upon long years of earnest preparation for war;
+upon the blood-ties of the most tenacious of European peoples; upon a
+Nature that spread her wings over the rough children of the veld and
+menaced their enemies with the heat and glamour of her sun, with
+famine and drought and weariness, with all the hidden dangers that
+lurked in her glittering plains and rock-strewn uplands.
+
+[Sidenote: Aspects of the war.]
+
+It is not proposed to give any detailed account of the military
+operations which led, first, to the annexation of the Boer Republics,
+and then to the actual disarmament of the entire Dutch population of
+South Africa. The most that the plan of this work permits of is to
+present the broad outlines of the war in such a manner that the
+several phases of the military conflict may be seen in true
+perspective, and the relationship between them and the administrative
+efforts of Lord Milner be correctly indicated. But it will not be
+found inconsistent with this restricted treatment to refer to certain
+conspicuous features of the war upon which contemporary discussion has
+chiefly centred, and in respect of which opinions have been pronounced
+that do not seem likely to harmonise in all cases with the results of
+a more mature judgment and a less interested inquiry.
+
+The test by which the success or failure of any given military effort
+is to be measured is, of course, the test of results. But the
+application of this test must not be embarrassed by the assumption,
+which seems to have vitiated so much otherwise admirable criticism on
+the conduct of the war in South Africa, that every action in which a
+properly equipped and wisely directed force is engaged must
+necessarily be successful: or that, if it be not successful, it
+follows, as a matter of course, that the officer in command, or one of
+his subordinates, must have committed some open and ascertainable
+violation of the principles of military science. So far is this from
+being the case, that military history is full of examples in which the
+highest merit and resolution of a commander have been nullified or
+cheated by the wanton interferences of physical nature, or by acts on
+the part of subordinates admittedly beyond the control of any human
+skill or foresight.[183]
+
+         [Footnote 183: This chapter was in type some weeks before
+         Vol. I. of the Official History of the War was published.
+         Where, however, the Official History amends or supplements
+         figures, documents, etc., given in earlier official
+         publications, the fact is mentioned in a foot-note.]
+
+[Sidenote: Delay of operations.]
+
+Any just appreciation of the events of the first year of the war must
+be based upon a clear understanding of the degree in which the
+military action of the Salisbury Cabinet fell short of the advice
+given by Lord Milner, and, in an equal degree by Lord Wolseley, the
+Commander-in-Chief. We have noticed already[184] the grave inadequacy
+of the measures of preparation for war carried out in South Africa
+between the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference and the recall of
+General Butler. On June 1st the South African garrison consisted of
+4,462 men in Cape Colony, and 5,827 men in Natal; or 10,289 men with
+24 field-guns in all.[185] On August 2nd the Government decided to
+send 2,000 additional troops to Natal, and the Indian Government was
+warned, a little later, that certain troops might be required for
+service in South Africa. In spite of Lord Milner's urgent
+representations of the danger of leaving the colonies unprotected, no
+considerable body of troops, as we have seen, was ordered out, until
+the diplomatic situation had become seriously aggravated by the
+definite failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene
+through Mr. Smuts.
+
+         [Footnote 184: See p. 191.]
+
+         [Footnote 185: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission). The Official
+         _History of the War in South Africa_ gives the total on
+         August 2nd as "not exceeding 9,940 men."]
+
+Of the 10,000 men despatched after the Cabinet meeting of September
+8th, more than half were requisitioned from the Indian Army, while the
+remainder were drawn mainly from the Mediterranean garrisons.
+
+Thus, by the beginning of the second week in October there were 22,104
+British troops in South Africa, of whom 7,400 were at the Cape and
+14,704 in Natal, and 60 field-guns.[186] But the Army Corps, the
+"striking force," was still in England. In pursuance of its
+determination to postpone to the last moment any action that could be
+represented as an attempt to force a war upon the Boers, the British
+Government had refrained from giving orders for the mobilisation of
+the offensive force until October 7th, or a fortnight after the
+Cabinet meeting of September 22nd, when its determination to
+"formulate its own proposals" was communicated to the Transvaal
+Government.[187] It was then calculated that three months must elapse
+before this force could be equipped, transported, and placed in the
+field in South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 186: Cd. 1,789. But the Official History gives the
+         British total at the outbreak of war as 27,054 men (as
+         against over 50,000 burghers); of whom 15,811 (including
+         2,781 local troops) were in Natal, 5,221 regulars and 4,574
+         local troops were in the Cape Colony, and 1,448 men, raised
+         locally by Col. Baden-Powell, were in Mafeking and Southern
+         Rhodesia.]
+
+         [Footnote 187: But the Admiralty were given details of the
+         offensive force on September 20th. (_Official History._)]
+
+[Sidenote: No political gain.]
+
+Before recording the disastrous effects of the postponement of
+effective military preparations, from June to September, it remains to
+consider whether any political gains, sufficient to compensate for the
+loss of military strength, were secured. The policy of relying upon
+Afrikander advice failed; since, as we have seen, the admonitions of
+Sir Henry de Villiers and Mr. Hofmeyr came too late to turn President
+Krüger from an obduracy founded upon long years of military
+preparation. The over-sea British had made up their minds in June; and
+nothing occurred in the subsequent negotiations to deepen their
+conviction of the essential justice of the British cause. India was
+unmoved; indeed, the Hindu masses were slightly sympathetic, while the
+feudatory princes came forward with offers of men and treasure to the
+Government of the Queen-Empress. The attitude of the respective
+governments of France, Germany, and Russia was correct. But what
+secured this result was not any perception of the moderation of the
+British demands, or any recognition of the genuine reluctance of the
+British Government to make war, but the sight of the British Navy
+everywhere holding the seas, the rapidity and ease with which large
+bodies of troops were transported from every quarter of the British
+world, and the manner in which each reverse was met by a display of
+new and unexpected reserves of military strength.
+
+If the British Government thought that it would win the peoples of
+Continental Europe to its side by a show of hesitation to make war
+upon a weak state, the sequel proved that it had gravely misunderstood
+the conditions under which international respect is produced. Hatred
+of England rose in inverse ratio to the evidence of the justness of
+her cause. When the Boers were victorious, or seemed to be most
+capable of defying the efforts of the largest fighting force that
+Great Britain had ever put into the field; when, that is to say, it
+was most clearly demonstrated that British supremacy in South Africa
+could only have been maintained by force of arms against the
+formidable rival which had risen against it, then the wave of popular
+hatred surged highest. When the British arms prospered, the clamour
+sank; but only to rise again until it was finally allayed by the
+knowledge that the Boer resistance was at an end, and that the British
+Empire had emerged from the conflict a stronger and more united power.
+
+[Sidenote: Attitude of the United States.]
+
+The case of the United States was somewhat different. Here was an
+industrial nation like our own; and one, moreover, whose people were
+qualified alike by constitutional and legal tradition, habits of
+thought, and identity of language, to have discerned the reality of
+the reluctance displayed by the British Government to employ force
+until every resource of diplomacy and every device of statecraft had
+been exhausted, and to have drawn the conclusion that the power which
+drove the Government into war was a sense of duty, and not greed of
+territory. Moreover, there was at this time, at any rate among the
+more cultivated classes, a feeling of gratitude for the action of
+Great Britain in preventing European intervention during the
+Spanish-American war, and a genuine desire, on that ground alone, to
+show sympathy with the English people in the conflict in which they
+had become involved. In these circumstances it is somewhat strange
+that public opinion in the United States was unmistakably inclined to
+favour the Boers during almost the entire period of the war. It is
+perfectly true that the United States Government was consistently
+friendly; but this did not alter the fact that the dominant note in
+nearly all public expressions of the sentiment of the United States'
+people was one of sympathy with the Boer, and of hostility to the
+British cause. It might have been thought that, just as most
+Englishmen, in the case of the conflict between the United States and
+Spain, were prepared to assume that a nation imbued with the
+traditions and principles of the Anglo-Saxon race would not have
+undertaken to enforce its will upon a weak Power without having
+convinced itself first of the justice of its cause, so the Americans
+would have entertained an equally favourable presumption in respect of
+the people of Great Britain. That this was not done is due to a cause
+which is as significant as it is well ascertained. Making all
+allowance for the prejudice against England inevitably aroused in the
+minds of the less thoughtful members of a great democratic community,
+by the fact that her opponent was both a weak state and a republic,
+this very general refusal to accept the political morality of the
+English people as a guarantee of the justice of their action in South
+Africa suggests the presence of another and more specific influence.
+The explanation given by Americans is that the English nation was
+itself divided upon the question of the morality of the South African
+War--or, at any rate, that the public utterances that reached the
+United States were such as to convey this impression. That being so,
+they ask, Can you blame us for hesitating to adopt what was at the
+most, as we understood it, the opinion of a majority? In support of
+this view they point to the public utterances, before and after the
+war had broken out, of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley,
+and Mr. Bryce. Of these, the former was the official head of the
+Liberal Party, while the two latter were men whose literary
+achievements had made their names and personalities both familiar and
+respected in the United States. If the opinions of these public men
+were on this occasion wholly unrepresentative, why, they ask, were
+their speeches and articles unrefuted; or, at any rate, allowed to go
+forth to the world uncondemned by any clear and authoritative
+manifestation of the dissent and displeasure of their countrymen?
+
+[Sidenote: Injurious declarations.]
+
+That declarations such as these did in fact produce injurious effects
+directly calculable in human lives, in money, and in the waste and
+devastation of war, is a fact which will claim the attention of the
+reader on a subsequent occasion. They came not merely from the mouths of
+the Irish Nationalists, and of advanced Radicals such as Mr.
+Lloyd-George and Mr. John Burns, but from men of wider repute. That
+public opinion should have allowed responsible Englishmen in time of war
+to "speak and write as though they belonged to the enemy,"--whether due
+to an exaggerated regard for our traditional freedom of speech, or to a
+failure to recognise that the altered conditions produced by the
+extension and perfection of telegraphic communication, and the
+development of the Press throughout the civilised world, gave such
+utterances a value in international relations altogether different from
+that possessed (say) by similar utterances on the part of the
+anti-nationalists during the Napoleonic wars--is a circumstance that
+merits the most serious consideration. No one will deny that this
+unpatriotic form of opposition, so long as it exists, constitutes an
+ever-recurring danger to the most vital interests of the community. The
+ultimate remedy lies in the creation of a representative council of the
+Empire, and the consequent separation of questions of inter-imperial and
+foreign policy from the local and irrelevant issues of party politics.
+Until this is done, it remains to establish a mutual understanding
+under which such questions would be recognised as being outside the
+sphere of party recrimination; and for this purpose it is necessary to
+create a force of public opinion strong enough to compel the observance
+of this understanding; or, failing this, to visit its non-observance
+with political penalties commensurate to the injury inflicted.
+
+[Sidenote: The Army Corps absorbed.]
+
+The conflict which followed the expiration of the forty-eight hours
+allowed by the Boer ultimatum is in more than one respect the most
+extraordinary in the annals of war. The existence of the cable and
+telegraph made instant and continuous communication possible between
+the army in the field and the nation at home. Public opinion, informed
+by the daily records furnished by the Press, became a factor in
+determining the conduct of the war. Nor is it strange that a civilian
+population, separated by 6,000 miles from the theatre of operations,
+should have proved an injurious counsellor. The army was ordered to
+conquer a people, but forbidden to employ the methods by which alone
+it has been hitherto held that conquest is attainable. But no
+influence exercised upon the course of the war by false
+humanitarianism or political partisanship produced any results
+comparable to the original injury inflicted upon the British Army by
+the ignorance and irresolution displayed by the nation. The
+postponement of effective military preparations by the Home Government
+until the necessity for these preparations had become so plain that
+no effort of the Opposition could embarrass its action, was the _fons
+et origo_ of all subsequent disaster. The failure to mobilise the Army
+Corps in June had placed the Army in a position of disadvantage at the
+outbreak of the war, from which it never wholly recovered. The
+original striking force--the Army Corps--was not employed in its
+proper function, but absorbed, upon its arrival in South Africa, in
+the task of supporting the defensive forces. Twenty-two thousand men,
+with an Army Corps advancing upon Bloemfontein or Pretoria, would have
+sufficed to repel attacks upon the colonial frontiers, and to check
+rebellion in the Cape Colony. But twenty-two thousand men defending
+one thousand miles of frontier from a mobile force nearly twice as
+numerous with the Army Corps six thousand miles away in England, was a
+very different thing. Yet this was the situation in which the nation,
+by withholding from the Government the support necessary to enable it
+to give effect to the advice of Lord Wolseley, had elected to place
+the British Army. The plan of mobilisation, long prepared and complete
+in all particulars, worked with perfect success. Twenty Companies of
+the Army Service Corps sailed on October 6th, a day before the actual
+mobilisation order was issued. The rest of the offensive force--one
+Cavalry Division, one Army Corps, and eight battalions of lines of
+communication troops--began to be embarked on October 20th, and by
+November 17th the long succession of transports, bearing the whole of
+the men, horses, and guns of which it was composed (with the exception
+of one cavalry regiment detained by horse sickness), had sailed for
+South Africa. This was Lord Wolseley's task, and it was promptly and
+efficiently performed. The War Office was not inefficient; but the
+refusal to mobilise in June had thrown the whole scheme of the
+offensive and defensive campaign out of gear.
+
+[Sidenote: General Buller.]
+
+With the evidence of the War Commission before us, it is impossible to
+divest General Buller of a share of responsibility for the disastrous
+conditions under which the war was commenced. He was nominated to the
+South African command in June, and he was consulted upon the strength
+and composition of the force which was to be employed. On July 7th
+Lord Wolseley asked the Government, apart from the immediate
+mobilisation of the Army Corps which he still urged, to "consider
+whether we should not at a very early date send one Infantry Division
+and one Cavalry Brigade--say 10,000 men--to South Africa," adding that
+he had "no doubt as to the present necessity of strengthening our
+military position." But ten days later the despatch of this
+reinforcement of 10,000 men was "not considered urgent." Since,
+according to Lord Wolseley's minute of the proceedings of the meeting
+held at the War Office on July 18th, 1899, General Buller used the
+weight of his authority to support General Butler's opposition to Lord
+Milner's urgent request for immediate reinforcements. In reply to a
+question as to the desirability of strengthening the South African
+garrisons, he said on this occasion, that--
+
+     "he had complete confidence in Butler's ability and forethought,
+     and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons on the spot
+     did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out
+     any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our
+     position against any possible attack by the Boers on our
+     frontiers."
+
+This memorandum, Lord Wolseley added, contained not the "exact words,"
+but the "exact meaning" of what he said.[188] It was the precise
+opposite of the view which Lord Milner had laid before the Home
+Government.[189] Indeed the degree in which General Buller had
+misconceived the entire military situation in South Africa became at
+once apparent when he reached Capetown. He had come out to South
+Africa with the not unnatural idea that he was to command a definite
+British army, which was to engage a definite Boer army. When he had
+learnt from Lord Milner and others what the situation actually was, he
+is said to have gathered up his new impressions in the remark: "It
+seems to me that I have got to conquer the whole of South Africa."
+General Buller even appears to have shared the common belief of his
+fellow-countrymen at home that the Cape was a British colony not only
+in name but in fact. Nor was he prepared to abandon this belief all at
+once. He suggested to the High Commissioner that it would be possible
+to form local defence forces out of the Dutch farmers in the Colony.
+Lord Milner said that this was totally impracticable; but he added
+that he would consult Mr. Schreiner on the matter. It is needless to
+say, however, that the Prime Minister deprecated the proposal in the
+most emphatic terms.[190]
+
+         [Footnote 188: Cd. 1,789, pp. 15-17.]
+
+         [Footnote 189: Nor was the Intelligence Department less
+         urgent than Lord Milner. "In July of last year [1899],
+         earlier warnings being disregarded, a formal communication
+         was made for the consideration of the Cabinet, advising the
+         despatch of a large force fully equipped, estimated to be
+         sufficient to safeguard Natal and Cape Colony from the first
+         onrush of the Boers."--Sir John Ardagh, in _The Balfourian
+         Parliament_, 1900-1905. By Henry W. Lucy, p. 10. See also the
+         evidence of the War Commission, and the "Military Notes"
+         issued by the D. M. I. in June (1899).]
+
+         [Footnote 190: In a memorandum of November 20th (furnished to
+         Gen. Forestier-Walker) Gen. Buller, on the eve of starting
+         for Natal, gives as a first paragraph in his "appreciation of
+         the situation" the following remark: "1. Ever since I have
+         been here we have been like the man, who, with a long day's
+         work before him, overslept himself and so was late for
+         everything all day." (_Official History_, p. 209.)]
+
+The War Office scheme was designed to provide a defensive force to
+hold the colonies, and an offensive force to invade the Republics. In
+the three months that elapsed before this scheme was put into effect,
+the conditions upon which it was based had changed completely. On the
+day that Buller reached Capetown (October 31st) White, with almost the
+whole of the Natal defensive force, was shut up in Ladysmith by
+Joubert. When at length the last units of the Army Corps were landed
+(December 4th) in South Africa, Buller was at Maritzburg, organising a
+force for the relief of White; and practically the entire offensive
+force had been broken up to disengage the defensive forces, or save
+them from destruction. Buller himself had 14,000 of the Army Corps in
+Natal, and more were to follow; Methuen was taking 8,000 men for the
+relief of Kimberley; and the balance were being pushed up to
+strengthen the original defensive forces that were holding the
+railways immediately South of the Orange Free State border, and
+checking the rebellion in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony.
+Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg (December 10th), Methuen's defeat at
+Magersfontein (December 11th), and Buller's defeat at Colenso
+(December 15th) together provided ample evidence of the fact that,
+however desirable it might be to assume the offensive, a purely
+defensive _rôle_ must for the time be assigned to the troops then in
+South Africa; and that this state of affairs must continue until the
+arrival of very considerable reinforcements.
+
+[Sidenote: New striking force necessary.]
+
+The perception of this fact caused the Government to appoint (December
+17th) Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his Chief-of-Staff, to the
+South African command, and to prepare and despatch an entirely new
+striking force. It was this new force and not the original Army Corps
+that "marched to Pretoria," and struck the successive blows which
+enabled Lord Roberts to report to the Secretary of State for War
+(November 15th, 1900) that; "with the occupation of Komati Poort, and
+the dispersal of Commandant-General Louis Botha's army, the organised
+resistance of the two Republics might be said to have ceased." It was
+not, therefore, until Lord Roberts was able to march from Modder River
+Station (February 11th, 1900), after a month spent at the Cape in
+reorganising the transport and other preparations essential to the
+success of an army destined to advance for many hundreds of miles
+through a hostile country, that the British Army in South Africa was
+in the position in which the acceptance of Lord Wolseley's advice,
+given in June and July, 1899, would have put it upon the outbreak of
+war. Nor was the force with which Lord Roberts then advanced, 36,000
+men, more numerous than the striking force which would have been
+provided, by Lord Wolseley's scheme, had it been carried out in the
+manner in which he desired. For the business with which the scattered
+Army Corps was occupied when Lord Roberts arrived at Capetown (January
+10th, 1900)--the relief of Ladysmith and Kimberley, and the defence of
+the eastern districts of the Cape Colony from the Free State commandos
+and the colonial rebels--was work directly caused by the absence of
+the Army Corps from South Africa when the war broke out. It is not too
+much to say that the whole of the serious losses incurred by the
+British forces in South Africa from the commencement of the war up to
+the date of Lord Roberts's advance into the Free State territory,
+would have been avoided if the state of public opinion had permitted
+the Salisbury Cabinet in June to make military preparations
+commensurate with the gravity of the situation as disclosed by Lord
+Milner.
+
+[Sidenote: The regular army exhausted.]
+
+In forming an estimate of the performance of the British Army in South
+Africa, from a military point of view, it is necessary to remember the
+grave initial disadvantage in which it was placed; and that this
+initial disadvantage was due, not to the War Office, not to the
+Cabinet, but to the nation itself. The manner in which the losses thus
+caused were repaired is significant and instructive. By the end of the
+year (1899), the troops composing three divisions in excess of the
+Army Corps were either landed in South Africa or under orders to
+proceed to the seat of war. In addition to the 22,000 defensive troops
+in South Africa on October 11th, the War Office had supplied, not
+merely the 47,000 men of the Army Corps, but 85,000 men in all. But,
+having done this, it had practically reached the limit of troops
+available in the regular army for over-sea operations. By April, 1900,
+all the reserves had been used up. There remained, it is true, 103,023
+"effectives" of all ranks of the regular army in the United Kingdom on
+April 1st; but this total was composed of 37,333 "immature" troops; of
+the recruits who had joined since October 1st, 1899; of reservists
+unfit for foreign service; and of sick and wounded sent home from
+South Africa: that is to say, of men who, for one reason or another,
+were all alike unfit for service abroad.[191] Further drafts might
+have been made upon the British regulars in India; but this course was
+held to be imprudent. In plain words, the exhaustion of the regular
+army compelled the Government to avail itself more fully of the offers
+of military aid which had reached it from the colonies, and to utilise
+the militia and volunteer forces. On December 18th, 1899, the
+announcement was made that the War Office would allow twelve militia
+battalions to volunteer for service abroad, and that a considerable
+force of yeomanry and a contingent of picked men from the volunteers
+would be accepted. This appeal to the latent military resources of the
+Empire met with a ready and ample response. Throughout the whole
+course of the war the United Kingdom sent 45,566 militia, 19,856
+volunteers, and 35,520 yeomanry, with 7,273 South African
+Constabulary, and 833 Scottish Horse; the over-sea colonies (including
+305 volunteers from India) provided 30,633 men;[192] while of the
+small British population in South Africa no less than the astonishing
+total of 46,858 took part in the war.[193] In all some 200,000
+men--militia, volunteers, and irregulars--came forward to supplement
+the regular army.
+
+         [Footnote 191: Cd. 1,789.]
+
+         [Footnote 192: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 193: See returns cited by Lord Roberts in House of
+         Lords, February 27th, 1906. The irregulars _raised_ in South
+         Africa were between 50,000 and 60,000, according to the _War
+         Commission Report_.]
+
+[Sidenote: Auxiliary forces utilised.]
+
+It was mainly from the auxiliary forces and the colonial contingents,
+and not from the regular army, that the reinforcements were supplied
+which repaired the critical losses of the defensive campaign, and
+enabled the new striking force to be organised. Nor can it be said
+that the British Government failed to do all that was possible to
+retrieve its original error, when once the defeats inflicted by the
+Boer forces had awakened it to a knowledge of the real situation in
+South Africa. In his despatch of February 6th, 1900, Lord Roberts was
+able to report that, on January 31st, there was an effective fighting
+force of nearly 40,000 men in Natal and another of 60,000 in the Cape
+Colony. Mr. Chamberlain put the case for the Government at its highest
+in speaking at Birmingham on May 11th, 1900:
+
+     "Supposing that twelve months ago any man had said in public that
+     this country would be able to send out from its own shores and
+     from its own citizens an army of more than 150,000 men, fully
+     equipped, and that it would be joined by another force of more
+     than 30,000 men, voluntarily offered by our self-governing
+     colonies ... if he had said that this army, together numbering
+     200,000 men, or thereabouts, could have been provided with the
+     best commissariat, with the most admirable medical appliances and
+     stores that had ever accompanied an army--if he could have said
+     that at the same time there would have remained behind in this
+     country something like half a million of men, who although they
+     may not be equal man to man to the regulars and best-drilled
+     armies, are nevertheless capable of bearing arms to some
+     purpose--if he had said all this, he would have been laughed to
+     scorn."
+
+Moreover, the army was successful. The work which it was required to
+do was done. In order to realise the merit of its success two
+circumstances must be borne in mind: first, the enormous area of South
+Africa, and, second, the fact that practically the whole of this area,
+if we except the few considerable towns, was not only ill-provided
+with means of communication and food supplies, but inhabited by a
+population which was openly hostile, or, what was worse, secretly
+disaffected. Lord Roberts, in the course of his despatches,
+endeavoured to bring home both of these circumstances to the public in
+England.
+
+Of the area he wrote:[194]
+
+         [Footnote 194: November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.]
+
+     "The magnitude of the task which Her Majesty's Imperial troops
+     have been called upon to perform will perhaps be better realised
+     if I give the actual number of miles of the several lines of
+     communication, each one of which has had to be carefully guarded,
+     and compare with the well-known countries of Europe the enormous
+     extent of the theatre of war, from one end of which to the other
+     troops have had to be frequently moved.
+
+[Sidenote: Vastness of South Africa.]
+
+     "The areas included in the theatre of war are as follows:
+
+                                         Square Miles.
+               Cape Colony                  277,151
+               Orange River Colony           48,326
+               Transvaal                    113,640
+               Natal                         18,913
+                                           --------
+                  Total                     458,030
+                                           --------
+               Rhodesia                     750,000
+
+     "And the distances troops have had to travel are:
+
+                    By Land                  Miles.
+               Capetown to Pretoria          1,040
+               Pretoria to Komati Poort        260
+               Capetown to Kimberley           647
+               Kimberley to Mafeking           223
+               Mafeking to Pretoria            160
+               Mafeking to Beira             1,135
+               Durban to Pretoria              511
+
+     "From these tables it will be seen that, after having been
+     brought by sea 6,000 miles and more from their base in the United
+     Kingdom, the army in South Africa had to be distributed over an
+     area of greater extent than France (204,146 square miles) and
+     Germany (211,168 square miles) put together, and, if we include
+     that part of Rhodesia with which we had to do, larger than the
+     combined areas of France, Germany, and Austria (261,649 square
+     miles)."
+
+Of the nature of the country and its inhabitants he wrote:[195]
+
+         [Footnote 195: November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.]
+
+     "And it should be remembered that over these great distances we
+     were dependent on single lines of railway for the food supply,
+     guns, ammunition, horses, transport animals, and hospital
+     equipment, in fact, all the requirements of an army in the
+     field, and that, along these lines, bridges and culverts had
+     been destroyed in many places, and rails were being constantly
+     torn up."
+
+And of the Cape Colony he wrote:[196]
+
+         [Footnote 196: February 6th, 1900. Capetown.]
+
+     "The difficulties of carrying on war in South Africa do not
+     appear to be sufficiently appreciated by the British public. In
+     an enemy's country we should know exactly how we stood; but out
+     here we have not only to defeat the enemy on the northern
+     frontier, but to maintain law and order within the colonial
+     limits. Ostensibly, the Dependency is loyal, and no doubt a large
+     number of its inhabitants are sincerely attached to the British
+     rule and strongly opposed to Boer domination. On the other hand,
+     a considerable section would prefer a republican form of
+     government, and, influenced by ties of blood and association,
+     side with the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Even the
+     public service at the Cape is not free from men whose sympathies
+     with the enemy may lead them to divulge secrets and give valuable
+     assistance to the Boer leaders in other ways."
+
+[Sidenote: The offensive campaign.]
+
+Bearing in mind that the offensive campaign dates, not from the expiry
+of the Boer ultimatum on October 11th, 1899, but from Lord Roberts's
+advance from Modder River Station on February 11th, 1900, the mere
+record of dates and events is sufficiently impressive. On February
+12th the Free State border was crossed; on the 15th Kimberley was
+relieved, on the 27th Cronje's force surrendered at Paardeberg, on the
+28th Ladysmith was relieved, and on March 13th Bloemfontein, the
+capital of the Free State, was occupied. The army again advanced
+early in May; Kroonstad was entered on the 12th; on May 24th, the
+Queen's birthday, the Free State was annexed; the Vaal was crossed on
+the 27th, Johannesburg was occupied on the 31st, and on June 5th the
+British flag was hoisted on the Raadzaal at Pretoria. In the meantime
+Mafeking had been relieved with absolute punctuality on May 17th.[197]
+On June 11th the Boers evacuated Laing's Nek and Majuba, and the Natal
+Field Force, under Buller, entered the Transvaal from the south-east.
+The next day Roberts defeated the Boers under Louis Botha at Diamond
+Hill. On July 30th Prinsloo and 4,000 burghers surrendered to Hunter;
+on August 27th the main Transvaal army, under Louis Botha, was again
+defeated at Dalmanutha, and on September 1st the Transvaal was
+annexed. On the 11th President Krüger fled the Transvaal; Komati
+Poort, the eastern frontier town on the railway line to Delagoa Bay,
+was entered on the 24th, and two days later railway communication was
+re-opened between Delagoa Bay and Pretoria.
+
+         [Footnote 197: Lord Roberts had asked Col. Baden-Powell how
+         long he could hold out at Mafeking, and then promised that
+         the relief of the town should be effected within the required
+         period.]
+
+In spite of the vast area and harassing conditions of the war, in
+spite of its own military unpreparedness, and the unexpected strength
+of the Boer attack, the Power which created the Republics had
+destroyed them within less than a twelvemonth from the day on which
+they had defied it.
+
+At this point it will be convenient to place on record certain general
+conclusions which arise out of the events and circumstances of the
+South African War, and to consider certain military criticisms which
+have been offered upon the conduct of the British Army in the field.
+
+We have seen that the initial losses of the campaign were due, not to
+any defects in the Army as a fighting force, but to the position in
+which the Army was placed by the irresolution of the nation. We have
+seen also that within less than a year of the ultimatum the capitals
+of the two Republics were occupied, and their power of "organised
+resistance" was destroyed. During this stage of the war the regular
+Army, small as it was, supplemented by selected reinforcements from
+the auxiliary services, and by the colonial contingents, sufficed to
+do the work required of it. In the second stage, when the work to be
+accomplished was nothing less than the disarmament of the entire Dutch
+population of South Africa, the character of the reinforcements
+supplied had greatly depreciated,[198] and the prolongation of the war
+was in part to be attributed to this circumstance. For the present,
+however, it will be sufficient to confine our observations to the
+period of "organised resistance."
+
+         [Footnote 198: One fighting British general stated that one
+         of the first stage force was equal to five of the men
+         supplied after the reserves had been used up in April,
+         1900.]
+
+[Sidenote: General conclusions.]
+
+The first of these conclusions is the fact that the real evil revealed
+by the South African War is not the inefficiency, or unpreparedness of
+the War Office, but the ignorance,[199] and therefore unpreparedness,
+of the country. From this unreadiness for war on the part of the
+nation as a whole there sprang two results: (1) the refusal of the
+Salisbury Cabinet to allow the War Office to make adequate military
+preparations in June, and the disregard of the advice alike of Lord
+Milner and Lord Wolseley; (2) the insufficient supply of reserves for
+the forces in the field, arising ultimately from the small percentage
+of men in the nation trained to the use of arms.
+
+         [Footnote 199: For the direct part played by the Liberal
+         leaders in the production of this ignorance, see p. 256.]
+
+The second conclusion to which we are led is that the specific result
+of the absence of effective preparations for War in June was to throw
+the War Office scheme of a fighting force out of gear. Twenty-two
+thousand defensive troops, with a striking force of fifty thousand in
+South Africa, would have proved sufficient to attain the ends of
+British policy. As it was, the Army Corps being in England when
+hostilities commenced, and not arriving in its entirety until December
+4th, the fifty thousand offensive force was absorbed in the work of
+extricating the twenty-two thousand defensive force. In other words,
+the British Army was not put in the position contemplated by Lord
+Wolseley's scheme until an entirely new fighting force had been
+organised and advanced from Modder River in the beginning of February,
+1900. This new striking force was identical in numbers with the
+original striking force, the Army Corps,[200] provided by Lord
+Wolseley's scheme.
+
+[Sidenote: Criticisms examined.]
+
+Among criticisms on the British Army in the field there are two that
+claim attention. The first of these is the allegation that military
+efficiency was sacrificed to a desire to spare life. In so far as this
+criticism is concerned with the handling of their troops by British
+commanders, it is strenuously denied that either Lord Roberts, or any
+of his subordinates, allowed a desire to spare the lives of the troops
+under their command to interfere with the successful execution of any
+military operation. The specific example of the alleged interference
+of this motive, usually cited, is the conduct of the attack upon the
+Boer position at Paardeberg. In respect of these operations the actual
+facts, as they presented themselves to the mind of Lord Roberts, are
+these. On reaching the Paardeberg position from Jacobsdal the
+Commander-in-Chief found that in the operations of the preceding day
+Lord Kitchener had lost a thousand men without gaining a single
+advantage. The position held by the Boers, although it was commanded
+by rising ground on all sides, was one which afforded admirable cover
+in repelling an attacking force. In these circumstances Lord Roberts
+decided, as an application of the principles of military science, to
+"sap up" to the Boer positions. The correctness of this decision was
+proved by the result. The moment that the Boers realised that they
+were to be given no further opportunity--such as a repetition of a
+direct attack upon their position would have afforded--of inflicting
+heavy loss on the British troops, whilst their eventual surrender was
+no less inevitable, the white flag was hoisted.
+
+         [Footnote 200: _I.e._, _less_ troops for lines of
+         communication. Lord Roberts's force was 36,000, the Army
+         Corps was 47,000.]
+
+It is denied with equal definiteness that any general feeling of the
+kind alleged existed among subordinate officers or the rank and file
+of the British troops. Where, however, the allegation of "a desire to
+spare life" has regard to the enemy and not to the British troops, the
+answer is to be found in the fact that any humanity inconsistent with
+military efficiency was apparent and not real. The comparative
+immunity enjoyed by the enemy on occasions when he was defeated is due
+to physical conditions wholly favourable to the Boers, to the
+knowledge of the country possessed by the burghers individually and
+collectively, and to the circumstance that the inhabitants of the
+country districts were, in almost all cases, ready to give them every
+possible assistance in escaping from the British. There is one
+particular statement in connection with this criticism which admits of
+absolute denial. It has been said that Lord Roberts, the
+Commander-in-Chief, received instructions from the Home Government
+directing him to spare the enemy as much as possible. This statement,
+in spite of its _prima facie_ improbability, has met with very general
+acceptance. None the less it is entirely baseless. The only
+limitations imposed by the Home Government upon Lord Roberts's
+complete freedom of action in the conduct of the military operations
+which he directed were such as arose from the difficulty experienced
+in supplying him upon all occasions with troops of the precise number
+and character required.
+
+[Sidenote: The German general staff.]
+
+The second criticism is one put forward by the German General Staff,
+forming, as it does, the only valid complaint against the professional
+merits of Lord Roberts advanced by that body. The British
+Commander-in-Chief, say these German critics, made it his object to
+"manoeuvre" the Boers out of positions instead of inflicting severe
+losses upon them. The answer to this criticism, in its general form,
+is to be found in the physical conditions of the country. On the
+occasions to which reference is made the burgher forces were found to
+be posted on high ground, behind rocks or in intrenchments, with fine
+open ground in front of them. Obviously in these circumstances what
+military science required of the commander directing the attacking
+force was to find a means of placing his own troops on equal terms
+with the enemy; and this was what Lord Roberts did. The criticism,
+however, as more precisely stated and applied to the battle of Diamond
+Hill in particular, and to the engagements fought in the course of
+Lord Roberts's advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, takes the form
+of the allegation that, while the enveloping movement on both flanks
+was executed successfully, the full result of this initial success was
+not obtained because the attack upon the Boer centre was not pressed
+home. In other words, the enemy's centre was never caught and
+destroyed by the envelopment of his flanks. This is historically true,
+and yet the German critics cannot be said to have established their
+case, for they omit to take the tactics of the Boers into
+consideration. Stated briefly, these were to hold on to a position and
+inflict such losses as they could upon the attacking troops, until the
+final assault became imminent; and then to mount their ponies and
+gallop away. Against such tactics as these, it would have been of no
+avail to push in a frontal attack with the certainty of incurring
+heavy loss, and without the chance of securing a decisive success. It
+would have been merely playing into the hands of the Boers.
+
+Under such conditions all that was possible was to demonstrate against
+the Boer centre in the hope of holding them in their position, until
+the flanking columns should have nullified their mobility by cutting
+in on their line of retreat. The Boers, however, took every precaution
+against such an eventuality; and the result was generally, as stated
+by the German critics, that the Boers were "manoeuvred" out of their
+positions. But this does not prove that the course adopted by Lord
+Roberts was wrong; it merely proves the extreme difficulty of
+inflicting a severe defeat upon an enemy who declines to risk a
+decisive action, and whose mobility gives him the power to do so. The
+course advocated by the critics would have been equally barren of
+result, while the cost in lives would have been far greater.
+
+[Sidenote: The Boers not in uniform.]
+
+It remains to notice certain definite circumstances which caused the
+British Army in South Africa to be confronted by difficulties which no
+other army has been required to face. The Boers were accorded all the
+privileges of a civilised army, although at the same time they
+violated the most essential of the conditions upon the observance of
+which these privileges are based. This condition is the wearing, by
+the forces of a belligerent, of such a uniform and distinctive dress
+as will be sufficient to enable the other belligerent to discriminate
+with facility between the combatant and non-combatant population of
+his enemy. The fact that the burgher forces were not in uniform and
+were yet accorded the privileges claimed by civilised troops, was in
+itself a circumstance that increased both the efforts required, and
+the losses incurred, by the British Army to an extent which has not as
+yet been fully realised. In the operations which Lord Roberts had
+conducted in Afghanistan it was not the organised army but the
+tribesmen that had proved difficult to overcome. The Afghan army
+retreated, or, if it stood its ground, was defeated. But the
+tribesmen who "sniped" the British troops from the mountain slopes and
+from behind stones and rocks, who assembled from all sides as rapidly
+as they melted away, constituted the real difficulty of the campaign.
+In South Africa the burgher forces were army and tribesmen alike.
+Owing to the absence of any distinctive uniform the combatant Boers
+mingled freely with the British soldiers, and went to and fro among
+the non-combatant Boer population in the towns and districts occupied
+by the British. On one day they were in the British camp as
+ox-drivers, or provision-sellers, or what not, and on the next they
+were in the burgher fighting line. A single instance will serve to
+convey an impression of the complete immunity with which not merely
+the rank and file, but commandants and generals, entered and left the
+British lines. It is believed that on one night General Louis Botha
+slept in Johannesburg close to Lord Roberts, the British
+Commander-in-Chief. The next morning he left the town in company with
+some of the British troops. And in the Natal campaign it is notorious
+that the camps of the Ladysmith relieving force were swarming with
+Boer spies whom it was impossible to detect and punish. Even in the
+besieged town itself the utmost secrecy at headquarters did not always
+avail to prevent a timely intimation of a contemplated attack from
+reaching the enemy's lines. Add to this the fact that every Boer
+farmhouse throughout South Africa was an Intelligence Depôt for the
+enemy, and it is easy to understand the facility displayed by the
+mobile and ununiformed Boer forces in evading the British columns.
+
+Whether the humanity displayed by the British Government in thus
+recognising the burghers as regular belligerents, and in other
+respects, did not tend to bring about the very evil sought to be
+avoided is another question. It is quite possible to maintain that the
+comparative immunity from punishment and the disproportionate military
+success which the Boers enjoyed did in fact, by contributing to the
+prolongation of the war, ultimately produce a greater loss of life,
+and a greater amount of material suffering, than would have been
+incurred by the South African Dutch if the war had been waged with
+greater severity on the part of Great Britain. That it increased the
+cost of the war both in lives and in treasure to the British nation is
+obvious. But this is a consideration which does not affect any
+estimate of the merit or demerit displayed by the British Army in the
+field that may be formed either by British or foreign critics. In
+order to prove competency it is not necessary to show that no single
+mistake was made or that nothing that was done might not have been
+done better. No war department, no army ever has been or ever will be
+created that could come scatheless from the application of such a test
+of absolute efficiency. What we require to know is whether the same
+standard of efficiency was shown to have been attained in the War
+Office and in the Army as is required and obtained in any other branch
+of the public service, or in any successful or progressive undertaking
+conducted by private enterprise. The circumstances of the war were
+abnormal. From one point of view it was a civil war; from another it
+was a rebellion, and from a third it was a war between two rival
+military powers, each of whom desired to become supreme in South
+Africa. What the military critic has to consider is not so much how
+these circumstances arose, or whether they could have been changed or
+avoided by any political action on the part of Great Britain, but the
+degree in which the conditions imposed by them upon the British Army
+must be taken into account in applying the ordinary tests of military
+efficiency to the work which it accomplished in this particular
+campaign.
+
+[Sidenote: Difficulties of the campaign.]
+
+The nature of the difficulties presented by the vast extent of the
+theatre of war, the deficiency of means of communication, the
+imperfect cultivation of the land, the sparseness of the population
+and their hostility to the British, and the physical and climatic
+aspects of South Africa in general, have been broadly indicated in the
+passages taken from Lord Roberts's despatches. To pursue the inquiry
+further would be to travel beyond the scope of this work. That,
+however, there is nothing unusual in the fact that civilian forces,
+inspired by love of country and aided by physical conditions
+exceptionally favourable to themselves, should be able to offer a
+successful resistance to professional soldiers may be seen by a
+reference to one of the little wars of the seventeenth century. In the
+year 1690 twenty-two thousand French and Savoyard troops were sent by
+Louis XIV. to storm the Balsille--a rocky eminence _mutatis mutandis_
+the equivalent of a South African kopje--held by 350 Piedmontese
+Vaudois. Even so the besieged patriots made good their escape, and,
+owing to the sudden change in the politics of Europe brought about by
+the accession of William of Orange to the crown of England, actually
+concluded an honourable peace with their sovereign, Victor Amadeus of
+Savoy, a few days after they had been driven from the Balsille.
+Assuming that the British troops employed from first to last in the
+South African War were five times as numerous as the forces placed in
+the field by the Dutch nationalists--say 450,000 as against 90,000--we
+have here a numerical superiority which dwindles into insignificance
+beside the magnificent disproportion of the professional troops
+required to deal with a civilian force in this seventeenth-century
+struggle.[201]
+
+         [Footnote 201: Any reader desiring to learn the particulars
+         of this struggle is referred to the pages of the writer's
+         _The Valley of Light: Studies with Pen and Pencil in the
+         Vaudois Valleys of Piedmont_. (Macmillan, 1899). It may be
+         added that Napoleon manifested a keen interest in the
+         military details of the engagements between the French and
+         Savoyard troops and the Vaudois. As regards the number of
+         combatants on the Boer side. Lord Kitchener puts the total
+         (from first to last) at 95,000 (Cd. 1790, p. 13). The
+         _Official History_, however, gives, as the result of an
+         elaborate calculation, 87,365 (Vol. I. App. 4).]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY
+
+
+The direct share which Lord Milner took in the skilful disposition of
+the handful of British troops available at the outbreak of the war for
+the defence of the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony has been
+mentioned. The part which he played during the first period of the war
+in his relationship to the military authorities is sufficiently
+indicated by the words which appear in Lord Roberts's final despatch.
+
+     "This despatch," writes the Commander-in-Chief on April 2nd,
+     1901, "would be incomplete were I to omit to mention the benefit
+     I have derived from the unfailing support and wise counsels of
+     Sir Alfred Milner. I can only say here that I have felt it a high
+     privilege to work in close communication with one whose courage
+     never faltered however grave the responsibilities might be which
+     surrounded him, and who, notwithstanding the absorbing cares of
+     his office, seemed always able to find time for a helpful message
+     or for the tactful solution of a difficult question."
+
+That this is no conventional compliment, even in the mouth of so great
+a general as Lord Roberts, will appear from the fact that on one
+occasion--to be presently noted--Lord Milner's judgment did not
+entirely recommend itself at the moment to the Commander-in-Chief.
+
+[Sidenote: An unnatural alliance.]
+
+But such services, important as they were, are mere accidents in
+comparison with the volume of continuous and concentrated effort
+required to keep the machinery of administration available for the
+Imperial Government in a colony in which not merely the majority of
+the inhabitants, but the majority of the members of the Legislative
+Assembly, and half of the ministers of the Crown, were in more or less
+complete sympathy with the enemy. The Boer ultimatum, by making it
+impossible for the British Government to be any longer cajoled into an
+elusory settlement by Boer diplomacy, had relieved Lord Milner of a
+load of anxiety, and closed a period of unparalleled physical and
+mental strain. But it by no means brought Lord Milner's task to an
+end. The open rebellion of the Dutch subjects of the Crown,
+considerable alike in point of numbers and area, was not the most
+dangerous aspect of the state of utter disaffection, or rather
+demoralisation, to which the Cape Colony had been reduced by twenty
+years of Dutch ascendancy and nationalist propaganda. Just as before
+the ultimatum it was the influence, exercised by constitutional means,
+and ostensibly in the interests of the Imperial Government, over the
+Republics that brought the Salisbury Cabinet within measurable
+distance of diplomatic defeat; so, during the war, what was done and
+said by the Afrikander nationalists within the letter of the law
+constituted in fact the most formidable obstacle to the success of the
+British arms. If the Dutch in the Cape Colony had been left to
+themselves, their efforts to encourage the resistance of the Boers, in
+view of the rapid and effective blows struck by Lord Roberts, would
+probably have been without result. But unhappily their efforts
+stimulated the traditional sympathisers of the Boers in England to
+fresh action; and they were themselves stimulated in turn by the
+excesses of the party opposition which sprang into life again directly
+Lord Roberts's campaign had relieved the British people from any fear
+of military humiliation. Just as in the period before the war we found
+the Afrikander leaders striving to "mediate" between the Transvaal and
+the British Government; so now during the war we find them striving to
+"conciliate" the two contending parties. In both cases their aim was
+the same--to prevent the destruction of the Republics and the
+consequent ruin of the nationalist cause. As in the former case
+"mediation" was a euphemism for the diplomatic defeat of the British
+Government, so now "conciliation" is synonymous with the restoration
+of the independence of the Boers--that is, the renunciation of all
+that the British people, whether islander or colonist, had fought to
+secure. That any considerable body of Englishmen should have allowed
+themselves to become a second time the dupes of so coarse a political
+hypocrisy may well arouse surprise to-day; to a future generation it
+will seem almost incredible. The fact, however, admits of neither
+doubt nor contradiction. It is writ large in Hansard, in the
+Blue-books, and in the daily journals. The whole force of this strange
+and unnatural alliance between England's most bitter and most skilful
+enemies in South Africa and a section of her own sons at home, was
+directed against Lord Milner during the remaining years of his High
+Commissionership.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr Schreiners's attitude.]
+
+For the moment, however, the ultimatum had rendered the British people
+practically unanimous in the desire to chastise the insolence of the
+Boer, and, in the face of this determination, no opposition was
+manifested by the Afrikander Government to the free movement and
+disembarkation of the Imperial troops. The employment of the local
+forces in the defence of the colony was another matter. The Free State
+commandos crossed the Orange River on October 31st, 1899. The delay
+was not due to any regard felt by President Steyn for Mr. Schreiner,
+but solely to military considerations. On the previous day General
+Joubert had shut up Sir George White's force in Ladysmith; and there
+was, therefore, no longer any likelihood that these commandos would be
+required in Natal. The invasion of the Colony south of the Orange
+River produced, as we have noticed, a marked change in Mr. Schreiner's
+attitude; causing him finally to abandon the neutrality policy and
+recognise the necessity of employing the local volunteer forces in the
+defence of the Colony. None the less the injury inflicted upon British
+interests by the Prime Minister's attempt to keep the people of the
+Cape Colony out of the conflict was unquestionable. The ministers of
+the Crown in this British Colony had allowed arms and ammunition to go
+through to the Free State, until the Imperial authorities had
+interfered; they had refused to supply Mafeking and Kimberley with
+much-needed artillery; they had refused to call out the volunteers
+until the Colony was about to be invaded by the Free State as well as
+by the Transvaal, and even then they had delayed to supply these
+forces with Lee-Enfield rifles. These were injuries the effect of
+which could not be repaired by any subsequent co-operation with the
+representatives of the British Government. In addition to calling out
+the volunteers, Mr. Schreiner allowed the Imperial military
+authorities to take over the Cape Government railways, and he
+consented to the proclamation of martial law in those districts of the
+Colony in which the Dutch were in rebellion. But he was far from
+yielding, even now, that full and complete assistance to the Governor
+which would have been expected, as a matter of course, from the Prime
+Minister of any other British colony. On one occasion, at least,
+during this period the conflict between his views and those of Lord
+Milner became so acute that his resignation seemed to be inevitable.
+But this was not to be the end of the Afrikander Ministry. In
+proportion as Mr. Schreiner approached gradually to agreement with
+Lord Milner, so did he incur the displeasure of Mr. Hofmeyr and the
+Dutch, until (in June, 1901) the Ministry perished of internal
+dissension.
+
+A week after Lord Roberts reached Capetown (January 10th, 1900), Lord
+Milner sent home a despatch in which he tells the story of the
+rebellion in the Cape Colony. The state of the districts on the
+western border of the Republics, north of the Orange River, is
+described in the words of a reliable and unbiassed witness who has
+just arrived at Capetown from Vryburg, where he has been lately
+resident:
+
+     "All the farmers in the Vryburg, Kuruman, and Taungs districts,"
+     says this witness, "have joined the Boers, and I do not believe
+     that you will find ten loyal British subjects among the Dutch
+     community in the whole of Bechuanaland. The Field Cornets and
+     Justices of the Peace on the Dutch side have all joined ... the
+     conduct of the rebels has been unbearable."
+
+Of the position of that part of the Eastern Province of the Cape
+Colony which, lying to the south of the Free State, formed the main
+seat of the rebellion, Lord Milner himself writes:
+
+[Sidenote: Treatment of loyalists.]
+
+     "Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation of
+     Colesberg, no less than five great districts--those of Colesberg,
+     Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and Wodehouse--had gone over
+     without hesitation, and, so to speak, bodily, to the enemy.
+     Throughout that region the Landdrosts of the Orange Free State
+     had established their authority, and everywhere, in the
+     expressive words of a magistrate, British loyalists were "being
+     hunted out of town after town like sheep." In the invaded
+     districts the method of occupation has always been more or less
+     the same. The procedure is as follows:--A commando enters, the
+     Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the
+     courthouse, or market-place, and a Proclamation is read annexing
+     the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in which he
+     explains that the people must now obey the Free State laws
+     generally, though they are at present under martial law. A local
+     Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a few days
+     or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve against their
+     country. In either case they lose their property to a greater or
+     less extent. If they elect to quit they are often robbed before
+     starting or on the journey; if they stay their property and
+     themselves are commandeered.
+
+     "The number of rebels who have actually taken up arms and joined
+     the enemy during their progress throughout the five annexed
+     districts can for the present only be matter of conjecture. I
+     shall, however, be on the safe side in reckoning that during
+     November it was a number not less than the total of the invading
+     commandos, that is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the
+     invading commandos themselves a certain proportion were colonists
+     who had crossed the border before the invasion took place. And
+     the number, whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and
+     during November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee
+     from the Albert district has estimated the total number of
+     colonial Boers who have joined the enemy in the invaded
+     districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the
+     districts north of that river, to which I referred at the
+     beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less. Adding
+     to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal immediately
+     before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with the view of
+     taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the conclusion
+     that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of those now
+     fighting against us in South Africa, and probably somewhat more,
+     either are, or till quite recently were, subjects of the
+     Queen."[202]
+
+         [Footnote 202: Cd. 264 (Despatch of January 16th, 1900).]
+
+As it turned out, this eastern rebellion was kept within limits by
+General French's advance upon Colesberg, and by the skilful and
+successful cavalry operations which he subsequently carried out upon
+the Free State border; but there is abundant evidence to support the
+belief that any second reverse in the Eastern Province, such as that
+which General Gatacre suffered at Stormberg, would have proved the
+signal for a rising in the Western Province. The Bond was active; and
+the tone of the meetings held by the various branches throughout the
+Colony was as frankly hostile to the Imperial Government as it was
+sympathetic to the Republics.
+
+[Sidenote: State of western province.]
+
+The extent to which Mr. Schreiner's qualified co-operation with the
+Imperial authorities had aroused the hostility of the Bond will be
+seen from the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting of the Cape
+Distriks-bestuur, held at the office of _Ons Land_ at the end of
+January (1900). It was a small meeting, but among those present were
+Mr. Hofmeyr himself and Mr. Malan, the editor of _Ons Land_. On the
+motion of the latter, it was unanimously determined that the
+forthcoming Annual Congress of the Bond should be asked to pass a--
+
+     "resolution (_a_) giving expression of Congress's entire
+     disapproval of the policy which led to the present bloody war
+     instead of to a peaceful solution of the differences with the
+     South African Republic by means of arbitration; and (_b_) urging
+     a speedy re-establishment of peace on fair and righteous
+     conditions, as also a thorough inquiry by our Parliament into the
+     way in which, during the war, private property, the civil
+     liberties, and constitutional rights of the subject have been
+     treated."[203]
+
+         [Footnote 203: Cd. 261.]
+
+Even more significant--as evidence of the dangerous feeling of
+exaltation which possessed the Dutch at this time--was the New Year's
+exhortation of _Ons Land_, the journalistic mouthpiece of Mr. Hofmeyr.
+And Mr. Hofmeyr, it must be remembered, was not only the head of the
+_Commissie van Toezicht_, or Executive of three which controlled the
+Afrikander Bond, but the real master of the majority in the Cape
+Parliament, upon which the Schreiner Cabinet depended for its
+existence. After setting out the "mighty deeds" achieved by the
+Afrikander arms during the last three months, this bitter and
+relentless opponent of British supremacy in South Africa proceeded to
+declare that "still mightier deeds" were to be seen in the coming year
+(1900), and that the Afrikander nation, so far from being extinguished
+by the conflict with Great Britain, would be welded into one compact
+mass, and flourish more and more.
+
+Nor was this all. In the closing days of the year (1899) information
+reached the British military authorities that a plot was on foot to
+seize Capetown. The Dutch from the country districts were to assemble
+in the capital in the guise of excursionists who had come to town to
+enjoy the Christmas and New Year holidays. On New Year's Eve, the
+night reported to have been fixed for the attempt, all the military
+stations in Capetown were kept in frequent communication by telephone;
+the streets were paraded by pickets; and, in the drill-shed the
+Capetown Highlanders slept under arms. Whether any attempt of the sort
+was seriously contemplated or not, there is no question as to the fact
+that the utmost necessity for precaution was recognised by the
+military authorities at Capetown during this period, in spite of the
+security afforded by the reinforcements which the Home Government was
+pouring into the Colony. It was an old boast of the militant Dutch in
+the Cape Colony that they would find a way to prevent British troops
+from using the colonial railways to attack the Boers.[204] And when
+at length, a month after Lord Roberts had arrived, the transport
+system had been reorganised, the troops concentrated at De Aar and
+Modder River, and everything was ready for the forward movement, the
+most complete secrecy was observed as to the departure of the
+Commander-in-Chief and Lord Kitchener. Instead of leaving for the
+front with the final drafts from the Capetown station in Adderley
+Street, amid the cheering of the British population, these two
+distinguished soldiers were driven in a close carriage, on the evening
+of February 6th, from Government House to the Salt River Station,
+where they caught the ordinary passenger train for De Aar.
+
+         [Footnote 204: At the time of the Bechuanaland Expedition
+         (1884-5), when the writer was in South Africa, "a controversy
+         was seriously maintained between the two moderate Afrikander
+         journals, the _Sud Africaan_ and the _Volksblad_, on the
+         question whether the Imperial Government had, or had not, the
+         right to send troops through the Colony, without the consent
+         of the Colonial Ministry. In commenting upon this question a
+         correspondent wrote in the _Patriot_, the extreme organ of
+         the Afrikanders: 'I believe the _Volksblad_ is correct in
+         maintaining that England has that right. But if England has
+         the right to send _Rooibaatjes_ (_i.e._ British soldiers) to
+         kill my brethren in the Transvaal, then I have also the right
+         to try and prevent the same. My brother is nearer than
+         England. England can send troops, but whether they will all
+         arrive safely in Stellaland--that stands to be seen.'"--_A
+         History of South Africa_, by the writer. (Dent, 1900.)]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Robert's advance.]
+
+No one was more aware of the reality of the Dutch disaffection in the
+Colony than Lord Milner. Before Lord Roberts left Capetown for the
+front he addressed a memorandum to him, in which the attention of the
+Commander-in-Chief was drawn to certain special elements of danger in
+the whole situation in South Africa as affected by the rebellion of
+the Dutch in the Cape Colony. With reference to this memorandum Lord
+Roberts writes, in the second of his despatches (February 16th, 1900):
+
+     "Before quitting the seat of Government I received a memorandum
+     from the High Commissioner, in which Sir Alfred Milner reviewed
+     the political and military situation, and laid stress on the
+     possibility of a general rising among the disaffected Dutch
+     population, should the Cape Colony be denuded of troops for the
+     purpose of carrying on offensive operations in the Orange Free
+     State. In reply I expressed the opinion that the military
+     requirements of the case demanded an early advance into the
+     enemy's country; that such an advance, if successful, would
+     lessen the hostile pressure both on the northern frontiers of the
+     Colony and in Natal; that the relief of Kimberley had to be
+     effected before the end of February, and would set free most of
+     the troops encamped on the Modder River, and that the arrival of
+     considerable reinforcements from home, especially of Field
+     Artillery, by the 19th of February, would enable those points
+     along the frontier which were weakly held to be materially
+     strengthened. I trusted, therefore, that His Excellency's
+     apprehensions would prove groundless. No doubt a certain amount
+     of risk had to be run, but protracted inaction seemed to me to
+     involve more serious dangers than the bolder course which I have
+     decided to adopt."
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's proposal.]
+
+There cannot, of course, be any question as to the general wisdom of
+this decision. Both in this case, and again in deciding to advance
+from Bloemfontein upon Johannesburg and Pretoria, it was just by
+taking his risks--risks that would have reduced a lesser man to
+inaction--that Lord Roberts displayed the distinguishing quality of a
+great captain of war. In both cases the best defence was to attack.
+But as Lord Roberts, in this brief reference, does not indicate the
+real point of the High Commissioner's representations, it is necessary
+to state with some precision what it was that Lord Milner had actually
+in his mind. The last thing which occurred to him was to advocate any
+course that could weaken our offensive action. But the peculiarity of
+the South African political situation, which enabled even a defeated
+enemy, by detaching a very small force, to raise a new war in our
+rear, in what was nominally our country, and thus to hamper, and
+possibly altogether arrest, the forward movement, was constantly
+present to his thought. The proposal which Lord Milner desired Lord
+Roberts to adopt was that a certain minimum of mobile troops should be
+definitely set aside for the defence of the Colony, and kept there,
+whatever happened; since, in Lord Milner's opinion, it was only in
+this way that a real and effective form of defence could be made
+possible, and the number of men locked up in the passive defence of
+the railway lines greatly reduced. If this suggestion had been carried
+out, as Lord Milner intended, there would have been no second
+rebellion. What prevented Lord Roberts from adopting the High
+Commissioner's suggestion was the numerical insufficiency of the
+troops at his disposal. In order to carry the war into the enemy's
+country, he had practically to denude the Cape Colony of troops. The
+subsequent course of the war will reveal the direct and disastrous
+influence which the situation in the Cape Colony was destined to
+exercise upon the military decisions of the republican leaders--an
+influence which would have been lessened materially, if not altogether
+removed, by the creation of this permanent and mobile force. And, in
+point of fact, Lord Milner's apprehension that the rebellion might
+even now interfere with the success of the forward movement, unless
+adequate provision was made to keep it in check, received almost
+immediate confirmation. While Lord Roberts was engaged in the capture
+of Cronje's force at Paardeberg, the north-midland districts of
+Prieska, Britstown, and Carnarvon, lying to the west of the railway
+from De Aar to Orange River, broke out into rebellion. Although Lord
+Roberts at once directed certain columns to concentrate upon this new
+area of disaffection, the situation had become so serious that on
+March 8th--_i.e._, the day after Poplar Grove, and in the course of
+the rapid march upon Bloemfontein--Lord Roberts--
+
+     "desired Major-General Lord Kitchener to proceed to De Aar with
+     the object of collecting reinforcements, and of taking such steps
+     as might be necessary to punish the rebels and to prevent the
+     spread of disaffection."[205]
+
+         [Footnote 205: Despatch dated "Government House,
+         Bloemfontein, March 15th, 1900."]
+
+That is to say, the disclosure of a new centre of active rebellion in
+the Colony deprived the Commander-in-Chief of the services of Lord
+Kitchener, his Chief-of-Staff, when he was in the act of executing one
+of the most critical movements of the campaign.
+
+[Sidenote: The Boer peace overtures.]
+
+The complete revolution in the military situation produced by Lord
+Roberts's victorious advance into the Free State elicited from
+Presidents Krüger and Steyn the "peace overtures" cabled to Lord
+Salisbury on March 5th, 1900. In this characteristic document the two
+Presidents remark that--
+
+     "they consider it [their] duty solemnly to declare that this war
+     was undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the
+     threatened independence of the South African Republic, and is
+     only continued in order to secure and safeguard the incontestable
+     independence of both Republics as sovereign international states,
+     and to obtain the assurance that those of Her Majesty's subjects
+     who have taken part with [them] in this war shall suffer no harm
+     whatever in person or property."
+
+They further declare that "on these conditions, but on these
+conditions alone," they are now, as in the past, desirous of seeing
+peace re-established in South Africa; and they add considerately that
+they have refrained from making this declaration "so long as the
+advantage was always on their side," from a fear lest it "might hurt
+the feelings of honour of the British people." They conclude:
+
+     "But now that the prestige of the British Empire may be
+     considered to be assured by the capture of one of our forces by
+     Her Majesty's troops, and that we are thereby forced to evacuate
+     other positions which our forces had occupied, that difficulty is
+     over, and we can no longer hesitate clearly to inform your
+     Government and people, in the sight of the whole civilised world,
+     why we are fighting, and on what conditions we are ready to
+     restore peace."[206]
+
+         [Footnote 206: Cd. 35.]
+
+The best comment upon this grossly disingenuous document is that which
+is afforded by certain passages in Mr. Reitz's book, _A Century of
+Wrong_, which was written in anticipation of the outbreak of war and
+issued so soon as this anticipation had been realised:
+
+     "The struggle of now nearly a century," he writes in his appeal
+     to his brother Afrikanders, "hastens to an end; we are
+     approaching the last act in that great drama which is so
+     momentous for all South Africa.... The questions which present
+     themselves for solution in the approaching conflict have their
+     origin deep in the history of the past.... By its light we are
+     more clearly enabled to comprehend the truth to which our people
+     appeal as a final justification for embarking on the war now so
+     close at hand.... May the hope which glowed in our hearts during
+     1880, and which buoyed us up during that struggle, burn on
+     steadily! May it prove a beacon of light in our path, invincibly
+     moving onwards through blood and through tears, until it leads us
+     to a real union of South Africa.... Whether the result be victory
+     or death, Liberty will assuredly rise on South Africa ... just as
+     freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more
+     than a century ago. Then from Zambesi to Simon's Town it will be
+     Africa for the Afrikander."[207]
+
+         [Footnote 207: Mr. Reitz's work was translated into English
+         by Mr. W. T. Stead.]
+
+And to this may be added the following extract from a letter written
+by "one of the distinguished members of the Volksraad" who voted for
+war against Great Britain, to one of his friends, a member of the
+Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony:
+
+     "Our plan is, with God's help, to take all that is English in
+     South Africa; so, in case you true Afrikanders wish to throw off
+     the English yoke, now is the time to hoist the Vier-kleur in
+     Capetown. You can rely on us; we will push through from sea to
+     sea, and wave one flag over the whole of South Africa, under one
+     Afrikander Government, if we can reckon on our Afrikander
+     brethren."[208]
+
+         [Footnote 208: Cd. 109.]
+
+[Sidenote: The British reply.]
+
+Lord Salisbury's reply, sent from the Foreign Office on March 11th, is
+as follows:
+
+     "I have the honour to acknowledge Your Honours' telegram dated
+     the 5th of March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is
+     principally to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall
+     recognise the 'incontestable independence' of the South African
+     Republic and Orange Free State 'as sovereign international
+     states,' and to offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a
+     conclusion.
+
+     "In the beginning of October last peace existed between Her
+     Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then
+     were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some
+     months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African
+     Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for certain
+     very serious grievances under which British residents in the
+     South African Republic were suffering. In the course of these
+     negotiations the South African Republic had, to the knowledge of
+     Her Majesty's Government, made considerable armaments, and the
+     latter had, consequently, taken steps to provide corresponding
+     reinforcements to the British garrisons of Capetown and Natal. No
+     infringement of the rights guaranteed by the Conventions had up
+     to that point taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two
+     days' notice, the South African Republic, after issuing an
+     insulting ultimatum, declared war upon Her Majesty, and the
+     Orange Free State, with whom there had not even been any
+     discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were
+     immediately invaded by the two Republics, siege was laid to three
+     towns within the British frontier, a large portion of the two
+     colonies was overrun, with great destruction to property and
+     life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of
+     extensive portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those
+     dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In
+     anticipation of these operations, the South African Republic had
+     been accumulating for many years past military stores on an
+     enormous scale, which by their character could only have been
+     intended for use against Great Britain.
+
+     "Your Honours make some observations of a negative character upon
+     the object with which these preparations were made. I do not
+     think it necessary to discuss the questions you have raised. But
+     the result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy,
+     has been that the British Empire has been compelled to confront
+     an invasion which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and
+     the loss of thousands of precious lives. This great calamity has
+     been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in
+     recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two Republics.
+
+     "In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the
+     position which was given to them, and the calamities which their
+     unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions, Her
+     Majesty's Government can only answer your Honours' telegram by
+     saying that they are not prepared to assent to the independence
+     either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free
+     State."
+
+[Sidenote: Conventions to be annulled.]
+
+This reply has been cited at length for two reasons. In the first
+place it affords a concise and weighty statement of the British case
+against the Republics, and, in the second, it contains a specific and
+reasoned declaration of the central decision of the Salisbury Cabinet,
+against which the efforts both of the Dutch party in the Cape and of
+the friends of the Boers in England continued to be directed, until
+the controversy was closed by the surrender of the republican leaders
+at Vereeniging. In the Cape Colony the cry of "conciliation" was
+raised to cloak the gross appearance of a movement which was, in fact,
+a direct co-operation with the enemy. And the same specious word was
+adopted in England, so soon as the strain of the war had begun to make
+itself felt in the constituencies, as a decent flag under which the
+party opponents of the Unionist Government in general could join
+forces with the traditional friends of the Boers and other convinced
+opponents of Imperial consolidation. The decision of the Salisbury
+Cabinet not to restore the system of the Conventions, which was in
+fact the decision of the great mass of the British people both at home
+and over-sea, was not reversed. It was confirmed in the House of
+Commons by 208 votes against 52 on July 25th, 1900, and by the verdict
+of the country in the General Election which followed.[209] But the
+political agitation by which it was sought to reverse this decision
+was none the less injurious alike to the Boer and British peoples,
+since it acted as a powerful incentive to the republican leaders to
+continued struggle which, except for the illusions created by this
+agitation, they would have recognised as hopeless in itself and
+unjustified by any prospect of military success. In both cases the
+effect of the agitation was the same: the war was unnecessarily
+prolonged--intentionally by the Afrikander nationalists, and
+unintentionally by Lord (then Mr.) Courtney, Mr. Morley, Mr. Bryce,
+and other opponents in England of the annexation of the Republics.
+
+         [Footnote 209: The Unionist party was returned to power with
+         a slightly decreased majority--130 as against 150. But this
+         loss of seats was counterbalanced by the consideration that
+         it is unusual for the same Government to be entrusted with a
+         second period of office by a democratic electorate.]
+
+[Sidenote: The 'Conciliation' movement.]
+
+The Presidents had demanded the recognition of the independence of the
+Republics and a free pardon for the Cape rebels as the price of peace.
+The Afrikander nationalists at once began to co-operate with the
+Republics in the endeavour to wrest these terms from the British
+Government. Mr. Schreiner, as we have seen, had already incurred Mr.
+Hofmeyr's displeasure by allowing the Cape Government to render
+assistance to the Imperial authorities in the prosecution of the war.
+The breach thus created between the Prime Minister and Sir Richard
+(then Mr.) Solomon, on the one hand, and Dr. Te Water, Mr. Merriman,
+and Mr. Sauer, who shared the views of the Bond, on the other, was,
+rapidly widened by the "conciliation" meetings held throughout the
+Colony by the Afrikander nationalists in support of the "peace
+overtures" of the Presidents. The British population at the Cape was
+quick to realise the insidious and fatal character of the
+"conciliation" movement thus inaugurated by the Afrikander
+nationalists. The universal alarm and indignation to which it gave
+rise among the loyalists of both nationalities found expression in the
+impassioned speech which Sir James (then Mr.) Rose Innes delivered at
+the Municipal Hall of Claremont[210] on March 30th, 1900. The purpose
+of the meeting was to allow the British subjects thus assembled to
+record their approval of Lord Salisbury's reply to the Republics, and
+their conviction that "the incorporation of these States within the
+dominions of the Queen could alone secure peace, prosperity, and
+public freedom throughout South Africa." In supporting this
+resolution, Sir James Rose Innes said:
+
+         [Footnote 210: A suburb of Capetown.]
+
+     "This question of permanent peace is the key-stone of the whole
+     matter, because, I take it, we none of us want to see another war
+     of this kind. We do not want to see the misery and the suffering
+     and the loss which a war of this kind entails. We do not want to
+     see our sandy plains drenched with the best blood of England
+     again, fighting against white men in this country. We do not want
+     to see the flower of colonial manhood shot down on the plains of
+     the Orange Free State and the Karroo, and neither do we want to
+     see brave men, born in South Africa, dying in heaps, dying for
+     what we know is a hopeless ideal. Therefore we say, 'In Heaven's
+     name give us peace! Have a settlement, but make no settlement
+     which shall not be calculated, as far as human foresight can
+     provide, to secure a permanent peace.'"
+
+These were strong words, and their significance was heightened by the
+well-known independence of Sir James Innes's political outlook.
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner at Bloemfontein.]
+
+A fortnight later Lord Milner declared his mind on the same question.
+Both the occasion and the speech are of special interest. The High
+Commissioner had just returned from a fortnight at the front. On March
+19th he left Capetown in company with Sir Richard Solomon for the
+north-eastern districts of the Colony, which, having rebelled in
+November, had just been reduced to order by General Brabant and the
+"Colonial Division," when the Free State invaders had been drawn off
+by Lord Roberts's advance. After a week in the Colony, Lord Milner
+travelled on by rail to Bloemfontein, which he reached on the 27th. It
+was a stimulating and suggestive moment. He was now the guest of the
+British Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency, where, just ten months
+ago, as the guest of President Steyn, he had met Paul Krüger for the
+first time. The little Free State capital, then wrapped in its
+accustomed quietude, was now filled with the tumultuous presence of a
+great army. But, complete as was the revolution accomplished by Lord
+Roberts's advance, there were signs that the Boer was dying hard, even
+if he were not coming to life again. On the 30th a disquieting
+engagement was fought at Karree Siding, and on the 31st de Wet dealt
+his second shrewd blow at Sannah's Post.
+
+With this experience of the actualities of war, Lord Milner, leaving
+Bloemfontein on April 2nd, had returned to Capetown. On the 12th he
+was presented with an appreciative address, signed by all, except one,
+of the Nonconformist ministers of religion resident in and around
+Capetown, in which personal affection for himself and approval of his
+policy were expressed. The action of these men was altogether
+exceptional. It was justified by the circumstance that in England Lord
+Milner's policy had been subjected to the bitterest criticism in
+quarters where Nonconformist influence was predominant. Not only to
+Lord Courtney, but to other Liberal friends and associates, the High
+Commissioner had become a "lost mind." To the Afrikander nationalists
+he was "the enemy"; the efforts which had barely sufficed to keep the
+administrative machinery of a British colony at the disposal of the
+Imperial Government were represented as the unconstitutional acts of a
+tyrannical proconsul; having ruthlessly exposed the aspirations of the
+Afrikander nationalists he was now to become the destroyer of the Boer
+nation. The personal note in the address was, therefore, both
+instructive and welcome, and it elicited a response in which the charm
+of a calm and generous nature shines through an unalterable
+determination to know and do the right:
+
+     "As regards myself personally, I cannot but feel it is a great
+     source of strength at a trying time to be assured of the
+     confidence and approval of the men I see before me, and of all
+     whom they represent. You refer to my having to encounter
+     misrepresentation and antagonism. I do not wish to make too much
+     of that. I have no doubt been exposed to much criticism and some
+     abuse. There has, I sometimes think, been an exceptional display
+     of mendacity at my expense. But this is the fate of every public
+     man who is forced by circumstances into a somewhat prominent
+     position in a great crisis. And, after all, praise and blame have
+     a wonderful way of balancing one another if you only give them
+     time.
+
+     "I remember when I left England for South Africa three years ago,
+     it was amidst a chorus of eulogy so excessive that it made me
+     feel thoroughly uncomfortable. To protest would have been
+     useless: it would only have looked like affectation. So I just
+     placed the surplus praise to my credit, so to speak, as something
+     to live on in the days which I surely knew must come sooner or
+     later, if I did my duty, when I would meet with undeserved
+     censure. And certainly I have had to draw on that account rather
+     heavily during the last nine months. But there is still a balance
+     on the right side which, thanks to you and others, is now once
+     more increasing. So I cannot pose as a martyr, and, what is more
+     important, I cannot complain of any want of support. No man,
+     placed as I have been in a position of singular embarrassment,
+     exposed to bitter attacks to which he could not reply, and unable
+     to explain his conduct even to his own friends, has ever had more
+     compensation to be thankful for than I have had in the constant,
+     devoted, forbearing support and confidence of all those South
+     Africans, whether in this Colony, in Natal, or in the Republics,
+     whose sympathy is with the British Empire.
+
+[Sidenote: Never again.]
+
+     "In the concluding paragraph of your address you refer in weighty
+     and well-considered language to the conditions which you deem
+     necessary for the future peace and prosperity of South Africa,
+     and for the ultimate harmony and fusion of its white races. I can
+     only say that I entirely agree with the views expressed in that
+     paragraph. The longer the struggle lasts, the greater the
+     sacrifices which it involves, the stronger must surely be the
+     determination of all of us to achieve a settlement which will
+     render the repetition of this terrible scourge impossible. 'Never
+     again,' must be the motto of all thinking, of all humane men. It
+     is for that reason, not from any lust of conquest, not from any
+     desire to trample on a gallant, if misguided, enemy, that we
+     desire that the settlement shall be no patchwork and no
+     compromise; that it shall leave no room for misunderstanding, no
+     opportunity for intrigue, for the revival of impossible
+     ambitions, or the accumulation of enormous armaments. President
+     Krüger has said that he wants no more Conventions, and I
+     entirely agree with him. A compromise of that sort is unfair to
+     everybody. If there is one thing of which, after recent
+     experiences, I am absolutely convinced, it is that the vital
+     interests of all those who live in South Africa, of our present
+     enemies as much as of those who are on our side, demand that
+     there should not be two dissimilar and antagonistic political
+     systems in that which nature and history have irrevocably decided
+     must be one country. To agree to a compromise which would leave
+     any ambiguity on that point would not be magnanimity: it would be
+     weakness, ingratitude, and cruelty--ingratitude to the heroic
+     dead, and cruelty to the unborn generations.
+
+     "But when I say that, do not think that I wish to join in the
+     outcry, at present so prevalent, against the fine old virtue of
+     magnanimity. I believe in it as much as ever I did, and there is
+     plenty of room for it in the South Africa of to-day. We can show
+     it by a frank recognition of what is great and admirable in the
+     character of our enemies; by not maligning them as a body because
+     of the sins of the few, or perhaps even of many, individuals. We
+     can show it by not crowing excessively over our victories, and by
+     not thinking evil of every one who, for one reason or another, is
+     unable to join in our legitimate rejoicings. We can show it by
+     striving to take care that our treatment of those who have been
+     guilty of rebellion, while characterised by a just severity
+     towards the really guilty parties, should be devoid of any spirit
+     of vindictiveness, or of race-prejudice. We can show it, above
+     all, when this dire struggle is over, by proving by our acts that
+     they libelled us who said that we fought for gold or any material
+     advantage, and that the rights and privileges which we have
+     resolutely claimed for ourselves we are prepared freely to extend
+     to others, even to those who have fought against us, whenever
+     they are prepared loyally to accept them."[211]
+
+         [Footnote 211: Cd. 261.]
+
+It is the third of three critical utterances of which each is
+summarised, as it were, in a single luminous phrase. To the Cape Dutch
+he spoke at Graaf Reinet, after their own manner: "Of course you are
+loyal!" To England, on the Uitlander's behalf, he wrote: "The case for
+intervention is overwhelming." And now he gathered the whole long
+lesson of the war into the two words, "never again."
+
+[Sidenote: British policy.]
+
+A month later Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham (May 11th), made
+a general statement of the nature of the settlement upon which the
+British Government had determined. The separate existence of the
+Republics, "constantly intriguing as they had done with foreign
+nations, constantly promoting agitation and disaffection in our own
+colonies," was to be tolerated no longer; but the "individual
+liberties" of the Boers were to be preserved. After the war was over a
+period of Crown Colony government would be necessary; "but," he added,
+"as soon as it is safe and possible it will be the desire and the
+intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce these States into
+the great circle of self-governing colonies." In making this
+pronouncement Mr. Chamberlain referred in terms of just severity to
+the injurious influence which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as the
+official leader of the Liberal party, had exercised upon the
+diplomatic contest of the preceding year. At the precise period when a
+word might have been worth anything to the cause of peace, Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, he said--
+
+     "had again and again declaimed his own opinion that not only was
+     war out of the question, but that military preparations of any
+     kind were altogether unnecessary. I do not speak of the wisdom
+     which dictated such an expression of opinion," Mr. Chamberlain
+     continued, "although he repeated that statement three days before
+     the ultimatum was delivered, and a week before the invasion of
+     Natal took place. I do not speak, therefore, of his foresight.
+     But what is to be said of the patriotism of a man who is not a
+     single individual but who represents a great party by virtue of
+     his position--although he does not represent it by virtue of his
+     opinion--what is to be said of such a man who, at such a time,
+     should countermine the endeavours for peace of Her Majesty's
+     Government?"
+
+And in the same speech Mr. Chamberlain warned his fellow-countrymen
+"against the efforts which would be made by the politicians to snatch
+from them the fruits of a victory which would be won by their
+soldiers; and in particular against the campaign of misrepresentation
+which had been commenced already by Mr. Paul, the Stop-the-War
+Committee, and the other bodies which were so lavish with what they
+were pleased to call their 'accurate information.'"
+
+[Sidenote: Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.]
+
+Had Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman seen fit to profit by the experience
+of the past, the whole of the suffering and loss of the next year and
+a half of wanton hostilities, in all human probability, would have
+been avoided. But Mr. Chamberlain's rebuke was disregarded. The
+senseless and unnatural alliance between the Afrikander nationalists
+and the Liberal Opposition was renewed. It is quite true that the
+official leader of the Opposition, in speaking at Glasgow on June 7th,
+two days after Lord Roberts had occupied Pretoria, declared that, in
+respect of the settlement, "one broad principle" must be laid down--
+
+     "the British Imperial power, which has hitherto been supreme in
+     effect in South Africa, must in future be supreme in form as well
+     as in effect, and this naturally carries with it the point which
+     is sometimes put in the foreground, namely, that there must be no
+     possibility that any such outbreak of hostilities as we have been
+     witnessing shall again occur.... The two conquered States must,
+     in some form or under some condition, become States of the
+     British Empire."
+
+But when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proceeded to inform his audience
+how this was to be done, he used expressions which not only robbed his
+original statement of all significance as an indication of British
+unanimity, but conveyed a direct intimation to the Afrikander
+nationalists that their endeavours to frustrate the declared objects
+of the Unionist Government would receive the support and encouragement
+of the Opposition in England. His words were:
+
+     "We need have no doubt how it is to be done. By applying our
+     Liberal principles, the Liberal principles from which the
+     strength of the Empire has been derived, and on which it depends.
+     Let us apply our Liberal principles, and whether our party be in
+     a majority, or in a minority, I think that it is well in our
+     power to secure that these principles shall be applied. [The
+     General Election was imminent.] Let us restore as early as
+     possible, and let us maintain, those rights of self-government
+     which give not only life and vigour, but contentment and loyalty
+     to every colony which enjoys them...."
+
+"Liberal principles," when applied to a given administrative problem,
+as Mr. Chamberlain took occasion to point out (June 19th), meant, for
+practical purposes, the opinions which prominent members of the
+Liberal party were known to hold upon the matter in question. Lord
+(then Mr.) Courtney was for autonomy--"the re-establishment of the
+independence of the two Republics." Mr. Bryce advocated "the
+establishment of two protected States, which would have a sham
+independence of not much advantage to them for any practical or useful
+purpose, but very dangerous to us." And then there was Mr. Morley. Now
+Mr. Morley, only a week before, at Oxford (June 10th), had condemned
+not only the war, but by implication, the rejection of President
+Krüger's illusory Franchise Bill.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. John Morley.]
+
+     "I assert," said Mr. Morley, "that the evils which have resulted
+     from the war immeasurably transcend the evils with which it was
+     proposed to deal.... I abhor the whole transaction of the war. I
+     think in many ways it is an irreparable situation. We have done
+     a great wrong--a wrong of which I believe there is scarcely any
+     Englishman living who will not bitterly repent."[212]
+
+         [Footnote 212: Mr. Morley has the doubtful merit of
+         consistency. As recently as April 27th, 1906, he alluded to
+         the South African War as "that delusive and guilty war," in
+         an address to the Eighty Club. According to _The Times_
+         report this expression was received with cheers.]
+
+With these words fresh in his memory, Mr. Chamberlain continued:
+
+     "Is Mr. Morley a Liberal? I do not know in that case what would
+     become of the new territories if his principles were applied. But
+     this I do know--that in that case you would have immediately to
+     get rid of Sir Alfred Milner, who is the one great official in
+     South Africa who has shown from the first a true grasp of the
+     situation; and you would have also to get rid of the Colonial
+     Secretary, which would not, perhaps, matter."[213]
+
+         [Footnote 213: It may perhaps be objected that some credit
+         should have been allowed to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in
+         view of the fact that a sum of £41,807,400 was voted in
+         Committee of Supply in the House of Commons for military
+         requirements, practically without discussion, within four and
+         a half hours on June 19th, 1900. This objection is answered
+         by the words used by the Duke of Devonshire on the same day:
+         "I am afraid I must tell Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman that he
+         is not likely to receive from us any recognition, either
+         effusive or otherwise, of the patriotism of his party. It is
+         quite true that, as he took credit to himself and his
+         friends, they have not offered any opposition to our demands
+         for supplies or to the military measures which it has been
+         found necessary for the Government to take; but the reason
+         for that prudent abstinence is not very far to seek. Sir
+         Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his friends knew very well that
+         any factious opposition to the granting of these supplies
+         would have brought down upon them the almost unanimous
+         condemnation of the whole people; and Sir Henry
+         Campbell-Bannerman is much too shrewd and sensible a man to
+         risk the danger of committing for his party an act of
+         political suicide."--Address to Women's Liberal Unionist
+         Association.]
+
+And so in 1900--after the Raid, after the long diplomatic conflict,
+after the sudden revelation of the military strength of the
+Republics, after the ambitions of the Afrikander nationalists had been
+unmasked, and after the Dutch subjects of the Queen had risen in
+arms--the Liberal friends of the South African Dutch set themselves to
+do again what they had done in 1880. Just as then President Krüger
+wrote,[214] on behalf of himself and his Afrikander allies, to Lord
+(then Mr.) Courtney: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere ... will be
+useful.... We have done our duty, and used all legitimate influence to
+cause the [Federation] proposals to fail"; so now these Boer
+sympathisers prepared to work hand in hand with the Afrikander
+nationalists in their endeavour to secure the "fall" of Lord Milner,
+and to cause the Annexation proposals to "fail." Happily the analogy
+ends here. Upon the "anvil" of Lord Milner the "hammers" of the
+enemies of the Empire were worn out--_Tritantur mallei, remanet
+incus_.
+
+         [Footnote 214: June 26th, 1880, C. 2,655.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT
+
+
+The correspondence forwarded to the Colonial Office during the first
+half of the year 1900 by Lord Milner, and presented to the House of
+Commons in time for the Settlement debate of July 25th, furnishes a
+complete record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement. The whole
+of this interesting and significant collection of documents is worthy of
+attention; but all that can be done here is to direct the notice of the
+reader to one or two of its more salient features--features which
+illustrate the extraordinary condition of the Cape Colony, and explain
+how the disaffection of the Dutch subjects of the Crown was to be first
+aggravated, and then used as a means of saving the independence of the
+Republics. The position taken up by the Bond at the end of January
+(1900) in view of Mr. Schreiner's gradual conversion to the side of the
+Imperial Government, is sufficiently indicated in the resolution
+prepared for submission to the annual Congress, to which reference has
+been already[215] made. It was, in effect, a condemnation not only of
+the British Government, but of the Cape Government also, in so far as it
+had co-operated with the Imperial authorities, and a determination to
+prevent the war from being carried to a logical and successful
+conclusion by the incorporation of the Boer Republics into the system of
+British South Africa. The annual Congress, at which these opinions were
+to be affirmed, was announced to be held at Somerset East, on March 8th.
+Lord Milner, however, represented to Mr. Schreiner that it was very
+undesirable that such a demonstration should take place; and, through
+Mr. Schreiner's influence, the Congress was postponed. But the Prime
+Minister, in undertaking to use his influence with the Bond to prevent a
+denunciation of the policy of the Imperial Government at so critical a
+period, expressed the hope that the loyalists on their side would
+refrain from any public demonstration of an opposite character.
+
+         [Footnote 215: See p. 349.]
+
+This abstinence from agitation, which was obviously desirable in the
+public interests at a time of intense political excitement, by no
+means suited the leaders of the Bond. _Ons Land_, in commenting upon
+the postponement of the Congress, incidentally reveals the real
+consideration which made it worth while for the Bond to promote an
+agitation of this kind. The Bond organ regrets that the Congress has
+been postponed. And why?
+
+     "It is said that the [South African] League would have held a
+     Congress had the Bond Congress been held. We have nothing to do
+     with what the League does or does not do; as a matter of fact,
+     its opinion has already been published in the Imperial
+     Blue-books. We were of opinion that it would have been the duty
+     of the Afrikander party to express itself at the Congress in
+     unmistakable terms, and resolutely, in order thereby to maintain
+     its true position and strengthen the hands of its friends in
+     England who have courageously and with self-sacrifice striven for
+     the good and just cause."[216]
+
+         [Footnote 216: Cd. 261.]
+
+This, then, was the real object of the agitation--to "strengthen the
+hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England." The writer
+of this article suggests, however, that there is still a prospect that
+the "good cause" may be promoted, after all, in the way which he
+desires.
+
+[Sidenote: Origin of the movement.]
+
+This prospect was speedily realised. With characteristic astuteness,
+the Bond leaders discovered a method by which their object could be
+achieved without exposing themselves to the reproach of "stirring up
+strife." The meetings were to be held, not as Bond meetings, but as
+"conciliation" meetings. The manner in which the machinery of the
+conciliation movement was originally set in motion will appear from
+the following telegram, which President Krüger sent to President
+Steyn, on January 20th--that is, a little more than a month before the
+Bond Congress was postponed:
+
+     "A certain E. T. Hargrove, an English journalist, about whom Dr.
+     Leyds formerly wrote that he had done much in Holland to work up
+     the peace memorial to Queen Victoria, has come here, as he says,
+     from Sauer and Merriman, who are ready to range themselves openly
+     on our side, to make propaganda in the Cape Colony, provided an
+     official declaration is given that the Republics only desire to
+     secure complete independence. He wished that I should write a
+     letter to Queen Victoria, but this I refused, and thought it
+     desirable that I should write a letter to him personally, in
+     which an answer is given to his question. He thinks that a great
+     propaganda can be made in the Cape Colony, whereby influence can
+     be brought to bear again on the English people and the world. I
+     myself do not expect much result, but think that a letter can do
+     good, and should be glad to have your opinion and observations as
+     soon as possible."[217]
+
+         [Footnote 217: Cd. 261.]
+
+This telegram, one of the many documents found at Bloemfontein upon
+its occupation by Lord Roberts, is supplemented by the further facts
+disclosed by the investigations of the Concessions Commission, that a
+sum of £1,000 was advanced to Mr. Hargrove by the manager of the
+Netherlands Railway on February 3rd, 1900, and that this loan, paid in
+specie, was "debited to the account 'Political Situation,' to be
+hereafter arranged with the Government." The purposes for which Mr.
+Hargrove secured this large sum are stated in the following question
+and answer:
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Hargrove's £1,000.]
+
+     Q. 591. "Did he ask for money to carry out this object [_i.e._ to
+     stop the war on the assurance that the Boers wanted nothing more
+     than their independence]?"
+
+     MR. J. VAN KRETSCHMAR, General Manager of the Netherlands South
+     African Railway Company: "Yes; he said he had travelling expenses
+     to defray, a lot of publications to issue, and books to be
+     written, and he asked for money for these purposes."[218]
+
+         [Footnote 218: Cd. 624. The memorandum also noted that the
+         £1,000 was "paid at request of F. W. Reitz" (the State
+         Secretary). In the Concessions Commission the following
+         letter is published:
+
+                         "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA.
+                              _7 April, 1899._
+
+         TO VAN KRETSCHMAR VAN VEEN, ESQ.,
+         DIRECTOR OF THE N.Z.A. RY. CO.
+
+         HON'D. SIR,--With reference to a letter of his Excellency the
+         Ambassador, dated 23 March last, with reference to Mr.
+         Statham and the latter's request for an assistance of £300
+         for furniture and such like, I have the honour to inform you
+         confidentially that the Executive Council has resolved to
+         grant this gentleman Statham an amount of £150. As, according
+         to previous agreement, a yearly allowance is paid to Mr.
+         Statham by your Company, I have the honour to request you
+         kindly to pay out to the said Mr. Statham the sum granted
+         him. His Excellency the Ambassador is likewise being informed
+         of this decision of the Executive Council.--I have, etc.,
+
+                                   J. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_."
+         (Q. 608.)
+
+         Mr. Statham is understood to have been a frequent contributor
+         to those Liberal journals which sympathised with the Boer
+         cause. His allowance, however, had ceased before the war
+         broke out.]
+
+Three months later President Krüger's telegram was laid before the two
+ministers whose names it contained by Mr. Schreiner, at Lord Milner's
+request, in order that they might have an opportunity of "repudiating
+or explaining the allegations affecting themselves which it
+contained." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer denied that Mr. Hargrove
+had received any authority from them to use their names "in the manner
+which he appeared to have done." And on April 19th Mr. Merriman
+himself wrote to Mr. Hargrove to ask for an explanation. To this
+letter Mr. Hargrove replied immediately:
+
+     "This is not an answer to your note of this date, but is to ask
+     you to allow me to show your note to a friend of yours and of
+     mine. As it is marked 'private' I cannot do this until I hear
+     from you. Would you be so good as to send word by the driver of
+     the cab which waits?..."
+
+In a second letter, written on the same day (April 19th), and
+presumably after he had consulted the mutual friend in question, Mr.
+Hargrove wrote:
+
+     "Knowing as you do that I never told you of my proposed trip to
+     Pretoria, that I never talked the matter over with you in any
+     shape or form, you may be sure that when I got there I did not
+     speak or make promises in your behalf. But I did mention your
+     name in this way: I told President Krüger of a conversation I had
+     had with Mr. Sauer, in which I had asked him what his attitude
+     would be in the event of the Republics offering to withdraw their
+     forces from colonial territory on the condition that their
+     independence would be recognised. Mr. Sauer's reply was that, in
+     those circumstances he would, in his personal capacity, most
+     certainly urge the acceptance of that offer, and that, although
+     he could speak for himself only, he thought it probable you would
+     do the same."
+
+Mr. Hargrove adds that the "misconception" embodied in President
+Krüger's telegram is due to the circumstance that it was probably
+"dictated in a hurry, amidst a rush of other business," and contained
+a "hasty and more or less careless account" of a "long talk"
+translated to the President by Mr. Reitz from English into Dutch.
+
+Mr. Hargrove at the same time forwarded a copy of this letter to Mr.
+Sauer. With this latter minister of the Crown he enjoyed a more
+intimate acquaintance, since, as Lord Milner points out,[219] he had
+been Mr. Sauer's travelling companion during this latter's
+"well-meant, but unsuccessful, journey to Wodehouse, which was
+immediately followed by the rebellion of that district."
+
+         [Footnote 219: In his covering despatch, Cd. 261, p. 126. For
+         the circumstances of Mr. Sauer's visit to Dordrecht on the
+         occasion mentioned see note, p. 287.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Graaf Reinet congress.]
+
+This, then, was the character of the man who travelled throughout the
+Colony, addressing meetings of the Dutch population, in order that
+"the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England might be
+strengthened." At the People's Congress, held at Graaf Reinet (May
+30th) he rose to his full stature. "The worst foes of the British
+Empire," he said,[220] "were not the Boers, but those who had set up
+the howl for annexation." And he concluded by urging his audience to
+renew their hopes, for he believed that "if they did everything in
+their power to show what was right they would win in the end." On the
+following day Mr. Hargrove was asked, in the name of the Congress, to
+continue his agitation in England. The Congress, however, did not
+propose to rely exclusively upon Mr. Hargrove's efforts. It resolved
+to send a deputation of Cape colonists "to tell the simple truth as
+they know it" to the people of Great Britain and Ireland.
+
+         [Footnote 220: As reported in _The Cape Times_, Cd. 261.]
+
+There is one other fact which is disclosed by this official
+correspondence from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State
+which cannot be overlooked. Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer both repudiated
+absolutely President Krüger's statement that Mr. Hargrove "had come
+here [_i.e._ to Pretoria], as he says, from Sauer and Merriman." In
+view of this repudiation, it is somewhat startling to find that the
+letters covering the minutes of the conciliation meetings, forwarded
+to Lord Milner from time to time with the request that they may be
+sent on to the Colonial Office, bear the signature of Mr. Albert
+Cartwright, as honorary secretary of the Conciliation Committee of
+South Africa. Mr. Albert Cartwright was editor of _The South African
+News_--that is to say, of the journal which, as we have noticed
+before, served as the medium for the expression of the political views
+of Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. At the period in question _The South
+African News_ rendered itself notorious by circulating the absurd, but
+none the less injurious, report that General Buller and his army had
+surrendered to the Boers in Natal and agreed to return to England on
+parole; by publishing stories of imaginary Boer victories; by
+eulogising Mr. Hargrove, whose acceptance of the £1,000 from the
+Netherlands Railway it definitely denied; and by its persistent and
+vehement denunciations of Lord Milner. At a later period Mr.
+Cartwright was convicted of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and
+condemned to a term of imprisonment.[221]
+
+         [Footnote 221: See p. 477.]
+
+[Sidenote: Mischievous effects.]
+
+The situation thus brought about is described by Lord Milner in a
+passage in the despatch[222] which covers the transmission of the
+newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet. After
+stating that in return for Mr. Schreiner's efforts to secure the
+postponement of the Bond Congress, he had himself persuaded the
+leaders of the Progressive party to abstain from any public
+demonstration of their opinions, he writes:
+
+         [Footnote 222: Cd. 261, despatch of June 6th, 1900.]
+
+     "There was a truce of God on both sides. Then came the
+     'conciliation' movement, and the country was stirred from end to
+     end by a series of meetings much more violent and mischievous
+     than the regular Bond Congress would have been, though, of
+     course, on the same lines. The truce being thus broken, it would
+     have been useless--and, as a matter of fact, I did not
+     attempt--to restrain an expression of opinion on the other side.
+     Hence the long series of meetings held in British centres to
+     pronounce in favour of the annexation of both Republics, and to
+     give cordial support to the policy of Her Majesty's Government
+     and myself personally. On the whole, the utterances at these
+     meetings have been marked by a moderation totally absent in the
+     tone of the conciliators. But no doubt a certain number of
+     violent things have been said, and a certain amount of
+     unnecessary heat generated. I do not think, however, that those
+     [the loyalists] who have held these meetings, under extraordinary
+     provocation, are greatly to blame if this has occasionally been
+     the case."
+
+That the "conciliation" movement exercised a most injurious influence
+in a colony of which a considerable area was in rebellion or under
+martial law, and where the majority of the inhabitants were in
+sympathy with the enemy is obvious. But from the point of view of the
+Afrikander nationalists it was an intelligible and effective method of
+promoting the objects which they had in view. What is amazing is the
+part which was played in it by Englishmen, and the confident manner in
+which the promoters of the movement relied upon the political
+co-operation of the friends of the Boers in the ranks of the Liberal
+party in England. Every Afrikander who attended these meetings knew
+that he was doing his best to arouse hatred against the Englishman and
+sympathy for the Boer. The nature of the resolutions to which he gave
+his adherence left him in no doubt on this point.
+
+     "The war," said Mr. A. B. de Villiers, at the People's Congress,
+     "was the most unrighteous war that was ever pursued. The simple
+     aim was to seize the Republics. If that was persisted in,
+     Afrikanders would not rest.... Britain would efface the Republics
+     and make the people slaves. Race hatred would then be prolonged
+     from generation to generation."
+
+To publish abroad such opinions as these was obviously to invite
+rebellion in the Cape Colony, to encourage the resistance of the
+Boers, and to embarrass the British authorities, both civil and
+military, throughout South Africa. This was precisely what the
+Afrikander nationalist desired to do. But what is to be thought of the
+Englishmen who, both in the Cape Colony and in England, took part in
+this "conciliation" movement? Surely they did not desire these same
+results. Were they, then, the comrades or the dupes of the Afrikander
+nationalists? This is a question upon which the individual reader may
+be left to form his own judgment.
+
+[Sidenote: Comrades or dupes.]
+
+This much, at least, is certain. What gave the Afrikander nationalists
+the power to bring about the second invasion of the Cape Colony, and
+to inflict a year and a half of guerilla warfare upon South Africa,
+was the co-operation of these Englishmen--whether comrades or
+dupes--who opposed the annexation of the Republics. The intense
+sympathy felt by the Afrikanders for their defeated kinsmen was
+natural; but the means by which it was enflamed were artificial. Lord
+Milner himself, with his accustomed serenity of judgment, refused to
+take a "gloomy view" of the question of racial relations in the
+Colony, still less in South Africa as a whole.
+
+     "If it is true," he wrote on June 6th, "as the 'conciliators' are
+     never tired of threatening us, that race hatred will be eternal,
+     why should they make such furious efforts to keep it up at the
+     present moment? The very vehemence of their declarations that the
+     Afrikanders will never forgive, nor forget, nor acquiesce, seems
+     to me to indicate a considerable and well-justified anxiety on
+     their part lest these terrible things should, after all, happen."
+
+But while the Cape Colony was in the throes of this agitation, British
+soldiers were gallantly fighting their way to Johannesburg and
+Pretoria. During the six weeks of Lord Roberts's "prolonged and
+enforced halt" at Bloemfontein (March 13th--May 1st), and
+subsequently, while the Army was advancing upon the Transvaal,
+considerable progress was made in the work of clearing the Colony of
+the republican invaders and re-establishing British authority in the
+districts in which the Dutch had risen in rebellion. In the course of
+these operations a large number of rebels had fallen into the hands of
+the Imperial military authorities, and it was the question of the
+treatment of these colonial rebels that was destined to bring Mr.
+Schreiner into direct conflict with those of his ministers who still
+held the opinions of the Bond.
+
+[Sidenote: The punishment of rebels.]
+
+In the middle of April Lord Milner had received from Mr. Chamberlain a
+despatch containing a preliminary statement of the opinion of the Home
+Government upon the two questions of the compensation of loyalists and
+the punishment of rebels, and on April 14th he requested his ministers
+to give formal expression to their views upon the subjects to which
+Mr. Chamberlain had drawn his attention. A fortnight later Lord Milner
+reported to the Home Government the conclusions at which Mr. Schreiner
+and his fellow-ministers had arrived. Trial by jury for persons
+indicted for high treason must be abandoned, since it would be
+impossible for the Crown to obtain the necessary convictions, and a
+special tribunal must be established by statute. As regards the nature
+of the punishment to be inflicted upon the rebels, Mr. Schreiner
+wrote:
+
+     "Ministers submit that the ends of justice would be served by the
+     selection of a certain limited number of the principal offenders,
+     whose trials would mark the magnitude of their offence and whose
+     punishment, if found guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the
+     remainder, ministers believe that the interests both of sound
+     policy and of public morality would be served if Her Gracious
+     Majesty were moved to issue, as an act of grace, a Proclamation
+     of amnesty under which, upon giving proper security for their
+     good behaviour, all persons chargeable with high treason, except
+     those held for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to
+     their avocations."[223]
+
+         [Footnote 223: Cd. 264.]
+
+The substance of the Ministers' Minutes containing these conclusions,
+and the arguments by which they were supported--notably an appeal to
+the "Canadian precedent"--were telegraphed to the Home Government, and
+on May 4th Mr. Chamberlain replied, also by telegram. While the
+people of Great Britain were animated by no vindictive feeling against
+"those who had been or were in arms against Her Majesty's forces,
+whether enemies or rebels"--did, in fact, desire that all racial
+animosity should disappear in South Africa at the earliest possible
+moment after the war was over--the "sentiments of both sides" must be
+taken into consideration. The consequences which would ensue from "the
+rankling sense of injustice" that would arise if the rebels were
+actually placed in a better position after the struggle was over than
+those who had risked life and property in the determination to remain
+"loyal to their Queen and flag," would be no less serious than the bad
+results to be anticipated from any display of a revengeful policy on
+the part of the loyalists. He continued:
+
+     "Clemency to rebels is a policy which has the hearty sympathy of
+     Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an
+     obligation of duty and honour. The question is, how can these two
+     policies be harmonised? It is clear that, in the interest of
+     future peace, it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot be
+     indulged in with impunity, and above all that, if unsuccessful,
+     it is not a profitable business for the rebel. Otherwise the
+     State would be offering a premium to rebellion. The present
+     moment, therefore, while the war is still proceeding, and while
+     efforts may still be made to tempt British subjects into
+     rebellious courses, is in any case not appropriate for announcing
+     that such action may be indulged in with absolute impunity. And
+     if, as has been suggested, a great many of the Queen's rebellious
+     subjects are the mere tools of those who have deceived them, it
+     is important that these should be made aware individually that,
+     whatever their leaders may tell them, rebellion is a punishable
+     offence.
+
+[Sidenote: Clemency and justice.]
+
+     "Up to this time very lenient treatment has been meted out to
+     rebels. Although, according to the law of the Cape Colony, and
+     under martial law, the punishment of death might have been
+     inflicted, in no case has any rebel suffered the capital penalty,
+     and the vast majority have been permitted for the present to
+     return to their homes and to resume their occupations. There are
+     many degrees in the crime of rebellion. Her Majesty's Government
+     desire that in any case means shall be found for dealing
+     effectually with: (1) The ringleaders and promoters; (2) those
+     who have committed outrages or looted the property of their loyal
+     fellow-subjects; (3) those who have committed acts contrary to
+     the usages of civilised warfare, such as abuse of the white flag,
+     firing on hospitals, etc. There remain (4) those who, though not
+     guilty, of either of those offences, have openly and willingly
+     waged war against Her Majesty's forces; (5) those who confined
+     themselves to aiding Her Majesty's enemies by giving information
+     or furnishing provisions; and (6) those who can satisfactorily
+     prove that they acted under compulsion. In the opinion of Her
+     Majesty's Government a distinction ought to be, if possible,
+     drawn between these different classes.
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government recognise the difficulty of indicting
+     for high treason all who have taken part with the enemy, and they
+     would suggest, for the consideration of your ministers, the
+     expediency of investing either the Special Judicial Commission
+     which, as stated in your telegram of 28th April, is contemplated
+     by your ministers, or a separate Commission, with powers to
+     schedule the names of all persons implicated in the rebellion
+     under the various heads indicated above. It would be necessary
+     to decide beforehand how the different categories should then be
+     dealt with. As regards 1, 2, and 3, they would, of course, be
+     brought before the Judicial Commission and tried by them. Might
+     not 4 and 5 be allowed to plead guilty, and be thereupon either
+     sentenced to a fine carrying with it disfranchisement, or
+     released on recognisances, to come up for judgment when called
+     upon (this also to involve disfranchisement), while 6 might be
+     subjected to disfranchisement alone? Her Majesty's Government
+     offer these as suggestions for the consideration of your
+     ministers.
+
+     "In regard to the reasons urged by your ministers in favour of a
+     general amnesty, Her Majesty's Government would point out that
+     they are of a highly controversial character, and it is
+     impossible to discuss them fully at a moment when an indication
+     of the views of Her Majesty's Government is urgently required.
+     Her Majesty's Government would only observe that the policy which
+     they have indicated in this telegram appears to them to be one
+     not merely of justice, but of clemency, which the whole white
+     population of the Colony might well accept as satisfactory, and
+     which should not, any more than the ordinary administration of
+     justice, encourage the natives to think that the two white races
+     are permanently disunited, while with especial reference to the
+     third reason, it may be observed that the expediency of the
+     action to be taken in such cases depends upon circumstances which
+     must vary greatly according to date and locality. In Lower Canada
+     in 1837-38 there was a revolt during peace against the Queen's
+     authority, founded on grievances under constitutional conditions
+     which were recognised as unsatisfactory by the Government of the
+     day, and altered by subsequent legislation. In the Cape there has
+     been adhesion to the Queen's enemies during war by those who
+     have not even the pretext of any grievance, and who have for a
+     generation enjoyed full constitutional liberty. In Canada the
+     insurrection was never a formidable one from a military point of
+     view; in the Cape it has added very largely to the cost and
+     difficulty of the war, and has entailed danger and heavy loss to
+     Her Majesty's troops."[224]
+
+         [Footnote 224: Cd. 264.]
+
+[Sidenote: The ministry divided.]
+
+This estimate of the guilt of the Cape rebels--moderate in the light
+of British colonial history, merciful beyond dispute as judged by the
+practice of foreign States--failed to commend itself to the Afrikander
+Ministry. On May 29th, when the full text of the Cape ministers'
+minutes and enclosures had reached the Colonial Office, Lord Milner
+inquired of Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of his ministers, whether the
+disfranchisement proposed was for life or for a period only; and
+further, whether, in view of their fuller knowledge of the
+representations of the Cape Ministry, the views of the Home Government
+were still to be accepted as those expressed in the despatch of May
+4th. To these questions Mr. Chamberlain replied, by telegram, on June
+10th, that the Government continued to hold the opinion that the
+policy already suggested should be substantially adhered to; while, as
+to the period of disfranchisement, he pointed out that--
+
+     "conviction and sentence for high treason carried with it
+     disfranchisement for life, and if the offenders were spared the
+     other and severer penalties of rebellion, justice seemed to
+     demand that they should suffer the full political penalty.
+     Disfranchisement for life did not seem to Her Majesty's
+     Government to be a very serious punishment for rebellion."
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Schreiner resigns.]
+
+On June 11th Lord Milner was informed by Mr. Schreiner that ministers
+were hopelessly divided on the subject of the treatment of the rebels,
+and that their differences could not be composed, and on the following
+day he replied that, if he could not receive the support of a
+unanimous Cabinet to which he, as Governor, was constitutionally
+entitled, he would be compelled, in the discharge of his duty, to seek
+it elsewhere. Mr. Schreiner's resignation, which was placed in Lord
+Milner's hands on the next day, was followed by the appointment, on
+June 18th, of a Progressive Ministry with Sir Gordon Sprigg as Prime
+Minister and Sir James Rose Innes as Attorney-General. Mr. Schreiner,
+in his memorandum of June 11th, had forwarded to Lord Milner documents
+containing particulars of the individual views of the members of his
+Cabinet. Mr. Solomon, the Attorney-General, was prepared to adopt a
+policy in respect of the treatment of the rebels, and the machinery by
+which that policy was to be carried out, which appeared to him to
+involve nothing that would prevent "complete accord between Her
+Majesty's Government and this Government on the question." And in this
+view both Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Herholdt concurred. But the remaining
+members of the Cabinet were entirely opposed to any policy other than
+that of granting a general amnesty to all rebels except the "principal
+offenders," and allowing these latter to be tried by the machinery of
+justice already in existence--_i.e._ by Afrikander juries. The minutes
+which they respectively addressed to the Prime Minister were bitter
+invectives directed alike against the Home Government and Lord Milner.
+
+     "We are asked," Mr. Merriman wrote, on his own and Mr. Sauer's
+     behalf, with reference to the suggestions of the Home Government,
+     "to deal with a number of men who have, at worst, taken up arms
+     in what they, however erroneously, considered to be a righteous
+     war--a war in which they joined the Queen's enemies to resist
+     what prominent men both here and in England have repeatedly
+     spoken of as a crime.... These men, irrespective of class, we are
+     asked to put under a common political proscription, to deprive
+     them of their civil rights, and by so doing (in fact, this is the
+     main commendation of the measure to the "loyals") to deprive
+     their friends and kinsfolk, who have rendered the Colony yeoman
+     service at the most critical time, of that legitimate influence
+     which belongs to a majority. We are asked, in fact, to create a
+     class of political 'helots' in South Africa, where we are now
+     waging a bloody and costly war ostensibly for the purpose of
+     putting an end to a similar state of affairs."
+
+Of course, all this and much more might have been read at any time
+since the war began in the columns of _The South African News_, but in
+a minister's memorandum to the Prime Minister, and over the signature
+"John X. Merriman," its naked hostility arrests the mind. Dr. Te
+Water's memorandum, although much shorter than that of Mr. Merriman,
+is even more outspoken. To him, the direct representative of the
+republican nationalists in the Afrikander Cabinet, amnesty for the
+rebels is the "sound and proper policy." And naturally, since in his
+eyes the rebels themselves are--
+
+     "British subjects of Dutch extraction who, after vainly
+     endeavouring, by all possible constitutional means, to prevent
+     what they, in common with the rest of the civilised world,
+     believe to be an unjust and infamous war against their near
+     kinsmen, aided the Republics in the terrible struggle forced upon
+     them."[225]
+
+         [Footnote 225: Cd. 264.]
+
+[Sidenote: A progressive ministry.]
+
+This is vitriol-throwing, but it is none the less significant. These
+three men formed half of the six ministers to whom collectively, Lord
+Milner, as Governor of the Cape Colony, had to look for advice during
+the two critical years that the Afrikander party was in power.
+Fortunately, in his capacity of High Commissioner for South Africa, he
+was free to act without their advice, as the representative of the
+Queen. Even so, his achievement is little less than marvellous. Aided
+by Mr. Schreiner's pathetic sense of loyalty to the person of the
+sovereign, he had kept the Cape Government outwardly true to its
+allegiance. The long hours of patient remonstrance, the word-battles
+from which the Prime Minister had risen sometimes white with
+passionate resentment, had not been useless. By tact, by serenity of
+disposition, by depth of conviction, and latterly by sheer force of
+argument, Lord Milner had won Mr. Schreiner, not indeed to the side of
+England, but at least to the side of that Empire-State of which
+England was the head. With the Prime Minister went Sir Richard
+Solomon, Mr. Herholdt, and one or two of the Afrikander rank and file.
+Thus reinforced, the Progressives commanded a working majority in the
+Legislative Assembly, and the ascendancy of the Afrikander party was
+at an end.
+
+Apart from the secession of Mr. Schreiner and his immediate followers,
+the Parliamentary strength of the Afrikander party was lessened by
+another circumstance, to which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman referred
+in the debate on the South African Settlement in the House of Commons
+on July 25th. Certain members of the Cape Parliament, said the leader
+of the Liberal Opposition, had been arrested for high treason, with
+the result that the Afrikander party was deprived of their votes, and
+the balance of power between that party and the Progressive party was
+upset. And he protested against this manner of turning an Afrikander
+majority into a minority. The reply which these remarks on the part of
+this friend of the Afrikander party in England drew from the
+Government is instructive:
+
+     "May I remind the right honourable gentleman," said Mr. Balfour,
+     "that the balance of parties was disturbed by another and
+     different cause on which he has made no protest? Some members of
+     that Parliament, not sharing the views of those who are
+     imprisoned, are now fighting at the front and risking their lives
+     in the defence of the Empire. Their party is deprived of their
+     services in the Cape Parliament, and I should have thought that
+     this would have affected the right honourable gentleman much more
+     than the absence of men who, under any circumstances, must be
+     supposed to be under the darkest suspicion as to their view and
+     policy respecting the country to which they owe allegiance."
+
+The Cape Parliament met under the new Ministry in July, and the chief
+business of the session, which lasted until the middle of October, was
+the passing of the Treason Bill. On July 9th Lord Milner was able to
+inform Mr. Chamberlain (by telegram) that the Bill had been prepared,
+and to indicate the nature of its main provisions. These were: (1) An
+indemnity for acts done under martial law; (2) the establishment of a
+Special Court to try cases in which the Attorney-General might decide
+to indict any person for high treason, such cases to be tried without
+a jury; (3) the establishment of a Special Commission to "deal with
+rebels not so indicted and to punish all found guilty with
+disfranchisement for five years from the date of conviction"; and (4)
+the legalisation of the already existing Compensation Commission. In a
+despatch dated July 26th--the day after the Settlement debate in the
+House of Commons--Mr. Chamberlain replied at length to the arguments
+put forward by the Schreiner Ministry in favour of a general amnesty,
+and exposed in particular the historical inaccuracy of the appeal to
+the "Canadian precedent." At the same time he stated that Her
+Majesty's Government, while they could not be a consenting party to a
+policy condoning adhesion to the enemy in the field, had no doubt that
+"such a measure of penalty as the mass of loyal opinion in the Colony
+considered adequate would meet with their concurrence." That is to
+say, the proposal of the Home Government for disfranchisement for life
+was not pressed, but was abandoned in favour of the lenient penalty
+originally proposed by Sir Richard Solomon, independently of any
+consideration of the views of the Colonial Office, and now adopted by
+the Progressive Ministry.
+
+[Sidenote: The treason bill.]
+
+In spite of its leniency, the Treason Bill met with the violent and
+protracted resistance of the Afrikander party in the Legislative
+Assembly. The opportunity thus afforded for the delivery of fierce
+invectives against the Imperial authorities was utilised to the full,
+and the fires of disaffection lighted by the "Conciliation" meetings
+were kindled anew into the second and more disastrous conflagration
+that culminated in the proceedings of the Worcester Conference
+(December 6th). In the Cape Parliamentary Reports the picture of this
+nightmare session is to be found faithfully presented in all its ugly
+and grotesque details. Two facts will serve to show to what a degree
+the members of the Legislative Assembly of this British colony had
+identified themselves with the cause of the enemy. The first is the
+circumstance that it was a common practice of the Afrikander members
+to refer in Parliament to the military successes of the Boers with
+pride as "our" victories. The second is the fact that Mr. Sauer, only
+three months ago a minister of the Crown, declared, in opposing the
+second reading of the Bill, that "a time would come when there would
+be very few Dutchmen who would not blush when they told their children
+that they had not helped their fellow-countrymen in their hour of
+need."[226] Morally, though not legally, the Afrikander members had
+gone over to the enemy no less than the rebels who had taken up arms
+against their sovereign. This was the "loyalty" of the Bond.
+
+         [Footnote 226: _Cape Times_, August 23rd, 1900.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner visits the colonies.]
+
+The Treason Bill was promulgated, under the title of "The Indemnity
+and Special Tribunals Act, 1900," on October 12th. On the same day
+Lord Milner left Capetown for a brief visit to the Transvaal and
+Orange River Colony. The intention of the Home Government to place the
+administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies in his
+hands had been made known to him informally; and it was obviously
+desirable, therefore, that he should acquaint himself with the actual
+state of affairs as soon as possible. After a somewhat adventurous
+journey through the Orange River Colony, he reached Pretoria on the
+15th, and remained at the capital until the 22nd. He then proceeded to
+Johannesburg, where he spent the next three days (October 22nd to
+25th). At both places he made provisional arrangements, in
+consultation with Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, for the early
+establishment of so much of the machinery of civil administration as
+the exigencies of the military situation permitted. Leaving
+Johannesburg on the 25th, the High Commissioner stopped for the night
+at Kroonstad, _en route_ for Bloemfontein. On the morning following he
+woke up to find the train still motionless, since the line had been
+cut by the Boers--an almost daily occurrence at this period of the
+war. After a few hours, however, the journey was resumed; but the High
+Commissioner's train was preceded by an armoured train as far as
+Smalldeel, from which point it ran without escort to Bloemfontein,
+where he remained until November 1st. Here, in addition to making the
+necessary arrangements for the beginning of civil administration in
+the Orange River Colony, Lord Milner had the satisfaction of
+inaugurating the career of the South African Constabulary under the
+command of Major-General Baden-Powell. The departure from Bloemfontein
+was delayed for a few hours by the destruction of the span of a
+railway bridge by the Boers; but at 12 o'clock the High
+Commissioner's train, again preceded by its armoured companion, was
+able to resume its journey southwards. In the course of the following
+day (November 2nd) the English mail, going northwards from Capetown,
+was met, and among other communications which Lord Milner then
+received was the despatch of October 18th enclosing the commissions
+under which he was appointed to administer the new colonies upon Lord
+Roberts's approaching return to England.
+
+Lord Milner arrived at Capetown on November 3rd. During his three
+weeks' absence the situation in the Cape Colony had changed for the
+worse. After the Treason Bill debates the anti-British propaganda,
+still carried on under the grotesque pretence of promoting
+"conciliation," had taken a different and more sinister form. To their
+denunciation of the Home Government and its treatment of the
+Republics, the Afrikander nationalists now added slander and abuse of
+the British and colonial troops in South Africa. In order to
+understand how such calumnies were possible in the face of the
+singular humanity with which the military operations of the Imperial
+troops had been conducted, a brief reference to the course of the war
+is necessary. The change from regular to guerilla warfare initiated by
+the Boer leaders in the later months of this year (1900), and the
+consequent withdrawal of British garrisons from insecurely held
+districts both in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, were
+accompanied by the return to arms of many burghers who, on taking the
+oath of neutrality, had been allowed to resume their civil
+occupations. This breach of faith, whether voluntary or compulsory,
+compelled the British military commanders to adopt measures of greater
+severity in the operations undertaken for the reconquest of the
+revolted areas. The punishment inflicted upon the inhabitants of such
+areas, especially those adjoining the colonial border, although
+merciful in comparison with the penalties actually incurred under the
+laws of war by those who, having surrendered, resumed their arms, was
+considerably more rigorous than the treatment to which the republican
+Dutch had been originally subjected. This legitimate and necessary
+increase of severity, displayed by the British commanders in districts
+where the burghers had surrendered, and then taken up arms a second,
+or even a third time, was the sole basis of fact upon which the
+Afrikander nationalists in the Cape Colony founded the vast volume of
+imaginary outrage and inhumanity on the part of the Imperial troops
+which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was held subsequently to have
+endorsed by accusing the British Government of carrying on the war in
+South Africa by "methods of barbarism."[227]
+
+         [Footnote 227: June 14th; 1901 (Holborn Restaurant, and
+         elsewhere later). "Whatever Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman may
+         think or say, the German nation may think or say."--The
+         _Vossische Zeitung._]
+
+[Sidenote: Libels on the British troops.]
+
+The weapon now adopted for the anti-British campaign was the
+circulation through the Bond Press, Dutch and English, of accounts of
+cruel or infamous acts alleged to have been committed by British
+soldiers, and described with every detail calculated to arouse the
+passionate resentment of the colonial Dutch. There is only one way in
+which the reader can be brought to understand the wantonly false and
+wholly disgraceful character of these libels. It is to place before
+his eyes the literal translation of two examples, printed in Dutch in
+_The Worcester Advertiser_ of November 23rd, 1900; that is to say, in
+anticipation of the People's Congress, which was to be held less than
+a fortnight later (December 6th) at the little town in the Western
+Province so named. The article is headed: "Dreadful Murders
+perpetrated on Farmers, Women, and Children, near Boshoff:
+
+[Sidenote: Two examples.]
+
+     "... This unfortunate man [a Boer prisoner] left behind him his
+     dear wife and four children. One or two days after his departure
+     there came a couple of heroes in the house of the unfortunate
+     woman, locked the doors and set fire to the curtains. The woman,
+     awfully frightened by it, was in a cruel way handled by these
+     ruffians, and compelled to make known where the guns and
+     ammunition were hidden. The poor woman, surrounded by her dear
+     children (who were from time to time pushed back by these
+     soldiers), answered that she could swear before the holy God that
+     there was not a single gun or cartridge or anything of that sort
+     hidden on that farm. In the meantime the curtains were destroyed
+     by the smoke and flames to ashes. The house, at least, was not
+     attacked by the flames, but the low, mean lot put at the four
+     corners of the house a certain amount of dynamite, to destroy it
+     in this way.
+
+     "The heroic warrior and commander over a portion of the civilised
+     (?) British troops knocked with great force at the door of the
+     house--where still the poor wife and children were upon their
+     knees praying to the Heavenly Father for deliverance--saying, 'I
+     give you ten minutes' time to acquaint me and point out to me
+     where the weapons and ammunition are hidden, and if you do not
+     comply I shall make the house and all fly into the air.' The poor
+     wife fell upon her knees before the cruel man; prayed the cruel
+     man to spare her and her children, where God was her witness
+     there was nothing of the kind on the farm, neither was there
+     anything stowed away in the house.
+
+     "Standing before him, as if deprived of her senses, [was] the
+     poor wife with her four innocent children, and when the ten
+     minutes had expired house and all were blown to atoms with
+     dynamite, and [there were] laid in ruins, the bodies of the
+     deplorable five. May the good God receive their souls with
+     Him!...
+
+     "A wife of a Transvaal Boer (who is still in the field, fighting
+     for his freedom and right) was lodging with one of her relations,
+     when, two days later, after she had given birth to a baby boy,
+     she was visited by seven warriors, or so-called Tommy Atkins; the
+     young urchin was taken away from its mother by its two legs, by
+     the so-called noble British, and his head battered in against the
+     bed-post until it had breathed its last, and thereupon thrown out
+     by the door as if it was the carcase of a cat or dog. Then these
+     damn wretches began their play with this poor and weak woman, who
+     only 48 hours before was delivered of a child. The poor wife was
+     treated so low and debauched by this seven that she, after a few
+     hours, gave up the spirit, and like her child [was] murdered in
+     the most dissolute manner.... Can we longer allow that our
+     fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, relatives, yes, our
+     children, are murdered by these coward and common murderers? or
+     has not the time yet arrived to prevent this civilised nation, or
+     to punish them for their atrocities?"[228]
+
+         [Footnote 228: As translated in Blue-book, Cd. 547. Mr. de
+         Jong, the editor of the paper, was prosecuted (and convicted)
+         for the publication of this and another similar article
+         (December 28th).]
+
+On November 26th _The South African News_ published the translation of
+a letter to the Press, written by a member of the Legislative
+Assembly, in view of the same meeting:
+
+     "I am yet glad that another People's Congress will be held.
+
+     "It is our duty to speak now; it is more than time to protest, as
+     British subjects, against the extermination of defenceless women
+     and children....
+
+     "But, in Heaven's name, let the Congress be a People's Congress
+     in reality. Let no one or other stay away for one or other small
+     difficulty. Let members of Parliament, clergymen, yes, every man,
+     old or young, be present at Worcester on the 6th of December
+     next. Let them turn up in numbers. Let us use our rights as
+     British subjects in a worthy and decided manner. Let us at least
+     adopt three petitions or resolutions: (1) Praying Her Majesty,
+     our Gracious Queen, to make an end to the burning of homes and
+     the ill-treatment of helpless women and children; if not, that
+     they may be murdered at once, rather than die slowly by hunger
+     and torture; (2) a petition in which it be urged that the war
+     should be ended, and the Republics allowed to retain their
+     independence; and finally, a pledge that those who do not wish
+     to sign these petitions will no longer be supported by us in any
+     way.
+
+     "[No shopkeeper, attorney, doctor, master, or any one--no
+     victuals, meat, bread, meal, sheep, oxen, horses, vegetables,
+     fruit whatsoever will he sell to the jingoes until the wrong is
+     righted and compensated.]
+
+     "The dam is full. Our nation cannot, dare not, say with Cain, 'Am
+     I my brother's keeper?' There must be a way out for the
+     overflowing water. Disloyal deeds and talk are wrong. But if we,
+     as a nation, as one man, earnestly and decisively lay our hands
+     to the plough in a constitutional manner, and are determined, I
+     trust, through God's help, we shall--yes, we must--win."
+
+The passage placed in brackets, in which this member of the Cape
+Parliament urges that all who may refuse to sign the two "petitions"
+should be rigorously boycotted, was omitted--without any indication of
+omission--by _The South African News_. _Ons Land_, on the other hand,
+expressed approval of the letter as it stood.[229]
+
+         [Footnote 229: Cd. 547.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Worcester congress.]
+
+These were the kind of stories, and the kind of appeals, with which
+the mind of the colonial Dutch had been inflamed by the nationalist
+leaders when the Worcester Congress met. The gathering is said to have
+consisted of between 8,000 and 10,000 persons; and its promoters
+claimed that a far larger number--120,000 persons--were represented by
+the deputies sent from ninety-seven districts in the Colony. At the
+close of the meeting a deputation was appointed to lay the resolutions
+passed by the Congress before the High Commissioner, and request him
+to bring them officially to the notice of the Home Government. It was
+composed of Mr. de Villiers, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church;
+a member of the Legislative Council; the member of the Legislative
+Assembly for Worcester, and two others. This deputation was received
+by Lord Milner at Government House on December 11th, and the
+circumstances of the remarkable interview which then took place
+present a striking picture of the state of the Colony at this time,
+and of the extraordinary attitude which the mass of the Dutch
+population had assumed towards the representative of their sovereign.
+It is one of those illuminating occasions in which a whole situation
+is, as it were, gathered up into a single scene.
+
+The disloyal purpose of the deputation is heightened rather than
+concealed by the disguise of the constitutional forms in which it is
+clothed. The scarcely veiled demand for the independence of the Cape
+Colony, now put forward by the Afrikander nationalists, is as
+magnificently audacious as the ultimatum. Knowing the infamous
+character of the methods by which the agitation in favour of the Boers
+was being promoted, Lord Milner might have been excused if he had
+given way to some strong expressions of indignation. No such note,
+however, is heard in his reply. He is as dry and passionless as an
+attorney receiving his clients. Yet his words are as frank as his
+manner is composed. To these delegates he speaks the most terrible
+truths with the same freedom as he would have used, if the business of
+their errand had been a pleasant interchange of compliments, instead
+of a grim defiance that might, or might not, be converted from words
+into deeds.
+
+[Sidenote: Deputation to Lord Milner.]
+
+Lord Milner, who is accompanied only by his private secretary,
+surprises the deputation at the outset by requesting that the
+resolutions may be read forthwith in his presence. They are:
+
+     "1. We, men and women of South Africa assembled and represented
+     here, having heard the report of the people's deputation to
+     England, and having taken into earnest consideration the
+     deplorable condition into which the peoples of South Africa have
+     been plunged, and the grave dangers threatening our civilisation,
+     record our solemn conviction that the highest interest of South
+     Africa demand (1) A termination of the war now raging, with its
+     untold misery and horror, as well as the burning of houses, the
+     devastation of the country, the extermination of a white
+     nationality, and the treatment to which women and children are
+     subjected, which was bound to leave a lasting legacy of
+     bitterness and hatred, while seriously endangering the future
+     relationship between the forces of civilisation and barbarism in
+     South Africa; and (2) the retention by the Republics of their
+     independence, whereby alone the peace of South Africa can be
+     maintained.
+
+     "2. That this meeting desires a full recognition of the right of
+     the people of this Colony to settle and manage its own affairs,
+     and expresses its grave disapproval of the policy pursued and
+     adopted in this matter by the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir
+     Alfred Milner.
+
+     "3. That this Congress solemnly pledges itself to labour in a
+     constitutional way unceasingly for the attainment of the objects
+     contained in the above resolutions, and resolves to send a
+     deputation to His Excellency Sir Alfred Milner to bring these
+     resolutions officially to the notice of Her Majesty's
+     Government."
+
+These resolutions having been read, Mr. de Villiers proceeds to make
+two points. First, there will be no lasting peace in South Africa
+until the independence of the Republics is restored; unless this is
+done, race feeling will go on prevailing "for generations." And,
+second, it is the "devastation of property" and "the treatment of the
+women and children" by the British that has roused the colonial Dutch
+to assemble at the Congress. Mr. Pretorius, the member of the
+Legislative Council, then drives home both of these points by a short
+but emphatic speech, delivered in Dutch, in which he asserts that one
+of the consequences of the war will be a "never-ending irreconcilable
+racial hatred" between the British and Dutch inhabitants.[230] Lord
+Milner then rises from his chair and replies to the deputation:
+
+         [Footnote 230: It is scarcely necessary to point out that
+         this prophecy of continued racial hatred has been completely
+         falsified by events. The writer went out to South Africa a
+         second time in January, 1904, when two years had not passed
+         since the surrender of the Boers. The one thing, above all
+         others, that struck him, and every other visitor from
+         England, was the profound peace that reigned from end to end
+         of the land.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's reply.]
+
+[Sidenote: War no longer justifiable.]
+
+     "I accede to your request to bring these resolutions to the
+     notice of Her Majesty's Government. I think it is doubtful
+     whether I ought to do so, but in view of the prevailing
+     bitterness and excitement it is better to err, if one must err,
+     on the side of conciliation and fairness. And, having regard
+     especially to the fact that one of the resolutions is directed
+     against myself, I wish to avoid any appearance of a desire to
+     suppress its companions on account of it. But, having gone thus
+     far on the road of concession, I take the liberty, in no
+     unfriendly and polemical spirit, of asking you quite frankly what
+     good you think can be done by resolutions of this character? I am
+     not now referring to the resolution against myself. That is a
+     matter of very minor importance. The pith of the whole business
+     is in resolution number one, a resolution evidently framed with
+     great care by the clever men who are engineering the present
+     agitation in the Colony. Now, that resolution asks for two
+     things--a termination of the war, and the restoration of the
+     independence of the Republics. In desiring the termination of the
+     war we are all agreed, but nothing can be less conducive to the
+     attainment of that end than to encourage in those who are still
+     carrying on a hopeless resistance the idea that there is any,
+     even the remotest chance, of the policy of annexation being
+     reversed. I am not now speaking for myself. This is not a
+     question for me. I am simply directing your attention to the
+     repeatedly declared policy of Her Majesty's Government, a policy
+     just endorsed by an enormous majority of the nation, and not only
+     by the ordinary supporters of the Government, but by the bulk of
+     those ordinarily opposed to it. Moreover, that policy is approved
+     by all the great self-governing colonies of the Empire, except
+     this one, and in this one by something like half the white
+     population, and practically the whole of the native. And this
+     approving half of the white population, be it observed, embraces
+     all those who, in the recent hour of danger, when this Colony
+     itself was invaded and partially annexed, fought and suffered
+     for the cause of Queen and Empire. I ask you, is it reasonable to
+     suppose that Her Majesty's Government is going back upon a policy
+     deliberately adopted, repeatedly declared, and having this
+     overwhelming weight of popular support throughout the whole
+     Empire behind it? And if it is not, I ask you further: What is
+     more likely to lead to a termination of the war--a recognition of
+     the irrevocable nature of this policy, or the reiteration of
+     menacing protests against it? And there is another respect in
+     which I fear this resolution is little calculated to promote that
+     speedy restoration of peace which we have all at heart. I refer
+     to the tone of aggressive exaggeration which characterises its
+     allusions to the conduct of the war. No doubt the resolution is
+     mild compared with some of the speeches by which it was
+     supported, just as those speeches themselves were mild compared
+     with much that we are now too well accustomed to hear and to
+     read, in the way of misrepresentation and abuse of the British
+     Government, British statesmen, British soldiers, the British
+     people. But even the resolution, mild in comparison with such
+     excesses, is greatly lacking in that sobriety and accuracy which
+     it is so necessary for all of us to cultivate in these days of
+     bitterly inflamed passions. It really is preposterous to talk,
+     among other things, about 'the extermination of a white
+     nationality,' or to give any sort of countenance to the now fully
+     exploded calumny about the ill-treatment of women and children.
+     The war, gentlemen, has its horrors--every war has. Those horrors
+     increase as it becomes more irregular on the part of the enemy,
+     thus necessitating severer measures on the part of the Imperial
+     troops. But, having regard to the conditions, it is one of the
+     most humane wars that has ever been waged in history. It has
+     been humane, I contend, on both sides, which does not, of course,
+     mean that on both sides there have not been isolated acts
+     deserving of condemnation. Still, the general direction, the
+     general spirit on both sides, has been humane. But it is another
+     question whether the war on the side of the enemy is any longer
+     justifiable. It is certainly not morally justifiable to carry on
+     a resistance involving the loss of many lives and the destruction
+     of an immense quantity of property, when the object of that
+     resistance can no longer, by any possibility, be attained. No
+     doubt, great allowance must be made for most of the men still
+     under arms, though it is difficult to defend the conduct of their
+     leaders in deceiving them. The bulk of the men still in the field
+     are buoyed up with false hopes. They are incessantly fed with
+     lies--lies as to their own chance of success, and, still worse,
+     as to the intention of the British Government with regard to them
+     should they surrender. And for that very reason it seems all the
+     more regrettable that anything should be said or done here which
+     could help still further to mislead them, still further to
+     encourage a resistance which creates the very evils that these
+     people are fighting to escape. It is because I am sincerely
+     convinced that a resolution of this character, like the meeting
+     at which it was passed, like the whole agitation of which that
+     meeting is part, is calculated, if it has any effect at all,
+     still further to mislead the men who are engaged in carrying on
+     this hopeless struggle, that I feel bound, in sending it to Her
+     Majesty's Government, to accompany it with this expression of my
+     strong personal dissent."[231]
+
+         [Footnote 231: Cd. 547.]
+
+The comment of _Ons Land_ upon Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester
+Congress deputation was an open defiance of the Imperial authorities
+and a scarcely veiled incitement to rebellion. Mr. Advocate Malan, the
+editor, who had been elected for the Malmesbury Division upon the
+retirement of Mr. Schreiner--now rejected by the Bond--wrote:[232]
+
+         [Footnote 232: As stated in a _Central News_ telegram,
+         published in London on December 14th, 1900.]
+
+     "Sir Alfred Milner considers the request of the Afrikanders for
+     peace and justice unreasonable. The agitation has now reached the
+     end of the first period--that of pleading and petitioning. A deaf
+     ear has been turned to the cry of the Afrikanders and their
+     Church. But the battle for justice will continue from a different
+     standpoint--by mental and material powers. The path will be hard,
+     and sacrifices will be required, but the victory will be
+     glorious!"
+
+There were, of course, some voices that were raised, among both the
+republican and colonial Dutch, in favour of more moderate counsels. In
+the preceding month (November) Mr. Melius de Villiers, the late Chief
+Justice of the Free State, wrote to a Dutch Reformed minister in the
+Cape Colony to beg him to use all his influence against the efforts
+being made in the Cape Colony to encourage the Boers to continue the
+struggle. "However much I loved and valued the independence of the
+Free State," he says, "it is now absolutely certain that the struggle
+on the part of the burghers is a hopeless and useless one." And he
+then suggests that the Dutch Reformed ministers in the Cape Colony,
+instead of petitioning the Queen to grant the independence of the
+Republics, should intercede with ex-President Steyn and the Federal
+leaders and induce them to discontinue the fight. Women's Congresses
+and People's Congresses, held to denounce the barbarities perpetrated
+in the war, will avail nothing; but the Dutch Reformed Church could
+fulfil no higher mission than this genuine peace-making. "It may go
+against their grain to urge our people to yield," he adds, "but it
+seems to me a plain duty."[233] But such voices were powerless to
+counteract the effect produced upon the Boers by the demonstrations of
+hatred against the British Government, manifested by men whose minds
+had been inflamed by the infamous slanders of the Imperial troops to
+which the "conciliation" movement had given currency.
+
+         [Footnote 233: Cd. 547.]
+
+[Sidenote: Second invasion of the colony.]
+
+On the morning of December 16th, five days after he had received the
+Worcester Congress deputation, Lord Milner heard that the burgher
+forces had again crossed the Orange River between Aliwal North and
+Bethulie. Before them lay hundreds of miles of country full of food
+and horses, and inhabited by people who were in sympathy with them. On
+the 20th martial law was proclaimed in twelve additional districts. On
+the 17th of the following month the whole of the Cape Colony, with the
+exception of Capetown, Simon's Town, Wynberg, Port Elizabeth, East
+London, and the native territories, was placed under the same
+military rule. In the words of a protest subsequently addressed by the
+Burgher Peace Committee to their Afrikander brethren, the "fatal
+result of the Worcester Congress had been that the commandos had again
+entered the Cape Colony." The friends of the Boers in England, duped
+by the Afrikander nationalists, had involved England and South Africa
+in a year and a half of costly, destructive, and unnecessary war.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION
+
+
+The new year (1901) opened with a full revelation of the magnitude of
+the task which lay before the Imperial troops. Lord Roberts had
+frankly recognised that the destruction of the Governments and
+organised armies of the Republics would be followed by the more
+difficult and lengthy task of disarming the entire Boer population
+within their borders.
+
+     "Recent events have convinced me," he wrote from Pretoria on
+     October 10th, 1900, "that the permanent tranquillity of the
+     Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete
+     disarmament of the inhabitants; and, though the extent of the
+     country to be visited, and the ease with which guns, rifles, and
+     ammunition can be hidden, will render the task a difficult one,
+     its accomplishment is only a matter of time and patience."
+
+That this task proved altogether more lengthy and more arduous than
+Lord Roberts at this time expected, was due mainly, though not
+exclusively, to the same cause as that which had placed the British
+army in a position of such grave disadvantage at the outbreak of the
+war--the play of party politics in England. Lord Roberts had foreseen
+that the process of disarming the Boers would be slow and difficult;
+but he had not anticipated that the Imperial troops would be hindered
+in the accomplishment of this task by the political action of the
+friends of the Boers in England, or that the public utterances of
+prominent members of the Liberal Opposition would re-act with such
+dangerous effects upon the Afrikander nationalists that, after more
+than a year of successful military operations, the process of
+disarmament would have to be applied to the Cape Colony as well as to
+the territories of the late Republics.
+
+Looking back to the year 1900, with the events of the intervening
+period before us, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
+decision of the Boer leaders to continue the struggle was determined
+by political, and not by military considerations. More than one
+circumstance points to the fact that both the Boer generals and the
+civilian members of the Executives of the late Republics recognised
+that their position was practically hopeless from a military point of
+view.[234] And while Louis Botha, the Commandant-General of the
+Transvaal, urged his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms after the
+battle of Dalmanutha, it was President Steyn, a politician, and not a
+fighting man, who manifested the stubborn determination that was
+directly responsible for the unnecessary devastation and suffering
+which the guerilla war entailed upon the Boer people. The remote, but
+still carefully cherished possibility of foreign intervention, the
+belief that the colonial Dutch would even yet rise _en masse_, and the
+reliance upon the traditional sympathy of the Liberal party with the
+Boer aspirations for independence, were all considerations that
+contributed to the decision. But of these three influences the last
+was incomparably the most important; since it not only affected the
+disposition of the republican leaders, but, what was more, stimulated
+the Afrikander nationalists to make the efforts which brought the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony to the condition of passionate resentment
+that drew the Boer commandos, in the last month of 1900 and the
+opening months of 1901, a second time across the Orange River.
+
+         [Footnote 234: See letter of Piet de Wet to his brother
+         Christian, in Cd. 547, and correspondence between Steyn and
+         Reitz (captured by British troops), in Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: An injurious influence.]
+
+We have seen the actual origin of this most injurious influence. The
+"conciliation" movement was initiated in the Cape Colony by the
+Afrikander nationalists in concert with President Krüger, in order
+that "the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England
+might be strengthened." They were strengthened. We have observed the
+formation of a Conciliation Committee in England, working in close
+connection with the parent organisation, founded by Mr. Hargrove, in
+the Cape Colony; and we have noticed the declarations of Mr. Morley,
+Lord Courtney, and Mr. Bryce, in favour of the restoration of the
+internal independence of the Boers--declarations all made in
+opposition to the expressed determination of the British Government to
+incorporate the Republics into the system of the British Empire. The
+official leader of the Liberal party was less consistent. In June,
+1900, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman signified in general terms his
+recognition of the necessity of this measure. But he returned in
+October to vague expressions of sympathy with the Boers, which, after
+the general election had resulted in the return of the Unionist
+majority, took the form of a direct condemnation of the South African
+policy of the Government. In the course of the year 1901 he reiterated
+two charges with increasing vehemence. The conduct of the war was
+inhuman; and the Government, by refusing to offer any terms to the
+republican leaders inconsistent with the decision to incorporate the
+Republics into the Empire, were exacting the unnecessary humiliation
+of an unconditional surrender from a gallant foe. These injurious
+utterances at length provoked Lord Salisbury's indignant comment:
+"England is, I believe, the only country in which, during a great war,
+eminent men write and speak publicly as if they belonged to the
+enemy;" and elicited from Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith,
+Mr. Haldane, and Sir Henry Fowler, the assurance that the
+determination of the British people to "see the war through" had in no
+way weakened. But, in spite of these patriotic utterances on the part
+of the Liberal Imperialists, the fact remains that, throughout the
+whole period of the guerilla war, the Boer commandos were encouraged
+to resist the Imperial troops by the knowledge that prominent members
+of the Liberal party in England had declared themselves to be opposed
+to what they termed the "suppression" of the Boer people,[235] and
+were condemning in unmeasured terms the British military authorities
+for employing the sole methods by which the guerilla leaders could be
+encountered on equal terms, and the disarmament of the Dutch
+population could be accomplished.
+
+[Sidenote: Peace party among the Boers.]
+
+There is another element in the attitude of the burgher population at
+this critical period, a knowledge of which is essential to a correct
+understanding of the methods and conditions of the guerilla war. The
+existence among the republican Dutch of a considerable body of opinion
+in favour of submission was a circumstance of which the Imperial
+authorities were aware, and one of which they desired, naturally
+enough, to take the fullest advantage. It was known also to the
+militant Boer leaders; and it is obvious that any estimate of the
+degree in which these leaders are to be held directly responsible for
+the loss and suffering entailed by the decision to continue the war,
+will depend largely upon the manner in which they dealt with those
+members of their own community who were prepared, after Lord
+Roberts's victories, to become peaceable citizens of the British
+Empire.
+
+         [Footnote 235: "This war no longer makes a pretence of being
+         a war of defence; it is a war for gold-fields, for territory,
+         and for the suppression of two brave and noble peoples. This
+         wicked war has lost us the moral leadership of mankind."--Mr.
+         E. Robertson, M.P., June 5th, 1901.]
+
+The action of the Boer leaders in this respect is established by the
+indisputable testimony of the official documents which fell into the
+hands of the British authorities in the subsequent progress of the
+war. Every endeavour of the peace party to make itself heard was
+punished with rigorous, sometimes brutal, severity; fictitious
+reports, calculated to raise false hopes of foreign intervention, were
+circulated among the burghers in the field; and every effort was made
+to prevent a knowledge of the British Government's proposals for the
+future administration of the new colonies from reaching the rank and
+file of the burgher population. The details of this action on the part
+of the Boer leaders constitute collectively a body of evidence
+sufficient to have justified the employment of measures infinitely
+more severe than those which were in fact adopted by the British
+military authorities for the capture of the Boer commandos and the
+disarmament of the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa; and in the face
+of this evidence, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reiterated charges
+against the Government, whether of "methods of barbarism" or of
+prolonging the war by the neglect to offer reasonable terms to the
+Boers, must be held as wanton in their origin as they were injurious
+in their results.
+
+[Sidenote: Administrative changes.]
+
+The despatch of October 18th, 1900, which, as we have seen, Lord
+Milner received as he was returning from his visit to the new
+colonies, contained certain new commissions, under the terms of which
+the "prospective administration" of the Transvaal and the Orange River
+Colony was placed in his hands in succession to Lord Roberts, while at
+the same time he remained Governor of the Cape Colony and High
+Commissioner for South Africa. This combination of offices was purely
+temporary, since Her Majesty's Government (Mr. Chamberlain wrote to
+Lord Milner) "were anxious to take advantage of his unique fitness for
+the great task of inaugurating the civil government of the two new
+colonies." It was proposed therefore, that, as soon as the necessary
+legal provision could be made for establishing constitutions for the
+two new colonies, Lord Milner should be appointed as their Governor,
+with a Lieutenant-Governor for the Orange River Colony, and should
+cease to be the Governor of the Cape Colony. This new arrangement,
+which, as Mr. Chamberlain pointed out, involved the severance of the
+High Commissionership from the Governorship of the Cape Colony to
+which it had been attached for so long a period,[236] did not take
+effect, however, until the end of February, 1901, when Lord Milner
+finally left the Cape Colony for the Transvaal.
+
+         [Footnote 236: Cd. 547.]
+
+Lord Roberts relinquished the command of the British forces in South
+Africa on November 29th, 1900. The Home Government at this time
+attached great importance to the issue of a proclamation setting out
+clearly the generous terms upon which the Boers would be received into
+the empire; and, in connection with this question, Lord Milner, during
+his recent visit to Pretoria, had discussed with Lord Kitchener the
+methods by which the influence of the surrendered Boers and the more
+moderate Afrikanders, who were in favour of submission, could be
+brought to bear upon the general mass of the fighting burghers. Lord
+Milner, however, upon his return to the Cape Colony, expressed the
+opinion that the issue of a proclamation in the then existing
+circumstances would be a mistake, since it would only be regarded as a
+sign of weakness. And in support of this opinion he states, in a
+telegram of December 11th, that the cabled summary of Mr.
+Chamberlain's
+
+     "recent speech in the House of Commons, containing virtually the
+     principal points in the proposed proclamation, has been instantly
+     seized upon by the Bond leaders [in the Cape Colony] and is
+     represented by them as a sign that Her Majesty's Government is
+     wavering in its policy, and that the reaction in British public
+     opinion, which they have always relied on, is setting in."[237]
+
+         [Footnote 237: Cd. 547.]
+
+Both Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener confirmed this judgment at the
+time; and on January 28th, 1901--when de Wet was on the point of
+breaking through the British troops into the Cape Colony--the latter
+telegraphed to Lord Milner:
+
+     "When the Boers are inclined to peace, they will want, I think,
+     to discuss various questions, and when that time comes a
+     proclamation which would meet as far as possible the points
+     raised would, no doubt, be very valuable.... But just now I do
+     not think they have any idea of making peace whilst the Colony
+     question is so prominent. I have let it be known that I would be
+     glad to see an officer or meet Botha at any time if he wished to
+     do so."[238]
+
+         [Footnote 238: Cd. 547.]
+
+Three days afterwards Lord Milner received a further telegram from
+Lord Kitchener on the same subject, which he also forwarded to the
+Colonial Office:
+
+     "Ex-President Pretorius has just returned from seeing L. Botha
+     and Schalk Burger [the Commandant-General and the Acting
+     President of the South African Republic]. They stated that they
+     were fighting for their independence, and meant to continue to do
+     so to the bitter end, and would not discuss any question of
+     peace."[239]
+
+         [Footnote 239: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Boer leaders irreconcilable.]
+
+In view of this irreconcilable attitude on the part of the Boer
+leaders, Mr. Chamberlain abandoned the proposal, and the proclamation
+was not issued until six months later, when the blockhouse system had
+been successfully initiated.
+
+But, although Lord Milner had recognised the futility of the appeal by
+proclamation, he had readily approved of Lord Kitchener's endeavour to
+make the British proposals known to the placable but terrorised
+section of the fighting burghers, through the agency of those of their
+kinsmen and friends who had surrendered. After all advances to the
+Boer leaders in the field had totally failed, "it seemed to us," Lord
+Milner reported to Mr. Chamberlain,[240]
+
+         [Footnote 240: January 12th, 1901. Cd. 547.]
+
+     "that those who had already surrendered would have means not open
+     to us of communicating with the bulk of the Boers still under
+     arms, persuading them of the hopelessness of their resistance,
+     and removing the misapprehension of our intentions, which some of
+     the commanders who were still holding out had sedulously
+     fostered."
+
+It was in these circumstances and with these objects in view that,
+after Lord Roberts's departure, the Burgher Peace Committee was formed
+at Pretoria; and it is to the address which Lord Kitchener then
+delivered (December 21st, 1900) to this Committee that we must look
+for the origin and purpose of the Burgher, or Concentration Camps.
+
+[Sidenote: Origin of the Burgher camps.]
+
+     "It having been brought to Lord Kitchener's notice," says the
+     published report, "that the principal difficulty that burghers,
+     desirous of surrendering, experienced was that they were not
+     allowed to remain in their own districts, and were afraid of the
+     penalties attached to not having adhered strictly to the oath of
+     neutrality, which they had, in most cases, been made to break by
+     the coercive measures of Boers out on commando, he wished to give
+     the burghers still in the field every opportunity of becoming
+     acquainted with the treatment he proposed now to extend to them,
+     their families, and their property.
+
+     "Instructions had been issued to form laagers for all surrendered
+     burghers, their wives, families, and stock, on the railway in
+     their own districts under military protection; and, except where
+     it was proved that a burgher had voluntarily broken his oath and
+     gone out on commando, no difference would be made between those
+     who had not taken the oath. To protect deserted women and
+     children they would also be brought into these laagers, where
+     their husbands and sons, who desired to live peacefully, could
+     freely join them.
+
+     "It was essential that the country should be thus cleared,
+     because so long as the means of subsistence remained in and on
+     the farms, so long small commandos were enabled to continue in
+     the field. In return, Lord Kitchener expected every assistance
+     from those to whom he gave protection. They must each and all
+     help to the best of their ability by influencing in every way in
+     their power those still in the field to surrender. These measures
+     would be applied gradually, and extended if they proved
+     successful. Burghers must understand that no responsibility could
+     be accepted for stock or property, except for that which they
+     brought in with them, and then only if they kept it within the
+     limits of the protection he was prepared to afford."[241]
+
+         [Footnote 241: Cd. 547.]
+
+The report of Lord Kitchener's speech from which these paragraphs are
+taken was printed in Dutch and circulated by the Burgher Peace
+Committee. It is certainly significant that a measure which was
+subsequently held up to the execration of the civilised world by the
+official leader of the Liberal party and the friends of the Boers in
+England, should have been carefully explained by Lord Kitchener to an
+audience of Boers at Pretoria, and accepted by them as a means of
+enabling the peaceably disposed burghers to escape from the compulsion
+of their leaders. In this, as in many other matters, the English
+friends of the Boers were _plus royalistes que le roi même_.
+
+[Sidenote: Boer coercive measures.]
+
+These, then, were the means employed by the British military
+authorities to avert a needless protraction of the war. We have now to
+observe the methods by which the Boer leaders prevented their efforts
+from producing the desired result. In view of the destruction of the
+organised resistance of the Republics, Lord Roberts had made known by
+proclamation that all burghers who surrendered their arms and took the
+oath of neutrality would be allowed to return to their homes, or, if
+at home, to remain there undisturbed. This implied an intention on the
+part of the British authorities to provide such protection as would
+enable the surrendered burghers to remain in peaceable possession of
+their property. General Botha, as we have already noted, was
+personally in favour of a general surrender after the battle of
+Dalmanutha; but, when once the majority of the Boer leaders had
+decided to continue to resist the establishment of British authority
+by force of arms, it became his business to keep every fighting
+burgher in the field. Here, again, the work of the Intelligence
+Department provides us with instructive evidence of the purposes and
+acts of the enemy. In the course of the subsequent military operations
+Sir Bindon Blood captured a number of official documents in the Boer
+Government laager at Roos Senekal. One of these, referring to the
+period in question, sufficiently indicates the nature of the "coercive
+measures" to which Lord Kitchener had alluded. Under date October 6th,
+1900, General Botha gives instructions to the Boer commandant at
+Bethel to telegraph round to the Boer generals and officers certain
+military instructions, and he then adds:
+
+     "Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers from laying
+     down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do not listen to
+     this, to confiscate everything moveable or unmoveable, and also
+     to burn their houses. Get into direct communication with the
+     Standerton men, and destroy the railway line between Heidelberg
+     and Standerton, and especially derail and hold up trains. In this
+     manner we will obtain a large quantity of food."[242]
+
+         [Footnote 242: Cd. 663. See also the text of the circular
+         issued on December 2nd, 1900, by Louis Botha, as
+         Commandant-General of the Boer forces, to all military
+         officers, landdrosts, etc., giving specific instructions for
+         the punishment of surrendered burghers who refused to join
+         the commandos when called upon, and for the evasion of the
+         neutrality oath.]
+
+And, while the peaceably inclined burghers were prevented from
+surrendering by the fear of these penalties, the courage of the
+commandos was maintained by the spread of false information. Among
+these same papers found at Roos Senekal is a telegram despatched on
+November 2nd, 1900, to General Viljoen, containing a number of
+encouraging statements bearing upon the political and military
+situation, of which the three following may be taken as
+characteristic:
+
+     "October, 1900. A Congress of Delegates of the Powers was held at
+     Parijs [Paris], whereby England asked for an extension of six
+     months to carry on the war. This was refused by the powers on the
+     proposal of Holland and Austria.
+
+     "France is ready to land troops in England on the 1st November.
+
+     "Cape Colonial troops to the number of 2,500 have been sent back
+     by General Roberts, having quarrelled with the regulars. Their
+     arms were taken away and burnt. This last is official news
+     received by General Fourie."[243]
+
+         [Footnote 243: Cd. 663.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Not civilised warfare".]
+
+It was in order to counteract the effects of this system of terrorism
+and deceit, that the endeavour was made to inform the mass of the
+Boers still in arms of the actual state of affairs, both in respect of
+the hopelessness of foreign intervention and the real intentions of
+the British Government, through the agency of the Burgher Peace
+Committee. The treatment accorded to these peace emissaries is
+justifiable, possibly, by a strict interpretation of the laws of war;
+but it fixes inevitably the responsibility for the needless sufferings
+of the Boer people in the guerilla war, upon Ex-President Steyn,
+Schalk Burger, Louis Botha, Christian de Wet, and the other Boer
+leaders. On January 10th, 1901, of three agents of the Peace Committee
+taken prisoners to De Wet's laager near Lindley, one--a British
+subject--was flogged and then shot, and two, who were burghers, were
+flogged.[244] And on February 12th Meyer de Kock, the Secretary of the
+Committee, was shot.[245]
+
+         [Footnote 244: Cd. 547.]
+
+         [Footnote 245: Cd. 663. It was at this time that the utterly
+         unjustifiable and brutal murder of the coloured man, Esau,
+         took place in the invasion of the Calvinia district of the
+         Cape Colony. His sole offence was his known loyalty to the
+         British Government. "He was flogged on January 15th, 1901,
+         and kept in gaol till February 5th, when he was flogged
+         through the streets and shot outside the village by a Boer
+         named Strydom, who stated that he acted according to orders."
+         Cd. 547.]
+
+But the efforts of the Peace Committee were not altogether thrown
+away. The terrible deaths of these men, true martyrs of the Boer
+cause, evoked more than one notable protest against the insensate
+determination of Ex-President Steyn and De Wet.
+
+     "Dear Brother, ... From what I hear you are so angry with me,"
+     wrote General Piet de Wet to his brother Christian, "that you
+     have decided to kill me should you find me. May God not allow it
+     that you should have the opportunity to shed more innocent blood.
+     Enough has been shed already.... I beseech you, let us think over
+     the matter coolly for a moment, and see whether our cause is
+     really so pure and righteous that we can rely on God's
+     help."[246]
+
+         [Footnote 246: Cd. 547.]
+
+And Mr. H. A. Du Plessis, the predikant at Lindley in the Orange River
+Colony, addressed an "open letter" to the clergy of the Dutch Reformed
+Church in the Cape Colony.
+
+     "It is not civilised warfare any more on the part of the
+     burghers. They have become desperate, and as fanatics do things
+     in conflict with a Christian spirit and civilisation.... About a
+     fortnight ago, G. Müller, one of my deacons and brother of the
+     late minister of Burghersdorp, was brutally ill-used. He had to
+     strip, and received twenty-five lashes with a stirrup leather--he
+     is not the only one--because he took letters from a member of the
+     Peace Committee to certain heads of the burgher force, in which
+     they were strongly advised to give in. At the same time Andries
+     Wessels and J. Morgendael were taken prisoners. They left
+     Kroonstad at their own request, and with the sanction of the
+     military authorities, in order to have an interview with the
+     leaders of the burgher force. Morgendael was mortally wounded by
+     Commandant Froneman without a hearing, and at the instigation of
+     General C. de Wet. He died afterwards.... In such a shameful, in
+     fact, inhuman, manner were these men treated; and for what
+     reason? Simply because they had tried to save their country and
+     people....
+
+     "The burghers are kept totally in the dark by their leaders as to
+     what the real state of affairs is. Because I wish to save them
+     from certain ruin I make this appeal to you....
+
+     "If [the burghers] knew what the true state of affairs was, a
+     large portion would long ago have come in and delivered up their
+     arms....
+
+     "Therefore, I implore you, stand still for a few moments and
+     think of the true interests of the Afrikander nation, and see if
+     you will not alter your opinion, and quench the fire of war
+     instead of feeding the flame....[247]
+
+         [Footnote 247: Cd. 547.]
+
+These letters, which were published in _The Cape Times_, formed part
+of an attempt made by the Burgher Peace Committee, "to induce some of
+the leading men in the colony, who are known to sympathise with the
+Boers, to tell the men still in the field that the hope of any
+assistance from here is a delusion." But, in thus reporting this new
+endeavour to Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Milner adds that he is not,
+himself, "very sanguine" of its success.
+
+[Sidenote: Policy of the Bond.]
+
+There was only too good ground for this opinion. The Afrikander
+nationalists of the Cape hated England no less than did the republican
+nationalists, though they feared her more. The policy which the Bond
+had adopted after the occupation of the Republics by the British
+forces was perfectly definite. Its object was to avert the final
+disaster of the war by securing the maintenance of the Republics as
+independent centres of Afrikander nationalism. In order to do this the
+Bond resolved to keep the Cape Colony in a state of smouldering
+rebellion, to encourage the continued resistance of the Boer
+commandos, and to render all the material assistance to the guerilla
+leaders and their forces that could be afforded without exposing the
+Cape Dutch to the penalties of treason. It may be doubted, however,
+whether the Bond leaders, in view of the resolute attitude of the
+loyalist population and their consistent and unfaltering support of
+Lord Milner, would have embarked upon this policy, unless they had
+calculated upon the co-operation of the Liberal Opposition in England.
+As it was, their expectations in this respect had been amply
+fulfilled, and the policy itself, as we have seen, had been admirably
+carried into effect.
+
+The second invasion of the Cape Colony began, as we have noticed, with
+the incursion of the Boers after the Worcester Congress. On December
+16th, 1900, Kruitzinger, with seven hundred, and Hertzog with twelve
+hundred men, crossed the Orange River; and by February 11th, 1901, De
+Wet, who had been "headed back" in December, had succeeded in eluding
+the British columns and entered the Colony.[248] At this moment
+success seemed to be within measurable distance both to the Bond and
+to De Wet. The point of view of the astute Afrikander statesmen is
+different from that of the guerilla leader; but each party is equally
+hopeful of the ultimate victory of the nationalist cause. Of the
+attitude of the Bond in this month of February, 1901, Mr. Kipling
+writes from Capetown:
+
+         [Footnote 248: Cd. 522.]
+
+     "Some of the extremists of the Bond are for committing themselves
+     now, fully, to the Dutch cause, De Wet and all; but some of the
+     others are hunting for some sort of side-path that will give them
+     a chance of keeping on the ground-level of the gallows, within
+     hail of a seat in the next Parliament. If De Wet wins--he is
+     assumed to be in command of several thousands, all lusting for
+     real battle, and sure of a welcome among many more thousands
+     alight with the same desire--the Bond may, of course, come out
+     flat-footedly on his side. Just at present the apricots are not
+     quite ripe enough. But the Bond has unshaken faith in the
+     Opposition, whose every word and action are quoted here, and lead
+     to more deaths on the veld. _It is assumed that His Majesty's
+     Opposition will save the Bond, and South Africa for the Bond, if
+     only the commandos make the war expensive._"[249]
+
+         [Footnote 249: The italics are Mr. Kipling's. _The Science of
+         Rebellion: a Tract for the Times_, by Rudyard Kipling.]
+
+[Sidenote: De Wet in the colony.]
+
+If this account of the attitude of the Bond stood alone, its value
+would be merely that of an _ex parte_ statement by a competent
+observer on the spot. But it does not stand alone. The accident of the
+capture of the Boer official papers at Roos Senekal, to which we have
+referred before, has provided us with a record of the thoughts which
+were in De Wet's mind at the time when Mr. Kipling's words were
+written. In a report dated "On the Veld, February 14th, 1901,"
+Commandant-General Botha is informed that "De Wet's last news is that
+the Cape Colony has risen to a man, and has already taken up arms.
+They refused to give up to the British Government. Many more are only
+waiting operations on part of De Wet to join him; and General De Wet
+concludes this report with the words: 'It is certain that the ways of
+the Lord are hidden from us, and that, after all, it seems that the
+day of a united South Africa is not far off.'"
+
+The writer of this despatch is the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the
+Orange Free State; and to his report of De Wet's success in the Cape
+Colony, he now adds an account of what is happening on the other side
+of the Orange River:
+
+     "The burghers in the Orange Free State are hopeful, and expecting
+     a happy ending. The grudge against the Britisher has now taken
+     deep root, and the women and girls are encouraging the burghers
+     to stick up to the bitter end. So that our cause now rests in the
+     union of the burghers, and, with God's help, we will accomplish
+     our end.... The enemy's plan is to starve us out, but he will
+     never do it, now we have an outlet from the Cape Colony, even if
+     we have to use force."[250]
+
+         [Footnote 250: Cd. 663.]
+
+De Wet was chased out of the Colony by the British columns on February
+28th, but smaller commandos under Kruitzinger, Fouché, Scheepers, and
+Malan remained behind. Apart from their mobility, and the persistent
+manner in which they clung to rugged and mountainous districts, the
+ability of these Boer raiders to keep the field against the Imperial
+troops must be attributed to the sympathy and material assistance
+which they received from the colonial Dutch. The actual number of
+recruits which they secured was small; but, in Lord Kitchener's
+words--
+
+     "the friendly feelings of a considerable portion of the rural
+     population assured to them at all times not only an ample food
+     supply, but also timely information of the movements of our
+     pursuing columns--two points which told heavily in their
+     favour."[251]
+
+         [Footnote 251: Cd. 605.]
+
+[Sidenote: Effect of Cape rebellion.]
+
+In view of the enormous area of the sparsely populated and difficult
+country throughout which their movements were thus facilitated, it is
+not surprising that these roaming commandos were never completely
+suppressed. Of the 21,256 men who surrendered after Vereeniging, 3,635
+were Boers and rebels, who had been, up to that time, at large in the
+Cape Colony.[252] The importance of the contribution which the
+disloyal majority of the Cape Dutch were enabled, in this manner, to
+make to the power of resistance exhibited by the Boers in the guerilla
+war has scarcely been sufficiently appreciated. As it was, a large
+body of Imperial troops, which would otherwise have been available for
+completing the conquest of the new colonies, were kept employed, not
+merely in guarding the all-important railway lines, but from time to
+time in arduous, costly, and exhausting military operations in the
+Cape Colony.[253]
+
+         [Footnote 252: Cd. 988.]
+
+         [Footnote 253: "Cape Colony is a great disappointment to me
+         ... no general rising can be expected in that quarter....
+         [But] the little contingent there has been of great help to
+         us: they have kept 50,000 troops occupied, with which
+         otherwise we should have had to reckon."--Gen. Christian de
+         Wet at the Vereeniging Conference on May 16th, 1902. App. A.
+         _The Three Years' War_, by Christian Rudolf de Wet
+         (Constable, 1902). But see forward also, p. 485, for part
+         played by British loyalists.]
+
+The value of this contribution was quite well understood by the
+Afrikander nationalists of the Cape. In Mr. Kipling's vigorous
+English, "north and south they were working for a common object--the
+manufacture of pro-Boers in England by doubling the income-tax." And
+it is in the extension of the area of the war by the establishment of
+the Boer commandos in the Cape Colony that we must find the one valid
+military consideration which underlay the failure of the peace
+negotiations between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha
+(February-April, 1901), and the final rejection of the British terms
+of surrender by the Boer leaders in June. The point is made perfectly
+plain in the official notice signed by Schalk Burger, as Acting
+President of the South African Republic, and Steyn, as President of
+the Orange Free State, which was issued to the burghers on June 20th,
+1901. After reciting that the British terms had been referred to
+"State President Krüger and the deputation in Europe," and that
+President Krüger's reply had been considered by a conference of the
+Governments of both Republics, at which Chief-Commandant C. De Wet,
+Commandant-General L. Botha, and Assistant-Commandant J. H. De la Rey
+had presented a full report, the document continues:
+
+     "And considering the good progress in our cause in the colonies,
+     where our brothers oppose the cruel injustice done to the
+     Republics more and more in depriving them of their independence,
+     considering further the invaluable personal and material
+     sacrifices they [the Colonial Dutch] have made for our cause,
+     which would all be worthless and vain with a peace whereby the
+     independence of the Republics is given up ... [it is resolved]
+     that no peace will be made ... by which our independence and
+     national existence, or the interests of our colonial brothers,
+     shall be the price paid, and that the war will be vigorously
+     prosecuted."[254]
+
+         [Footnote 254: Cd. 663.]
+
+[Sidenote: Afrikander statesmanship.]
+
+It is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the
+Afrikander nationalist leaders. The qualities of statesmanship that
+enabled a Cavour or a Bismarck to make a nation were theirs. From the
+apparent hopelessness of the position created by Lord Roberts's swift
+and overwhelming victories, they had brought round their affairs to
+the point at which they now stood. The task which confronted the
+Imperial troops was no longer to disarm the inhabitants of the
+Republics, but to disarm and subdue practically the entire Dutch
+population of South Africa. And to the military difficulties inherent
+in the accomplishment of such a task in such a country, they had added
+the opposition of political forces operating both in England and South
+Africa with scarcely less embarrassing effects. Had it been merely an
+affair of the island people and the island statesmen, the Bond might
+still have won. The courage and endurance of the Imperial troops alone
+would not have saved South Africa. The army was the instrument of the
+people, and it was for the people to make use of this instrument, or
+to withdraw it, as they chose. But the over-sea British claimed a
+voice in the settlement; and the Bond had no friends among them. The
+"younger nations" and the "man" at Capetown saved South Africa for the
+Empire.
+
+Before we proceed to consider the broad features of the military
+operations by which the disarmament of the Dutch was at length
+accomplished, a reference must be made to the account of the general
+situation in South Africa addressed by Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain
+from Capetown on February 6th, 1901. Among all the notable documents
+which he furnished to his official chief, none affords more convincing
+evidence of cool judgment, mastery of South African conditions, and
+sureness of statecraft than this. It is a letter, and not a despatch,
+and as such it contains some personal details which would not have
+found a place in more formal communications.
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's survey.]
+
+Two reasons, Lord Milner writes, have prevented him from sending for a
+long time past any general review of South African affairs. "I am
+occupied," he says, "every day that passes from morning till night by
+business, all of which is urgent, and the amount and variety of which
+you are doubtless able to judge from the communications on a great
+variety of subjects which are constantly passing between us." And in
+addition to this, he has always hoped that "some definite point would
+be reached, at which it might be possible to sum up that chapter of
+our history which contained the war, and to forecast the work of
+administrative construction which must succeed it." Now, however, it
+is useless to wait longer for a "clear and clean-cut" situation.
+Although he has not "the slightest doubt of the ultimate result," he
+foresees that the work which still lies before the Imperial troops
+will be "slower, more difficult, more harassing, and more expensive
+than was at one time anticipated."
+
+     "It is no use denying that the last half-year has been one of
+     retrogression. Seven months ago this Colony was perfectly quiet,
+     at least as far as the Orange River. The southern half of the
+     Orange River Colony was rapidly settling down, and even a
+     considerable portion of the Transvaal, notably the south-western
+     districts, seemed to have definitely accepted British authority,
+     and to rejoice at the opportunity of a return to orderly
+     government and the pursuits of peace. To-day the scene is
+     completely altered."
+
+The "increased losses to the country," due to the prolongation of the
+struggle and to the guerilla methods adopted by the Boer leaders, are
+obvious.
+
+     "The fact that the enemy are now broken up into a great number of
+     small forces, raiding in every direction, and that our troops are
+     similarly broken up in pursuit of them, makes the area of actual
+     fighting, and consequently of destruction, much wider than it
+     would be in the case of a conflict between equal numbers
+     operating in large masses. Moreover, the fight is now mainly over
+     supplies. The Boers live entirely on the country through which
+     they pass, not only taking all the food they can lay hands upon
+     on the farms--grain, forage, horses, cattle, etc., but looting
+     the small village stores for clothes, boots, coffee, sugar, etc.,
+     of all of which they are in great need. Our forces, on their
+     side, are compelled to denude the country of everything moveable,
+     in order to frustrate these tactics of the enemy. No doubt a
+     considerable amount of the stock taken by us is not wholly lost,
+     but simply removed to the refugee camps, which are now being
+     established at many points along the railway lines. But even
+     under these circumstances the loss is great, through animals
+     dying on the route, or failing to find sufficient grass to live
+     upon when collected in large numbers at the camps. Indeed, the
+     loss of crops and stock is a far more serious matter than the
+     destruction of farm buildings, of which so much has been heard."
+
+And to this loss incidental to the campaign there has been added
+recently "destruction of a wholly wanton and malicious character."
+This is the injury done to the mining plant in the outlying districts
+of the Rand by the Boer raiders, a destruction for which there is no
+possible excuse.
+
+     "It has no reason or justification in connection with military
+     operations, but is pure vandalism, and outside the scope of
+     civilised warfare.... Directly or indirectly, all South Africa,
+     including the agricultural population, owes its prosperity to the
+     mines, and, of course, especially to the mines of the Transvaal.
+     To money made in mining it is indebted for such progress, even in
+     agriculture, as it has recently made, and the same source will
+     have to be relied upon for the recuperation of agriculture after
+     the ravages of war.
+
+     "Fortunately the damage done to the mines has not been large,
+     relatively to the vast total amount of the fixed capital sunk in
+     them. The mining area is excessively difficult to guard against
+     purely predatory attacks having no military purpose, because it
+     is, so to speak, 'all length and no breadth'--one long thin line,
+     stretching across the country from east to west for many miles.
+     Still, garrisoned as Johannesburg now is, it is only possible
+     successfully to attack a few points in it. Of the raids hitherto
+     made, and they have been fairly numerous, only one has resulted
+     in any serious damage. In that instance the injury done to the
+     single mine attacked amounted to £200,000, and it is estimated
+     that the mine is put out of working for two years. This mine is
+     only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of the
+     most important. These facts may afford some indication of the
+     ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the Transvaal
+     and all South Africa, but on many European interests, if that
+     general destruction of mine works which was contemplated just
+     before our occupation of Johannesburg had been carried out.
+     However serious in some respects may have been the military
+     consequences of our rapid advance to Johannesburg, South Africa
+     owes more than is commonly recognised to that brilliant dash
+     forward, by which the vast mining apparatus, the foundation of
+     all her wealth, was saved from the ruin threatening it."
+
+[Sidenote: Material destruction.]
+
+As the result of the last six or seven months of destructive warfare,
+"a longer period of recuperation will be required than was originally
+anticipated." At the same time, Lord Milner points out that, with
+Kimberley and the Rand, the "main engines of prosperity," virtually
+undamaged, the economic consequences of the war, "though grave, do not
+appear by any means appalling."
+
+     "The country population will need a good deal of help, first to
+     preserve it from starvation, and then, probably, to supply it
+     with a certain amount of capital to make a fresh start. And the
+     great industry of the country will need some little time before
+     it is able to render any assistance. But, in a young country with
+     great recuperative powers, it will not take many years before the
+     economic ravages of the war are effaced."
+
+He then turns to consider the "moral effect" of the recrudescence of
+the war, which is, in his opinion, more serious than the mere material
+destruction of the last six months. In the middle of 1900 the feeling
+in the Orange River Colony and the western districts of the Transvaal
+was "undoubtedly pacific."
+
+     "The inhabitants were sick of the war. They were greatly
+     astonished, after all that had been dinned into them, by the fair
+     and generous treatment they received on our first occupation, and
+     it would have taken very little to make them acquiesce readily in
+     the new régime. At that time, too, the feeling in the Colony was
+     better than I have ever known it."
+
+[Sidenote: Recrudescence of the war.]
+
+If it had been possible to screen those portions of the conquered
+territories which were fast settling down to peaceful pursuits from
+the incursions of the enemy still in the field, the worst results of
+the guerilla war might have been avoided. But the "vast extent of the
+country, and the necessity of concentrating our forces for the long
+advance, first to Pretoria and then to Komati Poort," made this
+impossible. The Boer leaders raided the country already occupied, but
+now left exposed; and, encouraged by the small successes thus easily
+obtained, the commandos reappeared first in the south-east of the
+Orange River Colony, then in the south-west of the Transvaal, and
+finally in every portion of the conquered territory.
+
+Those among the burgher population who desired to submit to British
+rule now found themselves in a position of great difficulty.
+
+     "Instead of being made prisoners of war, they had been allowed to
+     remain on their farms on taking the oath of neutrality, and many
+     of them were really anxious to keep it. But they had not the
+     strength of mind, nor, from want of education, a sufficient
+     appreciation of the sacredness of the obligation which they had
+     undertaken, to resist the pressure of their old companions in
+     arms when these reappeared among them appealing to their
+     patriotism and to their fears. In a few weeks or months the very
+     men whom we had spared and treated with exceptional leniency were
+     up in arms again, justifying their breach of faith in many cases
+     by the extraordinary argument that we had not preserved them from
+     the temptation to commit it.
+
+     "The general rising at the back of our advanced forces naturally
+     led to the return of a number of our troops, and to a straggling
+     conflict not yet concluded, in which the conduct of our own
+     troops, naturally enough, was not characterised by the same
+     leniency to the enemy which marked our original conquest. We did
+     not, indeed, treat the men who had broken parole with the same
+     severity with which I believe any other nation would have
+     treated them. Entitled as we were by the universally recognised
+     rules of war to shoot the men who, having once been prisoners in
+     our hands and having been released on a distinct pledge to
+     abstain from further part in the war, had once more taken up arms
+     against us, we never in a single instance availed ourselves of
+     that right. But as our columns swept through the revolted
+     country, meeting on every hand with hostility, and even with
+     treachery, on the part of the people whom we had spared, no doubt
+     in some cases the innocent suffered with the guilty. Men who had
+     actually kept faith with us were, in some instances, made
+     prisoners of war, or saw their property destroyed, simply because
+     it was impossible to distinguish between them and the greater
+     number who had broken faith. This, no doubt, resulted in further
+     accessions to the ranks of the enemy. And this tendency was
+     augmented by the evacuation, necessary for military reasons, of a
+     number of places, such as Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, and
+     Smithfield, which we had held for months, and in which we had
+     actually established a reasonably satisfactory civil
+     administration. Latterly, something has been done to check the
+     general demoralisation, and to afford places of refuge for those
+     willing to submit, by establishing camps along the railway lines
+     to which burghers may take themselves, their families, and their
+     stock for protection. No doubt this is a very inadequate
+     substitute for the effectual defence of whole districts.
+     Consequently the camps are mostly tenanted by women and children
+     whose male relatives are, in many cases, in the field against us.
+     But, as far as it goes, it is a good measure, and there can be no
+     doubt that, whenever we succeed in striking a decisive blow at
+     any of the numerous commandos roaming about the country, a good
+     many of their less willing members will find their way to one or
+     other of these camps in order to avoid further fighting."
+
+As the guerilla warfare thus swept back over the new colonies, the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony, who at one time, about the middle of the
+preceding year (1900), had seemed disposed to acquiesce in the union
+of all South Africa under the British flag, became once more restless
+and embittered.
+
+[Sidenote: A carnival of mendacity.]
+
+     "Every act of harshness, however necessary, on the part of our
+     troops, was exaggerated and made the most of, though what
+     principally inflamed the minds of the people were alleged
+     instances of needless cruelty which never occurred. Never in my
+     life have I read of, much less experienced, such a carnival of
+     mendacity as that which accompanied the pro-Boer agitation in
+     this Colony at the end of last year. And these libels still
+     continue to make themselves felt. It is true that excitement has
+     subsided somewhat during the last two months, partly because some
+     of the worst inventions about the conduct of the British troops
+     have been exposed and utterly discredited, and partly because the
+     general introduction of martial law has tended greatly to check
+     seditious writing and speaking. But even now the general feeling
+     in most of the country districts is very bad, and the commandos
+     which invaded the Colony in December and have been roaming about
+     ever since, while they have not gained many adherents among the
+     colonial farmers, have nevertheless enjoyed the very substantial
+     aid which the sympathy of the majority of the inhabitants was
+     able to give them, in supporting themselves, obtaining fresh
+     supplies of food and horses, and evading the forces sent in
+     pursuit of them."
+
+Of the general attitude of the Cape Dutch at this time Lord Milner
+writes with the lenient judgment of complete understanding:
+
+     "I am satisfied by experience that the majority of those Dutch
+     inhabitants of the Colony who sympathise with the Republics,
+     however little they may be able to resist giving active
+     expression to that sympathy when the enemy actually appear
+     amongst them, do not desire to see their own districts invaded or
+     to find themselves personally placed in the awkward dilemma of
+     choosing between high treason and an unfriendly attitude to the
+     men of their own race from beyond the border. There are
+     extremists who would like to see the whole of the Cape Colony
+     overrun. But the bulk of the farmers, especially the substantial
+     ones, are not of this mind. They submit readily enough even to
+     stringent regulations having for their object the prevention of
+     the spread of invasion. And not a few of them are, perhaps,
+     secretly glad that the prohibition of seditious speaking and
+     writing, of political meetings, and of the free movement of
+     political firebrands through the country enables them to keep
+     quiet, without actually themselves taking a strong line against
+     the propaganda, and, to do them justice, they behave reasonably
+     well under the pass and other regulations necessary for that
+     purpose, as long as care is taken not to make these regulations
+     too irksome to them in the conduct of their business, or in their
+     daily lives.
+
+     "That there has been an invasion at all is no doubt due to the
+     weakness of some of the Dutch colonists in tolerating, or
+     supporting, the violent propaganda, which could not but lead the
+     enemy to believe that they had only to come into the Colony in
+     order to meet with general active support. But this was a
+     miscalculation on the part of the enemy, though a very pardonable
+     one. They knew the vehemence of the agitation in their favour as
+     shown by the speeches in Parliament, the series of public
+     meetings culminating in the Worcester Congress, the writings of
+     the Dutch Press, the very general wearing of the republican
+     colours, the singing of the Volkslied, and so forth, and they
+     regarded these demonstrations as meaning more than they actually
+     did. Three things were forgotten. Firstly, that a great
+     proportion of the Afrikanders in the Colony who really meant
+     business had slipped away and joined the republican ranks long
+     ago. Secondly, that the abortive rebellion of a year ago had left
+     the people of the border districts disinclined to repeat the
+     experiment of a revolt. Thirdly, that owing to the precautionary
+     measures of the Government the amount of arms and ammunition in
+     the hands of the country population throughout the greater part
+     of the Colony is not now anything like as large as it usually is,
+     and far smaller than it was a year ago."
+
+[Sidenote: British population in arms.]
+
+In these circumstances the object to be aimed at is to screen off as
+much of the country as possible from raids. But the Cape Colony is
+considerably larger in area than France and the United Kingdom put
+together; it has "an immense length of frontier that can be crossed
+anywhere," and "exceedingly primitive means of communication." The
+exclusion of mobile guerilla bands from across the frontier is,
+therefore, "something of an impossibility." There is one method, and
+one only, by which "the game of the invaders can be frustrated." It is
+to provide each district with the means of defending itself. And so a
+local defence force has been formed in all districts, with the
+exception of those--happily the least important in the Colony--in
+which the population is extremely small and the loyalists are very
+few.
+
+     "In the other districts, the response on the part of the British
+     population to the general call to arms recently made by the
+     Ministry has been better than the most sanguine expected. It was
+     always admitted, by their friends and foes alike, that the bulk
+     of the Afrikander population would never take up arms on the side
+     of the British Government in this quarrel, even for local
+     defence. The appeal was, therefore, virtually directed to the
+     British population, mostly townspeople, and to a small, but no
+     doubt very strong and courageous, minority of the Afrikanders who
+     have always been loyalists. These classes had been already
+     immensely drawn on by the Cape police, the regular volunteer
+     corps, and the numerous irregular mounted corps which had been
+     called into existence because of the war. There must have been
+     twelve thousand Cape Colonists under arms before the recent
+     appeal, and, as things are now going, we shall get as many more
+     under that appeal--a truly remarkable achievement under a purely
+     voluntary system. The fact that, if the war continues for a few
+     months longer, so large a number of the South African British
+     will be under arms (for, it must be remembered, in addition to
+     the Cape colonists we have about one thousand Rhodesians, and, I
+     should say, at least ten thousand Uitlanders) is one that cannot
+     be left out of account in considering either the present
+     imbroglio or the settlement after peace is restored.
+
+     "It is, indeed, calculated to exercise a most important and, I
+     believe, beneficial influence upon the South African politics of
+     the future. Among the principal causes of the trouble of the
+     past and present was the contempt felt by the Afrikander
+     countryman, used to riding and shooting, and generally in
+     possession of a good rifle and plenty of cartridges, for other
+     white men less habituated to arms than he was himself. That
+     feeling can hardly survive the experience of the past twelve
+     months, and especially of the last six weeks. The splendid
+     fighting of the despised Johannesburgers of the Imperial Light
+     Horse, and of the other South African Colonial Corps, has become
+     a matter of history, and the present _levée en masse_ of the
+     British people, including the townsmen, of this Colony, is proof
+     positive that when the necessity is really felt they are equal to
+     the best in courage and public spirit. In this respect the events
+     of the past few months, unfortunate as they have been in many
+     ways, have undoubtedly their brighter side. The mutual respect of
+     the two principal white races is the first condition of a healthy
+     political life in the South Africa of the future. It is possible
+     that if the extreme strain of the most recent developments of the
+     war had never been felt throughout Cape Colony, the British
+     inhabitants would never have had the opportunity of showing that
+     they were inferior to none in their willingness to bear all the
+     burdens of citizenship, including that of personal service."
+
+[Sidenote: Remember the loyalists.]
+
+And Lord Milner urges that in the future England should not forget
+that there are loyalists in South Africa as well as Boers; and that
+the loyalists are Dutch as well as British.
+
+     "The important part now played, even from the purely military
+     point of view, by the South African loyalists ought, as it seems
+     to me, to have a good effect not only in South Africa but in
+     England. The inherent vice, if I may say so, of almost all
+     public discussion of our South African difficulties is the
+     tendency to concentrate attention too exclusively on the Boers.
+     Say what we will, the controversy always seems to relapse into
+     the old ruts--it is the British Government on the one hand and
+     the Boers on the other. The question how a particular policy will
+     affect not merely our enemies, but our now equally numerous
+     friends, seems seldom to be adequately considered. And yet it
+     would seem that justice and policy alike should lead us to be as
+     eager to consider the feelings and interests, and to retain the
+     loyalty, of those who are fighting on our side, as to disarm the
+     present enmity and win the future confidence of those who are
+     fighting against us. And this principle would seem all the easier
+     to adhere to because there is really nothing which the great body
+     of the South African loyalists desire which it is not for the
+     honour and advantage of the mother country to insist upon.
+
+     "Of vindictiveness, or desire to oppress the Afrikanders, there
+     is, except in hasty utterances inevitable in the heat of the
+     conflict, which have no permanent significance, or in tirades
+     which are wholly devoid of influence, no sign whatever. The
+     attitude of almost all leading and representative men, and the
+     general trend of public feeling among the loyalists, even in the
+     intensity of the struggle, is dead against anything like racial
+     exclusiveness or domination. If this were not so it would be
+     impossible for a section of pure-bred Afrikanders, small no doubt
+     in numbers but weighty in character and position, to take the
+     strong line which they do in opposition to the views of the
+     majority of their own people, based as these are, and as they
+     know them to be, upon a misconception of our policy and
+     intentions. These men are among the most devoted adherents to the
+     Imperial cause, and would regard with more disfavour and alarm
+     than any one the failure of the British nation to carry out its
+     avowed policy in the most complete manner. They are absolutely
+     convinced that the unquestioned establishment of British
+     supremacy, and the creation of one political system from Capetown
+     to the Zambesi, is, after all that has happened, the only
+     salvation for men of their own race, as well as for others."
+
+[Sidenote: "One Country, One Flag."]
+
+And, in conclusion, he writes of the "predominant, indeed the almost
+unanimous, feeling of those South Africans who sympathise with the
+Imperial Government," that--
+
+     "they are sick to death of the war, which has brought ruin to
+     many of them, and imposed considerable sacrifices on almost all.
+     But they would rather see the war continue for an indefinite time
+     than run the risk of any compromise which would leave even the
+     remotest chance of the recurrence of so terrible a scourge in the
+     future. They are prepared to fight and suffer on in order to make
+     South Africa, indisputably and for ever, one country under one
+     flag, with one system of government, and that system the British,
+     which they believe to ensure the highest possible degree of
+     justice and freedom to men of all races."
+
+In this luminous review of what Lord Milner terms "if by no means the
+most critical, possibly the most puzzling" state of affairs since the
+outbreak of the war, it will be observed that he puts the time
+required by South Africa to recover from the economic ravages of the
+war at "not many years." In point of fact, two and a half years after
+the surrender of Vereeniging nothing remained but the scattered
+graveyards upon the veld, the empty tins still tinkling upon the wire
+fences by the railways, and an occasional blockhouse, to remind the
+traveller of the devastating struggle from which the country had so
+recently emerged. This estimate of the period of recuperation affords
+a measure of the magnitude of Lord Milner's achievement in the three
+concluding years of his administration. For the rest, we look in vain
+for any trace of bitterness, or even of partisanship, in his frank and
+penetrating analysis. It is the survey of a man who is completely
+master of the situation; who is absolutely convinced of the justice of
+the British cause; who has no illusions and no fears.
+
+[Sidenote: Feeding the enemy.]
+
+With the circumstances in which the burghers were induced by their
+leaders to continue, or renew, their resistance to the Imperial troops
+before us, both the long duration of the guerilla war, and the methods
+by which it was finally brought to a close, become easily
+intelligible. At the same time it must not be forgotten that, from a
+purely military point of view, the relapse of the conquered
+territories into war was due to the insufficiency of British troops.
+By the end of April, 1900, as we have noticed before, all the reserves
+of the regular army had been exhausted; and, in addition to this, at
+the end of twelve months' service a considerable proportion of the
+Home and over-sea auxiliaries left South Africa to return to civil
+life. Had there been a sufficient number of trained soldiers to
+occupy effectively the Boer Republics, the war would not have swept
+back through them and over their borders into the Colony. Even so, the
+actual number of British troops in South Africa under Lord Roberts's
+command would have sufficed to subjugate the Boers, had the British
+military authorities employed the severe methods of warfare to which
+any other belligerent would have had recourse under the like
+conditions--methods of merciful severity which were employed, in fact,
+by the Union forces in the civil war in America.[255] But, by the
+irony of fate, the humane methods of the British, in the absence of a
+practically unlimited supply of trained troops, made the revival of
+hostilities possible on the part of the Boers, and thereby created the
+necessity for the employment of those more rigorous, but, by
+comparison, still humane and generous methods, in respect of which the
+charge of inhumanity was brought against Great Britain by the friends
+of the Boers in England and on the continent of Europe. No one will
+maintain that it is a part of the duty of a belligerent to support the
+non-combatant population of the enemy. Yet this duty was voluntarily
+assumed throughout the war by the British military authorities, who,
+from the occupation of Bloemfontein onwards, fed the non-combatant
+Boer population as well as they fed their own troops.
+
+         [Footnote 255: _E.g._ those employed by General Sherman in
+         his march to the Sea, through Georgia, in the latter part of
+         1864.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Kitchener's task.]
+
+An incident that happened after the occupation of Pretoria exhibits
+the remarkable generosity of the British attitude. At a time when,
+owing to the Boer attacks upon the railway, the utmost difficulty was
+experienced in getting supplies from the thousand-miles'-distant base
+at the coast, Lord Roberts was compelled to send away a part of the
+civilian population to General Botha, and they were removed by the
+Boer Commandant-General to Barberton. That is to say, while the
+British, on the one hand, were giving part of the supplies on which
+the existence of their troops depended, to the non-combatant
+population of the enemy, the enemy, on the other hand, was doing his
+utmost to destroy the single line of railway which alone stood between
+the British Army and starvation. When, therefore, Lord Kitchener
+succeeded to the command of the British forces in South Africa
+(November 29th, 1900), he found the task of disarmament complicated by
+two factors. There was the desire of the Home Government that the war
+should be conducted upon the humane lines hitherto adopted, and there
+was also the fact that the Imperial troops were not numerous enough to
+occupy effectively the whole territory of the Republics, or, in other
+words, to do the one thing of all others necessary to make this humane
+conduct of the war consistent with military success. It was
+impossible, with the troops at his disposal, for Lord Kitchener to
+hold the enormous territory of the conquered Republics. It was
+impossible, perhaps, to support a larger force in a country so poorly
+provided with food supplies and means of communication. An
+alternative plan had to be found. This plan was to remove the horses,
+cattle, and food supplies from the areas which he was unable to
+occupy, and to transport the non-combatant inhabitants to places where
+they could be both fed and protected. And, when this had been
+done--or, more correctly, while it was in process of being done--he
+had to capture the small, mobile bodies of burghers operating over the
+whole of the unprotected area of the late Republics and the Cape
+Colony, and to collect gradually the fighting Boers, captured or
+surrendered, into the colonial or over-sea prisoners' camps.
+
+Certain districts, of which those surrounding the towns of Kimberley,
+Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Johannesburg were the more important, had
+from the first been effectively occupied and securely held. All the
+troops at Lord Kitchener's disposal, that were not absorbed in the
+work of garrisoning these districts and maintaining the lines of
+communication, were organised into mobile columns, which were
+distributed among General Officers respectively attached to a
+particular area. In a despatch of July 8th, 1901, Lord Kitchener was
+able to report that, as the result of the recent work of these mobile
+columns, the Boers, although "still able, in case of emergency, to
+concentrate a considerable number of men," were, in his opinion,
+"unable to undertake any large scheme of operations." Apart from the
+heavy drain from prisoners captured and deaths in the field, the loss
+of their ox-waggons had seriously affected their mobility and supply
+arrangements.
+
+     "Divided up into small parties of three to four hundred men," he
+     writes, "they are scattered all over the country without plans
+     and without hope, and on the approach of our troops they
+     disperse, to reassemble in the same neighbourhood when our men
+     pass on. In this way they continue an obstinate resistance
+     without retaining anything, or defending the smallest portion of
+     this vast country."
+
+He estimates that there are not more than 13,500[256] Boers in the
+field in the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and the Cape Colony.
+But he adds that--
+
+         [Footnote 256: This estimate was very much too small: at the
+         Vereeniging surrender, when many thousands more of Boers had
+         been captured or killed 21,256 burghers and rebels laid down
+         their arms. Cd. 988.]
+
+     "with long lines of railway to hold, every yard of which has to
+     be defended, both to secure our own civil and military supplies,
+     and, what is more important, to prevent the enemy from obtaining
+     necessaries from the capture of our trains, the employment of
+     large numbers of troops continues to be a necessity.... The Boer
+     party who declared war have quitted the field, and are now urging
+     those whom they deserted to continue a useless struggle by giving
+     lying assurances to the ignorant burghers of outside assistance,
+     and by raising absurdly deceitful hopes that Great Britain has
+     not sufficient endurance to see the matter through."[257]
+
+         [Footnote 257: Cd. 695.]
+
+But it had become evident that some more systematic effort was
+required for the capture of the commandos, unless the slow task of
+wearing down the Boer resistance was to be almost indefinitely
+protracted; and this same month of July, 1901, witnessed the extension
+of the blockhouse lines, which proved the turning-point in the
+guerilla war. The origin of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouse
+defence is described by him in his despatch of August 8th, 1901.
+
+[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.]
+
+     "Experience had shown," he writes, "that the line of defensible
+     posts, extending across the Orange River Colony, from Jacobsdal
+     to Ladybrand, constituted a considerable obstacle to the free
+     movement of the enemies' roving bands, and that the gradual
+     completion of chains of blockhouses placed at intervals of a
+     mile, sometimes less, along the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
+     railways, had obtained for our traffic a comparative security
+     which it had not previously enjoyed."[258]
+
+         [Footnote 258: Cd. 820.]
+
+In July, therefore, Lord Kitchener made arrangements for the
+construction of three additional lines of blockhouses. The first ran
+from Aliwal North westward, following the course of the Orange River, to
+Bethulie, and was continued thence alongside the railway through
+Stormberg, Rosmead, Naauwpoort, and De Aar, northward to Kimberley. The
+second commenced at Frederickstad and ran northward by the source of the
+Mooi River to Breed's Nek in the Magaliesberg, from which point it was
+connected with the British garrison at Commando Nek, and thus screened
+the western side of the Pretoria and Johannesburg area. The third,
+running from Eerste Fabriken in the north, by Springs and Heidelberg,
+southward to the Vaal River, protected the same district from attack
+upon the east. These new blockhouse lines, Lord Kitchener wrote,
+promised to be of much assistance in the future. Not only did they
+protect the British communications, and render inter-communication
+between the different portions of the Boer forces difficult, but, in the
+absence of frontiers, natural or artificial, they served as barriers
+against which the British mobile columns were able to drive bands of the
+enemy and force them to surrender. Indeed, the blockhouse lines proved
+the chief instrument of success; for with the gradual extension of the
+system, the area of active hostilities was confined in an increasing
+degree to the vast half-deserted regions through which the commandos
+roamed, and the British columns swept at intervals in pursuit of them.
+
+A month later, August 8th, Lord Kitchener reported a further step in
+advance. He had formed "some specially mobile columns for independent
+and rapid action in different parts of the country, generally at some
+distance from the operations of other troops." The commanders of these
+new mobile columns had a free hand in respect of their movements,
+since they were guided by the special intelligence, which they
+themselves collected, and not solely by information from headquarters.
+The effect produced by the development of the blockhouse system,
+combined with the greater freedom of initiative allowed to the new
+mobile columns, became apparent in the increasing number of Boers
+captured or voluntarily surrendering themselves in the month of
+August, when altogether more than two thousand of the enemy were
+accounted for.[259] On the 7th of this month the delayed[260]
+proclamation was issued, and a date--September 15th--was fixed as the
+limit within which the guerilla leaders might, by voluntarily
+surrendering, avoid certain penalties which were duly set out. In
+order to counteract the effect of this action on the part of the
+British Government, General Botha stimulated his followers to
+increased military enterprise.
+
+         [Footnote 259: There were 186 killed, 75 wounded, 1,384
+         prisoners, 529 voluntary surrenders; while 930 rifles, 90,958
+         rounds of ammunition, 1,332 waggons and carts, 13,570 horses,
+         and 65,879 cattle were captured. Cd. 820.]
+
+         [Footnote 260: See p. 420.]
+
+     "But," says Lord Kitchener, "though there has been no general
+     surrender, the device to which the Commandant-General resorted
+     for turning the thoughts of his burghers in another direction has
+     probably cost him and his cause [a heavier loss] than a simple
+     pursuance of the usual evasive tactics would have even entailed."
+
+[Sidenote: Large captures of Boers.]
+
+The precise extent of this loss is shown in the returns for September,
+which record captures and surrenders almost as numerous as those of
+the preceding month.
+
+     "It cannot be expected," Lord Kitchener adds, "even under the
+     most favourable conditions, that in the presence of the
+     ever-diminishing numbers opposing us in the field, these figures
+     can be maintained, but I feel confident that so long as any
+     resistance is continued, no exertion will be spared either by
+     officers or men of this force to carry out the task they still
+     have before them."[261]
+
+         [Footnote 261: Cd. 820. The September returns were: 170 Boers
+         killed in action, 114 wounded prisoners, 1,385 unwounded
+         prisoners, and 1,393 surrenders.]
+
+[Sidenote: The railway lines secured.]
+
+In another month a position had been reached in which it was possible for
+the work of administrative reconstruction--interrupted a year ago by the
+development of the guerilla warfare--to be resumed. At this date
+(November, 1901), the resistance of the Dutch population had been weakened
+by the loss of 53,000 fighting Boers, of whom 42,000 were in British
+custody, while the rest had been killed, wounded, or otherwise put out of
+action. In the Transvaal 14,700 square miles, and in the Orange River
+Colony 17,000 square miles of territory had been enclosed by blockhouse
+lines. A square formed roughly by lines running respectively from
+Klerksdorp to Zeerust on the west, from Zeerust to Middelburg on the
+north, from Middelburg to Standerton on the east, and from Standerton to
+Klerksdorp on the south, enclosing Pretoria and the Rand, was the
+protected area of the Transvaal. The whole of the Orange River Colony
+south of the blockhouse line, Kimberley-Winberg-Bloemfontein-Ladybrand,
+was also a protected area; and the Cape Colony, south of the main railway
+lines, was similarly screened off. But an application of what may be
+termed "the railway-cutting test" yields, perhaps, the most eloquent
+testimony both to the magnitude of the original task undertaken by the
+Imperial troops, and to the degree of success which had been obtained. In
+October, 1900, the railway lines, upon which the British troops depended
+for supplies of food and ammunition, were cut thirty-two times, or more
+than once a day. The number of times in which they were cut in the
+succeeding November was thirty; in December twenty-one; in January, 1901,
+sixteen; in February, as the result of De Wet's invasion of the Cape
+Colony, they were cut thirty times; in March eighteen; in April eighteen;
+in May twelve; in June eight; in July four; in August four; in September
+twice; and in October not at all. Still more significant of the approach
+of peace was the fact that now, for the first time, the British population
+was allowed to return to Johannesburg in any considerable numbers.[262]
+
+         [Footnote 262: In August 648 refugees returned; in November
+         the number had risen to 2,623.]
+
+It remains to consider two questions which cannot be omitted from any
+account; however brief, of the manner in which the disarmament of the
+Dutch in South Africa was effected. The first of these is the charge
+of inhumanity brought against the Imperial military authorities in
+respect of the deportation of the Boer non-combatants to the Burgher
+Camps; and the second is the actual effect produced upon the burghers
+in the field by the public denunciations of the war by members of the
+Liberal Opposition in England.
+
+[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.]
+
+In charging the British Government and Lord Kitchener with inhumanity
+in the conduct of the war, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and other friends
+of the Boer cause relied in the main upon the circumstance that a
+certain proportion of the Boer population was removed compulsorily
+from districts which the British troops were unable to occupy
+effectively, and upon the further fact that the Burgher Camps
+exhibited an unusually high rate of mortality. The necessity for the
+removal of this non-combatant population will scarcely be disputed in
+view of the methods adopted by the Boer leaders to compel the burghers
+to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops, and the fact that
+nearly every house in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, inhabited
+by the Dutch, served as an intelligence office, a recruiting depôt,
+and a base of supplies for the roving commandos. Nor will it be denied
+that the responsibility for the unnecessary suffering incurred by the
+Boer people in the guerilla war rests upon those of the Boer leaders
+who formed and enforced the decision to continue the struggle, and not
+upon the British Government. The alleged "inhumanity," therefore, of
+the Imperial military authorities consists in the circumstance that,
+instead of leaving these helpless non-combatants to be supported by
+the Boer leaders, they removed them to places of security, where they
+were fed, housed, and generally maintained, in as little discomfort as
+circumstances permitted. If the lesser suffering of the Burgher Camps
+was the only alternative to greater suffering, and possibly
+starvation, on the veld, the Boers had only their own leaders to thank
+for the position in which they found themselves. The death-rate of the
+Burgher Camps was exceptionally high as compared with that of any
+ordinary European community. But the population of the camps was no
+less exceptional. It consisted of women and children, with a small
+proportion of adult males; and of all these the majority had come to
+the camps as refugees, insufficiently clothed, weakened by exposure
+and often by starvation. Obviously the death-rate of such a refugee
+community would be much higher, under the most favourable conditions,
+than that of an ordinary European town; and, in order to find a valid
+point of comparison, we must seek statistics provided by similar
+collections of refugees, brought together under the like exceptional
+circumstances. We are unable to find any such parallel case, for the
+sufficient reason that history records no other example of a nation at
+war which, at the risk of impairing the efficiency of its own forces
+in the field, has endeavoured, not merely to feed and clothe, but to
+house, nurse, and even educate the non-combatant population of its
+enemy.
+
+[Sidenote: Reduction of the death-rate.]
+
+What we do know, however, is that, of the total deaths in these camps
+of refuge, the great majority were those of infants and children.
+This is a circumstance which in itself goes far to make the excess of
+the camp death-rate apparent rather than real; since, in the first
+place, the Boer mothers, owing to their insanitary habits and
+ignorance,[263] are not accustomed to bring more than one out of every
+two children to maturity; and in the second, the rate of infant
+mortality is abnormally high, as compared with that of a given
+community as a whole, even in the most highly developed countries. The
+highest monthly death-rate was that of October, 1901, when, out of a
+population of 112,109 in all camps, there were 3,205 deaths, or 344
+per thousand per annum.[264] But of these deaths, 500 only (in round
+numbers) were those of adults, and 2,700 were those of children. That
+is to say, in this worst month we have in the refugee camps an adult
+death-rate of (roughly) 50 per thousand, as compared with a European
+death-rate varying from 16.7 in Norway to 33.2 in Hungary,[265] and a
+children's death-rate of 300 per thousand, as compared with the 208
+per thousand of the contemporary rate of infant mortality in
+thirty-three great towns of the United Kingdom, or in Birkenhead alone
+of 362 per thousand. And from this time forward the death-rate of the
+refugee camps was rapidly reduced. The reason for this reduction is
+significant. By the development of the blockhouse lines the British
+military authorities had been enabled to protect their supplies from
+the attacks of the guerilla leaders. In other words, Lord Kitchener
+was now able to defend the Boer non-combatants against the efforts
+made by their own leaders to deprive them of food and other
+necessaries of life. And ultimately the mortality in the Burgher Camps
+was reduced to a point "much below the normal rates under ordinary
+local circumstances."[266]
+
+         [Footnote 263: For the grotesque, repulsive, and even fatal
+         remedies employed by the Boer women in the treatment of their
+         children in sickness, the reader is referred to the medical
+         reports on the condition of the refugee camps published in
+         the Blue-book.]
+
+         [Footnote 264: The figures are those given by Miss Hobhouse,
+         as based upon the official returns (_The Brunt of the War_,
+         pp. 329-31).]
+
+         [Footnote 265: _I.e._ annual per 1,000 on a basis of 25 years
+         (1874-98).]
+
+         [Footnote 266: Cd. 1,163, p. 159. See also _ibid._, p. 151,
+         and p. 178. Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer
+         complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps (made by
+         Acting President Schalk Burger), is as follows:
+
+              "Numerous complaints were made to me in the early part
+              of this year (1901), by surrendered burghers, who stated
+              that after they laid down their arms their families were
+              ill-treated, and their stock and property confiscated by
+              order of the Commandant-Generals of the Transvaal and
+              Orange Free State. These acts appear to have been taken
+              in consequence of the circular dated Roos Senekal, 6th
+              November, 1900, in which the Commandant-General says:
+              'Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers
+              laying down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do
+              not listen to this, to confiscate everything movable or
+              immovable, and also to burn their houses.'
+
+              "I took occasion, at my interview with
+              Commandant-General Louis Botha (February 28th, 1901), to
+              bring this matter before him, and I told him that if he
+              continued such acts I should be forced to bring in all
+              women and children, and as much property as possible, to
+              protect them from the acts of his burghers. I further
+              inquired if he would agree to spare the farms and
+              families of neutral or surrendered burghers, in which
+              case I expressed my willingness to leave undisturbed the
+              farms and families of burghers who were on commando,
+              provided they did not actively assist their relatives.
+              The Commandant-General emphatically refused even to
+              consider any such arrangement. He said: 'I am entitled
+              by law to force every man to join, and if they do not do
+              so to confiscate their property, and leave their
+              families on the veld.' I asked him what course I could
+              pursue to protect surrendered burghers and their
+              families, and he then said, 'The only thing you can do,
+              is to send them out of the country, as if I catch them
+              they must suffer.' After this there was nothing more to
+              be said, and as military operations do not permit of the
+              protection of individuals, I had practically no choice
+              but to continue my system of bringing inhabitants of
+              certain areas into the protection of our lines. My
+              decision was conveyed to the Commandant-General in my
+              official letter, dated Pretoria, 16th April, 1901, from
+              which the following is an extract:
+
+              "'As I informed your Honour at Middelburg, owing to the
+              irregular manner in which you have conducted and
+              continue to conduct hostilities, by forcing unwilling
+              and peaceful inhabitants to join your Commandos, a
+              proceeding totally unauthorised by the recognised
+              customs of war, I have no other course open to me, and
+              am forced to take the very unpleasant and repugnant
+              steps of bringing in the women and children.
+
+              "'I have the greatest sympathy for the sufferings of
+              these poor people, which I have done my best to
+              alleviate, and it is a matter of surprise to me and to
+              the whole civilised world, that your Honour considers
+              yourself justified in still causing so much suffering to
+              the people of the Transvaal, by carrying on a hopeless
+              and useless struggle.'
+
+              "From the foregoing, it will, I believe, be perfectly
+              clear that the responsibility for the action complained
+              of by Mr. Burger (the so-styled Acting State President
+              of the Transvaal), rests rather with the
+              Commandants-General of the Transvaal and Orange Free
+              State, than with the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in
+              South Africa....
+
+              "It is not the case that every area has been cleared of
+              the families of burghers, although this might be
+              inferred from the despatch under discussion. On the
+              contrary, very large numbers of women and children are
+              still out, either in Boer Camps or on their farms, and
+              my Column Commanders have orders to leave them alone,
+              unless it is clear that they must starve if they are
+              left out upon the veld....
+
+              "Finally, I indignantly and entirely deny the
+              accusations of rough and cruel treatment of women and
+              children who were being brought in from their farms to
+              the camp. Hardships may have been sometimes inseparable
+              from the process, but the Boer women in our hands
+              themselves bear the most eloquent testimony to the
+              kindness and consideration shown to them by our soldiers
+              on all such occasions."
+
+         With this statement it is interesting to compare Sir Henry
+         Campbell-Bannerman's words at Bath, November 20th, 1901:
+
+              "Is our hypocrisy so great that we actually flatter
+              ourselves upon our great humanity, because we have saved
+              from starvation those whose danger of starvation we have
+              caused?... The hypocrisy of these excuses is almost more
+              loathsome than the cruelty itself.... We have set
+              ourselves to punish this country, to reduce it
+              apparently to ruin, because it has ventured to make war
+              against us."
+
+         Truly an extraordinary attitude for a future Prime Minister
+         of England!]
+
+The charge of prolonging the war by public declarations of sympathy
+with the enemy[267] was definitely formulated against certain members
+of the Liberal Opposition and the Irish Nationalist party by Lord St.
+Aldwyn (Sir Michael Hicks Beach), at Oldham on October 10th, 1901.
+
+         [Footnote 267: What was even worse than such declarations of
+         sympathy with the Boers was the manifestation of hostility
+         against the loyalist population of South Africa. _E.g._ Sir
+         William Harcourt (in a letter in _The Times_ of December
+         17th, 1900), wrote: "I sometimes think that those bellicose
+         gentlemen--especially those who do not fight--must
+         occasionally cast longing, lingering looks towards the times
+         before they were subsidised (_sic_) by the authors of the
+         Raid to bring about the position in which they now find
+         themselves."]
+
+[Sidenote: Why the war was prolonged.]
+
+     "The real cause of the prolongation of this war has been
+     something which, on my word, I believe could never have been seen
+     in any other country in the world. It has been the speeches in
+     Parliament of British members of the House of Commons, doing
+     everything they could against their country and in favour of her
+     enemies. It has been articles in certain journals taking
+     absolutely the same lines--I am not talking of mere attacks on
+     his Majesty's Government, or even calumnies of individual
+     ministers, that is part of the ordinary machinery of political
+     warfare, and one of the advantages of an absolutely free Press.
+     No, what I am talking of is the prominence given to the opinions
+     and sentiments of men who were called Pro-Boers, as if they
+     represented the feelings of a large section of their
+     fellow-countrymen. The invention of lies, like the alleged
+     quarrel between Lord Kitchener and the War Office, was intended
+     to damage this country in the conduct of the war, as was also the
+     wicked charges made against the humanity of our generals and our
+     soldiers in the Concentration Camps and in the field, the
+     attempts, such as I saw only the other day in one of these
+     papers, to prove that in those gallant contests at Fort
+     Itala[268] and on the borders of Natal our soldiers had not
+     repulsed their enemies, but were themselves the defeated party.
+     We here do not attach any importance to those things. We rate
+     them at their true value because we know something about their
+     authors--but what do you think is thought of them when they go
+     out to South Africa? What do the Boers and their leaders think
+     when they read the newspapers written in England which are full
+     of these things? The Boers have many faults, but they are a
+     simple and patriotic people. They never can imagine that English
+     newspapers would print these things, that English members of
+     Parliament would speak them, taking always the side of their
+     country's enemies, unless these things were true. They are
+     deceived. They greedily swallow all this as representing the
+     opinion of a great section of the public in this country, and
+     those who have said these things and those who have circulated
+     them are the parties who are guilty before God of prolonging this
+     war. There are the Irish Nationalists. Let me read to you words
+     which I heard with the greatest pain in the last session of
+     Parliament from the leader of the Irish Nationalists, a man of
+     consummate eloquence and perfect self-control. What did Mr. John
+     Redmond say? He prayed God that the resistance of the Boers might
+     be strengthened, and that South Africa might take vengeance for
+     its wrongs by separating itself from the Empire which had deluged
+     it with blood, and become a free and independent nation. We in
+     England pass over words of that sort, though I believe they would
+     not have been uttered with impunity by a member of the
+     Legislative Assembly of any other country in the world."
+
+         [Footnote 268: September 26th, 1901. See Cd. 820 for report
+         of this action.]
+
+[Sidenote: Campbell-Bannerman's reply.]
+
+Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reply to the charge brought against him
+by Lord St. Aldwyn, and subsequently by Lord Salisbury,[269] is
+contained in the words following, which were spoken by him at
+Plymouth, on November 19th:
+
+         [Footnote 269: Letter to Miss Milner, November 11th, 1901.
+         See p. 416.]
+
+     "Now I declare, ladies and gentlemen, for myself, that from first
+     to last I have never uttered one syllable that could be twisted
+     by any ingenuity into encouragement by the Boers. No, I have
+     never even expressed ordinary pity for, or sympathy with them,
+     because I did not wish to run the risk of being misunderstood.
+     What I have done, and what I hope I shall continue to do, is to
+     denounce the stupidity of the way in which the Government were
+     dealing with the Boers."
+
+There is only one method by which the amazing effrontery of this
+denial can be sufficiently exhibited. It is to place underneath it
+quotations from speeches delivered by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
+himself at Stirling on October 25th, by Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P., at
+Galashiels on October 14th, and by Mr. E. Robertson, M.P., at Dundee
+on October 16th, as printed in the "Official Organ of the Orange Free
+State Government," dated September 21st, 1901, a copy of which was
+found in a Boer laager on the veld. The extracts selected are these:
+
+Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman:
+
+     "The whole country in the two belligerent States, outside the
+     mining towns, is a howling wilderness. The farms are burned, the
+     country is wasted. The flocks and herds are either butchered or
+     driven off; the mills are destroyed, furniture and instruments of
+     agriculture smashed. These things are what I have termed methods
+     of barbarism. I adhere to the phrase. I cannot improve upon it.
+     If these are not the methods of barbarism, what methods did
+     barbarism employ?... My belief is that the mass of the British
+     people ... do not desire to see a brave people subjugated or
+     annihilated."
+
+Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P.:
+
+     "The war was unnecessary, and therefore unjust.... He wished he
+     could agree that we were fighting in a just cause, that we had
+     always fought according to acknowledged civilised methods; but as
+     an honest man he could not do so."
+
+Mr. Edmund Robertson, M.P.:
+
+     "The victory of the Government (at the last General Election) had
+     been the main cause of the prolongation of the war. If they had
+     been defeated their successors would have been men with a free
+     hand, and the Boers themselves might have been ready to make
+     concessions, which they would not make, and had not made, to
+     those whom they believed to be their enemies and persecutors. If
+     the Empire was to be saved, the Government must be
+     destroyed."[270]
+
+         [Footnote 270: The facts are stated in a letter published in
+         _The Times_ on March 10th, 1902.]
+
+Can any human being of ordinary intelligence believe that these
+passages, containing denunciations of the war, were circulated by
+Ex-President Steyn for any other purpose than that of encouraging the
+burghers to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops?
+
+And to this evidence may be added the protest made by "An Old
+Berliner" in _The Times_ of November 27th, 1901:
+
+[Sidenote: "Methods of barbarism".]
+
+     "What I want to impress upon your readers is the much more
+     serious and, indeed, incalculable mischief done by the public
+     utterances of responsible politicians, and, to take the most
+     pernicious example of all, by the reckless language of Sir Henry
+     Campbell-Bannerman. The words he uttered about England's methods
+     of barbarism have been used ever since as the watchwords of
+     England's detractors throughout the length and breadth of
+     Germany."[271]
+
+         [Footnote 271: See also note, p. 399 (Extract from the
+         _Vossische Zeitung_). The baseless and malevolent allegations
+         of specific acts of inhumanity or outrage on the part of
+         British soldiers, circulated by Boer sympathisers in England
+         and on the continent of Europe, have been passed over in
+         silence. For an exposure of these calumnies the reader is
+         referred to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's _The War in South
+         Africa_ (Smith, Elder). A record of the manner in which they
+         were repudiated by the Boer population in South Africa will
+         be found in Cd. 1, 163, pp. 99, 106-111, 113-121. Among those
+         who protested were German subjects, and Germans who had
+         become British subjects, resident in South Africa. Perhaps
+         the most significant of all these protests is the resolution
+         passed unanimously by the members of the Natal House of
+         Assembly, all standing: "That this House desires to repudiate
+         the false charges of inhumanity brought against His Majesty's
+         Army by a section of the inhabitants of the continent of
+         Europe and certain disloyal subjects within the British
+         Isles, and this House places on record its deliberate
+         conviction that the war in South Africa has been prosecuted
+         by His Majesty's Government and Army upon lines of humanity
+         and consideration for the enemy unparalleled in the history
+         of nations."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+PREPARING FOR PEACE
+
+
+We have already noticed that arrangements were made in October, 1900,
+under which the High Commissionership was to be separated from the
+Governorship of the Cape Colony in order that Lord Milner might be
+free to undertake the work of administrative reconstruction in the new
+colonies. In pursuance of this decision of the Home Government, Lord
+Milner became Administrator of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
+upon the departure of Lord Roberts (November 29th, 1900); but
+circumstances did not permit him to resign the governorship of the
+Cape Colony and remove to the Transvaal until three months later. The
+new Governor of the Cape Colony was Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who
+was himself succeeded, as Governor of Natal, by Sir Henry E. McCallum;
+and at the same time (March 1st, 1901), Sir H. (then Major)
+Goold-Adams was appointed Deputy-Administrator of the Orange River
+Colony, where he took over the duties hitherto discharged by General
+Pretyman as Military Governor.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner in the Transvaal.]
+
+Lord Milner left Capetown to assume the administration of the new
+colonies on February 28th, 1901. The incidents of his journey
+northwards are illustrative alike of the state of South Africa at this
+time, and of the varied responsibilities of the High Commissioner.
+After three months of continuous and successful conflict with the
+forces of rebellion in the south, he was suddenly confronted with a
+situation in the north even more pregnant with the possibilities of
+disaster. This was the day on which Commandant-General Louis Botha
+entered the British lines at Middelburg to treat for peace with
+General Lord Kitchener; and many counsels of precaution sped
+northwards upon the wires as the High Commissioner's train crossed the
+plains and wound slowly up through the mountain passes that led to the
+higher levels of the Karroo plateau. March 1st, which was spent in the
+train, was the most idle day that Lord Milner had passed for many
+months. The respite was of short duration. At midnight, directly after
+the train had left De Aar junction, a long telegram from Lord
+Kitchener, giving the substance of his interview with Botha, caught
+the High Commissioner. But if peace was in the air in the north, war
+held the field in the south. From De Aar to Bloemfontein the railway
+line was astir with British troops, concentrating or dispersing, in
+pursuit of De Wet. At Bloemfontein station Lord Milner was met (March
+2nd) by Lord Kitchener, and the nature of the reply to be given to
+Botha was discussed between them. On the next morning Lord Milner's
+saloon car was attached to the Commander-in-Chief's train, and a long
+telegram was drafted and despatched to London.[272] The position which
+Lord Milner took up on this occasion, and afterwards at the final
+negotiations of Vereeniging, was that which he had himself condensed
+in the two words "never again." He was anxious for peace; no man more
+than he; but a peace upon terms that would leave South Africa with the
+remotest prospect of a return to the abnormal political conditions
+which had made the war inevitable, he regarded as a disaster to be
+avoided at all costs. This telegram despatched, the train left
+Bloemfontein, and, in spite of more than one sign of the proximity of
+the Boer raiders, it reached Pretoria without delay at 9 a.m. on March
+4th. The next ten days Lord Milner remained at the capital of the
+Transvaal, in constant communication with the Home Government on the
+subject of the peace negotiations[273] with the Boers, which
+ultimately proved abortive; but on the 9th he went over to
+Johannesburg for the day to see the house which was being prepared for
+his occupation. On the 15th he left Pretoria finally for Johannesburg.
+He was received at the station by a guard of honour furnished by the
+Rand Rifles, and, thus escorted, drove to Sunnyside, a pleasant house
+in what is now the suburb of Parktown, commanding an unbroken view
+over the veld to the Magaliesberg range beyond Pretoria; and here
+he continued to reside until he left South Africa on April 2nd, 1905.
+
+         [Footnote 272: This telegram is printed in Cd. 528.]
+
+         [Footnote 273: For the nature of these "Middelburg terms,"
+         see forward in note 2 on p. 568.]
+
+[Illustration: _By permission of the Argus Printing and Publishing
+Co., Ltd., Johannesburg._
+
+Lord Milner at Sunnyside.]
+
+[Sidenote: Affairs in the Cape colony.]
+
+From this time forward (March 15th, 1901), Lord Milner's
+administrative activity is primarily concerned with the Transvaal and
+Orange River Colony. Owing, however, to the continued resistance of
+the Boers and the extension of the area of hostilities by the second
+invasion of the Cape Colony, the administrative development of the new
+colonies was confined within the narrowest limits, until six months of
+strenuous military operations had enabled Lord Kitchener to render the
+protected areas and the railways virtually secure against the raids of
+the Boer commandos. Four out of these six months were occupied by Lord
+Milner's second visit to England (May-August, 1901). But before we
+approach this episode, and thereby resume the main current of the
+narrative, it is necessary to trace the course of events in the Cape
+Colony. With the government of the Colony once more in the hands of
+the British party, Lord Milner had been relieved of the acute and
+constant anxieties that marked his official relationship to the
+Afrikander Ministry. On the vital question of the necessity of
+establishing British authority upon terms that would make any
+repetition of the war impossible, Sir Gordon Sprigg and his ministers
+were absolutely at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government.
+Whatever differences of opinion arose subsequently between the Cape
+ministers and the Imperial authorities were differences not of
+principle but of detail. For the most part they were such as would
+have manifested themselves in any circumstances in a country where the
+civil government was compelled, by the exigencies of war, to surrender
+some of its powers to the military authority.
+
+[Sidenote: The Bond and peace.]
+
+By supporting the Treason Bill, Mr. Schreiner and Sir Richard Solomon
+had dissociated themselves from the Afrikander nationalists; and
+henceforward their influence was used unreservedly on the side of
+British supremacy.[274] On the other hand, Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer,
+as we have seen, had openly denounced the policy of the Imperial
+Government, and no less openly advocated the aims, and defended the
+methods, of the Afrikander Bond. The Bond's determination to do all in
+its power to secure the independence of the Boers, and thereby defeat
+the policy of the Imperial Government, was manifested by the abrupt
+refusal of its leaders to associate themselves with the efforts of the
+Burgher Peace Committee. Mr. P. de Wet and the other peace delegates
+who had visited the Colony in the circumstances already mentioned,
+desired the Bond to co-operate with them by informing the republican
+leaders that they must expect no military assistance from the
+Afrikander party, and by formally advising them to end the war in the
+interests of the Afrikander population. The details of the incident,
+as recorded in the Blue-book,[275] show that Mr. Theron, the President
+of the Provincial Bestuur of the Bond and a member of the Legislative
+Assembly, was at first disposed to regard the proposal of the peace
+delegates with favour. But, after expressing himself to this effect at
+Wellington, on February 15th, 1901, he went to Capetown to consult the
+Bond leaders on the matter, and, as the result of this consultation,
+he wrote to Mr. de Wet, five days later, declining to meet the peace
+delegates again, or negotiate with them, on the ground that the
+"principles of the Afrikander Bond" would be prejudiced by his
+entering into official negotiations with the deputation, whose
+official status he was unable, after inquiry, to recognise. It is
+difficult not to connect this summary treatment of the peace delegates
+by the Bond with the fact that, just at this time, General C. de Wet
+was reporting to General Louis Botha that the "Cape Colony had risen
+to a man."[276] However this may be, the wholesale manner in which the
+Afrikander Bond had identified itself in the country districts with
+the Boer invaders is sufficiently displayed by a return published six
+months later, from which it appears that, out of a total of
+thirty-three men holding official positions in the Bond organisation
+in three districts in the Cape Colony, twenty-seven were accused of
+high treason, of whom twenty-four were convicted, two absconded, and
+one was acquitted.[277]
+
+         [Footnote 274: Sir Richard Solomon was appointed legal
+         adviser to the new Transvaal Administration.]
+
+         [Footnote 275: Cd. 903.]
+
+         [Footnote 276: See p. 431.]
+
+         [Footnote 277: Cd. 903.]
+
+With the Bond in this mood, with certain districts practically
+maintaining the enemy and certain other districts constantly exposed
+to the incursions of the guerilla leaders, with a large proportion of
+the loyalist population fighting at the front, and a still larger
+number organised for local defence, and with the whole of the Colony,
+except the ports, under martial law, it was obviously impossible for
+the machinery of representative government to continue in its normal
+course.
+
+[Sidenote: Anti-British libels.]
+
+The registration of electors, which, under the provisions of the
+colonial law, was directed to take place not later than the last day
+of February, 1901, was postponed to a more convenient season. The
+existing register, while it contained the names of--it was
+estimated--ten thousand persons disfranchised, or about to be
+disfranchised, for rebellion, and of some thousands of others then in
+arms against their sovereign, failed to include persons who had
+acquired the necessary qualifications since the date of the last
+registration (1899). Apart from the unsatisfactory condition of the
+voters' lists, there were other circumstances that made it undesirable
+as well as difficult not merely to hold the elections necessary to
+fill up the nine or ten vacant seats in the Legislative Assembly, but
+even to summon Parliament. Locomotion in many parts of the Colony was
+inconvenient, and sometimes dangerous. So large a proportion of the
+members of both chambers were absent in Europe, or engaged either in
+repelling the invaders or in repressing rebellion, that the remainder,
+if assembled, would present a mere simulacrum of the actual
+legislature of the Colony. Moreover, it was necessary that no fresh
+opportunities for promoting disaffection should be provided by
+discussions in Parliament or contested elections. The "carnival of
+mendacity" which, culminating in the Worcester Congress, was mainly
+responsible for the second invasion of the Colony, had been
+inaugurated by the inflammatory speeches delivered in the last session
+of Parliament by the Afrikander members during the debates on the
+Treason Bill. The spirit of malevolence displayed at this period by
+the anti-British Press, whether printed in Dutch or in English, may be
+inferred from the list of convictions reported on April 19th by Sir W.
+Hely-Hutchinson to the Colonial Office. Mr. Albert Cartwright, editor
+of _The South African News_ (the reputed organ of Mr. Merriman and Mr.
+Sauer), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and
+sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment without hard labour. Mr.
+Advocate Malan, editor of _Ons Land_ (the reputed organ of Mr.
+Hofmeyr), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on General French,
+and sentenced to a similar term of imprisonment. Mr. de Jong, editor
+of _The Worcester Advertiser_, and Mr. Vosloo, editor of _Het Oosten_,
+were both convicted of the same offence as Mr. Malan, and sentenced to
+six months' imprisonment without hard labour, while the former was
+further charged with a seditious libel attributing atrocities to the
+British troops, in respect of which he was convicted and sentenced to
+a fine of £100 or two months' imprisonment.[278]
+
+         [Footnote 278: Cd. 903.]
+
+The extension of martial law in January (1901) had made such excesses,
+whether on the platform or in the Press, no longer possible. But the
+Afrikander nationalists in the ports, and especially in Capetown,
+continued to render assistance to the guerilla leaders, both by
+providing intelligence of the plans of the British military
+authorities, and by forwarding supplies of arms and ammunition, until
+the time (October 9th) when these towns were placed, like the rest of
+the Colony, under martial law.
+
+In these circumstances Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, acting on the advice of
+his ministers, prorogued the Cape Parliament from time to time, until
+the actual termination of hostilities made it possible for the
+inhabitants of the Colony to return to the normal conditions of their
+political life. As, however, the provision for the ordinary cost of
+administration made by the Colonial Parliament in its last session did
+not extend beyond June 30th, 1901, it became necessary to provide for
+the expenditure of the Colony after this date by the issue of
+Governor's warrants, under which the Treasurer-General was authorised
+to pay out funds in anticipation of legislative authority. This
+technically illegal procedure, by which the authority of the Governor
+was substituted temporarily for that of Parliament, was advised by the
+Cape ministers and sanctioned by Mr. Chamberlain. In this way
+provision was made for the financial needs of the Government; and
+when, after the war, the Cape Parliament was able to meet again, the
+necessary bills of indemnity, legalising these acts of the Governor
+and acts committed by the military authorities in the administration
+of martial law, were passed in due course.[279]
+
+         [Footnote 279: The action of Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson was not
+         without precedent. See Cd. 903, pp. 57 and 67, and p. 123,
+         _supra_.]
+
+[Sidenote: Breakdown of government.]
+
+The only alternative course was the suspension, or abrogation, of the
+Cape constitution by the Home Government. In view of the appeal for
+the suspension of the constitution made to Mr. Chamberlain a year
+later, and refused by him--an appeal which was endorsed by the
+judgment both of Lord Milner and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and supported by
+the majority of the loyalists of both nationalities--it is interesting
+to observe that petitions addressed to the Governor in June, 1901,
+reveal a considerable body of opinion in favour of the proposal at
+this date. These petitions came from the British inhabitants of the
+small towns in the Eastern Province, since, in the vigorous language
+of one of the petitioners, "it's those who live in small towns that
+feel the Bond's iron heel." And the same correspondent asserts that a
+great number of persons have been prevented from signing the petition,
+although they approve of it, by fear of the "Bond boycott," adding,
+"Some of the Bond members have already remarked, 'Now martial law is
+on we are not in it; but wait until it's removed, then it will be our
+turn.'"[280]
+
+         [Footnote 280: Cd. 903.]
+
+The collapse of the system of responsible government in the Cape
+Colony was complete. The truth upon which Lord Durham insisted in his
+famous Report on Canada, that responsible government is only possible
+where an effective majority of the inhabitants are British, was once
+more demonstrated. In the granting of supplies, the characteristic
+function of the lower chamber, the authority of the Governor was now
+substituted for that of Parliament. The endeavour to check the
+rebellion by the agency of the civil courts had been already
+abandoned. The lenient penalties of the Treason Bill had produced a
+large increase of disaffection. On April 6th, 1901, a notice was
+issued by the Attorney-General warning the public that "any act of
+treason or rebellion and any crime of a political character" committed
+after the 12th instant would be brought no longer before the Special
+Tribunals, with their mitigated penalties created by the Act of 1900,
+but dealt with by the ordinary courts, and punishable by the severe
+penalties of the common law of the Colony. But this warning of the
+Attorney-General was superseded a fortnight later (April 22nd), by a
+notice, issued by Lord Kitchener and published by the Cape
+Government, under which it was declared that--
+
+[Sidenote: The military courts.]
+
+     "All subjects of His[281] Majesty and all persons residing in the
+     Cape Colony who shall, in districts thereof in which martial law
+     prevails, be actively in arms against His Majesty, or who shall
+     directly invite others to take up arms against him, or who shall
+     actively aid or assist the enemy or commit any overt act by which
+     the safety of His Majesty's forces or subjects is endangered,
+     shall immediately on arrest be tried by court martial, convened
+     by my authority, and shall on conviction be liable to the
+     severest penalties of the law."
+
+         [Footnote 281: Queen Victoria died January 22nd, 1901.]
+
+The decision to deal with such cases by military courts was taken by
+Lord Kitchener, after consultation with Lord Milner, on the ground
+that the state of the midland and north-western districts was such
+that "only prompt and severe punishment could stop the spread of
+rebellion and prevent general anarchy."[282] The Cape Government,
+however, in assenting to the measure, stipulated that certain
+conditions should be laid down for the constitution and procedure of
+the military courts, sufficient to check the more obvious abuses to
+which such tribunals are liable. These conditions, as expressed in a
+minute of Sir James Innes, the Attorney-General, were embodied in a
+set of instructions issued by Lord Kitchener to his officers
+concurrently with the publication of the notice of April 22nd. Nor was
+this all. In view of the continued assistance known to be rendered to
+the Boer and rebel commandos by the Afrikander nationalists, martial
+law was extended, on October 9th, to the Cape ports; and on December
+2nd the British Government announced that, as the result of the
+establishment of martial law at the South African ports, no persons
+would be allowed to land in South Africa from January 1st, 1902,
+onwards without a permit, except under certain special circumstances.[283]
+
+         [Footnote 282: Cd. 983.]
+
+         [Footnote 283: Cd. 903. These measures were taken upon Lord
+         Milner's return to the Transvaal (September, 1901) after his
+         visit to England. The scandal of the almost open co-operation
+         of the Bond with the Boer leaders had become notorious, and
+         this assistance was recognised as a contributory cause to the
+         protraction of the guerilla war.]
+
+Ample evidence alike of the necessity of these measures, and of the
+_de facto_ suspension of the constitution, is provided by a Minister's
+minute of September 12th, 1901. The immediate object of the minute is
+to advise the Governor that it is impossible, in the opinion of the
+Cape Ministry, to avoid the further prorogation of Parliament; and
+this, although the Constitution Ordinance requires the Cape Parliament
+to meet "once at least every year," and cannot, therefore, be complied
+with, unless Parliament is summoned "for the despatch of business on
+or before Saturday, 12th October." In support of this decision Sir
+Gordon Sprigg and his colleagues referred to the Military Intelligence
+Report for the current month, which showed that, south of the Orange
+River, there were a dozen or more commandos, with a total of from
+1,800 to 2,000 men; while in the portion of the Colony north of the
+river there were "numerous commandos also roaming about." Then follows
+a startling revelation of the character of the men whom the Bond
+organisation had sent to Parliament:
+
+[Sidenote: Condition of Cape parliament.]
+
+     "One member of the House of Assembly," ministers write, "is
+     undergoing a term of imprisonment for seditious libel, three
+     members are awaiting their trial on the charge of high treason,
+     two seats are practically vacant by reason of the absence of the
+     members without leave during the whole of last session. Those two
+     members are alleged to have welcomed the invaders of the Colony,
+     and encouraged rebellion, and then fled to Holland, where they
+     are now living. One seat is vacant by the resignation of the
+     member, who has accepted an appointment in the Transvaal Colony.
+     Another seat is vacant on account of the death of the member,
+     another member is sending in his resignation owing to ill health,
+     which compels him to reside in Europe. In all these cases the
+     divisions concerned are either under martial law or in a state of
+     disturbance, which makes new elections impracticable.
+
+     "Besides the cases enumerated there are members who have been
+     deported from their homes on account of the seditious influences
+     which the military authorities allege they were exercising, and
+     others who are under military observation, with respect to whom
+     their attendance in Parliament must be regarded as uncertain.
+     Several members also are engaged in military operations, whose
+     attendance could not, in the present condition of the country, be
+     relied on. There are also some members who would be unable to
+     attend owing to the state of war and rebellion prevailing in the
+     districts where they reside, whose personal presence is
+     necessary for the protection of their families and property."
+
+Such a legislature, they concluded, could not be regarded as "fairly
+representing the people." Moreover--
+
+     "There is also the further consideration that the probability of
+     good resulting from the meeting of Parliament now is but small,
+     while the likelihood of evil consequences accruing from the
+     publication of speeches of a character similar to many that were
+     delivered last session is strong. The tendency of such speeches
+     would be to encourage the spirit of rebellion which unhappily
+     prevails in the Colony over a large area, and ministers regard it
+     as an imperative duty to do everything in their power to subdue
+     that rebellious spirit, and restore peace and good-will to the
+     distracted country."[284]
+
+         [Footnote 284: Cd. 903.]
+
+The necessity for the more stringent action now taken by the Imperial
+authorities was, therefore, undoubted. But here again, in placing the
+ports, the centres of commercial life, under martial law, an endeavour
+was made to render the restraints of military rule as little onerous
+as possible. A Board, consisting of three persons nominated
+respectively by the Governor, the Prime Minister, and the General
+Commanding in the Cape Colony, was created for the consideration and,
+where necessary, the redress of all complaints or grievances arising
+out of martial law in the Colony, other than pecuniary claims against
+the Government. The fact that, on the whole, martial law was
+judiciously administered is indicated by the Report of the proceedings
+of this Board, presented on December 3rd by Mr. (now Sir Lewis)
+Mitchell, who, as Manager of the Standard Bank, had been appointed
+chairman by Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson. Out of 199 cases brought before
+the Board, Mr. Mitchell writes:
+
+     "A fair number of substantial grievances have been redressed, but
+     in a majority of instances the Board have held that complainants
+     suffered through some misconduct of their own, or were deported,
+     imprisoned, or otherwise punished on reasonable grounds of
+     suspicion."[285]
+
+         [Footnote 285: Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: Loyalists defend the colony.]
+
+In all this Sir Gordon Sprigg loyally co-operated with the Imperial
+military authorities. His attitude, and that of the loyalist
+inhabitants of the Colony, may be gathered from the speech which he
+delivered at Capetown on December 1st, 1901. In this striking and
+inspiring utterance we have the companion picture to that presented in
+the minute of September 12th. Throughout there runs a note of
+justifiable pride in the military efforts of the Cape Government, and
+in the sacrifices which these efforts have entailed upon the loyalist
+population. First there was the number of troops provided. The Cape
+Government had placed, he said, 18,000 men in the field against the
+invaders and rebels; they had a defensive force of 18,000 town guards,
+of whom 3,000 were natives; and, in addition, 7,000 natives were
+under arms in the Transkei for the defence of those territories. In
+respect of this force of 18,000 men in the field, Sir Gordon Sprigg
+pointed out that such a number of men, coming from a population of
+500,000, was equivalent to a force of 1,450,000 men from the United
+Kingdom, with its population of over 40,000,000. He might have added
+that, since half of the 500,000 Europeans in the Cape Colony were
+"either actually in rebellion against the Crown or in positive
+sympathy with rebellion," the more correct equivalent force from the
+United Kingdom would have been 3,000,000 men. And as for the cost of
+maintenance, the colony provided three-fourths of the expenditure upon
+the 18,000 men in the field, while it wholly supported the town guards
+and other purely defensive forces. He then dwelt with satisfaction
+upon the fact that these local forces were now entirely controlled by
+the Cape Government, which had made itself responsible for the defence
+of no less than thirty-one districts of the Colony.
+
+     "Months ago," he said, "we pressed strongly upon the
+     Commander-in-Chief to hand over to us the colonial forces then
+     under his direction. We thought that if we got them into our
+     possession, not only defraying the cost of their maintenance, but
+     taking charge of certain parts of the Colony, we could keep those
+     districts clear of the enemy. We were continually putting that
+     view before the Commander-in-Chief, and also before the High
+     Commissioner, Lord Milner, but still the matter hung, and we had
+     communications going backwards and forwards till at last the High
+     Commissioner communicated with me, and he said, 'I think the only
+     way to come to an understanding in this matter is, if we have a
+     conference. If you could manage to meet Lord Kitchener and
+     myself, I have great hopes we should be able to arrange what you
+     desire.' I asked then if Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner could
+     come to meet me half-way, but Lord Kitchener said it was not
+     possible for him to leave Pretoria at that time, but he would be
+     only too delighted if I could come up and meet him and Lord
+     Milner upon the question. The result of that was that I went up
+     with two of my colleagues. It has been put about all over the
+     country that we were ordered by Lord Kitchener to proceed to
+     Pretoria, but, so far from that being the case, it was our
+     suggestion that we should take over the command of certain
+     portions of the country, and we went up to Pretoria to secure
+     that object. And in that we were successful, and the result of it
+     has been published very lately."[286]
+
+         [Footnote 286: Cd. 903. This was, in its essence, the
+         proposal for the systematic and effective defence of the
+         Colony, which Lord Milner had consistently advocated both
+         before and during the war--with General Butler and the Home
+         Government, with Lord Roberts at the time of the Forward
+         Movement (see p. 353), and now at the eleventh hour with Lord
+         Kitchener in support of the Cape Government.]
+
+[Sidenote: Second visit to England.]
+
+These events, revealing the slow and laborious progress of the
+Imperial troops in a South Africa rent by war from end to end, account
+sufficiently for the postponement of the work of active administrative
+reconstruction in the new colonies, to which Lord Milner owed the
+opportunity for his second visit to England. On April 3rd, 1901, he
+telegraphed a request that he might be allowed to return home at an
+early date, on leave, since he feared that, unless he had a short
+rest, he would approach the onerous duty of superintending the work of
+reconstruction with lessened efficiency. "I have now been continuously
+in harness," he said, "without a day's holiday, for more than two
+years ... and it is, undoubtedly, better for the public service, if I
+am to get such a rest at all, that I should take leave immediately
+while military operations still continue and the work of civil
+administration is necessarily curtailed, rather than when it will be
+possible to organise civil government in a more complete fashion, and
+when many important problems which are for the moment in abeyance will
+have to be dealt with." To this request Mr. Chamberlain replied that,
+although His Majesty's Government greatly regretted that it was
+necessary for Lord Milner to leave South Africa at present, they quite
+recognised that it was unavoidable that he should take the rest which
+the severe strain of the last two years had made imperative.[287] He
+was, therefore, to take leave as soon as he found it possible to do
+so.
+
+         [Footnote 287: Cd. 547.]
+
+[Sidenote: Civil affairs in new colonies.]
+
+None the less the little that could be done to develop the inchoate
+machinery of administration which marked the transition from military
+to civil order in the new colonies, was done, and done well, before
+Lord Milner left Johannesburg. On May 4th, 1901, Sir H. Gould-Adams
+was able to report that the chief departments of the administration
+of the Orange River Colony had been transferred from military to
+civil officials, and reorganised on a permanent basis. In the
+Transvaal the departments of finance, law, mines, and that of the
+Secretary to the Administration, had been organised, and were
+gradually taking over an increasing volume of administrative work from
+the military officials. Even more significant was the establishment by
+proclamation (May 8th), of a nominated Town Council for the management
+of the municipal affairs of Johannesburg, and the consequent abolition
+of the office of Military Governor, with the transfer of the
+departments hitherto controlled by him to a Government Commissioner
+and other officials of the civil administration. This step was
+rendered possible by the circumstance that a certain number of the
+principal residents, of whom twelve were nominated for service on the
+Council, had now returned to their homes. It marked the recommencement
+of the industrial life of the Rand, which had followed the permission,
+given by Lord Kitchener in April, for three mines to resume work. From
+this time forward the Uitlander refugees began to return; although, as
+we have seen,[288] it was not possible to allow the general mass of
+the inhabitants to leave the coast towns until the following November.
+And, in addition to this, Lord Milner had obtained statements of the
+views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the
+settlement of the new colonies. Mr. Chamberlain had attached great
+importance to this interchange of opinions; rightly holding that, in
+determining the conditions and methods of the settlement of the
+conquered territories, the British South African colonies should be
+taken into the counsels of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had,
+therefore, submitted to the colonial Governments the draft of the
+Letters Patent, under which the system of Crown Colony government was
+to be established in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, before
+they were issued.[289] As the result of these consultations the terms
+of surrender granted to the Boers at Vereeniging, and the consequent
+administrative arrangements arising out of them, embodied decisions
+based not merely on the judgment of the Imperial Government, but on
+what was virtually the unanimous opinion of the loyal population of
+South Africa. In this, as in the crisis of the negotiations before the
+war, the loyalists found in Lord Milner their "representative man."
+
+         [Footnote 288: See p. 459.]
+
+         [Footnote 289: The Letters Patent were not issued until
+         August.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner in England.]
+
+Lord Milner--then Sir Alfred Milner--left Capetown on May 8th, and
+reached England on the 24th. On his arrival in London he was met at
+the station by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, and immediately
+conducted to the King, who was at that time still residing at
+Marlborough House. At the end of a long audience His Majesty announced
+his intention of raising him to the peerage, the first of many marks
+of royal favour, including his elevation to the Privy Council, which
+were shown to the High Commissioner during his stay in England. The
+warm demonstrations of popular regard with which he had been welcomed
+upon his arrival in London, were followed by a luncheon given on the
+next day (Saturday, May 25th) in his honour by Mr. Chamberlain, his
+official chief. The speech elicited by this notable occasion is one in
+which a graceful humour is characteristically blended with deep
+emotion. Those who have had the good fortune to hear many of Lord
+Milner's speeches--speeches sometimes turning a page of history,
+sometimes mere incidents of official or administrative routine--know
+that they are all alike distinguished by the high quality of
+sincerity.[290] But this was an occasion upon which even adroitness of
+intellect and integrity of purpose might well have sought the shelter
+of conventional expressions. Lord Milner dispenses with any such
+protection. "In a rational world," he said, it would have seemed
+better to everybody that he, "with a big unfinished job awaiting
+him," and many of his fellow workmen unable to take the rest which
+they both deserved and needed, "should have arrived, and stayed, and
+returned in the quietest possible manner." But it was an age in which
+it "seemed impossible for many people to put a simple and natural
+interpretation on anything; and his arrival in this quiet manner would
+have been misconstrued to a degree, which would have been injurious to
+the public interests." If his "hard-begged holiday" could have been
+represented as a "veiled recall," then of course it was obvious that,
+having taken the proverbial hansom from Waterloo to his own chambers,
+this very harmless action would have been "trumpeted over two
+continents as evidence of his disgrace."
+
+         [Footnote 290: It was, in its essence, the "high seriousness
+         of absolute sincerity" that Arnold, after Aristotle, makes
+         the central attribute of poetic thought. In commenting upon a
+         speech delivered at Germiston on March 15th, 1905, the
+         Johannesburg _Star_ wrote on the day following: "Did ever a
+         High Commissioner for South Africa speak in this wise before?
+         But beneath the light words and unstudied diction there is
+         the weight and sureness of the 'inevitable' thought. A man
+         who has pursued a single task for eight years with
+         unremitting effort and unswerving devotion can afford to put
+         his mind into his words. And in all that Lord Milner says
+         there is an absolute sincerity, born of high integrity of
+         purpose and an assurance of knowledge, that compels
+         conviction. Or, rather, should we say, that makes the need of
+         conviction as unnecessary as a lamp in daylight."]
+
+     "It is hard, it is ludicrous," he continued, "that some of the
+     busiest men in the world should be obliged to occupy their time,
+     and that so many of my friends and well wishers should be put to
+     inconvenience--and on a day, too, when it would be so nice to be
+     in the country--merely in order to prove to persons with an
+     ingrained habit of self-delusion that the British Government will
+     not give up its agents in the face of the enemy, or that the
+     people of this country will not allow themselves to be bored into
+     abandoning what they have spent millions of treasure and so many
+     precious lives to obtain. All I can say is, that if it was
+     necessary (I apologise for it: I am sorry to be the centre of a
+     commotion from which no man could be constitutionally more averse
+     than myself), I can only thank you heartily for the kindness and
+     the cordiality with which the thing has been done. I feel indeed
+     that the praises which have been bestowed, the honours which
+     have been heaped on me, are beyond my deserts. But the simplest
+     thing to do under these circumstances is to try to deserve them
+     in the future. In any case I am under endless obligations. It is
+     difficult to say these things in the face of the persons
+     principally concerned, but I feel bound to take this opportunity,
+     especially in view of the remarks which have been made in certain
+     quarters, to express my deep sense of gratitude for the manner in
+     which His Majesty's Government, and especially my immediate
+     chief, have shown me great forbearance, and given me support most
+     prompt at the moment when it was most needed, without which I
+     should have been helpless indeed. And I have also to thank many
+     friends, not a few of them here present, and some not present,
+     for messages of encouragement, for kindly words of suggestion and
+     advice received at critical moments, some of which have been of
+     invaluable assistance to me, and have made an indelible
+     impression on my heart. I am afraid, if I were to refer to all my
+     benefactors, it would be like the bidding prayer--and you would
+     all lose your trains.
+
+[Sidenote: Hint from the bidding prayer.]
+
+     "But there is one hint I may take from the bidding prayer. Not
+     only in this place, but at all times and in all places, I am
+     specially bound to remember the devotion of the loyalists--the
+     Dutch loyalists, if you please, and not only the British--the
+     loyalists of South Africa. They responded to all my appeals to
+     act, and, harder still, to wait. They never lost their cheery
+     confidence in the darkest days of our misfortunes, they never
+     faltered in their fidelity to a man of whose errors and failings
+     they were necessarily more conscious than anybody else, but of
+     whose honesty of purpose they were long ago, and once for all,
+     convinced. If there is anything most gratifying to me on this
+     memorable occasion it is the encouragement which I know the
+     events of yesterday and of to-day will give to thousands of our
+     South African fellow-countrymen, like minded with us, in the
+     homes and in the camps of South Africa.
+
+     "Your Royal Highness,[291] Mr. Chamberlain, ladies, and
+     gentlemen--I am sure you will not desire me to enter into any
+     political questions to-day. More than that, I really have nothing
+     to add to what I have already said and written, I fear with
+     wearisome reiteration. It seems to me we are slowly progressing
+     towards the predestined end; latterly it has appeared as if the
+     pace was somewhat quickening, but I do not wish to make too much
+     of that or to speak with any too great confidence. However long
+     the road, it seems to me the only one to the object which we were
+     bound to pursue, and which seems now fairly in sight. What has
+     sustained me personally--if your kindness will allow me to make a
+     personal reference--what has sustained me personally on the weary
+     road is my absolute, unshakable conviction that it was the only
+     one which we could travel.
+
+         [Footnote 291: The Duke of Cambridge.]
+
+     "Peace we could have had by self-effacement. We could have had it
+     easily and comfortably on those terms. But we could not have held
+     our own by any other methods than those which we have been
+     obliged to adopt. I do not know whether I feel more inclined to
+     laugh or to cry when I have to listen for the hundredth time to
+     these dear delusions, this Utopian dogmatising that it only
+     required a little more time, a little more patience, a little
+     more tact, a little more meekness, a little more of all those
+     gentle virtues of which I know I am so conspicuously devoid, in
+     order to conciliate--to conciliate what? Panoplied hatred,
+     insensate ambition, invincible ignorance. I fully believe that
+     the time is coming--Heaven knows how we desire it to come
+     quickly--when all the qualities of the most gentle and forbearing
+     statesmanship which are possessed by any of our people will be
+     called for, and ought to be applied, in South Africa. I do not
+     say for a moment there is not great scope for them even to-day,
+     but always provided they do not mar what is essential for success
+     in the future--the conclusiveness of the final scenes of the
+     present drama."
+
+[Sidenote: Merriman and Sauer mission.]
+
+[Sidenote: Liberals and Afrikanders.]
+
+As a declaration to the British world that Lord Milner "possessed the
+unabated confidence of his sovereign and of his fellow countrymen,"
+Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon was amply justified. The protraction of the
+war was beginning to try the endurance of the nation. Mr. Sauer and
+Mr. Merriman were in England for the express purpose of discrediting
+Lord Milner, and behind these fierce political freelances was the
+astute brain of the Bond Master, Hofmeyr. They had been commissioned
+early in the year by the Afrikander nationalists to give effect to the
+resolutions of the Worcester Congress by co-operating with their
+friends in England in an agitation for the recall of the High
+Commissioner. It was said that these two ex-ministers of the Crown
+were authorised to offer an undertaking that the Bond would use its
+influence with ex-President Krüger and Mr. Fischer[292] to terminate
+the war, in exchange for the promise of "autonomy" for the Boers and
+a general armistice for the Cape rebels. However this may be, the
+delegates of the Worcester Congress made it their chief business to
+represent to the members of the Liberal party who favoured their
+cause, that the recall of Lord Milner would remove the chief obstacle
+to peace. This attempt never came within a measurable distance of
+success; but its failure was not due to any want of effort on the part
+of that section of the Liberal opposition which had been opposed to
+the annexation of the Republics, and now denounced the British
+Government and the Imperial troops for their "methods of barbarism."
+The completeness with which Lord Courtney, Mr. Bryce, Mr.
+Lloyd-George, Lord Loreburn (Sir Robert Reid), Mr. Burns, and other
+prominent members of the Liberal party identified themselves with the
+policy and action of the Afrikander Bond, is disclosed by the
+proceedings which marked the banquet given on June 5th in honour of
+Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. Mr. Bryce, in a letter expressing his
+approbation of the object of the banquet and his regret at his
+inability to attend it, wrote: "Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer have not
+only distinguished public records, but did excellent service, for
+which the Government ought to have been grateful, in allaying passion
+and averting disturbances in Cape Colony."[293] Lord (then Mr.)
+Courtney, in proposing a vote of thanks to the guests of the evening,
+declared that the annexation of the Republics was "a wrong and a
+blunder"; adding that the Liberal policy would some day be "to temper
+annexation, if not to abrogate it." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer
+revealed the aims of their mission with perfect frankness. The former,
+after alluding to Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon as a display of the
+"Imperial spirit of the servile senate who decreed ovations and
+triumphs to Caligula and Domitian, when they had received rebuffs from
+the ancestors both of ourselves and the heroic Dutch now struggling in
+South Africa," and characterising Lord Milner's High Commissionership
+as "a career of unmitigated and hopeless failure," proceeded to demand
+his immediate recall. To employ Lord Milner in the settlement of the
+new colonies, said Mr. Merriman, would be "a suicidal and ruinous
+policy. He was a violent partizan; his predictions never came true;
+the bursts of fustian and the frivolous utterances of his despatches
+showed an ill-balanced and ill-regulated mind, which was utterly
+unable to cope with the problem." While, as for the prospect of a
+British army ever conquering the South African Dutch, he reasserted
+the opinion which he held before the war--"Our friends they might be,
+but our subjects never."[294] Mr. Sauer, who "felt honoured by seeing
+such a gathering, and seeing in it a Gladstone[295] and a Leonard
+Courtney," was no less explicit:
+
+         [Footnote 292: These two ex-officials, representing the
+         respective Governments of the late Republics, were living in
+         Holland at this time.]
+
+         [Footnote 293: It is only fair to assume that Mr. Bryce was
+         not acquainted with the details of the Dordrecht and Hargrove
+         affairs, to which reference has been made respectively at p.
+         287 and p. 375. And, still more that he was unaware of the
+         utterly discreditable Basuto incident, with respect to which
+         General Gordon's biographer writes: "The consequence was that
+         Mr. Sauer deliberately resolved to destroy Gordon's
+         reputation as a statesman, and to ensure the triumph of his
+         own policy by an act of treachery which has never been
+         surpassed."--_The Life of Gordon_, vol. ii., p. 83. (Fisher
+         Unwin.)]
+
+         [Footnote 294: Compare the different and infinitely more
+         instructive treatment of the question of Dutch allegiance by
+         Lord Milner in his Johannesburg speech, quoted at p. 145.]
+
+         [Footnote 295: _I.e._, the Rev. Stephen Gladstone.]
+
+     "I stand here," he said, "as a representative of the Dutch
+     people, and declare that they never mean to be a subject race. If
+     they cannot get their rights by justice they will get them by
+     other means.... I am glad to go back and tell my own people how
+     many there are in this country who appreciate their devotion to
+     an ideal, and are prepared to befriend them in the hour of
+     trial."[296]
+
+         [Footnote 296: Apart from those mentioned in the text, the
+         following attended the Merriman and Sauer banquet: Mr. E.
+         Robertson, M.P. (chairman), Lord Farrer, Mr. T. Shaw, M.P.,
+         Mr. Burt, M.P., Mr. Channing, M.P., Mr. John Ellis, M.P., Mr.
+         H. J. Wilson, M.P., Sir Wilfred Lawson, Mr. Frederic
+         Harrison, and others. And among those who sent letters of
+         regret for their absence were the Marquis of Ripon, Lord
+         Hobhouse, Dr. Spence Watson, Mr. Seale-Hayne, M.P., and Lord
+         Loreburn.]
+
+A fortnight later a meeting of those who sympathised with the Boer
+cause was held in the Queen's Hall, Langham Place. The spirit of this
+notorious gathering, presided over by Mr. Labouchere, M.P., and
+attended by Mr. Merriman. Mr. Sauer, Mr. Lloyd-George, M.P., and other
+Radical members of Parliament, is sufficiently revealed by certain
+characteristic incidents which marked the proceedings. The agents of
+the meeting wore the Transvaal colours; a member of the audience who
+uncovered at the mention of King Edward was ejected; the Union Jack
+was hissed and hooted; and, while a printed form was handed round
+inviting the signatures of persons prepared to pay eight and-a-half
+guineas for a tour in Holland and the privilege of seeing ex-President
+Krüger, the name of the British sovereign was received by the audience
+with marks of evident disapprobation.
+
+[Sidenote: Agitation for Milner's recall.]
+
+The agitation for Lord Milner's recall was continued throughout the
+year. It was accompanied by a repetition, in England and on the
+continent of Europe, of the shameless calumnies upon the Imperial
+troops, which had marked the "carnival of mendacity" that led to the
+second invasion of Cape Colony. The injurious effect produced upon the
+Boers in the field by the support thus given by public men in England
+to the "continued resistance" policy of the Afrikander nationalists,
+has been already noticed, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to say
+more on this aspect of the subject. The attempt to discredit Lord
+Milner culminated in the declaration made by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
+then recognised as the official leader of the Liberal party, at
+Plymouth, on November 19th, 1901, that, unless the British Government
+changed its methods, "the whole of the Dutch population in our colonies,
+as well as in the two territories, would in all probability be
+permanently and violently alienated from us" when the war was ended. "I
+am ready to speak out to-night," he continued, "and to say what I have
+never yet said, that for my part I despair of this peril being conjured
+away so long as the present Colonial Secretary is in Downing Street and
+the present High Commissioner is at Pretoria." When the full report of
+this speech had reached the Cape, the Vigilance Committee, a body
+representing the loyalists of both nationalities, met[297] under the
+presidency of Sir Gordon Sprigg, and resolved:
+
+         [Footnote 297: December 17th, 1901.]
+
+     "That this committee views with the utmost disapproval the
+     statement of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at Plymouth, to the
+     effect that no satisfactory settlement would be arrived at in
+     South Africa so long as Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner retained
+     their present offices, and, on the contrary, emphatically affirms
+     that the retention in office of those statesmen is regarded by
+     the South African loyalists as affording the best security for a
+     settlement which will be permanent, just, and consistent with the
+     honour of the empire and the best interests of South Africa, and,
+     further, affirms that the whole tone of Sir Henry
+     Campbell-Bannerman's speech is most pernicious, and prejudicial
+     to Imperial interests in South Africa, and shows him to be
+     entirely out of sympathy with loyalist opinion in South Africa."
+
+With this prompt and uncompromising rejoinder we may take leave of an
+attempt to remove a great and devoted servant of the empire, which is
+as discreditable to the intelligence as it is to the patriotism of
+those prominent members of the Liberal party who thus lent their
+co-operation to the Afrikander nationalists. In South Africa the
+issue was simple. While Boer and rebel combined in their efforts to
+rid themselves of the man who had thwarted their ambitions, the
+loyalists closed their ranks and stood firm in his support. It is to
+the far-off Homeland that we have to turn for the spectacle of a
+nation in which gratitude to the man who upheld the flag gave place to
+sympathy for the enemy and the rebel; in which patriotism itself
+yielded to a greed of place wrapped up by sophistry in such decent
+terms as "humanity," "Liberal principles," and "conciliation."
+
+[Sidenote: Finances of the new colonies.]
+
+In the meantime Lord Milner had returned to Johannesburg. His
+"hard-begged" holiday had proved a change of occupation rather than a
+respite from work. Before he left England (August 10th), he had made
+known to the Home Government the actual condition of the infant
+administrations of the new colonies, and obtained a provision for
+their immediate wants. The Letters Patent constituting him Governor
+and Commander-in-Chief of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony had
+been passed under the Great Seal; and these and other instruments
+creating a system of Crown Colony Government, with Executive and
+Legislative Councils in both colonies, had been sent to him in
+readiness for use "whenever it might be thought expedient to bring
+them into operation."[298] And on August 6th the House of Commons had
+voted £6,500,000 as a grant in aid of the revenues of the Transvaal
+and Orange River Colony. Of this sum £1,000,000 was required for the
+purchase of fresh rolling-stock for the Imperial Military Railways,
+still placed under the direction of Sir Percy (then Colonel) Girouard,
+and £500,000 was assigned to "relief and re-settlement," an item which
+included the purchase of land and other arrangements for the
+establishment of suitable British settlers on farms in both colonies.
+The debate on the vote afforded a significant exhibition of the spirit
+of mingled pessimism and distrust in which the Liberal Opposition
+approached every aspect of the South African question. The idea of the
+Transvaal ever being able to repay this grant-in-aid out of the
+"hypothetical" development loan appeared ridiculous to Sir William
+Harcourt. "Why," asked the Liberal ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer,
+"was not the money required for the South African Constabulary put
+forward in a supplementary military vote, instead of being proposed in
+this form and, under the grant-in-aid, subject to future repayment by
+the Transvaal, in which nobody believed?"[299]
+
+         [Footnote 298: They were read and published by Lord Milner on
+         June 21st, 1902.]
+
+         [Footnote 299: It is scarcely necessary to say that the
+         entire cost of the Constabulary has been borne by the new
+         colonies; or that every penny of this grant-in-aid was paid
+         back out of the development loan raised in 1902-3.]
+
+This temporary financial assistance was of the utmost importance. Just
+as in the Cape Colony Lord Milner had seen that the Boers and
+Afrikander nationalists were to be beaten at their own game of renewed
+invasion by enabling the loyalist population to defend the Colony, so
+in the new colonies he proposed to beat the guerilla leaders at their
+game of wanton and mischievous resistance by building up a new
+prosperity faster than they could destroy the old. The conditions
+under which he worked, and the state in which he found South Africa
+when he began to engage actively in the work of reconstruction, he has
+himself described. In a despatch, written from the "High
+Commissioner's Office, Johannesburg," on November 15th, 1901, not only
+has Lord Milner placed on record the actual position of affairs in the
+new colonies at this time, but he has sketched with masterly precision
+the nature of the economic and administrative problems that awaited
+solution. The progress towards pacification won by the mobile columns
+and the blockhouse system, the dominant influence of the railways as
+the agency of transport, the condition of the Concentration Camps, and
+the degree in which our responsibility for the non-combatant and
+surrendered Boers limited our capacity to restore our own people to
+their homes, the economic exhaustion of the country, the threatened
+danger of the scarcity of native labour, and the processes and
+problems of repatriation--all these subjects are touched as by a
+master of statecraft.
+
+[Sidenote: Improved situation.]
+
+     "Without being unduly optimistic," he writes, "it is impossible
+     not to be struck by two great changes for the better in [the
+     military situation] since the time when I first took up my
+     residence in the Transvaal--just eight months ago. These are the
+     now almost absolute safety and uninterrupted working of the
+     railways and the complete pacification of certain central
+     districts. As regards the railways, I cannot illustrate the
+     contrast better than by my own experiences. In the end of last
+     year and the earlier months of this I had occasion to make
+     several journeys between Capetown and Johannesburg or Pretoria,
+     and between Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. Though most careful
+     preparations were made and every precaution taken, I was
+     frequently 'hung up' on these journeys because the line had been
+     blown up--not, I think, with any reference to my movements, but
+     in the ordinary course of affairs. Small bodies of the enemy were
+     always hovering about, and a state of extreme vigilance, not to
+     say anxiety, was observable almost everywhere along the line.
+     Since my return from England I have again traversed the country
+     from East London to Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, and from
+     Johannesburg to Durban and back, to say nothing of constant
+     journeys between this place and Pretoria. On no single occasion
+     has there been the slightest hitch or the least cause for alarm.
+     The trains have been absolutely up to time, and very good time.
+     They could not have been more regular in the most peaceful
+     country. This personal experience, in itself unimportant, is
+     typical of a general improvement. I may add, in confirmation of
+     it, that during the last two months the mail train from Capetown
+     to the north has only been late on one or two occasions, and then
+     it was a matter of hours. Six months ago it was quite a common
+     event for it to arrive a day, or a couple of days, late. I need
+     not enlarge on the far-reaching importance of the improvement
+     which these instances illustrate. Not only have the derailments,
+     often accompanied by deplorable loss of life, which were at one
+     time so common, almost entirely ceased, but, owing to more
+     regular running, and especially the resumption of night running,
+     the carrying capacity of the railways has greatly increased.
+     Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the lines themselves to meet the
+     enormous and ever-increasing extra requirements resulting from
+     the war, and the shortness of rolling-stock, not any interference
+     from the enemy, which causes us whatever difficulties--and they
+     are still considerable--we now labour under in the matter of
+     transport. When the large amount of additional rolling-stock
+     ordered for the Imperial Military Railways last summer is
+     received--and the first instalment will arrive very
+     shortly--there will be a further great and progressive
+     improvement in the conveyance of supplies and materials for the
+     troops, the civil population of the towns, and the concentration
+     camps.
+
+[Sidenote: Contraction of area of war.]
+
+     "The advance made in clearing the country is equally marked. Six
+     months ago the enemy were everywhere, outside the principal
+     towns. It is true they held nothing, but they raided wherever
+     they pleased, and, though mostly in small bodies, which made
+     little or no attempt at resistance when seriously pressed, they
+     almost invariably returned to their old haunts when the pressure
+     was over. It looked as though the process might go on
+     indefinitely. I had every opportunity of watching it, for during
+     the first two months of my residence here it was in full swing in
+     the immediate neighbourhood. There were half a dozen Boer
+     strong-holds, or rather trysting-places, quite close to Pretoria
+     and Johannesburg, and the country round was quite useless to us
+     for any purpose but that of marching through it, while the enemy
+     seemed to find no difficulty in subsisting there....
+
+     "To-day a large and important district of the Transvaal is now
+     firmly held by us. But it must not be supposed that all the rest
+     is held, or even roamed over, by the enemy. Wide districts of
+     both the new colonies are virtually derelict, except, in some
+     cases, for the native population. This is especially true of the
+     northern part of the Transvaal, which has always been a native
+     district, and where, excepting in Pietersburg and some other
+     positions held by our troops, the natives are now almost the only
+     inhabitants. Indeed, nothing is more characteristic of the latest
+     stage of the war than the contraction of Boer resistance within
+     certain wide but fairly well-defined districts, separated from
+     one another by considerable spaces. Instead of ranging
+     indifferently over the whole of the two late Republics, the enemy
+     show an increasing tendency to confine themselves to certain
+     neighbourhoods, which have always been their chief, though till
+     recently by no means their exclusive, centres of strength....
+     From time to time the commandos try to break out of these
+     districts and to extend the scene of operations. But the failure
+     of the latest of these raids--Botha's bold attempt to invade
+     Natal--shows the disadvantages under which the Boers now labour
+     in attempting to undertake distant expeditions.
+
+     "The contraction of the theatre of war is doubtless due to the
+     increased difficulty which the enemy have in obtaining horses and
+     supplies, but, above all, to the great reduction in their
+     numbers.... To wear out the resistance of the Boers still in the
+     field--not more than one-eighth, I think, of the total number of
+     burghers who have, first and last, been engaged in the
+     war[300]--may take a considerable time yet, and will almost
+     certainly involve further losses. I will not attempt to forecast
+     either the time or the cost. What seems evident is that the
+     concentration of the Boers, and the substitution of several
+     fairly well-defined small campaigns for that sort of running
+     fight all over the country which preceded them, is on the whole
+     an advantage to us, and tends to bring the end of the struggle
+     within a more measurable distance. Our great object, it seems to
+     me, should be to keep the Boers within the areas of their main
+     strength, even if such concentration makes the commandos
+     individually more dangerous and involves more desperate fighting,
+     and meanwhile to push on with might and main the settlement of
+     those parts of the country out of which they have been driven. No
+     doubt this is a difficult, and must be a gradual, process. The
+     full extent of the difficulty will appear from the sequel. But it
+     is the point to which the main efforts, of the civil authorities
+     at any rate, should be continually directed.
+
+         [Footnote 300: An under-estimate. One-fourth, or one-fifth,
+         would have been nearer the mark. See note, p. 454.]
+
+[Sidenote: The return to the Rand.]
+
+     "If the latest phase of the military situation is maintained,
+     _i.e._, if we are able to prevent the Boers from breaking back
+     into the cleared areas, or from injuring the railway lines, I can
+     see no reason why the work of settlement should not proceed at a
+     greatly quickened pace in the immediate future. The most urgent
+     point is to bring back the exiled Uitlanders to the Rand, always
+     provided that they are able to find employment when they arrive
+     there. But the basis of any general revival of industrial and
+     commercial activity on the Rand is the resumption of mining
+     operations. So far it has only been found possible to proceed
+     very slowly in this respect. The full capacity of the Rand is
+     about 6,000 stamps. The first step was taken in April last, when
+     the Commander-in-Chief agreed to allow the Chamber of Mines to
+     open three mines with 50 stamps each. Up till now permission has
+     been granted for the working of 600 stamps, but only 450 have
+     actually been started. This is slow work, but even this
+     beginning, modest as it is, has made an immense difference in
+     the aspect of Johannesburg since first I came here in March last.
+
+     "The number of people allowed to return from time to time, for
+     other than mining employments, is in proportion to the number of
+     stamps re-started. This, no doubt, is a wise principle, for
+     business generally can only expand _pari passu_ with the
+     resumption of mining. Up to the present something like 10,000
+     people have been allowed to come up, the vast majority of them
+     being refugees, though there is a small new element of civil
+     servants and civilians in the employ of the military. Assuming
+     that from 8,000 to 9,000 are refugees, this would represent about
+     one-sixth of the total number of well-accredited Uitlanders
+     registered in the books of the 'Central Registration Committee.'
+
+     "The best that can be said on the thorny subject of the return of
+     the refugees, is that latterly the rate of return has been
+     steadily increasing. Last month the military authorities allowed
+     us to grant 400 ordinary permits (this number is over and above
+     permits given to officials or persons specially required for
+     particular services to the Army or the Government). This month
+     the number has been raised to 800. I need hardly say that the
+     selection of 800 people out of something like fifty times that
+     number is an onerous and ungrateful task. South Africa simply
+     rings with complaints as to favouritism in the distribution of
+     permits. As a matter of fact, whatever mistakes have been made,
+     there has been no favouritism. I do not mean to say that a
+     certain number of people--not a large number--have not slipped
+     through or been smuggled up under false pretences. But the great
+     bulk of the permits have been allotted by the Central
+     Registration Committee, a large, capable, and most representative
+     body of the citizens of this town and neighbourhood. And they
+     have been allotted on well-defined principles, and with great
+     impartiality.... I am satisfied that no body of officials, even
+     if our officials were not already over-worked in other
+     directions, could have done the business so well.
+
+[Sidenote: Labour and transport.]
+
+     "There can, I think, be little doubt that the present rate of
+     return can be maintained, and I am not without hope that it may
+     in a short time be considerably increased. But this depends
+     entirely, for the reasons already given, on the question whether
+     the resumption of mining operations can be quickened. The
+     obstacles to such a quickening are two-fold: first, want of
+     native labour; secondly, want of trucks to bring up not only the
+     increased supplies which a larger population necessitates, but
+     also, and this is even a more serious matter, to bring up the
+     material required for their work. The latter, I need hardly say,
+     is a very heavy item, not only in the case of the mines, but in
+     the case of all those other industries, building, for instance,
+     which only need a chance in order to burst into extreme activity
+     in this place. For the Rand requires just now an increase of
+     everything--dwelling-houses, offices, roads, sewers, lighting,
+     water-supply, etc., etc. Capital would be readily forthcoming for
+     every kind of construction, and many skilled workmen are waiting
+     at the coast. But it is no use bringing up workmen to live in the
+     dearest place in the world unless they have the materials to work
+     with. The most necessary materials, however, are bulky, and the
+     carrying capacity of the railways, greatly improved as it is,
+     gives no promise of an early importation of quantities of bulky
+     material, if the other and more urgent demands upon our means of
+     transport are to be satisfied.
+
+     "As regards native labour for the mines, the greater development
+     of which is a condition of all other industrial development, the
+     difficulty is that, while natives can be found in abundance to
+     do surface work, the number of those who are willing to go
+     underground is limited. There are only certain tribes among whom
+     underground workers can be found in any great numbers, and these
+     reside mostly in Portuguese territory. As you are aware,
+     difficulties have arisen about the introduction of Portuguese
+     natives, and the matter is at present the subject of negotiations
+     between the Governor-General of Mozambique and myself. Having
+     regard to the friendly attitude of the Governor-General, I have
+     every hope that this difficulty may soon be overcome. But even
+     then we shall not be able to count on any great immediate influx
+     of labourers from Portuguese territory....
+
+[Sidenote: The concentration camps.]
+
+     "The delay in obtaining native labour would be more serious if it
+     were not for the existence of that other and still greater
+     obstacle to the rapid revival of industry here which I have
+     already dwelt on, namely, the difficulty of transport. And this
+     latter difficulty is immensely aggravated at the present time by
+     the constantly increasing requirements of the concentration
+     camps. Not only has the number of people in these camps
+     increased, with overwhelming rapidity, to an extent never
+     contemplated when they were first started, but the extreme state
+     of destitution in which many of the people arrived, and the
+     deplorable amount of sickness which has all along existed among
+     them, create a demand for a great deal more than mere primary
+     necessities, such as food and shelter, if the condition of the
+     camps is to be anything like what we should wish to see it. The
+     amount of mortality in these camps, especially amongst very young
+     children, as you are well aware, has been deplorable. I do not,
+     indeed, agree with those who think--or assert--that the mortality
+     among the Boers would have been less, if thousands of women and
+     children had been allowed to live on isolated farms in a
+     devastated country, or to roam about on the trail of the
+     commandos. Indeed, I feel confident that it would have been far
+     greater. The best proof of this is the deplorable state of
+     starvation and sickness in which great numbers of people arrived
+     at the camps, and which rendered them easy victims to the attack
+     of epidemic diseases. At the same time it is evident that the
+     ravages of disease would have been less if our means of transport
+     had allowed us to provide them on their first arrival, not only
+     with tents, rations, and necessary medicines (all of which were,
+     as a matter of fact, supplied with great promptitude), but with
+     the hundred and one appliances and comforts which are so
+     essential for the recovery of the weakly and the sick, and the
+     prevention of the spread of disease. I do not mean to say that it
+     was only want of material, due to the insuperable difficulties of
+     transport (especially at the time when the camps were first
+     started, and when railways were subject to continual
+     interruptions) from which the camps suffered. Equally serious was
+     the want of personnel; of the necessary number of doctors,
+     nurses, matrons, superintendents, etc., who were simply not to be
+     found in South Africa, severely taxed as it had already been to
+     find men and women of sufficient training and experience to look
+     after the other victims of the war. Still, the want of material
+     has been a serious item; and it is evidently a want which, as the
+     carrying capacity of the railways increases, we must do our best
+     to supply. The Ladies' Commission, of whose devoted labours in
+     visiting and inspecting the camps it is impossible to speak too
+     highly (they have been of inestimable service to the Government),
+     have handed in a considerable list of requirements, which have
+     been, and are being, supplied as fast as possible. But evidently
+     these requirements enter into competition, and most serious
+     competition, with the supply of food and materials necessary for
+     the revival even of our central industry, not to say of
+     industrial and agricultural activity elsewhere in the new
+     colonies, of which, under the circumstances, it is, for the
+     moment, unfortunately impossible to think.
+
+     "To decide between the competing demands upon the still very
+     limited amount of truckage available for civil purposes, after
+     the paramount requirements of the army have been satisfied, is
+     indeed a most difficult and delicate task. Whether we have done
+     all for the best, it is not for me to say. That any amount of
+     conscientious thought and labour has been devoted, on all hands,
+     to grappling with the problem, I can confidently assert. And I am
+     equally confident that whatever has been done, and whatever may
+     yet be done, the amount of hardship must have been and must still
+     be very great. It would be amusing, if amusement were possible in
+     the presence of so much sadness and suffering, to put side by
+     side the absolutely contradictory criticisms, all equally
+     vehement, to which our action is subjected. On the one hand is
+     the outcry against the cruelty and heartlessness manifested in
+     not making better provision for the people in the concentration
+     camps: on the other, the equally loud outcry against our
+     injustice in leaving the British refugees in idleness and poverty
+     at the coast, in order to keep the people in the concentration
+     camps supplied with every luxury and comfort. I have even
+     frequently heard the expression that we are 'spoiling' the people
+     in the Boer camps. We are, alas, not in a position to spoil
+     anybody, however much we might desire to do so....
+
+     "The pressing questions connected with the return of the refugees
+     and the maintenance of the Boers at present in the concentration
+     camps are, it is evident, only the first of a series of problems
+     of the most complicated character, which have to be solved before
+     the country can resume its normal life....
+
+[Sidenote: Re-settlement problems.]
+
+     "Even if the war were to come to an end to-morrow, it would not
+     be possible to let the people in the concentration camps go back
+     at once to their former homes. They would only starve there. The
+     country is, for the most part, a desert, and, before it can be
+     generally re-occupied, a great deal will have to be done in the
+     way of re-stocking, provision of seed, and also probably, in the
+     absence of draught animals, for the importation of steam ploughs.
+
+     "Then there are the arrangements to be made for the return of the
+     prisoners of war. Evidently these will have to wait till the
+     whole of the British refugees are brought back. The latter not
+     only have the strongest claim, but they will be immediately
+     wanted when order is restored, and will have, as soon as the
+     railway can bring up the necessary material, abundance of work,
+     whereas it may take some time before the country is fit to
+     receive the prisoners. Nevertheless, though the return of the
+     prisoners may still be far distant, there are certain measures
+     which have to be taken even now, in order that we may be able to
+     deal with the matter when the time comes.
+
+     "Altogether, the number and complexity of the tasks, embraced
+     under the general term 're-settlement,' which are either already
+     upon us or will come upon us as the country gradually quiets
+     down, are sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted. And yet the
+     tone of hopefulness among the British population who have so far
+     returned to the new colonies is very marked, especially in the
+     Transvaal. It is not incompatible with many grievances, and with
+     much grumbling at the Administration. But that was only to be
+     expected, and is of very small importance as long as people are
+     prepared to tackle the big work of reconstruction in front of
+     them in a vigorous and sanguine spirit. Nor is this hopefulness,
+     in my opinion, at all ill-founded, however gloomy may be the
+     immediate outlook.
+
+     "Terrible as have been the ravages of war and the destruction of
+     agricultural capital, a destruction which is now pretty well
+     complete, the great fact remains that the Transvaal possesses an
+     amount of mineral wealth, virtually unaffected by the war, which
+     will ensure the prosperity of South Africa for the next fifty
+     years; and other resources, both industrial and agricultural,
+     which, properly developed, should make it a rich country, humanly
+     speaking, for ever. Economically, all that is required is that a
+     very small proportion of the superabundant but exhaustible riches
+     of the mines should be devoted to developing the vast permanent
+     sources of wealth which the country possesses, and which will
+     maintain a European population twenty times as large as the
+     present, when all the gold has been dug out. No doubt it is not
+     economic measures alone which will ensure that result. A social
+     change is also necessary, viz., the introduction of fresh blood,
+     of a body of enterprising European settlers, especially on the
+     land, to reinforce the Boer population, who have been far too
+     few, and far too easy-going, to do even the remotest justice to
+     the vast natural capabilities of the soil, on which, for the most
+     part, they have done little more than squat. But then the
+     introduction of the right type of agricultural settlers, though
+     it will not come about of itself, would not seem to be a task
+     beyond the powers of statesmanship to grapple with.
+
+[Sidenote: The land settlement report.]
+
+     "This despatch has dealt so largely with questions of immediate
+     urgency, that I have left myself no time to refer to the work
+     which is being quietly done in both the new colonies to build up
+     the framework of the new Administration. I can hardly claim for
+     myself that I have been able to give to that work anything more
+     than the most general supervision, as my time is more than fully
+     occupied in dealing with matters of present urgency. But, thanks
+     to the great energy displayed by the principal officers of the
+     Administration--by Major Goold-Adams and Mr. Wilson at
+     Bloemfontein, by Mr. Fiddes, Sir Richard Solomon, and Mr. Duncan,
+     at Pretoria, and by Sir Godfrey Lagden and Mr. Wybergh here--a
+     really surprising amount of ground has been covered. Despite all
+     the difficulties and discouragements of the present time, the
+     machinery of the Government is getting rapidly into working
+     order, and, as soon as normal conditions are restored, the new
+     colonies will find themselves provided with an Administration
+     capable of dealing with the needs of a great and progressive
+     community, and with efficient and trustworthy courts of law. A
+     number of fundamental laws are being worked out, and will shortly
+     be submitted for your approval. In the Orange River Colony they
+     do not involve any great change of system, but, in the Transvaal,
+     some most important reforms are at once necessary, while an
+     immense amount of useless rubbish, which encumbered the Statute
+     Book and made it the despair of jurists, has already been
+     repealed."[301]
+
+         [Footnote 301: Cd. 903.]
+
+In spite of the disturbed condition of the country, two independent
+inquiries, each of which was concerned with matters of cardinal
+importance to the future of South Africa, were concluded before the
+second year of the war had run its course. From the report addressed
+to Mr. Chamberlain by the Land Settlement Commission, of which Mr.
+Arnold-Forster was chairman, and from that presented to Lord Milner by
+Sir William (then Mr.) Willcocks[302] on Irrigation in South Africa,
+there emerged three significant conclusions. Racial fusion, or the
+ultimate solution of the nationality difficulty, was to be found in
+the establishment of British settlers upon the land, living side by
+side with the Dutch farmers and identified with them by common
+pursuits and interests; the possibility alike of the successful
+introduction of these settlers and of the development of the hitherto
+neglected agricultural resources of South Africa depended upon the
+enlargement and improvement of the cultivable area by irrigation; and
+the only existing source of wealth capable of providing the material
+agencies for the realisation of these objects was the Witwatersrand
+gold industry. British agricultural settlers for the political,
+irrigation for the physical regeneration of South Africa--this was the
+essence of these two Reports.
+
+         [Footnote 302: Managing Director of the Daira Sania Company;
+         of the Indian and Egyptian Irrigation Services.]
+
+     "We desire to express our firm conviction," wrote the Land
+     Settlement Commissioners,[303] "that a well-considered scheme of
+     settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the
+     most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South
+     Africa. We find among those who wish to see British rule in
+     South Africa maintained and its influence for good extended, but
+     one opinion upon this subject. There even seems reason to fear
+     lest the vast expenditure of blood and treasure which has marked
+     the war should be absolutely wasted, unless some strenuous effort
+     be made to establish in the country, at the close of the war, a
+     thoroughly British population large enough to make a recurrence
+     of division and disorder impossible."
+
+         [Footnote 303: Cd. 626.]
+
+[Sidenote: The irrigation report.]
+
+Apart from its mineral development, Sir William Willcocks points
+out,[304] South Africa has remained "strangely stationary. Fifty years
+ago it was a pastoral country importing cereals and dairy produce, and
+even hay from foreign countries. It is the same to-day. Half a century
+ago it needed a farm of 5,000 acres to keep a family in decent
+comfort; to-day it needs the same farm of 5,000 acres to keep a single
+family in comfort." West of the great Drakenberg range it is an arid,
+or semi-arid, region. The reason is not so much that the rainfall is
+deficient, as that the rain comes at the wrong time, and is wasted.
+What is wanted is water-storage, with irrigation works to spread the
+water upon the land when it is needed by the farmer. Nothing short of
+the agency of the State will serve to bring about this physical
+revolution; for bad legislation must be annulled, and a great
+intercolonial system of water-husbandry, comparable to those of India
+and Egypt, must be created. Hitherto agriculture, in spite of the
+latent possibilities of the country, has scarcely been "attempted";
+for, with the exception of the extreme south-western corner of the
+Cape Colony, the "conquered territory" of the Orange River Colony, and
+the high veld of the Transvaal, the agricultural development of South
+Africa "depends entirely on irrigation."
+
+         [Footnote 304: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+But, great as was the claim of agriculture, the claim of the gold
+industry was at once more immediate and more imperative.
+
+     "Valuable as water may be for agricultural purposes," Sir William
+     Willcocks wrote, "it is a thousand times more valuable for
+     gold-washing at the Rand mines."
+
+And again:
+
+     "The prosperity and well-being of every interest, not only in the
+     Transvaal, but in South Africa generally, will depend on the
+     prosperity of the Rand, certainly for the next fifty years.
+     Though my life has been spent in the execution of irrigation
+     projects and the furtherance of agricultural prosperity, I feel
+     that, under the special conditions prevailing in South Africa,
+     the suggestion of any course other than the obvious one of first
+     putting the Rand mines on a sound footing as far as their water
+     supply is concerned, would have constituted me a bigot. Ten acres
+     of irrigable land in the Mooi or Klip river valleys, with
+     Johannesburg in the full tide of prosperity, will yield as good a
+     rent as forty acres with Johannesburg in decay."
+
+And the prosperity of the mines is not only essential in the present:
+it is to be the instrument for the development of the permanent
+resources of the Transvaal:
+
+[Sidenote: Economic importance of Rand.]
+
+     "The mineral wealth of the Transvaal is extra-ordinarily great,
+     but it is exhaustible, some say within a space of fifty years,
+     others within a space of one hundred years. It would be a
+     disaster indeed for the country if none of this wealth were
+     devoted to the development of its agriculture. Agricultural
+     development is slow, but it is permanent, and knows of no
+     exhaustion. If the companies working the gold, coal, and diamond
+     mines were by decree compelled to devote a percentage of their
+     gains to the execution of irrigation works on lines laid down by
+     the Government, they would assist in the permanent development of
+     the country and would be investing in works which, though slow to
+     give a remuneration, would, at any rate, be absolutely permanent.
+     It would thus happen, that when the mineral wealth of the country
+     had disappeared, its agricultural wealth would have been put on
+     such a solid basis that the country would not have to fall from
+     the height of prosperity to the depth of poverty."
+
+These were conclusions of so fundamental a nature that no statesman
+could afford to overlook them; and, in point of fact, Lord Milner kept
+them steadily in sight from first to last in all that he did for the
+administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies.
+
+Another effort of the civil administration which was carried on
+successfully during the war was the teaching of the Boer children in
+the refugee camps. The narrative of the circumstances in which the
+camp schools were first organised, of the manner in which teachers
+came forward from all parts of the empire to offer their services, and
+of the complete success which attended their efforts, was told three
+years later by Mr. E. B. Sargant, the Education Adviser to the
+Administration. The report in which the story appears not only affords
+a record unique in the annals of educational effort, but adds a
+pleasing and significant page to what is otherwise a gloomy chapter of
+the war.[305] Mr. Sargant was invited by Lord Milner to organise the
+work of educational reconstruction in the new colonies in the autumn
+of 1900. He was then travelling in Canada, in the course of a journey
+through the empire undertaken for the purpose of investigating the
+methods and conditions of education in the several British colonies;
+and he reached Capetown on November 6th, 1900. At that time the
+headquarters of the new Transvaal Administration had not been
+established in Pretoria; but in the Orange River Colony certain
+schools along the railway line and elsewhere had been opened under the
+military Government. From observations made in December in the two new
+colonies, Mr. Sargant had begun to fear that the work of educational
+reorganisation would have to be indefinitely postponed, when a visit
+to the Boer prisoners' camp at Seapoint, Capetown, gave him the idea
+from which the whole system of the camp schools was subsequently
+evolved. Here he found that a school for boys and young men had been
+provided by the prisoners themselves, but that it was destitute of
+books and of almost all the necessary appliances. Mr. Sargant's appeal
+on behalf of this school met with a ready response from the Cape
+Government. What could be done here, he thought, could be done
+elsewhere. The nearest refugee camp to Capetown was at Norval's Pont,
+on the borders of the Orange River Colony; and it was here that Mr.
+Sargant determined to make his first experiment.
+
+         [Footnote 305: This Report was issued (June 14th, 1904) from
+         the Education Adviser's Office, Johannesburg, on "The
+         Development of Education in the Transvaal and Orange River
+         Colony." It is one of the many contributions of permanent
+         value to political and economic science that mark the second
+         period of Lord Milner's Administration in South Africa.
+         _E.g._, in Appendix XXX. of this Report, the various
+         solutions of the much-vexed question of religious instruction
+         in State Schools, severally adopted by the self-governing
+         colonies of the empire, are excellently presented in tabular
+         form.]
+
+[Sidenote: Origin of the camp schools.]
+
+     "Having provided myself," Mr. Sargant says, "with several boxes
+     of school books, I left Capetown on the last day of January and
+     took up my quarters in the camp already named. The Military
+     Commandant threw himself heartily into the experiment, although
+     at that time the provision of food and shelter for each new
+     influx of refugees was a matter of great difficulty. Fortunately
+     Norval's Pont, being nearer the base of supplies than the other
+     camps, had a few marquees to spare. In two of these I opened the
+     first camp school, remaining for a fortnight as its headmaster.
+     The rest of the teachers were found in the camp itself. It was
+     apparent from the first that the school would be a success. The
+     children flocked to it, and the mothers who brought them were
+     well content with the arrangement that the religious instruction
+     should be given in Dutch and other lessons in English. Here, as
+     in several other camps which were visited later, I found that a
+     school, taught through the medium of Dutch, had already been
+     opened by some of the more serious-minded of the people. In this
+     case, an offer was made to me by the Commandant to suppress this
+     school and to send the children to my marquees. This I refused,
+     and in less than two months I had the gratification of knowing
+     that teachers and children had come voluntarily to the Government
+     school, and that the tents in which they had been taught formed
+     one of a row of six which were needed to accommodate the rapidly
+     increasing number of scholars."[306]
+
+         [Footnote 306: Report on "The Development of Education in the
+         Transvaal and Orange River Colony."]
+
+[Sidenote: Over-sea teachers.]
+
+After this initial success Mr. Sargant made arrangements, first from
+Bloemfontein, and afterwards from Pretoria, for the establishment of
+such schools in all the refugee camps; and by the end of May, 1901,
+there were 4,000 children in the camp schools, as against 3,500 in the
+town schools of the two colonies. In the following month it became
+evident that the local supply of teachers would be insufficient to
+meet the demands of the rapidly increasing schools; and Lord Milner
+devoted much of his time during his leave of absence to making
+arrangements for the introduction of a number of well-trained teachers
+from England, and subsequently from the over-sea colonies. Before
+these welcome reinforcements could arrive, however, the number of
+children in the camp schools, apart from the Government schools in the
+towns, had risen to 17,500, and the supply of South African teachers
+was exhausted. "In many cases," says Mr. Sargant, "the services of
+young men and women who had passed the sixth, fifth, and even fourth
+standard were utilised temporarily." With the new year, 1902, drafts
+of carefully chosen and well-qualified teachers from England began to
+arrive. Both the Board of Education for England and Wales and the
+Scotch Education Department took up the work of selection and
+appointment, and the co-operation of the Canadian, Australian, and New
+Zealand Governments was obtained.[307] From this time forward the
+system of the camp schools was steadily extended; and on May 31st,
+1902, the date of the Vereeniging surrender, when the attendance
+reached its highest point, more than 17,000 Boer children were being
+thus educated in the Transvaal camps, and more than 12,000 in those of
+the Orange River Colony.[308]
+
+         [Footnote 307: These imported teachers worked harmoniously
+         with the South African teachers, whether of British or Dutch
+         extraction; they filled the gap left by the Hollander
+         teachers, who had returned to Europe after the outbreak of
+         the war, and formed a valuable element in the permanent staff
+         of the Education Departments of the new colonies. In 1903
+         there were 475 of these over-sea teachers at work in the two
+         colonies, as against some 800 teachers appointed in South
+         Africa.]
+
+         [Footnote 308: Some idea of the significance of these figures
+         may be gathered from the fact that the highest number of
+         children on the rolls of the Government schools of the Orange
+         Free State was 8,157 (in the year 1898). That is to say, the
+         British Administration in the Orange River Colony was
+         educating one-third more Boer children in the camp schools
+         alone than the Free State Government had educated in time of
+         peace. Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: Administrative progress, 1901.]
+
+Apart from this unique and significant effort, the reports furnished
+by the various departmental heads to Lord Milner in December afford
+striking and sufficient evidence of the progress of the civil
+administration in both the new colonies during the year 1901. In the
+Orange River Colony the sphere of operations of the departments
+existing at the time when Sir H. Gould-Adams was appointed
+Deputy-administrator (March, 1901), had been increased, and new
+departments were being organised. A statement issued by the financial
+adviser on August 29th showed that for the period March 13th, 1900
+(the occupation of Bloemfontein) to June 30th, 1901, the "real"
+revenue and expenditure of the colony were respectively £301,800 8_s._
+and £217,974 18_s._; an excess of revenue over expenditure of £83,825
+10_s._ And during the half-year July 1st-December 31st the revenue
+collected was about one-third in excess of the actual civil
+expenditure.[309] The progress in education was remarkable. At the end
+of February, 1902, there were 13,384 children on the roll of the
+Government schools, camp and town,[310] or nearly 5,000 more than the
+greatest number at school at any one time under the Republic, and the
+reorganisation of both higher and technical instruction had been taken
+in hand. A system of local self-government had been commenced by the
+establishment of Boards of Health at Bloemfontein and in all
+districts in the protected area, while in the capital itself the Town
+Council was again at work. The Agricultural Department formed on July
+1st, 1901, had taken over a large number of sheep and cattle from the
+military authorities, and a commencement of tree-planting under an
+experienced forester had been made. The Land Board was created in
+October, with two branches concerned respectively with Settlement and
+Repatriation. The Settlement branch was occupied especially in
+procuring land suitable for agricultural purposes, and its efforts
+were so successful that by the end of April, 1902, 150 British
+settlers had been placed on farms. The Repatriation branch was engaged
+in collecting information as to the whereabouts of the absentee Boer
+landowners and their families, and the condition of their lands and
+houses; in investigating the possibility of importing fresh stock, and
+in collecting vehicles, implements, seed-corn, and the other
+necessaries which would be required to enable the Boer population,
+when repatriated, to resume their normal pursuits. Also temporary
+courts, pending the re-opening of the ordinary civil courts, had been
+established.
+
+         [Footnote 309: Cd. 1,163, p. 145. The accounts were
+         complicated by expenditure for, and refunds from, the
+         military authorities.]
+
+         [Footnote 310: This is in the Orange River Colony alone. For
+         the number of children in the _camp_ schools of both
+         colonies, as apart from the _town_ schools, see above.]
+
+In the Transvaal the work was on a larger scale. Five departments,
+those of the Secretary to the Administration (afterwards Colonial
+Secretary), the Legal Adviser (afterwards Attorney-General), the
+Controller of the Treasury (afterwards Treasurer), the Mining
+Commissioner and of the Commissioner for Native Affairs, were already
+organised. The progress achieved by the heads of these departments in
+the Transvaal, and by Sir H. Gould-Adams and Mr. Wilson in the Orange
+River Colony, formed collectively a record the merit of which was
+acknowledged by "an expression of the high appreciation of His
+Majesty's Government of the services which they had rendered in
+circumstances of exceptional difficulty."[311]
+
+         [Footnote 311: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+It is difficult to present an account of the work already done in the
+Transvaal in a form at once brief and representative. The report of
+Mr. Fiddes, the Secretary to the Administration,[312] recorded the
+progress made in education, public works, and district administration.
+Since July twenty-four new schools, of which seven were camp schools,
+eight fee-paying schools, and nine free town schools, had been opened,
+and 169 teachers were employed in the town schools, and 173 in the
+camp schools, opened by the Administration. The public buildings,
+including the hospitals and asylums at Johannesburg and Pretoria, the
+post offices and the seventeen prisons administered by the department,
+were being maintained and, where necessary, restored. In Johannesburg,
+as we have seen, a Town Council had been established, but Pretoria was
+still administered by a Military Governor, who controlled a temporary
+Town Board and the police. The Administration, however, was empowered
+by proclamation No. 28 of 1901 to appoint Boards of Health in places
+where no municipality existed, and it was expected that Pretoria would
+be endowed, before long, with the same municipal privileges as
+Johannesburg.
+
+         [Footnote 312: Dated December 12th, 1901.]
+
+[Sidenote: Legislative reforms.]
+
+The volume of work handled in the Legal Adviser's office formed a
+remarkable testimony to the energy and capacity of Sir Richard
+Solomon. Resident magistrates' courts had been established in twelve
+districts; temporary courts were being held in Pretoria and
+Johannesburg; the offices of the Registrar of Deeds and of the Orphan
+Master, and the Patent Office, were reorganised; and an ordinance
+creating a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and five
+Puisne Judges, was drafted ready to be brought into operation so soon
+as circumstances permitted. The chaotic Statute Book of the late
+Republic had been overhauled. A large number of laws, some obsolete,
+some impliedly repealed, but still appearing on the Statute Book, and
+others unsuited to the new _régime_, had been repealed by
+proclamation; and at the same time many ordinances dealing with
+matters of fundamental importance had been prepared for submission to
+the future Legislative Council at the first opportunity.
+
+The report of Mr. Duncan, the Controller of the Treasury, showed that
+the revenue actually being collected, mainly from the customs, the
+Post Office, mining and trading licences, and native passes, would
+provide for the ordinary expenditure of the civil administration. And,
+in point of fact, when the accounts were made up at the end of the
+first financial year of the new colonies (July 1st, 1901-June 30th,
+1902) it was found that the Orange River Colony had a balance in hand
+of £231,000, while in the Transvaal the expenditure on civil
+administration[313] had been covered by the revenue, which had assumed
+already the respectable figure of £1,393,000.
+
+The Departments of Mines and Native Affairs had been reorganised, and
+the work done by Mr. Wybergh and Sir Godfrey Lagden respectively in
+these departments, in co-operation with Sir Richard Solomon, had
+produced the administrative reforms immediately required to regulate
+the employment of native labourers in the mines. By proclamations
+amending or repealing existing laws and making fresh provisions where
+necessary the native had been protected against oppression and robbery
+at the hands of unscrupulous labour-agents, and the liquor traffic,
+the chief cause of his insubordination and incapacity, had been
+effectively repressed. Considerations of public security made the
+maintenance of the "pass" system necessary, but modifications were
+introduced into the working of the system sufficient to protect the
+educated native from unnecessary humiliation and the native labourer
+from excessive punishment. In addition to this departmental work two
+commissions had been appointed by Lord Milner to investigate two
+matters of direct and immediate concern to the gold industry. The
+first of these, over which Sir Richard Solomon presided, was engaged
+in reviewing the existing gold laws, with a view to the introduction
+of new legislation embodying such modifications as the best local
+experience and the financial interests of the colony might require.
+The second was employed in formulating measures necessary to provide
+both the mines and the community of the Rand with a water-supply that
+would be at once permanent and economic.
+
+         [Footnote 313: Excluding expenditure on the South African
+         Constabulary and relief and re-settlement, and certain other
+         charges. Cd. 1,163.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Johannesburg police.]
+
+There remain certain special features of the administrative
+reconstruction accomplished in 1901 that merit attention, as showing
+the degree in which Lord Milner kept in view the fundamental
+necessities of the situation revealed by the Land Settlement and
+Irrigation Reports to which reference has been made above. As part of
+the work of the Law Department, the Johannesburg Municipal Police had
+been organised and placed under the control of Mr. Showers, the late
+head of the Calcutta Police.
+
+     "This fine body," Lord Milner wrote, "consists mainly of picked
+     men from the Army Reserve, including many old soldiers of the
+     Guards, and others who have fought in the war. The men are
+     dressed like London policemen, but carry rifles. This odd-looking
+     equipment is characteristic of the double nature of their duties.
+     On the one hand they do the work of ordinary town police, and
+     exhibit in that characteristic the same efficiency and civility
+     as their London prototypes. On the other hand, they have played
+     an important part in assisting the military and the Rand Rifles
+     in the defence of the long line, fifty miles in extent of towns
+     and mining villages which constitute the Rand district. Latterly,
+     since the enemy have been quite driven out of this part of the
+     country, the military portion of their duties is diminishing in
+     importance, though the danger of small raids on outlying portions
+     of the Rand by parties coming from a distance is not yet wholly
+     removed. On the other hand, with the return of the civil
+     population, their work as police proper is greatly on the
+     increase. In their struggle with the illicit liquor dealers, one
+     of the most difficult of their duties, they have so far met with
+     a great measure of success."[314]
+
+         [Footnote 314: Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: South African constabulary.]
+
+Just as here, in the case of the Johannesburg police, so in the
+formation of the South African Constabulary and in the reorganisation
+of the railways, Lord Milner had determined that no opportunity of
+adding to the permanent British population of the two colonies should
+be lost. The South African Constabulary was formed in October, 1900,
+by General Baden-Powell, mainly on the lines of the Canadian
+North-West police, for the protection of the settled population in the
+new colonies. Since July, 1901, however, when it had been called out
+for military service, this force, at the time some 9,000 strong, had
+been employed as part of the army under the direction of the
+Commander-in-Chief, although its organisation, finance, and internal
+discipline were dealt with by the High Commissioner. The men recruited
+for the Constabulary were of British birth, and every endeavour was
+made in the selection of recruits to secure persons who were adapted
+by pursuits and character to become permanent and useful colonists. It
+is interesting to note that a body of 500 burgher police, consisting
+of former burghers of the Orange Free State, and placed under the
+colonel commanding the Orange Colony division, had been associated
+with the Constabulary during the time that they were thus serving with
+the troops. Nor is it necessary to point out that the military
+experience, the knowledge of the country, and acquaintance with the
+life of the veld which the Constabulary gained at this period, largely
+contributed to the efficiency which they displayed afterwards in the
+discharge of their regular duties.
+
+But of all the reconstructive work accomplished in this year of
+continuous and harassing warfare, the reorganisation of the railways
+was perhaps the most essential and the most successful in its
+immediate results. Although the railways of the two new colonies
+remained entirely under the control of the military authorities, their
+future importance to the civil administration was so great that, as
+Lord Milner wrote,[315] "questions affecting their organisation and
+development naturally claimed his constant attention." And this all
+the more, since Sir Percy Girouard, the Director of Military
+Railways, had been chosen by the Home Government to undertake the
+management of the joint railway system of the two colonies so soon as
+it was handed over to the civil authorities. The work accomplished
+included the repair of the damage inflicted by the enemy, the increase
+and improvement of the rolling-stock, the reorganisation of the staff
+of European employees, and the construction of new lines required for
+the industrial development of the country. Apart from 102 engines and
+984 trucks, the Boers had destroyed many pumping-stations and station
+buildings, 385 spans of bridges and culverts, and 25 miles of line.
+These injuries to the "plant" of the railways were repaired "in an
+absolutely permanent manner," and orders had been placed in August for
+60 engines and 1,200 trucks over and above those required to replace
+the rolling-stock destroyed by the enemy.[316] As the staff employed
+in the time of the Republics had been "actively engaged on the side of
+the enemy, and were animated by an exceedingly anti-British
+spirit,"[317] they had to be almost entirely replaced.
+
+         [Footnote 315: December 14th, 1901. Cd. 903.]
+
+         [Footnote 316: The new rolling-stock was paid for out of the
+         grant-in-aid voted in August, 1901. The first of the new
+         lines constructed was that from Bloemfontein to Basutoland,
+         opening up the rich agricultural land known as the "conquered
+         territory" on the Basuto border in the Orange River Colony,
+         where many of the new British settlers had been established.]
+
+         [Footnote 317: The completeness with which the Netherlands
+         Railway Company had identified itself with the Government of
+         the South African Republic is well expressed in the reply of
+         Mr. Van Kretchmar, the General Manager of the N.Z.A.S.M., to
+         a question put to him by the Transvaal Concessions
+         Commissioners: "We considered that the interests of the
+         Republic were our interests" (Q. 612). Many of these railway
+         employees were, of course, imported Hollanders.]
+
+[Sidenote: Reorganisation of railways.]
+
+     "But," Lord Milner continues, "the many difficulties incidental
+     to the organisation of a large new staff, unaccustomed to work
+     with one another, are being successfully overcome, and business
+     is carried on with a smoothness which gives no indication of the
+     internal revolution so recently effected. The new railway staff
+     comprises some 4,000 men of British race, including 1,500
+     Reservists or Irregulars who had fought in the war, and who, with
+     other newcomers, form a permanent addition to the British
+     population of South Africa."
+
+Thanks to the blockhouse system, supplemented where necessary by
+armoured trains, the mail trains from the ports to Johannesburg were
+running almost as rapidly and as safely as in time of peace. But the
+demands of the military traffic were so enormous that opportunities
+for ordinary traffic were still rigorously restricted.
+
+     "Military requirements in food supplies, remounts and munitions
+     of war," Lord Milner wrote, "represented 29,000 tons weekly from
+     the ports; while the movements of men and horses to and fro over
+     the [then] huge theatre of war were as constant as they were
+     sudden."
+
+None the less the civil traffic was increasing. While in August only
+684 refugees had returned, in November the number had risen to 2,623;
+and while in August the tonnage of civil supplies forwarded to
+Bloemfontein and the Transvaal was 4,612, in November it was 8,522.
+This result, moreover, had been obtained with the old rolling-stock,
+and a much more rapid progress was anticipated in the future, since
+the additional rolling-stock had already begun to arrive. And in
+anticipation of this increased rate of progress, the Commander-in-Chief
+had
+
+     "now seen his way to allow the mines to start 400 fresh stamps
+     per month, as against an average of under 100 in previous months,
+     and had also consented to the grant of 1,600 permits a month
+     (representing about 4,000 persons) for return to the Transvaal."
+
+In addition to the repair and reorganisation of the lines running to
+the coast, the Transvaal collieries had been re-opened and the coal
+traffic had been resumed. Not only had progress been made in stocking
+the mines with coal, timber, and machinery, preparatory to the full
+resumption of working activity, but the large unemployed native
+population found in Johannesburg at the time of Lord Milner's arrival
+had been utilised for the construction of a new and much-needed coal
+line, which ran for thirteen miles along the Rand.
+
+     "This short line," Lord Milner wrote, "would have no less than
+     thirty to forty miles of sidings leading from it to every
+     important mine, and securing direct delivery of about 1,000,000
+     tons of coal per annum, as well as of a large tonnage of general
+     stores."
+
+[Sidenote: Development by railways.]
+
+And then follows a statement of the part to be played by railway
+construction in the policy of material development, which was pursued
+with such determination by Lord Milner after the restoration of peace.
+
+     "It seems almost superfluous to argue the case for further
+     railway development in South Africa, and especially in the new
+     colonies. The richest agricultural districts of both colonies are
+     far removed from markets. The through lines to the coast from the
+     great centres of industry will be choked with traffic. Both to
+     stimulate agriculture and to facilitate the operations of
+     commerce, additional lines and relief lines will be urgently
+     required. Moreover, if the construction of the most necessary of
+     these is undertaken as fast as the districts through which they
+     pass are pacified, employment will be provided for large numbers
+     of persons who would otherwise be idle and dependent on
+     Government for relief, as well as for many newcomers, who will be
+     a valuable addition to the population of the country. If there is
+     one enterprise which is certain to be thoroughly popular with the
+     old population, it is this. The one thing which the Boers will
+     thoroughly appreciate will be railways bringing their richest
+     land into touch with the best markets. And the British population
+     will be equally in favour of such a course."[318]
+
+         [Footnote 318: Cd. 903.]
+
+Thus, six months before Vereeniging, and less than three months after
+Lord Milner's return from England, the "big unfinished job" was well
+in hand.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING
+
+
+[Sidenote: The gold industry re-started.]
+
+With the beginning of the year 1902, the question of the ultimate
+submission of the Boers had become a matter of months, or even weeks.
+The guerilla leaders had been beaten at their own game. In spite of
+the extension of the area of the war, the terrorising of the peaceably
+inclined burghers, the co-operation of the Afrikander nationalists,
+and the encouragement derived from Boer sympathisers in England, the
+most important districts of the Transvaal and half of the Orange River
+Colony were being restored to the pursuits of peace. The great
+industry of South Africa was re-established, and agriculture was not
+only resumed but even developing upon more enlightened principles
+within the protected areas of the two colonies; while in the Orange
+River Colony 150 new British settlers had been planted upon farms
+before the terms of the Vereeniging surrender were signed. The story
+of this steady progress is told by the mere items in the monthly
+records furnished by Lord Milner to the Home Government. The gold
+industry of the Rand recommenced in May, 1901, when, with permission
+to set 150 stamps at work, 7,439 oz. of gold were won. Up to
+November, when, as we have seen, the military situation for the first
+time permitted any considerable body of refugees to return, progress
+was slow; but in this month the output amounted to 32,000 oz. in round
+numbers. In December the number of stamps working had risen to 953,
+and the output to 52,897 oz. Henceforward the advance was rapid and
+sustained. In the remaining five months of the war (January to May,
+1902), the number of stamps at work rose to 2,095, the monthly output
+to 138,600 oz., of the value of £600,000, and 30,000 additional
+British refugees had been brought back to their homes on the Rand, in
+view of the increasing certainty of employment afforded by the
+expanding gold industry. Thus, before the surrender of the Boer forces
+in the field, half of the British population had been restored to the
+Transvaal, and the gold industry had been so far re-established that
+its production had reached one-third of the highest annual rate
+attained before the war broke out. Nor must it be forgotten that
+during these last months the conditions of the refugee camps were
+being steadily improved, until, as already noted, the death-rate was
+ultimately reduced below the normal.
+
+The Home Government had been unprepared for the military struggle
+precipitated by the ultimatum; Lord Milner was determined that, so far
+as his efforts could avail, it should not be unprepared for the
+economic conflict for which peace would be the signal. In a despatch
+of January 25th, 1902, he urged once more upon Mr. Chamberlain the
+importance of settling British colonists upon the land, and pressed
+for a "decision on the main issues" raised by this question.
+
+[Sidenote: Land settlement.]
+
+     "This subject has for long occupied my attention," he wrote,
+     "and, in a tentative way, a good deal has been done. But we have
+     reached a point where little more progress can be made without a
+     decision on the main issues. The question is, whether British
+     colonisation is to be undertaken on a large and effective scale,
+     under Government control and with Government assistance, or to be
+     left to take care of itself, with whatever little help and
+     sympathy an Administration, devoid of any general plan, and with
+     no special funds devoted to the particular purpose, can give
+     it.... The principal consideration is the necessity of avoiding a
+     sharp contrast and antagonism in the character and sentiments of
+     the population between the country districts and the towns. If we
+     do nothing, we shall be confronted, sooner or later, with an
+     industrial urban population, rapidly increasing, and almost
+     wholly British in sentiment, and, on the other hand, a rural
+     population, wholly Dutch, agriculturally unprogressive. It is not
+     possible to contemplate such a state of affairs without grave
+     misgivings. We shall have to reinstate the bulk of our prisoners
+     upon their farms, and provide them with the means of starting
+     life anew, but unless we at the same time introduce some new
+     element we may be simply laying up the material for further
+     trouble. The land will remain as neglected, the attitude of the
+     rural population as unprogressive, and as much out of sympathy
+     with British ideas as ever.... To satisfy these demands, it is
+     clear that no small and makeshift scheme will suffice. Land
+     settlement must be undertaken on a large scale; otherwise,
+     however useful, it will be _politically_ unimportant.
+
+     "The time is fast approaching when it will be absolutely
+     necessary to raise loans for both new colonies to meet expenses
+     arising immediately out of the war. I wish to place on record my
+     profound conviction that unless, in raising these loans, we
+     provide a substantial sum for the purchase of land and the
+     settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity
+     will be lost which will never recur, and the neglect of which
+     will have the most prejudicial effect on the future peace and
+     prosperity of South Africa. I do not, indeed, ask that these
+     first loans should include a sum as large as may ultimately be
+     required if land settlement is to assume the proportions which I
+     contemplate. But, if our first considerable undertakings in this
+     line are proving themselves successful, I foresee no difficulty
+     in obtaining more money later on, should we require it. What I do
+     fear is a check now, when we ought to be in a position to seize
+     every possible opportunity of getting hold of land suitable to
+     our purpose, and of retaining in the country such men as we want
+     to put on it. If we lose the next year or two we lose the game,
+     and without that power of acting promptly, which a ready command
+     of money alone can give, we shall begin to throw away
+     opportunities from this moment at which I am writing onwards.
+
+     "What I want to put plainly to His Majesty's Government are these
+     two questions: (1) Are we to be allowed to go on purchasing good
+     land, by voluntary agreement wherever possible, but compulsorily,
+     if necessary? And, assuming this question to be answered in the
+     affirmative, (2) what amount shall we be able to dispose of for
+     this purpose in the immediate future?"[319]
+
+         [Footnote 319: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+It had been arranged during Lord Milner's last visit to England that
+the large expenditure inevitably arising out of the economic
+reconstruction and future development of the new colonies, should be
+provided by a loan secured upon their assets and revenues. The
+purposes for which this immediate outlay was especially required were
+the acquisition of the existing railways and the construction of new
+lines, land settlement, the repatriation of the Boers, and the
+compensation of loyalists for war losses both in the new colonies and
+in the Cape and Natal. Lord Milner now proposed that the Home
+Government should decide to appropriate, out of the funds to be thus
+raised, a sum of £3,000,000 to land settlement, and that of this sum
+£2,000,000 should be spent in the Transvaal and £1,000,000 in the
+Orange Colony. The "development" loan, as it was called, was not
+issued until after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa in the
+(South African) summer of 1902-3; but Lord Milner's proposal was
+approved in principle, and he was enabled to employ the limited
+resources at his disposal in the purchase of blocks of land suitable
+for the purposes of agriculture in both colonies.
+
+Apart from the progress thus achieved in this matter of supreme
+importance, as Lord Milner deemed it, to the future of South Africa,
+the preparation of the administrative machinery, the _matériel_ of
+transport, and the supplies of all kinds required for the repatriation
+of the Boers, was pushed forward with increasing activity. At the same
+time certain other administrative questions were brought by him to the
+consideration of the Home Government during these months (January to
+May, 1902), with the result that the ink was scarcely dry upon the
+Treaty of Surrender before he was able to ask for, and obtain,
+decisions upon them.
+
+[Sidenote: On the eve of peace.]
+
+The telegrams which passed between Lord Milner and the Colonial Office
+on these matters, during the weeks immediately preceding and following
+the Vereeniging surrender, are significant. Beside the clear thrust of
+Lord Milner's calculated energy, Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to keep
+pace with the needs of the situation sink into comparative inertia. On
+April 18th Lord Milner telegraphs the particulars of the 10 per cent.
+tax which he proposes to levy on the net produce of the mining
+industry. The rate is high--twice as high as the gold tax under the
+Republic--and will yield an annual revenue of £500,000 or £600,000 on
+a basis of the present normal production of the mines; but he believes
+that it will be "accepted without serious opposition, if it is imposed
+while the industry is rapidly advancing." And he expresses the hope
+that the explanation which he has furnished will be "sufficient to
+show the principles" of the tax, and that he may publicly announce the
+decision on this matter of such general economic importance at once.
+Mr. Chamberlain, however, requires further information; and we find
+Lord Milner telegraphing on June 2nd: "I trust you will now agree to
+the tax on the profits of gold mines; I am anxious to publish the
+Proclamation in next Friday's _Gazette_." And to this Mr. Chamberlain
+replies on June 4th, "I agree to the imposition of a 10 per cent. tax
+on the profits of gold mines." On June 2nd, that is, two days after
+the terms of surrender have been signed at Pretoria, Lord Milner sends
+a "most urgent" telegram on the immediate financial position:
+
+     "The departments are still very busy with the estimates of the
+     new colonies and Constabulary. They are rather late this year,
+     but that was quite unavoidable. The result promises to be good.
+     We can pay for all normal expenditure and the 6,000 South African
+     Constabulary out of revenue. But, as you know, there is nothing
+     provided for the various extraordinary items which have been
+     hitherto financed out of the £500,000 grant for relief and
+     re-settlement. In all my estimates I have relied on a loan for
+     this. As I understand, the loan is deferred. As the £500,000 is
+     nearly exhausted, and it would be disastrous if land settlement,
+     which latter is at last making good progress, were stopped,
+     especially at this juncture, I would ask for immediate authority
+     to spend another £500,000 on these purposes. This is independent
+     of the amounts which will be required under the last clause of
+     the Terms of Surrender, about which I will address you
+     immediately. I earnestly hope that there may be no delay in
+     acceding to this request. The work to be got through in the
+     immediate future is so enormous that, unless we can get the
+     fundamental questions of finance settled promptly, a breakdown
+     is inevitable. It would be a great relief to my mind to feel that
+     services already started and working well were provided for at
+     least for some months ahead, before I plunge into the new and
+     heavy job of restoring the Boer population, which will require
+     all my attention in the immediate future."[320]
+
+         [Footnote 320: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+Mr. Chamberlain's reply comes on June 18th:
+
+     "You may incur expenditure up to £500,000 more for relief and
+     re-settlement, pending the issue of the loan."
+
+On June 10th Lord Milner telegraphs an outline scheme for repatriating
+the Boers. "As time presses," he concludes, "I am going ahead on these
+lines; but I am anxious to know that they have your general approval."
+The reply, dated June 18th, is: "The proposals are approved generally.
+Send by post a report on the details of the arrangement and the
+persons appointed." At the same time Lord Milner has been pressing for
+a decision on the question of land settlement. He has sent a despatch
+on May 9th containing full particulars of the terms upon which it is
+proposed to offer and to suitable applicants; and he now telegraphs,
+on June 20th:
+
+[Sidenote: "It is vital to make a start".]
+
+     "If you could agree generally to the terms in my despatch, I
+     would immediately deal with some of the most pressing cases on
+     those lines. The terms may be improved upon later; meanwhile it
+     is vital to make a start."
+
+There is land available, and there are men available--over-sea
+colonists, and yeomen with a knowledge of agriculture, who have fought
+in the war, and have, therefore, a first claim to be considered. But
+these desirable settlers cannot afford to wait in a country like South
+Africa, where the cost of living is abnormally high, without a
+definite prospect of employment.
+
+     "Unless something is done at once," he says, "there will be
+     bitter complaint. [The Transvaal] Government is already being
+     severely, though unjustly, criticised for the delay."
+
+This is answered by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of July 7th, in which
+he "concurs generally" in Lord Milner's proposals, and leaves him
+"full discretion to deal with the details of the scheme, which it is
+not possible to criticise effectively" in London.
+
+In a telegram of June 21st we get the announcement of the formal
+initiation of Crown Colony government:
+
+     "I have this day read and published the Letters Patent," Lord
+     Milner says, "constituting the Government of the Transvaal, and
+     my Commission; and I have taken the prescribed oath."
+
+And on July 3rd he suggests that an announcement should be made at
+once of the intention of the Home Government to enlarge the
+Legislative Councils of both colonies by the admission of a
+non-official element:
+
+[Sidenote: Colonists and the settlement.]
+
+     "I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would
+     be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to
+     the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present
+     improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new
+     colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of
+     public business."
+
+To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief
+telegram of July 7th.[321]
+
+         [Footnote 321: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the
+spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the cumbrous
+wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of
+the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of
+Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the
+tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after
+the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new
+colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever
+previously attained."[322] The story of this "tremendous effort," with
+its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved
+for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part
+which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the
+republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South
+Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 322: At Johannesburg, March 31st, 1905. From _The
+         Star_ report.]
+
+Before we approach the actual circumstances which accompanied the
+surrender of the Boer forces in the field, it is necessary to recall
+the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of the new
+colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and the
+Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the preceding
+year (1901). In these communications--the origin of which has been
+mentioned previously[323]--the significance attached by loyalist
+opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily left
+undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncements of the general policy
+of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape ministers,
+while recognising that full representative self-government should be
+conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the necessity of
+maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until "such time as it
+was certain that representative institutions could be established, due
+regard being had to the paramount necessity of maintaining and
+strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in question." And as,
+in their opinion, "this consummation would be ultimately assured and
+materially strengthened by a large influx of immigrants favourably
+disposed to British rule," they expressed the hope that "no time would
+be lost after the conclusion of the war in putting into effect a large
+scheme of land settlement." More than this, with the object-lesson of
+the actual breakdown of representative government in their own Colony
+before their eyes, they added a recommendation that this British
+immigration should not be confined to the new colonies, but that a
+portion of the funds to be provided by the Imperial Government for
+this purpose should be allocated to the Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 323: See p. 489.]
+
+[Sidenote: The language question.]
+
+In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the
+settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in
+particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion
+of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of
+British government in the former Republics would afford. The
+settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated
+as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal
+administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before
+intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to
+crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore,
+insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the
+predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support
+of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the
+"Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so
+called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from
+"the Dutch language used in public offices and official documents." No
+one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth
+of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education
+sufficient to qualify him for the public services, or for a
+professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second
+language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less
+difficult--probably more difficult--to him than to learn English, the
+desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English
+becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical
+convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making
+English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority
+to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the
+language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a
+matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South
+Africa.
+
+     "The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa
+     generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance
+     of the English language. The language question has done more,
+     probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke
+     racial animosity."
+
+They, therefore, recommend that--
+
+     "English should be the official and predominant language in the
+     higher courts, and in the public service--combined with such
+     concessions in favour of Dutch as justice, convenience, and
+     circumstances may require. Dutch interpreters should be attached
+     to all courts and to the principal public offices, and their
+     services should be available free of charge, in civil as well as
+     in criminal cases. English should be the medium of instruction in
+     all secondary schools, and in all standards in primary schools
+     situated in English districts, and in the higher standards in all
+     other primary schools. Dutch should be the medium of instruction
+     meanwhile in the lower forms in the Dutch districts, and it
+     should be taught in all schools where there is a reasonable
+     demand for it."[324]
+
+         [Footnote 324: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+On the question of disarmament they wrote:
+
+     "In order to secure complete pacification, disarmament is
+     necessary. Re-armament should not be allowed until both the new
+     colonies are considered fit for self-government, and even then
+     the carrying of arms and the issuing of ammunition should be
+     contingent on the taking of the oath of allegiance."
+
+[Sidenote: The native question.]
+
+On the subject of the treatment of the natives in the new colonies,
+the remarks of the Natal ministers are weighty and pertinent.
+
+     "For a long while," they wrote, "the natives cannot be given
+     political rights. The grant of such rights would have the effect
+     of alienating the sympathy of English and Dutch alike, and would
+     materially prejudice the good government of the new colonies, and
+     be provocative of racial bitterness. In the meantime the natives
+     should be taught habits of steady industry.
+
+     "Officers appointed over the natives should be acquainted with
+     their language and customs.
+
+     "The assumption in England that colonists are unjust and brutal
+     to the natives has worked great harm, and both Dutch and English
+     have suffered from its influence.
+
+     "A native policy out of sympathy with colonial views is likely,
+     owing to the past history of South Africa, to arouse so strong a
+     feeling that even the just rights of natives would be
+     disregarded. It is essential, in the interests of the natives
+     themselves, generally, that the Home Government should work in
+     accord with colonial sentiments as a whole, and the great
+     influence of a colonial minister in sympathy with colonists will
+     secure far more reforms than will any attempt to over-rule local
+     feeling."[325]
+
+         [Footnote 325: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+As one of certain immediately practicable steps in the direction of
+South African unity, the Natal Ministry advocated "reciprocity" in the
+learned professions and the Civil Services of the several colonies. To
+effect this purpose they recommended that uniform tests of
+professional qualifications should be adopted throughout South Africa,
+and that public officers should be allowed to proceed from the civil
+service of one colony to that of another, their separate periods of
+service counting as continuous "for pension and other purposes." They
+also put forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of
+the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal. The justice of this
+claim, in so far as it referred to a portion of Zululand wrongfully
+annexed by the Transvaal Boers, was recognised by the Imperial
+Government, and the district in question was transferred to Natal on
+the termination of the war.
+
+As High Commissioner, Lord Milner was bound to prevent the grant of
+any terms to the Boers inconsistent with the future maintenance of
+British supremacy in South Africa, now re-established at so great a
+cost. As the representative man of the British in South Africa, he
+was no less bound to see that the terms of surrender contained no
+concessions to the separatist aspirations of the Boer people
+calculated to form an obstacle to the future administrative union of
+the South African colonies. With this two-fold responsibility laid
+upon him, it is not surprising that his view both of what might be
+conceded safely to the Boer leaders, and of how it might be conceded,
+was somewhat different from that of the Commander-in-Chief. That the
+Boers themselves were conscious of being likely to get more favourable
+terms from Lord Kitchener than from the High Commissioner, is apparent
+from the anxiety which they displayed to deal exclusively with the
+former. In this object, however, they were entirely unsuccessful,
+since the Home Government indicated from the first their desire that
+Lord Milner should be present at the meetings for negotiation; and in
+the end the terms of surrender were drafted by him with the assistance
+of Sir Richard Solomon, the legal adviser to the Transvaal
+Administration.
+
+[Sidenote: The peace negotiations.]
+
+The actual circumstances in which the Vereeniging negotiations
+originated were these. Early in the year 1902, when, as we have seen,
+the ultimate success of the military operations directed by Lord
+Kitchener was assured, the Netherlands Government communicated their
+readiness to mediate between the British Government and the
+Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State,
+with a view to the termination of hostilities. To this offer the
+British Government replied that, while they were sincerely desirous of
+terminating the war, the only persons whom they could recognise as
+competent to negotiate for peace were the leaders of the Boer forces
+in the field. Lord Kitchener was directed, however, to forward a copy
+of the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments
+to the Boer leaders. In acknowledging this communication Mr. Schalk
+Burger, as acting President of the South African Republic, informed
+Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to treat for peace, but that
+before doing so he wished to see President Steyn. He, therefore, asked
+for a safe-conduct through the British lines and back to effect this
+purpose. On March 13th, 1902, the Home Government authorised Lord
+Kitchener to grant this request, if "he and Lord Milner agreed in
+thinking it desirable." As the result of the consultation between
+Schalk Burger and Steyn, a conference of the Free State and Transvaal
+leaders was held at Klerksdorp, at which it was decided, on April
+10th, to request the British Commander-in-Chief to receive
+representatives of the Boers personally, "time and place to be
+appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals."
+The approval of the Home Government having been obtained, President
+Steyn, Mr. Schalk Burger, and Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey
+met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 12th, at Pretoria. The
+proposals which the Boer representatives then put forward were wholly
+inadmissible. Nevertheless, Lord Kitchener telegraphed them to London
+with the remark:
+
+     "I have assured [the Boer representatives] that His Majesty's
+     Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain the
+     independence of the Republics, as this would do, and that they
+     must expect a refusal."
+
+[Sidenote: Independence refused.]
+
+On the day following the British Government replied that they could
+not
+
+     "entertain any proposals which were based upon the former
+     independence of the Republics, which had been formally annexed to
+     the British Crown."
+
+Upon learning this reply President Steyn and his colleagues took up
+the position that they were not competent to surrender the
+independence of their country, since only the "people," meaning
+thereby the burghers still in the field, could do this. They asked,
+therefore, for an armistice to enable them to consult the burghers.
+This request was refused on the ground that no basis of agreement had,
+as yet, been reached. The Boer representatives then asked that the
+British Government should state the "terms which they were prepared to
+grant, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence"; while they on
+their side undertook to refer these terms to the people, "without any
+expression of approval or disapproval." In answer to this proposal
+Lord Kitchener was authorised to refer the Boer representatives to the
+offer made by him to General Botha at Middelburg twelve months
+before.
+
+     "We have received," telegraphed the Secretary for War on April
+     16th, "with considerable surprise the message from the Boer
+     leaders contained in your telegram of 14th April.
+
+     "The meeting was arranged at their request, and they must have
+     been aware of our repeated declarations that we could not
+     entertain any proposals based on the renewed independence of the
+     two South African States. We were, therefore, entitled to assume
+     that the Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of
+     independence, and would propose terms of surrender for the forces
+     still in the field.
+
+     "They now state that they are constitutionally incompetent to
+     discuss terms which do not include a restoration of independence,
+     but request us to inform them what conditions would be granted
+     if, after submitting the matter to their followers, they were to
+     relinquish the demand for independence.
+
+     "This does not seem to us to be a satisfactory method of
+     proceeding, or one best adapted to secure, at the earliest
+     moment, a cessation of the hostilities which have involved the
+     loss of so much life and treasure.
+
+     "We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to
+     spare the effusion of further blood, and to hasten the
+     restoration of peace and prosperity to the countries afflicted by
+     the war; and you and Lord Milner are therefore authorised to
+     refer the Boer leaders to the offer made by you to General Botha
+     more than twelve months ago,[326] and to inform them that,
+     although the subsequent great reduction in the strength of the
+     forces opposed to us, and the additional sacrifice thrown upon us
+     by the refusal of that offer would justify us in imposing far
+     more onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the hope of a
+     permanent peace and reconciliation, to accept a general surrender
+     on the lines of that offer, but with such modifications in detail
+     as may be agreed upon mutually.
+
+     "You are also authorised to discuss such modifications with them,
+     and to submit the result for our approval.
+
+     "Communicate this to the High Commissioner."[327]
+
+         [Footnote 326: For these, the "Middelburg" or "Botha" terms,
+         see above, p. 471, and forward; p. 568, note 2.]
+
+         [Footnote 327: Cd. 1,096.]
+
+[Sidenote: Consulting the Burghers.]
+
+Upon learning the contents of this telegram, the Boer representatives
+put forward the request that their "deputation" in Europe, Mr. Abraham
+Fischer, Mr. Cornelius Wessels, and Mr. Wolmarans,[328] might be
+allowed to return to South Africa to take part in the negotiations,
+and again asked for an armistice while the return of the deputation
+and the subsequent meetings of the burghers were taking place. Both
+these requests were refused on military grounds; but Lord Kitchener
+was willing to grant facilities to the Boer leaders to consult the
+burghers, and arrangements were made in the course of the next two
+days (April 17th-19th) for representatives of the Boer commandos in
+the field--exclusive of those in the Cape Colony--to be elected, and
+meet at Vereeniging, a small town on the Vaal near the border of the
+two colonies, on May 13th or 15th. During the month that followed,
+every possible assistance was rendered by the Commander-in-Chief to
+the Boer leaders with the object of enabling them to carry out these
+arrangements. Safe-conducts, under flags of truce, and passes for
+their officers and messengers, were freely granted; and the localities
+chosen for the commando assemblies, the places and dates of which had
+been notified to Lord Kitchener before the Boer representatives left
+Pretoria, were "scrupulously avoided" by the British troops. In spite,
+however, of the restrictions imposed upon the activity of the forces
+under his command, Lord Kitchener was able to report, on June 1st,
+that "good progress" had been made in the work of the campaign up to
+the actual cessation of hostilities.[329]
+
+         [Footnote 328: This deputation was despatched in March, 1900,
+         to "win the sympathy of the nations," in De Wet's words.]
+
+         [Footnote 329: Cd. 986.]
+
+The sixty Boer representatives--two for each commando--thus assembled
+at Vereeniging appointed, on May 18th, a special commission to treat
+for peace. The commissioners, who included Commandant-Generals Louis
+Botha and Christian De Wet, Generals Hertzog, De la Rey and Smuts, and
+President Steyn, Acting President Schalk Burger, and other
+civilians,[330] proceeded at once to Pretoria, where, on May 19th,
+they met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner in conference, and put forward
+the following three proposals as a basis of negotiation:
+
+         [Footnote 330: A full list of the names is to be found in the
+         Draft Terms of Surrender at p. 564.]
+
+[Sidenote: The terms drafted.]
+
+     "(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards
+     foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under
+     British supervision. (3) We are prepared to surrender a part of
+     our territory."
+
+What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's
+telegram to the Secretary for War:
+
+     "Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for
+     negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid
+     down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion,
+     nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the
+     afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner
+     proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the
+     burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of
+     objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner
+     should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as
+     possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.[331] They
+     will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for
+     the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the
+     draft document."[332]
+
+         [Footnote 331: These were the "Middelburg terms" of a year
+         ago. See note 2, p. 568.]
+
+         [Footnote 332: Cd. 1,096.]
+
+The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is
+to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between
+May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness
+on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they
+allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction
+to"[333] the Middelburg terms; admit that there is a "fundamental
+difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their own may be
+accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;[334] and finally
+maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"[335] to the Middelburg
+terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.[336] To all this Lord
+Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take your
+proposal into consideration."
+
+         [Footnote 333: Smuts.]
+
+         [Footnote 334: Hertzog.]
+
+         [Footnote 335: De Wet.]
+
+         [Footnote 336: Botha.]
+
+[Sidenote: Payment of Boer war debts.]
+
+On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in
+consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the
+Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State
+High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the
+negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur;
+but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the
+the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military
+and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The
+Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by
+their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be
+recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments
+for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner,
+on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very
+unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets
+of the Republican Governments, all liabilities existing at the time
+when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay for
+expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a war
+against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, utterly
+indefensible. The British people, he said--
+
+     "would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of
+     hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the
+     people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much
+     smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during
+     the war."
+
+As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and
+receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing,
+with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home
+Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the
+Middelburg terms.
+
+This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the
+clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately
+became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a
+compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite
+sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course
+of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make
+a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government
+followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant--£3,000,000--and in
+rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this sum should be
+devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued by
+them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be
+submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to
+be appointed to distribute the £3,000,000 grant.
+
+The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in
+the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the
+Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful
+general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and
+anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and
+arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping
+military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army
+or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted
+statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South
+Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and
+interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are
+being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is
+exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the
+actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once
+accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of
+surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to
+an agreement, it will be the _English_ document which will be wired to
+England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, and which
+will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not necessary to
+place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the British
+Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a particular
+matter, he replies:
+
+     "As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain
+     promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to
+     which a reference may be made later should appear in it.
+     Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should
+     appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to
+     clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible
+     misunderstanding."
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's vigilance.]
+
+And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You
+must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid
+before His Majesty's Government." And, to prevent any possible
+misconstruction of Lord Kitchener's statement, "there is a pledge that
+the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly
+considered," he says:
+
+     "Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am
+     convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this
+     document must contain everything about which there is anything in
+     the form of a pledge."
+
+And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he
+draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language
+to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been "completely
+annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement should be
+signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the document, or its
+terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal."
+
+The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord
+Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated,
+unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer
+commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months
+of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of
+their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion
+and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new
+agreement." As it was, Lord Milner's faultless precision during the
+whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home
+Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer
+"delegates."
+
+     "It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr.
+     Chamberlain,[337] "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of
+     this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at
+     Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those
+     occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by
+     His Majesty's Government."
+
+         [Footnote 337: Mr. Chamberlain to Generals Botha, De Wet, and
+         De la Rey, August 28th, 1902. Cd. 1,284.]
+
+[Sidenote: Approval of Home Government.]
+
+At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement
+was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain
+informed Lord Milner by telegram that the Cabinet approved of the
+submission of this document with certain minor alterations, and with
+the new clause dealing with the grant of £3,000,000, to the Assembly
+at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be inflicted
+upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed in
+private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener and
+Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had been
+settled by communications which had passed between Lord Milner and Mr.
+Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The reason for
+this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner, while they
+objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made part of
+the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless quite
+willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which it
+was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of
+Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the
+statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their
+respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on
+May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His
+Majesty's Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of
+further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to
+the assembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The
+Boer commissioners left at 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day
+for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of Surrender were
+submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher representatives.
+One other point had been raised and settled between Lord Milner and
+the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August 7th, 1901,
+certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of
+confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that
+in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly
+dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could
+not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government
+concurred.
+
+The text of the document submitted to the burgher representatives at
+Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows:
+
+     "_Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces
+     in the Field, approved by His Majesty's Government._
+
+     "His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord
+     Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T.
+     Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and
+     Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange
+     Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis
+     Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the
+     Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their
+     respective burghers desirous to terminate the present
+     hostilities, agree on the following articles:
+
+[Sidenote: The surrender agreement.]
+
+     "1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their
+     arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in
+     their possession or under their control, and desist from any
+     further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King Edward
+     VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The manner
+     and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord
+     Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant
+     Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.
+
+     "2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal
+     or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present
+     outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring
+     their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King
+     Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as
+     transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence
+     ensured.
+
+     "3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be
+     deprived of their personal liberty or their property.
+
+     "4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any
+     of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in
+     connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this
+     clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of
+     war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the
+     Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial
+     immediately after the close of hostilities.
+
+     "5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the
+     Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the
+     children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when
+     necessary for the better and more effectual administration of
+     justice.
+
+     "6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and
+     Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their
+     protection, on taking out a licence according to law.
+
+     "7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River
+     Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil
+     government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative
+     institutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced.
+
+     "8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will
+     not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.
+
+     "9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the
+     Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the
+     war.
+
+     "10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the
+     local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each
+     district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the
+     presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of
+     assisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and
+     supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide
+     themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed,
+     stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their
+     normal occupation.
+
+     "His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these
+     Commissions a sum of £3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will
+     allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African
+     Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the
+     late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a
+     Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government,
+     and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to
+     have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they
+     will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of
+     war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally
+     given.
+
+     "In addition to the above-named free grant of £3,000,000, His
+     Majesty's Government will be prepared to make advances on loan
+     for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and
+     afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent.
+     interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit
+     of this clause."[338]
+
+         [Footnote 338: Cd. 1,096. President Steyn was too ill to sign
+         the Agreement, and De Wet signed first of the Free State
+         representatives. He was declared President, in the place of
+         Steyn, at Vereeniging on the 29th.]
+
+[Sidenote: Punishment of rebels.]
+
+To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of
+the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer
+commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of
+Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner.
+
+     "His Majesty's Government must place it on record that the
+     treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion
+     and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be
+     determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the
+     laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have
+     joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that
+     part of the British Empire to which they belong.
+
+     "His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape Government
+     that the following are their views as to the terms which should
+     be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the
+     field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th
+     April, 1901:
+
+     "With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon
+     surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document before the
+     resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes
+     place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the
+     punishment to be awarded to them, provided they shall not have
+     been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the usages of
+     civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be entitled for
+     life[339] to be registered as voters or to vote at any
+     Parliamentary Divisional Council, or municipal election. With
+     reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape
+     Colony and all other persons holding an official position under
+     the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of
+     commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for
+     high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such
+     special court as may be hereafter constituted by law, the
+     punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the
+     court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of
+     death be inflicted.
+
+     "The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt
+     with according to the law of the Colony."[340]
+
+         [Footnote 339: This was reduced to a period of five years.]
+
+         [Footnote 340: Cd. 1,096. As compared with the Middelburg
+         terms, the terms accepted at Vereeniging were slightly less
+         favourable to the Boers in respect of permission to possess
+         arms, and the use of the Dutch language; but the monetary
+         assistance promised to the repatriated burghers was more
+         generous. The free grant was raised from one million to three
+         millions, and the advances on loan were offered for the first
+         two years free of interest, and subsequently at only three
+         per cent. The greater destruction of property consequent upon
+         the prolongation of the war made this increased assistance
+         necessary and reasonable. It is noticeable, however, that
+         Lord Milner, alike in the Middelburg and Vereeniging
+         negotiations, although he was opposed to any payment of the
+         costs incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on the war,
+         was prepared to go even farther than the Home Government in
+         the direction of a generous treatment of the Boers in all
+         other matters that concerned their material prosperity.
+
+         One variation as between the Middelburg and Vereeniging terms
+         is noticeable in view of the statement, made in the House of
+         Commons by the present (1906) Under-Secretary for the
+         Colonies (Mr. Winston Churchill), that the use of the word
+         "natives" in clause viii. of the Terms of Surrender prevented
+         the introduction of any legislation affecting the _status_ of
+         Asiatics and "coloured persons" in the new colonies prior to
+         the establishment of self-government. This assertion was
+         based upon the contention that the word "natives" is
+         understood by the Boers to indicate the "native of any
+         country other than those of the European inhabitants of South
+         Africa." The actual text of the corresponding clause in the
+         Middelburg terms (Lord Kitchener's despatch of March 20th,
+         1901, in Cd. 528) is as follows: "As regards the extension of
+         the franchise to the Kafirs in the Transvaal and Orange River
+         Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government
+         to give such franchise before representative government is
+         granted to these colonies, and if then given it will be so
+         limited as to secure the just predominance of the white
+         races. The legal position of coloured persons will, however,
+         be similar to that which they hold in Cape Colony." Apart
+         from the fact that the Boers were debarred by Lord Milner's
+         specific statements either from going behind the English text
+         of the Vereeniging Terms of Surrender, or from "explaining
+         [the Vereeniging Terms] by anything in the Middelburg
+         proposal," it is difficult to see how this Middelburg clause
+         could have raised any presumption in the minds of the Boer
+         commissioners that the English word "native" was intended to
+         include not only the Kafirs (of which word it is a loose
+         equivalent, since the dark-skinned native of the Bantu
+         tribes, or the Kafir, has practically ousted the aboriginal
+         yellow-skinned natives of South Africa--the Bushmen and
+         Hottentots), but the "coloured people," or half-castes.
+
+         Lord Milner himself declared in the House of Lords (July
+         31st, 1906) with reference to Mr. Churchill's statement that
+         the question had not been raised, to the best of his belief,
+         by the Boer commissioners; and that in any case there was
+         nothing in the Vereeniging Agreement to prevent the Crown
+         Colony administration of the new colonies from legislating in
+         respect of "coloured persons." [And _a fortiori_ in respect
+         of British Indians.] His words were: "The English text of the
+         treaty says 'natives' and does not say 'coloured people.' I
+         think that in the Dutch version the word 'naturellen' was
+         used. I venture to say that nobody familiar with the common
+         use of language in South Africa would hold either that
+         'natives' included coloured people, some of whom very much
+         more resemble whites than natives, or that 'naturellen'
+         included 'kleurlingen,' which is the universally accepted
+         Dutch word in South Africa for coloured people."]
+
+[Sidenote: The last debates.]
+
+[Sidenote: Accepting the inevitable.]
+
+With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final
+stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still
+required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly
+at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the
+morning of the 29th the delegates assembled in the tent provided by
+the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of
+the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners
+on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting
+President of the South African Republic, then announced that the
+meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses
+should be taken--to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or
+to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting,
+and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in
+questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various
+Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding
+between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the
+Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the
+delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually
+proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on
+the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so
+much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in
+the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria
+convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of
+accepting the British terms, each of them was anxious, individually,
+to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the
+surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible
+from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour
+should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the
+question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the
+delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the
+Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted
+discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the
+afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the
+limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long
+debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke
+more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments
+used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering
+that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he
+said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of
+indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be
+continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the
+form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the
+substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice
+the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From
+this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words
+of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute--for every man was
+preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement." Then
+a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the
+commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6
+votes.
+
+         [Footnote 341: The minutes of the final meetings of the
+         commando representatives--as also those of the earlier
+         meetings of May 15th to 17th--have been published by General
+         Christian de Wet in _The Three Years' War_.]
+
+After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution
+constituting a committee[342] to collect funds for the destitute Boers
+was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the
+decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to
+sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.
+
+         [Footnote 342: Three of the members of this committee,
+         Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to
+         proceed to Europe for the purposes of this appeal.]
+
+Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to
+Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on
+administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going
+on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the
+telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the
+Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was
+just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought
+the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner
+and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former
+British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here,
+at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10
+o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender Agreement
+was signed.[343]
+
+         [Footnote 343: The actual surrender of the arms in the
+         possession of the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out
+         with admirable promptitude. Three weeks after the agreement
+         had been signed Lord Kitchener was able, in a final despatch
+         from Capetown on June 23rd, to record his "high appreciation
+         of the unflagging energy and unfailing tact" with which
+         Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet had
+         facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed
+         to receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and
+         Orange River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in
+         the Cape Colony less expeditious in surrendering to General
+         French. In all 21,226 burghers and colonial rebels, of whom
+         11,166 were in the Transvaal, 6,455 in the Orange River
+         Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down their arms. Lord
+         Kitchener's last words (despatches of June 21st and 23rd),
+         addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the
+         Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic
+         utterances. His message to the former was:
+
+              "I find it difficult in the short space at my disposal
+              to acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South
+              Africa to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand,
+              Canada, Cape Colony, and Natal. I will only say here
+              that no request of mine was ever refused by any of these
+              Governments, and that their consideration and generosity
+              were only equalled by the character and quality of the
+              troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that
+              country."
+
+         And of the troops, which under his command had successfully
+         accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he
+         wrote:
+
+              "The protracted struggle which has for so long caused
+              suffering to South Africa has at length terminated, and
+              I should fail to do justice to my own feelings if at
+              this moment I neglected to bear testimony to the
+              patience, tenacity, and heroism which has been displayed
+              by all ranks of His Majesty's forces, Imperial and
+              Colonial, during the whole course of the war. Nothing
+              but the qualities of bravery and endurance in our troops
+              could have overcome the difficulties of this campaign,
+              or have finally enabled the empire to reap the fruits of
+              all its sacrifices."]
+
+[Sidenote: Admissions of the Boer leaders.]
+
+The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at
+Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the
+hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer
+sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people
+abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war
+in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of aggression
+forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the enemies of
+England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
+wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the enemy. Very different
+is the account of the origin of the war, which Acting President
+Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow countrymen in this day
+of truth-telling.
+
+     "Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he
+     said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon.
+     We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we
+     under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon
+     our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the
+     possibility of defeat."
+
+And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and
+one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded
+by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war;
+I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this
+"although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts,
+State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general
+of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as
+members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the
+war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, since in
+the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies himself
+would have found no occasion for departing from the truth.
+
+[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.]
+
+No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now
+that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that
+the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they
+regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of
+barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more
+Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought
+the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General
+de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war,
+said:
+
+     "I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That
+     is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I
+     think also we might meet the emergency in this way--a part of the
+     men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the
+     women, and then they could take the women with them to the
+     English in the towns."
+
+But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any
+longer carrying this plan into effect.
+
+     "When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of
+     provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot
+     without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then
+     well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too
+     thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English
+     protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our
+     greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man
+     answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to
+     the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women
+     now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how
+     can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to
+     give up liberty for their sakes?"
+
+And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said:
+
+     "If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision
+     for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every
+     kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has
+     caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get
+     them into the townships, but later on this became impossible,
+     because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the
+     idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending
+     the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable,
+     because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and
+     the men still on commando were not so closely related to these
+     families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them."
+
+Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the
+efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected
+areas.
+
+[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.]
+
+     "A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We
+     could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the
+     enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different
+     aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by
+     day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos."
+
+And again--
+
+     "There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have
+     managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have
+     been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the
+     British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But
+     things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after
+     district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory.
+     In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its
+     forces upon us."
+
+To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of
+again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony.
+
+     "Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season
+     of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed.
+     How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that
+     they can only go _op-een-stap_?"[344]
+
+         [Footnote 344: An onomatopoeic expression for the step of a
+         tired horse.]
+
+Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct
+evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers,
+and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led
+them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May
+30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of
+the English Government "may not be very advantageous to us, but
+nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position." And
+Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the
+document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to
+stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is
+because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a
+tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it.
+What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and
+the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the
+continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief
+description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,[345] he
+writes:
+
+         [Footnote 345: _The Three Years' War._]
+
+     "There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes
+     or No. It was an ultimatum--this proposal of England. What were
+     we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination."
+
+[Sidenote: Boer claim to independence.]
+
+Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the
+question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the
+moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the
+British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their
+minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives
+agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the
+sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming
+their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History may well ask,
+On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical standard,[346] the
+Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the administrative
+autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged by the laws of
+war,[347] they had been saved from the alternatives of physical
+annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic generosity of
+the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant population. From a
+constitutional point of view, the presence of Article IV.[348] in the
+London Convention was in itself sufficient to refute the claim of the
+republic to be a "sovereign international state."
+
+         [Footnote 346: [The Transvaal Government]--"or rather the
+         President and his advisers--committed the fatal mistake of
+         trying to maintain a government which was at the same time
+         undemocratic and incompetent.... An exclusive government may
+         be pardoned if it is efficient; an inefficient government, if
+         it rests upon the people. But a government which is both
+         inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under
+         which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of
+         government which the Transvaal attempted to maintain. They
+         ought, therefore, to have either extended their franchise or
+         reformed their administration" (Bryce, _Impressions of South
+         Africa_, 2nd Ed., 1900). Mr. Bryce is not likely to have been
+         unduly severe. "The political sin of the Transvaal against
+         the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of detail--of
+         less or more--but was fundamental in its denial of elementary
+         political right." And again: In the Transvaal "an armed
+         minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the
+         taxes, denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the
+         money extorted" (Captain Mahan, _The Merits of the Transvaal
+         Dispute_, 1900 [included in _The Problem of Asia_]). To
+         these, perhaps, I may be permitted to add the following words
+         spoken by myself in 1894--more than a year before the
+         Raid--and published in 1895 (_South Africa: a Study,
+         etc._):--"The Boer has still to justify his possession of
+         these ample pastures, these rich and fertile valleys, and
+         these stores of gold and of coal. If he can enlarge his mind,
+         if he can reform existing abuses, if he can expand an archaic
+         system of government and render it sufficiently elastic to
+         meet the requirements of an enlarged population and important
+         and increasing industries--well and good. If not, let the
+         Boer beware; for he will place himself in conflict with the
+         intelligence and the progress of South Africa. _Then_ the
+         Boer system will be condemned by a higher authority than the
+         Colonial Office or the opinion of England; and from the high
+         court of Nature--a court from which no appeal lies--the
+         inexorable decree will go forth: 'Cut it down; why cumbereth
+         it the ground?'"]
+
+         [Footnote 347: See admissions of the Boer Generals quoted
+         _supra_.]
+
+         [Footnote 348: "The South African Republic will conclude no
+         treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the
+         Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward
+         or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved
+         by Her Majesty the Queen." Captain Mahan writes: "In refusing
+         the Transvaal that independence in foreign relations which
+         would enable other states to hold it directly accountable,
+         Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that
+         foreigners should be so treated as to give no just cause for
+         reclamations.... Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate
+         control of foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose
+         not to permit interference in the Transvaal by a foreign
+         Power, was responsible for conditions of wrong to foreign
+         citizens within its borders. She had surrendered the right to
+         interfere, as suzerain, with internal affairs; but she had
+         not relieved herself, as by a grant of full independence and
+         sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility for
+         injury due to internal maladministration, any more than the
+         United States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy [in
+         the case of the Italian citizens lynched at New Orleans] by
+         the state sovereignty of Louisiana" (_Ibid._). And, says the
+         same writer, _a fortiori_ was Great Britain justified in
+         interfering on behalf of her own subjects.]
+
+[Sidenote: Effect of surrender terms.]
+
+Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by
+the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question
+whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating
+at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which,
+as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been
+deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually
+pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms
+actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the
+British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement of
+the country, and left it to them to decide at what time, and by what
+stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies. The two
+respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight
+dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess
+rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language
+in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions
+are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound
+policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain
+districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small
+number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated
+homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous
+and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The
+refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves
+with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional
+Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy
+responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an
+altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police.
+At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in
+such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under
+the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient
+remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system--a
+system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition of arms by
+the natives in South Africa--the number of rifles possessed by the
+Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government;
+while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege
+of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to
+British rule would form an additional safeguard.
+
+In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of
+course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of
+English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South
+Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have
+resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of
+the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have
+retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these
+circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination
+of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the
+material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was
+the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new
+administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free
+trade in language"--that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond,
+the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the
+convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of
+administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these
+concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full
+self-government would not be granted to either of the new colonies
+until a British or loyalist majority was assured.
+
+[Sidenote: Free initiative secured.]
+
+But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their
+immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete
+freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for
+the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative
+reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task--at once more
+congenial and more especially his own--was discharged is a matter that
+must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of
+the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the
+review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the Orange Free State, The, his report
+    of De Wet's success in Cape Colony, 431, 432.
+  Administrative reconstruction, 397, 458, 489, 523 _et seq._
+  Africa. _See_ South Africa.
+  Afrikander Bond, The, 46;
+    programme of, 50 _et seq._;
+    its sphere of action, 55;
+    its power in Cape Colony, 55;
+    its origin, 56;
+    its purpose, 56 to 58, 106;
+    its first congress, 59;
+    its "programme of principles," 59;
+    its change of policy, 60;
+    members returned to it by the Cape Parliament, 60, 483;
+    meets at Bloemfontein, 63;
+    adopts the Hofmeyr programme, 64;
+    its manner of reuniting European communities in S. Africa, 65;
+    its first openly avowed aim, 66;
+    falls back on the policy of 1881, 69;
+    its influence in the Cape Legislature, 70, 93, 121, 122, 141;
+    its attempts to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, 94, 95;
+    the parliamentary chief and the real leader of, 97;
+    Lord Milner's remonstrance to the Dutch of Cape Colony, 84, 91, 92, 98;
+    the sum and substance of its policy, 106, 107, 119;
+    address to Lord Milner from the Graaf Reinet branch, 108;
+    Lord Milner's reply, 109 to 113;
+    Sir Gordon Sprigg's defiance of, 116;
+    the funds of, 118;
+    its domination, 150;
+    nature of its "mediation" with Pres. Krüger, 162, 169, 195, 274, 276;
+    demonstrations organised by, 215;
+    the completeness with which it had undermined British power, 223;
+    its view of the Salisbury Cabinet, 274;
+    its activity, 348;
+    its attitude at the end of January, 1900, 373;
+    annual congress at Somerset East, 374;
+    its policy after the occupation of the Republics, 429;
+    its attitude in February, 1901, 430;
+    the qualities of its leaders, 435;
+    its leaders decline to associate themselves with the efforts of the
+      Burgher Peace Committee, 474;
+    its identification with the Boer invaders, 475;
+    the character of the men it sent to Parliament, 483.
+  "Afrikanderdom," the doctrine of, 197.
+  Afrikander nationalists, The, 48 (note), 267;
+    the creed of, 48 _et seq._, 119;
+    their plan of a united S. Africa, 70;
+    Mr. Chamberlain's hope of winning their support, 73;
+    strength of their forces, 74, 96, 104;
+    their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
+    uneasiness of, 113;
+    dominate S. Africa, 126;
+    their motives with regard to the Bloemfontein Conference, 157;
+    their direct appeal to the Queen, 294;
+    unmasked, 300;
+    their speech and action during the war, 343;
+    they co-operate with the two Republics with a view to pressing their
+      "peace overtures" on the British Government, 360, 361;
+    their "conciliation" meetings, 361, 382;
+    renewal of their alliance with the Liberal Opposition, 369;
+    their objects, 382, 383;
+    their opposition to the Treason Bill, 395;
+    their references to Boer successes, 396;
+    they slander the British troops, 398;
+    their hatred of England, 429;
+    assistance rendered by them to the guerilla leaders, 478;
+    their commission to Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 495.
+  "Afrikander party" The, the friends of in England, 375, 379.
+  Agricultural Department, The, formation of in Orange River Colony, 525.
+  Agriculture, The development of in new colonies, 536.
+  "Albany" settlers, The, 15, 271.
+  Albert, 346.
+  _Albert Times, The_, 120.
+  Aliens Expulsion and Immigration Laws, The, Mr. Chamberlain's demand for
+      the repeal of, 81;
+    repeal and amendment of, 82, 88, 94.
+  Aliwal North, 346, 411, 455.
+  Amershof, Mr. Justice, 103.
+  Amery, Mr., 291, 300.
+  Amphitheatre Meeting, The, 131.
+  Anti-British Press, The, 68, 166, 205 to 207, 225, 272, 349, 374, 380,
+    391, 403, 409, 477.
+  Ardagh, Sir John, 319 (note).
+  Arms, The surrender of, 573;
+    the possession of, 581.
+  Army Corps, The, the order to mobilise, 244, 317, 318;
+    arrival of, 305, 321, 331.
+  Arnold-Forster, H. O., 516.
+  Asquith, H. H., his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 92, 99;
+    his utterances, 416.
+  Attorney-General, The (Cape), notice issued by as to acts of treason,
+      480.
+
+
+  Baden-Powell, Colonel, afterwards General, 191 (note), 329 (note), 397,
+      530.
+  Balfour, A. J., 203 (note), 228, 302, 307.
+  _Balfourian Parliament, The_, 319 (note).
+  Balliol Scholars, 76 (note).
+  Bantu, The, 11, 12, 25.
+  Barberton, 452.
+  Barkly East, 346.
+  Barkly, Sir Henry, 275.
+  Bastards, The, 281.
+  Basuto incident, The, 496 (note).
+  Basutoland, 83;
+    British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298;
+    construction of the railway to from Bloemfontein, 532 (note).
+  Beaconsfield, Lord, 24.
+  Bechuanaland Expedition, The, 350 (note).
+  Bechuanaland, 83;
+    the administration of the European population of, 35;
+    the Transvaal's attempt to secure, 64, 74, 93;
+    the Dutch community in, 346.
+  Bechuanas, the employment of as indentured labourers, 117.
+  Beechranger Hottentots, The, 2, 4.
+  Belgrave, Lord (now Duke of Westminster), 167.
+  Berry, Dr. (now Sir) Wm., 124 (note).
+  Bethulie Bridge, 411, 455;
+    alleged movement of British troops to, 236.
+  Bezuidenhout, the Boer, 11.
+  Blignaut, J. N., letter from, 258.
+  Blockhouse system, The, area inclosed by, 458;
+    effect produced by, 456, 457;
+    efficiency of, 576;
+    extension of, 455;
+    its help to the railways, 533.
+  Bloemfontein, Meeting of the Afrikander Bond at, 63;
+    opening of the railway at, 67;
+    seizure of correspondence at, 156, 162, 206, 376;
+    the occupation of, 328, 363, 384;
+    visit of Lord Milner to, 397;
+    the effective occupation of the district round, 453;
+    discussion at of the question of peace between Lords Milner and
+      Kitchener, 471;
+    civil administration in, 524;
+    construction of the railway to Basutoland, 532 (note).
+  Bloemfontein Conference, The, 268;
+    proposed, 140;
+    agreed to by President Krüger, 153;
+    negotiations leading up to, 151 to 165;
+    meeting of, 167, 168;
+    the discussion at a closing of, 168, 172;
+    the result of, 172;
+    the four months which followed, 174.
+  Bloemfontein Convention, The, 17, 87 (note);
+    Sir G. Grey's criticism of, 19.
+  _Bloemfontein Express, The_, 50, 54, 63, 67.
+  Blood, Sir Bindon, 425.
+  Bodley, J. E. C., statement by, 76 (note).
+  Boer Administration, The, depraved character of, 212.
+  Boer Army, The, 336, 337, 340 (note).
+  Boer aspirations, The, 302.
+  Boer children, Teaching of during the war, 519 to 523.
+  Boer Peace commissioners, The, their tortuous diplomacy, 526;
+    the "Terms of Surrender" communicated to them, 563;
+    their departure from Pretoria, 569.
+  Boer deputation in Europe, The, 555.
+  Boer emigrants, The, 19.
+  Boer leaders, The, their decision to continue the struggle, 414, 417,
+      418, 424 _et seq._;
+    their disingenuousness, 557;
+    penalties to which they were liable, 564;
+    they treat for peace, 552, 555 _et seq._
+  Boer raiders, The, 438.
+  Boer revolt of 1880-81, The, 31.
+  Boer Republics, The (_see also_ Orange Free State and Transvaal),
+      creation of, 17, 19;
+    scheme for their union with the British colonies, 24.
+  Boer spies, 337.
+  Boer, vernacular, The, 547.
+  Boers, The, the (3rd) Duke of Portland's despatch relating to their
+      treatment, 9;
+    their dealings with the natives, 11;
+    the grant of self-government to, 29;
+    their resistance to British arms 48;
+    their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
+    their military forces, 181, 340 (note),
+      without uniform, 336;
+    personal dealings with, 194, 195;
+    their friends in England, 232, 414, 424, 573;
+    breaches of faith by, 399;
+    their losses up to November, 1901, 458;
+    final surrender of, 573 (note).
+  Bond, The. _See_ Afrikander Bond.
+  Bond Press, The, 209.
+  Booy the Hottentot, 11.
+  Borckenhagen the German, 49, 50, 66.
+  Botha, Louis, 564;
+    dispersal of his army, 322;
+    defeat of at Diamond Hill, 329;
+    defeat of at Dalmanutha, 329;
+    in Johannesburg, 337;
+    urges his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms, 414, 424;
+    his determination to fight on, 421;
+    circular issued by him, 425 (note);
+    his responsibility for the suffering of the Boers during the guerilla
+      war, 427;
+    failure of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener, 434;
+    stimulates his followers, 457;
+    treats for peace, 471, 552, 554;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556;
+    letter to him from Mr. Chamberlain as to the re-opening of the
+      discussion after the surrender of Vereeniging, 562;
+    advocates submission, 571, 577;
+    Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact and energy after signing the
+      treaty of peace, 573 (note);
+    his views on the position of the Boer women and children during the
+      later stages of the war, 575;
+    his testimony to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's blockhouse system,
+      576;
+    his admission as to the impossibility of again raising a revolt in Cape
+      Colony, 577.
+  "Botha" terms, The, 471, 554.
+  Bower, Sir Graham, 41.
+  Brand, President, 28, 275;
+    discourages the Afrikander Bond, 55;
+    the rôle played by him in 1881, 153.
+  Brebner J., 564.
+  Breed's Nek, 455.
+  British Administration, the failure of in S. Africa, 1, 22;
+    distrust of by the British in S. Africa, 37;
+    the Bond and, 65;
+    its impotency, 69;
+    efficiency of impaired by English party politics, 254.
+  British and Dutch factions, The, bitterness of, 244.
+  British Army, The, in Cape Colony and Natal, 189, 325;
+    disadvantage in which it was placed, 253;
+    its performance in S. Africa, 323;
+    the number of effectives available, 323;
+    its difficulties, 330 _et seq._;
+    the slander of, 398, 499.
+  British colonists, the settlement of on the land, 538.
+  British Government, representatives of at the Cape, 7;
+    its treatment of the natives and Dutch in S. Africa, 8.
+  British Navy, The, the offer of an annual contribution to the cost of,
+      95;
+    holds the seas, 311.
+  British party, A, the creation of, 150.
+  British policy in S. Africa, 9 _et seq._;
+    up to 1897, 69.
+  British population in Cape Colony, The, 107, 115, 127;
+    effect of the Redistribution Bill on, 125;
+    their approval of Lord Milner's policy, 216;
+    their dismay at the Imperial Government's reception of the seven years'
+      franchise law, 222;
+    their support of Lord Milner, 270;
+    numbers which took part in the war, 324.
+  British settlers in the country, 61.
+  Britstown, 354.
+  _Brunt of The War, The_, 462 (note).
+  Bryce, James, The Rt. Hon. M.P., attitude and public utterances of, 259,
+      314, 360, 415, 496;
+    misstatement by, 263;
+    the "settlement" advocated by him, 370;
+    his view of the Transvaal Government, 579 (note).
+  Buller, General Sir Redvers, 191;
+    defeat of, 306;
+    his responsibility for the early disasters, 318, 319;
+    his misconception of the state of affairs, 319, 320;
+    at Maritzburg, 321;
+    forces at his disposal, 321;
+    false report of surrender to the Boers, 380.
+  Bundy, Thomas Dashwood, 212 (note).
+  Bunu, the affair of, 89 (note).
+  Burger, Schalk, 89, 101, 159, 564;
+    denounced by Krüger, 100;
+    attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
+    his determination to fight on, 421;
+    his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers in the guerilla war,
+      427;
+    his official notice of June 20th, 1901, 434;
+    his complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps, 463 (note);
+    announces to Lord Kitchener that he is prepared to treat for peace,
+      552;
+    granted a safe-conduct through the British lines to consult Mr. Steyn,
+      552;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556;
+    calls upon the meeting to decide upon continuing the war or not, 570;
+    his account of the origin of the war, 574;
+    his reasons for treating for peace, 578.
+  Burgher Camps, deportation of Boer non-combatants to, 459;
+    high rate of mortality in, 460 to 463;
+    Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the
+      camps, 463 (note);
+    condition of, 503, 505, 513;
+    establishment of schools in, 519 to 523;
+    views of the Boers on, 575.
+  Burgher meetings, The, the minutes of, 560 _et seq._
+  Burgher Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423;
+    its efforts, 427, 429;
+    treatment of its agents, 427 to 429;
+    Bond leaders hold aloof from, 474.
+  Burghersdorp, The theological seminary of, 120.
+  Burns, John, 315, 496.
+  Burt, Thomas, 498 (note).
+  Butler, General Sir William, refuses to transmit a petition for
+      protection from the British residents in the Transvaal, 131, 176;
+    his sympathy with the views of Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 174, 184;
+    his views of a war, 174, 175, 179;
+    his view of the Uitlander grievances, 175;
+    the friction between him and Lord Milner, 175, 176;
+    his view of the attitude of the British inhabitants of S. Africa, 177;
+    his action during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of war,
+      180;
+    requested to furnish a scheme of defence, 180, 181;
+    his scheme, 181 to 183;
+    his evidence before the War Commission, 175 (note), 181 to 183;
+    his failure to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate
+      reinforcements, 183, 319;
+    his withdrawal from the command at the Cape, 184, 247, 269, 289;
+    his only point of agreement with Lord Milner, 185;
+    his estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces, 185;
+    is informed of the Cabinet's decision as to reinforcements, 190.
+
+
+  Caledon, Lord, one of the first measures as Governor of the Cape, 10.
+  Cambridge, The Duke of, 494 (note).
+  Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, his public utterances on the war, 192,
+      252, 256, 259, 314, 367, 368, 399, 416, 418, 574;
+    his treatment of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal as to preparations for war,
+      265, 266;
+    his attitude in Committee of Supply, 371 (note);
+    his remarks in the debate on the S. African Settlement, 393;
+    his charges of inhumanity against the Government and Lord Kitchener,
+      460, 464 (note);
+    his reply to the charge brought against him by Sir M. Hicks-Beach, 466,
+      467;
+    his speech at Stirling on October 25th, 1901, 467;
+    his declaration at Plymouth, 499.
+  "Canadian Precedent," The, 385.
+  Cape Colony, The, an incident in the settlement of the Dutch E. India Co.
+      at, 2;
+    isolation of at the end of the 18th century, 6;
+    the task of governing, 6;
+    the old European population in, 7;
+    representatives of the British Government at, 7;
+    the temporary British occupation of in 1795-1803, 8;
+    population of at the time of the permanent British occupation, 10;
+    Franco-Dutch population in, 11;
+    the "Albany Settlers" in, 15;
+    the emancipation of slaves in, 15;
+    disintegrating influences at work in, 28;
+    transfer to the British Government, 51;
+    the sphere of action of the Afrikander Bond, 55;
+    conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Transvaal, 64;
+    speech of Cecil Rhodes on March 12th, 1898, 67;
+    anti-British sentiment of the Dutch leaders in, 91;
+    the political situation at the time of Lord Milner's arrival, 93;
+    division of parties in, 97;
+    aspirations of the Dutch in, 105;
+    the leaders of Dutch opinion in, 106;
+    public meetings in, 131;
+    nationalists of, 142, 195;
+    the vote for responsible government in, 147;
+    creation of a British party in, 151;
+    the garrison in, 191;
+    demonstrations in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, 215;
+    petition from to the Queen, 216;
+    the British forces in, 243;
+    the Boer aspiration to annex, 258, 259;
+    organisation of the defences of, 269, 278;
+    the British population of, 271;
+    only in name a British colony, 273;
+    alarming rumours from, 305;
+    rebellion of the Dutch in, 341 to 372;
+    proclamation of martial law, 345, 411;
+    Lord Milner's despatch dealing with the rebellion, 346;
+    disclosure of a new centre of rebellion, 354, 355;
+    the second invasion of, 383, 430;
+    racial relations in, 383;
+    clearing it of the republican invaders, 384;
+    the situation in November, 1900, 398;
+    De Wet enters, 430;
+    is chased out, 432;
+    the area to be protected, 445;
+    response of the British population to arms, 446;
+    numbers of Boers in the field in, 454;
+    screened off by blockhouses, 458;
+    the course of events in, 473;
+    collapse of the system of responsible government in, 478 to 480;
+    the Government stipulates for certain conditions as to the procedure
+      of military courts, 481;
+    number of troops placed by the Government of in the field, 485, 486;
+    treatment of rebels in, 563, 567.
+  _Cape Argus, The_, 243 (note).
+  Cape Boys, The, the ill-treatment of, 89 (note).
+  Cape Civil Service, The, disaffection of, 272.
+  Cape Distriks-bestuur, The, 349.
+  Cape electoral system, The, 115, 116.
+  Cape garrison, The, 191, 204, 278.
+  Cape local forces, The, 281 (note).
+  Cape Ministry, The (_see also_ Schreiner Cabinet and Sprigg), its views
+      as to its duties and powers in case of a war, 164;
+    and the Bond, 193;
+    attitude of, 198;
+    "moral support of," 217;
+    its views upon the settlement of the new colonies, 546.
+  Cape nationalists, The, 167, 268.
+  Cape Parliament, The, Afrikander Bond influence in, 60, 70, 393;
+    Progressive majority in, 393;
+    prorogation of, 478, 482.
+  Cape Parliamentary Reports, 395.
+  _Cape Times, The_, 48 (note), 220, 379 (note);
+    report of J. X. Merriman's speech in, 62;
+    its reported interview with Cecil Rhodes, 114;
+    its views on the Redistribution Bill, 117.
+  Capetown, mass meeting at, 204, 250;
+    alleged plot to seize, 350.
+  _Carisbrook Castle, The S.S._, 132 (note).
+  Carnarvon, 354.
+  Carnarvon, Lord, his scheme of federal union, 27.
+  "Carnival of Mendacity," The, 477.
+  Cartwright, Albert, 380, 381, 477.
+  _Cecil Rhodes_, Vindex's, 68 (note).
+  _Century of Wrong, A_, Mr. Reitz's, 356.
+  Cetewayo, destruction of a British regiment by one of his _impis_ 17;
+    his organisation of the Zulus, 25.
+  Chaka, 25.
+  Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, 40, 41, 45, 72;
+    his inquiry of Lord Rosmead as to the Jameson raid, 42;
+    his active sympathy with the Uitlanders, 47;
+    his policy, 72, 73, 125;
+    his choice of Lord Milner as High Commissioner, 75, 77;
+    his despatch of March 6th 1897, 81;
+    accusation against, 82;
+    asserts Great Britain's suzerainty over the Transvaal, 126 (note);
+    his intimation to the Pretoria Executive as to the dynamite contract,
+      130;
+    accepts the suggestion of a conference at Bloemfontein, and decides
+      to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the
+      Uitlanders, 140;
+    a question put by him to Mr. Philip Schreiner, 146;
+    authorises Lord Milner to attend the Bloemfontein Conference, 155;
+    his despatch of May 10th, 1899, 155, 194;
+    agrees with the line proposed to be taken by Lord Milner at the
+      Bloemfontein Conference, 157;
+    his alleged determination to force a war on the Transvaal, 184;
+    his declaration in the House of Commons on the failure of the
+      Bloemfontein Conference, 188;
+    his desire to avoid war, 196;
+    the support given by him to Lord Milner, 200;
+    his speech of June 26th, 1899, at Birmingham, 202, 204;
+    urges delay in passing the limited Franchise Bill, 210;
+    believes the crisis to be at an end, 221;
+    prepared to accept Krüger's illusory Franchise Law, 222;
+    statement by him in the House of Commons on the new franchise law, 227;
+    proposes to the Transvaal a joint commission, 229;
+    his action after the repudiation by the Pretoria Executive of the
+      arrangement made between Mr. Smuts and Sir Wm. Greene, 238, 239;
+    he repudiates the claim made by the S. African Republic to be a
+      sovereign international state, 240;
+    his despatch of September 8th, 1899, 240, 241;
+    his speech at Highbury on August 27th, 249;
+    his proposal to Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman as to preparations for war,
+      265, 266;
+    repudiates the charges of bad faith brought against Sir Wm. Greene,
+      290;
+    his anxiety for a peaceful settlement, 293;
+    his statement at Birmingham, on May 11th, 1900, as to the number of the
+      forces in S. Africa, 325;
+    his statement at Birmingham of the nature of the settlement the
+      Government had determined on, 367;
+    sends a despatch to Lord Milner on the subjects of compensation of
+      loyalists and punishment of rebels, 384;
+    his reply to the views of the Schreiner Cabinet on the questions, 386;
+    his views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels, 389;
+    replies to the arguments of the Schreiner Ministry
+      in favour of a general amnesty, 395;
+    his speech containing the chief points in the proposed proclamation to
+      the fighting burghers, 420;
+    abandons the proposal, 421;
+    sanctions the issue of Governor's warrants at the Cape, 479;
+    refuses an appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479;
+    assents to Lord Milner's application for leave, 488;
+    importance attached by him to the views of the Cape and Natal
+      Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies,
+      489, 490;
+    receives Lord Milner, 490, 491;
+    report presented to him by the Land Settlement Commission, 516;
+    agrees to a tax on the mining industry, 542;
+    his reply to Lord Milner's telegram on the financial position, 543;
+    concurs in Lord Milner's proposals for land settlement, 544;
+    approves Lord Milner's suggestion as to the enlargement of the
+      Legislative Councils, 545;
+    declines to re-open the discussion after the signature of the
+      Vereeniging surrender, 562.
+  Channing, M.P., Mr., 489 (note).
+  Chartered Company, The, 36, 66, 83.
+  Churchill, Winston, Mr., his statement on the use of the word "natives"
+    in the "Terms of Surrender," 568 (note).
+  Civil Administration, the establishment of, in the new colonies, 397,
+      519;
+    its progress, 489, 524.
+  Claremont, speech of Sir J. Rose Innes at, 361, 362.
+  Cloete, Judge, his opinion of Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's
+    frontier policy, 14.
+  "Closer Union," the policy of, 49, 70.
+  "Coercive measures," Boer, 425.
+  Colenso, 306, 321;
+    a result of the defeat at, 8;
+    the Free State Boers moving on, 305.
+  Colesberg, 346, 348.
+  Colonial Conference, The, of 1897, 95.
+  Colonial Office, The, the administration of, 23;
+    a leakage from, 153.
+  Colonial questions, the study of, 24;
+    necessity of, 254.
+  Colonial rebels, The, penalties to be inflicted on, 563, 567;
+    surrenders of, 573 (note).
+  Colonies, The, offers of military aid from, 251, 324.
+  Commando Nek, 455.
+  _Commissie Van Toezicht, The_, 349.
+  Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, The, the report of, 97.
+  Concentration Camps. _See_ Burgher Camps.
+  Concessions Commission, The, 376, 377 (note).
+  "Conciliation," movement, The, 343, 359, 361, 373 to 412;
+    Lord Milner's record of the origin of the movement, 373;
+    injurious influence of the movement on the Colony, 381;
+    the Englishmen who took part in, 383;
+    the initiation of, 375, 415.
+  Conciliation Committee, The, in England, 415.
+  Conservative Governments, 255.
+  Conventions, The, Sir George Grey on, 19;
+    Lord Milner on, 86, 87 (note), 358, 360.
+  _Cornhill Magazine, The_, 263 (note).
+  _Coronation of King Edward VII._, J. E. C. Bodley's, 76 (note).
+  Courtney, Leonard (now Lord), his public utterances on the war, 232,
+      251, 257 to 259, 360, 363, 496, 497;
+    advocates the autonomy of the Republics, 370, 415;
+    letter to him from President Krüger, 372.
+  Cronje, surrenders at Paardeberg, 328.
+  Cronwright-Schreiner, Mrs., 146.
+  Crown Colony Government, formal initiation of, 490, 501, 544.
+  Customs Union, The, 36.
+
+
+  _Daily Chronicle, The_, a statement in as to the crisis in S. Africa,
+    154.
+  Dalmanutha, defeat of Louis Botha at, 329, 414.
+  Davies, "Karri," Major W. D., 88.
+  De Aar, 305, 354, 455.
+  De Jong, Mr., 402 (note), 477.
+  De Kock, Meyer, shot, 427.
+  Delagoa Bay, The proposed railway line to, 29;
+    its purchase recommended by Sir Bartle Frere, 29;
+    appearance of a British squadron at, 82;
+    consignment of ammunition to, 236;
+    railway communication with Pretoria re-opened, 329.
+  De la Rey, J. H., 434, 552, 556, 562 (note), 564;
+    Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note).
+  _De Patriot_, 48, 50 (note), 56, 57, 63.
+  _De Rand Post_, 213.
+  Derby, Lord, publication of his telegram of Feb. 27th, 1884, 262.
+  _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, 54, 57 (note), 58.
+  De Villiers, A. B., 382, 404, 406.
+  De Villiers, Melius, 160, 232;
+    advocates a cessation of hostilities, 401.
+  De Villiers, Sir Henry, 28, 95 (note), 102;
+    his letter of May 21st, 1899, to Pres. Steyn, 159;
+    his visit to Pretoria in 1899, 159, 160;
+    his complaint of the obscurity of the new franchise law, 218, 219;
+    his letter to Mr. Fischer urging Pres. Krüger's acceptance of the joint
+      inquiry, 232, 311;
+    his appeal to Pres. Steyn not to declare war, 292.
+  "Development Loan," The, 540.
+  Devonshire, The Duke of, comment on Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's attitude
+    in Committee of Supply, 371 (note).
+  De Wet, Christian, 420, 434, 562 (note), 564, 575;
+    his blow at Sannah's Post, 363;
+    his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers during the guerilla
+      war, 427, 428;
+    his laager near Lindley, 427;
+    enters Cape Colony, 430, 577;
+    chased out of it, 432;
+    his _Three Years' War_, 433 (note);
+    the pursuit of, 471;
+    his report to L. Botha on the rising in the Cape, 475;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556;
+    signs the Vereeniging Agreement, 567 (note);
+    advocates a continuance of the war, 571, 578;
+    Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note).
+  De Wet, Piet, protests against the treatment of the agents of the Peace
+      Committee, 427;
+    desires the Afrikander leaders to associate themselves with the Burgher
+      Peace Committee, 474.
+  De Wet, Sir Jacobus, 82.
+  Diamond Hill, defeat of the Boers at, 329.
+  Diamond Jubilee, The, celebration of on the Rand, 86, 90.
+  Diamond Mines, The, earnings of, 23;
+    Mr. Merriman's association with, 149.
+  Diamonds, The discovery of, 23.
+  Disarmament, The operation of, 413 to 469;
+    views of the Natal Ministry on, 549.
+  Dodd, Mr., arrest of, 131.
+  Doornkop, The surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at, 68 (note).
+  Dordrecht affair, The, 496 (note).
+  Downing Street, The impossibility of governing S. Africa from, 1, 22,
+      34, 35;
+    Mr. Chamberlain and, 47.
+  Doyle, Sir A. Conan, his _War in South Africa_, 469 (note).
+  Duncan, Mr., 515, 527.
+  Du Plessis, H. A., his protest against the treatment of the Boers who
+    were in favour of peace, 428.
+  Durban, 271.
+  D'Urban, Sir Benjamin, the reversal of his frontier policy, 12 to 15.
+  Durham, Lord, his report on Canada, 480.
+  Dutch, The, their first conflict with the natives of S. Africa, 3.
+  Dutch, The Cape, rebellion of, 341 to 372;
+    the aggravation and use of their disaffection, 373;
+    disarmament of, 413 to 469;
+    their sympathy with the Boer raiders, 432, 433;
+    their restlessness and embitterment, 443;
+    their general attitude, 444.
+  Dutch East India Company, The, an incident in their settlement at the
+      Cape, 2;
+    a century and a half of their government, 5;
+    the corner stone of their policy, 5;
+    their instructions to Van Riebeck, 5, 9.
+  Dutch language, The, the use of, 565, 581.
+  Dutch party, The, interests of, 273.
+  Dutch Press, The, the nationalist propaganda of, 69, 106, 107, 119.
+  Dutch Reformed Church, The, 120, 215, 410, 411, 428.
+  Dutch Republic, A, The establishment of, 255, 356, 357.
+  Dutch South African, The, the original stock from which they are
+      descended, 5;
+    their essential unity, 24;
+    Lord Milner's anxiety to see their best side, 90;
+    anti-British sentiment of, 91, 104;
+    their moral conquest of Cape Colony, 107.
+  Dutch, The republican, 17, 19, 28, 36;
+    conditions under which they were incorporated into the system of
+      British S. Africa, 545.
+  Dutch vote, The, 150.
+  Du Toit, Rev. S. J., 50 (note), 54;
+    his articles in _De Patriot_, 56;
+    rejected by the Bond, 58;
+    reference to him in J. N. Blignaut's letter, 258.
+  Duxbury, Mr., 212 (note).
+  Dynamite Contract, The, 130.
+
+
+  Ebden, Mr. Alfred, 173.
+  Edgar, Tom Jackson, 130, 131 (note), 132, 175.
+  Educational reconstruction, The work of, 519 to 523.
+  Eerste Fabriken, 456.
+  Eighty Club, The, an address to by Mr. Morley, 371 (note).
+  Eliot, Mr., 306.
+  Ellis, M.P., John, 498 (note).
+  Emigrant Farmers, The, 15 to 17.
+  England, The military unpreparedness of, 185;
+    ignorance of the situation in S. Africa, 251, 253, 283, 316, 323, 331;
+    hatred of, 312.
+  _England in Egypt_, 76.
+  English language, The, war against, 58.
+  English State Church, The, Afrikander view of, 53.
+  "Equal rights for all white men," The policy of, 1, 32.
+  Esau, brutal murder of, 427 (note).
+
+
+  Farelly, Mr., 126 (note), 214.
+  Farmer, Canon, 259.
+  "Farmers' Protection Association, The," 59, 60.
+  Farrer, Lord, 498 (note).
+  Faure, Pieter (now Sir), 93, 105.
+  Fiddes, G. V., 167, 515;
+    his report on the work of the departments of education, public works,
+      and district administration, 526.
+  Fischer, Abraham, 126 (note), 161, 203, 204, 210, 239 (note);
+    acts as interpreter at the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
+    his advice to Krüger, 217;
+    in constant communication with Mr. Schreiner, 217 (note);
+    dissociates himself from the "mediation" policy of the Cape
+      nationalists, 234;
+    works at the completion of the military preparations of the Republics,
+      234;
+    revises the Boer reply to the British despatch of Sept. 8th, 1899, 242;
+    recasts the ultimatum, 291;
+    attempt to influence him to terminate the war, 495.
+  Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, The, 203 to 210, 236, 275, 555.
+  Fish River, The, grants of land beyond, 13.
+  FitzPatrick, Sir Percy, 264, 273.
+  _Five Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers_, 16 (note).
+  Forestier-Walker, Lieut.-General, appointed to the Cape command, 184,
+      247, 269;
+    military measures of, 288.
+  Fouché, 432.
+  Fowler, Sir Henry, 416.
+  Franchise for the Uitlanders, The five years', 37, 156, 157, 170, 172,
+      238;
+    conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238.
+  Franchise Law, The, 209 _et seq._;
+    the Volksraad discussion on, 213;
+    demonstrations upon, 215;
+    Krüger recommends a further modification of, 217;
+    the new law passed, 218;
+    obscurity of its provisions, 218 to 220;
+    flagrant insincerity of, 234;
+    Mr. Smuts offers a simplified seven years', subsequently a five years'
+      franchise in lieu of the proposed joint inquiry, 237, 238;
+    conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238;
+    the Home Government kept inactive by, 288.
+  France, The attitude of, 311.
+  Franco-Dutch population at the Cape, The, 11;
+    secession of part of, 17.
+  Fraser, Edmund, difficult position of, 175.
+  Fraser, J. G., his opposition to the policy of "closer union," 49;
+    beaten for the Presidential election, 70.
+  Free State Dutch, The, 18.
+  Frederickstad, 455.
+  French, General, his advance on Colesberg, 348;
+    libel on, 477;
+    surrenders of rebels to, 573 (note).
+  French, Mr., 306.
+  Frere, (the late) Sir Bartle, 24, 25, 261;
+    his diagnosis of the S. African situation, 26;
+    his difference with the Beaconsfield Cabinet, 26;
+    his recall, 27;
+    the vindication of his statesmanship, 27;
+    his knowledge of S. African conditions, 28;
+    drafts a scheme of administrative reform, 28;
+    his private memo, written from the Cape in 1879, 29;
+    events following his recall, 34, 255;
+    letter from to Sir Gordon Sprigg, 263.
+  Frere, Sir Bartle, and Mr. John Morley, 261.
+  _Friend, The_ (Bloemfontein), 235.
+  Froneman, Commandant, 428.
+
+
+  Gatacre, General, defeat at Stormberg, 321, 348.
+  German Emperor, The, telegram of, 71.
+  German General Staff, The, reply to its criticism, 334.
+  German Government, The, action of, 37, 232;
+    attitude of, 311.
+  German Marines at Delagoa Bay, 39 (note).
+  Germiston, Lord Milner's speech at, 491 (note).
+  Gill, Sir David, his words, 286.
+  Girouard, Sir Percy, 502, 532.
+  Gladstone, Rev. Stephen, 498.
+  Gladstone, W. E., S. African policy of, 26, 31.
+  Glencoe, British force despatched to, 291.
+  Glenelg, Lord (_see_ also Grant), Cloete's opinion of his despatch
+    reversing Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy, 14.
+  Gold Industry, The, Commissions on, 529;
+    resumption of, 536.
+  Goodenough, General, his schemes for the defence of the British
+    colonies, 180.
+  Goold-Adams, Major Sir H., 470, 488, 515, 524, 526.
+  Government House, watched by spies, 273.
+  Governor's warrants, 478.
+  Graaf Reinet, first congress of the Afrikander Bond at, 59;
+    Lord Milner's speech at, 84, 91, 92, 98, 99, 107, 115, 367;
+    opening of the railway at, 108;
+    the people's congress at, 379, 381.
+  Grahamstown, 61.
+  Graham, T. Lynedoch, 116 (note).
+  Grant, Charles (aft. Lord Glenelg), his reversal of Sir Benjamin
+    D'Urban's frontier policy, 12 _et seq._
+  Greene, Sir Wm. Conyngham, 82, 127, 131 (note), 198, 210, 226 (note),
+    237, 238, 241, 242, 252, 290, 295, 299, 310.
+  Gregorowski, Chief Justice, 103, 259.
+  Grey, Sir Edward, 416.
+  Grey, Sir George, neglect of his advice by the Home Government 18;
+    his exposure of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions, 19;
+    his despatch to Sir E. B. Lytton, 19;
+    is charged with "direct disobedience," 20, 22;
+    recalled and reinstated, 20;
+    attitude of the Home Government towards, 21.
+  Griqualand West, the discovery of diamonds in, 23;
+    an invitation to the Boers to invade, 260.
+  Groebler, Mr., 204, 205.
+  Guerilla warfare, commencement of, 398;
+    Pres. Steyn's responsibility for, 414, 415;
+    methods and conditions of, 417;
+    responsibility for sufferings of the Boers during, 426, 427;
+    increased losses, to the country due to, 437;
+    methods by which it was brought to a close, 450, 575.
+
+
+  Haldane, Mr., 416.
+  _Handelsblad_, The Amsterdam, an article in, 50.
+  Harcourt, Sir William, 75, 76, 502;
+    his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 78;
+    his misstatement on the Suzerainty question, 262;
+    his manifestation of hostility to the loyalist population of South
+      Africa, 464 (note);
+    his financial miscalculations, 502.
+  Hargrove, E. T., 375 to 380, 415, 496 (note).
+  Harrison, Frederic, 498 (note).
+  "Harry" the Hottentot chief, 3.
+  Heany, Captain, 40, 42, 43.
+  Heidelberg, 456.
+  Hely-Hutchinson, Sir Walter, 470;
+    prorogues the Cape Parliament, 478, 479 (note).
+  Herholdt, A. J., 150, 204;
+    joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142;
+    his mission, 205 (note), 207;
+    his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 390, 393.
+  _Het Oosten_, 477.
+  Het Volk, 55 (note).
+  Hertzog, General, 564, 572;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 558;
+    crosses the Orange River, 430.
+  High Commissioner for S. Africa, The, decreasing power of, 36;
+    severance of the office from the governorship of the Cape, 419, 470.
+  "High Court Crisis," The, 102, 103.
+  _History of the War in South Africa, The Official_, vol. i. 309 (note)
+    _et seq._
+  _History of the War in South Africa, The Times'_, 217 (note), 300 (note),
+    309 (note), 340 (note), 351 (note).
+  Hobhouse, Lord, 498 (note).
+  Hobhouse, Miss, 462 (note).
+  "Hofmeyr Compromise, The," 277.
+  Hofmeyr, J. H., 55;
+    the influence of, 60;
+    adoption of his programme by the Bond, 64;
+    his alliance with Rhodes, 65;
+    dictates Lord Rosmead's policy, 70;
+    his attitude towards the offer of a contribution to the cost of the
+      British Navy, 95;
+    the real leader of the Bond party, 97, 116, 117;
+    his action to prevent the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the
+      petition of the Uitlanders, 140;
+    asks Lord Milner to meet Krüger in conference, 140, 153;
+    his methods for paralysing British administration, 140, 141;
+    his motives, 147;
+    approaches Lord Milner as to meeting Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein, 154,
+      156;
+    his anxiety to prevent decisive action of the Imperial Government, 158;
+    his absence from the Bloemfontein Conference, 167;
+    the pressure of his "mediation," 196;
+    in close communication with Abraham Fischer, 203;
+    confers with Messrs. Fischer and Smuts at Bloemfontein, 205;
+    goes to Pretoria, 207;
+    the failure of his mission, 209;
+    his relations with the republican nationalists, 216, 217;
+    urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry, 232, 311;
+    his view of Mr. Schreiner's position as Premier of the Cape, 235;
+    his opinion of the result of war, 275;
+    his telegram of Sept. 14th to Pres. Steyn, 275;
+    his displeasure at the Schreiner Cabinet, 346, 361;
+    at a meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur, 349.
+  Hottentots, The, 2 to 5, 9, 10.
+  House of Commons, The, debate in on the S. African settlement, 393.
+  Hunter, General, Sir A., Prinsloo surrenders to, 329.
+
+
+  "Imperial factor, The," 40;
+    the elimination of, 34, 85.
+  Imperial Light Horse, The, 179, 447.
+  Imperial military authorities, The, charges brought against, 459.
+  Imperial military railways, The, 502, 505.
+  Imperial spirit, The, 21, 24.
+  Imperial troops, The, calumnies on, 398, 499;
+    insufficiency of, 452, 453;
+    the task of, 435, 452, 487.
+  Impossible position, An, 128.
+  _Impressions of South Africa_, By J. Bryce, extract from, 579 (note).
+  Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act, The, 396.
+  "Independence," the Boer claim to, 578.
+  India, The feudatory princes of, 311.
+  Indian Army, The, troops from for S. Africa, 243, 310.
+  Indian military authorities, The, promptitude displayed by, 289.
+  Industrial Commission, The, anticipation of good results from, 105;
+    impartiality of, 89;
+    treatment of its Report, 99 to 101.
+  Industrial corporations, growth of, 36.
+  Innes, Sir James, 118 (note), 125, 271, 361, 362;
+    becomes Attorney-General, 390;
+    notice issued by him as to treason, 480, 481.
+  Intelligence Department, The, the work of, 177, 180, 190, 217 (note),
+    233, 234 (notes), 257, 277 (note), 292 (note), 319 (note), 425.
+  Inter-State Conference, An, proposal of, 153.
+  Irish Nationalist party, The, 465.
+  Irrigation, report of Sir W. Willcocks on, 516, 529.
+  Isandlhwana, the military disaster of, 17, 26.
+
+
+  Jameson, Dr., 38 _et seq._;
+    his disregard of the Reformers' message and of Rhodes's telegram, 43.
+  Jameson Raid, The, 33, 37, 41;
+    its effect on the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance, 68;
+    object of, 38 to 44;
+    Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into, 82;
+    political forces set in motion by, 93;
+    results of, 69, 71.
+  Janssen, David, the murder of, 2, 3.
+  Johannesburg, 439;
+    Lord Milner's farewell speech at, 129, 145;
+    the second Reform movement at, 132;
+    enthusiastic meeting at, 198, 199, 215;
+    march of Lord Roberts on, 214;
+    exodus from, 246;
+    situation in, 248;
+    occupation of, 329;
+    Lord Roberts's decision to advance on, 352;
+    arrangements for the civil administration of, 397;
+    effective occupation of the district round, 453;
+    British population allowed to return to, 459;
+    Lord Milner's reception at, 472;
+    establishment of a Town Council for, 489;
+    abolition of the office of Military Governor, 489;
+    the public buildings at, 526;
+    organisation of municipal police in, 529.
+  Johannesburg insurrection, The, 41.
+  Johannesburg mines, The, project of wrecking, 214.
+  Johannesburg Reformers, The, 88 (note).
+  _Johannesburg Star, The_, 145 (note), 245;
+    extract from, 491 (note).
+  Johannesburgers, The, splendid fighting of, 447.
+  _John Bull & Co._, Max O'Rell's, 43 (note).
+  Joint Inquiry, The, proposed, 229, 231;
+    refused by the Volksraad, 237.
+  Joubert, General, 101, 235, 320, 344.
+  Jubilee despatch, Lord Milner's, 90 to 92, 99, 104, 107.
+
+
+  Kafir, invasion of 1834-5, The, 15.
+  Kafirs, British policy towards, 12 _et seq._
+  Kafir wars, The, 17.
+  Karree Siding, 363.
+  Kei River, The, the Kafir's line of, 13.
+  Kekewich, Colonel, calls for arms, 304.
+  Kitchener, Lord, 303;
+    appointed Chief of the Staff to Lord Roberts, 321;
+    his losses before Paardeberg, 332;
+    instructed to proceed to De Aar, 354;
+    reduces to order the north-midland districts of the Cape, 362;
+    defamatory libel on, 381;
+    agrees with Lord Milner's views as to the proposed proclamation to
+      the burghers, 420, 421;
+    his address to the Burgher Peace Committee, 422;
+    failure of his peace negotiations with L. Botha, 434;
+    his accession to the command, 452;
+    the troops at his disposal, 453;
+    origin of his system of blockhouse defence, 455;
+    his expectations of the blockhouse lines, 456;
+    reports the creation of mobile columns, 456;
+    his reply to the official Boer complaint against the system of Burgher
+      Camps, 463 (note);
+    discusses with Lord Milner the nature of the reply to Botha's overtures
+      for peace, 471;
+    instructions to his officers as to procedure in military courts, 481;
+    permits the mines to re-open, 489;
+    differs from Lord Milner's views of the terms of the surrender, 551,
+      560;
+    directed to put forward a copy of the correspondence between the
+      British and Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders, 552;
+    assures the Boer leaders that no terms will be granted maintaining the
+      independence of the Republics, 553;
+    is authorised to refer the leaders to the offer made to General Botha
+      at Middelburg, 554;
+    refuses the terms of the Boer peace commissioners, 557;
+    announces "peace" to Lord Milner, 572;
+    records his appreciation of the energy and tact displayed after the
+      signing of the peace treaty by Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and
+      C. De Wet, 573;
+    his last words addressed to the Colonial Governments and the Secretary
+      of State for War, 573 (note);
+    the efficiency of his blockhouse system, 576.
+  Kimberley, 259, 271, 286 (note), 455;
+    the diamond industry at, 23;
+    plans for the defence of, 178, 278, 279;
+    Lancashire Regiment sent to, 288;
+    is cut off, 304, 305;
+    relief of, 328;
+    effective occupation of the district of, 453.
+  Kimberley, The Earl of, 27.
+  Kimberley Volunteers, The, 280, 282 (note).
+  Kipling, Rudyard, on the attitude of the Bond 430, 434.
+  Klerksdorp, 458;
+    conference at, 552.
+  Kock, Judge, warlike speech of at Paardekraal, 197.
+  Komati Poort, the occupation of, 322, 329.
+  Kotzé, Chief Justice, the dismissal of, 102, 103;
+    indignation caused by, 116.
+  Krause, Dr., 214.
+  Kretschmar, J. Van, 377, 533 (note).
+  Krogh, General, 564.
+  Kroonstad entered, 329.
+  Krüger, Paul, 84 to 86;
+    his letter to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney on Sir Bartle Frere's recall, 27;
+    his allusion to Germany at the German Club at Pretoria, 38;
+    supplies arms to adherents of the nationalist cause, 71;
+    invited to visit England, 72;
+    calls for the appointment of the Industrial Commission, 89, 99;
+    uncompromising attitude of, 89;
+    denounces Schalk Burger, 100;
+    elected President of the South African Republic for the fourth time,
+      101;
+    dismisses Chief Justice Kotzé, 102, 103;
+    his determination to increase the disabilities of the Uitlanders, 103;
+    signs a treaty of alliance with the Orange Free State, 104;
+    his attitude in 1898, 114;
+    subsidises the Bond, 118;
+    claims independence for the South African Republic, 126 (note);
+    consents to meet Lord Milner at Bloemfontein, 153;
+    his retrogressive policy, 160;
+    meets Lord Milner, 168;
+    his appearance at the Conference, 171;
+    his motive in attending it, 172;
+    the possibility of his declaring war, 183;
+    expresses his intention of introducing his franchise scheme to the
+      Volksraad, 193;
+    the scheme laid before the Volksraad, 194, 197;
+    his incapacity to yield, 194;
+    complexity of his franchise proposals, 196;
+    his bid for the "moral support," of the Cape Ministry, 209;
+    grants a limited franchise, 209;
+    his object in doing so, 210, 211;
+    wishes to retain the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, 217;
+    recommends to the Volksraad a further modification of the Franchise
+      Bill, 217;
+    inadequacy of his franchise law, 218;
+    hastens arrangements for war, 231;
+    his secret agents 233 (note);
+    urged by Afrikander Members of Cape Parliament to accept the offered
+      joint inquiry, 233;
+    opposition to it, 234;
+    strength of his military position, 244;
+    his note refusing to consider the British offer of September 8th handed
+      to Sir Wm. Greene, 252;
+    his boast, 259;
+    the illusory concessions embodied in his franchise law, 268;
+    spies in his pay, 273;
+    his coarse duplicity, 277;
+    winning all along the line, 288;
+    flees the Transvaal, 329;
+    his "peace overtures," 355;
+    his letter to Mr. Courtney, 372;
+    his telegram to Pres. Steyn shortly before the Bond Congress at
+      Somerset East was postponed, 375, 377;
+    attempt to influence him to terminate the war, 495.
+  Krüger, Tjaart, 212 (note), 213.
+  Krügersdorp, arrival of Dr. Jameson at, 44.
+  Kruitzinger, crosses the Orange River, 430, 432.
+
+
+  Labouchere, Henry, 232, 233, 237, 256, 498.
+  Ladies' Commission, The, 511.
+  Ladysmith, British force entrained at, 291;
+    Sir G. White shut up in, 320, 344;
+    spies in the camp of the relieving force, 337.
+  Lagden, Sir Godfrey, 515, 528.
+  Laing's Nek, evacuated by the Boers, 329.
+  Lancashire Regiment, The, sent to garrison Kimberley, 288.
+  Land settlement, proposed loan for, 540, 543, 544.
+  Land Settlement Commission, The, 516, 529.
+  Langlaate Estate, The, 149.
+  Lanyon, Sir Owen, 263.
+  Lawson, Sir Wilfred, 498 (note).
+  _Leader, The Transvaal_, 213 (note), 245.
+  Legal Adviser's office, The, work of, 527.
+  Legislative Councils of the new colonies, The, enlargement of, 544.
+  Léon, M., 288.
+  Leonard, J. W., 61, 93.
+  Lewis, Mrs., 144.
+  Leyds, Dr., 50 (note), 232, 375;
+    communication opened with European Powers through, 103, 104;
+    despatched to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary of the South African
+      Republic, 125.
+  Liberal Opposition leaders, The, attitude and public utterances of, 143,
+      167, 192, 203, 252, 257, 259, 261, 264 to 266, 314, 367, 368, 371
+      (note), 399, 414, 424, 430, 431, 460, 496, 502;
+    their desire to escape from responsibility, 254;
+    renewal of their alliance with the Afrikander nationalists, 369, 496;
+    representations of the delegates of the Worcester Congress to, 496.
+  Liberal Party, The, mandate to, 25;
+    friends of the Boers in the ranks of, 382, 417, 573.
+    _See also_ Bryce, Burns, Campbell-Bannerman, Courtney, Labouchere,
+       Lloyd-George, Morley, etc.
+  _Life of Gordon, The_, 497 (note).
+  _Lifetime in South Africa, A_, 16 (note).
+  Limpopo River, The, 36.
+  Lindley, De Wet's laager at, 427.
+  Lloyd-George, Mr., 315, 496, 498.
+  Loch, Lord, 36, 37;
+    retirement of, 74.
+  Lombard, Mr., 213.
+  London Convention (1884), The, 31, 87 (note), 262;
+    a violation of, 81;
+    Article IV. in, 580.
+  _Lord Milner and South Africa_, 166 (note).
+  Loreburn, Lord, his attitude during the war, 496.
+  Lorenzo Marques, Transvaal ammunition despatched from, 237.
+  Loyalists, The compensation of, 384.
+  Lucas, General, 564.
+  Lytton, Sir E. B., 20, 21 (notes).
+
+
+  McCallum, Sir Henry E., 470.
+  Mafeking, 259;
+    the rôle played by, 179 (note);
+    capture of an armoured train outside, 304;
+    relief of, 329.
+  Mafeking Volunteers, The, 282 (note).
+  Magaliesberg, The, 455.
+  Magersfontein, 321;
+    a result of the defeat at, 8.
+  Majuba Hill, the British defeat at, 43, 186, 255;
+    evacuated by the Boers, 329.
+  Malan, Commandant, 432.
+  Malan, Mr., 349, 410, 477.
+  Manchester, meeting at, 251, 257.
+  Maritzburg, 271, 321;
+    public meeting at, 249, 250.
+  Martial law, declaration of in additional districts, 411, 478, 482;
+    its administration, 484, 485.
+  Martial Law Board, The, 484, 485.
+  Massingham, Mr., 154 (note).
+  _Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, The_, Captain Mahan's, 579 (note).
+  Merriman, J. X. 61, 69, 93, 97;
+    report of his Grahamstown speech in the _Cape Times_, 62;
+    his letter of March 11th, 1898, to President Steyn, 114;
+    joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142;
+    his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond, 143,
+      144, 148;
+    his association with the Diamond Mines at Kimberley, 149;
+    his partisanship, 149;
+    his desire to induce President Krüger to grant a "colourable measure
+      of reform," 151, 152;
+    sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,
+      152;
+    his appeal to Mr. Fischer, 161;
+    his breach with Mr. Schreiner, 361;
+    his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics, 376 to 378;
+    repudiation of Pres. Krüger's statement as to his intimacy with Mr.
+      Hargrove, 380; his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 391;
+    his denunciation of the policy of the Home Government, 391, 474;
+    purpose of his visit to England, 495;
+    banquet in his honour, 496;
+    his frankness as to his mission, 497;
+    his attack on Lord Milner, 497;
+    attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall, 498.
+  Methuen, Lord, his engagements, 305; forces at his disposal, 321.
+  Meyer, J. L., his views on the war, 574.
+  Middelburg, 458.
+  Middelburg Terms, The, 471, 554, 557 (note), 558, 559, 561, 562, 568
+    (note).
+  Military criticisms on the war, 330 _et seq._
+  "Military Notes," estimate in of Boer forces, 181 (note).
+  Military preparations, delay in making, 242, 243, 246, 250, 279, 288,
+    290, 309 to 311, 316.
+  Military railways, The, 502, 532.
+  Milner, Viscount, pre-eminence of his administration in South Africa, 32;
+    the state of affairs he was called on to deal with, 33;
+    the political situation on his arrival in South Africa, 69;
+    the choice of him as High Commissioner, 75;
+    his official career, 75;
+    his assistance to Sir William Harcourt, 75, 76;
+    banquet to him, 77;
+    extract from his speech at the banquet, 78;
+    affection of those associated with him, 78, 79;
+    his resolution, 79, 219;
+    bitterness of Afrikanders and Boers against, 80;
+    his profound knowledge of the needs of South Africa, 80;
+    efforts of the Liberal party to revoke the final arrangements of his
+      administration, 81;
+    his arrival in South Africa, 81;
+    the policy of, 82;
+    travels through Cape Colony, etc., 83;
+    his speech at Graaf Reinet, 84, 91, 92, 98, 99, 107, 115;
+    his official duties, 84;
+    his position in regard to the Transvaal Government, 84, 85;
+    his anxiety to arrange matters by a friendly discussion with President
+      Krüger, 85, 86, 88;
+    confidence shown him by the British population, 86 (note);
+    his policy with regard to the Conventions, 87;
+    his anxiety to see the best side of the Dutch in the Cape, 90 to 92;
+    travels round Cape Colony, 104;
+    conciliatory utterances of, 105;
+    his reply to the address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander
+      Bond, 109 to 113;
+    the position taken up by him towards the Cape Dutch, 114;
+    his impartiality, 122;
+    visits England, 127;
+    his grasp of the situation, 127;
+    urges the British Government to put an end to an impossible position,
+      128;
+    his farewell speech at Johannesburg, 128, 145;
+    endorses the petition of the Uitlanders, 131;
+    his intention to make public in England his despatch on the position of
+      the Uitlanders, 139;
+    asked to meet Pres. Krüger in conference, 140;
+    warns Mr. Schreiner of the gravity of the situation, 140;
+    postponement of the publication of his despatch, 140;
+    difficulty of his position, 142;
+    sounded by Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Merriman as to the possibility of an
+      inter-state Conference, 152;
+    his despatch of May 4th, 1899, telegraphed, 153;
+    approached by Mr. Hofmeyr as to meeting Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein,
+      154;
+    issue of his despatch of May 4th, 1899, 156, 169, 194;
+    consults Mr. Chamberlain as to the "line" he should take at the
+      Conference, 156, 157;
+    his view of Pres. Krüger's acceptance of a conference, 159;
+    meets Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein, 167;
+    his staff, 167;
+    his reception at Bloemfontein, 168 (note);
+    his embarrassing position, 169, 192;
+    the compromise offered by him, 170;
+    his "inflexibility," 170;
+    his motive in attending the Conference, 171;
+    address presented to him on his return from it to Capetown, 172, 173;
+    essence of his reply to the address, 173;
+    origin of his disagreement with General Butler, 175, 176;
+    his desire for preparations for war, 178, 183, 186, 269, 309, 331;
+    his only point of agreement with General Butler, 185;
+    his reiterated warnings, 189;
+    inadequate reinforcements sent in response to his appeal, 191, 192;
+    acquiesces in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, 195;
+    his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet, 198 to 201;
+    support given him by Mr. Chamberlain, 200, 201;
+    his interviews with Mr. Schreiner, 200, 201;
+    assists the Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, 207, 208;
+    urges delay in passing the Franchise Bill through the Volksraad, 210;
+    demonstrations of confidence in his statesmanship, 215;
+    his influence with the Afrikander leaders, 216;
+    his opinion of the new franchise law, 219, 220;
+    points out to Mr. Chamberlain defects in the law, 221;
+    prevents surrender of Home Government, 222 _et seq._;
+    his resolute advocacy of the Uitlanders' cause, 224;
+    bitter attack on him in _Punch_, 225;
+    his despatch protesting against the readiness of the Government to
+      accept the new franchise law, 225 to 229;
+    further deflection of his policy, 231;
+    conveys to the Pretoria Executive the offer of a joint inquiry, 231;
+    withdraws the limit placed by Sir Wm. Greene upon the time of the reply
+      from the Boer Government to the British Government's despatch of
+      September 8th, 1899, 241;
+    the compromise proposed by him at Bloemfontein, 244;
+    his anxiety, 247;
+    asks for another military adviser, 247;
+    his despatch explaining his position at the Bloemfontein Conference,
+      247;
+    appeals for prompt action, 248;
+    Mr. (now Lord) Courtney's attack on Lord Milner, 252, 257, 258;
+    warns the English people of the advocacy of a Dutch Republic in South
+      Africa, 255;
+    makes known to the Government the state of affairs, 267;
+    his colonial ministers, 270;
+    support given him by the British population in South Africa, 270;
+    atmosphere of intrigue by which he was surrounded, 271;
+    abuse of him by the _South African News_, 272, 380, 381;
+    passage of war material to the Orange Free State brought to his notice
+      accidentally, 273;
+    his personal charm, 277;
+    his efforts to persuade Mr. Schreiner of the necessity of providing for
+      the defence of Kimberley, 278, 279;
+    his advice to the Cape and Home Governments, 282, 283;
+    his limited powers, 283;
+    a passage in his speech in the House of Lords on February 26th, 1906,
+      283;
+    defensive measures devised by him, 288;
+    his use of the time elapsing between the recall of General Butler and
+      the ultimatum 289;
+    instructed to repudiate the claim of the South African Republic to be
+      a sovereign international state, 290;
+    his anxiety to attain a peaceful settlement, 293;
+    receives the ultimatum, 295;
+    warns the British authorities in Natal, Rhodesia, and Basutoland, 298;
+    the call upon his constructive statesmanship, 303;
+    consults Mr. Schreiner upon the feasibility of carrying out Sir Redvers
+      Buller's suggestion to form local defences out of Dutch farmers, 320;
+    his relationship with the military authorities, 341;
+    alliance against him, 343, 344;
+    scant help afforded him by Mr. Schreiner, 345;
+    his despatch telling the story of the rebellion in the Cape, 346;
+    addresses a memorandum to Lord Roberts on the rebellion in Cape Colony,
+      351, 352;
+    his view as to the defence of the Cape, 353;
+    visits the north-midland districts of the Cape, 362;
+    arrives at Bloemfontein, 363;
+    receives an appreciative address at Capetown, 363;
+    his reply to the address, 364;
+    his record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement, 373;
+    his representation to Mr. Schreiner as to the proposed Bond congress at
+      Somerset East, 374;
+    his despatch covering the newspaper report of the People's Congress at
+      Graaf Reinet, 381;
+    his view of racial relations in Cape Colony, 383;
+    receives a despatch from Mr. Chamberlain on the questions of the
+      compensation of loyalists and the punishment of rebels, 384;
+    inquires as to the Home Government's views upon the disfranchisement
+      of the rebels, 389;
+    bitter invectives against him of members of the Schreiner Cabinet, 391;
+    wins over Mr. Schreiner to the side of the Empire-State, 393;
+    indicates to Mr. Chamberlain the nature of the Treason Bill, 394;
+    pays a brief visit to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 396;
+    makes arrangements for the civil administration of Pretoria and
+      Johannesburg, 397;
+    his journey to Bloemfontein, 397;
+    inaugurates the South African Constabulary, 397;
+    receives the commissions under which he is appointed to administer
+      the new colonies, 398, 419, 470, 501;
+    receives a deputation from the Worcester Congress, 404;
+    his reply, 406;
+    his final departure from the Cape to the Transvaal, 419;
+    his objection to issuing a proclamation to the fighting burghers at
+      the close of 1900, 420;
+    approves of Lord Kitchener's proposals, 421;
+    his account to Mr. Chamberlain of the situation on February 6th, 1901,
+      436;
+    leaves Capetown to assume administration of the new colonies, 470;
+    incidents of his journey, 471;
+    discusses with Lord Kitchener the nature of the reply to Botha's
+      overtures for peace, 471;
+    the position taken up by him, 472;
+    at Pretoria, 472;
+    the sphere of his administrative activity, 473;
+    his second visit to England, 473, 487, 490;
+    endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479;
+    issues a notice as to acts of treason, 480, 481;
+    obtains the views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question
+      of the settlement of the new colonies, 489;
+    his reception on his second return to England, 490;
+    his audience with the King, 490;
+    marks of royal favour shown to him, 490, 491;
+    his speech at a luncheon given in his honour, 492;
+    agitation for his recall, 499;
+    returns to Johannesburg, 501;
+    his despatch describing affairs in November, 1901, 503;
+    invites Mr. E. B. Sargant to organise the work of educational
+      reconstruction, 520;
+    appoints commissions on the gold industry, 529;
+    his attention to the reorganisation of the railways, 532;
+    urges the settlement of British colonists on the land, 538;
+    proposes a loan for land settlement, 540;
+    his tireless energy, 541, 545;
+    his proposed tax on the mining industry, 541;
+    his telegram on the immediate financial position, 542;
+    his repatriation scheme, 543;
+    presses for a decision on the land settlement question, 543;
+    differs from Lord Kitchener's views upon the terms of the surrender,
+      551, 560;
+    drafts the terms of the surrender, 551, 558;
+    refuses the terms of the Boer Peace Commissioners, 557;
+    his care as to the English text of the Vereeniging surrender, 560, 561;
+    England's debt to him, 562;
+    summoned to Pretoria for the signing of the treaty of peace, 572.
+  Mines Department, The, reorganisation of, 528.
+  Mines, The, the project of wrecking, 214;
+    permitted to re-open, 489, 507;
+    native labour for, 509;
+    their prosperity, 518.
+  Mining plant, injury to by Boer raiders, 438.
+  Mining industry, Lord Milner's proposed 10 per cent, tax on, 541.
+  Missionaries, The, work of, 18.
+  Mitchell, Sir Lewis, 485.
+  Mobile columns, The creation of, 456.
+  Modder River, Station, 322, 328.
+  Monypenny, Mr., attempt to arrest, 245.
+  Mooi River, The, 455.
+  Morgendael, J., 428.
+  Morley, John, misstatement by, 261;
+    his attitude and public utterances on the war, 252, 259, 263, 314,
+      360, 370, 371 (note), 415.
+  Müller, E. B. Iwan, letter in the possession of, 166;
+    his _Lord Milner and South Africa_, 166 (note).
+  Müller, G., 428.
+  Municipal police, Organisation of, 529.
+
+
+  Naauwpoort, 455.
+  Namaqualand, The election for, 121.
+  Napier, Sir George, his evidence before the House of Commons on Lord
+    Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy, 14.
+  Natal, 51;
+    a menace to, 26;
+    public meetings in, 131, 215;
+    petition from to the Queen, 216;
+    the invasion of, 235;
+    the British forces in, 243, 246, 269;
+    Boer aspiration to annex, 258, 259;
+    mobilisation of the local forces in, 280 (note);
+    Transvaal commando sent to the border, 290;
+    the British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298;
+    treatment of the rebels in, 563, 567, 568.
+  Natal Ministry, The, views of on the settlement of the new colonies,
+      547 to 550;
+    views of on disarmament and the treatment of the natives, 549;
+    advocates "reciprocity" in the learned professions and civil services
+      of the several colonies, 550;
+    puts forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of
+      the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal, 550;
+    its view as to the treatment of the rebels, 568.
+  Nationalist movement, in South Africa, The, 48 _et seq._
+  National Union, The, 41.
+  Native Affairs, The Department of, in the Transvaal, 528.
+  Natives, The, the question of arming, 281;
+    the question of the franchise for, 566;
+    the treatment of, 549.
+  Navy Contribution Bill, The, 96;
+    second reading of, 125 (note).
+  Netherlands Government, The, 232;
+    offer mediation, 551.
+  Netherlands Railway, The, 376 to 381, 532 (note).
+  New South Wales, offers a military contingent, 251.
+  Nicholls incident, The, 212, 213.
+  Nicholson, Colonel, 179.
+  _Nineteenth Century, The_, 261 (note);
+    article by Sir Bartle Frere in, 29 (note).
+  Non-interference, the principle of, 10, 12.
+  _Norman, The S.S._, 247.
+  Norval's Pont, 521.
+
+
+  Olivier, Commandant, 287 (note), 564.
+  _Ons Land_, its pæan of triumph over the surrender of Jameson's troopers,
+      68 (note);
+    its reproof of Sir Pieter Faure, 105;
+    its anti-British policy, 106;
+    its indictment of the Sprigg Ministry, 117;
+    its presentation of the objects of the Afrikander party, 119;
+    its article on the Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and Herholdt, 205 to 207;
+    meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur at the offices of, 348, 349;
+    its New Year exhortation, 349;
+    its comment on the postponement of the Bond Congress at Somerset East,
+      374;
+    its approval of the slanders on British troops, 403;
+    its comment on Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester Congress, 409;
+    libels General French, 477.
+  Orange Free State, The, mineral wealth of, 54;
+    relations of the Imperial Government to, 87 (note);
+    its treaty of alliance with the Transvaal, 104, 125;
+    irritation in against British intervention, 215;
+    ammunition sent to, 216, 247, 273, 286;
+    alleged movement of British troops to the border of, 236;
+    the danger of a premature grant of responsible government to, 284;
+    decides to declare war, 291;
+    Lord Roberts enters, 328;
+    annexation of, 329;
+    invades south of Orange River, 344;
+    the Landdrosts of, 347;
+    the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of, 432;
+    area enclosed by blockhouse lines, 458;
+    the number of scholars on the school rolls, 523 (note).
+  Orange River, The, 455.
+  Orange River Colony, Lord Milner arranges for the civil administration
+      of, 397;
+    reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.E. of, 441;
+    numbers of Boers in the field in, 454;
+    progress of civil administration in, 489, 524;
+    issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of, 490, 501,
+      544;
+    grant in aid of the revenue of, 501;
+    number of scholars on the school rolls, 523, 524;
+    revenue of, 528;
+    farm settlers in, 536;
+    the settlement of, 546;
+    military administration in, 566;
+    taxation of landed property in, 566.
+  _Oranjie Unie_, The, 55 (note).
+  _Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed, The_, 49, 54 (note), 234 to
+    236 (notes).
+
+
+  Paardeberg, conduct of the attack on, 332;
+    surrender of Cronje at, 328, 354.
+  Paardekraal, great assemblage of Boers at, 197;
+    speeches delivered at, 213.
+  Pakeman, Mr., arrest of, 245.
+  "Pass" system, The, 528.
+  Paul, H., 368.
+  Peace, Preparing for, 470 to 535.
+  Peace commissioners, The Boer, 556.
+  Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423;
+    treatment of agents of, 427 to 429;
+    its efforts, 427, 429.
+  Permits, The establishment of, 482.
+  Poplar Grove, 354.
+  Port Elizabeth, Ammunition landed at, 216, 236.
+  Portland, The (3rd) Duke of, his despatch referring to the treatment of
+    the Boers, 9
+  Pretoria, The British flag hoisted over the Raadzaal of, 167 (note), 329;
+    war preparations at, 234, 235, 244;
+    ammunition sent to, 236;
+    railway communication with Delagoa Bay re-opened, 329;
+    Lord Roberts's decision to advance on, 352;
+    his occupation of, 369;
+    Lord Milner makes arrangements for the civil administration, 397;
+    Burgher Peace Committee formed at, 412, 422;
+    effective occupation of the district round, 453;
+    Lord Milner at, 472;
+    the public buildings at, 526;
+    meeting between the Boer leaders and Lords Milner and Kitchener at,
+      552, 556.
+  Pretoria Convention, The, 31, 87 (note).
+  Pretoria Executive, The, attitude of, 82, 88, 89;
+    Mr. Chamberlain's communication to on the dynamite contract, 130;
+    its attempt to buy off the capitalists, 131, 152;
+    its committal to a policy of defiance, 158;
+    its negotiations with the Home Government after the Bloemfontein
+      Conference, 196, 199;
+    its lack of good faith, 231;
+    repudiates the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir Wm. Greene, 238,
+      239, 242;
+    charges Sir Wm. Greene with bad faith, 242;
+    its declaration of September 15th, 1899, to Mr. Hofmeyr, 276;
+    brings negotiations to a conclusion, 289;
+    its replies to the British despatches of July 27th and May 10th, 294.
+  Pretorius, Mr., 406, 421.
+  Pretyman, General, 470.
+  Price, Mr., 306.
+  Prieska, 354.
+  Prinsloo, Commandant, surrender of, 329.
+  Pro-Boers, The manufacture of, 434, 443.
+  Proclamation to the fighting burghers, The proposed, 420.
+  "Programme of Principles," The Afrikander Bond, 59.
+  Progressive Cabinet, A, formation of, 280 (note), 390.
+  Progressive Party, The, 97, 98, 116, 118;
+    the funds of; 118;
+    their strength in the Cape Parliament, 121, 122, 393;
+    led by Sir Gordon Sprigg, 125;
+    their support of Lord Milner, 271;
+    resolution presented to the Home Government by, 295.
+  _Punch_, 225.
+
+
+  Queen's Hall, Pro-Boer meeting in, 498.
+  Queensland, offers a military contingent, 251.
+
+
+  Raad, The, meeting of, 193.
+  Racial fusion, The problem of, 516.
+  Railway lines, The cutting of, 459.
+  Railways, The, the reorganisation of, 530, 535.
+  Rand, The, 36, 518;
+    agitation on for reform, 131;
+    recommencement of the industrial life of, 489, 507, 536.
+  Rebels, The, treatment of, 384 to 391, 563, 567, 568;
+    their disfranchisement, 388, 389;
+    surrenders of, 573 (note).
+  "Reciprocity" between the civil services of the several colonies, 550.
+  Redistribution Bill, The, introduction of, 116;
+    second reading of, 117, 118;
+    its effect on the British population, 125.
+  Reform Committee, The, 39;
+    their message to Dr. Jameson, 40;
+    alteration of their plans, 41, 42.
+  Refugees, The return of, 489, 507, 508, 512, 533.
+  Registration of electors, The, postponed, 476.
+  _Reichstag, The S.S._, 236.
+  Reinforcements, The, character of, 330.
+  Reitz, F. W., 50, 144, 159, 294, 564;
+    his policy of "closer union," 49;
+    takes Dr. Leyds's place as State Secretary, 126;
+    asserts the Sovereignty of the Transvaal, 127 (note);
+    his reply to Mr. Chamberlain's communication on the dynamite contract,
+      130;
+    instructed to decline Mr. Chamberlain's request for delay in passing
+      the Franchise Bill, 211;
+    his despatch refusing the preferred joint inquiry, 237;
+    communicates to the British Government Mr. Smut's new proposals for
+      a five years' franchise, 238;
+    his despatch repudiating the Smuts-Greene arrangement, 239;
+    his appeal to "Free Staters and Brother Afrikanders," 297;
+    Mr. Amery's meeting with him, 300;
+    his book, _A Century of Wrong_, 356;
+    a letter of his published by the Concessions Commission, 377 (note).
+  Repatriation scheme, Lord Milner's, 543.
+  Republican nationalists, The, 259, 275, 282;
+    their hatred of England, 429.
+  Republican United States of South Africa, The, 258, 259.
+  Republics, The, military preparations of, 166, 167, 178, 234;
+    expulsion of British subjects from, 246;
+    manifestoes issued by upon the outbreak of war, 257;
+    their treatment of British residents on the declaration of war, 292;
+    fall of, 329;
+    the British case against, 357 to 359.
+  Reserves, Insufficient supply of, 323, 331.
+  Retrocession, The, 255.
+  Rhodes, Cecil, 34, 35, 83;
+    his scheme of commercial federation, 38, 39;
+    his comment on Dr. Jameson's Raid, 40;
+    actual cause of the failure of his plan, 45;
+    his methods, 46;
+    his alliance with the Afrikander Bond, 46;
+    his alliance with J. H. Hofmeyr, 65;
+    an incident in his political career, 66;
+    his speech of March 12th, 1898, 67;
+    recognised by the Bond as its enemy, 68;
+    his resignation, 93, 96;
+    his return to political life, 97;
+    the actual chief of the Progressives, 117;
+    opposed at Barkly West, 118 (note);
+    returned for both Barkly West and Namaqualand, 121;
+    his tactics after the election following upon Sir Gordon Sprigg's
+      dissolution of Parliament, 122, 123;
+    his interview with Lord Milner, 124 (note); his anger at the impotence
+      of England, 306;
+    endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479.
+  Rhodesia, 84, 192;
+    demonstration in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, 215;
+    petition from to the Queen, 216;
+    organisation of the defences of, 269;
+    warned by Lord Milner, 298.
+  Ripon, The Marquess of, 37, 498 (note).
+  Roberts, Lord, 329 (note);
+    a result of his occupation of Bloemfontein, 156;
+    appointed to the South African command, 321;
+    strength of his force, 322, 332 (note);
+    his despatches, 326 to 328, 339, 341, 352;
+    his tactics at Paardeberg, 332, 333;
+    his alleged instructions from the Government, 333;
+    a reply to criticism of German General Staff upon his strategy, 334;
+    his campaign, 343;
+    his decision to advance on Johannesburg and Pretoria, 352;
+    his qualities as a captain of war, 353;
+    why he did not carry out Lord Milner's suggestion as to the defence of
+      the Cape, 353;
+    his occupation of Pretoria, 369;
+    his enforced halt at Bloemfontein, 384;
+    his approaching return to England, 398;
+    his recognition of the difficulty of the task of disarmament, 413;
+    relinquishes command of the forces in South Africa, 419;
+    agrees with Lord Milner's views on the proposed proclamation to the
+      burghers, 420;
+    his proclamation, 424;
+    his victories, 435;
+    sends some of the civilian population to L. Botha, 452.
+  Robertson, Edmund, M.P., 417, 498 (note);
+    his speech at Dundee on Oct. 16th, 1901, 467, 468.
+  Robinson, J. B., 149.
+  Robinson, Sir John, his view of the reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's
+    frontier policy, 16.
+  Roos Senekal, capture of documents at, 425, 426, 431;
+    circular issued at, 463 (note).
+  Rosebery Lord, his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 278;
+    his support of the Government, 264, 416.
+  Rosmead, 455.
+  Rosmead, Lord, 36, 39;
+    his action, 45;
+    his response to Mr. Chamberlain's counsels, 46;
+    his policy, 70;
+    his attitude at Pretoria, 72;
+    intimates his wish to retire, 74;
+    his resistance to the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize
+      Bechuanaland, 74;
+    retires, 75;
+    his promise to obtain reasonable reforms from. President Krüger,
+      88 (note).
+  _Rosslyn Castle, The S.S._, 305.
+  Russia, attitude of, 311.
+
+
+  St. Aldwyn, Lord, his charge against members of the Liberal Opposition
+    and the Irish Nationalists, 465.
+  Salisbury, The (late) Marquess of, 75;
+    sympathetic speech of on the Transvaal question, 228, 229;
+    his answer to the charge of "military unpreparedness," 265;
+    receives "peace overtures," 355;
+    his reply, 357;
+    his indignant comment on the attitude of the Liberal leaders, 416;
+    his charge against Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, 466;
+    receives Lord Milner, 490.
+  Salisbury Cabinet, The, reluctance of to push matters to an extremity,
+      176, 188;
+    its disregard of Lord Wolseley's advice, 177, 188, 189, 190;
+    its decision as to reinforcements, 190, 191;
+    the course it decided to adopt, 196;
+    its weakness, 223, 224;
+    determines to make a definite announcement of its South African
+      policy; 228;
+    position taken up by it, 230;
+    its last effort to come to a friendly understanding, 240;
+    its despatch of Sept, 8th, 1899, 241, 242;
+    decides to raise the strength of the Natal and Cape forces, 242,
+      243, 246, 250, 279, 288;
+    its reluctance to make war, 251;
+    patriotism of, 266;
+    Afrikander leaders' view of, 274;
+    decides to mobilise an army corps, 290;
+    its military action, 309, 310, 331;
+    its alleged instructions to Lord Roberts, 333, 334;
+    its decision as to the Conventions, 360.
+  Sand River Convention, The, 17;
+    Sir George Grey's exposure of, 19.
+  Sannah's Post, 363.
+  Sargant, E. B., his story of the educational efforts during the war,
+    520 to 523.
+  Sauer, Hans, 97.
+  Sauer, J. W., joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142;
+    his sympathy with the Boers, 149;
+    his mission to Dordrecht, 287 (note), 379 (note);
+    his breach with Mr. Schreiner, 361;
+    his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics, 376, 377;
+    his intimacy with Mr. Hargrove, 379;
+    his repudiation of Pres. Krüger's statement as to his connection with
+      Mr. Hargrove, 380;
+    his declaration when opposing the second reading of the Treason Bill,
+      396, 474;
+    purpose of his visit to England, 495;
+    banquet in his honour, 496;
+    his frankness as to his mission, 497;
+    attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall, 498.
+  Scheepers, 432.
+  Schreiner Cabinet, The, 96, 124, 141, 150;
+    the Bond Members of, 142;
+    its desire to prevent British intervention, 150;
+    its "planks," 158;
+    the Te Water correspondence, 162 to 166;
+    its opinion of Pres. Krüger's franchise proposals, 198;
+    uses its influence to assist the Pretoria Executive in refusing the
+      franchise reform put forward by Lord Milner, 199;
+    its refusal to call out the local forces, 280 to 283, 345;
+    refuses aid to Mafeking and Kimberley, 345;
+    its demise, 346, 390;
+    individual views of the members on the treatment of the rebels, 390.
+  Schreiner-Bond coalition, The, 98.
+  Schreiner, Olive, 144.
+  Schreiner, Philip, adopted as the parliamentary leader by the Bond, 97;
+    moves a vote of "no confidence" in the Sprigg Ministry, 118;
+    his electoral utterances, 118;
+    forms a ministry, 124;
+    warned by Lord Milner of the gravity of the situation, 140;
+    his blind partisanship for the Transvaal, 142, 147;
+    his relationship to Lord Milner, 143;
+    his history, 144;
+    his regard for the British Empire, 145;
+    his reply to a question of Mr. Chamberlain's, 146;
+    his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander nationalists, 146;
+    sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,
+      152;
+    receives warning telegrams from England, 153, 154;
+    writes a confidential letter to President Steyn, 154;
+    the influence which he used with the Transvaal Government, 155;
+    his view of Krüger's acceptance of a conference, 158;
+    his solicitude to attend the Bloemfontein Conference, 167;
+    his partisanship on the question of the franchise, 198, 199;
+    informed of the Home Governments' intention to "complete" the Cape
+      Garrison, 204;
+    his view of the grant of a limited franchise to the Uitlanders, 210;
+    urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry, 232, 235;
+    his position, 235;
+    his declaration as to the attitude he would assume in the event of
+      war, 248;
+    his knowledge of the Port Elizabeth ammunition for the Free State,
+      273;
+    his benediction of Pres. Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme and of the
+      Volksraad's proposals, 276;
+    his complex political creed, 278;
+    his resistance to Lord Milner's plans of local military preparation,
+      278;
+    recedes from his standpoint of neutrality, 280, 344, 345, 373;
+    is prevailed on to call out the Kimberley volunteers, 280;
+    his final concession, 281;
+    fails to provide Kimberley with arms, 304;
+    consents to the proclamation of martial law, 345;
+    scant help afforded by him to Lord Milner, 345;
+    his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 361, 474;
+    uses his influence for the postponement of the Bond Congress at
+      Somerset East, 374;
+    is brought into conflict with the Bond members of his Cabinet, 384;
+    his views upon the nature of the punishment to be inflicted on rebels,
+      385, 390;
+    his sense of loyalty to the person of the Sovereign, 392;
+    his support of the Treason Bill, 474.
+  Schreiner, Theophilus, 144.
+  Schutte, Mr., 212 (note).
+  _Science of Rebellion, The_, 431 (note).
+  Seale-Hayne, M.P., Mr., 498 (note).
+  Select Committee on British South Africa, The proceedings of, extract
+    from, 146.
+  _Settlement after the War, The_, 214 (note).
+  Settlement of the new colonies, The, the question of, 489, 564 _et seq._
+  Seventeen, The Chamber of, 3, 4, 5.
+  Shaw, M.P., Thomas, 498 (note);
+    his speech at Galashiels on October 14th, 1901, 467, 468.
+  Sherman, General, 451 (note).
+  Showers, Mr., 529.
+  Silberbauer, Mr., 167.
+  Simon's Bay, 57.
+  Slaghter's Nek, the "rebellion" of, 11.
+  Slaves, The emancipation of in Cape Colony, 15.
+  Smalldeel, 397.
+  Smartt, Dr., 116 (note).
+  Smuts, J. C., 152, 159, 204, 212 (note), 572;
+    appointed State Attorney, 126;
+    attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
+    report in _The Times_ of a conversation with, 214;
+    is entrusted with the projected destruction of the mines, 214;
+    furnishes an explanatory memorandum of the new franchise law, 218;
+    offers Sir William Greene a simplified seven years' franchise in lieu
+      of a joint inquiry, 237, 238;
+    his attempt to disown the arrest of Mr. Pakeman, 245;
+    his words at Vereeniging on May 30th, 1902, 276;
+    failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene through
+      him, 309, 310;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 558;
+    his suggestion as to a "formal clause" in the draft Vereeniging
+      agreement, 561;
+    his responsibility for the origin of the war, 574.
+  Solomon, Saul, 147.
+  Solomon, Sir R., 118 (note);
+    accepts office under the Schreiner Ministry as Attorney-General, 124,
+      142;
+    his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond, 144,
+      147, 148;
+    his distrust of Rhodes, 148;
+    his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 361, 474;
+    visits the north-midland districts of the Cape with Lord Milner, 362;
+    his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 390, 393, 395;
+    his support of the Treason Bill, 474;
+    appointed Legal Adviser to the New Transvaal administration, 474
+      (note);
+    help afforded by him to Lord Milner, 515;
+    his energy and capacity, 527;
+    presides over a commission on the gold industry, 529;
+    assists Lord Milner in the draft of the terms of the Vereeniging
+      surrender, 551, 558.
+  Somerset East, Annual Congress at, 374.
+  South Africa, failure of British administration in, 1;
+    population of European descent in, 5;
+    British treatment of the natives and Dutch in, 8 _et seq._;
+    the first effort to introduce a large British population, 15;
+    public interest in, 23;
+    ultimate control of British policy in, 24;
+    the decision of cardinal questions dealing with its administration, 34;
+    the Dutch population of, 43, 46, 49, 98, 105;
+    Dutch view of the nationalist movement in, 49;
+    before and after the Jameson Raid, 68;
+    as Lord Milner found it, 69;
+    attempts to secure the reunion of under the British flag, 69;
+    the British cause in, 71;
+    reinforcement of the British garrison in, 94;
+    aspirations of the Dutch in, 105;
+    despondency of the British population, 107;
+    result of the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference on the British
+      population, 172;
+    moral weakness of England's position in, 186;
+    approval of Lord Milner's policy by the British population, 216;
+    dismay of the British population as the Imperial Governments' reported
+      acceptance of the franchise law, 222;
+    performance of the British Army in, 323;
+    numbers of the British Army in on April 1st, 1900, 323;
+    numbers of the British population in who served, 324;
+    the task of subduing the entire Dutch population of, 435;
+    loyalists in, 447, 448;
+    the manifestation of hostility against the loyalist population of,
+      464 (note).
+  _South Africa: A Study, etc._, 579 (note).
+  South African Constabulary, inauguration of, 397, 530;
+    expenses of, 502;
+    composition of, 531.
+  South African Garrison, The, 178, 190, 309, 310.
+  South African League, The, 96, 133, 212 (note), 374.
+  South African Nationality, The, the creation of, 58.
+  _South African News, The_, 225, 380;
+    its abuse of Lord Milner, 272, 391, 477;
+    its charge against British soldiers, 402.
+  South African Republics, The attempt to bring them into a federal system
+      under the British Crown, 69;
+    their relations with the British Government, 81;
+    their military preparations, 166, 167, 178, 181.
+  South African Settlement, The, debate on in the House of Commons, 393.
+  South African Unity, The goal of, 65, 66, 69.
+  South African War, The Great, events which culminated in, 25, 188.
+  South Central Africa, 36.
+  Sprigg, Sir Gordon, 70, 280 (note);
+    his Ministry, 93, 94, 96, 97, 124, 217 (note);
+    his regard for British interests, 94;
+    his relations with Cecil Rhodes, 94;
+    the attempt to prevent him from attending the Colonial Conference of
+      1897, 94, 95;
+    resolves to bring forward a Redistribution Bill, 116;
+    appeals to the electorate, 118;
+    defeat of his Ministry, 124;
+    leads the Progressives in opposition, 125;
+    becomes Premier, 390;
+    is at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government, 473, 485;
+    his view as to the prorogation of Parliament, 482;
+    his loyal co-operations with the Imperial authorities, 485;
+    replies to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 500.
+  Springs, 456.
+  Standerton, 458.
+  _Star, The_ (Johannesburg), 145 (note), 245, 491 (note).
+  Statham, Mr., 377 (note).
+  Stead, W. T., 75, 357 (note).
+  Steenekamp, Mrs. Anna E., 16 (note).
+  Steyn, Marthinus, 70, 564;
+    his agency in the matter of the Bloemfontein Conference, 140;
+    Mr. Merriman's letter to him with reference to "a colourable measure
+      of reform" in the Transvaal, 152;
+    accepts the rôle of peace-maker, 153;
+    asks the Cape Premier to ascertain Lord Milner's willingness to meet
+      Pres. Krüger, 154, 155;
+    formal acceptance of his invitation to the Bloemfontein Conference,
+      156;
+    his replies to Dr. Te Water's letters, 162;
+    his willingness to take part in the Conference, 168;
+    his evening reception on the opening day of the Conference, 171;
+    inquires as to movements of British troops, 236;
+    his pledge that Cape Colony should not be invaded, 279;
+    his commandos, 289;
+    the ultimatum submitted for his approval, 291;
+    his misgivings, 291;
+    receives an appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers, 292;
+    declares war, 295;
+    his "peace overtures," 355;
+    his responsibility for the guerilla war, 414, 415, 427;
+    circulates utterances of the leaders of the Liberal Opposition, 468;
+    consults with Schalk Burger as to peace, 552;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552;
+    his negotiations, 553;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 564;
+    his inability to sign the agreement, 567 (note).
+  Stop-the-war Committee, The, 368.
+  Stormberg, 321, 348, 455;
+    a result of the defeat at, 8.
+  _Story of an African Farm, The_, 144.
+  Strydom, the Boer, 427 (note).
+  _Studenten Blad_, The, of the Theological Seminary of Burghersdorp, 120.
+  _Sud Africaan_, The, 351 (note).
+  Sunnyside, 472.
+  Swaziland border, The, the question of, 89 (note).
+  Swaziland Convention, The, 87 (note).
+  Sydney, Public meeting at, 250.
+  Symons, General, 319.
+
+
+  "Taal," The, preservation of, 547.
+  Tembuland border, The, advance of the Boers to, 281;
+    Mr. Schreiner's action with reference to, 281, 282.
+  Tembus, The, 281.
+  "Terms of Surrender," The, communicated to the Boer Commissioners, 563;
+    the draft agreement of, 564.
+  Terrorism and deceit, A system of, 425, 426.
+  Te Water, Dr., 93, 94, 142, 150, 154, 235;
+    resignation of, 95, 116;
+    joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124;
+    his faithfulness to the Bond, 162, 163;
+    advocates amnesty for the rebels, 392.
+  Te Water Correspondence, The, 156, 162 to 166.
+  Theron, T. P., 64;
+    opposes the Redistribution Bill, 117;
+    declines to meet the peace delegates, 475.
+  Thomas, C. H., 49.
+  _Three Years War, The_, 433 (note), 570 (note);
+    extract from, 578.
+  _Times, The_, 261 (note);
+    report of a conversation with Mr. Smuts, 214;
+    reproduces Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with its correspondent, 221,
+      227;
+    letter of Sir Wm. Harcourt to, 262;
+    report of a speech by Mr. Morley, 371 (note);
+    protest in of "an old Berliner," 468.
+  Transkei, The, 486.
+  Transvaal, The, Sir Bartle Frere's visit to in 1879, 28;
+    restoration of the Boer Republic in, 30, 31, 34;
+    the English of, 42, 43;
+    mineral wealth of, 54;
+    the Afrikander Bond in, 55;
+    conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Cape, 64;
+    attempts to secure Bechuanaland, 64;
+    position of the British population in, 71;
+    race oligarchy in, 84;
+    more hopeful situation in, 99;
+    the position in Feb., 1898, 103;
+    the question of reform in, 105, 106, 107;
+    unprogressiveness of, 112;
+    progress of armament in, 125, 158, 255;
+    its communications with the paramount power, 126;
+    reliance of on the Orange Free State, 128;
+    the position of British residents in, 130, 173;
+    presentation of the petition of the British residents, 131;
+    our stand against Dutch tyranny in, 186;
+    alleged conspiracy against, 212;
+    Mr. Morley's statement as to the annexation of, 261;
+    commandos ordered to take up their position on the Natal border, 290;
+    flight of the British population from, 292;
+    entered by the Natal Field Force, 329;
+    annexation of, 329;
+    reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.W. of, 441;
+    numbers of Boers in the field in, 454;
+    area enclosed by blockhouse lines, 458;
+    progress of civil administration in, 489, 525;
+    issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of, 490, 501,
+      544;
+    grant in aid of the revenues of, 501;
+    area held, 505, 506;
+    mineral wealth of unaffected by the war, 514;
+    extent of its mineral wealth, 519;
+    number of children educated in the camps in, 523;
+    the revenue of, 528;
+    the settlement of, 546;
+    military administration in, 566;
+    taxation of landed property in, 566.
+  _Transvaal from Within, The_, 131 (note), 264, 274 (note).
+  Transvaal question, The, debated in both Houses of Parliament, 228.
+  Treason Bill, The, 394 to 398;
+    the support given to it by Mr. Schreiner and Sir R. Solomon, 474;
+    the debates on, 477;
+    the lenient penalties of, 480.
+  Tugela, The, General Buller's attempt to force the passage, 306.
+
+
+  Uitlander Council, The, 211, 215;
+    its view of the new franchise law, 218;
+    its disappointment with the announcement that the law is acceptable to
+      the Imperial Government, 222 (note).
+  Uitlanders, The, a five years' franchise advocated for, 37;
+    the enfranchisement of, 38;
+    their "admitted grievances," 72;
+    confirmation of their complaints, 89;
+    Krüger's determination to increase their disabilities, 103;
+    their petition, 131;
+    postponement of the publication of Lord Milner's despatch dealing with
+      their grievances, 140;
+    formal acceptance of, 155, 157;
+    General Butler's view of their grievances, 175;
+    their claim for enfranchisement, 185;
+    granted a limited franchise, 209;
+    their view of the measure, 211;
+    petitions to the Queen for justice to, 216;
+    their detailed criticism of the new franchise law, 220;
+    the British Government's view of the concessions made to them, 229,
+      230;
+    outrageous treatment of, 244, 245;
+    espionage on, 273;
+    their return, 489, 507, 508, 512.
+  Ultimatum, The, 246, 253 to 299;
+    the day on which it expired, 279 (note);
+    submitted to Pres. Steyn for his approval, 291;
+    recast by Mr. Fischer, 291;
+    delay in presenting, 291;
+    delivered to Sir Wm. Greene, 295;
+    reaches Lord Milner, 295;
+    reaches the Colonial Office, 298;
+    reply of Her Majesty's Government, 298;
+    its effect on Lord Milner, 342;
+    its effect on the British people, 344.
+  Unionist leaders, The, and Lord Milner's administration, 81.
+  Union Jack, The, hissed, 499.
+  United States of America, The, attitude of towards Great Britain during
+    the war, 264, 312, 313, 314.
+  Upington Ministry, The, 60.
+  Upington, Sir Thomas, 93;
+    resignation of, 116 (note).
+
+
+  Vaal River, The, 456.
+  Valley of Light, The, 340 (note).
+  Vandam, Captain, 245.
+  Van Riebeck, Commander, The diary of, 2, 3;
+    the Dutch E. India Co's instructions to as to the treatment of natives
+      in S. Africa, 5, 9.
+  Vereeniging, 555, 556;
+    Mr. Smuts's words at on May 30th, 1902, 276;
+    the surrender of, 303, 359, 433, 454 (note), 536 to 583;
+    two and a half years after, 449;
+    signing of the Terms of Surrender, 542;
+    difference between Lord Milner's and Lord Kitchener's views as to the
+      Terms of Surrender, 551;
+    circumstances under which the negotiations originated, 551 _et seq._;
+    the three proposals put forward by the Boer leaders, 556;
+    Article X, of the Terms of Surrender, 559;
+    Mr. Smuts's suggestion as to a "formal clause," 561;
+    the draft agreement telegraphed to England, 562;
+    its wording, 564;
+    the signature of, 567, 573;
+    its terms compared with the Middelburg terms, 568 (note);
+    acceptation of the British terms, 571, 572;
+    generosity of the terms, 580;
+    leniency of the terms, 581;
+    immediate effect of the terms, 583.
+  Victoria, offers a military contingent, 251.
+  Victoria, Queen, presentation of the second petition to, 131, 194;
+    petitions to for justice to the Uitlanders, 216;
+    proposed letter to from Krüger, 376;
+    death of, 481 (note).
+  Vigilance Committee, The, 500.
+  Viljoen, General, a telegram to, 426.
+  _Volksblad_, The, 351 (note).
+  Volksraad, The, discusses the question of accepting the joint inquiry,
+      237;
+    refuses it, 237.
+  Vosloo, Mr., 477.
+  _Vossische Zeitung_, The, 399 (note), 469 (note).
+  Vryburg division, the return of representatives for, 121.
+  Vryburg, goes over to the Boers, 280.
+
+
+  Walrond, M. S. O., 167.
+  Walter, M. P. C., 213 (note).
+  War Commission, The, 318, 319 (note), 324 (note);
+    General Sir Wm. Butler's evidence before, 175 (note), 181 to 183.
+  War, Declaration of, 297;
+    the first days of, 304;
+    the conduct of, 316;
+    area of the country over which it was waged, 326, 339;
+    difficulties of carrying on, 328;
+    general conclusions arising from the events, and military criticisms
+      on, 330 _et seq._;
+    the unnecessary prolongation of, 360;
+    economic consequences of, 439;
+    moral effect of its recrudescence, 440;
+    method of waging it, 450 to 453.
+  _War in South Africa, The Official History of_, vol. i. p. 309 (note)
+    _et seq._
+  _War in South Africa, The_, Sir Conan Doyle's, 469 (note).
+  War Office, The, efficiency of, 339.
+  Watson, Dr. Spence, 498 (note).
+  Webb, Mr., arrest of, 131.
+  Wessels, Andries, 428.
+  Wessels, C. J., 260, 555.
+  White, Montagu, 232.
+  White, Sir George, shut up in Ladysmith, 320, 344.
+  Willcocks, Sir William, his report on irrigation, 516 to 518.
+  Williams, Colonel Hanbury, 167.
+  Willoughby, Sir John, 44.
+  Wilson, H. F. C., 515, 526.
+  Wilson, M.P., H. J., 498 (note).
+  Witwatersrand Gold Mines, The, 25, 31, 36.
+  Witwatersrand, The, Krüger raises the Vier-kleur on, 31.
+  Wodehouse, 346, 379.
+  Wodehouse, Sir Philip, 275.
+  Wolmarans, A. D., 168, 555.
+  Wolseley, Lord, his advice to the Salisbury Cabinet, 177, 188, 190, 309,
+      322, 331;
+    his task, 317, 318.
+  Woolls-Sampson, Col. Sir Aubrey, 88;
+    forms the Imperial Light Horse, 179.
+  _Worcester Advertiser, The_, 477;
+    its charge against British soldiers, 400.
+  Worcester Conference, The, 395, 403, 477;
+    the resolutions of, 405, 495;
+    a fatal result of, 412;
+    representations of its delegates to the Liberal party, 496.
+  Wybergh, Mr., 515, 528.
+  Wylant, the 'Sick-Comforter,' 3.
+
+
+  Zeerust, 458.
+  _Zuid Africaan_, The, articles in, 63.
+  Zulus, The, military power of, 25, 26.
+  Zululand, a portion of transferred to Natal, 550.
+
+
+_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by 
+W. Basil Worsfold
+
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+<title>The Project Gutenberg e-Book of Lord Milner's Work in South Africa; Author: W. Basil Worsfold</title>
+
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+
+Project Gutenberg's Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by W. Basil Worsfold
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Lord Milner's Work in South Africa
+       From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902
+
+Author: W. Basil Worsfold
+
+Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26490]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by A www.PGDP.net Volunteer, Christine P. Travers
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+http://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<p class="tn">Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all
+other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling
+has been maintained.</p>
+
+<a id="img001" name="img001"></a>
+<div class="figcenter">
+<img src="images/img001.jpg" width="400" height="506" alt="Milner" title="">
+</div>
+<div class="figcenter">
+<img src="images/img001b.jpg" width="200" height="60" alt="Milner signature" title="">
+</div>
+
+<h1>LORD MILNER'S WORK<br>
+  IN SOUTH AFRICA</h1>
+
+<p class="center noindent">FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT IN 1897 TO<br>
+  THE PEACE OF VEREENIGING IN 1902</p>
+
+<p class="center noindent p2 smcap">containing hitherto unpublished information</p>
+
+<h2>BY W. BASIL WORSFOLD</h2>
+
+<p class="center noindent p2 smcap">with portraits and map</p>
+
+<p class="centered_block p4">
+     "What would have been the position to-day in South Africa if
+     there had not been a man prepared to take upon himself
+     responsibility; a man whom difficulties could not conquer, whom
+     disasters could not cow, and whom obloquy could never
+     move?"&mdash;<span class="smcap">Lord Goschen</span> <span class="italic">in the House of Lords, March 29th, 1906</span></p>
+
+<p class="p4 center noindent small">
+  LONDON<br>
+  JOHN MURRAY ALBEMARLE STREET W<br>
+  1906</p>
+
+<p class="center noindent p4 italic smaller">This Edition enjoys copyright in all countries signatory to the Berne
+Convention, as well as in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and all British
+Colonies and Dependencies.</p>
+
+<p class="center noindent p4 italic small">Printed by Hazell, Watson &amp; Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.</p>
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagev" name="pagev"></a>(p. v)</span> PREFACE</h2>
+
+
+<p>In sending this book to press I have only two remarks to make by way
+of preface.</p>
+
+<p>The first is wholly personal. It has been my good fortune to reside
+twice for a considerable period in South Africa&mdash;first in the
+neighbourhood of Capetown (1883-5), and afterwards in Johannesburg
+(1904-5). During these periods of residence, and also during the long
+interval between them, I have been brought into personal contact with
+many of the principal actors in the events which are related in this
+book. While, therefore, no pains have been spared to secure accuracy
+by a careful study of official papers and other reliable publications,
+my information is not derived by any means exclusively from these
+sources.</p>
+
+<p>My second remark is the expression of a hope that the contents of this
+book may be regarded not merely as a chapter of history, but also as a
+body of facts essential to the full understanding of the circumstances
+and conditions of South Africa, as it is to-day. Since the restoration
+of peace&mdash;an event not yet five years old&mdash;a great change has been
+wrought in the political and <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevi" name="pagevi"></a>(p. vi)</span> economic framework of this
+province of the empire. None the less, with a few conspicuous
+exceptions, almost all of the principal actors in these pages are
+still there; and, presumably, they are very much the same men now as
+they were before, and during, the war. And in this connection it
+remains to notice an aspect of the South African struggle which
+transcends all others in fruitfulness and importance. It was a
+struggle to keep South Africa not a dependency of Great Britain, but a
+part of the empire. The over-sea Britains, understanding it in this
+sense, took their share in it. They made their voices heard in the
+settlement. The service which they thus collectively performed was
+great. It would have been infinitely greater if they had been directly
+represented in an administration nominally common to them and the
+mother country. No political system can be endowed with effective
+unity&mdash;with that organic unity which is the only effective
+unity&mdash;unless it is possessed of a single vehicle of thought and
+action. To create this vehicle&mdash;an administrative body in which all
+parts of the empire would be duly represented&mdash;is difficult to-day.
+The forces of disunion, which are at work both at home and beyond the
+seas, may make it impossible to-morrow.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+  W. B. W.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Ridge, near Capel, Surrey</span>,<br>
+  <span class="italic add2em">October 19th, 1906</span></p>
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevii" name="pagevii"></a>(p. vii)</span> CONTENTS</h2>
+<a id="toc" name="toc"></a>
+<div class="toc">
+<ul class="none">
+<li><span class="ralign smcap">Page</span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER I</li>
+<li><span class="smcap">downing street and the man on the spot</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page001">1</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER II</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">the creed of the afrikander nationalists</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page048">48</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER III</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">a year of observation</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page075">75</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER IV</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">under which flag?</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page130">130</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER V</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">playing for time</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page188">188</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER VI</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">the ultimatum</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page253">253</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER VII</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">the fall of the republics</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page300">300</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="pagenum"><a id="pageviii" name="pageviii"></a>(p. viii)</span> CHAPTER VIII</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">the rebellion in the cape colony</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page341">341</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER IX</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">the "conciliation" movement</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page373">373</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER X</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">the disarmament of the dutch population</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page413">413</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER XI</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">preparing for peace</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page470">470</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em">CHAPTER XII</li>
+
+<li><span class="smcap">the surrender of vereeniging</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page536">536</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2"><span class="min1em">INDEX</span>
+<span class="ralign"><a href="#page585">585</a></span></li>
+</ul>
+
+<p class="p2 title">ILLUSTRATIONS</p>
+
+<ul class="none">
+<li><span class="ralign smcap">Facing Page</span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="smcap">portrait of lord milner</span><br>
+  <span class="italic smaller">From a photograph by Elliott &amp; Fry (Photogravure)</span>
+<span class="ralign italic"><a href="#img001">Frontispiece</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="smcap">lord milner at sunnyside</span>
+<span class="ralign italic"><a href="#img002">473</a></span></li>
+
+<li class="p2 min1em"><span class="smcap">map of south africa</span>
+<span class="ralign italic"><a href="#img003">At the End</a></span></li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+
+
+<h1><span class="pagenum"><a id="page001" name="page001"></a>(p. 001)</span> LORD MILNER</h1>
+
+<h3>CHAPTER I</h3>
+
+<p class="title">DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT</p>
+
+
+<p>The failure of British administration in South Africa during the
+nineteenth century forms a blemish upon the record of the Victorian
+era that is at first sight difficult to understand. If success could
+be won in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in India and in Egypt,
+why failure in South Africa? For failure it was. A century of wars,
+missionary effort, British expansion, industrial development, of lofty
+administrative ideals and great men sacrificed, had left the two
+European races with political ambitions so antagonistic, and social
+differences so bitter, that nothing less than the combined military
+resources of the colonies and the mother-country sufficed to compel
+the Dutch to recognise the British principle of "equal rights for all
+white men south of the Zambesi." Among the many contributory causes of
+failure that can be distinguished, the two most prominent are the
+nationality difficulty and the native question. But these are problems
+of administration that have been solved elsewhere: the former in
+Canada and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page002" name="page002"></a>(p. 002)</span> the latter in India. Or, to turn to agencies of a
+different order, is the cause of failure to be found in a grudging
+nature&mdash;the existence of physical conditions that made it difficult
+for the white man, or for the white and coloured man together, to
+wring a livelihood from the soil? The answer is that the like material
+disadvantages have been conquered in Australia, India, and in Egypt,
+by Anglo-Saxon energy. We might apply the Socratic method throughout,
+traversing the entire range of our distinguishable causes; but in
+every case the inquiry would reveal success in some other portion of
+the Anglo-Saxon domain to darken failure in South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>Nevertheless, in so far as any single influence can be assigned to
+render intelligible a result brought about by many agencies, various
+in themselves and operating from time to time in varying degrees, the
+explanation is to be found in a little incident that happened in the
+second year of the Dutch East India Company's settlement at the Cape
+of Good Hope. The facts are preserved for us by the diary which
+Commander Van Riebeck was ordered to keep for the information of his
+employers. Under the date October 19th, 1653, we read that David
+Janssen, a herdsman, was found lying dead of assegai wounds, inflicted
+by the Beechranger Hottentots, while the cattle placed under his
+charge were seen disappearing round the curve of the Lion's Head. The
+theft had been successfully accomplished through the perfidy <span class="pagenum"><a id="page003" name="page003"></a>(p. 003)</span>
+of a certain "Harry," a Hottentot chief, who was living on terms of
+friendship with the Dutch&mdash;a circumstance which was sufficiently
+apparent from the fact that the raid was timed to take place at an
+hour on Sunday morning when the whole of the little community, with
+the exception of two sentinels and a second herdsman, were assembled
+to hear a sermon from the "Sick-Comforter," Wylant. It was the first
+conflict between the Dutch and the natives; for Van Riebeck had been
+bidden, for various excellent reasons, to keep on good terms with the
+Hottentots, and to treat them kindly. But the murder of a white man
+was a serious matter. Kindness scarcely seemed to meet the case; and
+so Van Riebeck applied to the Directors, the famous Chamber of
+Seventeen, for definite instructions as to the course which he must
+pursue.</p>
+
+ <span class="sidenote">Van Riebeck's difficulty.</span>
+
+<p>He was told that only the actual murderer of David Janssen (if
+apprehended) was to be put to death; that cattle equal in amount to
+the cattle stolen were to be recovered, but only from the actual
+robbers; and that "Harry," if necessary, should be sent to prison at
+Batavia. But he was not otherwise to molest or injure the offending
+Hottentots. Excellent advice, and such as we should expect from the
+countrymen of Grotius in their most prosperous era.
+But unfortunately
+it was quite impossible for Van Riebeck, with his handful of soldiers
+and sailors, planted at the extremity of the great barbaric continent
+of Africa, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page004" name="page004"></a>(p. 004)</span> to think of putting it into effect. He replied
+that he had no means of identifying the individual wrong-doers, and
+that the institution of private property was unknown among the
+Hottentots. The only method by which the individual could be punished
+was by punishing the tribe, and he therefore proposed to capture the
+tribe and their cattle. But this was a course of action which was
+repugnant to the Directors' sense of justice. It aroused, besides, a
+vision of reinforcements ordered from Batavia, and of disbursements
+quite disproportionate to the practical utility of the Cape station as
+an item in the system of the Company. In vain Van Riebeck urged that a
+large body of slaves and ten or twelve hundred head of cattle would be
+a great addition to the resources of the settlement. The Chamber of
+Seventeen refused to sanction the proposals of the commander, and, as
+its own were impracticable, nothing was done. The Beechranger tribe
+escaped with impunity, and the Hottentots, as a whole, were emboldened
+to make fresh attacks upon the European settlers.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Afrikander stock.</span>
+
+<p>This simple narrative is a lantern that sheds a ray of light upon an
+obscure subject. Two points are noticeable in the attitude of the home
+authority. First, there is its inability to grasp the local
+conditions; and second, the underlying assumption that a moral
+judgment based upon the conditions of the home country, if valid, must
+be equally valid in South Africa. By the time that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page005" name="page005"></a>(p. 005)</span> home
+authority had become Downing Street instead of the peripatetic Chamber
+of Seventeen, the field of mischievous action over which these
+misconceptions operated had become enlarged. The natives were there,
+as before; but, in addition to the natives, there had grown up a
+population of European descent, some thirty thousand in number, whose
+manner of life and standards of thought and conduct were scarcely more
+intelligible to the British, or indeed to the European mind, than
+those of the yellow-skinned Hottentot or the brown-skinned Kafir. A
+century and a half of the Dutch East India Company's government&mdash;a
+government "in all things political purely despotic, in all things
+commercial purely monopolist"&mdash;had produced a people unlike any other
+European community on the face of the earth.
+Of the small original
+stock from which the South African Dutch are descended, one-quarter
+were Huguenot refugees from France, an appreciable section were
+German, and the institution of slavery had added to this admixture the
+inevitable strain of non-Aryan blood. But this racial change was by no
+means all that separated the European population in the Cape Colony
+from the Dutch of Holland. A more potent agency had been at work. The
+corner-stone of the policy of the Dutch East India Company was the
+determination to debar the settlers from all intercourse&mdash;social,
+intellectual, commercial, and political&mdash;with their kinsmen in Europe.
+One fact will suffice to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page006" name="page006"></a>(p. 006)</span> show how perfectly this object was
+attained. Incredible as it may seem, it is the case that at the end of
+the eighteenth century no printing-press was to be found in the Cape
+Colony, nor had this community of twenty thousand Europeans the means
+of knowing the nature of the laws and regulations of the Government by
+which it was ruled. So long and complete an isolation from European
+civilisation produced a result which is as remarkable in itself as it
+is significant to the student of South African history. This
+phenomenon was the existence, in the nineteenth century, of a
+community of European blood whose moral and intellectual standards
+were those of the seventeenth.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The nationality difficulty.</span>
+
+<p>Our dip into the early history of South Africa is not purposeless. It
+does not, of course, explain the failure of British administration;
+but it brings us into touch with circumstances that were bound to make
+the task of governing the Cape Colony&mdash;a task finally undertaken by
+England in 1806&mdash;one of peculiar difficulty. The native population was
+strange, but the European population was even more strange and
+abnormal.
+If we had been left to deal with the native population alone
+we should have experienced no serious difficulty in rendering them
+harmless neighbours, and have been able to choose our own time for
+entering upon the responsibilities involved in the administration of
+their territories. But, coming second on the field, we were bound to
+modify <span class="pagenum"><a id="page007" name="page007"></a>(p. 007)</span> our native policy to suit the conditions of a
+preexisting relationship between the white and black races that was
+not of our creation, and one, moreover, that was in many respects
+repugnant to British ideas of justice. Nor was this all. The old
+European population, which should have been, naturally, our ally and
+fellow-worker in the task of native administration, gradually changed
+from its original position of a subject nationality to that of a
+political rival; and, as such, openly bid against us for the
+mastership of the native African tribes.</p>
+
+<p>Now when two statesmen are pitted against each other, of whom one is a
+man whose methods of attack are limited by nineteenth-century ideas,
+while the morality of the other, being that of the seventeenth
+century, permits him greater freedom of action, it is obvious that the
+first will be at a disadvantage. And this would be the case more than
+ever if the nineteenth-century statesman was under the impression that
+his political antagonist was a man whose code of morals was identical
+with his own. When once he had learnt that the moral standard of the
+other was lower than, or different from, his own, he would of course
+make allowance for the circumstance, and he would then be able to
+contest the position with him upon equal terms. But until he had
+grasped this fact he would be at a disadvantage.</p>
+
+<p>Generally speaking, the representatives of the British Government,
+both Governors and High <span class="pagenum"><a id="page008" name="page008"></a>(p. 008)</span> Commissioners, soon learnt that
+neither the natives nor the Dutch population could be dealt with on
+the same footing as a Western European. But the British Government
+cannot be said to have thoroughly learnt the same lesson until, in
+almost the last week of the nineteenth century, the three successive
+defeats of Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso aroused it to a
+knowledge of the fact that we had been within an ace of losing South
+Africa. Many, indeed, would question whether even now the lesson had
+been thoroughly learnt. But, however this may be, it is certain that
+throughout the nineteenth century the Home Government wished to treat
+both the natives and the Dutch in South Africa on a basis of British
+ideas; and that by so doing it constantly found itself in conflict
+with its own local representatives, who knew that the only hope of
+success lay in dealing with both alike on a basis of South African
+ideas.</p>
+
+<p>As the result of this chronic inability of British statesmen to
+understand South Africa, it follows that the most instructive manner
+of regarding our administration of that country during the nineteenth
+century is to get a clear conception of the successive divergences of
+opinion between the home and the local authorities.</p>
+
+<p>At the very outset of British administration&mdash;during the temporary
+occupation of the Cape from 1795 to 1808&mdash;we find a theoretically
+perfect policy laid down for the guidance of the early <span class="pagenum"><a id="page009" name="page009"></a>(p. 009)</span>
+English Governors in their treatment of the Boers, or Dutch frontier
+farmers. It is just as admirable, in its way, as were the instructions
+for the treatment of the Hottentots furnished by the Directors of the
+Dutch East India Company to Van Riebeck. In a despatch of July, 1800,
+the third Duke of Portland, who was then acting as Secretary for the
+Colonies, writes:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Non-interference.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Considering the tract of country over which these border
+     inhabitants are dispersed, the rude and uncultivated state in
+     which they live, and the wild notions of independence which
+     prevail among them, I am afraid any attempts to introduce
+     civilisation and a strict administration of justice will be slow
+     in their progress, and likely, if not proceeded upon with caution
+     and management, rather to create a spirit of resistance, or to
+     occasion them to emigrate still further from the seat of
+     government, than answer the beneficent views with which they
+     might be undertaken. In fact, it seems to me the proper system of
+     policy to observe to them is to interfere as little as possible
+     in their domestic concerns and interior economy; to consider them
+     rather as distant communities dependent upon the Government than
+     as subjects necessarily amenable to the laws and regulations
+     established within the precincts of Government. Mutual advantages
+     arising from barter and commerce, and a strict adherence to good
+     faith and justice in all arrangements with them, joined to
+     efficient protection and occasional acts of kindness on the part
+     of the Government, seem likely to be the best means of securing
+     their attachment."</p>
+
+<p>Who would have thought that this statement of policy, admirable as it
+is at first sight, contained <span class="pagenum"><a id="page010" name="page010"></a>(p. 010)</span> in itself the germ of a
+political heresy of the first magnitude? Yet so it was. The principle
+of non-interference, here for the first time enunciated and
+subsequently followed with fatal effect, could not be applied by a
+nineteenth-century administration to the case of a seventeenth-century
+community without its virtually renouncing the functions of
+government. Obviously this was not the intention of the home
+authority. There remained the difficulty of knowing when to apply, and
+when not to apply, the principle; and directly a specific case arose
+there was the possibility that, while the local authority, with a full
+knowledge of the local conditions, might think interference necessary,
+the home authority, without such knowledge, might take an opposite
+view.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Slaghter's Nek.</span>
+
+<p>A very few years sufficed to show that the most ordinary exercise of
+the functions of government might be regarded as an "interference with
+the domestic concerns and interior economy" of the European subjects
+of the British Crown in South Africa. At the time of the permanent
+occupation of the Cape (1806) the population of the colony consisted
+of three classes: 26,720 persons of European descent, 17,657
+Hottentots, and 29,256 returned as slaves. One of the first measures
+of the British Governor, Lord Caledon, was the enactment of a series
+of regulations intended to confer civil rights on the Hottentots,
+while at the same time preventing them from using their freedom at the
+expense of the European population. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page011" name="page011"></a>(p. 011)</span> From the British, or
+even European point of view, this was a piece of elementary justice to
+which no man could possibly take exception. As applied to the
+conditions of the Franco-Dutch population in the Cape Colony it was,
+in fact, a serious interference with their "domestic concerns and
+internal economy." And as such it produced the extraordinary protest
+known to history as the "Rebellion" of Slaghter's Nek.
+There was no
+question as to the facts. Booy, the Hottentot, had completed his term
+of service with Frederick Bezuidenhout, the Boer, and was therefore
+entitled, under the Cape law, to leave his master's farm, and to
+remove his property. All this Bezuidenhout admitted; but when it came
+to a question of yielding obedience to the magistrate's order, the
+Boer said "No." In the words of Pringle, "He boldly declared that he
+considered this interference between him (a free burgher) and <span class="italic">his</span>
+Hottentot to be a presumptuous innovation upon his rights, and an
+intolerable usurpation of tyrannical authority."</p>
+
+<p>And the danger of allowing the Boers to pursue their
+seventeenth-century dealings with the natives became rapidly greater
+when the European Colonists, Dutch and English, were brought, by their
+natural eastward expansion, into direct contact with the masses of
+military Bantu south and east of the Drakenberg chain of
+mountains&mdash;the actual dark-skinned "natives" of South Africa as it is
+known to the people <span class="pagenum"><a id="page012" name="page012"></a>(p. 012)</span> of Great Britain. The Boer frontiersman,
+with his aggressive habits and ingrained contempt for a dark-skin,
+disintegrated the Bantu mass before we were ready to undertake the
+work of reconstruction. And therefore the local British authority soon
+learnt that non-interference in the case of the Boer generally meant
+the necessity of a much more serious interference at a subsequent date
+with both Boer and Kafir. And so non-interference, in the admirable
+spirit of the Duke of Portland's despatch, came to bear one meaning in
+Downing Street and quite another in Capetown.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">D'Urban's policy.</span>
+
+<p>The earliest of the three crucial "divergences of opinion," to which
+collectively the history of our South African administration owes its
+sombre hue, was that which led to the reversal of Sir Benjamin
+D'Urban's frontier policy by Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg)
+at the end of the year 1835. The circumstances were these. On
+Christmas Day, 1834, the Kafirs (without any declaration of war,
+needless to say) invaded the Cape Colony, murdering the settlers in
+the isolated farms, burning their homesteads, and driving off their
+cattle. After a six months' campaign, in which the Dutch and British
+settlers fought by the side of the regular troops, a treaty was made
+with the Kafir chiefs which, in the opinion of D'Urban
+and his local
+advisers, would render the eastern frontier of the Colony secure from
+further inroads. The Kafirs were to retire to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page013" name="page013"></a>(p. 013)</span> the line of
+the Kei River, thus surrendering part of their territory to the
+European settlers who had suffered most severely from the invasion;
+while a belt of loyal Kafirs, supported by a chain of forts, was to be
+interposed between the defeated tribes and the colonial farmsteads. In
+addition to these measures, D'Urban proposed to compensate the
+settlers for the enormous losses<a id="footnotetag1" name="footnotetag1"></a><a href="#footnote1" title="Go to footnote 1"><span class="small">[1]</span></a> which they had incurred; since, as
+a contemporary and not unfriendly writer<a id="footnotetag2" name="footnotetag2"></a><a href="#footnote2" title="Go to footnote 2"><span class="small">[2]</span></a> puts it, the British
+Government had exposed them for fourteen years to Kafir depredations,
+rather than acknowledge the existence of a state of affairs that must
+plainly have compelled it to make active exertions for their
+protection.</p>
+
+<p>The view of the home authority was very different. In the opinion of
+His Majesty's ministers at Downing Street the Kafir invasion was the
+result of a long series of unjustifiable encroachments on the part of
+the European settlers. D'Urban was instructed, therefore, to reinstate
+the Kafirs in the districts from which they had retired under the
+treaty of September, 1835, and to cancel all grants of land beyond the
+Fish River&mdash;the original eastern boundary of the Colony&mdash;which the
+Colonial Government <span class="pagenum"><a id="page014" name="page014"></a>(p. 014)</span> had made to its European subjects from
+1817 onwards; while, as for compensation, any indemnity was altogether
+out of the question, since the colonists had only themselves to thank
+for the enmity of the natives&mdash;if, indeed, they had not deliberately
+provoked the war with a view to the acquisition of fresh territory.</p>
+
+<p>The divergence between these two opinions is sufficiently well marked.
+To trace the precise agencies through which two diametrically opposed
+views were evolved on this occasion from the same groundwork of facts
+would be too lengthy a business; but, by way of comment, we may recall
+two statements, each significant and authentic. Cloete, writing while
+the events in question were still fresh in his mind, says of Lord
+Glenelg's despatch: "A communication more cruel, unjust, and insulting
+to the feelings not only of Sir Benjamin D'Urban ... but of the
+inhabitants ... could hardly have been penned by a declared enemy of
+the country and its Governor." And Sir George Napier, by whom D'Urban
+was superseded, stated in evidence given before the House of Commons:
+"My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes, have confirmed me
+that I was wrong and Sir Benjamin D'Urban was perfectly right; that if
+he meant to keep Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing
+so was by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Great Trek.</span>
+
+<p>This settlement of a South African question <span class="pagenum"><a id="page015" name="page015"></a>(p. 015)</span> upon a basis of
+British, or rather non-South African, ideas was followed by events as
+notorious as they were disastrous. It must be remembered that in
+1819-20 the first and only effort to introduce a considerable British
+population into South Africa had been successfully carried out when
+the "Albany" settlers, to the number of some five thousand, were
+established in this and other districts upon the eastern border of the
+Cape Colony. The colonial farmers who suffered from the Kafir invasion
+of 1834-5 were not exclusively Boers. Among them there were many
+members of the new British population, and the divergence of opinion
+between D'Urban and Lord Glenelg was all the more significant, since
+in this case the British settlers were in agreement with the Boers. It
+was no longer merely a divergence of views as between the local and
+the home authority, but as between the British in Britain and the
+British in South Africa. It must also be remembered that, in the same
+year as the Kafir invasion, a social revolution&mdash;the emancipation of
+slaves&mdash;had been accomplished in the Cape Colony by an Act of the
+British Parliament, in comparison with which the nationalisation of
+the railways or of the mines in England would seem a comparatively
+trifling disturbance of the system of private property to the
+Englishman of to-day. The reversal of D'Urban's arrangements for the
+safety of the eastern frontier was not only bad in itself, but it came
+at a bad time. Whether <span class="pagenum"><a id="page016" name="page016"></a>(p. 016)</span> the secession of the Emigrant Farmers
+would in any case have taken place as the result of the emancipation
+of slaves is a matter which cannot now be decided. But, however this
+may be, the fact remains that two men so well qualified to give an
+opinion on the subject as Judge Cloete and Sir John Robinson, the
+first Prime Minister of Natal, unhesitatingly ascribe the determining
+influence which drove the Boers to seek a home beyond the jurisdiction
+of the British Government to the sense of injustice created by the
+measures dictated by Lord Glenelg, and by the whole spirit of his
+despatch.<a id="footnotetag3" name="footnotetag3"></a><a href="#footnote3" title="Go to footnote 3"><span class="small">[3]</span></a> And this judgment is supported by the fact that the
+wealthier Dutch of the Western Province were much more seriously
+affected by the emancipation of slaves than the "Boers" of the eastern
+districts of the Colony; yet it was these latter, of course, who
+provided the bulk of the emigrants who crossed the Orange River in the
+years of the
+Great Trek (1835-8) We shall not therefore be drawing an
+extravagantly improbable conclusion, if we decide that the movement
+which divided European South Africa was due to a well-ascertained
+divergence <span class="pagenum"><a id="page017" name="page017"></a>(p. 017)</span> of opinion between the home and local
+authorities&mdash;both British.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The birth of the republic.</span>
+
+<p>The results of this secession of something like one-fourth of the
+Franco-Dutch population are common knowledge. Out of the scattered
+settlements founded by the Emigrant Farmers beyond the borders of the
+Colony were created, in 1852 (Sand River Convention) and 1854
+(Bloemfontein Convention), the two Boer Republics,
+which half a
+century later withstood for two years and eight months the whole
+available military force of the British Empire. The first effect of
+the secession was to erect the republican Dutch into a rival power
+which bid against the British Government for the territory and
+allegiance of the natives. Secession, therefore, made the inevitable
+task of establishing the supremacy of the white man in South Africa
+infinitely more costly both in blood and treasure. The British nation
+accepted the task, which fell to it as paramount power, with the
+greatest reluctance. The endless and apparently aimless Kafir wars
+exhausted the patience of the country, and the destruction of an
+entire British regiment by Ketshwayo's<a id="footnotetag4" name="footnotetag4"></a><a href="#footnote4" title="Go to footnote 4"><span class="small">[4]</span></a> <span class="italic">impis</span> created a feeling of
+deep resentment against the great High Commissioner, whose policy was
+held&mdash;unreasonably enough&mdash;responsible for the military disaster of
+Isandlhwana. Two opportunities of recovering the lost solidarity of
+the Europeans were presented before the republican Dutch had set
+themselves <span class="pagenum"><a id="page018" name="page018"></a>(p. 018)</span> definitely to work for the supremacy of South
+Africa through reunion with their colonial kinsfolk. That both were
+lost was due at bottom to the disgust of the British people at the
+excessive cost and burden of establishing a civilised administration
+over the native population in South Africa. But in both cases the
+immediate agency of disaster was the refusal of the Home Government to
+listen to the advice of its local representative.
+<span class="sidenote">Sir George Grey.</span>
+Sir George Grey
+would have regained the lost solidarity of the Europeans by taking
+advantage of the natural recoil manifested among the Free State Dutch
+from independence and responsibility towards the more settled and
+prosperous life assured by British rule. His proposal was to unite the
+Cape Colony, Natal, and the Free State in a federal legislature,
+consisting of representatives chosen by popular vote in the several
+states. In urging this measure he took occasion to combat the
+pessimistic views of South African affairs which were prevalent in
+England. The country was not commercially useless, but of "great and
+increasing value." Its people did not desire Kafir wars, but were well
+aware of the much greater advantages which they derived from the
+peaceful pursuits of industry. The colonists were themselves willing
+to contribute to the defence of that part of the Queen's dominions in
+which they lived. And, finally, the condition of the natives was not
+hopeless, for the missionaries were producing most beneficial effects
+upon the tribes of the interior. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page019" name="page019"></a>(p. 019)</span> But the most powerful
+argument which Grey used was his ruthless exposure of the futility of
+the Conventions. By allowing the Boer emigrants to grow into
+independent communities the British Government believed that not only
+had they relieved themselves of responsibility for the republican
+Dutch, but that they had secured, in addition, the unfaltering
+allegiance of the larger Dutch population which remained behind in the
+Cape Colony. Grey assured the Home Government that in both respects it
+was the victim of a delusion bred of its complete ignorance of South
+African conditions. The Boer Republics would give trouble. Apart from
+the bad draftsmanship of the conventions&mdash;a fertile source of
+disagreement&mdash;these small states would be centres of intrigue and
+"internal commotions," while at the same time their revenues would be
+too small to provide efficiently for their protection against the
+warlike tribes. The policy of <span class="italic">divide et impera</span>&mdash;or, as Grey called
+it, the "dismemberment" policy&mdash;would fail, since the political
+barrier which had been erected was wholly artificial.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Although these European countries are treated as separate
+     nations," he wrote, "their inhabitants bear the same family names
+     as the inhabitants of this Colony, and maintain with them ties of
+     the closest intimacy and relationship. They speak generally the
+     same language&mdash;not English, but Dutch. They are for the most part
+     of the same religion, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church.
+     They have the same laws&mdash;the Roman Dutch. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page020" name="page020"></a>(p. 020)</span> They have the
+     same sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and
+     frequently the same feelings regarding the native races....</p>
+
+<p>"I think that there can be no doubt that, in any great public, or
+     popular, or national question or movement, the mere fact of
+     calling these people different nations would not make them so,
+     nor would the fact of a mere fordable stream running between them
+     sever their sympathies or prevent them from acting in unison....
+     Many questions might arise in which, if the Government on the
+     south side of the Orange River took a different view from that on
+     the north side of the river, it might be very doubtful which of
+     the two Governments the great mass of the people would obey."<a id="footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5"></a><a href="#footnote5" title="Go to footnote 5"><span class="small">[5]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The "divergence of opinion" between Capetown and Downing Street was
+complete. Grey was charged with "direct disobedience" for listening to
+the offers of the Free State inhabitants. Recalled by a despatch of
+June 4th, 1859, he was reinstated in August on condition that "he felt
+himself sufficiently free and uncompromised," both with the Cape
+Legislature and the people of the Free State, to be able personally to
+carry out the policy of the Home Government, which, said the despatch,</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "is entirely opposed to those measures, tending to the resumption
+     of sovereignty over that State, of which you have publicly
+     expressed your approval in your speech to the Cape Parliament,
+     and in your answers to the address from the State in question."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page021" name="page021"></a>(p. 021)</span> Nor was that all. In his endeavours to establish a simple but
+effective system of European magistrates over the Kafirs beyond the
+eastern border of the Colony, he was hampered by the short-sighted
+economy of the Home Government. It seems incredible that a Colonial
+Governor, even at that epoch, should have been looked upon by Downing
+Street as a sort of importunate mendicant. But Grey's language shows
+that this was the attitude against which he had to defend himself.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The burden of the empire.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I would now only urge upon Her Majesty's Government," he writes
+     on September 8th, 1858, "that they should not distress me more
+     than is absolutely necessary for the government and control of
+     the people of the country which lies beyond the Colony of the
+     Cape of Good Hope. Stripping the country as I am of troops [to
+     serve in putting down the Indian Mutiny], some great disaster
+     will take place if necessary funds are at the same time cut off
+     from me. I am sure, if the enormous reductions I have effected in
+     military expenditure are considered, the most rigid economists
+     will feel that the money paid by Great Britain for the control of
+     this country has been advantageously laid out."</p>
+
+<p>These extracts are not pleasant reading. They were written at the time
+when the Imperial spirit was at its nadir. In the plain language of
+the Secretary of State for the Colonies<a id="footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6"></a><a href="#footnote6" title="Go to footnote 6"><span class="small">[6]</span></a> in 1858, it was a time when
+ministers were "compelled to recognise as fact the increased and
+increasing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page022" name="page022"></a>(p. 022)</span> dislike of Parliament to the maintenance of large
+military establishments in our colonies at Imperial cost." Yet one
+more passage must be cited, not so much because it is tinged by a
+certain grim humour&mdash;although this is a valuable quality in such a
+context&mdash;as because it affords an eminently pertinent illustration in
+support of the contention that the refusal of the Home Government to
+follow the advice of the "man on the spot" has been the operative
+cause of the failure of British administration in South Africa. The
+reply to the charge of "direct disobedience," which Grey formulates in
+one leisurely sentence, runs as follows:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "With regard to any necessity which might exist for my removal on
+     the ground of not holding the same views upon essential points of
+     policy as Her Majesty's Government hold, I can only make the
+     general remark that, during the five years which have elapsed
+     since I was appointed to my present office, there have been at
+     least seven Secretaries of State for the Colonial Department,
+     each of whom held different views upon some important points of
+     policy connected with this country."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The discovery of diamonds.</span>
+
+<p>Grey was not by any means the only Governor of the Cape to show the
+home authorities how impossible it was to govern South Africa from
+Downing Street, and to urge upon them the necessity of allowing their
+representative, the one man who was familiar with local conditions, to
+decide by what methods the objects of British <span class="pagenum"><a id="page023" name="page023"></a>(p. 023)</span> policy could
+be most effectively advanced. But it was not until some considerable
+time after the Colonial Department had been placed under a separate
+Secretary of State, and the Colonial Office had been constituted on
+its present basis, with a staff of permanent officials, that these
+protests produced any appreciable effect. What really aroused an
+interest in South Africa&mdash;that is to say a practical interest, as
+distinct from the interest created by the stories of missionary
+enterprise and travel, and by the records of Kafir warfare&mdash;was the
+discovery of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1870, and the subsequent
+establishment of the diamond industry at Kimberley. It was the first
+time that anything certain had occurred to show that the vast
+"hinterland" of the Cape might prove to be a territory of industrial
+possibilities. The earnings of the diamond mines provided the Cape
+Colony with a revenue sufficient to enable it to link together its
+main towns by a tolerable railway system. The industry, once
+established, attracted British capital and British population, and by
+so doing it did what Blue-books and missionary reports had failed to
+do: it brought the every-day life of the British Colonist in South
+Africa within the purview of the nation. Thanks to the Kimberley mines
+the Cape ceased to be thought of as a country whose resources were
+exclusively pastoral and agricultural.</p>
+
+<p>The epoch of the next great divergence of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page024" name="page024"></a>(p. 024)</span> opinion was a more
+hopeful time from an Imperialist point of view. Lord Beaconsfield, who
+was the first statesman to give practical expression to the belief
+that the maintenance of empire was not inconsistent with the welfare
+of the masses of the home population, was in power. British statesmen,
+and the class from which British statesmen are drawn, had begun to
+study Colonial questions in a more hopeful and intelligent spirit.
+Something had been learnt, too, of the actual conditions of South
+Africa. And yet it was at this epoch that what was, perhaps, the most
+ruinous of all the divergences of opinion between Capetown and Downing
+Street occurred.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Sir Bartle Frere.</span>
+
+<p>When Sir Bartle Frere was sent out to South Africa to carry out a
+definite scheme for the union of the Republics with the British
+colonies in a federal system, British statesmen and the educated
+classes in general had adopted the views expressed by Grey twenty
+years before. Tardily they had learnt to recognise both the essential
+unity of the Dutch population and the value of the country as an
+industrial asset of the empire. But, in the meantime, the centre of
+political power had shifted in England. The extension of the franchise
+had placed the ultimate control of British policy in South Africa in
+the hands of a class of electors who were, as yet, wholly uneducated
+in the political and economic conditions of that country. The
+divergence of opinion between the home and the local authority became
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page025" name="page025"></a>(p. 025)</span> in this case wider than ever. In short, it was the will of
+the nation that caused Frere to be arrested midway in the
+accomplishment of his task, and gave a mandate in 1880 to the Liberal
+party to administer South Africa upon the lines of a policy shaped in
+contemptuous indifference of the profoundest convictions and most
+solemn warnings of a great proconsul and most loyal servant of the
+Crown.</p>
+
+<p>The facts of Frere's supersession and recall are notorious: the story
+is too recent to need telling at length. We know now that, apart from
+the actual discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-mines, all that he
+foresaw and foretold has been realised in the events which culminated,
+twenty years later, in the great South African War. The military power
+which at that time (1877-80) stood in the way of South African unity
+under the British flag was the Zulu people. The whole adult male
+population of the tribe had been trained for war, and organised by
+Ketshwayo into a fighting machine. With this formidable military
+instrument at his command Ketshwayo proposed to emulate the sanguinary
+career of conquest pursued by his grandfather Tshaka;<a id="footnotetag7" name="footnotetag7"></a><a href="#footnote7" title="Go to footnote 7"><span class="small">[7]</span></a> and he had
+prepared the way for the half-subdued military Bantu throughout South
+Africa to co-operate with him in a general revolt against the growing
+supremacy of the white man. Frere removed this obstacle. But in doing
+so he, or rather the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page026" name="page026"></a>(p. 026)</span> general entrusted with the command of
+the military operations, lost a British regiment at Isandlhwana. This
+revelation of the strength of the Zulu army was, in fact, a complete
+confirmation of the correctness of Frere's diagnosis of the South
+African situation. His contention was that England must give evidence
+of both her capacity and her intention to control the native
+population of South Africa before she could reasonably ask the
+republican Dutch to surrender their independence and reunite with the
+British colonies in a federal system under the British flag. A native
+power, organised solely for aggressive warfare against one of two
+possible white neighbours, constituted therefore, in his opinion, not
+only a perpetual menace to the safety of Natal, but an insuperable
+obstacle to the effective discharge of a duty by the paramount Power,
+the successful performance of which was a condition precedent to the
+reunion of the European communities. The only point in dispute was the
+question whether the powers of Ketshwayo's <span class="italic">impis</span> had been
+exaggerated. To this question the disaster of Isandlhwana returned an
+emphatic "No."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The recall of Frere.</span>
+
+<p>The divergence of opinion between Frere and Lord Beaconsfield's
+cabinet was trivial as compared with the profound gulf which separated
+his policy from the South African policy of Mr. Gladstone. After the
+return of the Liberal party to power in the spring of 1880, Frere was
+allowed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page027" name="page027"></a>(p. 027)</span> to remain in office until August 1st, when he was
+recalled by a telegraphic despatch. But, as Lord Kimberley pointed out
+to him, there had been "so much divergence" between his views and
+those of the Home Government that he would not have been allowed to
+remain at the Cape, "had it not been for the special reason that there
+was a prospect of his being able materially to forward the policy of
+confederation." This prospect, of course, had then been removed by the
+failure of the Cape Government, on June 29th, to bring about the
+conference of delegates from the several States, which was the initial
+step towards the realisation of Lord Carnarvon's scheme of federal
+union.</p>
+
+<p>The vindication of Frere's statesmanship has been carried, by the
+inexorable logic of events, far beyond the sphere of Blue-book
+arguments. But it is impossible to read this smug despatch without
+recalling the words which Mr. Krüger wrote to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney
+on June 26th of the same year: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere will ...
+be useful.... We have done our duty and used all legitimate influence
+to cause the conference proposals to fail." That is to say, it was
+known to these faithful confederates of that section of the Liberal
+party of which Mr. Courtney was the head, that the Gladstone
+Government had determined to recall Sir Bartle Frere three days before
+"the special reason" for maintaining him at the Cape had disappeared.</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page028" name="page028"></a>(p. 028)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Frere's forecast.</span>
+
+<p>But what we are really concerned with is the nature of the opinions
+upon the central question of South African administration which Frere
+put forward at this critical period. With these before us, the most
+elementary acquaintance with the events of the last ten years will
+suffice to indicate the profound degree in which his knowledge of
+South African conditions surpassed the knowledge of those who took
+upon themselves to reverse his policy. What, above all, Frere realised
+was, that a point had been reached at which the whole of South Africa
+must be gathered under the British flag without delay. He had noted
+the disintegrating influences at work in the Cape Colony and the
+strength of the potential antagonism of the republican Dutch. The
+annexation of the Transvaal was not his deed, nor did either the time
+or the manner in which it was done command his approval. But he
+asserted that British rule, once established there, must be maintained
+at all costs. With this end in view, he urged that every
+responsibility incurred by England in the act of annexation must be
+fulfilled to the letter. Utilising the information which he had gained
+by personal observation during his visit to the Transvaal in 1879, and
+availing himself of the co-operation of President Brand, of the Free
+State, and Chief Justice de Villiers, in the Cape Colony, he drafted a
+scheme of administrative reform sufficient to satisfy the legitimate
+aspirations of the Boers for self-government without <span class="pagenum"><a id="page029" name="page029"></a>(p. 029)</span>
+endangering the permanency of British rule. It included proposals for
+administrative and financial reforms framed with a view of reducing
+the cost of government to the lowest point consistent with efficiency,
+for the reorganisation of the courts of law, for the survey of the
+proposed railway line to Delagoa Bay, and full details of a system of
+representative government. This measure he urged upon the Colonial
+Office as one of immediate necessity, since it embodied the fulfilment
+of the definite promises of an early grant of self-government made to
+the Boers at the time of annexation.<a id="footnotetag8" name="footnotetag8"></a><a href="#footnote8" title="Go to footnote 8"><span class="small">[8]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>He recognised the value of Delagoa Bay as an essential factor in the
+political and commercial system of a united South Africa, and he
+earnestly recommended its acquisition by purchase from the Portuguese
+Government. His perception of the extreme importance of satisfying all
+legitimate claims of the Boers, and his acute realisation of the
+danger of allowing the Transvaal to become a "jumping-off ground"
+either for foreign powers or Afrikander Nationalists, are exhibited in
+due relationship in a private memorandum which he wrote from the Cape
+at the end of July, 1879:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Any reliance on mere force in the Transvaal must react
+     dangerously down here in the old colony, and convert the Dutch
+     Country party, now as loyal and prosperous a section of the
+     population <span class="pagenum"><a id="page030" name="page030"></a>(p. 030)</span> as any under the Crown, into dangerous
+     allies of the small anti-English Republican party, who are for
+     separation, thus paralysing the efforts of the loyal English
+     party now in power, who aim at making the country a
+     self-defending integral portion of the British Empire. Further,
+     any attempt to give back or restore the Boer Republic in the
+     Transvaal must lead to anarchy and failure, and probably, at no
+     distant period, to a vicious imitation of some South American
+     Republics, in which the more uneducated and misguided Boers,
+     dominated and led by better educated foreign
+     adventurers&mdash;Germans, Hollanders, Irish Home Rulers, and other
+     European Republicans and Socialists&mdash;will become a pest to the
+     whole of South Africa, and a most dangerous fulcrum to any
+     European Power bent on contesting our naval supremacy, or
+     injuring us in our colonies.</p>
+
+<p>"There is no escaping from the responsibility which has already
+     been incurred, ever since the British flag was planted on the
+     Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still
+     arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility....
+     If you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always
+     to be heavily paid for in both blood and treasure.... Your object
+     is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This
+     will have to be asserted some day, and the assertion will not
+     become easier by delay. The trial of strength will be forced on
+     you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by
+     postponing the trial if we start with a good cause."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Could not the man who foresaw these dangers have prevented them? It is
+impossible to resist the momentum of this thought.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The retrocession.</span>
+
+<p>The events by which this forecast was so closely realised are not
+likely to be effaced from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page031" name="page031"></a>(p. 031)</span> memory of this generation.
+Frere had scarcely left the Colony from which he had been recalled by
+the joint efforts of Mr. Krüger and Lord (then Mr.) Courtney before
+the former, with his fellow triumvirs, had raised the Vier-kleur upon
+the still desolate uplands of the Witwatersrand. The attempt to put
+down by force the Boer revolt of 1880-81 failed. Mr. Gladstone's
+cabinet recoiled before the prospect of a war in which the Boers might
+have been supported by their kinsmen in the Free State and the Cape
+Colony.
+The retrocession of the Transvaal under the terms of the
+Pretoria Convention (1881) was followed by further concessions
+embodied in the London Convention of 1884. It is absolutely
+established as fact that Mr. Gladstone's Government intended, by
+certain articles contained in both conventions, to secure to all
+actual and potential British residents in the Transvaal the enjoyment
+of all the political rights of citizenship possessed by the Boers. But
+it is equally certain that the immediate contravention of Article XVI.
+of the Pretoria Convention, when in 1882 the period of residence
+necessary to qualify for the franchise was raised from two to five
+years, was allowed to pass without protest from the Imperial
+Government. And thus a breach of the Convention, which the discovery
+of the Witwatersrand gold-fields (1886) and the subsequent
+establishment of a great British industrial community made a matter of
+vital importance, was condoned. A few years more and the country which
+prided itself <span class="pagenum"><a id="page032" name="page032"></a>(p. 032)</span> upon being the home of liberty and of free
+institutions was confounded by the spectacle of a South Africa of its
+own making, in which a British majority denied the franchise in a
+Dutch Republic, contrasted with a Dutch minority dominating and
+controlling the machinery of responsible government in a British
+colony.</p>
+
+<p>This situation brings us (to use a military phrase) within striking
+distance of the objective of the present work&mdash;the personality and
+efforts of the man who administered South Africa in the momentous
+years of the struggle for equal rights for all white men from the
+Zambesi to Capetown.</p>
+
+<p>If the records set out in the preceding pages leave any impression
+upon the mind, it is one that must produce a sense of amazement,
+almost exasperation, at the thought of the many mistakes and disasters
+that might have been avoided, if only greater weight had been attached
+to the advice tendered to the British Government by its local
+representative in South Africa. And with this sense of amazement a
+generous mind will associate inevitably a feeling of regret for the
+injustice unwittingly, but none the less irreparably, inflicted upon
+loyal and capable servants of the Crown&mdash;an injustice so notorious
+that it has made South Africa the "grave of reputations." Apart from
+the pre-eminence with which the period of Lord Milner's administration
+is invested by the occurrence within it of a military conflict of
+unparalleled magnitude, Lord Milner stands out in the annals <span class="pagenum"><a id="page033" name="page033"></a>(p. 033)</span>
+of South Africa as the first High Commissioner whose knowledge of
+South African conditions was allowed to inspire the policy of the Home
+Government, and who himself was recognised by the Government and
+people of Great Britain as voicing the convictions and aspirations of
+all loyal subjects of the Crown in that province of the empire.</p>
+
+<p>The state of affairs with which Lord Milner was called upon to deal
+was in its essence the situation sketched by Frere twenty years before
+in the memorable forecast to which reference has been made. But the
+working of the forces indicated by Frere as destined, if unchecked, to
+drive England one day to a life-and-death struggle for her supremacy
+in South Africa, had been complicated by an event which cannot be
+omitted altogether from a chapter intended, like a Euripidean
+prologue, to prepare the mind of the spectator for the proper
+understanding of the characters and action of the drama. This event is
+the Jameson Raid.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Jameson raid.</span>
+
+<p>In order to see the Jameson Raid in its true perspective, it is not
+sufficient to place it in relationship to those familiar and notorious
+events by which it was followed. It must also be placed in
+relationship to the no less clearly defined events by which it was
+preceded. Thus placed it becomes the direct outcome of the refusal of
+the Imperial Government to use the advice of its local
+representative&mdash;or, more precisely, of the refusal to base its policy
+on South African instead <span class="pagenum"><a id="page034" name="page034"></a>(p. 034)</span> of British conditions: and, as
+such, it convinced the Imperial Government of the need of reviving the
+power of its local representative. In other words, it is a connecting
+link between the High Commissionerships of Frere and Milner. The
+events which followed the recall of Frere were accepted by the British
+inhabitants of South Africa as a practical demonstration of the
+inherent viciousness of the system under which the decision of
+cardinal questions of South African administration was left in the
+hands of the House of Commons, a body in which they were not
+represented; which met 6,000 miles away; whose judgment was liable to
+be warped by irrelevant considerations of English party politics; and
+one which was admittedly unfamiliar with the country and peoples whose
+interests were vitally affected by the manner in which these questions
+were decided. The lesson of the retrocession was taken to heart so
+earnestly that, fifteen years later, the majority of the British
+residents in the Transvaal refused to support a movement for reform
+which involved the re-establishment of Imperial authority, while among
+those who were loyal to the British connection throughout South Africa
+its effect was to make them think, <span class="sidenote">Rhodes.</span>
+as did Rhodes, that the machinery
+of the various local British governments must be dissociated as much
+as possible from the principles and methods of the Home Government.
+Hence the necessity for what Rhodes called the "elimination of the
+Imperial factor." The <span class="pagenum"><a id="page035" name="page035"></a>(p. 035)</span> expression, as he afterwards
+explained, was in no way inconsistent with attachment to the British
+connection. As read in the context in which it was originally used, it
+meant merely that the European population of Bechuanaland,<a id="footnotetag9" name="footnotetag9"></a><a href="#footnote9" title="Go to footnote 9"><span class="small">[9]</span></a> being
+mainly Boer immigrants, could be administered more successfully by
+officers responsible to a government which, like that of the Cape
+Colony, was well versed in South African conditions, than by officers
+directly responsible to the Imperial Government. The phrase was a
+criticism of Downing Street, and still more of English party
+government. In short, Rhodes was convinced that if a system of British
+administration, based on South African conditions, was ever to be
+carried on successfully, the local British authority, and not the Home
+Government, must be the machine employed; and in order to allow it to
+work freely, its action must be made as independent as possible of
+Downing Street. For Downing Street was an authority which blew hot or
+cold, in accordance with the views of the party for the time being in
+power.<a id="footnotetag10" name="footnotetag10"></a><a href="#footnote10" title="Go to footnote 10"><span class="small">[10]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">New forces.</span>
+
+<p>And, in point of fact, both parties in England <span class="pagenum"><a id="page036" name="page036"></a>(p. 036)</span> acquiesced in
+this judgment of the South African British. During the years between
+Frere's recall and the appointment of Lord Milner (1880-1897) the High
+Commissioner was a decreasing force. Both Lord Rosmead and Lord Loch
+did little to mould the destiny of South Africa: not because they
+lacked capacity, but because it was the determination of the Home
+Government to leave the difficult problem of South African unity to
+local initiative. On the other hand, the progress which was made in
+this direction by local initiative, aided as it was by the fortuitous
+discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, was considerable. The
+highlands of South Central Africa were acquired for the British race,
+and the Boer was effectively prevented from carrying the Vier-kleur
+beyond the Limpopo; the railway, drawn through the Free State by the
+magnet of the Rand, disturbed the retirement of the republican Dutch;
+and finally the Cape Colony and Natal were linked together with the
+Free State in a Customs Union. But the development of the mineral
+resources of the country led to the appearance of a new factor in
+South African politics. The comparative decline in the activity of the
+High Commissioner had been accompanied by the establishment and growth
+of powerful industrial corporations. It is easy to understand how a
+man like Rhodes, with the wealth and influence of De Beers and the
+Chartered Company at his command, might seek, by an alliance with the
+"great houses" of the Rand, to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page037" name="page037"></a>(p. 037)</span> find in private effort an
+instrument for remedying the deficiencies of the Imperial Government
+even more appropriate than the local governmental action upon which he
+had previously relied. For the work of these industrial corporations
+had powerfully enlisted the interest and sympathy of the British
+public. The Jameson Raid was an illegitimate and disastrous
+application of an otherwise meritorious and successful effort to
+strengthen the British hold upon South Africa by private enterprise.
+It was at once the measure of Imperial inefficiency, and its cure.</p>
+
+<p>One other circumstance must be recalled in estimating the extent to
+which the Home Government had earned the distrust of the British
+population in South Africa. Only eighteen months<a id="footnotetag11" name="footnotetag11"></a><a href="#footnote11" title="Go to footnote 11"><span class="small">[11]</span></a> before the Raid
+the High Commissioner, Lord Loch, had gone to Pretoria carrying a
+despatch in which the grant of a five years' franchise was advocated
+on behalf of the Uitlanders. His instructions were to present this
+despatch, and press upon President Krüger personally the necessity for
+giving effect to its recommendations. These instructions were
+cancelled at the last moment by Lord Ripon, because the German
+Ambassador had made representations in London that such action would
+be regarded as an interference with the <span class="italic">status quo</span> in South Africa,
+and, as such, detrimental to German interests in that country. And six
+months later<a id="footnotetag12" name="footnotetag12"></a><a href="#footnote12" title="Go to footnote 12"><span class="small">[12]</span></a> <span class="pagenum"><a id="page038" name="page038"></a>(p. 038)</span> President Krüger, in attending a "Kommers"
+given by the German Club at Pretoria in honour of the Kaiser Wilhelm
+II.'s birthday, alluded to Germany as a grown-up power that would stop
+England from "kicking" the child Republic.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Rhodes's Plan.</span>
+
+<p>The Raid was, therefore, a short cut to baffle German intrigue and
+solve the problem of South African unity at one blow. For to Rhodes
+the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders meant the withdrawal of the
+Transvaal Government from its opposition to his scheme of commercial
+federation. It is obvious that one ground of justification, and one
+only, can be found for the usurpation of the functions of government
+by a private individual, or group of individuals. This justification
+is success. It has been the custom to represent Dr. Jameson's decision
+to "ride in" as "an act of monumental folly," alike from a political
+and a military point of view.
+But this opinion overlooks the fact that
+the affair may have been so planned in Rhodes's mind that success did
+not depend upon the victory of the Uitlanders, aided by Jameson's
+troopers, but on the presence of the High Commissioner in the
+Transvaal under such conditions as would make the intervention of the
+Imperial Government at once imperative and effectual. The
+representative of the Imperial Government, backed by a Johannesburg in
+armed revolt against the Boer oligarchy, would find himself&mdash;so Rhodes
+thought&mdash;in a position highly favourable to the successful prosecution
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page039" name="page039"></a>(p. 039)</span> of the demands which had already been put forward on behalf
+of British subjects resident in the Transvaal. And in order that this
+essential part of the plan might be carried out without a moment of
+unnecessary delay, Rhodes kept a train, with steam up, in the station
+at Capetown ready to speed Lord Rosmead northwards directly the news
+of Dr. Jameson's arrival at Johannesburg should have reached him. Once
+Jameson's force had "got through," he relied upon the Reform
+Committee, however incomplete its preparations, being able to hold
+Johannesburg for a couple of days against any force the Boers could
+bring.<a id="footnotetag13" name="footnotetag13"></a><a href="#footnote13" title="Go to footnote 13"><span class="small">[13]</span></a> Nor in the light of what happened, during the war, both at
+Mafeking and Kimberley, can this expectation be thought extravagant.
+Here his responsibilities would have ended. The High Commissioner and
+the Imperial Government would have done the rest. To indulge in
+metaphor, the Imperial locomotive was to be set going, but the lines
+on which it was to run were those laid down by Mr. Rhodes.</p>
+
+<p>If this was the essence of Rhodes's plan, it would matter
+comparatively little whether the Reformers had, or had not, completed
+their preparations, or whether Dr. Jameson had 1,200 or 500 men.
+Certainly some such assumption is necessary to account for the fact
+that Rhodes <span class="pagenum"><a id="page040" name="page040"></a>(p. 040)</span> treated his confederates at Johannesburg as so
+many pawns on a chess-board. It is equally necessary to account for
+Dr. Jameson's action. "Twenty years friends, and now he goes in and
+ruins me," was Rhodes's comment on the news that Dr. Jameson had
+"ridden in," in spite of his own orders to the contrary and the
+message to the same effect which Captain Heany had delivered on behalf
+of the Reformers. But what if Dr. Jameson knew, or thought that he
+knew, that Rhodes's object in forcing the insurrection was not to make
+the Uitlanders reduce Krüger, but to compel the Imperial Government to
+step in? In this case he may well have thought that what was essential
+was not that the rising should be successful, but that there should be
+a rising of any kind; provided that it was sufficiently grave to
+arrest the attention of the world, and claim the interference of the
+Imperial Government.</p>
+
+<p>According to Mr. Chamberlain the continued inaction of the Imperial
+Government in the eighteen months that had passed since Lord Loch's
+visit to Pretoria in June, 1894, was due to two circumstances. In the
+first place, "the Uitlanders and their organs had always deprecated
+the introduction into the dispute of what is called in South Africa
+the 'Imperial factor'"; and in the second, the "rumours" of violent
+measures "were continually falsified by the event." Obviously, if
+Rhodes forced an insurrection with the intention of removing these
+obstacles&mdash;if, that is to say, the intervention <span class="pagenum"><a id="page041" name="page041"></a>(p. 041)</span> of the
+Imperial Government, and not the success of the insurrection, was his
+primary object&mdash;the temerity of Dr. Jameson's invasion is materially
+diminished. Now Mr. Chamberlain's statement, made under date February
+4th, 1896, <span class="italic">i.e.</span> five weeks after the Raid, is perfectly consistent
+with the view of the attitude of the Reformers expressed by Rhodes on
+the day before the Raid took place.</p>
+
+<p>Dr. Jameson's force, it will be remembered, started on the evening of
+Sunday, December 29th, 1895. Up to three days before&mdash;the
+26th&mdash;nothing had occurred to interfere with the final arrangement,
+telegraphed to Dr. Jameson from Capetown, that the movement in
+Johannesburg would take place on Saturday, the 28th. The circumstances
+which caused the Reformers to alter their plans were explained by
+Rhodes in an interview with Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary,
+at Capetown on the same Saturday, the 28th, with his accustomed
+vivacity. The Johannesburg insurrection, he said&mdash;</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The reformers divided.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "had fizzled out as a damp squib. The capitalists financing the
+     movement had made the hoisting of the British flag a <span class="italic">sine quâ
+     non</span>.
+This the National Union rejected, and issued a manifesto
+     declaring for a republic. The division had led to the complete
+     collapse of the movement, and it was thought that the leaders
+     would make the best terms they could with President Krüger."</p>
+
+<p>The telegrams which reached Dr. Jameson between the 26th and 29th
+contained the same facts, with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page042" name="page042"></a>(p. 042)</span> the further information that
+Captain Heany was travelling by special train to him with a message
+direct from the Reformers. In these circumstances it is said that
+Rhodes at Capetown imagined as little as the Reform leaders at
+Johannesburg that Dr. Jameson would cross the frontier. That, however,
+there was another point of view from which the situation might present
+itself to Dr. Jameson is shown by the fact that Mr. Chamberlain, in
+reply to the High Commissioner's telegram reporting the substance of
+Rhodes's statement to Sir Graham Bower, at once<a id="footnotetag14" name="footnotetag14"></a><a href="#footnote14" title="Go to footnote 14"><span class="small">[14]</span></a> inquired of Lord
+Rosmead, "Are you sure Jameson has not moved in consequence of the
+collapse?"</p>
+
+<p>Was Mr. Chamberlain right? Did Dr. Jameson see in the fact that the
+Reformers were divided on such an issue only an additional reason for
+carrying out a plan which had for its object to compel the Imperial
+Government to intervene in the affairs of the Transvaal before it was
+too late; that is to say, before the British population had definitely
+committed itself to the policy of a purged republic, but a republic
+under any flag but that of Great Britain? Such a policy was not merely
+possible. It seemed inevitable to the vivacious French observer who
+wrote, not from hearsay, but "with his eyes upon the object," in
+December, 1893:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The Transvaal will never be an English colony. The English of
+     the Transvaal, as well as those <span class="pagenum"><a id="page043" name="page043"></a>(p. 043)</span> of Cape Colony and
+     Natal, would be as firmly opposed to it as the Boers themselves,
+     for they have never forgiven England for letting herself be
+     beaten by the Boers at Majuba Hill and accepting her defeat, a
+     proceeding which has rendered them ridiculous in the eyes of the
+     Dutch population of South Africa.... With me this is not a simple
+     impression, but a firm conviction."<a id="footnotetag15" name="footnotetag15"></a><a href="#footnote15" title="Go to footnote 15"><span class="small">[15]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Jameson's decision.</span>
+
+<p>If these were the considerations which weighed with Dr. Jameson, his
+decision to "ride in" was inconsistent neither with friendship nor
+with patriotism. When Captain Heany had read from his pocket-book the
+message from the Reformers, Jameson paced for twenty minutes outside
+his tent. Having re-entered it, he announced his determination to
+disregard Heany's message no less than Rhodes's telegram.
+It was a
+momentous decision to take after twenty minutes' thought. Had he a
+reasonable expectation of carrying out the plan as Rhodes conceived
+it, in spite of the change in the position of affairs at Johannesburg?
+Had he any reason to believe that Rhodes desired him to force the
+insurrection in spite of his telegrams to the contrary? It is the
+answers to these questions that make the Raid, as far as Dr. Jameson
+is concerned, an "act of monumental folly," or a legitimate assumption
+of personal responsibility that is part of the empire-builder's
+stock-in-trade. The answer to the second question remains a matter of
+speculation. The answer to the first is to be found in the record of
+the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page044" name="page044"></a>(p. 044)</span> expedition. Dr. Jameson reached Krügersdorp at three
+o'clock on Wednesday, January 1st. A few hours before a cyclist had
+brought him congratulatory messages from the Reform leaders. The goal
+was almost within sight. What prevented Sir John Willoughby from
+taking his little force safely over the remaining twenty miles from
+Krügersdorp to Johannesburg was the merest accident: the few hours'
+delay caused, naturally enough, by Dr. Jameson's desire that his force
+should be met and escorted by a small body of volunteers from the
+Rand. He did not want, as he said, to go to Johannesburg as "a
+pirate." Sir John Willoughby's evidence is perfectly definite and
+conclusive on the point. If the force had pushed on by road from
+Krügersdorp to Johannesburg on Wednesday evening&mdash;had not, in
+Willoughby's words, "messed about" at Krügersdorp in expectation of
+the welcoming escort&mdash;Johannesburg would have been reached in safety
+on Thursday morning. With Dr. Jameson in Johannesburg and Lord Rosmead
+speeding northwards in his special train, the way would have been
+prepared for that decisive and successful action on the part of the
+Imperial Government which Rhodes had desired to bring about.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Why the raid failed.</span>
+
+<p>But, unsuccessful as was the actual expedition, the decision to "ride
+in" had secured the intervention of the Imperial Government. If
+intervention could have done what Rhodes expected of it, Dr. Jameson's
+decision to "ride in" would <span class="pagenum"><a id="page045" name="page045"></a>(p. 045)</span> have gained, at the cost of few
+lives and no increase of the national debt, what the war gained four
+years later at the cost of twenty thousand lives and £220,000,000. As
+it was, it failed to win the franchise for the Uitlanders. Why did not
+Lord Rosmead, with so strong a Colonial Secretary as Mr. Chamberlain
+at his back, brush the Raid aside, and address himself to the removal
+of the greater wrong that gave it birth? If Lord Rosmead had acted in
+the spirit of Mr. Chamberlain's despatches; if he had reminded the
+Government of the Republic from the first "that the danger from which
+they had just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which led
+up to it were not removed, might recur, although in a different form";
+if he had used "plain language" to President Krüger; and if, above
+all, he had remembered&mdash;as Mr. Chamberlain reminded him&mdash;that "the
+people of Johannesburg had surrendered in the belief that reasonable
+concessions would have been arranged through his intervention, and
+until these were granted, or were definitely promised to him by the
+President, the root-causes of the recent troubles would
+remain,"&mdash;might he not yet have saved South Africa for the empire
+without subjecting her to the dread arbitrament of the sword?</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain.</span>
+
+<p>It is in the answer to this question that we find the actual cause of
+the utter failure of Rhodes's plan. The truth is that success in any
+real sense&mdash;that is to say, success which would <span class="pagenum"><a id="page046" name="page046"></a>(p. 046)</span> have
+strengthened British supremacy and promoted the union of European
+South Africa&mdash;was impossible. The sole response which Lord Rosmead
+returned to Mr. Chamberlain's counsels was the weary confession: "The
+question of concessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between
+President Krüger and myself." The methods employed by Rhodes were so
+questionable that no High Commissioner could have allowed the Imperial
+Government to have derived any advantage from them. To have gained the
+franchise for the Uitlanders as the result of violent and unscrupulous
+action, would have inflicted an enduring injury upon the British cause
+in South Africa for which the enfranchisement itself would have been
+small compensation. The disclosure of these methods and, with them, of
+the hollowness of Rhodes's alliance with the Afrikander Bond, alarmed
+and incensed the whole Dutch population of South Africa. What this
+meant Lord Rosmead knew, and Mr. Chamberlain did not know. The ten
+years' truce between the forces of the Afrikander nationalists and the
+paramount Power was at an end. To combat these forces something better
+than the methods of the Raid was required. <span class="italic">Non tali auxilio, nec
+defensoribus istis!</span> No modern race have excelled the Dutch in courage
+and endurance. In Europe they had successfully defended their
+independence against the flower of the armies of Spain, Austria, and
+France. The South African Dutch were not inferior in these <span class="pagenum"><a id="page047" name="page047"></a>(p. 047)</span>
+qualities to the people of the parent stock. If such a race, embarked
+upon what it conceived to be a struggle for national existence, was to
+be overcome, the hands of the conqueror must be clean as well as
+strong. None the less the active sympathy with the Uitlanders
+exhibited in Mr. Chamberlain's despatches was welcomed by the British
+as evidence that the new Colonial Secretary was more alert and
+determined than his predecessors. For the first time in the history of
+British administration in South Africa, Downing Street had shown
+itself more zealous than Capetown. It was the solitary ray of light
+that broke the universal gloom in which South Africa was enshrouded by
+the catastrophe of the Raid.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page048" name="page048"></a>(p. 048)</span> CHAPTER II</h3>
+
+<p class="title">THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS<a id="footnotetag16" name="footnotetag16"></a><a href="#footnote16" title="Go to footnote 16"><span class="small">[16]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Carl Borckenhagen.</span>
+
+<p>In the face of the colossal resistance offered to the British arms by
+the Boers and their colonial kinsmen in the South African War, it may
+seem unnecessary to produce any evidence in support of the contention
+that the military strength then displayed by the Dutch in South Africa
+was the result of long and careful preparation. But the same inability
+to grasp the facts of the South African situation which kept the Army
+Corps in England three months after it should have been sent to the
+Cape, is still to be met with. This attitude of mind&mdash;whether it be a
+consciousness of moral rectitude, or a mere insular disdain of looking
+at things from any but a British point of view&mdash;is still to be
+observed in the statements of those politicians who will even now deny
+that any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page049" name="page049"></a>(p. 049)</span> trace of a definite plan of action, or of a
+concerted purpose, which could properly be described as a "conspiracy"
+against British supremacy was to be found among the Dutch population
+of South Africa as a whole, prior to the outbreak of the war. It is
+for the benefit of such politicians in part, and still more with a
+view of bringing the mind of the reader into something approaching a
+direct contact with the actual working of the Afrikander mind, that I
+transcribe a statement of the pure doctrine of the Bond, as it was
+expounded by the German,
+Borckenhagen, and his followers in the Free
+State. It will, however, be convenient to preface the quotation with a
+word of explanation in respect both of the text and the personality of
+Borckenhagen.</p>
+
+<p>The passage, which is taken <span class="italic">verbatim</span> from a work entitled, "The
+Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed," is a collection of sentences
+gathered from Dutch pamphlets and articles "emanating from Holland,"
+and translated literally into the somewhat uncouth English of the
+text. The author of the work, Mr. C. H. Thomas, was for many years a
+burgher of the Free State, where he shared the opinions of President
+Brand, and subsequently supported Mr. J. G. Fraser in opposing the
+policy of "closer union" with the South African Republic, advocated by
+Brand's successor, Mr. F. W. Reitz. The point of view from which the
+Dutch of Holland regarded the nationalist movement in South Africa was
+succinctly <span class="pagenum"><a id="page050" name="page050"></a>(p. 050)</span> stated in an article published by the Amsterdam
+<span class="italic">Handelsblad</span> in 1881.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The future of England lies in India, and the future of Holland
+     in South Africa.... When our capitalists vigorously develop this
+     trade, and, for example, form a syndicate to buy Delagoa Bay from
+     Portugal, then a railway from Capetown to Bloemfontein,
+     Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Delagoa Bay will be a lucrative
+     investment. And when, in course of time, the Dutch language shall
+     universally prevail in South Africa, this most extensive
+     territory will become a North America for Holland, and enable us
+     to balance the Anglo-Saxon race."<a id="footnotetag17" name="footnotetag17"></a><a href="#footnote17" title="Go to footnote 17"><span class="small">[17]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Carl Borckenhagen, who, with Mr. Reitz,<a id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18"></a><a href="#footnote18" title="Go to footnote 18"><span class="small">[18]</span></a> advocated the
+establishment of the Bond in 1881, was a German republican. His name
+has been associated with Mr. Thomas's summary of the Bond propaganda
+in the Free State, because, as editor of <span class="italic">The Bloemfontein Express</span> up
+to the time of his death, early in 1898, he was probably the most
+consistent of all the South African exponents of the nationalist
+creed. Certainly it is no exaggeration to say that he converted the
+Free State of Brand into the Free State of Steyn.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p class="center smcap">"The Bond Programme</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">The doctrine of the Bond.</span>
+
+<p>"The Afrikander Bond has as final object what is summed up in its
+     motto of 'Afrika voor de Afrikaners.' The whole of South Africa
+     belongs by just right to the Afrikander nation. It is the
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page051" name="page051"></a>(p. 051)</span> privilege and duty of every Afrikander to contribute
+     all in his power towards the expulsion of the English usurper.
+     The States of South Africa to be federated in one independent
+     Republic.</p>
+
+<p>The Afrikander Bond prepares for this consummation.</p>
+
+<p>Argument in justification:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>(<span class="italic">a</span>) The transfer of the Cape Colony to the British Government
+     took place by circumstances of <span class="italic">force majeure</span> and without the
+     consent of the Dutch nation, who renounced all claim in favour of
+     the Afrikander or Boer nation.</p>
+
+<p>(<span class="italic">b</span>) Natal is territory which accrued to a contingent of the
+     Boer nation by purchase from the Zulu king, who received the
+     consideration agreed for.</p>
+
+<p>(<span class="italic">c</span>) The British authorities expelled the rightful owners from
+     Natal by force of arms without just cause.</p>
+
+<p>The task of the Afrikander Bond consists in:</p>
+
+<p>(<span class="italic">a</span>) Procuring the staunch adhesion and co-operation of every
+     Afrikander and other real friend of the cause.</p>
+
+<p>(<span class="italic">b</span>) To obtain the sympathy, the moral and effective aid, of one
+     or more of the world's Powers.</p>
+
+<p>The means to accomplish those tasks are:</p>
+
+<p>Personal persuasion, Press propaganda, legislation and diplomacy.</p>
+
+<p>The direction of the application of these means is entrusted to a
+     select body of members eligible for their loyalty to the cause
+     and their abilities and position. That body will conduct such
+     measures as need the observance of special secrecy. Upon the rest
+     of the members will devolve activities of a general character
+     under the direction of the selected chiefs.</p>
+
+<p>One of the indispensable requisites is the proper organisation of
+     an effective fund, which is to be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page052" name="page052"></a>(p. 052)</span> regularly sustained.
+     Bond members will aid each other in all relations of public life
+     in preference to non-members.</p>
+
+<p>In the efforts of gaining adherence to the cause it is of
+     importance to distinguish three categories of persons:</p>
+
+<p>(1) The class of Afrikanders who are to some extent deteriorated
+     by assimilative influences with the English race, whose
+     restoration to patriotism will need great efforts, discretion,
+     and patience.</p>
+
+<p>(2) The apparently unthinking and apathetic class who prefer to
+     relegate all initiative to leaders whom they will loyally follow.
+     This class is the most numerous by far.</p>
+
+<p>(3) The warmly patriotic class, including men gifted with
+     intelligence, energy, and speech, qualified as leaders, and apt
+     to exercise influence over the rest.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">Among these three classes many exist whose views and religious
+     scruples need to be corrected. Scripture abounds in proofs and
+     salient analogies applying to the situation and justifying our
+     cause. In this, as well as in other directions, the members who
+     work in circulating written propaganda will supply the correct
+     and conclusive arguments accessible to all.</p>
+
+<p>Upon the basis of our just rights the British Government, if not
+     the entire nation, is the usurping enemy of the Boer nation.</p>
+
+<p>In dealing with an enemy it is justifiable to employ, besides
+     force, also means of a less open character, such as diplomacy and
+     stratagem.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">Anti-british methods.</span>
+
+<p>The greatest danger to Afrikanderdom is the English policy of
+     Anglicising the Boer nation&mdash;to submerge it by the process of
+     assimilation.</p>
+
+<p>A distinct attitude of holding aloof from English influences is
+     the only remedy against that peril and for thwarting that
+     insidious policy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page053" name="page053"></a>(p. 053)</span> It is only such an attitude that will preserve the
+     nation in its simple faith and habits of morality, and provide
+     safety against the dangers of contamination and pernicious
+     examples, with all their fateful consequences to body and soul.</p>
+
+<p>Let the Dutch language have the place of honour in schools and
+     homes.</p>
+
+<p>Let alliances of marriage with the English be stamped as
+     unpatriotic.</p>
+
+<p>Let every Afrikander see that he is at all times well armed with
+     the best possible weapons, and maintains the expert use of the
+     rifle among young and old, so as to be ready when duty calls, and
+     the time is ripe for asserting the nation's rights and being rid
+     of English thraldom.</p>
+
+<p>Employ teachers only who are animated with truly patriotic
+     sentiments.</p>
+
+<p>Let it be well understood that English domination will also bring
+     English intolerance and servitude, for it is only a very frail
+     link which separates the English State Church from actual
+     Romanism, and its proselytism <span class="italic">en bloc</span> is only a matter of short
+     time.</p>
+
+<p>Equally repugnant and dangerous is England's policy towards the
+     coloured races, whom she aims, for the sake of industrial profit,
+     at elevating to equal rank with whites, in direct conflict with
+     spiritual authority&mdash;a policy which incites coloured people to
+     rivalry with their superiors, and can only end in common
+     disaster.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst remaining absolutely independent, the ties of blood,
+     relationship, and language point to Holland for a domestic base.</p>
+
+<p>As to commerce, Germany, America, and other industrial nations
+     could more than fill the gap left by England, and such
+     connections should be cultivated as a potent means towards
+     obtaining foreign support to our cause and identification with
+     it.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page054" name="page054"></a>(p. 054)</span> If the mineral wealth of the Transvaal and Orange Free
+     State becomes established&mdash;as appears certain from discoveries
+     already made&mdash;England will not rest until these are also hers.</p>
+
+<p>The leopard will retain its spots. The independence of both
+     Republics is at stake on that account alone, with the risk that
+     the rightful owners of the land will become the hewers of wood
+     and drawers of water for the usurpers.</p>
+
+<p>There is no alternative hope for the peace and progress of South
+     Africa except by the total excision of the British ulcer.</p>
+
+<p>Reliable signs are not wanting to show that our nation is
+     designed by Providence as the instrument for the recovery of its
+     rights, and for the chastisement of proud, perfidious
+     Albion."<a id="footnotetag19" name="footnotetag19"></a><a href="#footnote19" title="Go to footnote 19"><span class="small">[19]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>These brief and disjointed sentences present in their shortest form
+arguments and exhortations with which the Dutch population of the Free
+State, the Transvaal, and the Cape Colony, were familiarised through
+the Press, the pulpit, the platform, and through individual
+intercourse and advocacy, from the time of the Retrocession in 1881
+onwards. It is in effect the scheme of a Bond "worked out more in
+detail by some friends at Bloemfontein," as published by Borckenhagen
+in his paper, <span class="italic">The Bloemfontein Express</span>, on April 7th, 1881, to which
+Du Toit, the founder of the Bond in the Cape Colony, referred in the
+pamphlet, <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span> (The Transvaal War), which he issued
+from his press at the Paarl later on in the same year. The nationalist
+creed, as <span class="pagenum"><a id="page055" name="page055"></a>(p. 055)</span> thus formulated, was preached consistently in the
+Free State; but in the Cape Colony it was modified by Hofmeyr to meet
+the exigencies of Colonial politics.</p>
+
+<p>None the less it was in the Cape Colony that the Bond, as a political
+organisation, was destined to find its chief sphere of action. In the
+Free State it was discouraged by President Brand, and in point of fact
+the British population was too insignificant a factor in the politics
+of the central republic to make it necessary to maintain a distinct
+organisation for the promotion of nationalist sentiment. In the
+Transvaal, again, the Bond maintained no regular organisation. And
+this for two reasons. Every burgher of the northern Republic was
+sufficiently animated by the anti-British sentiments which it was
+intended to promote; and the only "constitution" which the Transvaal
+Dutch would accept was one which embodied principles so flagrantly
+inconsistent with submission to British authority that it could not be
+adopted by the branches of the Bond in the Cape Colony without
+exposing its members to immediate prosecution for high treason.<a id="footnotetag20" name="footnotetag20"></a><a href="#footnote20" title="Go to footnote 20"><span class="small">[20]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>In the politics of the Cape Colony, however, the Bond became the
+predominant force; and any picture, however briefly sketched, of South
+Africa as it was when Lord Milner's administration commenced,
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page056" name="page056"></a>(p. 056)</span> must include some account of the origin and methods of this
+remarkable organisation.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The origin of the Bond.</span>
+
+<p>The origin of the Afrikander Bond is to be found in the articles
+written by the Rev. S. J. du Toit, a Dutch predikant, in <span class="italic">De Patriot</span>,
+a newspaper published at the Paarl, of which he was the editor. Mr. du
+Toit's political standpoint is sufficiently revealed by the fact that
+in 1881 he claimed that <span class="italic">De Patriot</span> had done more than any other
+single agency to secure the successful revolt of the Boers from
+British authority accomplished in that year. The inspiration which
+drove his pen to advocate the founding of a political organisation,
+that should serve to prepare the way for a more general and complete
+"war of independence," was the defeat of the British troops by the
+Transvaal burghers.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "This is now our time," he wrote, in the same year, "to establish
+     the Bond, while a national consciousness has been awakened
+     through the Transvaal War. And the Bond must be our preparation
+     for the future confederation of all the States and Colonies of
+     South Africa. The English Government keeps talking of a
+     confederation under the British flag. That will never happen. We
+     can assure them of that. We have often said it: there is just one
+     hindrance to confederation, and that is the English flag. Let
+     them take that away, and the confederation under the free
+     Afrikander flag would be established. But so long as the English
+     flag remains here the Afrikander Bond must be our confederation.
+     And the British will, after a while, realise that Froude's advice
+     is the best for them: they must just have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page057" name="page057"></a>(p. 057)</span> Simon's Bay
+     as a naval and military station on the road to India, and give
+     over all the rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders."<a id="footnotetag21" name="footnotetag21"></a><a href="#footnote21" title="Go to footnote 21"><span class="small">[21]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>This general statement of the purpose of the Bond was supported by
+reiterated appeals to racial passion:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The little respect which the Afrikander had for British troops
+     and cannons [up to the Majuba defeat]," he writes, "is utterly
+     done away. And England has learnt so much respect for us
+     Afrikanders that she will take care not to be so ready to make
+     war with us again.... The Englishman has made himself hated,
+     language and all. And this is well."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The objects of the Bond.</span>
+
+<p>When, by the use of these and even more violent expressions, the mind
+of the Dutch population had been sufficiently aroused, Du Toit
+proceeded to unfold his plan of campaign. His <span class="italic">modus operandi</span> is
+similar to that of Borckenhagen in its main features. The Bond, says
+<span class="italic">De Patriot</span>, must boycott all English traders, except only those who
+are ready to adopt its principles. English signboards, advertisements,
+shops and book-keepers, must be abolished. The English banks must be
+replaced by a National Bank. No land must be sold to Englishmen. The
+Republics must "make their own ammunition, and be well supplied with
+cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery to work them." And he
+cheerfully notices that "at Heidelberg there are already 4,000
+cartridges <span class="pagenum"><a id="page058" name="page058"></a>(p. 058)</span> made daily, and a few skilful Afrikanders have
+begun to make shells, too. This is right: so must we become a nation."
+For the Cape Colony, however, "such preparations are not so especially
+necessary." But, most of all, Du Toit insists upon the need of
+combating the growing use of the English language. "English
+education," he laments, "has done more mischief to our country and
+nation than we can express." And, therefore, he urges "war" against
+the English language. In the schools, in the Church, and "in our
+family life above all," it must be considered a "disgrace to speak
+English.... Who will join the war? All true Afrikanders, we hope."</p>
+
+<p>Thus was the Bond, the child of Majuba, quickened into conscious being
+by the fiery pen of the predikant, Du Toit. Poor Du Toit! His after
+life was a strange commentary upon this early triumph of his brain,
+won in the drowsy solitudes of the Paarl. Summoned to be Director of
+Education in the Transvaal, he was quickly disillusioned of his love
+of his Dutch mother-country by actual intercourse with the
+contemptuous Hollanders whom Krüger had invited to serve the Republic.
+Later, again, he was rejected by the Bond which he had himself
+created, and driven to find comfort in the broad freedom of allegiance
+to an Empire-state.</p>
+
+<p>The object of the Bond, as stated by Du Toit in <span class="italic">De Transvaalse
+Oorlog</span>, was the "creation of a South African nationality ... through
+the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page059" name="page059"></a>(p. 059)</span> establishment of this Bond in all states and colonies of
+South Africa." Its organisation was to consist of a central governing
+body (<span class="italic">bestuur</span>), with provincial, district, and ward <span class="italic">besturen</span>. The
+central <span class="italic">bestuur</span> was to be composed of five members, two for the Cape
+Colony, and one each for the Transvaal, Natal, and Free State, who
+were "to meet yearly in one or other of the chief towns of the
+component states." The provincial <span class="italic">besturen</span>, consisting of one
+representative from each of the district <span class="italic">besturen</span>, were to meet
+every six months at their respective colonial or state capitals.<a id="footnotetag22" name="footnotetag22"></a><a href="#footnote22" title="Go to footnote 22"><span class="small">[22]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The first Congress of the Afrikander Bond was held at Graaf Reinet in
+1882. In the draft constitution then drawn up for the approval of its
+members, the relationship of the Bond to the British Government in
+South Africa was defined with commendable frankness. In the "Programme
+of Principles" was the article:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     In itself acknowledging no single form of government as the only
+     suitable form, and whilst acknowledging the form of government
+     existing at present, [the Bond] means that the aim of our
+     national development must be a united South Africa under its own
+     flag.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's influence.</span>
+
+<p>And it was upon the basis of this "Programme of Principles" that the
+earliest Bond organisations were formed in the Transvaal, the Free
+State, and the Cape Colony. In the year following the Graaf Reinet
+Congress, however, the "Farmers' <span class="pagenum"><a id="page060" name="page060"></a>(p. 060)</span> Protection Association" was
+amalgamated with the Bond in the Cape Colony,
+and the influence of Mr.
+J. H. Hofmeyr led the joint organisation to adopt a modified
+"programme." Mr. Hofmeyr, who was destined afterwards to assume the
+undisputed headship of the Bond, was an economist as well as a
+nationalist. He was intensely interested in the development of the
+country districts, and he saw that the conditions of agriculture could
+hardly be improved without the co-operation of the British and more
+progressive section of the farming class. He also knew that an
+organisation, professing to forward aims of avowed disloyalty, would
+rapidly find itself in collision with the Cape Government. With the
+growth of Mr. Hofmeyr's influence the policy, though not the aims, of
+the Bond was changed. All declarations, such as the clause "under its
+own flag," inconsistent with allegiance to the British Crown were
+omitted from the official constitution, and its individual members
+were exhorted to avoid any behaviour or expressions likely to prevent
+Englishmen from joining the organisation. As early as 1884 the Bond
+secured the return of twenty-five members to the Cape Parliament, and
+it was their support that enabled the Upington Ministry to maintain
+itself in office against an opposition which consisted of the main
+body of the representatives elected by the British population; and
+from this date onwards it was the recognised aim of Mr. Hofmeyr to
+control the Legislature of the Colony <span class="pagenum"><a id="page061" name="page061"></a>(p. 061)</span> by making it
+impossible for any ministry to dispense with the support of the Bond
+members, although he refrained from putting a ministry of Bondsmen
+into office. To have done this latter might have united the British
+population and their representatives in a solid phalanx, and
+endangered the success of the effort to separate the British settlers
+in the country districts from the more recent arrivals from
+England&mdash;mostly townsmen&mdash;which remained a fruitful source of
+Afrikander influence up to the time of the Jameson Raid. By
+representing the new British population, which followed in the wake of
+the mineral discoveries, as "fortune-seekers" and adventurers and not
+genuine colonists, the Bond endeavoured, not merely to widen the
+natural line of cleavage between the townsman and the countryman, but
+actually to detach the older British settlers from sympathy with the
+mother country, and, by drawing them within the sphere of Afrikander
+nationalist aspirations, to make them share its own antagonism to
+British supremacy.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Merriman and the Bond.</span>
+
+<p>But, in spite of the change of policy due to Mr. Hofmeyr, the old
+leaven of stalwart Bondsmen remained sufficiently in evidence to draw
+from Mr. J. X. Merriman&mdash;then a strong Imperialist in close
+association with Mr. J. W. Leonard&mdash;a striking rebuke. The speech in
+question was made, fittingly enough, at Grahamstown, the most
+"English" town in South Africa, in 1885. It was reprinted with
+complete appropriateness, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page062" name="page062"></a>(p. 062)</span> in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span> of July 10th,
+1899. The struggle which Mr. Merriman had foreseen fourteen years
+before was then near at hand; while Mr. Merriman himself had become a
+member of a ministry placed in power by the Bond for the avowed
+purpose of "combating the British Government."</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The situation is a grave one," he said. "It is not a question of
+     localism; it is not a question of party politics; but it is a
+     question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral
+     part of the British Empire.... You will have to keep public men
+     up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind
+     whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the
+     British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as
+     privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the
+     Bond. From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison
+     began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come
+     to this&mdash;Is England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in
+     South Africa?... Since then that institution has made a show of
+     loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty.... Some people, who
+     should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the
+     idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole
+     teaching of history goes to show that when the conflict was
+     between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent
+     section triumphed. And so we see that some moderate men are in
+     the power of an institution whose avowed object is to combat the
+     British Government. In any other country such an organisation
+     could not have grown; but here, among a scattered population, it
+     has insidiously and successfully worked.... No one who wishes
+     well for the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page063" name="page063"></a>(p. 063)</span> British Government could have read the
+     leading articles of the <span class="italic">Zuid Africaan</span>, and <span class="italic">Express</span>, and <span class="italic">De
+     Patriot</span>, in expounding the Bond principles, without seeing that
+     the maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the
+     object they have in view are absolutely different things. My
+     quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its
+     main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount
+     power in South Africa."</p>
+
+<p>This was plain speaking. The rare insight revealed in such a sentence
+as this&mdash;"in any other country such an organisation could not have
+grown, but here, <span class="italic">among a scattered population</span>, it has insidiously
+and successfully worked"; the piquant incident of the reproduction of
+the speech on the eve of the war; the fact that the man who made this
+diagnosis was to drink the poison whose fatal effects he described so
+faithfully, was indeed to become the most bitter opponent of the great
+statesman that "kept South Africa a part of the British
+Empire,"&mdash;these things together make Mr. Merriman's Grahamstown speech
+one of the most curious and instructive of the political utterances of
+the period.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Change of Bond policy.</span>
+
+<p>In the year following (1886) the Bond met officially, for the first
+and only time, as an inter-state organisation. Bloemfontein was the
+place of assemblage, and in the Central Bestuur, or Committee, the
+South African Republic, the Free State, and the Cape Colony were each
+represented by two delegates. This meeting revealed the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page064" name="page064"></a>(p. 064)</span>
+practical difficulties which prevented the Cape nationalists from
+adopting the definitely anti-British programme of the Bond leaders in
+the Republics; and the conflict of commercial interests between the
+Cape Colony and the Transvaal, already initiated by the attempt of the
+latter to secure Bechuanaland in 1884-5,
+confirmed the Cape delegates
+in their decision to develop the Bond in the Cape Colony upon colonial
+rather than inter-state lines. The result of the divergences of aim
+manifested at Bloemfontein was speedily made apparent in the Cape
+Colony. In 1887 Mr. T. P. Theron, then Secretary of the Bond,
+delivered an address in which the new, or Hofmeyr, programme was
+formulated and officially adopted. In recommending the new policy to
+the members of the Bond, Mr. Theron made no secret of the nature of
+the considerations by which its leaders had been chiefly influenced.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "You must remember," he said, "that the eyes of all are directed
+     towards you. The Press will cause your actions, expressions, and
+     resolutions to be known everywhere. You cannot but feel how much
+     depends on us for our nation and our country. If we must plead
+     guilty in the past of many an unguarded expression, let us be
+     more cautious and guarded for the future."</p>
+
+<p>And he then proceeded to sketch a picture of racial conciliation, when
+all "differences and disagreements" between Dutch and English would be
+merged in the consciousness of a new and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page065" name="page065"></a>(p. 065)</span> common
+nationality&mdash;pointing out, however, that the advent of that day
+depended on "you and me, my fellow Bond members."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Rhodes and Hofmeyr.</span>
+
+<p>Assuming that the predominance of Afrikander ideals could be secured
+only by the complete separation of the local governments from the
+Government of Great Britain, nothing could be more masterly than the
+manner in which the Bond approached the task of reuniting the European
+communities of South Africa&mdash;the task which the Imperial Government
+had abandoned as hopeless. As inspired and controlled by Hofmeyr
+during the years between this date (1887) and the Jameson Raid, the
+Bond embodied a volume of effort in which the most sincere supporter
+of the British connection could co-operate. It was the assistance
+afforded by the Bond in moulding British administration in South
+Africa upon South African lines that provided the common ground upon
+which Rhodes and Hofmeyr met in their long alliance. Hofmeyr probably
+never abandoned his belief that a republican form of government was
+the inevitable <span class="italic">dénouement</span> to which the administration of South
+Africa on a basis of South African ideas must lead. Rhodes never
+wavered in his loyalty to the British connection. But there was a
+great body of useful work which both men could accomplish in common,
+which each desired to see accomplished, which, when accomplished,
+would leave each free to choose the path&mdash;Republican or Imperial&mdash;by
+which the last stage was to be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page066" name="page066"></a>(p. 066)</span> traversed and the goal of
+South African unity finally attained.</p>
+
+<p>The character and career of Rhodes afford material for a study of such
+peculiar and engrossing interest that any adequate treatment of the
+subject would require a separate volume. Fortunately, the broad facts
+of his life are sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to
+attempt the almost impossible task of condensing a volume within the
+limits of a few pages. None the less, there is one incident in his
+political career which must be recalled here, and that for the simple
+reason that it establishes two facts, each of which is essential to
+the complete understanding of the situation in the Cape Colony as it
+developed immediately after the Raid. First, that all through the
+years of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance the Bond remained at heart true
+to the aim which it had at first openly avowed&mdash;the aim of
+establishing a united South Africa under its own flag. And second,
+that Rhodes was equally staunch in maintaining his ideal of a united
+South Africa under the British flag. The incident which exhibits both
+these facts in the clearest light is the refusal by Rhodes of the
+overtures made to him by Borckenhagen. At the time when these
+overtures were made Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the
+Chartered Company had been successfully launched, and the alliance
+between himself and Hofmeyr was in full operation. The occasion which
+led to them was the opening of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page067" name="page067"></a>(p. 067)</span> the railway at Bloemfontein
+in 1890&mdash;a railway constructed by the Cape Government under a friendly
+arrangement with the Free State. And it was one, therefore, which
+afforded a conspicuous example of the value of the Bond influence as a
+means of securing progress in the direction of South African unity.
+The story was told by Rhodes himself in a speech which he made in the
+Cape Colony on March 12th, 1898.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Rhodes and Borckenhagen.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I remember," he said, "that we had a great meeting at
+     Bloemfontein, and in the usual course I had to make a speech. I
+     think I was your Prime Minister. And this speech pleased many
+     there, and especially&mdash;and I speak of him with the greatest
+     respect&mdash;a gentleman who is dead,
+Mr. Borckenhagen. He came to me
+     and asked me to dictate to him the whole of my speech. I said, 'I
+     never wrote a speech, and I don't know what I said; but I will
+     tell you what I know about it.' He wrote it down, and afterwards
+     came to Capetown with me.... He spoke very nicely to me about my
+     speech. 'Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa.' And I said,
+     'So do I; I am with you entirely. We must have a united South
+     Africa.' He said, 'There is nothing in the way.' And I said, 'No;
+     there is nothing in the way. Well,' I said, 'we are one.' 'Yes,'
+     he said, 'and I will tell you: we will take you as our leader,'
+     he said. 'There is only one small thing, and that is, we must, of
+     course, be independent to the rest of the world.' I said, 'No;
+     you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to
+     forget all my history and traditions; and I would be a fool,
+     because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by
+     yours.' From that day he assumed a most acrid tone in his
+     <span class="italic">Express</span> towards myself, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page068" name="page068"></a>(p. 068)</span> I was made full sorry at
+     times by the tone. But that was the overpowering thought in his
+     mind&mdash;an independent South Africa."<a id="footnotetag23" name="footnotetag23"></a><a href="#footnote23" title="Go to footnote 23"><span class="small">[23]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Effects of the raid.</span>
+
+<p>The facts here disclosed explain how it was that the apparently
+satisfactory situation in South Africa before the Raid so rapidly
+developed into the dangerous situation of the years that followed it.
+The Raid tore aside the veil which the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance had
+cast over the eyes alike of Dutch and British, and left them free to
+see the essential antagonism of aim between the two men in its naked
+truth.<a id="footnotetag24" name="footnotetag24"></a><a href="#footnote24" title="Go to footnote 24"><span class="small">[24]</span></a> From that moment Rhodes was recognised by the Bond as its
+chief and most dangerous enemy; and as such he was pursued by its
+bitterest hostility to the day of his death; while Rhodes, on the
+other hand, was driven to seek support solely in the people of his own
+nationality. From that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page069" name="page069"></a>(p. 069)</span> moment the Bond fell back upon the
+policy of 1881. The Dutch Press, pulpit, and platform commenced an
+active nationalist propaganda on the old racial lines; and the
+advocacy of anti-British aims increased in boldness and in
+definiteness as the Transvaal grew strong with its inflowing
+armaments.</p>
+
+<p>We are now in a position to sum up the main features of the situation
+in South Africa as Lord Milner found it. British administration,
+controlled from Downing Street, had quickly led to what Sir George
+Grey called the dismemberment of European South Africa. The Imperial
+Government, having found out its mistake, had endeavoured to regain
+the lost solidarity of the European communities and its authority over
+them, by bringing the Republics into a federal system under the
+British Crown. It had been thwarted in this endeavour by the military
+resistance of the Boers in the Transvaal, and the fear of a like
+resistance on the part of the Dutch population throughout South
+Africa. Its impotency had invited, and in part justified, the efforts
+made by local British initiative to solve the problem of South African
+unity on South African lines, but in a manner consistent with the
+maintenance of British supremacy. The early success of these efforts,
+prosecuted mainly through the agency of Rhodes, had been obliterated
+by the Jameson Raid. All attempts to secure the reunion of South
+Africa under the British flag having failed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page070" name="page070"></a>(p. 070)</span> alike under
+Imperial and local British initiative, the way was open for the
+Afrikander nationalists once more to put forward the alternative plan
+of a united South Africa under its own flag, which they had formulated
+in the year immediately following the retrocession of the Transvaal.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Situation in 1896.</span>
+
+<p>In proportion as the friends and supporters of British supremacy were
+discredited and depressed by the catastrophe of the Raid, the
+advocates and promoters of Afrikander nationalism were emboldened and
+encouraged.
+It was not Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the
+Cape who succeeded the discredited Rhodes (January 13th, 1896), but
+Mr. Hofmeyr, the veteran leader of the Afrikander Bond, that dictated
+the policy which Lord Rosmead must pursue to re-establish the
+integrity of the Imperial Government in the minds of its Dutch
+subjects. At the next presidential election in the Free State (March
+4th, 1896), Mr. J. G. Fraser, the head of the moderate party which
+followed in the steps of President Brand, was hopelessly beaten by Mr.
+Marthinus Steyn, an Afrikander nationalist of the scientific school of
+Borckenhagen, and a politician whose immediate programme included the
+"closer union" of that state with the South African Republic, the
+terms of which were finally settled at Bloemfontein on March 9th,
+1897. In the Cape Colony the Bond organised its resources with a view
+of securing even more complete control of the Cape Legislature at the
+general election of 1898. And lastly, President Krüger, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page071" name="page071"></a>(p. 071)</span> who
+had ceased to rely upon Holland for administrative talent, and opened
+the lucrative offices of the South African Republic to the ambitious
+and educated Afrikander youth of the Free State and Cape Colony,
+commenced methodically and secretly to supply arms and ammunition to
+the adherents of the nationalist cause in the British Colonies.</p>
+
+<p>But disastrous as was the Jameson Raid in its method of execution and
+immediate effects, it produced certain results that cannot be held to
+have been prejudicial to the British cause in South Africa, if once we
+recognise the fact that the English people as a whole were totally
+ignorant, at the time of its occurrence, of the extent to which the
+sub-continent had already slipped from their grasp. Something of the
+long advance towards the goal of nationalist ambition, achieved by the
+Bond, was revealed. The emphatic cry of "Hands off" to Germany, for
+which the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation provided the occasion,
+was undoubtedly the means of arresting the progress of that power, at
+a point when further progress would have gained her a foot-hold in
+South Africa from which nothing short of actual hostilities could have
+dislodged her. And more important still was the fact that the Raid,
+with its train of dramatic incidents, had published, once and for all,
+the humiliating position of the British population in the Transvaal
+throughout the length and breadth of the Anglo-Saxon world, and
+compelled the Imperial Government <span class="pagenum"><a id="page072" name="page072"></a>(p. 072)</span> to pledge itself to obtain
+the redress of the "admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's policy.</span>
+
+<p>Against the rallying forces of Afrikander nationalism Mr. Chamberlain,
+for the moment, had nothing to oppose but the vague and as yet unknown
+power of an awakened Imperial sentiment. Lord Rosmead's attitude at
+Pretoria had convinced him of the uselessness of expecting that any
+satisfactory settlement of the franchise question could be brought
+about through the agency of the High Commissioner. He, therefore,
+invited President Krüger to visit England in the hope that his own
+personal advocacy of the cause of the Uitlanders, backed up by the
+weight of the Salisbury Government, might remove the "root causes" of
+Transvaal unrest. But President Krüger refused to confer with the
+Colonial Secretary upon any other than the wholly inadmissible basis
+of the conversion of the London Convention into a treaty of amity such
+as one independent power might conclude with another. Mr. Chamberlain,
+therefore, having put upon record that the purpose of the proposed
+conference was to give effect to the London Convention and not to
+destroy it,
+proceeded to formulate a South African policy that would
+enable him to make the most effective use of the authority of Great
+Britain as paramount Power. His purpose was to win Dutch opinion in
+the Free State and the Cape Colony to the side of the Imperial
+Government, and then to use this more progressive Dutch <span class="pagenum"><a id="page073" name="page073"></a>(p. 073)</span>
+opinion as the fulcrum by which the lever of Imperial remonstrance was
+to be successfully applied to the Transvaal Government. In the
+speech<a id="footnotetag25" name="footnotetag25"></a><a href="#footnote25" title="Go to footnote 25"><span class="small">[25]</span></a> in which he sketched the main lines of this policy he
+declared emphatically that the paramount power of England was to be
+maintained at all costs, that foreign intervention would not be
+permitted under any pretence, and that the admitted grievances of the
+Uitlanders were to be redressed:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "We have," he continued, "a confident hope that we shall be able
+     in the course of no lengthened time to restore the situation as
+     it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, to have at our backs
+     the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population
+     in South Africa, and if we have that, the opinion&mdash;the united
+     opinion&mdash;which that will constitute, will be an opinion which no
+     power in Africa can resist."</p>
+
+<p>With the record of the last ten years before us it seems strange that
+Mr. Chamberlain should ever have believed in the efficacy of such a
+policy: still more strange that he should have spoken of his
+"confident hope" of winning the Afrikander nationalists to support the
+paramount Power. But it must be remembered that the evidence of the
+real sentiments and purposes of the nationalists here set forth in the
+preceding pages, and now the common property of all educated
+Englishmen, was then known only to perhaps a dozen journalists and
+politicians in England; and if these men had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page074" name="page074"></a>(p. 074)</span> attempted to
+impart their knowledge to the general public, they would have failed
+from the sheer inability of the average Englishman to believe that
+"British subjects" under responsible government could be anything but
+loyal to the Imperial tie.</p>
+
+<p>But little as Mr. Chamberlain knew of the real strength of the forces
+of Afrikander nationalism, he discerned enough of the South African
+situation to realise that this policy would have no chance of success,
+unless the maintenance of the British cause in South Africa was placed
+in the hands of a personality of exceptional vigour and capacity.
+When, therefore, Lord Rosmead intimated his desire to be relieved of
+the heavy responsibility of the joint offices of High Commissionship
+for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony no attempt to
+dissuade him was made. His health had been enfeebled for some time
+past, and he did not long survive his return to England. Both in
+Australia and at the Cape he had devoted his strength and ability to
+the service of the Empire. In the years 1883-5 he had resolutely and
+successfully opposed the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize
+Bechuanaland. His failure to control his powerful and impatient Prime
+Minister is mitigated by the circumstance that it was solely on the
+ground of public interest that, upon the retirement of Lord Loch in
+1895, he had allowed himself, in spite of his advanced years and
+indifferent health, to assume the office of High Commissioner for a
+third time.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page075" name="page075"></a>(p. 075)</span> CHAPTER III</h3>
+
+<p class="title">A YEAR OF OBSERVATION</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Sir Alfred Milner.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Rosmead retired early in 1897. It is said that three men so
+different in character as Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr.
+Stead, each separately fixed upon the same name as being that of the
+man most capable of undertaking the position of High Commissioner in
+South Africa&mdash;a position always difficult, but now more than ever
+arduous and responsible. To nine out of every ten men with whom he had
+been brought into contact there was little in Sir Alfred Milner&mdash;as he
+then was&mdash;to distinguish him from other high-principled, capable, and
+pleasant-mannered heads of departments in the Civil Service.
+His
+<span class="italic">métier</span> was finance, and his accomplishment literature. Commencing
+with journalism and an unsuccessful contest (in the Liberal interest)
+for the Harrow division of Middlesex, he had been private secretary to
+Lord Goschen, Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and Head of the
+Inland Revenue. In this latter office he had given invaluable
+assistance to Sir William Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
+in respect of what is perhaps the most successful of recent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page076" name="page076"></a>(p. 076)</span>
+methods of raising revenue&mdash;the death duties. The principle of the
+graduated death duties was Harcourt's; but it was Milner who worked
+out the elaborate system which rendered his ideas coherent, and
+enabled them eventually to be put into effect. Academic distinctions,
+however ample, cannot be said to-day to afford a definite assurance of
+pre-eminent capacity for the service of the State. Yet it was
+certainly no disadvantage to Sir Alfred Milner to have been a scholar
+of Balliol, or a President of the Oxford Union.<a id="footnotetag26" name="footnotetag26"></a><a href="#footnote26" title="Go to footnote 26"><span class="small">[26]</span></a> Whatever direct
+knowledge the educated public had of him was based probably upon the
+impression created by his book <span class="italic">England in Egypt</span>. This was a work
+which indicated that its author had formed high ideals of English
+statesmanship, and that his experience of a complex administrative
+system, working in a political society full of intrigue and
+international jealousy, had developed in him the rare qualities of
+insight and humour. Some of his readers might have reflected that an
+active association with so accomplished a master of financial and
+administrative method as Lord Cromer was in itself a useful equipment
+for a colonial administrator.</p>
+
+<p>But the British public, both in England and South Africa, took their
+view of the appointment <span class="pagenum"><a id="page077" name="page077"></a>(p. 077)</span> from the opinions expressed by the
+many prominent men to whom Sir Alfred Milner was personally known. The
+leaders and the Press of both parties were unstinted in approval of
+the choice which Mr. Chamberlain had made. The banquet given to Sir
+Alfred Milner three weeks before his departure to the Cape (March
+28th, 1897) provided an occasion for an expression of unrestrained
+admiration and confidence unique in the annals of English public life.
+"He has the union of intellect with fascination that makes men mount
+high," wrote Lord Rosebery. And Sir William Harcourt, "the most
+grateful and obliged" of Milner's "many friends and admirers,"
+pronounced him to be "a man deserving of all praise and all
+affection." Mr. Asquith, who presided, stated in a speech marked
+throughout by a note of intimate friendliness that "no appointment of
+our time has been received with a larger measure both of the
+approbation of experienced men and of the applause of the public." The
+office itself was "at the present moment the most arduous and
+responsible in the administrative service of the country." Not only
+"embarrassing problems," but "formidable personalities" would confront
+the new High Commissioner for South Africa:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "But," he added, "we know that he takes with him as clear an
+     intellect and as sympathetic an imagination, and, if need should
+     arise, a power of resolution as tenacious and as inflexible as
+     belongs to any man of our acquaintance."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page078" name="page078"></a>(p. 078)</span> Milner's reply is significant of the spirit in which he had
+undertaken his task. Like Rhodes, he had found in his Oxford studies
+the reasoned basis for an enlightened Imperialism. Chief among his
+earliest political convictions was the belief that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "there was no political object comparable in importance with that
+     of preventing a repetition of such a disaster [as the loss of the
+     United States]: the severance of another link in the great
+     Imperial chain.... It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill
+     any position in the character of what I may be, perhaps, allowed
+     to call a 'civilian soldier of the Empire.' To succeed in it, to
+     render any substantial service to any part of our world-wide
+     State, would be all that in any of my most audacious dreams I had
+     ever ventured to aspire to. But in a cause in which one
+     absolutely believes, even failure&mdash;personal failure, I mean, for
+     the cause itself is not going to fail&mdash;would be preferable to an
+     easy life of comfortable prosperity in another sphere."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Personal traits.</span>
+
+<p>This was the man who was sent to maintain the interests of the
+paramount Power in a South Africa shaken by racial antagonism, and
+already feverish with political intrigue and commercial rivalry. Of
+all the tributes of the farewell banquet, Sir William Harcourt's was
+closest to the life&mdash;"worthy of all praise and all affection." The
+quality of inspiring affection to which this impressive phrase bore
+witness was one which had made itself felt among the humblest of those
+who were fortunate enough to have been associated with Lord Milner in
+any public work. Long after Milner had left Egypt, the face of
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page079" name="page079"></a>(p. 079)</span> the Syrian or Coptic Effendi of the Finance Department in
+Cairo would light up at the chance mention of the genial Englishman
+who had once been his chief. And in remote English counties revenue
+officials still hang his portrait upon the walls of their lodgings.
+Such men had no claim to appraise his professional merit or his gifts
+of intellect; but their feelings were responsive to the charm of his
+nature. "He was so considerate": that was their excuse for retaining
+his name and personality among the pleasant memories of the past. But
+the other side of Milner's character, the power of "tenacious and
+inflexible resolution," of which Mr. Asquith spoke, was destined to be
+brought into play so prominently during the "eight dusky years" of his
+South African administration, that to the distant on-looker it came to
+be accepted as the characterising quality of the man. To some Milner
+became the "man of blood and iron"; determined, like Bismarck, to
+secure the unity of a country by trampling with iron-shod boots upon
+the liberties of its people: even as in the view of others his clear
+mental vision&mdash;never more clear than in South Africa&mdash;became clouded
+by an adopted partisanship, and he was a "lost mind." Nothing could be
+further from the truth. If the man lived who could have turned the
+Boer and Afrikander from hatred and distrust of England and English
+ideas by personal charm and honourable dealing, it was the man who
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page080" name="page080"></a>(p. 080)</span> had universally inspired all his former associates, whether
+equals or subordinates, with admiration and affection. Whatever
+bitterness was displayed against Lord Milner personally by the Boer
+and Afrikander leaders after the issue of the war was decided was due
+to their perception that he was then&mdash;as always&mdash;a source of strength
+and an inspiration for renewed effort to those whom they regarded as
+their rivals or opponents. They hated him just as the French hated
+Bismarck&mdash;because he was the strong man on the other side.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Milner's inflexibility was, in its essence, a keener perception
+of duty than the ordinary: it was a determination to do what he
+believed to be for the good of South Africa and the Empire,
+irrespective of any consideration of personal or party relationship.
+It was in no sense the incapacity to measure the strength of an
+opponent, still less did it arise from any failure to perceive the
+cogency of an opinion in conflict with his own. Before the eight years
+of his administration had passed, Lord Milner's knowledge of the needs
+of South Africa and the Empire had become so profound that it carried
+him ahead of the most enlightened and patriotic of the home statesmen
+who supported him loyally to the end. Through the period of the war,
+when the issues were simple and primitive, they were wholly with him.
+But afterwards they supported him not so much because they understood
+the methods which he employed and the objects at which he aimed, as
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page081" name="page081"></a>(p. 081)</span> because they were by this time convinced of his complete
+mastery of the political and economic problems of South Africa. It is
+to this inability to understand the facts of the South African
+situation, as he had learnt them, that we must attribute the
+comparative feebleness shown by the Unionist leaders in resisting the
+perverse attempt which was made by the Liberal party, after the
+General Election of 1906, to revoke the final arrangements of his
+administration. The interval that separated Lord Milner's knowledge of
+South Africa from that of the Liberal ministers was profound; but even
+the Unionist chiefs showed but slight appreciation of the unassailable
+validity of the administrative decisions with which they had
+identified themselves, when the "swing of the pendulum" brought these
+decisions again, and somewhat unexpectedly, before the great tribunal
+of the nation.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Arrival at Cape Town.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner sailed for the Cape on April 17th, 1897. At the actual
+moment of his arrival the relations between the Home Government and
+the South African Republic were strained almost to the breaking point.
+In a peremptory despatch of March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain had demanded
+the repeal of the Aliens Immigration and Aliens Expulsion Laws of
+1896&mdash;the former of which constituted a flagrant violation of the
+freedom of entry secured to British subjects by Article XIV. of the
+London Convention. This virtual ultimatum was emphasised by the
+appearance of a British <span class="pagenum"><a id="page082" name="page082"></a>(p. 082)</span> squadron at Delagoa Bay, and by the
+despatch of reinforcements to the South African garrisons. The evident
+determination of the Imperial Government induced the Volksraad to
+repeal the Immigration Law and to pass a resolution in favour of
+amending the Expulsion Law. The crisis was over in June, and during
+the next few months the Pretoria Executive showed a somewhat more
+conciliatory temper towards the Government of Great Britain. And in
+this connection two other facts must be recorded. In August, 1896, Sir
+Jacobus de Wet had been succeeded as British Agent at Pretoria by Sir
+William (then Mr.) Conyngham Greene, and the Imperial Government was
+assured, by this appointment, of the services of an able man and a
+trained diplomatist. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the
+Raid, promised in July, 1896, met on February 16th, 1897, and reported
+on July 13th of the same year. Its report did little more than
+reassert the findings of the Cape Parliamentary Inquiry, which had
+been before the British public for the last year. It was otherwise
+remarkable for the handle which it gave (by the failure to insist upon
+the production of certain telegrams) to some extreme Radicals to
+assert Mr. Chamberlain's "complicity" in the "invasion" of the
+Transvaal as originally planned by Mr. Rhodes.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner's thoroughness.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner had expressed his intention of acquainting himself with
+the conditions of South Africa by personal observation before he
+attempted to take any definite action for the solution of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page083" name="page083"></a>(p. 083)</span> problems awaiting his attention. Nor, after the first month
+of anxious diplomatic controversy with the Pretoria Executive, was
+there anything either in the political situation in the Cape Colony,
+or in the attitude of the Transvaal Government, to prevent him from
+putting his purpose into effect. Apart from the circumstance that the
+reorganisation of the Chartered Company's Administration&mdash;a question
+in which the political future of Mr. Rhodes was largely involved&mdash;was
+a matter upon which his observation and advice were urgently required
+by the Colonial Office, Lord Milner had no intention, as he said, of
+"being tied to an office chair at Capetown." He had resolved,
+therefore, to visit at the earliest opportunity, first, the country
+districts of the colony which formed the actual seat of the Dutch
+population, and, second, the two protectorates of Bechuanaland and
+Basutoland, which were administered by officers directly responsible
+to the High Commissioner, as the representative of the Imperial
+Government. In point of fact he did more than this. Within a year of
+his arrival he had travelled through the Cape Colony (August and
+September, 1897), through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia
+(November and December, 1897), and visited Basutoland (April, 1898).
+And with characteristic thoroughness he set himself to learn both the
+Dutch of Holland and the "Taal"&mdash;the former in order that he might
+read the newspapers which the Afrikanders read, and the latter to
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page084" name="page084"></a>(p. 084)</span> open the way to that intercourse of eye and ear which most
+helps a man to know the character of his neighbour.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Milner's year of observation may be said to have ended with the
+speech at Graaf Reinet (March 3rd, 1898), which held his first clear
+and emphatic public utterance. During the greater part of this period
+he was by no means exclusively occupied with the shortcomings of
+President Krüger. The discharge of his official duties as Governor of
+the Cape Colony required more than ordinary care and watchfulness in
+view of the disturbed state of South African politics. And as High
+Commissioner he was called upon to deal with a number of questions
+relative to the affairs of Rhodesia and the Protectorates, of which
+some led him into the new and unfamiliar field of native law and
+custom, while others involved the exercise of his judgment on delicate
+matters of personal fitness and official etiquette. But an account of
+these questions&mdash;questions which he handled with equal insight and
+decision&mdash;must yield to the commanding interest of the actual steps by
+which he approached the two central problems upon the solution of
+which the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa
+depended&mdash;the removal of the pernicious system of race oligarchy in
+the Transvaal, and the preservation of the Cape Colony in its
+allegiance to the British Crown.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">His friendliness to the Boers.</span>
+
+<p>The position which Lord Milner took up in his relations with the
+Transvaal Government was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page085" name="page085"></a>(p. 085)</span> one that was consistent alike with
+his personal characteristics and with the dictates of a high and
+enlightened statesmanship. Within the first few weeks of his arrival
+he let it be known, both through the British Agent at Pretoria, and
+through those of the Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony who were on
+terms of intimacy with President Krüger, that he desired, as it were,
+to open an entirely new account between the two governments. He, a new
+High Commissioner with no South African past, with no errors to
+retrieve, no failures to rankle, could afford to bury the diplomatic
+hatchet. There was nothing to prevent him from approaching the
+discussion of any questions that might arise in a spirit of perfect
+friendliness, or from believing that the President would be inspired,
+on his side, by the same friendly feelings. It was his hope,
+therefore, that much of the friction incidental to formal diplomatic
+controversy might be avoided through the settlement of all lesser
+matters by amicable and informal discussion between President Krüger
+and himself.</p>
+
+<p>This was no mere official pose. Milner never posed. He, too, desired
+to eliminate the Imperial factor in his own way. He saw from the first
+the advantage of limiting the area of dispute between Downing Street
+and Pretoria; and he made it his object to settle as many matters as
+possible by friendly discussion on the spot. The desire to avoid
+unnecessary diplomatic friction, and to make the best of President
+Krüger, was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page086" name="page086"></a>(p. 086)</span> manifested in all he did at this time. In the
+course of the preparations for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee
+by the British community on the Rand, the new High Commissioner was
+asked to decide whether the toast of Queen Victoria, or that of
+President Krüger, should come first upon the list at the public
+banquet. He replied unhesitatingly that the courtesy due to President
+Krüger, as the head of the State, must be fully accorded. On this
+occasion, of all others, British subjects, he said, "should be most
+careful to avoid anything which might be regarded as a slight to the
+South African Republic or its chief magistrate."<a id="footnotetag27" name="footnotetag27"></a><a href="#footnote27" title="Go to footnote 27"><span class="small">[27]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner and the Conventions.</span>
+
+<p>While to President Krüger Lord Milner said, "Let us see if we cannot
+arrange matters by friendly discussion between ourselves"; to the
+Colonial Office he said, "Give them time; don't hurry them. Reform
+there must be: if by no other means, then by our intervention. But
+before we intervene, let us be sure that they either cannot, or will
+not, reform themselves. Therefore let us wait patiently, and make
+things as easy as possible for President Krüger."
+More than this, he
+had almost as little belief in the utility <span class="pagenum"><a id="page087" name="page087"></a>(p. 087)</span> of the
+Conventions<a id="footnotetag28" name="footnotetag28"></a><a href="#footnote28" title="Go to footnote 28"><span class="small">[28]</span></a> as Grey had in those of his epoch. Whether the Boers
+did, or did not, call the Queen "Suzerain" seemed to him to be a small
+matter&mdash;an etymological question, as he afterwards called it. What was
+essential was that men of British blood should not be kept under the
+heel of the Dutch. Moreover, the grievances for which the observance
+of the London Convention, however strictly enforced, could provide a
+remedy, were insignificant as compared with the more real grievances,
+such as the attack upon the independence of the law courts, the injury
+to industrial life caused by a corrupt and incompetent administration,
+and the denial of elementary political rights, which no technical
+observance of the Convention would remove. Nor did it escape Lord
+Milner's notice that a policy of rigid insistence upon the letter of
+the Conventions might place the Imperial Government in a position of
+grave disadvantage. If any breach of the Conventions was once made the
+subject of earnest diplomatic complaint, the demand of the Imperial
+Government must be enforced even at the cost of war. The Conventions,
+therefore, should be invoked as little as possible. For, if the Boers
+denied the British Law Officers' interpretation of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page088" name="page088"></a>(p. 088)</span> the text,
+the Imperial Government might find itself on the horns of a dilemma.
+Either it must beat an undignified retreat, or it must make war upon
+the Transvaal for a mere technicality, a proceeding which would gain
+for the Republic a maximum, and for the Imperial Government a minimum
+of sympathy and support. Therefore, he said, "Keep the Conventions in
+the background. If we are to fight let it be about something that is
+essential to the peace and well-being of South Africa, and not a mere
+diplomatic wrangle between the Pretoria Executive and the British
+Government."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Transvaal affairs.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner's hope that President Krüger might meet him half-way,
+although it was shown by subsequent events to have been devoid of
+foundation, had for the moment superficial appearances in its favour.
+After their retreat on the question of the Aliens Immigration Law the
+attitude of the Pretoria Executive remained for some time outwardly
+less hostile to the Imperial Government. Woolls-Sampson and "Karri"
+Davies were released from Pretoria gaol in honour of Queen Victoria's
+Jubilee,<a id="footnotetag29" name="footnotetag29"></a><a href="#footnote29" title="Go to footnote 29"><span class="small">[29]</span></a> and at the same period the first and only step was taken
+that offered a genuine <span class="pagenum"><a id="page089" name="page089"></a>(p. 089)</span> promise of reform from within. The
+Industrial Commission, appointed earlier in the year by the Executive
+at the request of President Krüger, surprised the Uitlander community
+by conducting its inquiry with a thoroughness and impartiality that
+left no ground for complaint. Its report, reviewing in detail the
+conditions of the mining industry, was published in July. It afforded
+a complete confirmation of the fiscal and administrative complaints
+put forward by the Uitlanders against the Government; and as Mr.
+Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was both a member of
+the Executive and the leader of the more progressive section of the
+Boers, there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the recommendations
+of the Report being carried into effect. Scarcely more than six months
+later President Krüger proved conclusively that the hope of these, or
+of any other, reforms was entirely unfounded; but so long as there
+remained any prospect of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government
+being able to settle their differences by themselves, Lord Milner
+consistently pursued his intention of "making things easy" for the
+Transvaal Government. And this although the Pretoria Executive soon
+began to make heavy drafts upon his patience in other respects.<a id="footnotetag30" name="footnotetag30"></a><a href="#footnote30" title="Go to footnote 30"><span class="small">[30]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page090" name="page090"></a>(p. 090)</span> If Lord Milner was prepared to make the most of Paul Krüger
+and the Boers, he showed himself no less ready to see the best side of
+the Dutch in the Cape Colony. As we have already had occasion to
+notice, the year of his appointment was that of the Diamond Jubilee
+celebration; and on June 23rd he sent home a brief despatch in which
+he dwelt with evident satisfaction upon the share taken by the Dutch
+in the general demonstrations of loyalty called forth by the occasion
+in the Cape Colony. After a reference to the number of loyal addresses
+or congratulatory telegrams which had been sent to the Colonial
+Secretary for transmission to the Queen, he continued:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The enthusiasm evoked here ... seems to me to be of peculiar
+     interest ... in view of recent events, which, as you are aware,
+     have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different
+     sections of the community. All I can say is that, so far as I am
+     able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the
+     loyalty of any portion of the community to Her Majesty the Queen.
+     People of all races, the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as
+     well as the African natives, have vied with one another in
+     demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the
+     throne. When every allowance is made for the exaggeration of
+     feeling caused by the unparalleled scale and prolonged duration
+     of the present festivities, and for the contagious excitement
+     which they have produced, it is impossible to doubt that the
+     feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much
+     stronger than has sometimes been believed. In <span class="pagenum"><a id="page091" name="page091"></a>(p. 091)</span> my
+     opinion, the impression made by the world-wide celebration of Her
+     Majesty's Jubilee has strengthened that feeling throughout South
+     Africa, and is likely to have a permanent value."<a id="footnotetag31" name="footnotetag31"></a><a href="#footnote31" title="Go to footnote 31"><span class="small">[31]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">First impressions of the Dutch.</span>
+
+<p>It has been urged that the opinion here recorded is inconsistent with
+the charge of anti-British sentiment subsequently brought by Lord
+Milner against the Dutch leaders in the Cape Colony, and the despatch
+itself has been cited as affording evidence of the contention that the
+unfavourable view subsequently expressed in the Graaf Reinet speech,
+and more definitely in the despatch of May 4th, 1899, was not the
+result of independent investigation, but was a view formed to support
+the Imperial Government in a coercive policy towards the Transvaal.
+This criticism, which is a perfectly natural one, only serves to
+establish the fact that Lord Milner actually did approach the study of
+the nationality difficulty in complete freedom from any preconceived
+notions on the subject. As he said, he went to South Africa with an
+"open mind." So far from having any prejudice against the Dutch, his
+first impression was distinctly favourable, and as such he recorded
+it, suitably enough, in this Jubilee despatch. But it must be
+remembered that the opinion here recorded was based upon a very
+limited field of observation. At the time when this despatch was
+written Lord Milner had not yet been quite two months in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page092" name="page092"></a>(p. 092)</span>
+South Africa, and his experience of the Dutch of the Cape Colony had
+been confined to intercourse with the Dutch of the Cape peninsula;
+that is to say, he had only come into contact with that section of the
+Cape Dutch which is, as indeed it has been for a century, closely
+identified, from a social point of view, with the official and
+mercantile British population of Capetown and its suburbs.</p>
+
+<p>What the Jubilee despatch really shows is that Lord Milner was
+prepared to make the best of the Dutch. The contrast between its tone
+of ready appreciation and the note of earnest remonstrance in the
+Graaf Reinet speech is apparent enough. The despatch is dated June
+23rd, 1897; the speech was delivered on March 3rd, 1898. What had
+happened in this interval of nine months to produce so marked a change
+in the mind of the genial, clear-sighted Englishman, who, as Mr.
+Asquith said, took with him to South Africa "as sympathetic an
+imagination" as any man of his acquaintance? <span class="italic">Nemo repente fuit
+turpissimus.</span> Whether the diagnosis of his Graaf Reinet speech was
+right or wrong, something must have happened to turn Lord Milner from
+ready appreciation to grave remonstrance.</p>
+
+<p>The circumstances which provide the answer to this question form an
+element of vital importance in the volume of evidence upon which
+posterity will pronounce the destruction of the Dutch Republics in
+South Africa to have been a just and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page093" name="page093"></a>(p. 093)</span> necessary, or a
+needless and aggressive, act. But to see them in true perspective, the
+reader must first be possessed of some more precise information of the
+political situation in the Cape Colony at this time.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Sprigg ministry.</span>
+
+<p>At the period of Lord Milner's appointment the political forces set in
+motion by the Raid were operating already to prepare the way for the
+new and significant combinations of persons and parties in the Cape
+Colony that took definite form in the parliamentary crisis of May,
+1898.
+The Ministry now in office was that formed by Sir Gordon Sprigg
+upon Mr. Rhodes's resignation of the premiership after the Raid
+(January 6th, 1896). Like every other Cape Ministry of the last
+thirteen years, it was dependent upon the support of the Afrikander
+Bond, which supplied two out of the six members of the cabinet&mdash;Mr.
+Pieter Faure, Minister of Agriculture, and a moderate Bondsman, and
+Dr. Te Water, the intimate friend of Mr. Hofmeyr, and his direct
+representative in the Ministry. Another minister, Sir Thomas Upington,
+who had succeeded Mr. Philip Schreiner as Attorney-General, had been
+himself Prime Minister in the period 1884-6, when he and Sir Gordon
+Sprigg (then Treasurer-General), had opposed the demand for the
+intervention of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, successfully
+and strenuously advocated by Mr. J. W. Leonard and Mr. Merriman. It
+was, therefore, eminently, what would be called in France "a Ministry
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page094" name="page094"></a>(p. 094)</span> of the Centre." Sir Gordon Sprigg's regard for British
+interests was too lukewarm to command the confidence of the more
+decided advocates of British supremacy; while, on the other hand, his
+more or less friendly relations with Mr. Rhodes aroused the suspicions
+of the Dutch extremists. But Dr. Te Water's presence in the Ministry,
+offering in itself a sufficient assurance that no measures deemed by
+Mr. Hofmeyr to be contrary to the interests of the Bond would be
+adopted, had secured for the Government the votes of the majority of
+the Dutch members of the Legislative Assembly. An example of the
+subserviency of the Sprigg Ministry to the Bond at this date was
+afforded upon Lord Milner's arrival. As we have seen, the Home
+Government determined to reinforce the South African garrison, in
+order to strengthen its demand upon the Transvaal Government for the
+repeal of the Aliens Immigration Law. Although no direct opposition
+was offered by the Ministry to this measure, the insufficiency of
+barrack accommodation in the Cape Colony was used as a pretext for
+placing obstacles in the way of its accomplishment. These difficulties
+were successfully overcome by Lord Milner, and in the end the
+reinforcements arrived without giving rise to any political
+excitement.<a id="footnotetag32" name="footnotetag32"></a><a href="#footnote32" title="Go to footnote 32"><span class="small">[32]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Navy contribution bill.</span>
+
+<p>A more disagreeable incident was the covert attempt made by the Bond
+to obstruct the business <span class="pagenum"><a id="page095" name="page095"></a>(p. 095)</span> of the Cape Parliament, in order
+that Sir Gordon Sprigg might be prevented from taking his place among
+the other prime ministers of the self-governing colonies at the
+Colonial Conference, and representing the Cape in the Jubilee
+celebrations in England.<a id="footnotetag33" name="footnotetag33"></a><a href="#footnote33" title="Go to footnote 33"><span class="small">[33]</span></a> This was the beginning of a disagreement
+between the Ministry and the Bond, which gradually increased in
+seriousness after Sir Gordon's return from England, until it
+culminated in the resignation of Dr. Te Water (May, 1898).
+The offer
+of an annual contribution to the cost of the British Navy, which was
+affirmed in principle by the Cape Parliament at this time, was
+understood in England to be a mark of Afrikander attachment to the
+British connection. In point of fact the measure received practically
+no support from the Bondsmen in Parliament; while, outside of
+Parliament, on Bond platforms and in the Bond Press, the Government's
+action in the matter was employed as an effective argument to
+stimulate disaffection in the ranks of its Dutch supporters. Mr.
+Hofmeyr, however, was careful not to allow the Bond, as an
+organisation, to commit itself to any overt opposition to the
+principle of a contribution to the British Navy&mdash;an attitude which
+would have been obviously inconsistent with the Bond's profession of
+loyalty&mdash;and with characteristic irony the third reading of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page096" name="page096"></a>(p. 096)</span>
+the Navy Contribution Bill was eventually passed, a year later,
+without a division in the Legislative Assembly by a Ministry<a id="footnotetag34" name="footnotetag34"></a><a href="#footnote34" title="Go to footnote 34"><span class="small">[34]</span></a>
+placed in office by Bond votes for the declared purpose of opposing
+the policy of the Imperial Government on the one question&mdash;the reform
+of the Transvaal Administration&mdash;upon the issue of which depended the
+maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Rhodes's position.</span>
+
+<p>But circumstances of deeper significance contributed to deprive the
+Sprigg Ministry of the support of the Bond, causing its majority to
+dwindle, and driving Sir Gordon himself, in an increasing degree, into
+the opposite camp. The British population for the first time showed a
+tendency to organise itself in direct opposition to the Bond. As Sir
+Gordon Sprigg grew more Imperialist, the Progressive party was formed
+for parliamentary purposes; while for the purpose of combating the
+Afrikander nationalist movement in general an Imperialist
+organisation, called the South African League, was established with
+the avowed object of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa.
+Mr. Cecil Rhodes, immediately after the Raid, announced his intention
+of taking no further part in the politics of the Cape Colony, and of
+devoting himself, for the future, to the development of Rhodesia. But
+upon his return from England, after giving evidence before the
+Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, he was received with so much
+warmth by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page097" name="page097"></a>(p. 097)</span> British population at Capetown in July, 1897,
+that he had retracted this decision, and determined to assume the same
+position of real, though not nominal, leadership of what was
+afterwards the Progressive party as Mr. Hofmeyr held in the Bond. Mr.
+Rhodes's return to political life, following, as it did, upon the
+report of the Committee of Inquiry, aroused the most bitter hostility
+against him on the part of his former associates in the Bond. And the
+Sprigg Ministry, by their increasing reliance upon the new party of
+which he was the leader, incurred the distrust of its Dutch supporters
+to a corresponding extent. In the meantime the Bond leaders had
+adopted Mr. Philip Schreiner, who was not a member of the Bond, as
+their parliamentary chief in the place of Rhodes, and this new
+combination was strengthened by the accession of Mr. J. X. Merriman
+and Mr. J. W. Sauer. Thus the opening months of the new year, 1898,
+found the population of the Cape Colony grouping itself roughly, for
+the first time, into two parties with definite and mutually
+destructive aims. On the one side there was the Sprigg Ministry, now
+almost exclusively supported by the British section of the Cape
+electorate, soon to be organised on the question of "redistribution"
+into the Progressive party, with Rhodes as its real, though not its
+recognised, leader; and on the other there was the Bond party, with
+Schreiner as its parliamentary chief and Hofmeyr as its real leader,
+depending in no <span class="pagenum"><a id="page098" name="page098"></a>(p. 098)</span> less a degree upon the Dutch population of
+the Colony, and naturally opposed to an electoral reform that
+threatened to deprive this population of its parliamentary
+preponderance. And in a few months' time, as we shall see, the
+Schreiner-Bond coalition took for its immediate aim the prevention of
+British interference in the Transvaal; while the Progressive party
+came, no less openly, to avow its determination to promote and support
+the action of the Imperial Government in seeking to obtain redress for
+the Uitlander grievances.</p>
+
+<p>The movements here briefly indicated were, of course, perfectly well
+known to Lord Milner as constitutional Governor of the Colony. But at
+Graaf Reinet he probes the situation too deeply, and speaks with too
+authoritative a tone, to allow us to suppose that the remonstrance
+which he then addressed to the Cape Dutch was based upon any sources
+of knowledge less assured than his own observation and experience. For
+the Graaf Reinet speech is not an affair of ministers' minutes or
+party programmes; it is the straight talk of a man taught by eye and
+ear, and informed by direct relationships with the persons and
+circumstances that are envisaged in his words. To restate our
+question, which among these facts of personal observation and
+experience produced the change from the ready appreciation of the Cape
+Dutch, shown in the Jubilee despatch, to the earnest remonstrance of
+the Graaf Reinet speech? The historian cannot claim, like the writer
+of creative <span class="pagenum"><a id="page099" name="page099"></a>(p. 099)</span> literature, to exhibit the working of the human
+mind. In the terms of the Aristotelian formula, he can relate only
+what "has" happened, leaving to the craftsman whose pen is enlarged
+and ennobled by the universal truth of art to tell what "must" happen.
+But such satisfaction as the lesser branch of literature can afford is
+at the disposal of the reader, in "good measure, pressed down, and
+running over." Without assuming, then, the philosophic certainty of
+poetry, we know that between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet
+speech the development of the great South African drama reached its
+"turning-point" in the Transvaal; while in the Cape Colony Lord Milner
+was learning daily more of the "formidable personalities" and the
+"embarrassing problems" to which Mr. Asquith had referred.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">No reform in the Transvaal.</span>
+
+<p>The more hopeful situation in the Transvaal that followed upon the
+determined action of the Imperial Government in May was succeeded by a
+period punctuated by events which, taken collectively, obliterated all
+prospect of "reform from within."
+The treatment accorded to the report
+of the Industrial Commission, which, as we have noticed, established
+the truth of practically all the fiscal and administrative complaints
+of the Uitlanders, was a matter of especial significance. The
+Commission was created by President Krüger; it was in effect the
+fulfilment of his promises, made after the Raid, to redress the
+grievances of the Uitlanders. The Commissioners were his own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page100" name="page100"></a>(p. 100)</span>
+officials, Boers and Hollanders; men who had no prejudice against the
+Government, and no sympathy with the new population, yet their
+recommendations, if carried into effect, would have removed the most
+serious of the industrial grievances of the British community. The
+Report had raised great expectations. It was thought that, not all,
+but a substantial proportion of its recommendations would be put into
+effect. Here, then, was an opportunity for reform which involved no
+loss of prestige, entailed no danger to the independence of the
+Republic, and held not the slightest threat to the stability of
+burgher predominance. If what President Krüger was waiting for was a
+convenient opportunity, he had such an opportunity now. This
+reasonable forecast was utterly falsified by the event. Mr. Schalk
+Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was denounced by Mr. Krüger in
+the Volksraad as a traitor to the Republic, because he had dared to
+set his hand to so distasteful a document. The report itself was
+thrown contemptuously by the grim old President from the Volksraad to
+the customary committee of true-blue "doppers," whose ignorance of the
+industrial conditions of the Rand was equalled only by their personal
+devotion to himself. Here the adverse findings of the commissioners on
+the dynamite and railway monopolies were reversed; and the
+recommendation for a Local Board for the Rand was condemned as
+subversive of the authority of the State. At length, after the report
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page101" name="page101"></a>(p. 101)</span> had been tossed about from Volksraad to committee, and from
+committee to Volksraad, until very little of the original
+recommendations remained, the Government took action. In addition to
+an immaterial reduction of the exorbitant rates charged by the
+Netherlands Railway Company&mdash;a concession subsequently alleged to have
+been the price paid by the Hollander Corporation to avoid further
+inquiry into its affairs&mdash;it was announced that, with the object of
+lessening the cost of living on the Rand, the import duties upon
+certain necessaries in common use would be reduced, in accordance with
+the recommendations of the Commissioners on this point; but that,
+since it was obviously inexpedient to diminish the revenue of the
+Republic, the duties upon certain other articles of the same class
+would be raised to an extent more than counterbalancing the loss upon
+the reduction. <span class="italic">Parturiunt montes; nascitur ridiculus mus.</span></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Krüger re-elected president.</span>
+
+<p>This singular display of mingled effrontery and duplicity marked the
+closing months of the year (1897). In the February following Mr.
+Krüger was elected to the presidency of the South African Republic for
+the fourth time. It was generally recognised that the success of his
+candidature was inevitable, but few, within or without the Transvaal,
+had expected him to secure so decisive a victory over his competitors.
+The figures&mdash;Krüger 12,858, Schalk Burger 3,750, and Joubert
+(Commandant-General) 2,001&mdash;were additional <span class="pagenum"><a id="page102" name="page102"></a>(p. 102)</span> evidence of the
+impotency or lukewarmness of the reform party among the burghers. The
+first act of President Krüger, on his return to power, was to dismiss
+Chief Justice Kotzé. Mr. Kotzé's struggle for the independence of the
+law courts, thus summarily closed, had commenced a year before with
+what was known as the "High Court crisis." At that time President
+Krüger had obtained power from the Volksraad by the notorious law No.
+1 of 1897 to compel the judges, on pain of dismissal, to renounce the
+right, recently exercised, to declare laws, which were in their
+opinion inconsistent with the Grondwet (Constitution), to be, to that
+extent, invalid. As a protest against this autocratic proceeding the
+entire bench of judges threatened to resign, and the courts were
+adjourned. The deadlock continued until a compromise was arranged
+through the intervention of Chief Justice de Villiers. The President
+undertook to introduce a new law providing satisfactorily for the
+independence of the Courts, and the judges, on their side, pledged
+themselves not to exercise the "testing" right in the meantime. In
+February, 1898, Chief Justice Kotzé wrote to remind President Krüger
+that his promise remained unfulfilled,<a id="footnotetag35" name="footnotetag35"></a><a href="#footnote35" title="Go to footnote 35"><span class="small">[35]</span></a> withdrawing at the same
+time the conditional <span class="pagenum"><a id="page103" name="page103"></a>(p. 103)</span> pledge not to exercise the "testing"
+right given by himself. The President then dismissed Mr. Kotzé under
+Law No. 1, compelled a second judge, Mr. Justice Amershof (who had
+supported the Chief Justice in the position he had taken up) to
+resign, and appointed, as the new Chief Justice, Mr. Gregorowski, who,
+as Chief Justice of the Free State, had presided at the trial of the
+Reformers in 1896, and at the time of the crisis a year before had
+declared that "no honourable man could possibly accept the position of
+a judge so long as Law No. 1 remained in force." The judicature was
+now rendered subservient to the Executive, and the Uitlanders were
+thus deprived of their last constitutional safeguard against the
+injustice of the Boer and Hollander oligarchy.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">His reactionary policy.</span>
+
+<p>This was the position in the Transvaal in February, 1898. President
+Krüger had demonstrated by his refusal to carry out the
+recommendations of the Industrial Commission, and by the dismissal of
+Chief Justice Kotzé, that he was determined not merely to set himself
+against all measures of reform, but to increase the disabilities under
+which the Uitlanders had hitherto lived. He had been placed, for the
+fourth time, at the head of the Republic by an overwhelming majority;
+he had refused to sacrifice a penny of revenue, and he was in
+possession of ample resources, which were being sedulously applied in
+increasing his already disproportionate supply of munitions of war.
+Through Dr. Leyds, who had returned from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page104" name="page104"></a>(p. 104)</span> his mission to
+Europe, he had opened up communications with European Powers, that
+placed him in a position to avail himself to the full of the possible
+embarrassment of Great Britain through international rivalries or
+disagreements. In South Africa he had carried through a treaty of
+offensive and defensive alliance with the Free State, and he had
+received more than one recent assurance that the flame of Afrikander
+nationalism had been kindled anew by the Bond in the Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<p>These events were disquieting enough in themselves; but what made the
+disappearance of any prospect of spontaneous reform in the Transvaal
+still more serious to the High Commissioner for South Africa, was the
+complaisance with which President Krüger's reactionary policy was
+regarded by the Dutch subjects of the Crown. It was just here that
+Lord Milner's observations must have yielded the most startling
+results. We know that the days which had passed since the Jubilee
+despatch was written had brought him constant and varied opportunities
+for seeing "things as they really were" in South Africa; we know that
+he was keenly alert in the accomplishment of his mission, and we may
+presume, therefore, that few, if any, of these opportunities were
+lost.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Attitude of the Cape Dutch.</span>
+
+<p>In September Lord Milner had travelled right round the Colony. At
+every little town and <span class="italic">dorp</span>&mdash;wherever, in fact, he went&mdash;he conversed
+with the Dutch, whom his pleasant manner quickly won to friendliness;
+and all the speeches that he made in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page105" name="page105"></a>(p. 105)</span> reply to the addresses
+of welcome were extremely conciliatory in tone. This was the time when
+there were hopeful anticipations of the good results that were to come
+from the Industrial Commission; and Lord Milner often began his speech
+with an expression of the sense of relief which he felt&mdash;a feeling
+which his audience must share&mdash;that now there was to be peace in South
+Africa. These conciliatory utterances of the new High Commissioner
+were almost completely ignored by the Dutch Press. An exception to
+this rule of silence was significant. The High Commissioner was
+accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. (now Sir Pieter)
+Faure. On one occasion Mr. Faure made some remarks in the same spirit
+as that in which Lord Milner had spoken. "People," he said, "talk of
+Africa for the Afrikanders; but what I say is, Africa for all."
+The
+expression of this moderate sentiment drew down upon Mr. Faure a sharp
+reproof from <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>. From this and many other such incidents it
+must have begun to dawn upon Lord Milner's mind that what the Dutch of
+the Cape Colony wanted was not conciliation but domination.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">"Hands off" the Transvaal.</span>
+
+<p>And so it came about that in the months that President Krüger was busy
+shutting the door against reform, Lord Milner was learning to realise
+that on this all-important matter there was nothing to hope from the
+Cape Dutch. When once the question of reform, or no reform, in the
+Transvaal came up, all conciliatory speeches were useless. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page106" name="page106"></a>(p. 106)</span>
+It made no difference whether the Transvaal was right or wrong; it was
+always, "<span class="italic">Our</span> Transvaal, good or bad." In short, all that happened
+both in the Transvaal and the Cape Colony during this (South African)
+spring and summer was of the nature to impress conclusively upon Lord
+Milner's mind that on the crucial issue between the Imperial
+Government and the Transvaal, the leaders of Dutch opinion in the Cape
+Colony were against the British cause. The rank and file of the Dutch
+population, if left to themselves, might be indifferent, possibly
+friendly; but the Bond organisation had placed them under the control
+of the Bond leaders; and the Bond was hostile. What, more than
+anything else, would serve to confirm this impression was Lord
+Milner's constant study of the Dutch Press. Among these journals, <span class="italic">Ons
+Land</span> presented the most authoritative and significant expression of
+the Bond policy, as directed by Mr. Hofmeyr's astute brain and
+unrivalled experience. The editorial columns of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> rarely
+contained a sentence that, standing alone, could be quoted as evidence
+of its advocacy of anti-British action. Its method was far more
+subtle. In everything in which Great Britain was concerned the
+attitude which it adopted was one of profound alienation, rather than
+of aggressive hostility. England's position in the world was presented
+and discussed as though "Afrikanders" were no more interested in it
+than they were in that of any foreign country. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page107" name="page107"></a>(p. 107)</span> And, in South
+African matters, the tone of the Dutch Press, and of the Bond leaders,
+was not merely discouraging; at any hint of possible British action
+for the improvement of the administrative conditions of the Transvaal,
+it took a note of menace. "Hands off" the Transvaal: that was the sum
+and substance of Bond policy.</p>
+
+<p>Between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech, then, the
+Transvaal Government had shown that it had set its face definitely
+against reform, and Lord Milner had had time to realise the true state
+of political feeling in the Colony of which he was Governor. While
+there was anger among the British at the hopeless situation in the
+Transvaal, among the Dutch was a fixed determination not to allow the
+Transvaal to be interfered with. And there was something else that
+Lord Milner would have observed during his travels throughout the
+Colony. It was the utter despondency of the British population, and
+the condition of abasement to which they had been reduced. Nor can he
+have failed to observe that everywhere among the British there was a
+constant apology for the Raid; while, on the part of the Dutch, there
+was no recognition of all that the British had done to wipe out its
+stain and to mitigate its effects: in a word, that the moral conquest
+of the Colony by the Dutch was practically complete.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner at Graaf Reinet.</span>
+
+<p>It was with this accumulated evidence in his <span class="pagenum"><a id="page108" name="page108"></a>(p. 108)</span> mind that Lord
+Milner travelled down, on March 2nd, 1898, from Capetown to Graaf
+Reinet, expecting to take part in a Governor's function of the
+ordinary sort at the opening of the railway on the following day. The
+conventional expressions of loyalty to the Queen, and the scarcely
+veiled hypocrisy and defiance with which the Dutch reiterated them, at
+the time when the whole weight of their influence was thrown against
+Great Britain on the only South African question that really mattered,
+had become nauseating even to his serene temper and generous
+disposition. He was wearied, too, of receiving a frivolous or
+unfriendly reply from the Pretoria Executive to the most reasonable
+proposals of the Imperial Government. Late at night there was brought
+to him, in the train, a copy of an address from the Graaf Reinet
+branch of the Afrikander Bond, which was to be presented to him on the
+morrow. It contained, in more than usually pointed language, a protest
+against "the charges of disloyalty made against the Bond," and a
+request that the High Commissioner would "convey to the Queen the
+expression of its unswerving loyalty." As he read on we can imagine
+how, in ominous contrast to the superficial protestations of the text,
+something exceptionally aggressive in the tone of the address,
+something which emphasised the inconsistency of these formal
+professions of attachment to the throne with the very practical
+hostility of their <span class="pagenum"><a id="page109" name="page109"></a>(p. 109)</span> authors to British policy, struck the
+High Commissioner with peculiar force. The Dutch, who, under British
+rule, enjoyed&mdash;one might almost say abused&mdash;every privilege of
+citizenship in the Cape Colony, were quite prepared to see the British
+excluded, under Dutch rule, from these same privileges in the
+Transvaal. More than that, they were determined to employ all the
+agencies at their command to prevent any effective interference with
+the Transvaal oligarchy. Lord Milner evidently felt that the time had
+come for remonstrance, so, gathering up the impressions which had been
+accumulating in his mind, he wrote down then and there his answer,
+which was delivered on the following day.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her
+     Majesty's subjects is loyal, but I should be much more glad to be
+     allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason
+     could there be for any disloyalty? You have thriven wonderfully
+     well under Her Majesty's Government. This country, despite its
+     great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural
+     disadvantages to contend against, and yet let any one compare the
+     position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her
+     Majesty's reign, or even thirty years ago. The progress in
+     material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress
+     are greater still. And you have other blessings which by no means
+     always accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely
+     free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging
+     the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of
+     law <span class="pagenum"><a id="page110" name="page110"></a>(p. 110)</span> manned by men of the highest ability and integrity,
+     and secure in the discharge of their high functions from all
+     external interference. You have&mdash;at least as regards the white
+     races&mdash;perfect equality of citizenship. And these things have not
+     been won from a reluctant sovereign. They have been freely and
+     gladly bestowed upon you, because freedom and self-government,
+     justice and equality, are the first principles of British policy.
+     And they are secured to you by the strength of the power that
+     gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack
+     without your being asked to contribute one pound to that
+     protection unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of
+     course you are loyal; it would be monstrous if you were not.</p>
+
+<p>"And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have
+     to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may
+     put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or
+     less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to
+     shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the
+     population of the Colony&mdash;Dutch as well as English&mdash;are, I
+     firmly believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know
+     they live under a good constitution, and have no wish to change
+     it, and regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august
+     lady at the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to
+     consider; if political controversy were confined to the internal
+     affairs of the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of
+     hard language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among
+     the usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody
+     else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd&mdash;so obviously
+     absurd&mdash;that nobody would take it seriously, and the charges
+     would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">The loyalty of the Bond.</span>
+
+<p>"What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty <span class="pagenum"><a id="page111" name="page111"></a>(p. 111)</span> in
+     this case, what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under
+     it, is the fact that the political controversies of this country
+     at present unfortunately turn largely upon another question&mdash;I
+     mean the relations of Her Majesty's Government to the South
+     African Republic&mdash;and that, whenever there is any prospect of any
+     difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once
+     vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality,
+     espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that
+     they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the
+     politician&mdash;often the best of men, though singularly
+     injudicious&mdash;who, whenever any disputes arise with another
+     country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be
+     in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very
+     much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his
+     fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly
+     opposite assumption. And so I do not take it that in this case
+     people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy
+     with the Government of the Transvaal&mdash;which, seeing the close tie
+     of relationship which unites a great portion of the population
+     here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly
+     natural&mdash;to a point which gives some ground for the assertion
+     that they seem to care much more for the independence of the
+     Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to
+     which they themselves belong.</p>
+
+<p>"For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in
+     espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open
+     rupture between that country and the British Government. They
+     loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they
+     think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government
+     that in case of war with the Transvaal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page112" name="page112"></a>(p. 112)</span> it would have a
+     great number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it,
+     that is a way to prevent such a calamity.</p>
+
+<p>"But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the
+     assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the
+     independence of the Transvaal&mdash;that independence which it has
+     itself given&mdash;and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order
+     to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact
+     opposite of the truth. So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it
+     is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes
+     of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they
+     are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the
+     Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the
+     semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that
+     country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only
+     on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly
+     reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of
+     the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain's
+     moderate attitude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is
+     not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government
+     which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at
+     all. It is that unprogressiveness&mdash;I will not say the
+     retrogressiveness&mdash;of the Government of the Transvaal and its
+     deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it
+     devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every
+     impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers
+     which threaten it are internal.</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">Milner's appeal to the Dutch.</span>
+
+<p>"Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that
+     this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all
+     that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation
+     that at the present moment any advice that I could <span class="pagenum"><a id="page113" name="page113"></a>(p. 113)</span>
+     tender, or that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender
+     in that quarter, though it was the best advice in the world,
+     would be instantly rejected because it was British. But the same
+     does not apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and
+     especially to those who have gone so far in the expression of
+     their sympathy for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these
+     charges of disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least
+     cannot be suspected across the border; and if all they
+     desire&mdash;and I believe it is what they desire&mdash;is to preserve the
+     South African Republic, and to promote good relations between it
+     and the British Colonies and Government, then let them use all
+     their influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming
+     the Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its
+     Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing
+     it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and, what is even
+     more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its
+     administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa,
+     such as this Colony or the Orange Free State. That is the
+     direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate
+     troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than
+     thirty years, is to be found."<a id="footnotetag36" name="footnotetag36"></a><a href="#footnote36" title="Go to footnote 36"><span class="small">[36]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No
+such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High
+Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now
+eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action
+and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect,
+and grew uneasy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page114" name="page114"></a>(p. 114)</span> The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable.
+What is the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch,
+if you refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one
+thing of all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should
+feel&mdash;that the Transvaal should "assimilate its institutions ... and
+the tone and temper of its administration, to those of the free
+communities of South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free
+State."</p>
+
+<p>The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was
+the weight of inevitable truth.</p>
+
+<p>A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to
+urge President Krüger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he
+says:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner's speech at
+     Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in <span class="italic">The
+     Cape Times</span>. Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled
+     hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble
+     ahead....</p>
+
+<p>"Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the
+     future lies in the attitude of President Krüger and his vain hope
+     of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened
+     minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using
+     the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true
+     Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent
+     discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their
+     mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs
+     cannot last. It must break down from inherent rottenness, and
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page115" name="page115"></a>(p. 115)</span> it will be well if the fall does not sweep away the
+     freedom of all of us.</p>
+
+<p>"I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in
+     the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and
+     good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between
+     the South African Republic and a catastrophe."<a id="footnotetag37" name="footnotetag37"></a><a href="#footnote37" title="Go to footnote 37"><span class="small">[37]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Sprigg and the Bond.</span>
+
+<p>Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the
+British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased
+by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had
+been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the
+essential morality of England's dealings with the Dutch been
+vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had
+done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to
+do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was
+unassailable. We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the
+different sections of the British population were manifesting a
+tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this
+movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge
+the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time
+past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population
+of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by
+any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary
+representatives. In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the
+Cape electoral <span class="pagenum"><a id="page116" name="page116"></a>(p. 116)</span> system was brought before the Ministry. The
+indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotzé, and the
+growing evidence of President Krüger's determination to ride
+rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed
+to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of
+the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the
+common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of
+British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid
+British party thus formed adopted the title of "Progressives." The
+Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing
+to Mr. Hofmeyr;
+but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now assured of the almost
+united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament,
+resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was
+approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr.
+Hofmeyr's representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.<a id="footnotetag38" name="footnotetag38"></a><a href="#footnote38" title="Go to footnote 38"><span class="small">[38]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Redistribution.</span>
+
+<p>Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the
+parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He
+had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his
+Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to
+throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which <span class="pagenum"><a id="page117" name="page117"></a>(p. 117)</span> Mr.
+Rhodes was the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in
+doubt. On the resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was
+at once turned on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr. Schreiner gave
+notice of a vote of "no confidence." It was put off until June 13th,
+and in the meantime the second reading of the
+Redistribution Bill was
+met by the "previous question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of
+the Provincial Council of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in
+Parliament or in the Press, to conceal the fact that, under the
+question of redistribution, wider and more momentous issues were at
+stake. The counts in the Bond's indictment of the Ministry, as set out
+in <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, were (1) its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the
+proposed gift of a warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of
+sympathy with the South African Republic. Against these crimes it had
+nothing to place, except that it had permitted the employment of the
+captured Bechuanas, as indentured labourers<a id="footnotetag39" name="footnotetag39"></a><a href="#footnote39" title="Go to footnote 39"><span class="small">[39]</span></a>&mdash;its sole merit, in
+the opinion of the Bond journal. <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, on the other hand,
+declared with equal frankness that the real point to be decided was,
+whether the interests of President Krüger and the South African
+Republic, or those of the Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire,
+had the greater claim upon the Government and Parliament of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page118" name="page118"></a>(p. 118)</span> Colony. And Mr. Schreiner, when, on June 13th, he introduced
+the "no confidence" motion, asked the House to condemn the Ministry on
+the ground that it had not shown any "sympathy" with, or made any
+"conciliatory approach" towards, the "sister Republic." On Monday,
+June 20th, the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was carried
+by a majority of seven, but two days later, June 22nd, the Ministry
+found itself in a minority of five on Mr. Schreiner's motion of "no
+confidence."<a id="footnotetag40" name="footnotetag40"></a><a href="#footnote40" title="Go to footnote 40"><span class="small">[40]</span></a> In these circumstances Sir Gordon Sprigg determined
+not to resign, but to appeal to the electorate&mdash;a course justified by
+constitutional usage&mdash;and Parliament was dissolved.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The general election, 1898.</span>
+
+<p>The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no
+little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were
+supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and
+other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by
+President Krüger and his agents from the revenues of the
+Transvaal.<a id="footnotetag41" name="footnotetag41"></a><a href="#footnote41" title="Go to footnote 41"><span class="small">[41]</span></a> Mr. Schreiner's election utterances were studiously
+moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the
+Malmesbury division, by whom he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page119" name="page119"></a>(p. 119)</span> was returned to Parliament,
+contained a reference to "the noble empire which was theirs, and to
+which they belonged." But such pronouncements by no means represented
+the sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself. The
+objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive
+form by <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to
+oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in
+politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation
+of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words,
+to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the
+diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general
+preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise. The
+under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch
+population may be understood from the fact that the following frank
+appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was
+published in the columns of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it
+     must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The
+     majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go
+     bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two
+     Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the
+     stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at
+     least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape
+     Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The <span class="pagenum"><a id="page120" name="page120"></a>(p. 120)</span>
+     two Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the
+     stranger [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> British] are unable to continue the fight. One
+     day the question of who is to be master will have to be referred
+     to the arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend
+     upon the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our
+     side we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince
+     matters. This is the real point at issue; and in this light every
+     Afrikander must learn to see it. And what assistance can we
+     expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority
+     of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on
+     the sword when God's time comes."<a id="footnotetag42" name="footnotetag42"></a><a href="#footnote42" title="Go to footnote 42"><span class="small">[42]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become
+what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of
+rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander
+nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from
+certain extracts from the <span class="italic">Studenten Blad</span> of the Theological Seminary
+of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by <span class="italic">The Albert
+Times</span>. The passage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by
+November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students
+had at that date joined the Boer forces:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Anti-british sentiment.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors
+     of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as
+     their heart's blood&mdash;a people that followed our fathers to the
+     new fatherland which they had bought with their <span class="pagenum"><a id="page121" name="page121"></a>(p. 121)</span> blood
+     and snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their
+     freedom? Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and
+     retook the land with God's aid and with their blood. But England
+     is not satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same
+     people, and not only our freedom, but our language, our
+     nationality, our religion! Must we surrender everything, and
+     disown our fathers? I cannot agree with this. The thought is
+     hateful to me&mdash;the thought of trampling on the bodies of our
+     fathers as we extend the hand of friendship to those who have
+     slain our fathers in an unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say
+     that the Bible teaches us to love our enemies. I think, however,
+     that the text cannot be here applied. Race hatred is something
+     quite distinct from personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as
+     a private individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if,
+     however, I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander,
+     must regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion&mdash;as a
+     wolf that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the
+     chief reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the
+     enemies of our religion."</p>
+
+<p>At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were
+over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned.
+Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned
+both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former
+constituency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus
+vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return
+of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take
+place until the 15th. As all three <span class="pagenum"><a id="page122" name="page122"></a>(p. 122)</span> constituencies were
+expected to elect Progressives&mdash;an expectation which was
+fulfilled&mdash;the result of the general election was to give the Bond a
+bare majority of one, and this in spite of the fact that a
+considerably larger total of votes had been cast for the Progressive
+than for the Bond candidates.<a id="footnotetag43" name="footnotetag43"></a><a href="#footnote43" title="Go to footnote 43"><span class="small">[43]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner's impartiality.</span>
+
+<p>These somewhat unusual circumstances gave rise to an incident which is
+significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner
+discharged the duties of his office as constitutional Governor of the
+Cape Colony. In view of the circumstance that the Progressives had
+polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a
+minority in the Assembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry
+should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until
+the Namaqualand election had been held. He believed, further, that in
+the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce
+one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the
+Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution
+of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The
+partial appropriation made by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page123" name="page123"></a>(p. 123)</span> Parliament before the
+dissolution was exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be
+provided without the authority of Parliament was the issue of
+Governor's warrants on the Treasury. Lord Milner was willing to sign
+warrants to enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during
+the unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last
+appropriation and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of
+the constitutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain
+supply is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to
+issue warrants for any longer period. He held, moreover, that as the
+Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be
+completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as
+the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was,
+no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair
+prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to
+put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have
+failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question. A
+loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with
+or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run
+the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and
+of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might
+otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But,
+as Governor of the Colony, he refused <span class="pagenum"><a id="page124" name="page124"></a>(p. 124)</span> to allow any
+considerations of party interest, on this or on any subsequent
+occasion, to influence his judgment. While he conceived it to be his
+duty to give advice and criticism to public men of all shades of
+political opinion, he showed himself inexorably opposed to the thought
+of straining his constitutional powers in the slightest degree for the
+benefit of one side or the other.<a id="footnotetag44" name="footnotetag44"></a><a href="#footnote44" title="Go to footnote 44"><span class="small">[44]</span></a> Accordingly provision for the
+expenses of administration was made by Governor's warrants up to
+September 30th, and on the day following the Vryburg election
+(September 16th), a proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th
+was issued.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Schreiner, prime minister.</span>
+
+<p>On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no
+confidence" by a majority of two.<a id="footnotetag45" name="footnotetag45"></a><a href="#footnote45" title="Go to footnote 45"><span class="small">[45]</span></a> On the 17th the House assembled
+with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to
+the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members
+of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close
+association with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The
+latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided
+with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The
+Progressives <span class="pagenum"><a id="page125" name="page125"></a>(p. 125)</span> continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon
+Sprigg. Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an
+"independent," since he had found himself unable to work in
+association with a party in which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence.
+The new Ministry was not strong enough to resist the continued demand
+of the Progressives for a measure of electoral reform; but the
+Redistribution Bill, as now passed, took the form of a compromise so
+disastrous to the British population that the Bond majority was
+increased to eight by the new elections held in April, 1899.<a id="footnotetag46" name="footnotetag46"></a><a href="#footnote46" title="Go to footnote 46"><span class="small">[46]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Mr. Chamberlain's policy, as we have seen, was based upon the belief
+that it was possible to win over the Dutch in the Cape Colony and the
+Free State to the side of the Imperial Government. But here, in
+October, 1898, was an Afrikander ministry in power in the Cape Colony
+pledged to prevent the intervention of the Imperial Government in the
+affairs of the Transvaal. From that moment the issue became more and
+more one not of right, but of might. In the Free State, as we have
+seen, what was virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with the
+northern Republic had been ratified by the Volksraad. In the Transvaal
+the work of armament was proceeding apace, and Dr. Leyds had been
+despatched to Europe, as Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic, with
+authority and funds calculated to enable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page126" name="page126"></a>(p. 126)</span> him to enlist the
+active sympathy of the Continental powers on behalf of the Pretoria
+Executive. His place as State Secretary had been filled, in July, by
+Mr. Reitz, the former President of the Free State, and one of the
+actual founders of the Afrikander Bond; and Mr. Smuts, a younger and
+even more enthusiastic believer in the nationalist creed, was
+appointed to the office of State Attorney.<a id="footnotetag47" name="footnotetag47"></a><a href="#footnote47" title="Go to footnote 47"><span class="small">[47]</span></a> With the exception of
+Rhodesia and Natal and the native territories immediately under the
+control of the Imperial Government, the Afrikander nationalists
+dominated the whole of South Africa. Nor is it surprising that, in
+these circumstances, the tone of the communications passing between
+the Transvaal Government and the paramount Power should have become
+increasingly unsatisfactory.<a id="footnotetag48" name="footnotetag48"></a><a href="#footnote48" title="Go to footnote 48"><span class="small">[48]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page127" name="page127"></a>(p. 127)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Milner's visit to England.</span>
+
+<p>In the (English) winter of 1898-9 Lord Milner paid a visit to England.
+Sir William Greene, who had left Pretoria on a holiday on June 29th,
+was also at home during the same period. Lord Milner's visit was due
+in part to the necessity for medical treatment;<a id="footnotetag49" name="footnotetag49"></a><a href="#footnote49" title="Go to footnote 49"><span class="small">[49]</span></a> but, in any case,
+it had become desirable that he should be able to communicate fully to
+Mr. Chamberlain the grave views which he had formed on the South
+African situation. He left for England on November 2nd, landed on the
+19th, sailed on January 28th, and reached Capetown again on February
+14th. During the whole of the two months that he was in England he was
+engaged in an endeavour to impress upon Mr. Chamberlain, and everybody
+else with whom he could converse, that the existing state of affairs
+was one which, if allowed to remain unchanged, would end in the loss
+of South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>During nineteen months of close observation and earnest, patient
+study, Lord Milner had grasped the situation in its completeness. What
+he saw was the demoralising effect of the spectacle of the Dutch
+ruling in the Cape Colony, and the British being tyrannised over in
+the Transvaal. Looking at South Africa as a whole, there was the fact,
+as indisputable as it was grotesque, that the British inhabitant was
+in a position of distinct <span class="pagenum"><a id="page128" name="page128"></a>(p. 128)</span> inferiority to the Dutch; and this
+although the Cape and Natal were British colonies, while the Transvaal
+and the Free State were states subject to the authority of Great
+Britain as paramount Power. It was an impossible position. What Lord
+Milner urged upon the Imperial Government was the plain necessity of
+putting an end to an intolerable state of things which showed no
+capacity of righting itself; of pressing for justice to the British
+population of the Transvaal, with an absolute determination to obtain
+it. That such a policy might result in war, he knew; though neither he
+nor any one else realised, in the beginning of 1899, how near war
+actually was. The reliance of the Transvaal oligarchy on the Orange
+Free State, now bound to them by a formal alliance, and on the party
+of the Bond now in power at the Cape, might tempt them to resist even
+the most moderate demands. But Milner no doubt hoped that, if the
+British Government grasped the nettle firmly, and, while treating the
+Transvaal with all possible diplomatic courtesy, yet left no doubt
+whatever of its inflexible resolution, war might still be avoided. And
+in any case he felt that there was no option for the British
+Government but to take up the case of the Transvaal British, if a
+shred of respect for the power and name of Britain was to be preserved
+in South Africa. To embark on such a policy involved two dangers: the
+danger of war, and what in Milner's eyes was perhaps even greater,
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page129" name="page129"></a>(p. 129)</span> the danger that, by advancing just claims and then, letting
+ourselves be "bluffed" out of them, we might yet further lessen, and
+indeed totally destroy, what hold we still possessed upon the
+affection of the South African British or on the respect either of
+British or Dutch. In the light of past experience the second danger
+may well have seemed to him the greater of the two. But, with perils
+on both hands, he still felt that there was nothing for it but to go
+forward, to make one supreme effort to save a situation which was
+rapidly becoming a hopeless one. To have remained quiescent, with the
+forces which were gradually edging us out of the Sub-Continent growing
+on every side, could only have ended in the overthrow, or at best, the
+euthanasia of British dominion in South Africa.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">His verdict.</span>
+
+<p>It was in the course of this visit that Lord Milner realised the
+magnitude of the task that lay before him. To save England in spite of
+herself; to keep South Africa a part of the Empire in spite of
+ignorance at home, in the teeth of an armed Republic and an Afrikander
+ministry, required not merely an iron will and mastership in
+statecraft, but a reasoned and unfaltering belief in the justice of
+the British cause. "Certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my
+might," he said long afterwards in his farewell speech at
+Johannesburg, "because I was, from head to foot, one mass of glowing
+conviction of the rightness of our cause."<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page130" name="page130"></a>(p. 130)</span> CHAPTER IV</h3>
+
+<p class="title">UNDER WHICH FLAG?</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Uitlanders' petition.</span>
+
+<p>Upon his return Lord Milner found that the storm clouds had gathered
+in the Transvaal. In a despatch of January 13th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain
+had informed the Pretoria Executive that the proposed extension of the
+dynamite contract in its new form (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> as, in effect, a "privileged
+importation by one firm," although nominally "a State undertaking")
+was held by the law officers of the Crown to be as much a violation of
+the Convention as the original monopoly, which had been cancelled on
+the representations of the Imperial Government in 1892. Mr. Reitz's
+reply, which Lord Milner transmitted to the Colonial Office not long
+after his arrival at Capetown, was a blunt assertion that, in the
+opinion of his Government, the Imperial Government had no right to
+interfere. But in the meantime the whole question of the position of
+the British residents in the Transvaal had been raised directly by the
+agitation which had arisen out of the shooting of Edgar at
+Johannesburg on December 18th, 1898.<a id="footnotetag50" name="footnotetag50"></a><a href="#footnote50" title="Go to footnote 50"><span class="small">[50]</span></a> This <span class="pagenum"><a id="page131" name="page131"></a>(p. 131)</span> event was
+followed by the petition for protection,
+which Sir William Butler (who
+was General-in-Command, and during Lord Milner's absence Acting High
+Commissioner) refused to transmit to the Secretary of State (January
+4th, 1899); by the arrest of Messrs. Webb and Dodd and the breaking up
+of the Amphitheatre meeting (January 14th); by the attempt of the
+Pretoria Executive to buy off the capitalists (February 27th-April
+14th); by the presentation of the second petition to the Queen (March
+24th); by the agitation on the Rand in favour of the reforms for which
+it prayed; and lastly by the public meetings held in the Cape Colony
+and Natal for, and against, the intervention of the Imperial
+Government.<a id="footnotetag51" name="footnotetag51"></a><a href="#footnote51" title="Go to footnote 51"><span class="small">[51]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Within three months of his return Lord Milner cabled the masterly
+statement in which he endorsed the petition of the Uitlanders<a id="footnotetag52" name="footnotetag52"></a><a href="#footnote52" title="Go to footnote 52"><span class="small">[52]</span></a> with
+the memorable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page132" name="page132"></a>(p. 132)</span> words: "The case for intervention is
+overwhelming." Like the Graaf Reinet speech, this despatch of May 4th
+was written at white heat, but the opinions which it expressed were in
+no less a degree the mature and measured judgments of a mind fully
+informed upon every detail germane to the issue. So much is this the
+fact that all that is essential for the full comprehension of the
+second Reform Movement at Johannesburg&mdash;the salient features of which
+have been outlined above&mdash;is to be found within the limits of this
+brief and notable State document:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The intervention despatch.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Having regard to the critical character of the South African
+     situation and the likelihood of an early reply by Her Majesty's
+     Government to the Petition, I am telegraphing remarks which under
+     ordinary circumstances I should have made by despatch. Events of
+     importance have followed so fast on each other since my return to
+     South Africa, and my time has been so occupied in dealing with
+     each incident severally, that I have had no time for reviewing
+     the whole position.</p>
+
+<p>"The present crisis undoubtedly arises out of the Edgar incident.
+     But that incident merely precipitated a struggle which was
+     certain to come. It is possible to make too much of the killing
+     of Edgar. It was a shocking and, in my judgment, a criminal
+     blunder, such as would have caused a popular outcry anywhere. It
+     was made much worse by the light way in which it was first dealt
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page133" name="page133"></a>(p. 133)</span> with by the Public Prosecutor and then by the judge at
+     the trial. By itself, however, it would not have justified, nor,
+     in fact, provoked the present storm. But it happened to touch a
+     particularly sore place. There is no grievance which rankles more
+     in the breasts of the Uitlander population than the conduct of
+     the police, who, while they have proved singularly incompetent to
+     deal with gross scandals like the illicit liquor trade, are harsh
+     and arbitrary in their treatment of individuals whom they happen
+     to dislike, as must have become evident to you from the recurrent
+     ill-treatment of coloured people. There are absolutely no grounds
+     for supposing that the excitement which the death of Edgar caused
+     was factitious. It has been laid to the door of the South African
+     League, but the officials of the League were forced into action
+     by Edgar's fellow-workmen. And, the consideration of grievances
+     once started by the police grievance, it was inevitable that the
+     smouldering but profound discontent of the population who
+     constantly find their affairs mismanaged, their protests
+     disregarded, and their attitude misunderstood, by a Government on
+     which they have absolutely no means of exercising any influence,
+     should once more break into flame.</p>
+
+<p>"We have, therefore, simply to deal with a popular movement of a
+     similar kind to that of 1894 and 1895 before it was perverted and
+     ruined by a conspiracy of which the great body of the Uitlanders
+     were totally innocent. None of the grievances then complained of,
+     and which then excited universal sympathy, have been remedied,
+     and others have been added. The case is much stronger. It is
+     impossible to overlook the tremendous change for the worse, which
+     has been effected by the lowering of the status of the High Court
+     of Judicature and by the establishment of the principle embodied
+     in the new draft Grondwet that any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page134" name="page134"></a>(p. 134)</span> resolution of the
+     Volksraad is equivalent to a law. The instability of the laws has
+     always been one of the most serious grievances. The new
+     Constitution provides for their permanent instability, the judges
+     being bound by their oath to accept every Volksraad resolution as
+     equally binding with a law passed in the regular form, and with
+     the provisions of the Constitution itself. The law prescribing
+     this oath is one of which the present Chief Justice said that no
+     self-respecting man could sit on the Bench while it was on the
+     Statute Book. Formerly the foreign population, however bitterly
+     they might resent the action of the Legislature and of the
+     Administration, had yet confidence in the High Court of
+     Judicature. It cannot be expected that they should feel the same
+     confidence to-day. Seeing no hope in any other quarter, a number
+     of Uitlanders who happen to be British subjects have addressed a
+     petition to Her Majesty the Queen. I have already expressed my
+     opinion of its substantial genuineness  <span class="sidenote2">The movement not artificial.</span>
+and the absolute <span class="italic">bona
+     fides</span> of its promoters. But the petition is only one proof among
+     many of the profound discontent of the unenfranchised population,
+     who are a great majority of the white inhabitants of the State."</p>
+
+<p>"The public meeting of the 14th January was indeed broken up by
+     workmen, many of them poor burghers, in the employment of the
+     Government and instigated by Government officials, and it is
+     impossible at present to hold another meeting of a great size.
+     Open-air meetings are prohibited by law, and by one means or
+     another all large public buildings have been rendered
+     unavailable. But smaller meetings are being held almost nightly
+     along the Rand, and are unanimous in their demand for
+     enfranchisement. The movement is steadily growing in force and
+     extent.</p>
+
+<p>"With regard to the attempt to represent that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page135" name="page135"></a>(p. 135)</span> movement
+     as artificial, the work of scheming capitalists or professional
+     agitators, I regard it as a wilful perversion of the truth. The
+     defenceless people who are clamouring for a redress of grievances
+     are doing so at great personal risk. It is notorious that many
+     capitalists regard political agitation with disfavour because of
+     its effect on the markets. It is equally notorious that the
+     lowest class of Uitlanders, and especially the illicit liquor
+     dealers, have no sympathy whatever with the cause of reform.
+     Moreover, there are in all classes a considerable number who only
+     want to make money and clear out, and who, while possibly
+     sympathising with reform, feel no great interest in a matter
+     which may only concern them temporarily. But a very large and
+     constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders are not birds
+     of passage; they contemplate a long residence in the country, or
+     to make it their permanent home. These people are the mainstay of
+     the reform movement as they are of the prosperity of the country.
+     They would make excellent citizens if they had the chance.</p>
+
+<p>"A busy industrial community is not naturally prone to political
+     unrest. But they bear the chief burden of taxation; they
+     constantly feel in their business and daily lives the effects of
+     chaotic local legislation and of incompetent and unsympathetic
+     administration; they have many grievances, but they believe all
+     these could gradually be removed if they had only a fair share of
+     political power. This is the meaning of their vehement demand for
+     enfranchisement. Moreover, they are mostly British subjects,
+     accustomed to a free system and equal rights; they feel deeply
+     the personal indignity involved in a position of permanent
+     subjection to the ruling caste, which owes its wealth and power
+     to their exertion. The political turmoil in the Transvaal
+     Republic will never end till the permanent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page136" name="page136"></a>(p. 136)</span> Uitlander
+     population is admitted to a share in the government, and while
+     that turmoil lasts there will be no tranquillity or adequate
+     progress in Her Majesty's South African dominions.</p>
+
+<p>"The relations between the British Colonies and the two Republics
+     are intimate to a degree which one must live in South Africa in
+     order fully to realise. Socially, economically, ethnologically,
+     they are all one country. The two principal white races are
+     everywhere inextricably mixed up; it is absurd for either to
+     dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they
+     can live in harmony, and the country progress, is equality all
+     round. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six
+     Governments; but not under two absolutely conflicting social and
+     political systems&mdash;perfect equality for Dutch and British in the
+     British Colonies side by side with the permanent subjection of
+     the British to the Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to
+     talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs.</p>
+
+<p>"It is this which makes the internal condition of the Transvaal
+     Republic a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty's Government.
+     No merely local question affects so deeply the welfare and peace
+     of her own South African possessions. And the right of Great
+     Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment to the Uitlanders
+     is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The
+     majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect.
+     But the enormous number of British subjects, the endless series
+     of their grievances, and the nature of those grievances, which
+     are not less serious because they are not individually
+     sensational, makes protection by the ordinary diplomatic means
+     impossible. We are, as you know, for ever remonstrating about
+     this, that, and the other injury to British subjects. Only in
+     rare cases, and only when we are very <span class="pagenum"><a id="page137" name="page137"></a>(p. 137)</span> emphatic, do we
+     obtain any redress. The sore between us and the Transvaal
+     Republic is thus inevitably kept up, while the result in the way
+     of protection to our subjects is lamentably small. For these
+     reasons it has been, as you know, my constant endeavour to reduce
+     the number of our complaints. I may sometimes have abstained when
+     I ought to have protested from my great dislike of ineffectual
+     nagging. But I feel that the attempt to remedy the
+     hundred-and-one wrongs springing from a hopeless system by taking
+     up isolated cases, is perfectly vain. It may easily lead to war,
+     but will never lead to real improvement."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">Enfranchisement the remedy.</span>
+
+<p>"The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these
+     injuries&mdash;the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic
+     protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of Uitlander
+     representation would gradually but surely bring about. It seems a
+     paradox, but it is true, that the only effective way of
+     protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our
+     subjects. The admission of the Uitlanders to a fair share of
+     political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic.
+     But it would, at the same time, remove most of our causes of
+     difference with it, and modify and, in the long run, entirely
+     remove that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great
+     Britain which at present dominates its internal and external
+     policy.</p>
+
+<p>"The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted
+     answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But,
+     in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for
+     years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not
+     true that this is owing to the Raid. They were going from bad to
+     worse before the Raid. We were on the verge of war before the
+     Raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page138" name="page138"></a>(p. 138)</span> effect of the Raid has been to give the policy of
+     leaving things alone a new lease of life, and with the old
+     consequences.</p>
+
+<p>"The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently
+     in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted
+     grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for
+     redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of
+     Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government within
+     the Queen's dominions. A certain section of the Press, not in the
+     Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a
+     republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing
+     references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with
+     the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of
+     war, it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I
+     regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a
+     ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the
+     British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large
+     number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used
+     which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right,
+     even in this Colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth.
+     Thousands of men peacefully disposed, and, if left alone,
+     perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are
+     being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding
+     exasperation on the side of the British.</p>
+
+<p>"I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous
+     propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of Her
+     Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South
+     Africa. And the best proof alike of its power and its justice
+     would be to obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair
+     share in the government of the country which owes everything to
+     their exertions. It could <span class="pagenum"><a id="page139" name="page139"></a>(p. 139)</span> be made perfectly clear that
+     our action was not directed against the existence of the
+     Republic. We should only be demanding the re-establishment of
+     rights which now exist in the Orange Free State, and which
+     existed in the Transvaal itself at the time of, and long after,
+     the withdrawal of British sovereignty. It would be no selfish
+     demand, as other Uitlanders besides those of British birth would
+     benefit by it. It is asking for nothing from others which we do
+     not give ourselves. And it would certainly go to the root of the
+     political unrest in South Africa, and, though temporarily it
+     might aggravate, it would ultimately extinguish the race feud,
+     which is the great bane of the country."<a id="footnotetag53" name="footnotetag53"></a><a href="#footnote53" title="Go to footnote 53"><span class="small">[53]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It was Lord Milner's intention that the text of this despatch should
+have been made public upon its receipt in England. It contained the
+essential facts of the South African situation; and, what is more, it
+exhibited with perfect frankness the connection between Dutch
+ascendancy in the Cape Colony and Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal&mdash;a
+matter which was very imperfectly understood. The circumstance that
+these essential facts were before the British people, and, moreover,
+the circumstance that President Krüger knew that they were before the
+British people, would, he believed, greatly increase the effect of the
+strong demand for reforms which the Imperial Government had determined
+to address to the Pretoria Executive in response to the petition to
+the Queen.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's intervention.</span>
+
+<p>Nor was he alone in this opinion. Mr. Hofmeyr <span class="pagenum"><a id="page140" name="page140"></a>(p. 140)</span> knew that a
+despatch of grave importance had gone home. He had gathered, no doubt,
+a fairly accurate notion of its tenor from Mr. Schreiner, whom Lord
+Milner had warned some time before of "the gravity of the
+situation."<a id="footnotetag54" name="footnotetag54"></a><a href="#footnote54" title="Go to footnote 54"><span class="small">[54]</span></a> It is not going beyond the limits of probability to
+assume that the Master of the Bond realised the effect which the
+publication of these plain truths, backed by the authority of the High
+Commissioner, would produce upon the mind of the English people, and
+that he thereupon determined to take steps to prevent a turn of
+affairs which, as he conceived, would be most unfavourable to the
+nationalist cause. Surmises apart, it is certain, at least, that five
+days sufficed to place Mr. Hofmeyr in a position to ask Lord Milner if
+he would favourably consider an invitation to meet President Krüger in
+conference at Bloemfontein; and that within three days more (May 12th)
+a definite proposal to this effect had been made through the agency of
+President Steyn and accepted by Mr. Chamberlain. Nor, is it any less
+certain that, in view of the friendly discussion which was to take
+place so soon, the Secretary of State decided to postpone the
+publication of Lord Milner's despatch. This is the short history of
+the Bloemfontein Conference. It was a counter-stroke dealt by one of
+those "formidable personalities" of which Mr. Asquith spoke, and in
+all respects worthy of Mr. Hofmeyr's <span class="pagenum"><a id="page141" name="page141"></a>(p. 141)</span> statesmanship. Indeed,
+the methods which he employed for paralysing the machinery of British
+administration in South Africa were always subtle: infinitely more
+subtle than those which Parnell adopted in the not very dissimilar
+circumstances of the Home Rule campaign.</p>
+
+<p>The decision to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch of
+May 4th was a serious mistake, the injurious effect of which was felt
+both at the Conference and afterwards. But before we observe the
+incidents by which this central event was immediately preceded, it is
+necessary to examine more fully the political environment in which
+Lord Milner found himself established now that the April elections<a id="footnotetag55" name="footnotetag55"></a><a href="#footnote55" title="Go to footnote 55"><span class="small">[55]</span></a>
+had given the Afrikander party an assured tenure of power, and, at the
+same time, the moment had arrived for the Imperial Government to
+fulfil the pledge given on February 4th, 1896, for the redress of the
+"admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Bond and the ministry.</span>
+
+<p>The Schreiner Ministry was the agent of the Bond; it could not exist
+for a day if the Bond withdrew its support. The Bond majority in the
+Legislative Assembly had been returned by the Dutch inhabitants of the
+Colony for the avowed purpose of preventing the intervention of the
+Imperial Government in the affairs of the Transvaal. The Ministry and
+its supporters had begun by ranging themselves definitely on the side
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page142" name="page142"></a>(p. 142)</span> of the Transvaal. And, therefore, in all that was done by
+either party from the Bloemfontein Conference to the Ultimatum, it
+followed, <span class="italic">ex hypothesi</span>, that, in their opinion, the Transvaal was
+right, and England was wrong. Twice, as we shall see, Mr. Schreiner,
+on behalf of the Cape Ministry, hastened to declare publicly that the
+proposals of the Transvaal were all that was satisfactory, before he
+even knew what those proposals were. The Cape nationalists represented
+themselves as "mediators." They had as little intention of mediating
+between the Pretoria Executive and the British Government as a
+barrister, heavily feed and primed with his client's case, has of
+mediating between his client and his client's opponent at the hearing
+of a case in court.</p>
+
+<p>But the Bond was "loyal." The Bond members of the Cabinet&mdash;T. Nicholas
+German Te Water, and Albertus Johannes Herholdt, no less than William
+Philip Schreiner, John Xavier Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, and
+Richard Solomon&mdash;had sworn, upon taking office, "to be faithful and
+bear true allegiance to Her Majesty."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Schreiner ministry.</span>
+
+<p>The situation in which Lord Milner now found himself was thus one of
+so extraordinary a character that it would be difficult to find a
+parallel to it in the annals of our colonial administration. As High
+Commissioner, he had advocated in the most emphatic terms the exercise
+of the authority of Great Britain, as paramount Power, in the
+Transvaal. As Governor of the Cape Colony, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page143" name="page143"></a>(p. 143)</span> he was bound to
+administer the affairs of the Colony in accordance with the advice
+tendered by his ministers. And the advice which ministers were pledged
+to give him was the direct opposite of that which he himself, as High
+Commissioner, had given to the Imperial Government. To dismiss his
+ministers&mdash;the alternative to accepting this advice&mdash;would have been
+an extreme measure, to be justified only upon clear evidence that they
+had failed in the duty which they, no less than he himself, owed to
+the Crown. Whether Mr. Schreiner's Cabinet did so fail is a matter
+that the reader must determine for himself; possibly it would be
+difficult to show that, collectively or individually, the Cape
+ministers did anything more injurious to British interests than was
+done by the Liberal Opposition&mdash;again collectively or individually&mdash;in
+England. One thing is certain: the action of the Afrikander Cabinet,
+whether within or beyond the letter of its allegiance, lessened&mdash;and
+was intended to lessen&mdash;the force of an effort on the part of the
+Imperial Government, which might otherwise have averted the necessity
+for war.</p>
+
+<p>And here certain questions which will arise inevitably to the mind
+that pursues the narrative of the next few months, must be
+anticipated. What was the position of Mr. Schreiner? What was his real
+standpoint, and what was his relationship to Lord Milner? How was it
+that two Englishmen, Mr. Merriman and Sir (then Mr.) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page144" name="page144"></a>(p. 144)</span> Richard
+Solomon, came to be in this Afrikander Cabinet, and what were their
+respective motives in thus associating themselves with the objects of
+the Bond?</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The prime minister.</span>
+
+<p>Mr. Philip Schreiner was the son of a German by birth, a missionary of
+the London Missionary Society, who had married an Englishwoman, and
+afterwards settled in the Orange Free State. He had himself married a
+sister of Mr. F. W. Reitz, formerly President of the Free State, and
+now State Secretary of the South African Republic. The Schreiner
+family was remarkable for intellectual power. Of his sisters one is
+the authoress of <span class="italic">The Story of an African Farm</span>, and a second, Mrs.
+Lewis, like her brother Theophilus, was an active Imperialist and a
+determined opponent of the Bond. Mr. Schreiner himself was educated at
+the South African College at Capetown, and subsequently at Cambridge,
+where he was placed first in the First Class of the Law Tripos, and
+afterwards elected a Fellow of Downing. After a successful career at
+the Cape Bar he was appointed Attorney-General in Mr. Rhodes's
+Ministry, a position which he held at the time of the Raid. He was
+prevented by his strong disapproval of the part then played by Mr.
+Rhodes from joining the Progressive party; and, having accepted the
+position of Parliamentary leader of the Bond, he had become, as we
+have seen, Prime Minister through the Bond victory in the Cape General
+Election of 1898. It is characteristic alike of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page145" name="page145"></a>(p. 145)</span> Mr.
+Schreiner and of his political position that the only word of sympathy
+with the British connection, uttered from first to last during this
+election by the Bond candidates or their supporters, was the
+conventional reference to the greatness of the British Empire which,
+as we have noticed, occurred in his address to the electors of
+Malmesbury. With these political and social ties, Mr. Schreiner was
+compelled to be a South African first and a British subject second.
+His is precisely the kind of case where true allegiance can be
+expected only when a federal constitution has been created for the
+Empire.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "See," said Lord Milner, in his farewell speech at Johannesburg,
+     "how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone
+     solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of
+     South Africa; how it would unite its white races as nothing else
+     can. The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great
+     Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept
+     allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland.
+     But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of integrity,
+     without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal
+     devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South
+     Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for
+     the good of South Africa as a member of that greater whole."<a id="footnotetag56" name="footnotetag56"></a><a href="#footnote56" title="Go to footnote 56"><span class="small">[56]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>With Schreiner, and such as he, loyalty to the Crown was for the
+moment the product of intellectual judgment or considerations of
+policy. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page146" name="page146"></a>(p. 146)</span> All, or almost all, the instinctive feelings, born
+of pleasant associations with persons and places, which enter so
+largely into the sentiment of patriotism seem to have drawn him, as
+they drew his sister, Mrs. Cronwright-Schreiner, into sympathy with
+the cause of Afrikander nationalism. What his view was upon the
+particular issue now agitating South Africa may be gathered from an
+answer which he gave to a question put to him by Mr. Chamberlain in
+the course of the inquiry into the Raid (1897):</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p><span class="smcap">Mr. Chamberlain:</span> I suppose your view is that the Imperial
+     Government should adopt the same policy as the Cape Government,
+     and should refrain from even friendly representations as not
+     being calculated to advance the cause of the Uitlanders?</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Mr. Schreiner:</span> Yes, decidedly, so far as purely internal concerns
+     are concerned.<a id="footnotetag57" name="footnotetag57"></a><a href="#footnote57" title="Go to footnote 57"><span class="small">[57]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In other words, Mr. Schreiner was a consistent and convinced opponent
+of Imperial intervention. But there was a difference between his
+motive and that of the Bond leaders. Schreiner desired to prevent
+intervention, not because he did not recognise the justice of the
+claims of the Uitlanders, but because he believed that the Imperial
+Government was devoid of any right to intervene under the Conventions;
+while, at the same time, his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander
+nationalists made him blind to the existence of any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page147" name="page147"></a>(p. 147)</span> moral
+right of interference that England might possess, as the Power
+responsible for the well-being of South Africa as a whole. And so,
+partly by force of environment and partly by a narrow and erroneous
+interpretation of the principles of international law,<a id="footnotetag58" name="footnotetag58"></a><a href="#footnote58" title="Go to footnote 58"><span class="small">[58]</span></a> the Boer
+and Hollander oligarchy in the Transvaal, with all its moral obliquity
+and administrative incompetence, had become, as it were, a thing
+sacrosanct in his eyes. Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond leaders, on the other
+hand, desired to prevent intervention because they were perfectly
+satisfied to see the British Uitlanders in a position of political
+inferiority, and perfectly content with the whole situation, the
+continuance of which, as they knew, was directly calculated to bring
+about the supremacy of the Dutch race in South Africa. Therefore
+Hofmeyr made no effort to improve the state of affairs in the
+Transvaal until he saw the storm bursting. And when, at a later stage,
+he set himself to work in earnest to induce President Krüger to grant
+reforms, he did so to save the cause of Afrikander nationalism and not
+to assist the British Government in winning justice for the
+Uitlanders.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Sir Richard Solomon.</span>
+
+<p>Sir Richard Solomon, who was a nephew of Saul Solomon, the prominent
+radical politician chiefly instrumental in carrying the vote for
+Responsible Government through the Legislative Council of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page148" name="page148"></a>(p. 148)</span>
+the Cape Colony (1872), was the leader of the Bar at Kimberley. His
+presence, at first sight, formed a wholly incongruous element in such
+a ministry. On the native question, in his fiscal views, as a
+supporter of the Redistribution Bill, and in his sympathy with the
+Uitlanders, he was in direct conflict with the characteristic
+principles of the Bond. His one link with the Afrikander party was his
+distrust of Rhodes; and in view of his unquestioned loyalty to the
+British connection, his decision to join the Schreiner Ministry is
+probably to be attributed to his personal friendship for the Prime
+Minister. On the other hand, his ability, detachment from local
+parties, and the respect which he commanded, made him a valuable asset
+to Mr. Schreiner.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Messrs. Merriman and Sauer.</span>
+
+<p>Mr. Merriman, whose close political associate was Mr. Sauer, had twice
+held office under Mr. Rhodes (1890-96); but his separation from
+Rhodes, consequent upon the Raid, had thrown him into the arms of the
+Bond. Some of the more striking incidents in Mr. Merriman's political
+career have been already mentioned.<a id="footnotetag59" name="footnotetag59"></a><a href="#footnote59" title="Go to footnote 59"><span class="small">[59]</span></a> Fifteen years ago more
+Imperialist than Rhodes, he was soon to show himself more Bondsman
+than the Bond. Once the resolute, almost inspired, castigator of the
+separatist aims of that organisation, he was now in close and
+sympathetic association with the leaders of Afrikander nationalism in
+the Republics and the Cape Colony. The denunciations <span class="pagenum"><a id="page149" name="page149"></a>(p. 149)</span> of
+"capitalism" and "capitalists" with which he now regaled his
+Afrikander allies, had an ill savour in the mouth of the man who had
+tried to amalgamate the Diamond Mines at Kimberley&mdash;failing where
+Rhodes and Beit afterwards succeeded&mdash;and who, attracted by the magnet
+of gold discovery, for a short time had acted as manager of the
+Langlaagte Estate and Mr. J. B. Robinson's interests at Johannesburg.
+With political principles thus unstable and a mind strangely sensitive
+to any emotional appeal, it is not surprising that Mr. Merriman
+displayed the proverbial enthusiasm of the convert in his new
+political creed. His original perception of the imprudence and
+administrative incompetency of President Krüger's <span class="italic">régime</span> was rapidly
+obliterated by a growing partizanship, which in turn gave place to an
+unreasoning sympathy with the Boer cause, combined with a bitter
+antipathy against all who were concerned, whether in a civil or
+military capacity, in giving effect to the intervention of the
+Imperial Government on behalf of the British industrial community in
+the Transvaal. Mr. J. W. Sauer was destined to exhibit his political
+convictions in a manner so demonstrative that his words and acts, as
+recorded in the sequel, will leave the reader in no doubt as to the
+reality of his sympathy with the Boer and Afrikander cause. For the
+moment, therefore, it is sufficient to notice that, although he shared
+Mr. Merriman's present abhorrence of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page150" name="page150"></a>(p. 150)</span> "capitalism" and
+"capitalists," he was for many years of his life a promoter and
+director of mining and other companies.</p>
+
+<p>Of the two Bondsmen in the Cabinet, Mr. Herholdt was a member of the
+Legislative Council, and a Dutch farmer of moderate views and good
+repute; while Dr. Te Water was the friend and confidant of Mr.
+Hofmeyr, and, as such, the intermediary between the Bond and the
+Afrikander nationalists in the Free State and in the Transvaal.</p>
+
+<p>The Schreiner Cabinet was the velvet glove which covered the mailed
+hand of Mr. Hofmeyr. Dr. Te Water had been Colonial Secretary in the
+Sprigg Ministry up to the crisis of May, 1898. He was now "minister
+without portfolio" in the Schreiner Ministry. His presence was the
+sign and instrument of the domination of the Bond; and the domination
+of the Bond was as yet the permanent and controlling factor in the
+administration of the Colony under Responsible Government. The fact
+that only two out of six members of the Ministry were Bondsmen, is to
+be referred to the circumstance that the actual business of
+administration had been hitherto mainly in the hands of a small group
+of British colonial politicians, who were prepared to bid against each
+other for the all-important support of the Dutch vote. With the
+majority of these men, to be in office was an object for the
+attainment of which they were prepared to make a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page151" name="page151"></a>(p. 151)</span>
+considerable sacrifice in respect of their somewhat elastic political
+principles. The denial of political rights to the British population
+in the Transvaal, by threatening the maintenance of British supremacy
+in South Africa, had now for the first time created a British party in
+the Cape Colony&mdash;the Progressives&mdash;strong enough to act in
+independence of the Bond. The existence of this British party, not
+only free from the Bond, but determined (although it was in a
+minority) to challenge the Bond predominance, was a new phenomenon in
+Cape politics. In itself it constituted an appreciable improvement
+upon the previously existing state of affairs; since the British
+population was thus no longer hopelessly weakened by being divided
+into two parties of almost equal strength, nor were its leaders any
+longer obliged to subordinate their regard for British interests to
+the primary necessity of obtaining office by Bond support.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Policy of the ministry.</span>
+
+<p>Mr. Schreiner's Ministry, however, in spite of a difference of motives
+on the part of its individual members, was unanimous in its desire to
+prevent that intervention of the Imperial Government for which, in
+Lord Milner's judgment, there was "overwhelming" necessity. The idea
+of inducing President Krüger to grant such a "colourable measure of
+reform"<a id="footnotetag60" name="footnotetag60"></a><a href="#footnote60" title="Go to footnote 60"><span class="small">[60]</span></a> as would satisfy the Imperial Government, or at least
+deprive it of any justification <span class="pagenum"><a id="page152" name="page152"></a>(p. 152)</span> for interference by force of
+arms, was in contemplation some months before the Bloemfontein
+Conference took place. On January 1st, 1899, Mr. Merriman wrote to
+President Steyn with this object in view. "Is there no opportunity,"
+he said,<a id="footnotetag61" name="footnotetag61"></a><a href="#footnote61" title="Go to footnote 61"><span class="small">[61]</span></a> "of bringing about a <span class="italic">rapprochement</span> between us, in which
+the Free State might play the part of honest broker? We, <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, the
+Colony and Free State, have common material interests in our railway,
+apart from our anxiety to see the common welfare of South Africa
+increase from the removal of the one great cause of unrest and the
+pretext for outside interference."</p>
+
+<p>And Lord Milner, very soon after his return from England, was sounded
+by Mr. Schreiner as to the possibility of settling the franchise
+question by means of a South African Conference. Early in March&mdash;when
+Mr. Smuts was in Capetown, and the Pretoria Executive was engaged in
+the abortive attempt to separate the leaders of the mining industry
+from the rank and file of the Uitlander population by offering them
+certain fiscal and industrial reforms, if only they would undertake to
+discourage the agitation for political rights&mdash;the same subject was
+brought before the High Commissioner by Mr. Merriman himself. In
+pursuance of the real purpose of the Afrikander Ministry&mdash;<span class="italic">i.e.</span> to
+obtain a fictitious concession from President Krüger, instead of the
+"fair share in the government <span class="pagenum"><a id="page153" name="page153"></a>(p. 153)</span> of the country" required by
+the Imperial Government&mdash;it was proposed originally to exclude Lord
+Milner altogether from the negotiations by arranging that the
+Transvaal Government should bring forward proposals for reform at an
+inter-State Conference consisting of representatives of the
+governments of the two Republics and the self-governing British
+Colonies. But Lord Milner was, happily, High Commissioner as well as
+Governor of the Cape. As High Commissioner, he declared that at any
+such Conference the Imperial Government must be separately
+represented. Neither the Transvaal nor the Free State was willing to
+enter a Conference on these terms, although they were acceptable to
+the Cape Government; and the plan fell to the ground.</p>
+
+<p>It was then that Mr. Hofmeyr intervened, in view of Lord Milner's
+despatch of May 4th; and President Steyn, persuaded with dramatic
+swiftness to accept the rôle of peace-maker, which his predecessor,
+Sir John Brand, had played with such success in 1881, secured the
+grudging consent of President Krüger to meet the High Commissioner at
+Bloemfontein.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's <span class="italic">tour de force</span>.</span>
+
+<p>The incidents which led to the accomplishment of Hofmeyr's <span class="italic">tour de
+force</span> are singularly instructive. Lord Milner's despatch was
+telegraphed from Capetown about midday on May 4th. It was soon
+apparent that there was a leakage, legitimate or illegitimate, from
+the Colonial Office. On Saturday, the 6th, Mr. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page154" name="page154"></a>(p. 154)</span> Schreiner
+received warning telegrams from trusted sources in London, including
+"Hofmeyr's best friends"; and on this day he wrote a letter to
+President Steyn containing a "proposition" of so confidential a
+character that it could not be telegraphed in spite of the urgent need
+of haste.<a id="footnotetag62" name="footnotetag62"></a><a href="#footnote62" title="Go to footnote 62"><span class="small">[62]</span></a> On Monday, the 8th, Mr. Schreiner received more warning
+telegrams, and Dr. Te Water, in writing to President Steyn, expressed
+his hope that the proposition, made by Schreiner in his letter of
+Saturday, might by this time "have been accepted, or that something
+had been done which would achieve the same purpose."<a id="footnotetag63" name="footnotetag63"></a><a href="#footnote63" title="Go to footnote 63"><span class="small">[63]</span></a> On the same
+day the Cape papers published an alarming telegram reproducing from
+<span class="italic">The Daily Chronicle</span><a id="footnotetag64" name="footnotetag64"></a><a href="#footnote64" title="Go to footnote 64"><span class="small">[64]</span></a> a statement that the South African situation
+was very serious, and that the British Government was prepared to
+"take some risk of war." On Tuesday, the 9th, Lord Milner was present
+at a dinner given by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly; and Mr.
+Hofmeyr, who was among the guests, in the course of a long
+conversation with him after dinner, broached the idea of his meeting
+President Krüger at Bloemfontein. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Milner
+sent for Mr. Hofmeyr and discussed the subject more at length; and, a
+little later, when he had gone to the Governor's Office, Mr. Schreiner
+came in with a telegram <span class="pagenum"><a id="page155" name="page155"></a>(p. 155)</span> from President Steyn, in which the
+Cape Prime Minister was requested to ascertain formally whether the
+High Commissioner would be willing to accept an invitation to meet
+President Krüger. This telegram Lord Milner forwarded to Mr.
+Chamberlain, adding that the Cape Cabinet was "strongly" in favour of
+acceptance, and that Schreiner himself had declared that the
+invitation was the result of the "influence which he (Schreiner) had
+been using with the Transvaal Government ever since I had warned him
+of the gravity of the situation."<a id="footnotetag65" name="footnotetag65"></a><a href="#footnote65" title="Go to footnote 65"><span class="small">[65]</span></a> Mr. Chamberlain's reply (May
+12th), authorised Lord Milner to accept President Steyn's invitation,
+and in doing so, to state that a despatch was already on its way which
+contained a similar proposal made by the Imperial Government&mdash;</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The conference arranged.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "in the hope that, in concert with the President, you may arrive
+     at such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept
+     and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable
+     concession to their just demands and a settlement of the
+     difficulties which have threatened the good relations"</p>
+
+<p class="noindent">between the two Governments. This was the famous despatch of May 10th,
+in which Mr. Chamberlain reviewed carefully and exhaustively the whole
+situation as between the Transvaal and the Imperial Government, and
+formally accepted the Uitlanders' Petition to the Queen. It was not
+published until June 14th, <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, after the Bloemfontein <span class="pagenum"><a id="page156" name="page156"></a>(p. 156)</span>
+Conference had been held. It was then issued, together with Lord
+Milner's despatch of May 4th, in a Blue-book containing the complete
+record of all discussions of Transvaal affairs subsequent to Lord
+Milner's appointment.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of the next few days communications passed rapidly
+between Lord Milner, Mr. Chamberlain, President Steyn, and President
+Krüger, with the result that, on May 18th, President Steyn's
+invitation was formally accepted, and on the following day it was
+arranged that the Conference should begin on May 31st. Never was
+intervention more effective, or less obtrusive. Mr. Hofmeyr's part in
+the affair was confined apparently to an after-dinner conversation
+with the High Commissioner. Nor was the directing hand of the Master
+of the Bond revealed more fully until Lord Roberts's occupation of
+Bloemfontein placed the British authorities in possession of part of
+the communications which passed at this time, and during the four
+succeeding months, between the Cape nationalists and their republican
+confederates. And even in these documents Hofmeyr's name is rarely
+found at the end of a letter or telegram. It is Schreiner or Te Water
+who writes or telegraphs to Steyn or Fischer, adding sometimes, by way
+of emphasis, "Hofmeyr says" this or that. In the meantime (May 22nd),
+Lord Milner had telegraphed, for "an indication of the line" which Mr.
+Chamberlain wished him to take at the Conference. He himself <span class="pagenum"><a id="page157" name="page157"></a>(p. 157)</span>
+suggested that the franchise question should be put in the foreground;
+since it would be useless to discuss other matters in dispute until a
+satisfactory settlement of this all-important question had been
+achieved. Mr. Chamberlain replied (May 24th), agreeing with the line
+indicated by Lord Milner:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I think personally that you should lay all the stress," he
+     telegraphed, "on the question of the franchise in the first
+     instance. Other reforms are less pressing, and will come in time
+     if this can be arranged satisfactorily, and the form of oath
+     modified."</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Chamberlain at the same time authorised Lord Milner to inform the
+Uitlander petitioners that they might rely upon obtaining the general
+sympathy of the Imperial Government in the prayers which they had
+addressed to the Queen.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Motives of Afrikander leaders.</span>
+
+<p>There was no doubt in Lord Milner's mind as to the real motives which
+had prompted the Afrikander nationalist leaders to make this effort.
+They recognised at length that he was in earnest, and that Mr.
+Chamberlain was in earnest, and they desired, above all things, to
+avoid a crisis which would force a conflict before their ultimate
+plans had fully matured. Lord Milner knew that any delay which
+involved the continuance of the present position&mdash;a position which was
+one of moral superiority for the Dutch&mdash;would unite the whole of the
+Dutch, with a section of the British population, against Great Britain
+within a measurable period. He recognised that the franchise <span class="pagenum"><a id="page158" name="page158"></a>(p. 158)</span>
+question was the one issue which could be raised between the paramount
+Power and the South African Republic in which the whole of the Cape
+Dutch would not throw in their lot bodily with their republican
+kinsmen. This very anxiety on the part of Mr. Hofmeyr to prevent the
+decisive action of the Imperial Government was evidence of the truth
+of his estimate. But as a response to the appeal of the Graaf Reinet
+speech, this Afrikander mediation came too late. "Hands off" the
+Transvaal was the first plank in the platform of the Schreiner
+Ministry; "reform" was a second and subsidiary plank, adopted in place
+of the first only when they had been driven to abandon it by Lord
+Milner's resolution and statesmanship. But the purpose of the Ministry
+now, no less than before, was to hinder, and not to help, the British
+Government in obtaining justice for the Uitlanders. Moreover, the
+Transvaal armaments were well advanced, and the Pretoria Executive was
+too deeply committed to a policy of defiance to allow it to draw back
+without humiliation. Nevertheless, Lord Milner felt bound to avail
+himself of any prospect of peace that the Conference might afford.
+When, however, Mr. Schreiner, in bringing President Steyn's telegram,
+had said that he regarded the proposal as "a great step in advance on
+the part of President Krüger," Lord Milner had replied that he could
+"hardly take that view, as the invitation did not emanate from
+President Krüger <span class="pagenum"><a id="page159" name="page159"></a>(p. 159)</span> himself," and contained no indication of
+"the basis or subject of discussion."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Krüger's obduracy.</span>
+
+<p>The High Commissioner was right. The slight degree in which any appeal
+adequate to the occasion was likely to prove acceptable to President
+Krüger may be gathered from a passage in a letter of Sir Henry de
+Villiers to President Steyn (May 21st), in which the Chief Justice of
+the Cape refers to his recent experience in Pretoria when he was on
+this very errand of "mediation":</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President, as
+     I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on
+     him; but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I thought,
+     would be amenable to argument: but I fear that either my advice
+     had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with
+     the President.</p>
+
+<p>"I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad
+     with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms.</p>
+
+<p>"It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily
+     from the Government, instead of being gradually forced from them.
+     In the former case, they would rally the greater number of the
+     malcontents around them; in the latter case, no gratitude will be
+     felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides,
+     there can be no doubt that, as the alien population increases, as
+     it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their
+     discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be
+     conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal made
+     by the President seems to be simply ridiculous.</p>
+
+<p>"I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page160" name="page160"></a>(p. 160)</span> known
+     to my fellow-Commissioners that the President would adopt his
+     retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever
+     have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would
+     have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the
+     condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other
+     words, to recommence the war....</p>
+
+<p>"I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly,
+     but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object
+     in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are,
+     of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President's
+     position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience
+     will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can
+     reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used
+     your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will
+     also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace
+     successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make
+     his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the
+     arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide
+     over immediate difficulties."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief
+Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in
+allusion to this same visit to Pretoria:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw,
+     three months ago, that if President Krüger did not voluntarily
+     yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the
+     whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Krüger's friends
+     to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is
+     war with England; on the other side there are concessions
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page161" name="page161"></a>(p. 161)</span> which will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now,
+     decide at once how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English
+     five years' franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders,
+     make them your friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will
+     have a majority of the Uitlanders with you when they become
+     burghers. The answer I got was: We have done too much already,
+     and cannot do more. Yet afterwards they did a great deal more.
+     The same policy of doing nothing except under pressure is still
+     being pursued. The longer the delay, the more they will have to
+     yield."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Afrikander advice.</span>
+
+<p>This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr.
+Merriman's appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir
+Henry's letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed
+to Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Free State Executive and a
+convinced nationalist; and it is otherwise remarkable for an estimate
+of the economic conditions of the Boers which subsequent experience
+has completely justified:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I most strongly urge you," he writes, "to use your utmost
+     influence to bear on President Krüger to concede some colourable
+     measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as
+     in those of his own State. Granted that he does nothing. What is
+     the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing
+     off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless
+     hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should
+     recruit his Republic with new blood&mdash;and the sands are running
+     out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The
+     fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page162" name="page162"></a>(p. 162)</span> done.... A moderate franchise reform and municipal
+     privileges would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a
+     maintenance of the oath ought to be sufficient safeguard against
+     the swamping of the old population."<a id="footnotetag66" name="footnotetag66"></a><a href="#footnote66" title="Go to footnote 66"><span class="small">[66]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>But the Schreiner Cabinet contained, as we have seen, a representative
+of Mr. Hofmeyr in the person of Dr. Te Water. Mr. Merriman could see
+that the position in the Transvaal was one that could not go on
+indefinitely&mdash;that "the fabric would go to pieces of its own accord,
+unless something was done." Dr. Te Water was blind even to this aspect
+of the question. The correspondence found after the occupation of
+Bloemfontein (March 13th, 1900), from which these letters are taken,
+contains also certain letters to President Steyn that disclose both
+the nature of the Afrikander mediation, as it was understood by the
+nationalist leaders of the Cape Colony, and the faithfulness with
+which Dr. Te Water served them.</p>
+
+<p>The Te Water correspondence, as we have it,<a id="footnotetag67" name="footnotetag67"></a><a href="#footnote67" title="Go to footnote 67"><span class="small">[67]</span></a> consists of three
+letters written respectively on May 8th, 17th, and 27th, from "the
+Colonial Secretary's Office, Capetown," to President Steyn. The
+replies of the latter have been withheld, not unnaturally, from the
+public eye. In the first of these letters Dr. Te Water "hopes
+heartily" that Schreiner's "proposition" for the Conference <span class="pagenum"><a id="page163" name="page163"></a>(p. 163)</span>
+has been accepted, and then proceeds to impress upon him the
+advisability of President Krüger's yielding on the ground, not of
+justice, but of temporary expediency. In so doing, this Minister of
+the Crown completely identifies himself with the aspirations of the
+Afrikander nationalists, and he concludes by asking for "a private
+telegraphic code. The absence thereof was badly felt on Saturday, when
+Schreiner was obliged to write instead of telegraphing."</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Circumstances appear to me now," he writes, "to be such that our
+     friends in Pretoria must be yielding; with their friends at the
+     head of the Government here, they have a better chance that
+     reasonable propositions made by them will be accepted than they
+     would have had if we had been unsuccessful at the late elections
+     and our enemies were advisers.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">"Play to win time".</span>
+
+<p>"Schreiner, who knows more than any one of us, feels strongly
+     that things are extremely critical.</p>
+
+<p>"Telegrams from people in London, whom he thoroughly trusts, such
+     as J. H.'s<a id="footnotetag68" name="footnotetag68"></a><a href="#footnote68" title="Go to footnote 68"><span class="small">[68]</span></a> best friends, received by him on Saturday and this
+     morning, strengthen him in his opinion. We must now play to win
+     time. Governments are not perpetual, and I pray that the present
+     team, so unjustly disposed towards us, may receive their reward
+     before long. Their successors, I am certain, will follow a less
+     hateful policy towards us. When we hear that you have succeeded
+     in Pretoria, then we must bring influence to bear here."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the second letter Dr. Te Water regrets that he cannot share
+President Steyn's view that "all <span class="pagenum"><a id="page164" name="page164"></a>(p. 164)</span> the noise about war is
+bluff." Then there follows a passage showing that Mr. Steyn had
+entertained expectations of assistance from the Schreiner Cabinet that
+even Dr. Te Water could not reconcile with his ideas of ministerial
+allegiance:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "But now I should like a few words of explanation," he writes,
+     "as to what you mean by saying that 'The Cape Ministry will be
+     able to do much more good.' In what respect do you think that we
+     can be of more use than before?"</p>
+
+<p>Assuming, for the moment, that President Steyn had written, "In the
+event of war becoming inevitable, or having broken out, the Cape
+Ministry will be able to do much more good than it is doing now," or
+words to this effect, it would appear that he shared the erroneous
+views of Mr. Reitz, against which Sir Henry de Villiers had protested
+during his visit to Pretoria. In the letter to Mr. Melius de Villiers,
+from which we have quoted above, Sir Henry writes:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz
+     and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and
+     duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are ministers of
+     the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible
+     assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions, a
+     responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of
+     internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all
+     the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown;
+     at least if they did not do so they would be liable to
+     dismissal."</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page165" name="page165"></a>(p. 165)</span> Dr. Te Water then continues:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I would very much like to know your views, and if we are not
+     already working in that direction I will try, as far as possible,
+     to do what I can to give effect to your wishes, which may be for
+     the welfare of all. Please let me hear immediately and fully
+     about this."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Te Water and Steyn.</span>
+
+<p>The last letter, written on the eve of the Conference, opens with a
+curiously significant passage. There were some things discussed
+between Steyn and Te Water that Mr. Schreiner was not to know.
+President Steyn has been getting nervous. Dr. Te Water, therefore,
+reassures him:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Yours received on my return this morning from Aberdeen. Telegram
+     also reached me. I keep all your communications strictly private:
+     naturally you do not exclude my colleagues and our friend
+     Hofmeyr. I have often read extracts to them, but do not be
+     afraid; I shall not give you away."</p>
+
+<p>It also contains the information that, as President Steyn had no
+private code available, Dr. Te Water has borrowed the private
+telegraphic code of the Cabinet for President Steyn's use.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic
+     code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and
+     I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of
+     weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself <span class="italic">only</span>. It
+     is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and
+     the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am
+     afraid that things leak out there in one way or another."</p>
+
+<p>And he then drives home the advice given before: <span class="pagenum"><a id="page166" name="page166"></a>(p. 166)</span> "It is
+honestly now the time to yield a little, however one may later again
+tighten the rope."</p>
+
+<p>One other letter must be given to complete this view of the
+circumstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th,
+1899&mdash;that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord
+Milner that he should accept President Steyn's good offices to arrange
+the conference with President Krüger. It is addressed to President
+Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+
+<p><span class="add5em smcap">Department of Foreign Affairs</span>,<br>
+<span class="left50 smcap">"Government Offices, Pretoria.</span><br>
+  <span class="ralign italic">"May 9th, 1899.</span></p>
+
+<p>"<span class="smcap">Dear Mr. President</span>,&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the
+     ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the
+     Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could
+     consequently not get the desired information earlier.</p>
+
+<p>"The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser
+     and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will
+     be able to supply you with any of either sort.</p>
+
+<p>"On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest.</p>
+
+<p>"The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet
+     officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come
+     in it through your proposed plan. The copies <span class="italic">re</span> dynamite will
+     be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting,</p>
+
+<p>"Your humble servant and friend,<br>
+  <span class="left50 smcap">"P. Groebler.</span>"<a id="footnotetag69" name="footnotetag69"></a><a href="#footnote69" title="Go to footnote 69"><span class="small">[69]</span></a></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page167" name="page167"></a>(p. 167)</span> The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for
+time," because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal
+party to power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of
+their policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics
+were "playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until
+their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them
+to defy the British Government.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Bloemfontein conference.</span>
+
+<p>It was in these circumstances that the High Commissioner met President
+Krüger in conference at Bloemfontein (May 31st&mdash;June 5th). He was
+accompanied only by his staff: Mr. G. V. Fiddes (Imperial Secretary),
+Mr. M. S. O. Walrond (Private Secretary), Colonel Hanbury Williams
+(Military Secretary) and Lord Belgrave (A.D.C.),<a id="footnotetag70" name="footnotetag70"></a><a href="#footnote70" title="Go to footnote 70"><span class="small">[70]</span></a> with Mr.
+Silberbauer (the interpreter) and a shorthand writer. Mr. Schreiner
+had been very solicitous to attend the Conference; but Lord Milner,
+following his usual practice, had determined to keep the affairs of
+the High Commissionership completely distinct from those in which he
+was concerned as Governor of the Cape Colony. The absence both of the
+Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr was not unnaturally a matter of
+"sincere regret" to Dr. Te Water, as he informed President Steyn on
+the eve of the Conference.<a id="footnotetag71" name="footnotetag71"></a><a href="#footnote71" title="Go to footnote 71"><span class="small">[71]</span></a> Nor did Lord Milner avail <span class="pagenum"><a id="page168" name="page168"></a>(p. 168)</span>
+himself of President Steyn's willingness to take part in the
+proceedings; but, at the High Commissioner's suggestion, Mr. Fischer
+(who was a member of the Free State Executive) was invited to act as
+interpreter&mdash;a duty which he discharged to the satisfaction of both
+parties. With President Krüger there went to Bloemfontein Mr. Schalk
+Burger and Mr. A. D. Wolmarans (members of the Transvaal Executive),
+Mr. J. C. Smuts (the State Attorney), and two other officials. All of
+these, the High Commissioner's Staff, and Mr. Fischer were present at
+the meetings of the Conference; but the actual discussion was confined
+to Lord Milner and President Krüger.<a id="footnotetag72" name="footnotetag72"></a><a href="#footnote72" title="Go to footnote 72"><span class="small">[72]</span></a> As regards the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page169" name="page169"></a>(p. 169)</span>
+business in hand, the failure to publish the despatch of May 4th had
+deprived Lord Milner of what would have proved a helpful influence.
+Mr. Hofmeyr's action had procured an opportunity for "friendly
+discussion." But the friendliness was to be all on the side of the
+Imperial Government. For the purpose of the Afrikander leaders was, as
+we have seen, to secure a fictitious concession on the part of
+President Krüger. Lord Milner's aim was to obtain by friendly
+discussion a genuine and substantial measure of reform; and the
+prospect of his success would have been greatly increased if this
+despatch and Mr. Chamberlain's reply to it had been before the public
+when the Conference took place. It was written with the object of
+making the British people and President Krüger alike aware how grave
+was the judgment which he had formed of the existing situation. With
+England alive to the near danger which threatened her supremacy in
+South Africa, and President Krüger brought to understand that the man
+with whom he had to deal was one who held these opinions, Lord Milner
+could have been "friendly" without the risk of having his friendliness
+mistaken for a readiness to accept the illusory concession which was
+all that the Afrikander mediation was intended to secure.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's attitude.</span>
+
+<p>As it was, Lord Milner was placed in a position of great
+embarrassment. If he "used plain language" he exposed himself to the
+charge of entering upon the discussion in an <span class="pagenum"><a id="page170" name="page170"></a>(p. 170)</span> aggressive
+spirit, calculated to make agreement difficult. If he adopted a
+conciliatory tone, his arguments seemed to be nothing more than the
+abortive protests with which the grim old President had cheerfully
+filled the republican waste-paper basket for the last ten years. It
+has been suggested that Lord Milner might have obtained a better
+result if he had shown himself less "inflexible"; if, in short, he had
+been willing to accept a "compromise." But any such criticism is based
+upon an entire misunderstanding of the method which the High
+Commissioner did, in fact, adopt. The five years' franchise&mdash;the
+Bloemfontein minimum&mdash;was in itself a compromise. What Lord Milner
+said, in effect, to President Krüger was this: "I have a whole sheaf
+of grievances against you: the dynamite monopoly, excessive railway
+rates, interference with the independence of the judiciary, a vicious
+police system, administrative corruption, municipal abuses, and the
+rest. I will let all these go in exchange for one thing&mdash;a franchise
+reform which will give at once to a fair proportion of the Uitlander
+population some appreciable representation in the government of the
+Republic." Lord Milner not only offered a compromise, but a compromise
+that enormously reduced the area of dispute. His "inflexibility" arose
+from the simple fact that, having readily and frankly yielded all that
+could be yielded without sacrificing the paramount object of securing
+a permanent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page171" name="page171"></a>(p. 171)</span> settlement of the Uitlander question, he had
+nothing further to concede, and said so.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">President Krüger.</span>
+
+<p>No two men more characteristic of the two utterly unlike and
+antagonistic political systems, which they respectively represented,
+could have been found. At the evening reception given by President
+Steyn on the opening day of the Conference, a big man, in a tightly
+buttoned frock-coat, stood just inside the door for ten minutes, and
+then moved awkwardly away. Above the frock-coat was a peasant's face,
+half-shrewd, half-furtive, with narrow eyes and a large, crooked mouth
+which somehow gave the man a look of power. This was President Krüger,
+<span class="italic">ætat.</span> 74. Once, doubtless, Paul Krüger's large and powerful frame
+had made him an impressive figure among a race of men as stalwart as
+the Boers. But he was now an old man: the powerful body had become
+shapeless and unwieldy; he had given up walking, and only left his
+stoep to drag himself clumsily into his carriage, and although he
+retained all his old tenacity of purpose, his mind had lost much of
+its former alertness. It needed all Mr. Smuts' mental resources&mdash;all
+that the young Afrikander had so recently learnt at Cambridge and the
+Temple&mdash;to enable the old President to maintain, even by the aid of
+his State-Attorney's ingenious paper pleadings, a decent show of
+defence against the perfect moderation and relentless logic with which
+the High Commissioner presented the British case. Lord Milner went to
+the Conference <span class="pagenum"><a id="page172" name="page172"></a>(p. 172)</span> to make "one big straightforward effort to
+avert a great disaster"; Krüger to drive a "Kafir bargain." The end
+was as Lord Milner had foreseen. To yield the necessary instalment of
+reform seemed to President Krüger, in this mind, "worse than
+annexation"; and on June 5th Lord Milner declared, "The Conference is
+absolutely at an end, and there is no obligation on either side
+arising out of it."</p>
+
+<p>The Bloemfontein Conference made retreat for ever impossible. Lord
+Milner himself was perfectly conscious that in holding President
+Krüger to the franchise question he had made the conference the
+pivotal occasion upon which turned the issue of peace or war. He knew,
+when he closed the proceedings with a declaration that his meeting
+with President Krüger had utterly failed to provide a solution of the
+franchise question, that from this day forward there could be no
+turning back for him or for the Imperial Government. But he knew, too,
+that poor as was the prospect of obtaining the minimum reforms by any
+subsequent negotiation, nothing could contribute more to the
+attainment of this object than the blunt rejection of the makeshift
+proposals put forward by President Krüger at Bloemfontein.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">After the conference.</span>
+
+<p>The result of the Conference, from this point of view, and its effect
+upon the British population in South Africa, may be gathered from the
+address presented to Lord Milner on his return to Capetown, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page173" name="page173"></a>(p. 173)</span>
+and from his reply to it. By the mouth of Mr. Alfred Ebden, a veteran
+colonist, the British population of the Colony then (June 12th)
+expressed their "admiration" of Lord Milner's "firm stand" on behalf
+of the Uitlanders, offered him their "earnest support," and declared
+their "entire confidence in his fairness and ability to bring these
+unhappy differences to a satisfactory settlement." The essence of Lord
+Milner's reply lies in the words, "some remedy has still to be found."
+The nationality problem would be solved if the principle of equality
+could be established all round. The Transvaal is "the one State where
+inequality is the rule, which keeps the rest of South Africa in a
+fever." It is inconsistent, he says, with the position of Great
+Britain as paramount Power, and with the dignity of the white race,
+that a great community of white men "should continue in that state of
+subjection which is the lot of the immigrant white population of the
+Transvaal." And he concludes:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I see it is suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her
+     Majesty's Government is one of aggression. I know better than any
+     man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has
+     been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will
+     continue. But it cannot relapse into indifference. Can any one
+     desire that it should? It would be disastrous that the present
+     period of stress and strain should not result in some settlement
+     to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in the future. Of
+     that I am still hopeful. It may be that the Government of the
+     South African Republic <span class="pagenum"><a id="page174" name="page174"></a>(p. 174)</span> will yet see its way to adopt a
+     measure of reform more liberal than that proposed at
+     Bloemfontein. If not, there may be other means of achieving the
+     desired result. In any case, it is a source of strength to those
+     who are fighting the battle of reform, and will, I believe,
+     contribute more than anything else to a peaceful victory, to feel
+     that they have behind them, as they perhaps never had before, the
+     unanimous sympathy of the British people throughout the
+     world."<a id="footnotetag73" name="footnotetag73"></a><a href="#footnote73" title="Go to footnote 73"><span class="small">[73]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>In the four months that followed the Bloemfontein Conference a burden
+of toil and responsibility was laid upon Lord Milner which would have
+crushed any lesser man into utter passivity or resignation. An
+Afrikander Cabinet, with a nationalist element reporting its
+confidential councils with the Governor to Mr. Hofmeyr, the Bond
+Master, and President Steyn, the secret ally of President Krüger,
+would have been sufficient in itself to paralyse the faculties of any
+ordinary administrator at such a crisis. But this was not the only
+adverse influence with which circumstances brought Lord Milner into
+collision. Incredible as it may seem, it is none the less the fact
+that Sir William Butler, the General-in-Command of the British forces
+in South Africa, and the military adviser of the High Commissioner,
+was in close political sympathy with Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, and
+in complete agreement with their views. For General Butler held that a
+war to compel the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page175" name="page175"></a>(p. 175)</span> Boer oligarchy to grant the elementary
+political rights to the British in the Transvaal, which even Mr.
+Gladstone's Cabinet intended to secure for them, would be the
+"greatest calamity that ever occurred in South Africa." And more than
+this, that if the Home Government did make war, it would be merely
+playing the game of "the party of the Raid, the South African
+League."<a id="footnotetag74" name="footnotetag74"></a><a href="#footnote74" title="Go to footnote 74"><span class="small">[74]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner and Butler.</span>
+
+<p>It is generally supposed that Lord Milner's disagreement with General
+Butler had its origin in the conduct of the latter, when Acting High
+Commissioner, in refusing the first Uitlander petition. This is quite
+untrue. Lord Milner's view of the Uitlander grievances was, of course,
+different from that of General Butler, who treated the appeal to the
+Queen as an unnecessary and artificial agitation against the Transvaal
+Government, and thereby placed the Acting British Agent, Mr. Edmund
+Fraser, in a position of extreme difficulty; since Mr. Fraser was, of
+course, desirous of carrying out his duties upon the general lines
+followed by Sir William Greene in accordance with the instructions of
+the Home Government. But the Transvaal question had never been
+discussed between Lord Milner and General Butler; and at the time of
+the Edgar incident Lord Milner was in England, and he had no means,
+therefore, of forming an opinion as to the significance which attached
+to this event, or the agitation to which it gave rise. On this
+particular point <span class="pagenum"><a id="page176" name="page176"></a>(p. 176)</span> there was no opportunity for a conflict of
+opinion. Had Lord Milner been in South Africa he would, no doubt, have
+accepted the first petition to the Queen; but he made no complaint of
+General Butler's refusal to receive it. For the moment it was General
+Butler's business, as Acting High Commissioner, and not Lord Milner's.
+From a wider point of view, General Butler's action was injurious. It
+was one of the many instances in which their English sympathisers have
+led the Boers to destruction. But there was no friction, or argument,
+or unfriendliness between him and the High Commissioner on this
+account. This arose at a much later period; and arose, not on the
+general question of policy, but on the question of the necessity of
+military precautions in view of the imminence of war.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Reinforcements requested.</span>
+
+<p>The friction between the High Commissioner and the General-in-Command
+in South Africa was the most disastrous manifestation of a disregard
+of the necessity for timely military preparations on the part of the
+Imperial Government, which, when war broke out, jeopardised the
+success of the British arms. For quite distinct reasons both General
+Butler and the Imperial Government were opposed to any preparations
+for war. The Salisbury Cabinet were reluctant to take any step that
+might seem to indicate that they considered that the door to a
+peaceful solution of the dispute was closed. In thus subordinating the
+needs of the military situation to those of the political, they
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page177" name="page177"></a>(p. 177)</span> acted in direct opposition to the maxim <span class="italic">si pacem vis,
+bellum para</span>. They carried this policy to such a point that they
+disregarded the advice of Lord Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, and
+that of the Intelligence Department,<a id="footnotetag75" name="footnotetag75"></a><a href="#footnote75" title="Go to footnote 75"><span class="small">[75]</span></a> with the result that when the
+war did break out the available British forces in South Africa were
+found to be in a position of grave disadvantage. The motive of General
+Butler's opposition was entirely different.
+His view was that what
+made the situation dangerous was not President Krüger's obduracy, but
+what he called the "persistent effort" to "produce war" made by the
+British inhabitants who desired Imperial intervention in the
+Transvaal. And he, therefore, held that any reinforcements sent by the
+Home Government would "add largely to the ferment which he (General
+Butler) was endeavouring to reduce by every means."<a id="footnotetag76" name="footnotetag76"></a><a href="#footnote76" title="Go to footnote 76"><span class="small">[76]</span></a> The position
+in June and July, from a military point of view, was as extraordinary
+as it was harassing to Lord Milner. In England the civil authority,
+the Cabinet, was refusing to make the preparations which its military
+adviser declared to be necessary. In South Africa the civil authority,
+the High Commissioner, was provided with a military adviser who cabled
+to the Home Government political reasons for not sending the
+reinforcements which the High Commissioner then urgently required. In
+these circumstances it is obvious that nothing but the supreme efforts
+of Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page178" name="page178"></a>(p. 178)</span> Milner could have saved England from an overwhelming
+military defeat, or from a moral catastrophe even more injurious to
+the interests of the empire.</p>
+
+<p>When Lord Milner saw, before the Bloemfontein Conference, that the
+situation was becoming dangerous&mdash;and still more after the
+Conference&mdash;he desired that preparations for war should be made by the
+Imperial Government as a precautionary measure. Between December 1st,
+1896, and December, 1898, the South African garrison had been raised
+from 5,409 to 9,593 men.<a id="footnotetag77" name="footnotetag77"></a><a href="#footnote77" title="Go to footnote 77"><span class="small">[77]</span></a> It remained at a little under 10,000 up
+to the end of August, 1899. Lord Milner had repeatedly impressed upon
+the Home Government, from the middle of 1897 onwards, that 10,000 men
+was the minimum force consistent with safety. In view of the increased
+tension after Bloemfontein and of the enormous armament of the South
+African Republic, he felt that this minimum had become inadequate, and
+that it was desirable, and would strengthen the chance of a peaceful
+submission of the Boers, to steadily but unostentatiously increase the
+garrison. And what he desired especially was that the general on the
+spot should do, locally and quietly, all that could be done to advance
+these preparations. The measures which he urged were that plans should
+be prepared for the defence of Kimberley and other towns on the
+colonial borders, and that all supplies and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page179" name="page179"></a>(p. 179)</span> material of war
+necessary to put these plans into effect should be accumulated, and,
+as far as possible, distributed.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">General Butler's objections.</span>
+
+<p>General Butler, as we have seen, was opposed to all preparations for
+war; and it is not surprising, therefore, that everybody who offered
+assistance, or advice on the military situation, was coldly received
+by him. Mr. (now Sir) Aubrey Wools-Sampson, who, after the failure of
+the Bloemfontein Conference, threw up lucrative civil employment in
+Rhodesia in order to come to the Cape and place himself, as a
+volunteer, at the service of the military authorities in the event of
+war, was so completely discouraged that he went to Natal to form the
+nucleus of the splendid fighting force afterwards known as the
+Imperial Light Horse. When Colonel Nicholson, then head of the British
+South Africa Police in Rhodesia, suggested that, in the same event, an
+attack on the Transvaal, launched from the north, might prove valuable
+as a means of diverting a portion of the Burgher forces from
+employment against the Cape Colony and Natal, General Butler is said
+to have looked upon his proposal as another Jameson Raid.<a id="footnotetag78" name="footnotetag78"></a><a href="#footnote78" title="Go to footnote 78"><span class="small">[78]</span></a> And
+when, after the Bloemfontein Conference had been held, the Home
+Government, in response to Lord Milner's repeated appeals, proposed to
+send out the very inadequate reinforcements which formed its first
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page180" name="page180"></a>(p. 180)</span> effort to strengthen the British military position in South
+Africa, General Butler immediately represented to the War Office that
+these additional troops were unnecessary, and protested against their
+being despatched.</p>
+
+<p>General Butler's action at this crisis is so remarkable, and so
+unprecedented, that the circumstances must be related with some
+precision. In 1896, and again in 1897, General Goodenough had
+submitted to the War Office schemes for the defence of the British
+colonies, in which both the enormous extent of the frontiers to be
+protected and the great numerical superiority of the burgher forces to
+the then existing British garrison were fully exhibited. A memorandum
+of the Department of Military Intelligence, dated September 21st,
+1898, urged "that defence schemes should be drawn up locally for the
+Cape and Natal"; that "the arrangements which would be made for the
+despatch of reinforcements from England, and for the provision of
+supplies and transport, be worked out fully in the War Office; and
+that the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what
+action under these arrangements would be required of him on the
+outbreak of war."<a id="footnotetag79" name="footnotetag79"></a><a href="#footnote79" title="Go to footnote 79"><span class="small">[79]</span></a> On December 21st, 1898, General Butler, upon
+succeeding to the South African command, was requested to furnish, at
+an early date, a fresh scheme of defence embodying his own proposals
+for the distribution of the 9,500 British troops then in South Africa
+in the event <span class="pagenum"><a id="page181" name="page181"></a>(p. 181)</span> of war. At the same time the latest information
+as to the military strength of the two Republics&mdash;showing, among other
+things, a total of 40,000 burghers<a id="footnotetag80" name="footnotetag80"></a><a href="#footnote80" title="Go to footnote 80"><span class="small">[80]</span></a>&mdash;was forwarded to him, and his
+attention was directed to the fact that the troops under his command
+must be considered as a purely defensive force, whose <span class="italic">rôle</span> would be
+to repel invasion pending the arrival of reinforcements from England.
+In the absence of any reply to this communication General Butler was
+again requested, on June 6th, 1899 (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> after the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference), to report on the defence of the British
+colonies. He then sent his scheme of defence, cabling the substance in
+cipher, on June 9th, and sending the text by despatch on June 14th. On
+June 21st he received a War Office telegram informing him that it had
+been decided to "increase the efficiency of the existing force" in
+South Africa. And to this communication was added the question: "Do
+you desire to make any observations?"</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">"Ringing the War Office bell".</span>
+
+<p>The sequel can be given in General Butler's words: "I looked on the
+one side," he said, in giving evidence before the War Commission, "and
+I saw what seemed to me a very serious political agitation going on
+with a Party that I had not alluded to yet, whom I had always looked
+upon as a Third Party; they were pressing on all they knew. The
+Government did not seem to be aware of that, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page182" name="page182"></a>(p. 182)</span> this
+telegram brought matters to such a point that I thought it gave me the
+opportunity to speak. So I took these words 'any observations,' and
+answered in a way which I thought would at least ring the War Office
+bell."</p>
+
+<p>The telegram with which General Butler "rang the War Office bell" was
+this:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "You ask for my observations: present condition of opinion here
+     is highly excited, and doubtless the news <span class="italic">quoting</span> preparations
+     referred to in your telegram, if it transpires, will add largely
+     to the ferment which I am endeavouring to reduce by every means.
+     Persistent effort of a party to produce war forms, in my
+     estimation, gravest elements in situation here. Believe war
+     between white races, coming as sequel to Jameson Raid, and
+     subsequent events of last three years, would be greatest calamity
+     that ever occurred in South Africa."</p>
+
+<p>This telegram elicited the following reply from the Home Government:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "You cannot understand too clearly that, whatever your private
+     opinions, it is your duty to be guided in all questions of policy
+     by the High Commissioner, who is fully aware of our views, and
+     whom you will, of course, loyally support."</p>
+
+<p>In the course of his evidence before the War Commission General Butler
+gave some further explanation of the motives which had prompted his
+reply to the telegram of June 21st. In response to the question, "It
+was never in your contemplation <span class="pagenum"><a id="page183" name="page183"></a>(p. 183)</span> that Mr. Krüger would
+declare war?" he replied:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">General Butler's view.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "My view was this, that as long as I held the neck of the bottle,
+     so to speak, there would be no war ... but to my mind the minute
+     there was the least indication of the Imperial Government coming
+     in, in front of, or behind, that party [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> "the party of the
+     Raid, the South African League"], there would be a serious state
+     of things. Until then there was, to my mind, no probability&mdash;no
+     possibility&mdash;of an invasion. That was the state of my mind at the
+     time ... [and] I wished to point it out before final decisions
+     were arrived at."</p>
+
+<p>And in a note which he desired to be appended to his evidence before
+the War Commission, General Butler wrote with reference to his failure
+to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements, that in
+his opinion "such a demand at such a time would be to force the hands
+of the Government, play into the hands of the 'Third Party,' and
+render [himself] liable to the accusation in the future that [he] had
+by this premature action produced or hastened hostilities."<a id="footnotetag81" name="footnotetag81"></a><a href="#footnote81" title="Go to footnote 81"><span class="small">[81]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Here was an impasse from which obviously there was but one method of
+extrication. Either the High Commissioner or his military adviser must
+be recalled. That the Imperial Government did not recall General
+Butler then and there cannot be attributed to any ignorance on their
+part of Lord Milner's extreme anxiety for adequate <span class="pagenum"><a id="page184" name="page184"></a>(p. 184)</span> military
+preparations. It arose, no doubt, from the circumstance that General
+Butler was known to be favourably inclined to the Boer cause, and
+that, therefore, his removal at this juncture would have been
+represented by the friends of the Boers in England, and by the
+official leader of the Opposition, as evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's
+alleged determination to force a war upon the Transvaal. General
+Butler was allowed, in these circumstances, to remain at the Cape
+until the latter part of August, when fresh employment was found for
+him, and Lieutenant-General Forestier-Walker was appointed to the Cape
+command. How General Butler was able to reconcile the opinions which
+he had expressed to the War Office with the discharge of his duties as
+military adviser to Lord Milner during these two critical months is a
+matter which need not be discussed. The decision to retain him in the
+South African command would seem, on the face of it, to have been a
+grave administrative error. It is enough for us to record the
+undoubted facts that Lord Milner was supremely dissatisfied with the
+action of General Butler as his military adviser, and that whereas the
+High Commissioner had requested the Home Government to provide him
+with a new military adviser in June, General Butler did in fact remain
+at the Cape until the latter part of August.</p>
+
+<p>General Butler is reputed to be both an able man and a good soldier.
+It is interesting, therefore, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page185" name="page185"></a>(p. 185)</span> to know what was his view, and
+to compare it with that of Lord Milner. In these opinions, which
+dominated General Butler during the period in question (May to August,
+1899), there was only one point in which he and Lord Milner found
+themselves at one. This was the danger of the war; that is to say, the
+seriousness of the military task which would await Great Britain in
+the event of war with the Dutch in South Africa.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">What Lord Milner thought.</span>
+
+<p>As a great deal has been written on the subject of the military
+unpreparedness of England, and it has, moreover, been frequently
+stated in this connection that Sir William Butler was the only man to
+form a just estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces,
+it is very desirable to place on record what was really in Lord
+Milner's mind at this time. He agreed with General Butler in his
+estimate of the formidable character of the Boers; but he differed
+from him in everything else. To Lord Milner's mind the situation
+presented itself primarily from a political, and not from a military
+point of view. He believed that England was bound to struggle at least
+for political equality between the British and Dutch throughout South
+Africa. He felt that, after our bad record in the past, it would be
+absolutely fatal to begin to struggle for this equality unless we were
+prepared to carry our efforts to a successful issue. He thought that
+such a claim as this for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders was one
+that admitted of only two alternatives&mdash;it must never <span class="pagenum"><a id="page186" name="page186"></a>(p. 186)</span> be
+made, or, being made, it must never be abandoned. The whole weakness
+of our position in South Africa was a moral weakness. The contempt
+which the Dutch had learnt for England was writ large over the whole
+social and political fabric of South Africa. Englishmen could not look
+the Dutch in the face as equals. If, after all our previous
+humiliations and failures; after Majuba, and after the Raid, we were
+going to commence a struggle for equality&mdash;nothing more, and then not
+to get it, the shame would be too grave for any great Power to
+support, or for those who sympathised with us in South Africa to
+endure. We had raised the British party in South Africa from the dust
+by the stand which we had made against Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal.
+If we were going to retreat from that position, the discredit of our
+action would compel England to resign her claim to be paramount Power,
+and with the resignation of that claim England's rights in South
+Africa would inevitably shrink to the narrow limits of a naval base at
+Simon's Town, and a sub-tropical plantation in Natal. What was
+fundamental was not the possibility of war, but the impossibility of
+retreat.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Retreat impossible.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner still thought it possible, though not probable, that, if
+the British Government took a perfectly strong and unwavering line,
+the Dutch would yield, not indeed everything, but something
+substantial. He also foresaw that it was possible, perhaps probable,
+that they would not yield, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page187" name="page187"></a>(p. 187)</span> that in this case a state of
+tension would be created which must end in war. His position was,
+therefore, definite and consistent from the first. As we are pursuing
+a policy from which we cannot retreat&mdash;a policy that may lead to
+war&mdash;it is wholly unjustifiable, he said, to remain unprepared,
+unarmed, without a plan, as if war were quite out of the question. And
+so far from thinking that the preparations which he urged upon the
+Imperial Government, and more especially upon General Butler, would
+make war more likely, he believed that they would make it less likely.
+But even if they did lead the Dutch to fight, it was not war but
+"retreat" that must be avoided at all costs.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page188" name="page188"></a>(p. 188)</span> CHAPTER V</h3>
+
+<p class="title">PLAYING FOR TIME</p>
+
+
+<p>On June 8th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons,
+that with the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, a "new
+situation" had arisen. If the Imperial Government had translated this
+remark into action, the South African War would have been less
+disastrous, less protracted, and less costly. But the same order of
+considerations which prevented the Salisbury Cabinet from recalling
+General Butler in June, caused it to withhold its sanction from the
+preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. From
+the political point of view it was held to be desirable that the
+British Government should have an absolutely good case as before the
+world&mdash;a case which would not only ensure the whole-hearted support of
+the great bulk of the nation, and the active sympathy of the over-sea
+British communities; but one that would be so strong in justice as to
+overcome, or at least mitigate, the natural repugnance with which
+international opinion regards a great and powerful state that imposes
+its will upon a small and weak people by force of arms. Above all,
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page189" name="page189"></a>(p. 189)</span> it had become a cardinal principle in Mr. Chamberlain's
+South African policy to refrain to the last moment from any step which
+would necessarily close the door to a peaceful solution of the
+differences which had arisen between the South African Republic and
+the Imperial Government.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Policy of Home Government.</span>
+
+<p>Influenced by these considerations, the Government refused to give
+effect to the measures demanded by the military situation, as it
+existed after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, except in so
+far as these demands could be satisfied without prejudice to the
+dominating political objects which it had in view. As to the nature of
+these measures there could be no reasonable doubt. It was necessary to
+raise the British forces in the Cape Colony and Natal to a point
+sufficient for defensive purposes, and to prepare an additional
+force&mdash;an army corps&mdash;for any offensive movement against one or both
+of the Republics. And as 6,000 miles of sea separated the seat of war
+from the chief base of the army, the United Kingdom, it was obvious
+that the defensive force should be despatched at once, and the
+offensive force prepared no less speedily, in order that it might be
+held in readiness to embark at the earliest moment that its services
+were required.</p>
+
+<p>To Lord Milner's reiterated warnings of the last two years, there was
+now added the definite advice of Lord Wolseley and the Department
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page190" name="page190"></a>(p. 190)</span> of Military Intelligence. In a memorandum dated June 8th,
+1899,<a id="footnotetag82" name="footnotetag82"></a><a href="#footnote82" title="Go to footnote 82"><span class="small">[82]</span></a> and addressed to the Secretary of State for War, the
+Commander-in-Chief advised the mobilisation in England of a force
+consisting of one complete army corps, one cavalry division, one
+battalion mounted infantry, and four infantry battalions for lines of
+communication; the collection of transport in South Africa; and the
+immediate initiation of all subsidiary arrangements necessary for
+conveying these additional troops and their equipment to the seat of
+war. This advice was disregarded; but in place of the immediate
+mobilisation of the Army Corps the Cabinet decided to increase the
+efficiency of the existing force in South Africa, and General Butler
+was informed of this decision, as we have seen, on June 21st. On July
+7th,<a id="footnotetag83" name="footnotetag83"></a><a href="#footnote83" title="Go to footnote 83"><span class="small">[83]</span></a> Lord Wolseley recommended, in addition to the mobilisation of
+the offensive force&mdash;which he still deemed necessary&mdash;that "the South
+African garrisons should be strengthened by the despatch of 10,000 men
+at a very early date." Instead of adopting these measures, the
+Government confined itself to doing just the few necessary things,
+both for defence and offence, that could be done without creating any
+belief in its warlike intentions, and without involving any
+appreciable expenditure of the public funds. Undoubtedly this latter
+consideration&mdash;the desire to avoid any expenditure that might
+afterwards prove to have been unnecessary&mdash;added <span class="pagenum"><a id="page191" name="page191"></a>(p. 191)</span> weight to
+the purely political argument against immediate military preparation.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Preparations delayed.</span>
+
+<p>The course actually taken by the Salisbury Cabinet was this. Instead
+of the immediate mobilisation of the offensive force, Lord Wolseley
+was instructed to prepare a scheme for the "constitution,
+organisation, and mobilisation" of such a force; and to do this in
+consultation with Sir Redvers Buller, the General Officer commanding
+at Aldershot, who had been selected to lead the British forces in
+South Africa in the event of war. Instead of the immediate despatch of
+additional troops sufficient to render the South African garrisons
+capable of repelling invasion&mdash;which was what Lord Milner had
+especially desired&mdash;the actual deficiencies of the existing Cape
+garrison<a id="footnotetag84" name="footnotetag84"></a><a href="#footnote84" title="Go to footnote 84"><span class="small">[84]</span></a> were made good by the despatch in July of small additions
+of artillery and engineers, and by directing General Butler to provide
+the fresh transport without which even this diminutive force was
+unable to mobilise. At the same time certain special service
+officers,<a id="footnotetag85" name="footnotetag85"></a><a href="#footnote85" title="Go to footnote 85"><span class="small">[85]</span></a> including engineers and officers of the Army Service
+Corps, were sent out to organise the materials, locally existing, for
+the defence of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page192" name="page192"></a>(p. 192)</span> eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and
+the southern districts of Rhodesia; and generally to make preliminary
+preparations for the provisioning, transport, and distribution of any
+British forces that might be despatched subsequently to the Cape
+Colony.</p>
+
+<p>These were the utterly inadequate reinforcements sent in response to
+Lord Milner's urgent appeal, and in disregard of General Butler's
+protest that they were wholly undesirable&mdash;an opinion which was
+endorsed in England by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, when, on June 17th,
+1899, he declared that there was nothing in the South African
+situation to justify even preparations for war.</p>
+
+<p>During the interval between the Bloemfontein Conference and General
+Butler's recall in the latter part of August Lord Milner's position
+was one of unparalleled difficulty. The Cape and Natal garrisons were
+maintained in a state of perilous weakness by the policy of the Home
+Government. The measures to be undertaken locally for the defence of
+the colonies, which the Cabinet had sanctioned, were wholly
+insufficient in Lord Milner's opinion. And the general execution of
+these wholly insufficient local measures was left in the hands of a
+General Officer who had told the Secretary of State that he absolutely
+disapproved of them on political grounds, since the mere announcement
+of their being made would "add largely to the ferment," which he "was
+[then] endeavouring to reduce by every <span class="pagenum"><a id="page193" name="page193"></a>(p. 193)</span> means." The Cape
+Ministry, with whom rested the disposal of the colonial forces, was a
+ministry placed in office by the Bond for the especial purpose of
+opposing British intervention in the Transvaal. In these circumstances
+it needed all Lord Milner's mastery of South African conditions, and
+all his tact and address, to make the relations between himself and
+his Afrikander Cabinet tolerable; and, above all, in view of the
+refusal of the Imperial Government to sanction the military
+preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, it required ceaseless
+vigilance on his part to prevent the acceptance of an illusory
+settlement which would have sounded the death-knell of British
+supremacy in South Africa.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">President Krüger's proposals.</span>
+
+<p>On the last day of the Conference President Krüger had put in a
+memorandum in which he expressed his intention of introducing his
+franchise scheme to the Volksraad, and his hope that the High
+Commissioner would be able to recommend this, and a further proposal
+for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, to the favourable
+consideration of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had replied that
+any such proposals would be considered on their merits; but that the
+President must not expect them to be connected in any way with the
+proceedings of the Conference, out of which, as he then declared, no
+obligation had arisen on either side.</p>
+
+<p>The Raad met on Friday, June 9th; and on Monday, the 12th&mdash;the day on
+which Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page194" name="page194"></a>(p. 194)</span> Milner received the Ebden address<a id="footnotetag86" name="footnotetag86"></a><a href="#footnote86" title="Go to footnote 86"><span class="small">[86]</span></a>&mdash;President
+Krüger laid the draft Franchise law, containing his revised
+Bloemfontein scheme, before it. On Tuesday, 13th, Mr. Chamberlain's
+despatch of May 10th, on the position of the Uitlanders and the
+petition to the Queen, was delivered to the Transvaal Government by
+the British Agent; and on Wednesday, June 14th, as we have already
+noticed, the Blue-book containing this despatch, Lord Milner's
+despatch of May 4th, and the whole story of the franchise controversy
+up to the Bloemfontein Conference, was published in England. As the
+conditions under which Lord Milner's despatch had been telegraphed to
+England were now changed, it would have been better if it had remained
+unpublished, and the stage of fighting diplomacy, reached through the
+failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, had been at once opened&mdash;and
+opened in another way. What Lord Milner had learnt at Bloemfontein was
+not merely that President Krüger was unwilling to yield, but that he
+was psychologically incapable of yielding. He had learnt, that is to
+say, not that Krüger was determined to refuse the particular reform
+which the Imperial Government demanded, but that his whole system of
+thought was irreconcilably opposed to that of any English statesman.
+It is the knowledge which can be obtained only by personal dealings
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page195" name="page195"></a>(p. 195)</span> with the Boers, and no one who has had such personal
+dealings can fail to remember the sense of hopelessness that such an
+experience brings with it. The Boer may be faithful to his own canons
+of morality; but his whole manner of life and thought is one that
+makes his notion of the obligations of truth and justice very
+different from that of the ordinary educated European. He is not
+devoid of the conception of duty, but he applies this conception in
+methods adapted to the narrow and illiberal conditions of his isolated
+and self-centred life.</p>
+
+<p>As for the mediation of the Cape Afrikanders, Lord Milner estimated it
+at its real value. The Cape nationalists believed that war would
+result in disaster to their cause; the Republican nationalists did
+not. They both hated the British in an equal degree. But the
+Afrikander leaders at the Cape knew that they had the game in their
+own hands. "For goodness' sake," they said, "keep quiet until we have
+got rid of this creature, Milner; and the Salisbury Cabinet&mdash;the
+'present team so unjustly disposed to us'&mdash;is replaced by a Liberal
+Government."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's task.</span>
+
+<p>That was the meaning of their mediation&mdash;nothing more. Lord Milner
+acquiesced in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, but what he wanted
+was a polite but absolutely inflexible insistence upon the
+Bloemfontein minimum, and at the same time such military preparations
+as, in view of the clear possibility of a failure of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page196" name="page196"></a>(p. 196)</span>
+negotiations, seemed to him absolutely vital. This, however, was not
+the course which the Salisbury Cabinet thought right to adopt; and the
+problem that now lay before him was to convert the illusory
+concessions, which were all that Afrikander mediation was able or even
+desirous to wring from President Krüger, into the genuine reform that
+the British Government had twice pledged itself to secure.</p>
+
+<p>But Lord Milner had also grasped the fact that the one issue which
+could drive a wedge into Dutch solidarity was the franchise question.
+He had determined, therefore, that nothing that transpired at the
+Bloemfontein Conference should permit President Krüger to change the
+ground of dispute from this central issue. During the negotiations
+between the Home Government and the Pretoria Executive that followed
+the Conference, and especially during the period of Mr. Hofmeyr's
+active intervention, his most necessary and pressing task was to
+prevent the Salisbury Cabinet from being "jockeyed" by Boer diplomacy
+out of the advantageous position which he had then taken up on its
+behalf. The pressure of the Hofmeyr mediation increased the difficulty
+of this task by driving President Krüger into a series of franchise
+proposals of the utmost complexity. The danger was that Mr.
+Chamberlain and his colleagues in the Cabinet, in their earnest desire
+to avoid war, might recognise some illusory measures of reform as
+satisfactory, and then, after further consideration, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page197" name="page197"></a>(p. 197)</span> finding
+them to be worthless, be driven by their previous admission to make
+war, after all, not on the single issue of "equality all round," but
+on an issue that might be plausibly represented to South Africa and
+the world as the independence of the Boers.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Draft Franchise Law.</span>
+
+<p>The period is crowded with demonstrations, despatches, mediations,
+petitions, and incidents of all kinds. A tithe of these&mdash;disentangled
+from the Blue-books, but vitalised by a knowledge of the master facts
+that lie behind the official pen&mdash;will serve, however, to present the
+play of the mingling, conflicting, and then frankly opposing forces.
+The "formidable personalities" are all in motion. At first it seemed
+as though the whole weight of the Schreiner Cabinet, acting in
+conjunction with General Butler's political objection to military
+preparation on the part of the Imperial Government, was to be thrown
+into the scale against Lord Milner's efforts. On June 12th President
+Krüger laid the draft of his new Franchise Law before the Raad, which
+then (the 15th) adjourned, in order that the feeling of the burghers
+might be ascertained. On the 17th a great assemblage of Boers met at
+Paardekraal, and, among the warlike speeches then delivered was that
+of Judge Kock,<a id="footnotetag87" name="footnotetag87"></a><a href="#footnote87" title="Go to footnote 87"><span class="small">[87]</span></a> a member of the Transvaal Executive, who "dwelt
+upon the doctrine of 'what he called Afrikanderdom,' and said that he
+'regarded the Afrikanders, from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page198" name="page198"></a>(p. 198)</span> Cape to the Zambesi as
+one great family. If the Republics are lost,' he continued, 'the
+Afrikanders would lose. The independence of the country was to them a
+question of life and death. The Free State would stand by the
+Transvaal, even to the death. Not only the Free State, but also the
+Cape Colony.'" Nor was this boast without some foundation. A week
+before (June 10th), Mr. Schreiner had requested Lord Milner to inform
+Mr. Chamberlain that, in ministers' opinion, President Krüger's
+franchise proposal was "practical, reasonable, and a considerable step
+in the right direction."<a id="footnotetag88" name="footnotetag88"></a><a href="#footnote88" title="Go to footnote 88"><span class="small">[88]</span></a> Four days later (June 14th) he further
+informed the Governor that, in ministers' opinion, there was nothing
+in the existing situation to justify "the active interference of the
+Imperial Government in what were the internal affairs of the
+Transvaal."<a id="footnotetag89" name="footnotetag89"></a><a href="#footnote89" title="Go to footnote 89"><span class="small">[89]</span></a> And this expression of opinion the Prime Minister also
+desired Lord Milner, as the only constitutional medium of
+communication between the Cape Ministry and the Secretary of State, to
+convey to Mr. Chamberlain. On the day (June 10th) on which the first
+of these interviews between Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner took place,
+a meeting of five thousand persons&mdash;in Sir William Greene's words,
+"the largest and most enthusiastic ever held at Johannesburg"&mdash;passed
+three resolutions which sufficiently exhibit the extent to which the
+views of the Cape <span class="pagenum"><a id="page199" name="page199"></a>(p. 199)</span> Ministry differed from those of the
+Transvaal British. After affirming the principle of equal political
+rights for all white inhabitants of South Africa, and declaring that
+President Krüger's Bloemfontein proposals were "wholly inadequate,"
+this great meeting proceeded to place on record its "deep sense of
+obligation" to Lord Milner for his endeavour to secure the redress of
+the Uitlander grievances, and its willingness, in order to "support
+his Excellency in his efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement," to
+endorse "his very moderate proposals on the franchise question as the
+irreducible minimum that could be accepted."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Action of Schreiner ministry.</span>
+
+<p>In other words, the Schreiner Cabinet, immediately after the failure
+of the Conference, used its influence unreservedly to assist the
+Pretoria Executive in refusing the franchise reform put forward by the
+High Commissioner&mdash;a reform which, in the opinion of the community
+most concerned and most capable of judging of its effect, constituted
+an "irreducible minimum" only to be accepted in deference to Lord
+Milner's judgment, and in the hope of avoiding war. Mr. Schreiner's
+action on this occasion was characteristic of the blind partizanship
+of the Cape Ministry. On June 10th, when the Prime Minister pressed
+his and his colleagues' favourable view of President Krüger's
+proposals upon Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, the draft Franchise
+Law, with its intricate provisions, had not been laid before the
+Volksraad. Mr. Schreiner, therefore, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page200" name="page200"></a>(p. 200)</span> had made haste to bless
+before he knew what he was blessing. And a few weeks later, as we
+shall notice, he let his zeal for the Boer oligarchy outrun his
+discretion in an even more amazing manner.</p>
+
+<p>In these difficult circumstances Lord Milner displayed the highest
+address in his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet. Thanks to his
+mingled tact and firmness, aided by the outspoken support which he
+received from Mr. Chamberlain, his intercourse with his ministers
+remained outwardly friendly, while at the same time he had the
+satisfaction of seeing that during the next few weeks the
+considerations of policy, which he laid before them with absolute
+frankness, appreciably modified their original attitude. He had at
+once availed himself of the one point on which he and they were in
+agreement. With reference to the first interview with Mr. Schreiner
+(June 10th), he telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"In reply I told him [Mr. Schreiner] I was prepared to
+     communicate this expression of his opinion, although I strongly
+     held an opposite view, as he was aware.</p>
+
+<p>"He admitted, in subsequent conversation, that the President of
+     the South African Republic's scheme could, in his opinion, be
+     improved in detail; for instance, by immediately admitting men
+     who had entered the country previous to 1890, and by making
+     optional the period of naturalisation....</p>
+
+<p>"In reply, I told him that these were points of first-rate
+     importance and not of detail, especially the latter; and that,
+     since after all he seemed to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page201" name="page201"></a>(p. 201)</span> agree with me more than
+     with the President of the South African Republic, he had better
+     address his advice to the latter, and not to Her Majesty's
+     Government."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>And at the long and rather unpleasant interview of June 14th,
+although, as we have seen, Mr. Schreiner desired Lord Milner to inform
+Mr. Chamberlain that the Cape Ministry considered the "active
+interference" of the British Government unjustified, yet he also said
+"that he and his colleagues were agreed that there were two respects
+in which the Government of the South African Republic might better
+their franchise scheme: (1) By admitting to the full franchise at once
+persons who had entered the country before 1890; and (2) By making it
+optional to obtain the full franchise without previous naturalisation
+after seven years' residence."<a id="footnotetag90" name="footnotetag90"></a><a href="#footnote90" title="Go to footnote 90"><span class="small">[90]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Mr. Chamberlain's reply (June 16th), contained a more direct
+admonition. Lord Milner was instructed to inform the Cape Ministers
+that the Government trusted that they would "use all the influence
+they could to induce the Transvaal Government to take such action as
+would relieve Her Majesty's Government from the necessity of
+considering the question of being obliged to have recourse to
+interference of such a nature."<a id="footnotetag91" name="footnotetag91"></a><a href="#footnote91" title="Go to footnote 91"><span class="small">[91]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's speech.</span>
+
+<p>This was admirable backing, and precisely what Lord Milner required to
+aid him in his two-fold task of bringing both the Cape Ministry and
+the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page202" name="page202"></a>(p. 202)</span> Pretoria Executive to a more reasonable frame of mind.
+But Mr. Chamberlain's next step was one of questionable utility.</p>
+
+<p>In his speech at Birmingham (June 26th), after reviewing the relations
+of Great Britain with the Transvaal Boers during the last twenty
+years, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the Imperial Government, although
+deeply anxious not to use force, must somehow see that things were put
+right in South Africa.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "We have tried waiting, patience, and trusting to promises which
+     are never kept," he said; "we can wait no more. It is our duty,
+     not only to the Uitlanders, but to the English throughout South
+     Africa, to the native races, and to our own prestige in that part
+     of the world, and in the world at large, to insist that the
+     Transvaal falls into line with the other states in South Africa,
+     and no longer menaces the peace and prosperity of the whole."</p>
+
+<p>This was the kind of speech which would have been suitable and
+effective, if the South African garrison had been 20,000 instead of
+10,000 strong, and the expeditionary force had been mobilised on
+Salisbury Plain. It was unsuitable and ineffective under the existing
+circumstances; when, that is to say, the British Government, by
+refusing to sanction the measures advised by the Commander-in-Chief,
+had elected to put themselves at a military disadvantage for the sake
+of prolonging the stage of friendly discussion and in the hope of
+gaining their point by diplomatic means. In these circumstances such
+speeches were merely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page203" name="page203"></a>(p. 203)</span> food for President Krüger to use in
+feeding the enthusiasm of his burghers. What Lord Milner desired of
+the Home Government was, as we have seen, a polite but inflexible
+demand for the Bloemfontein minimum, coupled with unostentatious, but
+effective, military preparations. The Home Government, as the sequel
+will show, were driven by the unpatriotic attitude of the Liberal
+Opposition into a precisely opposite course in both these respects.
+Their demand was vague in substance, and irritating in manner; while
+their inadequate defensive preparations were more than neutralised by
+the loudness with which, in deference to the views of the Liberal
+Opposition, they proclaimed their reluctance to undertake military
+measures on a scale that would really have made an impression on the
+Boers.<a id="footnotetag92" name="footnotetag92"></a><a href="#footnote92" title="Go to footnote 92"><span class="small">[92]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Fischer-Hofmeyr mission.</span>
+
+<p>One result which Mr. Chamberlain's speech produced was to bring Mr.
+Hofmeyr once more upon the scene. Before this date (June 26th) Mr.
+Fischer, apparently considering that the failure of the Bloemfontein
+Conference cast a reflection upon the statesmanship and influence of
+the Free State Government, had commenced a second essay in mediation.
+Early in June he had paid a visit to Capetown, where he was in close
+communication with Mr. Hofmeyr and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page204" name="page204"></a>(p. 204)</span> Cape Ministers, and
+had twice called upon the High Commissioner. He had left Capetown on
+the 19th for Bloemfontein; and then proceeded to Pretoria, which he
+reached on the 25th. At the Transvaal capital he entered into
+negotiations with the Executive, calling upon the British Agent on the
+26th, and again on the 28th, and maintaining communication, through
+him, with Lord Milner. From Pretoria Mr. Fischer returned to
+Bloemfontein in company with Mr. Smuts and Mr. Groebler,<a id="footnotetag93" name="footnotetag93"></a><a href="#footnote93" title="Go to footnote 93"><span class="small">[93]</span></a> on July
+1st. Here he met Mr. Hofmeyr, who, leaving Capetown with Mr. Herholdt,
+on the same day (July 1st), reached Bloemfontein early on the
+following morning.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Hofmeyr was in Bloemfontein, because the events of the last few
+days had convinced him that the only hope of saving the
+situation&mdash;saving it, that is, from the Afrikander nationalist point
+of view&mdash;lay in prompt and energetic action on his part. On June 23rd
+Mr. Schreiner had been informed by the High Commissioner of the
+intention of the Home Government to "complete" the Cape garrison; and
+shortly afterwards the despatch of the special service officers was
+publicly announced in England. Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham
+on the 26th, cabled almost <span class="italic">in extenso</span> to the High Commissioner, was
+communicated to the local press on the 28th. On the same evening a
+mass meeting, held in the Good Hope Hall at Capetown, declared its
+strong approval of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page205" name="page205"></a>(p. 205)</span> action of the Imperial Government on
+behalf of the British population in the Transvaal. With these signs of
+an approaching Armageddon before his eyes, Mr. Hofmeyr had overcome
+his objection to personal dealings with President Krüger, and had
+resolved to go to Pretoria to confer with the leaders of the Boer
+oligarchy. But, in order to protect himself from the risk of a useless
+rebuff, he had first arranged to meet Mr. Fischer at Bloemfontein, and
+obtain through him and President Steyn some definite assurance that
+his counsels would be treated with respect, before finally proceeding
+to the Transvaal.</p>
+
+<p>On Sunday, July 2nd, and in these circumstances, a conference was held
+between the Master of the Bond and Mr. Fischer and Mr. Smuts&mdash;two men
+not unworthy to represent the cause of Afrikander nationalism in their
+respective republics. As the result of their discussions, carried on
+almost uninterruptedly from the early morning until nearly midnight,
+Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr. Groebler, in the words of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>,
+"knew precisely what had to be done, in the opinion of the Colonial
+representatives, to gain the moral support of Colonial Afrikanders and
+to lead in the direction of peace."<a id="footnotetag94" name="footnotetag94"></a><a href="#footnote94" title="Go to footnote 94"><span class="small">[94]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr at Bloemfontein.</span>
+
+<p>On the following day (Monday, the 3rd) Mr. Fischer and his companions
+arrived again in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page206" name="page206"></a>(p. 206)</span> Pretoria; but Mr. Hofmeyr remained at
+Bloemfontein, since he had decided not to go to the Transvaal capital,
+unless "he was assured of achieving something of importance there." Up
+to the afternoon of Tuesday (the 4th) no such assurance had been
+received; and, says <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, "as it seemed the assurance was almost
+in a contrary direction, preparations were already made for the
+homeward journey." But a little later on in the day Mr. Hofmeyr and
+his companion "received a hint that, although their chances of success
+at Pretoria were but slight, they were not altogether hopeless." The
+facts thus far provided by <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> must now be supplemented by a
+reference to the telegrams which fell into the hands of the British
+authorities a year later upon the occupation of Bloemfontein. From
+these documents we know that President Krüger at first telegraphed to
+President Steyn a polite refusal of Mr. Hofmeyr's mediation. This was
+followed, on Tuesday morning, by a telegram from Mr. Fischer himself,
+informing President Steyn that the Transvaal Government "would be glad
+to meet Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt, but that he could not say what
+chance there was of their mission succeeding until the Volksraad had
+been consulted." This, as we have seen, was by no means sufficient for
+Mr. Hofmeyr. But later on there came a second telegram&mdash;the telegram
+which <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> delicately calls a "hint"&mdash;in which Mr. Fischer said
+that President Krüger "was willing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page207" name="page207"></a>(p. 207)</span> to see Mr. Hofmeyr before
+he brought the matter before the Raad," and that he himself "hoped to
+obtain certain concessions from the Executive Council, with the
+members of which he was in consultation."</p>
+
+<p>Thus encouraged, Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt at once left
+Bloemfontein by special train, and, travelling all night, reached
+Pretoria on Wednesday, the 5th, at seven o'clock.</p>
+
+<p>"From the station," says <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, "they were escorted by various
+officials and friends to the Transvaal Hotel, where rooms had been
+engaged for them as guests of the State. Even before they had taken
+breakfast they had an audience with President Krüger. On the
+invitation of His Honour they accompanied Mr. Fischer to three
+meetings of the Executive Council&mdash;two on Wednesday and one on
+Thursday. They had the opportunity, too, of meeting the greater part
+of the Volksraad members, and of conversing with them. What occurred
+on this occasion is, of course, private, and not for publication."</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt left Pretoria on Friday, the 7th, and
+reached Capetown on Monday, the 10th.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner and the mission.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner did everything possible to secure the success of the
+Fischer-Hofmeyr mission. Provided President Krüger was induced to give
+the Uitlanders an appreciable share in the government of the
+Transvaal, it made no difference to the Imperial Government whether he
+did so from a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page208" name="page208"></a>(p. 208)</span>
+desire to secure the "moral support" of the
+<span class="sidenote">Bid for "moral support".</span>
+Cape Afrikander party, or from any other motive of political
+expediency. What was essential was that the existing franchise scheme
+should be so far improved as to become a genuine, and no longer a
+fictitious, measure of reform. On the understanding that the "mission"
+had no less an object in view&mdash;an understanding which he gained from
+conversation with Mr. Fischer himself as well as from Mr. Schreiner
+and Mr. Hofmeyr&mdash;Lord Milner placed the British Government code at the
+disposal of Mr. Fischer and the Prime Minister, and further arranged
+with the former to communicate with him (Lord Milner) through the
+British Agent at Pretoria. But Lord Milner especially impressed, alike
+upon Mr. Fischer, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. Schreiner, the necessity of
+urging President Krüger to discuss any proposed modifications in the
+Draft Law with the Imperial Government or its representatives, before
+they were submitted to the Raad. The objection to the adoption of this
+course, which, according to Mr. Fischer's statement,<a id="footnotetag95" name="footnotetag95"></a><a href="#footnote95" title="Go to footnote 95"><span class="small">[95]</span></a> the Pretoria
+Executive did in fact make, was their inability to "recognise the
+right of the British Government to be consulted on the franchise,
+which was an internal matter." This objection, however, as Lord Milner
+pointed out to the members of the Pretoria Executive, both directly
+through Sir William Greene,<a id="footnotetag96" name="footnotetag96"></a><a href="#footnote96" title="Go to footnote 96"><span class="small">[96]</span></a> and indirectly through Mr. Hofmeyr and
+Mr. Fischer, was a mere pretext. "The whole world," he said <span class="pagenum"><a id="page209" name="page209"></a>(p. 209)</span>
+in effect, "knows that whatever alterations you make in the Draft
+Law&mdash;and indeed the Law itself&mdash;will be the result of the pressure
+brought to bear upon you by the British Government. That being so, to
+refuse to discuss these alterations with us privately, and in a
+friendly manner, because the franchise is an 'internal matter,' is to
+strain at a gnat while you are all the while swallowing a camel." But
+neither at this time, nor at any other period in the three months'
+negotiations, did President Krüger desire to come to an agreement with
+the British Government at the price of granting a genuine measure of
+reform. As a bid for the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, but
+without the slightest attempt to consult with the British Government
+or its representatives, he recommended to the Volksraad, on July 7th,
+certain amendments, the effect of which was to confer the franchise
+upon a very small body of Uitlanders, and that only if they succeeded
+in complying with certain cumbersome and protracted formalities.<a id="footnotetag97" name="footnotetag97"></a><a href="#footnote97" title="Go to footnote 97"><span class="small">[97]</span></a>
+On the following morning the Bond Press announced, with a great
+flourish of trumpets, that Mr. Hofmeyr's mission had been remarkably
+successful, and set out the amendments of "The Great Reform Act" as
+representing the fruit of his and Mr. Fischer's efforts. This was for
+the public. To Mr. Fischer, Hofmeyr himself telegraphed on his return
+journey to Capetown, that he "deplored the failure" of his mission,
+when he "thought <span class="pagenum"><a id="page210" name="page210"></a>(p. 210)</span> he had reason to expect success." Mr.
+Schreiner, on the other hand, was no less ready to bless the "Hofmeyr
+compromise" than Krüger's original scheme. Upon receiving by telegram
+the bare heads of the proposed amendments, and without waiting to
+learn what practical effect they would have upon the position of the
+Uitlanders, he hastily authorised <span class="italic">The South African News</span> to announce
+(July 8th) that the Cape Government considered the proposals of the
+amended law "adequate, satisfactory, and such as should secure a
+peaceful settlement."<a id="footnotetag98" name="footnotetag98"></a><a href="#footnote98" title="Go to footnote 98"><span class="small">[98]</span></a> This opinion he subsequently modified; and,
+at Lord Milner's request, he advised Mr. Fischer (July 11th) to urge
+his friends at Pretoria to delay the passage of the bill through the
+Volksraad. And Lord Milner was authorised by Mr. Chamberlain to
+instruct Sir William Greene to offer the same advice to the Transvaal
+Government, with the more precise intimation that "full particulars of
+the new scheme" ought to be furnished officially to the Imperial
+Government, if the proposals which it embodied were to form "any
+element in the settlement of the differences between the two
+Governments."<a id="footnotetag99" name="footnotetag99"></a><a href="#footnote99" title="Go to footnote 99"><span class="small">[99]</span></a> The High Commissioner's object was, of course, to
+reduce the area of formal negotiations, and therefore the risk of
+official friction, to its narrowest limits. But this was not President
+Krüger's object. His principle was the very opposite of that of the
+Imperial Government. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page211" name="page211"></a>(p. 211)</span> They abstained from preparations for
+war in order to improve the prospect of a peaceable settlement. The
+force upon which he relied was the warlike temper of his burghers, and
+the answering enthusiasm which the spectacle of the Republic, prepared
+to defy the British Empire, would arouse among the whole Dutch
+population of South Africa. Mr. Reitz was, therefore, instructed to
+decline Mr. Chamberlain's request on the ground that "the whole matter
+was out of the hands of the Government";<a id="footnotetag100" name="footnotetag100"></a><a href="#footnote100" title="Go to footnote 100"><span class="small">[100]</span></a> meaning, thereby, that
+it had already been submitted to the Volksraad. This, again, was the
+thinnest of excuses, since President Krüger had never yet shown any
+scruple in modifying or withdrawing proposals already laid before the
+Volksraad, when it suited him to do so.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Bogus Conspiracy.</span>
+
+<p>It may be questioned, however, whether, even at this time, the "whole
+matter" had not passed, in another and more serious sense, "out of the
+hands" both of the Pretoria Executive and the British Government. The
+political atmosphere of South Africa had become electric. The
+Uitlanders themselves cherished no illusion on the subject of
+President Krüger's proposals. Amended and re-amended, the Franchise
+Law, as the Uitlander Council then and there declared, left the
+granting of the franchise at the discretion of the Boer officials or
+the Pretoria Executive, and as such it was "a most dangerous measure,
+and apparently framed with the object of defeating the end it
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page212" name="page212"></a>(p. 212)</span> was presumed to have in view."<a id="footnotetag101" name="footnotetag101"></a><a href="#footnote101" title="Go to footnote 101"><span class="small">[101]</span></a> Further and convincing
+evidence of the utterly vicious and depraved character of the
+<span class="italic">personnel</span> of the Boer administration was afforded by the proceedings
+arising out of the alleged "conspiracy" against the Republic, of which
+the unfortunate Englishman Nicholls was the innocent victim (May 18th
+to July 25th).<a id="footnotetag102" name="footnotetag102"></a><a href="#footnote102" title="Go to footnote 102"><span class="small">[102]</span></a> In this disgraceful affair the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page213" name="page213"></a>(p. 213)</span> gravest
+offences against international comity were committed; high officials,
+including Mr. Tjaart Krüger, the President's youngest son, were
+implicated in a gross and scandalous prostitution of the machinery of
+justice; and yet no apology was offered to the Imperial Government,
+nor any compensation awarded to Nicholls for the two months'
+imprisonment and continuous persecution by the agents-provocateurs, to
+which he had been subjected. The impassioned speeches delivered at the
+Paardekraal meeting was only one among many signs of the dangerous
+hostility to England and everything English that had taken possession
+of the Republic. <span class="sidenote">War fever in the Transvaal.</span>
+The British residents who had petitioned the Queen
+were denounced as "revolutionaries," and threatened with the vengeance
+of the burghers. "If war breaks out," wrote <span class="italic">De Rand Post</span>,"<a id="footnotetag103" name="footnotetag103"></a><a href="#footnote103" title="Go to footnote 103"><span class="small">[103]</span></a> the
+Johannesburg agitators are the real instigators, and to these
+ringleaders capital punishment should be meted out." In the Volksraad
+discussion of the Franchise Law the same passionate hatred of the
+Uitlanders was manifested. "Is it the English only who have the right
+to make conditions?" asked Mr. Lombard on July 15th. "If it comes to
+be a question of war, there will be a great destruction. And who will
+be destroyed if it comes to a collision? Why, the subjects of Her
+Majesty in Johannesburg."<a id="footnotetag104" name="footnotetag104"></a><a href="#footnote104" title="Go to footnote 104"><span class="small">[104]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page214" name="page214"></a>(p. 214)</span> These expressions scarcely do justice to the spirit of
+vindictiveness with which certain of the republican leaders regarded
+the British population of the Rand. On May 22nd, 1900, less than a
+year after the date of the Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Bill,
+and when Lord Roberts was advancing rapidly upon Johannesburg, a
+conversation took place with Mr. Smuts in Pretoria, which was reported
+in <span class="italic">The Times</span>. In the course of this conversation the State Attorney
+said, with reference to the proposed destruction of the mines, that
+"he greatly regretted that Johannesburg should suffer, but that the
+Government had no choice in the matter, as the popular pressure upon
+them was too great to be resisted." This determination is rightly
+characterised by Mr. Farrelly, the late legal adviser to the
+Government of the South African Republic, as the "fiendish project of
+wrecking the mines and plunging into hopeless misery for years tens of
+thousands of innocent men, women, and children." But that is not all.
+He has put upon record<a id="footnotetag105" name="footnotetag105"></a><a href="#footnote105" title="Go to footnote 105"><span class="small">[105]</span></a> the sinister fact that the man entrusted
+with the execution of this infamous design was Mr. Smuts himself. The
+mines were saved, therefore, not by the Boer Government, but in spite
+of it, and solely through the independent action of Dr. Krause, the
+Acting-Commandant of Johannesburg, who "arrested the leader of the
+wreckers, sent by Mr. Smuts, the day before the surrender to Lord
+Roberts."<a id="footnotetag106" name="footnotetag106"></a><a href="#footnote106" title="Go to footnote 106"><span class="small">[106]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page215" name="page215"></a>(p. 215)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Action of the British.</span>
+
+<p>The British population, although it provided no such displays of
+racial passion, was in an equally determined mood. Undismayed by the
+threats of the Boers, the Uitlander Council continued calmly to
+analyse the Franchise Bill in each successive phase&mdash;an unostentatious
+but very useful service, which materially assisted Lord Milner in
+following the windings and doublings of Boer diplomacy. After the
+great meeting at Johannesburg (June 10th), the British centres in the
+Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia gave similar demonstrations of their
+confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, and their conviction of the
+justice and necessity of the five years' franchise demanded by the
+Imperial Government. On the other hand, the irritation against British
+intervention was growing daily in the Free State; and the Dutch
+Reformed Church and the Bond had organised a counter-demonstration in
+the Cape Colony. The Synod of the former, meeting on June 30th, drew
+up an address protesting that the differences between Lord Milner's
+franchise proposals and those of President Krüger were not sufficient
+to justify the "horrors of war," and requested the Governor to forward
+it to the Queen. At Capetown (July 12th) and in the Dutch districts
+throughout the Colony, Bond meetings were held at which resolutions
+were passed in favour of a "compromise" as between Lord Milner's five
+years' franchise and the scheme embodied in President Krüger's law.
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page216" name="page216"></a>(p. 216)</span> More sinister was the circumstance that the information,
+that a consignment of 500 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges, landed at
+Port Elizabeth on July 8th, had been permitted by the Cape Government
+to be forwarded through the Colony to the Free State, only came to the
+ears of the High Commissioner by an accident. In the meantime, more
+definite evidence of the almost unanimous approval of Lord Milner's
+policy by the British population in South Africa was forthcoming. In
+all three British colonies petitions to the Queen praying for justice
+to the Uitlanders, and affirming absolute confidence in Lord Milner,
+were signed. The Natal petition contained the names of three-fourths
+of the adult male population of the Colony, while the signatures to
+the joint petition of the Cape and Rhodesia had already reached a
+total of 40,500 before the end of July. In other respects the
+testimony of Natal was clear and unmistakable. In this predominantly
+English Colony identical resolutions supporting the action and policy
+of the Imperial Government, were carried unanimously in both Chambers
+of the Legislature.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's warning.</span>
+
+<p>In the middle of July the situation improved in a slight degree
+through the influence which Lord Milner had exercised upon the
+Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony. On the 14th the Cape Parliament
+met, and on this day Mr. Hofmeyr, chagrined at a suggestion for
+further support which he had received from the republican <span class="pagenum"><a id="page217" name="page217"></a>(p. 217)</span>
+nationalists at Pretoria, despatched a telegram to Mr. Smuts, in which
+he, as the recognised head of the Afrikander Bond, reminded the
+members of President Krüger's Executive that the promised co-operation
+of the Cape Government with them had been definitely limited to "moral
+support." And he plainly hinted that, unless greater deference was
+shown to his advice, even this "moral support" might be withdrawn.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The most important suggestions sent from here will apparently
+     not be adopted. The independence of the Republics is in danger.
+     As to the Colony, the utmost prospect held out was moral support.
+     The Ministry and the Bond have acted up to that. If Parliament
+     [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> the Cape Parliament] goes too strongly in the same
+     direction, there may be a change of Ministry, with Sprigg or
+     Rhodes backed by Milner. Would your interests be benefited
+     thereby? <span class="italic">Verb. sat. sap.</span>"<a id="footnotetag107" name="footnotetag107"></a><a href="#footnote107" title="Go to footnote 107"><span class="small">[107]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>As President Krüger wanted to retain the "moral support" of the Cape
+Government for a few weeks longer, he listened to Mr. Fischer's
+advice<a id="footnotetag108" name="footnotetag108"></a><a href="#footnote108" title="Go to footnote 108"><span class="small">[108]</span></a> to humour their prejudices, and forthwith recommended a
+further modification of the Franchise Bill to the Volksraad. This
+final amendment, under which a uniform seven years' retrospective
+franchise was substituted for a nine years' retrospective <span class="pagenum"><a id="page218" name="page218"></a>(p. 218)</span>
+franchise, alternate with a seven years' retrospective franchise
+taking effect five years after the passing of the law (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> in
+1904), was accepted on July 18th, and the new Franchise Law was passed
+on the 19th and promulgated on the 26th. Its provisions were so
+obscure that it was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum furnished
+by the State Attorney, Mr. Smuts. But even assuming that the legal
+pitfalls could be removed, and the law, thus simplified, would be
+worked in the most liberal spirit by the officials of the Republic,
+President Krüger's proposals failed to provide the essential reform
+which Lord Milner had pledged himself and the Imperial Government to
+obtain. That reform was the immediate endowment of a substantial
+proportion of the British residents in the Transvaal with the rights
+of citizenship. To use his own words,<a id="footnotetag109" name="footnotetag109"></a><a href="#footnote109" title="Go to footnote 109"><span class="small">[109]</span></a> "the whole point" of his
+Bloemfontein proposal was "to put the Uitlanders in a position to
+fight their own battles, and so to avoid the necessity of pressing for
+the redress of specific grievances."</p>
+
+<p>No one in South Africa had any doubt as to the entire inadequacy of
+the Franchise Bill to fulfil this essential object. In the opinion of
+the Uitlander Council it was<a id="footnotetag110" name="footnotetag110"></a><a href="#footnote110" title="Go to footnote 110"><span class="small">[110]</span></a> "expressly designed to exclude
+rather than admit the newcomer." Sir Henry de Villiers complained<a id="footnotetag111" name="footnotetag111"></a><a href="#footnote111" title="Go to footnote 111"><span class="small">[111]</span></a>
+to Mr. Fischer:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Then there is the Franchise Bill, which is so <span class="pagenum"><a id="page219" name="page219"></a>(p. 219)</span> obscure
+     that the State Attorney had to issue an explanatory memorandum to
+     remove the obscurities. But surely a law should be clear enough
+     to speak for itself, and no Government or court of law will be
+     bound by the State Attorney's explanations. I do not know what
+     those explanations are, but the very fact that they are required
+     condemns the Bill. That Bill certainly does not seem quite to
+     carry out the promises made to you, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr.
+     Herholdt."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">An illusory measure.</span>
+
+<p>And Lord Milner, in his final analysis of the law on July 26th,
+concludes<a id="footnotetag112" name="footnotetag112"></a><a href="#footnote112" title="Go to footnote 112"><span class="small">[112]</span></a> that "the Bill as it stands leaves it practically in
+the hands of the Government to enfranchise, or not to enfranchise, the
+Uitlanders as it chooses." And he then draws attention to the very
+grave consideration that if the paramount Power once accepts this
+illusory measure, it will deprive itself of any future right of
+intervention on the franchise question.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "And the worst of it," he wrote, "is that should the Bill,
+     through a literal interpretation of its complicated provisions,
+     fail to secure the object at which it avowedly aims, no one will
+     be able to protest against the result."</p>
+
+<p>For one moment it seemed to the anxious warden of British interests in
+South Africa as though the Home Government might be caught in
+President Krüger's legislative net. The incident is one that well
+exhibits the tireless effort and unflinching resolution with which
+Lord Milner discharged the duties of his office.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page220" name="page220"></a>(p. 220)</span> President Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme was a maze of legal
+pitfalls. What these pitfalls were the reader may learn from the
+analysis of the scheme which was published in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span> of June
+10th, 1899. When the Franchise Bill was before the Volksraad this
+complicated scheme, as we have seen, was amended and re-amended; and
+each new provision was as intricate in its working as the parent
+scheme. It is obvious that nothing short of a commission of inquiry
+could have determined with certainty the manner in which the
+representation of the Uitlanders was affected by each successive
+amendment. While these changes were in progress in the Raadzaal at
+Pretoria&mdash;changes so "numerous and so rapid," as Lord Milner
+said,<a id="footnotetag113" name="footnotetag113"></a><a href="#footnote113" title="Go to footnote 113"><span class="small">[113]</span></a> that it was "absolutely impossible at any given moment to
+know what the effect of the scheme, as existing at that moment, was
+likely to be"&mdash;Lord Milner himself at Capetown was at one and the same
+time overwhelmed with detailed criticisms from Uitlanders, anxious
+that no legal pitfall or administrative obstacle should remain
+undetected, and besieged with cables from the Colonial Office
+requesting precise information upon any point upon which an energetic
+member of the House of Commons might have chosen to interrogate the
+Secretary of State. And, in addition to this rain of telegrams, people
+on the spot were constantly calling at Government House to ask if the
+High Commissioner <span class="pagenum"><a id="page221" name="page221"></a>(p. 221)</span> had observed this or that defect or trap
+in clauses, the text of which he had not yet had time to receive,
+still less to read or comprehend. All this, too, was over and above
+the heavy administrative and official duties of the Governor and High
+Commissioner&mdash;duties which Lord Milner was called upon to perform with
+more than usual care, in view of the political ascendancy of the Dutch
+party in the Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's assumption.</span>
+
+<p>On July 13th, Lord Milner sent warning telegrams to Mr.
+Chamberlain,<a id="footnotetag114" name="footnotetag114"></a><a href="#footnote114" title="Go to footnote 114"><span class="small">[114]</span></a> pointing out specific defects in the Franchise Bill,
+and showing how seriously President Krüger's proposals fell short of
+the Bloemfontein minimum. Five days later the Volksraad accepted the
+final amendments. The face value of the Bill, as it now stood to be
+converted into law, was a seven years' franchise, prospective and
+retrospective. When, therefore, Mr. Chamberlain heard this same day
+(July 18th) that the Volksraad had accepted the bill in this form with
+only five dissentients, he seems to have assumed that a really
+considerable concession had been made by President Krüger at the last
+moment, and that, with the President and the Volksraad in this mood,
+still further concessions would be forthcoming. Under this impression
+he informed the House of Commons lobby correspondent of <span class="italic">The Times</span>
+that "the crisis might be regarded as at an end." His words were
+reproduced in <span class="italic">The Times</span> on the day <span class="pagenum"><a id="page222" name="page222"></a>(p. 222)</span> following (July 19th),
+and at once cabled to South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>It is impossible for any one who has not lived in South Africa to
+realise the sickening distrust and dread produced in the minds of the
+loyal subjects of the Crown by this statement. War they were ready to
+face. But to go back to every-day life once again bowed down with the
+shame of a moral Majuba, to meet the eyes of the Dutch once more
+aflame with the light of victory, to hear their words of insolent
+contempt&mdash;was ignominy unspeakable and unendurable. The Uitlander
+Council at once cabled an emphatic message of protest<a id="footnotetag115" name="footnotetag115"></a><a href="#footnote115" title="Go to footnote 115"><span class="small">[115]</span></a> to Mr.
+Chamberlain, and every loyalist that had a friend in England
+telegraphed to beg him to use all his influence to prevent the
+surrender of the Government. How near the British population in South
+Africa were to this ignominy may be gathered from the fact that on
+this day Lord Milner received a telegram in which Mr. Chamberlain
+congratulated him upon the successful issue of his efforts. Lord
+Milner's reply <span class="pagenum"><a id="page223" name="page223"></a>(p. 223)</span> was one that could have left no doubt in Mr.
+Chamberlain's mind as to the gravity of the misconception under which
+he laboured. It was, of course, beyond the High Commissioner's power
+to prevent the Home Government from accepting the Franchise Bill; but
+he could at least remove the impression that he was anxious to
+participate in an act, which would have made the breach between the
+loyalists of South Africa and the mother country final and
+irrevocable.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The relapse in England.</span>
+
+<p>It is scarcely possible to believe that Mr. Chamberlain, with Lord
+Milner's telegrams before him, was himself prepared to accept
+President Krüger's illusory franchise scheme. The source of the
+weakness of the Government in the conduct of the negotiations, no less
+than in its refusal to make adequate preparations for war, is to be
+found in the inability of the mass of the people of England to
+understand how completely British power in South Africa had been
+undermined by the Afrikander nationalists during the last twenty
+years. How could the average elector know that the refusal or
+acceptance of the Volksraad Bill, differing only from the Bloemfontein
+minimum in an insignificant&mdash;as it seemed&mdash;particular of two years,
+would, in fact, make known to all European South Africa whether
+President Krüger or the British Government was master of the
+sub-continent? In view of this profound ignorance of South African
+conditions, and the consequent uncertainty of any assured support,
+even from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page224" name="page224"></a>(p. 224)</span> members of their own party, the Salisbury
+Cabinet may well have argued: "Here is something at last that we can
+represent as a genuine concession. Let us take it, and have done with
+this troublesome South African question; or leave it to the next
+Liberal Government to settle."</p>
+
+<p>If the Cabinet did so reason to themselves, what English statesman
+could have "cast the first stone" at them? But how profound is the
+interval between the spirit of the policy of "the man on the spot,"
+with his eyes upon the object, and the spirit of the policy of the
+island statesman with one eye upon the hustings and the other strained
+to catch an intermittent glimpse of an unfamiliar and distant Africa!</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's anxiety.</span>
+
+<p>This 19th of July was a dark day for the High Commissioner. In the
+morning came Mr. Chamberlain's telegram with its ominous suggestion of
+a change for the worse in the attitude of the Home Government. And
+this change in the Cabinet was, as Lord Milner knew, only the natural
+reflection of a wider change, which had manifested itself among the
+supporters of the Government and in the country at large since the
+publication, on June 14th, of his despatch of May 4th. Private letters
+had made him aware that to men to whom Dutch ascendancy at the Cape
+and Boer tyranny in the Transvaal, Afrikander nationalism and Boer
+armaments, were meaningless expressions, his resolute advocacy of the
+Uitlanders' cause and his frank presentation of the weakness of Great
+Britain had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page225" name="page225"></a>(p. 225)</span> seemed the work of a disordered imagination or a
+violent partisanship. Nor was his knowledge of the relapse in England
+limited to the warnings or protests of his private friends. <span class="italic">The South
+African News</span>, the ministerial organ, which of late had filled its
+columns with adverse criticisms taken from the London Press, this
+morning contained a bitter article on him reprinted from <span class="italic">Punch</span>,
+which had arrived by the yesterday's mail. After all, it seemed, the
+long struggle against mis-government in the Transvaal was going to end
+in failure; and the British people would once more be befooled. With
+such thoughts in his mind, Lord Milner must have found the work of
+making up the weekly despatches for the Colonial Office&mdash;for it was a
+Wednesday<a id="footnotetag116" name="footnotetag116"></a><a href="#footnote116" title="Go to footnote 116"><span class="small">[116]</span></a>&mdash;a wearisome and depressing task. The mail was detained
+until long past the customary hour. But before it left, in spite of
+discouragement and anxiety, Lord Milner had gathered together into a
+brief compass all the documents necessary to put Mr. Chamberlain in
+possession of every material fact relative to the new law&mdash;passed only
+on the day before&mdash;and to the proceedings of the Transvaal Executive
+and the Volksraad between the 12th and the 19th. And, in addition to
+this, he had written a fresh estimate of the Franchise Bill in its
+latest form, in which he emphasised his former verdict that the
+proposals which it contained were not such as the Uitlanders <span class="pagenum"><a id="page226" name="page226"></a>(p. 226)</span>
+would be likely to accept. And in particular he pointed out that the
+fact of the final amendment being thus readily adopted by the
+Volksraad disposed of the contention, upon which President Krüger had
+laid so much stress at Bloemfontein, that his "burghers" would not
+permit him to make the concessions which the British Government
+required. He wrote:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "On July 12th Her Majesty's Government requested the Government
+     of the South African Republic to give them time to consider the
+     measure and communicate their views before it was proceeded with.
+     To this the Government of the South African Republic replied, on
+     July 13th, with a polite negative, saying that 'the whole matter
+     was out of the hands of the Government, and it was no longer
+     possible for the Government to satisfy the demands of the
+     Secretary of State.' The State-Attorney informed Mr. Greene<a id="footnotetag117" name="footnotetag117"></a><a href="#footnote117" title="Go to footnote 117"><span class="small">[117]</span></a>
+     at the same time that 'the present proposals represented
+     absolutely the greatest concession that could be got from the
+     Volksraad, and could not be enlarged. He personally had tried
+     hard for seven years' retrospective franchise, but the Raad would
+     not hear of it, and it was only with difficulty that the present
+     proposals were obtained.' This was on the 12th, but within a week
+     the seven years' retrospective franchise had been adopted.
+     Indeed, the statement of the absolute impossibility of obtaining
+     more than a particular measure of enfranchisement from the
+     Volksraad or the burghers has been made over and over again in
+     the history of this question&mdash;never more emphatically than by the
+     President himself at Bloemfontein&mdash;and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page227" name="page227"></a>(p. 227)</span> has over and
+     over again been shown to be a delusion."<a id="footnotetag118" name="footnotetag118"></a><a href="#footnote118" title="Go to footnote 118"><span class="small">[118]</span></a>
+</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's statement.</span>
+
+<p>But this full record of the shifts and doublings of Boer diplomacy
+would not reach London for another two weeks and a half. It was
+necessary, therefore, to use the cable. Early the next morning Lord
+Milner sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, in which he warned
+the Home Government of the extreme discouragement produced among all
+who were attached to the British connection by <span class="italic">The Times</span> statement
+of their readiness to accept the Franchise Bill. On that afternoon
+(July 20th), Mr. Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons
+in which he took up a much more satisfactory position. The Government,
+he said, were led to hope that the new law "might prove to be a basis
+of settlement on the lines laid down" by Lord Milner at the
+Bloemfontein Conference. They observed, however, that "a number of
+conditions" which might be used "to take away with one hand what had
+been given with the other" were still retained. But they&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "felt assured that the President, having accepted the principle
+     for which they had contended, would be prepared to reconsider any
+     detail of his schemes which could be shown to be a possible
+     hindrance to the full accomplishment of the objects in view, and
+     that he would not allow them to be nullified or reduced in value
+     by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of
+     administration."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page228" name="page228"></a>(p. 228)</span> That is to say, Mr. Chamberlain was no longer willing to take
+the bill at its face value, but in accordance with his determination
+to exhaust every possible resource of diplomacy before he turned to
+force, he gave President Krüger credit for a genuine desire to promote
+a peaceable settlement. A week later he formulated the method by which
+the President was to be allowed an opportunity of justifying this
+generous estimate of his intentions. In the meantime Lord Milner had
+sent lengthy telegrams to the Secretary of State on the 23rd, and
+again on the 26th, and the Salisbury Cabinet had determined to make a
+definite pronouncement of its South African policy, and to endeavour
+to arouse the country to a sense of the seriousness of the situation
+with which President Krüger's continued obduracy would bring it face
+to face. On July 27th Mr. Balfour declared, in addressing the Union of
+Conservative Associations, that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "If endless patience, endless desire to prevent matters coming to
+     extremities, if all the resources of diplomacy, were utterly
+     ineffectual to untie the knot, other means must inevitably be
+     found by which that knot must be loosened."</p>
+
+<p>On the day following (July 28th) the Transvaal question was debated in
+both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Lords the Prime Minister,
+Lord Salisbury, delivered a moderate and almost sympathetic speech.
+After making all allowance for the natural apprehension experienced by
+President <span class="pagenum"><a id="page229" name="page229"></a>(p. 229)</span> Krüger at the sudden inrush of population caused
+by the discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, he expressed the
+opinion that an attempt "to put the two races fairly and honestly on
+the same footing" would bring a peaceful solution of the crisis. But,
+he added&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "How long we are to consider that solution, and what patience we
+     are bound to show, these things I will not discuss. We have to
+     consider not only the feelings of the inhabitants of the
+     Transvaal, but, what is more important, the feelings of our
+     fellow-subjects.... Whatever happens, when the validity of the
+     Conventions is impeached, they belong from that time entirely to
+     history. I am quite sure that if this country has to make
+     exertions in order to secure the most elementary justice for
+     British subjects,&mdash;I am quite sure [it] will not reinstate a
+     state of things that will bring back the old difficulties in all
+     their formidable character at the next turn of the wheel. Without
+     intruding on his thoughts, I do not think President Krüger has
+     sufficiently considered this."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Joint Commission.</span>
+
+<p>In the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain announced that he had proposed
+to the Transvaal Government that a joint commission should be
+appointed to test the efficacy of the scheme of electoral reform
+embodied in the new Franchise Law. This proposal was set out in detail
+in a despatch already addressed to the High Commissioner, the
+substance of which had been telegraphed<a id="footnotetag119" name="footnotetag119"></a><a href="#footnote119" title="Go to footnote 119"><span class="small">[119]</span></a> to him on the preceding
+day (July 27th). The British Government assumed that "the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page230" name="page230"></a>(p. 230)</span>
+concessions now made to the Uitlanders were intended in good faith to
+secure to them some approach to the equality which was promised in
+1881"; they proposed that the "complicated details and questions of a
+technical nature" involved in the new law should be discussed in the
+first instance by delegates appointed by the High Commissioner and by
+the South African Republic; and if, and when, a "satisfactory
+agreement" had been reached on these points, they further proposed
+that all disputes as to the terms of the Convention should be settled
+by a "judicial authority, whose independence ... would be above
+suspicion," and all remaining matters in respect of the political
+representation of the Uitlanders by "another personal Conference"
+between the High Commissioner and President Krüger.</p>
+
+<p>Although the position which the Salisbury Cabinet had now taken up was
+one which placed them beyond the danger of accepting an illusory
+franchise scheme in lieu of an adequate measure of reform, it was not
+the course of action which was best to follow, except from the point
+of view of opening the eyes of the British public. In itself further
+delay was dangerous. It gave the Boers more time to arm, while we, for
+this very reason for which it was necessary to protract the
+negotiations, were prevented from arming vigorously. It discouraged
+our friends in South Africa, and made them even begin to doubt whether
+Great Britain "meant business." It was good policy <span class="pagenum"><a id="page231" name="page231"></a>(p. 231)</span> to offer
+the Joint Inquiry, given the truth of the assumption upon which this
+offer was based&mdash;namely, that the Bill represented an honest desire on
+the part of President Krüger to provide a peaceable settlement of the
+Uitlander question. Lord Milner knew, within the limits of human
+intelligence, that this assumption was wholly unwarranted. The Home
+Government apparently did not. As the result of this difference, Lord
+Milner's policy was again deflected to the extent that two months of
+negotiation were devoted to a purely futile endeavour to persuade the
+Pretoria Executive to prove the good faith of a proposal, which was
+never intended to be anything more than a pretext for delay. And, as
+before, the injury to British interests lay in the fact that, while
+the Home Government was prevented from making any adequate use of this
+delay by its determination not to make preparations for war until war
+was in sight, the period was fully utilised by President Krüger, who
+since Bloemfontein had been resolutely hastening the arrangements
+necessary for attacking the British colonies at a given moment with
+the entire burgher forces of the two Republics.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Krüger urged to accept.</span>
+
+<p>The offer of the Joint Inquiry was formally communicated to the
+Pretoria Executive in an eminently friendly telegram<a id="footnotetag120" name="footnotetag120"></a><a href="#footnote120" title="Go to footnote 120"><span class="small">[120]</span></a> from Lord
+Milner on August 1st. Efforts were made on all sides to induce
+President Krüger to accept it. Chief <span class="pagenum"><a id="page232" name="page232"></a>(p. 232)</span> Justice de Villiers
+wrote strongly in this sense to Mr. Fischer,<a id="footnotetag121" name="footnotetag121"></a><a href="#footnote121" title="Go to footnote 121"><span class="small">[121]</span></a> and to his brother
+Melius, the Chief Justice of the Free State. Mr. Schreiner telegraphed
+to Mr. Fischer, and Mr. Hofmeyr to President Steyn, both urging that
+the influence of the Free State should be used in favour of the
+proposal. The Dutch Government advised the Republic "not to refuse the
+English proposal";<a id="footnotetag122" name="footnotetag122"></a><a href="#footnote122" title="Go to footnote 122"><span class="small">[122]</span></a> and further informed Dr. Leyds that, in the
+opinion of the German Government, "every approach to one of the Great
+Powers in this very critical moment will be without any results
+whatever, and very dangerous to the Republic."<a id="footnotetag123" name="footnotetag123"></a><a href="#footnote123" title="Go to footnote 123"><span class="small">[123]</span></a> Even the English
+sympathisers of the Boers were in favour of acceptance. Mr. Montagu
+White, the Transvaal Consul-General in London, cabled that "Courtney,
+Labouchere, both our friends, and friendly papers without exception,"
+recommended this course; and that "refusal meant war and would
+estrange friends." The letter which he wrote to Mr. Reitz on the same
+day (August 4th), possesses an independent interest, as revealing the
+degree in which the friends of the Boers in England had identified
+themselves with the policy of the Afrikander party in the Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The essence of friendly advice," said Mr. White,<a id="footnotetag124" name="footnotetag124"></a><a href="#footnote124" title="Go to footnote 124"><span class="small">[124]</span></a> "is:
+     Accept the proposal in principle, point out how difficult it will
+     be to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to statistics, etc.,
+     and how undesirable it would be to have a miscarriage of the
+     Commission. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page233" name="page233"></a>(p. 233)</span> In other words: Gain as much time as you
+     can, and give the public time here to get out of the dangerous
+     frame of mind which Chamberlain's speeches have created....
+     Labouchere said to me this morning: 'Don't, for goodness' sake,
+     let Mr. Krüger make his first mistake by refusing this; a little
+     skilful management, and he will give Master Joe another fall.' He
+     further said: 'You are such past-masters of the art of gaining
+     time; here is an opportunity; you surely haven't let your right
+     hands lose their cunning, and you ought to spin out the
+     negotiations for quite two or three months.'"</p>
+
+<p>A week later (August 11th), President Krüger received a telegram<a id="footnotetag125" name="footnotetag125"></a><a href="#footnote125" title="Go to footnote 125"><span class="small">[125]</span></a>
+in which fifty Afrikander members of the Cape Parliament advanced the
+same argument. The acceptance of the Joint Commission, they pointed
+out, would provide a way out of a crisis "which might prove fatal to
+the best interests, not only of our Transvaal and Free State brethren,
+but also of the Afrikander party." They, therefore, begged his Honour
+to "lay their words privately" before the Executive and the Volksraad.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Krüger resolved on war.</span>
+
+<p>But President Krüger, like Lord Milner, had his eyes fixed upon the
+object. He looked beyond the Afrikander leaders to the rank and file
+of the Dutch population in the British colonies, with whom he had been
+in direct communication through his agents for many months past.<a id="footnotetag126" name="footnotetag126"></a><a href="#footnote126" title="Go to footnote 126"><span class="small">[126]</span></a>
+He knew that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page234" name="page234"></a>(p. 234)</span> any such inquiry as Mr. Chamberlain proposed
+would expose the flagrant insincerity of the Franchise Bill. On August
+2nd he had telegraphed to President Steyn that compliance with the
+Joint Commission was "tantamount to the destruction of the
+independence of the Republic."<a id="footnotetag127" name="footnotetag127"></a><a href="#footnote127" title="Go to footnote 127"><span class="small">[127]</span></a> To the Dutch Consul-General<a id="footnotetag128" name="footnotetag128"></a><a href="#footnote128" title="Go to footnote 128"><span class="small">[128]</span></a>
+he was perfectly frank: "Defeats such as the English had suffered in
+the war for freedom, and later under Jameson, had never been suffered
+by the Boers." His burghers were ready to "go on the <span class="italic">battue</span> of
+Englishmen," when he gave the word.<a id="footnotetag129" name="footnotetag129"></a><a href="#footnote129" title="Go to footnote 129"><span class="small">[129]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Fischer ceases to "mediate".</span>
+
+<p>The burghers of the Free State could be counted upon with almost equal
+certainty. Mr. Fischer, a more potent influence than President Steyn,
+had by this time openly dissociated himself from the "mediation"
+policy of the Cape nationalists, and was again (August 4th to 9th) at
+Pretoria. Here he threw himself heart and soul into the work of
+completing the military preparations of the two Republics. On the 6th
+he telegraphed to President Steyn that the draft reply was prepared;
+that it "invited discussion and asked questions to gain time," and
+that, therefore, it "was not yet necessary to deliberate as to calling
+together the Volksraad" for the final decision of peace or war.
+"Military matters, especially artillery," he added, "seem to me very
+faulty. Care will be taken to make all <span class="pagenum"><a id="page235" name="page235"></a>(p. 235)</span> necessary
+preparations."<a id="footnotetag130" name="footnotetag130"></a><a href="#footnote130" title="Go to footnote 130"><span class="small">[130]</span></a> Nor did he leave the Transvaal capital until he
+had settled the details of the invasion of Natal with General Joubert.
+Indeed, from this time onwards to the despatch of the ultimatum&mdash;a
+document which came, in its final form, from his pen&mdash;Mr. Fischer's
+part in the conduct of the negotiations was second only to that of
+President Krüger. In all he did he displayed the same reasoned
+determination to oppose British supremacy in South Africa which he has
+exhibited since the war in his control of the Bloemfontein <span class="italic">Friend</span>.
+Orders for the inspection of the commando organisation in the Free
+State had been given before Mr. Fischer had left Bloemfontein; and on
+his return from Pretoria he responded to Mr. Schreiner's urgent and
+continued representations of the desirability of inducing President
+Krüger to accept Mr. Chamberlain's offer, by a request to be informed
+of any probable movements of British forces. Mr. Schreiner's reply,
+that the Free State must ask for such information from the High
+Commissioner, caused him to apply to Mr. Hofmeyr for an explanation of
+the Cape Premier's attitude. The inquiry produced a notable analysis
+of Mr. Schreiner's position.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Hofmeyr says," Dr. Te Water telegraphed, "that whatever the
+     Premier's feelings or relations to our people are, he is at the
+     same time a minister of the Crown. As such he has on him claims
+     in two directions, of which he is acquitting himself to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page236" name="page236"></a>(p. 236)</span>
+     the best of his ability. He has no control over the movement of
+     troops. You had better come and have a quiet talk. Meanwhile the
+     Free State should surely refrain from an aggressive step."<a id="footnotetag131" name="footnotetag131"></a><a href="#footnote131" title="Go to footnote 131"><span class="small">[131]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>This well-meant advice was somewhat belated. In reply to a telegram
+from President Steyn, asking whether it was true that the Imperial
+Government was going to send 1,000 men to Bethulie Bridge, Lord Milner
+replied on August 16th, that, "as a matter of fact, no despatch of
+Imperial troops to the borders of the Orange Free State was in
+contemplation." But he added that in view of the much more substantial
+reports of the "importation of large quantities of munitions of war"
+into that State and "the general arming of the burghers," it "would
+not have been unnatural, if such military preparations had been
+responded to by a defensive movement" on the part of the British
+Government.<a id="footnotetag132" name="footnotetag132"></a><a href="#footnote132" title="Go to footnote 132"><span class="small">[132]</span></a> Indeed, the circumstances which had led to Mr.
+Fischer's co-operation in Mr. Hofmeyr's "mediation" were rapidly
+disappearing. The Port Elizabeth Mausers and ammunition were safely
+through the Cape Colony; a further consignment of Mauser ammunition
+arrived at Delagoa Bay (August 16th) in the German steamship
+<span class="italic">Reichstag</span> at the very time that these telegrams were passing; and
+both this and other enormous consignments were forwarded to Pretoria a
+fortnight later in spite of an abortive attempt on the part of the
+British Foreign Office <span class="pagenum"><a id="page237" name="page237"></a>(p. 237)</span> to induce the Portuguese authorities
+to retain them. The possession of an adequate supply of ammunition was
+a matter of cardinal importance to which, as we have seen, President
+Steyn had drawn the attention of the Pretoria Executive nearly a month
+before the Bloemfontein Conference. It was these Mauser cartridges
+that were wanted especially, since, without them, the new arm&mdash;the
+splendid Mauser magazine rifle&mdash;must have been rejected in place of
+the inferior Martini-Henry for which the Boers had long been provided
+with an ample reserve of ammunition.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Smuts-Greene negotiations.</span>
+
+<p>In the meantime the British Government was still waiting for a reply
+to its offer of a Joint Inquiry. On August 7th the Volksraad discussed
+the question, and on the 12th a despatch was written by Mr. Reitz
+refusing the offer on the ground that such a proposal was inconsistent
+with the independence of the Republic. It was held back, however,
+until September 1st; that is to say, until the Portuguese authorities
+had allowed the Transvaal ammunition to leave Lorenzo Marques. Then,
+as we shall see, it was forwarded in conjunction with a second
+despatch of September 2nd. The delay was won by a characteristic
+display of "the art of gaining time," in which, as Mr. Labouchere
+remarked, the Boers were past-masters. On the same day that Mr. Reitz
+wrote his despatch (August 12th), Mr. Smuts approached Sir William
+Greene<a id="footnotetag133" name="footnotetag133"></a><a href="#footnote133" title="Go to footnote 133"><span class="small">[133]</span></a> with the offer of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page238" name="page238"></a>(p. 238)</span> a still further simplified
+seven years' franchise in lieu of the Joint Commission. When, however,
+Sir William Greene assured him that the British Government would not
+accept anything less than the Bloemfontein minimum, he subsequently
+agreed to an arrangement of which the main items were: A five years'
+franchise; the workable character of the new law to be secured by the
+submission of its provisions to the British Agent with a legal
+adviser; and increased representation in the Volksraad, together with
+the use of the English language. After communications had passed
+between Sir William Greene, Lord Milner, and Mr. Chamberlain, these
+proposals, with certain reservations, were formally communicated to
+the British Government by Mr. Reitz on August 19th. Two days later a
+second note was forwarded in which the offer contained in the previous
+note (August 19th) was declared to be subject to the acceptance by the
+British Government of two conditions. These conditions&mdash;an undertaking
+not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic in the future
+and a specific withdrawal of the claim of suzerainty&mdash;amounted in
+effect to a formal renunciation by Great Britain of its position as
+paramount Power in South Africa. <span class="sidenote">Boer diplomacy.</span>
+In other words, the Pretoria
+Executive had repudiated the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir
+William Greene. Mr. Chamberlain, noticing the material variation
+between the original offer as initialled by Mr. Smuts and forwarded by
+Sir William <span class="pagenum"><a id="page239" name="page239"></a>(p. 239)</span> Greene, and Mr. Reitz's note of August 19th,
+instructed Sir William Greene to obtain an explanation of the
+discrepancy from the Transvaal Government. The reply was a curt
+rejoinder that there was not "the slightest chance of an alteration or
+an amplification" of the terms of the arrangement as set out in the
+note of the 19th.<a id="footnotetag134" name="footnotetag134"></a><a href="#footnote134" title="Go to footnote 134"><span class="small">[134]</span></a> In these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain
+telegraphed a reply on August 28th, in which he accepted the original
+offer, and rejected the impossible conditions subsequently attached to
+it.<a id="footnotetag135" name="footnotetag135"></a><a href="#footnote135" title="Go to footnote 135"><span class="small">[135]</span></a> The terms of settlement thus proposed were in substance the
+same as those of the despatch of July 27th, with the exception that an
+inquiry by the British Agent was substituted for the Joint Commission,
+and the five years' franchise of the Smuts-Greene arrangement was
+accepted in lieu of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad law.
+The Transvaal reply was a further essay in the same useful "art of
+gaining time." It was dated September 2nd, and contained a definite
+withdrawal of the Smuts-Greene offer as embodied in the notes of
+August 19th and 21st, and a vague return to the Joint Commission.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Under certain conditions," wrote Mr. Reitz,<a id="footnotetag136" name="footnotetag136"></a><a href="#footnote136" title="Go to footnote 136"><span class="small">[136]</span></a> "this
+     Government would be glad to learn from Her Majesty's Government
+     how they propose that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page240" name="page240"></a>(p. 240)</span> the Commission should be
+     constituted, and what place and time for meeting is
+     suggested."<a id="footnotetag137" name="footnotetag137"></a><a href="#footnote137" title="Go to footnote 137"><span class="small">[137]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>And this with the consoling promise of a "further reply" to other
+questions arising out of the despatch of July 27th, which the
+Transvaal Government had not yet been able to consider.</p>
+
+<p>The response to this astute document was the last effort of the
+Salisbury Cabinet to arrange a settlement upon the basis of the
+"friendly discussion" inaugurated at Bloemfontein. The British
+Government, Mr. Chamberlain wrote, had "absolutely repudiated" the
+claim, made in the notes of April 16th and May 9th, that the South
+African Republic was a "sovereign international state," and they could
+not, therefore, consider a proposal which was conditional on the
+acceptance of this view of the status of the Republic. They "could not
+now consent to go back to the proposals for which those of the note of
+August 19th were intended as a substitute," since they were "satisfied
+that the law of 1899, in which these proposals were finally embodied,
+was insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial
+representation" of the Uitlanders. They were "still prepared to accept
+the offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the note of August 19th,"
+provided that an inquiry, joint or unilateral as the Transvaal
+Government might prefer, showed that "the new scheme of representation
+would not be encumbered <span class="pagenum"><a id="page241" name="page241"></a>(p. 241)</span> by conditions which would nullify
+the intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the
+Uitlanders." They assumed that "the new members of the Raad would be
+permitted to use their own language." They expressed their belief that
+"the acceptance of these terms would at once remove the tension
+between the two Governments, and would in all probability render
+unnecessary any further intervention" on the franchise question, and
+their readiness&mdash;</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">A definite demand.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "to make immediate arrangements for a further conference between
+     the President of the South African Republic and the High
+     Commissioner to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal
+     of Arbitration, and the questions ... which were neither
+     Uitlander grievances nor questions of interpretation"</p>
+
+<p class="noindent">of the Convention. And they added that if the reply of the Republic
+was negative or inconclusive, "they would reserve to themselves the
+right to reconsider the situation <span class="italic">de novo</span>, and to formulate their
+own proposals for a final settlement."<a id="footnotetag138" name="footnotetag138"></a><a href="#footnote138" title="Go to footnote 138"><span class="small">[138]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The text of this despatch was telegraphed to Lord Milner late at night
+on September 8th. It was presented to the Transvaal Government on the
+12th, with a request that the reply might reach the British Agent not
+later than midday on the 14th. This limit of time was fixed by Sir
+William Greene on his own initiative, and it was withdrawn by Lord
+Milner's instructions, in order that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page242" name="page242"></a>(p. 242)</span> Pretoria Executive
+might not be unduly hurried. The Transvaal reply, which was delivered
+on the 15th, was a refusal to accept the Smuts-Greene arrangement,
+re-stated by the British Government, as the basis of the franchise
+reform, coupled with a charge of bad faith against Sir William Greene.</p>
+
+<p>It was a cleverly composed document, which owed its diplomatic effect
+in no small degree to Mr. Fischer, who had revised it. It was written
+for publication, since, in Mr. Fischer's opinion, the time had come to
+write despatches which would "justify the Republic in the eyes of the
+world"; and with this end in view it contained the suggestion that the
+British Government was bent upon worrying the Pretoria Executive into
+war.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "This Government," it explains, "continues to cherish the hope
+     that Her Majesty's Government, on further consideration, will
+     feel itself free to abandon the idea of making the new proposals
+     more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions,
+     and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal
+     for a Joint Commission at first proposed by the Secretary of
+     State for the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, and
+     subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by it."<a id="footnotetag139" name="footnotetag139"></a><a href="#footnote139" title="Go to footnote 139"><span class="small">[139]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Reinforcements sanctioned.</span>
+
+<p>The British despatch of September 8th represented the united opinion
+of the Cabinet Council which had met on that day to consider the South
+African situation. In sending it, the Government also decided to raise
+the strength of the Natal and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page243" name="page243"></a>(p. 243)</span> Cape forces to the total of
+22,000, estimated by the War Office as sufficient for defensive
+purposes, by the immediate addition of 10,000 men, of whom nearly
+6,000 were to be provided by the Indian Army.<a id="footnotetag140" name="footnotetag140"></a><a href="#footnote140" title="Go to footnote 140"><span class="small">[140]</span></a> The despatch
+itself, definite in contents and resolute in tone, was the sort of
+communication which, in Lord Milner's judgment, should have been
+forwarded to the Transvaal Government after the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference; and the additional troops now ordered out
+were nothing more than the substantial reinforcements for which he had
+applied in June. The three months' negotiations had led the Salisbury
+Cabinet to the precise conclusion which Lord Milner had formed at
+Bloemfontein. The only hope of a peaceable settlement lay in a
+definite demand, backed by preparations for war. But to do this in
+June, and to do it in September, were two very different things.
+Assuming that diplomatic pressure could in any case have availed to
+secure the necessary reforms, it is obvious that, whatever prospect of
+success attached to this course of action&mdash;Policy No. 2, as Lord
+Milner called it&mdash;in June, was materially diminished in September.
+During the interval the British Government had done practically
+nothing to improve its military position. That of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page244" name="page244"></a>(p. 244)</span> President
+Krüger had been conspicuously improved. He had carried the Free State
+with him; he had got his Mauser ammunition and additional artillery,
+and he had completed his arrangements for the simultaneous
+mobilisation of the burghers of the two Republics. Even now the
+military action of the British Government was confined to preparations
+for defence; for the order to mobilise the army corps was not given
+until the next Cabinet Council had been held on September 22nd. The
+spirit of Pretoria was very different. The commandos were on their way
+to the Natal border before the reply to this British despatch of
+September 8th was delivered to the British Agent. That was President
+Krüger's real answer&mdash;not the diplomatic fencing of September 15th.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Violence of the Boers.</span>
+
+<p>More than this, the three months' negotiations had embittered the
+relations of the British and Dutch factions in every South African
+state to such a degree that any compromise of the sort proposed by
+Lord Milner at Bloemfontein was no longer sufficient to effect a
+settlement. The moderate measure of representation then suggested
+would have been rejected now by the Uitlanders as wholly inadequate
+for their protection, in view of the violent antipathy to them and the
+gold industry which the diplomatic struggle had evoked among all
+classes of the Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal. The particulars of
+the outrageous treatment, and still more outrageous threats, to which
+the British Uitlanders were subjected from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page245" name="page245"></a>(p. 245)</span> this time onwards
+up to the ultimatum are to be found in the Blue-books. As early as the
+middle of August, when the Smuts-Greene negotiations had just been
+commenced, Mr. Monypenny, the editor of the Johannesburg <span class="italic">Star</span>, was
+warned that the Transvaal Government intended to issue a warrant for
+his arrest on a charge of high treason. This intention, postponed
+during the fortnight of delay won by these negotiations, was carried
+out on September 1st, on which day Mr. Pakeman, the editor of the
+<span class="italic">Transvaal Leader</span>, was secured, while Mr. Monypenny succeeded in
+effecting his escape. This indefensible act was followed by a
+characteristic attempt to disown it, made by Mr. Smuts, the State
+Attorney, the nature of which is sufficiently exhibited in the
+following telegram, despatched by the High Commissioner on September
+4th to the Secretary of State:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"The charge against Pakeman has been reduced to one under the
+     Press Law of 1896, and he has been admitted to bail. There have
+     been no further arrests. Greene telegraphs as follows:</p>
+
+<p>"<span class="italic">Begins.</span>&mdash;A statement has been published through the Press this
+     morning by the State Attorney 'that no instructions had ever been
+     issued from Pretoria for the arrest of the editors of the
+     <span class="italic">Leader</span> or the <span class="italic">Star</span>.' The facts are as follows: On Friday
+     morning the Public Prosecutor of Johannesburg and Captain Vandam,
+     who had come over from Johannesburg to Pretoria, were interviewed
+     by the State Attorney in his office here. In the afternoon these
+     two officers returned <span class="pagenum"><a id="page246" name="page246"></a>(p. 246)</span> to Johannesburg, and arrested the
+     editor of the <span class="italic">Leader</span> the same evening, failing to capture the
+     editor of the <span class="italic">Star</span>.&mdash;<span class="italic">Ends.</span></p>
+
+<p>"There is no doubt that the arrest of both editors was decided by
+     the Government and other arrests contemplated, intimidation of
+     Uitlander leaders being the object. The exodus from Johannesburg
+     is taking formidable proportions. Many refugees of all classes
+     have come to Capetown. In Natal there are an even larger number.
+     A good deal of money is being spent on relief."<a id="footnotetag141" name="footnotetag141"></a><a href="#footnote141" title="Go to footnote 141"><span class="small">[141]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The violence of the Boers culminated a week before the Ultimatum
+(October 9th-11th) in the wholesale expulsion of the British subjects
+still remaining in the two Republics. Assuming that this measure was
+justifiable on military grounds, there can be no excuse for the brutal
+precipitancy with which it was enforced. It crowded the colonial ports
+with homeless and impoverished fugitives; it inflicted unnecessary
+suffering and pecuniary loss upon inoffensive and innocent
+non-combatants, both European and native; and it was accompanied in
+some instances by displays of wanton cruelty and deliberate spite
+utterly unworthy of a people of European descent.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Anxiety of High Commissioner.</span>
+
+<p>Thus it was only when Lord Milner's foresight had been unmistakably
+confirmed by the stern logic of facts that the British Government
+ordered these 10,000 troops to South Africa, 6,000 of whom&mdash;the Indian
+contribution&mdash;arrived just in time to save Natal from being overrun by
+the Boers. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page247" name="page247"></a>(p. 247)</span> The three weeks preceding the Cabinet Council of
+September 8th, at which this decision was arrived at, had been a
+period of intense anxiety for the High Commissioner. With the
+spectacle of the increasing activity of England's enemies, and the
+increasing dismay of England's friends, before his eyes, his protests
+against the inactivity of the Home Government had become more urgent.
+In the middle of August he declared that he could no longer be
+responsible for the administration of South Africa unless he were
+provided immediately with another military adviser. General
+Forestier-Walker was then appointed, and after the departure of
+General Butler the Imperial Government intervened at length to check
+the further passage of munitions of war through the Colony to the Free
+State.<a id="footnotetag142" name="footnotetag142"></a><a href="#footnote142" title="Go to footnote 142"><span class="small">[142]</span></a> The <span class="italic">Norman</span>, the mail-boat of August 23rd in which Sir
+William Butler sailed for England, took home the masterly
+despatch<a id="footnotetag143" name="footnotetag143"></a><a href="#footnote143" title="Go to footnote 143"><span class="small">[143]</span></a> in which Lord Milner explained the position taken up by
+him at the Bloemfontein Conference, and showed how completely the
+proposals of the Transvaal Government differed from the spirit of the
+settlement which he had then invited President Krüger to accept. In
+doing so he reviewed the whole course of the subsequent negotiations,
+pointed out the insidious character of the last Transvaal proposal
+(August 19th and 21st), and emphatically protested against the
+suggestion that the Imperial Government should <span class="pagenum"><a id="page248" name="page248"></a>(p. 248)</span> barter its
+rights as paramount Power for "another hastily framed franchise
+scheme," on account of its "superficial conformity" with what, after
+all, was only a single item in the long list of questions that must be
+adjusted before the peaceful progress of South Africa would be
+assured.<a id="footnotetag144" name="footnotetag144"></a><a href="#footnote144" title="Go to footnote 144"><span class="small">[144]</span></a> On August 28th Mr. Schreiner, when called to account in
+the Cape Parliament for having allowed, "in the usual course," the
+Mausers and ammunition for the Free State to pass through the Colony,
+made the strange declaration that in the event of war&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "he would do his very best to maintain [for the Cape Colony] the
+     position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with
+     regard to its forces and with regard to its people."</p>
+
+<p>Three days later (August 31st) Lord Milner sent a still more
+impressive appeal for "prompt and decisive action" on the part of the
+Home Government. The despatch, which was telegraphed, is otherwise
+significant for its account of the situation in Johannesburg:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I am receiving representations from many quarters," he said, "to
+     urge Her Majesty's Government to terminate the state of suspense.
+     Hitherto I have hesitated to address you on the subject, lest Her
+     Majesty's Government should think me impatient. But I feel bound
+     to let you know that I am satisfied, from inquiries made in
+     various reliable quarters, that the distress is now really
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page249" name="page249"></a>(p. 249)</span> serious. The most severe suffering is at Johannesburg.
+     Business there is at a standstill; many traders have become
+     insolvent, and others are only kept on their legs by the leniency
+     of their creditors. Even the mines, which have been less affected
+     hitherto, are now suffering, owing to the withdrawal of workmen,
+     both European and native. The crisis also affects the trading
+     centres in the Colony. In spite of this, the purport of all the
+     representations made to me is to urge prompt and decided action,
+     not to deprecate further interference on the part of Her
+     Majesty's Government. British South Africa is prepared for
+     extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in order to see the
+     vindication of British authority. It is a prolongation of the
+     negotiations, endless and indecisive of result, that is dreaded.
+     I fear seriously that there will be a strong reaction of feeling
+     against the policy of Her Majesty's Government if matters drag.
+     Please to understand that I invariably preach confidence and
+     patience&mdash;not without effect. But if I did not inform you of the
+     increasing difficulty in doing this, and of the unmistakable
+     growth of uneasiness about the present situation, and of a desire
+     to see it terminated at any cost, I should be failing in my
+     duty."<a id="footnotetag145" name="footnotetag145"></a><a href="#footnote145" title="Go to footnote 145"><span class="small">[145]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The crisis in South Africa.</span>
+
+<p>Indeed, while in England Mr. Chamberlain was remarking (at Highbury,
+August 27th) that he "could not truly say that the crisis was passed,"
+and picturesquely complaining of President Krüger "dribbling out
+reforms like water from a squeezed sponge," every loyalist in South
+Africa knew that the time for words had gone by. On September 6th and
+7th public meetings were held respectively <span class="pagenum"><a id="page250" name="page250"></a>(p. 250)</span> at Maritzburg and
+Capetown, at which resolutions were passed affirming the uselessness
+of continuing the negotiations and the necessity for the prompt action
+of the Imperial Government.</p>
+
+<p>Even this did not exhaust the evidence which was needed to persuade
+the Salisbury Cabinet to make effective preparations for the defence
+of the British colonies. The Cabinet Council of September 8th had
+before it, in addition to the Transvaal note of September 2nd, a
+direct and urgent request<a id="footnotetag146" name="footnotetag146"></a><a href="#footnote146" title="Go to footnote 146"><span class="small">[146]</span></a> for immediate reinforcements from the
+Government of Natal&mdash;the loyal colony which, as Lord Milner had
+declared, was to be defended "by the whole force of the empire."</p>
+
+<p>These were the circumstances in which the Salisbury Cabinet did in
+September what Lord Milner had advised them to do in June. It is
+impossible to maintain that the British Government had gained anything
+in the way of political results comparable with the fatal loss of
+military strength incurred by the three months' delay. The over-sea
+British did not need to be taught either the justice or the necessity
+of securing citizen rights for the industrial population of the
+Transvaal. Before Lord Milner had been authorised to state that the
+petition of the Uitlanders had been favourably received by the Home
+Government, the citizens of Sydney had recorded in a public meeting
+their "sympathy with their fellow-countrymen in the Transvaal," and
+expressed their <span class="pagenum"><a id="page251" name="page251"></a>(p. 251)</span> hope "that Her Majesty might be pleased to
+grant the prayer of her subjects." Queensland, Victoria, and New South
+Wales had all three offered military contingents by July 21st;<a id="footnotetag147" name="footnotetag147"></a><a href="#footnote147" title="Go to footnote 147"><span class="small">[147]</span></a>
+the other colonies refrained only from a desire not to embarrass the
+Home Government in its negotiations with the Transvaal. Whatever good
+effect was produced upon the public opinion of the continent of Europe
+and the United States of America by the obvious reluctance of the
+British Government to make war upon a puny enemy, was more than
+counterbalanced by the spectacle of a great Power prevented from
+employing the most elementary military precautions by a nice regard
+for the susceptibilities of its political and commercial rivals. The
+idea that the sentiment either of the world at large or of the
+over-sea British would be favourably impressed by the three months of
+futile negotiations was a sheer delusion. It was the people of England
+who had to be educated.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Manchester meeting.</span>
+
+<p>How little they knew of the actual situation in South Africa, and of
+the real character of the Boers may be seen from what happened on
+September 15th. On this day a meeting was held at Manchester to
+protest against the mere idea of England having to make war upon the
+Transvaal. Lord (then Mr.) Courtney "hailed with satisfaction" the
+British despatch of September 8th, which, having been published in the
+Continental papers on the 13th, had appeared a day later (14th) in
+those <span class="pagenum"><a id="page252" name="page252"></a>(p. 252)</span> of Great Britain. "It was a rebuke to the
+fire-eaters," he said, "and a rebuke most of all to one whom I must
+designate as a lost man, a lost mind&mdash;I mean Sir Alfred Milner." And
+Mr. John Morley, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was convinced that
+there was no need of any preparations for war; the Transvaal
+Government "could not withdraw from the five years' franchise." The
+day on which these words were uttered was the day on which the note
+containing President Krüger's determination to "withdraw" from the
+five years' franchise, and his refusal even to consider the British
+offer of September 8th&mdash;hailed with satisfaction by his old ally, Lord
+Courtney&mdash;was handed to Sir William Greene.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page253" name="page253"></a>(p. 253)</span> CHAPTER VI</h3>
+
+<p class="title">THE ULTIMATUM</p>
+
+
+<p>The British people were destined to pay a heavy penalty for the
+ignorance and irresolution that caused them to withhold, from June to
+September, the mandate without which the Government was unable to
+prepare for war. What that penalty was will be made sufficiently clear
+when we come to consider the position of grave disadvantage in which
+the British forces designated for the South African campaign were
+placed at the outbreak of the war. For the moment it is enough to
+notice that, just as the real source of the military weakness of
+England in the war was the fact that only a very small proportion of
+her adult male population had received an elementary training in arms,
+so the futility of her peace strategy must be traced to the general
+ignorance of the bitter hatred with which British supremacy was
+regarded, not only by the Boers, but also by the Dutch subjects of the
+Crown in the Cape Colony and Natal. In a world-wide and composite
+State such as the British Empire, it is, of course, natural that the
+people of one component part should be unfamiliar, in a greater or
+lesser degree, with the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page254" name="page254"></a>(p. 254)</span> conditions of any other part. What
+makes this mutual unfamiliarity dangerous is the circumstance that the
+control of the foreign relations, and of the effective military and
+naval forces, of the Empire as a whole, remains exclusively in the
+hands of the people of one part&mdash;the United Kingdom. In the absence of
+any administrative body in which the over-sea Britains are
+represented, the power, thus possessed, of moulding the destiny of any
+one province of the Empire lays upon the island people the duty of
+informing themselves adequately upon the circumstances and conditions
+of all its component parts. It is obvious that the likelihood of this
+duty being efficiently performed has been diminished greatly by the
+extension of the franchise. Fortunately, however, in the case of
+Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, questions involving a decision to
+employ the Army or Navy which Great Britain maintains for the defence
+of the Empire have arisen rarely in recent years. It is in regard to
+India and South Africa that these decisions have been constantly
+required; and for half a century past each of these two countries in
+turn has been the battlefield of English parties. But while the
+efficiency of British administration has suffered in both cases by
+variations of policy due to party oscillations, infinitely greater
+injury has been done in South Africa than in India.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Attitude of the island people.</span>
+
+<p>In respect of South Africa, while, speaking broadly, Liberal
+Governments have sought to escape from existing responsibilities, or
+to decline <span class="pagenum"><a id="page255" name="page255"></a>(p. 255)</span> new ones, Conservative Governments have sought to
+discharge these responsibilities with the object of making this
+country a homogeneous and self-supporting unit of the empire. To
+persuade the nation to accept a policy which might, and probably
+would, involve it in an immediate sacrifice both of men and money, was
+plainly a more difficult task than to persuade it that no need existed
+for any such sacrifices. The "long view" of the Imperialist statesmen
+was supported in the present instance by past experience and by the
+judgment of the great majority of the British population actually
+resident in South Africa. The home English, remembering that the
+recall of Sir Bartle Frere had been followed by Majuba and the
+Retrocession, were anxious to maintain British supremacy unimpaired in
+South Africa. What kept them irresolute was the uncertainty as to
+whether this supremacy really was, or was not, in danger. Lord Milner
+had told them that the establishment of a Dutch Republic, embracing
+all South Africa, was being openly advocated, and that nothing but a
+striking proof of Great Britain's intention to remain the paramount
+Power&mdash;such as would be afforded by insisting upon the grant of equal
+rights to the British population in the Transvaal&mdash;could arrest the
+growth of the nationalist movement. He had pointed out also that the
+conversion of the Boer Republic into an arsenal of munitions of war,
+when, as in the case of Ketshwayo, there was no enemy against
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page256" name="page256"></a>(p. 256)</span> whom these arms could be turned other than Great Britain,
+was in itself a definite and unmistakable menace to British supremacy.
+This, moreover, was the deliberate and reasoned verdict of a man who
+had been commissioned, with almost universal approval, to ascertain
+the real state of affairs in South Africa. If the nation had believed
+Lord Milner in June, the British Government would have received the
+political support that would have enabled it to make the preparations
+for war in that month which, as we have seen, it was now making in
+September.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Liberal opposition.</span>
+
+<p>The agency which, by playing upon the ignorance of the public,
+prevented the nation from accepting at once the truth of Lord Milner's
+verdict, was the Liberal Opposition. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the
+official leader of the Liberal party, maintained throughout the three
+months in question that no reason existed for military preparation.
+Mr. Labouchere wrote, on the eve of the war: "The Boers invade Natal!
+You might just as well talk of their invading England." When Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman maintained that there was no need for the
+Government to make any military preparations, we must presume that he
+believed one of two things: either that President Krüger would yield,
+or that, if President Krüger did not yield, there was nothing in the
+condition of South Africa to make it necessary for Great Britain to
+give any proof of her ability to maintain her position as paramount
+Power by force of arms. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page257" name="page257"></a>(p. 257)</span> The action of the Liberal Opposition
+resolves itself, therefore, into a declaration, on its own authority
+as against Lord Milner's, that neither the republican nor the colonial
+Dutch had any intention of making war upon Great Britain in South
+Africa, or any resources which would enable them to carry out such an
+intention with any hope of success. Now, apart from the overwhelming
+testimony to the utter falsity of this assertion which is afforded by
+the facts of the campaign, and apart from such documents as the
+manifestos issued by both Republics upon the outbreak of the war, we
+possess&mdash;thanks to the exertions of the Intelligence Department&mdash;a
+mass of evidence, in the shape of private and official correspondence,
+which enables us to learn what was actually passing in the minds of
+the Dutch at this time. On the 15th of this month of September, 1899,
+the meeting to which we have referred<a id="footnotetag148" name="footnotetag148"></a><a href="#footnote148" title="Go to footnote 148"><span class="small">[148]</span></a> was held at Manchester,
+with the object, not of strengthening the hands of the Government in
+the military preparations which they were making thus tardily, but of
+protesting against the very idea that there was anything in the
+attitude of the Dutch in South Africa to make war necessary. A perusal
+of two of these captured documents will enable the reader to judge for
+himself in what degree this Liberal view of the situation corresponded
+with the facts. The first is a letter written on September 25th&mdash;that
+is to say, ten days after Lord Courtney was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page258" name="page258"></a>(p. 258)</span> denouncing Lord
+Milner as "a lost mind" at Manchester&mdash;by Mr. Blignaut, brother to the
+State Secretary of the Free State. It is concerned with the safe
+arrival in the Free State of a Colonial Afrikander, who has left his
+home in the Western Province of the Cape Colony to join the republican
+forces:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+
+<p class="center">[Translation.]</p>
+<p><span class="left50 smcap">"Kroonstadt, Orange Free State</span>,<br>
+  <span class="ralign italic">"September 25th, 1899.</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2">"Your wire to hand this morning, to which I
+  replied. &mdash;&mdash; has arrived.</p>
+
+<p>"I never gave the youngster credit for such plans
+  to dodge Mr. &mdash;&mdash;, and not to be trapped and
+  taken back. I think he owes his friend &mdash;&mdash; something
+  for his advice how to proceed. As he is here
+  now, he can remain. I see myself he will never be
+  satisfied to stay there [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> in the colony] while there
+  is war going on.</p>
+
+<p>"The only thing we are afraid of now is that
+  Chamberlain, with his admitted fitfulness of temper,
+  will cheat us out of the war, and consequently the
+  opportunity of annexing the Cape Colony and
+  Natal, and forming the Republican United States
+  of South Africa; for, in spite of [S. J. du Toit],
+  we have forty-six thousand fighting men who have
+  pledged themselves to die shoulder to shoulder in
+  defence of our liberty, and to secure the independence
+  of South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>
+  "Please forward &mdash;&mdash;'s luggage.</p>
+<p class="left50">"<span class="smcap">J. N. Blignaut</span>."<a id="footnotetag149" name="footnotetag149"></a><a href="#footnote149" title="Go to footnote 149"><span class="small">[149]</span></a></p>
+
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Afrikander aspirations.</span>
+
+<p>This is not an isolated or exceptional expression of opinion. It is a
+typical statement of what was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page259" name="page259"></a>(p. 259)</span> in the mind of ninety-nine out
+of every hundred republican nationalists at this time. The aspirations
+it contains were proclaimed a fortnight later to the world by
+President Krüger himself in the boast that his Republic would "stagger
+humanity." They appeared in the nonchalant remarks made a few days
+later by Mr. Gregorowski, the Chief Justice of the Transvaal, in
+bidding farewell to Canon Farmer,<a id="footnotetag150" name="footnotetag150"></a><a href="#footnote150" title="Go to footnote 150"><span class="small">[150]</span></a> who was preparing to leave his
+cure at Pretoria in view of the certainty of war.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Is it really necessary for you to go? The war will be over in a
+     fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the
+     English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace."</p>
+
+<p>War, then, for the Boer meant "an opportunity of annexing the Cape
+Colony and Natal, and forming the Republican United States of South
+Africa." When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, Lord
+Courtney, Mr. James Bryce, and other Liberal leaders saw no reason why
+the British Government should make military preparations&mdash;did, in
+fact, do all in their power to induce the English people to withhold
+the support necessary to allow the British Government to make these
+preparations&mdash;there were, twelve thousand British troops in South
+Africa to oppose the "forty-six thousand fighting men who had pledged
+themselves to die shoulder to shoulder" to secure the independence,
+not of the Transvaal but of "South Africa".</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page260" name="page260"></a>(p. 260)</span> And what of the Dutch in the Cape Colony? Our second document
+will enlighten us on this point. It is an invitation, composed in
+doggerel rhyme, to the Boer forces to invade Griqualand West, signed
+by the chairman of a district branch of the Afrikander Bond. The date
+is not given; but as the proclamation under which Head-Commandant C.
+J. Wessels annexed the districts in question is dated November 11th,
+1899, it was obviously written during the first three or four weeks of
+the war.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>[Translation.]</p>
+
+<p>"Dear countrymen of the Transvaal: Brothers of our religion and
+     language: Our hearts are burning for you all: when your brave men
+     fall, we pray to God night and day to help you with His might; we
+     are powerless by ourselves&mdash;the English are so angry with us that
+     they have taken away our ammunition, all our powder and
+     cartridges; if you can provide us each with a packet of ten and a
+     Mauser, you will see what we can do; Englishmen won't stand
+     before us, they will go to the devil. There are a few English
+     here, but we count them amongst the dead; for the rest we are all
+     Boers, and only wait for you to move us. Englishmen are not our
+     friends, and we will not serve under their flag; so we all shout
+     together, as Transvaal subjects, 'God save President Krüger, and
+     the Transvaal army; God save President Steyn, and all Free
+     Staters great and small!'"<a id="footnotetag151" name="footnotetag151"></a><a href="#footnote151" title="Go to footnote 151"><span class="small">[151]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Ignorance of Liberal leaders.</span>
+
+<p>But, apart from this profound misconception of the real feeling and
+intentions of the Afrikander <span class="pagenum"><a id="page261" name="page261"></a>(p. 261)</span> nationalists in South Africa,
+manifested with such disastrous effect during these critical
+months&mdash;June to September, 1899&mdash;the leaders of the Liberal Opposition
+otherwise displayed in their public utterances an ignorance of this
+province of the Empire that can only be characterised as "wanton." For
+what expression other than "wanton ignorance" can be used to describe
+the habit of mind which permits public men to make statements in
+direct conflict with the facts of South African history, as
+established by ascertainable evidence, or to state as facts
+allegations which proper inquiry would have shown to be untrue? Here
+again, from a mass of material provided by the utterances which came
+from the Liberal Opposition leaders on South African affairs, a few
+instances only can be brought to the notice of the reader, and these
+in the briefest form consistent with precision. On September 5th Mr.
+John Morley, speaking at Arbroath, stated that Sir Bartle Frere had
+"annexed the Transvaal." The present baronet, the late High
+Commissioner's son, called him to account at once; but it required
+three successive letters<a id="footnotetag152" name="footnotetag152"></a><a href="#footnote152" title="Go to footnote 152"><span class="small">[152]</span></a> to wring from Mr. John Morley a specific
+acknowledgement of his error. The evidence which establishes the fact
+that Frere did not annex the Transvaal is the following statement,
+bearing his signature and published in February, 1881:<a id="footnotetag153" name="footnotetag153"></a><a href="#footnote153" title="Go to footnote 153"><span class="small">[153]</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page262" name="page262"></a>(p. 262)</span> "It was an act which in no way originated with me, over
+     which I had no control, and with which I was only subsequently
+     incidentally connected.... It was a great question then, as now,
+     whether the annexation was justifiable."</p>
+
+<p>This was on the 5th. On the 27th a letter was published in <span class="italic">The Times</span>
+in which Sir William Harcourt wrote, in respect of the suzerainty
+question:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "All further argument is now superfluous, as the matter is
+     decisively disposed of by the publication at Pretoria of Lord
+     Derby's telegram of February 27th, 1884, in which the effect of
+     the London Convention of that date was stated in the following
+     words: 'There will be the same complete independence in the
+     Transvaal as in the Orange Free State.'"</p>
+
+<p>In a letter written on the day following, and published in <span class="italic">The Times</span>
+of October 2nd, the writer of the present work pointed out, among
+other inaccuracies, that the words actually telegraphed by Lord Derby
+were: "same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in
+Orange Free State." That is to say, before the word "independence" the
+word "internal"&mdash;vitally important to the present issue&mdash;was inserted
+in the original, and omitted in the Boer version, from which Sir
+William Harcourt had quoted without referring to the Blue-book, Cd.
+4,036.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Its injurious effect.</span>
+
+<p>The third instance occurred some three months later. Mr. James Bryce,
+speaking on December <span class="pagenum"><a id="page263" name="page263"></a>(p. 263)</span> 14th, 1899, stated that Sir Bartle
+Frere "sent to govern the Transvaal Sir Owen Lanyon, an officer
+unfitted by training and character for so delicate and difficult a
+task."<a id="footnotetag154" name="footnotetag154"></a><a href="#footnote154" title="Go to footnote 154"><span class="small">[154]</span></a> The following passage, which the present writer
+subsequently published, affords precise and overwhelming evidence of
+the absolute untruth of Mr. Bryce's assertion. It appears in a letter
+written by Sir Bartle Frere on December 13th, 1878, to Mr. (now Sir)
+Gordon Sprigg, then Premier of Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The Secretary of State has nominated Lanyon to take Shepstone's
+     place whenever he leaves [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> when Lanyon leaves Kimberley,
+     where he was Administrator of Griqualand West]. This was not my
+     arrangement, and had it been left to me I think I should have
+     arranged otherwise, for while I believe Lanyon to be one of the
+     most right-minded, hardworking, and able men in South Africa, I
+     know he does not fancy the work in the Transvaal, and I think I
+     could have done better. However, it does not rest with me, and
+     all I have to do is to find a man fit to take his place when he
+     leaves."<a id="footnotetag155" name="footnotetag155"></a><a href="#footnote155" title="Go to footnote 155"><span class="small">[155]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>All of these three men were of Cabinet rank. Two of them, Mr. Morley
+and Mr. Bryce, enjoyed a great and deserved reputation as men of
+letters; and their public utterances on the South African question,
+accepted in large measure on the strength <span class="pagenum"><a id="page264" name="page264"></a>(p. 264)</span> of this literary
+reputation, were responsible in an appreciable degree for the distrust
+and coldness manifested by the people of the United States of America
+towards Great Britain during the first year of the war. But this is a
+consideration of secondary importance. The vital point to recognise is
+that, so long as the Empire remains without a common representative
+council, a knowledge of the conditions of the over-sea Britains must
+be considered as necessary a part of the political equipment of any
+English statesman as a knowledge of Lancashire or of Kent. After the
+war had broken out, Lord Rosebery, almost alone among Liberal
+statesmen, did something to support the Government. This distinguished
+advocate of Imperial unity and national efficiency then recommended
+the English people to educate themselves by reading Sir Percy
+FitzPatrick's <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>, and encouraged them by
+declaring his belief that England would "muddle through" this, as
+other wars. It does not seem, however, to have occurred to Lord
+Rosebery that, if he had used his undoubted influence in time to
+prevent his party from making it impossible for the Salisbury Cabinet
+to carry out in June the effective peace strategy long recommended by
+Lord Milner, the prospect of a "muddle" would have been materially
+diminished, if not altogether removed.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Chamberlain's proposal.</span>
+
+<p>There is one other fact that cannot be overlooked in estimating the
+degree in which the Liberal leaders are answerable to the nation for
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page265" name="page265"></a>(p. 265)</span> the fatal error of postponing effective military
+preparations from June to September. After the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference Lord Milner, as we have seen, asked for
+immediate and substantial reinforcements. Mr. Chamberlain then
+approached Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman with a proposal that the
+Government should inform the Opposition leaders of the circumstances
+that made military preparations necessary, and of the precise measures
+which they might deem advisable to adopt from time to time, on the
+understanding that the Opposition, on their part, should refrain from
+raising any public discussion as to the expediency of these measures.
+The object of this proposal was, of course, to enable the Government
+to make effective preparations for war, without lessening the prospect
+of achieving a peaceful settlement by the negotiations in progress.
+Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's reply to this overture was a refusal to
+make the Opposition a party to any such arrangement. If the Government
+chose to make military preparations they must do so, he said, entirely
+on their own responsibility.</p>
+
+<p>The significance of this refusal of Mr. Chamberlain's offer appears
+from the answer which was subsequently put forward by the Prime
+Minister, the late Lord Salisbury, to the charge of "military
+unpreparedness" brought against the British Government after the early
+disasters of the campaign. What prevented the Cabinet, according to
+the Premier, from taking the measures required <span class="pagenum"><a id="page266" name="page266"></a>(p. 266)</span> by the
+military situation in June was the British system of popular
+government. Any preparations on the scale demanded by Lord Milner and
+Lord Wolseley could not have been set on foot without provoking the
+fullest discussion in Parliament and the Press. The leaders of the
+Opposition would have contested fiercely the proposals of the
+Government, and the perversion of these opportunities for discussion
+into an anti-war propaganda might have exhibited England as a country
+divided against itself. It may be questioned whether, in point of
+fact, the Liberal leaders could have done anything more calculated to
+injure the interests of their country if the Government had mobilised
+the army corps, and despatched the ten thousand defensive troops in
+June, than they did when these measures were postponed until
+September. But, however this may be, the circumstance that this
+proposal was made by Mr. Chamberlain, and refused by Sir H.
+Campbell-Bannerman, is noteworthy both as an indication of the spirit
+of lofty patriotism of which the Salisbury Cabinet, in spite of its
+initial error, was destined to give more than one proof in the course
+of the war and as an example of a method of escaping from the
+injurious results of a well-recognised defect in the democratic system
+of government&mdash;a method which, it is not unreasonable to hope, may be
+employed with success should the like occasion arise at any future
+time.</p>
+
+<p>This, then, was the state of affairs in England. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page267" name="page267"></a>(p. 267)</span> The
+Opposition throughout the negotiations was proclaiming that war was
+out of the question, and that preparations for war were altogether
+unnecessary. The people, being ignorant of the progress which the
+nationalist movement in South Africa had made, were irresolute, and
+withheld from the Government the support without which it could not
+make adequate military preparations, except at the risk of defeat in
+Parliament and possible loss of office.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Objects of Afrikander policy.</span>
+
+<p>What was the position in South Africa? Above all, what was the
+position of the man whose duty it was "to take all such measures and
+do all such things" as were necessary for the safety of the subjects
+of the Crown and for the maintenance of British interests? The
+ignorance of South Africa that led to the partial paralysis of the
+Government was in no sense attributable to him. The broad fact that
+the Afrikander nationalist<a id="footnotetag156" name="footnotetag156"></a><a href="#footnote156" title="Go to footnote 156"><span class="small">[156]</span></a> movement had made the moral supremacy
+of the Dutch complete was declared by Lord Milner, during his visit to
+England in the winter of 1898-9, to the Colonial Secretary and other
+members of the Salisbury Cabinet. His verdict that nothing but prompt
+and energetic action on the part of the Imperial Government could keep
+South Africa a part of the Empire was publicly made known (so far as
+he was concerned) in his despatch of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page268" name="page268"></a>(p. 268)</span> May 4th, 1899, which
+was withheld, however, from publication until June 14th. The
+Bloemfontein Conference was a device of the Afrikander nationalists at
+the Cape to avert a military conflict between the South African
+Republic and Great Britain, which, they believed, would result not
+merely in the destruction of the Republics, but in the loss of the
+prospect&mdash;which they then enjoyed&mdash;of achieving through the existence
+of the Republics the independence of the Afrikander nation as a whole.
+All this Lord Milner made perfectly clear to Mr. Chamberlain. The
+illusory concessions embodied in President Krüger's Franchise Law were
+yielded by the Republics with the object of securing the "moral
+support" of the Cape Afrikanders in the negotiations, and thereby
+obtaining the delay which was required to complete their military
+preparations; since the Republican nationalists, unlike those of the
+Cape, believed that the independence of the Afrikander nation could be
+wrested from Great Britain by force of arms. The efforts made by the
+Cape nationalists, first to secure these concessions, and then to
+induce the republican nationalists to grant the further concessions
+which would have satisfied the British Government, were made for the
+same purpose as the Bloemfontein Conference had been arranged&mdash;namely,
+to avert a conflict which, being premature, would be disastrous to the
+nationalist cause, not only in the Republics but in the Cape Colony.
+The respective objects both of the republican <span class="pagenum"><a id="page269" name="page269"></a>(p. 269)</span> and Cape
+nationalists had been divined by Lord Milner, and, therefore,
+immediately after the failure of the Conference, he had urged the Home
+Government to send reinforcements to South Africa sufficient to defend
+British territory from attack, and to check any incipient rebellion in
+the Cape Colony. The negotiations might, or might not, result in a
+peaceful settlement; but it was futile, nay more, it was dangerous, he
+said, for Great Britain to go on as though war were out of the
+question.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's position.</span>
+
+<p>This was the view of the South African situation which Lord Milner
+laid before the Home Government in June. We have seen what was done by
+them in response to these representations. Some special service
+officers were sent out to organise locally the defences of the Cape
+Colony and Rhodesia. The Cape and Natal garrisons were strengthened by
+a few very inadequate reinforcements arriving in the course of the
+next two months. General Butler was not recalled until the latter part
+of August; his successor, General Forestier-Walker, did not arrive
+until September 6th. We have traced the causes which made it
+impossible for the Imperial Government, as they conceived, to do more
+than this; and when in due course we come to consider the broad phases
+of the war, the nature of the penalty which the British Army, and the
+British nation, had to pay for the partial paralysis of the Government
+will become sufficiently apparent.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page270" name="page270"></a>(p. 270)</span> The man who suffered most by all this was Lord Milner. When
+he asked for military preparations, he was told that he could not have
+them. When he asked for the removal of a military adviser with whom
+he was supremely dissatisfied, he was told that he must put up with
+General Butler for a little longer. He put up with him for two months.
+His Colonial ministers, whose advice on many points he was bound to
+accept so long as he did not dismiss them, were men placed in office
+by the Dutch subjects of the Crown for the very purpose of
+frustrating, by constitutional means, the successful intervention in
+the Transvaal, by which alone, in his opinion, British supremacy could
+be made a reality.</p>
+
+<p>Indeed, the odds were heavily against Lord Milner in his task of
+saving England, in spite of herself and in spite of the enemies of
+whose power she was wholly ignorant, and to whose very existence she
+remained contemptuously indifferent. To the great mass of the British
+population in South Africa, he stood for England and English justice.
+To them he seemed the representative man, for whom they had waited
+many a long year. They felt that he was fighting their battle and
+doing their work; and, making allowance for local jealousies and
+accidental partialities, they never ceased to regard him thus. This
+was his one and only source of assured support. But he was far removed
+from the active British centres: <span class="pagenum"><a id="page271" name="page271"></a>(p. 271)</span> from the group of towns
+formed by the Albany settlers and their descendants in the Eastern
+Province, and from Kimberley, Durban and Maritzburg, and Johannesburg.
+In the Cape peninsula, of course, there was a considerable British
+population of professional and commercial men; but this population had
+been so closely related by business and social ties with the
+preponderant Dutch population of the Western Province that many among
+them hesitated to declare themselves openly against the Dutch party.
+All who were members of the Progressive party, from the time of the
+Graaf Reinet speech, had given unswerving support to Lord Milner's
+policy; but the strength of the influence created by years of
+alternate political co-operation with the Bond leaders may be gathered
+from the fact that even so staunch a supporter of the British
+connection as Sir James (then Mr.) Rose Innes did not publicly declare
+his adhesion to the intervention policy until after the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference. Moreover, the increasing political solidarity
+of the British population in the Cape Colony augmented the bitterness
+with which the few English politicians, who had remained in alliance
+with the Dutch party, regarded the man whose resolution and insight
+had penetrated and exposed the designs of the Bond.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Intrigues and disaffection.</span>
+
+<p>It is difficult to convey any adequate impression of the atmosphere of
+suspicion and intrigue by which Lord Milner was surrounded. The Dutch
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page272" name="page272"></a>(p. 272)</span> party was in the ascendant in the Colony. The Cape Civil
+Service was tainted throughout with disaffection. Even the <span class="italic">personnel</span>
+of the Government offices at Capetown, although it contained many
+excellent and loyal men, included also many who were disaffected or
+lukewarm. It is characteristic of the situation that during the most
+critical period of the negotiations with the Transvaal, the
+ministerial organ, <span class="italic">The South African News</span>, permitted itself to
+indulge, where Lord Milner, was concerned, not only in the bitterest
+criticisms but in outspoken personal abuse. To have abused the
+representative of the Sovereign in a British colony of which one-half
+of the population was seething with sedition, while a part had been
+actually armed for rebellion by the secret emissaries of a state with
+which Great Britain was on the verge of war, is an act which admits of
+only one interpretation. Lord Milner was to be got rid of at all
+costs; for the policy which <span class="italic">The South African News</span> was intended to
+promote was that not of Great Britain, but of the Transvaal. The paper
+was directly inspired&mdash;it is indeed not unlikely that the articles
+themselves were written&mdash;by some of the members of the Ministry, Lord
+Milner's "constitutional advisers," whom throughout he himself treated
+with the respect to which their position entitled them.</p>
+
+<p>But nothing, perhaps, shows more vividly how extraordinary was the
+position in which Lord Milner found himself than the fact, which we
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page273" name="page273"></a>(p. 273)</span> have already noted, that the passage of the large
+consignment of 500 Mauser rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges for the Free
+State, to which the Prime Minister's attention was "drawn specially,
+because it was large," on July 15th, was not made known to him, the
+Governor of the Cape Colony, until August 9th, and then only by
+accident.<a id="footnotetag157" name="footnotetag157"></a><a href="#footnote157" title="Go to footnote 157"><span class="small">[157]</span></a> There is only one explanation of this remarkable
+incident: the interests of the Dutch party were different from those
+of the British Government. The Cape Colony was only in name a British
+colony. Under the guise of constitutional forms it had attained
+independence&mdash;virtual, though not nominal. If Lord Milner had
+contracted the habit of Biblical quotation from the Afrikander
+leaders, he might well have quoted the words of the psalmist: "Many
+bulls have compassed me; strong bulls of Bashan have beset me
+round."<a id="footnotetag158" name="footnotetag158"></a><a href="#footnote158" title="Go to footnote 158"><span class="small">[158]</span></a> Even the approaches to Government House were watched by
+spies in President Krüger's pay, who carefully noted all who came and
+went. Members of the Uitlander community were the special subjects of
+this system of espionage.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Spies round Government House.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "When on a visit to Capetown," writes Sir Percy FitzPatrick, "I
+     called several times upon the High Commissioner, and learning, by
+     private advice, that my movements were being reported in detail
+     through the Secret Service Department, I informed Sir Alfred
+     Milner of the fact. Sir Alfred admitted that the idea of secret
+     agents in British territory <span class="pagenum"><a id="page274" name="page274"></a>(p. 274)</span> and spies round or in
+     Government House was not pleasant, but expressed the hope that
+     those things should not deter those who wished to call on him, as
+     he was there as the representative of Her Majesty for the benefit
+     of British subjects, and very desirous of ascertaining for
+     himself the facts of the case."<a id="footnotetag159" name="footnotetag159"></a><a href="#footnote159" title="Go to footnote 159"><span class="small">[159]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The Afrikander leaders in the Cape never identified themselves with
+the British cause. To them the Salisbury Cabinet was a "team most
+unjustly disposed towards us"; a team, moreover, which they earnestly,
+and not without reason, hoped might be replaced by a Liberal
+Government that would allow them undisturbed to carry forward their
+plans to full fruition. The motive of their "mediation," such as it
+was, was political expediency. It was not from any belief in the
+justice of the British claims that they endeavoured to persuade the
+republican nationalists to give way; still less from any feeling that
+England's cause was their cause. When, at length, they became really
+earnest in pressing President Krüger to grant a "colourable" measure
+of franchise reform&mdash;to use Mr. Merriman's adjective&mdash;it was for their
+own sake, and not for England's, that they worked. This motive runs
+through the whole of their correspondence; but it emerges more frankly
+in the urgent messages sent during the three days (September 12th to
+15th) in which the Transvaal reply to the British despatch of
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page275" name="page275"></a>(p. 275)</span> September 8th was being prepared. "Mind," telegraphs Mr.
+Hofmeyr to Mr. Fischer on September 13th, "war will probably have a
+fatal effect on the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Afrikander
+party." And when, from Mr. Fischer's reply, war was seen to have come
+in spite of all his counsels of prudence, the racial tie asserted
+itself, and he found consolation for his impotence in an expression of
+his hatred against England. On September 14th Mr. Hofmeyr telegraphed
+to President Steyn:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I suppose you have seen our wires to Fischer and his replies,
+     which latter I deeply regret. The 'to be or not to be' of the
+     Transvaal, Free State, and our party at the Cape, depends upon
+     this decision. The trial is a severe one, but hardly so severe as
+     the outrageous despatches received by Brand from [Sir Philip]
+     Wodehouse and [Sir Henry] Barkly. The enemy then hoped that Brand
+     would refuse, as the Transvaal's enemy now hopes Krüger will do;
+     but Brand conceded, and saved the State. Follow Brand's example.
+     Future generations of your and my people will praise you."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Hofmeyr's "bitter feelings".</span>
+
+<p>And on the 15th:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "You have no conception of my bitter feelings, which can hardly
+     be surpassed by that of our and your people, but the stronger my
+     feelings the more I am determined to repress them, when
+     considering questions of policy affecting the future weal or woe
+     of our people. May the Supreme Being help you, me, and them. Have
+     not seen the High Commissioner for weeks."</p>
+
+<p>The reply of the republican nationalists, addressed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page276" name="page276"></a>(p. 276)</span> to Mr.
+Hofmeyr and forwarded through President Steyn, contains a
+characteristically distorted version of the course of the
+negotiations. They have made concession after concession, but all in
+vain. "However much we recognise and value your kind intentions," they
+write, "we regret that it is no longer possible for us to comply with
+the extravagant and brutal requests of the British Government." Thus
+the Pretoria Executive declared themselves on September 15th, 1899, to
+the Master of the Bond, when they were in the act of refusing Mr.
+Chamberlain's offer to accept a five years' franchise bill, provided
+it was shown by due inquiry to be a genuine measure of reform. Very
+different was the account of the same transaction given by Mr. Smuts,
+when, in urging the remnant of the burghers of both Republics to
+surrender, he said, on May 30th, 1902, at Vereeniging, "I am one of
+those who, as members of the Government of the South African Republic,
+<span class="italic">provoked the war with England</span>". But the passage in this document
+which is most useful to the historian is that in which the republican
+nationalists remind the Afrikander leaders at the Cape of the
+insincerity of their original "mediation." In dialectics Mr. Fischer,
+Mr. Smuts, and Mr. Reitz are quite able to hold their own with Mr.
+Hofmeyr, Dr. Te Water, and Mr. Schreiner. They have not forgotten the
+Cape Prime Minister's precipitate benediction alike of President
+Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme and of the seven years' <span class="pagenum"><a id="page277" name="page277"></a>(p. 277)</span>
+franchise of the Volksraad proposals. They remember also how the
+"Hofmeyr compromise" was proclaimed in the Bond and the ministerial
+press as affording conclusive evidence of the "sweet reasonableness"
+of President Krüger and his Executive. And so they remark, "We are
+sorry not to be able to follow your advice; but we point out that you
+yourself let it be known that we had your whole approval, if we gave
+the present franchise as we were doing."<a id="footnotetag160" name="footnotetag160"></a><a href="#footnote160" title="Go to footnote 160"><span class="small">[160]</span></a> Here we have the kernel
+of the whole matter. A nine years', seven years', or a five years'
+franchise was all one to the Cape Nationalists, provided only that
+England was kept a little longer from claiming her position as
+paramount Power in South Africa. For these men knew, or thought they
+knew, that for England "a little longer" would be "too late."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner.</span>
+
+<p>It was a greater achievement to have frustrated so subtle a
+combination, directed by the astute mind of Mr. Hofmeyr&mdash;the man who
+refused to allow his passions to interfere with his policy&mdash;than to
+have prevented the British Government from falling a victim to the
+coarse duplicity of President Krüger. Tireless effort and consummate
+statesmanship alone would not have accomplished this purpose. To these
+qualities Lord Milner added a personal charm, elusive, and yet
+irresistible; and it was this "union of intellect with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page278" name="page278"></a>(p. 278)</span>
+fascination," of which Lord Rosebery had spoken,<a id="footnotetag161" name="footnotetag161"></a><a href="#footnote161" title="Go to footnote 161"><span class="small">[161]</span></a> that enabled him
+to transcend the infinite difficulty of his official relationship to
+Mr. Schreiner. Even so that relationship must have broken down under
+the strain of the negotiations and the war, had not Mr. Schreiner's
+complex political creed included the saving clause of allegiance to
+his sovereign. When once the British troops had begun to land Mr.
+Schreiner accepted the new situation. No longer merely the
+parliamentary head of the Dutch party and the agent of the Bond, he
+realised also his responsibility as a minister of the Crown. None the
+less there were matters of the gravest concern in which, both before
+and after the ultimatum, the Prime Minister used all the
+constitutional means at his disposal to oppose Lord Milner. When, upon
+the arrival (August 5th) of the small additions to the Cape garrison
+ordered out in June, Lord Milner determined to draw the attention of
+the Ministry to the exposed condition of the Colony, he found that the
+Prime Minister's views differed completely from his own. A few days
+later he addressed a minute to his ministers on the subject of the
+defence of Kimberley and other military questions. From this time
+onwards, in almost daily battles, Mr. Schreiner resisted the plans of
+local military preparation which Lord Milner deemed necessary for the
+protection of the Colony. His object, as he said, was to keep the Cape
+Colony out of the struggle.<a id="footnotetag162" name="footnotetag162"></a><a href="#footnote162" title="Go to footnote 162"><span class="small">[162]</span></a> On Friday, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page279" name="page279"></a>(p. 279)</span> September 8th,
+when in London the Cabinet Council was held at which it was decided to
+send out the 10,000 troops to reinforce the South African garrison, at
+Capetown Lord Milner was engaged in a long endeavour to persuade his
+Prime Minister that it was necessary to do something for the defence
+of Kimberley.<a id="footnotetag163" name="footnotetag163"></a><a href="#footnote163" title="Go to footnote 163"><span class="small">[163]</span></a> Up to the very day on which the Free State
+commandos crossed the border, Mr. Schreiner relied upon the definite
+pledge given him by President Steyn that the territory of the Cape
+Colony would not be invaded; and not until that day was he undeceived.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Schreiner and Steyn.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I said to the President," he declared in the Cape Parliament a
+     year later,<a id="footnotetag164" name="footnotetag164"></a><a href="#footnote164" title="Go to footnote 164"><span class="small">[164]</span></a> "that I would not believe he would invade south
+     of the Orange River.<a id="footnotetag165" name="footnotetag165"></a><a href="#footnote165" title="Go to footnote 165"><span class="small">[165]</span></a> President Steyn's reply was, 'Can you
+     give me a guarantee that no troops will come to the border?' Of
+     course, I could give no such guarantee, and I did not then
+     believe that, although such a guarantee could not be given, the
+     Free State would invade British territory with the object of
+     endeavouring to promote the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page280" name="page280"></a>(p. 280)</span> establishment of one
+     Republic in South Africa, as the Prime Minister<a id="footnotetag166" name="footnotetag166"></a><a href="#footnote166" title="Go to footnote 166"><span class="small">[166]</span></a> has said."</p>
+
+<p>As the Boer invasion spread further into the Colony Mr. Schreiner
+receded proportionately from his original standpoint of neutrality.
+Indeed, three distinct phases in the Prime Minister's progress can be
+distinguished. In the first stage, which lasted until the actual
+invasion of the Colony by the Boer commandos, he used all his
+constitutional power to prevent the people of the Colony, British and
+Dutch alike, from being involved in the war: and it was only after a
+severe struggle that Lord Milner prevailed upon him even to call out
+the Kimberley Volunteers on October 2nd, <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, a week before the
+Ultimatum. This, "the neutrality" stage, lasted up to the invasion.
+After the invasion came the second stage, in which Mr. Schreiner seems
+to have argued to himself in this manner: "As the Boers have invaded
+this colony, I, as Prime Minister, cannot refuse that the local forces
+should be called out to protect its territory." And so on October
+16th, after Vryburg had gone over to the Boers, after Kimberley had
+been cut off, and the whole country from Kimberley to Orange River was
+in the hands of the enemy, he consented to the issue of a proclamation
+calling out 2,000 volunteers for garrison duty within the Colony.<a id="footnotetag167" name="footnotetag167"></a><a href="#footnote167" title="Go to footnote 167"><span class="small">[167]</span></a>
+But in making this tardy concession he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page281" name="page281"></a>(p. 281)</span> was careful to point
+out to Lord Milner that the British cause would lose more than it
+would gain. "I warn you," he said in effect, "that it is not to your
+advantage; because you are the weaker party. In the Cape Colony more
+men will fight for the Boers than will fight for you." The third stage
+in Mr. Schreiner's conversion was reached when, in November, 1899, the
+invading Boers had advanced to the Tembuland border, in the extreme
+east of the Colony. Then Mr. Schreiner allowed the natives to be
+called out for the defence of their own territory. In making this
+final concession the Prime Minister yielded to the logic of facts in a
+matter concerning which he had previously offered a most stubborn
+resistance to the Governor's arguments.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Schreiner and local forces.</span>
+
+<p>For in the discussion of the measures urged by Lord Milner as
+necessary for the protection of the Colony, the question of arming the
+natives and coloured people had necessarily arisen. The Bastards in
+the west and the Tembus in the east were known to be eager to defend
+the Queen's country against invasion. Mr. Schreiner declared that to
+arm the natives was to do violence to the central principle upon which
+the maintenance of civilisation in South Africa was based&mdash;the
+principle that the black man must never be used to fight against the
+white. Lord Milner did not question the validity <span class="pagenum"><a id="page282" name="page282"></a>(p. 282)</span> of this
+principle; but he maintained&mdash;and rightly, as Mr. Schreiner admitted
+subsequently by his action in the case of the Tembu frontier&mdash;that it
+could not be applied to the case in question. "If white men," he said,
+"will go and invade the territory of the blacks, then the blacks must
+be armed to repel the invasion."</p>
+
+<p>The change which came over Mr. Schreiner's attitude, due, no doubt,
+partly to his gradual enlightenment as to the real aims of the
+republican nationalists, but also to the skilful use which Lord Milner
+made of that enlightenment, may be traced in the following contrasts.
+Before the Boer invasion he refused to call out the local forces of
+the Colony even for purposes of defence;<a id="footnotetag168" name="footnotetag168"></a><a href="#footnote168" title="Go to footnote 168"><span class="small">[168]</span></a> afterwards he not only
+sanctioned the employment of these forces in the Colony, but allowed
+them to take part in Lord Roberts' advance upon Bloemfontein and
+Pretoria. Before the invading Boers, having already possessed
+themselves of the north-eastern districts of Cape Colony, began to
+threaten the purely native territories to the south, he would not hear
+of the natives being armed for their own protection. But when the
+Boers had actually reached the borders of Tembuland he consented. In
+his advice to the Cape Government, no less than in that which he gave
+to the Home Government, Lord Milner was shown to be in the right. In
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page283" name="page283"></a>(p. 283)</span> both cases he urged an effective preparation for war. In
+both the measures which he advised were ultimately taken; but taken
+only when they had lost all their power as a means of promoting peace,
+and half of their efficacy as a contribution to the rapid and
+successful prosecution of the war. In both cases Lord Milner was able,
+in the face of unparalleled obstacles, to secure just the minimum
+preparation for war which stood between the British Empire and
+overwhelming military disaster.</p>
+
+<p>We have observed the position in Great Britain, and found that the
+root cause of the impotence of the Home Government was the nation's
+ignorance of South Africa. In the Cape Colony the evil was of a
+different order. Lord Milner, although High Commissioner for South
+Africa, had within the Colony only the strictly limited powers of a
+constitutional governor. The British population were keenly alive to
+the necessity for active preparations for the defence of their
+country; were, indeed, indignant at the refusal of the Schreiner
+Cabinet to allow the local forces to be called out: but the Dutch
+party was in office, the Bond was "loyal," Mr. Schreiner was a
+minister of the Crown, and the most that the Governor could do was to
+urge upon his ministers the measures upon the execution of which he
+had no power to insist.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Seven years after.</span>
+
+<p>The best comment upon this strange situation is that which is afforded
+by a passage in Lord Milner's speech in the House of Lords on February
+26th, 1906. Seven years have gone by, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page284" name="page284"></a>(p. 284)</span> the great
+proconsul has returned to England. He is drawn from his much-needed
+rest by a sudden danger to the country which he has kept a part of the
+Empire. The Unionist Government has fallen, and a Liberal Government
+has been placed in power. He is warning this Government of the danger
+of a premature grant of responsible government to the Orange River
+Colony.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "What is going to happen under responsible government? It is more
+     than probable, it is, humanly speaking, certain, that the persons
+     to whom I have referred will form a large majority, if not almost
+     the whole, of that first elected Parliament of the Orange River
+     Colony to which, from the first hour of its existence, the whole
+     legislative and executive power in that colony is to be
+     entrusted. I do not suggest that they will begin by doing
+     anything sinister. All forms will be duly observed; as why should
+     they not be? It will be perfectly possible for them, with the
+     most complete constitutional propriety, little by little to
+     reverse all that has been done, and gradually to get rid of the
+     British officials, the British teachers, the bulk of the British
+     settlers, and any offensive British taint which may cling to the
+     statute-book or the administration. I can quite understand that,
+     from the point of view of what are known as the pro-Boers, such a
+     result is eminently desirable. They thought the war was a crime,
+     the annexation a blunder, and they think to-day that the sooner
+     you can get back to the old state of things the better. I say I
+     quite understand that view, though I do not suppose it is shared
+     by His Majesty's ministers, or, at any rate, by all of them. What
+     I cannot understand is how any human being, not being a pro-Boer,
+     can regard with equanimity the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page285" name="page285"></a>(p. 285)</span> prospect that the very
+     hand which drafted the ultimatum of October, 1899,<a id="footnotetag169" name="footnotetag169"></a><a href="#footnote169" title="Go to footnote 169"><span class="small">[169]</span></a> may
+     within a year be drafting 'Ministers' Minutes' for submission to
+     a British Governor who will have virtually no option but to obey
+     them. What will be the contents of those minutes, I wonder? As
+     time goes on it may be a proposal for dispensing with English as
+     an official language, or a proposal for the distribution to every
+     country farmer of a military rifle and so many hundred
+     cartridges, in view of threatened danger from the Basutos."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">"Just reminiscences".</span>
+
+<p>So far Lord Milner had dealt with the Orange River Colony. Then he let
+his thoughts range back to these months of his great ordeal.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"I think I can see the Governor just hesitating a little to put
+     his hand to such a document. In that case I think I can hear the
+     instant low growl of menace from Press and platform and pulpit,
+     the hints of the necessity of his recall, and the answering
+     scream from the pro-Boer Press of Britain against the ruthless
+     satrap, ignorant of constitutional usage and wholly
+     misunderstanding his own position, who dared to trample upon the
+     rights of a free people. I may be told, I know I shall be told,
+     that such notions are the wild imaginings of a disordered brain,
+     that these are theoretical possibilities having no relation to
+     fact or to probability. <span class="italic">My Lords, they are not imaginings. They
+     are just reminiscences.</span></p>
+
+<p>"I know what it is to be Governor of a self-governing colony,
+     with the disaffected element in the ascendant. I was bitterly
+     attacked for not being sufficiently submissive under the
+     circumstances. Yet, even with the least submissive Governor, the
+     position is so weak that strange things happen. It was under
+     responsible government, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page286" name="page286"></a>(p. 286)</span> and in the normal working of
+     responsible government, that 1,000,000 cartridges were passed
+     through Cape Colony, on the eve of the war, to arm the people who
+     were just going to attack us, and that some necessary cannon were
+     stopped from being sent to a defenceless border town,<a id="footnotetag170" name="footnotetag170"></a><a href="#footnote170" title="Go to footnote 170"><span class="small">[170]</span></a> which
+     directly afterwards was besieged, and which, from want of these
+     cannon, was nearly taken."<a id="footnotetag171" name="footnotetag171"></a><a href="#footnote171" title="Go to footnote 171"><span class="small">[171]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Thus, six and a half years later, Lord Milner spoke of these months of
+<span class="italic">Sturm und Drang</span> in the calm and passionless atmosphere of the House
+of Lords.</p>
+
+<p>From Bloemfontein to the ultimatum, the British flag in South Africa
+was stayed upon the "inflexible resolution" of one man. Two months
+later, when the army corps was all but landed, the English at the Cape
+gave speech. Then Sir David Gill's words at the St. Andrew's Day
+celebration of November 30th, 1890 came as a fresh breeze dispersing
+the miasmic humours of some low-lying, ill-drained plain.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">What the loyalists thought.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"In the history of the British colonies," he said, "no Governor
+     has ever been placed in greater difficulties. In spite of a
+     support of the most shamelessly feeble character, and in spite of
+     a want of understanding at home, His Excellency has not only had
+     to originate and carry out a policy, but he has had to instruct
+     the whole nation in the dangers which threatened; and the means
+     which were necessary to remove that danger.</p>
+
+<p>"When His Excellency came to this colony he found it honeycombed
+     with sedition. He found a canting loyalty, which aimed at the
+     overthrow of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page287" name="page287"></a>(p. 287)</span> British supremacy in this colony, and not
+     only in this colony, but in South Africa as well.... There have
+     been a mighty lot of misunderstandings in this country, a mighty
+     lot of mealy-mouthed loyalty, that did not mean loyalty at all,
+     and a mighty working to overthrow the power of Englishmen (and
+     Scotchmen) in this country&mdash;first of all to bring them into
+     contempt with the native population; secondly, to deprive them of
+     all political power; and thirdly, to deprive them of all material
+     power.... We have a minister who has gone to the front,<a id="footnotetag172" name="footnotetag172"></a><a href="#footnote172" title="Go to footnote 172"><span class="small">[172]</span></a> but
+     it is a remarkable fact that since that minister has gone to the
+     front the accessions of colonists to the ranks of the rebels have
+     been tenfold greater than they were before he went. It is in the
+     face of these innumerable difficulties that Sir Alfred Milner has
+     carried out his work."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This is how it struck a distinguished man of science, and one who was
+qualified, moreover, by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page288" name="page288"></a>(p. 288)</span> a residence at the Cape which dated
+back to the days of the Zulu War, to understand the full significance
+of what was going on around him.</p>
+
+<p>In July and August, President Krüger was winning all along the line.
+The Home Government was kept harmless and inactive by the Franchise
+Bill; the Cape Government tied the hands of the High Commissioner;
+supplies of arms and ammunition were pouring in, the temper of the
+burghers in both republics was rising, foreign military officers and
+M. Léon of the Creuzot Works had arrived; in short, the military
+preparations of four years were consummated without let or hindrance.
+September was less exclusively favourable to the republican cause. On
+September 8th, as we have seen, the Salisbury Cabinet determined to
+send out the defensive forces for which Lord Milner had asked three
+months before. Sir William Butler had been recalled; and General
+Forestier-Walker did all in his power to carry out the measures urged,
+and in most cases actually devised, by Lord Milner for the effective
+employment of the few thousand Imperial troops at his disposal. On the
+18th and 19th the Lancashire regiment was sent up-country from
+Capetown&mdash;half to garrison Kimberley, and half to hold the bridge that
+carried the main trunk line over the Orange River on its way
+northwards to Kimberley and then past the Transvaal border to
+Rhodesia. In doing this, however, Lord Milner was careful to point out
+to President Steyn that no menace <span class="pagenum"><a id="page289" name="page289"></a>(p. 289)</span> was intended to the Free
+State, which, "in case of war with the Transvaal Her Majesty's
+Government hoped would remain neutral, and the neutrality of which
+would be most strictly respected." Such excellent use was made by Lord
+Milner of the six weeks which elapsed between the recall of General
+Butler and the ultimatum (October 9th-11th), that the handful of
+regulars dotted down before the Free State border of the colony, and
+skilfully distributed at strategic points upon the railways, sufficed
+to keep President Steyn's commandos from penetrating south of the
+Orange River, until the army corps had begun to disembark at the Cape
+ports. On this, as on another occasion to be subsequently noted, it is
+difficult to withhold a tribute of admiration to the gifted
+personality of the man who, himself a civilian, could thus readily
+apply his unique knowledge of South African conditions to the uses of
+the art of war. At the same time, the promptitude and efficiency
+displayed by the Indian military authorities provided Natal, by
+October 8th, with a force that proved just&mdash;and only just&mdash;sufficient
+to prevent the Boer commandos from sweeping right through that colony
+down to Durban.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The negotiations closed.</span>
+
+<p>In the meantime the negotiations, having served their purpose, were
+being brought rapidly to a conclusion by the Pretoria Executive. On
+September 15th, as we have seen, the Republic notified its refusal to
+accept the terms offered in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page290" name="page290"></a>(p. 290)</span> the British despatch of the 8th;
+and before that date, as we have also noted, some of the Transvaal
+commandos had been ordered to take up their positions on the Natal
+border. On the 22nd a meeting of the Cabinet was held in London, at
+which it was decided to mobilise the army corps&mdash;a measure advised by
+Lord Wolseley in June. At the same time Lord Milner was instructed by
+telegraph to communicate to the South African Republic a despatch<a id="footnotetag173" name="footnotetag173"></a><a href="#footnote173" title="Go to footnote 173"><span class="small">[173]</span></a>
+in which the British Government "absolutely denied and repudiated" the
+claim of the South African Republic to be a "sovereign international
+state," and informed the Pretoria Executive that its refusal to
+entertain the offer made on September 8th&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "coming as it did at the end of nearly four months of protracted
+     negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation extending
+     over a period of more than five years, made it useless to further
+     pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and that Her
+     Majesty's Government were now compelled to consider the situation
+     afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final
+     settlement"</p>
+
+<p class="noindent">of the questions at issue. The result of these deliberations was to be
+communicated to Lord Milner in a later despatch.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Burghers mobilised.</span>
+
+<p>This note of September 22nd, together with a second communication of
+the same date, in which Mr. Chamberlain warmly repudiated the charges
+of bad faith brought against Sir William Greene, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page291" name="page291"></a>(p. 291)</span> reached the
+Pretoria Executive on the 25th, and on the same day it was known that
+a British force had entrained at Ladysmith for Glencoe. On the 26th
+intelligence of so serious a nature reached Lord Milner, that he
+telegraphed to warn the Home Government that the Transvaal and Free
+State were likely to take the initiative. According to Mr. Amery,<a id="footnotetag174" name="footnotetag174"></a><a href="#footnote174" title="Go to footnote 174"><span class="small">[174]</span></a>
+an ultimatum had been drafted upon receipt of the British note, and
+telegraphed on the following day to President Steyn for his approval.
+At Bloemfontein, however, the document was entirely recast by Mr.
+Fischer. Even so, in its amended form, it was ready on the 27th. On
+that day the Free State Raad, after six days of secret session,
+determined to join the sister Republic in declaring war upon Great
+Britain, and on the 28th the Transvaal commandos were mobilised. The
+ultimatum, according to the same authority, would have been delivered
+to Sir William Greene on Monday, October 2nd, had not deficiencies in
+the Boer transport and commissariat arrangements made it impossible
+for the burgher forces to advance immediately upon the British troops
+in Natal. At the last moment, also, President Steyn seems to have had
+some misgivings. On September 26th, together with the draft ultimatum
+from Pretoria, a suggestive telegram from Capetown, signed "Micaiah,"
+and bidding him "Read chapter xxii. 1st Book of Kings, and accept
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page292" name="page292"></a>(p. 292)</span> warning," had reached him;<a id="footnotetag175" name="footnotetag175"></a><a href="#footnote175" title="Go to footnote 175"><span class="small">[175]</span></a> and a few days later he
+received, through Mr. Fischer, a powerful appeal for peace from Sir
+Henry de Villiers.</p>
+
+<p>However this may be, the few administrative acts that remained to be
+taken were quickly accomplished in both Republics. In the Transvaal
+the remnant of the British population was already in flight; the law
+courts were suspended; the control of the railways was assumed by the
+Government and, in order to protect colonial recruits from the legal
+penalties attached to rebellion, on September 29th the Executive was
+empowered by the Volksraad to confer citizen rights on all aliens
+serving in the forces of the Republic. Not content with their
+barbarous expulsion of the British population, the Governments of both
+Republics for a week before the expiry of the ultimatum treated those
+of them who still remained as though a state of war had already been
+in existence. During these last days telegrams and letters praying for
+protection against some act of violence or spoliation were constantly
+arriving at Government House. But what could the High Commissioner do?
+The Army Corps was 6,000 miles away; the 10,000 defensive troops were
+most of them still on the water. The Free State, in Mr. Fischer's
+words, "did not recognise international law, and claimed to commandeer
+all persons whatsoever" under its own. In the Transvaal, Mr. Reitz
+(after consultation with Mr. Smuts) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page293" name="page293"></a>(p. 293)</span> was coolly replying to
+the British Agent's protest against the seizure of the property of
+British subjects, including £150,000 worth of bar gold, that "the
+property of private individuals of whatever nationality could be, and
+was being, commandeered to the value of £15 a head."<a id="footnotetag176" name="footnotetag176"></a><a href="#footnote176" title="Go to footnote 176"><span class="small">[176]</span></a> On October
+2nd the Transvaal Raads adjourned, and on the same day President Steyn
+informed the High Commissioner that the Free State burghers had been
+summoned for commando service. An interchange of telegrams then
+ensued, of which one, despatched on October 6th, is important as
+showing how earnestly Lord Milner seconded Mr. Chamberlain's endeavour
+to keep the door open for a peaceful settlement up to the last moment.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Last words.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I have the honour," he said, "to acknowledge Your Honour's long
+     telegram of yesterday afternoon [the 5th], the substance of which
+     I have communicated to Her Majesty's Government. There is, I
+     think, a conclusive reply to Your Honour's accusation against the
+     policy of Her Majesty's Government, but no good purpose would be
+     served by recrimination. The present position is that burgher
+     forces are assembled in very large numbers in immediate proximity
+     to the frontiers of Natal, while the British troops occupy
+     certain defensive positions well within those borders. The
+     question is whether the burgher forces will invade British
+     territory, thus closing the door to any possibility of a pacific
+     solution. I cannot believe that the South African Republic will
+     take such aggressive action, or that Your Honour would
+     countenance such a course, which there is nothing to justify.
+     Prolonged <span class="pagenum"><a id="page294" name="page294"></a>(p. 294)</span> negotiations have hitherto failed to bring
+     about a satisfactory understanding, and no doubt such
+     understanding is more difficult than ever to-day, after the
+     expulsion of British subjects with great loss and suffering; but
+     until the threatened act of aggression is committed I shall not
+     despair of peace, and I feel sure that any reasonable proposal,
+     from whatever quarter proceeding, would be favourably considered
+     by Her Majesty's Government if it offered an immediate
+     termination of present tension and a prospect of permanent
+     tranquillity."<a id="footnotetag177" name="footnotetag177"></a><a href="#footnote177" title="Go to footnote 177"><span class="small">[177]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>With this&mdash;practically the final communication of the British
+Government&mdash;it is instructive to compare the "last words" of the two
+other protagonists. The Pretoria Executive, true to its policy of
+playing for time, sends through Mr. Reitz two long and argumentative
+replies to the British despatches of July 27th (the Joint Commission),
+and May 10th (Mr. Chamberlain's reply to the petition to the Queen).
+The Afrikander nationalists having failed to "mediate" in Pretoria and
+Bloemfontein, consoled themselves with a final effort in the shape of
+a direct appeal to the Queen. In a petition signed by the fifty-eight
+Afrikander members of both Houses of the Cape Parliament, including,
+of course, the members of the Schreiner Cabinet, they declare their
+earnest belief that the South African Republic "is fully awakened to
+the wisdom and discretion of making liberal provision for the
+representation of the Uitlanders," and urge Her Majesty's Government
+to appoint a Joint Commission&mdash;a proposal to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page295" name="page295"></a>(p. 295)</span> which the
+British Government had declared that it was impossible to return. The
+effect of this somewhat half-hearted effort was, however, on this
+occasion appreciably diminished by the fact that the nationalist
+petition was accompanied by a resolution presented by fifty-three
+Progressive members of the Cape Parliament, embodying their entire
+disapproval of the opinion put forward by the petitioners, and
+containing the assurance that Her Majesty's Government might rely upon
+their strongest support.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The ultimatum delivered.</span>
+
+<p>The ultimatum was delivered to Sir William Greene on the afternoon of
+Monday, October 9th, and forthwith telegraphed to the High
+Commissioner at Capetown. Although it was a week behind time at
+Pretoria, its arrival was somewhat unexpected at Government House.
+Saturday and Sunday had been days of quite unusual calm. The
+Secretary, whose business it was to decode the official telegrams,
+commenced his task with but languid interest. He had decoded so many
+apparently unnecessary and inconclusive despatches of late. At first
+this seemed very much like the others. But, as he worked on, he came
+upon words that startled him to a sudden attention:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"This Government ... in the interest not only of this Republic,
+     but also of all South Africa,... feels itself called upon and
+     obliged ... to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the
+     assurance:</p>
+
+<p>"(<span class="italic">a</span>) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by
+     the friendly course of arbitration, or <span class="pagenum"><a id="page296" name="page296"></a>(p. 296)</span> by whatever
+     amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her
+     Majesty's Government.</p>
+
+<p>"(<span class="italic">b</span>) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be
+     instantly withdrawn.</p>
+
+<p>"(<span class="italic">c</span>) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in
+     South Africa since June 1st, 1899, shall be removed from South
+     Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this
+     Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee upon the
+     part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities
+     against any portion of the possessions of the British Government
+     shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within
+     a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the
+     Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith,
+     be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from
+     the borders.</p>
+
+<p>"(<span class="italic">d</span>) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas
+     shall not be landed in any part of South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>"This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative
+     answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her
+     Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon
+     Wednesday, October 11th, 1899, not later than five o'clock p.m.,
+     and it desires further to add that, in the event of unexpectedly
+     no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval,
+     it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of
+     Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will
+     not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and
+     that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place
+     within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our
+     borders, the Government will be compelled to regard that also as
+     a formal declaration of war.</p>
+
+<p>
+  "I have, etc.,</p>
+<p class="left50">"<span class="smcap">F. W. Reitz</span>, <span class="italic">State Secretary</span>."<a id="footnotetag178" name="footnotetag178"></a><a href="#footnote178" title="Go to footnote 178"><span class="small">[178]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page297" name="page297"></a>(p. 297)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">An appeal to Afrikanders.</span>
+
+<p>The war had come; and come in the almost incredible form of a naked
+assertion of the intention of the South African Republic to oust Great
+Britain from its position of paramount Power in South Africa. And the
+declaration of war,<a id="footnotetag179" name="footnotetag179"></a><a href="#footnote179" title="Go to footnote 179"><span class="small">[179]</span></a> published two days later by President Steyn,
+was no less definite. It referred to Great Britain's "unfounded claim
+to paramountcy for the whole of South Africa, and thus also over this
+State," and exhorted the burghers of the Free State to "stand up as
+one man against the oppressor and violator of right." Even greater
+frankness characterised the appeal to "Free Staters and Brother
+Afrikanders" issued by Mr. Reitz. In this document<a id="footnotetag180" name="footnotetag180"></a><a href="#footnote180" title="Go to footnote 180"><span class="small">[180]</span></a> not only was
+the entire Dutch population of South Africa invited to rid themselves,
+by force of arms, of British supremacy, but the statement of the Boer
+case took the form of an impeachment that covered the whole period of
+British administration. Great Britain&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"has, ever since the birth of our nation, been the oppressor of
+     the Afrikander and the native alike.</p>
+
+<p>"From Slagter's Nek to Laing's Nek, from the Pretoria Convention
+     to the Bloemfontein Conference&mdash;they have ever been the
+     treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and
+     the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they
+     want the gold-fields of the Witwatersrand.</p>
+
+<p>"Where is Waterboer to-day? He who had to be defended against the
+     Free State is to-day without <span class="pagenum"><a id="page298" name="page298"></a>(p. 298)</span> an inch of ground. Where
+     lies Lobengula in his unknown grave to-day, and what fillibusters
+     and fortune-hunters are possessors of his country?</p>
+
+<p>"Where are the native chiefs of Bechuanaland now, and who owns
+     their land?</p>
+
+<p>"Read the history of South Africa, and ask yourselves: Has the
+     British Government been a blessing or a curse to this
+     sub-continent?</p>
+
+<p>"Brother Afrikanders! I repeat, the day is at hand on which great
+     deeds are expected of us. WAR has broken out. What is it to be? A
+     wasted and enslaved South Africa, or&mdash;a Free, United South
+     Africa?</p>
+
+<p>"Come, let us stand shoulder to shoulder and do our holy duty!
+     The Lord of Hosts will be our Leader.</p>
+
+<p>"Be of good cheer.</p>
+<p class="left50">"<span class="smcap">F. W. Reitz.</span>"</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>That Monday night, besides repeating the ultimatum to the Home
+Government, Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the British authorities in
+Natal, Rhodesia, Basutoland, and the frontier towns.</p>
+
+<p>The ultimatum reached the Colonial Office at 6.45 a.m. on Tuesday. The
+reply, which was cabled to Lord Milner at 10.45 p.m. on the same day,
+was not unworthy of the occasion:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The British reply.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the
+     peremptory demands of the Government of the South African
+     Republic. You will inform the Government of the South African
+     Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the South
+     African Republic are such as Her <span class="pagenum"><a id="page299" name="page299"></a>(p. 299)</span> Majesty's Government
+     deem it impossible to discuss."<a id="footnotetag181" name="footnotetag181"></a><a href="#footnote181" title="Go to footnote 181"><span class="small">[181]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The High Commissioner was further desired to instruct Sir William
+Greene, in delivering the British reply, to ask for his passports.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page300" name="page300"></a>(p. 300)</span> CHAPTER VII</h3>
+
+<p class="title">THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS</p>
+
+
+<p>With the presentation of the Boer ultimatum the first and most
+difficult part of Lord Milner's task was accomplished. The actual
+pretensions of President Krüger and his republican confederates in the
+Free State and the Cape Colony were declared in a manner that could
+not fail to make them understood by the British people at home. The
+nationalists were unmasked. To what assurance of victory their
+military preparations had led them may be seen from the story of Mr.
+Amery's meeting with Mr. Reitz, two days before October 2nd, the
+Monday originally fixed for the delivery of the ultimatum. On the
+afternoon of this day, September 30th, Mr. Amery was walking with the
+State Secretary in Pretoria. Mr. Reitz, he tells us,<a id="footnotetag182" name="footnotetag182"></a><a href="#footnote182" title="Go to footnote 182"><span class="small">[182]</span></a> "suddenly
+turned round and said, 'Have you read <span class="italic">Treasure Island</span>? 'Yes.' 'Then
+you may remember the passage where they "tip the black spot" to Long
+John Silver?' 'Yes.' 'Well, I expect it will fall to my lot on Monday
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page301" name="page301"></a>(p. 301)</span> to "tip the black spot" to Long John Greene.' And hereupon
+the State Secretary cheerily detailed to his astounded listener the
+terms of the ultimatum, compliance with which might yet save the
+British Empire from war."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Effect of the ultimatum.</span>
+
+<p>Very different was the position at Capetown. Here there was no room
+either for levity or the insolence of anticipated triumph. Knowing
+what Lord Milner did&mdash;what he, of all men, had most cause to
+know&mdash;both of our unreadiness, and of the preparedness and confidence
+of the enemy, he could scarcely have looked forward to the future
+without the very gravest apprehension. None the less the ultimatum
+brought with it a certain sense of relief. The negotiations, which had
+degenerated long since into a diplomatic farce, were terminated. The
+situation had become once more clear. It has been the duty of few men
+to bear so heavy and so prolonged a burden of responsibility as that
+from which Lord Milner was thus set free. The danger that the Home
+Government, in its earnest desire for peace, might accept a settlement
+that would leave undecided the central issue of Boer or British
+supremacy in South Africa had never been wholly absent from his mind
+during the harassing negotiations that succeeded the Conference. Up to
+the very end there had been a haunting dread lest, in spite of his
+ceaseless vigilance and unstinted toil, a manifestation of British
+loyalty that would never be repeated should be coldly discouraged, and
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page302" name="page302"></a>(p. 302)</span> the nationalist movement allowed to proceed unchecked, until
+every colonist of British blood had surrendered the hope of remaining
+a citizen of the Empire for the degrading necessity of securing for
+himself and his children a tolerable position in the United States of
+South Africa by a timely alliance with the more progressive Dutch.
+From the presence of this danger Lord Milner was now relieved, since,
+as he instantly foresaw, the whip-lash of this frank appeal to force
+brought conviction where marshalled arguments were powerless to move.
+He had done what the religious enthusiasm of Livingstone, the
+political sagacity of Grey, the splendid devotion and prescience of
+Frere, and the Elizabethan statecraft of Rhodes, had failed to do. <span class="italic">He
+had made the Boer speak out.</span></p>
+
+<p>England was far from knowing all that these Boer aspirations meant, or
+the progress already achieved in the direction of their realisation.
+But this ignorance made the demands of the ultimatum seem the more
+insolent. To Mr. Balfour it was as though President Krüger had gone
+mad. But madness or insolence, the effect was the same. With the mass
+of the nation all hesitation, all balancing of arguments, were at an
+end. The one thing that was perceived was that any further attempt to
+treat with a people so minded would be an admission to the world that
+British supremacy had disappeared from South Africa. On this point,
+outside the narrow influence of a few professional <span class="pagenum"><a id="page303" name="page303"></a>(p. 303)</span> partisans
+and peace-makers, there had never been any doubt: the only question
+was whether British supremacy was, or was not, in danger. The Boer
+challenge having resolved this question, the mind of the nation was
+made up. The army, as the instrument of its will, was called upon to
+give effect to its decision.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">An anxious situation.</span>
+
+<p>Two years and eight months elapsed between the expiration of the two
+days' grace allowed by the ultimatum and the surrender of Vereeniging.
+During the first twelve months of this period Lord Milner's
+initiative, though his position remained arduous, anxious, and
+responsible, and his activity unceasing, was necessarily subordinated
+to that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South
+Africa. But during the second period of the war&mdash;that is to say, from
+November 29th, 1900, when Lord Kitchener succeeded Lord Roberts&mdash;the
+constructive statesmanship of the High Commissioner was called forth
+in an increasing degree as the area secured for peaceable occupation
+became widened, and the problems involved in the settlement and future
+administration of the new colonies emerged into increasing prominence
+and importance. But even during the first period, when the task of the
+army was the comparatively simple one of overcoming the organised
+resistance of the Republics and subduing the rebellion in the Cape
+Colony, Lord Milner's unshaken confidence and perfect mastery of South
+African conditions proved of inestimable value.</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page304" name="page304"></a>(p. 304)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Results and unpreparedness.</span>
+
+<p>Five years later he described himself as an "incorrigible optimist."
+Optimist or not, at this time he harboured no illusions. He knew that
+the postponement or neglect of military preparations had left
+thousands of loyal subjects of the Crown in a position of entire
+defencelessness, and made rebellion easy for thousands of the
+disaffected Dutch. The first days of war, like the last days of peace,
+were punctuated by appeals for the troops that should have been in
+South Africa, but were in England; or for guns, rifles, and ammunition
+which Mr. Schreiner had kept idle in the colonial armouries until it
+was too late. On Friday, October 13th, he held a long and anxious
+consultation over the wires with Colonel Kekewich at Kimberley. A
+thousand rifles were wanted, and wanted instantly. The Cape Artillery
+15-pounders, reluctantly conceded at the last moment by Mr. Schreiner,
+had not come. They never came, for the next day Kimberley was cut off,
+and by Sunday morning Capetown had lost count of the border districts
+from Kimberley southward to Orange River. On this Friday the first
+definite piece of bad news reached the High Commissioner. An armoured
+train, trying to run back to Mafeking, had been captured by the Boers.
+In proportion as Lord Milner had urged the need of preparation for
+war, so now he was the first to realise how grave would be the results
+of unpreparedness. Fortunately, his comments upon the events of these
+first three <span class="pagenum"><a id="page305" name="page305"></a>(p. 305)</span> months of the war have been preserved; and the
+record of what was passing in his mind from day to day reveals a
+burden of anxiety that contrasts sharply with the easy tolerance with
+which the first bad news was received in England. On Wednesday, the
+18th, a week after the ultimatum had expired, he wrote of Natal: "We
+are being slowly surrounded, and our force unwisely split up." He was
+gravely concerned for the safety of Kimberley, and he "doubted the
+ability of Mafeking to hold out." On November 1st, the day after
+General Buller had landed at Capetown, he wrote: "Things are going
+from bad to worse to-day. In Natal the Orange Free State Boers are
+making a move on Colenso, while in the Colony they have crossed in
+force at Bethulie; and there is also some suspicion of an attack on
+the line between Orange River bridge and De Aar." On November 9th, the
+arrival of the <span class="italic">Rosslyn Castle</span>, the first of the Army Corps
+transports, brought a gleam of brightness. She was a little late, as
+she had been warned to go out of her course after leaving Las Palmas,
+to avoid a suspicious vessel. But Methuen's first engagements seemed
+to him to be Pyrrhic victories. It was "the old story of charging
+positions from which the enemy simply clears, after having shot a lot
+of our men." On December 5th "alarming rumours came pouring in from
+all over the Colony," and two days later Lord Milner telegraphed to
+warn the Secretary of State that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page306" name="page306"></a>(p. 306)</span> war was now aggravated
+by rebellion. On Saturday, December 16th, the day after Colenso, he
+wrote: "This has been a week of disasters, to-day being the worst of
+all. News was received this morning that Buller had been severely
+defeated yesterday in attempting to force the passage of the Tugela."</p>
+
+<p>It was a time when he was receiving the panic outcry for the immediate
+relief of Kimberley, in which Rhodes vented his rage at the military
+impotence to which for the moment England had allowed herself to be
+reduced in South Africa; when his councils with his ministers were
+"gloomy functions," and his Prime Minister's arguments against the
+measures which he deemed necessary for the defence of the Colony and
+the protection of the native territories had become not merely
+wearisome but embittered. His main resource lay in his intense
+activity. It was his custom, during this critical period, to begin the
+day by seeing Mr. Eliot and Mr. Price, the heads of the railways, and
+Mr. French, the Postmaster-General. In this way he received
+information of every movement of any significance that had occurred
+within the range of the railway and post-office systems during the
+preceding twenty-four hours&mdash;information which was of the highest
+utility both to him and to the military authorities. Then followed an
+endless succession of visitors, from the Prime Minister to the most
+recent newspaper correspondent out from home, and a long afternoon
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page307" name="page307"></a>(p. 307)</span> and evening of concentrated and unbroken labour upon
+despatches, proclamations, minutes, and other official documents. A
+short ride or walk was sometimes interpolated, but his days were a
+dead round of continuous occupation. "One day is so like
+another&mdash;crowded with work; all hateful, but with no very special
+feature," he wrote. But of another he says: "Worked very hard all day;
+the usual interviews. It was very difficult to take one's mind off the
+absorbing subject of the ill success of our military operations."</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Balfour called the insolence of the ultimatum "madness." But Lord
+Milner knew that it was no madness, but an assured belief in victory;
+a confidence founded upon long years of earnest preparation for war;
+upon the blood-ties of the most tenacious of European peoples; upon a
+Nature that spread her wings over the rough children of the veld and
+menaced their enemies with the heat and glamour of her sun, with
+famine and drought and weariness, with all the hidden dangers that
+lurked in her glittering plains and rock-strewn uplands.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Aspects of the war.</span>
+
+<p>It is not proposed to give any detailed account of the military
+operations which led, first, to the annexation of the Boer Republics,
+and then to the actual disarmament of the entire Dutch population of
+South Africa. The most that the plan of this work permits of is to
+present the broad outlines of the war in such a manner that the
+several <span class="pagenum"><a id="page308" name="page308"></a>(p. 308)</span> phases of the military conflict may be seen in true
+perspective, and the relationship between them and the administrative
+efforts of Lord Milner be correctly indicated. But it will not be
+found inconsistent with this restricted treatment to refer to certain
+conspicuous features of the war upon which contemporary discussion has
+chiefly centred, and in respect of which opinions have been pronounced
+that do not seem likely to harmonise in all cases with the results of
+a more mature judgment and a less interested inquiry.</p>
+
+<p>The test by which the success or failure of any given military effort
+is to be measured is, of course, the test of results. But the
+application of this test must not be embarrassed by the assumption,
+which seems to have vitiated so much otherwise admirable criticism on
+the conduct of the war in South Africa, that every action in which a
+properly equipped and wisely directed force is engaged must
+necessarily be successful: or that, if it be not successful, it
+follows, as a matter of course, that the officer in command, or one of
+his subordinates, must have committed some open and ascertainable
+violation of the principles of military science. So far is this from
+being the case, that military history is full of examples in which the
+highest merit and resolution of a commander have been nullified or
+cheated by the wanton interferences of physical nature, or by acts on
+the part of subordinates admittedly <span class="pagenum"><a id="page309" name="page309"></a>(p. 309)</span> beyond the control of
+any human skill or foresight.<a id="footnotetag183" name="footnotetag183"></a><a href="#footnote183" title="Go to footnote 183"><span class="small">[183]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Delay of operations.</span>
+
+<p>Any just appreciation of the events of the first year of the war must
+be based upon a clear understanding of the degree in which the
+military action of the Salisbury Cabinet fell short of the advice
+given by Lord Milner, and, in an equal degree by Lord Wolseley, the
+Commander-in-Chief. We have noticed already<a id="footnotetag184" name="footnotetag184"></a><a href="#footnote184" title="Go to footnote 184"><span class="small">[184]</span></a> the grave inadequacy
+of the measures of preparation for war carried out in South Africa
+between the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference and the recall of
+General Butler. On June 1st the South African garrison consisted of
+4,462 men in Cape Colony, and 5,827 men in Natal; or 10,289 men with
+24 field-guns in all.<a id="footnotetag185" name="footnotetag185"></a><a href="#footnote185" title="Go to footnote 185"><span class="small">[185]</span></a> On August 2nd the Government decided to
+send 2,000 additional troops to Natal, and the Indian Government was
+warned, a little later, that certain troops might be required for
+service in South Africa. In spite of Lord Milner's urgent
+representations of the danger of leaving the colonies unprotected, no
+considerable body of troops, as we have seen, was ordered out, until
+the diplomatic situation had become seriously aggravated by the
+definite failure of the negotiations <span class="pagenum"><a id="page310" name="page310"></a>(p. 310)</span> initiated by Sir
+William Greene through Mr. Smuts.</p>
+
+<p>Of the 10,000 men despatched after the Cabinet meeting of September
+8th, more than half were requisitioned from the Indian Army, while the
+remainder were drawn mainly from the Mediterranean garrisons.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, by the beginning of the second week in October there were 22,104
+British troops in South Africa, of whom 7,400 were at the Cape and
+14,704 in Natal, and 60 field-guns.<a id="footnotetag186" name="footnotetag186"></a><a href="#footnote186" title="Go to footnote 186"><span class="small">[186]</span></a> But the Army Corps, the
+"striking force," was still in England. In pursuance of its
+determination to postpone to the last moment any action that could be
+represented as an attempt to force a war upon the Boers, the British
+Government had refrained from giving orders for the mobilisation of
+the offensive force until October 7th, or a fortnight after the
+Cabinet meeting of September 22nd, when its determination to
+"formulate its own proposals" was communicated to the Transvaal
+Government.<a id="footnotetag187" name="footnotetag187"></a><a href="#footnote187" title="Go to footnote 187"><span class="small">[187]</span></a> It was then calculated that three months must elapse
+before this force could be equipped, transported, and placed in the
+field in South Africa.</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page311" name="page311"></a>(p. 311)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">No political gain.</span>
+
+<p>Before recording the disastrous effects of the postponement of
+effective military preparations, from June to September, it remains to
+consider whether any political gains, sufficient to compensate for the
+loss of military strength, were secured. The policy of relying upon
+Afrikander advice failed; since, as we have seen, the admonitions of
+Sir Henry de Villiers and Mr. Hofmeyr came too late to turn President
+Krüger from an obduracy founded upon long years of military
+preparation. The over-sea British had made up their minds in June; and
+nothing occurred in the subsequent negotiations to deepen their
+conviction of the essential justice of the British cause. India was
+unmoved; indeed, the Hindu masses were slightly sympathetic, while the
+feudatory princes came forward with offers of men and treasure to the
+Government of the Queen-Empress. The attitude of the respective
+governments of France, Germany, and Russia was correct. But what
+secured this result was not any perception of the moderation of the
+British demands, or any recognition of the genuine reluctance of the
+British Government to make war, but the sight of the British Navy
+everywhere holding the seas, the rapidity and ease with which large
+bodies of troops were transported from every quarter of the British
+world, and the manner in which each reverse was met by a display of
+new and unexpected reserves of military strength.</p>
+
+<p>If the British Government thought that it would win the peoples of
+Continental Europe to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page312" name="page312"></a>(p. 312)</span> its side by a show of hesitation to
+make war upon a weak state, the sequel proved that it had gravely
+misunderstood the conditions under which international respect is
+produced. Hatred of England rose in inverse ratio to the evidence of
+the justness of her cause. When the Boers were victorious, or seemed
+to be most capable of defying the efforts of the largest fighting
+force that Great Britain had ever put into the field; when, that is to
+say, it was most clearly demonstrated that British supremacy in South
+Africa could only have been maintained by force of arms against the
+formidable rival which had risen against it, then the wave of popular
+hatred surged highest. When the British arms prospered, the clamour
+sank; but only to rise again until it was finally allayed by the
+knowledge that the Boer resistance was at an end, and that the British
+Empire had emerged from the conflict a stronger and more united power.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Attitude of the United States.</span>
+
+<p>The case of the United States was somewhat different. Here was an
+industrial nation like our own; and one, moreover, whose people were
+qualified alike by constitutional and legal tradition, habits of
+thought, and identity of language, to have discerned the reality of
+the reluctance displayed by the British Government to employ force
+until every resource of diplomacy and every device of statecraft had
+been exhausted, and to have drawn the conclusion that the power which
+drove the Government into war was a sense of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page313" name="page313"></a>(p. 313)</span> duty, and not
+greed of territory. Moreover, there was at this time, at any rate
+among the more cultivated classes, a feeling of gratitude for the
+action of Great Britain in preventing European intervention during the
+Spanish-American war, and a genuine desire, on that ground alone, to
+show sympathy with the English people in the conflict in which they
+had become involved. In these circumstances it is somewhat strange
+that public opinion in the United States was unmistakably inclined to
+favour the Boers during almost the entire period of the war. It is
+perfectly true that the United States Government was consistently
+friendly; but this did not alter the fact that the dominant note in
+nearly all public expressions of the sentiment of the United States'
+people was one of sympathy with the Boer, and of hostility to the
+British cause. It might have been thought that, just as most
+Englishmen, in the case of the conflict between the United States and
+Spain, were prepared to assume that a nation imbued with the
+traditions and principles of the Anglo-Saxon race would not have
+undertaken to enforce its will upon a weak Power without having
+convinced itself first of the justice of its cause, so the Americans
+would have entertained an equally favourable presumption in respect of
+the people of Great Britain. That this was not done is due to a cause
+which is as significant as it is well ascertained. Making all
+allowance for the prejudice against England inevitably <span class="pagenum"><a id="page314" name="page314"></a>(p. 314)</span>
+aroused in the minds of the less thoughtful members of a great
+democratic community, by the fact that her opponent was both a weak
+state and a republic, this very general refusal to accept the
+political morality of the English people as a guarantee of the justice
+of their action in South Africa suggests the presence of another and
+more specific influence. The explanation given by Americans is that
+the English nation was itself divided upon the question of the
+morality of the South African War&mdash;or, at any rate, that the public
+utterances that reached the United States were such as to convey this
+impression. That being so, they ask, Can you blame us for hesitating
+to adopt what was at the most, as we understood it, the opinion of a
+majority? In support of this view they point to the public utterances,
+before and after the war had broken out, of Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, and Mr. Bryce. Of these, the
+former was the official head of the Liberal Party, while the two
+latter were men whose literary achievements had made their names and
+personalities both familiar and respected in the United States. If the
+opinions of these public men were on this occasion wholly
+unrepresentative, why, they ask, were their speeches and articles
+unrefuted; or, at any rate, allowed to go forth to the world
+uncondemned by any clear and authoritative manifestation of the
+dissent and displeasure of their countrymen?</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page315" name="page315"></a>(p. 315)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Injurious declarations.</span>
+
+<p>That declarations such as these did in fact produce injurious effects
+directly calculable in human lives, in money, and in the waste and
+devastation of war, is a fact which will claim the attention of the
+reader on a subsequent occasion. They came not merely from the mouths
+of the Irish Nationalists, and of advanced Radicals such as Mr.
+Lloyd-George and Mr. John Burns, but from men of wider repute. That
+public opinion should have allowed responsible Englishmen in time of
+war to "speak and write as though they belonged to the
+enemy,"&mdash;whether due to an exaggerated regard for our traditional
+freedom of speech, or to a failure to recognise that the altered
+conditions produced by the extension and perfection of telegraphic
+communication, and the development of the Press throughout the
+civilised world, gave such utterances a value in international
+relations altogether different from that possessed (say) by similar
+utterances on the part of the anti-nationalists during the Napoleonic
+wars&mdash;is a circumstance that merits the most serious consideration. No
+one will deny that this unpatriotic form of opposition, so long as it
+exists, constitutes an ever-recurring danger to the most vital
+interests of the community. The ultimate remedy lies in the creation
+of a representative council of the Empire, and the consequent
+separation of questions of inter-imperial and foreign policy from the
+local and irrelevant issues of party politics. Until this is done, it
+remains <span class="pagenum"><a id="page316" name="page316"></a>(p. 316)</span> to establish a mutual understanding under which such
+questions would be recognised as being outside the sphere of party
+recrimination; and for this purpose it is necessary to create a force
+of public opinion strong enough to compel the observance of this
+understanding; or, failing this, to visit its non-observance with
+political penalties commensurate to the injury inflicted.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Army Corps absorbed.</span>
+
+<p>The conflict which followed the expiration of the forty-eight hours
+allowed by the Boer ultimatum is in more than one respect the most
+extraordinary in the annals of war. The existence of the cable and
+telegraph made instant and continuous communication possible between
+the army in the field and the nation at home. Public opinion, informed
+by the daily records furnished by the Press, became a factor in
+determining the conduct of the war. Nor is it strange that a civilian
+population, separated by 6,000 miles from the theatre of operations,
+should have proved an injurious counsellor. The army was ordered to
+conquer a people, but forbidden to employ the methods by which alone
+it has been hitherto held that conquest is attainable. But no
+influence exercised upon the course of the war by false
+humanitarianism or political partisanship produced any results
+comparable to the original injury inflicted upon the British Army by
+the ignorance and irresolution displayed by the nation. The
+postponement of effective military preparations by the Home Government
+until the necessity <span class="pagenum"><a id="page317" name="page317"></a>(p. 317)</span> for these preparations had become so
+plain that no effort of the Opposition could embarrass its action, was
+the <span class="italic">fons et origo</span> of all subsequent disaster. The failure to
+mobilise the Army Corps in June had placed the Army in a position of
+disadvantage at the outbreak of the war, from which it never wholly
+recovered. The original striking force&mdash;the Army Corps&mdash;was not
+employed in its proper function, but absorbed, upon its arrival in
+South Africa, in the task of supporting the defensive forces.
+Twenty-two thousand men, with an Army Corps advancing upon
+Bloemfontein or Pretoria, would have sufficed to repel attacks upon
+the colonial frontiers, and to check rebellion in the Cape Colony. But
+twenty-two thousand men defending one thousand miles of frontier from
+a mobile force nearly twice as numerous with the Army Corps six
+thousand miles away in England, was a very different thing. Yet this
+was the situation in which the nation, by withholding from the
+Government the support necessary to enable it to give effect to the
+advice of Lord Wolseley, had elected to place the British Army. The
+plan of mobilisation, long prepared and complete in all particulars,
+worked with perfect success. Twenty Companies of the Army Service
+Corps sailed on October 6th, a day before the actual mobilisation
+order was issued. The rest of the offensive force&mdash;one Cavalry
+Division, one Army Corps, and eight battalions of lines of
+communication troops&mdash;began to be embarked on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page318" name="page318"></a>(p. 318)</span> October 20th,
+and by November 17th the long succession of transports, bearing the
+whole of the men, horses, and guns of which it was composed (with the
+exception of one cavalry regiment detained by horse sickness), had
+sailed for South Africa. This was Lord Wolseley's task, and it was
+promptly and efficiently performed. The War Office was not
+inefficient; but the refusal to mobilise in June had thrown the whole
+scheme of the offensive and defensive campaign out of gear.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">General Buller.</span>
+
+<p>With the evidence of the War Commission before us, it is impossible to
+divest General Buller of a share of responsibility for the disastrous
+conditions under which the war was commenced. He was nominated to the
+South African command in June, and he was consulted upon the strength
+and composition of the force which was to be employed. On July 7th
+Lord Wolseley asked the Government, apart from the immediate
+mobilisation of the Army Corps which he still urged, to "consider
+whether we should not at a very early date send one Infantry Division
+and one Cavalry Brigade&mdash;say 10,000 men&mdash;to South Africa," adding that
+he had "no doubt as to the present necessity of strengthening our
+military position." But ten days later the despatch of this
+reinforcement of 10,000 men was "not considered urgent." Since,
+according to Lord Wolseley's minute of the proceedings of the meeting
+held at the War Office on July 18th, 1899, General <span class="pagenum"><a id="page319" name="page319"></a>(p. 319)</span> Buller
+used the weight of his authority to support General Butler's
+opposition to Lord Milner's urgent request for immediate
+reinforcements. In reply to a question as to the desirability of
+strengthening the South African garrisons, he said on this occasion,
+that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "he had complete confidence in Butler's ability and forethought,
+     and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons on the spot
+     did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out
+     any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our
+     position against any possible attack by the Boers on our
+     frontiers."</p>
+
+<p>This memorandum, Lord Wolseley added, contained not the "exact words,"
+but the "exact meaning" of what he said.<a id="footnotetag188" name="footnotetag188"></a><a href="#footnote188" title="Go to footnote 188"><span class="small">[188]</span></a> It was the precise
+opposite of the view which Lord Milner had laid before the Home
+Government.<a id="footnotetag189" name="footnotetag189"></a><a href="#footnote189" title="Go to footnote 189"><span class="small">[189]</span></a> Indeed the degree in which General Buller had
+misconceived the entire military situation in South Africa became at
+once apparent when he reached Capetown. He had come out to South
+Africa with the not unnatural idea that he was to command a definite
+British army, which was to engage a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page320" name="page320"></a>(p. 320)</span> definite Boer army. When
+he had learnt from Lord Milner and others what the situation actually
+was, he is said to have gathered up his new impressions in the remark:
+"It seems to me that I have got to conquer the whole of South Africa."
+General Buller even appears to have shared the common belief of his
+fellow-countrymen at home that the Cape was a British colony not only
+in name but in fact. Nor was he prepared to abandon this belief all at
+once. He suggested to the High Commissioner that it would be possible
+to form local defence forces out of the Dutch farmers in the Colony.
+Lord Milner said that this was totally impracticable; but he added
+that he would consult Mr. Schreiner on the matter. It is needless to
+say, however, that the Prime Minister deprecated the proposal in the
+most emphatic terms.<a id="footnotetag190" name="footnotetag190"></a><a href="#footnote190" title="Go to footnote 190"><span class="small">[190]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The War Office scheme was designed to provide a defensive force to
+hold the colonies, and an offensive force to invade the Republics. In
+the three months that elapsed before this scheme was put into effect,
+the conditions upon which it was based had changed completely. On the
+day that Buller reached Capetown (October 31st) White, with almost the
+whole of the Natal defensive force, was shut up in Ladysmith by
+Joubert. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page321" name="page321"></a>(p. 321)</span> When at length the last units of the Army Corps
+were landed (December 4th) in South Africa, Buller was at Maritzburg,
+organising a force for the relief of White; and practically the entire
+offensive force had been broken up to disengage the defensive forces,
+or save them from destruction. Buller himself had 14,000 of the Army
+Corps in Natal, and more were to follow; Methuen was taking 8,000 men
+for the relief of Kimberley; and the balance were being pushed up to
+strengthen the original defensive forces that were holding the
+railways immediately South of the Orange Free State border, and
+checking the rebellion in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony.
+Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg (December 10th), Methuen's defeat at
+Magersfontein (December 11th), and Buller's defeat at Colenso
+(December 15th) together provided ample evidence of the fact that,
+however desirable it might be to assume the offensive, a purely
+defensive <span class="italic">rôle</span> must for the time be assigned to the troops then in
+South Africa; and that this state of affairs must continue until the
+arrival of very considerable reinforcements.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">New striking force necessary.</span>
+
+<p>The perception of this fact caused the Government to appoint (December
+17th) Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his Chief-of-Staff, to the
+South African command, and to prepare and despatch an entirely new
+striking force. It was this new force and not the original Army Corps
+that "marched to Pretoria," and struck the successive blows which
+enabled Lord Roberts to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page322" name="page322"></a>(p. 322)</span> report to the Secretary of State for
+War (November 15th, 1900) that; "with the occupation of Komati Poort,
+and the dispersal of Commandant-General Louis Botha's army, the
+organised resistance of the two Republics might be said to have
+ceased." It was not, therefore, until Lord Roberts was able to march
+from Modder River Station (February 11th, 1900), after a month spent
+at the Cape in reorganising the transport and other preparations
+essential to the success of an army destined to advance for many
+hundreds of miles through a hostile country, that the British Army in
+South Africa was in the position in which the acceptance of Lord
+Wolseley's advice, given in June and July, 1899, would have put it
+upon the outbreak of war. Nor was the force with which Lord Roberts
+then advanced, 36,000 men, more numerous than the striking force which
+would have been provided, by Lord Wolseley's scheme, had it been
+carried out in the manner in which he desired. For the business with
+which the scattered Army Corps was occupied when Lord Roberts arrived
+at Capetown (January 10th, 1900)&mdash;the relief of Ladysmith and
+Kimberley, and the defence of the eastern districts of the Cape Colony
+from the Free State commandos and the colonial rebels&mdash;was work
+directly caused by the absence of the Army Corps from South Africa
+when the war broke out. It is not too much to say that the whole of
+the serious losses incurred by the British forces in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page323" name="page323"></a>(p. 323)</span> South
+Africa from the commencement of the war up to the date of Lord
+Roberts's advance into the Free State territory, would have been
+avoided if the state of public opinion had permitted the Salisbury
+Cabinet in June to make military preparations commensurate with the
+gravity of the situation as disclosed by Lord Milner.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The regular army exhausted.</span>
+
+<p>In forming an estimate of the performance of the British Army in South
+Africa, from a military point of view, it is necessary to remember the
+grave initial disadvantage in which it was placed; and that this
+initial disadvantage was due, not to the War Office, not to the
+Cabinet, but to the nation itself. The manner in which the losses thus
+caused were repaired is significant and instructive. By the end of the
+year (1899), the troops composing three divisions in excess of the
+Army Corps were either landed in South Africa or under orders to
+proceed to the seat of war. In addition to the 22,000 defensive troops
+in South Africa on October 11th, the War Office had supplied, not
+merely the 47,000 men of the Army Corps, but 85,000 men in all. But,
+having done this, it had practically reached the limit of troops
+available in the regular army for over-sea operations. By April, 1900,
+all the reserves had been used up. There remained, it is true, 103,023
+"effectives" of all ranks of the regular army in the United Kingdom on
+April 1st; but this total was composed of 37,333 "immature" troops; of
+the recruits who had joined since October 1st, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page324" name="page324"></a>(p. 324)</span> 1899; of
+reservists unfit for foreign service; and of sick and wounded sent
+home from South Africa: that is to say, of men who, for one reason or
+another, were all alike unfit for service abroad.<a id="footnotetag191" name="footnotetag191"></a><a href="#footnote191" title="Go to footnote 191"><span class="small">[191]</span></a> Further drafts
+might have been made upon the British regulars in India; but this
+course was held to be imprudent. In plain words, the exhaustion of the
+regular army compelled the Government to avail itself more fully of
+the offers of military aid which had reached it from the colonies, and
+to utilise the militia and volunteer forces. On December 18th, 1899,
+the announcement was made that the War Office would allow twelve
+militia battalions to volunteer for service abroad, and that a
+considerable force of yeomanry and a contingent of picked men from the
+volunteers would be accepted. This appeal to the latent military
+resources of the Empire met with a ready and ample response.
+Throughout the whole course of the war the United Kingdom sent 45,566
+militia, 19,856 volunteers, and 35,520 yeomanry, with 7,273 South
+African Constabulary, and 833 Scottish Horse; the over-sea colonies
+(including 305 volunteers from India) provided 30,633 men;<a id="footnotetag192" name="footnotetag192"></a><a href="#footnote192" title="Go to footnote 192"><span class="small">[192]</span></a> while
+of the small British population in South Africa no less than the
+astonishing total of 46,858 took part in the war.<a id="footnotetag193" name="footnotetag193"></a><a href="#footnote193" title="Go to footnote 193"><span class="small">[193]</span></a> In all some
+200,000 men&mdash;militia, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page325" name="page325"></a>(p. 325)</span> volunteers, and irregulars&mdash;came
+forward to supplement the regular army.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Auxiliary forces utilised.</span>
+
+<p>It was mainly from the auxiliary forces and the colonial contingents,
+and not from the regular army, that the reinforcements were supplied
+which repaired the critical losses of the defensive campaign, and
+enabled the new striking force to be organised. Nor can it be said
+that the British Government failed to do all that was possible to
+retrieve its original error, when once the defeats inflicted by the
+Boer forces had awakened it to a knowledge of the real situation in
+South Africa. In his despatch of February 6th, 1900, Lord Roberts was
+able to report that, on January 31st, there was an effective fighting
+force of nearly 40,000 men in Natal and another of 60,000 in the Cape
+Colony. Mr. Chamberlain put the case for the Government at its highest
+in speaking at Birmingham on May 11th, 1900:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Supposing that twelve months ago any man had said in public that
+     this country would be able to send out from its own shores and
+     from its own citizens an army of more than 150,000 men, fully
+     equipped, and that it would be joined by another force of more
+     than 30,000 men, voluntarily offered by our self-governing
+     colonies ... if he had said that this army, together numbering
+     200,000 men, or thereabouts, could have been provided with the
+     best commissariat, with the most admirable medical appliances and
+     stores that had ever accompanied an army&mdash;if he could have said
+     that at the same time there would have remained behind in this
+     country something like half a million of men, who <span class="pagenum"><a id="page326" name="page326"></a>(p. 326)</span>
+     although they may not be equal man to man to the regulars and
+     best-drilled armies, are nevertheless capable of bearing arms to
+     some purpose&mdash;if he had said all this, he would have been laughed
+     to scorn."</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, the army was successful. The work which it was required to
+do was done. In order to realise the merit of its success two
+circumstances must be borne in mind: first, the enormous area of South
+Africa, and, second, the fact that practically the whole of this area,
+if we except the few considerable towns, was not only ill-provided
+with means of communication and food supplies, but inhabited by a
+population which was openly hostile, or, what was worse, secretly
+disaffected. Lord Roberts, in the course of his despatches,
+endeavoured to bring home both of these circumstances to the public in
+England.</p>
+
+<p>Of the area he wrote:<a id="footnotetag194" name="footnotetag194"></a><a href="#footnote194" title="Go to footnote 194"><span class="small">[194]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Vastness of South Africa.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"The magnitude of the task which Her Majesty's Imperial troops
+     have been called upon to perform will perhaps be better realised
+     if I give the actual number of miles of the several lines of
+     communication, each one of which has had to be carefully guarded,
+     and compare with the well-known countries of Europe the enormous
+     extent of the theatre of war, from one end of which to the other
+     troops have had to be frequently moved.</p>
+
+<p>"The areas included in the theatre of war are as follows:</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page327" name="page327"></a>(p. 327)</span>
+
+<table  border="0" cellpadding="0" summary="Areas included in the theatre of war.">
+<colgroup>
+    <col width="50%">
+    <col width="50%">
+</colgroup>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="right">Square Miles.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Cape Colony</td>
+<td class="right">277,151</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Orange River Colony</td>
+<td class="right">48,326</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Transvaal</td>
+<td class="right">113,640</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Natal</td>
+<td class="right">18,913</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="right">&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">Total</td>
+<td class="right">458,030</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="right">&mdash;&mdash;&mdash;</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Rhodesia</td>
+<td class="right">750,000</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>"And the distances troops have had to travel are:</p>
+
+<table  border="0" cellpadding="0" summary="Distances.">
+<colgroup>
+    <col width="50%">
+    <col width="50%">
+</colgroup>
+<tr>
+<td>By Land</td>
+<td class="right">Miles.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Capetown to Pretoria</td>
+<td class="right">1,040</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Pretoria to Komati Poort</td>
+<td class="right">260</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Capetown to Kimberley</td>
+<td class="right">647</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Kimberley to Mafeking</td>
+<td class="right">223</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Mafeking to Pretoria</td>
+<td class="right">160</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Mafeking to Beira</td>
+<td class="right">1,135</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>Durban to Pretoria</td>
+<td class="right">511</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>"From these tables it will be seen that, after having been brought by
+sea 6,000 miles and more from their base in the United Kingdom, the
+army in South Africa had to be distributed over an area of greater
+extent than France (204,146 square miles) and Germany (211,168 square
+miles) put together, and, if we include that part of Rhodesia with
+which we had to do, larger than the combined areas of France, Germany,
+and Austria (261,649 square miles)."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Of the nature of the country and its inhabitants he wrote:<a id="footnotetag195" name="footnotetag195"></a><a href="#footnote195" title="Go to footnote 195"><span class="small">[195]</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "And it should be remembered that over these great distances we
+     were dependent on single lines of railway for the food supply,
+     guns, ammunition, horses, transport animals, and hospital
+     equipment, in fact, all the requirements of an army in the
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page328" name="page328"></a>(p. 328)</span> field, and that, along these lines, bridges and
+     culverts had been destroyed in many places, and rails were being
+     constantly torn up."</p>
+
+<p>And of the Cape Colony he wrote:<a id="footnotetag196" name="footnotetag196"></a><a href="#footnote196" title="Go to footnote 196"><span class="small">[196]</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The difficulties of carrying on war in South Africa do not
+     appear to be sufficiently appreciated by the British public. In
+     an enemy's country we should know exactly how we stood; but out
+     here we have not only to defeat the enemy on the northern
+     frontier, but to maintain law and order within the colonial
+     limits. Ostensibly, the Dependency is loyal, and no doubt a large
+     number of its inhabitants are sincerely attached to the British
+     rule and strongly opposed to Boer domination. On the other hand,
+     a considerable section would prefer a republican form of
+     government, and, influenced by ties of blood and association,
+     side with the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Even the
+     public service at the Cape is not free from men whose sympathies
+     with the enemy may lead them to divulge secrets and give valuable
+     assistance to the Boer leaders in other ways."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The offensive campaign.</span>
+
+<p>Bearing in mind that the offensive campaign dates, not from the expiry
+of the Boer ultimatum on October 11th, 1899, but from Lord Roberts's
+advance from Modder River Station on February 11th, 1900, the mere
+record of dates and events is sufficiently impressive. On February
+12th the Free State border was crossed; on the 15th Kimberley was
+relieved, on the 27th Cronje's force surrendered at Paardeberg, on the
+28th Ladysmith was relieved, and on March 13th Bloemfontein, the
+capital of the Free State, was occupied. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page329" name="page329"></a>(p. 329)</span> The army again
+advanced early in May; Kroonstad was entered on the 12th; on May 24th,
+the Queen's birthday, the Free State was annexed; the Vaal was crossed
+on the 27th, Johannesburg was occupied on the 31st, and on June 5th
+the British flag was hoisted on the Raadzaal at Pretoria. In the
+meantime Mafeking had been relieved with absolute punctuality on May
+17th.<a id="footnotetag197" name="footnotetag197"></a><a href="#footnote197" title="Go to footnote 197"><span class="small">[197]</span></a> On June 11th the Boers evacuated Laing's Nek and Majuba,
+and the Natal Field Force, under Buller, entered the Transvaal from
+the south-east. The next day Roberts defeated the Boers under Louis
+Botha at Diamond Hill. On July 30th Prinsloo and 4,000 burghers
+surrendered to Hunter; on August 27th the main Transvaal army, under
+Louis Botha, was again defeated at Dalmanutha, and on September 1st
+the Transvaal was annexed. On the 11th President Krüger fled the
+Transvaal; Komati Poort, the eastern frontier town on the railway line
+to Delagoa Bay, was entered on the 24th, and two days later railway
+communication was re-opened between Delagoa Bay and Pretoria.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of the vast area and harassing conditions of the war, in
+spite of its own military unpreparedness, and the unexpected strength
+of the Boer attack, the Power which created the Republics had
+destroyed them within less than <span class="pagenum"><a id="page330" name="page330"></a>(p. 330)</span> a twelvemonth from the day
+on which they had defied it.</p>
+
+<p>At this point it will be convenient to place on record certain general
+conclusions which arise out of the events and circumstances of the
+South African War, and to consider certain military criticisms which
+have been offered upon the conduct of the British Army in the field.</p>
+
+<p>We have seen that the initial losses of the campaign were due, not to
+any defects in the Army as a fighting force, but to the position in
+which the Army was placed by the irresolution of the nation. We have
+seen also that within less than a year of the ultimatum the capitals
+of the two Republics were occupied, and their power of "organised
+resistance" was destroyed. During this stage of the war the regular
+Army, small as it was, supplemented by selected reinforcements from
+the auxiliary services, and by the colonial contingents, sufficed to
+do the work required of it. In the second stage, when the work to be
+accomplished was nothing less than the disarmament of the entire Dutch
+population of South Africa, the character of the reinforcements
+supplied had greatly depreciated,<a id="footnotetag198" name="footnotetag198"></a><a href="#footnote198" title="Go to footnote 198"><span class="small">[198]</span></a> and the prolongation of the war
+was in part to be attributed to this circumstance. For the present,
+however, it will be sufficient to confine our observations to the
+period of "organised resistance."</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page331" name="page331"></a>(p. 331)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">General conclusions.</span>
+
+<p>The first of these conclusions is the fact that the real evil revealed
+by the South African War is not the inefficiency, or unpreparedness of
+the War Office, but the ignorance,<a id="footnotetag199" name="footnotetag199"></a><a href="#footnote199" title="Go to footnote 199"><span class="small">[199]</span></a> and therefore unpreparedness,
+of the country. From this unreadiness for war on the part of the
+nation as a whole there sprang two results: (1) the refusal of the
+Salisbury Cabinet to allow the War Office to make adequate military
+preparations in June, and the disregard of the advice alike of Lord
+Milner and Lord Wolseley; (2) the insufficient supply of reserves for
+the forces in the field, arising ultimately from the small percentage
+of men in the nation trained to the use of arms.</p>
+
+<p>The second conclusion to which we are led is that the specific result
+of the absence of effective preparations for War in June was to throw
+the War Office scheme of a fighting force out of gear. Twenty-two
+thousand defensive troops, with a striking force of fifty thousand in
+South Africa, would have proved sufficient to attain the ends of
+British policy. As it was, the Army Corps being in England when
+hostilities commenced, and not arriving in its entirety until December
+4th, the fifty thousand offensive force was absorbed in the work of
+extricating the twenty-two thousand defensive force. In other words,
+the British Army was not put in the position contemplated by Lord
+Wolseley's scheme until an entirely new fighting <span class="pagenum"><a id="page332" name="page332"></a>(p. 332)</span> force had
+been organised and advanced from Modder River in the beginning of
+February, 1900. This new striking force was identical in numbers with
+the original striking force, the Army Corps,<a id="footnotetag200" name="footnotetag200"></a><a href="#footnote200" title="Go to footnote 200"><span class="small">[200]</span></a> provided by Lord
+Wolseley's scheme.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Criticisms examined.</span>
+
+<p>Among criticisms on the British Army in the field there are two that
+claim attention. The first of these is the allegation that military
+efficiency was sacrificed to a desire to spare life. In so far as this
+criticism is concerned with the handling of their troops by British
+commanders, it is strenuously denied that either Lord Roberts, or any
+of his subordinates, allowed a desire to spare the lives of the troops
+under their command to interfere with the successful execution of any
+military operation. The specific example of the alleged interference
+of this motive, usually cited, is the conduct of the attack upon the
+Boer position at Paardeberg. In respect of these operations the actual
+facts, as they presented themselves to the mind of Lord Roberts, are
+these. On reaching the Paardeberg position from Jacobsdal the
+Commander-in-Chief found that in the operations of the preceding day
+Lord Kitchener had lost a thousand men without gaining a single
+advantage. The position held by the Boers, although it was commanded
+by rising ground on all sides, was one which afforded admirable cover
+in repelling an attacking force. In these circumstances Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page333" name="page333"></a>(p. 333)</span>
+Roberts decided, as an application of the principles of military
+science, to "sap up" to the Boer positions. The correctness of this
+decision was proved by the result. The moment that the Boers realised
+that they were to be given no further opportunity&mdash;such as a
+repetition of a direct attack upon their position would have
+afforded&mdash;of inflicting heavy loss on the British troops, whilst their
+eventual surrender was no less inevitable, the white flag was hoisted.</p>
+
+<p>It is denied with equal definiteness that any general feeling of the
+kind alleged existed among subordinate officers or the rank and file
+of the British troops. Where, however, the allegation of "a desire to
+spare life" has regard to the enemy and not to the British troops, the
+answer is to be found in the fact that any humanity inconsistent with
+military efficiency was apparent and not real. The comparative
+immunity enjoyed by the enemy on occasions when he was defeated is due
+to physical conditions wholly favourable to the Boers, to the
+knowledge of the country possessed by the burghers individually and
+collectively, and to the circumstance that the inhabitants of the
+country districts were, in almost all cases, ready to give them every
+possible assistance in escaping from the British. There is one
+particular statement in connection with this criticism which admits of
+absolute denial. It has been said that Lord Roberts, the
+Commander-in-Chief, received instructions from the Home Government
+directing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page334" name="page334"></a>(p. 334)</span> him to spare the enemy as much as possible. This
+statement, in spite of its <span class="italic">prima facie</span> improbability, has met with
+very general acceptance. None the less it is entirely baseless. The
+only limitations imposed by the Home Government upon Lord Roberts's
+complete freedom of action in the conduct of the military operations
+which he directed were such as arose from the difficulty experienced
+in supplying him upon all occasions with troops of the precise number
+and character required.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The German general staff.</span>
+
+<p>The second criticism is one put forward by the German General Staff,
+forming, as it does, the only valid complaint against the professional
+merits of Lord Roberts advanced by that body. The British
+Commander-in-Chief, say these German critics, made it his object to
+"man&oelig;uvre" the Boers out of positions instead of inflicting severe
+losses upon them. The answer to this criticism, in its general form,
+is to be found in the physical conditions of the country. On the
+occasions to which reference is made the burgher forces were found to
+be posted on high ground, behind rocks or in intrenchments, with fine
+open ground in front of them. Obviously in these circumstances what
+military science required of the commander directing the attacking
+force was to find a means of placing his own troops on equal terms
+with the enemy; and this was what Lord Roberts did. The criticism,
+however, as more precisely stated and applied to the battle of Diamond
+Hill in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page335" name="page335"></a>(p. 335)</span> particular, and to the engagements fought in the
+course of Lord Roberts's advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, takes
+the form of the allegation that, while the enveloping movement on both
+flanks was executed successfully, the full result of this initial
+success was not obtained because the attack upon the Boer centre was
+not pressed home. In other words, the enemy's centre was never caught
+and destroyed by the envelopment of his flanks. This is historically
+true, and yet the German critics cannot be said to have established
+their case, for they omit to take the tactics of the Boers into
+consideration. Stated briefly, these were to hold on to a position and
+inflict such losses as they could upon the attacking troops, until the
+final assault became imminent; and then to mount their ponies and
+gallop away. Against such tactics as these, it would have been of no
+avail to push in a frontal attack with the certainty of incurring
+heavy loss, and without the chance of securing a decisive success. It
+would have been merely playing into the hands of the Boers.</p>
+
+<p>Under such conditions all that was possible was to demonstrate against
+the Boer centre in the hope of holding them in their position, until
+the flanking columns should have nullified their mobility by cutting
+in on their line of retreat. The Boers, however, took every precaution
+against such an eventuality; and the result was generally, as stated
+by the German critics, that the Boers were "man&oelig;uvred" out of their
+positions. But <span class="pagenum"><a id="page336" name="page336"></a>(p. 336)</span> this does not prove that the course adopted
+by Lord Roberts was wrong; it merely proves the extreme difficulty of
+inflicting a severe defeat upon an enemy who declines to risk a
+decisive action, and whose mobility gives him the power to do so. The
+course advocated by the critics would have been equally barren of
+result, while the cost in lives would have been far greater.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Boers not in uniform.</span>
+
+<p>It remains to notice certain definite circumstances which caused the
+British Army in South Africa to be confronted by difficulties which no
+other army has been required to face. The Boers were accorded all the
+privileges of a civilised army, although at the same time they
+violated the most essential of the conditions upon the observance of
+which these privileges are based. This condition is the wearing, by
+the forces of a belligerent, of such a uniform and distinctive dress
+as will be sufficient to enable the other belligerent to discriminate
+with facility between the combatant and non-combatant population of
+his enemy. The fact that the burgher forces were not in uniform and
+were yet accorded the privileges claimed by civilised troops, was in
+itself a circumstance that increased both the efforts required, and
+the losses incurred, by the British Army to an extent which has not as
+yet been fully realised. In the operations which Lord Roberts had
+conducted in Afghanistan it was not the organised army but the
+tribesmen that had proved difficult to overcome. The Afghan army
+retreated, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page337" name="page337"></a>(p. 337)</span> or, if it stood its ground, was defeated. But the
+tribesmen who "sniped" the British troops from the mountain slopes and
+from behind stones and rocks, who assembled from all sides as rapidly
+as they melted away, constituted the real difficulty of the campaign.
+In South Africa the burgher forces were army and tribesmen alike.
+Owing to the absence of any distinctive uniform the combatant Boers
+mingled freely with the British soldiers, and went to and fro among
+the non-combatant Boer population in the towns and districts occupied
+by the British. On one day they were in the British camp as
+ox-drivers, or provision-sellers, or what not, and on the next they
+were in the burgher fighting line. A single instance will serve to
+convey an impression of the complete immunity with which not merely
+the rank and file, but commandants and generals, entered and left the
+British lines. It is believed that on one night General Louis Botha
+slept in Johannesburg close to Lord Roberts, the British
+Commander-in-Chief. The next morning he left the town in company with
+some of the British troops. And in the Natal campaign it is notorious
+that the camps of the Ladysmith relieving force were swarming with
+Boer spies whom it was impossible to detect and punish. Even in the
+besieged town itself the utmost secrecy at headquarters did not always
+avail to prevent a timely intimation of a contemplated attack from
+reaching the enemy's lines. Add to this the fact that every Boer
+farmhouse <span class="pagenum"><a id="page338" name="page338"></a>(p. 338)</span> throughout South Africa was an Intelligence Depôt
+for the enemy, and it is easy to understand the facility displayed by
+the mobile and ununiformed Boer forces in evading the British columns.</p>
+
+<p>Whether the humanity displayed by the British Government in thus
+recognising the burghers as regular belligerents, and in other
+respects, did not tend to bring about the very evil sought to be
+avoided is another question. It is quite possible to maintain that the
+comparative immunity from punishment and the disproportionate military
+success which the Boers enjoyed did in fact, by contributing to the
+prolongation of the war, ultimately produce a greater loss of life,
+and a greater amount of material suffering, than would have been
+incurred by the South African Dutch if the war had been waged with
+greater severity on the part of Great Britain. That it increased the
+cost of the war both in lives and in treasure to the British nation is
+obvious. But this is a consideration which does not affect any
+estimate of the merit or demerit displayed by the British Army in the
+field that may be formed either by British or foreign critics. In
+order to prove competency it is not necessary to show that no single
+mistake was made or that nothing that was done might not have been
+done better. No war department, no army ever has been or ever will be
+created that could come scatheless from the application of such a test
+of absolute efficiency. What we require to know is whether the same
+standard of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page339" name="page339"></a>(p. 339)</span> efficiency was shown to have been attained in
+the War Office and in the Army as is required and obtained in any
+other branch of the public service, or in any successful or
+progressive undertaking conducted by private enterprise. The
+circumstances of the war were abnormal. From one point of view it was
+a civil war; from another it was a rebellion, and from a third it was
+a war between two rival military powers, each of whom desired to
+become supreme in South Africa. What the military critic has to
+consider is not so much how these circumstances arose, or whether they
+could have been changed or avoided by any political action on the part
+of Great Britain, but the degree in which the conditions imposed by
+them upon the British Army must be taken into account in applying the
+ordinary tests of military efficiency to the work which it
+accomplished in this particular campaign.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Difficulties of the campaign.</span>
+
+<p>The nature of the difficulties presented by the vast extent of the
+theatre of war, the deficiency of means of communication, the
+imperfect cultivation of the land, the sparseness of the population
+and their hostility to the British, and the physical and climatic
+aspects of South Africa in general, have been broadly indicated in the
+passages taken from Lord Roberts's despatches. To pursue the inquiry
+further would be to travel beyond the scope of this work. That,
+however, there is nothing unusual in the fact that civilian forces,
+inspired by love of country and aided by physical conditions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page340" name="page340"></a>(p. 340)</span>
+exceptionally favourable to themselves, should be able to offer a
+successful resistance to professional soldiers may be seen by a
+reference to one of the little wars of the seventeenth century. In the
+year 1690 twenty-two thousand French and Savoyard troops were sent by
+Louis XIV. to storm the Balsille&mdash;a rocky eminence <span class="italic">mutatis mutandis</span>
+the equivalent of a South African kopje&mdash;held by 350 Piedmontese
+Vaudois. Even so the besieged patriots made good their escape, and,
+owing to the sudden change in the politics of Europe brought about by
+the accession of William of Orange to the crown of England, actually
+concluded an honourable peace with their sovereign, Victor Amadeus of
+Savoy, a few days after they had been driven from the Balsille.
+Assuming that the British troops employed from first to last in the
+South African War were five times as numerous as the forces placed in
+the field by the Dutch nationalists&mdash;say 450,000 as against 90,000&mdash;we
+have here a numerical superiority which dwindles into insignificance
+beside the magnificent disproportion of the professional troops
+required to deal with a civilian force in this seventeenth-century
+struggle.<a id="footnotetag201" name="footnotetag201"></a><a href="#footnote201" title="Go to footnote 201"><span class="small">[201]</span></a><a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page341" name="page341"></a>(p. 341)</span> CHAPTER VIII</h3>
+
+<p class="title">THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY</p>
+
+
+<p>The direct share which Lord Milner took in the skilful disposition of
+the handful of British troops available at the outbreak of the war for
+the defence of the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony has been
+mentioned. The part which he played during the first period of the war
+in his relationship to the military authorities is sufficiently
+indicated by the words which appear in Lord Roberts's final despatch.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "This despatch," writes the Commander-in-Chief on April 2nd,
+     1901, "would be incomplete were I to omit to mention the benefit
+     I have derived from the unfailing support and wise counsels of
+     Sir Alfred Milner. I can only say here that I have felt it a high
+     privilege to work in close communication with one whose courage
+     never faltered however grave the responsibilities might be which
+     surrounded him, and who, notwithstanding the absorbing cares of
+     his office, seemed always able to find time for a helpful message
+     or for the tactful solution of a difficult question."</p>
+
+<p>That this is no conventional compliment, even in the mouth of so great
+a general as Lord Roberts, will appear from the fact that on one
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page342" name="page342"></a>(p. 342)</span> occasion&mdash;to be presently noted&mdash;Lord Milner's judgment did
+not entirely recommend itself at the moment to the Commander-in-Chief.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">An unnatural alliance.</span>
+
+<p>But such services, important as they were, are mere accidents in
+comparison with the volume of continuous and concentrated effort
+required to keep the machinery of administration available for the
+Imperial Government in a colony in which not merely the majority of
+the inhabitants, but the majority of the members of the Legislative
+Assembly, and half of the ministers of the Crown, were in more or less
+complete sympathy with the enemy. The Boer ultimatum, by making it
+impossible for the British Government to be any longer cajoled into an
+elusory settlement by Boer diplomacy, had relieved Lord Milner of a
+load of anxiety, and closed a period of unparalleled physical and
+mental strain. But it by no means brought Lord Milner's task to an
+end. The open rebellion of the Dutch subjects of the Crown,
+considerable alike in point of numbers and area, was not the most
+dangerous aspect of the state of utter disaffection, or rather
+demoralisation, to which the Cape Colony had been reduced by twenty
+years of Dutch ascendancy and nationalist propaganda. Just as before
+the ultimatum it was the influence, exercised by constitutional means,
+and ostensibly in the interests of the Imperial Government, over the
+Republics that brought the Salisbury Cabinet within measurable
+distance of diplomatic defeat; so, during the war, what was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page343" name="page343"></a>(p. 343)</span>
+done and said by the Afrikander nationalists within the letter of the
+law constituted in fact the most formidable obstacle to the success of
+the British arms. If the Dutch in the Cape Colony had been left to
+themselves, their efforts to encourage the resistance of the Boers, in
+view of the rapid and effective blows struck by Lord Roberts, would
+probably have been without result. But unhappily their efforts
+stimulated the traditional sympathisers of the Boers in England to
+fresh action; and they were themselves stimulated in turn by the
+excesses of the party opposition which sprang into life again directly
+Lord Roberts's campaign had relieved the British people from any fear
+of military humiliation. Just as in the period before the war we found
+the Afrikander leaders striving to "mediate" between the Transvaal and
+the British Government; so now during the war we find them striving to
+"conciliate" the two contending parties. In both cases their aim was
+the same&mdash;to prevent the destruction of the Republics and the
+consequent ruin of the nationalist cause. As in the former case
+"mediation" was a euphemism for the diplomatic defeat of the British
+Government, so now "conciliation" is synonymous with the restoration
+of the independence of the Boers&mdash;that is, the renunciation of all
+that the British people, whether islander or colonist, had fought to
+secure. That any considerable body of Englishmen should have allowed
+themselves to become <span class="pagenum"><a id="page344" name="page344"></a>(p. 344)</span> a second time the dupes of so coarse a
+political hypocrisy may well arouse surprise to-day; to a future
+generation it will seem almost incredible. The fact, however, admits
+of neither doubt nor contradiction. It is writ large in Hansard, in
+the Blue-books, and in the daily journals. The whole force of this
+strange and unnatural alliance between England's most bitter and most
+skilful enemies in South Africa and a section of her own sons at home,
+was directed against Lord Milner during the remaining years of his
+High Commissionership.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr Schreiners's attitude.</span>
+
+<p>For the moment, however, the ultimatum had rendered the British people
+practically unanimous in the desire to chastise the insolence of the
+Boer, and, in the face of this determination, no opposition was
+manifested by the Afrikander Government to the free movement and
+disembarkation of the Imperial troops. The employment of the local
+forces in the defence of the colony was another matter. The Free State
+commandos crossed the Orange River on October 31st, 1899. The delay
+was not due to any regard felt by President Steyn for Mr. Schreiner,
+but solely to military considerations. On the previous day General
+Joubert had shut up Sir George White's force in Ladysmith; and there
+was, therefore, no longer any likelihood that these commandos would be
+required in Natal. The invasion of the Colony south of the Orange
+River produced, as we have noticed, a marked change in Mr. Schreiner's
+attitude; causing him finally <span class="pagenum"><a id="page345" name="page345"></a>(p. 345)</span> to abandon the neutrality
+policy and recognise the necessity of employing the local volunteer
+forces in the defence of the Colony. None the less the injury
+inflicted upon British interests by the Prime Minister's attempt to
+keep the people of the Cape Colony out of the conflict was
+unquestionable. The ministers of the Crown in this British Colony had
+allowed arms and ammunition to go through to the Free State, until the
+Imperial authorities had interfered; they had refused to supply
+Mafeking and Kimberley with much-needed artillery; they had refused to
+call out the volunteers until the Colony was about to be invaded by
+the Free State as well as by the Transvaal, and even then they had
+delayed to supply these forces with Lee-Enfield rifles. These were
+injuries the effect of which could not be repaired by any subsequent
+co-operation with the representatives of the British Government. In
+addition to calling out the volunteers, Mr. Schreiner allowed the
+Imperial military authorities to take over the Cape Government
+railways, and he consented to the proclamation of martial law in those
+districts of the Colony in which the Dutch were in rebellion. But he
+was far from yielding, even now, that full and complete assistance to
+the Governor which would have been expected, as a matter of course,
+from the Prime Minister of any other British colony. On one occasion,
+at least, during this period the conflict between his views and those
+of Lord <span class="pagenum"><a id="page346" name="page346"></a>(p. 346)</span> Milner became so acute that his resignation seemed
+to be inevitable. But this was not to be the end of the Afrikander
+Ministry. In proportion as Mr. Schreiner approached gradually to
+agreement with Lord Milner, so did he incur the displeasure of Mr.
+Hofmeyr and the Dutch, until (in June, 1901) the Ministry perished of
+internal dissension.</p>
+
+<p>A week after Lord Roberts reached Capetown (January 10th, 1900), Lord
+Milner sent home a despatch in which he tells the story of the
+rebellion in the Cape Colony. The state of the districts on the
+western border of the Republics, north of the Orange River, is
+described in the words of a reliable and unbiassed witness who has
+just arrived at Capetown from Vryburg, where he has been lately
+resident:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "All the farmers in the Vryburg, Kuruman, and Taungs districts,"
+     says this witness, "have joined the Boers, and I do not believe
+     that you will find ten loyal British subjects among the Dutch
+     community in the whole of Bechuanaland. The Field Cornets and
+     Justices of the Peace on the Dutch side have all joined ... the
+     conduct of the rebels has been unbearable."</p>
+
+<p>Of the position of that part of the Eastern Province of the Cape
+Colony which, lying to the south of the Free State, formed the main
+seat of the rebellion, Lord Milner himself writes:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Treatment of loyalists.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation of
+     Colesberg, no less than five great districts&mdash;those of Colesberg,
+     Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and Wodehouse&mdash;had gone
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page347" name="page347"></a>(p. 347)</span> over without hesitation, and, so to speak, bodily, to
+     the enemy. Throughout that region the Landdrosts of the Orange
+     Free State had established their authority, and everywhere, in
+     the expressive words of a magistrate, British loyalists were
+     "being hunted out of town after town like sheep." In the invaded
+     districts the method of occupation has always been more or less
+     the same. The procedure is as follows:&mdash;A commando enters, the
+     Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the
+     courthouse, or market-place, and a Proclamation is read annexing
+     the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in which he
+     explains that the people must now obey the Free State laws
+     generally, though they are at present under martial law. A local
+     Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a few days
+     or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve against their
+     country. In either case they lose their property to a greater or
+     less extent. If they elect to quit they are often robbed before
+     starting or on the journey; if they stay their property and
+     themselves are commandeered.</p>
+
+<p>"The number of rebels who have actually taken up arms and joined
+     the enemy during their progress throughout the five annexed
+     districts can for the present only be matter of conjecture. I
+     shall, however, be on the safe side in reckoning that during
+     November it was a number not less than the total of the invading
+     commandos, that is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the
+     invading commandos themselves a certain proportion were colonists
+     who had crossed the border before the invasion took place. And
+     the number, whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and
+     during November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee
+     from the Albert district has estimated the total number of
+     colonial Boers who <span class="pagenum"><a id="page348" name="page348"></a>(p. 348)</span> have joined the enemy in the invaded
+     districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the
+     districts north of that river, to which I referred at the
+     beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less. Adding
+     to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal immediately
+     before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with the view of
+     taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the conclusion
+     that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of those now
+     fighting against us in South Africa, and probably somewhat more,
+     either are, or till quite recently were, subjects of the
+     Queen."<a id="footnotetag202" name="footnotetag202"></a><a href="#footnote202" title="Go to footnote 202"><span class="small">[202]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>As it turned out, this eastern rebellion was kept within limits by
+General French's advance upon Colesberg, and by the skilful and
+successful cavalry operations which he subsequently carried out upon
+the Free State border; but there is abundant evidence to support the
+belief that any second reverse in the Eastern Province, such as that
+which General Gatacre suffered at Stormberg, would have proved the
+signal for a rising in the Western Province. The Bond was active; and
+the tone of the meetings held by the various branches throughout the
+Colony was as frankly hostile to the Imperial Government as it was
+sympathetic to the Republics.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">State of western province.</span>
+
+<p>The extent to which Mr. Schreiner's qualified co-operation with the
+Imperial authorities had aroused the hostility of the Bond will be
+seen from the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting of the Cape
+Distriks-bestuur, held at the office <span class="pagenum"><a id="page349" name="page349"></a>(p. 349)</span> of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> at the
+end of January (1900). It was a small meeting, but among those present
+were Mr. Hofmeyr himself and Mr. Malan, the editor of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>. On
+the motion of the latter, it was unanimously determined that the
+forthcoming Annual Congress of the Bond should be asked to pass a&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "resolution (<span class="italic">a</span>) giving expression of Congress's entire
+     disapproval of the policy which led to the present bloody war
+     instead of to a peaceful solution of the differences with the
+     South African Republic by means of arbitration; and (<span class="italic">b</span>) urging
+     a speedy re-establishment of peace on fair and righteous
+     conditions, as also a thorough inquiry by our Parliament into the
+     way in which, during the war, private property, the civil
+     liberties, and constitutional rights of the subject have been
+     treated."<a id="footnotetag203" name="footnotetag203"></a><a href="#footnote203" title="Go to footnote 203"><span class="small">[203]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Even more significant&mdash;as evidence of the dangerous feeling of
+exaltation which possessed the Dutch at this time&mdash;was the New Year's
+exhortation of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, the journalistic mouthpiece of Mr. Hofmeyr.
+And Mr. Hofmeyr, it must be remembered, was not only the head of the
+<span class="italic">Commissie van Toezicht</span>, or Executive of three which controlled the
+Afrikander Bond, but the real master of the majority in the Cape
+Parliament, upon which the Schreiner Cabinet depended for its
+existence. After setting out the "mighty deeds" achieved by the
+Afrikander arms during the last three months, this bitter and
+relentless opponent of British supremacy in South Africa <span class="pagenum"><a id="page350" name="page350"></a>(p. 350)</span>
+proceeded to declare that "still mightier deeds" were to be seen in
+the coming year (1900), and that the Afrikander nation, so far from
+being extinguished by the conflict with Great Britain, would be welded
+into one compact mass, and flourish more and more.</p>
+
+<p>Nor was this all. In the closing days of the year (1899) information
+reached the British military authorities that a plot was on foot to
+seize Capetown. The Dutch from the country districts were to assemble
+in the capital in the guise of excursionists who had come to town to
+enjoy the Christmas and New Year holidays. On New Year's Eve, the
+night reported to have been fixed for the attempt, all the military
+stations in Capetown were kept in frequent communication by telephone;
+the streets were paraded by pickets; and, in the drill-shed the
+Capetown Highlanders slept under arms. Whether any attempt of the sort
+was seriously contemplated or not, there is no question as to the fact
+that the utmost necessity for precaution was recognised by the
+military authorities at Capetown during this period, in spite of the
+security afforded by the reinforcements which the Home Government was
+pouring into the Colony. It was an old boast of the militant Dutch in
+the Cape Colony that they would find a way to prevent British troops
+from using the colonial railways to attack the Boers.<a id="footnotetag204" name="footnotetag204"></a><a href="#footnote204" title="Go to footnote 204"><span class="small">[204]</span></a> And
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page351" name="page351"></a>(p. 351)</span> when at length, a month after Lord Roberts had arrived, the
+transport system had been reorganised, the troops concentrated at De
+Aar and Modder River, and everything was ready for the forward
+movement, the most complete secrecy was observed as to the departure
+of the Commander-in-Chief and Lord Kitchener. Instead of leaving for
+the front with the final drafts from the Capetown station in Adderley
+Street, amid the cheering of the British population, these two
+distinguished soldiers were driven in a close carriage, on the evening
+of February 6th, from Government House to the Salt River Station,
+where they caught the ordinary passenger train for De Aar.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Robert's advance.</span>
+
+<p>No one was more aware of the reality of the Dutch disaffection in the
+Colony than Lord Milner. Before Lord Roberts left Capetown for the
+front he addressed a memorandum to him, in which the attention of the
+Commander-in-Chief was drawn to certain special elements of danger in
+the whole situation in South Africa as affected by the rebellion of
+the Dutch in the Cape Colony. With <span class="pagenum"><a id="page352" name="page352"></a>(p. 352)</span> reference to this
+memorandum Lord Roberts writes, in the second of his despatches
+(February 16th, 1900):</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Before quitting the seat of Government I received a memorandum
+     from the High Commissioner, in which Sir Alfred Milner reviewed
+     the political and military situation, and laid stress on the
+     possibility of a general rising among the disaffected Dutch
+     population, should the Cape Colony be denuded of troops for the
+     purpose of carrying on offensive operations in the Orange Free
+     State. In reply I expressed the opinion that the military
+     requirements of the case demanded an early advance into the
+     enemy's country; that such an advance, if successful, would
+     lessen the hostile pressure both on the northern frontiers of the
+     Colony and in Natal; that the relief of Kimberley had to be
+     effected before the end of February, and would set free most of
+     the troops encamped on the Modder River, and that the arrival of
+     considerable reinforcements from home, especially of Field
+     Artillery, by the 19th of February, would enable those points
+     along the frontier which were weakly held to be materially
+     strengthened. I trusted, therefore, that His Excellency's
+     apprehensions would prove groundless. No doubt a certain amount
+     of risk had to be run, but protracted inaction seemed to me to
+     involve more serious dangers than the bolder course which I have
+     decided to adopt."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's proposal.</span>
+
+<p>There cannot, of course, be any question as to the general wisdom of
+this decision. Both in this case, and again in deciding to advance
+from Bloemfontein upon Johannesburg and Pretoria, it was just by
+taking his risks&mdash;risks that would have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page353" name="page353"></a>(p. 353)</span> reduced a lesser man
+to inaction&mdash;that Lord Roberts displayed the distinguishing quality of
+a great captain of war. In both cases the best defence was to attack.
+But as Lord Roberts, in this brief reference, does not indicate the
+real point of the High Commissioner's representations, it is necessary
+to state with some precision what it was that Lord Milner had actually
+in his mind. The last thing which occurred to him was to advocate any
+course that could weaken our offensive action. But the peculiarity of
+the South African political situation, which enabled even a defeated
+enemy, by detaching a very small force, to raise a new war in our
+rear, in what was nominally our country, and thus to hamper, and
+possibly altogether arrest, the forward movement, was constantly
+present to his thought. The proposal which Lord Milner desired Lord
+Roberts to adopt was that a certain minimum of mobile troops should be
+definitely set aside for the defence of the Colony, and kept there,
+whatever happened; since, in Lord Milner's opinion, it was only in
+this way that a real and effective form of defence could be made
+possible, and the number of men locked up in the passive defence of
+the railway lines greatly reduced. If this suggestion had been carried
+out, as Lord Milner intended, there would have been no second
+rebellion. What prevented Lord Roberts from adopting the High
+Commissioner's suggestion was the numerical insufficiency of the
+troops at his <span class="pagenum"><a id="page354" name="page354"></a>(p. 354)</span> disposal. In order to carry the war into the
+enemy's country, he had practically to denude the Cape Colony of
+troops. The subsequent course of the war will reveal the direct and
+disastrous influence which the situation in the Cape Colony was
+destined to exercise upon the military decisions of the republican
+leaders&mdash;an influence which would have been lessened materially, if
+not altogether removed, by the creation of this permanent and mobile
+force. And, in point of fact, Lord Milner's apprehension that the
+rebellion might even now interfere with the success of the forward
+movement, unless adequate provision was made to keep it in check,
+received almost immediate confirmation. While Lord Roberts was engaged
+in the capture of Cronje's force at Paardeberg, the north-midland
+districts of Prieska, Britstown, and Carnarvon, lying to the west of
+the railway from De Aar to Orange River, broke out into rebellion.
+Although Lord Roberts at once directed certain columns to concentrate
+upon this new area of disaffection, the situation had become so
+serious that on March 8th&mdash;<span class="italic">i.e.</span>, the day after Poplar Grove, and in
+the course of the rapid march upon Bloemfontein&mdash;Lord Roberts&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "desired Major-General Lord Kitchener to proceed to De Aar with
+     the object of collecting reinforcements, and of taking such steps
+     as might be necessary to punish the rebels and to prevent the
+     spread of disaffection."<a id="footnotetag205" name="footnotetag205"></a><a href="#footnote205" title="Go to footnote 205"><span class="small">[205]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page355" name="page355"></a>(p. 355)</span> That is to say, the disclosure of a new centre of active
+rebellion in the Colony deprived the Commander-in-Chief of the
+services of Lord Kitchener, his Chief-of-Staff, when he was in the act
+of executing one of the most critical movements of the campaign.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Boer peace overtures.</span>
+
+<p>The complete revolution in the military situation produced by Lord
+Roberts's victorious advance into the Free State elicited from
+Presidents Krüger and Steyn the "peace overtures" cabled to Lord
+Salisbury on March 5th, 1900. In this characteristic document the two
+Presidents remark that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "they consider it [their] duty solemnly to declare that this war
+     was undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the
+     threatened independence of the South African Republic, and is
+     only continued in order to secure and safeguard the incontestable
+     independence of both Republics as sovereign international states,
+     and to obtain the assurance that those of Her Majesty's subjects
+     who have taken part with [them] in this war shall suffer no harm
+     whatever in person or property."</p>
+
+<p>They further declare that "on these conditions, but on these
+conditions alone," they are now, as in the past, desirous of seeing
+peace re-established in South Africa; and they add considerately that
+they have refrained from making this declaration "so long as the
+advantage was always on their side," from a fear lest it "might hurt
+the feelings of honour of the British people." They conclude:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "But now that the prestige of the British Empire may be
+     considered to be assured by the capture of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page356" name="page356"></a>(p. 356)</span> one of our
+     forces by Her Majesty's troops, and that we are thereby forced to
+     evacuate other positions which our forces had occupied, that
+     difficulty is over, and we can no longer hesitate clearly to
+     inform your Government and people, in the sight of the whole
+     civilised world, why we are fighting, and on what conditions we
+     are ready to restore peace."<a id="footnotetag206" name="footnotetag206"></a><a href="#footnote206" title="Go to footnote 206"><span class="small">[206]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The best comment upon this grossly disingenuous document is that which
+is afforded by certain passages in Mr. Reitz's book, <span class="italic">A Century of
+Wrong</span>, which was written in anticipation of the outbreak of war and
+issued so soon as this anticipation had been realised:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The struggle of now nearly a century," he writes in his appeal
+     to his brother Afrikanders, "hastens to an end; we are
+     approaching the last act in that great drama which is so
+     momentous for all South Africa.... The questions which present
+     themselves for solution in the approaching conflict have their
+     origin deep in the history of the past.... By its light we are
+     more clearly enabled to comprehend the truth to which our people
+     appeal as a final justification for embarking on the war now so
+     close at hand.... May the hope which glowed in our hearts during
+     1880, and which buoyed us up during that struggle, burn on
+     steadily! May it prove a beacon of light in our path, invincibly
+     moving onwards through blood and through tears, until it leads us
+     to a real union of South Africa.... Whether the result be victory
+     or death, Liberty will assuredly rise on South Africa ... just as
+     freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more
+     than a century ago. Then from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page357" name="page357"></a>(p. 357)</span> Zambesi to Simon's Town
+     it will be Africa for the Afrikander."<a id="footnotetag207" name="footnotetag207"></a><a href="#footnote207" title="Go to footnote 207"><span class="small">[207]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>And to this may be added the following extract from a letter written
+by "one of the distinguished members of the Volksraad" who voted for
+war against Great Britain, to one of his friends, a member of the
+Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Our plan is, with God's help, to take all that is English in
+     South Africa; so, in case you true Afrikanders wish to throw off
+     the English yoke, now is the time to hoist the Vier-kleur in
+     Capetown. You can rely on us; we will push through from sea to
+     sea, and wave one flag over the whole of South Africa, under one
+     Afrikander Government, if we can reckon on our Afrikander
+     brethren."<a id="footnotetag208" name="footnotetag208"></a><a href="#footnote208" title="Go to footnote 208"><span class="small">[208]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The British reply.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Salisbury's reply, sent from the Foreign Office on March 11th, is
+as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"I have the honour to acknowledge Your Honours' telegram dated
+     the 5th of March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is
+     principally to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall
+     recognise the 'incontestable independence' of the South African
+     Republic and Orange Free State 'as sovereign international
+     states,' and to offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a
+     conclusion.</p>
+
+<p>"In the beginning of October last peace existed between Her
+     Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then
+     were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some
+     months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African
+     Republic, of which the object <span class="pagenum"><a id="page358" name="page358"></a>(p. 358)</span> was to obtain redress for
+     certain very serious grievances under which British residents in
+     the South African Republic were suffering. In the course of these
+     negotiations the South African Republic had, to the knowledge of
+     Her Majesty's Government, made considerable armaments, and the
+     latter had, consequently, taken steps to provide corresponding
+     reinforcements to the British garrisons of Capetown and Natal. No
+     infringement of the rights guaranteed by the Conventions had up
+     to that point taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two
+     days' notice, the South African Republic, after issuing an
+     insulting ultimatum, declared war upon Her Majesty, and the
+     Orange Free State, with whom there had not even been any
+     discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were
+     immediately invaded by the two Republics, siege was laid to three
+     towns within the British frontier, a large portion of the two
+     colonies was overrun, with great destruction to property and
+     life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of
+     extensive portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those
+     dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In
+     anticipation of these operations, the South African Republic had
+     been accumulating for many years past military stores on an
+     enormous scale, which by their character could only have been
+     intended for use against Great Britain.</p>
+
+<p>"Your Honours make some observations of a negative character upon
+     the object with which these preparations were made. I do not
+     think it necessary to discuss the questions you have raised. But
+     the result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy,
+     has been that the British Empire has been compelled to confront
+     an invasion which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and
+     the loss of thousands of precious <span class="pagenum"><a id="page359" name="page359"></a>(p. 359)</span> lives. This great
+     calamity has been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered
+     for having in recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two
+     Republics.</p>
+
+<p>"In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the
+     position which was given to them, and the calamities which their
+     unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions, Her
+     Majesty's Government can only answer your Honours' telegram by
+     saying that they are not prepared to assent to the independence
+     either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free
+     State."</p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Conventions to be annulled.</span>
+
+<p>This reply has been cited at length for two reasons. In the first
+place it affords a concise and weighty statement of the British case
+against the Republics, and, in the second, it contains a specific and
+reasoned declaration of the central decision of the Salisbury Cabinet,
+against which the efforts both of the Dutch party in the Cape and of
+the friends of the Boers in England continued to be directed, until
+the controversy was closed by the surrender of the republican leaders
+at Vereeniging. In the Cape Colony the cry of "conciliation" was
+raised to cloak the gross appearance of a movement which was, in fact,
+a direct co-operation with the enemy. And the same specious word was
+adopted in England, so soon as the strain of the war had begun to make
+itself felt in the constituencies, as a decent flag under which the
+party opponents of the Unionist Government in general could join
+forces with the traditional friends of the Boers and other convinced
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page360" name="page360"></a>(p. 360)</span> opponents of Imperial consolidation. The decision of the
+Salisbury Cabinet not to restore the system of the Conventions, which
+was in fact the decision of the great mass of the British people both
+at home and over-sea, was not reversed. It was confirmed in the House
+of Commons by 208 votes against 52 on July 25th, 1900, and by the
+verdict of the country in the General Election which followed.<a id="footnotetag209" name="footnotetag209"></a><a href="#footnote209" title="Go to footnote 209"><span class="small">[209]</span></a>
+But the political agitation by which it was sought to reverse this
+decision was none the less injurious alike to the Boer and British
+peoples, since it acted as a powerful incentive to the republican
+leaders to continued struggle which, except for the illusions created
+by this agitation, they would have recognised as hopeless in itself
+and unjustified by any prospect of military success. In both cases the
+effect of the agitation was the same: the war was unnecessarily
+prolonged&mdash;intentionally by the Afrikander nationalists, and
+unintentionally by Lord (then Mr.) Courtney, Mr. Morley, Mr. Bryce,
+and other opponents in England of the annexation of the Republics.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The 'Conciliation' movement.</span>
+
+<p>The Presidents had demanded the recognition of the independence of the
+Republics and a free pardon for the Cape rebels as the price of peace.
+The Afrikander nationalists at once began to co-operate with the
+Republics in the endeavour <span class="pagenum"><a id="page361" name="page361"></a>(p. 361)</span> to wrest these terms from the
+British Government. Mr. Schreiner, as we have seen, had already
+incurred Mr. Hofmeyr's displeasure by allowing the Cape Government to
+render assistance to the Imperial authorities in the prosecution of
+the war. The breach thus created between the Prime Minister and Sir
+Richard (then Mr.) Solomon, on the one hand, and Dr. Te Water, Mr.
+Merriman, and Mr. Sauer, who shared the views of the Bond, on the
+other, was, rapidly widened by the "conciliation" meetings held
+throughout the Colony by the Afrikander nationalists in support of the
+"peace overtures" of the Presidents. The British population at the
+Cape was quick to realise the insidious and fatal character of the
+"conciliation" movement thus inaugurated by the Afrikander
+nationalists. The universal alarm and indignation to which it gave
+rise among the loyalists of both nationalities found expression in the
+impassioned speech which Sir James (then Mr.) Rose Innes delivered at
+the Municipal Hall of Claremont<a id="footnotetag210" name="footnotetag210"></a><a href="#footnote210" title="Go to footnote 210"><span class="small">[210]</span></a> on March 30th, 1900. The purpose
+of the meeting was to allow the British subjects thus assembled to
+record their approval of Lord Salisbury's reply to the Republics, and
+their conviction that "the incorporation of these States within the
+dominions of the Queen could alone secure peace, prosperity, and
+public freedom throughout South Africa." In supporting this
+resolution, Sir James Rose Innes said:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page362" name="page362"></a>(p. 362)</span> "This question of permanent peace is the key-stone of
+     the whole matter, because, I take it, we none of us want to see
+     another war of this kind. We do not want to see the misery and
+     the suffering and the loss which a war of this kind entails. We
+     do not want to see our sandy plains drenched with the best blood
+     of England again, fighting against white men in this country. We
+     do not want to see the flower of colonial manhood shot down on
+     the plains of the Orange Free State and the Karroo, and neither
+     do we want to see brave men, born in South Africa, dying in
+     heaps, dying for what we know is a hopeless ideal. Therefore we
+     say, 'In Heaven's name give us peace! Have a settlement, but make
+     no settlement which shall not be calculated, as far as human
+     foresight can provide, to secure a permanent peace.'"</p>
+
+<p>These were strong words, and their significance was heightened by the
+well-known independence of Sir James Innes's political outlook.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner at Bloemfontein.</span>
+
+<p>A fortnight later Lord Milner declared his mind on the same question.
+Both the occasion and the speech are of special interest. The High
+Commissioner had just returned from a fortnight at the front. On March
+19th he left Capetown in company with Sir Richard Solomon for the
+north-eastern districts of the Colony, which, having rebelled in
+November, had just been reduced to order by General Brabant and the
+"Colonial Division," when the Free State invaders had been drawn off
+by Lord Roberts's advance. After a week in the Colony, Lord Milner
+travelled on by rail to Bloemfontein, which he reached on the 27th. It
+was a stimulating and suggestive moment. He was now <span class="pagenum"><a id="page363" name="page363"></a>(p. 363)</span> the
+guest of the British Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency, where, just
+ten months ago, as the guest of President Steyn, he had met Paul
+Krüger for the first time. The little Free State capital, then wrapped
+in its accustomed quietude, was now filled with the tumultuous
+presence of a great army. But, complete as was the revolution
+accomplished by Lord Roberts's advance, there were signs that the Boer
+was dying hard, even if he were not coming to life again. On the 30th
+a disquieting engagement was fought at Karree Siding, and on the 31st
+de Wet dealt his second shrewd blow at Sannah's Post.</p>
+
+<p>With this experience of the actualities of war, Lord Milner, leaving
+Bloemfontein on April 2nd, had returned to Capetown. On the 12th he
+was presented with an appreciative address, signed by all, except one,
+of the Nonconformist ministers of religion resident in and around
+Capetown, in which personal affection for himself and approval of his
+policy were expressed. The action of these men was altogether
+exceptional. It was justified by the circumstance that in England Lord
+Milner's policy had been subjected to the bitterest criticism in
+quarters where Nonconformist influence was predominant. Not only to
+Lord Courtney, but to other Liberal friends and associates, the High
+Commissioner had become a "lost mind." To the Afrikander nationalists
+he was "the enemy"; the efforts which had barely sufficed to keep the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page364" name="page364"></a>(p. 364)</span> administrative machinery of a British colony at the disposal
+of the Imperial Government were represented as the unconstitutional
+acts of a tyrannical proconsul; having ruthlessly exposed the
+aspirations of the Afrikander nationalists he was now to become the
+destroyer of the Boer nation. The personal note in the address was,
+therefore, both instructive and welcome, and it elicited a response in
+which the charm of a calm and generous nature shines through an
+unalterable determination to know and do the right:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"As regards myself personally, I cannot but feel it is a great
+     source of strength at a trying time to be assured of the
+     confidence and approval of the men I see before me, and of all
+     whom they represent. You refer to my having to encounter
+     misrepresentation and antagonism. I do not wish to make too much
+     of that. I have no doubt been exposed to much criticism and some
+     abuse. There has, I sometimes think, been an exceptional display
+     of mendacity at my expense. But this is the fate of every public
+     man who is forced by circumstances into a somewhat prominent
+     position in a great crisis. And, after all, praise and blame have
+     a wonderful way of balancing one another if you only give them
+     time.</p>
+
+<p>"I remember when I left England for South Africa three years ago,
+     it was amidst a chorus of eulogy so excessive that it made me
+     feel thoroughly uncomfortable. To protest would have been
+     useless: it would only have looked like affectation. So I just
+     placed the surplus praise to my credit, so to speak, as something
+     to live on in the days which I surely knew must come sooner or
+     later, if I did <span class="pagenum"><a id="page365" name="page365"></a>(p. 365)</span> my duty, when I would meet with
+     undeserved censure. And certainly I have had to draw on that
+     account rather heavily during the last nine months. But there is
+     still a balance on the right side which, thanks to you and
+     others, is now once more increasing. So I cannot pose as a
+     martyr, and, what is more important, I cannot complain of any
+     want of support. No man, placed as I have been in a position of
+     singular embarrassment, exposed to bitter attacks to which he
+     could not reply, and unable to explain his conduct even to his
+     own friends, has ever had more compensation to be thankful for
+     than I have had in the constant, devoted, forbearing support and
+     confidence of all those South Africans, whether in this Colony,
+     in Natal, or in the Republics, whose sympathy is with the British
+     Empire.</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">Never again.</span>
+
+<p>"In the concluding paragraph of your address you refer in weighty
+     and well-considered language to the conditions which you deem
+     necessary for the future peace and prosperity of South Africa,
+     and for the ultimate harmony and fusion of its white races. I can
+     only say that I entirely agree with the views expressed in that
+     paragraph. The longer the struggle lasts, the greater the
+     sacrifices which it involves, the stronger must surely be the
+     determination of all of us to achieve a settlement which will
+     render the repetition of this terrible scourge impossible. 'Never
+     again,' must be the motto of all thinking, of all humane men. It
+     is for that reason, not from any lust of conquest, not from any
+     desire to trample on a gallant, if misguided, enemy, that we
+     desire that the settlement shall be no patchwork and no
+     compromise; that it shall leave no room for misunderstanding, no
+     opportunity for intrigue, for the revival of impossible
+     ambitions, or the accumulation of enormous armaments. President
+     Krüger has said that he wants no more <span class="pagenum"><a id="page366" name="page366"></a>(p. 366)</span> Conventions, and
+     I entirely agree with him. A compromise of that sort is unfair to
+     everybody. If there is one thing of which, after recent
+     experiences, I am absolutely convinced, it is that the vital
+     interests of all those who live in South Africa, of our present
+     enemies as much as of those who are on our side, demand that
+     there should not be two dissimilar and antagonistic political
+     systems in that which nature and history have irrevocably decided
+     must be one country. To agree to a compromise which would leave
+     any ambiguity on that point would not be magnanimity: it would be
+     weakness, ingratitude, and cruelty&mdash;ingratitude to the heroic
+     dead, and cruelty to the unborn generations.</p>
+
+<p>"But when I say that, do not think that I wish to join in the
+     outcry, at present so prevalent, against the fine old virtue of
+     magnanimity. I believe in it as much as ever I did, and there is
+     plenty of room for it in the South Africa of to-day. We can show
+     it by a frank recognition of what is great and admirable in the
+     character of our enemies; by not maligning them as a body because
+     of the sins of the few, or perhaps even of many, individuals. We
+     can show it by not crowing excessively over our victories, and by
+     not thinking evil of every one who, for one reason or another, is
+     unable to join in our legitimate rejoicings. We can show it by
+     striving to take care that our treatment of those who have been
+     guilty of rebellion, while characterised by a just severity
+     towards the really guilty parties, should be devoid of any spirit
+     of vindictiveness, or of race-prejudice. We can show it, above
+     all, when this dire struggle is over, by proving by our acts that
+     they libelled us who said that we fought for gold or any material
+     advantage, and that the rights and privileges which we have
+     resolutely claimed for ourselves we are prepared freely to extend
+     to others, even to those who have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page367" name="page367"></a>(p. 367)</span> fought against us,
+     whenever they are prepared loyally to accept them."<a id="footnotetag211" name="footnotetag211"></a><a href="#footnote211" title="Go to footnote 211"><span class="small">[211]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It is the third of three critical utterances of which each is
+summarised, as it were, in a single luminous phrase. To the Cape Dutch
+he spoke at Graaf Reinet, after their own manner: "Of course you are
+loyal!" To England, on the Uitlander's behalf, he wrote: "The case for
+intervention is overwhelming." And now he gathered the whole long
+lesson of the war into the two words, "never again."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">British policy.</span>
+
+<p>A month later Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham (May 11th), made
+a general statement of the nature of the settlement upon which the
+British Government had determined. The separate existence of the
+Republics, "constantly intriguing as they had done with foreign
+nations, constantly promoting agitation and disaffection in our own
+colonies," was to be tolerated no longer; but the "individual
+liberties" of the Boers were to be preserved. After the war was over a
+period of Crown Colony government would be necessary; "but," he added,
+"as soon as it is safe and possible it will be the desire and the
+intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce these States into
+the great circle of self-governing colonies." In making this
+pronouncement Mr. Chamberlain referred in terms of just severity to
+the injurious influence which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as the
+official leader of the Liberal party, had exercised <span class="pagenum"><a id="page368" name="page368"></a>(p. 368)</span> upon the
+diplomatic contest of the preceding year. At the precise period when a
+word might have been worth anything to the cause of peace, Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, he said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "had again and again declaimed his own opinion that not only was
+     war out of the question, but that military preparations of any
+     kind were altogether unnecessary. I do not speak of the wisdom
+     which dictated such an expression of opinion," Mr. Chamberlain
+     continued, "although he repeated that statement three days before
+     the ultimatum was delivered, and a week before the invasion of
+     Natal took place. I do not speak, therefore, of his foresight.
+     But what is to be said of the patriotism of a man who is not a
+     single individual but who represents a great party by virtue of
+     his position&mdash;although he does not represent it by virtue of his
+     opinion&mdash;what is to be said of such a man who, at such a time,
+     should countermine the endeavours for peace of Her Majesty's
+     Government?"</p>
+
+<p>And in the same speech Mr. Chamberlain warned his fellow-countrymen
+"against the efforts which would be made by the politicians to snatch
+from them the fruits of a victory which would be won by their
+soldiers; and in particular against the campaign of misrepresentation
+which had been commenced already by Mr. Paul, the Stop-the-War
+Committee, and the other bodies which were so lavish with what they
+were pleased to call their 'accurate information.'"</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.</span>
+
+<p>Had Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman seen fit to profit by the experience
+of the past, the whole of the suffering and loss of the next year and
+a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page369" name="page369"></a>(p. 369)</span> half of wanton hostilities, in all human probability,
+would have been avoided. But Mr. Chamberlain's rebuke was disregarded.
+The senseless and unnatural alliance between the Afrikander
+nationalists and the Liberal Opposition was renewed. It is quite true
+that the official leader of the Opposition, in speaking at Glasgow on
+June 7th, two days after Lord Roberts had occupied Pretoria, declared
+that, in respect of the settlement, "one broad principle" must be laid
+down&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "the British Imperial power, which has hitherto been supreme in
+     effect in South Africa, must in future be supreme in form as well
+     as in effect, and this naturally carries with it the point which
+     is sometimes put in the foreground, namely, that there must be no
+     possibility that any such outbreak of hostilities as we have been
+     witnessing shall again occur.... The two conquered States must,
+     in some form or under some condition, become States of the
+     British Empire."</p>
+
+<p>But when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proceeded to inform his audience
+how this was to be done, he used expressions which not only robbed his
+original statement of all significance as an indication of British
+unanimity, but conveyed a direct intimation to the Afrikander
+nationalists that their endeavours to frustrate the declared objects
+of the Unionist Government would receive the support and encouragement
+of the Opposition in England. His words were:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "We need have no doubt how it is to be done. By applying our
+     Liberal principles, the Liberal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page370" name="page370"></a>(p. 370)</span> principles from which
+     the strength of the Empire has been derived, and on which it
+     depends. Let us apply our Liberal principles, and whether our
+     party be in a majority, or in a minority, I think that it is well
+     in our power to secure that these principles shall be applied.
+     [The General Election was imminent.] Let us restore as early as
+     possible, and let us maintain, those rights of self-government
+     which give not only life and vigour, but contentment and loyalty
+     to every colony which enjoys them...."</p>
+
+<p>"Liberal principles," when applied to a given administrative problem,
+as Mr. Chamberlain took occasion to point out (June 19th), meant, for
+practical purposes, the opinions which prominent members of the
+Liberal party were known to hold upon the matter in question. Lord
+(then Mr.) Courtney was for autonomy&mdash;"the re-establishment of the
+independence of the two Republics." Mr. Bryce advocated "the
+establishment of two protected States, which would have a sham
+independence of not much advantage to them for any practical or useful
+purpose, but very dangerous to us." And then there was Mr. Morley. Now
+Mr. Morley, only a week before, at Oxford (June 10th), had condemned
+not only the war, but by implication, the rejection of President
+Krüger's illusory Franchise Bill.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. John Morley.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I assert," said Mr. Morley, "that the evils which have resulted
+     from the war immeasurably transcend the evils with which it was
+     proposed to deal.... I abhor the whole transaction of the war. I
+     think in many ways it is an irreparable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page371" name="page371"></a>(p. 371)</span> situation. We
+     have done a great wrong&mdash;a wrong of which I believe there is
+     scarcely any Englishman living who will not bitterly
+     repent."<a id="footnotetag212" name="footnotetag212"></a><a href="#footnote212" title="Go to footnote 212"><span class="small">[212]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>With these words fresh in his memory, Mr. Chamberlain continued:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Is Mr. Morley a Liberal? I do not know in that case what would
+     become of the new territories if his principles were applied. But
+     this I do know&mdash;that in that case you would have immediately to
+     get rid of Sir Alfred Milner, who is the one great official in
+     South Africa who has shown from the first a true grasp of the
+     situation; and you would have also to get rid of the Colonial
+     Secretary, which would not, perhaps, matter."<a id="footnotetag213" name="footnotetag213"></a><a href="#footnote213" title="Go to footnote 213"><span class="small">[213]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>And so in 1900&mdash;after the Raid, after the long diplomatic conflict,
+after the sudden revelation of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page372" name="page372"></a>(p. 372)</span> the military strength of the
+Republics, after the ambitions of the Afrikander nationalists had been
+unmasked, and after the Dutch subjects of the Queen had risen in
+arms&mdash;the Liberal friends of the South African Dutch set themselves to
+do again what they had done in 1880. Just as then President Krüger
+wrote,<a id="footnotetag214" name="footnotetag214"></a><a href="#footnote214" title="Go to footnote 214"><span class="small">[214]</span></a> on behalf of himself and his Afrikander allies, to Lord
+(then Mr.) Courtney: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere ... will be
+useful.... We have done our duty, and used all legitimate influence to
+cause the [Federation] proposals to fail"; so now these Boer
+sympathisers prepared to work hand in hand with the Afrikander
+nationalists in their endeavour to secure the "fall" of Lord Milner,
+and to cause the Annexation proposals to "fail." Happily the analogy
+ends here. Upon the "anvil" of Lord Milner the "hammers" of the
+enemies of the Empire were worn out&mdash;<span class="italic">Tritantur mallei, remanet
+incus</span>.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page373" name="page373"></a>(p. 373)</span> CHAPTER IX</h3>
+
+<p class="title">THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT</p>
+
+
+<p>The correspondence forwarded to the Colonial Office during the first
+half of the year 1900 by Lord Milner, and presented to the House of
+Commons in time for the Settlement debate of July 25th, furnishes a
+complete record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement. The
+whole of this interesting and significant collection of documents is
+worthy of attention; but all that can be done here is to direct the
+notice of the reader to one or two of its more salient
+features&mdash;features which illustrate the extraordinary condition of the
+Cape Colony, and explain how the disaffection of the Dutch subjects of
+the Crown was to be first aggravated, and then used as a means of
+saving the independence of the Republics. The position taken up by the
+Bond at the end of January (1900) in view of Mr. Schreiner's gradual
+conversion to the side of the Imperial Government, is sufficiently
+indicated in the resolution prepared for submission to the annual
+Congress, to which reference has been already<a id="footnotetag215" name="footnotetag215"></a><a href="#footnote215" title="Go to footnote 215"><span class="small">[215]</span></a> made. It was, in
+effect, a condemnation not <span class="pagenum"><a id="page374" name="page374"></a>(p. 374)</span> only of the British Government,
+but of the Cape Government also, in so far as it had co-operated with
+the Imperial authorities, and a determination to prevent the war from
+being carried to a logical and successful conclusion by the
+incorporation of the Boer Republics into the system of British South
+Africa. The annual Congress, at which these opinions were to be
+affirmed, was announced to be held at Somerset East, on March 8th.
+Lord Milner, however, represented to Mr. Schreiner that it was very
+undesirable that such a demonstration should take place; and, through
+Mr. Schreiner's influence, the Congress was postponed. But the Prime
+Minister, in undertaking to use his influence with the Bond to prevent
+a denunciation of the policy of the Imperial Government at so critical
+a period, expressed the hope that the loyalists on their side would
+refrain from any public demonstration of an opposite character.</p>
+
+<p>This abstinence from agitation, which was obviously desirable in the
+public interests at a time of intense political excitement, by no
+means suited the leaders of the Bond. <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, in commenting upon
+the postponement of the Congress, incidentally reveals the real
+consideration which made it worth while for the Bond to promote an
+agitation of this kind. The Bond organ regrets that the Congress has
+been postponed. And why?</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "It is said that the [South African] League would have held a
+     Congress had the Bond Congress been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page375" name="page375"></a>(p. 375)</span> held. We have
+     nothing to do with what the League does or does not do; as a
+     matter of fact, its opinion has already been published in the
+     Imperial Blue-books. We were of opinion that it would have been
+     the duty of the Afrikander party to express itself at the
+     Congress in unmistakable terms, and resolutely, in order thereby
+     to maintain its true position and strengthen the hands of its
+     friends in England who have courageously and with self-sacrifice
+     striven for the good and just cause."<a id="footnotetag216" name="footnotetag216"></a><a href="#footnote216" title="Go to footnote 216"><span class="small">[216]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>This, then, was the real object of the agitation&mdash;to "strengthen the
+hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England." The writer
+of this article suggests, however, that there is still a prospect that
+the "good cause" may be promoted, after all, in the way which he
+desires.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Origin of the movement.</span>
+
+<p>This prospect was speedily realised. With characteristic astuteness,
+the Bond leaders discovered a method by which their object could be
+achieved without exposing themselves to the reproach of "stirring up
+strife." The meetings were to be held, not as Bond meetings, but as
+"conciliation" meetings. The manner in which the machinery of the
+conciliation movement was originally set in motion will appear from
+the following telegram, which President Krüger sent to President
+Steyn, on January 20th&mdash;that is, a little more than a month before the
+Bond Congress was postponed:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "A certain E. T. Hargrove, an English journalist, about whom Dr.
+     Leyds formerly wrote that he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page376" name="page376"></a>(p. 376)</span> had done much in Holland
+     to work up the peace memorial to Queen Victoria, has come here,
+     as he says, from Sauer and Merriman, who are ready to range
+     themselves openly on our side, to make propaganda in the Cape
+     Colony, provided an official declaration is given that the
+     Republics only desire to secure complete independence. He wished
+     that I should write a letter to Queen Victoria, but this I
+     refused, and thought it desirable that I should write a letter to
+     him personally, in which an answer is given to his question. He
+     thinks that a great propaganda can be made in the Cape Colony,
+     whereby influence can be brought to bear again on the English
+     people and the world. I myself do not expect much result, but
+     think that a letter can do good, and should be glad to have your
+     opinion and observations as soon as possible."<a id="footnotetag217" name="footnotetag217"></a><a href="#footnote217" title="Go to footnote 217"><span class="small">[217]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>This telegram, one of the many documents found at Bloemfontein upon
+its occupation by Lord Roberts, is supplemented by the further facts
+disclosed by the investigations of the Concessions Commission, that a
+sum of £1,000 was advanced to Mr. Hargrove by the manager of the
+Netherlands Railway on February 3rd, 1900, and that this loan, paid in
+specie, was "debited to the account 'Political Situation,' to be
+hereafter arranged with the Government." The purposes for which Mr.
+Hargrove secured this large sum are stated in the following question
+and answer:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Hargrove's £1,000.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>Q. 591. "Did he ask for money to carry out this object [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> to
+     stop the war on the assurance that the Boers wanted nothing more
+     than their independence]?"</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page377" name="page377"></a>(p. 377)</span> <span class="smcap">Mr. J. van Kretschmar</span>, General Manager of the
+     Netherlands South African Railway Company: "Yes; he said he had
+     travelling expenses to defray, a lot of publications to issue,
+     and books to be written, and he asked for money for these
+     purposes."<a id="footnotetag218" name="footnotetag218"></a><a href="#footnote218" title="Go to footnote 218"><span class="small">[218]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Three months later President Krüger's telegram was laid before the two
+ministers whose names it contained by Mr. Schreiner, at Lord Milner's
+request, in order that they might have an opportunity of "repudiating
+or explaining the allegations affecting themselves which it
+contained." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer denied that Mr. Hargrove
+had received any authority from them to use their names "in the manner
+which he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page378" name="page378"></a>(p. 378)</span> appeared to have done." And on April 19th Mr.
+Merriman himself wrote to Mr. Hargrove to ask for an explanation. To
+this letter Mr. Hargrove replied immediately:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "This is not an answer to your note of this date, but is to ask
+     you to allow me to show your note to a friend of yours and of
+     mine. As it is marked 'private' I cannot do this until I hear
+     from you. Would you be so good as to send word by the driver of
+     the cab which waits?..."</p>
+
+<p>In a second letter, written on the same day (April 19th), and
+presumably after he had consulted the mutual friend in question, Mr.
+Hargrove wrote:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Knowing as you do that I never told you of my proposed trip to
+     Pretoria, that I never talked the matter over with you in any
+     shape or form, you may be sure that when I got there I did not
+     speak or make promises in your behalf. But I did mention your
+     name in this way: I told President Krüger of a conversation I had
+     had with Mr. Sauer, in which I had asked him what his attitude
+     would be in the event of the Republics offering to withdraw their
+     forces from colonial territory on the condition that their
+     independence would be recognised. Mr. Sauer's reply was that, in
+     those circumstances he would, in his personal capacity, most
+     certainly urge the acceptance of that offer, and that, although
+     he could speak for himself only, he thought it probable you would
+     do the same."</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Hargrove adds that the "misconception" embodied in President
+Krüger's telegram is due to the circumstance that it was probably
+"dictated <span class="pagenum"><a id="page379" name="page379"></a>(p. 379)</span> in a hurry, amidst a rush of other business," and
+contained a "hasty and more or less careless account" of a "long talk"
+translated to the President by Mr. Reitz from English into Dutch.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Hargrove at the same time forwarded a copy of this letter to Mr.
+Sauer. With this latter minister of the Crown he enjoyed a more
+intimate acquaintance, since, as Lord Milner points out,<a id="footnotetag219" name="footnotetag219"></a><a href="#footnote219" title="Go to footnote 219"><span class="small">[219]</span></a> he had
+been Mr. Sauer's travelling companion during this latter's
+"well-meant, but unsuccessful, journey to Wodehouse, which was
+immediately followed by the rebellion of that district."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Graaf Reinet congress.</span>
+
+<p>This, then, was the character of the man who travelled throughout the
+Colony, addressing meetings of the Dutch population, in order that
+"the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England might be
+strengthened." At the People's Congress, held at Graaf Reinet (May
+30th) he rose to his full stature. "The worst foes of the British
+Empire," he said,<a id="footnotetag220" name="footnotetag220"></a><a href="#footnote220" title="Go to footnote 220"><span class="small">[220]</span></a> "were not the Boers, but those who had set up
+the howl for annexation." And he concluded by urging his audience to
+renew their hopes, for he believed that "if they did everything in
+their power to show what was right they would win in the end." On the
+following day Mr. Hargrove was asked, in the name of the Congress, to
+continue his agitation in England. The Congress, however, did not
+propose to rely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page380" name="page380"></a>(p. 380)</span> exclusively upon Mr. Hargrove's efforts. It
+resolved to send a deputation of Cape colonists "to tell the simple
+truth as they know it" to the people of Great Britain and Ireland.</p>
+
+<p>There is one other fact which is disclosed by this official
+correspondence from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State
+which cannot be overlooked. Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer both repudiated
+absolutely President Krüger's statement that Mr. Hargrove "had come
+here [<span class="italic">i.e.</span> to Pretoria], as he says, from Sauer and Merriman." In
+view of this repudiation, it is somewhat startling to find that the
+letters covering the minutes of the conciliation meetings, forwarded
+to Lord Milner from time to time with the request that they may be
+sent on to the Colonial Office, bear the signature of Mr. Albert
+Cartwright, as honorary secretary of the Conciliation Committee of
+South Africa. Mr. Albert Cartwright was editor of <span class="italic">The South African
+News</span>&mdash;that is to say, of the journal which, as we have noticed
+before, served as the medium for the expression of the political views
+of Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. At the period in question <span class="italic">The South
+African News</span> rendered itself notorious by circulating the absurd, but
+none the less injurious, report that General Buller and his army had
+surrendered to the Boers in Natal and agreed to return to England on
+parole; by publishing stories of imaginary Boer victories; by
+eulogising Mr. Hargrove, whose acceptance of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page381" name="page381"></a>(p. 381)</span> £1,000 from
+the Netherlands Railway it definitely denied; and by its persistent
+and vehement denunciations of Lord Milner. At a later period Mr.
+Cartwright was convicted of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and
+condemned to a term of imprisonment.<a id="footnotetag221" name="footnotetag221"></a><a href="#footnote221" title="Go to footnote 221"><span class="small">[221]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mischievous effects.</span>
+
+<p>The situation thus brought about is described by Lord Milner in a
+passage in the despatch<a id="footnotetag222" name="footnotetag222"></a><a href="#footnote222" title="Go to footnote 222"><span class="small">[222]</span></a> which covers the transmission of the
+newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet. After
+stating that in return for Mr. Schreiner's efforts to secure the
+postponement of the Bond Congress, he had himself persuaded the
+leaders of the Progressive party to abstain from any public
+demonstration of their opinions, he writes:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "There was a truce of God on both sides. Then came the
+     'conciliation' movement, and the country was stirred from end to
+     end by a series of meetings much more violent and mischievous
+     than the regular Bond Congress would have been, though, of
+     course, on the same lines. The truce being thus broken, it would
+     have been useless&mdash;and, as a matter of fact, I did not
+     attempt&mdash;to restrain an expression of opinion on the other side.
+     Hence the long series of meetings held in British centres to
+     pronounce in favour of the annexation of both Republics, and to
+     give cordial support to the policy of Her Majesty's Government
+     and myself personally. On the whole, the utterances at these
+     meetings have been marked by a moderation totally absent in the
+     tone of the conciliators. But no doubt a certain number of
+     violent things <span class="pagenum"><a id="page382" name="page382"></a>(p. 382)</span> have been said, and a certain amount of
+     unnecessary heat generated. I do not think, however, that those
+     [the loyalists] who have held these meetings, under extraordinary
+     provocation, are greatly to blame if this has occasionally been
+     the case."</p>
+
+<p>That the "conciliation" movement exercised a most injurious influence
+in a colony of which a considerable area was in rebellion or under
+martial law, and where the majority of the inhabitants were in
+sympathy with the enemy is obvious. But from the point of view of the
+Afrikander nationalists it was an intelligible and effective method of
+promoting the objects which they had in view. What is amazing is the
+part which was played in it by Englishmen, and the confident manner in
+which the promoters of the movement relied upon the political
+co-operation of the friends of the Boers in the ranks of the Liberal
+party in England. Every Afrikander who attended these meetings knew
+that he was doing his best to arouse hatred against the Englishman and
+sympathy for the Boer. The nature of the resolutions to which he gave
+his adherence left him in no doubt on this point.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The war," said Mr. A. B. de Villiers, at the People's Congress,
+     "was the most unrighteous war that was ever pursued. The simple
+     aim was to seize the Republics. If that was persisted in,
+     Afrikanders would not rest.... Britain would efface the Republics
+     and make the people slaves. Race hatred would then be prolonged
+     from generation to generation."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page383" name="page383"></a>(p. 383)</span> To publish abroad such opinions as these was obviously to
+invite rebellion in the Cape Colony, to encourage the resistance of
+the Boers, and to embarrass the British authorities, both civil and
+military, throughout South Africa. This was precisely what the
+Afrikander nationalist desired to do. But what is to be thought of the
+Englishmen who, both in the Cape Colony and in England, took part in
+this "conciliation" movement? Surely they did not desire these same
+results. Were they, then, the comrades or the dupes of the Afrikander
+nationalists? This is a question upon which the individual reader may
+be left to form his own judgment.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Comrades or dupes.</span>
+
+<p>This much, at least, is certain. What gave the Afrikander nationalists
+the power to bring about the second invasion of the Cape Colony, and
+to inflict a year and a half of guerilla warfare upon South Africa,
+was the co-operation of these Englishmen&mdash;whether comrades or
+dupes&mdash;who opposed the annexation of the Republics. The intense
+sympathy felt by the Afrikanders for their defeated kinsmen was
+natural; but the means by which it was enflamed were artificial. Lord
+Milner himself, with his accustomed serenity of judgment, refused to
+take a "gloomy view" of the question of racial relations in the
+Colony, still less in South Africa as a whole.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "If it is true," he wrote on June 6th, "as the 'conciliators' are
+     never tired of threatening us, that race hatred will be eternal,
+     why should they make <span class="pagenum"><a id="page384" name="page384"></a>(p. 384)</span> such furious efforts to keep it up
+     at the present moment? The very vehemence of their declarations
+     that the Afrikanders will never forgive, nor forget, nor
+     acquiesce, seems to me to indicate a considerable and
+     well-justified anxiety on their part lest these terrible things
+     should, after all, happen."</p>
+
+<p>But while the Cape Colony was in the throes of this agitation, British
+soldiers were gallantly fighting their way to Johannesburg and
+Pretoria. During the six weeks of Lord Roberts's "prolonged and
+enforced halt" at Bloemfontein (March 13th&mdash;May 1st), and
+subsequently, while the Army was advancing upon the Transvaal,
+considerable progress was made in the work of clearing the Colony of
+the republican invaders and re-establishing British authority in the
+districts in which the Dutch had risen in rebellion. In the course of
+these operations a large number of rebels had fallen into the hands of
+the Imperial military authorities, and it was the question of the
+treatment of these colonial rebels that was destined to bring Mr.
+Schreiner into direct conflict with those of his ministers who still
+held the opinions of the Bond.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The punishment of rebels.</span>
+
+<p>In the middle of April Lord Milner had received from Mr. Chamberlain a
+despatch containing a preliminary statement of the opinion of the Home
+Government upon the two questions of the compensation of loyalists and
+the punishment of rebels, and on April 14th he requested his ministers
+to give formal expression to their views <span class="pagenum"><a id="page385" name="page385"></a>(p. 385)</span> upon the subjects
+to which Mr. Chamberlain had drawn his attention. A fortnight later
+Lord Milner reported to the Home Government the conclusions at which
+Mr. Schreiner and his fellow-ministers had arrived. Trial by jury for
+persons indicted for high treason must be abandoned, since it would be
+impossible for the Crown to obtain the necessary convictions, and a
+special tribunal must be established by statute. As regards the nature
+of the punishment to be inflicted upon the rebels, Mr. Schreiner
+wrote:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Ministers submit that the ends of justice would be served by the
+     selection of a certain limited number of the principal offenders,
+     whose trials would mark the magnitude of their offence and whose
+     punishment, if found guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the
+     remainder, ministers believe that the interests both of sound
+     policy and of public morality would be served if Her Gracious
+     Majesty were moved to issue, as an act of grace, a Proclamation
+     of amnesty under which, upon giving proper security for their
+     good behaviour, all persons chargeable with high treason, except
+     those held for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to
+     their avocations."<a id="footnotetag223" name="footnotetag223"></a><a href="#footnote223" title="Go to footnote 223"><span class="small">[223]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The substance of the Ministers' Minutes containing these conclusions,
+and the arguments by which they were supported&mdash;notably an appeal to
+the "Canadian precedent"&mdash;were telegraphed to the Home Government, and
+on May 4th Mr. Chamberlain replied, also by telegram. While <span class="pagenum"><a id="page386" name="page386"></a>(p. 386)</span>
+the people of Great Britain were animated by no vindictive feeling
+against "those who had been or were in arms against Her Majesty's
+forces, whether enemies or rebels"&mdash;did, in fact, desire that all
+racial animosity should disappear in South Africa at the earliest
+possible moment after the war was over&mdash;the "sentiments of both sides"
+must be taken into consideration. The consequences which would ensue
+from "the rankling sense of injustice" that would arise if the rebels
+were actually placed in a better position after the struggle was over
+than those who had risked life and property in the determination to
+remain "loyal to their Queen and flag," would be no less serious than
+the bad results to be anticipated from any display of a revengeful
+policy on the part of the loyalists. He continued:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Clemency to rebels is a policy which has the hearty sympathy of
+     Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an
+     obligation of duty and honour. The question is, how can these two
+     policies be harmonised? It is clear that, in the interest of
+     future peace, it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot be
+     indulged in with impunity, and above all that, if unsuccessful,
+     it is not a profitable business for the rebel. Otherwise the
+     State would be offering a premium to rebellion. The present
+     moment, therefore, while the war is still proceeding, and while
+     efforts may still be made to tempt British subjects into
+     rebellious courses, is in any case not appropriate for announcing
+     that such action may be indulged in with absolute impunity. And
+     if, as has been suggested, a great many of the Queen's rebellious
+     subjects are the mere tools of those who <span class="pagenum"><a id="page387" name="page387"></a>(p. 387)</span> have deceived
+     them, it is important that these should be made aware
+     individually that, whatever their leaders may tell them,
+     rebellion is a punishable offence.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">Clemency and justice.</span>
+
+<p>"Up to this time very lenient treatment has been meted out to
+     rebels. Although, according to the law of the Cape Colony, and
+     under martial law, the punishment of death might have been
+     inflicted, in no case has any rebel suffered the capital penalty,
+     and the vast majority have been permitted for the present to
+     return to their homes and to resume their occupations. There are
+     many degrees in the crime of rebellion. Her Majesty's Government
+     desire that in any case means shall be found for dealing
+     effectually with: (1) The ringleaders and promoters; (2) those
+     who have committed outrages or looted the property of their loyal
+     fellow-subjects; (3) those who have committed acts contrary to
+     the usages of civilised warfare, such as abuse of the white flag,
+     firing on hospitals, etc. There remain (4) those who, though not
+     guilty, of either of those offences, have openly and willingly
+     waged war against Her Majesty's forces; (5) those who confined
+     themselves to aiding Her Majesty's enemies by giving information
+     or furnishing provisions; and (6) those who can satisfactorily
+     prove that they acted under compulsion. In the opinion of Her
+     Majesty's Government a distinction ought to be, if possible,
+     drawn between these different classes.</p>
+
+<p>"Her Majesty's Government recognise the difficulty of indicting
+     for high treason all who have taken part with the enemy, and they
+     would suggest, for the consideration of your ministers, the
+     expediency of investing either the Special Judicial Commission
+     which, as stated in your telegram of 28th April, is contemplated
+     by your ministers, or a separate Commission, with powers to
+     schedule the names of all persons implicated in the rebellion
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page388" name="page388"></a>(p. 388)</span> under the various heads indicated above. It would be
+     necessary to decide beforehand how the different categories
+     should then be dealt with. As regards 1, 2, and 3, they would, of
+     course, be brought before the Judicial Commission and tried by
+     them. Might not 4 and 5 be allowed to plead guilty, and be
+     thereupon either sentenced to a fine carrying with it
+     disfranchisement, or released on recognisances, to come up for
+     judgment when called upon (this also to involve
+     disfranchisement), while 6 might be subjected to disfranchisement
+     alone? Her Majesty's Government offer these as suggestions for
+     the consideration of your ministers.</p>
+
+<p>"In regard to the reasons urged by your ministers in favour of a
+     general amnesty, Her Majesty's Government would point out that
+     they are of a highly controversial character, and it is
+     impossible to discuss them fully at a moment when an indication
+     of the views of Her Majesty's Government is urgently required.
+     Her Majesty's Government would only observe that the policy which
+     they have indicated in this telegram appears to them to be one
+     not merely of justice, but of clemency, which the whole white
+     population of the Colony might well accept as satisfactory, and
+     which should not, any more than the ordinary administration of
+     justice, encourage the natives to think that the two white races
+     are permanently disunited, while with especial reference to the
+     third reason, it may be observed that the expediency of the
+     action to be taken in such cases depends upon circumstances which
+     must vary greatly according to date and locality. In Lower Canada
+     in 1837-38 there was a revolt during peace against the Queen's
+     authority, founded on grievances under constitutional conditions
+     which were recognised as unsatisfactory by the Government of the
+     day, and altered by subsequent legislation. In the Cape there has
+     been adhesion to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page389" name="page389"></a>(p. 389)</span> the Queen's enemies during war by
+     those who have not even the pretext of any grievance, and who
+     have for a generation enjoyed full constitutional liberty. In
+     Canada the insurrection was never a formidable one from a
+     military point of view; in the Cape it has added very largely to
+     the cost and difficulty of the war, and has entailed danger and
+     heavy loss to Her Majesty's troops."<a id="footnotetag224" name="footnotetag224"></a><a href="#footnote224" title="Go to footnote 224"><span class="small">[224]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The ministry divided.</span>
+
+<p>This estimate of the guilt of the Cape rebels&mdash;moderate in the light
+of British colonial history, merciful beyond dispute as judged by the
+practice of foreign States&mdash;failed to commend itself to the Afrikander
+Ministry. On May 29th, when the full text of the Cape ministers'
+minutes and enclosures had reached the Colonial Office, Lord Milner
+inquired of Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of his ministers, whether the
+disfranchisement proposed was for life or for a period only; and
+further, whether, in view of their fuller knowledge of the
+representations of the Cape Ministry, the views of the Home Government
+were still to be accepted as those expressed in the despatch of May
+4th. To these questions Mr. Chamberlain replied, by telegram, on June
+10th, that the Government continued to hold the opinion that the
+policy already suggested should be substantially adhered to; while, as
+to the period of disfranchisement, he pointed out that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "conviction and sentence for high treason carried with it
+     disfranchisement for life, and if the offenders were spared the
+     other and severer penalties of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page390" name="page390"></a>(p. 390)</span> rebellion, justice
+     seemed to demand that they should suffer the full political
+     penalty. Disfranchisement for life did not seem to Her Majesty's
+     Government to be a very serious punishment for rebellion."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Mr. Schreiner resigns.</span>
+
+<p>On June 11th Lord Milner was informed by Mr. Schreiner that ministers
+were hopelessly divided on the subject of the treatment of the rebels,
+and that their differences could not be composed, and on the following
+day he replied that, if he could not receive the support of a
+unanimous Cabinet to which he, as Governor, was constitutionally
+entitled, he would be compelled, in the discharge of his duty, to seek
+it elsewhere. Mr. Schreiner's resignation, which was placed in Lord
+Milner's hands on the next day, was followed by the appointment, on
+June 18th, of a Progressive Ministry with Sir Gordon Sprigg as Prime
+Minister and Sir James Rose Innes as Attorney-General. Mr. Schreiner,
+in his memorandum of June 11th, had forwarded to Lord Milner documents
+containing particulars of the individual views of the members of his
+Cabinet. Mr. Solomon, the Attorney-General, was prepared to adopt a
+policy in respect of the treatment of the rebels, and the machinery by
+which that policy was to be carried out, which appeared to him to
+involve nothing that would prevent "complete accord between Her
+Majesty's Government and this Government on the question." And in this
+view both Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Herholdt concurred. But the remaining
+members of the Cabinet were entirely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page391" name="page391"></a>(p. 391)</span> opposed to any policy
+other than that of granting a general amnesty to all rebels except the
+"principal offenders," and allowing these latter to be tried by the
+machinery of justice already in existence&mdash;<span class="italic">i.e.</span> by Afrikander
+juries. The minutes which they respectively addressed to the Prime
+Minister were bitter invectives directed alike against the Home
+Government and Lord Milner.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "We are asked," Mr. Merriman wrote, on his own and Mr. Sauer's
+     behalf, with reference to the suggestions of the Home Government,
+     "to deal with a number of men who have, at worst, taken up arms
+     in what they, however erroneously, considered to be a righteous
+     war&mdash;a war in which they joined the Queen's enemies to resist
+     what prominent men both here and in England have repeatedly
+     spoken of as a crime.... These men, irrespective of class, we are
+     asked to put under a common political proscription, to deprive
+     them of their civil rights, and by so doing (in fact, this is the
+     main commendation of the measure to the "loyals") to deprive
+     their friends and kinsfolk, who have rendered the Colony yeoman
+     service at the most critical time, of that legitimate influence
+     which belongs to a majority. We are asked, in fact, to create a
+     class of political 'helots' in South Africa, where we are now
+     waging a bloody and costly war ostensibly for the purpose of
+     putting an end to a similar state of affairs."</p>
+
+<p>Of course, all this and much more might have been read at any time
+since the war began in the columns of <span class="italic">The South African News</span>, but in
+a minister's memorandum to the Prime Minister, and over the signature
+"John X. Merriman," its <span class="pagenum"><a id="page392" name="page392"></a>(p. 392)</span> naked hostility arrests the mind.
+Dr. Te Water's memorandum, although much shorter than that of Mr.
+Merriman, is even more outspoken. To him, the direct representative of
+the republican nationalists in the Afrikander Cabinet, amnesty for the
+rebels is the "sound and proper policy." And naturally, since in his
+eyes the rebels themselves are&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "British subjects of Dutch extraction who, after vainly
+     endeavouring, by all possible constitutional means, to prevent
+     what they, in common with the rest of the civilised world,
+     believe to be an unjust and infamous war against their near
+     kinsmen, aided the Republics in the terrible struggle forced upon
+     them."<a id="footnotetag225" name="footnotetag225"></a><a href="#footnote225" title="Go to footnote 225"><span class="small">[225]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">A progressive ministry.</span>
+
+<p>This is vitriol-throwing, but it is none the less significant. These
+three men formed half of the six ministers to whom collectively, Lord
+Milner, as Governor of the Cape Colony, had to look for advice during
+the two critical years that the Afrikander party was in power.
+Fortunately, in his capacity of High Commissioner for South Africa, he
+was free to act without their advice, as the representative of the
+Queen. Even so, his achievement is little less than marvellous. Aided
+by Mr. Schreiner's pathetic sense of loyalty to the person of the
+sovereign, he had kept the Cape Government outwardly true to its
+allegiance. The long hours of patient remonstrance, the word-battles
+from which the Prime Minister had risen sometimes white with
+passionate resentment, had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page393" name="page393"></a>(p. 393)</span> not been useless. By tact, by
+serenity of disposition, by depth of conviction, and latterly by sheer
+force of argument, Lord Milner had won Mr. Schreiner, not indeed to
+the side of England, but at least to the side of that Empire-State of
+which England was the head. With the Prime Minister went Sir Richard
+Solomon, Mr. Herholdt, and one or two of the Afrikander rank and file.
+Thus reinforced, the Progressives commanded a working majority in the
+Legislative Assembly, and the ascendancy of the Afrikander party was
+at an end.</p>
+
+<p>Apart from the secession of Mr. Schreiner and his immediate followers,
+the Parliamentary strength of the Afrikander party was lessened by
+another circumstance, to which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman referred
+in the debate on the South African Settlement in the House of Commons
+on July 25th. Certain members of the Cape Parliament, said the leader
+of the Liberal Opposition, had been arrested for high treason, with
+the result that the Afrikander party was deprived of their votes, and
+the balance of power between that party and the Progressive party was
+upset. And he protested against this manner of turning an Afrikander
+majority into a minority. The reply which these remarks on the part of
+this friend of the Afrikander party in England drew from the
+Government is instructive:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "May I remind the right honourable gentleman," said Mr. Balfour,
+     "that the balance of parties was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page394" name="page394"></a>(p. 394)</span> disturbed by another
+     and different cause on which he has made no protest? Some members
+     of that Parliament, not sharing the views of those who are
+     imprisoned, are now fighting at the front and risking their lives
+     in the defence of the Empire. Their party is deprived of their
+     services in the Cape Parliament, and I should have thought that
+     this would have affected the right honourable gentleman much more
+     than the absence of men who, under any circumstances, must be
+     supposed to be under the darkest suspicion as to their view and
+     policy respecting the country to which they owe allegiance."</p>
+
+<p>The Cape Parliament met under the new Ministry in July, and the chief
+business of the session, which lasted until the middle of October, was
+the passing of the Treason Bill. On July 9th Lord Milner was able to
+inform Mr. Chamberlain (by telegram) that the Bill had been prepared,
+and to indicate the nature of its main provisions. These were: (1) An
+indemnity for acts done under martial law; (2) the establishment of a
+Special Court to try cases in which the Attorney-General might decide
+to indict any person for high treason, such cases to be tried without
+a jury; (3) the establishment of a Special Commission to "deal with
+rebels not so indicted and to punish all found guilty with
+disfranchisement for five years from the date of conviction"; and (4)
+the legalisation of the already existing Compensation Commission. In a
+despatch dated July 26th&mdash;the day after the Settlement debate in the
+House of Commons&mdash;Mr. Chamberlain replied at length to the arguments
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page395" name="page395"></a>(p. 395)</span> put forward by the Schreiner Ministry in favour of a general
+amnesty, and exposed in particular the historical inaccuracy of the
+appeal to the "Canadian precedent." At the same time he stated that
+Her Majesty's Government, while they could not be a consenting party
+to a policy condoning adhesion to the enemy in the field, had no doubt
+that "such a measure of penalty as the mass of loyal opinion in the
+Colony considered adequate would meet with their concurrence." That is
+to say, the proposal of the Home Government for disfranchisement for
+life was not pressed, but was abandoned in favour of the lenient
+penalty originally proposed by Sir Richard Solomon, independently of
+any consideration of the views of the Colonial Office, and now adopted
+by the Progressive Ministry.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The treason bill.</span>
+
+<p>In spite of its leniency, the Treason Bill met with the violent and
+protracted resistance of the Afrikander party in the Legislative
+Assembly. The opportunity thus afforded for the delivery of fierce
+invectives against the Imperial authorities was utilised to the full,
+and the fires of disaffection lighted by the "Conciliation" meetings
+were kindled anew into the second and more disastrous conflagration
+that culminated in the proceedings of the Worcester
+Conference (December 6th). In the Cape Parliamentary Reports the
+picture of this nightmare session is to be found faithfully presented
+in all its ugly and grotesque details. Two facts will serve to show to
+what a degree <span class="pagenum"><a id="page396" name="page396"></a>(p. 396)</span> the members of the Legislative Assembly of
+this British colony had identified themselves with the cause of the
+enemy. The first is the circumstance that it was a common practice of
+the Afrikander members to refer in Parliament to the military
+successes of the Boers with pride as "our" victories. The second is
+the fact that Mr. Sauer, only three months ago a minister of the
+Crown, declared, in opposing the second reading of the Bill, that "a
+time would come when there would be very few Dutchmen who would not
+blush when they told their children that they had not helped their
+fellow-countrymen in their hour of need."<a id="footnotetag226" name="footnotetag226"></a><a href="#footnote226" title="Go to footnote 226"><span class="small">[226]</span></a> Morally, though not
+legally, the Afrikander members had gone over to the enemy no less
+than the rebels who had taken up arms against their sovereign. This
+was the "loyalty" of the Bond.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner visits the colonies.</span>
+
+<p>The Treason Bill was promulgated, under the title of "The Indemnity
+and Special Tribunals Act, 1900," on October 12th. On the same day
+Lord Milner left Capetown for a brief visit to the Transvaal and
+Orange River Colony. The intention of the Home Government to place the
+administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies in his
+hands had been made known to him informally; and it was obviously
+desirable, therefore, that he should acquaint himself with the actual
+state of affairs as soon as possible. After a somewhat adventurous
+journey <span class="pagenum"><a id="page397" name="page397"></a>(p. 397)</span> through the Orange River Colony, he reached Pretoria
+on the 15th, and remained at the capital until the 22nd. He then
+proceeded to Johannesburg, where he spent the next three days (October
+22nd to 25th). At both places he made provisional arrangements, in
+consultation with Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, for the early
+establishment of so much of the machinery of civil administration as
+the exigencies of the military situation permitted. Leaving
+Johannesburg on the 25th, the High Commissioner stopped for the night
+at Kroonstad, <span class="italic">en route</span> for Bloemfontein. On the morning following he
+woke up to find the train still motionless, since the line had been
+cut by the Boers&mdash;an almost daily occurrence at this period of the
+war. After a few hours, however, the journey was resumed; but the High
+Commissioner's train was preceded by an armoured train as far as
+Smalldeel, from which point it ran without escort to Bloemfontein,
+where he remained until November 1st. Here, in addition to making the
+necessary arrangements for the beginning of civil administration in
+the Orange River Colony, Lord Milner had the satisfaction of
+inaugurating the career of the South African Constabulary under the
+command of Major-General Baden-Powell. The departure from Bloemfontein
+was delayed for a few hours by the destruction of the span of a
+railway bridge by the Boers; but at 12 o'clock the High <span class="pagenum"><a id="page398" name="page398"></a>(p. 398)</span>
+Commissioner's train, again preceded by its armoured companion, was
+able to resume its journey southwards. In the course of the following
+day (November 2nd) the English mail, going northwards from Capetown,
+was met, and among other communications which Lord Milner then
+received was the despatch of October 18th enclosing the commissions
+under which he was appointed to administer the new colonies upon Lord
+Roberts's approaching return to England.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Milner arrived at Capetown on November 3rd. During his three
+weeks' absence the situation in the Cape Colony had changed for the
+worse. After the Treason Bill debates the anti-British propaganda,
+still carried on under the grotesque pretence of promoting
+"conciliation," had taken a different and more sinister form. To their
+denunciation of the Home Government and its treatment of the
+Republics, the Afrikander nationalists now added slander and abuse of
+the British and colonial troops in South Africa. In order to
+understand how such calumnies were possible in the face of the
+singular humanity with which the military operations of the Imperial
+troops had been conducted, a brief reference to the course of the war
+is necessary. The change from regular to guerilla warfare initiated by
+the Boer leaders in the later months of this year (1900), and the
+consequent withdrawal of British garrisons from insecurely held
+districts both in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, were
+accompanied by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page399" name="page399"></a>(p. 399)</span> return to arms of many burghers who, on
+taking the oath of neutrality, had been allowed to resume their civil
+occupations. This breach of faith, whether voluntary or compulsory,
+compelled the British military commanders to adopt measures of greater
+severity in the operations undertaken for the reconquest of the
+revolted areas. The punishment inflicted upon the inhabitants of such
+areas, especially those adjoining the colonial border, although
+merciful in comparison with the penalties actually incurred under the
+laws of war by those who, having surrendered, resumed their arms, was
+considerably more rigorous than the treatment to which the republican
+Dutch had been originally subjected. This legitimate and necessary
+increase of severity, displayed by the British commanders in districts
+where the burghers had surrendered, and then taken up arms a second,
+or even a third time, was the sole basis of fact upon which the
+Afrikander nationalists in the Cape Colony founded the vast volume of
+imaginary outrage and inhumanity on the part of the Imperial troops
+which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was held subsequently to have
+endorsed by accusing the British Government of carrying on the war in
+South Africa by "methods of barbarism."<a id="footnotetag227" name="footnotetag227"></a><a href="#footnote227" title="Go to footnote 227"><span class="small">[227]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Libels on the British troops.</span>
+
+<p>The weapon now adopted for the anti-British campaign was the
+circulation through the Bond <span class="pagenum"><a id="page400" name="page400"></a>(p. 400)</span> Press, Dutch and English, of
+accounts of cruel or infamous acts alleged to have been committed by
+British soldiers, and described with every detail calculated to arouse
+the passionate resentment of the colonial Dutch. There is only one way
+in which the reader can be brought to understand the wantonly false
+and wholly disgraceful character of these libels. It is to place
+before his eyes the literal translation of two examples, printed in
+Dutch in <span class="italic">The Worcester Advertiser</span> of November 23rd, 1900; that is to
+say, in anticipation of the People's Congress, which was to be held
+less than a fortnight later (December 6th) at the little town in the
+Western Province so named. The article is headed: "Dreadful Murders
+perpetrated on Farmers, Women, and Children, near Boshoff:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Two examples.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"... This unfortunate man [a Boer prisoner] left behind him his
+     dear wife and four children. One or two days after his departure
+     there came a couple of heroes in the house of the unfortunate
+     woman, locked the doors and set fire to the curtains. The woman,
+     awfully frightened by it, was in a cruel way handled by these
+     ruffians, and compelled to make known where the guns and
+     ammunition were hidden. The poor woman, surrounded by her dear
+     children (who were from time to time pushed back by these
+     soldiers), answered that she could swear before the holy God that
+     there was not a single gun or cartridge or anything of that sort
+     hidden on that farm. In the meantime the curtains were destroyed
+     by the smoke and flames to ashes. The house, at least, was not
+     attacked by the flames, but the low, mean lot put at the four
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page401" name="page401"></a>(p. 401)</span> corners of the house a certain amount of dynamite, to
+     destroy it in this way.</p>
+
+<p>"The heroic warrior and commander over a portion of the civilised
+     (?) British troops knocked with great force at the door of the
+     house&mdash;where still the poor wife and children were upon their
+     knees praying to the Heavenly Father for deliverance&mdash;saying, 'I
+     give you ten minutes' time to acquaint me and point out to me
+     where the weapons and ammunition are hidden, and if you do not
+     comply I shall make the house and all fly into the air.' The poor
+     wife fell upon her knees before the cruel man; prayed the cruel
+     man to spare her and her children, where God was her witness
+     there was nothing of the kind on the farm, neither was there
+     anything stowed away in the house.</p>
+
+<p>"Standing before him, as if deprived of her senses, [was] the
+     poor wife with her four innocent children, and when the ten
+     minutes had expired house and all were blown to atoms with
+     dynamite, and [there were] laid in ruins, the bodies of the
+     deplorable five. May the good God receive their souls with
+     Him!...</p>
+
+<p>"A wife of a Transvaal Boer (who is still in the field, fighting
+     for his freedom and right) was lodging with one of her relations,
+     when, two days later, after she had given birth to a baby boy,
+     she was visited by seven warriors, or so-called Tommy Atkins; the
+     young urchin was taken away from its mother by its two legs, by
+     the so-called noble British, and his head battered in against the
+     bed-post until it had breathed its last, and thereupon thrown out
+     by the door as if it was the carcase of a cat or dog. Then these
+     damn wretches began their play with this poor and weak woman, who
+     only 48 hours before was delivered of a child. The poor wife was
+     treated so low and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page402" name="page402"></a>(p. 402)</span> debauched by this seven that she,
+     after a few hours, gave up the spirit, and like her child [was]
+     murdered in the most dissolute manner.... Can we longer allow
+     that our fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, relatives, yes, our
+     children, are murdered by these coward and common murderers? or
+     has not the time yet arrived to prevent this civilised nation, or
+     to punish them for their atrocities?"<a id="footnotetag228" name="footnotetag228"></a><a href="#footnote228" title="Go to footnote 228"><span class="small">[228]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On November 26th <span class="italic">The South African News</span> published the translation of
+a letter to the Press, written by a member of the Legislative
+Assembly, in view of the same meeting:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"I am yet glad that another People's Congress will be held.</p>
+
+<p>"It is our duty to speak now; it is more than time to protest, as
+     British subjects, against the extermination of defenceless women
+     and children....</p>
+
+<p>"But, in Heaven's name, let the Congress be a People's Congress
+     in reality. Let no one or other stay away for one or other small
+     difficulty. Let members of Parliament, clergymen, yes, every man,
+     old or young, be present at Worcester on the 6th of December
+     next. Let them turn up in numbers. Let us use our rights as
+     British subjects in a worthy and decided manner. Let us at least
+     adopt three petitions or resolutions: (1) Praying Her Majesty,
+     our Gracious Queen, to make an end to the burning of homes and
+     the ill-treatment of helpless women and children; if not, that
+     they may be murdered at once, rather than die slowly by hunger
+     and torture; (2) a petition in which it be urged that the war
+     should be ended, and the Republics allowed to retain their
+     independence; <span class="pagenum"><a id="page403" name="page403"></a>(p. 403)</span> and finally, a pledge that those who do
+     not wish to sign these petitions will no longer be supported by
+     us in any way.</p>
+
+<p>"[No shopkeeper, attorney, doctor, master, or any one&mdash;no
+     victuals, meat, bread, meal, sheep, oxen, horses, vegetables,
+     fruit whatsoever will he sell to the jingoes until the wrong is
+     righted and compensated.]</p>
+
+<p>"The dam is full. Our nation cannot, dare not, say with Cain, 'Am
+     I my brother's keeper?' There must be a way out for the
+     overflowing water. Disloyal deeds and talk are wrong. But if we,
+     as a nation, as one man, earnestly and decisively lay our hands
+     to the plough in a constitutional manner, and are determined, I
+     trust, through God's help, we shall&mdash;yes, we must&mdash;win."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The passage placed in brackets, in which this member of the Cape
+Parliament urges that all who may refuse to sign the two "petitions"
+should be rigorously boycotted, was omitted&mdash;without any indication of
+omission&mdash;by <span class="italic">The South African News</span>. <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, on the other hand,
+expressed approval of the letter as it stood.<a id="footnotetag229" name="footnotetag229"></a><a href="#footnote229" title="Go to footnote 229"><span class="small">[229]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Worcester congress.</span>
+
+<p>These were the kind of stories, and the kind of appeals, with which
+the mind of the colonial Dutch had been inflamed by the nationalist
+leaders when the Worcester Congress met. The gathering is said to have
+consisted of between 8,000 and 10,000 persons; and its promoters
+claimed that a far larger number&mdash;120,000 persons&mdash;were represented by
+the deputies sent from ninety-seven districts in the Colony. At the
+close of the meeting a deputation was appointed to lay the resolutions
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page404" name="page404"></a>(p. 404)</span> passed by the Congress before the High Commissioner, and
+request him to bring them officially to the notice of the Home
+Government. It was composed of Mr. de Villiers, a minister of the
+Dutch Reformed Church; a member of the Legislative Council; the member
+of the Legislative Assembly for Worcester, and two others. This
+deputation was received by Lord Milner at Government House on December
+11th, and the circumstances of the remarkable interview which then
+took place present a striking picture of the state of the Colony at
+this time, and of the extraordinary attitude which the mass of the
+Dutch population had assumed towards the representative of their
+sovereign. It is one of those illuminating occasions in which a whole
+situation is, as it were, gathered up into a single scene.</p>
+
+<p>The disloyal purpose of the deputation is heightened rather than
+concealed by the disguise of the constitutional forms in which it is
+clothed. The scarcely veiled demand for the independence of the Cape
+Colony, now put forward by the Afrikander nationalists, is as
+magnificently audacious as the ultimatum. Knowing the infamous
+character of the methods by which the agitation in favour of the Boers
+was being promoted, Lord Milner might have been excused if he had
+given way to some strong expressions of indignation. No such note,
+however, is heard in his reply. He is as dry and passionless as an
+attorney receiving his clients. Yet his words are as frank as his
+manner is composed. To these delegates he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page405" name="page405"></a>(p. 405)</span> speaks the most
+terrible truths with the same freedom as he would have used, if the
+business of their errand had been a pleasant interchange of
+compliments, instead of a grim defiance that might, or might not, be
+converted from words into deeds.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Deputation to Lord Milner.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner, who is accompanied only by his private secretary,
+surprises the deputation at the outset by requesting that the
+resolutions may be read forthwith in his presence. They are:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"1. We, men and women of South Africa assembled and represented
+     here, having heard the report of the people's deputation to
+     England, and having taken into earnest consideration the
+     deplorable condition into which the peoples of South Africa have
+     been plunged, and the grave dangers threatening our civilisation,
+     record our solemn conviction that the highest interest of South
+     Africa demand (1) A termination of the war now raging, with its
+     untold misery and horror, as well as the burning of houses, the
+     devastation of the country, the extermination of a white
+     nationality, and the treatment to which women and children are
+     subjected, which was bound to leave a lasting legacy of
+     bitterness and hatred, while seriously endangering the future
+     relationship between the forces of civilisation and barbarism in
+     South Africa; and (2) the retention by the Republics of their
+     independence, whereby alone the peace of South Africa can be
+     maintained.</p>
+
+<p>"2. That this meeting desires a full recognition of the right of
+     the people of this Colony to settle and manage its own affairs,
+     and expresses its grave disapproval of the policy pursued and
+     adopted in this matter by the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir
+     Alfred Milner.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page406" name="page406"></a>(p. 406)</span> "3. That this Congress solemnly pledges itself to labour
+     in a constitutional way unceasingly for the attainment of the
+     objects contained in the above resolutions, and resolves to send
+     a deputation to His Excellency Sir Alfred Milner to bring these
+     resolutions officially to the notice of Her Majesty's
+     Government."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>These resolutions having been read, Mr. de Villiers proceeds to make
+two points. First, there will be no lasting peace in South Africa
+until the independence of the Republics is restored; unless this is
+done, race feeling will go on prevailing "for generations." And,
+second, it is the "devastation of property" and "the treatment of the
+women and children" by the British that has roused the colonial Dutch
+to assemble at the Congress. Mr. Pretorius, the member of the
+Legislative Council, then drives home both of these points by a short
+but emphatic speech, delivered in Dutch, in which he asserts that one
+of the consequences of the war will be a "never-ending irreconcilable
+racial hatred" between the British and Dutch inhabitants.<a id="footnotetag230" name="footnotetag230"></a><a href="#footnote230" title="Go to footnote 230"><span class="small">[230]</span></a> Lord
+Milner then rises from his chair and replies to the deputation:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's reply.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I accede to your request to bring these resolutions to the
+     notice of Her Majesty's Government. I think it is doubtful
+     whether I ought to do so, but in view of the prevailing
+     bitterness and excitement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page407" name="page407"></a>(p. 407)</span> it is better to err, if one
+     must err, on the side of conciliation and fairness. And, having
+     regard especially to the fact that one of the resolutions is
+     directed against myself, I wish to avoid any appearance of a
+     desire to suppress its companions on account of it. But, having
+     gone thus far on the road of concession, I take the liberty, in
+     no unfriendly and polemical spirit, of asking you quite frankly
+     what good you think can be done by resolutions of this character?
+     I am not now referring to the resolution against myself. That is
+     a matter of very minor importance. The pith of the whole business
+     is in resolution number one, a resolution evidently framed with
+     great care by the clever men who are engineering the present
+     agitation in the Colony. Now, that resolution asks for two
+<span class="sidenote2">War no longer justifiable.</span>
+     things&mdash;a termination of the war, and the restoration of the
+     independence of the Republics. In desiring the termination of the
+     war we are all agreed, but nothing can be less conducive to the
+     attainment of that end than to encourage in those who are still
+     carrying on a hopeless resistance the idea that there is any,
+     even the remotest chance, of the policy of annexation being
+     reversed. I am not now speaking for myself. This is not a
+     question for me. I am simply directing your attention to the
+     repeatedly declared policy of Her Majesty's Government, a policy
+     just endorsed by an enormous majority of the nation, and not only
+     by the ordinary supporters of the Government, but by the bulk of
+     those ordinarily opposed to it. Moreover, that policy is approved
+     by all the great self-governing colonies of the Empire, except
+     this one, and in this one by something like half the white
+     population, and practically the whole of the native. And this
+     approving half of the white population, be it observed, embraces
+     all those who, in the recent hour of danger, when this Colony
+     itself was invaded <span class="pagenum"><a id="page408" name="page408"></a>(p. 408)</span> and partially annexed, fought and
+     suffered for the cause of Queen and Empire. I ask you, is it
+     reasonable to suppose that Her Majesty's Government is going back
+     upon a policy deliberately adopted, repeatedly declared, and
+     having this overwhelming weight of popular support throughout the
+     whole Empire behind it? And if it is not, I ask you further: What
+     is more likely to lead to a termination of the war&mdash;a recognition
+     of the irrevocable nature of this policy, or the reiteration of
+     menacing protests against it? And there is another respect in
+     which I fear this resolution is little calculated to promote that
+     speedy restoration of peace which we have all at heart. I refer
+     to the tone of aggressive exaggeration which characterises its
+     allusions to the conduct of the war. No doubt the resolution is
+     mild compared with some of the speeches by which it was
+     supported, just as those speeches themselves were mild compared
+     with much that we are now too well accustomed to hear and to
+     read, in the way of misrepresentation and abuse of the British
+     Government, British statesmen, British soldiers, the British
+     people. But even the resolution, mild in comparison with such
+     excesses, is greatly lacking in that sobriety and accuracy which
+     it is so necessary for all of us to cultivate in these days of
+     bitterly inflamed passions. It really is preposterous to talk,
+     among other things, about 'the extermination of a white
+     nationality,' or to give any sort of countenance to the now fully
+     exploded calumny about the ill-treatment of women and children.
+     The war, gentlemen, has its horrors&mdash;every war has. Those horrors
+     increase as it becomes more irregular on the part of the enemy,
+     thus necessitating severer measures on the part of the Imperial
+     troops. But, having regard to the conditions, it is one of the
+     most humane wars that has ever been waged in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page409" name="page409"></a>(p. 409)</span> history.
+     It has been humane, I contend, on both sides, which does not, of
+     course, mean that on both sides there have not been isolated acts
+     deserving of condemnation. Still, the general direction, the
+     general spirit on both sides, has been humane. But it is another
+     question whether the war on the side of the enemy is any longer
+     justifiable. It is certainly not morally justifiable to carry on
+     a resistance involving the loss of many lives and the destruction
+     of an immense quantity of property, when the object of that
+     resistance can no longer, by any possibility, be attained. No
+     doubt, great allowance must be made for most of the men still
+     under arms, though it is difficult to defend the conduct of their
+     leaders in deceiving them. The bulk of the men still in the field
+     are buoyed up with false hopes. They are incessantly fed with
+     lies&mdash;lies as to their own chance of success, and, still worse,
+     as to the intention of the British Government with regard to them
+     should they surrender. And for that very reason it seems all the
+     more regrettable that anything should be said or done here which
+     could help still further to mislead them, still further to
+     encourage a resistance which creates the very evils that these
+     people are fighting to escape. It is because I am sincerely
+     convinced that a resolution of this character, like the meeting
+     at which it was passed, like the whole agitation of which that
+     meeting is part, is calculated, if it has any effect at all,
+     still further to mislead the men who are engaged in carrying on
+     this hopeless struggle, that I feel bound, in sending it to Her
+     Majesty's Government, to accompany it with this expression of my
+     strong personal dissent."<a id="footnotetag231" name="footnotetag231"></a><a href="#footnote231" title="Go to footnote 231"><span class="small">[231]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The comment of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> upon Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester
+Congress deputation was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page410" name="page410"></a>(p. 410)</span> an open defiance of the Imperial
+authorities and a scarcely veiled incitement to rebellion. Mr.
+Advocate Malan, the editor, who had been elected for the Malmesbury
+Division upon the retirement of Mr. Schreiner&mdash;now rejected by the
+Bond&mdash;wrote:<a id="footnotetag232" name="footnotetag232"></a><a href="#footnote232" title="Go to footnote 232"><span class="small">[232]</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Sir Alfred Milner considers the request of the Afrikanders for
+     peace and justice unreasonable. The agitation has now reached the
+     end of the first period&mdash;that of pleading and petitioning. A deaf
+     ear has been turned to the cry of the Afrikanders and their
+     Church. But the battle for justice will continue from a different
+     standpoint&mdash;by mental and material powers. The path will be hard,
+     and sacrifices will be required, but the victory will be
+     glorious!"</p>
+
+<p>There were, of course, some voices that were raised, among both the
+republican and colonial Dutch, in favour of more moderate counsels. In
+the preceding month (November) Mr. Melius de Villiers, the late Chief
+Justice of the Free State, wrote to a Dutch Reformed minister in the
+Cape Colony to beg him to use all his influence against the efforts
+being made in the Cape Colony to encourage the Boers to continue the
+struggle. "However much I loved and valued the independence of the
+Free State," he says, "it is now absolutely certain that the struggle
+on the part of the burghers is a hopeless and useless one." And he
+then suggests that the Dutch Reformed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page411" name="page411"></a>(p. 411)</span> ministers in the Cape
+Colony, instead of petitioning the Queen to grant the independence of
+the Republics, should intercede with ex-President Steyn and the
+Federal leaders and induce them to discontinue the fight. Women's
+Congresses and People's Congresses, held to denounce the barbarities
+perpetrated in the war, will avail nothing; but the Dutch Reformed
+Church could fulfil no higher mission than this genuine peace-making.
+"It may go against their grain to urge our people to yield," he adds,
+"but it seems to me a plain duty."<a id="footnotetag233" name="footnotetag233"></a><a href="#footnote233" title="Go to footnote 233"><span class="small">[233]</span></a> But such voices were powerless
+to counteract the effect produced upon the Boers by the demonstrations
+of hatred against the British Government, manifested by men whose
+minds had been inflamed by the infamous slanders of the Imperial
+troops to which the "conciliation" movement had given currency.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Second invasion of the colony.</span>
+
+<p>On the morning of December 16th, five days after he had received the
+Worcester Congress deputation, Lord Milner heard that the burgher
+forces had again crossed the Orange River between Aliwal North and
+Bethulie. Before them lay hundreds of miles of country full of food
+and horses, and inhabited by people who were in sympathy with them. On
+the 20th martial law was proclaimed in twelve additional districts. On
+the 17th of the following month the whole of the Cape Colony, with the
+exception of Capetown, Simon's Town, Wynberg, Port Elizabeth, East
+London, and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page412" name="page412"></a>(p. 412)</span> native territories, was placed under the
+same military rule. In the words of a protest subsequently addressed
+by the Burgher Peace Committee to their Afrikander brethren, the
+"fatal result of the Worcester Congress had been that the commandos
+had again entered the Cape Colony." The friends of the Boers in
+England, duped by the Afrikander nationalists, had involved England
+and South Africa in a year and a half of costly, destructive, and
+unnecessary war.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page413" name="page413"></a>(p. 413)</span> CHAPTER X</h3>
+
+<p class="title">THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION</p>
+
+<p>The new year (1901) opened with a full revelation of the magnitude of
+the task which lay before the Imperial troops. Lord Roberts had
+frankly recognised that the destruction of the Governments and
+organised armies of the Republics would be followed by the more
+difficult and lengthy task of disarming the entire Boer population
+within their borders.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Recent events have convinced me," he wrote from Pretoria on
+     October 10th, 1900, "that the permanent tranquillity of the
+     Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete
+     disarmament of the inhabitants; and, though the extent of the
+     country to be visited, and the ease with which guns, rifles, and
+     ammunition can be hidden, will render the task a difficult one,
+     its accomplishment is only a matter of time and patience."</p>
+
+<p>That this task proved altogether more lengthy and more arduous than
+Lord Roberts at this time expected, was due mainly, though not
+exclusively, to the same cause as that which had placed the British
+army in a position of such grave disadvantage at the outbreak of the
+war&mdash;the play <span class="pagenum"><a id="page414" name="page414"></a>(p. 414)</span> of party politics in England. Lord Roberts had
+foreseen that the process of disarming the Boers would be slow and
+difficult; but he had not anticipated that the Imperial troops would
+be hindered in the accomplishment of this task by the political action
+of the friends of the Boers in England, or that the public utterances
+of prominent members of the Liberal Opposition would re-act with such
+dangerous effects upon the Afrikander nationalists that, after more
+than a year of successful military operations, the process of
+disarmament would have to be applied to the Cape Colony as well as to
+the territories of the late Republics.</p>
+
+<p>Looking back to the year 1900, with the events of the intervening
+period before us, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
+decision of the Boer leaders to continue the struggle was determined
+by political, and not by military considerations. More than one
+circumstance points to the fact that both the Boer generals and the
+civilian members of the Executives of the late Republics recognised
+that their position was practically hopeless from a military point of
+view.<a id="footnotetag234" name="footnotetag234"></a><a href="#footnote234" title="Go to footnote 234"><span class="small">[234]</span></a> And while Louis Botha, the Commandant-General of the
+Transvaal, urged his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms after the
+battle of Dalmanutha, it was President Steyn, a politician, and not a
+fighting man, who manifested the stubborn determination <span class="pagenum"><a id="page415" name="page415"></a>(p. 415)</span> that
+was directly responsible for the unnecessary devastation and suffering
+which the guerilla war entailed upon the Boer people. The remote, but
+still carefully cherished possibility of foreign intervention, the
+belief that the colonial Dutch would even yet rise <span class="italic">en masse</span>, and the
+reliance upon the traditional sympathy of the Liberal party with the
+Boer aspirations for independence, were all considerations that
+contributed to the decision. But of these three influences the last
+was incomparably the most important; since it not only affected the
+disposition of the republican leaders, but, what was more, stimulated
+the Afrikander nationalists to make the efforts which brought the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony to the condition of passionate resentment
+that drew the Boer commandos, in the last month of 1900 and the
+opening months of 1901, a second time across the Orange River.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">An injurious influence.</span>
+
+<p>We have seen the actual origin of this most injurious influence. The
+"conciliation" movement was initiated in the Cape Colony by the
+Afrikander nationalists in concert with President Krüger, in order
+that "the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England
+might be strengthened." They were strengthened. We have observed the
+formation of a Conciliation Committee in England, working in close
+connection with the parent organisation, founded by Mr. Hargrove, in
+the Cape Colony; and we have noticed the declarations of Mr. Morley,
+Lord Courtney, and Mr. Bryce, in favour of the restoration of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page416" name="page416"></a>(p. 416)</span> internal independence of the Boers&mdash;declarations all made in
+opposition to the expressed determination of the British Government to
+incorporate the Republics into the system of the British Empire. The
+official leader of the Liberal party was less consistent. In June,
+1900, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman signified in general terms his
+recognition of the necessity of this measure. But he returned in
+October to vague expressions of sympathy with the Boers, which, after
+the general election had resulted in the return of the Unionist
+majority, took the form of a direct condemnation of the South African
+policy of the Government. In the course of the year 1901 he reiterated
+two charges with increasing vehemence. The conduct of the war was
+inhuman; and the Government, by refusing to offer any terms to the
+republican leaders inconsistent with the decision to incorporate the
+Republics into the Empire, were exacting the unnecessary humiliation
+of an unconditional surrender from a gallant foe. These injurious
+utterances at length provoked Lord Salisbury's indignant comment:
+"England is, I believe, the only country in which, during a great war,
+eminent men write and speak publicly as if they belonged to the
+enemy;" and elicited from Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith,
+Mr. Haldane, and Sir Henry Fowler, the assurance that the
+determination of the British people to "see the war through" had in no
+way weakened. But, in spite of these patriotic utterances on the part
+of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page417" name="page417"></a>(p. 417)</span> Liberal Imperialists, the fact remains that,
+throughout the whole period of the guerilla war, the Boer commandos
+were encouraged to resist the Imperial troops by the knowledge that
+prominent members of the Liberal party in England had declared
+themselves to be opposed to what they termed the "suppression" of the
+Boer people,<a id="footnotetag235" name="footnotetag235"></a><a href="#footnote235" title="Go to footnote 235"><span class="small">[235]</span></a> and were condemning in unmeasured terms the British
+military authorities for employing the sole methods by which the
+guerilla leaders could be encountered on equal terms, and the
+disarmament of the Dutch population could be accomplished.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Peace party among the Boers.</span>
+
+<p>There is another element in the attitude of the burgher population at
+this critical period, a knowledge of which is essential to a correct
+understanding of the methods and conditions of the guerilla war. The
+existence among the republican Dutch of a considerable body of opinion
+in favour of submission was a circumstance of which the Imperial
+authorities were aware, and one of which they desired, naturally
+enough, to take the fullest advantage. It was known also to the
+militant Boer leaders; and it is obvious that any estimate of the
+degree in which these leaders are to be held directly responsible for
+the loss and suffering entailed by the decision to continue the war,
+will depend largely upon the manner in which they dealt with those
+members of their own community <span class="pagenum"><a id="page418" name="page418"></a>(p. 418)</span> who were prepared, after Lord
+Roberts's victories, to become peaceable citizens of the British
+Empire.</p>
+
+<p>The action of the Boer leaders in this respect is established by the
+indisputable testimony of the official documents which fell into the
+hands of the British authorities in the subsequent progress of the
+war. Every endeavour of the peace party to make itself heard was
+punished with rigorous, sometimes brutal, severity; fictitious
+reports, calculated to raise false hopes of foreign intervention, were
+circulated among the burghers in the field; and every effort was made
+to prevent a knowledge of the British Government's proposals for the
+future administration of the new colonies from reaching the rank and
+file of the burgher population. The details of this action on the part
+of the Boer leaders constitute collectively a body of evidence
+sufficient to have justified the employment of measures infinitely
+more severe than those which were in fact adopted by the British
+military authorities for the capture of the Boer commandos and the
+disarmament of the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa; and in the face
+of this evidence, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reiterated charges
+against the Government, whether of "methods of barbarism" or of
+prolonging the war by the neglect to offer reasonable terms to the
+Boers, must be held as wanton in their origin as they were injurious
+in their results.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Administrative changes.</span>
+
+<p>The despatch of October 18th, 1900, which, as we have seen, Lord
+Milner received as he was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page419" name="page419"></a>(p. 419)</span> returning from his visit to the
+new colonies, contained certain new commissions, under the terms of
+which the "prospective administration" of the Transvaal and the Orange
+River Colony was placed in his hands in succession to Lord Roberts,
+while at the same time he remained Governor of the Cape Colony and
+High Commissioner for South Africa. This combination of offices was
+purely temporary, since Her Majesty's Government (Mr. Chamberlain
+wrote to Lord Milner) "were anxious to take advantage of his unique
+fitness for the great task of inaugurating the civil government of the
+two new colonies." It was proposed therefore, that, as soon as the
+necessary legal provision could be made for establishing constitutions
+for the two new colonies, Lord Milner should be appointed as their
+Governor, with a Lieutenant-Governor for the Orange River Colony, and
+should cease to be the Governor of the Cape Colony. This new
+arrangement, which, as Mr. Chamberlain pointed out, involved the
+severance of the High Commissionership from the Governorship of the
+Cape Colony to which it had been attached for so long a period,<a id="footnotetag236" name="footnotetag236"></a><a href="#footnote236" title="Go to footnote 236"><span class="small">[236]</span></a>
+did not take effect, however, until the end of February, 1901, when
+Lord Milner finally left the Cape Colony for the Transvaal.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Roberts relinquished the command of the British forces in South
+Africa on November 29th, 1900. The Home Government at this time
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page420" name="page420"></a>(p. 420)</span> attached great importance to the issue of a proclamation
+setting out clearly the generous terms upon which the Boers would be
+received into the empire; and, in connection with this question, Lord
+Milner, during his recent visit to Pretoria, had discussed with Lord
+Kitchener the methods by which the influence of the surrendered Boers
+and the more moderate Afrikanders, who were in favour of submission,
+could be brought to bear upon the general mass of the fighting
+burghers. Lord Milner, however, upon his return to the Cape Colony,
+expressed the opinion that the issue of a proclamation in the then
+existing circumstances would be a mistake, since it would only be
+regarded as a sign of weakness. And in support of this opinion he
+states, in a telegram of December 11th, that the cabled summary of Mr.
+Chamberlain's</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "recent speech in the House of Commons, containing virtually the
+     principal points in the proposed proclamation, has been instantly
+     seized upon by the Bond leaders [in the Cape Colony] and is
+     represented by them as a sign that Her Majesty's Government is
+     wavering in its policy, and that the reaction in British public
+     opinion, which they have always relied on, is setting in."<a id="footnotetag237" name="footnotetag237"></a><a href="#footnote237" title="Go to footnote 237"><span class="small">[237]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Both Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener confirmed this judgment at the
+time; and on January 28th, 1901&mdash;when de Wet was on the point of
+breaking through the British troops into <span class="pagenum"><a id="page421" name="page421"></a>(p. 421)</span> the Cape
+Colony&mdash;the latter telegraphed to Lord Milner:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "When the Boers are inclined to peace, they will want, I think,
+     to discuss various questions, and when that time comes a
+     proclamation which would meet as far as possible the points
+     raised would, no doubt, be very valuable.... But just now I do
+     not think they have any idea of making peace whilst the Colony
+     question is so prominent. I have let it be known that I would be
+     glad to see an officer or meet Botha at any time if he wished to
+     do so."<a id="footnotetag238" name="footnotetag238"></a><a href="#footnote238" title="Go to footnote 238"><span class="small">[238]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Three days afterwards Lord Milner received a further telegram from
+Lord Kitchener on the same subject, which he also forwarded to the
+Colonial Office:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Ex-President Pretorius has just returned from seeing L. Botha
+     and Schalk Burger [the Commandant-General and the Acting
+     President of the South African Republic]. They stated that they
+     were fighting for their independence, and meant to continue to do
+     so to the bitter end, and would not discuss any question of
+     peace."<a id="footnotetag239" name="footnotetag239"></a><a href="#footnote239" title="Go to footnote 239"><span class="small">[239]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Boer leaders irreconcilable.</span>
+
+<p>In view of this irreconcilable attitude on the part of the Boer
+leaders, Mr. Chamberlain abandoned the proposal, and the proclamation
+was not issued until six months later, when the blockhouse system had
+been successfully initiated.</p>
+
+<p>But, although Lord Milner had recognised the futility of the appeal by
+proclamation, he had readily approved of Lord Kitchener's endeavour to
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page422" name="page422"></a>(p. 422)</span> make the British proposals known to the placable but
+terrorised section of the fighting burghers, through the agency of
+those of their kinsmen and friends who had surrendered. After all
+advances to the Boer leaders in the field had totally failed, "it
+seemed to us," Lord Milner reported to Mr. Chamberlain,<a id="footnotetag240" name="footnotetag240"></a><a href="#footnote240" title="Go to footnote 240"><span class="small">[240]</span></a></p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "that those who had already surrendered would have means not open
+     to us of communicating with the bulk of the Boers still under
+     arms, persuading them of the hopelessness of their resistance,
+     and removing the misapprehension of our intentions, which some of
+     the commanders who were still holding out had sedulously
+     fostered."</p>
+
+<p>It was in these circumstances and with these objects in view that,
+after Lord Roberts's departure, the Burgher Peace Committee was formed
+at Pretoria; and it is to the address which Lord Kitchener then
+delivered (December 21st, 1900) to this Committee that we must look
+for the origin and purpose of the Burgher, or Concentration Camps.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Origin of the Burgher camps.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"It having been brought to Lord Kitchener's notice," says the
+     published report, "that the principal difficulty that burghers,
+     desirous of surrendering, experienced was that they were not
+     allowed to remain in their own districts, and were afraid of the
+     penalties attached to not having adhered strictly to the oath of
+     neutrality, which they had, in most cases, been made to break by
+     the coercive measures of Boers out on commando, he wished to give
+     the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page423" name="page423"></a>(p. 423)</span> burghers still in the field every opportunity of
+     becoming acquainted with the treatment he proposed now to extend
+     to them, their families, and their property.</p>
+
+<p>"Instructions had been issued to form laagers for all surrendered
+     burghers, their wives, families, and stock, on the railway in
+     their own districts under military protection; and, except where
+     it was proved that a burgher had voluntarily broken his oath and
+     gone out on commando, no difference would be made between those
+     who had not taken the oath. To protect deserted women and
+     children they would also be brought into these laagers, where
+     their husbands and sons, who desired to live peacefully, could
+     freely join them.</p>
+
+<p>"It was essential that the country should be thus cleared,
+     because so long as the means of subsistence remained in and on
+     the farms, so long small commandos were enabled to continue in
+     the field. In return, Lord Kitchener expected every assistance
+     from those to whom he gave protection. They must each and all
+     help to the best of their ability by influencing in every way in
+     their power those still in the field to surrender. These measures
+     would be applied gradually, and extended if they proved
+     successful. Burghers must understand that no responsibility could
+     be accepted for stock or property, except for that which they
+     brought in with them, and then only if they kept it within the
+     limits of the protection he was prepared to afford."<a id="footnotetag241" name="footnotetag241"></a><a href="#footnote241" title="Go to footnote 241"><span class="small">[241]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The report of Lord Kitchener's speech from which these paragraphs are
+taken was printed in Dutch and circulated by the Burgher Peace
+Committee. It is certainly significant that a measure which was
+subsequently held up to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page424" name="page424"></a>(p. 424)</span> the execration of the civilised
+world by the official leader of the Liberal party and the friends of
+the Boers in England, should have been carefully explained by Lord
+Kitchener to an audience of Boers at Pretoria, and accepted by them as
+a means of enabling the peaceably disposed burghers to escape from the
+compulsion of their leaders. In this, as in many other matters, the
+English friends of the Boers were <span class="italic">plus royalistes que le roi même</span>.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Boer coercive measures.</span>
+
+<p>These, then, were the means employed by the British military
+authorities to avert a needless protraction of the war. We have now to
+observe the methods by which the Boer leaders prevented their efforts
+from producing the desired result. In view of the destruction of the
+organised resistance of the Republics, Lord Roberts had made known by
+proclamation that all burghers who surrendered their arms and took the
+oath of neutrality would be allowed to return to their homes, or, if
+at home, to remain there undisturbed. This implied an intention on the
+part of the British authorities to provide such protection as would
+enable the surrendered burghers to remain in peaceable possession of
+their property. General Botha, as we have already noted, was
+personally in favour of a general surrender after the battle of
+Dalmanutha; but, when once the majority of the Boer leaders had
+decided to continue to resist the establishment of British authority
+by force of arms, it became his business to keep every fighting
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page425" name="page425"></a>(p. 425)</span> burgher in the field. Here, again, the work of the
+Intelligence Department provides us with instructive evidence of the
+purposes and acts of the enemy. In the course of the subsequent
+military operations Sir Bindon Blood captured a number of official
+documents in the Boer Government laager at Roos Senekal. One of these,
+referring to the period in question, sufficiently indicates the nature
+of the "coercive measures" to which Lord Kitchener had alluded. Under
+date October 6th, 1900, General Botha gives instructions to the Boer
+commandant at Bethel to telegraph round to the Boer generals and
+officers certain military instructions, and he then adds:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers from laying
+     down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do not listen to
+     this, to confiscate everything moveable or unmoveable, and also
+     to burn their houses. Get into direct communication with the
+     Standerton men, and destroy the railway line between Heidelberg
+     and Standerton, and especially derail and hold up trains. In this
+     manner we will obtain a large quantity of food."<a id="footnotetag242" name="footnotetag242"></a><a href="#footnote242" title="Go to footnote 242"><span class="small">[242]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>And, while the peaceably inclined burghers were prevented from
+surrendering by the fear of these penalties, the courage of the
+commandos was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page426" name="page426"></a>(p. 426)</span> maintained by the spread of false information.
+Among these same papers found at Roos Senekal is a telegram despatched
+on November 2nd, 1900, to General Viljoen, containing a number of
+encouraging statements bearing upon the political and military
+situation, of which the three following may be taken as
+characteristic:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"October, 1900. A Congress of Delegates of the Powers was held at
+     Parijs [Paris], whereby England asked for an extension of six
+     months to carry on the war. This was refused by the powers on the
+     proposal of Holland and Austria.</p>
+
+<p>"France is ready to land troops in England on the 1st November.</p>
+
+<p>"Cape Colonial troops to the number of 2,500 have been sent back
+     by General Roberts, having quarrelled with the regulars. Their
+     arms were taken away and burnt. This last is official news
+     received by General Fourie."<a id="footnotetag243" name="footnotetag243"></a><a href="#footnote243" title="Go to footnote 243"><span class="small">[243]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">"Not civilised warfare".</span>
+
+<p>It was in order to counteract the effects of this system of terrorism
+and deceit, that the endeavour was made to inform the mass of the
+Boers still in arms of the actual state of affairs, both in respect of
+the hopelessness of foreign intervention and the real intentions of
+the British Government, through the agency of the Burgher Peace
+Committee. The treatment accorded to these peace emissaries is
+justifiable, possibly, by a strict interpretation of the laws of war;
+but it fixes inevitably the responsibility for the needless sufferings
+of the Boer people in the guerilla war, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page427" name="page427"></a>(p. 427)</span> upon Ex-President
+Steyn, Schalk Burger, Louis Botha, Christian de Wet, and the other
+Boer leaders. On January 10th, 1901, of three agents of the Peace
+Committee taken prisoners to De Wet's laager near Lindley, one&mdash;a
+British subject&mdash;was flogged and then shot, and two, who were
+burghers, were flogged.<a id="footnotetag244" name="footnotetag244"></a><a href="#footnote244" title="Go to footnote 244"><span class="small">[244]</span></a> And on February 12th Meyer de Kock, the
+Secretary of the Committee, was shot.<a id="footnotetag245" name="footnotetag245"></a><a href="#footnote245" title="Go to footnote 245"><span class="small">[245]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>But the efforts of the Peace Committee were not altogether thrown
+away. The terrible deaths of these men, true martyrs of the Boer
+cause, evoked more than one notable protest against the insensate
+determination of Ex-President Steyn and De Wet.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Dear Brother, ... From what I hear you are so angry with me,"
+     wrote General Piet de Wet to his brother Christian, "that you
+     have decided to kill me should you find me. May God not allow it
+     that you should have the opportunity to shed more innocent blood.
+     Enough has been shed already.... I beseech you, let us think over
+     the matter coolly for a moment, and see whether our cause is
+     really so pure and righteous that we can rely on God's
+     help."<a id="footnotetag246" name="footnotetag246"></a><a href="#footnote246" title="Go to footnote 246"><span class="small">[246]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page428" name="page428"></a>(p. 428)</span> And Mr. H. A. Du Plessis, the predikant at Lindley in the
+Orange River Colony, addressed an "open letter" to the clergy of the
+Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"It is not civilised warfare any more on the part of the
+     burghers. They have become desperate, and as fanatics do things
+     in conflict with a Christian spirit and civilisation.... About a
+     fortnight ago, G. Müller, one of my deacons and brother of the
+     late minister of Burghersdorp, was brutally ill-used. He had to
+     strip, and received twenty-five lashes with a stirrup leather&mdash;he
+     is not the only one&mdash;because he took letters from a member of the
+     Peace Committee to certain heads of the burgher force, in which
+     they were strongly advised to give in. At the same time Andries
+     Wessels and J. Morgendael were taken prisoners. They left
+     Kroonstad at their own request, and with the sanction of the
+     military authorities, in order to have an interview with the
+     leaders of the burgher force. Morgendael was mortally wounded by
+     Commandant Froneman without a hearing, and at the instigation of
+     General C. de Wet. He died afterwards.... In such a shameful, in
+     fact, inhuman, manner were these men treated; and for what
+     reason? Simply because they had tried to save their country and
+     people....</p>
+
+<p>"The burghers are kept totally in the dark by their leaders as to
+     what the real state of affairs is. Because I wish to save them
+     from certain ruin I make this appeal to you....</p>
+
+<p>"If [the burghers] knew what the true state of affairs was, a
+     large portion would long ago have come in and delivered up their
+     arms....</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, I implore you, stand still for a few moments and
+     think of the true interests of the Afrikander nation, and see if
+     you will not alter <span class="pagenum"><a id="page429" name="page429"></a>(p. 429)</span> your opinion, and quench the fire of
+     war instead of feeding the flame....<a id="footnotetag247" name="footnotetag247"></a><a href="#footnote247" title="Go to footnote 247"><span class="small">[247]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>These letters, which were published in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, formed part
+of an attempt made by the Burgher Peace Committee, "to induce some of
+the leading men in the colony, who are known to sympathise with the
+Boers, to tell the men still in the field that the hope of any
+assistance from here is a delusion." But, in thus reporting this new
+endeavour to Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Milner adds that he is not,
+himself, "very sanguine" of its success.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Policy of the Bond.</span>
+
+<p>There was only too good ground for this opinion. The Afrikander
+nationalists of the Cape hated England no less than did the republican
+nationalists, though they feared her more. The policy which the Bond
+had adopted after the occupation of the Republics by the British
+forces was perfectly definite. Its object was to avert the final
+disaster of the war by securing the maintenance of the Republics as
+independent centres of Afrikander nationalism. In order to do this the
+Bond resolved to keep the Cape Colony in a state of smouldering
+rebellion, to encourage the continued resistance of the Boer
+commandos, and to render all the material assistance to the guerilla
+leaders and their forces that could be afforded without exposing the
+Cape Dutch to the penalties of treason. It may be doubted, however,
+whether the Bond leaders, in view of the resolute attitude of the
+loyalist population <span class="pagenum"><a id="page430" name="page430"></a>(p. 430)</span> and their consistent and unfaltering
+support of Lord Milner, would have embarked upon this policy, unless
+they had calculated upon the co-operation of the Liberal Opposition in
+England. As it was, their expectations in this respect had been amply
+fulfilled, and the policy itself, as we have seen, had been admirably
+carried into effect.</p>
+
+<p>The second invasion of the Cape Colony began, as we have noticed, with
+the incursion of the Boers after the Worcester Congress. On December
+16th, 1900, Kruitzinger, with seven hundred, and Hertzog with twelve
+hundred men, crossed the Orange River; and by February 11th, 1901, De
+Wet, who had been "headed back" in December, had succeeded in eluding
+the British columns and entered the Colony.<a id="footnotetag248" name="footnotetag248"></a><a href="#footnote248" title="Go to footnote 248"><span class="small">[248]</span></a> At this moment
+success seemed to be within measurable distance both to the Bond and
+to De Wet. The point of view of the astute Afrikander statesmen is
+different from that of the guerilla leader; but each party is equally
+hopeful of the ultimate victory of the nationalist cause. Of the
+attitude of the Bond in this month of February, 1901, Mr. Kipling
+writes from Capetown:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Some of the extremists of the Bond are for committing themselves
+     now, fully, to the Dutch cause, De Wet and all; but some of the
+     others are hunting for some sort of side-path that will give them
+     a chance of keeping on the ground-level of the gallows, within
+     hail of a seat in the next Parliament. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page431" name="page431"></a>(p. 431)</span> If De Wet
+     wins&mdash;he is assumed to be in command of several thousands, all
+     lusting for real battle, and sure of a welcome among many more
+     thousands alight with the same desire&mdash;the Bond may, of course,
+     come out flat-footedly on his side. Just at present the apricots
+     are not quite ripe enough. But the Bond has unshaken faith in the
+     Opposition, whose every word and action are quoted here, and lead
+     to more deaths on the veld. <span class="italic">It is assumed that His Majesty's
+     Opposition will save the Bond, and South Africa for the Bond, if
+     only the commandos make the war expensive.</span>"<a id="footnotetag249" name="footnotetag249"></a><a href="#footnote249" title="Go to footnote 249"><span class="small">[249]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">De Wet in the colony.</span>
+
+<p>If this account of the attitude of the Bond stood alone, its value
+would be merely that of an <span class="italic">ex parte</span> statement by a competent
+observer on the spot. But it does not stand alone. The accident of the
+capture of the Boer official papers at Roos Senekal, to which we have
+referred before, has provided us with a record of the thoughts which
+were in De Wet's mind at the time when Mr. Kipling's words were
+written. In a report dated "On the Veld, February 14th, 1901,"
+Commandant-General Botha is informed that "De Wet's last news is that
+the Cape Colony has risen to a man, and has already taken up arms.
+They refused to give up to the British Government. Many more are only
+waiting operations on part of De Wet to join him; and General De Wet
+concludes this report with the words: 'It is certain that the ways of
+the Lord are hidden from us, and that, after all, it seems <span class="pagenum"><a id="page432" name="page432"></a>(p. 432)</span>
+that the day of a united South Africa is not far off.'"</p>
+
+<p>The writer of this despatch is the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the
+Orange Free State; and to his report of De Wet's success in the Cape
+Colony, he now adds an account of what is happening on the other side
+of the Orange River:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The burghers in the Orange Free State are hopeful, and expecting
+     a happy ending. The grudge against the Britisher has now taken
+     deep root, and the women and girls are encouraging the burghers
+     to stick up to the bitter end. So that our cause now rests in the
+     union of the burghers, and, with God's help, we will accomplish
+     our end.... The enemy's plan is to starve us out, but he will
+     never do it, now we have an outlet from the Cape Colony, even if
+     we have to use force."<a id="footnotetag250" name="footnotetag250"></a><a href="#footnote250" title="Go to footnote 250"><span class="small">[250]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>De Wet was chased out of the Colony by the British columns on February
+28th, but smaller commandos under Kruitzinger, Fouché, Scheepers, and
+Malan remained behind. Apart from their mobility, and the persistent
+manner in which they clung to rugged and mountainous districts, the
+ability of these Boer raiders to keep the field against the Imperial
+troops must be attributed to the sympathy and material assistance
+which they received from the colonial Dutch. The actual number of
+recruits which they secured was small; but, in Lord Kitchener's
+words&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "the friendly feelings of a considerable portion of the rural
+     population assured to them at all times <span class="pagenum"><a id="page433" name="page433"></a>(p. 433)</span> not only an
+     ample food supply, but also timely information of the movements
+     of our pursuing columns&mdash;two points which told heavily in their
+     favour."<a id="footnotetag251" name="footnotetag251"></a><a href="#footnote251" title="Go to footnote 251"><span class="small">[251]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Effect of Cape rebellion.</span>
+
+<p>In view of the enormous area of the sparsely populated and difficult
+country throughout which their movements were thus facilitated, it is
+not surprising that these roaming commandos were never completely
+suppressed. Of the 21,256 men who surrendered after Vereeniging, 3,635
+were Boers and rebels, who had been, up to that time, at large in the
+Cape Colony.<a id="footnotetag252" name="footnotetag252"></a><a href="#footnote252" title="Go to footnote 252"><span class="small">[252]</span></a> The importance of the contribution which the
+disloyal majority of the Cape Dutch were enabled, in this manner, to
+make to the power of resistance exhibited by the Boers in the guerilla
+war has scarcely been sufficiently appreciated. As it was, a large
+body of Imperial troops, which would otherwise have been available for
+completing the conquest of the new colonies, were kept employed, not
+merely in guarding the all-important railway lines, but from time to
+time in arduous, costly, and exhausting military operations in the
+Cape Colony.<a id="footnotetag253" name="footnotetag253"></a><a href="#footnote253" title="Go to footnote 253"><span class="small">[253]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page434" name="page434"></a>(p. 434)</span> The value of this contribution was quite well understood by
+the Afrikander nationalists of the Cape. In Mr. Kipling's vigorous
+English, "north and south they were working for a common object&mdash;the
+manufacture of pro-Boers in England by doubling the income-tax." And
+it is in the extension of the area of the war by the establishment of
+the Boer commandos in the Cape Colony that we must find the one valid
+military consideration which underlay the failure of the peace
+negotiations between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha
+(February-April, 1901), and the final rejection of the British terms
+of surrender by the Boer leaders in June. The point is made perfectly
+plain in the official notice signed by Schalk Burger, as Acting
+President of the South African Republic, and Steyn, as President of
+the Orange Free State, which was issued to the burghers on June 20th,
+1901. After reciting that the British terms had been referred to
+"State President Krüger and the deputation in Europe," and that
+President Krüger's reply had been considered by a conference of the
+Governments of both Republics, at which Chief-Commandant C. De Wet,
+Commandant-General L. Botha, and Assistant-Commandant J. H. De la Rey
+had presented a full report, the document continues:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "And considering the good progress in our cause in the colonies,
+     where our brothers oppose the cruel injustice done to the
+     Republics more and more in depriving them of their independence,
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page435" name="page435"></a>(p. 435)</span> considering further the invaluable personal and
+     material sacrifices they [the Colonial Dutch] have made for our
+     cause, which would all be worthless and vain with a peace whereby
+     the independence of the Republics is given up ... [it is
+     resolved] that no peace will be made ... by which our
+     independence and national existence, or the interests of our
+     colonial brothers, shall be the price paid, and that the war will
+     be vigorously prosecuted."<a id="footnotetag254" name="footnotetag254"></a><a href="#footnote254" title="Go to footnote 254"><span class="small">[254]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Afrikander statesmanship.</span>
+
+<p>It is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the
+Afrikander nationalist leaders. The qualities of statesmanship that
+enabled a Cavour or a Bismarck to make a nation were theirs. From the
+apparent hopelessness of the position created by Lord Roberts's swift
+and overwhelming victories, they had brought round their affairs to
+the point at which they now stood. The task which confronted the
+Imperial troops was no longer to disarm the inhabitants of the
+Republics, but to disarm and subdue practically the entire Dutch
+population of South Africa. And to the military difficulties inherent
+in the accomplishment of such a task in such a country, they had added
+the opposition of political forces operating both in England and South
+Africa with scarcely less embarrassing effects. Had it been merely an
+affair of the island people and the island statesmen, the Bond might
+still have won. The courage and endurance of the Imperial troops alone
+would not have saved South Africa. The army was the instrument of the
+people, and it <span class="pagenum"><a id="page436" name="page436"></a>(p. 436)</span> was for the people to make use of this
+instrument, or to withdraw it, as they chose. But the over-sea British
+claimed a voice in the settlement; and the Bond had no friends among
+them. The "younger nations" and the "man" at Capetown saved South
+Africa for the Empire.</p>
+
+<p>Before we proceed to consider the broad features of the military
+operations by which the disarmament of the Dutch was at length
+accomplished, a reference must be made to the account of the general
+situation in South Africa addressed by Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain
+from Capetown on February 6th, 1901. Among all the notable documents
+which he furnished to his official chief, none affords more convincing
+evidence of cool judgment, mastery of South African conditions, and
+sureness of statecraft than this. It is a letter, and not a despatch,
+and as such it contains some personal details which would not have
+found a place in more formal communications.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's survey.</span>
+
+<p>Two reasons, Lord Milner writes, have prevented him from sending for a
+long time past any general review of South African affairs. "I am
+occupied," he says, "every day that passes from morning till night by
+business, all of which is urgent, and the amount and variety of which
+you are doubtless able to judge from the communications on a great
+variety of subjects which are constantly passing between us." And in
+addition to this, he has always hoped that "some definite <span class="pagenum"><a id="page437" name="page437"></a>(p. 437)</span>
+point would be reached, at which it might be possible to sum up that
+chapter of our history which contained the war, and to forecast the
+work of administrative construction which must succeed it." Now,
+however, it is useless to wait longer for a "clear and clean-cut"
+situation. Although he has not "the slightest doubt of the ultimate
+result," he foresees that the work which still lies before the
+Imperial troops will be "slower, more difficult, more harassing, and
+more expensive than was at one time anticipated."</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "It is no use denying that the last half-year has been one of
+     retrogression. Seven months ago this Colony was perfectly quiet,
+     at least as far as the Orange River. The southern half of the
+     Orange River Colony was rapidly settling down, and even a
+     considerable portion of the Transvaal, notably the south-western
+     districts, seemed to have definitely accepted British authority,
+     and to rejoice at the opportunity of a return to orderly
+     government and the pursuits of peace. To-day the scene is
+     completely altered."</p>
+
+<p>The "increased losses to the country," due to the prolongation of the
+struggle and to the guerilla methods adopted by the Boer leaders, are
+obvious.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The fact that the enemy are now broken up into a great number of
+     small forces, raiding in every direction, and that our troops are
+     similarly broken up in pursuit of them, makes the area of actual
+     fighting, and consequently of destruction, much wider than it
+     would be in the case of a conflict between equal numbers
+     operating in large masses. Moreover, the fight is now mainly over
+     supplies. The Boers live entirely on the country through
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page438" name="page438"></a>(p. 438)</span> which they pass, not only taking all the food they can
+     lay hands upon on the farms&mdash;grain, forage, horses, cattle, etc.,
+     but looting the small village stores for clothes, boots, coffee,
+     sugar, etc., of all of which they are in great need. Our forces,
+     on their side, are compelled to denude the country of everything
+     moveable, in order to frustrate these tactics of the enemy. No
+     doubt a considerable amount of the stock taken by us is not
+     wholly lost, but simply removed to the refugee camps, which are
+     now being established at many points along the railway lines. But
+     even under these circumstances the loss is great, through animals
+     dying on the route, or failing to find sufficient grass to live
+     upon when collected in large numbers at the camps. Indeed, the
+     loss of crops and stock is a far more serious matter than the
+     destruction of farm buildings, of which so much has been heard."</p>
+
+<p>And to this loss incidental to the campaign there has been added
+recently "destruction of a wholly wanton and malicious character."
+This is the injury done to the mining plant in the outlying districts
+of the Rand by the Boer raiders, a destruction for which there is no
+possible excuse.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"It has no reason or justification in connection with military
+     operations, but is pure vandalism, and outside the scope of
+     civilised warfare.... Directly or indirectly, all South Africa,
+     including the agricultural population, owes its prosperity to the
+     mines, and, of course, especially to the mines of the Transvaal.
+     To money made in mining it is indebted for such progress, even in
+     agriculture, as it has recently made, and the same source will
+     have to be relied upon for the recuperation of agriculture after
+     the ravages of war.</p>
+
+<p>"Fortunately the damage done to the mines has <span class="pagenum"><a id="page439" name="page439"></a>(p. 439)</span> not been
+     large, relatively to the vast total amount of the fixed capital
+     sunk in them. The mining area is excessively difficult to guard
+     against purely predatory attacks having no military purpose,
+     because it is, so to speak, 'all length and no breadth'&mdash;one long
+     thin line, stretching across the country from east to west for
+     many miles. Still, garrisoned as Johannesburg now is, it is only
+     possible successfully to attack a few points in it. Of the raids
+     hitherto made, and they have been fairly numerous, only one has
+     resulted in any serious damage. In that instance the injury done
+     to the single mine attacked amounted to £200,000, and it is
+     estimated that the mine is put out of working for two years. This
+     mine is only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of
+     the most important. These facts may afford some indication of the
+     ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the Transvaal
+     and all South Africa, but on many European interests, if that
+     general destruction of mine works which was contemplated just
+     before our occupation of Johannesburg had been carried out.
+     However serious in some respects may have been the military
+     consequences of our rapid advance to Johannesburg, South Africa
+     owes more than is commonly recognised to that brilliant dash
+     forward, by which the vast mining apparatus, the foundation of
+     all her wealth, was saved from the ruin threatening it."</p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Material destruction.</span>
+
+<p>As the result of the last six or seven months of destructive warfare,
+"a longer period of recuperation will be required than was originally
+anticipated." At the same time, Lord Milner points out that, with
+Kimberley and the Rand, the "main engines of prosperity," virtually
+undamaged, the economic consequences of the war, "though grave, do not
+appear by any means appalling."</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page440" name="page440"></a>(p. 440)</span> "The country population will need a good deal of help,
+     first to preserve it from starvation, and then, probably, to
+     supply it with a certain amount of capital to make a fresh start.
+     And the great industry of the country will need some little time
+     before it is able to render any assistance. But, in a young
+     country with great recuperative powers, it will not take many
+     years before the economic ravages of the war are effaced."</p>
+
+<p>He then turns to consider the "moral effect" of the recrudescence of
+the war, which is, in his opinion, more serious than the mere material
+destruction of the last six months. In the middle of 1900 the feeling
+in the Orange River Colony and the western districts of the Transvaal
+was "undoubtedly pacific."</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The inhabitants were sick of the war. They were greatly
+     astonished, after all that had been dinned into them, by the fair
+     and generous treatment they received on our first occupation, and
+     it would have taken very little to make them acquiesce readily in
+     the new régime. At that time, too, the feeling in the Colony was
+     better than I have ever known it."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Recrudescence of the war.</span>
+
+<p>If it had been possible to screen those portions of the conquered
+territories which were fast settling down to peaceful pursuits from
+the incursions of the enemy still in the field, the worst results of
+the guerilla war might have been avoided. But the "vast extent of the
+country, and the necessity of concentrating our forces for the long
+advance, first to Pretoria and then to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page441" name="page441"></a>(p. 441)</span> Komati Poort," made
+this impossible. The Boer leaders raided the country already occupied,
+but now left exposed; and, encouraged by the small successes thus
+easily obtained, the commandos reappeared first in the south-east of
+the Orange River Colony, then in the south-west of the Transvaal, and
+finally in every portion of the conquered territory.</p>
+
+<p>Those among the burgher population who desired to submit to British
+rule now found themselves in a position of great difficulty.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Instead of being made prisoners of war, they had been allowed to
+     remain on their farms on taking the oath of neutrality, and many
+     of them were really anxious to keep it. But they had not the
+     strength of mind, nor, from want of education, a sufficient
+     appreciation of the sacredness of the obligation which they had
+     undertaken, to resist the pressure of their old companions in
+     arms when these reappeared among them appealing to their
+     patriotism and to their fears. In a few weeks or months the very
+     men whom we had spared and treated with exceptional leniency were
+     up in arms again, justifying their breach of faith in many cases
+     by the extraordinary argument that we had not preserved them from
+     the temptation to commit it.</p>
+
+<p>"The general rising at the back of our advanced forces naturally
+     led to the return of a number of our troops, and to a straggling
+     conflict not yet concluded, in which the conduct of our own
+     troops, naturally enough, was not characterised by the same
+     leniency to the enemy which marked our original conquest. We did
+     not, indeed, treat the men who had broken parole with the same
+     severity with which I believe any other nation would have
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page442" name="page442"></a>(p. 442)</span> treated them. Entitled as we were by the universally
+     recognised rules of war to shoot the men who, having once been
+     prisoners in our hands and having been released on a distinct
+     pledge to abstain from further part in the war, had once more
+     taken up arms against us, we never in a single instance availed
+     ourselves of that right. But as our columns swept through the
+     revolted country, meeting on every hand with hostility, and even
+     with treachery, on the part of the people whom we had spared, no
+     doubt in some cases the innocent suffered with the guilty. Men
+     who had actually kept faith with us were, in some instances, made
+     prisoners of war, or saw their property destroyed, simply because
+     it was impossible to distinguish between them and the greater
+     number who had broken faith. This, no doubt, resulted in further
+     accessions to the ranks of the enemy. And this tendency was
+     augmented by the evacuation, necessary for military reasons, of a
+     number of places, such as Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, and
+     Smithfield, which we had held for months, and in which we had
+     actually established a reasonably satisfactory civil
+     administration. Latterly, something has been done to check the
+     general demoralisation, and to afford places of refuge for those
+     willing to submit, by establishing camps along the railway lines
+     to which burghers may take themselves, their families, and their
+     stock for protection. No doubt this is a very inadequate
+     substitute for the effectual defence of whole districts.
+     Consequently the camps are mostly tenanted by women and children
+     whose male relatives are, in many cases, in the field against us.
+     But, as far as it goes, it is a good measure, and there can be no
+     doubt that, whenever we succeed in striking a decisive blow at
+     any of the numerous commandos roaming about the country, a good
+     many of their less willing members <span class="pagenum"><a id="page443" name="page443"></a>(p. 443)</span> will find their way
+     to one or other of these camps in order to avoid further
+     fighting."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>As the guerilla warfare thus swept back over the new colonies, the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony, who at one time, about the middle of the
+preceding year (1900), had seemed disposed to acquiesce in the union
+of all South Africa under the British flag, became once more restless
+and embittered.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">A carnival of mendacity.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Every act of harshness, however necessary, on the part of our
+     troops, was exaggerated and made the most of, though what
+     principally inflamed the minds of the people were alleged
+     instances of needless cruelty which never occurred. Never in my
+     life have I read of, much less experienced, such a carnival of
+     mendacity as that which accompanied the pro-Boer agitation in
+     this Colony at the end of last year. And these libels still
+     continue to make themselves felt. It is true that excitement has
+     subsided somewhat during the last two months, partly because some
+     of the worst inventions about the conduct of the British troops
+     have been exposed and utterly discredited, and partly because the
+     general introduction of martial law has tended greatly to check
+     seditious writing and speaking. But even now the general feeling
+     in most of the country districts is very bad, and the commandos
+     which invaded the Colony in December and have been roaming about
+     ever since, while they have not gained many adherents among the
+     colonial farmers, have nevertheless enjoyed the very substantial
+     aid which the sympathy of the majority of the inhabitants was
+     able to give them, in supporting themselves, obtaining fresh
+     supplies of food and horses, and evading the forces sent in
+     pursuit of them."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page444" name="page444"></a>(p. 444)</span> Of the general attitude of the Cape Dutch at this time Lord
+Milner writes with the lenient judgment of complete understanding:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"I am satisfied by experience that the majority of those Dutch
+     inhabitants of the Colony who sympathise with the Republics,
+     however little they may be able to resist giving active
+     expression to that sympathy when the enemy actually appear
+     amongst them, do not desire to see their own districts invaded or
+     to find themselves personally placed in the awkward dilemma of
+     choosing between high treason and an unfriendly attitude to the
+     men of their own race from beyond the border. There are
+     extremists who would like to see the whole of the Cape Colony
+     overrun. But the bulk of the farmers, especially the substantial
+     ones, are not of this mind. They submit readily enough even to
+     stringent regulations having for their object the prevention of
+     the spread of invasion. And not a few of them are, perhaps,
+     secretly glad that the prohibition of seditious speaking and
+     writing, of political meetings, and of the free movement of
+     political firebrands through the country enables them to keep
+     quiet, without actually themselves taking a strong line against
+     the propaganda, and, to do them justice, they behave reasonably
+     well under the pass and other regulations necessary for that
+     purpose, as long as care is taken not to make these regulations
+     too irksome to them in the conduct of their business, or in their
+     daily lives.</p>
+
+<p>"That there has been an invasion at all is no doubt due to the
+     weakness of some of the Dutch colonists in tolerating, or
+     supporting, the violent propaganda, which could not but lead the
+     enemy to believe that they had only to come into the Colony in
+     order to meet with general active <span class="pagenum"><a id="page445" name="page445"></a>(p. 445)</span> support. But this was
+     a miscalculation on the part of the enemy, though a very
+     pardonable one. They knew the vehemence of the agitation in their
+     favour as shown by the speeches in Parliament, the series of
+     public meetings culminating in the Worcester Congress, the
+     writings of the Dutch Press, the very general wearing of the
+     republican colours, the singing of the Volkslied, and so forth,
+     and they regarded these demonstrations as meaning more than they
+     actually did. Three things were forgotten. Firstly, that a great
+     proportion of the Afrikanders in the Colony who really meant
+     business had slipped away and joined the republican ranks long
+     ago. Secondly, that the abortive rebellion of a year ago had left
+     the people of the border districts disinclined to repeat the
+     experiment of a revolt. Thirdly, that owing to the precautionary
+     measures of the Government the amount of arms and ammunition in
+     the hands of the country population throughout the greater part
+     of the Colony is not now anything like as large as it usually is,
+     and far smaller than it was a year ago."</p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">British population in arms.</span>
+
+<p>In these circumstances the object to be aimed at is to screen off as
+much of the country as possible from raids. But the Cape Colony is
+considerably larger in area than France and the United Kingdom put
+together; it has "an immense length of frontier that can be crossed
+anywhere," and "exceedingly primitive means of communication." The
+exclusion of mobile guerilla bands from across the frontier is,
+therefore, "something of an impossibility." There is one method, and
+one only, by which "the game of the invaders can be frustrated." It is
+to provide each district with the means of defending itself. And so a
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page446" name="page446"></a>(p. 446)</span> local defence force has been formed in all districts, with
+the exception of those&mdash;happily the least important in the Colony&mdash;in
+which the population is extremely small and the loyalists are very
+few.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"In the other districts, the response on the part of the British
+     population to the general call to arms recently made by the
+     Ministry has been better than the most sanguine expected. It was
+     always admitted, by their friends and foes alike, that the bulk
+     of the Afrikander population would never take up arms on the side
+     of the British Government in this quarrel, even for local
+     defence. The appeal was, therefore, virtually directed to the
+     British population, mostly townspeople, and to a small, but no
+     doubt very strong and courageous, minority of the Afrikanders who
+     have always been loyalists. These classes had been already
+     immensely drawn on by the Cape police, the regular volunteer
+     corps, and the numerous irregular mounted corps which had been
+     called into existence because of the war. There must have been
+     twelve thousand Cape Colonists under arms before the recent
+     appeal, and, as things are now going, we shall get as many more
+     under that appeal&mdash;a truly remarkable achievement under a purely
+     voluntary system. The fact that, if the war continues for a few
+     months longer, so large a number of the South African British
+     will be under arms (for, it must be remembered, in addition to
+     the Cape colonists we have about one thousand Rhodesians, and, I
+     should say, at least ten thousand Uitlanders) is one that cannot
+     be left out of account in considering either the present
+     imbroglio or the settlement after peace is restored.</p>
+
+<p>"It is, indeed, calculated to exercise a most important and, I
+     believe, beneficial influence upon the South African politics of
+     the future. Among <span class="pagenum"><a id="page447" name="page447"></a>(p. 447)</span> the principal causes of the trouble
+     of the past and present was the contempt felt by the Afrikander
+     countryman, used to riding and shooting, and generally in
+     possession of a good rifle and plenty of cartridges, for other
+     white men less habituated to arms than he was himself. That
+     feeling can hardly survive the experience of the past twelve
+     months, and especially of the last six weeks. The splendid
+     fighting of the despised Johannesburgers of the Imperial Light
+     Horse, and of the other South African Colonial Corps, has become
+     a matter of history, and the present <span class="italic">levée en masse</span> of the
+     British people, including the townsmen, of this Colony, is proof
+     positive that when the necessity is really felt they are equal to
+     the best in courage and public spirit. In this respect the events
+     of the past few months, unfortunate as they have been in many
+     ways, have undoubtedly their brighter side. The mutual respect of
+     the two principal white races is the first condition of a healthy
+     political life in the South Africa of the future. It is possible
+     that if the extreme strain of the most recent developments of the
+     war had never been felt throughout Cape Colony, the British
+     inhabitants would never have had the opportunity of showing that
+     they were inferior to none in their willingness to bear all the
+     burdens of citizenship, including that of personal service."</p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Remember the loyalists.</span>
+
+<p>And Lord Milner urges that in the future England should not forget
+that there are loyalists in South Africa as well as Boers; and that
+the loyalists are Dutch as well as British.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"The important part now played, even from the purely military
+     point of view, by the South African loyalists ought, as it seems
+     to me, to have a good effect not only in South Africa but in
+     England. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page448" name="page448"></a>(p. 448)</span> The inherent vice, if I may say so, of almost
+     all public discussion of our South African difficulties is the
+     tendency to concentrate attention too exclusively on the Boers.
+     Say what we will, the controversy always seems to relapse into
+     the old ruts&mdash;it is the British Government on the one hand and
+     the Boers on the other. The question how a particular policy will
+     affect not merely our enemies, but our now equally numerous
+     friends, seems seldom to be adequately considered. And yet it
+     would seem that justice and policy alike should lead us to be as
+     eager to consider the feelings and interests, and to retain the
+     loyalty, of those who are fighting on our side, as to disarm the
+     present enmity and win the future confidence of those who are
+     fighting against us. And this principle would seem all the easier
+     to adhere to because there is really nothing which the great body
+     of the South African loyalists desire which it is not for the
+     honour and advantage of the mother country to insist upon.</p>
+
+<p>"Of vindictiveness, or desire to oppress the Afrikanders, there
+     is, except in hasty utterances inevitable in the heat of the
+     conflict, which have no permanent significance, or in tirades
+     which are wholly devoid of influence, no sign whatever. The
+     attitude of almost all leading and representative men, and the
+     general trend of public feeling among the loyalists, even in the
+     intensity of the struggle, is dead against anything like racial
+     exclusiveness or domination. If this were not so it would be
+     impossible for a section of pure-bred Afrikanders, small no doubt
+     in numbers but weighty in character and position, to take the
+     strong line which they do in opposition to the views of the
+     majority of their own people, based as these are, and as they
+     know them to be, upon a misconception of our policy and
+     intentions. These men are among the most devoted adherents to the
+     Imperial cause, and would regard <span class="pagenum"><a id="page449" name="page449"></a>(p. 449)</span> with more disfavour
+     and alarm than any one the failure of the British nation to carry
+     out its avowed policy in the most complete manner. They are
+     absolutely convinced that the unquestioned establishment of
+     British supremacy, and the creation of one political system from
+     Capetown to the Zambesi, is, after all that has happened, the
+     only salvation for men of their own race, as well as for others."</p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">"One Country, One Flag."</span>
+
+<p>And, in conclusion, he writes of the "predominant, indeed the almost
+unanimous, feeling of those South Africans who sympathise with the
+Imperial Government," that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "they are sick to death of the war, which has brought ruin to
+     many of them, and imposed considerable sacrifices on almost all.
+     But they would rather see the war continue for an indefinite time
+     than run the risk of any compromise which would leave even the
+     remotest chance of the recurrence of so terrible a scourge in the
+     future. They are prepared to fight and suffer on in order to make
+     South Africa, indisputably and for ever, one country under one
+     flag, with one system of government, and that system the British,
+     which they believe to ensure the highest possible degree of
+     justice and freedom to men of all races."</p>
+
+<p>In this luminous review of what Lord Milner terms "if by no means the
+most critical, possibly the most puzzling" state of affairs since the
+outbreak of the war, it will be observed that he puts the time
+required by South Africa to recover from the economic ravages of the
+war at "not many years." In point of fact, two and a half years after
+the surrender of Vereeniging nothing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page450" name="page450"></a>(p. 450)</span> remained but the
+scattered graveyards upon the veld, the empty tins still tinkling upon
+the wire fences by the railways, and an occasional blockhouse, to
+remind the traveller of the devastating struggle from which the
+country had so recently emerged. This estimate of the period of
+recuperation affords a measure of the magnitude of Lord Milner's
+achievement in the three concluding years of his administration. For
+the rest, we look in vain for any trace of bitterness, or even of
+partisanship, in his frank and penetrating analysis. It is the survey
+of a man who is completely master of the situation; who is absolutely
+convinced of the justice of the British cause; who has no illusions
+and no fears.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Feeding the enemy.</span>
+
+<p>With the circumstances in which the burghers were induced by their
+leaders to continue, or renew, their resistance to the Imperial troops
+before us, both the long duration of the guerilla war, and the methods
+by which it was finally brought to a close, become easily
+intelligible. At the same time it must not be forgotten that, from a
+purely military point of view, the relapse of the conquered
+territories into war was due to the insufficiency of British troops.
+By the end of April, 1900, as we have noticed before, all the reserves
+of the regular army had been exhausted; and, in addition to this, at
+the end of twelve months' service a considerable proportion of the
+Home and over-sea auxiliaries left South Africa to return to civil
+life. Had there been a sufficient number of trained soldiers <span class="pagenum"><a id="page451" name="page451"></a>(p. 451)</span>
+to occupy effectively the Boer Republics, the war would not have swept
+back through them and over their borders into the Colony. Even so, the
+actual number of British troops in South Africa under Lord Roberts's
+command would have sufficed to subjugate the Boers, had the British
+military authorities employed the severe methods of warfare to which
+any other belligerent would have had recourse under the like
+conditions&mdash;methods of merciful severity which were employed, in fact,
+by the Union forces in the civil war in America.<a id="footnotetag255" name="footnotetag255"></a><a href="#footnote255" title="Go to footnote 255"><span class="small">[255]</span></a> But, by the
+irony of fate, the humane methods of the British, in the absence of a
+practically unlimited supply of trained troops, made the revival of
+hostilities possible on the part of the Boers, and thereby created the
+necessity for the employment of those more rigorous, but, by
+comparison, still humane and generous methods, in respect of which the
+charge of inhumanity was brought against Great Britain by the friends
+of the Boers in England and on the continent of Europe. No one will
+maintain that it is a part of the duty of a belligerent to support the
+non-combatant population of the enemy. Yet this duty was voluntarily
+assumed throughout the war by the British military authorities, who,
+from the occupation of Bloemfontein onwards, fed the non-combatant
+Boer population as well as they fed their own troops.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Kitchener's task.</span>
+
+<p>An incident that happened after the occupation <span class="pagenum"><a id="page452" name="page452"></a>(p. 452)</span> of Pretoria
+exhibits the remarkable generosity of the British attitude. At a time
+when, owing to the Boer attacks upon the railway, the utmost
+difficulty was experienced in getting supplies from the
+thousand-miles'-distant base at the coast, Lord Roberts was compelled
+to send away a part of the civilian population to General Botha, and
+they were removed by the Boer Commandant-General to Barberton. That is
+to say, while the British, on the one hand, were giving part of the
+supplies on which the existence of their troops depended, to the
+non-combatant population of the enemy, the enemy, on the other hand,
+was doing his utmost to destroy the single line of railway which alone
+stood between the British Army and starvation. When, therefore, Lord
+Kitchener succeeded to the command of the British forces in South
+Africa (November 29th, 1900), he found the task of disarmament
+complicated by two factors. There was the desire of the Home
+Government that the war should be conducted upon the humane lines
+hitherto adopted, and there was also the fact that the Imperial troops
+were not numerous enough to occupy effectively the whole territory of
+the Republics, or, in other words, to do the one thing of all others
+necessary to make this humane conduct of the war consistent with
+military success. It was impossible, with the troops at his disposal,
+for Lord Kitchener to hold the enormous territory of the conquered
+Republics. It was impossible, perhaps, to support a larger force in a
+country so poorly provided with food supplies <span class="pagenum"><a id="page453" name="page453"></a>(p. 453)</span> and means of
+communication. An alternative plan had to be found. This plan was to
+remove the horses, cattle, and food supplies from the areas which he
+was unable to occupy, and to transport the non-combatant inhabitants
+to places where they could be both fed and protected. And, when this
+had been done&mdash;or, more correctly, while it was in process of being
+done&mdash;he had to capture the small, mobile bodies of burghers operating
+over the whole of the unprotected area of the late Republics and the
+Cape Colony, and to collect gradually the fighting Boers, captured or
+surrendered, into the colonial or over-sea prisoners' camps.</p>
+
+<p>Certain districts, of which those surrounding the towns of Kimberley,
+Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Johannesburg were the more important, had
+from the first been effectively occupied and securely held. All the
+troops at Lord Kitchener's disposal, that were not absorbed in the
+work of garrisoning these districts and maintaining the lines of
+communication, were organised into mobile columns, which were
+distributed among General Officers respectively attached to a
+particular area. In a despatch of July 8th, 1901, Lord Kitchener was
+able to report that, as the result of the recent work of these mobile
+columns, the Boers, although "still able, in case of emergency, to
+concentrate a considerable number of men," were, in his opinion,
+"unable to undertake any large scheme of operations." Apart from the
+heavy drain from prisoners <span class="pagenum"><a id="page454" name="page454"></a>(p. 454)</span> captured and deaths in the field,
+the loss of their ox-waggons had seriously affected their mobility and
+supply arrangements.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Divided up into small parties of three to four hundred men," he
+     writes, "they are scattered all over the country without plans
+     and without hope, and on the approach of our troops they
+     disperse, to reassemble in the same neighbourhood when our men
+     pass on. In this way they continue an obstinate resistance
+     without retaining anything, or defending the smallest portion of
+     this vast country."</p>
+
+<p>He estimates that there are not more than 13,500<a id="footnotetag256" name="footnotetag256"></a><a href="#footnote256" title="Go to footnote 256"><span class="small">[256]</span></a> Boers in the
+field in the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and the Cape Colony.
+But he adds that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "with long lines of railway to hold, every yard of which has to
+     be defended, both to secure our own civil and military supplies,
+     and, what is more important, to prevent the enemy from obtaining
+     necessaries from the capture of our trains, the employment of
+     large numbers of troops continues to be a necessity.... The Boer
+     party who declared war have quitted the field, and are now urging
+     those whom they deserted to continue a useless struggle by giving
+     lying assurances to the ignorant burghers of outside assistance,
+     and by raising absurdly deceitful hopes that Great Britain has
+     not sufficient endurance to see the matter through."<a id="footnotetag257" name="footnotetag257"></a><a href="#footnote257" title="Go to footnote 257"><span class="small">[257]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>But it had become evident that some more systematic effort was
+required for the capture of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page455" name="page455"></a>(p. 455)</span> commandos, unless the slow
+task of wearing down the Boer resistance was to be almost indefinitely
+protracted; and this same month of July, 1901, witnessed the extension
+of the blockhouse lines, which proved the turning-point in the
+guerilla war. The origin of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouse
+defence is described by him in his despatch of August 8th, 1901.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The blockhouse system.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Experience had shown," he writes, "that the line of defensible
+     posts, extending across the Orange River Colony, from Jacobsdal
+     to Ladybrand, constituted a considerable obstacle to the free
+     movement of the enemies' roving bands, and that the gradual
+     completion of chains of blockhouses placed at intervals of a
+     mile, sometimes less, along the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
+     railways, had obtained for our traffic a comparative security
+     which it had not previously enjoyed."<a id="footnotetag258" name="footnotetag258"></a><a href="#footnote258" title="Go to footnote 258"><span class="small">[258]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>In July, therefore, Lord Kitchener made arrangements for the
+construction of three additional lines of blockhouses. The first ran
+from Aliwal North westward, following the course of the Orange River,
+to Bethulie, and was continued thence alongside the railway through
+Stormberg, Rosmead, Naauwpoort, and De Aar, northward to Kimberley.
+The second commenced at Frederickstad and ran northward by the source
+of the Mooi River to Breed's Nek in the Magaliesberg, from which point
+it was connected with the British garrison at Commando Nek, and thus
+screened the western side of the Pretoria and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page456" name="page456"></a>(p. 456)</span> Johannesburg
+area. The third, running from Eerste Fabriken in the north, by Springs
+and Heidelberg, southward to the Vaal River, protected the same
+district from attack upon the east. These new blockhouse lines, Lord
+Kitchener wrote, promised to be of much assistance in the future. Not
+only did they protect the British communications, and render
+inter-communication between the different portions of the Boer forces
+difficult, but, in the absence of frontiers, natural or artificial,
+they served as barriers against which the British mobile columns were
+able to drive bands of the enemy and force them to surrender. Indeed,
+the blockhouse lines proved the chief instrument of success; for with
+the gradual extension of the system, the area of active hostilities
+was confined in an increasing degree to the vast half-deserted regions
+through which the commandos roamed, and the British columns swept at
+intervals in pursuit of them.</p>
+
+<p>A month later, August 8th, Lord Kitchener reported a further step in
+advance. He had formed "some specially mobile columns for independent
+and rapid action in different parts of the country, generally at some
+distance from the operations of other troops." The commanders of these
+new mobile columns had a free hand in respect of their movements,
+since they were guided by the special intelligence, which they
+themselves collected, and not solely by information from headquarters.
+The effect produced by the development of the blockhouse <span class="pagenum"><a id="page457" name="page457"></a>(p. 457)</span>
+system, combined with the greater freedom of initiative allowed to the
+new mobile columns, became apparent in the increasing number of Boers
+captured or voluntarily surrendering themselves in the month of
+August, when altogether more than two thousand of the enemy were
+accounted for.<a id="footnotetag259" name="footnotetag259"></a><a href="#footnote259" title="Go to footnote 259"><span class="small">[259]</span></a> On the 7th of this month the delayed<a id="footnotetag260" name="footnotetag260"></a><a href="#footnote260" title="Go to footnote 260"><span class="small">[260]</span></a>
+proclamation was issued, and a date&mdash;September 15th&mdash;was fixed as the
+limit within which the guerilla leaders might, by voluntarily
+surrendering, avoid certain penalties which were duly set out. In
+order to counteract the effect of this action on the part of the
+British Government, General Botha stimulated his followers to
+increased military enterprise.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "But," says Lord Kitchener, "though there has been no general
+     surrender, the device to which the Commandant-General resorted
+     for turning the thoughts of his burghers in another direction has
+     probably cost him and his cause [a heavier loss] than a simple
+     pursuance of the usual evasive tactics would have even entailed."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Large captures of Boers.</span>
+
+<p>The precise extent of this loss is shown in the returns for September,
+which record captures and surrenders almost as numerous as those of
+the preceding month.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "It cannot be expected," Lord Kitchener adds, "even under the
+     most favourable conditions, that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page458" name="page458"></a>(p. 458)</span> in the presence of the
+     ever-diminishing numbers opposing us in the field, these figures
+     can be maintained, but I feel confident that so long as any
+     resistance is continued, no exertion will be spared either by
+     officers or men of this force to carry out the task they still
+     have before them."<a id="footnotetag261" name="footnotetag261"></a><a href="#footnote261" title="Go to footnote 261"><span class="small">[261]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The railway lines secured.</span>
+
+<p>In another month a position had been reached in which it was possible
+for the work of administrative reconstruction&mdash;interrupted a year ago
+by the development of the guerilla warfare&mdash;to be resumed. At this
+date (November, 1901), the resistance of the Dutch population had been
+weakened by the loss of 53,000 fighting Boers, of whom 42,000 were in
+British custody, while the rest had been killed, wounded, or otherwise
+put out of action. In the Transvaal 14,700 square miles, and in the
+Orange River Colony 17,000 square miles of territory had been enclosed
+by blockhouse lines. A square formed roughly by lines running
+respectively from Klerksdorp to Zeerust on the west, from Zeerust to
+Middelburg on the north, from Middelburg to Standerton on the east,
+and from Standerton to Klerksdorp on the south, enclosing Pretoria and
+the Rand, was the protected area of the Transvaal. The whole of the
+Orange River Colony south of the blockhouse line,
+Kimberley-Winberg-Bloemfontein-Ladybrand, was also a protected area;
+and the Cape Colony, south of the main railway lines, was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page459" name="page459"></a>(p. 459)</span>
+similarly screened off. But an application of what may be termed "the
+railway-cutting test" yields, perhaps, the most eloquent testimony
+both to the magnitude of the original task undertaken by the Imperial
+troops, and to the degree of success which had been obtained. In
+October, 1900, the railway lines, upon which the British troops
+depended for supplies of food and ammunition, were cut thirty-two
+times, or more than once a day. The number of times in which they were
+cut in the succeeding November was thirty; in December twenty-one; in
+January, 1901, sixteen; in February, as the result of De Wet's
+invasion of the Cape Colony, they were cut thirty times; in March
+eighteen; in April eighteen; in May twelve; in June eight; in July
+four; in August four; in September twice; and in October not at all.
+Still more significant of the approach of peace was the fact that now,
+for the first time, the British population was allowed to return to
+Johannesburg in any considerable numbers.<a id="footnotetag262" name="footnotetag262"></a><a href="#footnote262" title="Go to footnote 262"><span class="small">[262]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>It remains to consider two questions which cannot be omitted from any
+account; however brief, of the manner in which the disarmament of the
+Dutch in South Africa was effected. The first of these is the charge
+of inhumanity brought against the Imperial military authorities in
+respect of the deportation of the Boer non-combatants to the Burgher
+Camps; and the second is the actual <span class="pagenum"><a id="page460" name="page460"></a>(p. 460)</span> effect produced upon the
+burghers in the field by the public denunciations of the war by
+members of the Liberal Opposition in England.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Burgher camps.</span>
+
+<p>In charging the British Government and Lord Kitchener with inhumanity
+in the conduct of the war, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and other friends
+of the Boer cause relied in the main upon the circumstance that a
+certain proportion of the Boer population was removed compulsorily
+from districts which the British troops were unable to occupy
+effectively, and upon the further fact that the Burgher Camps
+exhibited an unusually high rate of mortality. The necessity for the
+removal of this non-combatant population will scarcely be disputed in
+view of the methods adopted by the Boer leaders to compel the burghers
+to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops, and the fact that
+nearly every house in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, inhabited
+by the Dutch, served as an intelligence office, a recruiting depôt,
+and a base of supplies for the roving commandos. Nor will it be denied
+that the responsibility for the unnecessary suffering incurred by the
+Boer people in the guerilla war rests upon those of the Boer leaders
+who formed and enforced the decision to continue the struggle, and not
+upon the British Government. The alleged "inhumanity," therefore, of
+the Imperial military authorities consists in the circumstance that,
+instead of leaving these helpless non-combatants to be supported by
+the Boer leaders, they removed them to places of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page461" name="page461"></a>(p. 461)</span> security,
+where they were fed, housed, and generally maintained, in as little
+discomfort as circumstances permitted. If the lesser suffering of the
+Burgher Camps was the only alternative to greater suffering, and
+possibly starvation, on the veld, the Boers had only their own leaders
+to thank for the position in which they found themselves. The
+death-rate of the Burgher Camps was exceptionally high as compared
+with that of any ordinary European community. But the population of
+the camps was no less exceptional. It consisted of women and children,
+with a small proportion of adult males; and of all these the majority
+had come to the camps as refugees, insufficiently clothed, weakened by
+exposure and often by starvation. Obviously the death-rate of such a
+refugee community would be much higher, under the most favourable
+conditions, than that of an ordinary European town; and, in order to
+find a valid point of comparison, we must seek statistics provided by
+similar collections of refugees, brought together under the like
+exceptional circumstances. We are unable to find any such parallel
+case, for the sufficient reason that history records no other example
+of a nation at war which, at the risk of impairing the efficiency of
+its own forces in the field, has endeavoured, not merely to feed and
+clothe, but to house, nurse, and even educate the non-combatant
+population of its enemy.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Reduction of the death-rate.</span>
+
+<p>What we do know, however, is that, of the total deaths in these camps
+of refuge, the great majority <span class="pagenum"><a id="page462" name="page462"></a>(p. 462)</span> were those of infants and
+children. This is a circumstance which in itself goes far to make the
+excess of the camp death-rate apparent rather than real; since, in the
+first place, the Boer mothers, owing to their insanitary habits and
+ignorance,<a id="footnotetag263" name="footnotetag263"></a><a href="#footnote263" title="Go to footnote 263"><span class="small">[263]</span></a> are not accustomed to bring more than one out of every
+two children to maturity; and in the second, the rate of infant
+mortality is abnormally high, as compared with that of a given
+community as a whole, even in the most highly developed countries. The
+highest monthly death-rate was that of October, 1901, when, out of a
+population of 112,109 in all camps, there were 3,205 deaths, or 344
+per thousand per annum.<a id="footnotetag264" name="footnotetag264"></a><a href="#footnote264" title="Go to footnote 264"><span class="small">[264]</span></a> But of these deaths, 500 only (in round
+numbers) were those of adults, and 2,700 were those of children. That
+is to say, in this worst month we have in the refugee camps an adult
+death-rate of (roughly) 50 per thousand, as compared with a European
+death-rate varying from 16.7 in Norway to 33.2 in Hungary,<a id="footnotetag265" name="footnotetag265"></a><a href="#footnote265" title="Go to footnote 265"><span class="small">[265]</span></a> and a
+children's death-rate of 300 per thousand, as compared with the 208
+per thousand of the contemporary rate of infant mortality in
+thirty-three great towns of the United Kingdom, or in Birkenhead alone
+of 362 per thousand. And from this time forward the death-rate of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page463" name="page463"></a>(p. 463)</span> refugee camps was rapidly reduced. The reason for this
+reduction is significant. By the development of the blockhouse lines
+the British military authorities had been enabled to protect their
+supplies from the attacks of the guerilla leaders. In other words,
+Lord Kitchener was now able to defend the Boer non-combatants against
+the efforts made by their own leaders to deprive them of food and
+other necessaries of life. And ultimately the mortality in the Burgher
+Camps was reduced to a point "much below the normal rates under
+ordinary local circumstances."<a id="footnotetag266" name="footnotetag266"></a><a href="#footnote266" title="Go to footnote 266"><span class="small">[266]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page464" name="page464"></a>(p. 464)</span> The charge of prolonging the war by public declarations of
+sympathy with the enemy<a id="footnotetag267" name="footnotetag267"></a><a href="#footnote267" title="Go to footnote 267"><span class="small">[267]</span></a> was <span class="pagenum"><a id="page465" name="page465"></a>(p. 465)</span> definitely formulated
+against certain members of the Liberal Opposition and the Irish
+Nationalist party by Lord St. Aldwyn (Sir Michael Hicks Beach), at
+Oldham on October 10th, 1901.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Why the war was prolonged.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The real cause of the prolongation of this war has been
+     something which, on my word, I believe could never have been seen
+     in any other country in the world. It has been the speeches in
+     Parliament of British members of the House of Commons, doing
+     everything they could against their country and in favour of her
+     enemies. It has been articles in certain journals taking
+     absolutely the same lines&mdash;I am not talking of mere attacks on
+     his Majesty's Government, or even calumnies of individual
+     ministers, that is part of the ordinary machinery of political
+     warfare, and one of the advantages of an absolutely free Press.
+     No, what I am talking of is the prominence given to the opinions
+     and sentiments of men who were called Pro-Boers, as if they
+     represented the feelings of a large section of their
+     fellow-countrymen. The invention of lies, like the alleged
+     quarrel between Lord Kitchener and the War Office, was intended
+     to damage this country in the conduct of the war, as was also the
+     wicked charges made against the humanity of our generals and our
+     soldiers in the Concentration Camps and in the field, the
+     attempts, such as I saw only the other day in one of these
+     papers, to prove that in those gallant contests at Fort
+     Itala<a id="footnotetag268" name="footnotetag268"></a><a href="#footnote268" title="Go to footnote 268"><span class="small">[268]</span></a> and on the borders of Natal our soldiers had not
+     repulsed their enemies, but were themselves the defeated party.
+     We here do not attach any importance to those things. We rate
+     them at their true value because we know <span class="pagenum"><a id="page466" name="page466"></a>(p. 466)</span> something
+     about their authors&mdash;but what do you think is thought of them
+     when they go out to South Africa? What do the Boers and their
+     leaders think when they read the newspapers written in England
+     which are full of these things? The Boers have many faults, but
+     they are a simple and patriotic people. They never can imagine
+     that English newspapers would print these things, that English
+     members of Parliament would speak them, taking always the side of
+     their country's enemies, unless these things were true. They are
+     deceived. They greedily swallow all this as representing the
+     opinion of a great section of the public in this country, and
+     those who have said these things and those who have circulated
+     them are the parties who are guilty before God of prolonging this
+     war. There are the Irish Nationalists. Let me read to you words
+     which I heard with the greatest pain in the last session of
+     Parliament from the leader of the Irish Nationalists, a man of
+     consummate eloquence and perfect self-control. What did Mr. John
+     Redmond say? He prayed God that the resistance of the Boers might
+     be strengthened, and that South Africa might take vengeance for
+     its wrongs by separating itself from the Empire which had deluged
+     it with blood, and become a free and independent nation. We in
+     England pass over words of that sort, though I believe they would
+     not have been uttered with impunity by a member of the
+     Legislative Assembly of any other country in the world."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Campbell-Bannerman's reply.</span>
+
+<p>Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reply to the charge brought against him
+by Lord St. Aldwyn, and subsequently by Lord Salisbury,<a id="footnotetag269" name="footnotetag269"></a><a href="#footnote269" title="Go to footnote 269"><span class="small">[269]</span></a> is
+contained in the words following, which were spoken by him at
+Plymouth, on November 19th:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page467" name="page467"></a>(p. 467)</span> "Now I declare, ladies and gentlemen, for myself, that
+     from first to last I have never uttered one syllable that could
+     be twisted by any ingenuity into encouragement by the Boers. No,
+     I have never even expressed ordinary pity for, or sympathy with
+     them, because I did not wish to run the risk of being
+     misunderstood. What I have done, and what I hope I shall continue
+     to do, is to denounce the stupidity of the way in which the
+     Government were dealing with the Boers."</p>
+
+<p>There is only one method by which the amazing effrontery of this
+denial can be sufficiently exhibited. It is to place underneath it
+quotations from speeches delivered by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
+himself at Stirling on October 25th, by Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P., at
+Galashiels on October 14th, and by Mr. E. Robertson, M.P., at Dundee
+on October 16th, as printed in the "Official Organ of the Orange Free
+State Government," dated September 21st, 1901, a copy of which was
+found in a Boer laager on the veld. The extracts selected are these:</p>
+
+<p>Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The whole country in the two belligerent States, outside the
+     mining towns, is a howling wilderness. The farms are burned, the
+     country is wasted. The flocks and herds are either butchered or
+     driven off; the mills are destroyed, furniture and instruments of
+     agriculture smashed. These things are what I have termed methods
+     of barbarism. I adhere to the phrase. I cannot improve upon it.
+     If these are not the methods of barbarism, what methods did
+     barbarism employ?... My belief is that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page468" name="page468"></a>(p. 468)</span> mass of the
+     British people ... do not desire to see a brave people subjugated
+     or annihilated."</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P.:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The war was unnecessary, and therefore unjust.... He wished he
+     could agree that we were fighting in a just cause, that we had
+     always fought according to acknowledged civilised methods; but as
+     an honest man he could not do so."</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Edmund Robertson, M.P.:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The victory of the Government (at the last General Election) had
+     been the main cause of the prolongation of the war. If they had
+     been defeated their successors would have been men with a free
+     hand, and the Boers themselves might have been ready to make
+     concessions, which they would not make, and had not made, to
+     those whom they believed to be their enemies and persecutors. If
+     the Empire was to be saved, the Government must be
+     destroyed."<a id="footnotetag270" name="footnotetag270"></a><a href="#footnote270" title="Go to footnote 270"><span class="small">[270]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Can any human being of ordinary intelligence believe that these
+passages, containing denunciations of the war, were circulated by
+Ex-President Steyn for any other purpose than that of encouraging the
+burghers to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops?</p>
+
+<p>And to this evidence may be added the protest made by "An Old
+Berliner" in <span class="italic">The Times</span> of November 27th, 1901:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">"Methods of barbarism".</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "What I want to impress upon your readers is the much more
+     serious and, indeed, incalculable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page469" name="page469"></a>(p. 469)</span> mischief done by the
+     public utterances of responsible politicians, and, to take the
+     most pernicious example of all, by the reckless language of Sir
+     Henry Campbell-Bannerman. The words he uttered about England's
+     methods of barbarism have been used ever since as the watchwords
+     of England's detractors throughout the length and breadth of
+     Germany."<a id="footnotetag271" name="footnotetag271"></a><a href="#footnote271" title="Go to footnote 271"><span class="small">[271]</span></a><a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page470" name="page470"></a>(p. 470)</span> CHAPTER XI</h3>
+
+<p class="title">PREPARING FOR PEACE</p>
+
+
+<p>We have already noticed that arrangements were made in October, 1900,
+under which the High Commissionership was to be separated from the
+Governorship of the Cape Colony in order that Lord Milner might be
+free to undertake the work of administrative reconstruction in the new
+colonies. In pursuance of this decision of the Home Government, Lord
+Milner became Administrator of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
+upon the departure of Lord Roberts (November 29th, 1900); but
+circumstances did not permit him to resign the governorship of the
+Cape Colony and remove to the Transvaal until three months later. The
+new Governor of the Cape Colony was Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who
+was himself succeeded, as Governor of Natal, by Sir Henry E. McCallum;
+and at the same time (March 1st, 1901), Sir H. (then Major)
+Goold-Adams was appointed Deputy-Administrator of the Orange River
+Colony, where he took over the duties hitherto discharged by General
+Pretyman as Military Governor.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner in the Transvaal.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner left Capetown to assume the administration of the new
+colonies on February 28th, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page471" name="page471"></a>(p. 471)</span> 1901. The incidents of his
+journey northwards are illustrative alike of the state of South Africa
+at this time, and of the varied responsibilities of the High
+Commissioner. After three months of continuous and successful conflict
+with the forces of rebellion in the south, he was suddenly confronted
+with a situation in the north even more pregnant with the
+possibilities of disaster. This was the day on which
+Commandant-General Louis Botha entered the British lines at Middelburg
+to treat for peace with General Lord Kitchener; and many counsels of
+precaution sped northwards upon the wires as the High Commissioner's
+train crossed the plains and wound slowly up through the mountain
+passes that led to the higher levels of the Karroo plateau. March 1st,
+which was spent in the train, was the most idle day that Lord Milner
+had passed for many months. The respite was of short duration. At
+midnight, directly after the train had left De Aar junction, a long
+telegram from Lord Kitchener, giving the substance of his interview
+with Botha, caught the High Commissioner. But if peace was in the air
+in the north, war held the field in the south. From De Aar to
+Bloemfontein the railway line was astir with British troops,
+concentrating or dispersing, in pursuit of De Wet. At Bloemfontein
+station Lord Milner was met (March 2nd) by Lord Kitchener, and the
+nature of the reply to be given to Botha was discussed between them.
+On the next morning Lord Milner's saloon car was attached to the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page472" name="page472"></a>(p. 472)</span> Commander-in-Chief's train, and a long telegram was drafted
+and despatched to London.<a id="footnotetag272" name="footnotetag272"></a><a href="#footnote272" title="Go to footnote 272"><span class="small">[272]</span></a> The position which Lord Milner took up
+on this occasion, and afterwards at the final negotiations of
+Vereeniging, was that which he had himself condensed in the two words
+"never again." He was anxious for peace; no man more than he; but a
+peace upon terms that would leave South Africa with the remotest
+prospect of a return to the abnormal political conditions which had
+made the war inevitable, he regarded as a disaster to be avoided at
+all costs. This telegram despatched, the train left Bloemfontein, and,
+in spite of more than one sign of the proximity of the Boer raiders,
+it reached Pretoria without delay at 9 a.m. on March 4th. The next ten
+days Lord Milner remained at the capital of the Transvaal, in constant
+communication with the Home Government on the subject of the peace
+negotiations<a id="footnotetag273" name="footnotetag273"></a><a href="#footnote273" title="Go to footnote 273"><span class="small">[273]</span></a> with the Boers, which ultimately proved abortive;
+but on the 9th he went over to Johannesburg for the day to see the
+house which was being prepared for his occupation. On the 15th he left
+Pretoria finally for Johannesburg. He was received at the station by a
+guard of honour furnished by the Rand Rifles, and, thus escorted,
+drove to Sunnyside, a pleasant house in what is now the suburb of
+Parktown, commanding an unbroken view over <span class="pagenum"><a id="page473" name="page473"></a>(p. 473)</span> the veld to the
+Magaliesberg range beyond Pretoria; and here he continued to reside
+until he left South Africa on April 2nd, 1905.</p>
+
+<a id="img002" name="img002"></a>
+<div class="figcenter">
+<img src="images/img002.jpg" width="600" height="388" alt="" title="">
+<p><span class="italic small">By permission of the Argus Printing and Publishing
+Co., Ltd., Johannesburg.</span><br> LORD MILNER AT SUNNYSIDE.</p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Affairs in the Cape colony.</span>
+
+<p>From this time forward (March 15th, 1901), Lord Milner's
+administrative activity is primarily concerned with the Transvaal and
+Orange River Colony. Owing, however, to the continued resistance of
+the Boers and the extension of the area of hostilities by the second
+invasion of the Cape Colony, the administrative development of the new
+colonies was confined within the narrowest limits, until six months of
+strenuous military operations had enabled Lord Kitchener to render the
+protected areas and the railways virtually secure against the raids of
+the Boer commandos. Four out of these six months were occupied by Lord
+Milner's second visit to England (May-August, 1901). But before we
+approach this episode, and thereby resume the main current of the
+narrative, it is necessary to trace the course of events in the Cape
+Colony. With the government of the Colony once more in the hands of
+the British party, Lord Milner had been relieved of the acute and
+constant anxieties that marked his official relationship to the
+Afrikander Ministry. On the vital question of the necessity of
+establishing British authority upon terms that would make any
+repetition of the war impossible, Sir Gordon Sprigg and his ministers
+were absolutely at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government.
+Whatever differences of opinion arose subsequently between the Cape
+ministers and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page474" name="page474"></a>(p. 474)</span> Imperial authorities were differences not
+of principle but of detail. For the most part they were such as would
+have manifested themselves in any circumstances in a country where the
+civil government was compelled, by the exigencies of war, to surrender
+some of its powers to the military authority.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Bond and peace.</span>
+
+<p>By supporting the Treason Bill, Mr. Schreiner and Sir Richard Solomon
+had dissociated themselves from the Afrikander nationalists; and
+henceforward their influence was used unreservedly on the side of
+British supremacy.<a id="footnotetag274" name="footnotetag274"></a><a href="#footnote274" title="Go to footnote 274"><span class="small">[274]</span></a> On the other hand, Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer,
+as we have seen, had openly denounced the policy of the Imperial
+Government, and no less openly advocated the aims, and defended the
+methods, of the Afrikander Bond. The Bond's determination to do all in
+its power to secure the independence of the Boers, and thereby defeat
+the policy of the Imperial Government, was manifested by the abrupt
+refusal of its leaders to associate themselves with the efforts of the
+Burgher Peace Committee. Mr. P. de Wet and the other peace delegates
+who had visited the Colony in the circumstances already mentioned,
+desired the Bond to co-operate with them by informing the republican
+leaders that they must expect no military assistance from the
+Afrikander party, and by formally advising them to end the war in the
+interests of the Afrikander population. The details <span class="pagenum"><a id="page475" name="page475"></a>(p. 475)</span> of the
+incident, as recorded in the Blue-book,<a id="footnotetag275" name="footnotetag275"></a><a href="#footnote275" title="Go to footnote 275"><span class="small">[275]</span></a> show that Mr. Theron, the
+President of the Provincial Bestuur of the Bond and a member of the
+Legislative Assembly, was at first disposed to regard the proposal of
+the peace delegates with favour. But, after expressing himself to this
+effect at Wellington, on February 15th, 1901, he went to Capetown to
+consult the Bond leaders on the matter, and, as the result of this
+consultation, he wrote to Mr. de Wet, five days later, declining to
+meet the peace delegates again, or negotiate with them, on the ground
+that the "principles of the Afrikander Bond" would be prejudiced by
+his entering into official negotiations with the deputation, whose
+official status he was unable, after inquiry, to recognise. It is
+difficult not to connect this summary treatment of the peace delegates
+by the Bond with the fact that, just at this time, General C. de Wet
+was reporting to General Louis Botha that the "Cape Colony had risen
+to a man."<a id="footnotetag276" name="footnotetag276"></a><a href="#footnote276" title="Go to footnote 276"><span class="small">[276]</span></a> However this may be, the wholesale manner in which the
+Afrikander Bond had identified itself in the country districts with
+the Boer invaders is sufficiently displayed by a return published six
+months later, from which it appears that, out of a total of
+thirty-three men holding official positions in the Bond organisation
+in three districts in the Cape Colony, twenty-seven were accused of
+high treason, of whom twenty-four were convicted, two absconded, and
+one was acquitted.<a id="footnotetag277" name="footnotetag277"></a><a href="#footnote277" title="Go to footnote 277"><span class="small">[277]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page476" name="page476"></a>(p. 476)</span> With the Bond in this mood, with certain districts
+practically maintaining the enemy and certain other districts
+constantly exposed to the incursions of the guerilla leaders, with a
+large proportion of the loyalist population fighting at the front, and
+a still larger number organised for local defence, and with the whole
+of the Colony, except the ports, under martial law, it was obviously
+impossible for the machinery of representative government to continue
+in its normal course.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Anti-British libels.</span>
+
+<p>The registration of electors, which, under the provisions of the
+colonial law, was directed to take place not later than the last day
+of February, 1901, was postponed to a more convenient season. The
+existing register, while it contained the names of&mdash;it was
+estimated&mdash;ten thousand persons disfranchised, or about to be
+disfranchised, for rebellion, and of some thousands of others then in
+arms against their sovereign, failed to include persons who had
+acquired the necessary qualifications since the date of the last
+registration (1899). Apart from the unsatisfactory condition of the
+voters' lists, there were other circumstances that made it undesirable
+as well as difficult not merely to hold the elections necessary to
+fill up the nine or ten vacant seats in the Legislative Assembly, but
+even to summon Parliament. Locomotion in many parts of the Colony was
+inconvenient, and sometimes dangerous. So large a proportion of the
+members of both chambers were absent in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page477" name="page477"></a>(p. 477)</span> Europe, or engaged
+either in repelling the invaders or in repressing rebellion, that the
+remainder, if assembled, would present a mere simulacrum of the actual
+legislature of the Colony. Moreover, it was necessary that no fresh
+opportunities for promoting disaffection should be provided by
+discussions in Parliament or contested elections. The "carnival of
+mendacity" which, culminating in the Worcester Congress, was mainly
+responsible for the second invasion of the Colony, had been
+inaugurated by the inflammatory speeches delivered in the last session
+of Parliament by the Afrikander members during the debates on the
+Treason Bill. The spirit of malevolence displayed at this period by
+the anti-British Press, whether printed in Dutch or in English, may be
+inferred from the list of convictions reported on April 19th by Sir W.
+Hely-Hutchinson to the Colonial Office. Mr. Albert Cartwright, editor
+of <span class="italic">The South African News</span> (the reputed organ of Mr. Merriman and Mr.
+Sauer), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and
+sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment without hard labour. Mr.
+Advocate Malan, editor of <span class="italic">Ons Land</span> (the reputed organ of Mr.
+Hofmeyr), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on General French,
+and sentenced to a similar term of imprisonment. Mr. de Jong, editor
+of <span class="italic">The Worcester Advertiser</span>, and Mr. Vosloo, editor of <span class="italic">Het Oosten</span>,
+were both convicted of the same offence as Mr. Malan, and sentenced to
+six months' imprisonment <span class="pagenum"><a id="page478" name="page478"></a>(p. 478)</span> without hard labour, while the
+former was further charged with a seditious libel attributing
+atrocities to the British troops, in respect of which he was convicted
+and sentenced to a fine of £100 or two months' imprisonment.<a id="footnotetag278" name="footnotetag278"></a><a href="#footnote278" title="Go to footnote 278"><span class="small">[278]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The extension of martial law in January (1901) had made such excesses,
+whether on the platform or in the Press, no longer possible. But the
+Afrikander nationalists in the ports, and especially in Capetown,
+continued to render assistance to the guerilla leaders, both by
+providing intelligence of the plans of the British military
+authorities, and by forwarding supplies of arms and ammunition, until
+the time (October 9th) when these towns were placed, like the rest of
+the Colony, under martial law.</p>
+
+<p>In these circumstances Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, acting on the advice of
+his ministers, prorogued the Cape Parliament from time to time, until
+the actual termination of hostilities made it possible for the
+inhabitants of the Colony to return to the normal conditions of their
+political life. As, however, the provision for the ordinary cost of
+administration made by the Colonial Parliament in its last session did
+not extend beyond June 30th, 1901, it became necessary to provide for
+the expenditure of the Colony after this date by the issue of
+Governor's warrants, under which the Treasurer-General was authorised
+to pay out funds in anticipation of legislative authority. This
+technically <span class="pagenum"><a id="page479" name="page479"></a>(p. 479)</span> illegal procedure, by which the authority of the
+Governor was substituted temporarily for that of Parliament, was
+advised by the Cape ministers and sanctioned by Mr. Chamberlain. In
+this way provision was made for the financial needs of the Government;
+and when, after the war, the Cape Parliament was able to meet again,
+the necessary bills of indemnity, legalising these acts of the
+Governor and acts committed by the military authorities in the
+administration of martial law, were passed in due course.<a id="footnotetag279" name="footnotetag279"></a><a href="#footnote279" title="Go to footnote 279"><span class="small">[279]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Breakdown of government.</span>
+
+<p>The only alternative course was the suspension, or abrogation, of the
+Cape constitution by the Home Government. In view of the appeal for
+the suspension of the constitution made to Mr. Chamberlain a year
+later, and refused by him&mdash;an appeal which was endorsed by the
+judgment both of Lord Milner and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and supported by
+the majority of the loyalists of both nationalities&mdash;it is interesting
+to observe that petitions addressed to the Governor in June, 1901,
+reveal a considerable body of opinion in favour of the proposal at
+this date. These petitions came from the British inhabitants of the
+small towns in the Eastern Province, since, in the vigorous language
+of one of the petitioners, "it's those who live in small towns that
+feel the Bond's iron heel." And the same correspondent asserts that a
+great number of persons have been prevented from signing the petition,
+although they <span class="pagenum"><a id="page480" name="page480"></a>(p. 480)</span> approve of it, by fear of the "Bond boycott,"
+adding, "Some of the Bond members have already remarked, 'Now martial
+law is on we are not in it; but wait until it's removed, then it will
+be our turn.'"<a id="footnotetag280" name="footnotetag280"></a><a href="#footnote280" title="Go to footnote 280"><span class="small">[280]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The collapse of the system of responsible government in the Cape
+Colony was complete. The truth upon which Lord Durham insisted in his
+famous Report on Canada, that responsible government is only possible
+where an effective majority of the inhabitants are British, was once
+more demonstrated. In the granting of supplies, the characteristic
+function of the lower chamber, the authority of the Governor was now
+substituted for that of Parliament. The endeavour to check the
+rebellion by the agency of the civil courts had been already
+abandoned. The lenient penalties of the Treason Bill had produced a
+large increase of disaffection. On April 6th, 1901, a notice was
+issued by the Attorney-General warning the public that "any act of
+treason or rebellion and any crime of a political character" committed
+after the 12th instant would be brought no longer before the Special
+Tribunals, with their mitigated penalties created by the Act of 1900,
+but dealt with by the ordinary courts, and punishable by the severe
+penalties of the common law of the Colony. But this warning of the
+Attorney-General was superseded a fortnight later (April 22nd), by a
+notice, issued by Lord Kitchener and published by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page481" name="page481"></a>(p. 481)</span> Cape
+Government, under which it was declared that&mdash;</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The military courts.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "All subjects of His<a id="footnotetag281" name="footnotetag281"></a><a href="#footnote281" title="Go to footnote 281"><span class="small">[281]</span></a> Majesty and all persons residing in the
+     Cape Colony who shall, in districts thereof in which martial law
+     prevails, be actively in arms against His Majesty, or who shall
+     directly invite others to take up arms against him, or who shall
+     actively aid or assist the enemy or commit any overt act by which
+     the safety of His Majesty's forces or subjects is endangered,
+     shall immediately on arrest be tried by court martial, convened
+     by my authority, and shall on conviction be liable to the
+     severest penalties of the law."</p>
+
+<p>The decision to deal with such cases by military courts was taken by
+Lord Kitchener, after consultation with Lord Milner, on the ground
+that the state of the midland and north-western districts was such
+that "only prompt and severe punishment could stop the spread of
+rebellion and prevent general anarchy."<a id="footnotetag282" name="footnotetag282"></a><a href="#footnote282" title="Go to footnote 282"><span class="small">[282]</span></a> The Cape Government,
+however, in assenting to the measure, stipulated that certain
+conditions should be laid down for the constitution and procedure of
+the military courts, sufficient to check the more obvious abuses to
+which such tribunals are liable. These conditions, as expressed in a
+minute of Sir James Innes, the Attorney-General, were embodied in a
+set of instructions issued by Lord Kitchener to his officers
+concurrently with the publication of the notice of April 22nd. Nor was
+this all. In view of the continued assistance known to be rendered to
+the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page482" name="page482"></a>(p. 482)</span> Boer and rebel commandos by the Afrikander nationalists,
+martial law was extended, on October 9th, to the Cape ports; and on
+December 2nd the British Government announced that, as the result of
+the establishment of martial law at the South African ports, no
+persons would be allowed to land in South Africa from January 1st,
+1902, onwards without a permit, except under certain special
+circumstances.<a id="footnotetag283" name="footnotetag283"></a><a href="#footnote283" title="Go to footnote 283"><span class="small">[283]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Ample evidence alike of the necessity of these measures, and of the
+<span class="italic">de facto</span> suspension of the constitution, is provided by a Minister's
+minute of September 12th, 1901. The immediate object of the minute is
+to advise the Governor that it is impossible, in the opinion of the
+Cape Ministry, to avoid the further prorogation of Parliament; and
+this, although the Constitution Ordinance requires the Cape Parliament
+to meet "once at least every year," and cannot, therefore, be complied
+with, unless Parliament is summoned "for the despatch of business on
+or before Saturday, 12th October." In support of this decision Sir
+Gordon Sprigg and his colleagues referred to the Military Intelligence
+Report for the current month, which showed that, south of the Orange
+River, there were a dozen or more commandos, with a total of from
+1,800 to 2,000 men; while in the portion of the Colony <span class="pagenum"><a id="page483" name="page483"></a>(p. 483)</span> north
+of the river there were "numerous commandos also roaming about." Then
+follows a startling revelation of the character of the men whom the
+Bond organisation had sent to Parliament:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Condition of Cape parliament.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"One member of the House of Assembly," ministers write, "is
+     undergoing a term of imprisonment for seditious libel, three
+     members are awaiting their trial on the charge of high treason,
+     two seats are practically vacant by reason of the absence of the
+     members without leave during the whole of last session. Those two
+     members are alleged to have welcomed the invaders of the Colony,
+     and encouraged rebellion, and then fled to Holland, where they
+     are now living. One seat is vacant by the resignation of the
+     member, who has accepted an appointment in the Transvaal Colony.
+     Another seat is vacant on account of the death of the member,
+     another member is sending in his resignation owing to ill health,
+     which compels him to reside in Europe. In all these cases the
+     divisions concerned are either under martial law or in a state of
+     disturbance, which makes new elections impracticable.</p>
+
+<p>"Besides the cases enumerated there are members who have been
+     deported from their homes on account of the seditious influences
+     which the military authorities allege they were exercising, and
+     others who are under military observation, with respect to whom
+     their attendance in Parliament must be regarded as uncertain.
+     Several members also are engaged in military operations, whose
+     attendance could not, in the present condition of the country, be
+     relied on. There are also some members who would be unable to
+     attend owing to the state of war and rebellion prevailing in the
+     districts where they reside, whose personal presence <span class="pagenum"><a id="page484" name="page484"></a>(p. 484)</span> is
+     necessary for the protection of their families and property."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Such a legislature, they concluded, could not be regarded as "fairly
+representing the people." Moreover&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "There is also the further consideration that the probability of
+     good resulting from the meeting of Parliament now is but small,
+     while the likelihood of evil consequences accruing from the
+     publication of speeches of a character similar to many that were
+     delivered last session is strong. The tendency of such speeches
+     would be to encourage the spirit of rebellion which unhappily
+     prevails in the Colony over a large area, and ministers regard it
+     as an imperative duty to do everything in their power to subdue
+     that rebellious spirit, and restore peace and good-will to the
+     distracted country."<a id="footnotetag284" name="footnotetag284"></a><a href="#footnote284" title="Go to footnote 284"><span class="small">[284]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The necessity for the more stringent action now taken by the Imperial
+authorities was, therefore, undoubted. But here again, in placing the
+ports, the centres of commercial life, under martial law, an endeavour
+was made to render the restraints of military rule as little onerous
+as possible. A Board, consisting of three persons nominated
+respectively by the Governor, the Prime Minister, and the General
+Commanding in the Cape Colony, was created for the consideration and,
+where necessary, the redress of all complaints or grievances arising
+out of martial law in the Colony, other than pecuniary claims against
+the Government. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page485" name="page485"></a>(p. 485)</span> The fact that, on the whole, martial law was
+judiciously administered is indicated by the Report of the proceedings
+of this Board, presented on December 3rd by Mr. (now Sir Lewis)
+Mitchell, who, as Manager of the Standard Bank, had been appointed
+chairman by Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson. Out of 199 cases brought before
+the Board, Mr. Mitchell writes:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "A fair number of substantial grievances have been redressed, but
+     in a majority of instances the Board have held that complainants
+     suffered through some misconduct of their own, or were deported,
+     imprisoned, or otherwise punished on reasonable grounds of
+     suspicion."<a id="footnotetag285" name="footnotetag285"></a><a href="#footnote285" title="Go to footnote 285"><span class="small">[285]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Loyalists defend the colony.</span>
+
+<p>In all this Sir Gordon Sprigg loyally co-operated with the Imperial
+military authorities. His attitude, and that of the loyalist
+inhabitants of the Colony, may be gathered from the speech which he
+delivered at Capetown on December 1st, 1901. In this striking and
+inspiring utterance we have the companion picture to that presented in
+the minute of September 12th. Throughout there runs a note of
+justifiable pride in the military efforts of the Cape Government, and
+in the sacrifices which these efforts have entailed upon the loyalist
+population. First there was the number of troops provided. The Cape
+Government had placed, he said, 18,000 men in the field against the
+invaders and rebels; they had a defensive force of 18,000 town guards,
+of whom 3,000 were natives; <span class="pagenum"><a id="page486" name="page486"></a>(p. 486)</span> and, in addition, 7,000 natives
+were under arms in the Transkei for the defence of those territories.
+In respect of this force of 18,000 men in the field, Sir Gordon Sprigg
+pointed out that such a number of men, coming from a population of
+500,000, was equivalent to a force of 1,450,000 men from the United
+Kingdom, with its population of over 40,000,000. He might have added
+that, since half of the 500,000 Europeans in the Cape Colony were
+"either actually in rebellion against the Crown or in positive
+sympathy with rebellion," the more correct equivalent force from the
+United Kingdom would have been 3,000,000 men. And as for the cost of
+maintenance, the colony provided three-fourths of the expenditure upon
+the 18,000 men in the field, while it wholly supported the town guards
+and other purely defensive forces. He then dwelt with satisfaction
+upon the fact that these local forces were now entirely controlled by
+the Cape Government, which had made itself responsible for the defence
+of no less than thirty-one districts of the Colony.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Months ago," he said, "we pressed strongly upon the
+     Commander-in-Chief to hand over to us the colonial forces then
+     under his direction. We thought that if we got them into our
+     possession, not only defraying the cost of their maintenance, but
+     taking charge of certain parts of the Colony, we could keep those
+     districts clear of the enemy. We were continually putting that
+     view before the Commander-in-Chief, and also before the High
+     Commissioner, Lord Milner, but still the matter <span class="pagenum"><a id="page487" name="page487"></a>(p. 487)</span> hung,
+     and we had communications going backwards and forwards till at
+     last the High Commissioner communicated with me, and he said, 'I
+     think the only way to come to an understanding in this matter is,
+     if we have a conference. If you could manage to meet Lord
+     Kitchener and myself, I have great hopes we should be able to
+     arrange what you desire.' I asked then if Lord Kitchener and Lord
+     Milner could come to meet me half-way, but Lord Kitchener said it
+     was not possible for him to leave Pretoria at that time, but he
+     would be only too delighted if I could come up and meet him and
+     Lord Milner upon the question. The result of that was that I went
+     up with two of my colleagues. It has been put about all over the
+     country that we were ordered by Lord Kitchener to proceed to
+     Pretoria, but, so far from that being the case, it was our
+     suggestion that we should take over the command of certain
+     portions of the country, and we went up to Pretoria to secure
+     that object. And in that we were successful, and the result of it
+     has been published very lately."<a id="footnotetag286" name="footnotetag286"></a><a href="#footnote286" title="Go to footnote 286"><span class="small">[286]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Second visit to England.</span>
+
+<p>These events, revealing the slow and laborious progress of the
+Imperial troops in a South Africa rent by war from end to end, account
+sufficiently for the postponement of the work of active administrative
+reconstruction in the new colonies, to which Lord Milner owed the
+opportunity for his second visit to England. On April 3rd, 1901, he
+telegraphed a request that he might be allowed to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page488" name="page488"></a>(p. 488)</span> return
+home at an early date, on leave, since he feared that, unless he had a
+short rest, he would approach the onerous duty of superintending the
+work of reconstruction with lessened efficiency. "I have now been
+continuously in harness," he said, "without a day's holiday, for more
+than two years ... and it is, undoubtedly, better for the public
+service, if I am to get such a rest at all, that I should take leave
+immediately while military operations still continue and the work of
+civil administration is necessarily curtailed, rather than when it
+will be possible to organise civil government in a more complete
+fashion, and when many important problems which are for the moment in
+abeyance will have to be dealt with." To this request Mr. Chamberlain
+replied that, although His Majesty's Government greatly regretted that
+it was necessary for Lord Milner to leave South Africa at present,
+they quite recognised that it was unavoidable that he should take the
+rest which the severe strain of the last two years had made
+imperative.<a id="footnotetag287" name="footnotetag287"></a><a href="#footnote287" title="Go to footnote 287"><span class="small">[287]</span></a> He was, therefore, to take leave as soon as he found
+it possible to do so.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Civil affairs in new colonies.</span>
+
+<p>None the less the little that could be done to develop the inchoate
+machinery of administration which marked the transition from military
+to civil order in the new colonies, was done, and done well, before
+Lord Milner left Johannesburg. On May 4th, 1901, Sir H. Gould-Adams
+was able to report that the chief departments of the administration
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page489" name="page489"></a>(p. 489)</span> of the Orange River Colony had been transferred from
+military to civil officials, and reorganised on a permanent basis. In
+the Transvaal the departments of finance, law, mines, and that of the
+Secretary to the Administration, had been organised, and were
+gradually taking over an increasing volume of administrative work from
+the military officials. Even more significant was the establishment by
+proclamation (May 8th), of a nominated Town Council for the management
+of the municipal affairs of Johannesburg, and the consequent abolition
+of the office of Military Governor, with the transfer of the
+departments hitherto controlled by him to a Government Commissioner
+and other officials of the civil administration. This step was
+rendered possible by the circumstance that a certain number of the
+principal residents, of whom twelve were nominated for service on the
+Council, had now returned to their homes. It marked the recommencement
+of the industrial life of the Rand, which had followed the permission,
+given by Lord Kitchener in April, for three mines to resume work. From
+this time forward the Uitlander refugees began to return; although, as
+we have seen,<a id="footnotetag288" name="footnotetag288"></a><a href="#footnote288" title="Go to footnote 288"><span class="small">[288]</span></a> it was not possible to allow the general mass of
+the inhabitants to leave the coast towns until the following November.
+And, in addition to this, Lord Milner had obtained statements of the
+views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the
+settlement of the new colonies. Mr. Chamberlain <span class="pagenum"><a id="page490" name="page490"></a>(p. 490)</span> had attached
+great importance to this interchange of opinions; rightly holding
+that, in determining the conditions and methods of the settlement of
+the conquered territories, the British South African colonies should
+be taken into the counsels of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner
+had, therefore, submitted to the colonial Governments the draft of the
+Letters Patent, under which the system of Crown Colony government was
+to be established in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, before
+they were issued.<a id="footnotetag289" name="footnotetag289"></a><a href="#footnote289" title="Go to footnote 289"><span class="small">[289]</span></a> As the result of these consultations the terms
+of surrender granted to the Boers at Vereeniging, and the consequent
+administrative arrangements arising out of them, embodied decisions
+based not merely on the judgment of the Imperial Government, but on
+what was virtually the unanimous opinion of the loyal population of
+South Africa. In this, as in the crisis of the negotiations before the
+war, the loyalists found in Lord Milner their "representative man."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Milner in England.</span>
+
+<p>Lord Milner&mdash;then Sir Alfred Milner&mdash;left Capetown on May 8th, and
+reached England on the 24th. On his arrival in London he was met at
+the station by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, and immediately
+conducted to the King, who was at that time still residing at
+Marlborough House. At the end of a long audience His Majesty announced
+his intention of raising him to the peerage, the first of many marks
+of royal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page491" name="page491"></a>(p. 491)</span> favour, including his elevation to the Privy
+Council, which were shown to the High Commissioner during his stay in
+England. The warm demonstrations of popular regard with which he had
+been welcomed upon his arrival in London, were followed by a luncheon
+given on the next day (Saturday, May 25th) in his honour by Mr.
+Chamberlain, his official chief. The speech elicited by this notable
+occasion is one in which a graceful humour is characteristically
+blended with deep emotion. Those who have had the good fortune to hear
+many of Lord Milner's speeches&mdash;speeches sometimes turning a page of
+history, sometimes mere incidents of official or administrative
+routine&mdash;know that they are all alike distinguished by the high
+quality of sincerity.<a id="footnotetag290" name="footnotetag290"></a><a href="#footnote290" title="Go to footnote 290"><span class="small">[290]</span></a> But this was an occasion upon which even
+adroitness of intellect and integrity of purpose might well have
+sought the shelter of conventional expressions. Lord Milner dispenses
+with any such protection. "In a rational world," he said, it would
+have seemed better to everybody that he, "with a big unfinished job
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page492" name="page492"></a>(p. 492)</span> awaiting him," and many of his fellow workmen unable to take
+the rest which they both deserved and needed, "should have arrived,
+and stayed, and returned in the quietest possible manner." But it was
+an age in which it "seemed impossible for many people to put a simple
+and natural interpretation on anything; and his arrival in this quiet
+manner would have been misconstrued to a degree, which would have been
+injurious to the public interests." If his "hard-begged holiday" could
+have been represented as a "veiled recall," then of course it was
+obvious that, having taken the proverbial hansom from Waterloo to his
+own chambers, this very harmless action would have been "trumpeted
+over two continents as evidence of his disgrace."</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"It is hard, it is ludicrous," he continued, "that some of the
+     busiest men in the world should be obliged to occupy their time,
+     and that so many of my friends and well wishers should be put to
+     inconvenience&mdash;and on a day, too, when it would be so nice to be
+     in the country&mdash;merely in order to prove to persons with an
+     ingrained habit of self-delusion that the British Government will
+     not give up its agents in the face of the enemy, or that the
+     people of this country will not allow themselves to be bored into
+     abandoning what they have spent millions of treasure and so many
+     precious lives to obtain. All I can say is, that if it was
+     necessary (I apologise for it: I am sorry to be the centre of a
+     commotion from which no man could be constitutionally more averse
+     than myself), I can only thank you heartily for the kindness and
+     the cordiality with which the thing has been done. I feel indeed
+     that the praises which <span class="pagenum"><a id="page493" name="page493"></a>(p. 493)</span> have been bestowed, the honours
+     which have been heaped on me, are beyond my deserts. But the
+     simplest thing to do under these circumstances is to try to
+     deserve them in the future. In any case I am under endless
+     obligations. It is difficult to say these things in the face of
+     the persons principally concerned, but I feel bound to take this
+     opportunity, especially in view of the remarks which have been
+     made in certain quarters, to express my deep sense of gratitude
+     for the manner in which His Majesty's Government, and especially
+     my immediate chief, have shown me great forbearance, and given me
+     support most prompt at the moment when it was most needed,
+     without which I should have been helpless indeed. And I have also
+     to thank many friends, not a few of them here present, and some
+     not present, for messages of encouragement, for kindly words of
+     suggestion and advice received at critical moments, some of which
+     have been of invaluable assistance to me, and have made an
+     indelible impression on my heart. I am afraid, if I were to refer
+     to all my benefactors, it would be like the bidding prayer&mdash;and
+     you would all lose your trains.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">Hint from the bidding prayer.</span>
+
+<p>"But there is one hint I may take from the bidding prayer. Not
+     only in this place, but at all times and in all places, I am
+     specially bound to remember the devotion of the loyalists&mdash;the
+     Dutch loyalists, if you please, and not only the British&mdash;the
+     loyalists of South Africa. They responded to all my appeals to
+     act, and, harder still, to wait. They never lost their cheery
+     confidence in the darkest days of our misfortunes, they never
+     faltered in their fidelity to a man of whose errors and failings
+     they were necessarily more conscious than anybody else, but of
+     whose honesty of purpose they were long ago, and once for all,
+     convinced. If there is anything most gratifying to me on this
+     memorable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page494" name="page494"></a>(p. 494)</span> occasion it is the encouragement which I know
+     the events of yesterday and of to-day will give to thousands of
+     our South African fellow-countrymen, like minded with us, in the
+     homes and in the camps of South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>"Your Royal Highness,<a id="footnotetag291" name="footnotetag291"></a><a href="#footnote291" title="Go to footnote 291"><span class="small">[291]</span></a> Mr. Chamberlain, ladies, and
+     gentlemen&mdash;I am sure you will not desire me to enter into any
+     political questions to-day. More than that, I really have nothing
+     to add to what I have already said and written, I fear with
+     wearisome reiteration. It seems to me we are slowly progressing
+     towards the predestined end; latterly it has appeared as if the
+     pace was somewhat quickening, but I do not wish to make too much
+     of that or to speak with any too great confidence. However long
+     the road, it seems to me the only one to the object which we were
+     bound to pursue, and which seems now fairly in sight. What has
+     sustained me personally&mdash;if your kindness will allow me to make a
+     personal reference&mdash;what has sustained me personally on the weary
+     road is my absolute, unshakable conviction that it was the only
+     one which we could travel.</p>
+
+<p>"Peace we could have had by self-effacement. We could have had it
+     easily and comfortably on those terms. But we could not have held
+     our own by any other methods than those which we have been
+     obliged to adopt. I do not know whether I feel more inclined to
+     laugh or to cry when I have to listen for the hundredth time to
+     these dear delusions, this Utopian dogmatising that it only
+     required a little more time, a little more patience, a little
+     more tact, a little more meekness, a little more of all those
+     gentle virtues of which I know I am so conspicuously devoid, in
+     order to conciliate&mdash;to conciliate what? Panoplied hatred,
+     insensate ambition, invincible ignorance. I fully believe that
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page495" name="page495"></a>(p. 495)</span> the time is coming&mdash;Heaven knows how we desire it to
+     come quickly&mdash;when all the qualities of the most gentle and
+     forbearing statesmanship which are possessed by any of our people
+     will be called for, and ought to be applied, in South Africa. I
+     do not say for a moment there is not great scope for them even
+     to-day, but always provided they do not mar what is essential for
+     success in the future&mdash;the conclusiveness of the final scenes of
+     the present drama."</p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Merriman and Sauer mission.</span>
+
+<p>As a declaration to the British world that Lord Milner "possessed the
+unabated confidence of his sovereign and of his fellow countrymen,"
+Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon was amply justified. The protraction of the
+war was beginning to try the endurance of the nation. Mr. Sauer and
+Mr. Merriman were in England for the express purpose of discrediting
+Lord Milner, and behind these fierce political freelances was the
+astute brain of the Bond Master, Hofmeyr. They had been commissioned
+early in the year by the Afrikander nationalists to give effect to the
+resolutions of the Worcester Congress by co-operating with their
+friends in England in an agitation for the recall of the High
+Commissioner. It was said that these two ex-ministers of the Crown
+were authorised to offer an undertaking that the Bond would use its
+influence with ex-President Krüger and Mr. Fischer<a id="footnotetag292" name="footnotetag292"></a><a href="#footnote292" title="Go to footnote 292"><span class="small">[292]</span></a> to terminate
+the war, in exchange for the promise of "autonomy" <span class="pagenum"><a id="page496" name="page496"></a>(p. 496)</span> for the
+Boers and a general armistice for the Cape rebels. However this may
+be, the delegates of the Worcester Congress made it their chief
+business to represent to the members of the Liberal party who favoured
+their cause, that the recall of Lord Milner would remove the chief
+obstacle to peace. This attempt never came within a measurable
+distance of success; but its failure was not due to any want of effort
+on the part of that section of the Liberal opposition which had been
+opposed to the annexation of the Republics, and now denounced the
+British Government and the Imperial troops for their "methods of
+barbarism." <span class="sidenote">Liberals and Afrikanders.</span>
+The completeness with which Lord Courtney, Mr. Bryce, Mr.
+Lloyd-George, Lord Loreburn (Sir Robert Reid), Mr. Burns, and other
+prominent members of the Liberal party identified themselves with the
+policy and action of the Afrikander Bond, is disclosed by the
+proceedings which marked the banquet given on June 5th in honour of
+Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. Mr. Bryce, in a letter expressing his
+approbation of the object of the banquet and his regret at his
+inability to attend it, wrote: "Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer have not
+only distinguished public records, but did excellent service, for
+which the Government ought to have been grateful, in allaying passion
+and averting disturbances in Cape Colony."<a id="footnotetag293" name="footnotetag293"></a><a href="#footnote293" title="Go to footnote 293"><span class="small">[293]</span></a> Lord (then Mr.)
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page497" name="page497"></a>(p. 497)</span> Courtney, in proposing a vote of thanks to the guests of the
+evening, declared that the annexation of the Republics was "a wrong
+and a blunder"; adding that the Liberal policy would some day be "to
+temper annexation, if not to abrogate it." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr.
+Sauer revealed the aims of their mission with perfect frankness. The
+former, after alluding to Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon as a display of
+the "Imperial spirit of the servile senate who decreed ovations and
+triumphs to Caligula and Domitian, when they had received rebuffs from
+the ancestors both of ourselves and the heroic Dutch now struggling in
+South Africa," and characterising Lord Milner's High Commissionership
+as "a career of unmitigated and hopeless failure," proceeded to demand
+his immediate recall. To employ Lord Milner in the settlement of the
+new colonies, said Mr. Merriman, would be "a suicidal and ruinous
+policy. He was a violent partizan; his predictions never came true;
+the bursts of fustian and the frivolous utterances of his despatches
+showed an ill-balanced and ill-regulated mind, which was utterly
+unable to cope with the problem." While, as for the prospect of a
+British army ever conquering the South African Dutch, he reasserted
+the opinion which he held before the war&mdash;"Our <span class="pagenum"><a id="page498" name="page498"></a>(p. 498)</span> friends they
+might be, but our subjects never."<a id="footnotetag294" name="footnotetag294"></a><a href="#footnote294" title="Go to footnote 294"><span class="small">[294]</span></a> Mr. Sauer, who "felt honoured
+by seeing such a gathering, and seeing in it a Gladstone<a id="footnotetag295" name="footnotetag295"></a><a href="#footnote295" title="Go to footnote 295"><span class="small">[295]</span></a> and a
+Leonard Courtney," was no less explicit:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I stand here," he said, "as a representative of the Dutch
+     people, and declare that they never mean to be a subject race. If
+     they cannot get their rights by justice they will get them by
+     other means.... I am glad to go back and tell my own people how
+     many there are in this country who appreciate their devotion to
+     an ideal, and are prepared to befriend them in the hour of
+     trial."<a id="footnotetag296" name="footnotetag296"></a><a href="#footnote296" title="Go to footnote 296"><span class="small">[296]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>A fortnight later a meeting of those who sympathised with the Boer
+cause was held in the Queen's Hall, Langham Place. The spirit of this
+notorious gathering, presided over by Mr. Labouchere, M.P., and
+attended by Mr. Merriman. Mr. Sauer, Mr. Lloyd-George, M.P., and other
+Radical members of Parliament, is sufficiently revealed by certain
+characteristic incidents which marked the proceedings. The agents of
+the meeting wore the Transvaal colours; a member of the audience who
+uncovered at the mention of King <span class="pagenum"><a id="page499" name="page499"></a>(p. 499)</span> Edward was ejected; the
+Union Jack was hissed and hooted; and, while a printed form was handed
+round inviting the signatures of persons prepared to pay eight
+and-a-half guineas for a tour in Holland and the privilege of seeing
+ex-President Krüger, the name of the British sovereign was received by
+the audience with marks of evident disapprobation.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Agitation for Milner's recall.</span>
+
+<p>The agitation for Lord Milner's recall was continued throughout the
+year. It was accompanied by a repetition, in England and on the
+continent of Europe, of the shameless calumnies upon the Imperial
+troops, which had marked the "carnival of mendacity" that led to the
+second invasion of Cape Colony. The injurious effect produced upon the
+Boers in the field by the support thus given by public men in England
+to the "continued resistance" policy of the Afrikander nationalists,
+has been already noticed, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to say
+more on this aspect of the subject. The attempt to discredit Lord
+Milner culminated in the declaration made by Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, then recognised as the official leader of the
+Liberal party, at Plymouth, on November 19th, 1901, that, unless the
+British Government changed its methods, "the whole of the Dutch
+population in our colonies, as well as in the two territories, would
+in all probability be permanently and violently alienated from us"
+when the war was ended. "I am ready to speak out to-night," he
+continued, "and to say what I have never yet <span class="pagenum"><a id="page500" name="page500"></a>(p. 500)</span> said, that for
+my part I despair of this peril being conjured away so long as the
+present Colonial Secretary is in Downing Street and the present High
+Commissioner is at Pretoria." When the full report of this speech had
+reached the Cape, the Vigilance Committee, a body representing the
+loyalists of both nationalities, met<a id="footnotetag297" name="footnotetag297"></a><a href="#footnote297" title="Go to footnote 297"><span class="small">[297]</span></a> under the presidency of Sir
+Gordon Sprigg, and resolved:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "That this committee views with the utmost disapproval the
+     statement of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at Plymouth, to the
+     effect that no satisfactory settlement would be arrived at in
+     South Africa so long as Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner retained
+     their present offices, and, on the contrary, emphatically affirms
+     that the retention in office of those statesmen is regarded by
+     the South African loyalists as affording the best security for a
+     settlement which will be permanent, just, and consistent with the
+     honour of the empire and the best interests of South Africa, and,
+     further, affirms that the whole tone of Sir Henry
+     Campbell-Bannerman's speech is most pernicious, and prejudicial
+     to Imperial interests in South Africa, and shows him to be
+     entirely out of sympathy with loyalist opinion in South Africa."</p>
+
+<p>With this prompt and uncompromising rejoinder we may take leave of an
+attempt to remove a great and devoted servant of the empire, which is
+as discreditable to the intelligence as it is to the patriotism of
+those prominent members of the Liberal party who thus lent their
+co-operation to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page501" name="page501"></a>(p. 501)</span> the Afrikander nationalists. In South Africa
+the issue was simple. While Boer and rebel combined in their efforts
+to rid themselves of the man who had thwarted their ambitions, the
+loyalists closed their ranks and stood firm in his support. It is to
+the far-off Homeland that we have to turn for the spectacle of a
+nation in which gratitude to the man who upheld the flag gave place to
+sympathy for the enemy and the rebel; in which patriotism itself
+yielded to a greed of place wrapped up by sophistry in such decent
+terms as "humanity," "Liberal principles," and "conciliation."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Finances of the new colonies.</span>
+
+<p>In the meantime Lord Milner had returned to Johannesburg. His
+"hard-begged" holiday had proved a change of occupation rather than a
+respite from work. Before he left England (August 10th), he had made
+known to the Home Government the actual condition of the infant
+administrations of the new colonies, and obtained a provision for
+their immediate wants. The Letters Patent constituting him Governor
+and Commander-in-Chief of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony had
+been passed under the Great Seal; and these and other instruments
+creating a system of Crown Colony Government, with Executive and
+Legislative Councils in both colonies, had been sent to him in
+readiness for use "whenever it might be thought expedient to bring
+them into operation."<a id="footnotetag298" name="footnotetag298"></a><a href="#footnote298" title="Go to footnote 298"><span class="small">[298]</span></a> And on August 6th the House of Commons had
+voted £6,500,000 as a grant in aid of the revenues of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page502" name="page502"></a>(p. 502)</span>
+Transvaal and Orange River Colony. Of this sum £1,000,000 was required
+for the purchase of fresh rolling-stock for the Imperial Military
+Railways, still placed under the direction of Sir Percy (then Colonel)
+Girouard, and £500,000 was assigned to "relief and re-settlement," an
+item which included the purchase of land and other arrangements for
+the establishment of suitable British settlers on farms in both
+colonies. The debate on the vote afforded a significant exhibition of
+the spirit of mingled pessimism and distrust in which the Liberal
+Opposition approached every aspect of the South African question. The
+idea of the Transvaal ever being able to repay this grant-in-aid out
+of the "hypothetical" development loan appeared ridiculous to Sir
+William Harcourt. "Why," asked the Liberal ex-Chancellor of the
+Exchequer, "was not the money required for the South African
+Constabulary put forward in a supplementary military vote, instead of
+being proposed in this form and, under the grant-in-aid, subject to
+future repayment by the Transvaal, in which nobody believed?"<a id="footnotetag299" name="footnotetag299"></a><a href="#footnote299" title="Go to footnote 299"><span class="small">[299]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>This temporary financial assistance was of the utmost importance. Just
+as in the Cape Colony Lord Milner had seen that the Boers and
+Afrikander nationalists were to be beaten at their own game of renewed
+invasion by enabling the loyalist population to defend the Colony, so
+in the new colonies he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page503" name="page503"></a>(p. 503)</span> proposed to beat the guerilla leaders
+at their game of wanton and mischievous resistance by building up a
+new prosperity faster than they could destroy the old. The conditions
+under which he worked, and the state in which he found South Africa
+when he began to engage actively in the work of reconstruction, he has
+himself described. In a despatch, written from the "High
+Commissioner's Office, Johannesburg," on November 15th, 1901, not only
+has Lord Milner placed on record the actual position of affairs in the
+new colonies at this time, but he has sketched with masterly precision
+the nature of the economic and administrative problems that awaited
+solution. The progress towards pacification won by the mobile columns
+and the blockhouse system, the dominant influence of the railways as
+the agency of transport, the condition of the Concentration Camps, and
+the degree in which our responsibility for the non-combatant and
+surrendered Boers limited our capacity to restore our own people to
+their homes, the economic exhaustion of the country, the threatened
+danger of the scarcity of native labour, and the processes and
+problems of repatriation&mdash;all these subjects are touched as by a
+master of statecraft.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Improved situation.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Without being unduly optimistic," he writes, "it is impossible
+     not to be struck by two great changes for the better in [the
+     military situation] since the time when I first took up my
+     residence in the Transvaal&mdash;just eight months ago. These are the
+     now almost absolute safety and uninterrupted working of the
+     railways and the complete pacification <span class="pagenum"><a id="page504" name="page504"></a>(p. 504)</span> of certain
+     central districts. As regards the railways, I cannot illustrate
+     the contrast better than by my own experiences. In the end of
+     last year and the earlier months of this I had occasion to make
+     several journeys between Capetown and Johannesburg or Pretoria,
+     and between Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. Though most careful
+     preparations were made and every precaution taken, I was
+     frequently 'hung up' on these journeys because the line had been
+     blown up&mdash;not, I think, with any reference to my movements, but
+     in the ordinary course of affairs. Small bodies of the enemy were
+     always hovering about, and a state of extreme vigilance, not to
+     say anxiety, was observable almost everywhere along the line.
+     Since my return from England I have again traversed the country
+     from East London to Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, and from
+     Johannesburg to Durban and back, to say nothing of constant
+     journeys between this place and Pretoria. On no single occasion
+     has there been the slightest hitch or the least cause for alarm.
+     The trains have been absolutely up to time, and very good time.
+     They could not have been more regular in the most peaceful
+     country. This personal experience, in itself unimportant, is
+     typical of a general improvement. I may add, in confirmation of
+     it, that during the last two months the mail train from Capetown
+     to the north has only been late on one or two occasions, and then
+     it was a matter of hours. Six months ago it was quite a common
+     event for it to arrive a day, or a couple of days, late. I need
+     not enlarge on the far-reaching importance of the improvement
+     which these instances illustrate. Not only have the derailments,
+     often accompanied by deplorable loss of life, which were at one
+     time so common, almost entirely ceased, but, owing to more
+     regular running, and especially the resumption <span class="pagenum"><a id="page505" name="page505"></a>(p. 505)</span> of night
+     running, the carrying capacity of the railways has greatly
+     increased. Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the lines themselves
+     to meet the enormous and ever-increasing extra requirements
+     resulting from the war, and the shortness of rolling-stock, not
+     any interference from the enemy, which causes us whatever
+     difficulties&mdash;and they are still considerable&mdash;we now labour
+     under in the matter of transport. When the large amount of
+     additional rolling-stock ordered for the Imperial Military
+     Railways last summer is received&mdash;and the first instalment will
+     arrive very shortly&mdash;there will be a further great and
+     progressive improvement in the conveyance of supplies and
+     materials for the troops, the civil population of the towns, and
+     the concentration camps.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote2">Contraction of area of war.</span>
+
+<p>"The advance made in clearing the country is equally marked. Six
+     months ago the enemy were everywhere, outside the principal
+     towns. It is true they held nothing, but they raided wherever
+     they pleased, and, though mostly in small bodies, which made
+     little or no attempt at resistance when seriously pressed, they
+     almost invariably returned to their old haunts when the pressure
+     was over. It looked as though the process might go on
+     indefinitely. I had every opportunity of watching it, for during
+     the first two months of my residence here it was in full swing in
+     the immediate neighbourhood. There were half a dozen Boer
+     strong-holds, or rather trysting-places, quite close to Pretoria
+     and Johannesburg, and the country round was quite useless to us
+     for any purpose but that of marching through it, while the enemy
+     seemed to find no difficulty in subsisting there....</p>
+
+<p>"To-day a large and important district of the Transvaal is now
+     firmly held by us. But it must not be supposed that all the rest
+     is held, or even roamed over, by the enemy. Wide districts of
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page506" name="page506"></a>(p. 506)</span> both the new colonies are virtually derelict, except,
+     in some cases, for the native population. This is especially true
+     of the northern part of the Transvaal, which has always been a
+     native district, and where, excepting in Pietersburg and some
+     other positions held by our troops, the natives are now almost
+     the only inhabitants. Indeed, nothing is more characteristic of
+     the latest stage of the war than the contraction of Boer
+     resistance within certain wide but fairly well-defined districts,
+     separated from one another by considerable spaces. Instead of
+     ranging indifferently over the whole of the two late Republics,
+     the enemy show an increasing tendency to confine themselves to
+     certain neighbourhoods, which have always been their chief,
+     though till recently by no means their exclusive, centres of
+     strength.... From time to time the commandos try to break out of
+     these districts and to extend the scene of operations. But the
+     failure of the latest of these raids&mdash;Botha's bold attempt to
+     invade Natal&mdash;shows the disadvantages under which the Boers now
+     labour in attempting to undertake distant expeditions.</p>
+
+<p>"The contraction of the theatre of war is doubtless due to the
+     increased difficulty which the enemy have in obtaining horses and
+     supplies, but, above all, to the great reduction in their
+     numbers.... To wear out the resistance of the Boers still in the
+     field&mdash;not more than one-eighth, I think, of the total number of
+     burghers who have, first and last, been engaged in the
+     war<a id="footnotetag300" name="footnotetag300"></a><a href="#footnote300" title="Go to footnote 300"><span class="small">[300]</span></a>&mdash;may take a considerable time yet, and will almost
+     certainly involve further losses. I will not attempt to forecast
+     either the time or the cost. What seems evident is that the
+     concentration of the Boers, and the substitution of several
+     fairly well-defined small campaigns for that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page507" name="page507"></a>(p. 507)</span> sort of
+     running fight all over the country which preceded them, is on the
+     whole an advantage to us, and tends to bring the end of the
+     struggle within a more measurable distance. Our great object, it
+     seems to me, should be to keep the Boers within the areas of
+     their main strength, even if such concentration makes the
+     commandos individually more dangerous and involves more desperate
+     fighting, and meanwhile to push on with might and main the
+     settlement of those parts of the country out of which they have
+     been driven. No doubt this is a difficult, and must be a gradual,
+     process. The full extent of the difficulty will appear from the
+     sequel. But it is the point to which the main efforts, of the
+     civil authorities at any rate, should be continually directed.</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">The return to the Rand.</span>
+
+<p>"If the latest phase of the military situation is maintained,
+     <span class="italic">i.e.</span>, if we are able to prevent the Boers from breaking back
+     into the cleared areas, or from injuring the railway lines, I can
+     see no reason why the work of settlement should not proceed at a
+     greatly quickened pace in the immediate future. The most urgent
+     point is to bring back the exiled Uitlanders to the Rand, always
+     provided that they are able to find employment when they arrive
+     there. But the basis of any general revival of industrial and
+     commercial activity on the Rand is the resumption of mining
+     operations. So far it has only been found possible to proceed
+     very slowly in this respect. The full capacity of the Rand is
+     about 6,000 stamps. The first step was taken in April last, when
+     the Commander-in-Chief agreed to allow the Chamber of Mines to
+     open three mines with 50 stamps each. Up till now permission has
+     been granted for the working of 600 stamps, but only 450 have
+     actually been started. This is slow work, but even this
+     beginning, modest as it is, has made <span class="pagenum"><a id="page508" name="page508"></a>(p. 508)</span> an immense
+     difference in the aspect of Johannesburg since first I came here
+     in March last.</p>
+
+<p>"The number of people allowed to return from time to time, for
+     other than mining employments, is in proportion to the number of
+     stamps re-started. This, no doubt, is a wise principle, for
+     business generally can only expand <span class="italic">pari passu</span> with the
+     resumption of mining. Up to the present something like 10,000
+     people have been allowed to come up, the vast majority of them
+     being refugees, though there is a small new element of civil
+     servants and civilians in the employ of the military. Assuming
+     that from 8,000 to 9,000 are refugees, this would represent about
+     one-sixth of the total number of well-accredited Uitlanders
+     registered in the books of the 'Central Registration Committee.'</p>
+
+<p>"The best that can be said on the thorny subject of the return of
+     the refugees, is that latterly the rate of return has been
+     steadily increasing. Last month the military authorities allowed
+     us to grant 400 ordinary permits (this number is over and above
+     permits given to officials or persons specially required for
+     particular services to the Army or the Government). This month
+     the number has been raised to 800. I need hardly say that the
+     selection of 800 people out of something like fifty times that
+     number is an onerous and ungrateful task. South Africa simply
+     rings with complaints as to favouritism in the distribution of
+     permits. As a matter of fact, whatever mistakes have been made,
+     there has been no favouritism. I do not mean to say that a
+     certain number of people&mdash;not a large number&mdash;have not slipped
+     through or been smuggled up under false pretences. But the great
+     bulk of the permits have been allotted by the Central
+     Registration Committee, a large, capable, and most representative
+     body of the citizens of this town and neighbourhood. And they
+     have been allotted on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page509" name="page509"></a>(p. 509)</span> well-defined principles, and with
+     great impartiality.... I am satisfied that no body of officials,
+     even if our officials were not already over-worked in other
+     directions, could have done the business so well.</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">Labour and transport.</span>
+
+<p>"There can, I think, be little doubt that the present rate of
+     return can be maintained, and I am not without hope that it may
+     in a short time be considerably increased. But this depends
+     entirely, for the reasons already given, on the question whether
+     the resumption of mining operations can be quickened. The
+     obstacles to such a quickening are two-fold: first, want of
+     native labour; secondly, want of trucks to bring up not only the
+     increased supplies which a larger population necessitates, but
+     also, and this is even a more serious matter, to bring up the
+     material required for their work. The latter, I need hardly say,
+     is a very heavy item, not only in the case of the mines, but in
+     the case of all those other industries, building, for instance,
+     which only need a chance in order to burst into extreme activity
+     in this place. For the Rand requires just now an increase of
+     everything&mdash;dwelling-houses, offices, roads, sewers, lighting,
+     water-supply, etc., etc. Capital would be readily forthcoming for
+     every kind of construction, and many skilled workmen are waiting
+     at the coast. But it is no use bringing up workmen to live in the
+     dearest place in the world unless they have the materials to work
+     with. The most necessary materials, however, are bulky, and the
+     carrying capacity of the railways, greatly improved as it is,
+     gives no promise of an early importation of quantities of bulky
+     material, if the other and more urgent demands upon our means of
+     transport are to be satisfied.</p>
+
+<p>"As regards native labour for the mines, the greater development
+     of which is a condition of all other industrial development, the
+     difficulty is that, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page510" name="page510"></a>(p. 510)</span> while natives can be found in
+     abundance to do surface work, the number of those who are willing
+     to go underground is limited. There are only certain tribes among
+     whom underground workers can be found in any great numbers, and
+     these reside mostly in Portuguese territory. As you are aware,
+     difficulties have arisen about the introduction of Portuguese
+     natives, and the matter is at present the subject of negotiations
+     between the Governor-General of Mozambique and myself. Having
+     regard to the friendly attitude of the Governor-General, I have
+     every hope that this difficulty may soon be overcome. But even
+     then we shall not be able to count on any great immediate influx
+     of labourers from Portuguese territory....</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">The concentration camps.</span>
+
+<p>"The delay in obtaining native labour would be more serious if it
+     were not for the existence of that other and still greater
+     obstacle to the rapid revival of industry here which I have
+     already dwelt on, namely, the difficulty of transport. And this
+     latter difficulty is immensely aggravated at the present time by
+     the constantly increasing requirements of the concentration
+     camps. Not only has the number of people in these camps
+     increased, with overwhelming rapidity, to an extent never
+     contemplated when they were first started, but the extreme state
+     of destitution in which many of the people arrived, and the
+     deplorable amount of sickness which has all along existed among
+     them, create a demand for a great deal more than mere primary
+     necessities, such as food and shelter, if the condition of the
+     camps is to be anything like what we should wish to see it. The
+     amount of mortality in these camps, especially amongst very young
+     children, as you are well aware, has been deplorable. I do not,
+     indeed, agree with those who think&mdash;or assert&mdash;that the mortality
+     among the Boers would have been less, if thousands of women and
+     children had been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page511" name="page511"></a>(p. 511)</span> allowed to live on isolated farms in
+     a devastated country, or to roam about on the trail of the
+     commandos. Indeed, I feel confident that it would have been far
+     greater. The best proof of this is the deplorable state of
+     starvation and sickness in which great numbers of people arrived
+     at the camps, and which rendered them easy victims to the attack
+     of epidemic diseases. At the same time it is evident that the
+     ravages of disease would have been less if our means of transport
+     had allowed us to provide them on their first arrival, not only
+     with tents, rations, and necessary medicines (all of which were,
+     as a matter of fact, supplied with great promptitude), but with
+     the hundred and one appliances and comforts which are so
+     essential for the recovery of the weakly and the sick, and the
+     prevention of the spread of disease. I do not mean to say that it
+     was only want of material, due to the insuperable difficulties of
+     transport (especially at the time when the camps were first
+     started, and when railways were subject to continual
+     interruptions) from which the camps suffered. Equally serious was
+     the want of personnel; of the necessary number of doctors,
+     nurses, matrons, superintendents, etc., who were simply not to be
+     found in South Africa, severely taxed as it had already been to
+     find men and women of sufficient training and experience to look
+     after the other victims of the war. Still, the want of material
+     has been a serious item; and it is evidently a want which, as the
+     carrying capacity of the railways increases, we must do our best
+     to supply. The Ladies' Commission, of whose devoted labours in
+     visiting and inspecting the camps it is impossible to speak too
+     highly (they have been of inestimable service to the Government),
+     have handed in a considerable list of requirements, which have
+     been, and are being, supplied as fast as possible. But evidently
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page512" name="page512"></a>(p. 512)</span> these requirements enter into competition, and most
+     serious competition, with the supply of food and materials
+     necessary for the revival even of our central industry, not to
+     say of industrial and agricultural activity elsewhere in the new
+     colonies, of which, under the circumstances, it is, for the
+     moment, unfortunately impossible to think.</p>
+
+<p>"To decide between the competing demands upon the still very
+     limited amount of truckage available for civil purposes, after
+     the paramount requirements of the army have been satisfied, is
+     indeed a most difficult and delicate task. Whether we have done
+     all for the best, it is not for me to say. That any amount of
+     conscientious thought and labour has been devoted, on all hands,
+     to grappling with the problem, I can confidently assert. And I am
+     equally confident that whatever has been done, and whatever may
+     yet be done, the amount of hardship must have been and must still
+     be very great. It would be amusing, if amusement were possible in
+     the presence of so much sadness and suffering, to put side by
+     side the absolutely contradictory criticisms, all equally
+     vehement, to which our action is subjected. On the one hand is
+     the outcry against the cruelty and heartlessness manifested in
+     not making better provision for the people in the concentration
+     camps: on the other, the equally loud outcry against our
+     injustice in leaving the British refugees in idleness and poverty
+     at the coast, in order to keep the people in the concentration
+     camps supplied with every luxury and comfort. I have even
+     frequently heard the expression that we are 'spoiling' the people
+     in the Boer camps. We are, alas, not in a position to spoil
+     anybody, however much we might desire to do so....</p>
+
+<p>"The pressing questions connected with the return of the refugees
+     and the maintenance of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page513" name="page513"></a>(p. 513)</span> Boers at present in the
+     concentration camps are, it is evident, only the first of a
+     series of problems of the most complicated character, which have
+     to be solved before the country can resume its normal life....</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">Re-settlement problems.</span>
+
+<p>"Even if the war were to come to an end to-morrow, it would not
+     be possible to let the people in the concentration camps go back
+     at once to their former homes. They would only starve there. The
+     country is, for the most part, a desert, and, before it can be
+     generally re-occupied, a great deal will have to be done in the
+     way of re-stocking, provision of seed, and also probably, in the
+     absence of draught animals, for the importation of steam ploughs.</p>
+
+<p>"Then there are the arrangements to be made for the return of the
+     prisoners of war. Evidently these will have to wait till the
+     whole of the British refugees are brought back. The latter not
+     only have the strongest claim, but they will be immediately
+     wanted when order is restored, and will have, as soon as the
+     railway can bring up the necessary material, abundance of work,
+     whereas it may take some time before the country is fit to
+     receive the prisoners. Nevertheless, though the return of the
+     prisoners may still be far distant, there are certain measures
+     which have to be taken even now, in order that we may be able to
+     deal with the matter when the time comes.</p>
+
+<p>"Altogether, the number and complexity of the tasks, embraced
+     under the general term 're-settlement,' which are either already
+     upon us or will come upon us as the country gradually quiets
+     down, are sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted. And yet the
+     tone of hopefulness among the British population who have so far
+     returned to the new colonies is very marked, especially in the
+     Transvaal. It is not incompatible with many <span class="pagenum"><a id="page514" name="page514"></a>(p. 514)</span> grievances,
+     and with much grumbling at the Administration. But that was only
+     to be expected, and is of very small importance as long as people
+     are prepared to tackle the big work of reconstruction in front of
+     them in a vigorous and sanguine spirit. Nor is this hopefulness,
+     in my opinion, at all ill-founded, however gloomy may be the
+     immediate outlook.</p>
+
+<p>"Terrible as have been the ravages of war and the destruction of
+     agricultural capital, a destruction which is now pretty well
+     complete, the great fact remains that the Transvaal possesses an
+     amount of mineral wealth, virtually unaffected by the war, which
+     will ensure the prosperity of South Africa for the next fifty
+     years; and other resources, both industrial and agricultural,
+     which, properly developed, should make it a rich country, humanly
+     speaking, for ever. Economically, all that is required is that a
+     very small proportion of the superabundant but exhaustible riches
+     of the mines should be devoted to developing the vast permanent
+     sources of wealth which the country possesses, and which will
+     maintain a European population twenty times as large as the
+     present, when all the gold has been dug out. No doubt it is not
+     economic measures alone which will ensure that result. A social
+     change is also necessary, viz., the introduction of fresh blood,
+     of a body of enterprising European settlers, especially on the
+     land, to reinforce the Boer population, who have been far too
+     few, and far too easy-going, to do even the remotest justice to
+     the vast natural capabilities of the soil, on which, for the most
+     part, they have done little more than squat. But then the
+     introduction of the right type of agricultural settlers, though
+     it will not come about of itself, would not seem to be a task
+     beyond the powers of statesmanship to grapple with.</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">The land settlement report.</span>
+
+<p>"This despatch has dealt so largely with questions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page515" name="page515"></a>(p. 515)</span> of
+     immediate urgency, that I have left myself no time to refer to
+     the work which is being quietly done in both the new colonies to
+     build up the framework of the new Administration. I can hardly
+     claim for myself that I have been able to give to that work
+     anything more than the most general supervision, as my time is
+     more than fully occupied in dealing with matters of present
+     urgency. But, thanks to the great energy displayed by the
+     principal officers of the Administration&mdash;by Major Goold-Adams
+     and Mr. Wilson at Bloemfontein, by Mr. Fiddes, Sir Richard
+     Solomon, and Mr. Duncan, at Pretoria, and by Sir Godfrey Lagden
+     and Mr. Wybergh here&mdash;a really surprising amount of ground has
+     been covered. Despite all the difficulties and discouragements of
+     the present time, the machinery of the Government is getting
+     rapidly into working order, and, as soon as normal conditions are
+     restored, the new colonies will find themselves provided with an
+     Administration capable of dealing with the needs of a great and
+     progressive community, and with efficient and trustworthy courts
+     of law. A number of fundamental laws are being worked out, and
+     will shortly be submitted for your approval. In the Orange River
+     Colony they do not involve any great change of system, but, in
+     the Transvaal, some most important reforms are at once necessary,
+     while an immense amount of useless rubbish, which encumbered the
+     Statute Book and made it the despair of jurists, has already been
+     repealed."<a id="footnotetag301" name="footnotetag301"></a><a href="#footnote301" title="Go to footnote 301"><span class="small">[301]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In spite of the disturbed condition of the country, two independent
+inquiries, each of which was concerned with matters of cardinal
+importance to the future of South Africa, were concluded <span class="pagenum"><a id="page516" name="page516"></a>(p. 516)</span>
+before the second year of the war had run its course. From the report
+addressed to Mr. Chamberlain by the Land Settlement Commission, of
+which Mr. Arnold-Forster was chairman, and from that presented to Lord
+Milner by Sir William (then Mr.) Willcocks<a id="footnotetag302" name="footnotetag302"></a><a href="#footnote302" title="Go to footnote 302"><span class="small">[302]</span></a> on Irrigation in South
+Africa, there emerged three significant conclusions. Racial fusion, or
+the ultimate solution of the nationality difficulty, was to be found
+in the establishment of British settlers upon the land, living side by
+side with the Dutch farmers and identified with them by common
+pursuits and interests; the possibility alike of the successful
+introduction of these settlers and of the development of the hitherto
+neglected agricultural resources of South Africa depended upon the
+enlargement and improvement of the cultivable area by irrigation; and
+the only existing source of wealth capable of providing the material
+agencies for the realisation of these objects was the Witwatersrand
+gold industry. British agricultural settlers for the political,
+irrigation for the physical regeneration of South Africa&mdash;this was the
+essence of these two Reports.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "We desire to express our firm conviction," wrote the Land
+     Settlement Commissioners,<a id="footnotetag303" name="footnotetag303"></a><a href="#footnote303" title="Go to footnote 303"><span class="small">[303]</span></a> "that a well-considered scheme of
+     settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the
+     most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South
+     <span class="pagenum"><a id="page517" name="page517"></a>(p. 517)</span> Africa. We find among those who wish to see British
+     rule in South Africa maintained and its influence for good
+     extended, but one opinion upon this subject. There even seems
+     reason to fear lest the vast expenditure of blood and treasure
+     which has marked the war should be absolutely wasted, unless some
+     strenuous effort be made to establish in the country, at the
+     close of the war, a thoroughly British population large enough to
+     make a recurrence of division and disorder impossible."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The irrigation report.</span>
+
+<p>Apart from its mineral development, Sir William Willcocks points
+out,<a id="footnotetag304" name="footnotetag304"></a><a href="#footnote304" title="Go to footnote 304"><span class="small">[304]</span></a> South Africa has remained "strangely stationary. Fifty years
+ago it was a pastoral country importing cereals and dairy produce, and
+even hay from foreign countries. It is the same to-day. Half a century
+ago it needed a farm of 5,000 acres to keep a family in decent
+comfort; to-day it needs the same farm of 5,000 acres to keep a single
+family in comfort." West of the great Drakenberg range it is an arid,
+or semi-arid, region. The reason is not so much that the rainfall is
+deficient, as that the rain comes at the wrong time, and is wasted.
+What is wanted is water-storage, with irrigation works to spread the
+water upon the land when it is needed by the farmer. Nothing short of
+the agency of the State will serve to bring about this physical
+revolution; for bad legislation must be annulled, and a great
+intercolonial system of water-husbandry, comparable to those of India
+and Egypt, must be created. Hitherto agriculture, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page518" name="page518"></a>(p. 518)</span> in spite
+of the latent possibilities of the country, has scarcely been
+"attempted"; for, with the exception of the extreme south-western
+corner of the Cape Colony, the "conquered territory" of the Orange
+River Colony, and the high veld of the Transvaal, the agricultural
+development of South Africa "depends entirely on irrigation."</p>
+
+<p>But, great as was the claim of agriculture, the claim of the gold
+industry was at once more immediate and more imperative.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Valuable as water may be for agricultural purposes," Sir William
+     Willcocks wrote, "it is a thousand times more valuable for
+     gold-washing at the Rand mines."</p>
+
+<p>And again:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The prosperity and well-being of every interest, not only in the
+     Transvaal, but in South Africa generally, will depend on the
+     prosperity of the Rand, certainly for the next fifty years.
+     Though my life has been spent in the execution of irrigation
+     projects and the furtherance of agricultural prosperity, I feel
+     that, under the special conditions prevailing in South Africa,
+     the suggestion of any course other than the obvious one of first
+     putting the Rand mines on a sound footing as far as their water
+     supply is concerned, would have constituted me a bigot. Ten acres
+     of irrigable land in the Mooi or Klip river valleys, with
+     Johannesburg in the full tide of prosperity, will yield as good a
+     rent as forty acres with Johannesburg in decay."</p>
+
+<p>And the prosperity of the mines is not only essential in the present:
+it is to be the instrument <span class="pagenum"><a id="page519" name="page519"></a>(p. 519)</span> for the development of the
+permanent resources of the Transvaal:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Economic importance of Rand.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The mineral wealth of the Transvaal is extra-ordinarily great,
+     but it is exhaustible, some say within a space of fifty years,
+     others within a space of one hundred years. It would be a
+     disaster indeed for the country if none of this wealth were
+     devoted to the development of its agriculture. Agricultural
+     development is slow, but it is permanent, and knows of no
+     exhaustion. If the companies working the gold, coal, and diamond
+     mines were by decree compelled to devote a percentage of their
+     gains to the execution of irrigation works on lines laid down by
+     the Government, they would assist in the permanent development of
+     the country and would be investing in works which, though slow to
+     give a remuneration, would, at any rate, be absolutely permanent.
+     It would thus happen, that when the mineral wealth of the country
+     had disappeared, its agricultural wealth would have been put on
+     such a solid basis that the country would not have to fall from
+     the height of prosperity to the depth of poverty."</p>
+
+<p>These were conclusions of so fundamental a nature that no statesman
+could afford to overlook them; and, in point of fact, Lord Milner kept
+them steadily in sight from first to last in all that he did for the
+administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies.</p>
+
+<p>Another effort of the civil administration which was carried on
+successfully during the war was the teaching of the Boer children in
+the refugee camps. The narrative of the circumstances in which the
+camp schools were first organised, of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page520" name="page520"></a>(p. 520)</span> manner in which
+teachers came forward from all parts of the empire to offer their
+services, and of the complete success which attended their efforts,
+was told three years later by Mr. E. B. Sargant, the Education Adviser
+to the Administration. The report in which the story appears not only
+affords a record unique in the annals of educational effort, but adds
+a pleasing and significant page to what is otherwise a gloomy chapter
+of the war.<a id="footnotetag305" name="footnotetag305"></a><a href="#footnote305" title="Go to footnote 305"><span class="small">[305]</span></a> Mr. Sargant was invited by Lord Milner to organise
+the work of educational reconstruction in the new colonies in the
+autumn of 1900. He was then travelling in Canada, in the course of a
+journey through the empire undertaken for the purpose of investigating
+the methods and conditions of education in the several British
+colonies; and he reached Capetown on November 6th, 1900. At that time
+the headquarters of the new Transvaal Administration had not been
+established in Pretoria; but in the Orange River Colony certain
+schools along the railway line and elsewhere had been opened under the
+military Government. From observations made in December in the two new
+colonies, Mr. Sargant had begun to fear that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page521" name="page521"></a>(p. 521)</span> the work of
+educational reorganisation would have to be indefinitely postponed,
+when a visit to the Boer prisoners' camp at Seapoint, Capetown, gave
+him the idea from which the whole system of the camp schools was
+subsequently evolved. Here he found that a school for boys and young
+men had been provided by the prisoners themselves, but that it was
+destitute of books and of almost all the necessary appliances. Mr.
+Sargant's appeal on behalf of this school met with a ready response
+from the Cape Government. What could be done here, he thought, could
+be done elsewhere. The nearest refugee camp to Capetown was at
+Norval's Pont, on the borders of the Orange River Colony; and it was
+here that Mr. Sargant determined to make his first experiment.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Origin of the camp schools.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Having provided myself," Mr. Sargant says, "with several boxes
+     of school books, I left Capetown on the last day of January and
+     took up my quarters in the camp already named. The Military
+     Commandant threw himself heartily into the experiment, although
+     at that time the provision of food and shelter for each new
+     influx of refugees was a matter of great difficulty. Fortunately
+     Norval's Pont, being nearer the base of supplies than the other
+     camps, had a few marquees to spare. In two of these I opened the
+     first camp school, remaining for a fortnight as its headmaster.
+     The rest of the teachers were found in the camp itself. It was
+     apparent from the first that the school would be a success. The
+     children flocked to it, and the mothers who brought them were
+     well content with the arrangement that the religious instruction
+     should be given in Dutch and other <span class="pagenum"><a id="page522" name="page522"></a>(p. 522)</span> lessons in English.
+     Here, as in several other camps which were visited later, I found
+     that a school, taught through the medium of Dutch, had already
+     been opened by some of the more serious-minded of the people. In
+     this case, an offer was made to me by the Commandant to suppress
+     this school and to send the children to my marquees. This I
+     refused, and in less than two months I had the gratification of
+     knowing that teachers and children had come voluntarily to the
+     Government school, and that the tents in which they had been
+     taught formed one of a row of six which were needed to
+     accommodate the rapidly increasing number of scholars."<a id="footnotetag306" name="footnotetag306"></a><a href="#footnote306" title="Go to footnote 306"><span class="small">[306]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Over-sea teachers.</span>
+
+<p>After this initial success Mr. Sargant made arrangements, first from
+Bloemfontein, and afterwards from Pretoria, for the establishment of
+such schools in all the refugee camps; and by the end of May, 1901,
+there were 4,000 children in the camp schools, as against 3,500 in the
+town schools of the two colonies. In the following month it became
+evident that the local supply of teachers would be insufficient to
+meet the demands of the rapidly increasing schools; and Lord Milner
+devoted much of his time during his leave of absence to making
+arrangements for the introduction of a number of well-trained teachers
+from England, and subsequently from the over-sea colonies. Before
+these welcome reinforcements could arrive, however, the number of
+children in the camp schools, apart from the Government schools in the
+towns, had risen to 17,500, and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page523" name="page523"></a>(p. 523)</span> supply of South African
+teachers was exhausted. "In many cases," says Mr. Sargant, "the
+services of young men and women who had passed the sixth, fifth, and
+even fourth standard were utilised temporarily." With the new year,
+1902, drafts of carefully chosen and well-qualified teachers from
+England began to arrive. Both the Board of Education for England and
+Wales and the Scotch Education Department took up the work of
+selection and appointment, and the co-operation of the Canadian,
+Australian, and New Zealand Governments was obtained.<a id="footnotetag307" name="footnotetag307"></a><a href="#footnote307" title="Go to footnote 307"><span class="small">[307]</span></a> From this
+time forward the system of the camp schools was steadily extended; and
+on May 31st, 1902, the date of the Vereeniging surrender, when the
+attendance reached its highest point, more than 17,000 Boer children
+were being thus educated in the Transvaal camps, and more than 12,000
+in those of the Orange River Colony.<a id="footnotetag308" name="footnotetag308"></a><a href="#footnote308" title="Go to footnote 308"><span class="small">[308]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Administrative progress, 1901.</span>
+
+<p>Apart from this unique and significant effort, the reports furnished
+by the various departmental <span class="pagenum"><a id="page524" name="page524"></a>(p. 524)</span> heads to Lord Milner in December
+afford striking and sufficient evidence of the progress of the civil
+administration in both the new colonies during the year 1901. In the
+Orange River Colony the sphere of operations of the departments
+existing at the time when Sir H. Gould-Adams was appointed
+Deputy-administrator (March, 1901), had been increased, and new
+departments were being organised. A statement issued by the financial
+adviser on August 29th showed that for the period March 13th, 1900
+(the occupation of Bloemfontein) to June 30th, 1901, the "real"
+revenue and expenditure of the colony were respectively £301,800 8<span class="italic">s.</span>
+and £217,974 18<span class="italic">s.</span>; an excess of revenue over expenditure of £83,825
+10<span class="italic">s.</span> And during the half-year July 1st-December 31st the revenue
+collected was about one-third in excess of the actual civil
+expenditure.<a id="footnotetag309" name="footnotetag309"></a><a href="#footnote309" title="Go to footnote 309"><span class="small">[309]</span></a> The progress in education was remarkable. At the end
+of February, 1902, there were 13,384 children on the roll of the
+Government schools, camp and town,<a id="footnotetag310" name="footnotetag310"></a><a href="#footnote310" title="Go to footnote 310"><span class="small">[310]</span></a> or nearly 5,000 more than the
+greatest number at school at any one time under the Republic, and the
+reorganisation of both higher and technical instruction had been taken
+in hand. A system of local self-government had been commenced by the
+establishment of Boards of Health at Bloemfontein <span class="pagenum"><a id="page525" name="page525"></a>(p. 525)</span> and in all
+districts in the protected area, while in the capital itself the Town
+Council was again at work. The Agricultural Department formed on July
+1st, 1901, had taken over a large number of sheep and cattle from the
+military authorities, and a commencement of tree-planting under an
+experienced forester had been made. The Land Board was created in
+October, with two branches concerned respectively with Settlement and
+Repatriation. The Settlement branch was occupied especially in
+procuring land suitable for agricultural purposes, and its efforts
+were so successful that by the end of April, 1902, 150 British
+settlers had been placed on farms. The Repatriation branch was engaged
+in collecting information as to the whereabouts of the absentee Boer
+landowners and their families, and the condition of their lands and
+houses; in investigating the possibility of importing fresh stock, and
+in collecting vehicles, implements, seed-corn, and the other
+necessaries which would be required to enable the Boer population,
+when repatriated, to resume their normal pursuits. Also temporary
+courts, pending the re-opening of the ordinary civil courts, had been
+established.</p>
+
+<p>In the Transvaal the work was on a larger scale. Five departments,
+those of the Secretary to the Administration (afterwards Colonial
+Secretary), the Legal Adviser (afterwards Attorney-General), the
+Controller of the Treasury (afterwards Treasurer), the Mining
+Commissioner and of the Commissioner for Native Affairs, were already
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page526" name="page526"></a>(p. 526)</span> organised. The progress achieved by the heads of these
+departments in the Transvaal, and by Sir H. Gould-Adams and Mr. Wilson
+in the Orange River Colony, formed collectively a record the merit of
+which was acknowledged by "an expression of the high appreciation of
+His Majesty's Government of the services which they had rendered in
+circumstances of exceptional difficulty."<a id="footnotetag311" name="footnotetag311"></a><a href="#footnote311" title="Go to footnote 311"><span class="small">[311]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>It is difficult to present an account of the work already done in the
+Transvaal in a form at once brief and representative. The report of
+Mr. Fiddes, the Secretary to the Administration,<a id="footnotetag312" name="footnotetag312"></a><a href="#footnote312" title="Go to footnote 312"><span class="small">[312]</span></a> recorded the
+progress made in education, public works, and district administration.
+Since July twenty-four new schools, of which seven were camp schools,
+eight fee-paying schools, and nine free town schools, had been opened,
+and 169 teachers were employed in the town schools, and 173 in the
+camp schools, opened by the Administration. The public buildings,
+including the hospitals and asylums at Johannesburg and Pretoria, the
+post offices and the seventeen prisons administered by the department,
+were being maintained and, where necessary, restored. In Johannesburg,
+as we have seen, a Town Council had been established, but Pretoria was
+still administered by a Military Governor, who controlled a temporary
+Town Board and the police. The Administration, however, was empowered
+by proclamation No. 28 of 1901 to appoint Boards of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page527" name="page527"></a>(p. 527)</span> Health
+in places where no municipality existed, and it was expected that
+Pretoria would be endowed, before long, with the same municipal
+privileges as Johannesburg.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Legislative reforms.</span>
+
+<p>The volume of work handled in the Legal Adviser's office formed a
+remarkable testimony to the energy and capacity of Sir Richard
+Solomon. Resident magistrates' courts had been established in twelve
+districts; temporary courts were being held in Pretoria and
+Johannesburg; the offices of the Registrar of Deeds and of the Orphan
+Master, and the Patent Office, were reorganised; and an ordinance
+creating a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and five
+Puisne Judges, was drafted ready to be brought into operation so soon
+as circumstances permitted. The chaotic Statute Book of the late
+Republic had been overhauled. A large number of laws, some obsolete,
+some impliedly repealed, but still appearing on the Statute Book, and
+others unsuited to the new <span class="italic">régime</span>, had been repealed by
+proclamation; and at the same time many ordinances dealing with
+matters of fundamental importance had been prepared for submission to
+the future Legislative Council at the first opportunity.</p>
+
+<p>The report of Mr. Duncan, the Controller of the Treasury, showed that
+the revenue actually being collected, mainly from the customs, the
+Post Office, mining and trading licences, and native passes, would
+provide for the ordinary expenditure of the civil administration. And,
+in point of fact, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page528" name="page528"></a>(p. 528)</span> when the accounts were made up at the end
+of the first financial year of the new colonies (July 1st, 1901-June
+30th, 1902) it was found that the Orange River Colony had a balance in
+hand of £231,000, while in the Transvaal the expenditure on civil
+administration<a id="footnotetag313" name="footnotetag313"></a><a href="#footnote313" title="Go to footnote 313"><span class="small">[313]</span></a> had been covered by the revenue, which had assumed
+already the respectable figure of £1,393,000.</p>
+
+<p>The Departments of Mines and Native Affairs had been reorganised, and
+the work done by Mr. Wybergh and Sir Godfrey Lagden respectively in
+these departments, in co-operation with Sir Richard Solomon, had
+produced the administrative reforms immediately required to regulate
+the employment of native labourers in the mines. By proclamations
+amending or repealing existing laws and making fresh provisions where
+necessary the native had been protected against oppression and robbery
+at the hands of unscrupulous labour-agents, and the liquor traffic,
+the chief cause of his insubordination and incapacity, had been
+effectively repressed. Considerations of public security made the
+maintenance of the "pass" system necessary, but modifications were
+introduced into the working of the system sufficient to protect the
+educated native from unnecessary humiliation and the native labourer
+from excessive punishment. In addition to this departmental work two
+commissions had been appointed by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page529" name="page529"></a>(p. 529)</span> Lord Milner to investigate
+two matters of direct and immediate concern to the gold industry. The
+first of these, over which Sir Richard Solomon presided, was engaged
+in reviewing the existing gold laws, with a view to the introduction
+of new legislation embodying such modifications as the best local
+experience and the financial interests of the colony might require.
+The second was employed in formulating measures necessary to provide
+both the mines and the community of the Rand with a water-supply that
+would be at once permanent and economic.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Johannesburg police.</span>
+
+<p>There remain certain special features of the administrative
+reconstruction accomplished in 1901 that merit attention, as showing
+the degree in which Lord Milner kept in view the fundamental
+necessities of the situation revealed by the Land Settlement and
+Irrigation Reports to which reference has been made above. As part of
+the work of the Law Department, the Johannesburg Municipal Police had
+been organised and placed under the control of Mr. Showers, the late
+head of the Calcutta Police.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "This fine body," Lord Milner wrote, "consists mainly of picked
+     men from the Army Reserve, including many old soldiers of the
+     Guards, and others who have fought in the war. The men are
+     dressed like London policemen, but carry rifles. This odd-looking
+     equipment is characteristic of the double nature of their duties.
+     On the one hand they do the work of ordinary town police, and
+     exhibit in that characteristic the same <span class="pagenum"><a id="page530" name="page530"></a>(p. 530)</span> efficiency and
+     civility as their London prototypes. On the other hand, they have
+     played an important part in assisting the military and the Rand
+     Rifles in the defence of the long line, fifty miles in extent of
+     towns and mining villages which constitute the Rand district.
+     Latterly, since the enemy have been quite driven out of this part
+     of the country, the military portion of their duties is
+     diminishing in importance, though the danger of small raids on
+     outlying portions of the Rand by parties coming from a distance
+     is not yet wholly removed. On the other hand, with the return of
+     the civil population, their work as police proper is greatly on
+     the increase. In their struggle with the illicit liquor dealers,
+     one of the most difficult of their duties, they have so far met
+     with a great measure of success."<a id="footnotetag314" name="footnotetag314"></a><a href="#footnote314" title="Go to footnote 314"><span class="small">[314]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">South African constabulary.</span>
+
+<p>Just as here, in the case of the Johannesburg police, so in the
+formation of the South African Constabulary and in the reorganisation
+of the railways, Lord Milner had determined that no opportunity of
+adding to the permanent British population of the two colonies should
+be lost. The South African Constabulary was formed in October, 1900,
+by General Baden-Powell, mainly on the lines of the Canadian
+North-West police, for the protection of the settled population in the
+new colonies. Since July, 1901, however, when it had been called out
+for military service, this force, at the time some 9,000 strong, had
+been employed as part of the army under the direction of the
+Commander-in-Chief, although its organisation, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page531" name="page531"></a>(p. 531)</span> finance, and
+internal discipline were dealt with by the High Commissioner. The men
+recruited for the Constabulary were of British birth, and every
+endeavour was made in the selection of recruits to secure persons who
+were adapted by pursuits and character to become permanent and useful
+colonists. It is interesting to note that a body of 500 burgher
+police, consisting of former burghers of the Orange Free State, and
+placed under the colonel commanding the Orange Colony division, had
+been associated with the Constabulary during the time that they were
+thus serving with the troops. Nor is it necessary to point out that
+the military experience, the knowledge of the country, and
+acquaintance with the life of the veld which the Constabulary gained
+at this period, largely contributed to the efficiency which they
+displayed afterwards in the discharge of their regular duties.</p>
+
+<p>But of all the reconstructive work accomplished in this year of
+continuous and harassing warfare, the reorganisation of the railways
+was perhaps the most essential and the most successful in its
+immediate results. Although the railways of the two new colonies
+remained entirely under the control of the military authorities, their
+future importance to the civil administration was so great that, as
+Lord Milner wrote,<a id="footnotetag315" name="footnotetag315"></a><a href="#footnote315" title="Go to footnote 315"><span class="small">[315]</span></a> "questions affecting their organisation and
+development naturally claimed his constant attention." And this all
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page532" name="page532"></a>(p. 532)</span> the more, since Sir Percy Girouard, the Director of Military
+Railways, had been chosen by the Home Government to undertake the
+management of the joint railway system of the two colonies so soon as
+it was handed over to the civil authorities. The work accomplished
+included the repair of the damage inflicted by the enemy, the increase
+and improvement of the rolling-stock, the reorganisation of the staff
+of European employees, and the construction of new lines required for
+the industrial development of the country. Apart from 102 engines and
+984 trucks, the Boers had destroyed many pumping-stations and station
+buildings, 385 spans of bridges and culverts, and 25 miles of line.
+These injuries to the "plant" of the railways were repaired "in an
+absolutely permanent manner," and orders had been placed in August for
+60 engines and 1,200 trucks over and above those required to replace
+the rolling-stock destroyed by the enemy.<a id="footnotetag316" name="footnotetag316"></a><a href="#footnote316" title="Go to footnote 316"><span class="small">[316]</span></a> As the staff employed
+in the time of the Republics had been "actively engaged on the side of
+the enemy, and were animated by an exceedingly anti-British
+spirit,"<a id="footnotetag317" name="footnotetag317"></a><a href="#footnote317" title="Go to footnote 317"><span class="small">[317]</span></a> they had to be almost entirely replaced.</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page533" name="page533"></a>(p. 533)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Reorganisation of railways.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "But," Lord Milner continues, "the many difficulties incidental
+     to the organisation of a large new staff, unaccustomed to work
+     with one another, are being successfully overcome, and business
+     is carried on with a smoothness which gives no indication of the
+     internal revolution so recently effected. The new railway staff
+     comprises some 4,000 men of British race, including 1,500
+     Reservists or Irregulars who had fought in the war, and who, with
+     other newcomers, form a permanent addition to the British
+     population of South Africa."</p>
+
+<p>Thanks to the blockhouse system, supplemented where necessary by
+armoured trains, the mail trains from the ports to Johannesburg were
+running almost as rapidly and as safely as in time of peace. But the
+demands of the military traffic were so enormous that opportunities
+for ordinary traffic were still rigorously restricted.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Military requirements in food supplies, remounts and munitions
+     of war," Lord Milner wrote, "represented 29,000 tons weekly from
+     the ports; while the movements of men and horses to and fro over
+     the [then] huge theatre of war were as constant as they were
+     sudden."</p>
+
+<p>None the less the civil traffic was increasing. While in August only
+684 refugees had returned, in November the number had risen to 2,623;
+and while in August the tonnage of civil supplies forwarded <span class="pagenum"><a id="page534" name="page534"></a>(p. 534)</span>
+to Bloemfontein and the Transvaal was 4,612, in November it was 8,522.
+This result, moreover, had been obtained with the old rolling-stock,
+and a much more rapid progress was anticipated in the future, since
+the additional rolling-stock had already begun to arrive. And in
+anticipation of this increased rate of progress, the
+Commander-in-Chief had</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "now seen his way to allow the mines to start 400 fresh stamps
+     per month, as against an average of under 100 in previous months,
+     and had also consented to the grant of 1,600 permits a month
+     (representing about 4,000 persons) for return to the Transvaal."</p>
+
+<p>In addition to the repair and reorganisation of the lines running to
+the coast, the Transvaal collieries had been re-opened and the coal
+traffic had been resumed. Not only had progress been made in stocking
+the mines with coal, timber, and machinery, preparatory to the full
+resumption of working activity, but the large unemployed native
+population found in Johannesburg at the time of Lord Milner's arrival
+had been utilised for the construction of a new and much-needed coal
+line, which ran for thirteen miles along the Rand.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "This short line," Lord Milner wrote, "would have no less than
+     thirty to forty miles of sidings leading from it to every
+     important mine, and securing direct delivery of about 1,000,000
+     tons of coal per annum, as well as of a large tonnage of general
+     stores."</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page535" name="page535"></a>(p. 535)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Development by railways.</span>
+
+<p>And then follows a statement of the part to be played by railway
+construction in the policy of material development, which was pursued
+with such determination by Lord Milner after the restoration of peace.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "It seems almost superfluous to argue the case for further
+     railway development in South Africa, and especially in the new
+     colonies. The richest agricultural districts of both colonies are
+     far removed from markets. The through lines to the coast from the
+     great centres of industry will be choked with traffic. Both to
+     stimulate agriculture and to facilitate the operations of
+     commerce, additional lines and relief lines will be urgently
+     required. Moreover, if the construction of the most necessary of
+     these is undertaken as fast as the districts through which they
+     pass are pacified, employment will be provided for large numbers
+     of persons who would otherwise be idle and dependent on
+     Government for relief, as well as for many newcomers, who will be
+     a valuable addition to the population of the country. If there is
+     one enterprise which is certain to be thoroughly popular with the
+     old population, it is this. The one thing which the Boers will
+     thoroughly appreciate will be railways bringing their richest
+     land into touch with the best markets. And the British population
+     will be equally in favour of such a course."<a id="footnotetag318" name="footnotetag318"></a><a href="#footnote318" title="Go to footnote 318"><span class="small">[318]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Thus, six months before Vereeniging, and less than three months after
+Lord Milner's return from England, the "big unfinished job" was well
+in hand.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+<h3><span class="pagenum"><a id="page536" name="page536"></a>(p. 536)</span> CHAPTER XII</h3>
+
+<p class="title">THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING</p>
+
+
+<span class="sidenote">The gold industry re-started.</span>
+
+<p>With the beginning of the year 1902, the question of the ultimate
+submission of the Boers had become a matter of months, or even weeks.
+The guerilla leaders had been beaten at their own game. In spite of
+the extension of the area of the war, the terrorising of the peaceably
+inclined burghers, the co-operation of the Afrikander nationalists,
+and the encouragement derived from Boer sympathisers in England, the
+most important districts of the Transvaal and half of the Orange River
+Colony were being restored to the pursuits of peace. The great
+industry of South Africa was re-established, and agriculture was not
+only resumed but even developing upon more enlightened principles
+within the protected areas of the two colonies; while in the Orange
+River Colony 150 new British settlers had been planted upon farms
+before the terms of the Vereeniging surrender were signed. The story
+of this steady progress is told by the mere items in the monthly
+records furnished by Lord Milner to the Home Government. The gold
+industry of the Rand recommenced in May, 1901, when, with permission
+to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page537" name="page537"></a>(p. 537)</span> set 150 stamps at work, 7,439 oz. of gold were won. Up to
+November, when, as we have seen, the military situation for the first
+time permitted any considerable body of refugees to return, progress
+was slow; but in this month the output amounted to 32,000 oz. in round
+numbers. In December the number of stamps working had risen to 953,
+and the output to 52,897 oz. Henceforward the advance was rapid and
+sustained. In the remaining five months of the war (January to May,
+1902), the number of stamps at work rose to 2,095, the monthly output
+to 138,600 oz., of the value of £600,000, and 30,000 additional
+British refugees had been brought back to their homes on the Rand, in
+view of the increasing certainty of employment afforded by the
+expanding gold industry. Thus, before the surrender of the Boer forces
+in the field, half of the British population had been restored to the
+Transvaal, and the gold industry had been so far re-established that
+its production had reached one-third of the highest annual rate
+attained before the war broke out. Nor must it be forgotten that
+during these last months the conditions of the refugee camps were
+being steadily improved, until, as already noted, the death-rate was
+ultimately reduced below the normal.</p>
+
+<p>The Home Government had been unprepared for the military struggle
+precipitated by the ultimatum; Lord Milner was determined that, so far
+as his efforts could avail, it should not be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page538" name="page538"></a>(p. 538)</span> unprepared for
+the economic conflict for which peace would be the signal. In a
+despatch of January 25th, 1902, he urged once more upon Mr.
+Chamberlain the importance of settling British colonists upon the
+land, and pressed for a "decision on the main issues" raised by this
+question.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Land settlement.</span>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"This subject has for long occupied my attention," he wrote,
+     "and, in a tentative way, a good deal has been done. But we have
+     reached a point where little more progress can be made without a
+     decision on the main issues. The question is, whether British
+     colonisation is to be undertaken on a large and effective scale,
+     under Government control and with Government assistance, or to be
+     left to take care of itself, with whatever little help and
+     sympathy an Administration, devoid of any general plan, and with
+     no special funds devoted to the particular purpose, can give
+     it.... The principal consideration is the necessity of avoiding a
+     sharp contrast and antagonism in the character and sentiments of
+     the population between the country districts and the towns. If we
+     do nothing, we shall be confronted, sooner or later, with an
+     industrial urban population, rapidly increasing, and almost
+     wholly British in sentiment, and, on the other hand, a rural
+     population, wholly Dutch, agriculturally unprogressive. It is not
+     possible to contemplate such a state of affairs without grave
+     misgivings. We shall have to reinstate the bulk of our prisoners
+     upon their farms, and provide them with the means of starting
+     life anew, but unless we at the same time introduce some new
+     element we may be simply laying up the material for further
+     trouble. The land will remain as neglected, the attitude of the
+     rural population as unprogressive, and as much out of sympathy
+     with British ideas as ever.... <span class="pagenum"><a id="page539" name="page539"></a>(p. 539)</span> To satisfy these
+     demands, it is clear that no small and makeshift scheme will
+     suffice. Land settlement must be undertaken on a large scale;
+     otherwise, however useful, it will be <span class="italic">politically</span> unimportant.</p>
+
+<p>"The time is fast approaching when it will be absolutely
+     necessary to raise loans for both new colonies to meet expenses
+     arising immediately out of the war. I wish to place on record my
+     profound conviction that unless, in raising these loans, we
+     provide a substantial sum for the purchase of land and the
+     settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity
+     will be lost which will never recur, and the neglect of which
+     will have the most prejudicial effect on the future peace and
+     prosperity of South Africa. I do not, indeed, ask that these
+     first loans should include a sum as large as may ultimately be
+     required if land settlement is to assume the proportions which I
+     contemplate. But, if our first considerable undertakings in this
+     line are proving themselves successful, I foresee no difficulty
+     in obtaining more money later on, should we require it. What I do
+     fear is a check now, when we ought to be in a position to seize
+     every possible opportunity of getting hold of land suitable to
+     our purpose, and of retaining in the country such men as we want
+     to put on it. If we lose the next year or two we lose the game,
+     and without that power of acting promptly, which a ready command
+     of money alone can give, we shall begin to throw away
+     opportunities from this moment at which I am writing onwards.</p>
+
+<p>"What I want to put plainly to His Majesty's Government are these
+     two questions: (1) Are we to be allowed to go on purchasing good
+     land, by voluntary agreement wherever possible, but compulsorily,
+     if necessary? And, assuming this question to be answered in the
+     affirmative, (2) what amount <span class="pagenum"><a id="page540" name="page540"></a>(p. 540)</span> shall we be able to
+     dispose of for this purpose in the immediate future?"<a id="footnotetag319" name="footnotetag319"></a><a href="#footnote319" title="Go to footnote 319"><span class="small">[319]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It had been arranged during Lord Milner's last visit to England that
+the large expenditure inevitably arising out of the economic
+reconstruction and future development of the new colonies, should be
+provided by a loan secured upon their assets and revenues. The
+purposes for which this immediate outlay was especially required were
+the acquisition of the existing railways and the construction of new
+lines, land settlement, the repatriation of the Boers, and the
+compensation of loyalists for war losses both in the new colonies and
+in the Cape and Natal. Lord Milner now proposed that the Home
+Government should decide to appropriate, out of the funds to be thus
+raised, a sum of £3,000,000 to land settlement, and that of this sum
+£2,000,000 should be spent in the Transvaal and £1,000,000 in the
+Orange Colony. The "development" loan, as it was called, was not
+issued until after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa in the
+(South African) summer of 1902-3; but Lord Milner's proposal was
+approved in principle, and he was enabled to employ the limited
+resources at his disposal in the purchase of blocks of land suitable
+for the purposes of agriculture in both colonies.</p>
+
+<p>Apart from the progress thus achieved in this matter of supreme
+importance, as Lord Milner deemed it, to the future of South Africa,
+the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page541" name="page541"></a>(p. 541)</span> preparation of the administrative machinery, the
+<span class="italic">matériel</span> of transport, and the supplies of all kinds required for
+the repatriation of the Boers, was pushed forward with increasing
+activity. At the same time certain other administrative questions were
+brought by him to the consideration of the Home Government during
+these months (January to May, 1902), with the result that the ink was
+scarcely dry upon the Treaty of Surrender before he was able to ask
+for, and obtain, decisions upon them.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">On the eve of peace.</span>
+
+<p>The telegrams which passed between Lord Milner and the Colonial Office
+on these matters, during the weeks immediately preceding and following
+the Vereeniging surrender, are significant. Beside the clear thrust of
+Lord Milner's calculated energy, Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to keep
+pace with the needs of the situation sink into comparative inertia. On
+April 18th Lord Milner telegraphs the particulars of the 10 per cent.
+tax which he proposes to levy on the net produce of the mining
+industry. The rate is high&mdash;twice as high as the gold tax under the
+Republic&mdash;and will yield an annual revenue of £500,000 or £600,000 on
+a basis of the present normal production of the mines; but he believes
+that it will be "accepted without serious opposition, if it is imposed
+while the industry is rapidly advancing." And he expresses the hope
+that the explanation which he has furnished will be "sufficient to
+show the principles" of the tax, and that he may publicly announce the
+decision on this matter of such general economic importance at
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page542" name="page542"></a>(p. 542)</span> once. Mr. Chamberlain, however, requires further
+information; and we find Lord Milner telegraphing on June 2nd: "I
+trust you will now agree to the tax on the profits of gold mines; I am
+anxious to publish the Proclamation in next Friday's <span class="italic">Gazette</span>." And
+to this Mr. Chamberlain replies on June 4th, "I agree to the
+imposition of a 10 per cent. tax on the profits of gold mines." On
+June 2nd, that is, two days after the terms of surrender have been
+signed at Pretoria, Lord Milner sends a "most urgent" telegram on the
+immediate financial position:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The departments are still very busy with the estimates of the
+     new colonies and Constabulary. They are rather late this year,
+     but that was quite unavoidable. The result promises to be good.
+     We can pay for all normal expenditure and the 6,000 South African
+     Constabulary out of revenue. But, as you know, there is nothing
+     provided for the various extraordinary items which have been
+     hitherto financed out of the £500,000 grant for relief and
+     re-settlement. In all my estimates I have relied on a loan for
+     this. As I understand, the loan is deferred. As the £500,000 is
+     nearly exhausted, and it would be disastrous if land settlement,
+     which latter is at last making good progress, were stopped,
+     especially at this juncture, I would ask for immediate authority
+     to spend another £500,000 on these purposes. This is independent
+     of the amounts which will be required under the last clause of
+     the Terms of Surrender, about which I will address you
+     immediately. I earnestly hope that there may be no delay in
+     acceding to this request. The work to be got through in the
+     immediate future is so enormous that, unless we can get the
+     fundamental questions of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page543" name="page543"></a>(p. 543)</span> finance settled promptly, a
+     breakdown is inevitable. It would be a great relief to my mind to
+     feel that services already started and working well were provided
+     for at least for some months ahead, before I plunge into the new
+     and heavy job of restoring the Boer population, which will
+     require all my attention in the immediate future."<a id="footnotetag320" name="footnotetag320"></a><a href="#footnote320" title="Go to footnote 320"><span class="small">[320]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Mr. Chamberlain's reply comes on June 18th:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "You may incur expenditure up to £500,000 more for relief and
+     re-settlement, pending the issue of the loan."</p>
+
+<p>On June 10th Lord Milner telegraphs an outline scheme for repatriating
+the Boers. "As time presses," he concludes, "I am going ahead on these
+lines; but I am anxious to know that they have your general approval."
+The reply, dated June 18th, is: "The proposals are approved generally.
+Send by post a report on the details of the arrangement and the
+persons appointed." At the same time Lord Milner has been pressing for
+a decision on the question of land settlement. He has sent a despatch
+on May 9th containing full particulars of the terms upon which it is
+proposed to offer and to suitable applicants; and he now telegraphs,
+on June 20th:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">"It is vital to make a start".</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "If you could agree generally to the terms in my despatch, I
+     would immediately deal with some of the most pressing cases on
+     those lines. The terms may be improved upon later; meanwhile it
+     is vital to make a start."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page544" name="page544"></a>(p. 544)</span> There is land available, and there are men
+available&mdash;over-sea colonists, and yeomen with a knowledge of
+agriculture, who have fought in the war, and have, therefore, a first
+claim to be considered. But these desirable settlers cannot afford to
+wait in a country like South Africa, where the cost of living is
+abnormally high, without a definite prospect of employment.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Unless something is done at once," he says, "there will be
+     bitter complaint. [The Transvaal] Government is already being
+     severely, though unjustly, criticised for the delay."</p>
+
+<p>This is answered by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of July 7th, in which
+he "concurs generally" in Lord Milner's proposals, and leaves him
+"full discretion to deal with the details of the scheme, which it is
+not possible to criticise effectively" in London.</p>
+
+<p>In a telegram of June 21st we get the announcement of the formal
+initiation of Crown Colony government:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I have this day read and published the Letters Patent," Lord
+     Milner says, "constituting the Government of the Transvaal, and
+     my Commission; and I have taken the prescribed oath."</p>
+
+<p>And on July 3rd he suggests that an announcement should be made at
+once of the intention of the Home Government to enlarge the
+Legislative Councils of both colonies by the admission of a
+non-official element:</p>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page545" name="page545"></a>(p. 545)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">Colonists and the settlement.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would
+     be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to
+     the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present
+     improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new
+     colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of
+     public business."</p>
+
+<p>To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief
+telegram of July 7th.<a id="footnotetag321" name="footnotetag321"></a><a href="#footnote321" title="Go to footnote 321"><span class="small">[321]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the
+spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the cumbrous
+wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of
+the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of
+Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the
+tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after
+the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new
+colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever
+previously attained."<a id="footnotetag322" name="footnotetag322"></a><a href="#footnote322" title="Go to footnote 322"><span class="small">[322]</span></a> The story of this "tremendous effort," with
+its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved
+for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part
+which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the
+republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South
+Africa.</p>
+
+<p>Before we approach the actual circumstances which accompanied the
+surrender of the Boer <span class="pagenum"><a id="page546" name="page546"></a>(p. 546)</span> forces in the field, it is necessary
+to recall the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of
+the new colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and
+the Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the
+preceding year (1901). In these communications&mdash;the origin of which
+has been mentioned previously<a id="footnotetag323" name="footnotetag323"></a><a href="#footnote323" title="Go to footnote 323"><span class="small">[323]</span></a>&mdash;the significance attached by
+loyalist opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily
+left undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncements of the general
+policy of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape
+ministers, while recognising that full representative self-government
+should be conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the
+necessity of maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until
+"such time as it was certain that representative institutions could be
+established, due regard being had to the paramount necessity of
+maintaining and strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in
+question." And as, in their opinion, "this consummation would be
+ultimately assured and materially strengthened by a large influx of
+immigrants favourably disposed to British rule," they expressed the
+hope that "no time would be lost after the conclusion of the war in
+putting into effect a large scheme of land settlement." More than
+this, with the object-lesson of the actual breakdown of representative
+government in their own Colony before their eyes, they <span class="pagenum"><a id="page547" name="page547"></a>(p. 547)</span> added
+a recommendation that this British immigration should not be confined
+to the new colonies, but that a portion of the funds to be provided by
+the Imperial Government for this purpose should be allocated to the
+Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The language question.</span>
+
+<p>In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the
+settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in
+particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion
+of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of
+British government in the former Republics would afford. The
+settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated
+as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal
+administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before
+intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to
+crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore,
+insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the
+predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support
+of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the
+"Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so
+called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from
+"the Dutch language used in public offices and official documents." No
+one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth
+of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education
+sufficient to qualify him for the public <span class="pagenum"><a id="page548" name="page548"></a>(p. 548)</span> services, or for a
+professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second
+language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less
+difficult&mdash;probably more difficult&mdash;to him than to learn English, the
+desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English
+becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical
+convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making
+English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority
+to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the
+language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a
+matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South
+Africa.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa
+     generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance
+     of the English language. The language question has done more,
+     probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke
+     racial animosity."</p>
+
+<p>They, therefore, recommend that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "English should be the official and predominant language in the
+     higher courts, and in the public service&mdash;combined with such
+     concessions in favour of Dutch as justice, convenience, and
+     circumstances may require. Dutch interpreters should be attached
+     to all courts and to the principal public offices, and their
+     services should be available free of charge, in civil as well as
+     in criminal cases. English should be the medium of instruction in
+     all secondary schools, and in all standards in primary schools
+     situated in English districts, and in the higher standards in all
+     other primary schools. Dutch <span class="pagenum"><a id="page549" name="page549"></a>(p. 549)</span> should be the medium of
+     instruction meanwhile in the lower forms in the Dutch districts,
+     and it should be taught in all schools where there is a
+     reasonable demand for it."<a id="footnotetag324" name="footnotetag324"></a><a href="#footnote324" title="Go to footnote 324"><span class="small">[324]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>On the question of disarmament they wrote:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "In order to secure complete pacification, disarmament is
+     necessary. Re-armament should not be allowed until both the new
+     colonies are considered fit for self-government, and even then
+     the carrying of arms and the issuing of ammunition should be
+     contingent on the taking of the oath of allegiance."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The native question.</span>
+
+<p>On the subject of the treatment of the natives in the new colonies,
+the remarks of the Natal ministers are weighty and pertinent.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"For a long while," they wrote, "the natives cannot be given
+     political rights. The grant of such rights would have the effect
+     of alienating the sympathy of English and Dutch alike, and would
+     materially prejudice the good government of the new colonies, and
+     be provocative of racial bitterness. In the meantime the natives
+     should be taught habits of steady industry.</p>
+
+<p>"Officers appointed over the natives should be acquainted with
+     their language and customs.</p>
+
+<p>"The assumption in England that colonists are unjust and brutal
+     to the natives has worked great harm, and both Dutch and English
+     have suffered from its influence.</p>
+
+<p>"A native policy out of sympathy with colonial views is likely,
+     owing to the past history of South Africa, to arouse so strong a
+     feeling that even the just rights of natives would be
+     disregarded. It is <span class="pagenum"><a id="page550" name="page550"></a>(p. 550)</span> essential, in the interests of the
+     natives themselves, generally, that the Home Government should
+     work in accord with colonial sentiments as a whole, and the great
+     influence of a colonial minister in sympathy with colonists will
+     secure far more reforms than will any attempt to over-rule local
+     feeling."<a id="footnotetag325" name="footnotetag325"></a><a href="#footnote325" title="Go to footnote 325"><span class="small">[325]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>As one of certain immediately practicable steps in the direction of
+South African unity, the Natal Ministry advocated "reciprocity" in the
+learned professions and the Civil Services of the several colonies. To
+effect this purpose they recommended that uniform tests of
+professional qualifications should be adopted throughout South Africa,
+and that public officers should be allowed to proceed from the civil
+service of one colony to that of another, their separate periods of
+service counting as continuous "for pension and other purposes." They
+also put forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of
+the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal. The justice of this
+claim, in so far as it referred to a portion of Zululand wrongfully
+annexed by the Transvaal Boers, was recognised by the Imperial
+Government, and the district in question was transferred to Natal on
+the termination of the war.</p>
+
+<p>As High Commissioner, Lord Milner was bound to prevent the grant of
+any terms to the Boers inconsistent with the future maintenance of
+British supremacy in South Africa, now re-established at so great a
+cost. As the representative man of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page551" name="page551"></a>(p. 551)</span> British in South
+Africa, he was no less bound to see that the terms of surrender
+contained no concessions to the separatist aspirations of the Boer
+people calculated to form an obstacle to the future administrative
+union of the South African colonies. With this two-fold responsibility
+laid upon him, it is not surprising that his view both of what might
+be conceded safely to the Boer leaders, and of how it might be
+conceded, was somewhat different from that of the Commander-in-Chief.
+That the Boers themselves were conscious of being likely to get more
+favourable terms from Lord Kitchener than from the High Commissioner,
+is apparent from the anxiety which they displayed to deal exclusively
+with the former. In this object, however, they were entirely
+unsuccessful, since the Home Government indicated from the first their
+desire that Lord Milner should be present at the meetings for
+negotiation; and in the end the terms of surrender were drafted by him
+with the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon, the legal adviser to the
+Transvaal Administration.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The peace negotiations.</span>
+
+<p>The actual circumstances in which the Vereeniging negotiations
+originated were these. Early in the year 1902, when, as we have seen,
+the ultimate success of the military operations directed by Lord
+Kitchener was assured, the Netherlands Government communicated their
+readiness to mediate between the British Government and the
+Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State,
+with a view to the termination <span class="pagenum"><a id="page552" name="page552"></a>(p. 552)</span> of hostilities. To this offer
+the British Government replied that, while they were sincerely
+desirous of terminating the war, the only persons whom they could
+recognise as competent to negotiate for peace were the leaders of the
+Boer forces in the field. Lord Kitchener was directed, however, to
+forward a copy of the correspondence between the British and
+Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders. In acknowledging this
+communication Mr. Schalk Burger, as acting President of the South
+African Republic, informed Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to
+treat for peace, but that before doing so he wished to see President
+Steyn. He, therefore, asked for a safe-conduct through the British
+lines and back to effect this purpose. On March 13th, 1902, the Home
+Government authorised Lord Kitchener to grant this request, if "he and
+Lord Milner agreed in thinking it desirable." As the result of the
+consultation between Schalk Burger and Steyn, a conference of the Free
+State and Transvaal leaders was held at Klerksdorp, at which it was
+decided, on April 10th, to request the British Commander-in-Chief to
+receive representatives of the Boers personally, "time and place to be
+appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals."
+The approval of the Home Government having been obtained, President
+Steyn, Mr. Schalk Burger, and Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey
+met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 12th, at Pretoria. The
+proposals which the Boer representatives <span class="pagenum"><a id="page553" name="page553"></a>(p. 553)</span> then put forward
+were wholly inadmissible. Nevertheless, Lord Kitchener telegraphed
+them to London with the remark:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I have assured [the Boer representatives] that His Majesty's
+     Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain the
+     independence of the Republics, as this would do, and that they
+     must expect a refusal."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Independence refused.</span>
+
+<p>On the day following the British Government replied that they could
+not</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "entertain any proposals which were based upon the former
+     independence of the Republics, which had been formally annexed to
+     the British Crown."</p>
+
+<p>Upon learning this reply President Steyn and his colleagues took up
+the position that they were not competent to surrender the
+independence of their country, since only the "people," meaning
+thereby the burghers still in the field, could do this. They asked,
+therefore, for an armistice to enable them to consult the burghers.
+This request was refused on the ground that no basis of agreement had,
+as yet, been reached. The Boer representatives then asked that the
+British Government should state the "terms which they were prepared to
+grant, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence"; while they on
+their side undertook to refer these terms to the people, "without any
+expression of approval or disapproval." In answer to this proposal
+Lord Kitchener was authorised to refer the Boer representatives to the
+offer made <span class="pagenum"><a id="page554" name="page554"></a>(p. 554)</span> by him to General Botha at Middelburg twelve
+months before.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"We have received," telegraphed the Secretary for War on April
+     16th, "with considerable surprise the message from the Boer
+     leaders contained in your telegram of 14th April.</p>
+
+<p>"The meeting was arranged at their request, and they must have
+     been aware of our repeated declarations that we could not
+     entertain any proposals based on the renewed independence of the
+     two South African States. We were, therefore, entitled to assume
+     that the Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of
+     independence, and would propose terms of surrender for the forces
+     still in the field.</p>
+
+<p>"They now state that they are constitutionally incompetent to
+     discuss terms which do not include a restoration of independence,
+     but request us to inform them what conditions would be granted
+     if, after submitting the matter to their followers, they were to
+     relinquish the demand for independence.</p>
+
+<p>"This does not seem to us to be a satisfactory method of
+     proceeding, or one best adapted to secure, at the earliest
+     moment, a cessation of the hostilities which have involved the
+     loss of so much life and treasure.</p>
+
+<p>"We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to
+     spare the effusion of further blood, and to hasten the
+     restoration of peace and prosperity to the countries afflicted by
+     the war; and you and Lord Milner are therefore authorised to
+     refer the Boer leaders to the offer made by you to General Botha
+     more than twelve months ago,<a id="footnotetag326" name="footnotetag326"></a><a href="#footnote326" title="Go to footnote 326"><span class="small">[326]</span></a> and to inform them that,
+     although the subsequent great reduction in the strength of the
+     forces opposed to us, and the additional sacrifice thrown upon us
+     by the refusal <span class="pagenum"><a id="page555" name="page555"></a>(p. 555)</span> of that offer would justify us in
+     imposing far more onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the
+     hope of a permanent peace and reconciliation, to accept a general
+     surrender on the lines of that offer, but with such modifications
+     in detail as may be agreed upon mutually.</p>
+
+<p>"You are also authorised to discuss such modifications with them,
+     and to submit the result for our approval.</p>
+
+<p>"Communicate this to the High Commissioner."<a id="footnotetag327" name="footnotetag327"></a><a href="#footnote327" title="Go to footnote 327"><span class="small">[327]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Consulting the Burghers.</span>
+
+<p>Upon learning the contents of this telegram, the Boer representatives
+put forward the request that their "deputation" in Europe, Mr. Abraham
+Fischer, Mr. Cornelius Wessels, and Mr. Wolmarans,<a id="footnotetag328" name="footnotetag328"></a><a href="#footnote328" title="Go to footnote 328"><span class="small">[328]</span></a> might be
+allowed to return to South Africa to take part in the negotiations,
+and again asked for an armistice while the return of the deputation
+and the subsequent meetings of the burghers were taking place. Both
+these requests were refused on military grounds; but Lord Kitchener
+was willing to grant facilities to the Boer leaders to consult the
+burghers, and arrangements were made in the course of the next two
+days (April 17th-19th) for representatives of the Boer commandos in
+the field&mdash;exclusive of those in the Cape Colony&mdash;to be elected, and
+meet at Vereeniging, a small town on the Vaal near the border of the
+two colonies, on May 13th or 15th. During the month that followed,
+every possible assistance was rendered by the Commander-in-Chief to
+the Boer leaders with the object of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page556" name="page556"></a>(p. 556)</span> enabling them to carry
+out these arrangements. Safe-conducts, under flags of truce, and
+passes for their officers and messengers, were freely granted; and the
+localities chosen for the commando assemblies, the places and dates of
+which had been notified to Lord Kitchener before the Boer
+representatives left Pretoria, were "scrupulously avoided" by the
+British troops. In spite, however, of the restrictions imposed upon
+the activity of the forces under his command, Lord Kitchener was able
+to report, on June 1st, that "good progress" had been made in the work
+of the campaign up to the actual cessation of hostilities.<a id="footnotetag329" name="footnotetag329"></a><a href="#footnote329" title="Go to footnote 329"><span class="small">[329]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The sixty Boer representatives&mdash;two for each commando&mdash;thus assembled
+at Vereeniging appointed, on May 18th, a special commission to treat
+for peace. The commissioners, who included Commandant-Generals Louis
+Botha and Christian De Wet, Generals Hertzog, De la Rey and Smuts, and
+President Steyn, Acting President Schalk Burger, and other
+civilians,<a id="footnotetag330" name="footnotetag330"></a><a href="#footnote330" title="Go to footnote 330"><span class="small">[330]</span></a> proceeded at once to Pretoria, where, on May 19th,
+they met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner in conference, and put forward
+the following three proposals as a basis of negotiation:</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The terms drafted.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards
+     foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under
+     British supervision. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page557" name="page557"></a>(p. 557)</span> (3) We are prepared to surrender a
+     part of our territory."</p>
+
+<p>What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's
+telegram to the Secretary for War:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for
+     negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid
+     down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion,
+     nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the
+     afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner
+     proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the
+     burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of
+     objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner
+     should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as
+     possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.<a id="footnotetag331" name="footnotetag331"></a><a href="#footnote331" title="Go to footnote 331"><span class="small">[331]</span></a> They
+     will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for
+     the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the
+     draft document."<a id="footnotetag332" name="footnotetag332"></a><a href="#footnote332" title="Go to footnote 332"><span class="small">[332]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is
+to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between
+May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness
+on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they
+allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction
+to"<a id="footnotetag333" name="footnotetag333"></a><a href="#footnote333" title="Go to footnote 333"><span class="small">[333]</span></a> the Middelburg <span class="pagenum"><a id="page558" name="page558"></a>(p. 558)</span> terms; admit that there is a
+"fundamental difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their
+own may be accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;<a id="footnotetag334" name="footnotetag334"></a><a href="#footnote334" title="Go to footnote 334"><span class="small">[334]</span></a>
+and finally maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"<a id="footnotetag335" name="footnotetag335"></a><a href="#footnote335" title="Go to footnote 335"><span class="small">[335]</span></a> to the
+Middelburg terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.<a id="footnotetag336" name="footnotetag336"></a><a href="#footnote336" title="Go to footnote 336"><span class="small">[336]</span></a> To all
+this Lord Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take
+your proposal into consideration."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Payment of Boer war debts.</span>
+
+<p>On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in
+consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the
+Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State
+High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the
+negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur;
+but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the
+the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military
+and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The
+Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by
+their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be
+recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments
+for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner,
+on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very
+unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets
+of the Republican <span class="pagenum"><a id="page559" name="page559"></a>(p. 559)</span> Governments, all liabilities existing at
+the time when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay
+for expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a
+war against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate,
+utterly indefensible. The British people, he said&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of
+     hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the
+     people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much
+     smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during
+     the war."</p>
+
+<p>As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and
+receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing,
+with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home
+Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the
+Middelburg terms.</p>
+
+<p>This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the
+clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately
+became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a
+compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite
+sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course
+of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make
+a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government
+followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant&mdash;£3,000,000&mdash;and in
+rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this <span class="pagenum"><a id="page560" name="page560"></a>(p. 560)</span> sum should
+be devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued
+by them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be
+submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to
+be appointed to distribute the £3,000,000 grant.</p>
+
+<p>The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in
+the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the
+Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful
+general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and
+anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and
+arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping
+military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army
+or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted
+statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South
+Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and
+interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are
+being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is
+exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the
+actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once
+accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of
+surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to
+an agreement, it will be the <span class="italic">English</span> document which will be wired to
+England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page561" name="page561"></a>(p. 561)</span> and
+which will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not
+necessary to place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the
+British Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a
+particular matter, he replies:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain
+     promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to
+     which a reference may be made later should appear in it.
+     Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should
+     appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to
+     clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible
+     misunderstanding."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Lord Milner's vigilance.</span>
+
+<p>And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You
+must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid
+before His Majesty's Government." And, to prevent any possible
+misconstruction of Lord Kitchener's statement, "there is a pledge that
+the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly
+considered," he says:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am
+     convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this
+     document must contain everything about which there is anything in
+     the form of a pledge."</p>
+
+<p>And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he
+draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language
+to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page562" name="page562"></a>(p. 562)</span>
+"completely annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement
+should be signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the document,
+or its terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal."</p>
+
+<p>The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord
+Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated,
+unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer
+commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months
+of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of
+their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion
+and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new
+agreement." As it was, Lord Milner's faultless precision during the
+whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home
+Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer
+"delegates."</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr.
+     Chamberlain,<a id="footnotetag337" name="footnotetag337"></a><a href="#footnote337" title="Go to footnote 337"><span class="small">[337]</span></a> "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of
+     this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at
+     Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those
+     occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by
+     His Majesty's Government."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Approval of Home Government.</span>
+
+<p>At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement
+was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain
+informed Lord Milner by telegram that the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page563" name="page563"></a>(p. 563)</span> Cabinet approved
+of the submission of this document with certain minor alterations, and
+with the new clause dealing with the grant of £3,000,000, to the
+Assembly at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be
+inflicted upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed
+in private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener
+and Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had
+been settled by communications which had passed between Lord Milner
+and Mr. Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The
+reason for this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner,
+while they objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made
+part of the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless
+quite willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which
+it was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of
+Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the
+statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their
+respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on
+May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His
+Majesty's Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of
+further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to
+the assembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The
+Boer commissioners left at 7 o'clock in the evening of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page564" name="page564"></a>(p. 564)</span>
+same day for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of
+Surrender were submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher
+representatives. One other point had been raised and settled between
+Lord Milner and the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August
+7th, 1901, certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of
+confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that
+in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly
+dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could
+not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government
+concurred.</p>
+
+<p>The text of the document submitted to the burgher representatives at
+Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"<span class="italic">Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces
+     in the Field, approved by His Majesty's Government.</span></p>
+
+<p>"His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord
+     Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T.
+     Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and
+     Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange
+     Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis
+     Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the
+     Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their
+     respective burghers desirous to terminate the present
+     hostilities, agree on the following articles:</p>
+
+     <span class="sidenote2">The surrender agreement.</span>
+
+<p>"1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their
+     arms, handing over all guns, rifles, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page565" name="page565"></a>(p. 565)</span> and munitions of
+     war in their possession or under their control, and desist from
+     any further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King
+     Edward VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The
+     manner and details of this surrender will be arranged between
+     Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant
+     Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.</p>
+
+<p>"2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal
+     or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present
+     outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring
+     their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King
+     Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as
+     transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence
+     ensured.</p>
+
+<p>"3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be
+     deprived of their personal liberty or their property.</p>
+
+<p>"4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any
+     of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in
+     connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this
+     clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of
+     war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the
+     Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial
+     immediately after the close of hostilities.</p>
+
+<p>"5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the
+     Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the
+     children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when
+     necessary for the better and more effectual administration of
+     justice.</p>
+
+<p>"6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and
+     Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their
+     protection, on taking out a licence according to law.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page566" name="page566"></a>(p. 566)</span> "7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange
+     River Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by
+     civil government, and, as soon as circumstances permit,
+     representative institutions, leading up to self-government, will
+     be introduced.</p>
+
+<p>"8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will
+     not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.</p>
+
+<p>"9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the
+     Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the
+     war.</p>
+
+<p>"10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the
+     local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each
+     district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the
+     presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of
+     assisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and
+     supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide
+     themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed,
+     stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their
+     normal occupation.</p>
+
+<p>"His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these
+     Commissions a sum of £3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will
+     allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African
+     Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the
+     late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a
+     Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government,
+     and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to
+     have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they
+     will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of
+     war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally
+     given.</p>
+
+<p>"In addition to the above-named free grant of £3,000,000, His
+     Majesty's Government will be prepared <span class="pagenum"><a id="page567" name="page567"></a>(p. 567)</span> to make advances
+     on loan for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and
+     afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent.
+     interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit
+     of this clause."<a id="footnotetag338" name="footnotetag338"></a><a href="#footnote338" title="Go to footnote 338"><span class="small">[338]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Punishment of rebels.</span>
+
+<p>To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of
+the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer
+commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of
+Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner.</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"His Majesty's Government must place it on record that the
+     treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion
+     and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be
+     determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the
+     laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have
+     joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that
+     part of the British Empire to which they belong.</p>
+
+<p>"His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape Government
+     that the following are their views as to the terms which should
+     be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the
+     field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th
+     April, 1901:</p>
+
+<p>"With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon
+     surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document before the
+     resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes
+     place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the
+     punishment to be awarded to them, provided they <span class="pagenum"><a id="page568" name="page568"></a>(p. 568)</span> shall
+     not have been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the
+     usages of civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be
+     entitled for life<a id="footnotetag339" name="footnotetag339"></a><a href="#footnote339" title="Go to footnote 339"><span class="small">[339]</span></a> to be registered as voters or to vote at
+     any Parliamentary Divisional Council, or municipal election. With
+     reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape
+     Colony and all other persons holding an official position under
+     the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of
+     commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for
+     high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such
+     special court as may be hereafter constituted by law, the
+     punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the
+     court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of
+     death be inflicted.</p>
+
+<p>"The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt
+     with according to the law of the Colony."<a id="footnotetag340" name="footnotetag340"></a><a href="#footnote340" title="Go to footnote 340"><span class="small">[340]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page569" name="page569"></a>(p. 569)</span>
+<span class="sidenote">The last debates.</span>
+
+<p>With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final
+stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still
+required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly
+at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the
+morning of the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page570" name="page570"></a>(p. 570)</span> 29th the delegates assembled in the tent
+provided by the British military authorities, and a report of the
+proceedings of the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer
+commissioners on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger,
+as Acting President of the South African Republic, then announced that
+the meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses
+should be taken&mdash;to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or
+to surrender unconditionally.<a id="footnotetag341" name="footnotetag341"></a><a href="#footnote341" title="Go to footnote 341"><span class="small">[341]</span></a> The rest of the morning sitting,
+and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in
+questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various
+Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding
+between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the
+Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the
+delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually
+proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on
+the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so
+much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in
+the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria
+convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of
+accepting the British terms, <span class="sidenote">Accepting the inevitable.</span>
+each of them was anxious, individually,
+to avoid any action <span class="pagenum"><a id="page571" name="page571"></a>(p. 571)</span> which would fix the responsibility of
+the surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as
+possible from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his
+neighbour should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead
+of the question of submission being put to the vote immediately after
+the delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the
+Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted
+discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the
+afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the
+limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long
+debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke
+more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments
+used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering
+that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he
+said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of
+indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be
+continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the
+form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the
+substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice
+the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From
+this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words
+of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute&mdash;for every man
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page572" name="page572"></a>(p. 572)</span> was preparing himself for the bitter end&mdash;they came to an
+agreement." Then a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and
+empowering the commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was
+adopted by 54 to 6 votes.</p>
+
+<p>After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution
+constituting a committee<a id="footnotetag342" name="footnotetag342"></a><a href="#footnote342" title="Go to footnote 342"><span class="small">[342]</span></a> to collect funds for the destitute Boers
+was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the
+decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to
+sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.</p>
+
+<p>Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to
+Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on
+administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going
+on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the
+telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the
+Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was
+just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought
+the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner
+and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former
+British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here,
+at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page573" name="page573"></a>(p. 573)</span> o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender
+Agreement was signed.<a id="footnotetag343" name="footnotetag343"></a><a href="#footnote343" title="Go to footnote 343"><span class="small">[343]</span></a></p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Admissions of the Boer leaders.</span>
+
+<p>The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at
+Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the
+hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer
+sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people
+abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page574" name="page574"></a>(p. 574)</span> in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of
+aggression forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the
+enemies of England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the
+enemy. Very different is the account of the origin of the war, which
+Acting President Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow
+countrymen in this day of truth-telling.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he
+     said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon.
+     We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we
+     under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon
+     our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the
+     possibility of defeat."</p>
+
+<p>And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and
+one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded
+by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war;
+I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this
+"although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts,
+State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general
+of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as
+members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the
+war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page575" name="page575"></a>(p. 575)</span>
+since in the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies
+himself would have found no occasion for departing from the truth.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The Burgher camps.</span>
+
+<p>No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now
+that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that
+the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they
+regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of
+barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more
+Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought
+the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General
+de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war,
+said:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That
+     is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I
+     think also we might meet the emergency in this way&mdash;a part of the
+     men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the
+     women, and then they could take the women with them to the
+     English in the towns."</p>
+
+<p>But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any
+longer carrying this plan into effect.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of
+     provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot
+     without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then
+     well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too
+     thankful nowadays to know that <span class="pagenum"><a id="page576" name="page576"></a>(p. 576)</span> our wives are under
+     English protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our
+     greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man
+     answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to
+     the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women
+     now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how
+     can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to
+     give up liberty for their sakes?"</p>
+
+<p>And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision
+     for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every
+     kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has
+     caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get
+     them into the townships, but later on this became impossible,
+     because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the
+     idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending
+     the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable,
+     because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and
+     the men still on commando were not so closely related to these
+     families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them."</p>
+
+<p>Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the
+efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected
+areas.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">The blockhouse system.</span>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We
+     could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the
+     enemy at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page577" name="page577"></a>(p. 577)</span> every turn. But now things wear a very
+     different aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed,
+     but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our
+     commandos."</p>
+
+<p>And again&mdash;</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have
+     managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have
+     been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the
+     British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But
+     things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after
+     district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory.
+     In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its
+     forces upon us."</p>
+
+<p>To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of
+again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season
+     of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed.
+     How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that
+     they can only go <span class="italic">op-een-stap</span>?"<a id="footnotetag344" name="footnotetag344"></a><a href="#footnote344" title="Go to footnote 344"><span class="small">[344]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct
+evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers,
+and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led
+them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May
+30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of
+the English Government "may not <span class="pagenum"><a id="page578" name="page578"></a>(p. 578)</span> be very advantageous to us,
+but nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position."
+And Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the
+document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to
+stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is
+because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a
+tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it.
+What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and
+the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the
+continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief
+description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,<a id="footnotetag345" name="footnotetag345"></a><a href="#footnote345" title="Go to footnote 345"><span class="small">[345]</span></a> he
+writes:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes
+     or No. It was an ultimatum&mdash;this proposal of England. What were
+     we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Boer claim to independence.</span>
+
+<p>Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the
+question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the
+moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the
+British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their
+minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives
+agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the
+sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming
+their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History <span class="pagenum"><a id="page579" name="page579"></a>(p. 579)</span> may
+well ask, On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical
+standard,<a id="footnotetag346" name="footnotetag346"></a><a href="#footnote346" title="Go to footnote 346"><span class="small">[346]</span></a> the Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the
+administrative autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged
+by the laws of war,<a id="footnotetag347" name="footnotetag347"></a><a href="#footnote347" title="Go to footnote 347"><span class="small">[347]</span></a> they had been saved from the alternatives of
+physical annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic
+generosity of the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant
+population. From <span class="pagenum"><a id="page580" name="page580"></a>(p. 580)</span> a constitutional point of view, the
+presence of Article IV.<a id="footnotetag348" name="footnotetag348"></a><a href="#footnote348" title="Go to footnote 348"><span class="small">[348]</span></a> in the London Convention was in itself
+sufficient to refute the claim of the republic to be a "sovereign
+international state."</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Effect of surrender terms.</span>
+
+<p>Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by
+the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question
+whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating
+at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which,
+as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been
+deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually
+pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms
+actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the
+British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page581" name="page581"></a>(p. 581)</span> of the country, and left it to them to decide at what time,
+and by what stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies.
+The two respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight
+dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess
+rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language
+in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions
+are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound
+policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain
+districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small
+number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated
+homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous
+and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The
+refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves
+with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional
+Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy
+responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an
+altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police.
+At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in
+such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under
+the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient
+remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system&mdash;a
+system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition <span class="pagenum"><a id="page582" name="page582"></a>(p. 582)</span> of
+arms by the natives in South Africa&mdash;the number of rifles possessed by
+the Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government;
+while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege
+of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to
+British rule would form an additional safeguard.</p>
+
+<p>In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of
+course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of
+English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South
+Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have
+resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of
+the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have
+retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these
+circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination
+of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the
+material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was
+the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new
+administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free
+trade in language"&mdash;that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond,
+the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the
+convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of
+administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these
+concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full
+self-government would <span class="pagenum"><a id="page583" name="page583"></a>(p. 583)</span> not be granted to either of the new
+colonies until a British or loyalist majority was assured.</p>
+
+<span class="sidenote">Free initiative secured.</span>
+
+<p>But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their
+immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete
+freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for
+the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative
+reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task&mdash;at once more
+congenial and more especially his own&mdash;was discharged is a matter that
+must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of
+the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the
+review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+<a id="img003" name="img003"></a>
+<div class="figcenter">
+<a href="images/fullmap.jpg">
+<img src="images/fullmaptb.jpg" width="500" height="330" alt="Map" title=""></a>
+</div>
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page585" name="page585"></a>(p. 585)</span> INDEX</h2>
+
+<div class="index">
+<p>
+<span class="min2em">"Acting Chief-Commandant" of the Orange Free State,</span> The, his report of De Wet's success in Cape Colony,
+<a href="#page431">431</a>,
+<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Administrative reconstruction,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>,
+<a href="#page458">458</a>,
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page523">523</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Africa.</span> <span class="italic">See</span> <a href="#southafrica">South Africa</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="afrikbond" name="afrikbond"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Afrikander Bond, The,</span>
+<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">programme of,</span>
+<a href="#page050">50</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its sphere of action,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its power in Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its origin,</span>
+<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its purpose,</span>
+<a href="#page056">56</a> to
+<a href="#page058">58</a>,
+<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its first congress,</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its "programme of principles,"</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its change of policy,</span>
+<a href="#page060">60</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">members returned to it by the Cape Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page060">60</a>,
+<a href="#page483">483</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meets at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page063">63</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">adopts the Hofmeyr programme,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its manner of reuniting European communities in S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its first openly avowed aim,</span>
+<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">falls back on the policy of 1881,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its influence in the Cape Legislature,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>,
+<a href="#page093">93</a>,
+<a href="#page121">121</a>,
+<a href="#page122">122</a>,
+<a href="#page141">141</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its attempts to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page094">94</a>,
+<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the parliamentary chief and the real leader of,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's remonstrance to the Dutch of Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>,
+<a href="#page091">91</a>,
+<a href="#page092">92</a>,
+<a href="#page098">98</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the sum and substance of its policy,</span>
+<a href="#page106">106</a>,
+<a href="#page107">107</a>,
+<a href="#page119">119</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">address to Lord Milner from the Graaf Reinet branch,</span>
+<a href="#page108">108</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's reply,</span>
+<a href="#page109">109</a> to
+<a href="#page113">113</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Sir Gordon Sprigg's defiance of,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the funds of,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its domination,</span>
+<a href="#page150">150</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">nature of its "mediation" with Pres. Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page162">162</a>,
+<a href="#page169">169</a>,
+<a href="#page195">195</a>,
+<a href="#page274">274</a>,
+<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">demonstrations organised by,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the completeness with which it had undermined British power,</span>
+<a href="#page223">223</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its view of the Salisbury Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page274">274</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its activity,</span>
+<a href="#page348">348</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its attitude at the end of January, 1900,</span>
+<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">annual congress at Somerset East,</span>
+<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its policy after the occupation of the Republics,</span>
+<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its attitude in February, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page430">430</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the qualities of its leaders,</span>
+<a href="#page435">435</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its leaders decline to associate themselves with the efforts of the Burgher Peace Committee,</span>
+<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its identification with the Boer invaders,</span>
+<a href="#page475">475</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the character of the men it sent to Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page483">483</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Afrikanderdom,"</span> the doctrine of,
+<a href="#page197">197</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Afrikander nationalists, The,</span>
+<a href="#page048">48</a> (note),
+<a href="#page267">267</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the creed of,</span>
+<a href="#page048">48</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>,
+<a href="#page119">119</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their plan of a united S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Chamberlain's hope of winning their support,</span>
+<a href="#page073">73</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">strength of their forces,</span>
+<a href="#page074">74</a>,
+<a href="#page096">96</a>,
+<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their bitterness against Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">uneasiness of,</span>
+<a href="#page113">113</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dominate S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their motives with regard to the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their direct appeal to the Queen,</span>
+<a href="#page294">294</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">unmasked,</span>
+<a href="#page300">300</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their speech and action during the war,</span>
+<a href="#page343">343</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">they co-operate with the two Republics with a view to pressing their "peace overtures" on the British Government,</span>
+<a href="#page360">360</a>,
+<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their "conciliation" meetings,</span>
+<a href="#page361">361</a>,
+<a href="#page382">382</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">renewal of their alliance with the Liberal Opposition,</span>
+<a href="#page369">369</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their objects,</span>
+<a href="#page382">382</a>,
+<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their opposition to the Treason Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page395">395</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their references to Boer successes,</span>
+<a href="#page396">396</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">they slander the British troops,</span>
+<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their hatred of England,</span>
+<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">assistance rendered by them to the guerilla leaders,</span>
+<a href="#page478">478</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their commission to Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span>
+<a href="#page495">495</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Afrikander party" The,</span> the friends of in England,
+<a href="#page375">375</a>,
+<a href="#page379">379</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Agricultural Department,</span> The, formation of in Orange River Colony,
+<a href="#page525">525</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Agriculture, The</span> development of in new colonies,
+<a href="#page536">536</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Albany" settlers, The,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a>,
+<a href="#page271">271</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Albert,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Albert Times, The</span>,
+<a href="#page120">120</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Aliens Expulsion and Immigration Laws,</span> The, Mr. Chamberlain's demand for the repeal of,
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">repeal and amendment of,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>,
+<a href="#page088">88</a>,
+<a href="#page094">94</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Aliwal North,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>,
+<a href="#page411">411</a>,
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Amershof, Mr. Justice,</span>
+<a href="#page103">103</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Amery, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>,
+<a href="#page300">300</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Amphitheatre Meeting, The,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Anti-British Press, The,</span>
+<a href="#page068">68</a>,
+<a href="#page166">166</a>,
+<a href="#page205">205</a> to
+<a href="#page207">207</a>,
+<a href="#page225">225</a>,
+<a href="#page272">272</a>,
+<a href="#page349">349</a>,
+<a href="#page374">374</a>,
+<a href="#page380">380</a>,
+<a href="#page391">391</a>,
+<a href="#page403">403</a>,
+<a href="#page409">409</a>,
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Ardagh, Sir John,</span>
+<a href="#page319">319</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Arms, The surrender of,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the possession of,</span>
+<a href="#page581">581</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Army Corps, The,</span> the order to mobilise,
+<a href="#page244">244</a>,
+<a href="#page317">317</a>,
+<a href="#page318">318</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">arrival of,</span>
+<a href="#page305">305</a>,
+<a href="#page321">321</a>,
+<a href="#page331">331</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Arnold-Forster, H. O.,</span>
+<a href="#page516">516</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Asquith, H. H.,</span> his appreciation of Lord Milner,
+<a href="#page077">77</a>,
+<a href="#page092">92</a>,
+<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his utterances,</span>
+<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Attorney-General, The</span> (Cape), notice issued by as to acts of treason,
+<a href="#page480">480</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Baden-Powell,</span> Colonel, afterwards General,
+<a href="#page191">191</a> (note),
+<a href="#page329">329</a> (note),
+<a href="#page397">397</a>,
+<a href="#page530">530</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Balfour, A. J.,</span>
+<a href="#page203">203</a> (note),
+<a href="#page228">228</a>,
+<a href="#page302">302</a>,
+<a href="#page307">307</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Balfourian Parliament, The</span>,
+<a href="#page319">319</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Balliol Scholars,</span>
+<a href="#page076">76</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bantu, The,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>,
+<a href="#page012">12</a>,
+<a href="#page025">25</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Barberton,</span>
+<a href="#page452">452</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Barkly East,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Barkly, Sir Henry,</span>
+<a href="#page275">275</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bastards, The,</span>
+<a href="#page281">281</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Basuto incident, The,</span>
+<a href="#page496">496</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Basutoland,</span>
+<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">construction of the railway to from Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page532">532</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Beaconsfield, Lord,</span>
+<a href="#page024">24</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bechuanaland Expedition, The,</span>
+<a href="#page350">350</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bechuanaland,</span>
+<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the administration of the European population of,</span>
+<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Transvaal's attempt to secure,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>,
+<a href="#page074">74</a>,
+<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Dutch community in,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bechuanas, the employmen</span>t of as indentured labourers,
+<a href="#page117">117</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Beechranger Hottentots, The,</span>
+<a href="#page002">2</a>,
+<a href="#page004">4</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Belgrave, Lord</span> (now Duke of Westminster),
+<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Berry, Dr.</span> (now Sir) Wm.,
+<a href="#page124">124</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bethulie Bridge,</span>
+<a href="#page411">411</a>,
+<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">alleged movement of British troops to,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bezuidenhout, the Boer,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Blignaut, J. N., letter from,</span>
+<a href="#page258">258</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Blockhouse system,</span> The, area inclosed by,
+<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">effect produced by,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>,
+<a href="#page457">457</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">efficiency of,</span>
+<a href="#page576">576</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">extension of,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its help to the railways,</span>
+<a href="#page533">533</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bloemfontein, Meeting</span> of the Afrikander Bond at,
+<a href="#page063">63</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">opening of the railway at,</span>
+<a href="#page067">67</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">seizure of correspondence at,</span>
+<a href="#page156">156</a>,
+<a href="#page162">162</a>,
+<a href="#page206">206</a>,
+<a href="#page376">376</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the occupation of,</span>
+<a href="#page328">328</a>,
+<a href="#page363">363</a>,
+<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">visit of Lord Milner to,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the effective occupation of the district round,</span>
+<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">discussion at of the question of peace between Lords Milner and Kitchener,</span>
+<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">civil administration in,</span>
+<a href="#page524">524</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">construction of the railway to Basutoland,</span>
+<a href="#page532">532</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bloemfontein Conference,</span> The,
+<a href="#page268">268</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proposed,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">agreed to by President Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">negotiations leading up to,</span>
+<a href="#page151">151</a> to
+<a href="#page165">165</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meeting of,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>,
+<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the discussion at a closing of,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a>,
+<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the result of,</span>
+<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the four months which followed,</span>
+<a href="#page174">174</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bloemfontein Convention,</span> The,
+<a href="#page017">17</a>,
+<a href="#page087">87</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Sir G. Grey's criticism of,</span>
+<a href="#page019">19</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Bloemfontein Express, The</span>,
+<a href="#page050">50</a>,
+<a href="#page054">54</a>,
+<a href="#page063">63</a>,
+<a href="#page067">67</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Blood, Sir Bindon,</span>
+<a href="#page425">425</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bodley, J. E. C.,</span> statement by,
+<a href="#page076">76</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer Administration,</span> The, depraved character of,
+<a href="#page212">212</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer Army, The,</span>
+<a href="#page336">336</a>,
+<a href="#page337">337</a>,
+<a href="#page340">340</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer aspirations, The,</span>
+<a href="#page302">302</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer children,</span> Teaching of during the war,
+<a href="#page519">519</a> to
+<a href="#page523">523</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer Peace commissioners,</span> The, their tortuous diplomacy,
+<a href="#page526">526</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the "Terms of Surrender" communicated to them,</span>
+<a href="#page563">563</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their departure from Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page569">569</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer deputation</span> in Europe, The,
+<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer emigrants,</span> The,
+<a href="#page019">19</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer leaders,</span> The, their decision to continue the struggle,
+<a href="#page414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page417">417</a>,
+<a href="#page418">418</a>,
+<a href="#page424">424</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their disingenuousness,</span>
+<a href="#page557">557</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">penalties to which they were liable,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">they treat for peace,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>,
+<a href="#page555">555</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer raiders,</span> The,
+<a href="#page438">438</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer revolt</span> of 1880-81, The,
+<a href="#page031">31</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer Republics,</span> The (<span class="italic">see also</span> <a href="#orangefree">Orange Free State</a> and <a href="#transvaal">Transvaal</a>), creation of,
+<a href="#page017">17</a>,
+<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">scheme for their union with the British colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page024">24</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer spies,</span>
+<a href="#page337">337</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boer, vernacular,</span> The,
+<a href="#page547">547</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Boers, The,</span> the (3rd) Duke of Portland's despatch relating to their treatment,
+<a href="#page009">9</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their dealings with the natives,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the grant of self-government to,</span>
+<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their resistance to British arms</span>
+<a href="#page048">48</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their bitterness against Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their military forces,</span>
+<a href="#page181">181</a>,
+<a href="#page340">340</a> (note),<br>
+      without uniform,
+<a href="#page336">336</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">personal dealings with,</span>
+<a href="#page194">194</a>,
+<a href="#page195">195</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their friends in England,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page424">424</a>,
+<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">breaches of faith by,</span>
+<a href="#page399">399</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their losses up to November, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">final surrender of,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bond, The.</span> <span class="italic">See</span> <a href="#afrikbond">Afrikander Bond</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bond Press,</span> The,
+<a href="#page209">209</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Booy the Hottentot,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Borckenhagen</span> the German,
+<a href="#page049">49</a>,
+<a href="#page050">50</a>,
+<a href="#page066">66</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Botha, Louis,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dispersal of his army,</span>
+<a href="#page322">322</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defeat of at Diamond Hill,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defeat of at Dalmanutha,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in Johannesburg,</span>
+<a href="#page337">337</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urges his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms,</span>
+<a href="#page414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page424">424</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his determination to fight on,</span>
+<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">circular issued by him,</span>
+<a href="#page425">425</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the suffering of the Boers during the guerilla war,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">failure of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener,</span>
+<a href="#page434">434</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">stimulates his followers,</span>
+<a href="#page457">457</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">treats for peace,</span>
+<a href="#page471">471</a>,
+<a href="#page552">552</a>,
+<a href="#page554">554</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>,
+<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">letter to him from Mr. Chamberlain as to the re-opening of the discussion after the surrender of Vereeniging,</span>
+<a href="#page562">562</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advocates submission,</span>
+<a href="#page571">571</a>,
+<a href="#page577">577</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact and energy after signing the treaty of peace,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his views on the position of the Boer women and children during the later stages of the war,</span>
+<a href="#page575">575</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his testimony to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's blockhouse system,</span>
+<a href="#page576">576</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his admission as to the impossibility of again raising a revolt in Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page577">577</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Botha" terms,</span> The,
+<a href="#page471">471</a>,
+<a href="#page554">554</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bower, Sir Graham,</span>
+<a href="#page041">41</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Brand, President,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>,
+<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">discourages the Afrikander Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the rôle played by him in 1881,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Brebner J.,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Breed's Nek,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British Administration,</span> the failure of in S. Africa,
+<a href="#page001">1</a>,
+<a href="#page022">22</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">distrust of by the British in S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Bond and,</span>
+<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its impotency,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">efficiency of impaired by English party politics,</span>
+<a href="#page254">254</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British and Dutch factions,</span> The, bitterness of,
+<a href="#page244">244</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British Army,</span> The, in Cape Colony and Natal,
+<a href="#page189">189</a>,
+<a href="#page325">325</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">disadvantage in which it was placed,</span>
+<a href="#page253">253</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its performance in S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the number of effectives available,</span>
+<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its difficulties,</span>
+<a href="#page330">330</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the slander of,</span>
+<a href="#page398">398</a>,
+<a href="#page499">499</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British colonists,</span> the settlement of on the land,
+<a href="#page538">538</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British Government,</span> representatives of at the Cape,
+<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its treatment of the natives and Dutch in S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page008">8</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British Navy,</span> The, the offer of an annual contribution to the cost of,
+<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">holds the seas,</span>
+<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British party,</span> A, the creation of,
+<a href="#page150">150</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British policy</span> in S. Africa,
+<a href="#page009">9</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">up to 1897,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British population</span> in Cape Colony, The,
+<a href="#page107">107</a>,
+<a href="#page115">115</a>,
+<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">effect of the Redistribution Bill on,</span>
+<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their approval of Lord Milner's policy,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their dismay at the Imperial Government's reception of the seven years' franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page222">222</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their support of Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page270">270</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">numbers which took part in the war,</span>
+<a href="#page324">324</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">British settlers</span> in the country,
+<a href="#page061">61</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Britstown,</span>
+<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Brunt of The War, The</span>,
+<a href="#page462">462</a> (note).<br>
+
+<a id="bryce" name="bryce"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Bryce, James,</span> The Rt. Hon. M.P., attitude and public utterances of,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page314">314</a>,
+<a href="#page360">360</a>,
+<a href="#page415">415</a>,
+<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">misstatement by,</span>
+<a href="#page263">263</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the "settlement" advocated by him,</span>
+<a href="#page370">370</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of the Transvaal Government,</span>
+<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Buller, General Sir Redvers,</span>
+<a href="#page191">191</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defeat of,</span>
+<a href="#page306">306</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the early disasters,</span>
+<a href="#page318">318</a>,
+<a href="#page319">319</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his misconception of the state of affairs,</span>
+<a href="#page319">319</a>,
+<a href="#page320">320</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">at Maritzburg,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">forces at his disposal,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">false report of surrender to the Boers,</span>
+<a href="#page380">380</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bundy, Thomas Dashwood,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Bunu, the affair of,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Burger, Schalk,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a>,
+<a href="#page101">101</a>,
+<a href="#page159">159</a>,
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">denounced by Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attends the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his determination to fight on,</span>
+<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers in the guerilla war,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his official notice of June 20th, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page434">434</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps,</span>
+<a href="#page463">463</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">announces to Lord Kitchener that he is prepared to treat for peace,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">granted a safe-conduct through the British lines to consult Mr. Steyn,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span>
+<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">calls upon the meeting to decide upon continuing the war or not,</span>
+<a href="#page570">570</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his account of the origin of the war,</span>
+<a href="#page574">574</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reasons for treating for peace,</span>
+<a href="#page578">578</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="burghercamps" name="burghercamps"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Burgher Camps,</span> deportation of Boer non-combatants to,
+<a href="#page459">459</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">high rate of mortality in,</span>
+<a href="#page460">460</a> to
+<a href="#page463">463</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the camps,</span>
+<a href="#page463">463</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">condition of,</span>
+<a href="#page503">503</a>,
+<a href="#page505">505</a>,
+<a href="#page513">513</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">establishment of schools in,</span>
+<a href="#page519">519</a> to
+<a href="#page523">523</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">views of the Boers on,</span>
+<a href="#page575">575</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Burgher meetings,</span> The, the minutes of,
+<a href="#page560">560</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Burgher Peace Committee, The,</span>
+<a href="#page412">412</a>,
+<a href="#page422">422</a>,
+<a href="#page423">423</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its efforts,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>,
+<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">treatment of its agents,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a> to
+<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Bond leaders hold aloof from,</span>
+<a href="#page474">474</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Burghersdorp,</span> The theological seminary of,
+<a href="#page120">120</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="burns" name="burns"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Burns, John,</span>
+<a href="#page315">315</a>,
+<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Burt, Thomas,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Butler, General Sir William,</span> refuses to transmit a petition for protection from the British residents in the Transvaal,
+<a href="#page131">131</a>,
+<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his sympathy with the views of Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span>
+<a href="#page174">174</a>,
+<a href="#page184">184</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his views of a war,</span>
+<a href="#page174">174</a>,
+<a href="#page175">175</a>,
+<a href="#page179">179</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of the Uitlander grievances,</span>
+<a href="#page175">175</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the friction between him and Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page175">175</a>,
+<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of the attitude of the British inhabitants of S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page177">177</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his action during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of war,</span>
+<a href="#page180">180</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">requested to furnish a scheme of defence,</span>
+<a href="#page180">180</a>,
+<a href="#page181">181</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his scheme,</span>
+<a href="#page181">181</a> to
+<a href="#page183">183</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his evidence before the War Commission,</span>
+<a href="#page175">175</a> (note),
+<a href="#page181">181</a> to
+<a href="#page183">183</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his failure to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements,</span>
+<a href="#page183">183</a>,
+<a href="#page319">319</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his withdrawal from the command at the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page184">184</a>,
+<a href="#page247">247</a>,
+<a href="#page269">269</a>,
+<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his only point of agreement with Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces,</span>
+<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is informed of the Cabinet's decision as to reinforcements,</span>
+<a href="#page190">190</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Caledon, Lord, one of the first measures as Governor of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page010">10</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cambridge, The Duke of,</span>
+<a href="#page494">494</a> (note).<br>
+
+<a id="campbellbannerman" name="campbellbannerman"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, his public utterances on the war,</span>
+<a href="#page192">192</a>,
+<a href="#page252">252</a>,
+<a href="#page256">256</a>,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page314">314</a>,
+<a href="#page367">367</a>,
+<a href="#page368">368</a>,
+<a href="#page399">399</a>,
+<a href="#page416">416</a>,
+<a href="#page418">418</a>,
+<a href="#page574">574</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his treatment of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal as to preparations for war,</span>
+<a href="#page265">265</a>,
+<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attitude in Committee of Supply,</span>
+<a href="#page371">371</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his remarks in the debate on the S. African Settlement,</span>
+<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his charges of inhumanity against the Government and Lord Kitchener,</span>
+<a href="#page460">460</a>,
+<a href="#page464">464</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to the charge brought against him by Sir M. Hicks-Beach,</span>
+<a href="#page466">466</a>,
+<a href="#page467">467</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech at Stirling on October 25th, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page467">467</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his declaration at Plymouth,</span>
+<a href="#page499">499</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Canadian Precedent," The,</span>
+<a href="#page385">385</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape Colony, The, an incident in the settlement of the Dutch E. India Co. at,</span>
+<a href="#page002">2</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">isolation of at the end of the 18th century,</span>
+<a href="#page006">6</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the task of governing,</span>
+<a href="#page006">6</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the old European population in,</span>
+<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">representatives of the British Government at,</span>
+<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the temporary British occupation of in 1795-1803,</span>
+<a href="#page008">8</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">population of at the time of the permanent British occupation,</span>
+<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Franco-Dutch population in,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the "Albany Settlers" in,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the emancipation of slaves in,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">disintegrating influences at work in,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">transfer to the British Government,</span>
+<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the sphere of action of the Afrikander Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">speech of Cecil Rhodes on March 12th, 1898,</span>
+<a href="#page067">67</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">anti-British sentiment of the Dutch leaders in,</span>
+<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the political situation at the time of Lord Milner's arrival,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">division of parties in,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">aspirations of the Dutch in,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the leaders of Dutch opinion in,</span>
+<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">public meetings in,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">nationalists of,</span>
+<a href="#page142">142</a>,
+<a href="#page195">195</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the vote for responsible government in,</span>
+<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">creation of a British party in,</span>
+<a href="#page151">151</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the garrison in,</span>
+<a href="#page191">191</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">demonstrations in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">petition from to the Queen,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the British forces in,</span>
+<a href="#page243">243</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Boer aspiration to annex,</span>
+<a href="#page258">258</a>,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">organisation of the defences of,</span>
+<a href="#page269">269</a>,
+<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the British population of,</span>
+<a href="#page271">271</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">only in name a British colony,</span>
+<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">alarming rumours from,</span>
+<a href="#page305">305</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">rebellion of the Dutch in,</span>
+<a href="#page341">341</a> to
+<a href="#page372">372</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proclamation of martial law,</span>
+<a href="#page345">345</a>,
+<a href="#page411">411</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's despatch dealing with the rebellion,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">disclosure of a new centre of rebellion,</span>
+<a href="#page354">354</a>,
+<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the second invasion of,</span>
+<a href="#page383">383</a>,
+<a href="#page430">430</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">racial relations in,</span>
+<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">clearing it of the republican invaders,</span>
+<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the situation in November, 1900,</span>
+<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">De Wet enters,</span>
+<a href="#page430">430</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is chased out,</span>
+<a href="#page432">432</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the area to be protected,</span>
+<a href="#page445">445</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">response of the British population to arms,</span>
+<a href="#page446">446</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">numbers of Boers in the field in,</span>
+<a href="#page454">454</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">screened off by blockhouses,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the course of events in,</span>
+<a href="#page473">473</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">collapse of the system of responsible government in,</span>
+<a href="#page478">478</a> to
+<a href="#page480">480</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Government stipulates for certain conditions as to the procedure of military courts,</span>
+<a href="#page481">481</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">number of troops placed by the Government of in the field,</span>
+<a href="#page485">485</a>,
+<a href="#page486">486</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">treatment of rebels in,</span>
+<a href="#page563">563</a>,
+<a href="#page567">567</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Cape Argus, The</span>,
+<a href="#page243">243</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape Boys, The, the ill-treatment of,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape Civil Service, The, disaffection of,</span>
+<a href="#page272">272</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape Distriks-bestuur, The,</span>
+<a href="#page349">349</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape electoral system, The,</span>
+<a href="#page115">115</a>,
+<a href="#page116">116</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape garrison, The,</span>
+<a href="#page191">191</a>,
+<a href="#page204">204</a>,
+<a href="#page278">278</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape local forces, The,</span>
+<a href="#page281">281</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape Ministry, The (<span class="italic">see also</span> <a href="#schreinercabinet">Schreiner Cabinet</a> and <a href="#sprigg">Sprigg</a>), its views as to its duties and powers in case of a war,</span>
+<a href="#page164">164</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">and the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page193">193</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attitude of,</span>
+<a href="#page198">198</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">"moral support of,"</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its views upon the settlement of the new colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page546">546</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape nationalists, The,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>,
+<a href="#page268">268</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape Parliament, The, Afrikander Bond influence in,</span>
+<a href="#page060">60</a>,
+<a href="#page070">70</a>,
+<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Progressive majority in,</span>
+<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">prorogation of,</span>
+<a href="#page478">478</a>,
+<a href="#page482">482</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cape Parliamentary Reports,</span>
+<a href="#page395">395</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Cape Times, The</span>,
+<a href="#page048">48</a> (note),
+<a href="#page220">220</a>,
+<a href="#page379">379</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">report of J. X. Merriman's speech in,</span>
+<a href="#page062">62</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its reported interview with Cecil Rhodes,</span>
+<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its views on the Redistribution Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page117">117</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Capetown, mass meeting at,</span>
+<a href="#page204">204</a>,
+<a href="#page250">250</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">alleged plot to seize,</span>
+<a href="#page350">350</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2emitalic">Carisbrook Castle, The S.S.</span>,
+<a href="#page132">132</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Carnarvon,</span>
+<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Carnarvon, Lord, his scheme of federal union,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Carnival of Mendacity," The,</span>
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cartwright, Albert,</span>
+<a href="#page380">380</a>,
+<a href="#page381">381</a>,
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Cecil Rhodes</span>, Vindex's,
+<a href="#page068">68</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Century of Wrong, A</span>, Mr. Reitz's,
+<a href="#page356">356</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cetewayo, destruction of a British regiment by one of his <span class="italic">impis</span></span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his organisation of the Zulus,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Chaka,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>,
+<a href="#page041">41</a>,
+<a href="#page045">45</a>,
+<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his inquiry of Lord Rosmead as to the Jameson raid,</span>
+<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his active sympathy with the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page047">47</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his policy,</span>
+<a href="#page072">72</a>,
+<a href="#page073">73</a>,
+<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his choice of Lord Milner as High Commissioner,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>,
+<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch of March 6th 1897,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">accusation against,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">asserts Great Britain's suzerainty over the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his intimation to the Pretoria Executive as to the dynamite contract,</span>
+<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">accepts the suggestion of a conference at Bloemfontein, and decides to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a question put by him to Mr. Philip Schreiner,</span>
+<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">authorises Lord Milner to attend the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch of May 10th, 1899,</span>
+<a href="#page155">155</a>,
+<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">agrees with the line proposed to be taken by Lord Milner at the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his alleged determination to force a war on the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page184">184</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his declaration in the House of Commons on the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page188">188</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his desire to avoid war,</span>
+<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the support given by him to Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech of June 26th, 1899, at Birmingham,</span>
+<a href="#page202">202</a>,
+<a href="#page204">204</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urges delay in passing the limited Franchise Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">believes the crisis to be at an end,</span>
+<a href="#page221">221</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">prepared to accept Krüger's illusory Franchise Law,</span>
+<a href="#page222">222</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">statement by him in the House of Commons on the new franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proposes to the Transvaal a joint commission,</span>
+<a href="#page229">229</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his action after the repudiation by the Pretoria Executive of the arrangement made between Mr. Smuts and Sir Wm. Greene,</span>
+<a href="#page238">238</a>,
+<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">he repudiates the claim made by the S. African Republic to be a sovereign international state,</span>
+<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch of September 8th, 1899,</span>
+<a href="#page240">240</a>,
+<a href="#page241">241</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech at Highbury on August 27th,</span>
+<a href="#page249">249</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his proposal to Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman as to preparations for war,</span>
+<a href="#page265">265</a>,
+<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">repudiates the charges of bad faith brought against Sir Wm. Greene,</span>
+<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his anxiety for a peaceful settlement,</span>
+<a href="#page293">293</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his statement at Birmingham, on May 11th, 1900, as to the number of the forces in S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page325">325</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his statement at Birmingham of the nature of the settlement the Government had determined on,</span>
+<a href="#page367">367</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">sends a despatch to Lord Milner on the subjects of compensation of loyalists and punishment of rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to the views of the Schreiner Cabinet on the questions,</span>
+<a href="#page386">386</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page389">389</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">replies to the arguments of the Schreiner Ministry
+    in favour of a general amnesty,</span>
+<a href="#page395">395</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech containing the chief points in the proposed proclamation to the fighting burghers,</span>
+<a href="#page420">420</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">abandons the proposal,</span>
+<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">sanctions the issue of Governor's warrants at the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page479">479</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">refuses an appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution,</span>
+<a href="#page479">479</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">assents to Lord Milner's application for leave,</span>
+<a href="#page488">488</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance attached by him to the views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>,
+<a href="#page491">491</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">report presented to him by the Land Settlement Commission,</span>
+<a href="#page516">516</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">agrees to a tax on the mining industry,</span>
+<a href="#page542">542</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to Lord Milner's telegram on the financial position,</span>
+<a href="#page543">543</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">concurs in Lord Milner's proposals for land settlement,</span>
+<a href="#page544">544</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">approves Lord Milner's suggestion as to the enlargement of the Legislative Councils,</span>
+<a href="#page545">545</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">declines to re-open the discussion after the signature of the Vereeniging surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page562">562</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Channing, M.P., Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Chartered Company, The,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>,
+<a href="#page066">66</a>,
+<a href="#page083">83</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Churchill, Winston, Mr., his statement on the use of the word "natives" in the "Terms of Surrender,"</span>
+<a href="#page568">568</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Civil Administration, the establishment of, in the new colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>,
+<a href="#page519">519</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its progress,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page524">524</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Claremont, speech of Sir J. Rose Innes at,</span>
+<a href="#page361">361</a>,
+<a href="#page362">362</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cloete, Judge, his opinion of Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy,</span>
+<a href="#page014">14</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Closer Union," the policy of,</span>
+<a href="#page049">49</a>,
+<a href="#page070">70</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Coercive measures," Boer,</span>
+<a href="#page425">425</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Colenso,</span>
+<a href="#page306">306</a>,
+<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a result of the defeat at,</span>
+<a href="#page008">8</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Free State Boers moving on,</span>
+<a href="#page305">305</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Colesberg,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>,
+<a href="#page348">348</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Colonial Conference, The, of 1897,</span>
+<a href="#page095">95</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Colonial Office, The, the administration of,</span>
+<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a leakage from,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Colonial questions, the study of,</span>
+<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">necessity of,</span>
+<a href="#page254">254</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Colonial rebels, The, penalties to be inflicted on,</span>
+<a href="#page563">563</a>,
+<a href="#page567">567</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">surrenders of,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Colonies, The, offers of military aid from,</span>
+<a href="#page251">251</a>,
+<a href="#page324">324</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Commando Nek,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Commissie Van Toezicht, The</span>,
+<a href="#page349">349</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, The, the report of,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Concentration Camps. <span class="italic">See</span> <a href="#burghercamps">Burgher Camps</a>.<br></span>
+
+<span class="min2em">Concessions Commission, The,</span>
+<a href="#page376">376</a>,
+<a href="#page377">377</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Conciliation," movement, The,</span>
+<a href="#page343">343</a>,
+<a href="#page359">359</a>,
+<a href="#page361">361</a>,
+<a href="#page373">373</a> to
+<a href="#page412">412</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's record of the origin of the movement,</span>
+<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">injurious influence of the movement on the Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Englishmen who took part in,</span>
+<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the initiation of,</span>
+<a href="#page375">375</a>,
+<a href="#page415">415</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Conciliation Committee, The, in England,</span>
+<a href="#page415">415</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Conservative Governments,</span>
+<a href="#page255">255</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Conventions, The, Sir George Grey on,</span>
+<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner on,</span>
+<a href="#page086">86</a>,
+<a href="#page087">87</a> (note),
+<a href="#page358">358</a>,
+<a href="#page360">360</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Cornhill Magazine, The</span>,
+<a href="#page263">263</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Coronation of King Edward VII.</span>, J. E. C. Bodley's,
+<a href="#page076">76</a> (note).<br>
+
+<a id="courtney" name="courtney"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Courtney, Leonard (now Lord), his public utterances on the war,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page251">251</a>,
+<a href="#page257">257</a> to
+<a href="#page259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page360">360</a>,
+<a href="#page363">363</a>,
+<a href="#page496">496</a>,
+<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advocates the autonomy of the Republics,</span>
+<a href="#page370">370</a>,
+<a href="#page415">415</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">letter to him from President Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page372">372</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cronje, surrenders at Paardeberg,</span>
+<a href="#page328">328</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Cronwright-Schreiner, Mrs.,</span>
+<a href="#page146">146</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Crown Colony Government, formal initiation of,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>,
+<a href="#page501">501</a>,
+<a href="#page544">544</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Customs Union, The,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em italic">Daily Chronicle, The</span>, a statement in as to the crisis in S. Africa,
+<a href="#page154">154</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dalmanutha, defeat of Louis Botha at,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>,
+<a href="#page414">414</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Davies, "Karri," Major W. D.,</span>
+<a href="#page088">88</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Aar,</span>
+<a href="#page305">305</a>,
+<a href="#page354">354</a>,
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Jong, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page402">402</a> (note),
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Kock, Meyer, shot,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Delagoa Bay, The proposed railway line to,</span>
+<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its purchase recommended by Sir Bartle Frere,</span>
+<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appearance of a British squadron at,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">consignment of ammunition to,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">railway communication with Pretoria re-opened,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De la Rey, J. H.,</span>
+<a href="#page434">434</a>,
+<a href="#page552">552</a>,
+<a href="#page556">556</a>,
+<a href="#page562">562</a> (note),
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">De Patriot</span>,
+<a href="#page048">48</a>,
+<a href="#page050">50</a> (note),
+<a href="#page056">56</a>,
+<a href="#page057">57</a>,
+<a href="#page063">63</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">De Rand Post</span>,
+<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Derby, Lord, publication of his telegram of Feb. 27th, 1884,</span>
+<a href="#page262">262</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>,
+<a href="#page054">54</a>,
+<a href="#page057">57</a> (note),
+<a href="#page058">58</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Villiers, A. B.,</span>
+<a href="#page382">382</a>,
+<a href="#page404">404</a>,
+<a href="#page406">406</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Villiers, Melius,</span>
+<a href="#page160">160</a>,
+<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advocates a cessation of hostilities, </span>
+<a href="#page401">401</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Villiers, Sir Henry,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>,
+<a href="#page095">95</a> (note),
+<a href="#page102">102</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his letter of May 21st, 1899, to Pres. Steyn,</span>
+<a href="#page159">159</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his visit to Pretoria in 1899,</span>
+<a href="#page159">159</a>,
+<a href="#page160">160</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his complaint of the obscurity of the new franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page218">218</a>,
+<a href="#page219">219</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his letter to Mr. Fischer urging Pres. Krüger's acceptance of the joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page311">311</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his appeal to Pres. Steyn not to declare war,</span>
+<a href="#page292">292</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Development Loan," The,</span>
+<a href="#page540">540</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Devonshire, The Duke of, comment on Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's attitude in Committee of Supply,</span>
+<a href="#page371">371</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Wet, Christian,</span>
+<a href="#page420">420</a>,
+<a href="#page434">434</a>,
+<a href="#page562">562</a> (note),
+<a href="#page564">564</a>,
+<a href="#page575">575</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his blow at Sannah's Post,</span>
+<a href="#page363">363</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers during the guerilla war,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>,
+<a href="#page428">428</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his laager near Lindley,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">enters Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page430">430</a>,
+<a href="#page577">577</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">chased out of it,</span>
+<a href="#page432">432</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his <span class="italic">Three Years' War</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page433">433</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the pursuit of,</span>
+<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his report to L. Botha on the rising in the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page475">475</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>,
+<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">signs the Vereeniging Agreement,</span>
+<a href="#page567">567</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advocates a continuance of the war,</span>
+<a href="#page571">571</a>,
+<a href="#page578">578</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Wet, Piet, protests against the treatment of the agents of the Peace Committee,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">desires the Afrikander leaders to associate themselves with the Burgher Peace Committee,</span>
+<a href="#page474">474</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">De Wet, Sir Jacobus,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Diamond Hill, defeat of the Boers at,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Diamond Jubilee, The, celebration of on the Rand,</span>
+<a href="#page086">86</a>,
+<a href="#page090">90</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Diamond Mines, The, earnings of,</span>
+<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Merriman's association with,</span>
+<a href="#page149">149</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Diamonds, The discovery of,</span>
+<a href="#page023">23</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Disarmament, The operation of,</span>
+<a href="#page413">413</a> to
+<a href="#page469">469</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">views of the Natal Ministry on,</span>
+<a href="#page549">549</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dodd, Mr., arrest of,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Doornkop, The surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at,</span>
+<a href="#page068">68</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dordrecht affair, The,</span>
+<a href="#page496">496</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Downing Street, The impossibility of governing S. Africa from,</span>
+<a href="#page001">1</a>,
+<a href="#page022">22</a>,
+<a href="#page034">34</a>,
+<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Chamberlain and,</span>
+<a href="#page047">47</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Doyle, Sir A. Conan, his <span class="italic">War in South Africa</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page469">469</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Duncan, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page515">515</a>,
+<a href="#page527">527</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Du Plessis, H. A., his protest against the treatment of the Boers who were in favour of peace,</span>
+<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Durban,</span>
+<a href="#page271">271</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">D'Urban, Sir Benjamin, the reversal of his frontier policy,</span>
+<a href="#page012">12</a> to
+<a href="#page015">15</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Durham, Lord, his report on Canada,</span>
+<a href="#page480">480</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch, The, their first conflict with the natives of S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page003">3.</a><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch, The Cape, rebellion of,</span>
+<a href="#page341">341</a> to
+<a href="#page372">372</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the aggravation and use of their disaffection,</span>
+<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">disarmament of,</span>
+<a href="#page413">413</a> to
+<a href="#page469">469</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their sympathy with the Boer raiders,</span>
+<a href="#page432">432</a>,
+<a href="#page433">433</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their restlessness and embitterment,</span>
+<a href="#page443">443</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their general attitude,</span>
+<a href="#page444">444</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch East India Company, The, an incident in their settlement at the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page002">2</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a century and a half of their government,</span>
+<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the corner stone of their policy,</span>
+<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their instructions to Van Riebeck,</span>
+<a href="#page005">5</a>,
+<a href="#page009">9</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch language, The, the use of,</span>
+<a href="#page565">565</a>,
+<a href="#page581">581</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch party, The, interests of,</span>
+<a href="#page273">273</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch Press, The, the nationalist propaganda of,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>,
+<a href="#page106">106</a>,
+<a href="#page107">107</a>,
+<a href="#page119">119</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch Reformed Church, The,</span>
+<a href="#page120">120</a>,
+<a href="#page215">215</a>,
+<a href="#page410">410</a>,
+<a href="#page411">411</a>,
+<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch Republic, A, The establishment of,</span>
+<a href="#page255">255</a>,
+<a href="#page356">356</a>,
+<a href="#page357">357</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch South African, The, the original stock from which they are descended,</span>
+<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their essential unity,</span>
+<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's anxiety to see their best side,</span>
+<a href="#page090">90</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">anti-British sentiment of,</span>
+<a href="#page091">91</a>,
+<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their moral conquest of Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page107">107</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch, The republican,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>,
+<a href="#page019">19</a>,
+<a href="#page028">28</a>,
+<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conditions under which they were incorporated into the system of British S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page545">545</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dutch vote, The,</span>
+<a href="#page150">150</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Du Toit, Rev. S. J.,</span>
+<a href="#page050">50</a> (note),
+<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his articles in <span class="italic">De Patriot</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">rejected by the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page058">58</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reference to him in J. N. Blignaut's letter,</span>
+<a href="#page258">258</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Duxbury, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Dynamite Contract, The,</span>
+<a href="#page130">130</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Ebden, Mr. Alfred,</span>
+<a href="#page173">173</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Edgar, Tom Jackson,</span>
+<a href="#page130">130</a>,
+<a href="#page131">131</a> (note),
+<a href="#page132">132</a>,
+<a href="#page175">175</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Educational reconstruction, The work of,</span>
+<a href="#page519">519</a> to
+<a href="#page523">523</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Eerste Fabriken,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Eighty Club, The, an address to by Mr. Morley,</span>
+<a href="#page371">371</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Eliot, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page306">306</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Ellis, M.P., John,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Emigrant Farmers, The,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a> to
+<a href="#page017">17</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">England, The military unpreparedness of,</span>
+<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">ignorance of the situation in S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page251">251</a>,
+<a href="#page253">253</a>,
+<a href="#page283">283</a>,
+<a href="#page316">316</a>,
+<a href="#page323">323</a>,
+<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">hatred of,</span>
+<a href="#page312">312</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">England in Egypt</span>,
+<a href="#page076">76</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">English language, The, war against,</span>
+<a href="#page058">58</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">English State Church, The, Afrikander view of,</span>
+<a href="#page053">53</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Equal rights for all white men," The policy of,</span>
+<a href="#page001">1</a>,
+<a href="#page032">32</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Esau, brutal murder of,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a> (note).</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Farelly, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a> (note),
+<a href="#page214">214</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Farmer, Canon,</span>
+<a href="#page259">259</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Farmers' Protection Association, The,"</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a>,
+<a href="#page060">60</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Farrer, Lord,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Faure, Pieter (now Sir),</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>,
+<a href="#page105">105</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fiddes, G. V.,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>,
+<a href="#page515">515</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his report on the work of the departments of education, public works, and district administration,</span>
+<a href="#page526">526</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fischer, Abraham,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a> (note),
+<a href="#page161">161</a>,
+<a href="#page203">203</a>,
+<a href="#page204">204</a>,
+<a href="#page210">210</a>,
+<a href="#page239">239</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">acts as interpreter at the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his advice to Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in constant communication with Mr. Schreiner,</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dissociates himself from the "mediation" policy of the Cape nationalists,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">works at the completion of the military preparations of the Republics,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">revises the Boer reply to the British despatch of Sept. 8th, 1899,</span>
+<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recasts the ultimatum,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attempt to influence him to terminate the war,</span>
+<a href="#page495">495</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, The,</span>
+<a href="#page203">203</a> to
+<a href="#page210">210</a>,
+<a href="#page236">236</a>,
+<a href="#page275">275</a>,
+<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fish River, The, grants of land beyond,</span>
+<a href="#page013">13</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">FitzPatrick, Sir Percy,</span>
+<a href="#page264">264</a>,
+<a href="#page273">273</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Five Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers</span>,
+<a href="#page016">16</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Forestier-Walker, Lieut.-General, appointed to the Cape command,</span>
+<a href="#page184">184</a>,
+<a href="#page247">247</a>,
+<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">military measures of,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fouché,</span>
+<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fowler, Sir Henry,</span>
+<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Franchise for the Uitlanders, The five years',</span>
+<a href="#page037">37</a>,
+<a href="#page156">156</a>,
+<a href="#page157">157</a>,
+<a href="#page170">170</a>,
+<a href="#page172">172</a>,
+<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conditions attached to the proposed new franchise,</span>
+<a href="#page238">238</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Franchise Law, The,</span>
+<a href="#page209">209</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Volksraad discussion on,</span>
+<a href="#page213">213</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">demonstrations upon,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Krüger recommends a further modification of,</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the new law passed,</span>
+<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">obscurity of its provisions,</span>
+<a href="#page218">218</a> to
+<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">flagrant insincerity of,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Smuts offers a simplified seven years', subsequently a five years' franchise in lieu of the proposed joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>,
+<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conditions attached to the proposed new franchise,</span>
+<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Home Government kept inactive by,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">France, The attitude of,</span>
+<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Franco-Dutch population at the Cape, The,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">secession of part of,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fraser, Edmund, difficult position of,</span>
+<a href="#page175">175</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Fraser, J. G., his opposition to the policy of "closer union,"</span>
+<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">beaten for the Presidential election,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Free State Dutch, The,</span>
+<a href="#page018">18</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Frederickstad,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">French, General, his advance on Colesberg,</span>
+<a href="#page348">348</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">libel on,</span>
+<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">surrenders of rebels to,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">French, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page306">306</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Frere, (the late) Sir Bartle,</span>
+<a href="#page024">24</a>,
+<a href="#page025">25</a>,
+<a href="#page261">261</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his diagnosis of the S. African situation,</span>
+<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his difference with the Beaconsfield Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his recall,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the vindication of his statesmanship,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his knowledge of S. African conditions,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">drafts a scheme of administrative reform,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his private memo, written from the Cape in 1879,</span>
+<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">events following his recall,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>,
+<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">letter from to Sir Gordon Sprigg,</span>
+<a href="#page263">263</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Frere, Sir Bartle, and Mr. John Morley,</span>
+<a href="#page261">261</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Friend, The</span> (Bloemfontein),
+<a href="#page235">235</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Froneman, Commandant,</span>
+<a href="#page428">428</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Gatacre, General, defeat at Stormberg,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>,
+<a href="#page348">348</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">German Emperor, The, telegram of,</span>
+<a href="#page071">71</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">German General Staff, The, reply to its criticism,</span>
+<a href="#page334">334</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">German Government, The, action of,</span>
+<a href="#page037">37</a>,
+<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attitude of,</span>
+<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">German Marines at Delagoa Bay,</span>
+<a href="#page039">39</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Germiston, Lord Milner's speech at,</span>
+<a href="#page491">491</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Gill, Sir David, his words,</span>
+<a href="#page286">286</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Girouard, Sir Percy,</span>
+<a href="#page502">502</a>,
+<a href="#page532">532</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Gladstone, Rev. Stephen,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Gladstone, W. E., S. African policy of,</span>
+<a href="#page026">26</a>,
+<a href="#page031">31</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Glencoe, British force despatched to,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Glenelg, Lord (<span class="italic">see</span> also <a href="#grant">Grant</a>),</span> Cloete's opinion of his despatch reversing Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy,
+<a href="#page014">14</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Gold Industry, The, Commissions on,</span>
+<a href="#page529">529</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">resumption of,</span>
+<a href="#page536">536</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Goodenough, General, his schemes for the defence of the British colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page180">180</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Goold-Adams, Major Sir H.,</span>
+<a href="#page470">470</a>,
+<a href="#page488">488</a>,
+<a href="#page515">515</a>,
+<a href="#page524">524</a>,
+<a href="#page526">526</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Government House, watched by spies,</span>
+<a href="#page273">273</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Governor's warrants,</span>
+<a href="#page478">478</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Graaf Reinet, first congress of the Afrikander Bond at,</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's speech at,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>,
+<a href="#page091">91</a>,
+<a href="#page092">92</a>,
+<a href="#page098">98</a>,
+<a href="#page099">99</a>,
+<a href="#page107">107</a>,
+<a href="#page115">115</a>,
+<a href="#page367">367</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">opening of the railway at,</span>
+<a href="#page108">108</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the people's congress at,</span>
+<a href="#page379">379</a>,
+<a href="#page381">381</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Grahamstown,</span>
+<a href="#page061">61</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Graham, T. Lynedoch,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a> (note).<br>
+
+<a id="grant" name="grant"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Grant, Charles (aft. Lord Glenelg),</span> his reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's frontier policy,
+<a href="#page012">12</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Greene, Sir Wm. Conyngham,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>,
+<a href="#page127">127</a>,
+<a href="#page131">131</a> (note),
+<a href="#page198">198</a>,
+<a href="#page210">210</a>,
+<a href="#page226">226</a> (note),
+<a href="#page237">237</a>,
+<a href="#page238">238</a>,
+<a href="#page241">241</a>,
+<a href="#page242">242</a>,
+<a href="#page252">252</a>,
+<a href="#page290">290</a>,
+<a href="#page295">295</a>,
+<a href="#page299">299</a>,
+<a href="#page310">310</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Gregorowski, Chief Justice,</span>
+<a href="#page103">103</a>,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Grey, Sir Edward,</span>
+<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Grey, Sir George, neglect of his advice by the Home Government</span>
+<a href="#page018">18</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his exposure of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions,</span>
+<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch to Sir E. B. Lytton,</span>
+<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is charged with "direct disobedience,"</span>
+<a href="#page020">20</a>,
+<a href="#page022">22</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recalled and reinstated,</span>
+<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attitude of the Home Government towards,</span>
+<a href="#page021">21</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Griqualand West, the discovery of diamonds in,</span>
+<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">an invitation to the Boers to invade,</span>
+<a href="#page260">260</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Groebler, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page204">204</a>,
+<a href="#page205">205</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Guerilla warfare, commencement of,</span>
+<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Pres. Steyn's responsibility for,</span>
+<a href="#page414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page415">415</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">methods and conditions of,</span>
+<a href="#page417">417</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">responsibility for sufferings of the Boers during,</span>
+<a href="#page426">426</a>,
+<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">increased losses, to the country due to,</span>
+<a href="#page437">437</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">methods by which it was brought to a close,</span>
+<a href="#page450">450</a>,
+<a href="#page575">575</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Haldane, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Handelsblad</span>, The Amsterdam, an article in,
+<a href="#page050">50</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Harcourt, Sir William,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>,
+<a href="#page076">76</a>,
+<a href="#page502">502</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his appreciation of Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page077">77</a>,
+<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his misstatement on the Suzerainty question,</span>
+<a href="#page262">262</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his manifestation of hostility to the loyalist population of South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page464">464</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his financial miscalculations,</span>
+<a href="#page502">502</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hargrove, E. T.,</span>
+<a href="#page375">375</a> to
+<a href="#page380">380</a>,
+<a href="#page415">415</a>,
+<a href="#page496">496</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Harrison, Frederic,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Harry" the Hottentot chief,</span>
+<a href="#page003">3</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Heany, Captain,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>,
+<a href="#page042">42</a>,
+<a href="#page043">43</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Heidelberg,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hely-Hutchinson, Sir Walter,</span>
+<a href="#page470">470</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">prorogues the Cape Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page478">478</a>,
+<a href="#page479">479</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Herholdt, A. J.,</span>
+<a href="#page150">150</a>,
+<a href="#page204">204</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a>,
+<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his mission,</span>
+<a href="#page205">205</a> (note),
+<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his views as to the treatment of the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page390">390</a>,
+<a href="#page393">393</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Het Oosten</span>,
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Het Volk,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hertzog, General,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>,
+<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span>
+<a href="#page556">556</a>,
+<a href="#page558">558</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">crosses the Orange River,</span>
+<a href="#page430">430</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">High Commissioner for S. Africa, The, decreasing power of,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">severance of the office from the governorship of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page419">419</a>,
+<a href="#page470">470</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"High Court Crisis," The,</span>
+<a href="#page102">102</a>,
+<a href="#page103">103</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">History of the War in South Africa, The Official</span>, vol. i.
+<a href="#page309">309</a> (note) <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">History of the War in South Africa, The Times'</span>,
+<a href="#page217">217</a> (note),
+<a href="#page300">300</a> (note),
+<a href="#page309">309</a> (note),
+<a href="#page340">340</a> (note),
+<a href="#page351">351</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hobhouse, Lord,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hobhouse, Miss,</span>
+<a href="#page462">462</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Hofmeyr Compromise, The,"</span>
+<a href="#page277">277</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hofmeyr, J. H.,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the influence of,</span>
+<a href="#page060">60</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">adoption of his programme by the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his alliance with Rhodes,</span>
+<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dictates Lord Rosmead's policy,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attitude towards the offer of a contribution to the cost of the British Navy,</span>
+<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the real leader of the Bond party,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>,
+<a href="#page116">116</a>,
+<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his action to prevent the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the petition of the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">asks Lord Milner to meet Krüger in conference,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>,
+<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his methods for paralysing British administration,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>,
+<a href="#page141">141</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his motives,</span>
+<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">approaches Lord Milner as to meeting Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page154">154</a>,
+<a href="#page156">156</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his anxiety to prevent decisive action of the Imperial Government,</span>
+<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his absence from the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the pressure of his "mediation,"</span>
+<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in close communication with Abraham Fischer,</span>
+<a href="#page203">203</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">confers with Messrs. Fischer and Smuts at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page205">205</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">goes to Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the failure of his mission,</span>
+<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his relations with the republican nationalists,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>,
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page311">311</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of Mr. Schreiner's position as Premier of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his opinion of the result of war,</span>
+<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his telegram of Sept. 14th to Pres. Steyn,</span>
+<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his displeasure at the Schreiner Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>,
+<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">at a meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur,</span>
+<a href="#page349">349</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hottentots, The,</span>
+<a href="#page002">2</a> to
+<a href="#page005">5</a>,
+<a href="#page009">9</a>,
+<a href="#page010">10</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">House of Commons, The, debate in on the S. African settlement,</span>
+<a href="#page393">393</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Hunter, General, Sir A., Prinsloo surrenders to,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">"Imperial factor, The,"</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the elimination of,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>,
+<a href="#page085">85</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Imperial Light Horse, The,</span>
+<a href="#page179">179</a>,
+<a href="#page447">447</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Imperial military authorities, The, charges brought against,</span>
+<a href="#page459">459</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Imperial military railways, The,</span>
+<a href="#page502">502</a>,
+<a href="#page505">505</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Imperial spirit, The,</span>
+<a href="#page021">21</a>,
+<a href="#page024">24</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Imperial troops, The, calumnies on,</span>
+<a href="#page398">398</a>,
+<a href="#page499">499</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">insufficiency of,</span>
+<a href="#page452">452</a>,
+<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the task of,</span>
+<a href="#page435">435</a>,
+<a href="#page452">452</a>,
+<a href="#page487">487</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Impossible position, An,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Impressions of South Africa</span>, By J. Bryce, extract from,
+<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act, The,</span>
+<a href="#page396">396</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Independence," the Boer claim to,</span>
+<a href="#page578">578</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">India, The feudatory princes of,</span>
+<a href="#page311">311</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Indian Army, The, troops from for S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page243">243</a>,
+<a href="#page310">310</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Indian military authorities, The, promptitude displayed by,</span>
+<a href="#page289">289</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Industrial Commission, The, anticipation of good results from,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">impartiality of,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">treatment of its Report,</span>
+<a href="#page099">99</a> to
+<a href="#page101">101</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Industrial corporations, growth of,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Innes, Sir James,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a> (note),
+<a href="#page125">125</a>,
+<a href="#page271">271</a>,
+<a href="#page361">361</a>,
+<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">becomes Attorney-General,</span>
+<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">notice issued by him as to treason,</span>
+<a href="#page480">480</a>,
+<a href="#page481">481</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Intelligence Department, The, the work of,</span>
+<a href="#page177">177</a>,
+<a href="#page180">180</a>,
+<a href="#page190">190</a>,
+<a href="#page217">217</a> (note),
+<a href="#page233">233</a>,
+<a href="#page234">234</a> (notes),
+<a href="#page257">257</a>,
+<a href="#page277">277</a> (note),
+<a href="#page292">292</a> (note),
+<a href="#page319">319</a> (note),
+<a href="#page425">425</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Inter-State Conference, An, proposal of,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Irish Nationalist party, The,</span>
+<a href="#page465">465</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Irrigation, report of Sir W. Willcocks on,</span>
+<a href="#page516">516</a>,
+<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Isandlhwana, the military disaster of,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>,
+<a href="#page026">26</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Jameson, Dr.,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his disregard of the Reformers' message and of Rhodes's telegram,</span>
+<a href="#page043">43</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Jameson Raid,</span> The,
+<a href="#page033">33</a>,
+<a href="#page037">37</a>,
+<a href="#page041">41</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its effect on the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance,</span>
+<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">object of,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a> to
+<a href="#page044">44</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">political forces set in motion by,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">results of,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>,
+<a href="#page071">71</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Janssen, David, the murder of,</span>
+<a href="#page002">2</a>,
+<a href="#page003">3</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Johannesburg,</span>
+<a href="#page439">439</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's farewell speech at,</span>
+<a href="#page129">129</a>,
+<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the second Reform movement at,</span>
+<a href="#page132">132</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">enthusiastic meeting at,</span>
+<a href="#page198">198</a>,
+<a href="#page199">199</a>,
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">march of Lord Roberts on,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">exodus from,</span>
+<a href="#page246">246</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">situation in,</span>
+<a href="#page248">248</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">occupation of,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Roberts's decision to advance on,</span>
+<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">arrangements for the civil administration of,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">effective occupation of the district round,</span>
+<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">British population allowed to return to,</span>
+<a href="#page459">459</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner's reception at,</span>
+<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">establishment of a Town Council for,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">abolition of the office of Military Governor,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the public buildings at,</span>
+<a href="#page526">526</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">organisation of municipal police in,</span>
+<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Johannesburg insurrection, The,</span>
+<a href="#page041">41</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Johannesburg mines, The, project of wrecking,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Johannesburg Reformers, The,</span>
+<a href="#page088">88</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Johannesburg Star, The</span>,
+<a href="#page145">145</a> (note),
+<a href="#page245">245</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">extract from,</span>
+<a href="#page491">491</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Johannesburgers, The, splendid fighting of,</span>
+<a href="#page447">447</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">John Bull &amp; Co.</span>, Max O'Rell's,
+<a href="#page043">43</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Joint Inquiry, The, proposed,</span>
+<a href="#page229">229</a>,
+<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">refused by the Volksraad,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Joubert, General,</span>
+<a href="#page101">101</a>,
+<a href="#page235">235</a>,
+<a href="#page320">320</a>,
+<a href="#page344">344</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Jubilee despatch, Lord Milner's,</span>
+<a href="#page090">90</a> to
+<a href="#page092">92</a>,
+<a href="#page099">99</a>,
+<a href="#page104">104</a>,
+<a href="#page107">107</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Kafir, invasion of 1834-5, The,</span> 15.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kafirs, British policy towards,</span>
+<a href="#page012">12</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kafir wars, The,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Karree Siding,</span>
+<a href="#page363">363</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kei River, The, the Kafir's line of,</span>
+<a href="#page013">13</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kekewich, Colonel, calls for arms,</span>
+<a href="#page304">304</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kitchener, Lord,</span>
+<a href="#page303">303</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed Chief of the Staff to Lord Roberts,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his losses before Paardeberg,</span>
+<a href="#page332">332</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">instructed to proceed to De Aar,</span>
+<a href="#page354">354</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reduces to order the north-midland districts of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defamatory libel on,</span>
+<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">agrees with Lord Milner's views as to the proposed proclamation to the burghers,</span>
+<a href="#page420">420</a>,
+<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his address to the Burgher Peace Committee,</span>
+<a href="#page422">422</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">failure of his peace negotiations with L. Botha,</span>
+<a href="#page434">434</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his accession to the command,</span>
+<a href="#page452">452</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the troops at his disposal,</span>
+<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">origin of his system of blockhouse defence,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his expectations of the blockhouse lines,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reports the creation of mobile columns,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to the official Boer complaint against the system of Burgher Camps,</span>
+<a href="#page463">463</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">discusses with Lord Milner the nature of the reply to Botha's overtures for peace,</span>
+<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">instructions to his officers as to procedure in military courts,</span>
+<a href="#page481">481</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">permits the mines to re-open,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">differs from Lord Milner's views of the terms of the surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page551">551</a>,
+<a href="#page560">560</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">directed to put forward a copy of the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">assures the Boer leaders that no terms will be granted maintaining the independence of the Republics,</span>
+<a href="#page553">553</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is authorised to refer the leaders to the offer made to General Botha at Middelburg,</span>
+<a href="#page554">554</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">refuses the terms of the Boer peace commissioners,</span>
+<a href="#page557">557</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">announces "peace" to Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">records his appreciation of the energy and tact displayed after the signing of the peace treaty by Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and C. De Wet,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his last words addressed to the Colonial Governments and the Secretary of State for War,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the efficiency of his blockhouse system,</span>
+<a href="#page576">576</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kimberley,</span>
+<a href="#page259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page271">271</a>,
+<a href="#page286">286</a> (note),
+<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the diamond industry at,</span>
+<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">plans for the defence of,</span>
+<a href="#page178">178</a>,
+<a href="#page278">278</a>,
+<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lancashire Regiment sent to,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is cut off,</span>
+<a href="#page304">304</a>,
+<a href="#page305">305</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">relief of,</span>
+<a href="#page328">328</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">effective occupation of the district of,</span>
+<a href="#page453">453</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kimberley, The Earl of,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kimberley Volunteers, The,</span>
+<a href="#page280">280</a>,
+<a href="#page282">282</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kipling, Rudyard, on the attitude of the Bond</span>
+<a href="#page430">430</a>,
+<a href="#page434">434</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Klerksdorp,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conference at,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kock, Judge, warlike speech of at Paardekraal,</span>
+<a href="#page197">197</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Komati Poort, the occupation of,</span>
+<a href="#page322">322</a>,
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kotzé, Chief Justice, the dismissal of,</span>
+<a href="#page102">102</a>,
+<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">indignation caused by,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Krause, Dr.,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kretschmar, J. Van,</span>
+<a href="#page377">377</a>,
+<a href="#page533">533</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Krogh, General,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kroonstad entered,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Krüger, Paul,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a> to
+<a href="#page086">86</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his letter to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney on Sir Bartle Frere's recall,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his allusion to Germany at the German Club at Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">supplies arms to adherents of the nationalist cause,</span>
+<a href="#page071">71</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">invited to visit England,</span>
+<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">calls for the appointment of the Industrial Commission,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a>,
+<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">uncompromising attitude of,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">denounces Schalk Burger,</span>
+<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">elected President of the South African Republic for the fourth time,</span>
+<a href="#page101">101</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dismisses Chief Justice Kotzé,</span>
+<a href="#page102">102</a>,
+<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his determination to increase the disabilities of the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">signs a treaty of alliance with the Orange Free State,</span>
+<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attitude in 1898,</span>
+<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">subsidises the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">claims independence for the South African Republic,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">consents to meet Lord Milner at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his retrogressive policy,</span>
+<a href="#page160">160</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meets Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his appearance at the Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his motive in attending it,</span>
+<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the possibility of his declaring war,</span>
+<a href="#page183">183</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">expresses his intention of introducing his franchise scheme to the Volksraad,</span>
+<a href="#page193">193</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the scheme laid before the Volksraad,</span>
+<a href="#page194">194</a>,
+<a href="#page197">197</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his incapacity to yield,</span>
+<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">complexity of his franchise proposals,</span>
+<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his bid for the "moral support," of the Cape Ministry,</span>
+<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">grants a limited franchise,</span>
+<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his object in doing so,</span>
+<a href="#page210">210</a>,
+<a href="#page211">211</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">wishes to retain the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry,</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recommends to the Volksraad a further modification of the Franchise Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">inadequacy of his franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">hastens arrangements for war,</span>
+<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his secret agents</span>
+<a href="#page233">233</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urged by Afrikander Members of Cape Parliament to accept the offered joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page233">233</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">opposition to it,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">strength of his military position,</span>
+<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his note refusing to consider the British offer of September 8th handed to Sir Wm. Greene,</span>
+<a href="#page252">252</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his boast,</span>
+<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the illusory concessions embodied in his franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page268">268</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">spies in his pay,</span>
+<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his coarse duplicity,</span>
+<a href="#page277">277</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">winning all along the line,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">flees the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his "peace overtures,"</span>
+<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his letter to Mr. Courtney,</span>
+<a href="#page372">372</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his telegram to Pres. Steyn shortly before the Bond Congress at Somerset East was postponed,</span>
+<a href="#page375">375</a>,
+<a href="#page377">377</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attempt to influence him to terminate the war,</span>
+<a href="#page495">495</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Krüger, Tjaart,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a> (note),
+<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Krügersdorp, arrival of Dr. Jameson at,</span>
+<a href="#page044">44</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Kruitzinger, crosses the Orange River,</span>
+<a href="#page430">430</a>,
+<a href="#page432">432</a>.</p>
+
+<a id="labouchere" name="labouchere"></a>
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Labouchere, Henry,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page233">233</a>,
+<a href="#page237">237</a>,
+<a href="#page256">256</a>,
+<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Ladies' Commission, The,</span>
+<a href="#page511">511</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Ladysmith, British force entrained at,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Sir G. White shut up in,</span>
+<a href="#page320">320</a>,
+<a href="#page344">344</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">spies in the camp of the relieving force,</span>
+<a href="#page337">337</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lagden, Sir Godfrey,</span>
+<a href="#page515">515</a>,
+<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Laing's Nek, evacuated by the Boers,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lancashire Regiment, The, sent to garrison Kimberley,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Land settlement, proposed loan for,</span>
+<a href="#page540">540</a>,
+<a href="#page543">543</a>,
+<a href="#page544">544</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Land Settlement Commission, The,</span>
+<a href="#page516">516</a>,
+<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Langlaate Estate, The,</span>
+<a href="#page149">149</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lanyon, Sir Owen,</span>
+<a href="#page263">263</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lawson, Sir Wilfred,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Leader, The Transvaal</span>,
+<a href="#page213">213</a> (note),
+<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Legal Adviser's office, The, work of,</span>
+<a href="#page527">527</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Legislative Councils of the new colonies, The, enlargement of,</span>
+<a href="#page544">544</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Léon, M.,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Leonard, J. W.,</span>
+<a href="#page061">61</a>,
+<a href="#page093">93</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lewis, Mrs.,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Leyds, Dr.,</span>
+<a href="#page050">50</a> (note),
+<a href="#page232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page375">375</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">communication opened with European Powers through,</span>
+<a href="#page103">103</a>,
+<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">despatched to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary of the South African Republic,</span>
+<a href="#page125">125</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Liberal Opposition leaders, The, attitude and public utterances of,</span>
+<a href="#page143">143</a>,
+<a href="#page167">167</a>,
+<a href="#page192">192</a>,
+<a href="#page203">203</a>,
+<a href="#page252">252</a>,
+<a href="#page257">257</a>,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page261">261</a>,
+<a href="#page264">264</a> to
+<a href="#page266">266</a>,
+<a href="#page314">314</a>,
+<a href="#page367">367</a>,
+<a href="#page368">368</a>,
+<a href="#page371">371</a> (note),
+<a href="#page399">399</a>,
+<a href="#page414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page424">424</a>,
+<a href="#page430">430</a>,
+<a href="#page431">431</a>,
+<a href="#page460">460</a>,
+<a href="#page496">496</a>,
+<a href="#page502">502</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their desire to escape from responsibility,</span>
+<a href="#page254">254</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">renewal of their alliance with the Afrikander nationalists,</span>
+<a href="#page369">369</a>,
+<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">representations of the delegates of the Worcester Congress to,</span>
+<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Liberal Party, The, mandate to,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">friends of the Boers in the ranks of,</span>
+<a href="#page382">382</a>,
+<a href="#page417">417</a>,
+<a href="#page573">573</a>.<br>
+    <span class="min1em italic">See also</span> <a href="#bryce">Bryce</a>, <a href="#burns">Burns</a>, <a href="#campbellbannerman">Campbell-Bannerman</a>, <a href="#courtney">Courtney</a>, <a href="#labouchere">Labouchere</a>, <a href="#lloydgeorge">Lloyd-George</a>, <a href="#morley">Morley</a>, etc.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Life of Gordon, The</span>,
+<a href="#page497">497</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Lifetime in South Africa, A</span>,
+<a href="#page016">16</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Limpopo River, The,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lindley, De Wet's laager at,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="lloydgeorge" name="lloydgeorge"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Lloyd-George, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page315">315</a>,
+<a href="#page496">496</a>,
+<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Loch, Lord,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>,
+<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">retirement of,</span>
+<a href="#page074">74</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lombard, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">London Convention (1884), The,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>,
+<a href="#page087">87</a> (note),
+<a href="#page262">262</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a violation of,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Article IV. in,</span>
+<a href="#page580">580</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Lord Milner and South Africa</span>,
+<a href="#page166">166</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Loreburn, Lord, his attitude during the war,</span>
+<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lorenzo Marques, Transvaal ammunition despatched from,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Loyalists, The compensation of,</span>
+<a href="#page384">384</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lucas, General,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Lytton, Sir E. B.,</span>
+<a href="#page020">20</a>,
+<a href="#page021">21</a> (notes).</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">McCallum, Sir Henry E.,</span>
+<a href="#page470">470</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mafeking,</span>
+<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the rôle played by,</span>
+<a href="#page179">179</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">capture of an armoured train outside,</span>
+<a href="#page304">304</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">relief of,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mafeking Volunteers, The,</span>
+<a href="#page282">282</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Magaliesberg, The,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Magersfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a result of the defeat at,</span>
+<a href="#page008">8</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Majuba Hill, the British defeat at,</span>
+<a href="#page043">43</a>,
+<a href="#page186">186</a>,
+<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">evacuated by the Boers,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Malan, Commandant,</span>
+<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Malan, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page349">349</a>,
+<a href="#page410">410</a>,
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Manchester, meeting at,</span>
+<a href="#page251">251</a>,
+<a href="#page257">257</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Maritzburg,</span>
+<a href="#page271">271</a>,
+<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">public meeting at,</span>
+<a href="#page249">249</a>,
+<a href="#page250">250</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Martial law, declaration of in additional districts,</span>
+<a href="#page411">411</a>,
+<a href="#page478">478</a>,
+<a href="#page482">482</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its administration,</span>
+<a href="#page484">484</a>,
+<a href="#page485">485</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Martial Law Board, The,</span>
+<a href="#page484">484</a>,
+<a href="#page485">485</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Massingham, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page154">154</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, The</span>, Captain Mahan's,
+<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Merriman, J. X.</span>
+<a href="#page061">61</a>,
+<a href="#page069">69</a>,
+<a href="#page093">93</a>,
+<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">report of his Grahamstown speech in the <span class="italic">Cape Times</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page062">62</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his letter of March 11th, 1898, to President Steyn,</span>
+<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a>,
+<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page143">143</a>,
+<a href="#page144">144</a>,
+<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his association with the Diamond Mines at Kimberley,</span>
+<a href="#page149">149</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his partisanship,</span>
+<a href="#page149">149</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his desire to induce President Krüger to grant a "colourable measure of reform,"</span>
+<a href="#page151">151</a>,
+<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his appeal to Mr. Fischer,</span>
+<a href="#page161">161</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his breach with Mr. Schreiner,</span>
+<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics,</span>
+<a href="#page376">376</a> to
+<a href="#page378">378</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">repudiation of Pres. Krüger's statement as to his intimacy with Mr. Hargrove,</span>
+<a href="#page380">380</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his views as to the treatment of the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page391">391</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his denunciation of the policy of the Home Government,</span>
+<a href="#page391">391</a>,
+<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">purpose of his visit to England,</span>
+<a href="#page495">495</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">banquet in his honour,</span>
+<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his frankness as to his mission,</span>
+<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attack on Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Methuen, Lord, his engagements,</span>
+<a href="#page305">305</a>;<br>
+  <span class="min1em">forces at his disposal,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Meyer, J. L., his views on the war,</span>
+<a href="#page574">574</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Middelburg,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Middelburg Terms, The,</span>
+<a href="#page471">471</a>,
+<a href="#page554">554</a>,
+<a href="#page557">557</a> (note),
+<a href="#page558">558</a>,
+<a href="#page559">559</a>,
+<a href="#page561">561</a>,
+<a href="#page562">562</a>,
+<a href="#page568">568</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Military criticisms on the war,</span>
+<a href="#page330">330</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Military Notes," estimate in of Boer forces,</span>
+<a href="#page181">181</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Military preparations, delay in making,</span>
+<a href="#page242">242</a>,
+<a href="#page243">243</a>,
+<a href="#page246">246</a>,
+<a href="#page250">250</a>,
+<a href="#page279">279</a>,
+<a href="#page288">288</a>,
+<a href="#page290">290</a>,
+<a href="#page309">309</a> to
+<a href="#page311">311</a>,
+<a href="#page316">316</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Military railways, The,</span>
+<a href="#page502">502</a>,
+<a href="#page532">532</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Milner, Viscount, pre-eminence of his administration in South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page032">32</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the state of affairs he was called on to deal with,</span>
+<a href="#page033">33</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the political situation on his arrival in South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the choice of him as High Commissioner,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his official career,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his assistance to Sir William Harcourt,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>,
+<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">banquet to him,</span>
+<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">extract from his speech at the banquet,</span>
+<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">affection of those associated with him,</span>
+<a href="#page078">78</a>,
+<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his resolution,</span>
+<a href="#page079">79</a>,
+<a href="#page219">219</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">bitterness of Afrikanders and Boers against,</span>
+<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his profound knowledge of the needs of South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">efforts of the Liberal party to revoke the final arrangements of his administration,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his arrival in South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the policy of,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">travels through Cape Colony, etc.,</span>
+<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech at Graaf Reinet,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>,
+<a href="#page091">91</a>,
+<a href="#page092">92</a>,
+<a href="#page098">98</a>,
+<a href="#page099">99</a>,
+<a href="#page107">107</a>,
+<a href="#page115">115</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his official duties,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his position in regard to the Transvaal Government,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>,
+<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his anxiety to arrange matters by a friendly discussion with President Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page085">85</a>,
+<a href="#page086">86</a>,
+<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">confidence shown him by the British population,</span>
+<a href="#page086">86</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his policy with regard to the Conventions,</span>
+<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his anxiety to see the best side of the Dutch in the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page090">90</a> to
+<a href="#page092">92</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">travels round Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page104">104</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conciliatory utterances of,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to the address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page109">109</a> to
+<a href="#page113">113</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the position taken up by him towards the Cape Dutch,</span>
+<a href="#page114">114</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his impartiality,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">visits England,</span>
+<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his grasp of the situation,</span>
+<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urges the British Government to put an end to an impossible position,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his farewell speech at Johannesburg,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a>,
+<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">endorses the petition of the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his intention to make public in England his despatch on the position of the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page139">139</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">asked to meet Pres. Krüger in conference,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">warns Mr. Schreiner of the gravity of the situation,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">postponement of the publication of his despatch,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">difficulty of his position,</span>
+<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">sounded by Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Merriman as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch of May 4th, 1899, telegraphed,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">approached by Mr. Hofmeyr as to meeting Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page154">154</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">issue of his despatch of May 4th, 1899,</span>
+<a href="#page156">156</a>,
+<a href="#page169">169</a>,
+<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">consults Mr. Chamberlain as to the "line" he should take at the Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page156">156</a>,
+<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of Pres. Krüger's acceptance of a conference,</span>
+<a href="#page159">159</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meets Pres. Krüger at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his staff,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reception at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his embarrassing position,</span>
+<a href="#page169">169</a>,
+<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the compromise offered by him,</span>
+<a href="#page170">170</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his "inflexibility,"</span>
+<a href="#page170">170</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his motive in attending the Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">address presented to him on his return from it to Capetown,</span>
+<a href="#page172">172</a>,
+<a href="#page173">173</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">essence of his reply to the address,</span>
+<a href="#page173">173</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">origin of his disagreement with General Butler,</span>
+<a href="#page175">175</a>,
+<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his desire for preparations for war,</span>
+<a href="#page178">178</a>,
+<a href="#page183">183</a>,
+<a href="#page186">186</a>,
+<a href="#page269">269</a>,
+<a href="#page309">309</a>,
+<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his only point of agreement with General Butler,</span>
+<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reiterated warnings,</span>
+<a href="#page189">189</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">inadequate reinforcements sent in response to his appeal,</span>
+<a href="#page191">191</a>,
+<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">acquiesces in the negotiations after Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page195">195</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page198">198</a> to
+<a href="#page201">201</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">support given him by Mr. Chamberlain,</span>
+<a href="#page200">200</a>,
+<a href="#page201">201</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his interviews with Mr. Schreiner,</span>
+<a href="#page200">200</a>,
+<a href="#page201">201</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">assists the Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission,</span>
+<a href="#page207">207</a>,
+<a href="#page208">208</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urges delay in passing the Franchise Bill through the Volksraad,</span>
+<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">demonstrations of confidence in his statesmanship,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his influence with the Afrikander leaders,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his opinion of the new franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page219">219</a>,
+<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">points out to Mr. Chamberlain defects in the law,</span>
+<a href="#page221">221</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">prevents surrender of Home Government,</span>
+<a href="#page222">222</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his resolute advocacy of the Uitlanders' cause,</span>
+<a href="#page224">224</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">bitter attack on him in <span class="italic">Punch</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page225">225</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch protesting against the readiness of the Government to accept the new franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page225">225</a> to
+<a href="#page229">229</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">further deflection of his policy,</span>
+<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conveys to the Pretoria Executive the offer of a joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">withdraws the limit placed by Sir Wm. Greene upon the time of the reply from the Boer Government to the British Government's despatch of September 8th, 1899,</span>
+<a href="#page241">241</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the compromise proposed by him at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his anxiety,</span>
+<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">asks for another military adviser,</span>
+<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch explaining his position at the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appeals for prompt action,</span>
+<a href="#page248">248</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. (now Lord) Courtney's attack on Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page252">252</a>,
+<a href="#page257">257</a>,
+<a href="#page258">258</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">warns the English people of the advocacy of a Dutch Republic in South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">makes known to the Government the state of affairs,</span>
+<a href="#page267">267</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his colonial ministers,</span>
+<a href="#page270">270</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">support given him by the British population in South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page270">270</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">atmosphere of intrigue by which he was surrounded,</span>
+<a href="#page271">271</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">abuse of him by the <span class="italic">South African News</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page272">272</a>,
+<a href="#page380">380</a>,
+<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">passage of war material to the Orange Free State brought to his notice accidentally,</span>
+<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his personal charm,</span>
+<a href="#page277">277</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his efforts to persuade Mr. Schreiner of the necessity of providing for the defence of Kimberley,</span>
+<a href="#page278">278</a>,
+<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his advice to the Cape and Home Governments,</span>
+<a href="#page282">282</a>,
+<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his limited powers,</span>
+<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a passage in his speech in the House of Lords on February 26th, 1906,</span>
+<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defensive measures devised by him,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his use of the time elapsing between the recall of General Butler and the ultimatum</span>
+<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">instructed to repudiate the claim of the South African Republic to be a sovereign international state,</span>
+<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his anxiety to attain a peaceful settlement,</span>
+<a href="#page293">293</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives the ultimatum,</span>
+<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">warns the British authorities in Natal, Rhodesia, and Basutoland,</span>
+<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the call upon his constructive statesmanship,</span>
+<a href="#page303">303</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">consults Mr. Schreiner upon the feasibility of carrying out Sir Redvers Buller's suggestion to form local defences out of Dutch farmers,</span>
+<a href="#page320">320</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his relationship with the military authorities,</span>
+<a href="#page341">341</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">alliance against him,</span>
+<a href="#page343">343</a>,
+<a href="#page344">344</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">scant help afforded him by Mr. Schreiner,</span>
+<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch telling the story of the rebellion in the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">addresses a memorandum to Lord Roberts on the rebellion in Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page351">351</a>,
+<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view as to the defence of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page353">353</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">visits the north-midland districts of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">arrives at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page363">363</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives an appreciative address at Capetown,</span>
+<a href="#page363">363</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to the address,</span>
+<a href="#page364">364</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement,</span>
+<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his representation to Mr. Schreiner as to the proposed Bond congress at Somerset East,</span>
+<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch covering the newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet,</span>
+<a href="#page381">381</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of racial relations in Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page383">383</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives a despatch from Mr. Chamberlain on the questions of the compensation of loyalists and the punishment of rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">inquires as to the Home Government's views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page389">389</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">bitter invectives against him of members of the Schreiner Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page391">391</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">wins over Mr. Schreiner to the side of the Empire-State,</span>
+<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">indicates to Mr. Chamberlain the nature of the Treason Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page394">394</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">pays a brief visit to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page396">396</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">makes arrangements for the civil administration of Pretoria and Johannesburg,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his journey to Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">inaugurates the South African Constabulary,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives the commissions under which he is appointed to administer the new colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page398">398</a>,
+<a href="#page419">419</a>,
+<a href="#page470">470</a>,
+<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives a deputation from the Worcester Congress,</span>
+<a href="#page404">404</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply,</span>
+<a href="#page406">406</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his final departure from the Cape to the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page419">419</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his objection to issuing a proclamation to the fighting burghers at the close of 1900,</span>
+<a href="#page420">420</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">approves of Lord Kitchener's proposals,</span>
+<a href="#page421">421</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his account to Mr. Chamberlain of the situation on February 6th, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page436">436</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">leaves Capetown to assume administration of the new colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page470">470</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">incidents of his journey,</span>
+<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">discusses with Lord Kitchener the nature of the reply to Botha's overtures for peace,</span>
+<a href="#page471">471</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the position taken up by him,</span>
+<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">at Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the sphere of his administrative activity,</span>
+<a href="#page473">473</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his second visit to England,</span>
+<a href="#page473">473</a>,
+<a href="#page487">487</a>,
+<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution,</span>
+<a href="#page479">479</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">issues a notice as to acts of treason,</span>
+<a href="#page480">480</a>,
+<a href="#page481">481</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">obtains the views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reception on his second return to England,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his audience with the King,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">marks of royal favour shown to him,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>,
+<a href="#page491">491</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech at a luncheon given in his honour,</span>
+<a href="#page492">492</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">agitation for his recall,</span>
+<a href="#page499">499</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">returns to Johannesburg,</span>
+<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch describing affairs in November, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page503">503</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">invites Mr. E. B. Sargant to organise the work of educational reconstruction,</span>
+<a href="#page520">520</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appoints commissions on the gold industry,</span>
+<a href="#page529">529</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attention to the reorganisation of the railways,</span>
+<a href="#page532">532</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urges the settlement of British colonists on the land,</span>
+<a href="#page538">538</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proposes a loan for land settlement,</span>
+<a href="#page540">540</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his tireless energy,</span>
+<a href="#page541">541</a>,
+<a href="#page545">545</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his proposed tax on the mining industry,</span>
+<a href="#page541">541</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his telegram on the immediate financial position,</span>
+<a href="#page542">542</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his repatriation scheme,</span>
+<a href="#page543">543</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">presses for a decision on the land settlement question,</span>
+<a href="#page543">543</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">differs from Lord Kitchener's views upon the terms of the surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page551">551</a>,
+<a href="#page560">560</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">drafts the terms of the surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page551">551</a>,
+<a href="#page558">558</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">refuses the terms of the Boer Peace Commissioners,</span>
+<a href="#page557">557</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his care as to the English text of the Vereeniging surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page560">560</a>,
+<a href="#page561">561</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">England's debt to him,</span>
+<a href="#page562">562</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">summoned to Pretoria for the signing of the treaty of peace,</span>
+<a href="#page572">572</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mines Department, The, reorganisation of,</span>
+<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mines, The, the project of wrecking,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">permitted to re-open,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page507">507</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">native labour for,</span>
+<a href="#page509">509</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their prosperity,</span>
+<a href="#page518">518</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mining plant, injury to by Boer raiders,</span>
+<a href="#page438">438</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mining industry, Lord Milner's proposed 10 per cent, tax on,</span>
+<a href="#page541">541</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Missionaries, The, work of,</span>
+<a href="#page018">18</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mitchell, Sir Lewis,</span>
+<a href="#page485">485</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mobile columns, The creation of,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Modder River, Station,</span>
+<a href="#page322">322</a>,
+<a href="#page328">328</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Monypenny, Mr., attempt to arrest,</span>
+<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Mooi River, The,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Morgendael, J.,</span>
+<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="morley" name="morley"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Morley, John, misstatement by,</span>
+<a href="#page261">261</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attitude and public utterances on the war,</span>
+<a href="#page252">252</a>,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page263">263</a>,
+<a href="#page314">314</a>,
+<a href="#page360">360</a>,
+<a href="#page370">370</a>,
+<a href="#page371">371</a> (note),
+<a href="#page415">415</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Müller, E. B. Iwan, letter in the possession of,</span>
+<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his <span class="italic">Lord Milner and South Africa</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page166">166</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Müller, G.,</span>
+<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Municipal police, Organisation of,</span>
+<a href="#page529">529</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Naauwpoort,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Namaqualand, The election for,</span>
+<a href="#page121">121</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Napier, Sir George, his evidence before the House of Commons on Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy,</span>
+<a href="#page014">14</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Natal,</span>
+<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a menace to,</span>
+<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">public meetings in,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>,
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">petition from to the Queen,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the invasion of,</span>
+<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the British forces in,</span>
+<a href="#page243">243</a>,
+<a href="#page246">246</a>,
+<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Boer aspiration to annex,</span>
+<a href="#page258">258</a>,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">mobilisation of the local forces in,</span>
+<a href="#page280">280</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Transvaal commando sent to the border,</span>
+<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">treatment of the rebels in,</span>
+<a href="#page563">563</a>,
+<a href="#page567">567</a>,
+<a href="#page568">568</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Natal Ministry, The, views of on the settlement of the new colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page547">547</a> to
+<a href="#page550">550</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">views of on disarmament and the treatment of the natives,</span>
+<a href="#page549">549</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advocates "reciprocity" in the learned professions and civil services of the several colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page550">550</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">puts forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal,</span>
+<a href="#page550">550</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its view as to the treatment of the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page568">568</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Nationalist movement, in South Africa, The,</span>
+<a href="#page048">48</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">National Union, The,</span>
+<a href="#page041">41</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Native Affairs, The Department of, in the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Natives, The, the question of arming,</span>
+<a href="#page281">281</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the question of the franchise for,</span>
+<a href="#page566">566</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the treatment of,</span>
+<a href="#page549">549</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Navy Contribution Bill, The,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">second reading of,</span>
+<a href="#page125">125</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Netherlands Government, The,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">offer mediation,</span>
+<a href="#page551">551</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Netherlands Railway, The,</span>
+<a href="#page376">376</a> to
+<a href="#page381">381</a>,
+<a href="#page532">532</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">New South Wales, offers a military contingent,</span>
+<a href="#page251">251</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Nicholls incident, The,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a>,
+<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Nicholson, Colonel,</span>
+<a href="#page179">179</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Nineteenth Century, The</span>,
+<a href="#page261">261</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">article by Sir Bartle Frere in,</span>
+<a href="#page029">29</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Non-interference, the principle of,</span>
+<a href="#page010">10</a>,
+<a href="#page012">12</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Norman, The S.S.</span>,
+<a href="#page247">247</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Norval's Pont,</span>
+<a href="#page521">521</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Olivier, Commandant,</span>
+<a href="#page287">287</a> (note),
+<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Ons Land</span>, its pæan of triumph over the surrender of Jameson's troopers,
+<a href="#page068">68</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its reproof of Sir Pieter Faure,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its anti-British policy,</span>
+<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its indictment of the Sprigg Ministry,</span>
+<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its presentation of the objects of the Afrikander party,</span>
+<a href="#page119">119</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its article on the Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and Herholdt,</span>
+<a href="#page205">205</a> to
+<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur at the offices of,</span>
+<a href="#page348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page349">349</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its New Year exhortation,</span>
+<a href="#page349">349</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its comment on the postponement of the Bond Congress at Somerset East,</span>
+<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its approval of the slanders on British troops,</span>
+<a href="#page403">403</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its comment on Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester Congress,</span>
+<a href="#page409">409</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">libels General French,</span>
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="orangefree" name="orangefree"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Orange Free State, The, mineral wealth of,</span>
+<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">relations of the Imperial Government to,</span>
+<a href="#page087">87</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its treaty of alliance with the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page104">104</a>,
+<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">irritation in against British intervention,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">ammunition sent to,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>,
+<a href="#page247">247</a>,
+<a href="#page273">273</a>,
+<a href="#page286">286</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">alleged movement of British troops to the border of,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the danger of a premature grant of responsible government to,</span>
+<a href="#page284">284</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">decides to declare war,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Roberts enters,</span>
+<a href="#page328">328</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">annexation of,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">invades south of Orange River,</span>
+<a href="#page344">344</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Landdrosts of,</span>
+<a href="#page347">347</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of,</span>
+<a href="#page432">432</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">area enclosed by blockhouse lines,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the number of scholars on the school rolls,</span>
+<a href="#page523">523</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Orange River, The,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Orange River Colony, Lord Milner arranges for the civil administration of,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.E. of,</span>
+<a href="#page441">441</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">numbers of Boers in the field in,</span>
+<a href="#page454">454</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">progress of civil administration in,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page524">524</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>,
+<a href="#page501">501</a>,
+<a href="#page544">544</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">grant in aid of the revenue of,</span>
+<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">number of scholars on the school rolls,</span>
+<a href="#page523">523</a>,
+<a href="#page524">524</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">revenue of,</span>
+<a href="#page528">528</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">farm settlers in,</span>
+<a href="#page536">536</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the settlement of,</span>
+<a href="#page546">546</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">military administration in,</span>
+<a href="#page566">566</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">taxation of landed property in,</span>
+<a href="#page566">566</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Oranjie Unie</span>, The,
+<a href="#page055">55</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed, The</span>,
+<a href="#page049">49</a>,
+<a href="#page054">54</a> (note),
+<a href="#page234">234</a> to
+<a href="#page236">236</a> (notes).</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Paardeberg, conduct of the attack on,</span>
+<a href="#page332">332</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">surrender of Cronje at,</span>
+<a href="#page328">328</a>,
+<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Paardekraal, great assemblage of Boers at,</span>
+<a href="#page197">197</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">speeches delivered at,</span>
+<a href="#page213">213</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Pakeman, Mr., arrest of</span>,
+<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Pass" system, The,</span>
+<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Paul, H.,</span>
+<a href="#page368">368</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Peace, Preparing for,</span>
+<a href="#page470">470</a> to
+<a href="#page535">535</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Peace commissioners, The Boer,</span>
+<a href="#page556">556</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Peace Committee, The,</span>
+<a href="#page412">412</a>,
+<a href="#page422">422</a>,
+<a href="#page423">423</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">treatment of agents of,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a> to
+<a href="#page429">429</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its efforts,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a>,
+<a href="#page429">429</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Permits, The establishment of,</span>
+<a href="#page482">482</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Poplar Grove,</span>
+<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Port Elizabeth, Ammunition landed at,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>,
+<a href="#page236">236</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Portland, The (3rd) Duke of, his despatch referring to the treatment of the Boers,</span>
+<a href="#page009">9</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Pretoria, The British flag hoisted over the Raadzaal of,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a> (note),
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">war preparations at,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>,
+<a href="#page235">235</a>,
+<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">ammunition sent to,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">railway communication with Delagoa Bay re-opened,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Roberts's decision to advance on,</span>
+<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his occupation of,</span>
+<a href="#page369">369</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner makes arrangements for the civil administration,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Burgher Peace Committee formed at,</span>
+<a href="#page412">412</a>,
+<a href="#page422">422</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">effective occupation of the district round,</span>
+<a href="#page453">453</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Lord Milner at,</span>
+<a href="#page472">472</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the public buildings at,</span>
+<a href="#page526">526</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meeting between the Boer leaders and Lords Milner and Kitchener at,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>,
+<a href="#page556">556</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Pretoria Convention, The,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>,
+<a href="#page087">87</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Pretoria Executive, The, attitude of,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>,
+<a href="#page088">88</a>,
+<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Chamberlain's communication to on the dynamite contract,</span>
+<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its attempt to buy off the capitalists,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>,
+<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its committal to a policy of defiance,</span>
+<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its negotiations with the Home Government after the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page196">196</a>,
+<a href="#page199">199</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its lack of good faith,</span>
+<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">repudiates the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir Wm. Greene,</span>
+<a href="#page238">238</a>,
+<a href="#page239">239</a>,
+<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">charges Sir Wm. Greene with bad faith,</span>
+<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its declaration of September 15th, 1899, to Mr. Hofmeyr,</span>
+<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">brings negotiations to a conclusion,</span>
+<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its replies to the British despatches of July 27th and May 10th,</span>
+<a href="#page294">294</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Pretorius, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page406">406</a>,
+<a href="#page421">421</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Pretyman, General,</span>
+<a href="#page470">470</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Price, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page306">306</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Prieska,</span>
+<a href="#page354">354</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Prinsloo, Commandant, surrender of,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Pro-Boers, The manufacture of,</span>
+<a href="#page434">434</a>,
+<a href="#page443">443</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Proclamation to the fighting burghers, The proposed,</span>
+<a href="#page420">420</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Programme of Principles," The Afrikander Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Progressive Cabinet, A, formation of,</span>
+<a href="#page280">280</a> (note),
+<a href="#page390">390</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Progressive Party, The,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>,
+<a href="#page098">98</a>,
+<a href="#page116">116</a>,
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the funds of;</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their strength in the Cape Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page121">121</a>,
+<a href="#page122">122</a>,
+<a href="#page393">393</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">led by Sir Gordon Sprigg,</span>
+<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their support of Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page271">271</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">resolution presented to the Home Government by,</span>
+<a href="#page295">295</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Punch</span>,
+<a href="#page225">225</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Queen's Hall, Pro-Boer meeting in,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Queensland, offers a military contingent,</span>
+<a href="#page251">251</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Raad, The, meeting of,</span>
+<a href="#page193">193</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Racial fusion, The problem of,</span>
+<a href="#page516">516</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Railway lines, The cutting of,</span>
+<a href="#page459">459</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Railways, The, the reorganisation of,</span>
+<a href="#page530">530</a>,
+<a href="#page535">535</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Rand, The,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>,
+<a href="#page518">518</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">agitation on for reform,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recommencement of the industrial life of,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page507">507</a>,
+<a href="#page536">536</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Rebels, The, treatment of,</span>
+<a href="#page384">384</a> to
+<a href="#page391">391</a>,
+<a href="#page563">563</a>,
+<a href="#page567">567</a>,
+<a href="#page568">568</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their disfranchisement,</span>
+<a href="#page388">388</a>,
+<a href="#page389">389</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">surrenders of,</span>
+<a href="#page573">573</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Reciprocity" between the civil services of the several colonies,</span>
+<a href="#page550">550</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Redistribution Bill, The, introduction of,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">second reading of,</span>
+<a href="#page117">117</a>,
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its effect on the British population,</span>
+<a href="#page125">125</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Reform Committee, The,</span>
+<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their message to Dr. Jameson,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">alteration of their plans,</span>
+<a href="#page041">41</a>,
+<a href="#page042">42</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Refugees, The return of,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page507">507</a>,
+<a href="#page508">508</a>,
+<a href="#page512">512</a>,
+<a href="#page533">533</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Registration of electors, The, postponed,</span>
+<a href="#page476">476</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Reichstag, The S.S.</span>,
+<a href="#page236">236</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Reinforcements, The, character of,</span>
+<a href="#page330">330</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Reitz, F. W.,</span>
+<a href="#page050">50</a>,
+<a href="#page144">144</a>,
+<a href="#page159">159</a>,
+<a href="#page294">294</a>,
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his policy of "closer union,"</span>
+<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">takes Dr. Leyds's place as State Secretary,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">asserts the Sovereignty of the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page127">127</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to Mr. Chamberlain's communication on the dynamite contract,</span>
+<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">instructed to decline Mr. Chamberlain's request for delay in passing the Franchise Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page211">211</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch refusing the preferred joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">communicates to the British Government Mr. Smut's new proposals for a five years' franchise,</span>
+<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatch repudiating the Smuts-Greene arrangement,</span>
+<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his appeal to "Free Staters and Brother Afrikanders,"</span>
+<a href="#page297">297</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Amery's meeting with him,</span>
+<a href="#page300">300</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his book, <span class="italic">A Century of Wrong</span>,</span>
+<a href="#page356">356</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a letter of his published by the Concessions Commission,</span>
+<a href="#page377">377</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Repatriation scheme, Lord Milner's,</span>
+<a href="#page543">543</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Republican nationalists, The,</span>
+<a href="#page259">259</a>,
+<a href="#page275">275</a>,
+<a href="#page282">282</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their hatred of England,</span>
+<a href="#page429">429</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Republican United States of South Africa, The,</span>
+<a href="#page258">258</a>,
+<a href="#page259">259</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Republics, The, military preparations of,</span>
+<a href="#page166">166</a>,
+<a href="#page167">167</a>,
+<a href="#page178">178</a>,
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">expulsion of British subjects from,</span>
+<a href="#page246">246</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">manifestoes issued by upon the outbreak of war,</span>
+<a href="#page257">257</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their treatment of British residents on the declaration of war,</span>
+<a href="#page292">292</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">fall of,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the British case against,</span>
+<a href="#page357">357</a> to
+<a href="#page359">359</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Reserves, Insufficient supply of,</span>
+<a href="#page323">323</a>,
+<a href="#page331">331</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Retrocession, The,</span>
+<a href="#page255">255</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Rhodes, Cecil,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>,
+<a href="#page035">35</a>,
+<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his scheme of commercial federation,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a>,
+<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his comment on Dr. Jameson's Raid,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">actual cause of the failure of his plan,</span>
+<a href="#page045">45</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his methods,</span>
+<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his alliance with the Afrikander Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his alliance with J. H. Hofmeyr,</span>
+<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">an incident in his political career,</span>
+<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech of March 12th, 1898,</span>
+<a href="#page067">67</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recognised by the Bond as its enemy,</span>
+<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his resignation,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>,
+<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his return to political life,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the actual chief of the Progressives,</span>
+<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">opposed at Barkly West,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">returned for both Barkly West and Namaqualand,</span>
+<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his tactics after the election following upon Sir Gordon Sprigg's dissolution of Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a>,
+<a href="#page123">123</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his interview with Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a> (note);
+    <span class="min1em">his anger at the impotence of England,</span>
+<a href="#page306">306</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution,</span>
+<a href="#page479">479</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Rhodesia,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>,
+<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">demonstration in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">petition from to the Queen,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">organisation of the defences of,</span>
+<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">warned by Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page298">298</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Ripon, The Marquess of,</span>
+<a href="#page037">37</a>,
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Roberts, Lord,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a result of his occupation of Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page156">156</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed to the South African command,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">strength of his force,</span>
+<a href="#page322">322</a>,
+<a href="#page332">332</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his despatches,</span>
+<a href="#page326">326</a> to
+<a href="#page328">328</a>,
+<a href="#page339">339</a>,
+<a href="#page341">341</a>,
+<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his tactics at Paardeberg,</span>
+<a href="#page332">332</a>,
+<a href="#page333">333</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his alleged instructions from the Government,</span>
+<a href="#page333">333</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a reply to criticism of German General Staff upon his strategy,</span>
+<a href="#page334">334</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his campaign,</span>
+<a href="#page343">343</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his decision to advance on Johannesburg and Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page352">352</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his qualities as a captain of war,</span>
+<a href="#page353">353</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">why he did not carry out Lord Milner's suggestion as to the defence of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page353">353</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his occupation of Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page369">369</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his enforced halt at Bloemfontein,</span>
+<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his approaching return to England,</span>
+<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his recognition of the difficulty of the task of disarmament,</span>
+<a href="#page413">413</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">relinquishes command of the forces in South Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page419">419</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">agrees with Lord Milner's views on the proposed proclamation to the burghers,</span>
+<a href="#page420">420</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his proclamation,</span>
+<a href="#page424">424</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his victories,</span>
+<a href="#page435">435</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">sends some of the civilian population to L. Botha,</span>
+<a href="#page452">452</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Robertson, Edmund, M.P.,</span>
+<a href="#page417">417</a>,
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech at Dundee on Oct. 16th, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page467">467</a>,
+<a href="#page468">468</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Robinson, J. B.,</span>
+<a href="#page149">149</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Robinson, Sir John, his view of the reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's frontier policy,</span>
+<a href="#page016">16</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Roos Senekal, capture of documents at,</span>
+<a href="#page425">425</a>,
+<a href="#page426">426</a>,
+<a href="#page431">431</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">circular issued at,</span>
+<a href="#page463">463</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Rosebery Lord, his appreciation of Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page077">77</a>,
+<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his support of the Government,</span>
+<a href="#page264">264</a>,
+<a href="#page416">416</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Rosmead,</span>
+<a href="#page455">455</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Rosmead, Lord,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>,
+<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his action,</span>
+<a href="#page045">45</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his response to Mr. Chamberlain's counsels,</span>
+<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his policy,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attitude at Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">intimates his wish to retire,</span>
+<a href="#page074">74</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his resistance to the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize Bechuanaland,</span>
+<a href="#page074">74</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">retires,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his promise to obtain reasonable reforms from. President Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page088">88</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Rosslyn Castle, The S.S.</span>,
+<a href="#page305">305</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min1em">Russia, attitude of,</span>
+<a href="#page311">311</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">St. Aldwyn, Lord, his charge against members of the Liberal Opposition and the Irish Nationalists,</span>
+<a href="#page465">465</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Salisbury, The (late) Marquess of,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">sympathetic speech of on the Transvaal question,</span>
+<a href="#page228">228</a>,
+<a href="#page229">229</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his answer to the charge of "military unpreparedness,"</span>
+<a href="#page265">265</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives "peace overtures,"</span>
+<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply,</span>
+<a href="#page357">357</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his indignant comment on the attitude of the Liberal leaders,</span>
+<a href="#page416">416</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his charge against Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman,</span>
+<a href="#page466">466</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Salisbury Cabinet, The, reluctance of to push matters to an extremity,</span>
+<a href="#page176">176</a>,
+<a href="#page188">188</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its disregard of Lord Wolseley's advice,</span>
+<a href="#page177">177</a>,
+<a href="#page188">188</a>,
+<a href="#page189">189</a>,
+<a href="#page190">190</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its decision as to reinforcements,</span>
+<a href="#page190">190</a>,
+<a href="#page191">191</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the course it decided to adopt,</span>
+<a href="#page196">196</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its weakness,</span>
+<a href="#page223">223</a>,
+<a href="#page224">224</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">determines to make a definite announcement of its South African policy;</span>
+<a href="#page228">228</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">position taken up by it,</span>
+<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its last effort to come to a friendly understanding,</span>
+<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its despatch of Sept, 8th, 1899,</span>
+<a href="#page241">241</a>,
+<a href="#page242">242</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">decides to raise the strength of the Natal and Cape forces,</span>
+<a href="#page242">242</a>,
+<a href="#page243">243</a>,
+<a href="#page246">246</a>,
+<a href="#page250">250</a>,
+<a href="#page279">279</a>,
+<a href="#page288">288</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its reluctance to make war,</span>
+<a href="#page251">251</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">patriotism of,</span>
+<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Afrikander leaders' view of,</span>
+<a href="#page274">274</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">decides to mobilise an army corps,</span>
+<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its military action,</span>
+<a href="#page309">309</a>,
+<a href="#page310">310</a>,
+<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its alleged instructions to Lord Roberts,</span>
+<a href="#page333">333</a>,
+<a href="#page334">334</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its decision as to the Conventions,</span>
+<a href="#page360">360</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sand River Convention, The,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Sir George Grey's exposure of,</span>
+<a href="#page019">19</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sannah's Post,</span>
+<a href="#page363">363</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sargant, E. B., his story of the educational efforts during the war,</span>
+<a href="#page520">520</a> to
+<a href="#page523">523</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sauer, Hans,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sauer, J. W., joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a>,
+<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his sympathy with the Boers,</span>
+<a href="#page149">149</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his mission to Dordrecht,</span>
+<a href="#page287">287</a> (note),
+<a href="#page379">379</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his breach with Mr. Schreiner,</span>
+<a href="#page361">361</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics,</span>
+<a href="#page376">376</a>,
+<a href="#page377">377</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his intimacy with Mr. Hargrove,</span>
+<a href="#page379">379</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his repudiation of Pres. Krüger's statement as to his connection with Mr. Hargrove,</span>
+<a href="#page380">380</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his declaration when opposing the second reading of the Treason Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page396">396</a>,
+<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">purpose of his visit to England,</span>
+<a href="#page495">495</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">banquet in his honour,</span>
+<a href="#page496">496</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his frankness as to his mission,</span>
+<a href="#page497">497</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Scheepers,</span>
+<a href="#page432">432</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="schreinercabinet" name="schreinercabinet"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Schreiner Cabinet, The,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a>,
+<a href="#page124">124</a>,
+<a href="#page141">141</a>,
+<a href="#page150">150</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Bond Members of,</span>
+<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its desire to prevent British intervention,</span>
+<a href="#page150">150</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its "planks,"</span>
+<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Te Water correspondence,</span>
+<a href="#page162">162</a> to
+<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its opinion of Pres. Krüger's franchise proposals,</span>
+<a href="#page198">198</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">uses its influence to assist the Pretoria Executive in refusing the franchise reform put forward by Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page199">199</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its refusal to call out the local forces,</span>
+<a href="#page280">280</a> to
+<a href="#page283">283</a>,
+<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">refuses aid to Mafeking and Kimberley,</span>
+<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its demise,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>,
+<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">individual views of the members on the treatment of the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page390">390</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Schreiner-Bond coalition, The,</span>
+<a href="#page098">98</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Schreiner, Olive,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Schreiner, Philip, adopted as the parliamentary leader by the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">moves a vote of "no confidence" in the Sprigg Ministry,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his electoral utterances,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">forms a ministry,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">warned by Lord Milner of the gravity of the situation,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his blind partisanship for the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page142">142</a>,
+<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his relationship to Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page143">143</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his history,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his regard for the British Empire,</span>
+<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his reply to a question of Mr. Chamberlain's,</span>
+<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander nationalists,</span>
+<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives warning telegrams from England,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>,
+<a href="#page154">154</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">writes a confidential letter to President Steyn,</span>
+<a href="#page154">154</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the influence which he used with the Transvaal Government,</span>
+<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of Krüger's acceptance of a conference,</span>
+<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his solicitude to attend the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his partisanship on the question of the franchise,</span>
+<a href="#page198">198</a>,
+<a href="#page199">199</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">informed of the Home Governments' intention to "complete" the Cape Garrison,</span>
+<a href="#page204">204</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view of the grant of a limited franchise to the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>,
+<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his position,</span>
+<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his declaration as to the attitude he would assume in the event of war,</span>
+<a href="#page248">248</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his knowledge of the Port Elizabeth ammunition for the Free State,</span>
+<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his benediction of Pres. Krüger's Bloemfontein scheme and of the Volksraad's proposals,</span>
+<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his complex political creed,</span>
+<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his resistance to Lord Milner's plans of local military preparation,</span>
+<a href="#page278">278</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recedes from his standpoint of neutrality,</span>
+<a href="#page280">280</a>,
+<a href="#page344">344</a>,
+<a href="#page345">345</a>,
+<a href="#page373">373</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is prevailed on to call out the Kimberley volunteers,</span>
+<a href="#page280">280</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his final concession,</span>
+<a href="#page281">281</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">fails to provide Kimberley with arms,</span>
+<a href="#page304">304</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">consents to the proclamation of martial law,</span>
+<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">scant help afforded by him to Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page345">345</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span>
+<a href="#page361">361</a>,
+<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">uses his influence for the postponement of the Bond Congress at Somerset East,</span>
+<a href="#page374">374</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is brought into conflict with the Bond members of his Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page384">384</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his views upon the nature of the punishment to be inflicted on rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page385">385</a>,
+<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his sense of loyalty to the person of the Sovereign,</span>
+<a href="#page392">392</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his support of the Treason Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page474">474</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Schreiner, Theophilus,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Schutte, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Science of Rebellion, The</span>,
+<a href="#page431">431</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Seale-Hayne, M.P., Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Select Committee on British South Africa, The proceedings of, extract from,</span>
+<a href="#page146">146</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Settlement after the War, The</span>,
+<a href="#page214">214</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Settlement of the new colonies, The, the question of,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page564">564</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Seventeen, The Chamber of,</span>
+<a href="#page003">3</a>,
+<a href="#page004">4</a>,
+<a href="#page005">5</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Shaw, M.P., Thomas,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his speech at Galashiels on October 14th, 1901,</span>
+<a href="#page467">467</a>,
+<a href="#page468">468</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sherman, General,</span>
+<a href="#page451">451</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Showers, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page529">529</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Silberbauer, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Simon's Bay,</span>
+<a href="#page057">57</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Slaghter's Nek, the "rebellion" of,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Slaves, The emancipation of in Cape Colony,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Smalldeel,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Smartt, Dr.,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Smuts, J. C.,</span>
+<a href="#page152">152</a>,
+<a href="#page159">159</a>,
+<a href="#page204">204</a>,
+<a href="#page212">212</a> (note),
+<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed State Attorney,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attends the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">report in <span class="italic">The Times</span> of a conversation with,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is entrusted with the projected destruction of the mines,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">furnishes an explanatory memorandum of the new franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">offers Sir William Greene a simplified seven years' franchise in lieu of a joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>,
+<a href="#page238">238</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his attempt to disown the arrest of Mr. Pakeman,</span>
+<a href="#page245">245</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his words at Vereeniging on May 30th, 1902,</span>
+<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene through him,</span>
+<a href="#page309">309</a>,
+<a href="#page310">310</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span>
+<a href="#page556">556</a>,
+<a href="#page558">558</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his suggestion as to a "formal clause" in the draft Vereeniging agreement,</span>
+<a href="#page561">561</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the origin of the war,</span>
+<a href="#page574">574</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Solomon, Saul,</span>
+<a href="#page147">147</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Solomon, Sir R.,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">accepts office under the Schreiner Ministry as Attorney-General,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a>,
+<a href="#page142">142</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a>,
+<a href="#page147">147</a>,
+<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his distrust of Rhodes,</span>
+<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer,</span>
+<a href="#page361">361</a>,
+<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">visits the north-midland districts of the Cape with Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page362">362</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his views as to the treatment of the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page390">390</a>,
+<a href="#page393">393</a>,
+<a href="#page395">395</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his support of the Treason Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed Legal Adviser to the New Transvaal administration,</span>
+<a href="#page474">474</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">help afforded by him to Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page515">515</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his energy and capacity,</span>
+<a href="#page527">527</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">presides over a commission on the gold industry,</span>
+<a href="#page529">529</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">assists Lord Milner in the draft of the terms of the Vereeniging surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page551">551</a>,
+<a href="#page558">558</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Somerset East, Annual Congress at,</span>
+<a href="#page374">374</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="southafrica" name="southafrica"></a>
+<span class="min2em">South Africa, failure of British administration in,</span>
+<a href="#page001">1</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">population of European descent in,</span>
+<a href="#page005">5</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">British treatment of the natives and Dutch in,</span>
+<a href="#page008">8</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the first effort to introduce a large British population,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">public interest in,</span>
+<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">ultimate control of British policy in,</span>
+<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the decision of cardinal questions dealing with its administration,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Dutch population of,</span>
+<a href="#page043">43</a>,
+<a href="#page046">46</a>,
+<a href="#page049">49</a>,
+<a href="#page098">98</a>,
+<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Dutch view of the nationalist movement in,</span>
+<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">before and after the Jameson Raid,</span>
+<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">as Lord Milner found it,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attempts to secure the reunion of under the British flag,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the British cause in,</span>
+<a href="#page071">71</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reinforcement of the British garrison in,</span>
+<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">aspirations of the Dutch in,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">despondency of the British population,</span>
+<a href="#page107">107</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">result of the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference on the British population,</span>
+<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">moral weakness of England's position in,</span>
+<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">approval of Lord Milner's policy by the British population,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dismay of the British population as the Imperial Governments' reported acceptance of the franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page222">222</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">performance of the British Army in,</span>
+<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">numbers of the British Army in on April 1st, 1900,</span>
+<a href="#page323">323</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">numbers of the British population in who served,</span>
+<a href="#page324">324</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the task of subduing the entire Dutch population of,</span>
+<a href="#page435">435</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">loyalists in,</span>
+<a href="#page447">447</a>,
+<a href="#page448">448</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the manifestation of hostility against the loyalist population of,</span>
+<a href="#page464">464</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">South Africa: A Study, etc.</span>,
+<a href="#page579">579</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African Constabulary, inauguration of,</span>
+<a href="#page397">397</a>,
+<a href="#page530">530</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">expenses of,</span>
+<a href="#page502">502</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">composition of,</span>
+<a href="#page531">531</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African Garrison, The,</span>
+<a href="#page178">178</a>,
+<a href="#page190">190</a>,
+<a href="#page309">309</a>,
+<a href="#page310">310</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African League, The,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a>,
+<a href="#page133">133</a>,
+<a href="#page212">212</a> (note),
+<a href="#page374">374</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African Nationality, The, the creation of,</span>
+<a href="#page058">58</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">South African News, The</span>,
+<a href="#page225">225</a>,
+<a href="#page380">380</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its abuse of Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page272">272</a>,
+<a href="#page391">391</a>,
+<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its charge against British soldiers,</span>
+<a href="#page402">402</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African Republics, The attempt to bring them into a federal system under the British Crown,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their relations with the British Government,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their military preparations,</span>
+<a href="#page166">166</a>,
+<a href="#page167">167</a>,
+<a href="#page178">178</a>,
+<a href="#page181">181</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African Settlement, The, debate on in the House of Commons,</span>
+<a href="#page393">393</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African Unity, The goal of,</span>
+<a href="#page065">65</a>,
+<a href="#page066">66</a>,
+<a href="#page069">69</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South African War, The Great, events which culminated in,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>,
+<a href="#page188">188</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">South Central Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="sprigg" name="sprigg"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Sprigg, Sir Gordon,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>,
+<a href="#page280">280</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his Ministry,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>,
+<a href="#page094">94</a>,
+<a href="#page096">96</a>,
+<a href="#page097">97</a>,
+<a href="#page124">124</a>,
+<a href="#page217">217</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his regard for British interests,</span>
+<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his relations with Cecil Rhodes,</span>
+<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the attempt to prevent him from attending the Colonial Conference of 1897,</span>
+<a href="#page094">94</a>,
+<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">resolves to bring forward a Redistribution Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appeals to the electorate,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defeat of his Ministry,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">leads the Progressives in opposition,</span>
+<a href="#page125">125</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">becomes Premier,</span>
+<a href="#page390">390</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">is at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government,</span>
+<a href="#page473">473</a>,
+<a href="#page485">485</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his view as to the prorogation of Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page482">482</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his loyal co-operations with the Imperial authorities,</span>
+<a href="#page485">485</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">replies to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,</span>
+<a href="#page500">500</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Springs,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Standerton,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Star, The</span> (Johannesburg),
+<a href="#page145">145</a> (note),
+<a href="#page245">245</a>,
+<a href="#page491">491</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Statham, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page377">377</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Stead, W. T.,</span>
+<a href="#page075">75</a>,
+<a href="#page357">357</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Steenekamp, Mrs. Anna E.,</span>
+<a href="#page016">16</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Steyn, Marthinus,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>,
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his agency in the matter of the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Merriman's letter to him with reference to "a colourable measure of reform" in the Transvaal,</span>
+<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">accepts the rôle of peace-maker,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">asks the Cape Premier to ascertain Lord Milner's willingness to meet Pres. Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page154">154</a>,
+<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">formal acceptance of his invitation to the Bloemfontein Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page156">156</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his replies to Dr. Te Water's letters,</span>
+<a href="#page162">162</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his willingness to take part in the Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his evening reception on the opening day of the Conference,</span>
+<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">inquires as to movements of British troops,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his pledge that Cape Colony should not be invaded,</span>
+<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his commandos,</span>
+<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the ultimatum submitted for his approval,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his misgivings,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">receives an appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers,</span>
+<a href="#page292">292</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">declares war,</span>
+<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his "peace overtures,"</span>
+<a href="#page355">355</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his responsibility for the guerilla war,</span>
+<a href="#page414">414</a>,
+<a href="#page415">415</a>,
+<a href="#page427">427</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">circulates utterances of the leaders of the Liberal Opposition,</span>
+<a href="#page468">468</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">consults with Schalk Burger as to peace,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria,</span>
+<a href="#page552">552</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his negotiations,</span>
+<a href="#page553">553</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">appointed a peace commissioner,</span>
+<a href="#page556">556</a>,
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his inability to sign the agreement,</span>
+<a href="#page567">567</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Stop-the-war Committee, The,</span>
+<a href="#page368">368</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Stormberg,</span>
+<a href="#page321">321</a>,
+<a href="#page348">348</a>,
+<a href="#page455">455</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a result of the defeat at,</span>
+<a href="#page008">8</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Story of an African Farm, The</span>,
+<a href="#page144">144</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Strydom, the Boer,</span>
+<a href="#page427">427</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Studenten Blad</span>, The, of the Theological Seminary of Burghersdorp,
+<a href="#page120">120</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Sud Africaan</span>, The,
+<a href="#page351">351</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sunnyside,</span>
+<a href="#page472">472</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Swaziland border, The, the question of,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Swaziland Convention, The,</span>
+<a href="#page087">87</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Sydney, Public meeting at,</span>
+<a href="#page250">250</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Symons, General,</span>
+<a href="#page319">319</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">"Taal," The, preservation of,</span>
+<a href="#page547">547</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Tembuland border, The, advance of the Boers to,</span>
+<a href="#page281">281</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Schreiner's action with reference to,</span>
+<a href="#page281">281</a>,
+<a href="#page282">282</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Tembus, The,</span>
+<a href="#page281">281</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">"Terms of Surrender," The, communicated to the Boer Commissioners,</span>
+<a href="#page563">563</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the draft agreement of,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Terrorism and deceit, A system of,</span>
+<a href="#page425">425</a>,
+<a href="#page426">426</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Te Water, Dr.,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>,
+<a href="#page094">94</a>,
+<a href="#page142">142</a>,
+<a href="#page150">150</a>,
+<a href="#page154">154</a>,
+<a href="#page235">235</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">resignation of,</span>
+<a href="#page095">95</a>,
+<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">joins the Schreiner Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his faithfulness to the Bond,</span>
+<a href="#page162">162</a>,
+<a href="#page163">163</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advocates amnesty for the rebels,</span>
+<a href="#page392">392</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Te Water Correspondence, The,</span>
+<a href="#page156">156</a>,
+<a href="#page162">162</a> to
+<a href="#page166">166</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Theron, T. P.,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">opposes the Redistribution Bill,</span>
+<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">declines to meet the peace delegates,</span>
+<a href="#page475">475</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Thomas, C. H.,</span>
+<a href="#page049">49</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Three Years War, The</span>,
+<a href="#page433">433</a> (note),
+<a href="#page570">570</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">extract from,</span>
+<a href="#page578">578</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Times, The</span>,
+<a href="#page261">261</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">report of a conversation with Mr. Smuts,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reproduces Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with its correspondent,</span>
+<a href="#page221">221</a>,
+<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">letter of Sir Wm. Harcourt to,</span>
+<a href="#page262">262</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">report of a speech by Mr. Morley,</span>
+<a href="#page371">371</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">protest in of "an old Berliner,"</span>
+<a href="#page468">468</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Transkei, The,</span>
+<a href="#page486">486</a>.<br>
+
+<a id="transvaal" name="transvaal"></a>
+<span class="min2em">Transvaal, The, Sir Bartle Frere's visit to in</span> 1879,
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">restoration of the Boer Republic in,</span>
+<a href="#page030">30</a>,
+<a href="#page031">31</a>,
+<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the English of,</span>
+<a href="#page042">42</a>,
+<a href="#page043">43</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">mineral wealth of,</span>
+<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Afrikander Bond in,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Cape,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">attempts to secure Bechuanaland,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">position of the British population in,</span>
+<a href="#page071">71</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">race oligarchy in,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">more hopeful situation in,</span>
+<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the position in Feb., 1898,</span>
+<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the question of reform in,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a>,
+<a href="#page106">106</a>,
+<a href="#page107">107</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">unprogressiveness of,</span>
+<a href="#page112">112</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">progress of armament in,</span>
+<a href="#page125">125</a>,
+<a href="#page158">158</a>,
+<a href="#page255">255</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its communications with the paramount power,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reliance of on the Orange Free State,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the position of British residents in,</span>
+<a href="#page130">130</a>,
+<a href="#page173">173</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">presentation of the petition of the British residents,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">our stand against Dutch tyranny in,</span>
+<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">alleged conspiracy against,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Morley's statement as to the annexation of,</span>
+<a href="#page261">261</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">commandos ordered to take up their position on the Natal border,</span>
+<a href="#page290">290</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">flight of the British population from,</span>
+<a href="#page292">292</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">entered by the Natal Field Force,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">annexation of,</span>
+<a href="#page329">329</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.W. of,</span>
+<a href="#page441">441</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">numbers of Boers in the field in,</span>
+<a href="#page454">454</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">area enclosed by blockhouse lines,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">progress of civil administration in,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page525">525</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of,</span>
+<a href="#page490">490</a>,
+<a href="#page501">501</a>,
+<a href="#page544">544</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">grant in aid of the revenues of,</span>
+<a href="#page501">501</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">area held,</span>
+<a href="#page505">505</a>,
+<a href="#page506">506</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">mineral wealth of unaffected by the war,</span>
+<a href="#page514">514</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">extent of its mineral wealth,</span>
+<a href="#page519">519</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">number of children educated in the camps in,</span>
+<a href="#page523">523</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the revenue of,</span>
+<a href="#page528">528</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the settlement of,</span>
+<a href="#page546">546</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">military administration in,</span>
+<a href="#page566">566</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">taxation of landed property in,</span>
+<a href="#page566">566</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Transvaal from Within, The</span>,
+<a href="#page131">131</a> (note),
+<a href="#page264">264</a>,
+<a href="#page274">274</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Transvaal question, The, debated in both Houses of Parliament,</span>
+<a href="#page228">228</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Treason Bill, The,</span>
+<a href="#page394">394</a> to
+<a href="#page398">398</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the support given to it by Mr. Schreiner and Sir R. Solomon,</span>
+<a href="#page474">474</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the debates on,</span>
+<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the lenient penalties of,</span>
+<a href="#page480">480</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Tugela, The, General Buller's attempt to force the passage,</span>
+<a href="#page306">306</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Uitlander Council, The,</span>
+<a href="#page211">211</a>,
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its view of the new franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its disappointment with the announcement that the law is acceptable to the Imperial Government,</span>
+<a href="#page222">222</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Uitlanders, The, a five years' franchise advocated for,</span>
+<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the enfranchisement of,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their "admitted grievances,"</span>
+<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">confirmation of their complaints,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Krüger's determination to increase their disabilities,</span>
+<a href="#page103">103</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their petition,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">postponement of the publication of Lord Milner's despatch dealing with their grievances,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">formal acceptance of,</span>
+<a href="#page155">155</a>,
+<a href="#page157">157</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">General Butler's view of their grievances,</span>
+<a href="#page175">175</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their claim for enfranchisement,</span>
+<a href="#page185">185</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">granted a limited franchise,</span>
+<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their view of the measure,</span>
+<a href="#page211">211</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">petitions to the Queen for justice to,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their detailed criticism of the new franchise law,</span>
+<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the British Government's view of the concessions made to them,</span>
+<a href="#page229">229</a>,
+<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">outrageous treatment of,</span>
+<a href="#page244">244</a>,
+<a href="#page245">245</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">espionage on,</span>
+<a href="#page273">273</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their return,</span>
+<a href="#page489">489</a>,
+<a href="#page507">507</a>,
+<a href="#page508">508</a>,
+<a href="#page512">512</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Ultimatum, The,</span>
+<a href="#page246">246</a>,
+<a href="#page253">253</a> to
+<a href="#page299">299</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the day on which it expired,</span>
+<a href="#page279">279</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">submitted to Pres. Steyn for his approval,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recast by Mr. Fischer,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">delay in presenting,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">delivered to Sir Wm. Greene,</span>
+<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reaches Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page295">295</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reaches the Colonial Office,</span>
+<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reply of Her Majesty's Government,</span>
+<a href="#page298">298</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its effect on Lord Milner,</span>
+<a href="#page342">342</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its effect on the British people,</span>
+<a href="#page344">344</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Unionist leaders, The, and Lord Milner's administration,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Union Jack, The, hissed,</span>
+<a href="#page499">499</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">United States of America, The, attitude of towards Great Britain during the war,</span>
+<a href="#page264">264</a>,
+<a href="#page312">312</a>,
+<a href="#page313">313</a>,
+<a href="#page314">314</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Upington Ministry, The,</span>
+<a href="#page060">60</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Upington, Sir Thomas,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">resignation of,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a> (note).</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Vaal River, The,</span>
+<a href="#page456">456</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Valley of Light, The,</span>
+<a href="#page340">340</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Vandam, Captain,</span>
+<a href="#page245">245</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Van Riebeck, Commander, The diary of,</span>
+<a href="#page002">2</a>,
+<a href="#page003">3</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the Dutch E. India Co's instructions to as to the treatment of natives in S. Africa,</span>
+<a href="#page005">5</a>,
+<a href="#page009">9</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Vereeniging,</span>
+<a href="#page555">555</a>,
+<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Smuts's words at on May 30th, 1902,</span>
+<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the surrender of,</span>
+<a href="#page303">303</a>,
+<a href="#page359">359</a>,
+<a href="#page433">433</a>,
+<a href="#page454">454</a> (note),
+<a href="#page536">536</a> to
+<a href="#page583">583</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">two and a half years after,</span>
+<a href="#page449">449</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">signing of the Terms of Surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page542">542</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">difference between Lord Milner's and Lord Kitchener's views as to the Terms of Surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page551">551</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">circumstances under which the negotiations originated,</span>
+<a href="#page551">551</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the three proposals put forward by the Boer leaders,</span>
+<a href="#page556">556</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Article X, of the Terms of Surrender,</span>
+<a href="#page559">559</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mr. Smuts's suggestion as to a "formal clause,"</span>
+<a href="#page561">561</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the draft agreement telegraphed to England,</span>
+<a href="#page562">562</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its wording,</span>
+<a href="#page564">564</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the signature of,</span>
+<a href="#page567">567</a>,
+<a href="#page573">573</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its terms compared with the Middelburg terms,</span>
+<a href="#page568">568</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">acceptation of the British terms,</span>
+<a href="#page571">571</a>,
+<a href="#page572">572</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">generosity of the terms,</span>
+<a href="#page580">580</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">leniency of the terms,</span>
+<a href="#page581">581</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">immediate effect of the terms,</span>
+<a href="#page583">583</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Victoria, offers a military contingent,</span>
+<a href="#page251">251</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Victoria, Queen, presentation of the second petition to,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>,
+<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">petitions to for justice to the Uitlanders,</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proposed letter to from Krüger,</span>
+<a href="#page376">376</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">death of,</span>
+<a href="#page481">481</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Vigilance Committee, The,</span>
+<a href="#page500">500</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Viljoen, General, a telegram to,</span>
+<a href="#page426">426</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Volksblad</span>, The,
+<a href="#page351">351</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Volksraad, The, discusses the question of accepting the joint inquiry,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">refuses it,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Vosloo, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page477">477</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Vossische Zeitung</span>, The,
+<a href="#page399">399</a> (note),
+<a href="#page469">469</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Vryburg division, the return of representatives for,</span>
+<a href="#page121">121</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Vryburg, goes over to the Boers,</span>
+<a href="#page280">280</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Walrond, M. S. O.,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Walter, M. P. C.,</span>
+<a href="#page213">213</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">War Commission, The,</span>
+<a href="#page318">318</a>,
+<a href="#page319">319</a> (note),
+<a href="#page324">324</a> (note);<br>
+    <span class="min1em">General Sir Wm. Butler's evidence before,</span>
+<a href="#page175">175</a> (note),
+<a href="#page181">181</a> to
+<a href="#page183">183</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">War, Declaration of,</span>
+<a href="#page297">297</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the first days of,</span>
+<a href="#page304">304</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the conduct of,</span>
+<a href="#page316">316</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">area of the country over which it was waged,</span>
+<a href="#page326">326</a>,
+<a href="#page339">339</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">difficulties of carrying on,</span>
+<a href="#page328">328</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">general conclusions arising from the events, and military criticisms on,</span>
+<a href="#page330">330</a> <span class="italic">et seq.</span>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the unnecessary prolongation of,</span>
+<a href="#page360">360</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">economic consequences of,</span>
+<a href="#page439">439</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">moral effect of its recrudescence,</span>
+<a href="#page440">440</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">method of waging it,</span>
+<a href="#page450">450</a> to
+<a href="#page453">453</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">War in South Africa, The Official History of</span>, vol. i. p. 309 (note) <span class="italic">et seq.</span><br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">War in South Africa, The</span>, Sir Conan Doyle's,
+<a href="#page469">469</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">War Office, The, efficiency of,</span>
+<a href="#page339">339</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Watson, Dr. Spence,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Webb, Mr., arrest of,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wessels, Andries,</span>
+<a href="#page428">428</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wessels, C. J.,</span>
+<a href="#page260">260</a>,
+<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">White, Montagu,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">White, Sir George, shut up in Ladysmith,</span>
+<a href="#page320">320</a>,
+<a href="#page344">344</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Willcocks, Sir William, his report on irrigation,</span>
+<a href="#page516">516</a> to
+<a href="#page518">518</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Williams, Colonel Hanbury,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Willoughby, Sir John,</span>
+<a href="#page044">44</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wilson, H. F. C.,</span>
+<a href="#page515">515</a>,
+<a href="#page526">526</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wilson, M.P., H. J.,</span>
+<a href="#page498">498</a> (note).<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Witwatersrand Gold Mines, The,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>,
+<a href="#page031">31</a>,
+<a href="#page036">36</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Witwatersrand, The, Krüger raises the Vier-kleur on,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wodehouse,</span>
+<a href="#page346">346</a>,
+<a href="#page379">379</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wodehouse, Sir Philip,</span>
+<a href="#page275">275</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wolmarans, A. D.,</span>
+<a href="#page168">168</a>,
+<a href="#page555">555</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wolseley, Lord, his advice to the Salisbury Cabinet,</span>
+<a href="#page177">177</a>,
+<a href="#page188">188</a>,
+<a href="#page190">190</a>,
+<a href="#page309">309</a>,
+<a href="#page322">322</a>,
+<a href="#page331">331</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">his task,</span>
+<a href="#page317">317</a>,
+<a href="#page318">318</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Woolls-Sampson, Col. Sir Aubrey,</span>
+<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">forms the Imperial Light Horse,</span>
+<a href="#page179">179</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Worcester Advertiser, The</span>,
+<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">its charge against British soldiers,</span>
+<a href="#page400">400</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Worcester Conference, The,</span>
+<a href="#page395">395</a>,
+<a href="#page403">403</a>,
+<a href="#page477">477</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">the resolutions of,</span>
+<a href="#page405">405</a>,
+<a href="#page495">495</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">a fatal result of,</span>
+<a href="#page412">412</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">representations of its delegates to the Liberal party,</span>
+<a href="#page496">496</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wybergh, Mr.,</span>
+<a href="#page515">515</a>,
+<a href="#page528">528</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Wylant, the 'Sick-Comforter,'</span>
+<a href="#page003">3</a>.</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+<span class="min2em">Zeerust,</span>
+<a href="#page458">458</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em italic">Zuid Africaan</span>, The, articles in,
+<a href="#page063">63</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Zulus, The, military power of,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>,
+<a href="#page026">26</a>.<br>
+
+<span class="min2em">Zululand, a portion of transferred to Natal,</span>
+<a href="#page550">550</a>.</p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<p class="p4 italic">Printed by Hazell, Watson &amp; Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.</p>
+
+<div class="p4 footnote">
+<p><a id="footnote1" name="footnote1"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 1:</strong> The official returns showed that 456 farm-houses had been
+wholly, and 350 partially, destroyed; and that 60 waggons, 5,715
+horses, 111,930 head of horned cattle, and 161,930 sheep had been
+carried off by the Kafirs. And this apart from the remuneration
+claimed by the settlers for services in the field, and commandeered
+cattle and supplies.<a href="#footnotetag1"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote2" name="footnote2"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 2:</strong> Cloete. See note, p. 16.<a href="#footnotetag2"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote3" name="footnote3"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 3:</strong> For the benefit of those who may desire to read the
+passages in which these opinions are expressed, I append the
+references. Cloete's opinion is to be found in his "Five Lectures on
+the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers," delivered before the Natal
+Society and published at Capetown in 1856. A reprint of this work was
+published by Mr. Murray in 1899. Sir John Robinson's opinion, which
+endorses the views of Mrs. Anna Elizabeth Steenekamp as expressed in
+<span class="italic">The Cape Monthly Magazine</span> for September, 1876, is to be found at pp.
+46, 47 of his "A Lifetime in South Africa" (Smith, Elder, 1900).<a href="#footnotetag3"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote4" name="footnote4"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 4:</strong> Cetewayo.<a href="#footnotetag4"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote5" name="footnote5"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 5:</strong> Despatch of November 19th, 1858, to Sir E. B. Lytton.<a href="#footnotetag5"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote6" name="footnote6"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 6:</strong> Sir E. B. Lytton.<a href="#footnotetag6"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote7" name="footnote7"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 7:</strong> Chaka.<a href="#footnotetag7"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote8" name="footnote8"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 8:</strong> The receipt of the despatch in which these valuable
+recommendations were made was not even acknowledged by the Colonial
+Office. Frere himself gives the outlines of his proposals in an
+article published in <span class="italic">The Nineteenth Century</span> for February, 1881.<a href="#footnotetag8"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote9" name="footnote9"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 9:</strong> The Crown Colony&mdash;not the Protectorate&mdash;annexed by the
+Cape Colony in 1895.<a href="#footnotetag9"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote10" name="footnote10"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 10:</strong> Rhodes's words were: "If we do not settle this [<span class="italic">i.e.</span>
+the question of Bechuanaland] ourselves, we shall see it taken up in
+the House of Commons on one side or the other, not from any real
+interest in the question, but simply because of its consequences to
+those occupying the Ministerial benches. We want to get rid of Downing
+Street in this question, and to deal with it ourselves, as a
+self-governing colony."<a href="#footnotetag10"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote11" name="footnote11"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 11:</strong> June, 1894.<a href="#footnotetag11"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote12" name="footnote12"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 12:</strong> January 28th, 1895.<a href="#footnotetag12"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote13" name="footnote13"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 13:</strong> It is worth noticing that even the presence of the
+German Marines at Delagoa Bay was counterbalanced&mdash;whether by chance
+or design&mdash;by the coincidence of the arrival of a British troopship
+with time-expired men from the Indian garrison, off Durban.<a href="#footnotetag13"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote14" name="footnote14"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 14:</strong> Afternoon of Monday, December 30th.<a href="#footnotetag14"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote15" name="footnote15"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 15:</strong> "John Bull &amp; Co.," by "Max O'Rell," 1894.<a href="#footnotetag15"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote16" name="footnote16"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 16:</strong> "This is our Afrikander character. The descendants of
+Hollanders, Germans and Frenchmen inter-married, and are only known at
+present by their surnames. They form the Afrikander nationality, and
+call themselves Afrikanders. The Afrikanders are no more Hollanders
+than Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans. They have their own language,
+own morals and customs; they are just as much a nation as any
+other."&mdash;<span class="italic">De Patriot</span>, in the course of an article headed "A Common
+but Dangerous Error"&mdash;the error in question being the assertion that
+"the Cape Colony is an English colony" (translated and reproduced in
+<span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, September 3th, 1884).<a href="#footnotetag16"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote17" name="footnote17"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 17:</strong> Quoted by Du Toit in <span class="italic">De Patriot</span>: translation from the
+English reprint of <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>.<a href="#footnotetag17"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote18" name="footnote18"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 18:</strong> Then Judge, afterwards President of the Free State, and
+State-Secretary of the South African Republic in succession to Dr.
+Leyds.<a href="#footnotetag18"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote19" name="footnote19"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 19:</strong> P. 64 <span class="italic">et seq.</span> of <span class="italic">The Origin of the Anglo-Boer War
+Revealed</span> (Hodder &amp; Stoughton).<a href="#footnotetag19"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote20" name="footnote20"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 20:</strong> Under the changed conditions of to-day the Boer
+population is organised in the Transvaal into <span class="italic">Het Volk</span>, and in the
+Orange River Colony into the <span class="italic">Oranjie Unie</span>; both practically
+identical with the Bond in the Cape Colony.<a href="#footnotetag20"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote21" name="footnote21"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 21:</strong> Reprint of a pamphlet (found with the first leaf torn)
+containing an English translation of <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>, p. 8.<a href="#footnotetag21"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote22" name="footnote22"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 22:</strong> <span class="italic">De Transvaalse Oorlog</span>, pp. 7 and 8.<a href="#footnotetag22"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote23" name="footnote23"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 23:</strong> <span class="italic">Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and Speeches.</span> By
+Vindex; p. 533. Borckenhagen had just died.<a href="#footnotetag23"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote24" name="footnote24"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 24:</strong> <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, reputed to be controlled by Hofmeyr himself,
+and certainly the recognised organ of the Bond, published a pæan of
+triumph over the surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at Doornkop.
+"Afrikanderdom has awakened to a sense of earnestness which we have
+not observed since the heroic war of liberty in 1881. From the
+Limpopo, as far as Capetown, the second Majuba has given birth to a
+new inspiration and a new movement amongst our people in South
+Africa.... The flaccid and cowardly imperialism that had already begun
+to dilute and weaken our national blood, gradually turned aside before
+the new current that permeated our people.... Now or never the
+foundation of a wide-embracing nationalism must be laid.... The
+partition wall has disappeared ... never has the necessity for a
+policy of a colonial and republican union been greater; now the
+psychological moment has arrived; now our people have awakened all
+over South Africa; a new glow illumines our hearts; let us lay the
+foundation-stone of a real United South Africa on the soil of a pure
+and all-comprehensive national sentiment."<a href="#footnotetag24"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote25" name="footnote25"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 25:</strong> 1896.<a href="#footnotetag25"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote26" name="footnote26"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 26:</strong> Mr. Bodley, in his <span class="italic">Coronation of King Edward VII.</span>,
+remarks that of the seventy Balliol scholars elected during the
+mastership of Jowett (1870-1893) only three had at that time (1902)
+"attained eminence in any branch of public life." These three were Mr.
+H. H. Asquith, Dr. Charles Gore (then Bishop of Worcester), and Lord
+Milner.<a href="#footnotetag26"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote27" name="footnote27"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 27:</strong> The incident is otherwise interesting as affording the
+first sign of that confidence of the British population in Lord
+Milner, which, steadily increasing as the final and inevitable
+struggle approached, earned for him at length the unfaltering support
+of British South Africa. After the Rand celebrations were over, he was
+informed that his advice had been put into effect with "very
+considerable difficulty." The argument which had prevailed was this:
+"The new High Commissioner is a tested man of affairs; we all look to
+him to put British interests on a solid basis; and as we do this, let
+us obey him in a matter like this."<a href="#footnotetag27"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote28" name="footnote28"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 28:</strong> Apart from the question of the validity of the preamble
+to the Pretoria Convention (1881), two Conventions&mdash;the London
+Convention (1884), and the Swaziland Convention (1894)&mdash;were in force
+between the South African Republic and Great Britain. The relations of
+the Imperial Government to the Free State were regulated by the
+Bloemfontein Convention (1854). This latter and the Sand River
+Convention (1852), were the Conventions of Grey's time.<a href="#footnotetag28"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote29" name="footnote29"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 29:</strong> These two men, now Colonel Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson and
+Major W. D. "Karri" Davies, had refused to sign the petition of
+appeal&mdash;an act of submission which President Krüger required of the
+Johannesburg Reformers, before he released them from Pretoria gaol.
+They did so on the ground that the Imperial Government had made itself
+responsible for their safety; since they and the other Reformers, with
+the town of Johannesburg, had laid down their arms on the faith of
+Lord Rosmead's declaration that he would obtain reasonable reforms
+from President Krüger for the Uitlanders.<a href="#footnotetag29"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote30" name="footnote30"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 30:</strong> In the question of the Swaziland border, the affair of
+Bunu, and the continued and increasing ill-treatment of the Cape Boys,
+the Boer Government manifested its old spirit of aggression and
+duplicity. All these matters involved Lord Milner in anxious and
+wearisome negotiations, which, however, he contrived by mingled
+firmness and address to keep within the limits of friendly
+discussion.<a href="#footnotetag30"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote31" name="footnote31"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 31:</strong> This short despatch has been given practically <span class="italic">in
+extenso</span>. It was not published in the Blue-books, but it was
+communicated to the Press some three months after it had been
+received.<a href="#footnotetag31"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote32" name="footnote32"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 32:</strong> By August the South African garrison had been raised to
+the very moderate strength of rather more than 8,000 troops.<a href="#footnotetag32"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote33" name="footnote33"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 33:</strong> Sir Gordon Sprigg's long service as a minister of the
+Crown fully entitled him to this honour; nor was his presence rendered
+any the less desirable by the fact that Sir Henry de Villiers, the
+Chief Justice, was also attending the Jubilee in England.<a href="#footnotetag33"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote34" name="footnote34"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 34:</strong> The Schreiner Ministry.<a href="#footnotetag34"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote35" name="footnote35"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 35:</strong> There appears to have been some question as to whether
+the terms of the President's undertaking bound him to introduce the
+proposed measure into the Volksraad in 1897, or in 1898. Chief Justice
+de Villiers held that the latter date was contemplated by the
+President. But the point is immaterial, since President Krüger denied
+in the Volksraad, after the dismissal of Mr. Kotzé, that he had ever
+given an undertaking at all to Chief Justice de Villiers or to anybody
+else.<a href="#footnotetag35"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote36" name="footnote36"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 36:</strong> <span class="italic">Cape Times</span>, March 4th, 1898.<a href="#footnotetag36"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote37" name="footnote37"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 37:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag37"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote38" name="footnote38"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 38:</strong> He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship by Dr.
+Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a Progressive, and at the
+same time Sir Thomas Upington, who had resigned from ill-health, was
+succeeded by Mr. T. Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.<a href="#footnotetag38"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote39" name="footnote39"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 39:</strong> These were prisoners taken in the suppression of the
+revolt in Bechuanaland in 1897.<a href="#footnotetag39"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote40" name="footnote40"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 40:</strong> The little group of six, of which Sir James Innes was
+the head&mdash;including Sir R. Solomon and four others&mdash;voted <span class="italic">with</span> the
+Ministry for the Redistribution Bill, but <span class="italic">against</span> it on the "no
+confidence" motion (with the exception of Sir James himself). Also one
+moderate Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the
+Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.<a href="#footnotetag40"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote41" name="footnote41"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 41:</strong> Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a candidate
+financed from Pretoria.<a href="#footnotetag41"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote42" name="footnote42"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 42:</strong> As translated in <span class="italic">South Africa</span>, October 15th, 1898.<a href="#footnotetag42"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote43" name="footnote43"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 43:</strong> In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39 Progressive
+members were returned. A very careful and reliable calculation showed
+that, of an aggregate of 82,304 votes polled, 44,403 were cast for
+Progressive, and 37,901 for Afrikander candidates. More than this,
+while no Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than
+137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective majorities, of
+two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives, therefore, were entitled, on
+their aggregate vote, to a majority of six.<a href="#footnotetag43"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote44" name="footnote44"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 44:</strong> Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord Milner
+for the purpose of laying his views before him. But, it is said, the
+unwonted sternness of the Governor's expression at once convinced him
+of the hopelessness of his mission; and he withdrew without any
+attempt to argue his case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal
+magnetism, the incident is not without significance.<a href="#footnotetag44"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote45" name="footnote45"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 45:</strong> Both sides were one short of their full strength, but a
+Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was chosen Speaker of the
+House.<a href="#footnotetag45"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote46" name="footnote46"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 46:</strong> The second reading of the Navy Contribution Bill, giving
+effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg's pledge, was carried on December 2nd,
+1898, without a division.<a href="#footnotetag46"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote47" name="footnote47"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 47:</strong> The State-Secretaryship was offered first to Mr. Abraham
+Fischer, of the Free State, by whom it was declined (<span class="italic">Memoirs of Paul
+Krüger</span>, vol. ii., p. 297). The Cape Afrikanders desired the
+appointment of Mr. Smuts.<a href="#footnotetag47"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote48" name="footnote48"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 48:</strong> On May 7th, 1897, President Krüger had formally
+requested the Imperial Government to allow all questions at issue
+between the two Governments under the Convention to be submitted to
+the arbitration of the President of the Swiss Republic. To this
+proposal Mr. Chamberlain replied, on October 10th, that the
+relationship of Great Britain to the South African Republic being that
+of a suzerain Power, it would be impossible for the Imperial
+Government to permit the intervention of a foreign Power. On April
+16th, 1898, in a despatch embodying the legal opinions of Mr. Farelly,
+President Krüger claims that the South African Republic is an
+independent State, and denies the existence of any "suzerainty" on the
+part of Great Britain. In forwarding this despatch Lord Milner made
+the apposite comment that the propriety of employing the term
+suzerainty to express the rights possessed by Great Britain is an
+"etymological question," and Mr. Chamberlain, replying on December
+15th, accepts President Krüger's declaration that he is willing to
+abide by the articles of the Convention, reasserts the claim of
+suzerainty, declines to allow foreign arbitration, and demands the
+immediate fulfilment of Article IV. In a despatch of May 9th, 1899,
+Mr. Reitz asserts that the Republic is "a sovereign international
+State"; and on June 13th Mr. Chamberlain replies that he has no
+intention of continuing the discussion.<a href="#footnotetag48"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote49" name="footnote49"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 49:</strong> Owing to a slight affection of the eye.<a href="#footnotetag49"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote50" name="footnote50"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 50:</strong> "On the Sunday night before Christmas, a British subject
+named Tom Jackson Edgar was shot dead in his own house by a Boer
+policeman. Edgar, who was a man of singularly fine physique, and both
+able and accustomed to take care of himself, was returning home at
+about midnight, when one of three men standing by, who, as it
+afterwards transpired, was both ill and intoxicated, made an offensive
+remark. Edgar resented it with a blow which dropped the other
+insensible to the ground. The man's friends called for the police, and
+Edgar, meanwhile, entered his own house a few yards off. There was no
+attempt at concealment or escape; Edgar was an old resident and
+perfectly well known. Four policemen came.... The fact, however, upon
+which all witnesses agree is that, as the police burst open the door,
+Constable Jones [there are scores of Boers unable to speak a word of
+English who, nevertheless, own very characteristic English, Scotch,
+and Irish names] fired at Edgar and dropped him dead in the arms of
+his wife, who was standing in the passage a foot or so behind
+him."&mdash;<span class="smcap">FitzPatrick's</span> <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>.<a href="#footnotetag50"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote51" name="footnote51"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 51:</strong> For particulars of these events the reader is referred
+to <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>.<a href="#footnotetag51"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote52" name="footnote52"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 52:</strong> The petition, with its 21,684 signatures, reached Lord
+Milner through Sir W. (then Mr.) Greene, the British Agent at
+Pretoria, on March 27th. It was forwarded by the High Commissioner to
+England in the mail of March 29th. The same ship, the <span class="italic">Carisbrook
+Castle</span>, carried Dr. Leyds, who was returning to Europe after a visit
+to Pretoria. Sir W. Greene had returned to South Africa in the same
+ship with Lord Milner (February 14th), and had stayed at Government
+Cottage (Newlands) with him for some days, discussing Transvaal
+matters, before proceeding to Pretoria on February 19th.<a href="#footnotetag52"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote53" name="footnote53"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 53:</strong> C. 9,345.<a href="#footnotetag53"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote54" name="footnote54"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 54:</strong> C. 9,345. See forward, p. <a href="#page155">155</a>.<a href="#footnotetag54"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote55" name="footnote55"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 55:</strong> See p. <a href="#page125">125</a>.<a href="#footnotetag55"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote56" name="footnote56"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 56:</strong> <span class="italic">The Johannesburg Star</span>, April 1st, 1905.<a href="#footnotetag56"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote57" name="footnote57"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 57:</strong> Proceedings of the Select Committee on British South
+Africa (Q. 4,385).<a href="#footnotetag57"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote58" name="footnote58"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 58:</strong> For the position of Great Britain from the point of view
+of international law see some remarks in the note on page <a href="#page580">580</a> (Chapter
+XII.).<a href="#footnotetag58"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote59" name="footnote59"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 59:</strong> See pp. <a href="#page061">61</a>, <a href="#page069">69</a>, and <a href="#page093">93</a>.<a href="#footnotetag59"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote60" name="footnote60"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 60:</strong> Mr. Merriman's expression. See his letter to Mr. Fischer
+at p. <a href="#page161">161</a>.<a href="#footnotetag60"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote61" name="footnote61"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 61:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag61"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote62" name="footnote62"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 62:</strong> Letter of Te Water to Steyn. See forward, p. <a href="#page162">162</a>, where
+this letter is given.<a href="#footnotetag62"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote63" name="footnote63"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 63:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag63"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote64" name="footnote64"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 64:</strong> Then under the editorship of Mr. Massingham.<a href="#footnotetag64"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote65" name="footnote65"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 65:</strong> C. 9,345.<a href="#footnotetag65"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote66" name="footnote66"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 66:</strong> All these letters are in Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag66"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote67" name="footnote67"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 67:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag67"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote68" name="footnote68"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 68:</strong> Mr. Hofmeyr.<a href="#footnotetag68"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote69" name="footnote69"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 69:</strong> The original of this letter is now in the possession of
+Mr. E. B. Iwan Müller, by whom it was published in his work, <span class="italic">Lord
+Milner and South Africa</span>. The translation is that of the Department of
+Military Intelligence.<a href="#footnotetag69"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote70" name="footnote70"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 70:</strong> 2nd. Lieut. Royal Horse Guards. Exactly one year after
+the last day of the Conference (June 5th), he (then A.D.C. to Lord
+Roberts and Duke of Westminster) ran up the British flag over the
+Raadzaal at Pretoria.<a href="#footnotetag70"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote71" name="footnote71"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 71:</strong> Letter of May 27th (in Cd. 369).<a href="#footnotetag71"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote72" name="footnote72"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 72:</strong> Lord Milner left Capetown by special train at 8.30 a.m.
+on Monday, May 29th, and reached Bloemfontein punctually at 5 p.m. on
+Tuesday. Here he was met by President Steyn and various officials of
+the Free State; and an address of welcome was presented to him by the
+Mayor of Bloemfontein upon his arrival at the private house which had
+been provided for his accommodation during the Conference. At eleven
+o'clock on the following morning, Wednesday, the 31st, the High
+Commissioner went to the Presidency, where he was introduced by Mr.
+Steyn to President Krüger, Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr. Wolmarans. The
+first meeting of the Conference took place in the afternoon at 2.30,
+in the new offices of the Railway Department. In the evening a largely
+attended reception was given by President Steyn, at which Mr. Krüger
+was present for a short time and Lord Milner for about an hour. The
+Conference closed on the afternoon of Monday, June 5th, and Lord
+Milner then paid a farewell visit to President Steyn. The High
+Commissioner's special train left Bloemfontein on the following
+morning at 10.30, and reached Capetown at 6.45 on the evening of
+Wednesday, the 7th, where he was received by a large crowd, including
+three of the Cape Ministers and a number of Progressive Members of
+Parliament. President Steyn, who was present at the station on Tuesday
+morning to see the High Commissioner off, did everything possible for
+the comfort and convenience of his state guest during the week that he
+was in Bloemfontein. The proceedings of the Conference, with the High
+Commissioner's report upon them, are published in C. 9,404.<a href="#footnotetag72"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote73" name="footnote73"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 73:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag73"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote74" name="footnote74"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 74:</strong> Evidence before War Commission. Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag74"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote75" name="footnote75"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 75:</strong> See p. <a href="#page319">319</a> (note 2).<a href="#footnotetag75"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote76" name="footnote76"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 76:</strong> Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag76"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote77" name="footnote77"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 77:</strong> War Commission, Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag77"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote78" name="footnote78"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 78:</strong> This was precisely the <span class="italic">rôle</span> played by Mafeking, only
+defensively, not offensively.<a href="#footnotetag78"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote79" name="footnote79"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 79:</strong> Cd. 1,789 (War Commission).<a href="#footnotetag79"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote80" name="footnote80"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 80:</strong> These were the figures of the D. M. I. "Military Notes"
+of June, 1898; in the revised "Military Notes" of June, 1899, the
+estimated total of the Boer force was considerably greater&mdash;some
+50,000 exclusive of colonial rebels.<a href="#footnotetag80"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote81" name="footnote81"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 81:</strong> All of these extracts will be found in Cd. 1,791.<a href="#footnotetag81"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote82" name="footnote82"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 82:</strong> Cd. 1,789.<a href="#footnotetag82"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote83" name="footnote83"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 83:</strong> Cd. 1,789.<a href="#footnotetag83"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote84" name="footnote84"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 84:</strong> Three battalions, 6 guns, and a company of Royal
+Engineers were all the troops available for the defence of the Cape
+frontiers at this time (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> June).<a href="#footnotetag84"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote85" name="footnote85"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 85:</strong> Most of these came by mail boats on July 18th and 25th.
+Col. Baden-Powell (who was entrusted with the important duty of
+organising a force for the defence of Southern Rhodesia, and
+subsequently of raising the mounted infantry corps which held
+Mafeking) arrived on the latter date.<a href="#footnotetag85"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote86" name="footnote86"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 86:</strong> Expressing approval of the position Lord Milner had
+taken up at Bloemfontein. See p. <a href="#page173">173</a>.<a href="#footnotetag86"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote87" name="footnote87"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 87:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag87"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote88" name="footnote88"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 88:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag88"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote89" name="footnote89"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 89:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag89"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote90" name="footnote90"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 90:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag90"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote91" name="footnote91"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 91:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag91"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote92" name="footnote92"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 92:</strong> <span class="italic">E.g.</span> Mr. Balfour's statement in the House of Commons
+that the object of the despatch of the special service officers, and
+the small additions of engineers and artillery was "to complete the
+existing garrison." The purchase of transport, he said, had been long
+ago decided upon.<a href="#footnotetag92"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote93" name="footnote93"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 93:</strong> Under State-Secretary of the Transvaal.<a href="#footnotetag93"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote94" name="footnote94"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 94:</strong> Article on "The Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and Herholdt"
+in <span class="italic">Ons Land</span>, of July 11th, 1899, as reproduced in the <span class="italic">South African
+News</span> of the same date. This account of Mr. Hofmeyr's proceedings is
+presumed to have been published with his approval. C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag94"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote95" name="footnote95"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 95:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag95"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote96" name="footnote96"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 96:</strong> Then Mr. Conyngham Greene.<a href="#footnotetag96"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote97" name="footnote97"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 97:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag97"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote98" name="footnote98"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 98:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag98"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote99" name="footnote99"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 99:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag99"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote100" name="footnote100"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 100:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag100"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote101" name="footnote101"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 101:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag101"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote102" name="footnote102"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 102:</strong> On May 15th, 1899&mdash;<span class="italic">i.e.</span> a fortnight before the
+Bloemfontein Conference met&mdash;five persons alleged to be British
+subjects were arrested on a warrant, signed by Mr. Smuts as
+State-Attorney, on a charge of high treason. All of them, except one
+man&mdash;Nicholls, who was innocent&mdash;were agents of the secret service.
+The statement that the men were ex-British officers, and that one of
+them alleged that he was acting under direct instructions from the War
+Office, was disseminated through the Press by the Transvaal
+Government, with the object of discrediting (1) the South African
+League, and (2) the British Government, in the eyes of the civilised
+world. The whole of the alleged "conspiracy against the independence
+of the Republic," thanks to the endurance of Nicholls and the
+persistence of the Imperial authorities in South Africa, was shown to
+be the work of the Transvaal police, favoured by the negligence or
+political bad faith of certain Government officials. The prosecution
+was abandoned on July 25th. Mr. Duxbury, the counsel for the defence
+retained by the British Government, in reviewing the case and the
+proceedings, wrote (August 9th): "It seems abundantly clear, from all
+the facts which have come to light, that the whole of this disgraceful
+prosecution found its inception in the minds of Mr. Schutte, the
+Commissioner of Police, and Acting Chief Detective Beatty.... I must
+direct your attention to the very grave accusation contained in Thomas
+Dashwood Bundy's affidavit against Mr. Tjaart Krüger. This gentleman
+is the son of President Krüger, and is the Chief of the Secret Service
+department of this State." And of Mr. Smuts he writes: "I believe he
+was deceived by the detectives, and yet at the same time I fail to
+understand why, in a matter of such-magnitude, he allowed himself to
+sign warrants for the arrest of persons charged with such a serious
+crime as high treason on the strength of an affidavit signed by a
+detective, who, on the very day such affidavit was signed, had been
+denounced by the Chief Justice from the Bench of the High Court as a
+perjurer." C. 9,521 (which contains a full record of the whole
+affair).<a href="#footnotetag102"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote103" name="footnote103"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 103:</strong> The words are quoted by Mr. M. P. C. Walter, the
+editor, in a letter of protest published in the Transvaal <span class="italic">Leader</span> of
+July 7th, 1899. C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag103"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote104" name="footnote104"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 104:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag104"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote105" name="footnote105"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 105:</strong> <span class="italic">The Settlement after the War</span>, p. 218.<a href="#footnotetag105"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote106" name="footnote106"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 106:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag106"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote107" name="footnote107"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 107:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department. The telegrams
+thus referred to, in this and the following chapter, have not been
+published in the Blue-Books. They were published, however, in <span class="italic">The
+Times History of the War</span>. Their authenticity is undoubted. Sir Gordon
+Sprigg had held a conversation with the Governor on the 13th.<a href="#footnotetag107"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote108" name="footnote108"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 108:</strong> Mr. Fischer was still at Pretoria. C. 9, 415.<a href="#footnotetag108"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote109" name="footnote109"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 109:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag109"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote110" name="footnote110"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 110:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag110"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote111" name="footnote111"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 111:</strong> On July 31st, Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag111"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote112" name="footnote112"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 112:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag112"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote113" name="footnote113"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 113:</strong> August 23rd, C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag113"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote114" name="footnote114"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 114:</strong> C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag114"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote115" name="footnote115"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 115:</strong> "The Uitlander Council is keenly disappointed at the
+<span class="italic">Times</span>' announcement that the seven years' franchise is acceptable to
+the Imperial Government. We fear few will accept the franchise on this
+condition, so the result is not likely to abate unrest and discontent,
+nor redress pressing grievances. Such a settlement would not even
+approximate to the conditions obtaining in the Orange Free State and
+the [British] colonies, and would fail to secure the recognition of
+the principle of racial equality. We earnestly implore you not to
+depart from the High Commissioner's five years' compromise, which the
+Uitlanders accepted with great reluctance. The absolute necessity for
+a satisfactory settlement with an Imperial guarantee is emphasised by
+the insincerity and bad faith persistently shown during the Volksraad
+discussion of the Franchise Law."&mdash;C. 9,415.<a href="#footnotetag115"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote116" name="footnote116"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 116:</strong> The English outward mail-boat arrived on Tuesday, and
+the homeward boat left on Wednesday.<a href="#footnotetag116"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote117" name="footnote117"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 117:</strong> Sir W. Greene became a K.C.B. after the war had broken
+out.<a href="#footnotetag117"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote118" name="footnote118"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 118:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag118"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote119" name="footnote119"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 119:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag119"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote120" name="footnote120"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 120:</strong> C. 9,518.<a href="#footnotetag120"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote121" name="footnote121"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 121:</strong> See p. <a href="#page218">218</a> for this letter.<a href="#footnotetag121"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote122" name="footnote122"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 122:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag122"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote123" name="footnote123"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 123:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag123"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote124" name="footnote124"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 124:</strong> Cd. 369.<a href="#footnotetag124"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote125" name="footnote125"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 125:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag125"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote126" name="footnote126"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 126:</strong> It was known to the Intelligence Department that
+Krüger's secret agents had been in the Cape Colony for two years
+before the outbreak of war, and that they had distributed arms in
+certain districts of the Colony.<a href="#footnotetag126"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote127" name="footnote127"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 127:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag127"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote128" name="footnote128"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 128:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag128"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote129" name="footnote129"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 129:</strong> The expression "Ons wil nou Engelse schiet" was
+actually used. See Thomas's <span class="italic">Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed</span>,
+p. 110.<a href="#footnotetag129"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote130" name="footnote130"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 130:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag130"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote131" name="footnote131"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 131:</strong> Secured by the Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag131"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote132" name="footnote132"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 132:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag132"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote133" name="footnote133"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 133:</strong> Then Mr. Conyngham Greene. C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag133"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote134" name="footnote134"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 134:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag134"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote135" name="footnote135"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 135:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag135"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote136" name="footnote136"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 136:</strong> The despatch was presented to the British Agent, and
+telegraphed, through the High Commissioner, to the Home Government.
+Its diplomatic ambiguity was due to Mr. Fischer's influence.<a href="#footnotetag136"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote137" name="footnote137"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 137:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag137"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote138" name="footnote138"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 138:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag138"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote139" name="footnote139"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 139:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag139"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote140" name="footnote140"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 140:</strong> The despatch of 2,000 additional troops to Natal had
+been sanctioned on August 2nd, in response to the earnest appeal of
+the Natal Government. Hence at this time there were (roughly) 12,000
+Imperial troops in South Africa. It is noticeable that, although the
+despatch only reached Lord Milner on the morning of the 9th, the <span class="italic">Cape
+Argus</span> had contained a telegram, giving an account of the troops
+warned in India and England, on the evening of the 8th.<a href="#footnotetag140"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote141" name="footnote141"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 141:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag141"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote142" name="footnote142"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 142:</strong> Cd. 43.<a href="#footnotetag142"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote143" name="footnote143"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 143:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag143"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote144" name="footnote144"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 144:</strong> This despatch was received on September 8th. Cd. 43.<a href="#footnotetag144"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote145" name="footnote145"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 145:</strong> C. 9,521.<a href="#footnotetag145"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote146" name="footnote146"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 146:</strong> Received on September 6th. Cd. 44.<a href="#footnotetag146"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote147" name="footnote147"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 147:</strong> Cd. 18.<a href="#footnotetag147"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote148" name="footnote148"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 148:</strong> p. 251.<a href="#footnotetag148"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote149" name="footnote149"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 149:</strong> Cd. 420. The Blue-book points out that in the original
+"a well-known nick-name" is used for Mr. S. J. du Toit.<a href="#footnotetag149"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote150" name="footnote150"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 150:</strong> As reported by Reuter.<a href="#footnotetag150"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote151" name="footnote151"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 151:</strong> Cd. 420.<a href="#footnotetag151"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote152" name="footnote152"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 152:</strong> Published in <span class="italic">The Times</span>, September 30th, 1899.<a href="#footnotetag152"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote153" name="footnote153"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 153:</strong> In <span class="italic">The Nineteenth Century</span> for that month.<a href="#footnotetag153"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote154" name="footnote154"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 154:</strong> <span class="italic">The Times</span>, December 15th. Mr. Bryce was taking the
+chair at the last of a series of six lectures on "England in South
+Africa," given by the present writer in the great hall of the (then)
+Imperial Institute.<a href="#footnotetag154"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote155" name="footnote155"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 155:</strong> <span class="italic">Cornhill Magazine</span>, July, 1900. "The South African
+Policy of Sir Bartle Frere." By W. Basil Worsfold.<a href="#footnotetag155"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote156" name="footnote156"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 156:</strong> The reader is referred to p. 5 in Chap. I. for the
+racial characteristics of the South African Dutch, and to the note on
+p. 48 in Chap. II. for the political significance of the word
+"Afrikander," as stated by Mr. S. J. du Toit.<a href="#footnotetag156"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote157" name="footnote157"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 157:</strong> See letters between Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner in
+Cd. 43, p. 13.<a href="#footnotetag157"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote158" name="footnote158"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 158:</strong> Psalm xxii. 12.<a href="#footnotetag158"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote159" name="footnote159"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 159:</strong> <span class="italic">The Transvaal from Within</span>, p. 287.<a href="#footnotetag159"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote160" name="footnote160"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 160:</strong> This document was among those secured by the
+Intelligence Department, and published in <span class="italic">The Times History of the
+War</span>.<a href="#footnotetag160"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote161" name="footnote161"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 161:</strong> See p. <a href="#page077">77</a>.<a href="#footnotetag161"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote162" name="footnote162"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 162:</strong> In the House of Assembly, August 28th.<a href="#footnotetag162"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote163" name="footnote163"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 163:</strong> One of the earliest measures of precaution which Lord
+Milner desired was a plan for the defence of Kimberley. But when, on
+June 12th, the people of Kimberley requested the Government of the
+Colony to take steps for the protection of their town, the reply which
+they received, through the Civil Commissioner, was this: "There is no
+reason whatever for apprehending that Kimberley is, or in any
+contemplated event will be, in danger of attack, and Mr. Schreiner is
+of opinion that your fears are groundless and your anticipations
+without foundation."<a href="#footnotetag163"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote164" name="footnote164"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 164:</strong> September 24th, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag164"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote165" name="footnote165"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 165:</strong> This was on October 11th, 1899&mdash;the day on which the
+ultimatum expired.<a href="#footnotetag165"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote166" name="footnote166"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 166:</strong> Sir Gordon Sprigg&mdash;Mr. Schreiner's Ministry was
+replaced by a Progressive Ministry in June, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag166"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote167" name="footnote167"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 167:</strong> With this may be compared the fact that in Natal the
+whole of the local forces were mobilised on September 29th for active
+service. The dates upon which further units of the Cape local forces
+were called out are as follows: Uitenhage Rifles and Komgha Mounted
+Rifles, November 10th; Cape Medical Staff Corps, November 16th; and
+Frontier Mounted Rifles, November 24th.<a href="#footnotetag167"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote168" name="footnote168"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 168:</strong> The Kimberley and Mafeking Volunteers were called out
+at the last moment, but actually before the war broke out; but the
+safety of both these places was imperilled by the refusal, or delay,
+of the colonial Government to supply them with guns.<a href="#footnotetag168"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote169" name="footnote169"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 169:</strong> Mr. Fischer. See forward, p. <a href="#page291">291</a>.<a href="#footnotetag169"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote170" name="footnote170"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 170:</strong> Kimberley.<a href="#footnotetag170"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote171" name="footnote171"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 171:</strong> <span class="italic">The Times</span>, February 27th, 1906.<a href="#footnotetag171"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote172" name="footnote172"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 172:</strong> Mr. J. W. Sauer. The reference is (in Lord Milner's
+words) to Mr. Sauer's "well-meant but unsuccessful mission to
+Dordrecht, which was immediately followed by rebellion in that
+district." The facts, as fully disclosed a year later, are these. On
+November 23rd, 1899, Mr. Sauer held a meeting at Dordrecht to dissuade
+the Dutch subjects of the Crown in the Wodehouse Division of the
+Colony from joining in the rebellion. As the result of this meeting a
+deputation was sent to the Commandant of the Boer invading-force,
+Olivier, who was at Barkly East, desiring him not to come to
+Dordrecht. On November 27th another meeting was held (also addressed
+by Mr. Sauer) and a second deputation of the inhabitants waited upon
+Olivier. The sequel is revealed in the telegram despatched the
+following day (November 28th) by the Boer Commandant to the Secretary,
+the War Commission, Bloemfontein: "... To-day already I received the
+second deputation from Dordrecht not to come to Dordrecht. This is
+asked officially, but privately they say that this is also a blind,
+and that we must come at once...." On December 2nd Olivier was
+received with open arms at Dordrecht. It was in a district where, in
+the Boer Commandant's words, "the Afrikanders were rejoicing, and
+joining the commandos was universal."&mdash;Cd. 420, p. 108 and p. 96; Cd.
+43, p. 221; and Cd. 261, p. 126.<a href="#footnotetag172"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote173" name="footnote173"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 173:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag173"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote174" name="footnote174"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 174:</strong> <span class="italic">Times</span> correspondent and editor of <span class="italic">The Times History
+of the War</span>. Mr. Amery arrived at the Cape in the second week of
+September, and was at Pretoria from September 24th to October 13th.<a href="#footnotetag174"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote175" name="footnote175"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 175:</strong> Secured by Intelligence Department.<a href="#footnotetag175"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote176" name="footnote176"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 176:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag176"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote177" name="footnote177"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 177:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag177"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote178" name="footnote178"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 178:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag178"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote179" name="footnote179"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 179:</strong> Cd. 43.<a href="#footnotetag179"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote180" name="footnote180"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 180:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag180"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote181" name="footnote181"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 181:</strong> C. 9,530.<a href="#footnotetag181"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote182" name="footnote182"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 182:</strong> <span class="italic">Times History of the War in South Africa</span>, vol. i., p.
+360. It must be remembered that in the Transvaal all telegrams had
+been strictly censored from the end of August.<a href="#footnotetag182"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote183" name="footnote183"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 183:</strong> This chapter was in type some weeks before Vol. I. of
+the Official History of the War was published. Where, however, the
+Official History amends or supplements figures, documents, etc., given
+in earlier official publications, the fact is mentioned in a
+foot-note.<a href="#footnotetag183"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote184" name="footnote184"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 184:</strong> See p. <a href="#page191">191</a>.<a href="#footnotetag184"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote185" name="footnote185"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 185:</strong> Cd. 1,789 (War Commission). The Official <span class="italic">History of
+the War in South Africa</span> gives the total on August 2nd as "not
+exceeding 9,940 men."<a href="#footnotetag185"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote186" name="footnote186"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 186:</strong> Cd. 1,789. But the Official History gives the British
+total at the outbreak of war as 27,054 men (as against over 50,000
+burghers); of whom 15,811 (including 2,781 local troops) were in
+Natal, 5,221 regulars and 4,574 local troops were in the Cape Colony,
+and 1,448 men, raised locally by Col. Baden-Powell, were in Mafeking
+and Southern Rhodesia.<a href="#footnotetag186"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote187" name="footnote187"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 187:</strong> But the Admiralty were given details of the offensive
+force on September 20th. (<span class="italic">Official History.</span>)<a href="#footnotetag187"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote188" name="footnote188"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 188:</strong> Cd. 1,789, pp. 15-17.<a href="#footnotetag188"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote189" name="footnote189"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 189:</strong> Nor was the Intelligence Department less urgent than
+Lord Milner. "In July of last year [1899], earlier warnings being
+disregarded, a formal communication was made for the consideration of
+the Cabinet, advising the despatch of a large force fully equipped,
+estimated to be sufficient to safeguard Natal and Cape Colony from the
+first onrush of the Boers."&mdash;Sir John Ardagh, in <span class="italic">The Balfourian
+Parliament</span>, 1900-1905. By Henry W. Lucy, p. 10. See also the evidence
+of the War Commission, and the "Military Notes" issued by the D. M. I.
+in June (1899).<a href="#footnotetag189"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote190" name="footnote190"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 190:</strong> In a memorandum of November 20th (furnished to Gen.
+Forestier-Walker) Gen. Buller, on the eve of starting for Natal, gives
+as a first paragraph in his "appreciation of the situation" the
+following remark: "1. Ever since I have been here we have been like
+the man, who, with a long day's work before him, overslept himself and
+so was late for everything all day." (<span class="italic">Official History</span>, p. 209.)<a href="#footnotetag190"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote191" name="footnote191"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 191:</strong> Cd. 1,789.<a href="#footnotetag191"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote192" name="footnote192"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 192:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag192"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote193" name="footnote193"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 193:</strong> See returns cited by Lord Roberts in House of Lords,
+February 27th, 1906. The irregulars <span class="italic">raised</span> in South Africa were
+between 50,000 and 60,000, according to the <span class="italic">War Commission Report</span>.<a href="#footnotetag193"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote194" name="footnote194"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 194:</strong> November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.<a href="#footnotetag194"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote195" name="footnote195"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 195:</strong> November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.<a href="#footnotetag195"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote196" name="footnote196"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 196:</strong> February 6th, 1900. Capetown.<a href="#footnotetag196"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote197" name="footnote197"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 197:</strong> Lord Roberts had asked Col. Baden-Powell how long he
+could hold out at Mafeking, and then promised that the relief of the
+town should be effected within the required period.<a href="#footnotetag197"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote198" name="footnote198"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 198:</strong> One fighting British general stated that one of the
+first stage force was equal to five of the men supplied after the
+reserves had been used up in April, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag198"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote199" name="footnote199"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 199:</strong> For the direct part played by the Liberal leaders in
+the production of this ignorance, see p. <a href="#page256">256</a>.<a href="#footnotetag199"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote200" name="footnote200"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 200:</strong> <span class="italic">I.e.</span>, <span class="italic">less</span> troops for lines of communication. Lord
+Roberts's force was 36,000, the Army Corps was 47,000.<a href="#footnotetag200"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote201" name="footnote201"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 201:</strong> Any reader desiring to learn the particulars of this
+struggle is referred to the pages of the writer's <span class="italic">The Valley of
+Light: Studies with Pen and Pencil in the Vaudois Valleys of
+Piedmont</span>. (Macmillan, 1899). It may be added that Napoleon manifested
+a keen interest in the military details of the engagements between the
+French and Savoyard troops and the Vaudois. As regards the number of
+combatants on the Boer side. Lord Kitchener puts the total (from first
+to last) at 95,000 (Cd. 1790, p. 13). The <span class="italic">Official History</span>, however,
+gives, as the result of an elaborate calculation, 87,365 (Vol. I. App.
+4).<a href="#footnotetag201"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote202" name="footnote202"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 202:</strong> Cd. 264 (Despatch of January 16th, 1900).<a href="#footnotetag202"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote203" name="footnote203"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 203:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag203"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote204" name="footnote204"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 204:</strong> At the time of the Bechuanaland Expedition (1884-5),
+when the writer was in South Africa, "a controversy was seriously
+maintained between the two moderate Afrikander journals, the <span class="italic">Sud
+Africaan</span> and the <span class="italic">Volksblad</span>, on the question whether the Imperial
+Government had, or had not, the right to send troops through the
+Colony, without the consent of the Colonial Ministry. In commenting
+upon this question a correspondent wrote in the <span class="italic">Patriot</span>, the extreme
+organ of the Afrikanders: 'I believe the <span class="italic">Volksblad</span> is correct in
+maintaining that England has that right. But if England has the right
+to send <span class="italic">Rooibaatjes</span> (<span class="italic">i.e.</span> British soldiers) to kill my brethren in
+the Transvaal, then I have also the right to try and prevent the same.
+My brother is nearer than England. England can send troops, but
+whether they will all arrive safely in Stellaland&mdash;that stands to be
+seen.'"&mdash;<span class="italic">A History of South Africa</span>, by the writer. (Dent, 1900.)<a href="#footnotetag204"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote205" name="footnote205"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 205:</strong> Despatch dated "Government House, Bloemfontein, March
+15th, 1900."<a href="#footnotetag205"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote206" name="footnote206"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 206:</strong> Cd. 35.<a href="#footnotetag206"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote207" name="footnote207"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 207:</strong> Mr. Reitz's work was translated into English by Mr. W.
+T. Stead.<a href="#footnotetag207"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote208" name="footnote208"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 208:</strong> Cd. 109.<a href="#footnotetag208"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote209" name="footnote209"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 209:</strong> The Unionist party was returned to power with a
+slightly decreased majority&mdash;130 as against 150. But this loss of
+seats was counterbalanced by the consideration that it is unusual for
+the same Government to be entrusted with a second period of office by
+a democratic electorate.<a href="#footnotetag209"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote210" name="footnote210"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 210:</strong> A suburb of Capetown.<a href="#footnotetag210"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote211" name="footnote211"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 211:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag211"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote212" name="footnote212"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 212:</strong> Mr. Morley has the doubtful merit of consistency. As
+recently as April 27th, 1906, he alluded to the South African War as
+"that delusive and guilty war," in an address to the Eighty Club.
+According to <span class="italic">The Times</span> report this expression was received with
+cheers.<a href="#footnotetag212"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote213" name="footnote213"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 213:</strong> It may perhaps be objected that some credit should have
+been allowed to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in view of the fact that
+a sum of £41,807,400 was voted in Committee of Supply in the House of
+Commons for military requirements, practically without discussion,
+within four and a half hours on June 19th, 1900. This objection is
+answered by the words used by the Duke of Devonshire on the same day:
+"I am afraid I must tell Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman that he is not
+likely to receive from us any recognition, either effusive or
+otherwise, of the patriotism of his party. It is quite true that, as
+he took credit to himself and his friends, they have not offered any
+opposition to our demands for supplies or to the military measures
+which it has been found necessary for the Government to take; but the
+reason for that prudent abstinence is not very far to seek. Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman and his friends knew very well that any factious
+opposition to the granting of these supplies would have brought down
+upon them the almost unanimous condemnation of the whole people; and
+Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman is much too shrewd and sensible a man to
+risk the danger of committing for his party an act of political
+suicide."&mdash;Address to Women's Liberal Unionist Association.<a href="#footnotetag213"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote214" name="footnote214"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 214:</strong> June 26th, 1880, C. 2,655.<a href="#footnotetag214"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote215" name="footnote215"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 215:</strong> See p. <a href="#page349">349</a>.<a href="#footnotetag215"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote216" name="footnote216"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 216:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag216"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote217" name="footnote217"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 217:</strong> Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag217"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote218" name="footnote218"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 218:</strong> Cd. 624. The memorandum also noted that the £1,000 was
+"paid at request of F. W. Reitz" (the State Secretary). In the
+Concessions Commission the following letter is published:</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+  "<span class="smcap">Government Offices, Pretoria.</span><br>
+  <span class="italic">7 April, 1899.</span></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">To van Kretschmar van Veen, Esq.</span>,<br>
+  <span class="add2em smcap">Director of the N.Z.A. Ry. Co.</span></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Hon'd. Sir</span>,&mdash;With reference to a letter of his Excellency the
+Ambassador, dated 23 March last, with reference to Mr. Statham and the
+latter's request for an assistance of £300 for furniture and such
+like, I have the honour to inform you confidentially that the
+Executive Council has resolved to grant this gentleman Statham an
+amount of £150. As, according to previous agreement, a yearly
+allowance is paid to Mr. Statham by your Company, I have the honour to
+request you kindly to pay out to the said Mr. Statham the sum granted
+him. His Excellency the Ambassador is likewise being informed of this
+decision of the Executive Council.&mdash;I have, etc.,</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+  <span class="smcap">J. W. Reitz</span>, <span class="italic">State Secretary</span>."<br>
+  (Q. 608.)</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Statham is understood to have been a frequent contributor to those
+Liberal journals which sympathised with the Boer cause. His allowance,
+however, had ceased before the war broke out.<a href="#footnotetag218"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote219" name="footnote219"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 219:</strong> In his covering despatch, Cd. 261, p. 126. For the
+circumstances of Mr. Sauer's visit to Dordrecht on the occasion
+mentioned see note, p. <a href="#page287">287</a>.<a href="#footnotetag219"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote220" name="footnote220"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 220:</strong> As reported in <span class="italic">The Cape Times</span>, Cd. 261.<a href="#footnotetag220"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote221" name="footnote221"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 221:</strong> See p. <a href="#page477">477</a>.<a href="#footnotetag221"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote222" name="footnote222"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 222:</strong> Cd. 261, despatch of June 6th, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag222"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote223" name="footnote223"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 223:</strong> Cd. 264.<a href="#footnotetag223"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote224" name="footnote224"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 224:</strong> Cd. 264.<a href="#footnotetag224"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote225" name="footnote225"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 225:</strong> Cd. 264.<a href="#footnotetag225"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote226" name="footnote226"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 226:</strong> <span class="italic">Cape Times</span>, August 23rd, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag226"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote227" name="footnote227"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 227:</strong> June 14th; 1901 (Holborn Restaurant, and elsewhere
+later). "Whatever Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman may think or say, the
+German nation may think or say."&mdash;The <span class="italic">Vossische Zeitung.</span><a href="#footnotetag227"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote228" name="footnote228"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 228:</strong> As translated in Blue-book, Cd. 547. Mr. de Jong, the
+editor of the paper, was prosecuted (and convicted) for the
+publication of this and another similar article (December 28th).<a href="#footnotetag228"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote229" name="footnote229"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 229:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag229"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote230" name="footnote230"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 230:</strong> It is scarcely necessary to point out that this
+prophecy of continued racial hatred has been completely falsified by
+events. The writer went out to South Africa a second time in January,
+1904, when two years had not passed since the surrender of the Boers.
+The one thing, above all others, that struck him, and every other
+visitor from England, was the profound peace that reigned from end to
+end of the land.<a href="#footnotetag230"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote231" name="footnote231"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 231:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag231"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote232" name="footnote232"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 232:</strong> As stated in a <span class="italic">Central News</span> telegram, published in
+London on December 14th, 1900.<a href="#footnotetag232"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote233" name="footnote233"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 233:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag233"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote234" name="footnote234"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 234:</strong> See letter of Piet de Wet to his brother Christian, in
+Cd. 547, and correspondence between Steyn and Reitz (captured by
+British troops), in Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag234"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote235" name="footnote235"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 235:</strong> "This war no longer makes a pretence of being a war of
+defence; it is a war for gold-fields, for territory, and for the
+suppression of two brave and noble peoples. This wicked war has lost
+us the moral leadership of mankind."&mdash;Mr. E. Robertson, M.P., June
+5th, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag235"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote236" name="footnote236"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 236:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag236"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote237" name="footnote237"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 237:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag237"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote238" name="footnote238"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 238:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag238"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote239" name="footnote239"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 239:</strong> <span class="italic">Ibid.</span><a href="#footnotetag239"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote240" name="footnote240"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 240:</strong> January 12th, 1901. Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag240"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote241" name="footnote241"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 241:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag241"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote242" name="footnote242"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 242:</strong> Cd. 663. See also the text of the circular issued on
+December 2nd, 1900, by Louis Botha, as Commandant-General of the Boer
+forces, to all military officers, landdrosts, etc., giving specific
+instructions for the punishment of surrendered burghers who refused to
+join the commandos when called upon, and for the evasion of the
+neutrality oath.<a href="#footnotetag242"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote243" name="footnote243"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 243:</strong> Cd. 663.<a href="#footnotetag243"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote244" name="footnote244"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 244:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag244"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote245" name="footnote245"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 245:</strong> Cd. 663. It was at this time that the utterly
+unjustifiable and brutal murder of the coloured man, Esau, took place
+in the invasion of the Calvinia district of the Cape Colony. His sole
+offence was his known loyalty to the British Government. "He was
+flogged on January 15th, 1901, and kept in gaol till February 5th,
+when he was flogged through the streets and shot outside the village
+by a Boer named Strydom, who stated that he acted according to
+orders." Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag245"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote246" name="footnote246"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 246:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag246"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote247" name="footnote247"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 247:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag247"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote248" name="footnote248"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 248:</strong> Cd. 522.<a href="#footnotetag248"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote249" name="footnote249"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 249:</strong> The italics are Mr. Kipling's. <span class="italic">The Science of
+Rebellion: a Tract for the Times</span>, by Rudyard Kipling.<a href="#footnotetag249"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote250" name="footnote250"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 250:</strong> Cd. 663.<a href="#footnotetag250"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote251" name="footnote251"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 251:</strong> Cd. 605.<a href="#footnotetag251"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote252" name="footnote252"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 252:</strong> Cd. 988.<a href="#footnotetag252"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote253" name="footnote253"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 253:</strong> "Cape Colony is a great disappointment to me ... no
+general rising can be expected in that quarter.... [But] the little
+contingent there has been of great help to us: they have kept 50,000
+troops occupied, with which otherwise we should have had to
+reckon."&mdash;Gen. Christian de Wet at the Vereeniging Conference on May
+16th, 1902. App. A. <span class="italic">The Three Years' War</span>, by Christian Rudolf de Wet
+(Constable, 1902). But see forward also, p. <a href="#page485">485</a>, for part played by
+British loyalists.<a href="#footnotetag253"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote254" name="footnote254"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 254:</strong> Cd. 663.<a href="#footnotetag254"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote255" name="footnote255"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 255:</strong> <span class="italic">E.g.</span> those employed by General Sherman in his march
+to the Sea, through Georgia, in the latter part of 1864.<a href="#footnotetag255"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote256" name="footnote256"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 256:</strong> This estimate was very much too small: at the
+Vereeniging surrender, when many thousands more of Boers had been
+captured or killed 21,256 burghers and rebels laid down their arms.
+Cd. 988.<a href="#footnotetag256"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote257" name="footnote257"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 257:</strong> Cd. 695.<a href="#footnotetag257"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote258" name="footnote258"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 258:</strong> Cd. 820.<a href="#footnotetag258"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote259" name="footnote259"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 259:</strong> There were 186 killed, 75 wounded, 1,384 prisoners, 529
+voluntary surrenders; while 930 rifles, 90,958 rounds of ammunition,
+1,332 waggons and carts, 13,570 horses, and 65,879 cattle were
+captured. Cd. 820.<a href="#footnotetag259"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote260" name="footnote260"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 260:</strong> See p. <a href="#page420">420</a>.<a href="#footnotetag260"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote261" name="footnote261"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 261:</strong> Cd. 820. The September returns were: 170 Boers killed
+in action, 114 wounded prisoners, 1,385 unwounded prisoners, and 1,393
+surrenders.<a href="#footnotetag261"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote262" name="footnote262"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 262:</strong> In August 648 refugees returned; in November the number
+had risen to 2,623.<a href="#footnotetag262"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote263" name="footnote263"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 263:</strong> For the grotesque, repulsive, and even fatal remedies
+employed by the Boer women in the treatment of their children in
+sickness, the reader is referred to the medical reports on the
+condition of the refugee camps published in the Blue-book.<a href="#footnotetag263"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote264" name="footnote264"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 264:</strong> The figures are those given by Miss Hobhouse, as based
+upon the official returns (<span class="italic">The Brunt of the War</span>, pp. 329-31).<a href="#footnotetag264"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote265" name="footnote265"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 265:</strong> <span class="italic">I.e.</span> annual per 1,000 on a basis of 25 years
+(1874-98).<a href="#footnotetag265"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote266" name="footnote266"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 266:</strong> Cd. 1,163, p. 159. See also <span class="italic">ibid.</span>, p. 151, and p.
+178. Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the
+system of the Burgher Camps (made by Acting President Schalk Burger),
+is as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="quote">
+<p>"Numerous complaints were made to me in the early part of this
+     year (1901), by surrendered burghers, who stated that after they
+     laid down their arms their families were ill-treated, and their
+     stock and property confiscated by order of the
+     Commandant-Generals of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. These
+     acts appear to have been taken in consequence of the circular
+     dated Roos Senekal, 6th November, 1900, in which the
+     Commandant-General says: 'Do everything in your power to prevent
+     the burghers laying down their arms. I will be compelled, if they
+     do not listen to this, to confiscate everything movable or
+     immovable, and also to burn their houses.'</p>
+
+<p>"I took occasion, at my interview with Commandant-General Louis
+     Botha (February 28th, 1901), to bring this matter before him, and
+     I told him that if he continued such acts I should be forced to
+     bring in all women and children, and as much property as
+     possible, to protect them from the acts of his burghers. I
+     further inquired if he would agree to spare the farms and
+     families of neutral or surrendered burghers, in which case I
+     expressed my willingness to leave undisturbed the farms and
+     families of burghers who were on commando, provided they did not
+     actively assist their relatives. The Commandant-General
+     emphatically refused even to consider any such arrangement. He
+     said: 'I am entitled by law to force every man to join, and if
+     they do not do so to confiscate their property, and leave their
+     families on the veld.' I asked him what course I could pursue to
+     protect surrendered burghers and their families, and he then
+     said, 'The only thing you can do, is to send them out of the
+     country, as if I catch them they must suffer.' After this there
+     was nothing more to be said, and as military operations do not
+     permit of the protection of individuals, I had practically no
+     choice but to continue my system of bringing inhabitants of
+     certain areas into the protection of our lines. My decision was
+     conveyed to the Commandant-General in my official letter, dated
+     Pretoria, 16th April, 1901, from which the following is an
+     extract:</p>
+
+<p>"'As I informed your Honour at Middelburg, owing to the irregular
+     manner in which you have conducted and continue to conduct
+     hostilities, by forcing unwilling and peaceful inhabitants to
+     join your Commandos, a proceeding totally unauthorised by the
+     recognised customs of war, I have no other course open to me, and
+     am forced to take the very unpleasant and repugnant steps of
+     bringing in the women and children.</p>
+
+<p>"'I have the greatest sympathy for the sufferings of these poor
+     people, which I have done my best to alleviate, and it is a
+     matter of surprise to me and to the whole civilised world, that
+     your Honour considers yourself justified in still causing so much
+     suffering to the people of the Transvaal, by carrying on a
+     hopeless and useless struggle.'</p>
+
+<p>"From the foregoing, it will, I believe, be perfectly clear that
+     the responsibility for the action complained of by Mr. Burger
+     (the so-styled Acting State President of the Transvaal), rests
+     rather with the Commandants-General of the Transvaal and Orange
+     Free State, than with the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in
+     South Africa....</p>
+
+<p>"It is not the case that every area has been cleared of the
+     families of burghers, although this might be inferred from the
+     despatch under discussion. On the contrary, very large numbers of
+     women and children are still out, either in Boer Camps or on
+     their farms, and my Column Commanders have orders to leave them
+     alone, unless it is clear that they must starve if they are left
+     out upon the veld....</p>
+
+<p>"Finally, I indignantly and entirely deny the accusations of
+     rough and cruel treatment of women and children who were being
+     brought in from their farms to the camp. Hardships may have been
+     sometimes inseparable from the process, but the Boer women in our
+     hands themselves bear the most eloquent testimony to the kindness
+     and consideration shown to them by our soldiers on all such
+     occasions."</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>With this statement it is interesting to compare Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman's words at Bath, November 20th, 1901:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "Is our hypocrisy so great that we actually flatter ourselves
+     upon our great humanity, because we have saved from starvation
+     those whose danger of starvation we have caused?... The hypocrisy
+     of these excuses is almost more loathsome than the cruelty
+     itself.... We have set ourselves to punish this country, to
+     reduce it apparently to ruin, because it has ventured to make war
+     against us."</p>
+
+<p>Truly an extraordinary attitude for a future Prime Minister of
+England!<a href="#footnotetag266"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote267" name="footnote267"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 267:</strong> What was even worse than such declarations of sympathy
+with the Boers was the manifestation of hostility against the loyalist
+population of South Africa. <span class="italic">E.g.</span> Sir William Harcourt (in a letter
+in <span class="italic">The Times</span> of December 17th, 1900), wrote: "I sometimes think that
+those bellicose gentlemen&mdash;especially those who do not fight&mdash;must
+occasionally cast longing, lingering looks towards the times before
+they were subsidised (<span class="italic">sic</span>) by the authors of the Raid to bring about
+the position in which they now find themselves."<a href="#footnotetag267"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote268" name="footnote268"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 268:</strong> September 26th, 1901. See Cd. 820 for report of this
+action.<a href="#footnotetag268"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote269" name="footnote269"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 269:</strong> Letter to Miss Milner, November 11th, 1901. See p.
+<a href="#page416">416</a>.<a href="#footnotetag269"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote270" name="footnote270"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 270:</strong> The facts are stated in a letter published in <span class="italic">The
+Times</span> on March 10th, 1902.<a href="#footnotetag270"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote271" name="footnote271"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 271:</strong> See also note, p. <a href="#page399">399</a> (Extract from the <span class="italic">Vossische
+Zeitung</span>). The baseless and malevolent allegations of specific acts of
+inhumanity or outrage on the part of British soldiers, circulated by
+Boer sympathisers in England and on the continent of Europe, have been
+passed over in silence. For an exposure of these calumnies the reader
+is referred to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's <span class="italic">The War in South Africa</span>
+(Smith, Elder). A record of the manner in which they were repudiated
+by the Boer population in South Africa will be found in Cd. 1, 163,
+pp. 99, 106-111, 113-121. Among those who protested were German
+subjects, and Germans who had become British subjects, resident in
+South Africa. Perhaps the most significant of all these protests is
+the resolution passed unanimously by the members of the Natal House of
+Assembly, all standing: "That this House desires to repudiate the
+false charges of inhumanity brought against His Majesty's Army by a
+section of the inhabitants of the continent of Europe and certain
+disloyal subjects within the British Isles, and this House places on
+record its deliberate conviction that the war in South Africa has been
+prosecuted by His Majesty's Government and Army upon lines of humanity
+and consideration for the enemy unparalleled in the history of
+nations."<a href="#footnotetag271"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote272" name="footnote272"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 272:</strong> This telegram is printed in Cd. 528.<a href="#footnotetag272"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote273" name="footnote273"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 273:</strong> For the nature of these "Middelburg terms," see forward
+in note <a href="#footnote340">2</a> on p. <a href="#page568">568</a>.<a href="#footnotetag273"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote274" name="footnote274"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 274:</strong> Sir Richard Solomon was appointed legal adviser to the
+new Transvaal Administration.<a href="#footnotetag274"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote275" name="footnote275"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 275:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag275"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote276" name="footnote276"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 276:</strong> See p. <a href="#page431">431</a>.<a href="#footnotetag276"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote277" name="footnote277"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 277:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag277"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote278" name="footnote278"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 278:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag278"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote279" name="footnote279"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 279:</strong> The action of Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson was not without
+precedent. See Cd. 903, pp. 57 and 67, and p. 123, <span class="italic">supra</span>.<a href="#footnotetag279"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote280" name="footnote280"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 280:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag280"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote281" name="footnote281"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 281:</strong> Queen Victoria died January 22nd, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag281"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote282" name="footnote282"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 282:</strong> Cd. 983.<a href="#footnotetag282"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote283" name="footnote283"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 283:</strong> Cd. 903. These measures were taken upon Lord Milner's
+return to the Transvaal (September, 1901) after his visit to England.
+The scandal of the almost open co-operation of the Bond with the Boer
+leaders had become notorious, and this assistance was recognised as a
+contributory cause to the protraction of the guerilla war.<a href="#footnotetag283"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote284" name="footnote284"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 284:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag284"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote285" name="footnote285"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 285:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag285"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote286" name="footnote286"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 286:</strong> Cd. 903. This was, in its essence, the proposal for the
+systematic and effective defence of the Colony, which Lord Milner had
+consistently advocated both before and during the war&mdash;with General
+Butler and the Home Government, with Lord Roberts at the time of the
+Forward Movement (see p. <a href="#page353">353</a>), and now at the eleventh hour with Lord
+Kitchener in support of the Cape Government.<a href="#footnotetag286"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote287" name="footnote287"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 287:</strong> Cd. 547.<a href="#footnotetag287"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote288" name="footnote288"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 288:</strong> See p. <a href="#page459">459</a>.<a href="#footnotetag288"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote289" name="footnote289"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 289:</strong> The Letters Patent were not issued until August.<a href="#footnotetag289"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote290" name="footnote290"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 290:</strong> It was, in its essence, the "high seriousness of
+absolute sincerity" that Arnold, after Aristotle, makes the central
+attribute of poetic thought. In commenting upon a speech delivered at
+Germiston on March 15th, 1905, the Johannesburg <span class="italic">Star</span> wrote on the
+day following: "Did ever a High Commissioner for South Africa speak in
+this wise before? But beneath the light words and unstudied diction
+there is the weight and sureness of the 'inevitable' thought. A man
+who has pursued a single task for eight years with unremitting effort
+and unswerving devotion can afford to put his mind into his words. And
+in all that Lord Milner says there is an absolute sincerity, born of
+high integrity of purpose and an assurance of knowledge, that compels
+conviction. Or, rather, should we say, that makes the need of
+conviction as unnecessary as a lamp in daylight."<a href="#footnotetag290"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote291" name="footnote291"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 291:</strong> The Duke of Cambridge.<a href="#footnotetag291"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote292" name="footnote292"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 292:</strong> These two ex-officials, representing the respective
+Governments of the late Republics, were living in Holland at this
+time.<a href="#footnotetag292"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote293" name="footnote293"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 293:</strong> It is only fair to assume that Mr. Bryce was not
+acquainted with the details of the Dordrecht and Hargrove affairs, to
+which reference has been made respectively at p. 287 and p. 375. And,
+still more that he was unaware of the utterly discreditable Basuto
+incident, with respect to which General Gordon's biographer writes:
+"The consequence was that Mr. Sauer deliberately resolved to destroy
+Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure the triumph of his
+own policy by an act of treachery which has never been
+surpassed."&mdash;<span class="italic">The Life of Gordon</span>, vol. ii., p. 83. (Fisher Unwin.)<a href="#footnotetag293"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote294" name="footnote294"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 294:</strong> Compare the different and infinitely more instructive
+treatment of the question of Dutch allegiance by Lord Milner in his
+Johannesburg speech, quoted at p. 145.<a href="#footnotetag294"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote295" name="footnote295"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 295:</strong> <span class="italic">I.e.</span>, the Rev. Stephen Gladstone.<a href="#footnotetag295"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote296" name="footnote296"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 296:</strong> Apart from those mentioned in the text, the following
+attended the Merriman and Sauer banquet: Mr. E. Robertson, M.P.
+(chairman), Lord Farrer, Mr. T. Shaw, M.P., Mr. Burt, M.P., Mr.
+Channing, M.P., Mr. John Ellis, M.P., Mr. H. J. Wilson, M.P., Sir
+Wilfred Lawson, Mr. Frederic Harrison, and others. And among those who
+sent letters of regret for their absence were the Marquis of Ripon,
+Lord Hobhouse, Dr. Spence Watson, Mr. Seale-Hayne, M.P., and Lord
+Loreburn.<a href="#footnotetag296"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote297" name="footnote297"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 297:</strong> December 17th, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag297"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote298" name="footnote298"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 298:</strong> They were read and published by Lord Milner on June
+21st, 1902.<a href="#footnotetag298"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote299" name="footnote299"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 299:</strong> It is scarcely necessary to say that the entire cost of
+the Constabulary has been borne by the new colonies; or that every
+penny of this grant-in-aid was paid back out of the development loan
+raised in 1902-3.<a href="#footnotetag299"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote300" name="footnote300"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 300:</strong> An under-estimate. One-fourth, or one-fifth, would
+have been nearer the mark. See note, p. <a href="#page454">454</a>.<a href="#footnotetag300"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote301" name="footnote301"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 301:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag301"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote302" name="footnote302"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 302:</strong> Managing Director of the Daira Sania Company; of the
+Indian and Egyptian Irrigation Services.<a href="#footnotetag302"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote303" name="footnote303"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 303:</strong> Cd. 626.<a href="#footnotetag303"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote304" name="footnote304"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 304:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag304"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote305" name="footnote305"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 305:</strong> This Report was issued (June 14th, 1904) from the
+Education Adviser's Office, Johannesburg, on "The Development of
+Education in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony." It is one of the
+many contributions of permanent value to political and economic
+science that mark the second period of Lord Milner's Administration in
+South Africa. <span class="italic">E.g.</span>, in Appendix XXX. of this Report, the various
+solutions of the much-vexed question of religious instruction in State
+Schools, severally adopted by the self-governing colonies of the
+empire, are excellently presented in tabular form.<a href="#footnotetag305"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote306" name="footnote306"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 306:</strong> Report on "The Development of Education in the
+Transvaal and Orange River Colony."<a href="#footnotetag306"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote307" name="footnote307"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 307:</strong> These imported teachers worked harmoniously with the
+South African teachers, whether of British or Dutch extraction; they
+filled the gap left by the Hollander teachers, who had returned to
+Europe after the outbreak of the war, and formed a valuable element in
+the permanent staff of the Education Departments of the new colonies.
+In 1903 there were 475 of these over-sea teachers at work in the two
+colonies, as against some 800 teachers appointed in South Africa.<a href="#footnotetag307"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote308" name="footnote308"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 308:</strong> Some idea of the significance of these figures may be
+gathered from the fact that the highest number of children on the
+rolls of the Government schools of the Orange Free State was 8,157 (in
+the year 1898). That is to say, the British Administration in the
+Orange River Colony was educating one-third more Boer children in the
+camp schools alone than the Free State Government had educated in time
+of peace. Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag308"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote309" name="footnote309"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 309:</strong> Cd. 1,163, p. 145. The accounts were complicated by
+expenditure for, and refunds from, the military authorities.<a href="#footnotetag309"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote310" name="footnote310"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 310:</strong> This is in the Orange River Colony alone. For the
+number of children in the <span class="italic">camp</span> schools of both colonies, as apart
+from the <span class="italic">town</span> schools, see above.<a href="#footnotetag310"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote311" name="footnote311"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 311:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag311"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote312" name="footnote312"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 312:</strong> Dated December 12th, 1901.<a href="#footnotetag312"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote313" name="footnote313"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 313:</strong> Excluding expenditure on the South African Constabulary
+and relief and re-settlement, and certain other charges. Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag313"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote314" name="footnote314"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 314:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag314"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote315" name="footnote315"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 315:</strong> December 14th, 1901. Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag315"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote316" name="footnote316"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 316:</strong> The new rolling-stock was paid for out of the
+grant-in-aid voted in August, 1901. The first of the new lines
+constructed was that from Bloemfontein to Basutoland, opening up the
+rich agricultural land known as the "conquered territory" on the
+Basuto border in the Orange River Colony, where many of the new
+British settlers had been established.<a href="#footnotetag316"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote317" name="footnote317"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 317:</strong> The completeness with which the Netherlands Railway
+Company had identified itself with the Government of the South African
+Republic is well expressed in the reply of Mr. Van Kretchmar, the
+General Manager of the N.Z.A.S.M., to a question put to him by the
+Transvaal Concessions Commissioners: "We considered that the interests
+of the Republic were our interests" (Q. 612). Many of these railway
+employees were, of course, imported Hollanders.<a href="#footnotetag317"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote318" name="footnote318"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 318:</strong> Cd. 903.<a href="#footnotetag318"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote319" name="footnote319"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 319:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag319"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote320" name="footnote320"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 320:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag320"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote321" name="footnote321"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 321:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag321"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote322" name="footnote322"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 322:</strong> At Johannesburg, March 31st, 1905. From <span class="italic">The Star</span>
+report.<a href="#footnotetag322"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote323" name="footnote323"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 323:</strong> See p. <a href="#page489">489</a>.<a href="#footnotetag323"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote324" name="footnote324"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 324:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag324"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote325" name="footnote325"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 325:</strong> Cd. 1,163.<a href="#footnotetag325"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote326" name="footnote326"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 326:</strong> For these, the "Middelburg" or "Botha" terms, see
+above, p. <a href="#page471">471</a>, and forward; p. <a href="#page568">568</a>, note 2.<a href="#footnotetag326"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote327" name="footnote327"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 327:</strong> Cd. 1,096.<a href="#footnotetag327"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote328" name="footnote328"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 328:</strong> This deputation was despatched in March, 1900, to "win
+the sympathy of the nations," in De Wet's words.<a href="#footnotetag328"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote329" name="footnote329"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 329:</strong> Cd. 986.<a href="#footnotetag329"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote330" name="footnote330"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 330:</strong> A full list of the names is to be found in the Draft
+Terms of Surrender at p. 564.<a href="#footnotetag330"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote331" name="footnote331"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 331:</strong> These were the "Middelburg terms" of a year ago. See
+note <a href="#footnote340">2</a>, p. <a href="#page568">568</a>.<a href="#footnotetag331"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote332" name="footnote332"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 332:</strong> Cd. 1,096.<a href="#footnotetag332"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote333" name="footnote333"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 333:</strong> Smuts.<a href="#footnotetag333"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote334" name="footnote334"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 334:</strong> Hertzog.<a href="#footnotetag334"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote335" name="footnote335"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 335:</strong> De Wet.<a href="#footnotetag335"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote336" name="footnote336"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 336:</strong> Botha.<a href="#footnotetag336"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote337" name="footnote337"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 337:</strong> Mr. Chamberlain to Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la
+Rey, August 28th, 1902. Cd. 1,284.<a href="#footnotetag337"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote338" name="footnote338"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 338:</strong> Cd. 1,096. President Steyn was too ill to sign the
+Agreement, and De Wet signed first of the Free State representatives.
+He was declared President, in the place of Steyn, at Vereeniging on
+the 29th.<a href="#footnotetag338"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote339" name="footnote339"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 339:</strong> This was reduced to a period of five years.<a href="#footnotetag339"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote340" name="footnote340"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 340:</strong> Cd. 1,096. As compared with the Middelburg terms, the
+terms accepted at Vereeniging were slightly less favourable to the
+Boers in respect of permission to possess arms, and the use of the
+Dutch language; but the monetary assistance promised to the
+repatriated burghers was more generous. The free grant was raised from
+one million to three millions, and the advances on loan were offered
+for the first two years free of interest, and subsequently at only
+three per cent. The greater destruction of property consequent upon
+the prolongation of the war made this increased assistance necessary
+and reasonable. It is noticeable, however, that Lord Milner, alike in
+the Middelburg and Vereeniging negotiations, although he was opposed
+to any payment of the costs incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying
+on the war, was prepared to go even farther than the Home Government
+in the direction of a generous treatment of the Boers in all other
+matters that concerned their material prosperity.</p>
+
+<p>One variation as between the Middelburg and Vereeniging terms is
+noticeable in view of the statement, made in the House of Commons by
+the present (1906) Under-Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. Winston
+Churchill), that the use of the word "natives" in clause viii. of the
+Terms of Surrender prevented the introduction of any legislation
+affecting the <span class="italic">status</span> of Asiatics and "coloured persons" in the new
+colonies prior to the establishment of self-government. This assertion
+was based upon the contention that the word "natives" is understood by
+the Boers to indicate the "native of any country other than those of
+the European inhabitants of South Africa." The actual text of the
+corresponding clause in the Middelburg terms (Lord Kitchener's
+despatch of March 20th, 1901, in Cd. 528) is as follows: "As regards
+the extension of the franchise to the Kafirs in the Transvaal and
+Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's
+Government to give such franchise before representative government is
+granted to these colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as
+to secure the just predominance of the white races. The legal position
+of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold
+in Cape Colony." Apart from the fact that the Boers were debarred by
+Lord Milner's specific statements either from going behind the English
+text of the Vereeniging Terms of Surrender, or from "explaining [the
+Vereeniging Terms] by anything in the Middelburg proposal," it is
+difficult to see how this Middelburg clause could have raised any
+presumption in the minds of the Boer commissioners that the English
+word "native" was intended to include not only the Kafirs (of which
+word it is a loose equivalent, since the dark-skinned native of the
+Bantu tribes, or the Kafir, has practically ousted the aboriginal
+yellow-skinned natives of South Africa&mdash;the Bushmen and Hottentots),
+but the "coloured people," or half-castes.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Milner himself declared in the House of Lords (July 31st, 1906)
+with reference to Mr. Churchill's statement that the question had not
+been raised, to the best of his belief, by the Boer commissioners; and
+that in any case there was nothing in the Vereeniging Agreement to
+prevent the Crown Colony administration of the new colonies from
+legislating in respect of "coloured persons." [And <span class="italic">a fortiori</span> in
+respect of British Indians.] His words were: "The English text of the
+treaty says 'natives' and does not say 'coloured people.' I think that
+in the Dutch version the word 'naturellen' was used. I venture to say
+that nobody familiar with the common use of language in South Africa
+would hold either that 'natives' included coloured people, some of
+whom very much more resemble whites than natives, or that 'naturellen'
+included 'kleurlingen,' which is the universally accepted Dutch word
+in South Africa for coloured people."<a href="#footnotetag340"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote341" name="footnote341"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 341:</strong> The minutes of the final meetings of the commando
+representatives&mdash;as also those of the earlier meetings of May 15th to
+17th&mdash;have been published by General Christian de Wet in <span class="italic">The Three
+Years' War</span>.<a href="#footnotetag341"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote342" name="footnote342"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 342:</strong> Three of the members of this committee, Generals Botha,
+De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to proceed to Europe for the
+purposes of this appeal.<a href="#footnotetag342"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote343" name="footnote343"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 343:</strong> The actual surrender of the arms in the possession of
+the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out with admirable
+promptitude. Three weeks after the agreement had been signed Lord
+Kitchener was able, in a final despatch from Capetown on June 23rd, to
+record his "high appreciation of the unflagging energy and unfailing
+tact" with which Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet
+had facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed to
+receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and Orange
+River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in the Cape Colony
+less expeditious in surrendering to General French. In all 21,226
+burghers and colonial rebels, of whom 11,166 were in the Transvaal,
+6,455 in the Orange River Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down
+their arms. Lord Kitchener's last words (despatches of June 21st and
+23rd), addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the
+Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic
+utterances. His message to the former was:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "I find it difficult in the short space at my disposal to
+     acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South Africa to
+     the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Cape Colony,
+     and Natal. I will only say here that no request of mine was ever
+     refused by any of these Governments, and that their consideration
+     and generosity were only equalled by the character and quality of
+     the troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that country."</p>
+
+<p>And of the troops, which under his command had successfully
+accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he wrote:</p>
+
+<p class="quote">
+     "The protracted struggle which has for so long caused suffering
+     to South Africa has at length terminated, and I should fail to do
+     justice to my own feelings if at this moment I neglected to bear
+     testimony to the patience, tenacity, and heroism which has been
+     displayed by all ranks of His Majesty's forces, Imperial and
+     Colonial, during the whole course of the war. Nothing but the
+     qualities of bravery and endurance in our troops could have
+     overcome the difficulties of this campaign, or have finally
+     enabled the empire to reap the fruits of all its sacrifices."<a href="#footnotetag343"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote344" name="footnote344"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 344:</strong> An onomatop&oelig;ic expression for the step of a tired
+horse.<a href="#footnotetag344"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote345" name="footnote345"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 345:</strong> <span class="italic">The Three Years' War.</span><a href="#footnotetag345"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote346" name="footnote346"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 346:</strong> [The Transvaal Government]&mdash;"or rather the President
+and his advisers&mdash;committed the fatal mistake of trying to maintain a
+government which was at the same time undemocratic and incompetent....
+An exclusive government may be pardoned if it is efficient; an
+inefficient government, if it rests upon the people. But a government
+which is both inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under
+which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of government
+which the Transvaal attempted to maintain. They ought, therefore, to
+have either extended their franchise or reformed their administration"
+(Bryce, <span class="italic">Impressions of South Africa</span>, 2nd Ed., 1900). Mr. Bryce is
+not likely to have been unduly severe. "The political sin of the
+Transvaal against the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of
+detail&mdash;of less or more&mdash;but was fundamental in its denial of
+elementary political right." And again: In the Transvaal "an armed
+minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the taxes,
+denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the money extorted"
+(Captain Mahan, <span class="italic">The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute</span>, 1900 [included
+in <span class="italic">The Problem of Asia</span>]). To these, perhaps, I may be permitted to
+add the following words spoken by myself in 1894&mdash;more than a year
+before the Raid&mdash;and published in 1895 (<span class="italic">South Africa: a Study,
+etc.</span>):&mdash;"The Boer has still to justify his possession of these ample
+pastures, these rich and fertile valleys, and these stores of gold and
+of coal. If he can enlarge his mind, if he can reform existing abuses,
+if he can expand an archaic system of government and render it
+sufficiently elastic to meet the requirements of an enlarged
+population and important and increasing industries&mdash;well and good. If
+not, let the Boer beware; for he will place himself in conflict with
+the intelligence and the progress of South Africa. <span class="italic">Then</span> the Boer
+system will be condemned by a higher authority than the Colonial
+Office or the opinion of England; and from the high court of Nature&mdash;a
+court from which no appeal lies&mdash;the inexorable decree will go forth:
+'Cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?'"<a href="#footnotetag346"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote347" name="footnote347"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 347:</strong> See admissions of the Boer Generals quoted <span class="italic">supra</span>.<a href="#footnotetag347"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote348" name="footnote348"></a>
+<strong>Footnote 348:</strong> "The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or
+engagement with any state or nation other than the Orange Free State,
+nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic,
+until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen." Captain
+Mahan writes: "In refusing the Transvaal that independence in foreign
+relations which would enable other states to hold it directly
+accountable, Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that
+foreigners should be so treated as to give no just cause for
+reclamations.... Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate control of
+foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose not to permit
+interference in the Transvaal by a foreign Power, was responsible for
+conditions of wrong to foreign citizens within its borders. She had
+surrendered the right to interfere, as suzerain, with internal
+affairs; but she had not relieved herself, as by a grant of full
+independence and sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility
+for injury due to internal maladministration, any more than the United
+States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy [in the case of the
+Italian citizens lynched at New Orleans] by the state sovereignty of
+Louisiana" (<span class="italic">Ibid.</span>). And, says the same writer, <span class="italic">a fortiori</span> was
+Great Britain justified in interfering on behalf of her own subjects.<a href="#footnotetag348"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by 
+W. Basil Worsfold
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+Project Gutenberg's Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by W. Basil Worsfold
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Lord Milner's Work in South Africa
+       From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902
+
+Author: W. Basil Worsfold
+
+Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26490]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by A www.PGDP.net Volunteer, Christine P. Travers
+and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+http://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected,
+all other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's
+spelling has been maintained.]
+
+
+
+
+LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA
+
+FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT IN 1897 TO
+THE PEACE OF VEREENIGING IN 1902
+
+
+CONTAINING HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED INFORMATION
+
+
+BY W. BASIL WORSFOLD
+
+
+WITH PORTRAITS AND MAP
+
+
+
+
+     "What would have been the position to-day in South Africa if
+     there had not been a man prepared to take upon himself
+     responsibility; a man whom difficulties could not conquer, whom
+     disasters could not cow, and whom obloquy could never
+     move?"--LORD GOSCHEN _in the House of Lords, March 29th, 1906_
+
+
+
+
+  LONDON
+  JOHN MURRAY ALBEMARLE STREET W
+  1906
+
+
+_This Edition enjoys copyright in all countries signatory to the Berne
+Convention, as well as in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and all British
+Colonies and Dependencies._
+
+
+_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In sending this book to press I have only two remarks to make by way
+of preface.
+
+The first is wholly personal. It has been my good fortune to reside
+twice for a considerable period in South Africa--first in the
+neighbourhood of Capetown (1883-5), and afterwards in Johannesburg
+(1904-5). During these periods of residence, and also during the long
+interval between them, I have been brought into personal contact with
+many of the principal actors in the events which are related in this
+book. While, therefore, no pains have been spared to secure accuracy
+by a careful study of official papers and other reliable publications,
+my information is not derived by any means exclusively from these
+sources.
+
+My second remark is the expression of a hope that the contents of this
+book may be regarded not merely as a chapter of history, but also as a
+body of facts essential to the full understanding of the circumstances
+and conditions of South Africa, as it is to-day. Since the restoration
+of peace--an event not yet five years old--a great change has been
+wrought in the political and economic framework of this province of
+the empire. None the less, with a few conspicuous exceptions, almost
+all of the principal actors in these pages are still there; and,
+presumably, they are very much the same men now as they were before,
+and during, the war. And in this connection it remains to notice an
+aspect of the South African struggle which transcends all others in
+fruitfulness and importance. It was a struggle to keep South Africa
+not a dependency of Great Britain, but a part of the empire. The
+over-sea Britains, understanding it in this sense, took their share in
+it. They made their voices heard in the settlement. The service which
+they thus collectively performed was great. It would have been
+infinitely greater if they had been directly represented in an
+administration nominally common to them and the mother country. No
+political system can be endowed with effective unity--with that
+organic unity which is the only effective unity--unless it is
+possessed of a single vehicle of thought and action. To create this
+vehicle--an administrative body in which all parts of the empire would
+be duly represented--is difficult to-day. The forces of disunion,
+which are at work both at home and beyond the seas, may make it
+impossible to-morrow.
+
+                                   W. B. W.
+
+  RIDGE, NEAR CAPEL, SURREY,
+  _October 19th, 1906_
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+CHAPTER I                                               Page
+
+  DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT.................. 1
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+  THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS............... 48
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+  A YEAR OF OBSERVATION.................................. 75
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+  UNDER WHICH FLAG?..................................... 130
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+  PLAYING FOR TIME...................................... 188
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+  THE ULTIMATUM......................................... 253
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+  THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS............................. 300
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+  THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY...................... 341
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+  THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT........................... 373
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+  THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION............... 413
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+  PREPARING FOR PEACE................................... 470
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+  THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING.......................... 536
+
+
+INDEX................................................... 585
+
+
+
+
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+
+  PORTRAIT OF LORD MILNER                      _Frontispiece_
+    _From a photograph by Elliott & Fry (Photogravure)_
+
+                                            FACING PAGE
+
+  LORD MILNER AT SUNNYSIDE.............................. 473
+
+  MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA........................... _At the End_
+
+
+
+
+LORD MILNER
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT
+
+
+The failure of British administration in South Africa during the
+nineteenth century forms a blemish upon the record of the Victorian
+era that is at first sight difficult to understand. If success could
+be won in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in India and in Egypt,
+why failure in South Africa? For failure it was. A century of wars,
+missionary effort, British expansion, industrial development, of lofty
+administrative ideals and great men sacrificed, had left the two
+European races with political ambitions so antagonistic, and social
+differences so bitter, that nothing less than the combined military
+resources of the colonies and the mother-country sufficed to compel
+the Dutch to recognise the British principle of "equal rights for all
+white men south of the Zambesi." Among the many contributory causes of
+failure that can be distinguished, the two most prominent are the
+nationality difficulty and the native question. But these are problems
+of administration that have been solved elsewhere: the former in
+Canada and the latter in India. Or, to turn to agencies of a
+different order, is the cause of failure to be found in a grudging
+nature--the existence of physical conditions that made it difficult
+for the white man, or for the white and coloured man together, to
+wring a livelihood from the soil? The answer is that the like material
+disadvantages have been conquered in Australia, India, and in Egypt,
+by Anglo-Saxon energy. We might apply the Socratic method throughout,
+traversing the entire range of our distinguishable causes; but in
+every case the inquiry would reveal success in some other portion of
+the Anglo-Saxon domain to darken failure in South Africa.
+
+Nevertheless, in so far as any single influence can be assigned to
+render intelligible a result brought about by many agencies, various
+in themselves and operating from time to time in varying degrees, the
+explanation is to be found in a little incident that happened in the
+second year of the Dutch East India Company's settlement at the Cape
+of Good Hope. The facts are preserved for us by the diary which
+Commander Van Riebeck was ordered to keep for the information of his
+employers. Under the date October 19th, 1653, we read that David
+Janssen, a herdsman, was found lying dead of assegai wounds, inflicted
+by the Beechranger Hottentots, while the cattle placed under his
+charge were seen disappearing round the curve of the Lion's Head. The
+theft had been successfully accomplished through the perfidy of a
+certain "Harry," a Hottentot chief, who was living on terms of
+friendship with the Dutch--a circumstance which was sufficiently
+apparent from the fact that the raid was timed to take place at an
+hour on Sunday morning when the whole of the little community, with
+the exception of two sentinels and a second herdsman, were assembled
+to hear a sermon from the "Sick-Comforter," Wylant. It was the first
+conflict between the Dutch and the natives; for Van Riebeck had been
+bidden, for various excellent reasons, to keep on good terms with the
+Hottentots, and to treat them kindly. But the murder of a white man
+was a serious matter. Kindness scarcely seemed to meet the case; and
+so Van Riebeck applied to the Directors, the famous Chamber of
+Seventeen, for definite instructions as to the course which he must
+pursue.
+
+[Sidenote: Van Riebeck's difficulty.]
+
+He was told that only the actual murderer of David Janssen (if
+apprehended) was to be put to death; that cattle equal in amount to
+the cattle stolen were to be recovered, but only from the actual
+robbers; and that "Harry," if necessary, should be sent to prison at
+Batavia. But he was not otherwise to molest or injure the offending
+Hottentots. Excellent advice, and such as we should expect from the
+countrymen of Grotius in their most prosperous era. But unfortunately
+it was quite impossible for Van Riebeck, with his handful of soldiers
+and sailors, planted at the extremity of the great barbaric continent
+of Africa, to think of putting it into effect. He replied that he had
+no means of identifying the individual wrong-doers, and that the
+institution of private property was unknown among the Hottentots. The
+only method by which the individual could be punished was by punishing
+the tribe, and he therefore proposed to capture the tribe and their
+cattle. But this was a course of action which was repugnant to the
+Directors' sense of justice. It aroused, besides, a vision of
+reinforcements ordered from Batavia, and of disbursements quite
+disproportionate to the practical utility of the Cape station as an
+item in the system of the Company. In vain Van Riebeck urged that a
+large body of slaves and ten or twelve hundred head of cattle would be
+a great addition to the resources of the settlement. The Chamber of
+Seventeen refused to sanction the proposals of the commander, and, as
+its own were impracticable, nothing was done. The Beechranger tribe
+escaped with impunity, and the Hottentots, as a whole, were emboldened
+to make fresh attacks upon the European settlers.
+
+[Sidenote: The Afrikander stock.]
+
+This simple narrative is a lantern that sheds a ray of light upon an
+obscure subject. Two points are noticeable in the attitude of the home
+authority. First, there is its inability to grasp the local
+conditions; and second, the underlying assumption that a moral
+judgment based upon the conditions of the home country, if valid, must
+be equally valid in South Africa. By the time that the home authority
+had become Downing Street instead of the peripatetic Chamber of
+Seventeen, the field of mischievous action over which these
+misconceptions operated had become enlarged. The natives were there,
+as before; but, in addition to the natives, there had grown up a
+population of European descent, some thirty thousand in number, whose
+manner of life and standards of thought and conduct were scarcely more
+intelligible to the British, or indeed to the European mind, than
+those of the yellow-skinned Hottentot or the brown-skinned Kafir. A
+century and a half of the Dutch East India Company's government--a
+government "in all things political purely despotic, in all things
+commercial purely monopolist"--had produced a people unlike any other
+European community on the face of the earth. Of the small original
+stock from which the South African Dutch are descended, one-quarter
+were Huguenot refugees from France, an appreciable section were
+German, and the institution of slavery had added to this admixture the
+inevitable strain of non-Aryan blood. But this racial change was by no
+means all that separated the European population in the Cape Colony
+from the Dutch of Holland. A more potent agency had been at work. The
+corner-stone of the policy of the Dutch East India Company was the
+determination to debar the settlers from all intercourse--social,
+intellectual, commercial, and political--with their kinsmen in Europe.
+One fact will suffice to show how perfectly this object was attained.
+Incredible as it may seem, it is the case that at the end of the
+eighteenth century no printing-press was to be found in the Cape
+Colony, nor had this community of twenty thousand Europeans the means
+of knowing the nature of the laws and regulations of the Government by
+which it was ruled. So long and complete an isolation from European
+civilisation produced a result which is as remarkable in itself as it
+is significant to the student of South African history. This
+phenomenon was the existence, in the nineteenth century, of a
+community of European blood whose moral and intellectual standards
+were those of the seventeenth.
+
+[Sidenote: The nationality difficulty.]
+
+Our dip into the early history of South Africa is not purposeless. It
+does not, of course, explain the failure of British administration;
+but it brings us into touch with circumstances that were bound to make
+the task of governing the Cape Colony--a task finally undertaken by
+England in 1806--one of peculiar difficulty. The native population was
+strange, but the European population was even more strange and
+abnormal. If we had been left to deal with the native population alone
+we should have experienced no serious difficulty in rendering them
+harmless neighbours, and have been able to choose our own time for
+entering upon the responsibilities involved in the administration of
+their territories. But, coming second on the field, we were bound to
+modify our native policy to suit the conditions of a preexisting
+relationship between the white and black races that was not of our
+creation, and one, moreover, that was in many respects repugnant to
+British ideas of justice. Nor was this all. The old European
+population, which should have been, naturally, our ally and
+fellow-worker in the task of native administration, gradually changed
+from its original position of a subject nationality to that of a
+political rival; and, as such, openly bid against us for the
+mastership of the native African tribes.
+
+Now when two statesmen are pitted against each other, of whom one is a
+man whose methods of attack are limited by nineteenth-century ideas,
+while the morality of the other, being that of the seventeenth
+century, permits him greater freedom of action, it is obvious that the
+first will be at a disadvantage. And this would be the case more than
+ever if the nineteenth-century statesman was under the impression that
+his political antagonist was a man whose code of morals was identical
+with his own. When once he had learnt that the moral standard of the
+other was lower than, or different from, his own, he would of course
+make allowance for the circumstance, and he would then be able to
+contest the position with him upon equal terms. But until he had
+grasped this fact he would be at a disadvantage.
+
+Generally speaking, the representatives of the British Government,
+both Governors and High Commissioners, soon learnt that neither the
+natives nor the Dutch population could be dealt with on the same
+footing as a Western European. But the British Government cannot be
+said to have thoroughly learnt the same lesson until, in almost the
+last week of the nineteenth century, the three successive defeats of
+Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso aroused it to a knowledge of the
+fact that we had been within an ace of losing South Africa. Many,
+indeed, would question whether even now the lesson had been thoroughly
+learnt. But, however this may be, it is certain that throughout the
+nineteenth century the Home Government wished to treat both the
+natives and the Dutch in South Africa on a basis of British ideas; and
+that by so doing it constantly found itself in conflict with its own
+local representatives, who knew that the only hope of success lay in
+dealing with both alike on a basis of South African ideas.
+
+As the result of this chronic inability of British statesmen to
+understand South Africa, it follows that the most instructive manner
+of regarding our administration of that country during the nineteenth
+century is to get a clear conception of the successive divergences of
+opinion between the home and the local authorities.
+
+At the very outset of British administration--during the temporary
+occupation of the Cape from 1795 to 1808--we find a theoretically
+perfect policy laid down for the guidance of the early English
+Governors in their treatment of the Boers, or Dutch frontier farmers.
+It is just as admirable, in its way, as were the instructions for the
+treatment of the Hottentots furnished by the Directors of the Dutch
+East India Company to Van Riebeck. In a despatch of July, 1800, the
+third Duke of Portland, who was then acting as Secretary for the
+Colonies, writes:
+
+[Sidenote: Non-interference.]
+
+     "Considering the tract of country over which these border
+     inhabitants are dispersed, the rude and uncultivated state in
+     which they live, and the wild notions of independence which
+     prevail among them, I am afraid any attempts to introduce
+     civilisation and a strict administration of justice will be slow
+     in their progress, and likely, if not proceeded upon with caution
+     and management, rather to create a spirit of resistance, or to
+     occasion them to emigrate still further from the seat of
+     government, than answer the beneficent views with which they
+     might be undertaken. In fact, it seems to me the proper system of
+     policy to observe to them is to interfere as little as possible
+     in their domestic concerns and interior economy; to consider them
+     rather as distant communities dependent upon the Government than
+     as subjects necessarily amenable to the laws and regulations
+     established within the precincts of Government. Mutual advantages
+     arising from barter and commerce, and a strict adherence to good
+     faith and justice in all arrangements with them, joined to
+     efficient protection and occasional acts of kindness on the part
+     of the Government, seem likely to be the best means of securing
+     their attachment."
+
+Who would have thought that this statement of policy, admirable as it is
+at first sight, contained in itself the germ of a political heresy of
+the first magnitude? Yet so it was. The principle of non-interference,
+here for the first time enunciated and subsequently followed with fatal
+effect, could not be applied by a nineteenth-century administration to
+the case of a seventeenth-century community without its virtually
+renouncing the functions of government. Obviously this was not the
+intention of the home authority. There remained the difficulty of
+knowing when to apply, and when not to apply, the principle; and
+directly a specific case arose there was the possibility that, while the
+local authority, with a full knowledge of the local conditions, might
+think interference necessary, the home authority, without such
+knowledge, might take an opposite view.
+
+[Sidenote: Slaghter's Nek.]
+
+A very few years sufficed to show that the most ordinary exercise of
+the functions of government might be regarded as an "interference with
+the domestic concerns and interior economy" of the European subjects
+of the British Crown in South Africa. At the time of the permanent
+occupation of the Cape (1806) the population of the colony consisted
+of three classes: 26,720 persons of European descent, 17,657
+Hottentots, and 29,256 returned as slaves. One of the first measures
+of the British Governor, Lord Caledon, was the enactment of a series
+of regulations intended to confer civil rights on the Hottentots,
+while at the same time preventing them from using their freedom at the
+expense of the European population. From the British, or even
+European point of view, this was a piece of elementary justice to
+which no man could possibly take exception. As applied to the
+conditions of the Franco-Dutch population in the Cape Colony it was,
+in fact, a serious interference with their "domestic concerns and
+internal economy." And as such it produced the extraordinary protest
+known to history as the "Rebellion" of Slaghter's Nek. There was no
+question as to the facts. Booy, the Hottentot, had completed his term
+of service with Frederick Bezuidenhout, the Boer, and was therefore
+entitled, under the Cape law, to leave his master's farm, and to
+remove his property. All this Bezuidenhout admitted; but when it came
+to a question of yielding obedience to the magistrate's order, the
+Boer said "No." In the words of Pringle, "He boldly declared that he
+considered this interference between him (a free burgher) and _his_
+Hottentot to be a presumptuous innovation upon his rights, and an
+intolerable usurpation of tyrannical authority."
+
+And the danger of allowing the Boers to pursue their
+seventeenth-century dealings with the natives became rapidly greater
+when the European Colonists, Dutch and English, were brought, by their
+natural eastward expansion, into direct contact with the masses of
+military Bantu south and east of the Drakenberg chain of
+mountains--the actual dark-skinned "natives" of South Africa as it is
+known to the people of Great Britain. The Boer frontiersman, with his
+aggressive habits and ingrained contempt for a dark-skin,
+disintegrated the Bantu mass before we were ready to undertake the
+work of reconstruction. And therefore the local British authority soon
+learnt that non-interference in the case of the Boer generally meant
+the necessity of a much more serious interference at a subsequent date
+with both Boer and Kafir. And so non-interference, in the admirable
+spirit of the Duke of Portland's despatch, came to bear one meaning in
+Downing Street and quite another in Capetown.
+
+[Sidenote: D'Urban's policy.]
+
+The earliest of the three crucial "divergences of opinion," to which
+collectively the history of our South African administration owes its
+sombre hue, was that which led to the reversal of Sir Benjamin
+D'Urban's frontier policy by Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg)
+at the end of the year 1835. The circumstances were these. On
+Christmas Day, 1834, the Kafirs (without any declaration of war,
+needless to say) invaded the Cape Colony, murdering the settlers in
+the isolated farms, burning their homesteads, and driving off their
+cattle. After a six months' campaign, in which the Dutch and British
+settlers fought by the side of the regular troops, a treaty was made
+with the Kafir chiefs which, in the opinion of D'Urban and his local
+advisers, would render the eastern frontier of the Colony secure from
+further inroads. The Kafirs were to retire to the line of the Kei
+River, thus surrendering part of their territory to the European
+settlers who had suffered most severely from the invasion; while a
+belt of loyal Kafirs, supported by a chain of forts, was to be
+interposed between the defeated tribes and the colonial farmsteads. In
+addition to these measures, D'Urban proposed to compensate the
+settlers for the enormous losses[1] which they had incurred; since, as
+a contemporary and not unfriendly writer[2] puts it, the British
+Government had exposed them for fourteen years to Kafir depredations,
+rather than acknowledge the existence of a state of affairs that must
+plainly have compelled it to make active exertions for their
+protection.
+
+         [Footnote 1: The official returns showed that 456 farm-houses
+         had been wholly, and 350 partially, destroyed; and that 60
+         waggons, 5,715 horses, 111,930 head of horned cattle, and
+         161,930 sheep had been carried off by the Kafirs. And this
+         apart from the remuneration claimed by the settlers for
+         services in the field, and commandeered cattle and supplies.]
+
+         [Footnote 2: Cloete. See note, p. 16.]
+
+The view of the home authority was very different. In the opinion of
+His Majesty's ministers at Downing Street the Kafir invasion was the
+result of a long series of unjustifiable encroachments on the part of
+the European settlers. D'Urban was instructed, therefore, to reinstate
+the Kafirs in the districts from which they had retired under the
+treaty of September, 1835, and to cancel all grants of land beyond the
+Fish River--the original eastern boundary of the Colony--which the
+Colonial Government had made to its European subjects from 1817
+onwards; while, as for compensation, any indemnity was altogether out
+of the question, since the colonists had only themselves to thank for
+the enmity of the natives--if, indeed, they had not deliberately
+provoked the war with a view to the acquisition of fresh territory.
+
+The divergence between these two opinions is sufficiently well marked.
+To trace the precise agencies through which two diametrically opposed
+views were evolved on this occasion from the same groundwork of facts
+would be too lengthy a business; but, by way of comment, we may recall
+two statements, each significant and authentic. Cloete, writing while
+the events in question were still fresh in his mind, says of Lord
+Glenelg's despatch: "A communication more cruel, unjust, and insulting
+to the feelings not only of Sir Benjamin D'Urban ... but of the
+inhabitants ... could hardly have been penned by a declared enemy of
+the country and its Governor." And Sir George Napier, by whom D'Urban
+was superseded, stated in evidence given before the House of Commons:
+"My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes, have confirmed me
+that I was wrong and Sir Benjamin D'Urban was perfectly right; that if
+he meant to keep Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing
+so was by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them."
+
+[Sidenote: The Great Trek.]
+
+This settlement of a South African question upon a basis of British,
+or rather non-South African, ideas was followed by events as notorious
+as they were disastrous. It must be remembered that in 1819-20 the
+first and only effort to introduce a considerable British population
+into South Africa had been successfully carried out when the "Albany"
+settlers, to the number of some five thousand, were established in
+this and other districts upon the eastern border of the Cape Colony.
+The colonial farmers who suffered from the Kafir invasion of 1834-5
+were not exclusively Boers. Among them there were many members of the
+new British population, and the divergence of opinion between D'Urban
+and Lord Glenelg was all the more significant, since in this case the
+British settlers were in agreement with the Boers. It was no longer
+merely a divergence of views as between the local and the home
+authority, but as between the British in Britain and the British in
+South Africa. It must also be remembered that, in the same year as the
+Kafir invasion, a social revolution--the emancipation of slaves--had
+been accomplished in the Cape Colony by an Act of the British
+Parliament, in comparison with which the nationalisation of the
+railways or of the mines in England would seem a comparatively
+trifling disturbance of the system of private property to the
+Englishman of to-day. The reversal of D'Urban's arrangements for the
+safety of the eastern frontier was not only bad in itself, but it came
+at a bad time. Whether the secession of the Emigrant Farmers would in
+any case have taken place as the result of the emancipation of slaves
+is a matter which cannot now be decided. But, however this may be, the
+fact remains that two men so well qualified to give an opinion on the
+subject as Judge Cloete and Sir John Robinson, the first Prime
+Minister of Natal, unhesitatingly ascribe the determining influence
+which drove the Boers to seek a home beyond the jurisdiction of the
+British Government to the sense of injustice created by the measures
+dictated by Lord Glenelg, and by the whole spirit of his despatch.[3]
+And this judgment is supported by the fact that the wealthier Dutch of
+the Western Province were much more seriously affected by the
+emancipation of slaves than the "Boers" of the eastern districts of
+the Colony; yet it was these latter, of course, who provided the bulk
+of the emigrants who crossed the Orange River in the years of the
+Great Trek (1835-8) We shall not therefore be drawing an extravagantly
+improbable conclusion, if we decide that the movement which divided
+European South Africa was due to a well-ascertained divergence of
+opinion between the home and local authorities--both British.
+
+         [Footnote 3: For the benefit of those who may desire to read
+         the passages in which these opinions are expressed, I append
+         the references. Cloete's opinion is to be found in his "Five
+         Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers," delivered
+         before the Natal Society and published at Capetown in 1856. A
+         reprint of this work was published by Mr. Murray in 1899. Sir
+         John Robinson's opinion, which endorses the views of Mrs.
+         Anna Elizabeth Steenekamp as expressed in _The Cape Monthly
+         Magazine_ for September, 1876, is to be found at pp. 46, 47
+         of his "A Lifetime in South Africa" (Smith, Elder, 1900).]
+
+[Sidenote: The birth of the republic.]
+
+[Sidenote: Sir George Grey.]
+
+The results of this secession of something like one-fourth of the
+Franco-Dutch population are common knowledge. Out of the scattered
+settlements founded by the Emigrant Farmers beyond the borders of the
+Colony were created, in 1852 (Sand River Convention) and 1854
+(Bloemfontein Convention), the two Boer Republics, which half a century
+later withstood for two years and eight months the whole available
+military force of the British Empire. The first effect of the secession
+was to erect the republican Dutch into a rival power which bid against
+the British Government for the territory and allegiance of the natives.
+Secession, therefore, made the inevitable task of establishing the
+supremacy of the white man in South Africa infinitely more costly both
+in blood and treasure. The British nation accepted the task, which fell
+to it as paramount power, with the greatest reluctance. The endless and
+apparently aimless Kafir wars exhausted the patience of the country, and
+the destruction of an entire British regiment by Ketshwayo's[4] _impis_
+created a feeling of deep resentment against the great High
+Commissioner, whose policy was held--unreasonably enough--responsible
+for the military disaster of Isandlhwana. Two opportunities of
+recovering the lost solidarity of the Europeans were presented before
+the republican Dutch had set themselves definitely to work for the
+supremacy of South Africa through reunion with their colonial kinsfolk.
+That both were lost was due at bottom to the disgust of the British
+people at the excessive cost and burden of establishing a civilised
+administration over the native population in South Africa. But in both
+cases the immediate agency of disaster was the refusal of the Home
+Government to listen to the advice of its local representative. Sir
+George Grey would have regained the lost solidarity of the Europeans by
+taking advantage of the natural recoil manifested among the Free State
+Dutch from independence and responsibility towards the more settled and
+prosperous life assured by British rule. His proposal was to unite the
+Cape Colony, Natal, and the Free State in a federal legislature,
+consisting of representatives chosen by popular vote in the several
+states. In urging this measure he took occasion to combat the
+pessimistic views of South African affairs which were prevalent in
+England. The country was not commercially useless, but of "great and
+increasing value." Its people did not desire Kafir wars, but were well
+aware of the much greater advantages which they derived from the
+peaceful pursuits of industry. The colonists were themselves willing to
+contribute to the defence of that part of the Queen's dominions in which
+they lived. And, finally, the condition of the natives was not hopeless,
+for the missionaries were producing most beneficial effects upon the
+tribes of the interior. But the most powerful argument which Grey used
+was his ruthless exposure of the futility of the Conventions. By
+allowing the Boer emigrants to grow into independent communities the
+British Government believed that not only had they relieved themselves
+of responsibility for the republican Dutch, but that they had secured,
+in addition, the unfaltering allegiance of the larger Dutch population
+which remained behind in the Cape Colony. Grey assured the Home
+Government that in both respects it was the victim of a delusion bred of
+its complete ignorance of South African conditions. The Boer Republics
+would give trouble. Apart from the bad draftsmanship of the
+conventions--a fertile source of disagreement--these small states would
+be centres of intrigue and "internal commotions," while at the same time
+their revenues would be too small to provide efficiently for their
+protection against the warlike tribes. The policy of _divide et
+impera_--or, as Grey called it, the "dismemberment" policy--would fail,
+since the political barrier which had been erected was wholly
+artificial.
+
+         [Footnote 4: Cetewayo.]
+
+     "Although these European countries are treated as separate
+     nations," he wrote, "their inhabitants bear the same family names
+     as the inhabitants of this Colony, and maintain with them ties of
+     the closest intimacy and relationship. They speak generally the
+     same language--not English, but Dutch. They are for the most part
+     of the same religion, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church.
+     They have the same laws--the Roman Dutch. They have the same
+     sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and frequently
+     the same feelings regarding the native races....
+
+     "I think that there can be no doubt that, in any great public, or
+     popular, or national question or movement, the mere fact of
+     calling these people different nations would not make them so,
+     nor would the fact of a mere fordable stream running between them
+     sever their sympathies or prevent them from acting in unison....
+     Many questions might arise in which, if the Government on the
+     south side of the Orange River took a different view from that on
+     the north side of the river, it might be very doubtful which of
+     the two Governments the great mass of the people would obey."[5]
+
+         [Footnote 5: Despatch of November 19th, 1858, to Sir E. B.
+         Lytton.]
+
+The "divergence of opinion" between Capetown and Downing Street was
+complete. Grey was charged with "direct disobedience" for listening to
+the offers of the Free State inhabitants. Recalled by a despatch of
+June 4th, 1859, he was reinstated in August on condition that "he felt
+himself sufficiently free and uncompromised," both with the Cape
+Legislature and the people of the Free State, to be able personally to
+carry out the policy of the Home Government, which, said the despatch,
+
+     "is entirely opposed to those measures, tending to the resumption
+     of sovereignty over that State, of which you have publicly
+     expressed your approval in your speech to the Cape Parliament,
+     and in your answers to the address from the State in question."
+
+Nor was that all. In his endeavours to establish a simple but
+effective system of European magistrates over the Kafirs beyond the
+eastern border of the Colony, he was hampered by the short-sighted
+economy of the Home Government. It seems incredible that a Colonial
+Governor, even at that epoch, should have been looked upon by Downing
+Street as a sort of importunate mendicant. But Grey's language shows
+that this was the attitude against which he had to defend himself.
+
+[Sidenote: The burden of the empire.]
+
+     "I would now only urge upon Her Majesty's Government," he writes
+     on September 8th, 1858, "that they should not distress me more
+     than is absolutely necessary for the government and control of
+     the people of the country which lies beyond the Colony of the
+     Cape of Good Hope. Stripping the country as I am of troops [to
+     serve in putting down the Indian Mutiny], some great disaster
+     will take place if necessary funds are at the same time cut off
+     from me. I am sure, if the enormous reductions I have effected in
+     military expenditure are considered, the most rigid economists
+     will feel that the money paid by Great Britain for the control of
+     this country has been advantageously laid out."
+
+These extracts are not pleasant reading. They were written at the time
+when the Imperial spirit was at its nadir. In the plain language of
+the Secretary of State for the Colonies[6] in 1858, it was a time when
+ministers were "compelled to recognise as fact the increased and
+increasing dislike of Parliament to the maintenance of large military
+establishments in our colonies at Imperial cost." Yet one more passage
+must be cited, not so much because it is tinged by a certain grim
+humour--although this is a valuable quality in such a context--as
+because it affords an eminently pertinent illustration in support of
+the contention that the refusal of the Home Government to follow the
+advice of the "man on the spot" has been the operative cause of the
+failure of British administration in South Africa. The reply to the
+charge of "direct disobedience," which Grey formulates in one
+leisurely sentence, runs as follows:
+
+         [Footnote 6: Sir E. B. Lytton.]
+
+     "With regard to any necessity which might exist for my removal on
+     the ground of not holding the same views upon essential points of
+     policy as Her Majesty's Government hold, I can only make the
+     general remark that, during the five years which have elapsed
+     since I was appointed to my present office, there have been at
+     least seven Secretaries of State for the Colonial Department,
+     each of whom held different views upon some important points of
+     policy connected with this country."
+
+[Sidenote: The discovery of diamonds.]
+
+Grey was not by any means the only Governor of the Cape to show the
+home authorities how impossible it was to govern South Africa from
+Downing Street, and to urge upon them the necessity of allowing their
+representative, the one man who was familiar with local conditions, to
+decide by what methods the objects of British policy could be most
+effectively advanced. But it was not until some considerable time
+after the Colonial Department had been placed under a separate
+Secretary of State, and the Colonial Office had been constituted on
+its present basis, with a staff of permanent officials, that these
+protests produced any appreciable effect. What really aroused an
+interest in South Africa--that is to say a practical interest, as
+distinct from the interest created by the stories of missionary
+enterprise and travel, and by the records of Kafir warfare--was the
+discovery of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1870, and the subsequent
+establishment of the diamond industry at Kimberley. It was the first
+time that anything certain had occurred to show that the vast
+"hinterland" of the Cape might prove to be a territory of industrial
+possibilities. The earnings of the diamond mines provided the Cape
+Colony with a revenue sufficient to enable it to link together its
+main towns by a tolerable railway system. The industry, once
+established, attracted British capital and British population, and by
+so doing it did what Blue-books and missionary reports had failed to
+do: it brought the every-day life of the British Colonist in South
+Africa within the purview of the nation. Thanks to the Kimberley mines
+the Cape ceased to be thought of as a country whose resources were
+exclusively pastoral and agricultural.
+
+The epoch of the next great divergence of opinion was a more hopeful
+time from an Imperialist point of view. Lord Beaconsfield, who was the
+first statesman to give practical expression to the belief that the
+maintenance of empire was not inconsistent with the welfare of the
+masses of the home population, was in power. British statesmen, and
+the class from which British statesmen are drawn, had begun to study
+Colonial questions in a more hopeful and intelligent spirit. Something
+had been learnt, too, of the actual conditions of South Africa. And
+yet it was at this epoch that what was, perhaps, the most ruinous of
+all the divergences of opinion between Capetown and Downing Street
+occurred.
+
+[Sidenote: Sir Bartle Frere.]
+
+When Sir Bartle Frere was sent out to South Africa to carry out a
+definite scheme for the union of the Republics with the British
+colonies in a federal system, British statesmen and the educated
+classes in general had adopted the views expressed by Grey twenty
+years before. Tardily they had learnt to recognise both the essential
+unity of the Dutch population and the value of the country as an
+industrial asset of the empire. But, in the meantime, the centre of
+political power had shifted in England. The extension of the franchise
+had placed the ultimate control of British policy in South Africa in
+the hands of a class of electors who were, as yet, wholly uneducated
+in the political and economic conditions of that country. The
+divergence of opinion between the home and the local authority became
+in this case wider than ever. In short, it was the will of the nation
+that caused Frere to be arrested midway in the accomplishment of his
+task, and gave a mandate in 1880 to the Liberal party to administer
+South Africa upon the lines of a policy shaped in contemptuous
+indifference of the profoundest convictions and most solemn warnings
+of a great proconsul and most loyal servant of the Crown.
+
+The facts of Frere's supersession and recall are notorious: the story
+is too recent to need telling at length. We know now that, apart from
+the actual discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-mines, all that he
+foresaw and foretold has been realised in the events which culminated,
+twenty years later, in the great South African War. The military power
+which at that time (1877-80) stood in the way of South African unity
+under the British flag was the Zulu people. The whole adult male
+population of the tribe had been trained for war, and organised by
+Ketshwayo into a fighting machine. With this formidable military
+instrument at his command Ketshwayo proposed to emulate the sanguinary
+career of conquest pursued by his grandfather Tshaka;[7] and he had
+prepared the way for the half-subdued military Bantu throughout South
+Africa to co-operate with him in a general revolt against the growing
+supremacy of the white man. Frere removed this obstacle. But in doing
+so he, or rather the general entrusted with the command of the
+military operations, lost a British regiment at Isandlhwana. This
+revelation of the strength of the Zulu army was, in fact, a complete
+confirmation of the correctness of Frere's diagnosis of the South
+African situation. His contention was that England must give evidence
+of both her capacity and her intention to control the native
+population of South Africa before she could reasonably ask the
+republican Dutch to surrender their independence and reunite with the
+British colonies in a federal system under the British flag. A native
+power, organised solely for aggressive warfare against one of two
+possible white neighbours, constituted therefore, in his opinion, not
+only a perpetual menace to the safety of Natal, but an insuperable
+obstacle to the effective discharge of a duty by the paramount Power,
+the successful performance of which was a condition precedent to the
+reunion of the European communities. The only point in dispute was the
+question whether the powers of Ketshwayo's _impis_ had been
+exaggerated. To this question the disaster of Isandlhwana returned an
+emphatic "No."
+
+         [Footnote 7: Chaka.]
+
+[Sidenote: The recall of Frere.]
+
+The divergence of opinion between Frere and Lord Beaconsfield's
+cabinet was trivial as compared with the profound gulf which separated
+his policy from the South African policy of Mr. Gladstone. After the
+return of the Liberal party to power in the spring of 1880, Frere was
+allowed to remain in office until August 1st, when he was recalled by
+a telegraphic despatch. But, as Lord Kimberley pointed out to him,
+there had been "so much divergence" between his views and those of the
+Home Government that he would not have been allowed to remain at the
+Cape, "had it not been for the special reason that there was a
+prospect of his being able materially to forward the policy of
+confederation." This prospect, of course, had then been removed by the
+failure of the Cape Government, on June 29th, to bring about the
+conference of delegates from the several States, which was the initial
+step towards the realisation of Lord Carnarvon's scheme of federal
+union.
+
+The vindication of Frere's statesmanship has been carried, by the
+inexorable logic of events, far beyond the sphere of Blue-book
+arguments. But it is impossible to read this smug despatch without
+recalling the words which Mr. Krueger wrote to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney
+on June 26th of the same year: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere will ...
+be useful.... We have done our duty and used all legitimate influence
+to cause the conference proposals to fail." That is to say, it was
+known to these faithful confederates of that section of the Liberal
+party of which Mr. Courtney was the head, that the Gladstone
+Government had determined to recall Sir Bartle Frere three days before
+"the special reason" for maintaining him at the Cape had disappeared.
+
+[Sidenote: Frere's forecast.]
+
+But what we are really concerned with is the nature of the opinions
+upon the central question of South African administration which Frere
+put forward at this critical period. With these before us, the most
+elementary acquaintance with the events of the last ten years will
+suffice to indicate the profound degree in which his knowledge of
+South African conditions surpassed the knowledge of those who took
+upon themselves to reverse his policy. What, above all, Frere realised
+was, that a point had been reached at which the whole of South Africa
+must be gathered under the British flag without delay. He had noted
+the disintegrating influences at work in the Cape Colony and the
+strength of the potential antagonism of the republican Dutch. The
+annexation of the Transvaal was not his deed, nor did either the time
+or the manner in which it was done command his approval. But he
+asserted that British rule, once established there, must be maintained
+at all costs. With this end in view, he urged that every
+responsibility incurred by England in the act of annexation must be
+fulfilled to the letter. Utilising the information which he had gained
+by personal observation during his visit to the Transvaal in 1879, and
+availing himself of the co-operation of President Brand, of the Free
+State, and Chief Justice de Villiers, in the Cape Colony, he drafted a
+scheme of administrative reform sufficient to satisfy the legitimate
+aspirations of the Boers for self-government without endangering the
+permanency of British rule. It included proposals for administrative
+and financial reforms framed with a view of reducing the cost of
+government to the lowest point consistent with efficiency, for the
+reorganisation of the courts of law, for the survey of the proposed
+railway line to Delagoa Bay, and full details of a system of
+representative government. This measure he urged upon the Colonial
+Office as one of immediate necessity, since it embodied the fulfilment
+of the definite promises of an early grant of self-government made to
+the Boers at the time of annexation.[8]
+
+         [Footnote 8: The receipt of the despatch in which these
+         valuable recommendations were made was not even acknowledged
+         by the Colonial Office. Frere himself gives the outlines of
+         his proposals in an article published in _The Nineteenth
+         Century_ for February, 1881.]
+
+He recognised the value of Delagoa Bay as an essential factor in the
+political and commercial system of a united South Africa, and he
+earnestly recommended its acquisition by purchase from the Portuguese
+Government. His perception of the extreme importance of satisfying all
+legitimate claims of the Boers, and his acute realisation of the
+danger of allowing the Transvaal to become a "jumping-off ground"
+either for foreign powers or Afrikander Nationalists, are exhibited in
+due relationship in a private memorandum which he wrote from the Cape
+at the end of July, 1879:
+
+     "Any reliance on mere force in the Transvaal must react
+     dangerously down here in the old colony, and convert the Dutch
+     Country party, now as loyal and prosperous a section of the
+     population as any under the Crown, into dangerous allies of the
+     small anti-English Republican party, who are for separation, thus
+     paralysing the efforts of the loyal English party now in power,
+     who aim at making the country a self-defending integral portion
+     of the British Empire. Further, any attempt to give back or
+     restore the Boer Republic in the Transvaal must lead to anarchy
+     and failure, and probably, at no distant period, to a vicious
+     imitation of some South American Republics, in which the more
+     uneducated and misguided Boers, dominated and led by better
+     educated foreign adventurers--Germans, Hollanders, Irish Home
+     Rulers, and other European Republicans and Socialists--will
+     become a pest to the whole of South Africa, and a most dangerous
+     fulcrum to any European Power bent on contesting our naval
+     supremacy, or injuring us in our colonies.
+
+     "There is no escaping from the responsibility which has already
+     been incurred, ever since the British flag was planted on the
+     Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still
+     arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility....
+     If you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always
+     to be heavily paid for in both blood and treasure.... Your object
+     is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This
+     will have to be asserted some day, and the assertion will not
+     become easier by delay. The trial of strength will be forced on
+     you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by
+     postponing the trial if we start with a good cause."
+
+Could not the man who foresaw these dangers have prevented them? It is
+impossible to resist the momentum of this thought.
+
+[Sidenote: The retrocession.]
+
+The events by which this forecast was so closely realised are not
+likely to be effaced from the memory of this generation. Frere had
+scarcely left the Colony from which he had been recalled by the joint
+efforts of Mr. Krueger and Lord (then Mr.) Courtney before the former,
+with his fellow triumvirs, had raised the Vier-kleur upon the still
+desolate uplands of the Witwatersrand. The attempt to put down by
+force the Boer revolt of 1880-81 failed. Mr. Gladstone's cabinet
+recoiled before the prospect of a war in which the Boers might have
+been supported by their kinsmen in the Free State and the Cape Colony.
+The retrocession of the Transvaal under the terms of the Pretoria
+Convention (1881) was followed by further concessions embodied in the
+London Convention of 1884. It is absolutely established as fact that
+Mr. Gladstone's Government intended, by certain articles contained in
+both conventions, to secure to all actual and potential British
+residents in the Transvaal the enjoyment of all the political rights
+of citizenship possessed by the Boers. But it is equally certain that
+the immediate contravention of Article XVI. of the Pretoria
+Convention, when in 1882 the period of residence necessary to qualify
+for the franchise was raised from two to five years, was allowed to
+pass without protest from the Imperial Government. And thus a breach
+of the Convention, which the discovery of the Witwatersrand
+gold-fields (1886) and the subsequent establishment of a great British
+industrial community made a matter of vital importance, was condoned.
+A few years more and the country which prided itself upon being the
+home of liberty and of free institutions was confounded by the
+spectacle of a South Africa of its own making, in which a British
+majority denied the franchise in a Dutch Republic, contrasted with a
+Dutch minority dominating and controlling the machinery of responsible
+government in a British colony.
+
+This situation brings us (to use a military phrase) within striking
+distance of the objective of the present work--the personality and
+efforts of the man who administered South Africa in the momentous
+years of the struggle for equal rights for all white men from the
+Zambesi to Capetown.
+
+If the records set out in the preceding pages leave any impression
+upon the mind, it is one that must produce a sense of amazement,
+almost exasperation, at the thought of the many mistakes and disasters
+that might have been avoided, if only greater weight had been attached
+to the advice tendered to the British Government by its local
+representative in South Africa. And with this sense of amazement a
+generous mind will associate inevitably a feeling of regret for the
+injustice unwittingly, but none the less irreparably, inflicted upon
+loyal and capable servants of the Crown--an injustice so notorious
+that it has made South Africa the "grave of reputations." Apart from
+the pre-eminence with which the period of Lord Milner's administration
+is invested by the occurrence within it of a military conflict of
+unparalleled magnitude, Lord Milner stands out in the annals of South
+Africa as the first High Commissioner whose knowledge of South African
+conditions was allowed to inspire the policy of the Home Government,
+and who himself was recognised by the Government and people of Great
+Britain as voicing the convictions and aspirations of all loyal
+subjects of the Crown in that province of the empire.
+
+The state of affairs with which Lord Milner was called upon to deal
+was in its essence the situation sketched by Frere twenty years before
+in the memorable forecast to which reference has been made. But the
+working of the forces indicated by Frere as destined, if unchecked, to
+drive England one day to a life-and-death struggle for her supremacy
+in South Africa, had been complicated by an event which cannot be
+omitted altogether from a chapter intended, like a Euripidean
+prologue, to prepare the mind of the spectator for the proper
+understanding of the characters and action of the drama. This event is
+the Jameson Raid.
+
+[Sidenote: The Jameson raid.]
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes.]
+
+In order to see the Jameson Raid in its true perspective, it is not
+sufficient to place it in relationship to those familiar and notorious
+events by which it was followed. It must also be placed in relationship
+to the no less clearly defined events by which it was preceded. Thus
+placed it becomes the direct outcome of the refusal of the Imperial
+Government to use the advice of its local representative--or, more
+precisely, of the refusal to base its policy on South African instead
+of British conditions: and, as such, it convinced the Imperial
+Government of the need of reviving the power of its local
+representative. In other words, it is a connecting link between the High
+Commissionerships of Frere and Milner. The events which followed the
+recall of Frere were accepted by the British inhabitants of South Africa
+as a practical demonstration of the inherent viciousness of the system
+under which the decision of cardinal questions of South African
+administration was left in the hands of the House of Commons, a body in
+which they were not represented; which met 6,000 miles away; whose
+judgment was liable to be warped by irrelevant considerations of English
+party politics; and one which was admittedly unfamiliar with the country
+and peoples whose interests were vitally affected by the manner in which
+these questions were decided. The lesson of the retrocession was taken
+to heart so earnestly that, fifteen years later, the majority of the
+British residents in the Transvaal refused to support a movement for
+reform which involved the re-establishment of Imperial authority, while
+among those who were loyal to the British connection throughout South
+Africa its effect was to make them think, as did Rhodes, that the
+machinery of the various local British governments must be dissociated
+as much as possible from the principles and methods of the Home
+Government. Hence the necessity for what Rhodes called the "elimination
+of the Imperial factor." The expression, as he afterwards explained,
+was in no way inconsistent with attachment to the British connection. As
+read in the context in which it was originally used, it meant merely
+that the European population of Bechuanaland,[9] being mainly Boer
+immigrants, could be administered more successfully by officers
+responsible to a government which, like that of the Cape Colony, was
+well versed in South African conditions, than by officers directly
+responsible to the Imperial Government. The phrase was a criticism of
+Downing Street, and still more of English party government. In short,
+Rhodes was convinced that if a system of British administration, based
+on South African conditions, was ever to be carried on successfully, the
+local British authority, and not the Home Government, must be the
+machine employed; and in order to allow it to work freely, its action
+must be made as independent as possible of Downing Street. For Downing
+Street was an authority which blew hot or cold, in accordance with the
+views of the party for the time being in power.[10]
+
+         [Footnote 9: The Crown Colony--not the Protectorate--annexed
+         by the Cape Colony in 1895.]
+
+         [Footnote 10: Rhodes's words were: "If we do not settle this
+         [_i.e._ the question of Bechuanaland] ourselves, we shall see
+         it taken up in the House of Commons on one side or the other,
+         not from any real interest in the question, but simply
+         because of its consequences to those occupying the
+         Ministerial benches. We want to get rid of Downing Street in
+         this question, and to deal with it ourselves, as a
+         self-governing colony."]
+
+[Sidenote: New forces.]
+
+And, in point of fact, both parties in England acquiesced in this
+judgment of the South African British. During the years between
+Frere's recall and the appointment of Lord Milner (1880-1897) the High
+Commissioner was a decreasing force. Both Lord Rosmead and Lord Loch
+did little to mould the destiny of South Africa: not because they
+lacked capacity, but because it was the determination of the Home
+Government to leave the difficult problem of South African unity to
+local initiative. On the other hand, the progress which was made in
+this direction by local initiative, aided as it was by the fortuitous
+discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, was considerable. The
+highlands of South Central Africa were acquired for the British race,
+and the Boer was effectively prevented from carrying the Vier-kleur
+beyond the Limpopo; the railway, drawn through the Free State by the
+magnet of the Rand, disturbed the retirement of the republican Dutch;
+and finally the Cape Colony and Natal were linked together with the
+Free State in a Customs Union. But the development of the mineral
+resources of the country led to the appearance of a new factor in
+South African politics. The comparative decline in the activity of the
+High Commissioner had been accompanied by the establishment and growth
+of powerful industrial corporations. It is easy to understand how a
+man like Rhodes, with the wealth and influence of De Beers and the
+Chartered Company at his command, might seek, by an alliance with the
+"great houses" of the Rand, to find in private effort an instrument
+for remedying the deficiencies of the Imperial Government even more
+appropriate than the local governmental action upon which he had
+previously relied. For the work of these industrial corporations had
+powerfully enlisted the interest and sympathy of the British public.
+The Jameson Raid was an illegitimate and disastrous application of an
+otherwise meritorious and successful effort to strengthen the British
+hold upon South Africa by private enterprise. It was at once the
+measure of Imperial inefficiency, and its cure.
+
+One other circumstance must be recalled in estimating the extent to
+which the Home Government had earned the distrust of the British
+population in South Africa. Only eighteen months[11] before the Raid
+the High Commissioner, Lord Loch, had gone to Pretoria carrying a
+despatch in which the grant of a five years' franchise was advocated
+on behalf of the Uitlanders. His instructions were to present this
+despatch, and press upon President Krueger personally the necessity for
+giving effect to its recommendations. These instructions were
+cancelled at the last moment by Lord Ripon, because the German
+Ambassador had made representations in London that such action would
+be regarded as an interference with the _status quo_ in South Africa,
+and, as such, detrimental to German interests in that country. And six
+months later[12] President Krueger, in attending a "Kommers" given by
+the German Club at Pretoria in honour of the Kaiser Wilhelm II.'s
+birthday, alluded to Germany as a grown-up power that would stop
+England from "kicking" the child Republic.
+
+         [Footnote 11: June, 1894.]
+
+         [Footnote 12: January 28th, 1895.]
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes's Plan.]
+
+The Raid was, therefore, a short cut to baffle German intrigue and
+solve the problem of South African unity at one blow. For to Rhodes
+the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders meant the withdrawal of the
+Transvaal Government from its opposition to his scheme of commercial
+federation. It is obvious that one ground of justification, and one
+only, can be found for the usurpation of the functions of government
+by a private individual, or group of individuals. This justification
+is success. It has been the custom to represent Dr. Jameson's decision
+to "ride in" as "an act of monumental folly," alike from a political
+and a military point of view. But this opinion overlooks the fact that
+the affair may have been so planned in Rhodes's mind that success did
+not depend upon the victory of the Uitlanders, aided by Jameson's
+troopers, but on the presence of the High Commissioner in the
+Transvaal under such conditions as would make the intervention of the
+Imperial Government at once imperative and effectual. The
+representative of the Imperial Government, backed by a Johannesburg in
+armed revolt against the Boer oligarchy, would find himself--so Rhodes
+thought--in a position highly favourable to the successful prosecution
+of the demands which had already been put forward on behalf of
+British subjects resident in the Transvaal. And in order that this
+essential part of the plan might be carried out without a moment of
+unnecessary delay, Rhodes kept a train, with steam up, in the station
+at Capetown ready to speed Lord Rosmead northwards directly the news
+of Dr. Jameson's arrival at Johannesburg should have reached him. Once
+Jameson's force had "got through," he relied upon the Reform
+Committee, however incomplete its preparations, being able to hold
+Johannesburg for a couple of days against any force the Boers could
+bring.[13] Nor in the light of what happened, during the war, both at
+Mafeking and Kimberley, can this expectation be thought extravagant.
+Here his responsibilities would have ended. The High Commissioner and
+the Imperial Government would have done the rest. To indulge in
+metaphor, the Imperial locomotive was to be set going, but the lines
+on which it was to run were those laid down by Mr. Rhodes.
+
+         [Footnote 13: It is worth noticing that even the presence of
+         the German Marines at Delagoa Bay was
+         counterbalanced--whether by chance or design--by the
+         coincidence of the arrival of a British troopship with
+         time-expired men from the Indian garrison, off Durban.]
+
+If this was the essence of Rhodes's plan, it would matter
+comparatively little whether the Reformers had, or had not, completed
+their preparations, or whether Dr. Jameson had 1,200 or 500 men.
+Certainly some such assumption is necessary to account for the fact
+that Rhodes treated his confederates at Johannesburg as so many pawns
+on a chess-board. It is equally necessary to account for Dr. Jameson's
+action. "Twenty years friends, and now he goes in and ruins me," was
+Rhodes's comment on the news that Dr. Jameson had "ridden in," in
+spite of his own orders to the contrary and the message to the same
+effect which Captain Heany had delivered on behalf of the Reformers.
+But what if Dr. Jameson knew, or thought that he knew, that Rhodes's
+object in forcing the insurrection was not to make the Uitlanders
+reduce Krueger, but to compel the Imperial Government to step in? In
+this case he may well have thought that what was essential was not
+that the rising should be successful, but that there should be a
+rising of any kind; provided that it was sufficiently grave to arrest
+the attention of the world, and claim the interference of the Imperial
+Government.
+
+According to Mr. Chamberlain the continued inaction of the Imperial
+Government in the eighteen months that had passed since Lord Loch's
+visit to Pretoria in June, 1894, was due to two circumstances. In the
+first place, "the Uitlanders and their organs had always deprecated
+the introduction into the dispute of what is called in South Africa
+the 'Imperial factor'"; and in the second, the "rumours" of violent
+measures "were continually falsified by the event." Obviously, if
+Rhodes forced an insurrection with the intention of removing these
+obstacles--if, that is to say, the intervention of the Imperial
+Government, and not the success of the insurrection, was his primary
+object--the temerity of Dr. Jameson's invasion is materially
+diminished. Now Mr. Chamberlain's statement, made under date February
+4th, 1896, _i.e._ five weeks after the Raid, is perfectly consistent
+with the view of the attitude of the Reformers expressed by Rhodes on
+the day before the Raid took place.
+
+[Sidenote: The reformers divided.]
+
+Dr. Jameson's force, it will be remembered, started on the evening of
+Sunday, December 29th, 1895. Up to three days before--the
+26th--nothing had occurred to interfere with the final arrangement,
+telegraphed to Dr. Jameson from Capetown, that the movement in
+Johannesburg would take place on Saturday, the 28th. The circumstances
+which caused the Reformers to alter their plans were explained by
+Rhodes in an interview with Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary,
+at Capetown on the same Saturday, the 28th, with his accustomed
+vivacity. The Johannesburg insurrection, he said--
+
+     "had fizzled out as a damp squib. The capitalists financing the
+     movement had made the hoisting of the British flag a _sine qua
+     non_. This the National Union rejected, and issued a manifesto
+     declaring for a republic. The division had led to the complete
+     collapse of the movement, and it was thought that the leaders
+     would make the best terms they could with President Krueger."
+
+The telegrams which reached Dr. Jameson between the 26th and 29th
+contained the same facts, with the further information that Captain
+Heany was travelling by special train to him with a message direct
+from the Reformers. In these circumstances it is said that Rhodes at
+Capetown imagined as little as the Reform leaders at Johannesburg that
+Dr. Jameson would cross the frontier. That, however, there was another
+point of view from which the situation might present itself to Dr.
+Jameson is shown by the fact that Mr. Chamberlain, in reply to the
+High Commissioner's telegram reporting the substance of Rhodes's
+statement to Sir Graham Bower, at once[14] inquired of Lord Rosmead,
+"Are you sure Jameson has not moved in consequence of the collapse?"
+
+         [Footnote 14: Afternoon of Monday, December 30th.]
+
+Was Mr. Chamberlain right? Did Dr. Jameson see in the fact that the
+Reformers were divided on such an issue only an additional reason for
+carrying out a plan which had for its object to compel the Imperial
+Government to intervene in the affairs of the Transvaal before it was
+too late; that is to say, before the British population had definitely
+committed itself to the policy of a purged republic, but a republic
+under any flag but that of Great Britain? Such a policy was not merely
+possible. It seemed inevitable to the vivacious French observer who
+wrote, not from hearsay, but "with his eyes upon the object," in
+December, 1893:
+
+     "The Transvaal will never be an English colony. The English of
+     the Transvaal, as well as those of Cape Colony and Natal, would
+     be as firmly opposed to it as the Boers themselves, for they have
+     never forgiven England for letting herself be beaten by the Boers
+     at Majuba Hill and accepting her defeat, a proceeding which has
+     rendered them ridiculous in the eyes of the Dutch population of
+     South Africa.... With me this is not a simple impression, but a
+     firm conviction."[15]
+
+         [Footnote 15: "John Bull & Co.," by "Max O'Rell," 1894.]
+
+[Sidenote: Jameson's decision.]
+
+If these were the considerations which weighed with Dr. Jameson, his
+decision to "ride in" was inconsistent neither with friendship nor
+with patriotism. When Captain Heany had read from his pocket-book the
+message from the Reformers, Jameson paced for twenty minutes outside
+his tent. Having re-entered it, he announced his determination to
+disregard Heany's message no less than Rhodes's telegram. It was a
+momentous decision to take after twenty minutes' thought. Had he a
+reasonable expectation of carrying out the plan as Rhodes conceived
+it, in spite of the change in the position of affairs at Johannesburg?
+Had he any reason to believe that Rhodes desired him to force the
+insurrection in spite of his telegrams to the contrary? It is the
+answers to these questions that make the Raid, as far as Dr. Jameson
+is concerned, an "act of monumental folly," or a legitimate assumption
+of personal responsibility that is part of the empire-builder's
+stock-in-trade. The answer to the second question remains a matter of
+speculation. The answer to the first is to be found in the record of
+the expedition. Dr. Jameson reached Kruegersdorp at three o'clock on
+Wednesday, January 1st. A few hours before a cyclist had brought him
+congratulatory messages from the Reform leaders. The goal was almost
+within sight. What prevented Sir John Willoughby from taking his
+little force safely over the remaining twenty miles from Kruegersdorp
+to Johannesburg was the merest accident: the few hours' delay caused,
+naturally enough, by Dr. Jameson's desire that his force should be met
+and escorted by a small body of volunteers from the Rand. He did not
+want, as he said, to go to Johannesburg as "a pirate." Sir John
+Willoughby's evidence is perfectly definite and conclusive on the
+point. If the force had pushed on by road from Kruegersdorp to
+Johannesburg on Wednesday evening--had not, in Willoughby's words,
+"messed about" at Kruegersdorp in expectation of the welcoming
+escort--Johannesburg would have been reached in safety on Thursday
+morning. With Dr. Jameson in Johannesburg and Lord Rosmead speeding
+northwards in his special train, the way would have been prepared for
+that decisive and successful action on the part of the Imperial
+Government which Rhodes had desired to bring about.
+
+[Sidenote: Why the raid failed.]
+
+But, unsuccessful as was the actual expedition, the decision to "ride
+in" had secured the intervention of the Imperial Government. If
+intervention could have done what Rhodes expected of it, Dr. Jameson's
+decision to "ride in" would have gained, at the cost of few lives and
+no increase of the national debt, what the war gained four years later
+at the cost of twenty thousand lives and L220,000,000. As it was, it
+failed to win the franchise for the Uitlanders. Why did not Lord
+Rosmead, with so strong a Colonial Secretary as Mr. Chamberlain at his
+back, brush the Raid aside, and address himself to the removal of the
+greater wrong that gave it birth? If Lord Rosmead had acted in the
+spirit of Mr. Chamberlain's despatches; if he had reminded the
+Government of the Republic from the first "that the danger from which
+they had just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which led
+up to it were not removed, might recur, although in a different form";
+if he had used "plain language" to President Krueger; and if, above
+all, he had remembered--as Mr. Chamberlain reminded him--that "the
+people of Johannesburg had surrendered in the belief that reasonable
+concessions would have been arranged through his intervention, and
+until these were granted, or were definitely promised to him by the
+President, the root-causes of the recent troubles would
+remain,"--might he not yet have saved South Africa for the empire
+without subjecting her to the dread arbitrament of the sword?
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain.]
+
+It is in the answer to this question that we find the actual cause of
+the utter failure of Rhodes's plan. The truth is that success in any
+real sense--that is to say, success which would have strengthened
+British supremacy and promoted the union of European South Africa--was
+impossible. The sole response which Lord Rosmead returned to Mr.
+Chamberlain's counsels was the weary confession: "The question of
+concessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between President
+Krueger and myself." The methods employed by Rhodes were so
+questionable that no High Commissioner could have allowed the Imperial
+Government to have derived any advantage from them. To have gained the
+franchise for the Uitlanders as the result of violent and unscrupulous
+action, would have inflicted an enduring injury upon the British cause
+in South Africa for which the enfranchisement itself would have been
+small compensation. The disclosure of these methods and, with them, of
+the hollowness of Rhodes's alliance with the Afrikander Bond, alarmed
+and incensed the whole Dutch population of South Africa. What this
+meant Lord Rosmead knew, and Mr. Chamberlain did not know. The ten
+years' truce between the forces of the Afrikander nationalists and the
+paramount Power was at an end. To combat these forces something better
+than the methods of the Raid was required. _Non tali auxilio, nec
+defensoribus istis!_ No modern race have excelled the Dutch in courage
+and endurance. In Europe they had successfully defended their
+independence against the flower of the armies of Spain, Austria, and
+France. The South African Dutch were not inferior in these qualities
+to the people of the parent stock. If such a race, embarked upon what
+it conceived to be a struggle for national existence, was to be
+overcome, the hands of the conqueror must be clean as well as strong.
+None the less the active sympathy with the Uitlanders exhibited in Mr.
+Chamberlain's despatches was welcomed by the British as evidence that
+the new Colonial Secretary was more alert and determined than his
+predecessors. For the first time in the history of British
+administration in South Africa, Downing Street had shown itself more
+zealous than Capetown. It was the solitary ray of light that broke the
+universal gloom in which South Africa was enshrouded by the
+catastrophe of the Raid.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS[16]
+
+         [Footnote 16: "This is our Afrikander character. The
+         descendants of Hollanders, Germans and Frenchmen
+         inter-married, and are only known at present by their
+         surnames. They form the Afrikander nationality, and call
+         themselves Afrikanders. The Afrikanders are no more
+         Hollanders than Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans. They have
+         their own language, own morals and customs; they are just as
+         much a nation as any other."--_De Patriot_, in the course of
+         an article headed "A Common but Dangerous Error"--the error
+         in question being the assertion that "the Cape Colony is an
+         English colony" (translated and reproduced in _The Cape
+         Times_, September 3th, 1884).]
+
+
+In the face of the colossal resistance offered to the British arms by
+the Boers and their colonial kinsmen in the South African War, it may
+seem unnecessary to produce any evidence in support of the contention
+that the military strength then displayed by the Dutch in South Africa
+was the result of long and careful preparation. But the same inability
+to grasp the facts of the South African situation which kept the Army
+Corps in England three months after it should have been sent to the
+Cape, is still to be met with. This attitude of mind--whether it be a
+consciousness of moral rectitude, or a mere insular disdain of looking
+at things from any but a British point of view--is still to be
+observed in the statements of those politicians who will even now deny
+that any trace of a definite plan of action, or of a concerted
+purpose, which could properly be described as a "conspiracy" against
+British supremacy was to be found among the Dutch population of South
+Africa as a whole, prior to the outbreak of the war. It is for the
+benefit of such politicians in part, and still more with a view of
+bringing the mind of the reader into something approaching a direct
+contact with the actual working of the Afrikander mind, that I
+transcribe a statement of the pure doctrine of the Bond, as it was
+expounded by the German, Borckenhagen, and his followers in the Free
+State. It will, however, be convenient to preface the quotation with a
+word of explanation in respect both of the text and the personality of
+Borckenhagen.
+
+[Sidenote: Carl Borckenhagen.]
+
+The passage, which is taken _verbatim_ from a work entitled, "The
+Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed," is a collection of sentences
+gathered from Dutch pamphlets and articles "emanating from Holland,"
+and translated literally into the somewhat uncouth English of the
+text. The author of the work, Mr. C. H. Thomas, was for many years a
+burgher of the Free State, where he shared the opinions of President
+Brand, and subsequently supported Mr. J. G. Fraser in opposing the
+policy of "closer union" with the South African Republic, advocated by
+Brand's successor, Mr. F. W. Reitz. The point of view from which the
+Dutch of Holland regarded the nationalist movement in South Africa was
+succinctly stated in an article published by the Amsterdam
+_Handelsblad_ in 1881.
+
+     "The future of England lies in India, and the future of Holland
+     in South Africa.... When our capitalists vigorously develop this
+     trade, and, for example, form a syndicate to buy Delagoa Bay from
+     Portugal, then a railway from Capetown to Bloemfontein,
+     Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Delagoa Bay will be a lucrative
+     investment. And when, in course of time, the Dutch language shall
+     universally prevail in South Africa, this most extensive
+     territory will become a North America for Holland, and enable us
+     to balance the Anglo-Saxon race."[17]
+
+         [Footnote 17: Quoted by Du Toit in _De Patriot_: translation
+         from the English reprint of _De Transvaalse Oorlog_.]
+
+Carl Borckenhagen, who, with Mr. Reitz,[18] advocated the
+establishment of the Bond in 1881, was a German republican. His name
+has been associated with Mr. Thomas's summary of the Bond propaganda
+in the Free State, because, as editor of _The Bloemfontein Express_ up
+to the time of his death, early in 1898, he was probably the most
+consistent of all the South African exponents of the nationalist
+creed. Certainly it is no exaggeration to say that he converted the
+Free State of Brand into the Free State of Steyn.
+
+         [Footnote 18: Then Judge, afterwards President of the Free
+         State, and State-Secretary of the South African Republic in
+         succession to Dr. Leyds.]
+
+[Sidenote: The doctrine of the Bond.]
+
+     "THE BOND PROGRAMME
+
+     "The Afrikander Bond has as final object what is summed up in its
+     motto of 'Afrika voor de Afrikaners.' The whole of South Africa
+     belongs by just right to the Afrikander nation. It is the
+     privilege and duty of every Afrikander to contribute all in his
+     power towards the expulsion of the English usurper. The States of
+     South Africa to be federated in one independent Republic.
+
+     The Afrikander Bond prepares for this consummation.
+
+     Argument in justification:--
+
+     (_a_) The transfer of the Cape Colony to the British Government
+     took place by circumstances of _force majeure_ and without the
+     consent of the Dutch nation, who renounced all claim in favour of
+     the Afrikander or Boer nation.
+
+     (_b_) Natal is territory which accrued to a contingent of the
+     Boer nation by purchase from the Zulu king, who received the
+     consideration agreed for.
+
+     (_c_) The British authorities expelled the rightful owners from
+     Natal by force of arms without just cause.
+
+     The task of the Afrikander Bond consists in:
+
+     (_a_) Procuring the staunch adhesion and co-operation of every
+     Afrikander and other real friend of the cause.
+
+     (_b_) To obtain the sympathy, the moral and effective aid, of one
+     or more of the world's Powers.
+
+     The means to accomplish those tasks are:
+
+     Personal persuasion, Press propaganda, legislation and diplomacy.
+
+     The direction of the application of these means is entrusted to a
+     select body of members eligible for their loyalty to the cause
+     and their abilities and position. That body will conduct such
+     measures as need the observance of special secrecy. Upon the rest
+     of the members will devolve activities of a general character
+     under the direction of the selected chiefs.
+
+     One of the indispensable requisites is the proper organisation of
+     an effective fund, which is to be regularly sustained. Bond
+     members will aid each other in all relations of public life in
+     preference to non-members.
+
+     In the efforts of gaining adherence to the cause it is of
+     importance to distinguish three categories of persons:
+
+     (1) The class of Afrikanders who are to some extent deteriorated
+     by assimilative influences with the English race, whose
+     restoration to patriotism will need great efforts, discretion,
+     and patience.
+
+     (2) The apparently unthinking and apathetic class who prefer to
+     relegate all initiative to leaders whom they will loyally follow.
+     This class is the most numerous by far.
+
+     (3) The warmly patriotic class, including men gifted with
+     intelligence, energy, and speech, qualified as leaders, and apt
+     to exercise influence over the rest.
+
+            *       *       *       *       *
+
+     Among these three classes many exist whose views and religious
+     scruples need to be corrected. Scripture abounds in proofs and
+     salient analogies applying to the situation and justifying our
+     cause. In this, as well as in other directions, the members who
+     work in circulating written propaganda will supply the correct
+     and conclusive arguments accessible to all.
+
+     Upon the basis of our just rights the British Government, if not
+     the entire nation, is the usurping enemy of the Boer nation.
+
+     In dealing with an enemy it is justifiable to employ, besides
+     force, also means of a less open character, such as diplomacy and
+     stratagem.
+
+[Sidenote: Anti-british methods.]
+
+     The greatest danger to Afrikanderdom is the English policy of
+     Anglicising the Boer nation--to submerge it by the process of
+     assimilation.
+
+     A distinct attitude of holding aloof from English influences is
+     the only remedy against that peril and for thwarting that
+     insidious policy.
+
+     It is only such an attitude that will preserve the nation in its
+     simple faith and habits of morality, and provide safety against
+     the dangers of contamination and pernicious examples, with all
+     their fateful consequences to body and soul.
+
+     Let the Dutch language have the place of honour in schools and
+     homes.
+
+     Let alliances of marriage with the English be stamped as
+     unpatriotic.
+
+     Let every Afrikander see that he is at all times well armed with
+     the best possible weapons, and maintains the expert use of the
+     rifle among young and old, so as to be ready when duty calls, and
+     the time is ripe for asserting the nation's rights and being rid
+     of English thraldom.
+
+     Employ teachers only who are animated with truly patriotic
+     sentiments.
+
+     Let it be well understood that English domination will also bring
+     English intolerance and servitude, for it is only a very frail
+     link which separates the English State Church from actual
+     Romanism, and its proselytism _en bloc_ is only a matter of short
+     time.
+
+     Equally repugnant and dangerous is England's policy towards the
+     coloured races, whom she aims, for the sake of industrial profit,
+     at elevating to equal rank with whites, in direct conflict with
+     spiritual authority--a policy which incites coloured people to
+     rivalry with their superiors, and can only end in common
+     disaster.
+
+     Whilst remaining absolutely independent, the ties of blood,
+     relationship, and language point to Holland for a domestic base.
+
+     As to commerce, Germany, America, and other industrial nations
+     could more than fill the gap left by England, and such
+     connections should be cultivated as a potent means towards
+     obtaining foreign support to our cause and identification with
+     it.
+
+     If the mineral wealth of the Transvaal and Orange Free State
+     becomes established--as appears certain from discoveries already
+     made--England will not rest until these are also hers.
+
+     The leopard will retain its spots. The independence of both
+     Republics is at stake on that account alone, with the risk that
+     the rightful owners of the land will become the hewers of wood
+     and drawers of water for the usurpers.
+
+     There is no alternative hope for the peace and progress of South
+     Africa except by the total excision of the British ulcer.
+
+     Reliable signs are not wanting to show that our nation is
+     designed by Providence as the instrument for the recovery of its
+     rights, and for the chastisement of proud, perfidious
+     Albion."[19]
+
+         [Footnote 19: P. 64 _et seq._ of _The Origin of the
+         Anglo-Boer War Revealed_ (Hodder & Stoughton).]
+
+These brief and disjointed sentences present in their shortest form
+arguments and exhortations with which the Dutch population of the Free
+State, the Transvaal, and the Cape Colony, were familiarised through
+the Press, the pulpit, the platform, and through individual
+intercourse and advocacy, from the time of the Retrocession in 1881
+onwards. It is in effect the scheme of a Bond "worked out more in
+detail by some friends at Bloemfontein," as published by Borckenhagen
+in his paper, _The Bloemfontein Express_, on April 7th, 1881, to which
+Du Toit, the founder of the Bond in the Cape Colony, referred in the
+pamphlet, _De Transvaalse Oorlog_ (The Transvaal War), which he issued
+from his press at the Paarl later on in the same year. The nationalist
+creed, as thus formulated, was preached consistently in the Free
+State; but in the Cape Colony it was modified by Hofmeyr to meet the
+exigencies of Colonial politics.
+
+None the less it was in the Cape Colony that the Bond, as a political
+organisation, was destined to find its chief sphere of action. In the
+Free State it was discouraged by President Brand, and in point of fact
+the British population was too insignificant a factor in the politics
+of the central republic to make it necessary to maintain a distinct
+organisation for the promotion of nationalist sentiment. In the
+Transvaal, again, the Bond maintained no regular organisation. And
+this for two reasons. Every burgher of the northern Republic was
+sufficiently animated by the anti-British sentiments which it was
+intended to promote; and the only "constitution" which the Transvaal
+Dutch would accept was one which embodied principles so flagrantly
+inconsistent with submission to British authority that it could not be
+adopted by the branches of the Bond in the Cape Colony without
+exposing its members to immediate prosecution for high treason.[20]
+
+         [Footnote 20: Under the changed conditions of to-day the Boer
+         population is organised in the Transvaal into _Het Volk_, and
+         in the Orange River Colony into the _Oranjie Unie_; both
+         practically identical with the Bond in the Cape Colony.]
+
+[Sidenote: The origin of the Bond.]
+
+In the politics of the Cape Colony, however, the Bond became the
+predominant force; and any picture, however briefly sketched, of South
+Africa as it was when Lord Milner's administration commenced, must
+include some account of the origin and methods of this remarkable
+organisation.
+
+The origin of the Afrikander Bond is to be found in the articles
+written by the Rev. S. J. du Toit, a Dutch predikant, in _De Patriot_,
+a newspaper published at the Paarl, of which he was the editor. Mr. du
+Toit's political standpoint is sufficiently revealed by the fact that
+in 1881 he claimed that _De Patriot_ had done more than any other
+single agency to secure the successful revolt of the Boers from
+British authority accomplished in that year. The inspiration which
+drove his pen to advocate the founding of a political organisation,
+that should serve to prepare the way for a more general and complete
+"war of independence," was the defeat of the British troops by the
+Transvaal burghers.
+
+     "This is now our time," he wrote, in the same year, "to establish
+     the Bond, while a national consciousness has been awakened
+     through the Transvaal War. And the Bond must be our preparation
+     for the future confederation of all the States and Colonies of
+     South Africa. The English Government keeps talking of a
+     confederation under the British flag. That will never happen. We
+     can assure them of that. We have often said it: there is just one
+     hindrance to confederation, and that is the English flag. Let
+     them take that away, and the confederation under the free
+     Afrikander flag would be established. But so long as the English
+     flag remains here the Afrikander Bond must be our confederation.
+     And the British will, after a while, realise that Froude's advice
+     is the best for them: they must just have Simon's Bay as a naval
+     and military station on the road to India, and give over all the
+     rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders."[21]
+
+         [Footnote 21: Reprint of a pamphlet (found with the first
+         leaf torn) containing an English translation of _De
+         Transvaalse Oorlog_, p. 8.]
+
+This general statement of the purpose of the Bond was supported by
+reiterated appeals to racial passion:
+
+     "The little respect which the Afrikander had for British troops
+     and cannons [up to the Majuba defeat]," he writes, "is utterly
+     done away. And England has learnt so much respect for us
+     Afrikanders that she will take care not to be so ready to make
+     war with us again.... The Englishman has made himself hated,
+     language and all. And this is well."
+
+[Sidenote: The objects of the Bond.]
+
+When, by the use of these and even more violent expressions, the mind
+of the Dutch population had been sufficiently aroused, Du Toit
+proceeded to unfold his plan of campaign. His _modus operandi_ is
+similar to that of Borckenhagen in its main features. The Bond, says
+_De Patriot_, must boycott all English traders, except only those who
+are ready to adopt its principles. English signboards, advertisements,
+shops and book-keepers, must be abolished. The English banks must be
+replaced by a National Bank. No land must be sold to Englishmen. The
+Republics must "make their own ammunition, and be well supplied with
+cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery to work them." And he
+cheerfully notices that "at Heidelberg there are already 4,000
+cartridges made daily, and a few skilful Afrikanders have begun to
+make shells, too. This is right: so must we become a nation." For the
+Cape Colony, however, "such preparations are not so especially
+necessary." But, most of all, Du Toit insists upon the need of
+combating the growing use of the English language. "English
+education," he laments, "has done more mischief to our country and
+nation than we can express." And, therefore, he urges "war" against
+the English language. In the schools, in the Church, and "in our
+family life above all," it must be considered a "disgrace to speak
+English.... Who will join the war? All true Afrikanders, we hope."
+
+Thus was the Bond, the child of Majuba, quickened into conscious being
+by the fiery pen of the predikant, Du Toit. Poor Du Toit! His after
+life was a strange commentary upon this early triumph of his brain,
+won in the drowsy solitudes of the Paarl. Summoned to be Director of
+Education in the Transvaal, he was quickly disillusioned of his love
+of his Dutch mother-country by actual intercourse with the
+contemptuous Hollanders whom Krueger had invited to serve the Republic.
+Later, again, he was rejected by the Bond which he had himself
+created, and driven to find comfort in the broad freedom of allegiance
+to an Empire-state.
+
+The object of the Bond, as stated by Du Toit in _De Transvaalse
+Oorlog_, was the "creation of a South African nationality ... through
+the establishment of this Bond in all states and colonies of South
+Africa." Its organisation was to consist of a central governing body
+(_bestuur_), with provincial, district, and ward _besturen_. The
+central _bestuur_ was to be composed of five members, two for the Cape
+Colony, and one each for the Transvaal, Natal, and Free State, who
+were "to meet yearly in one or other of the chief towns of the
+component states." The provincial _besturen_, consisting of one
+representative from each of the district _besturen_, were to meet
+every six months at their respective colonial or state capitals.[22]
+
+         [Footnote 22: _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, pp. 7 and 8.]
+
+The first Congress of the Afrikander Bond was held at Graaf Reinet in
+1882. In the draft constitution then drawn up for the approval of its
+members, the relationship of the Bond to the British Government in
+South Africa was defined with commendable frankness. In the "Programme
+of Principles" was the article:
+
+     In itself acknowledging no single form of government as the only
+     suitable form, and whilst acknowledging the form of government
+     existing at present, [the Bond] means that the aim of our
+     national development must be a united South Africa under its own
+     flag.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's influence.]
+
+And it was upon the basis of this "Programme of Principles" that the
+earliest Bond organisations were formed in the Transvaal, the Free
+State, and the Cape Colony. In the year following the Graaf Reinet
+Congress, however, the "Farmers' Protection Association" was
+amalgamated with the Bond in the Cape Colony, and the influence of Mr.
+J. H. Hofmeyr led the joint organisation to adopt a modified
+"programme." Mr. Hofmeyr, who was destined afterwards to assume the
+undisputed headship of the Bond, was an economist as well as a
+nationalist. He was intensely interested in the development of the
+country districts, and he saw that the conditions of agriculture could
+hardly be improved without the co-operation of the British and more
+progressive section of the farming class. He also knew that an
+organisation, professing to forward aims of avowed disloyalty, would
+rapidly find itself in collision with the Cape Government. With the
+growth of Mr. Hofmeyr's influence the policy, though not the aims, of
+the Bond was changed. All declarations, such as the clause "under its
+own flag," inconsistent with allegiance to the British Crown were
+omitted from the official constitution, and its individual members
+were exhorted to avoid any behaviour or expressions likely to prevent
+Englishmen from joining the organisation. As early as 1884 the Bond
+secured the return of twenty-five members to the Cape Parliament, and
+it was their support that enabled the Upington Ministry to maintain
+itself in office against an opposition which consisted of the main
+body of the representatives elected by the British population; and
+from this date onwards it was the recognised aim of Mr. Hofmeyr to
+control the Legislature of the Colony by making it impossible for any
+ministry to dispense with the support of the Bond members, although he
+refrained from putting a ministry of Bondsmen into office. To have
+done this latter might have united the British population and their
+representatives in a solid phalanx, and endangered the success of the
+effort to separate the British settlers in the country districts from
+the more recent arrivals from England--mostly townsmen--which remained
+a fruitful source of Afrikander influence up to the time of the
+Jameson Raid. By representing the new British population, which
+followed in the wake of the mineral discoveries, as "fortune-seekers"
+and adventurers and not genuine colonists, the Bond endeavoured, not
+merely to widen the natural line of cleavage between the townsman and
+the countryman, but actually to detach the older British settlers from
+sympathy with the mother country, and, by drawing them within the
+sphere of Afrikander nationalist aspirations, to make them share its
+own antagonism to British supremacy.
+
+[Sidenote: Merriman and the Bond.]
+
+But, in spite of the change of policy due to Mr. Hofmeyr, the old
+leaven of stalwart Bondsmen remained sufficiently in evidence to draw
+from Mr. J. X. Merriman--then a strong Imperialist in close
+association with Mr. J. W. Leonard--a striking rebuke. The speech in
+question was made, fittingly enough, at Grahamstown, the most
+"English" town in South Africa, in 1885. It was reprinted with
+complete appropriateness, in _The Cape Times_ of July 10th, 1899. The
+struggle which Mr. Merriman had foreseen fourteen years before was
+then near at hand; while Mr. Merriman himself had become a member of a
+ministry placed in power by the Bond for the avowed purpose of
+"combating the British Government."
+
+     "The situation is a grave one," he said. "It is not a question of
+     localism; it is not a question of party politics; but it is a
+     question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral
+     part of the British Empire.... You will have to keep public men
+     up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind
+     whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the
+     British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as
+     privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the
+     Bond. From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison
+     began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come
+     to this--Is England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in
+     South Africa?... Since then that institution has made a show of
+     loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty.... Some people, who
+     should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the
+     idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole
+     teaching of history goes to show that when the conflict was
+     between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent
+     section triumphed. And so we see that some moderate men are in
+     the power of an institution whose avowed object is to combat the
+     British Government. In any other country such an organisation
+     could not have grown; but here, among a scattered population, it
+     has insidiously and successfully worked.... No one who wishes
+     well for the British Government could have read the leading
+     articles of the _Zuid Africaan_, and _Express_, and _De Patriot_,
+     in expounding the Bond principles, without seeing that the
+     maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the
+     object they have in view are absolutely different things. My
+     quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its
+     main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount
+     power in South Africa."
+
+This was plain speaking. The rare insight revealed in such a sentence
+as this--"in any other country such an organisation could not have
+grown, but here, _among a scattered population_, it has insidiously
+and successfully worked"; the piquant incident of the reproduction of
+the speech on the eve of the war; the fact that the man who made this
+diagnosis was to drink the poison whose fatal effects he described so
+faithfully, was indeed to become the most bitter opponent of the great
+statesman that "kept South Africa a part of the British
+Empire,"--these things together make Mr. Merriman's Grahamstown speech
+one of the most curious and instructive of the political utterances of
+the period.
+
+[Sidenote: Change of Bond policy.]
+
+In the year following (1886) the Bond met officially, for the first
+and only time, as an inter-state organisation. Bloemfontein was the
+place of assemblage, and in the Central Bestuur, or Committee, the
+South African Republic, the Free State, and the Cape Colony were each
+represented by two delegates. This meeting revealed the practical
+difficulties which prevented the Cape nationalists from adopting the
+definitely anti-British programme of the Bond leaders in the
+Republics; and the conflict of commercial interests between the Cape
+Colony and the Transvaal, already initiated by the attempt of the
+latter to secure Bechuanaland in 1884-5, confirmed the Cape delegates
+in their decision to develop the Bond in the Cape Colony upon colonial
+rather than inter-state lines. The result of the divergences of aim
+manifested at Bloemfontein was speedily made apparent in the Cape
+Colony. In 1887 Mr. T. P. Theron, then Secretary of the Bond,
+delivered an address in which the new, or Hofmeyr, programme was
+formulated and officially adopted. In recommending the new policy to
+the members of the Bond, Mr. Theron made no secret of the nature of
+the considerations by which its leaders had been chiefly influenced.
+
+     "You must remember," he said, "that the eyes of all are directed
+     towards you. The Press will cause your actions, expressions, and
+     resolutions to be known everywhere. You cannot but feel how much
+     depends on us for our nation and our country. If we must plead
+     guilty in the past of many an unguarded expression, let us be
+     more cautious and guarded for the future."
+
+And he then proceeded to sketch a picture of racial conciliation, when
+all "differences and disagreements" between Dutch and English would be
+merged in the consciousness of a new and common nationality--pointing
+out, however, that the advent of that day depended on "you and me, my
+fellow Bond members."
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes and Hofmeyr.]
+
+Assuming that the predominance of Afrikander ideals could be secured
+only by the complete separation of the local governments from the
+Government of Great Britain, nothing could be more masterly than the
+manner in which the Bond approached the task of reuniting the European
+communities of South Africa--the task which the Imperial Government
+had abandoned as hopeless. As inspired and controlled by Hofmeyr
+during the years between this date (1887) and the Jameson Raid, the
+Bond embodied a volume of effort in which the most sincere supporter
+of the British connection could co-operate. It was the assistance
+afforded by the Bond in moulding British administration in South
+Africa upon South African lines that provided the common ground upon
+which Rhodes and Hofmeyr met in their long alliance. Hofmeyr probably
+never abandoned his belief that a republican form of government was
+the inevitable _denouement_ to which the administration of South
+Africa on a basis of South African ideas must lead. Rhodes never
+wavered in his loyalty to the British connection. But there was a
+great body of useful work which both men could accomplish in common,
+which each desired to see accomplished, which, when accomplished,
+would leave each free to choose the path--Republican or Imperial--by
+which the last stage was to be traversed and the goal of South
+African unity finally attained.
+
+The character and career of Rhodes afford material for a study of such
+peculiar and engrossing interest that any adequate treatment of the
+subject would require a separate volume. Fortunately, the broad facts
+of his life are sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to
+attempt the almost impossible task of condensing a volume within the
+limits of a few pages. None the less, there is one incident in his
+political career which must be recalled here, and that for the simple
+reason that it establishes two facts, each of which is essential to
+the complete understanding of the situation in the Cape Colony as it
+developed immediately after the Raid. First, that all through the
+years of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance the Bond remained at heart true
+to the aim which it had at first openly avowed--the aim of
+establishing a united South Africa under its own flag. And second,
+that Rhodes was equally staunch in maintaining his ideal of a united
+South Africa under the British flag. The incident which exhibits both
+these facts in the clearest light is the refusal by Rhodes of the
+overtures made to him by Borckenhagen. At the time when these
+overtures were made Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the
+Chartered Company had been successfully launched, and the alliance
+between himself and Hofmeyr was in full operation. The occasion which
+led to them was the opening of the railway at Bloemfontein in 1890--a
+railway constructed by the Cape Government under a friendly
+arrangement with the Free State. And it was one, therefore, which
+afforded a conspicuous example of the value of the Bond influence as a
+means of securing progress in the direction of South African unity.
+The story was told by Rhodes himself in a speech which he made in the
+Cape Colony on March 12th, 1898.
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes and Borckenhagen.]
+
+     "I remember," he said, "that we had a great meeting at
+     Bloemfontein, and in the usual course I had to make a speech. I
+     think I was your Prime Minister. And this speech pleased many
+     there, and especially--and I speak of him with the greatest
+     respect--a gentleman who is dead, Mr. Borckenhagen. He came to me
+     and asked me to dictate to him the whole of my speech. I said, 'I
+     never wrote a speech, and I don't know what I said; but I will
+     tell you what I know about it.' He wrote it down, and afterwards
+     came to Capetown with me.... He spoke very nicely to me about my
+     speech. 'Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa.' And I said,
+     'So do I; I am with you entirely. We must have a united South
+     Africa.' He said, 'There is nothing in the way.' And I said, 'No;
+     there is nothing in the way. Well,' I said, 'we are one.' 'Yes,'
+     he said, 'and I will tell you: we will take you as our leader,'
+     he said. 'There is only one small thing, and that is, we must, of
+     course, be independent to the rest of the world.' I said, 'No;
+     you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to
+     forget all my history and traditions; and I would be a fool,
+     because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by
+     yours.' From that day he assumed a most acrid tone in his
+     _Express_ towards myself, and I was made full sorry at times by
+     the tone. But that was the overpowering thought in his mind--an
+     independent South Africa."[23]
+
+         [Footnote 23: _Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and
+         Speeches._ By Vindex; p. 533. Borckenhagen had just died.]
+
+The facts here disclosed explain how it was that the apparently
+satisfactory situation in South Africa before the Raid so rapidly
+developed into the dangerous situation of the years that followed it.
+The Raid tore aside the veil which the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance had
+cast over the eyes alike of Dutch and British, and left them free to
+see the essential antagonism of aim between the two men in its naked
+truth.[24] From that moment Rhodes was recognised by the Bond as its
+chief and most dangerous enemy; and as such he was pursued by its
+bitterest hostility to the day of his death; while Rhodes, on the
+other hand, was driven to seek support solely in the people of his own
+nationality. From that moment the Bond fell back upon the policy of
+1881. The Dutch Press, pulpit, and platform commenced an active
+nationalist propaganda on the old racial lines; and the advocacy of
+anti-British aims increased in boldness and in definiteness as the
+Transvaal grew strong with its inflowing armaments.
+
+         [Footnote 24: _Ons Land_, reputed to be controlled by Hofmeyr
+         himself, and certainly the recognised organ of the Bond,
+         published a paean of triumph over the surrender of Dr.
+         Jameson's troopers at Doornkop. "Afrikanderdom has awakened
+         to a sense of earnestness which we have not observed since
+         the heroic war of liberty in 1881. From the Limpopo, as far
+         as Capetown, the second Majuba has given birth to a new
+         inspiration and a new movement amongst our people in South
+         Africa.... The flaccid and cowardly imperialism that had
+         already begun to dilute and weaken our national blood,
+         gradually turned aside before the new current that permeated
+         our people.... Now or never the foundation of a
+         wide-embracing nationalism must be laid.... The partition
+         wall has disappeared ... never has the necessity for a policy
+         of a colonial and republican union been greater; now the
+         psychological moment has arrived; now our people have
+         awakened all over South Africa; a new glow illumines our
+         hearts; let us lay the foundation-stone of a real United
+         South Africa on the soil of a pure and all-comprehensive
+         national sentiment."]
+
+[Sidenote: Effects of the raid.]
+
+We are now in a position to sum up the main features of the situation
+in South Africa as Lord Milner found it. British administration,
+controlled from Downing Street, had quickly led to what Sir George
+Grey called the dismemberment of European South Africa. The Imperial
+Government, having found out its mistake, had endeavoured to regain
+the lost solidarity of the European communities and its authority over
+them, by bringing the Republics into a federal system under the
+British Crown. It had been thwarted in this endeavour by the military
+resistance of the Boers in the Transvaal, and the fear of a like
+resistance on the part of the Dutch population throughout South
+Africa. Its impotency had invited, and in part justified, the efforts
+made by local British initiative to solve the problem of South African
+unity on South African lines, but in a manner consistent with the
+maintenance of British supremacy. The early success of these efforts,
+prosecuted mainly through the agency of Rhodes, had been obliterated
+by the Jameson Raid. All attempts to secure the reunion of South
+Africa under the British flag having failed alike under Imperial and
+local British initiative, the way was open for the Afrikander
+nationalists once more to put forward the alternative plan of a united
+South Africa under its own flag, which they had formulated in the year
+immediately following the retrocession of the Transvaal.
+
+In proportion as the friends and supporters of British supremacy were
+discredited and depressed by the catastrophe of the Raid, the
+advocates and promoters of Afrikander nationalism were emboldened and
+encouraged. It was not Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the
+Cape who succeeded the discredited Rhodes (January 13th, 1896), but
+Mr. Hofmeyr, the veteran leader of the Afrikander Bond, that dictated
+the policy which Lord Rosmead must pursue to re-establish the
+integrity of the Imperial Government in the minds of its Dutch
+subjects. At the next presidential election in the Free State (March
+4th, 1896), Mr. J. G. Fraser, the head of the moderate party which
+followed in the steps of President Brand, was hopelessly beaten by Mr.
+Marthinus Steyn, an Afrikander nationalist of the scientific school of
+Borckenhagen, and a politician whose immediate programme included the
+"closer union" of that state with the South African Republic, the
+terms of which were finally settled at Bloemfontein on March 9th,
+1897. In the Cape Colony the Bond organised its resources with a view
+of securing even more complete control of the Cape Legislature at the
+general election of 1898. And lastly, President Krueger, who had
+ceased to rely upon Holland for administrative talent, and opened the
+lucrative offices of the South African Republic to the ambitious and
+educated Afrikander youth of the Free State and Cape Colony, commenced
+methodically and secretly to supply arms and ammunition to the
+adherents of the nationalist cause in the British Colonies.
+
+[Sidenote: Situation in 1896.]
+
+But disastrous as was the Jameson Raid in its method of execution and
+immediate effects, it produced certain results that cannot be held to
+have been prejudicial to the British cause in South Africa, if once we
+recognise the fact that the English people as a whole were totally
+ignorant, at the time of its occurrence, of the extent to which the
+sub-continent had already slipped from their grasp. Something of the
+long advance towards the goal of nationalist ambition, achieved by the
+Bond, was revealed. The emphatic cry of "Hands off" to Germany, for
+which the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation provided the occasion,
+was undoubtedly the means of arresting the progress of that power, at
+a point when further progress would have gained her a foot-hold in
+South Africa from which nothing short of actual hostilities could have
+dislodged her. And more important still was the fact that the Raid,
+with its train of dramatic incidents, had published, once and for all,
+the humiliating position of the British population in the Transvaal
+throughout the length and breadth of the Anglo-Saxon world, and
+compelled the Imperial Government to pledge itself to obtain the
+redress of the "admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's policy.]
+
+Against the rallying forces of Afrikander nationalism Mr. Chamberlain,
+for the moment, had nothing to oppose but the vague and as yet unknown
+power of an awakened Imperial sentiment. Lord Rosmead's attitude at
+Pretoria had convinced him of the uselessness of expecting that any
+satisfactory settlement of the franchise question could be brought
+about through the agency of the High Commissioner. He, therefore,
+invited President Krueger to visit England in the hope that his own
+personal advocacy of the cause of the Uitlanders, backed up by the
+weight of the Salisbury Government, might remove the "root causes" of
+Transvaal unrest. But President Krueger refused to confer with the
+Colonial Secretary upon any other than the wholly inadmissible basis
+of the conversion of the London Convention into a treaty of amity such
+as one independent power might conclude with another. Mr. Chamberlain,
+therefore, having put upon record that the purpose of the proposed
+conference was to give effect to the London Convention and not to
+destroy it, proceeded to formulate a South African policy that would
+enable him to make the most effective use of the authority of Great
+Britain as paramount Power. His purpose was to win Dutch opinion in
+the Free State and the Cape Colony to the side of the Imperial
+Government, and then to use this more progressive Dutch opinion as
+the fulcrum by which the lever of Imperial remonstrance was to be
+successfully applied to the Transvaal Government. In the speech[25] in
+which he sketched the main lines of this policy he declared
+emphatically that the paramount power of England was to be maintained
+at all costs, that foreign intervention would not be permitted under
+any pretence, and that the admitted grievances of the Uitlanders were
+to be redressed:
+
+         [Footnote 25: 1896.]
+
+     "We have," he continued, "a confident hope that we shall be able
+     in the course of no lengthened time to restore the situation as
+     it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, to have at our backs
+     the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population
+     in South Africa, and if we have that, the opinion--the united
+     opinion--which that will constitute, will be an opinion which no
+     power in Africa can resist."
+
+With the record of the last ten years before us it seems strange that
+Mr. Chamberlain should ever have believed in the efficacy of such a
+policy: still more strange that he should have spoken of his
+"confident hope" of winning the Afrikander nationalists to support the
+paramount Power. But it must be remembered that the evidence of the
+real sentiments and purposes of the nationalists here set forth in the
+preceding pages, and now the common property of all educated
+Englishmen, was then known only to perhaps a dozen journalists and
+politicians in England; and if these men had attempted to impart
+their knowledge to the general public, they would have failed from the
+sheer inability of the average Englishman to believe that "British
+subjects" under responsible government could be anything but loyal to
+the Imperial tie.
+
+But little as Mr. Chamberlain knew of the real strength of the forces
+of Afrikander nationalism, he discerned enough of the South African
+situation to realise that this policy would have no chance of success,
+unless the maintenance of the British cause in South Africa was placed
+in the hands of a personality of exceptional vigour and capacity.
+When, therefore, Lord Rosmead intimated his desire to be relieved of
+the heavy responsibility of the joint offices of High Commissionship
+for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony no attempt to
+dissuade him was made. His health had been enfeebled for some time
+past, and he did not long survive his return to England. Both in
+Australia and at the Cape he had devoted his strength and ability to
+the service of the Empire. In the years 1883-5 he had resolutely and
+successfully opposed the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize
+Bechuanaland. His failure to control his powerful and impatient Prime
+Minister is mitigated by the circumstance that it was solely on the
+ground of public interest that, upon the retirement of Lord Loch in
+1895, he had allowed himself, in spite of his advanced years and
+indifferent health, to assume the office of High Commissioner for a
+third time.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+A YEAR OF OBSERVATION
+
+
+Lord Rosmead retired early in 1897. It is said that three men so
+different in character as Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr.
+Stead, each separately fixed upon the same name as being that of the
+man most capable of undertaking the position of High Commissioner in
+South Africa--a position always difficult, but now more than ever
+arduous and responsible. To nine out of every ten men with whom he had
+been brought into contact there was little in Sir Alfred Milner--as he
+then was--to distinguish him from other high-principled, capable, and
+pleasant-mannered heads of departments in the Civil Service. His
+_metier_ was finance, and his accomplishment literature. Commencing
+with journalism and an unsuccessful contest (in the Liberal interest)
+for the Harrow division of Middlesex, he had been private secretary to
+Lord Goschen, Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and Head of the
+Inland Revenue. In this latter office he had given invaluable
+assistance to Sir William Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
+in respect of what is perhaps the most successful of recent methods
+of raising revenue--the death duties. The principle of the graduated
+death duties was Harcourt's; but it was Milner who worked out the
+elaborate system which rendered his ideas coherent, and enabled them
+eventually to be put into effect. Academic distinctions, however
+ample, cannot be said to-day to afford a definite assurance of
+pre-eminent capacity for the service of the State. Yet it was
+certainly no disadvantage to Sir Alfred Milner to have been a scholar
+of Balliol, or a President of the Oxford Union.[26] Whatever direct
+knowledge the educated public had of him was based probably upon the
+impression created by his book _England in Egypt_. This was a work
+which indicated that its author had formed high ideals of English
+statesmanship, and that his experience of a complex administrative
+system, working in a political society full of intrigue and
+international jealousy, had developed in him the rare qualities of
+insight and humour. Some of his readers might have reflected that an
+active association with so accomplished a master of financial and
+administrative method as Lord Cromer was in itself a useful equipment
+for a colonial administrator.
+
+         [Footnote 26: Mr. Bodley, in his _Coronation of King Edward
+         VII._, remarks that of the seventy Balliol scholars elected
+         during the mastership of Jowett (1870-1893) only three had at
+         that time (1902) "attained eminence in any branch of public
+         life." These three were Mr. H. H. Asquith, Dr. Charles Gore
+         (then Bishop of Worcester), and Lord Milner.]
+
+[Sidenote: Sir Alfred Milner.]
+
+But the British public, both in England and South Africa, took their
+view of the appointment from the opinions expressed by the many
+prominent men to whom Sir Alfred Milner was personally known. The
+leaders and the Press of both parties were unstinted in approval of
+the choice which Mr. Chamberlain had made. The banquet given to Sir
+Alfred Milner three weeks before his departure to the Cape (March
+28th, 1897) provided an occasion for an expression of unrestrained
+admiration and confidence unique in the annals of English public life.
+"He has the union of intellect with fascination that makes men mount
+high," wrote Lord Rosebery. And Sir William Harcourt, "the most
+grateful and obliged" of Milner's "many friends and admirers,"
+pronounced him to be "a man deserving of all praise and all
+affection." Mr. Asquith, who presided, stated in a speech marked
+throughout by a note of intimate friendliness that "no appointment of
+our time has been received with a larger measure both of the
+approbation of experienced men and of the applause of the public." The
+office itself was "at the present moment the most arduous and
+responsible in the administrative service of the country." Not only
+"embarrassing problems," but "formidable personalities" would confront
+the new High Commissioner for South Africa:
+
+     "But," he added, "we know that he takes with him as clear an
+     intellect and as sympathetic an imagination, and, if need should
+     arise, a power of resolution as tenacious and as inflexible as
+     belongs to any man of our acquaintance."
+
+Milner's reply is significant of the spirit in which he had undertaken
+his task. Like Rhodes, he had found in his Oxford studies the reasoned
+basis for an enlightened Imperialism. Chief among his earliest
+political convictions was the belief that--
+
+     "there was no political object comparable in importance with that
+     of preventing a repetition of such a disaster [as the loss of the
+     United States]: the severance of another link in the great
+     Imperial chain.... It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill
+     any position in the character of what I may be, perhaps, allowed
+     to call a 'civilian soldier of the Empire.' To succeed in it, to
+     render any substantial service to any part of our world-wide
+     State, would be all that in any of my most audacious dreams I had
+     ever ventured to aspire to. But in a cause in which one
+     absolutely believes, even failure--personal failure, I mean, for
+     the cause itself is not going to fail--would be preferable to an
+     easy life of comfortable prosperity in another sphere."
+
+[Sidenote: Personal traits.]
+
+This was the man who was sent to maintain the interests of the
+paramount Power in a South Africa shaken by racial antagonism, and
+already feverish with political intrigue and commercial rivalry. Of
+all the tributes of the farewell banquet, Sir William Harcourt's was
+closest to the life--"worthy of all praise and all affection." The
+quality of inspiring affection to which this impressive phrase bore
+witness was one which had made itself felt among the humblest of those
+who were fortunate enough to have been associated with Lord Milner in
+any public work. Long after Milner had left Egypt, the face of the
+Syrian or Coptic Effendi of the Finance Department in Cairo would
+light up at the chance mention of the genial Englishman who had once
+been his chief. And in remote English counties revenue officials still
+hang his portrait upon the walls of their lodgings. Such men had no
+claim to appraise his professional merit or his gifts of intellect;
+but their feelings were responsive to the charm of his nature. "He was
+so considerate": that was their excuse for retaining his name and
+personality among the pleasant memories of the past. But the other
+side of Milner's character, the power of "tenacious and inflexible
+resolution," of which Mr. Asquith spoke, was destined to be brought
+into play so prominently during the "eight dusky years" of his South
+African administration, that to the distant on-looker it came to be
+accepted as the characterising quality of the man. To some Milner
+became the "man of blood and iron"; determined, like Bismarck, to
+secure the unity of a country by trampling with iron-shod boots upon
+the liberties of its people: even as in the view of others his clear
+mental vision--never more clear than in South Africa--became clouded
+by an adopted partisanship, and he was a "lost mind." Nothing could be
+further from the truth. If the man lived who could have turned the
+Boer and Afrikander from hatred and distrust of England and English
+ideas by personal charm and honourable dealing, it was the man who
+had universally inspired all his former associates, whether equals or
+subordinates, with admiration and affection. Whatever bitterness was
+displayed against Lord Milner personally by the Boer and Afrikander
+leaders after the issue of the war was decided was due to their
+perception that he was then--as always--a source of strength and an
+inspiration for renewed effort to those whom they regarded as their
+rivals or opponents. They hated him just as the French hated
+Bismarck--because he was the strong man on the other side.
+
+Lord Milner's inflexibility was, in its essence, a keener perception
+of duty than the ordinary: it was a determination to do what he
+believed to be for the good of South Africa and the Empire,
+irrespective of any consideration of personal or party relationship.
+It was in no sense the incapacity to measure the strength of an
+opponent, still less did it arise from any failure to perceive the
+cogency of an opinion in conflict with his own. Before the eight years
+of his administration had passed, Lord Milner's knowledge of the needs
+of South Africa and the Empire had become so profound that it carried
+him ahead of the most enlightened and patriotic of the home statesmen
+who supported him loyally to the end. Through the period of the war,
+when the issues were simple and primitive, they were wholly with him.
+But afterwards they supported him not so much because they understood
+the methods which he employed and the objects at which he aimed, as
+because they were by this time convinced of his complete mastery of
+the political and economic problems of South Africa. It is to this
+inability to understand the facts of the South African situation, as
+he had learnt them, that we must attribute the comparative feebleness
+shown by the Unionist leaders in resisting the perverse attempt which
+was made by the Liberal party, after the General Election of 1906, to
+revoke the final arrangements of his administration. The interval that
+separated Lord Milner's knowledge of South Africa from that of the
+Liberal ministers was profound; but even the Unionist chiefs showed
+but slight appreciation of the unassailable validity of the
+administrative decisions with which they had identified themselves,
+when the "swing of the pendulum" brought these decisions again, and
+somewhat unexpectedly, before the great tribunal of the nation.
+
+[Sidenote: Arrival at Cape Town.]
+
+Lord Milner sailed for the Cape on April 17th, 1897. At the actual
+moment of his arrival the relations between the Home Government and
+the South African Republic were strained almost to the breaking point.
+In a peremptory despatch of March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain had demanded
+the repeal of the Aliens Immigration and Aliens Expulsion Laws of
+1896--the former of which constituted a flagrant violation of the
+freedom of entry secured to British subjects by Article XIV. of the
+London Convention. This virtual ultimatum was emphasised by the
+appearance of a British squadron at Delagoa Bay, and by the despatch
+of reinforcements to the South African garrisons. The evident
+determination of the Imperial Government induced the Volksraad to
+repeal the Immigration Law and to pass a resolution in favour of
+amending the Expulsion Law. The crisis was over in June, and during
+the next few months the Pretoria Executive showed a somewhat more
+conciliatory temper towards the Government of Great Britain. And in
+this connection two other facts must be recorded. In August, 1896, Sir
+Jacobus de Wet had been succeeded as British Agent at Pretoria by Sir
+William (then Mr.) Conyngham Greene, and the Imperial Government was
+assured, by this appointment, of the services of an able man and a
+trained diplomatist. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the
+Raid, promised in July, 1896, met on February 16th, 1897, and reported
+on July 13th of the same year. Its report did little more than
+reassert the findings of the Cape Parliamentary Inquiry, which had
+been before the British public for the last year. It was otherwise
+remarkable for the handle which it gave (by the failure to insist upon
+the production of certain telegrams) to some extreme Radicals to
+assert Mr. Chamberlain's "complicity" in the "invasion" of the
+Transvaal as originally planned by Mr. Rhodes.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's thoroughness.]
+
+Lord Milner had expressed his intention of acquainting himself with
+the conditions of South Africa by personal observation before he
+attempted to take any definite action for the solution of the
+problems awaiting his attention. Nor, after the first month of
+anxious diplomatic controversy with the Pretoria Executive, was there
+anything either in the political situation in the Cape Colony, or in
+the attitude of the Transvaal Government, to prevent him from putting
+his purpose into effect. Apart from the circumstance that the
+reorganisation of the Chartered Company's Administration--a question
+in which the political future of Mr. Rhodes was largely involved--was
+a matter upon which his observation and advice were urgently required
+by the Colonial Office, Lord Milner had no intention, as he said, of
+"being tied to an office chair at Capetown." He had resolved,
+therefore, to visit at the earliest opportunity, first, the country
+districts of the colony which formed the actual seat of the Dutch
+population, and, second, the two protectorates of Bechuanaland and
+Basutoland, which were administered by officers directly responsible
+to the High Commissioner, as the representative of the Imperial
+Government. In point of fact he did more than this. Within a year of
+his arrival he had travelled through the Cape Colony (August and
+September, 1897), through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia
+(November and December, 1897), and visited Basutoland (April, 1898).
+And with characteristic thoroughness he set himself to learn both the
+Dutch of Holland and the "Taal"--the former in order that he might
+read the newspapers which the Afrikanders read, and the latter to
+open the way to that intercourse of eye and ear which most helps a
+man to know the character of his neighbour.
+
+Lord Milner's year of observation may be said to have ended with the
+speech at Graaf Reinet (March 3rd, 1898), which held his first clear
+and emphatic public utterance. During the greater part of this period
+he was by no means exclusively occupied with the shortcomings of
+President Krueger. The discharge of his official duties as Governor of
+the Cape Colony required more than ordinary care and watchfulness in
+view of the disturbed state of South African politics. And as High
+Commissioner he was called upon to deal with a number of questions
+relative to the affairs of Rhodesia and the Protectorates, of which
+some led him into the new and unfamiliar field of native law and
+custom, while others involved the exercise of his judgment on delicate
+matters of personal fitness and official etiquette. But an account of
+these questions--questions which he handled with equal insight and
+decision--must yield to the commanding interest of the actual steps by
+which he approached the two central problems upon the solution of
+which the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa
+depended--the removal of the pernicious system of race oligarchy in
+the Transvaal, and the preservation of the Cape Colony in its
+allegiance to the British Crown.
+
+[Sidenote: His friendliness to the Boers.]
+
+The position which Lord Milner took up in his relations with the
+Transvaal Government was one that was consistent alike with his
+personal characteristics and with the dictates of a high and
+enlightened statesmanship. Within the first few weeks of his arrival
+he let it be known, both through the British Agent at Pretoria, and
+through those of the Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony who were on
+terms of intimacy with President Krueger, that he desired, as it were,
+to open an entirely new account between the two governments. He, a new
+High Commissioner with no South African past, with no errors to
+retrieve, no failures to rankle, could afford to bury the diplomatic
+hatchet. There was nothing to prevent him from approaching the
+discussion of any questions that might arise in a spirit of perfect
+friendliness, or from believing that the President would be inspired,
+on his side, by the same friendly feelings. It was his hope,
+therefore, that much of the friction incidental to formal diplomatic
+controversy might be avoided through the settlement of all lesser
+matters by amicable and informal discussion between President Krueger
+and himself.
+
+This was no mere official pose. Milner never posed. He, too, desired
+to eliminate the Imperial factor in his own way. He saw from the first
+the advantage of limiting the area of dispute between Downing Street
+and Pretoria; and he made it his object to settle as many matters as
+possible by friendly discussion on the spot. The desire to avoid
+unnecessary diplomatic friction, and to make the best of President
+Krueger, was manifested in all he did at this time. In the course of
+the preparations for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee by the
+British community on the Rand, the new High Commissioner was asked to
+decide whether the toast of Queen Victoria, or that of President
+Krueger, should come first upon the list at the public banquet. He
+replied unhesitatingly that the courtesy due to President Krueger, as
+the head of the State, must be fully accorded. On this occasion, of
+all others, British subjects, he said, "should be most careful to
+avoid anything which might be regarded as a slight to the South
+African Republic or its chief magistrate."[27]
+
+         [Footnote 27: The incident is otherwise interesting as
+         affording the first sign of that confidence of the British
+         population in Lord Milner, which, steadily increasing as the
+         final and inevitable struggle approached, earned for him at
+         length the unfaltering support of British South Africa. After
+         the Rand celebrations were over, he was informed that his
+         advice had been put into effect with "very considerable
+         difficulty." The argument which had prevailed was this: "The
+         new High Commissioner is a tested man of affairs; we all look
+         to him to put British interests on a solid basis; and as we
+         do this, let us obey him in a matter like this."]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner and the Conventions.]
+
+While to President Krueger Lord Milner said, "Let us see if we cannot
+arrange matters by friendly discussion between ourselves"; to the
+Colonial Office he said, "Give them time; don't hurry them. Reform
+there must be: if by no other means, then by our intervention. But
+before we intervene, let us be sure that they either cannot, or will
+not, reform themselves. Therefore let us wait patiently, and make
+things as easy as possible for President Krueger." More than this, he
+had almost as little belief in the utility of the Conventions[28] as
+Grey had in those of his epoch. Whether the Boers did, or did not,
+call the Queen "Suzerain" seemed to him to be a small matter--an
+etymological question, as he afterwards called it. What was essential
+was that men of British blood should not be kept under the heel of the
+Dutch. Moreover, the grievances for which the observance of the London
+Convention, however strictly enforced, could provide a remedy, were
+insignificant as compared with the more real grievances, such as the
+attack upon the independence of the law courts, the injury to
+industrial life caused by a corrupt and incompetent administration,
+and the denial of elementary political rights, which no technical
+observance of the Convention would remove. Nor did it escape Lord
+Milner's notice that a policy of rigid insistence upon the letter of
+the Conventions might place the Imperial Government in a position of
+grave disadvantage. If any breach of the Conventions was once made the
+subject of earnest diplomatic complaint, the demand of the Imperial
+Government must be enforced even at the cost of war. The Conventions,
+therefore, should be invoked as little as possible. For, if the Boers
+denied the British Law Officers' interpretation of the text, the
+Imperial Government might find itself on the horns of a dilemma.
+Either it must beat an undignified retreat, or it must make war upon
+the Transvaal for a mere technicality, a proceeding which would gain
+for the Republic a maximum, and for the Imperial Government a minimum
+of sympathy and support. Therefore, he said, "Keep the Conventions in
+the background. If we are to fight let it be about something that is
+essential to the peace and well-being of South Africa, and not a mere
+diplomatic wrangle between the Pretoria Executive and the British
+Government."
+
+         [Footnote 28: Apart from the question of the validity of the
+         preamble to the Pretoria Convention (1881), two
+         Conventions--the London Convention (1884), and the Swaziland
+         Convention (1894)--were in force between the South African
+         Republic and Great Britain. The relations of the Imperial
+         Government to the Free State were regulated by the
+         Bloemfontein Convention (1854). This latter and the Sand
+         River Convention (1852), were the Conventions of Grey's
+         time.]
+
+[Sidenote: Transvaal affairs.]
+
+Lord Milner's hope that President Krueger might meet him half-way,
+although it was shown by subsequent events to have been devoid of
+foundation, had for the moment superficial appearances in its favour.
+After their retreat on the question of the Aliens Immigration Law the
+attitude of the Pretoria Executive remained for some time outwardly
+less hostile to the Imperial Government. Woolls-Sampson and "Karri"
+Davies were released from Pretoria gaol in honour of Queen Victoria's
+Jubilee,[29] and at the same period the first and only step was taken
+that offered a genuine promise of reform from within. The Industrial
+Commission, appointed earlier in the year by the Executive at the
+request of President Krueger, surprised the Uitlander community by
+conducting its inquiry with a thoroughness and impartiality that left
+no ground for complaint. Its report, reviewing in detail the
+conditions of the mining industry, was published in July. It afforded
+a complete confirmation of the fiscal and administrative complaints
+put forward by the Uitlanders against the Government; and as Mr.
+Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was both a member of
+the Executive and the leader of the more progressive section of the
+Boers, there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the recommendations
+of the Report being carried into effect. Scarcely more than six months
+later President Krueger proved conclusively that the hope of these, or
+of any other, reforms was entirely unfounded; but so long as there
+remained any prospect of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government
+being able to settle their differences by themselves, Lord Milner
+consistently pursued his intention of "making things easy" for the
+Transvaal Government. And this although the Pretoria Executive soon
+began to make heavy drafts upon his patience in other respects.[30]
+
+         [Footnote 29: These two men, now Colonel Sir Aubrey
+         Woolls-Sampson and Major W. D. "Karri" Davies, had refused to
+         sign the petition of appeal--an act of submission which
+         President Krueger required of the Johannesburg Reformers,
+         before he released them from Pretoria gaol. They did so on
+         the ground that the Imperial Government had made itself
+         responsible for their safety; since they and the other
+         Reformers, with the town of Johannesburg, had laid down their
+         arms on the faith of Lord Rosmead's declaration that he would
+         obtain reasonable reforms from President Krueger for the
+         Uitlanders.]
+
+         [Footnote 30: In the question of the Swaziland border, the
+         affair of Bunu, and the continued and increasing
+         ill-treatment of the Cape Boys, the Boer Government
+         manifested its old spirit of aggression and duplicity. All
+         these matters involved Lord Milner in anxious and wearisome
+         negotiations, which, however, he contrived by mingled
+         firmness and address to keep within the limits of friendly
+         discussion.]
+
+If Lord Milner was prepared to make the most of Paul Krueger and the
+Boers, he showed himself no less ready to see the best side of the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony. As we have already had occasion to notice,
+the year of his appointment was that of the Diamond Jubilee
+celebration; and on June 23rd he sent home a brief despatch in which
+he dwelt with evident satisfaction upon the share taken by the Dutch
+in the general demonstrations of loyalty called forth by the occasion
+in the Cape Colony. After a reference to the number of loyal addresses
+or congratulatory telegrams which had been sent to the Colonial
+Secretary for transmission to the Queen, he continued:
+
+     "The enthusiasm evoked here ... seems to me to be of peculiar
+     interest ... in view of recent events, which, as you are aware,
+     have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different
+     sections of the community. All I can say is that, so far as I am
+     able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the
+     loyalty of any portion of the community to Her Majesty the Queen.
+     People of all races, the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as
+     well as the African natives, have vied with one another in
+     demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the
+     throne. When every allowance is made for the exaggeration of
+     feeling caused by the unparalleled scale and prolonged duration
+     of the present festivities, and for the contagious excitement
+     which they have produced, it is impossible to doubt that the
+     feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much
+     stronger than has sometimes been believed. In my opinion, the
+     impression made by the world-wide celebration of Her Majesty's
+     Jubilee has strengthened that feeling throughout South Africa,
+     and is likely to have a permanent value."[31]
+
+         [Footnote 31: This short despatch has been given practically
+         _in extenso_. It was not published in the Blue-books, but it
+         was communicated to the Press some three months after it had
+         been received.]
+
+[Sidenote: First impressions of the Dutch.]
+
+It has been urged that the opinion here recorded is inconsistent with
+the charge of anti-British sentiment subsequently brought by Lord
+Milner against the Dutch leaders in the Cape Colony, and the despatch
+itself has been cited as affording evidence of the contention that the
+unfavourable view subsequently expressed in the Graaf Reinet speech,
+and more definitely in the despatch of May 4th, 1899, was not the
+result of independent investigation, but was a view formed to support
+the Imperial Government in a coercive policy towards the Transvaal.
+This criticism, which is a perfectly natural one, only serves to
+establish the fact that Lord Milner actually did approach the study of
+the nationality difficulty in complete freedom from any preconceived
+notions on the subject. As he said, he went to South Africa with an
+"open mind." So far from having any prejudice against the Dutch, his
+first impression was distinctly favourable, and as such he recorded
+it, suitably enough, in this Jubilee despatch. But it must be
+remembered that the opinion here recorded was based upon a very
+limited field of observation. At the time when this despatch was
+written Lord Milner had not yet been quite two months in South
+Africa, and his experience of the Dutch of the Cape Colony had been
+confined to intercourse with the Dutch of the Cape peninsula; that is
+to say, he had only come into contact with that section of the Cape
+Dutch which is, as indeed it has been for a century, closely
+identified, from a social point of view, with the official and
+mercantile British population of Capetown and its suburbs.
+
+What the Jubilee despatch really shows is that Lord Milner was
+prepared to make the best of the Dutch. The contrast between its tone
+of ready appreciation and the note of earnest remonstrance in the
+Graaf Reinet speech is apparent enough. The despatch is dated June
+23rd, 1897; the speech was delivered on March 3rd, 1898. What had
+happened in this interval of nine months to produce so marked a change
+in the mind of the genial, clear-sighted Englishman, who, as Mr.
+Asquith said, took with him to South Africa "as sympathetic an
+imagination" as any man of his acquaintance? _Nemo repente fuit
+turpissimus._ Whether the diagnosis of his Graaf Reinet speech was
+right or wrong, something must have happened to turn Lord Milner from
+ready appreciation to grave remonstrance.
+
+The circumstances which provide the answer to this question form an
+element of vital importance in the volume of evidence upon which
+posterity will pronounce the destruction of the Dutch Republics in
+South Africa to have been a just and necessary, or a needless and
+aggressive, act. But to see them in true perspective, the reader must
+first be possessed of some more precise information of the political
+situation in the Cape Colony at this time.
+
+[Sidenote: The Sprigg ministry.]
+
+At the period of Lord Milner's appointment the political forces set in
+motion by the Raid were operating already to prepare the way for the
+new and significant combinations of persons and parties in the Cape
+Colony that took definite form in the parliamentary crisis of May,
+1898. The Ministry now in office was that formed by Sir Gordon Sprigg
+upon Mr. Rhodes's resignation of the premiership after the Raid
+(January 6th, 1896). Like every other Cape Ministry of the last
+thirteen years, it was dependent upon the support of the Afrikander
+Bond, which supplied two out of the six members of the cabinet--Mr.
+Pieter Faure, Minister of Agriculture, and a moderate Bondsman, and
+Dr. Te Water, the intimate friend of Mr. Hofmeyr, and his direct
+representative in the Ministry. Another minister, Sir Thomas Upington,
+who had succeeded Mr. Philip Schreiner as Attorney-General, had been
+himself Prime Minister in the period 1884-6, when he and Sir Gordon
+Sprigg (then Treasurer-General), had opposed the demand for the
+intervention of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, successfully
+and strenuously advocated by Mr. J. W. Leonard and Mr. Merriman. It
+was, therefore, eminently, what would be called in France "a Ministry
+of the Centre." Sir Gordon Sprigg's regard for British interests was
+too lukewarm to command the confidence of the more decided advocates
+of British supremacy; while, on the other hand, his more or less
+friendly relations with Mr. Rhodes aroused the suspicions of the Dutch
+extremists. But Dr. Te Water's presence in the Ministry, offering in
+itself a sufficient assurance that no measures deemed by Mr. Hofmeyr
+to be contrary to the interests of the Bond would be adopted, had
+secured for the Government the votes of the majority of the Dutch
+members of the Legislative Assembly. An example of the subserviency of
+the Sprigg Ministry to the Bond at this date was afforded upon Lord
+Milner's arrival. As we have seen, the Home Government determined to
+reinforce the South African garrison, in order to strengthen its
+demand upon the Transvaal Government for the repeal of the Aliens
+Immigration Law. Although no direct opposition was offered by the
+Ministry to this measure, the insufficiency of barrack accommodation
+in the Cape Colony was used as a pretext for placing obstacles in the
+way of its accomplishment. These difficulties were successfully
+overcome by Lord Milner, and in the end the reinforcements arrived
+without giving rise to any political excitement.[32]
+
+         [Footnote 32: By August the South African garrison had been
+         raised to the very moderate strength of rather more than
+         8,000 troops.]
+
+[Sidenote: Navy contribution bill.]
+
+A more disagreeable incident was the covert attempt made by the Bond
+to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, in order that Sir
+Gordon Sprigg might be prevented from taking his place among the other
+prime ministers of the self-governing colonies at the Colonial
+Conference, and representing the Cape in the Jubilee celebrations in
+England.[33] This was the beginning of a disagreement between the
+Ministry and the Bond, which gradually increased in seriousness after
+Sir Gordon's return from England, until it culminated in the
+resignation of Dr. Te Water (May, 1898). The offer of an annual
+contribution to the cost of the British Navy, which was affirmed in
+principle by the Cape Parliament at this time, was understood in
+England to be a mark of Afrikander attachment to the British
+connection. In point of fact the measure received practically no
+support from the Bondsmen in Parliament; while, outside of Parliament,
+on Bond platforms and in the Bond Press, the Government's action in
+the matter was employed as an effective argument to stimulate
+disaffection in the ranks of its Dutch supporters. Mr. Hofmeyr,
+however, was careful not to allow the Bond, as an organisation, to
+commit itself to any overt opposition to the principle of a
+contribution to the British Navy--an attitude which would have been
+obviously inconsistent with the Bond's profession of loyalty--and with
+characteristic irony the third reading of the Navy Contribution Bill
+was eventually passed, a year later, without a division in the
+Legislative Assembly by a Ministry[34] placed in office by Bond votes
+for the declared purpose of opposing the policy of the Imperial
+Government on the one question--the reform of the Transvaal
+Administration--upon the issue of which depended the maintenance of
+British supremacy in South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 33: Sir Gordon Sprigg's long service as a minister
+         of the Crown fully entitled him to this honour; nor was his
+         presence rendered any the less desirable by the fact that Sir
+         Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice, was also attending the
+         Jubilee in England.]
+
+         [Footnote 34: The Schreiner Ministry.]
+
+[Sidenote: Rhodes's position.]
+
+But circumstances of deeper significance contributed to deprive the
+Sprigg Ministry of the support of the Bond, causing its majority to
+dwindle, and driving Sir Gordon himself, in an increasing degree, into
+the opposite camp. The British population for the first time showed a
+tendency to organise itself in direct opposition to the Bond. As Sir
+Gordon Sprigg grew more Imperialist, the Progressive party was formed
+for parliamentary purposes; while for the purpose of combating the
+Afrikander nationalist movement in general an Imperialist
+organisation, called the South African League, was established with
+the avowed object of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa.
+Mr. Cecil Rhodes, immediately after the Raid, announced his intention
+of taking no further part in the politics of the Cape Colony, and of
+devoting himself, for the future, to the development of Rhodesia. But
+upon his return from England, after giving evidence before the
+Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, he was received with so much
+warmth by the British population at Capetown in July, 1897, that he
+had retracted this decision, and determined to assume the same
+position of real, though not nominal, leadership of what was
+afterwards the Progressive party as Mr. Hofmeyr held in the Bond. Mr.
+Rhodes's return to political life, following, as it did, upon the
+report of the Committee of Inquiry, aroused the most bitter hostility
+against him on the part of his former associates in the Bond. And the
+Sprigg Ministry, by their increasing reliance upon the new party of
+which he was the leader, incurred the distrust of its Dutch supporters
+to a corresponding extent. In the meantime the Bond leaders had
+adopted Mr. Philip Schreiner, who was not a member of the Bond, as
+their parliamentary chief in the place of Rhodes, and this new
+combination was strengthened by the accession of Mr. J. X. Merriman
+and Mr. J. W. Sauer. Thus the opening months of the new year, 1898,
+found the population of the Cape Colony grouping itself roughly, for
+the first time, into two parties with definite and mutually
+destructive aims. On the one side there was the Sprigg Ministry, now
+almost exclusively supported by the British section of the Cape
+electorate, soon to be organised on the question of "redistribution"
+into the Progressive party, with Rhodes as its real, though not its
+recognised, leader; and on the other there was the Bond party, with
+Schreiner as its parliamentary chief and Hofmeyr as its real leader,
+depending in no less a degree upon the Dutch population of the
+Colony, and naturally opposed to an electoral reform that threatened
+to deprive this population of its parliamentary preponderance. And in
+a few months' time, as we shall see, the Schreiner-Bond coalition took
+for its immediate aim the prevention of British interference in the
+Transvaal; while the Progressive party came, no less openly, to avow
+its determination to promote and support the action of the Imperial
+Government in seeking to obtain redress for the Uitlander grievances.
+
+The movements here briefly indicated were, of course, perfectly well
+known to Lord Milner as constitutional Governor of the Colony. But at
+Graaf Reinet he probes the situation too deeply, and speaks with too
+authoritative a tone, to allow us to suppose that the remonstrance
+which he then addressed to the Cape Dutch was based upon any sources
+of knowledge less assured than his own observation and experience. For
+the Graaf Reinet speech is not an affair of ministers' minutes or
+party programmes; it is the straight talk of a man taught by eye and
+ear, and informed by direct relationships with the persons and
+circumstances that are envisaged in his words. To restate our
+question, which among these facts of personal observation and
+experience produced the change from the ready appreciation of the Cape
+Dutch, shown in the Jubilee despatch, to the earnest remonstrance of
+the Graaf Reinet speech? The historian cannot claim, like the writer
+of creative literature, to exhibit the working of the human mind. In
+the terms of the Aristotelian formula, he can relate only what "has"
+happened, leaving to the craftsman whose pen is enlarged and ennobled
+by the universal truth of art to tell what "must" happen. But such
+satisfaction as the lesser branch of literature can afford is at the
+disposal of the reader, in "good measure, pressed down, and running
+over." Without assuming, then, the philosophic certainty of poetry, we
+know that between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech the
+development of the great South African drama reached its
+"turning-point" in the Transvaal; while in the Cape Colony Lord Milner
+was learning daily more of the "formidable personalities" and the
+"embarrassing problems" to which Mr. Asquith had referred.
+
+[Sidenote: No reform in the Transvaal.]
+
+The more hopeful situation in the Transvaal that followed upon the
+determined action of the Imperial Government in May was succeeded by a
+period punctuated by events which, taken collectively, obliterated all
+prospect of "reform from within." The treatment accorded to the report
+of the Industrial Commission, which, as we have noticed, established
+the truth of practically all the fiscal and administrative complaints
+of the Uitlanders, was a matter of especial significance. The
+Commission was created by President Krueger; it was in effect the
+fulfilment of his promises, made after the Raid, to redress the
+grievances of the Uitlanders. The Commissioners were his own
+officials, Boers and Hollanders; men who had no prejudice against the
+Government, and no sympathy with the new population, yet their
+recommendations, if carried into effect, would have removed the most
+serious of the industrial grievances of the British community. The
+Report had raised great expectations. It was thought that, not all,
+but a substantial proportion of its recommendations would be put into
+effect. Here, then, was an opportunity for reform which involved no
+loss of prestige, entailed no danger to the independence of the
+Republic, and held not the slightest threat to the stability of
+burgher predominance. If what President Krueger was waiting for was a
+convenient opportunity, he had such an opportunity now. This
+reasonable forecast was utterly falsified by the event. Mr. Schalk
+Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was denounced by Mr. Krueger in
+the Volksraad as a traitor to the Republic, because he had dared to
+set his hand to so distasteful a document. The report itself was
+thrown contemptuously by the grim old President from the Volksraad to
+the customary committee of true-blue "doppers," whose ignorance of the
+industrial conditions of the Rand was equalled only by their personal
+devotion to himself. Here the adverse findings of the commissioners on
+the dynamite and railway monopolies were reversed; and the
+recommendation for a Local Board for the Rand was condemned as
+subversive of the authority of the State. At length, after the report
+had been tossed about from Volksraad to committee, and from committee
+to Volksraad, until very little of the original recommendations
+remained, the Government took action. In addition to an immaterial
+reduction of the exorbitant rates charged by the Netherlands Railway
+Company--a concession subsequently alleged to have been the price paid
+by the Hollander Corporation to avoid further inquiry into its
+affairs--it was announced that, with the object of lessening the cost
+of living on the Rand, the import duties upon certain necessaries in
+common use would be reduced, in accordance with the recommendations of
+the Commissioners on this point; but that, since it was obviously
+inexpedient to diminish the revenue of the Republic, the duties upon
+certain other articles of the same class would be raised to an extent
+more than counterbalancing the loss upon the reduction. _Parturiunt
+montes; nascitur ridiculus mus._
+
+[Sidenote: Krueger re-elected president.]
+
+This singular display of mingled effrontery and duplicity marked the
+closing months of the year (1897). In the February following Mr.
+Krueger was elected to the presidency of the South African Republic for
+the fourth time. It was generally recognised that the success of his
+candidature was inevitable, but few, within or without the Transvaal,
+had expected him to secure so decisive a victory over his competitors.
+The figures--Krueger 12,858, Schalk Burger 3,750, and Joubert
+(Commandant-General) 2,001--were additional evidence of the impotency
+or lukewarmness of the reform party among the burghers. The first act
+of President Krueger, on his return to power, was to dismiss Chief
+Justice Kotze. Mr. Kotze's struggle for the independence of the law
+courts, thus summarily closed, had commenced a year before with what
+was known as the "High Court crisis." At that time President Krueger
+had obtained power from the Volksraad by the notorious law No. 1 of
+1897 to compel the judges, on pain of dismissal, to renounce the
+right, recently exercised, to declare laws, which were in their
+opinion inconsistent with the Grondwet (Constitution), to be, to that
+extent, invalid. As a protest against this autocratic proceeding the
+entire bench of judges threatened to resign, and the courts were
+adjourned. The deadlock continued until a compromise was arranged
+through the intervention of Chief Justice de Villiers. The President
+undertook to introduce a new law providing satisfactorily for the
+independence of the Courts, and the judges, on their side, pledged
+themselves not to exercise the "testing" right in the meantime. In
+February, 1898, Chief Justice Kotze wrote to remind President Krueger
+that his promise remained unfulfilled,[35] withdrawing at the same
+time the conditional pledge not to exercise the "testing" right given
+by himself. The President then dismissed Mr. Kotze under Law No. 1,
+compelled a second judge, Mr. Justice Amershof (who had supported the
+Chief Justice in the position he had taken up) to resign, and
+appointed, as the new Chief Justice, Mr. Gregorowski, who, as Chief
+Justice of the Free State, had presided at the trial of the Reformers
+in 1896, and at the time of the crisis a year before had declared that
+"no honourable man could possibly accept the position of a judge so
+long as Law No. 1 remained in force." The judicature was now rendered
+subservient to the Executive, and the Uitlanders were thus deprived of
+their last constitutional safeguard against the injustice of the Boer
+and Hollander oligarchy.
+
+         [Footnote 35: There appears to have been some question as to
+         whether the terms of the President's undertaking bound him to
+         introduce the proposed measure into the Volksraad in 1897, or
+         in 1898. Chief Justice de Villiers held that the latter date
+         was contemplated by the President. But the point is
+         immaterial, since President Krueger denied in the Volksraad,
+         after the dismissal of Mr. Kotze, that he had ever given an
+         undertaking at all to Chief Justice de Villiers or to anybody
+         else.]
+
+[Sidenote: His reactionary policy.]
+
+This was the position in the Transvaal in February, 1898. President
+Krueger had demonstrated by his refusal to carry out the
+recommendations of the Industrial Commission, and by the dismissal of
+Chief Justice Kotze, that he was determined not merely to set himself
+against all measures of reform, but to increase the disabilities under
+which the Uitlanders had hitherto lived. He had been placed, for the
+fourth time, at the head of the Republic by an overwhelming majority;
+he had refused to sacrifice a penny of revenue, and he was in
+possession of ample resources, which were being sedulously applied in
+increasing his already disproportionate supply of munitions of war.
+Through Dr. Leyds, who had returned from his mission to Europe, he
+had opened up communications with European Powers, that placed him in
+a position to avail himself to the full of the possible embarrassment
+of Great Britain through international rivalries or disagreements. In
+South Africa he had carried through a treaty of offensive and
+defensive alliance with the Free State, and he had received more than
+one recent assurance that the flame of Afrikander nationalism had been
+kindled anew by the Bond in the Cape Colony.
+
+These events were disquieting enough in themselves; but what made the
+disappearance of any prospect of spontaneous reform in the Transvaal
+still more serious to the High Commissioner for South Africa, was the
+complaisance with which President Krueger's reactionary policy was
+regarded by the Dutch subjects of the Crown. It was just here that
+Lord Milner's observations must have yielded the most startling
+results. We know that the days which had passed since the Jubilee
+despatch was written had brought him constant and varied opportunities
+for seeing "things as they really were" in South Africa; we know that
+he was keenly alert in the accomplishment of his mission, and we may
+presume, therefore, that few, if any, of these opportunities were
+lost.
+
+In September Lord Milner had travelled right round the Colony. At
+every little town and _dorp_--wherever, in fact, he went--he conversed
+with the Dutch, whom his pleasant manner quickly won to friendliness;
+and all the speeches that he made in reply to the addresses of
+welcome were extremely conciliatory in tone. This was the time when
+there were hopeful anticipations of the good results that were to come
+from the Industrial Commission; and Lord Milner often began his speech
+with an expression of the sense of relief which he felt--a feeling
+which his audience must share--that now there was to be peace in South
+Africa. These conciliatory utterances of the new High Commissioner
+were almost completely ignored by the Dutch Press. An exception to
+this rule of silence was significant. The High Commissioner was
+accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. (now Sir Pieter)
+Faure. On one occasion Mr. Faure made some remarks in the same spirit
+as that in which Lord Milner had spoken. "People," he said, "talk of
+Africa for the Afrikanders; but what I say is, Africa for all." The
+expression of this moderate sentiment drew down upon Mr. Faure a sharp
+reproof from _Ons Land_. From this and many other such incidents it
+must have begun to dawn upon Lord Milner's mind that what the Dutch of
+the Cape Colony wanted was not conciliation but domination.
+
+[Sidenote: Attitude of the Cape Dutch.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Hands off" the Transvaal.]
+
+And so it came about that in the months that President Krueger was busy
+shutting the door against reform, Lord Milner was learning to realise
+that on this all-important matter there was nothing to hope from the
+Cape Dutch. When once the question of reform, or no reform, in the
+Transvaal came up, all conciliatory speeches were useless. It made no
+difference whether the Transvaal was right or wrong; it was always,
+"_Our_ Transvaal, good or bad." In short, all that happened both in
+the Transvaal and the Cape Colony during this (South African) spring
+and summer was of the nature to impress conclusively upon Lord
+Milner's mind that on the crucial issue between the Imperial
+Government and the Transvaal, the leaders of Dutch opinion in the Cape
+Colony were against the British cause. The rank and file of the Dutch
+population, if left to themselves, might be indifferent, possibly
+friendly; but the Bond organisation had placed them under the control
+of the Bond leaders; and the Bond was hostile. What, more than
+anything else, would serve to confirm this impression was Lord
+Milner's constant study of the Dutch Press. Among these journals, _Ons
+Land_ presented the most authoritative and significant expression of
+the Bond policy, as directed by Mr. Hofmeyr's astute brain and
+unrivalled experience. The editorial columns of _Ons Land_ rarely
+contained a sentence that, standing alone, could be quoted as evidence
+of its advocacy of anti-British action. Its method was far more
+subtle. In everything in which Great Britain was concerned the
+attitude which it adopted was one of profound alienation, rather than
+of aggressive hostility. England's position in the world was presented
+and discussed as though "Afrikanders" were no more interested in it
+than they were in that of any foreign country. And, in South African
+matters, the tone of the Dutch Press, and of the Bond leaders, was not
+merely discouraging; at any hint of possible British action for the
+improvement of the administrative conditions of the Transvaal, it took
+a note of menace. "Hands off" the Transvaal: that was the sum and
+substance of Bond policy.
+
+Between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech, then, the
+Transvaal Government had shown that it had set its face definitely
+against reform, and Lord Milner had had time to realise the true state
+of political feeling in the Colony of which he was Governor. While
+there was anger among the British at the hopeless situation in the
+Transvaal, among the Dutch was a fixed determination not to allow the
+Transvaal to be interfered with. And there was something else that
+Lord Milner would have observed during his travels throughout the
+Colony. It was the utter despondency of the British population, and
+the condition of abasement to which they had been reduced. Nor can he
+have failed to observe that everywhere among the British there was a
+constant apology for the Raid; while, on the part of the Dutch, there
+was no recognition of all that the British had done to wipe out its
+stain and to mitigate its effects: in a word, that the moral conquest
+of the Colony by the Dutch was practically complete.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner at Graaf Reinet.]
+
+It was with this accumulated evidence in his mind that Lord Milner
+travelled down, on March 2nd, 1898, from Capetown to Graaf Reinet,
+expecting to take part in a Governor's function of the ordinary sort
+at the opening of the railway on the following day. The conventional
+expressions of loyalty to the Queen, and the scarcely veiled hypocrisy
+and defiance with which the Dutch reiterated them, at the time when
+the whole weight of their influence was thrown against Great Britain
+on the only South African question that really mattered, had become
+nauseating even to his serene temper and generous disposition. He was
+wearied, too, of receiving a frivolous or unfriendly reply from the
+Pretoria Executive to the most reasonable proposals of the Imperial
+Government. Late at night there was brought to him, in the train, a
+copy of an address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander
+Bond, which was to be presented to him on the morrow. It contained, in
+more than usually pointed language, a protest against "the charges of
+disloyalty made against the Bond," and a request that the High
+Commissioner would "convey to the Queen the expression of its
+unswerving loyalty." As he read on we can imagine how, in ominous
+contrast to the superficial protestations of the text, something
+exceptionally aggressive in the tone of the address, something which
+emphasised the inconsistency of these formal professions of attachment
+to the throne with the very practical hostility of their authors to
+British policy, struck the High Commissioner with peculiar force. The
+Dutch, who, under British rule, enjoyed--one might almost say
+abused--every privilege of citizenship in the Cape Colony, were quite
+prepared to see the British excluded, under Dutch rule, from these
+same privileges in the Transvaal. More than that, they were determined
+to employ all the agencies at their command to prevent any effective
+interference with the Transvaal oligarchy. Lord Milner evidently felt
+that the time had come for remonstrance, so, gathering up the
+impressions which had been accumulating in his mind, he wrote down
+then and there his answer, which was delivered on the following day.
+
+     "Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her
+     Majesty's subjects is loyal, but I should be much more glad to be
+     allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason
+     could there be for any disloyalty? You have thriven wonderfully
+     well under Her Majesty's Government. This country, despite its
+     great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural
+     disadvantages to contend against, and yet let any one compare the
+     position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her
+     Majesty's reign, or even thirty years ago. The progress in
+     material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress
+     are greater still. And you have other blessings which by no means
+     always accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely
+     free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging
+     the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of
+     law manned by men of the highest ability and integrity, and
+     secure in the discharge of their high functions from all external
+     interference. You have--at least as regards the white
+     races--perfect equality of citizenship. And these things have not
+     been won from a reluctant sovereign. They have been freely and
+     gladly bestowed upon you, because freedom and self-government,
+     justice and equality, are the first principles of British policy.
+     And they are secured to you by the strength of the power that
+     gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack
+     without your being asked to contribute one pound to that
+     protection unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of
+     course you are loyal; it would be monstrous if you were not.
+
+     "And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have
+     to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may
+     put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or
+     less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to
+     shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the
+     population of the Colony--Dutch as well as English--are, I firmly
+     believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know they live
+     under a good constitution, and have no wish to change it, and
+     regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august lady at
+     the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to consider; if
+     political controversy were confined to the internal affairs of
+     the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of hard
+     language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among the
+     usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody
+     else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd--so obviously
+     absurd--that nobody would take it seriously, and the charges
+     would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.
+
+[Sidenote: The loyalty of the Bond.]
+
+     "What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case,
+     what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under it, is the
+     fact that the political controversies of this country at present
+     unfortunately turn largely upon another question--I mean the
+     relations of Her Majesty's Government to the South African
+     Republic--and that, whenever there is any prospect of any
+     difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once
+     vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality,
+     espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that
+     they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the
+     politician--often the best of men, though singularly
+     injudicious--who, whenever any disputes arise with another
+     country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be
+     in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very
+     much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his
+     fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly
+     opposite assumption. And so I do not take it that in this case
+     people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy
+     with the Government of the Transvaal--which, seeing the close tie
+     of relationship which unites a great portion of the population
+     here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly
+     natural--to a point which gives some ground for the assertion
+     that they seem to care much more for the independence of the
+     Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to
+     which they themselves belong.
+
+     "For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in
+     espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open
+     rupture between that country and the British Government. They
+     loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they
+     think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government
+     that in case of war with the Transvaal it would have a great
+     number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, that
+     is a way to prevent such a calamity.
+
+     "But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the
+     assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the
+     independence of the Transvaal--that independence which it has
+     itself given--and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order
+     to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact
+     opposite of the truth. So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it
+     is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes
+     of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they
+     are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the
+     Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the
+     semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that
+     country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only
+     on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly
+     reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of
+     the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain's
+     moderate attitude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is
+     not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government
+     which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at
+     all. It is that unprogressiveness--I will not say the
+     retrogressiveness--of the Government of the Transvaal and its
+     deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it
+     devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every
+     impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers
+     which threaten it are internal.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's appeal to the Dutch.]
+
+     "Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that
+     this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all
+     that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation
+     that at the present moment any advice that I could tender, or
+     that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender in that
+     quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, would be
+     instantly rejected because it was British. But the same does not
+     apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and especially to
+     those who have gone so far in the expression of their sympathy
+     for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these charges of
+     disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least cannot be
+     suspected across the border; and if all they desire--and I
+     believe it is what they desire--is to preserve the South African
+     Republic, and to promote good relations between it and the
+     British Colonies and Government, then let them use all their
+     influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming the
+     Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its
+     Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing
+     it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and, what is even
+     more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its
+     administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa,
+     such as this Colony or the Orange Free State. That is the
+     direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate
+     troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than
+     thirty years, is to be found."[36]
+
+         [Footnote 36: _Cape Times_, March 4th, 1898.]
+
+Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No
+such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High
+Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now
+eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action
+and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect,
+and grew uneasy.
+
+The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable. What is
+the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch, if you
+refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one thing of
+all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should feel--that the
+Transvaal should "assimilate its institutions ... and the tone and
+temper of its administration, to those of the free communities of
+South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free State."
+
+The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was
+the weight of inevitable truth.
+
+A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to
+urge President Krueger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he
+says:
+
+     "You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner's speech at
+     Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in _The
+     Cape Times_. Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled
+     hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble
+     ahead....
+
+     "Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the
+     future lies in the attitude of President Krueger and his vain hope
+     of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened
+     minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using
+     the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true
+     Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent
+     discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their
+     mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs
+     cannot last. It must break down from inherent rottenness, and it
+     will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all
+     of us.
+
+     "I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in
+     the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and
+     good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between
+     the South African Republic and a catastrophe."[37]
+
+         [Footnote 37: Cd. 369.]
+
+[Sidenote: Sprigg and the Bond.]
+
+Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the
+British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased
+by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had
+been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the
+essential morality of England's dealings with the Dutch been
+vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had
+done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to
+do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was
+unassailable. We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the
+different sections of the British population were manifesting a
+tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this
+movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge
+the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time
+past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population
+of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by
+any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary
+representatives. In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the
+Cape electoral system was brought before the Ministry. The
+indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze, and the
+growing evidence of President Krueger's determination to ride
+rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed
+to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of
+the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the
+common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of
+British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid
+British party thus formed adopted the title of "Progressives." The
+Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing
+to Mr. Hofmeyr; but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now assured of the almost
+united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament,
+resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was
+approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr.
+Hofmeyr's representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.[38]
+
+         [Footnote 38: He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship
+         by Dr. Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a
+         Progressive, and at the same time Sir Thomas Upington, who
+         had resigned from ill-health, was succeeded by Mr. T.
+         Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.]
+
+[Sidenote: Redistribution.]
+
+Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the
+parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He
+had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his
+Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to
+throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes was
+the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in doubt. On the
+resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was at once turned
+on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr. Schreiner gave notice of a vote of
+"no confidence." It was put off until June 13th, and in the meantime
+the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was met by the "previous
+question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of the Provincial Council
+of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in Parliament or in the
+Press, to conceal the fact that, under the question of redistribution,
+wider and more momentous issues were at stake. The counts in the
+Bond's indictment of the Ministry, as set out in _Ons Land_, were (1)
+its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the proposed gift of a
+warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of sympathy with the
+South African Republic. Against these crimes it had nothing to place,
+except that it had permitted the employment of the captured Bechuanas,
+as indentured labourers[39]--its sole merit, in the opinion of the
+Bond journal. _The Cape Times_, on the other hand, declared with equal
+frankness that the real point to be decided was, whether the interests
+of President Krueger and the South African Republic, or those of the
+Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire, had the greater claim upon
+the Government and Parliament of the Colony. And Mr. Schreiner, when,
+on June 13th, he introduced the "no confidence" motion, asked the
+House to condemn the Ministry on the ground that it had not shown any
+"sympathy" with, or made any "conciliatory approach" towards, the
+"sister Republic." On Monday, June 20th, the second reading of the
+Redistribution Bill was carried by a majority of seven, but two days
+later, June 22nd, the Ministry found itself in a minority of five on
+Mr. Schreiner's motion of "no confidence."[40] In these circumstances
+Sir Gordon Sprigg determined not to resign, but to appeal to the
+electorate--a course justified by constitutional usage--and Parliament
+was dissolved.
+
+         [Footnote 39: These were prisoners taken in the suppression
+         of the revolt in Bechuanaland in 1897.]
+
+         [Footnote 40: The little group of six, of which Sir James
+         Innes was the head--including Sir R. Solomon and four
+         others--voted _with_ the Ministry for the Redistribution
+         Bill, but _against_ it on the "no confidence" motion (with
+         the exception of Sir James himself). Also one moderate
+         Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the
+         Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.]
+
+[Sidenote: The general election, 1898.]
+
+The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no
+little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were
+supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and
+other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by
+President Krueger and his agents from the revenues of the
+Transvaal.[41] Mr. Schreiner's election utterances were studiously
+moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the
+Malmesbury division, by whom he was returned to Parliament, contained
+a reference to "the noble empire which was theirs, and to which they
+belonged." But such pronouncements by no means represented the
+sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself. The
+objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive
+form by _Ons Land_, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to
+oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in
+politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation
+of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words,
+to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the
+diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general
+preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise. The
+under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch
+population may be understood from the fact that the following frank
+appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was
+published in the columns of _Ons Land_:
+
+         [Footnote 41: Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a
+         candidate financed from Pretoria.]
+
+     "When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it
+     must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The
+     majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go
+     bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two
+     Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the
+     stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at
+     least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape
+     Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The two
+     Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the stranger
+     [_i.e._ British] are unable to continue the fight. One day the
+     question of who is to be master will have to be referred to the
+     arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend upon
+     the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our side
+     we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince matters.
+     This is the real point at issue; and in this light every
+     Afrikander must learn to see it. And what assistance can we
+     expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority
+     of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on
+     the sword when God's time comes."[42]
+
+         [Footnote 42: As translated in _South Africa_, October 15th,
+         1898.]
+
+At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become
+what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of
+rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander
+nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from
+certain extracts from the _Studenten Blad_ of the Theological Seminary
+of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by _The Albert
+Times_. The passage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by
+November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students
+had at that date joined the Boer forces:
+
+[Sidenote: Anti-british sentiment.]
+
+     "Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors
+     of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as
+     their heart's blood--a people that followed our fathers to the
+     new fatherland which they had bought with their blood and
+     snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their freedom?
+     Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and retook the
+     land with God's aid and with their blood. But England is not
+     satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same people,
+     and not only our freedom, but our language, our nationality, our
+     religion! Must we surrender everything, and disown our fathers? I
+     cannot agree with this. The thought is hateful to me--the thought
+     of trampling on the bodies of our fathers as we extend the hand
+     of friendship to those who have slain our fathers in an
+     unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say that the Bible teaches
+     us to love our enemies. I think, however, that the text cannot be
+     here applied. Race hatred is something quite distinct from
+     personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as a private
+     individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if, however,
+     I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander, must
+     regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion--as a wolf
+     that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the chief
+     reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the
+     enemies of our religion."
+
+At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were
+over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned.
+Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned
+both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former
+constituency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus
+vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return
+of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take
+place until the 15th. As all three constituencies were expected to
+elect Progressives--an expectation which was fulfilled--the result of
+the general election was to give the Bond a bare majority of one, and
+this in spite of the fact that a considerably larger total of votes
+had been cast for the Progressive than for the Bond candidates.[43]
+
+         [Footnote 43: In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39
+         Progressive members were returned. A very careful and
+         reliable calculation showed that, of an aggregate of 82,304
+         votes polled, 44,403 were cast for Progressive, and 37,901
+         for Afrikander candidates. More than this, while no
+         Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than
+         137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective
+         majorities, of two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives,
+         therefore, were entitled, on their aggregate vote, to a
+         majority of six.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's impartiality.]
+
+These somewhat unusual circumstances gave rise to an incident which is
+significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner
+discharged the duties of his office as constitutional Governor of the
+Cape Colony. In view of the circumstance that the Progressives had
+polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a
+minority in the Assembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry
+should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until
+the Namaqualand election had been held. He believed, further, that in
+the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce
+one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the
+Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution
+of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The
+partial appropriation made by Parliament before the dissolution was
+exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be provided
+without the authority of Parliament was the issue of Governor's
+warrants on the Treasury. Lord Milner was willing to sign warrants to
+enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during the
+unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last appropriation
+and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of the
+constitutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain supply
+is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to issue
+warrants for any longer period. He held, moreover, that as the
+Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be
+completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as
+the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was,
+no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair
+prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to
+put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have
+failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question. A
+loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with
+or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run
+the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and
+of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might
+otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But,
+as Governor of the Colony, he refused to allow any considerations of
+party interest, on this or on any subsequent occasion, to influence
+his judgment. While he conceived it to be his duty to give advice and
+criticism to public men of all shades of political opinion, he showed
+himself inexorably opposed to the thought of straining his
+constitutional powers in the slightest degree for the benefit of one
+side or the other.[44] Accordingly provision for the expenses of
+administration was made by Governor's warrants up to September 30th,
+and on the day following the Vryburg election (September 16th), a
+proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th was issued.
+
+         [Footnote 44: Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord
+         Milner for the purpose of laying his views before him. But,
+         it is said, the unwonted sternness of the Governor's
+         expression at once convinced him of the hopelessness of his
+         mission; and he withdrew without any attempt to argue his
+         case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal magnetism, the
+         incident is not without significance.]
+
+[Sidenote: Schreiner, prime minister.]
+
+On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no
+confidence" by a majority of two.[45] On the 17th the House assembled
+with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to
+the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members
+of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close
+association with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The
+latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided
+with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The
+Progressives continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon Sprigg.
+Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an "independent," since
+he had found himself unable to work in association with a party in
+which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence. The new Ministry was not
+strong enough to resist the continued demand of the Progressives for a
+measure of electoral reform; but the Redistribution Bill, as now
+passed, took the form of a compromise so disastrous to the British
+population that the Bond majority was increased to eight by the new
+elections held in April, 1899.[46]
+
+         [Footnote 45: Both sides were one short of their full
+         strength, but a Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was
+         chosen Speaker of the House.]
+
+         [Footnote 46: The second reading of the Navy Contribution
+         Bill, giving effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg's pledge, was
+         carried on December 2nd, 1898, without a division.]
+
+Mr. Chamberlain's policy, as we have seen, was based upon the belief
+that it was possible to win over the Dutch in the Cape Colony and the
+Free State to the side of the Imperial Government. But here, in
+October, 1898, was an Afrikander ministry in power in the Cape Colony
+pledged to prevent the intervention of the Imperial Government in the
+affairs of the Transvaal. From that moment the issue became more and
+more one not of right, but of might. In the Free State, as we have
+seen, what was virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with the
+northern Republic had been ratified by the Volksraad. In the Transvaal
+the work of armament was proceeding apace, and Dr. Leyds had been
+despatched to Europe, as Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic, with
+authority and funds calculated to enable him to enlist the active
+sympathy of the Continental powers on behalf of the Pretoria
+Executive. His place as State Secretary had been filled, in July, by
+Mr. Reitz, the former President of the Free State, and one of the
+actual founders of the Afrikander Bond; and Mr. Smuts, a younger and
+even more enthusiastic believer in the nationalist creed, was
+appointed to the office of State Attorney.[47] With the exception of
+Rhodesia and Natal and the native territories immediately under the
+control of the Imperial Government, the Afrikander nationalists
+dominated the whole of South Africa. Nor is it surprising that, in
+these circumstances, the tone of the communications passing between
+the Transvaal Government and the paramount Power should have become
+increasingly unsatisfactory.[48]
+
+         [Footnote 47: The State-Secretaryship was offered first to
+         Mr. Abraham Fischer, of the Free State, by whom it was
+         declined (_Memoirs of Paul Krueger_, vol. ii., p. 297). The
+         Cape Afrikanders desired the appointment of Mr. Smuts.]
+
+         [Footnote 48: On May 7th, 1897, President Krueger had formally
+         requested the Imperial Government to allow all questions at
+         issue between the two Governments under the Convention to be
+         submitted to the arbitration of the President of the Swiss
+         Republic. To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain replied, on
+         October 10th, that the relationship of Great Britain to the
+         South African Republic being that of a suzerain Power, it
+         would be impossible for the Imperial Government to permit the
+         intervention of a foreign Power. On April 16th, 1898, in a
+         despatch embodying the legal opinions of Mr. Farelly,
+         President Krueger claims that the South African Republic is an
+         independent State, and denies the existence of any
+         "suzerainty" on the part of Great Britain. In forwarding this
+         despatch Lord Milner made the apposite comment that the
+         propriety of employing the term suzerainty to express the
+         rights possessed by Great Britain is an "etymological
+         question," and Mr. Chamberlain, replying on December 15th,
+         accepts President Krueger's declaration that he is willing to
+         abide by the articles of the Convention, reasserts the claim
+         of suzerainty, declines to allow foreign arbitration, and
+         demands the immediate fulfilment of Article IV. In a despatch
+         of May 9th, 1899, Mr. Reitz asserts that the Republic is "a
+         sovereign international State"; and on June 13th Mr.
+         Chamberlain replies that he has no intention of continuing
+         the discussion.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner's visit to England.]
+
+In the (English) winter of 1898-9 Lord Milner paid a visit to England.
+Sir William Greene, who had left Pretoria on a holiday on June 29th,
+was also at home during the same period. Lord Milner's visit was due
+in part to the necessity for medical treatment;[49] but, in any case,
+it had become desirable that he should be able to communicate fully to
+Mr. Chamberlain the grave views which he had formed on the South
+African situation. He left for England on November 2nd, landed on the
+19th, sailed on January 28th, and reached Capetown again on February
+14th. During the whole of the two months that he was in England he was
+engaged in an endeavour to impress upon Mr. Chamberlain, and everybody
+else with whom he could converse, that the existing state of affairs
+was one which, if allowed to remain unchanged, would end in the loss
+of South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 49: Owing to a slight affection of the eye.]
+
+During nineteen months of close observation and earnest, patient
+study, Lord Milner had grasped the situation in its completeness. What
+he saw was the demoralising effect of the spectacle of the Dutch
+ruling in the Cape Colony, and the British being tyrannised over in
+the Transvaal. Looking at South Africa as a whole, there was the fact,
+as indisputable as it was grotesque, that the British inhabitant was
+in a position of distinct inferiority to the Dutch; and this although
+the Cape and Natal were British colonies, while the Transvaal and the
+Free State were states subject to the authority of Great Britain as
+paramount Power. It was an impossible position. What Lord Milner urged
+upon the Imperial Government was the plain necessity of putting an end
+to an intolerable state of things which showed no capacity of righting
+itself; of pressing for justice to the British population of the
+Transvaal, with an absolute determination to obtain it. That such a
+policy might result in war, he knew; though neither he nor any one
+else realised, in the beginning of 1899, how near war actually was.
+The reliance of the Transvaal oligarchy on the Orange Free State, now
+bound to them by a formal alliance, and on the party of the Bond now
+in power at the Cape, might tempt them to resist even the most
+moderate demands. But Milner no doubt hoped that, if the British
+Government grasped the nettle firmly, and, while treating the
+Transvaal with all possible diplomatic courtesy, yet left no doubt
+whatever of its inflexible resolution, war might still be avoided. And
+in any case he felt that there was no option for the British
+Government but to take up the case of the Transvaal British, if a
+shred of respect for the power and name of Britain was to be preserved
+in South Africa. To embark on such a policy involved two dangers: the
+danger of war, and what in Milner's eyes was perhaps even greater,
+the danger that, by advancing just claims and then, letting ourselves
+be "bluffed" out of them, we might yet further lessen, and indeed
+totally destroy, what hold we still possessed upon the affection of
+the South African British or on the respect either of British or
+Dutch. In the light of past experience the second danger may well have
+seemed to him the greater of the two. But, with perils on both hands,
+he still felt that there was nothing for it but to go forward, to make
+one supreme effort to save a situation which was rapidly becoming a
+hopeless one. To have remained quiescent, with the forces which were
+gradually edging us out of the Sub-Continent growing on every side,
+could only have ended in the overthrow, or at best, the euthanasia of
+British dominion in South Africa.
+
+[Sidenote: His verdict.]
+
+It was in the course of this visit that Lord Milner realised the
+magnitude of the task that lay before him. To save England in spite of
+herself; to keep South Africa a part of the Empire in spite of
+ignorance at home, in the teeth of an armed Republic and an Afrikander
+ministry, required not merely an iron will and mastership in
+statecraft, but a reasoned and unfaltering belief in the justice of
+the British cause. "Certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my
+might," he said long afterwards in his farewell speech at
+Johannesburg, "because I was, from head to foot, one mass of glowing
+conviction of the rightness of our cause."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+UNDER WHICH FLAG?
+
+
+Upon his return Lord Milner found that the storm clouds had gathered
+in the Transvaal. In a despatch of January 13th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain
+had informed the Pretoria Executive that the proposed extension of the
+dynamite contract in its new form (_i.e._ as, in effect, a "privileged
+importation by one firm," although nominally "a State undertaking")
+was held by the law officers of the Crown to be as much a violation of
+the Convention as the original monopoly, which had been cancelled on
+the representations of the Imperial Government in 1892. Mr. Reitz's
+reply, which Lord Milner transmitted to the Colonial Office not long
+after his arrival at Capetown, was a blunt assertion that, in the
+opinion of his Government, the Imperial Government had no right to
+interfere. But in the meantime the whole question of the position of
+the British residents in the Transvaal had been raised directly by the
+agitation which had arisen out of the shooting of Edgar at
+Johannesburg on December 18th, 1898.[50] This event was followed by
+the petition for protection, which Sir William Butler (who was
+General-in-Command, and during Lord Milner's absence Acting High
+Commissioner) refused to transmit to the Secretary of State (January
+4th, 1899); by the arrest of Messrs. Webb and Dodd and the breaking up
+of the Amphitheatre meeting (January 14th); by the attempt of the
+Pretoria Executive to buy off the capitalists (February 27th-April
+14th); by the presentation of the second petition to the Queen (March
+24th); by the agitation on the Rand in favour of the reforms for which
+it prayed; and lastly by the public meetings held in the Cape Colony
+and Natal for, and against, the intervention of the Imperial
+Government.[51]
+
+         [Footnote 50: "On the Sunday night before Christmas, a
+         British subject named Tom Jackson Edgar was shot dead in his
+         own house by a Boer policeman. Edgar, who was a man of
+         singularly fine physique, and both able and accustomed to
+         take care of himself, was returning home at about midnight,
+         when one of three men standing by, who, as it afterwards
+         transpired, was both ill and intoxicated, made an offensive
+         remark. Edgar resented it with a blow which dropped the other
+         insensible to the ground. The man's friends called for the
+         police, and Edgar, meanwhile, entered his own house a few
+         yards off. There was no attempt at concealment or escape;
+         Edgar was an old resident and perfectly well known. Four
+         policemen came.... The fact, however, upon which all
+         witnesses agree is that, as the police burst open the door,
+         Constable Jones [there are scores of Boers unable to speak a
+         word of English who, nevertheless, own very characteristic
+         English, Scotch, and Irish names] fired at Edgar and dropped
+         him dead in the arms of his wife, who was standing in the
+         passage a foot or so behind him."--FITZPATRICK'S _The
+         Transvaal from Within_.]
+
+         [Footnote 51: For particulars of these events the reader is
+         referred to _The Transvaal from Within_.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Uitlanders' petition.]
+
+Within three months of his return Lord Milner cabled the masterly
+statement in which he endorsed the petition of the Uitlanders[52] with
+the memorable words: "The case for intervention is overwhelming."
+Like the Graaf Reinet speech, this despatch of May 4th was written at
+white heat, but the opinions which it expressed were in no less a
+degree the mature and measured judgments of a mind fully informed upon
+every detail germane to the issue. So much is this the fact that all
+that is essential for the full comprehension of the second Reform
+Movement at Johannesburg--the salient features of which have been
+outlined above--is to be found within the limits of this brief and
+notable State document:
+
+         [Footnote 52: The petition, with its 21,684 signatures,
+         reached Lord Milner through Sir W. (then Mr.) Greene, the
+         British Agent at Pretoria, on March 27th. It was forwarded by
+         the High Commissioner to England in the mail of March 29th.
+         The same ship, the _Carisbrook Castle_, carried Dr. Leyds,
+         who was returning to Europe after a visit to Pretoria. Sir W.
+         Greene had returned to South Africa in the same ship with
+         Lord Milner (February 14th), and had stayed at Government
+         Cottage (Newlands) with him for some days, discussing
+         Transvaal matters, before proceeding to Pretoria on February
+         19th.]
+
+[Sidenote: The intervention despatch.]
+
+     "Having regard to the critical character of the South African
+     situation and the likelihood of an early reply by Her Majesty's
+     Government to the Petition, I am telegraphing remarks which under
+     ordinary circumstances I should have made by despatch. Events of
+     importance have followed so fast on each other since my return to
+     South Africa, and my time has been so occupied in dealing with
+     each incident severally, that I have had no time for reviewing
+     the whole position.
+
+     "The present crisis undoubtedly arises out of the Edgar incident.
+     But that incident merely precipitated a struggle which was
+     certain to come. It is possible to make too much of the killing
+     of Edgar. It was a shocking and, in my judgment, a criminal
+     blunder, such as would have caused a popular outcry anywhere. It
+     was made much worse by the light way in which it was first dealt
+     with by the Public Prosecutor and then by the judge at the
+     trial. By itself, however, it would not have justified, nor, in
+     fact, provoked the present storm. But it happened to touch a
+     particularly sore place. There is no grievance which rankles more
+     in the breasts of the Uitlander population than the conduct of
+     the police, who, while they have proved singularly incompetent to
+     deal with gross scandals like the illicit liquor trade, are harsh
+     and arbitrary in their treatment of individuals whom they happen
+     to dislike, as must have become evident to you from the recurrent
+     ill-treatment of coloured people. There are absolutely no grounds
+     for supposing that the excitement which the death of Edgar caused
+     was factitious. It has been laid to the door of the South African
+     League, but the officials of the League were forced into action
+     by Edgar's fellow-workmen. And, the consideration of grievances
+     once started by the police grievance, it was inevitable that the
+     smouldering but profound discontent of the population who
+     constantly find their affairs mismanaged, their protests
+     disregarded, and their attitude misunderstood, by a Government on
+     which they have absolutely no means of exercising any influence,
+     should once more break into flame.
+
+     "We have, therefore, simply to deal with a popular movement of a
+     similar kind to that of 1894 and 1895 before it was perverted and
+     ruined by a conspiracy of which the great body of the Uitlanders
+     were totally innocent. None of the grievances then complained of,
+     and which then excited universal sympathy, have been remedied,
+     and others have been added. The case is much stronger. It is
+     impossible to overlook the tremendous change for the worse, which
+     has been effected by the lowering of the status of the High Court
+     of Judicature and by the establishment of the principle embodied
+     in the new draft Grondwet that any resolution of the Volksraad
+     is equivalent to a law. The instability of the laws has always
+     been one of the most serious grievances. The new Constitution
+     provides for their permanent instability, the judges being bound
+     by their oath to accept every Volksraad resolution as equally
+     binding with a law passed in the regular form, and with the
+     provisions of the Constitution itself. The law prescribing this
+     oath is one of which the present Chief Justice said that no
+     self-respecting man could sit on the Bench while it was on the
+     Statute Book. Formerly the foreign population, however bitterly
+     they might resent the action of the Legislature and of the
+     Administration, had yet confidence in the High Court of
+     Judicature. It cannot be expected that they should feel the same
+     confidence to-day. Seeing no hope in any other quarter, a number
+     of Uitlanders who happen to be British subjects have addressed a
+     petition to Her Majesty the Queen. I have already expressed my
+     opinion of its substantial genuineness and the absolute _bona
+     fides_ of its promoters. But the petition is only one proof among
+     many of the profound discontent of the unenfranchised population,
+     who are a great majority of the white inhabitants of the State."
+
+     "The public meeting of the 14th January was indeed broken up by
+     workmen, many of them poor burghers, in the employment of the
+     Government and instigated by Government officials, and it is
+     impossible at present to hold another meeting of a great size.
+     Open-air meetings are prohibited by law, and by one means or
+     another all large public buildings have been rendered
+     unavailable. But smaller meetings are being held almost nightly
+     along the Rand, and are unanimous in their demand for
+     enfranchisement. The movement is steadily growing in force and
+     extent.
+
+[Sidenote: The movement not artificial.]
+
+     "With regard to the attempt to represent that movement as
+     artificial, the work of scheming capitalists or professional
+     agitators, I regard it as a wilful perversion of the truth. The
+     defenceless people who are clamouring for a redress of grievances
+     are doing so at great personal risk. It is notorious that many
+     capitalists regard political agitation with disfavour because of
+     its effect on the markets. It is equally notorious that the
+     lowest class of Uitlanders, and especially the illicit liquor
+     dealers, have no sympathy whatever with the cause of reform.
+     Moreover, there are in all classes a considerable number who only
+     want to make money and clear out, and who, while possibly
+     sympathising with reform, feel no great interest in a matter
+     which may only concern them temporarily. But a very large and
+     constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders are not birds
+     of passage; they contemplate a long residence in the country, or
+     to make it their permanent home. These people are the mainstay of
+     the reform movement as they are of the prosperity of the country.
+     They would make excellent citizens if they had the chance.
+
+     "A busy industrial community is not naturally prone to political
+     unrest. But they bear the chief burden of taxation; they
+     constantly feel in their business and daily lives the effects of
+     chaotic local legislation and of incompetent and unsympathetic
+     administration; they have many grievances, but they believe all
+     these could gradually be removed if they had only a fair share of
+     political power. This is the meaning of their vehement demand for
+     enfranchisement. Moreover, they are mostly British subjects,
+     accustomed to a free system and equal rights; they feel deeply
+     the personal indignity involved in a position of permanent
+     subjection to the ruling caste, which owes its wealth and power
+     to their exertion. The political turmoil in the Transvaal
+     Republic will never end till the permanent Uitlander population
+     is admitted to a share in the government, and while that turmoil
+     lasts there will be no tranquillity or adequate progress in Her
+     Majesty's South African dominions.
+
+     "The relations between the British Colonies and the two Republics
+     are intimate to a degree which one must live in South Africa in
+     order fully to realise. Socially, economically, ethnologically,
+     they are all one country. The two principal white races are
+     everywhere inextricably mixed up; it is absurd for either to
+     dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they
+     can live in harmony, and the country progress, is equality all
+     round. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six
+     Governments; but not under two absolutely conflicting social and
+     political systems--perfect equality for Dutch and British in the
+     British Colonies side by side with the permanent subjection of
+     the British to the Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to
+     talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs.
+
+     "It is this which makes the internal condition of the Transvaal
+     Republic a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty's Government.
+     No merely local question affects so deeply the welfare and peace
+     of her own South African possessions. And the right of Great
+     Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment to the Uitlanders
+     is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The
+     majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect.
+     But the enormous number of British subjects, the endless series
+     of their grievances, and the nature of those grievances, which
+     are not less serious because they are not individually
+     sensational, makes protection by the ordinary diplomatic means
+     impossible. We are, as you know, for ever remonstrating about
+     this, that, and the other injury to British subjects. Only in
+     rare cases, and only when we are very emphatic, do we obtain any
+     redress. The sore between us and the Transvaal Republic is thus
+     inevitably kept up, while the result in the way of protection to
+     our subjects is lamentably small. For these reasons it has been,
+     as you know, my constant endeavour to reduce the number of our
+     complaints. I may sometimes have abstained when I ought to have
+     protested from my great dislike of ineffectual nagging. But I
+     feel that the attempt to remedy the hundred-and-one wrongs
+     springing from a hopeless system by taking up isolated cases, is
+     perfectly vain. It may easily lead to war, but will never lead to
+     real improvement."
+
+[Sidenote: Enfranchisement the remedy.]
+
+     "The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these
+     injuries--the political impotence of the injured. What diplomatic
+     protests will never accomplish, a fair measure of Uitlander
+     representation would gradually but surely bring about. It seems a
+     paradox, but it is true, that the only effective way of
+     protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our
+     subjects. The admission of the Uitlanders to a fair share of
+     political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic.
+     But it would, at the same time, remove most of our causes of
+     difference with it, and modify and, in the long run, entirely
+     remove that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great
+     Britain which at present dominates its internal and external
+     policy.
+
+     "The case for intervention is overwhelming. The only attempted
+     answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. But,
+     in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for
+     years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. It is not
+     true that this is owing to the Raid. They were going from bad to
+     worse before the Raid. We were on the verge of war before the
+     Raid, and the Transvaal was on the verge of revolution. The
+     effect of the Raid has been to give the policy of leaving things
+     alone a new lease of life, and with the old consequences.
+
+     "The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently
+     in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted
+     grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for
+     redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of
+     Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government within
+     the Queen's dominions. A certain section of the Press, not in the
+     Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a
+     republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing
+     references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with
+     the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in case of
+     war, it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I
+     regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a
+     ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the
+     British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large
+     number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used
+     which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right,
+     even in this Colony, to their fellow-citizens of British birth.
+     Thousands of men peacefully disposed, and, if left alone,
+     perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are
+     being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding
+     exasperation on the side of the British.
+
+     "I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous
+     propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of Her
+     Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South
+     Africa. And the best proof alike of its power and its justice
+     would be to obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair
+     share in the government of the country which owes everything to
+     their exertions. It could be made perfectly clear that our
+     action was not directed against the existence of the Republic. We
+     should only be demanding the re-establishment of rights which now
+     exist in the Orange Free State, and which existed in the
+     Transvaal itself at the time of, and long after, the withdrawal
+     of British sovereignty. It would be no selfish demand, as other
+     Uitlanders besides those of British birth would benefit by it. It
+     is asking for nothing from others which we do not give ourselves.
+     And it would certainly go to the root of the political unrest in
+     South Africa, and, though temporarily it might aggravate, it
+     would ultimately extinguish the race feud, which is the great
+     bane of the country."[53]
+
+         [Footnote 53: C. 9,345.]
+
+It was Lord Milner's intention that the text of this despatch should
+have been made public upon its receipt in England. It contained the
+essential facts of the South African situation; and, what is more, it
+exhibited with perfect frankness the connection between Dutch
+ascendancy in the Cape Colony and Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal--a
+matter which was very imperfectly understood. The circumstance that
+these essential facts were before the British people, and, moreover,
+the circumstance that President Krueger knew that they were before the
+British people, would, he believed, greatly increase the effect of the
+strong demand for reforms which the Imperial Government had determined
+to address to the Pretoria Executive in response to the petition to
+the Queen.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's intervention.]
+
+Nor was he alone in this opinion. Mr. Hofmeyr knew that a despatch of
+grave importance had gone home. He had gathered, no doubt, a fairly
+accurate notion of its tenor from Mr. Schreiner, whom Lord Milner had
+warned some time before of "the gravity of the situation."[54] It is
+not going beyond the limits of probability to assume that the Master
+of the Bond realised the effect which the publication of these plain
+truths, backed by the authority of the High Commissioner, would
+produce upon the mind of the English people, and that he thereupon
+determined to take steps to prevent a turn of affairs which, as he
+conceived, would be most unfavourable to the nationalist cause.
+Surmises apart, it is certain, at least, that five days sufficed to
+place Mr. Hofmeyr in a position to ask Lord Milner if he would
+favourably consider an invitation to meet President Krueger in
+conference at Bloemfontein; and that within three days more (May 12th)
+a definite proposal to this effect had been made through the agency of
+President Steyn and accepted by Mr. Chamberlain. Nor, is it any less
+certain that, in view of the friendly discussion which was to take
+place so soon, the Secretary of State decided to postpone the
+publication of Lord Milner's despatch. This is the short history of
+the Bloemfontein Conference. It was a counter-stroke dealt by one of
+those "formidable personalities" of which Mr. Asquith spoke, and in
+all respects worthy of Mr. Hofmeyr's statesmanship. Indeed, the
+methods which he employed for paralysing the machinery of British
+administration in South Africa were always subtle: infinitely more
+subtle than those which Parnell adopted in the not very dissimilar
+circumstances of the Home Rule campaign.
+
+         [Footnote 54: C. 9,345. See forward, p. 155.]
+
+The decision to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch of
+May 4th was a serious mistake, the injurious effect of which was felt
+both at the Conference and afterwards. But before we observe the
+incidents by which this central event was immediately preceded, it is
+necessary to examine more fully the political environment in which
+Lord Milner found himself established now that the April elections[55]
+had given the Afrikander party an assured tenure of power, and, at the
+same time, the moment had arrived for the Imperial Government to
+fulfil the pledge given on February 4th, 1896, for the redress of the
+"admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.
+
+         [Footnote 55: See p. 125.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Bond and the ministry.]
+
+The Schreiner Ministry was the agent of the Bond; it could not exist
+for a day if the Bond withdrew its support. The Bond majority in the
+Legislative Assembly had been returned by the Dutch inhabitants of the
+Colony for the avowed purpose of preventing the intervention of the
+Imperial Government in the affairs of the Transvaal. The Ministry and
+its supporters had begun by ranging themselves definitely on the side
+of the Transvaal. And, therefore, in all that was done by either
+party from the Bloemfontein Conference to the Ultimatum, it followed,
+_ex hypothesi_, that, in their opinion, the Transvaal was right, and
+England was wrong. Twice, as we shall see, Mr. Schreiner, on behalf of
+the Cape Ministry, hastened to declare publicly that the proposals of
+the Transvaal were all that was satisfactory, before he even knew what
+those proposals were. The Cape nationalists represented themselves as
+"mediators." They had as little intention of mediating between the
+Pretoria Executive and the British Government as a barrister, heavily
+feed and primed with his client's case, has of mediating between his
+client and his client's opponent at the hearing of a case in court.
+
+But the Bond was "loyal." The Bond members of the Cabinet--T. Nicholas
+German Te Water, and Albertus Johannes Herholdt, no less than William
+Philip Schreiner, John Xavier Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, and
+Richard Solomon--had sworn, upon taking office, "to be faithful and
+bear true allegiance to Her Majesty."
+
+[Sidenote: The Schreiner ministry.]
+
+The situation in which Lord Milner now found himself was thus one of
+so extraordinary a character that it would be difficult to find a
+parallel to it in the annals of our colonial administration. As High
+Commissioner, he had advocated in the most emphatic terms the exercise
+of the authority of Great Britain, as paramount Power, in the
+Transvaal. As Governor of the Cape Colony, he was bound to administer
+the affairs of the Colony in accordance with the advice tendered by
+his ministers. And the advice which ministers were pledged to give him
+was the direct opposite of that which he himself, as High
+Commissioner, had given to the Imperial Government. To dismiss his
+ministers--the alternative to accepting this advice--would have been
+an extreme measure, to be justified only upon clear evidence that they
+had failed in the duty which they, no less than he himself, owed to
+the Crown. Whether Mr. Schreiner's Cabinet did so fail is a matter
+that the reader must determine for himself; possibly it would be
+difficult to show that, collectively or individually, the Cape
+ministers did anything more injurious to British interests than was
+done by the Liberal Opposition--again collectively or individually--in
+England. One thing is certain: the action of the Afrikander Cabinet,
+whether within or beyond the letter of its allegiance, lessened--and
+was intended to lessen--the force of an effort on the part of the
+Imperial Government, which might otherwise have averted the necessity
+for war.
+
+And here certain questions which will arise inevitably to the mind
+that pursues the narrative of the next few months, must be
+anticipated. What was the position of Mr. Schreiner? What was his real
+standpoint, and what was his relationship to Lord Milner? How was it
+that two Englishmen, Mr. Merriman and Sir (then Mr.) Richard Solomon,
+came to be in this Afrikander Cabinet, and what were their respective
+motives in thus associating themselves with the objects of the Bond?
+
+[Sidenote: The prime minister.]
+
+Mr. Philip Schreiner was the son of a German by birth, a missionary of
+the London Missionary Society, who had married an Englishwoman, and
+afterwards settled in the Orange Free State. He had himself married a
+sister of Mr. F. W. Reitz, formerly President of the Free State, and
+now State Secretary of the South African Republic. The Schreiner
+family was remarkable for intellectual power. Of his sisters one is
+the authoress of _The Story of an African Farm_, and a second, Mrs.
+Lewis, like her brother Theophilus, was an active Imperialist and a
+determined opponent of the Bond. Mr. Schreiner himself was educated at
+the South African College at Capetown, and subsequently at Cambridge,
+where he was placed first in the First Class of the Law Tripos, and
+afterwards elected a Fellow of Downing. After a successful career at
+the Cape Bar he was appointed Attorney-General in Mr. Rhodes's
+Ministry, a position which he held at the time of the Raid. He was
+prevented by his strong disapproval of the part then played by Mr.
+Rhodes from joining the Progressive party; and, having accepted the
+position of Parliamentary leader of the Bond, he had become, as we
+have seen, Prime Minister through the Bond victory in the Cape General
+Election of 1898. It is characteristic alike of Mr. Schreiner and of
+his political position that the only word of sympathy with the British
+connection, uttered from first to last during this election by the
+Bond candidates or their supporters, was the conventional reference to
+the greatness of the British Empire which, as we have noticed,
+occurred in his address to the electors of Malmesbury. With these
+political and social ties, Mr. Schreiner was compelled to be a South
+African first and a British subject second. His is precisely the kind
+of case where true allegiance can be expected only when a federal
+constitution has been created for the Empire.
+
+     "See," said Lord Milner, in his farewell speech at Johannesburg,
+     "how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone
+     solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of
+     South Africa; how it would unite its white races as nothing else
+     can. The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great
+     Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept
+     allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland.
+     But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of integrity,
+     without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal
+     devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South
+     Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for
+     the good of South Africa as a member of that greater whole."[56]
+
+         [Footnote 56: _The Johannesburg Star_, April 1st, 1905.]
+
+With Schreiner, and such as he, loyalty to the Crown was for the
+moment the product of intellectual judgment or considerations of
+policy. All, or almost all, the instinctive feelings, born of
+pleasant associations with persons and places, which enter so largely
+into the sentiment of patriotism seem to have drawn him, as they drew
+his sister, Mrs. Cronwright-Schreiner, into sympathy with the cause of
+Afrikander nationalism. What his view was upon the particular issue
+now agitating South Africa may be gathered from an answer which he
+gave to a question put to him by Mr. Chamberlain in the course of the
+inquiry into the Raid (1897):
+
+     MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I suppose your view is that the Imperial
+     Government should adopt the same policy as the Cape Government,
+     and should refrain from even friendly representations as not
+     being calculated to advance the cause of the Uitlanders?
+
+     MR. SCHREINER: Yes, decidedly, so far as purely internal concerns
+     are concerned.[57]
+
+         [Footnote 57: Proceedings of the Select Committee on British
+         South Africa (Q. 4,385).]
+
+In other words, Mr. Schreiner was a consistent and convinced opponent
+of Imperial intervention. But there was a difference between his
+motive and that of the Bond leaders. Schreiner desired to prevent
+intervention, not because he did not recognise the justice of the
+claims of the Uitlanders, but because he believed that the Imperial
+Government was devoid of any right to intervene under the Conventions;
+while, at the same time, his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander
+nationalists made him blind to the existence of any moral right of
+interference that England might possess, as the Power responsible for
+the well-being of South Africa as a whole. And so, partly by force of
+environment and partly by a narrow and erroneous interpretation of the
+principles of international law,[58] the Boer and Hollander oligarchy
+in the Transvaal, with all its moral obliquity and administrative
+incompetence, had become, as it were, a thing sacrosanct in his eyes.
+Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond leaders, on the other hand, desired to
+prevent intervention because they were perfectly satisfied to see the
+British Uitlanders in a position of political inferiority, and
+perfectly content with the whole situation, the continuance of which,
+as they knew, was directly calculated to bring about the supremacy of
+the Dutch race in South Africa. Therefore Hofmeyr made no effort to
+improve the state of affairs in the Transvaal until he saw the storm
+bursting. And when, at a later stage, he set himself to work in
+earnest to induce President Krueger to grant reforms, he did so to save
+the cause of Afrikander nationalism and not to assist the British
+Government in winning justice for the Uitlanders.
+
+         [Footnote 58: For the position of Great Britain from the
+         point of view of international law see some remarks in the
+         note on page 580 (Chapter XII.).]
+
+[Sidenote: Sir Richard Solomon.]
+
+Sir Richard Solomon, who was a nephew of Saul Solomon, the prominent
+radical politician chiefly instrumental in carrying the vote for
+Responsible Government through the Legislative Council of the Cape
+Colony (1872), was the leader of the Bar at Kimberley. His presence,
+at first sight, formed a wholly incongruous element in such a
+ministry. On the native question, in his fiscal views, as a supporter
+of the Redistribution Bill, and in his sympathy with the Uitlanders,
+he was in direct conflict with the characteristic principles of the
+Bond. His one link with the Afrikander party was his distrust of
+Rhodes; and in view of his unquestioned loyalty to the British
+connection, his decision to join the Schreiner Ministry is probably to
+be attributed to his personal friendship for the Prime Minister. On
+the other hand, his ability, detachment from local parties, and the
+respect which he commanded, made him a valuable asset to Mr.
+Schreiner.
+
+[Sidenote: Messrs. Merriman and Sauer.]
+
+Mr. Merriman, whose close political associate was Mr. Sauer, had twice
+held office under Mr. Rhodes (1890-96); but his separation from
+Rhodes, consequent upon the Raid, had thrown him into the arms of the
+Bond. Some of the more striking incidents in Mr. Merriman's political
+career have been already mentioned.[59] Fifteen years ago more
+Imperialist than Rhodes, he was soon to show himself more Bondsman
+than the Bond. Once the resolute, almost inspired, castigator of the
+separatist aims of that organisation, he was now in close and
+sympathetic association with the leaders of Afrikander nationalism in
+the Republics and the Cape Colony. The denunciations of "capitalism"
+and "capitalists" with which he now regaled his Afrikander allies, had
+an ill savour in the mouth of the man who had tried to amalgamate the
+Diamond Mines at Kimberley--failing where Rhodes and Beit afterwards
+succeeded--and who, attracted by the magnet of gold discovery, for a
+short time had acted as manager of the Langlaagte Estate and Mr. J. B.
+Robinson's interests at Johannesburg. With political principles thus
+unstable and a mind strangely sensitive to any emotional appeal, it is
+not surprising that Mr. Merriman displayed the proverbial enthusiasm
+of the convert in his new political creed. His original perception of
+the imprudence and administrative incompetency of President Krueger's
+_regime_ was rapidly obliterated by a growing partizanship, which in
+turn gave place to an unreasoning sympathy with the Boer cause,
+combined with a bitter antipathy against all who were concerned,
+whether in a civil or military capacity, in giving effect to the
+intervention of the Imperial Government on behalf of the British
+industrial community in the Transvaal. Mr. J. W. Sauer was destined to
+exhibit his political convictions in a manner so demonstrative that
+his words and acts, as recorded in the sequel, will leave the reader
+in no doubt as to the reality of his sympathy with the Boer and
+Afrikander cause. For the moment, therefore, it is sufficient to
+notice that, although he shared Mr. Merriman's present abhorrence of
+"capitalism" and "capitalists," he was for many years of his life a
+promoter and director of mining and other companies.
+
+         [Footnote 59: See pp. 61, 69, and 93.]
+
+Of the two Bondsmen in the Cabinet, Mr. Herholdt was a member of the
+Legislative Council, and a Dutch farmer of moderate views and good
+repute; while Dr. Te Water was the friend and confidant of Mr.
+Hofmeyr, and, as such, the intermediary between the Bond and the
+Afrikander nationalists in the Free State and in the Transvaal.
+
+The Schreiner Cabinet was the velvet glove which covered the mailed
+hand of Mr. Hofmeyr. Dr. Te Water had been Colonial Secretary in the
+Sprigg Ministry up to the crisis of May, 1898. He was now "minister
+without portfolio" in the Schreiner Ministry. His presence was the
+sign and instrument of the domination of the Bond; and the domination
+of the Bond was as yet the permanent and controlling factor in the
+administration of the Colony under Responsible Government. The fact
+that only two out of six members of the Ministry were Bondsmen, is to
+be referred to the circumstance that the actual business of
+administration had been hitherto mainly in the hands of a small group
+of British colonial politicians, who were prepared to bid against each
+other for the all-important support of the Dutch vote. With the
+majority of these men, to be in office was an object for the
+attainment of which they were prepared to make a considerable
+sacrifice in respect of their somewhat elastic political principles.
+The denial of political rights to the British population in the
+Transvaal, by threatening the maintenance of British supremacy in
+South Africa, had now for the first time created a British party in
+the Cape Colony--the Progressives--strong enough to act in
+independence of the Bond. The existence of this British party, not
+only free from the Bond, but determined (although it was in a
+minority) to challenge the Bond predominance, was a new phenomenon in
+Cape politics. In itself it constituted an appreciable improvement
+upon the previously existing state of affairs; since the British
+population was thus no longer hopelessly weakened by being divided
+into two parties of almost equal strength, nor were its leaders any
+longer obliged to subordinate their regard for British interests to
+the primary necessity of obtaining office by Bond support.
+
+[Sidenote: Policy of the ministry.]
+
+Mr. Schreiner's Ministry, however, in spite of a difference of motives
+on the part of its individual members, was unanimous in its desire to
+prevent that intervention of the Imperial Government for which, in
+Lord Milner's judgment, there was "overwhelming" necessity. The idea
+of inducing President Krueger to grant such a "colourable measure of
+reform"[60] as would satisfy the Imperial Government, or at least
+deprive it of any justification for interference by force of arms,
+was in contemplation some months before the Bloemfontein Conference
+took place. On January 1st, 1899, Mr. Merriman wrote to President
+Steyn with this object in view. "Is there no opportunity," he
+said,[61] "of bringing about a _rapprochement_ between us, in which
+the Free State might play the part of honest broker? We, _i.e._, the
+Colony and Free State, have common material interests in our railway,
+apart from our anxiety to see the common welfare of South Africa
+increase from the removal of the one great cause of unrest and the
+pretext for outside interference."
+
+         [Footnote 60: Mr. Merriman's expression. See his letter to
+         Mr. Fischer at p. 161.]
+
+         [Footnote 61: Cd. 369.]
+
+And Lord Milner, very soon after his return from England, was sounded
+by Mr. Schreiner as to the possibility of settling the franchise
+question by means of a South African Conference. Early in March--when
+Mr. Smuts was in Capetown, and the Pretoria Executive was engaged in
+the abortive attempt to separate the leaders of the mining industry
+from the rank and file of the Uitlander population by offering them
+certain fiscal and industrial reforms, if only they would undertake to
+discourage the agitation for political rights--the same subject was
+brought before the High Commissioner by Mr. Merriman himself. In
+pursuance of the real purpose of the Afrikander Ministry--_i.e._ to
+obtain a fictitious concession from President Krueger, instead of the
+"fair share in the government of the country" required by the
+Imperial Government--it was proposed originally to exclude Lord Milner
+altogether from the negotiations by arranging that the Transvaal
+Government should bring forward proposals for reform at an inter-State
+Conference consisting of representatives of the governments of the two
+Republics and the self-governing British Colonies. But Lord Milner
+was, happily, High Commissioner as well as Governor of the Cape. As
+High Commissioner, he declared that at any such Conference the
+Imperial Government must be separately represented. Neither the
+Transvaal nor the Free State was willing to enter a Conference on
+these terms, although they were acceptable to the Cape Government; and
+the plan fell to the ground.
+
+It was then that Mr. Hofmeyr intervened, in view of Lord Milner's
+despatch of May 4th; and President Steyn, persuaded with dramatic
+swiftness to accept the role of peace-maker, which his predecessor,
+Sir John Brand, had played with such success in 1881, secured the
+grudging consent of President Krueger to meet the High Commissioner at
+Bloemfontein.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's _tour de force_.]
+
+The incidents which led to the accomplishment of Hofmeyr's _tour de
+force_ are singularly instructive. Lord Milner's despatch was
+telegraphed from Capetown about midday on May 4th. It was soon
+apparent that there was a leakage, legitimate or illegitimate, from
+the Colonial Office. On Saturday, the 6th, Mr. Schreiner received
+warning telegrams from trusted sources in London, including "Hofmeyr's
+best friends"; and on this day he wrote a letter to President Steyn
+containing a "proposition" of so confidential a character that it
+could not be telegraphed in spite of the urgent need of haste.[62] On
+Monday, the 8th, Mr. Schreiner received more warning telegrams, and
+Dr. Te Water, in writing to President Steyn, expressed his hope that
+the proposition, made by Schreiner in his letter of Saturday, might by
+this time "have been accepted, or that something had been done which
+would achieve the same purpose."[63] On the same day the Cape papers
+published an alarming telegram reproducing from _The Daily
+Chronicle_[64] a statement that the South African situation was very
+serious, and that the British Government was prepared to "take some
+risk of war." On Tuesday, the 9th, Lord Milner was present at a dinner
+given by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly; and Mr. Hofmeyr, who
+was among the guests, in the course of a long conversation with him
+after dinner, broached the idea of his meeting President Krueger at
+Bloemfontein. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Milner sent for Mr. Hofmeyr
+and discussed the subject more at length; and, a little later, when he
+had gone to the Governor's Office, Mr. Schreiner came in with a
+telegram from President Steyn, in which the Cape Prime Minister was
+requested to ascertain formally whether the High Commissioner would be
+willing to accept an invitation to meet President Krueger. This
+telegram Lord Milner forwarded to Mr. Chamberlain, adding that the
+Cape Cabinet was "strongly" in favour of acceptance, and that
+Schreiner himself had declared that the invitation was the result of
+the "influence which he (Schreiner) had been using with the Transvaal
+Government ever since I had warned him of the gravity of the
+situation."[65] Mr. Chamberlain's reply (May 12th), authorised Lord
+Milner to accept President Steyn's invitation, and in doing so, to
+state that a despatch was already on its way which contained a similar
+proposal made by the Imperial Government--
+
+         [Footnote 62: Letter of Te Water to Steyn. See forward, p.
+         162, where this letter is given.]
+
+         [Footnote 63: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 64: Then under the editorship of Mr. Massingham.]
+
+         [Footnote 65: C. 9,345.]
+
+[Sidenote: The conference arranged.]
+
+     "in the hope that, in concert with the President, you may arrive
+     at such an arrangement as Her Majesty's Government could accept
+     and recommend to the Uitlander population as a reasonable
+     concession to their just demands and a settlement of the
+     difficulties which have threatened the good relations"
+
+between the two Governments. This was the famous despatch of May 10th,
+in which Mr. Chamberlain reviewed carefully and exhaustively the whole
+situation as between the Transvaal and the Imperial Government, and
+formally accepted the Uitlanders' Petition to the Queen. It was not
+published until June 14th, _i.e._, after the Bloemfontein Conference
+had been held. It was then issued, together with Lord Milner's
+despatch of May 4th, in a Blue-book containing the complete record of
+all discussions of Transvaal affairs subsequent to Lord Milner's
+appointment.
+
+In the course of the next few days communications passed rapidly
+between Lord Milner, Mr. Chamberlain, President Steyn, and President
+Krueger, with the result that, on May 18th, President Steyn's
+invitation was formally accepted, and on the following day it was
+arranged that the Conference should begin on May 31st. Never was
+intervention more effective, or less obtrusive. Mr. Hofmeyr's part in
+the affair was confined apparently to an after-dinner conversation
+with the High Commissioner. Nor was the directing hand of the Master
+of the Bond revealed more fully until Lord Roberts's occupation of
+Bloemfontein placed the British authorities in possession of part of
+the communications which passed at this time, and during the four
+succeeding months, between the Cape nationalists and their republican
+confederates. And even in these documents Hofmeyr's name is rarely
+found at the end of a letter or telegram. It is Schreiner or Te Water
+who writes or telegraphs to Steyn or Fischer, adding sometimes, by way
+of emphasis, "Hofmeyr says" this or that. In the meantime (May 22nd),
+Lord Milner had telegraphed, for "an indication of the line" which Mr.
+Chamberlain wished him to take at the Conference. He himself
+suggested that the franchise question should be put in the foreground;
+since it would be useless to discuss other matters in dispute until a
+satisfactory settlement of this all-important question had been
+achieved. Mr. Chamberlain replied (May 24th), agreeing with the line
+indicated by Lord Milner:
+
+     "I think personally that you should lay all the stress," he
+     telegraphed, "on the question of the franchise in the first
+     instance. Other reforms are less pressing, and will come in time
+     if this can be arranged satisfactorily, and the form of oath
+     modified."
+
+Mr. Chamberlain at the same time authorised Lord Milner to inform the
+Uitlander petitioners that they might rely upon obtaining the general
+sympathy of the Imperial Government in the prayers which they had
+addressed to the Queen.
+
+[Sidenote: Motives of Afrikander leaders.]
+
+There was no doubt in Lord Milner's mind as to the real motives which
+had prompted the Afrikander nationalist leaders to make this effort.
+They recognised at length that he was in earnest, and that Mr.
+Chamberlain was in earnest, and they desired, above all things, to
+avoid a crisis which would force a conflict before their ultimate
+plans had fully matured. Lord Milner knew that any delay which
+involved the continuance of the present position--a position which was
+one of moral superiority for the Dutch--would unite the whole of the
+Dutch, with a section of the British population, against Great Britain
+within a measurable period. He recognised that the franchise question
+was the one issue which could be raised between the paramount Power
+and the South African Republic in which the whole of the Cape Dutch
+would not throw in their lot bodily with their republican kinsmen.
+This very anxiety on the part of Mr. Hofmeyr to prevent the decisive
+action of the Imperial Government was evidence of the truth of his
+estimate. But as a response to the appeal of the Graaf Reinet speech,
+this Afrikander mediation came too late. "Hands off" the Transvaal was
+the first plank in the platform of the Schreiner Ministry; "reform"
+was a second and subsidiary plank, adopted in place of the first only
+when they had been driven to abandon it by Lord Milner's resolution
+and statesmanship. But the purpose of the Ministry now, no less than
+before, was to hinder, and not to help, the British Government in
+obtaining justice for the Uitlanders. Moreover, the Transvaal
+armaments were well advanced, and the Pretoria Executive was too
+deeply committed to a policy of defiance to allow it to draw back
+without humiliation. Nevertheless, Lord Milner felt bound to avail
+himself of any prospect of peace that the Conference might afford.
+When, however, Mr. Schreiner, in bringing President Steyn's telegram,
+had said that he regarded the proposal as "a great step in advance on
+the part of President Krueger," Lord Milner had replied that he could
+"hardly take that view, as the invitation did not emanate from
+President Krueger himself," and contained no indication of "the basis
+or subject of discussion."
+
+[Sidenote: Krueger's obduracy.]
+
+The High Commissioner was right. The slight degree in which any appeal
+adequate to the occasion was likely to prove acceptable to President
+Krueger may be gathered from a passage in a letter of Sir Henry de
+Villiers to President Steyn (May 21st), in which the Chief Justice of
+the Cape refers to his recent experience in Pretoria when he was on
+this very errand of "mediation":
+
+     "On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President, as
+     I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on
+     him; but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I thought,
+     would be amenable to argument: but I fear that either my advice
+     had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with
+     the President.
+
+     "I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad
+     with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms.
+
+     "It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily
+     from the Government, instead of being gradually forced from them.
+     In the former case, they would rally the greater number of the
+     malcontents around them; in the latter case, no gratitude will be
+     felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides,
+     there can be no doubt that, as the alien population increases, as
+     it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their
+     discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be
+     conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal made
+     by the President seems to be simply ridiculous.
+
+     "I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my
+     fellow-Commissioners that the President would adopt his
+     retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever
+     have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would
+     have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the
+     condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other
+     words, to recommence the war....
+
+     "I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly,
+     but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object
+     in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are,
+     of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President's
+     position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience
+     will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can
+     reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used
+     your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will
+     also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace
+     successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make
+     his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the
+     arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide
+     over immediate difficulties."
+
+And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief
+Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in
+allusion to this same visit to Pretoria:
+
+     "From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw,
+     three months ago, that if President Krueger did not voluntarily
+     yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the
+     whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Krueger's friends
+     to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is
+     war with England; on the other side there are concessions which
+     will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now, decide at once
+     how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years'
+     franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders, make them your
+     friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority
+     of the Uitlanders with you when they become burghers. The answer
+     I got was: We have done too much already, and cannot do more. Yet
+     afterwards they did a great deal more. The same policy of doing
+     nothing except under pressure is still being pursued. The longer
+     the delay, the more they will have to yield."
+
+[Sidenote: Afrikander advice.]
+
+This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr.
+Merriman's appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir
+Henry's letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed
+to Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Free State Executive and a
+convinced nationalist; and it is otherwise remarkable for an estimate
+of the economic conditions of the Boers which subsequent experience
+has completely justified:
+
+     "I most strongly urge you," he writes, "to use your utmost
+     influence to bear on President Krueger to concede some colourable
+     measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as
+     in those of his own State. Granted that he does nothing. What is
+     the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing
+     off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless
+     hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should
+     recruit his Republic with new blood--and the sands are running
+     out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The
+     fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is
+     done.... A moderate franchise reform and municipal privileges
+     would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a
+     maintenance of the oath ought to be sufficient safeguard against
+     the swamping of the old population."[66]
+
+         [Footnote 66: All these letters are in Cd. 369.]
+
+But the Schreiner Cabinet contained, as we have seen, a representative
+of Mr. Hofmeyr in the person of Dr. Te Water. Mr. Merriman could see
+that the position in the Transvaal was one that could not go on
+indefinitely--that "the fabric would go to pieces of its own accord,
+unless something was done." Dr. Te Water was blind even to this aspect
+of the question. The correspondence found after the occupation of
+Bloemfontein (March 13th, 1900), from which these letters are taken,
+contains also certain letters to President Steyn that disclose both
+the nature of the Afrikander mediation, as it was understood by the
+nationalist leaders of the Cape Colony, and the faithfulness with
+which Dr. Te Water served them.
+
+The Te Water correspondence, as we have it,[67] consists of three
+letters written respectively on May 8th, 17th, and 27th, from "the
+Colonial Secretary's Office, Capetown," to President Steyn. The
+replies of the latter have been withheld, not unnaturally, from the
+public eye. In the first of these letters Dr. Te Water "hopes
+heartily" that Schreiner's "proposition" for the Conference has been
+accepted, and then proceeds to impress upon him the advisability of
+President Krueger's yielding on the ground, not of justice, but of
+temporary expediency. In so doing, this Minister of the Crown
+completely identifies himself with the aspirations of the Afrikander
+nationalists, and he concludes by asking for "a private telegraphic
+code. The absence thereof was badly felt on Saturday, when Schreiner
+was obliged to write instead of telegraphing."
+
+         [Footnote 67: Cd. 369.]
+
+     "Circumstances appear to me now," he writes, "to be such that our
+     friends in Pretoria must be yielding; with their friends at the
+     head of the Government here, they have a better chance that
+     reasonable propositions made by them will be accepted than they
+     would have had if we had been unsuccessful at the late elections
+     and our enemies were advisers.
+
+[Sidenote: "Play to win time".]
+
+     "Schreiner, who knows more than any one of us, feels strongly
+     that things are extremely critical.
+
+     "Telegrams from people in London, whom he thoroughly trusts, such
+     as J. H.'s[68] best friends, received by him on Saturday and this
+     morning, strengthen him in his opinion. We must now play to win
+     time. Governments are not perpetual, and I pray that the present
+     team, so unjustly disposed towards us, may receive their reward
+     before long. Their successors, I am certain, will follow a less
+     hateful policy towards us. When we hear that you have succeeded
+     in Pretoria, then we must bring influence to bear here."
+
+         [Footnote 68: Mr. Hofmeyr.]
+
+In the second letter Dr. Te Water regrets that he cannot share
+President Steyn's view that "all the noise about war is bluff." Then
+there follows a passage showing that Mr. Steyn had entertained
+expectations of assistance from the Schreiner Cabinet that even Dr. Te
+Water could not reconcile with his ideas of ministerial allegiance:
+
+     "But now I should like a few words of explanation," he writes,
+     "as to what you mean by saying that 'The Cape Ministry will be
+     able to do much more good.' In what respect do you think that we
+     can be of more use than before?"
+
+Assuming, for the moment, that President Steyn had written, "In the
+event of war becoming inevitable, or having broken out, the Cape
+Ministry will be able to do much more good than it is doing now," or
+words to this effect, it would appear that he shared the erroneous
+views of Mr. Reitz, against which Sir Henry de Villiers had protested
+during his visit to Pretoria. In the letter to Mr. Melius de Villiers,
+from which we have quoted above, Sir Henry writes:
+
+     "When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz
+     and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and
+     duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are ministers of
+     the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible
+     assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions, a
+     responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of
+     internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all
+     the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown;
+     at least if they did not do so they would be liable to
+     dismissal."
+
+Dr. Te Water then continues:
+
+     "I would very much like to know your views, and if we are not
+     already working in that direction I will try, as far as possible,
+     to do what I can to give effect to your wishes, which may be for
+     the welfare of all. Please let me hear immediately and fully
+     about this."
+
+[Sidenote: Te Water and Steyn.]
+
+The last letter, written on the eve of the Conference, opens with a
+curiously significant passage. There were some things discussed
+between Steyn and Te Water that Mr. Schreiner was not to know.
+President Steyn has been getting nervous. Dr. Te Water, therefore,
+reassures him:
+
+     "Yours received on my return this morning from Aberdeen. Telegram
+     also reached me. I keep all your communications strictly private:
+     naturally you do not exclude my colleagues and our friend
+     Hofmeyr. I have often read extracts to them, but do not be
+     afraid; I shall not give you away."
+
+It also contains the information that, as President Steyn had no
+private code available, Dr. Te Water has borrowed the private
+telegraphic code of the Cabinet for President Steyn's use.
+
+     "To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic
+     code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and
+     I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of
+     weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself _only_. It
+     is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and
+     the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am
+     afraid that things leak out there in one way or another."
+
+And he then drives home the advice given before: "It is honestly now
+the time to yield a little, however one may later again tighten the
+rope."
+
+One other letter must be given to complete this view of the
+circumstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th,
+1899--that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord
+Milner that he should accept President Steyn's good offices to arrange
+the conference with President Krueger. It is addressed to President
+Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows:
+
+                    "DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
+                         "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA.
+                                   "_May 9th_, 1899.
+
+     "DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,--
+
+     "I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the
+     ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the
+     Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could
+     consequently not get the desired information earlier.
+
+     "The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser
+     and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will
+     be able to supply you with any of either sort.
+
+     "On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest.
+
+     "The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet
+     officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come
+     in it through your proposed plan. The copies _re_ dynamite will
+     be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting,
+
+     "Your humble servant and friend,
+                                   "P. GROEBLER."[69]
+
+         [Footnote 69: The original of this letter is now in the
+         possession of Mr. E. B. Iwan Mueller, by whom it was published
+         in his work, _Lord Milner and South Africa_. The translation
+         is that of the Department of Military Intelligence.]
+
+The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for time,"
+because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal party to
+power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of their
+policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics were
+"playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until
+their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them
+to defy the British Government.
+
+[Sidenote: The Bloemfontein conference.]
+
+It was in these circumstances that the High Commissioner met President
+Krueger in conference at Bloemfontein (May 31st--June 5th). He was
+accompanied only by his staff: Mr. G. V. Fiddes (Imperial Secretary),
+Mr. M. S. O. Walrond (Private Secretary), Colonel Hanbury Williams
+(Military Secretary) and Lord Belgrave (A.D.C.),[70] with Mr.
+Silberbauer (the interpreter) and a shorthand writer. Mr. Schreiner
+had been very solicitous to attend the Conference; but Lord Milner,
+following his usual practice, had determined to keep the affairs of
+the High Commissionership completely distinct from those in which he
+was concerned as Governor of the Cape Colony. The absence both of the
+Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr was not unnaturally a matter of
+"sincere regret" to Dr. Te Water, as he informed President Steyn on
+the eve of the Conference.[71] Nor did Lord Milner avail himself of
+President Steyn's willingness to take part in the proceedings; but, at
+the High Commissioner's suggestion, Mr. Fischer (who was a member of
+the Free State Executive) was invited to act as interpreter--a duty
+which he discharged to the satisfaction of both parties. With
+President Krueger there went to Bloemfontein Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr.
+A. D. Wolmarans (members of the Transvaal Executive), Mr. J. C. Smuts
+(the State Attorney), and two other officials. All of these, the High
+Commissioner's Staff, and Mr. Fischer were present at the meetings of
+the Conference; but the actual discussion was confined to Lord Milner
+and President Krueger.[72] As regards the business in hand, the
+failure to publish the despatch of May 4th had deprived Lord Milner of
+what would have proved a helpful influence. Mr. Hofmeyr's action had
+procured an opportunity for "friendly discussion." But the
+friendliness was to be all on the side of the Imperial Government. For
+the purpose of the Afrikander leaders was, as we have seen, to secure
+a fictitious concession on the part of President Krueger. Lord Milner's
+aim was to obtain by friendly discussion a genuine and substantial
+measure of reform; and the prospect of his success would have been
+greatly increased if this despatch and Mr. Chamberlain's reply to it
+had been before the public when the Conference took place. It was
+written with the object of making the British people and President
+Krueger alike aware how grave was the judgment which he had formed of
+the existing situation. With England alive to the near danger which
+threatened her supremacy in South Africa, and President Krueger brought
+to understand that the man with whom he had to deal was one who held
+these opinions, Lord Milner could have been "friendly" without the
+risk of having his friendliness mistaken for a readiness to accept the
+illusory concession which was all that the Afrikander mediation was
+intended to secure.
+
+         [Footnote 70: 2nd. Lieut. Royal Horse Guards. Exactly one
+         year after the last day of the Conference (June 5th), he
+         (then A.D.C. to Lord Roberts and Duke of Westminster) ran up
+         the British flag over the Raadzaal at Pretoria.]
+
+         [Footnote 71: Letter of May 27th (in Cd. 369).]
+
+         [Footnote 72: Lord Milner left Capetown by special train at
+         8.30 a.m. on Monday, May 29th, and reached Bloemfontein
+         punctually at 5 p.m. on Tuesday. Here he was met by President
+         Steyn and various officials of the Free State; and an address
+         of welcome was presented to him by the Mayor of Bloemfontein
+         upon his arrival at the private house which had been provided
+         for his accommodation during the Conference. At eleven
+         o'clock on the following morning, Wednesday, the 31st, the
+         High Commissioner went to the Presidency, where he was
+         introduced by Mr. Steyn to President Krueger, Mr. Schalk
+         Burger and Mr. Wolmarans. The first meeting of the Conference
+         took place in the afternoon at 2.30, in the new offices of
+         the Railway Department. In the evening a largely attended
+         reception was given by President Steyn, at which Mr. Krueger
+         was present for a short time and Lord Milner for about an
+         hour. The Conference closed on the afternoon of Monday, June
+         5th, and Lord Milner then paid a farewell visit to President
+         Steyn. The High Commissioner's special train left
+         Bloemfontein on the following morning at 10.30, and reached
+         Capetown at 6.45 on the evening of Wednesday, the 7th, where
+         he was received by a large crowd, including three of the Cape
+         Ministers and a number of Progressive Members of Parliament.
+         President Steyn, who was present at the station on Tuesday
+         morning to see the High Commissioner off, did everything
+         possible for the comfort and convenience of his state guest
+         during the week that he was in Bloemfontein. The proceedings
+         of the Conference, with the High Commissioner's report upon
+         them, are published in C. 9,404.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's attitude.]
+
+As it was, Lord Milner was placed in a position of great
+embarrassment. If he "used plain language" he exposed himself to the
+charge of entering upon the discussion in an aggressive spirit,
+calculated to make agreement difficult. If he adopted a conciliatory
+tone, his arguments seemed to be nothing more than the abortive
+protests with which the grim old President had cheerfully filled the
+republican waste-paper basket for the last ten years. It has been
+suggested that Lord Milner might have obtained a better result if he
+had shown himself less "inflexible"; if, in short, he had been willing
+to accept a "compromise." But any such criticism is based upon an
+entire misunderstanding of the method which the High Commissioner did,
+in fact, adopt. The five years' franchise--the Bloemfontein
+minimum--was in itself a compromise. What Lord Milner said, in effect,
+to President Krueger was this: "I have a whole sheaf of grievances
+against you: the dynamite monopoly, excessive railway rates,
+interference with the independence of the judiciary, a vicious police
+system, administrative corruption, municipal abuses, and the rest. I
+will let all these go in exchange for one thing--a franchise reform
+which will give at once to a fair proportion of the Uitlander
+population some appreciable representation in the government of the
+Republic." Lord Milner not only offered a compromise, but a compromise
+that enormously reduced the area of dispute. His "inflexibility" arose
+from the simple fact that, having readily and frankly yielded all that
+could be yielded without sacrificing the paramount object of securing
+a permanent settlement of the Uitlander question, he had nothing
+further to concede, and said so.
+
+[Sidenote: President Krueger.]
+
+No two men more characteristic of the two utterly unlike and
+antagonistic political systems, which they respectively represented,
+could have been found. At the evening reception given by President
+Steyn on the opening day of the Conference, a big man, in a tightly
+buttoned frock-coat, stood just inside the door for ten minutes, and
+then moved awkwardly away. Above the frock-coat was a peasant's face,
+half-shrewd, half-furtive, with narrow eyes and a large, crooked mouth
+which somehow gave the man a look of power. This was President Krueger,
+_aetat._ 74. Once, doubtless, Paul Krueger's large and powerful frame
+had made him an impressive figure among a race of men as stalwart as
+the Boers. But he was now an old man: the powerful body had become
+shapeless and unwieldy; he had given up walking, and only left his
+stoep to drag himself clumsily into his carriage, and although he
+retained all his old tenacity of purpose, his mind had lost much of
+its former alertness. It needed all Mr. Smuts' mental resources--all
+that the young Afrikander had so recently learnt at Cambridge and the
+Temple--to enable the old President to maintain, even by the aid of
+his State-Attorney's ingenious paper pleadings, a decent show of
+defence against the perfect moderation and relentless logic with which
+the High Commissioner presented the British case. Lord Milner went to
+the Conference to make "one big straightforward effort to avert a
+great disaster"; Krueger to drive a "Kafir bargain." The end was as
+Lord Milner had foreseen. To yield the necessary instalment of reform
+seemed to President Krueger, in this mind, "worse than annexation"; and
+on June 5th Lord Milner declared, "The Conference is absolutely at an
+end, and there is no obligation on either side arising out of it."
+
+The Bloemfontein Conference made retreat for ever impossible. Lord
+Milner himself was perfectly conscious that in holding President
+Krueger to the franchise question he had made the conference the
+pivotal occasion upon which turned the issue of peace or war. He knew,
+when he closed the proceedings with a declaration that his meeting
+with President Krueger had utterly failed to provide a solution of the
+franchise question, that from this day forward there could be no
+turning back for him or for the Imperial Government. But he knew, too,
+that poor as was the prospect of obtaining the minimum reforms by any
+subsequent negotiation, nothing could contribute more to the
+attainment of this object than the blunt rejection of the makeshift
+proposals put forward by President Krueger at Bloemfontein.
+
+[Sidenote: After the conference.]
+
+The result of the Conference, from this point of view, and its effect
+upon the British population in South Africa, may be gathered from the
+address presented to Lord Milner on his return to Capetown, and from
+his reply to it. By the mouth of Mr. Alfred Ebden, a veteran colonist,
+the British population of the Colony then (June 12th) expressed their
+"admiration" of Lord Milner's "firm stand" on behalf of the
+Uitlanders, offered him their "earnest support," and declared their
+"entire confidence in his fairness and ability to bring these unhappy
+differences to a satisfactory settlement." The essence of Lord
+Milner's reply lies in the words, "some remedy has still to be found."
+The nationality problem would be solved if the principle of equality
+could be established all round. The Transvaal is "the one State where
+inequality is the rule, which keeps the rest of South Africa in a
+fever." It is inconsistent, he says, with the position of Great
+Britain as paramount Power, and with the dignity of the white race,
+that a great community of white men "should continue in that state of
+subjection which is the lot of the immigrant white population of the
+Transvaal." And he concludes:
+
+     "I see it is suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her
+     Majesty's Government is one of aggression. I know better than any
+     man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has
+     been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will
+     continue. But it cannot relapse into indifference. Can any one
+     desire that it should? It would be disastrous that the present
+     period of stress and strain should not result in some settlement
+     to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in the future. Of
+     that I am still hopeful. It may be that the Government of the
+     South African Republic will yet see its way to adopt a measure
+     of reform more liberal than that proposed at Bloemfontein. If
+     not, there may be other means of achieving the desired result. In
+     any case, it is a source of strength to those who are fighting
+     the battle of reform, and will, I believe, contribute more than
+     anything else to a peaceful victory, to feel that they have
+     behind them, as they perhaps never had before, the unanimous
+     sympathy of the British people throughout the world."[73]
+
+         [Footnote 73: C. 9,415.]
+
+In the four months that followed the Bloemfontein Conference a burden
+of toil and responsibility was laid upon Lord Milner which would have
+crushed any lesser man into utter passivity or resignation. An
+Afrikander Cabinet, with a nationalist element reporting its
+confidential councils with the Governor to Mr. Hofmeyr, the Bond
+Master, and President Steyn, the secret ally of President Krueger,
+would have been sufficient in itself to paralyse the faculties of any
+ordinary administrator at such a crisis. But this was not the only
+adverse influence with which circumstances brought Lord Milner into
+collision. Incredible as it may seem, it is none the less the fact
+that Sir William Butler, the General-in-Command of the British forces
+in South Africa, and the military adviser of the High Commissioner,
+was in close political sympathy with Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer, and
+in complete agreement with their views. For General Butler held that a
+war to compel the Boer oligarchy to grant the elementary political
+rights to the British in the Transvaal, which even Mr. Gladstone's
+Cabinet intended to secure for them, would be the "greatest calamity
+that ever occurred in South Africa." And more than this, that if the
+Home Government did make war, it would be merely playing the game of
+"the party of the Raid, the South African League."[74]
+
+         [Footnote 74: Evidence before War Commission. Cd. 1,791.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner and Butler.]
+
+It is generally supposed that Lord Milner's disagreement with General
+Butler had its origin in the conduct of the latter, when Acting High
+Commissioner, in refusing the first Uitlander petition. This is quite
+untrue. Lord Milner's view of the Uitlander grievances was, of course,
+different from that of General Butler, who treated the appeal to the
+Queen as an unnecessary and artificial agitation against the Transvaal
+Government, and thereby placed the Acting British Agent, Mr. Edmund
+Fraser, in a position of extreme difficulty; since Mr. Fraser was, of
+course, desirous of carrying out his duties upon the general lines
+followed by Sir William Greene in accordance with the instructions of
+the Home Government. But the Transvaal question had never been
+discussed between Lord Milner and General Butler; and at the time of
+the Edgar incident Lord Milner was in England, and he had no means,
+therefore, of forming an opinion as to the significance which attached
+to this event, or the agitation to which it gave rise. On this
+particular point there was no opportunity for a conflict of opinion.
+Had Lord Milner been in South Africa he would, no doubt, have accepted
+the first petition to the Queen; but he made no complaint of General
+Butler's refusal to receive it. For the moment it was General Butler's
+business, as Acting High Commissioner, and not Lord Milner's. From a
+wider point of view, General Butler's action was injurious. It was one
+of the many instances in which their English sympathisers have led the
+Boers to destruction. But there was no friction, or argument, or
+unfriendliness between him and the High Commissioner on this account.
+This arose at a much later period; and arose, not on the general
+question of policy, but on the question of the necessity of military
+precautions in view of the imminence of war.
+
+[Sidenote: Reinforcements requested.]
+
+The friction between the High Commissioner and the General-in-Command
+in South Africa was the most disastrous manifestation of a disregard
+of the necessity for timely military preparations on the part of the
+Imperial Government, which, when war broke out, jeopardised the
+success of the British arms. For quite distinct reasons both General
+Butler and the Imperial Government were opposed to any preparations
+for war. The Salisbury Cabinet were reluctant to take any step that
+might seem to indicate that they considered that the door to a
+peaceful solution of the dispute was closed. In thus subordinating the
+needs of the military situation to those of the political, they acted
+in direct opposition to the maxim _si pacem vis, bellum para_. They
+carried this policy to such a point that they disregarded the advice
+of Lord Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, and that of the Intelligence
+Department,[75] with the result that when the war did break out the
+available British forces in South Africa were found to be in a
+position of grave disadvantage. The motive of General Butler's
+opposition was entirely different. His view was that what made the
+situation dangerous was not President Krueger's obduracy, but what he
+called the "persistent effort" to "produce war" made by the British
+inhabitants who desired Imperial intervention in the Transvaal. And
+he, therefore, held that any reinforcements sent by the Home
+Government would "add largely to the ferment which he (General Butler)
+was endeavouring to reduce by every means."[76] The position in June
+and July, from a military point of view, was as extraordinary as it
+was harassing to Lord Milner. In England the civil authority, the
+Cabinet, was refusing to make the preparations which its military
+adviser declared to be necessary. In South Africa the civil authority,
+the High Commissioner, was provided with a military adviser who cabled
+to the Home Government political reasons for not sending the
+reinforcements which the High Commissioner then urgently required. In
+these circumstances it is obvious that nothing but the supreme efforts
+of Lord Milner could have saved England from an overwhelming military
+defeat, or from a moral catastrophe even more injurious to the
+interests of the empire.
+
+         [Footnote 75: See p. 319 (note 2).]
+
+         [Footnote 76: Cd. 1,791.]
+
+When Lord Milner saw, before the Bloemfontein Conference, that the
+situation was becoming dangerous--and still more after the
+Conference--he desired that preparations for war should be made by the
+Imperial Government as a precautionary measure. Between December 1st,
+1896, and December, 1898, the South African garrison had been raised
+from 5,409 to 9,593 men.[77] It remained at a little under 10,000 up
+to the end of August, 1899. Lord Milner had repeatedly impressed upon
+the Home Government, from the middle of 1897 onwards, that 10,000 men
+was the minimum force consistent with safety. In view of the increased
+tension after Bloemfontein and of the enormous armament of the South
+African Republic, he felt that this minimum had become inadequate, and
+that it was desirable, and would strengthen the chance of a peaceful
+submission of the Boers, to steadily but unostentatiously increase the
+garrison. And what he desired especially was that the general on the
+spot should do, locally and quietly, all that could be done to advance
+these preparations. The measures which he urged were that plans should
+be prepared for the defence of Kimberley and other towns on the
+colonial borders, and that all supplies and material of war necessary
+to put these plans into effect should be accumulated, and, as far as
+possible, distributed.
+
+         [Footnote 77: War Commission, Cd. 1,791.]
+
+[Sidenote: General Butler's objections.]
+
+General Butler, as we have seen, was opposed to all preparations for
+war; and it is not surprising, therefore, that everybody who offered
+assistance, or advice on the military situation, was coldly received
+by him. Mr. (now Sir) Aubrey Wools-Sampson, who, after the failure of
+the Bloemfontein Conference, threw up lucrative civil employment in
+Rhodesia in order to come to the Cape and place himself, as a
+volunteer, at the service of the military authorities in the event of
+war, was so completely discouraged that he went to Natal to form the
+nucleus of the splendid fighting force afterwards known as the
+Imperial Light Horse. When Colonel Nicholson, then head of the British
+South Africa Police in Rhodesia, suggested that, in the same event, an
+attack on the Transvaal, launched from the north, might prove valuable
+as a means of diverting a portion of the Burgher forces from
+employment against the Cape Colony and Natal, General Butler is said
+to have looked upon his proposal as another Jameson Raid.[78] And
+when, after the Bloemfontein Conference had been held, the Home
+Government, in response to Lord Milner's repeated appeals, proposed to
+send out the very inadequate reinforcements which formed its first
+effort to strengthen the British military position in South Africa,
+General Butler immediately represented to the War Office that these
+additional troops were unnecessary, and protested against their being
+despatched.
+
+         [Footnote 78: This was precisely the _role_ played by
+         Mafeking, only defensively, not offensively.]
+
+General Butler's action at this crisis is so remarkable, and so
+unprecedented, that the circumstances must be related with some
+precision. In 1896, and again in 1897, General Goodenough had
+submitted to the War Office schemes for the defence of the British
+colonies, in which both the enormous extent of the frontiers to be
+protected and the great numerical superiority of the burgher forces to
+the then existing British garrison were fully exhibited. A memorandum
+of the Department of Military Intelligence, dated September 21st,
+1898, urged "that defence schemes should be drawn up locally for the
+Cape and Natal"; that "the arrangements which would be made for the
+despatch of reinforcements from England, and for the provision of
+supplies and transport, be worked out fully in the War Office; and
+that the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what
+action under these arrangements would be required of him on the
+outbreak of war."[79] On December 21st, 1898, General Butler, upon
+succeeding to the South African command, was requested to furnish, at
+an early date, a fresh scheme of defence embodying his own proposals
+for the distribution of the 9,500 British troops then in South Africa
+in the event of war. At the same time the latest information as to
+the military strength of the two Republics--showing, among other
+things, a total of 40,000 burghers[80]--was forwarded to him, and his
+attention was directed to the fact that the troops under his command
+must be considered as a purely defensive force, whose _role_ would be
+to repel invasion pending the arrival of reinforcements from England.
+In the absence of any reply to this communication General Butler was
+again requested, on June 6th, 1899 (_i.e._ after the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference), to report on the defence of the British
+colonies. He then sent his scheme of defence, cabling the substance in
+cipher, on June 9th, and sending the text by despatch on June 14th. On
+June 21st he received a War Office telegram informing him that it had
+been decided to "increase the efficiency of the existing force" in
+South Africa. And to this communication was added the question: "Do
+you desire to make any observations?"
+
+         [Footnote 79: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission).]
+
+         [Footnote 80: These were the figures of the D. M. I.
+         "Military Notes" of June, 1898; in the revised "Military
+         Notes" of June, 1899, the estimated total of the Boer force
+         was considerably greater--some 50,000 exclusive of colonial
+         rebels.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Ringing the War Office bell".]
+
+The sequel can be given in General Butler's words: "I looked on the
+one side," he said, in giving evidence before the War Commission, "and
+I saw what seemed to me a very serious political agitation going on
+with a Party that I had not alluded to yet, whom I had always looked
+upon as a Third Party; they were pressing on all they knew. The
+Government did not seem to be aware of that, and this telegram
+brought matters to such a point that I thought it gave me the
+opportunity to speak. So I took these words 'any observations,' and
+answered in a way which I thought would at least ring the War Office
+bell."
+
+The telegram with which General Butler "rang the War Office bell" was
+this:
+
+     "You ask for my observations: present condition of opinion here
+     is highly excited, and doubtless the news _quoting_ preparations
+     referred to in your telegram, if it transpires, will add largely
+     to the ferment which I am endeavouring to reduce by every means.
+     Persistent effort of a party to produce war forms, in my
+     estimation, gravest elements in situation here. Believe war
+     between white races, coming as sequel to Jameson Raid, and
+     subsequent events of last three years, would be greatest calamity
+     that ever occurred in South Africa."
+
+This telegram elicited the following reply from the Home Government:
+
+     "You cannot understand too clearly that, whatever your private
+     opinions, it is your duty to be guided in all questions of policy
+     by the High Commissioner, who is fully aware of our views, and
+     whom you will, of course, loyally support."
+
+In the course of his evidence before the War Commission General Butler
+gave some further explanation of the motives which had prompted his
+reply to the telegram of June 21st. In response to the question, "It
+was never in your contemplation that Mr. Krueger would declare war?"
+he replied:
+
+[Sidenote: General Butler's view.]
+
+     "My view was this, that as long as I held the neck of the bottle,
+     so to speak, there would be no war ... but to my mind the minute
+     there was the least indication of the Imperial Government coming
+     in, in front of, or behind, that party [_i.e._ "the party of the
+     Raid, the South African League"], there would be a serious state
+     of things. Until then there was, to my mind, no probability--no
+     possibility--of an invasion. That was the state of my mind at the
+     time ... [and] I wished to point it out before final decisions
+     were arrived at."
+
+And in a note which he desired to be appended to his evidence before
+the War Commission, General Butler wrote with reference to his failure
+to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate reinforcements, that in
+his opinion "such a demand at such a time would be to force the hands
+of the Government, play into the hands of the 'Third Party,' and
+render [himself] liable to the accusation in the future that [he] had
+by this premature action produced or hastened hostilities."[81]
+
+         [Footnote 81: All of these extracts will be found in Cd.
+         1,791.]
+
+Here was an impasse from which obviously there was but one method of
+extrication. Either the High Commissioner or his military adviser must
+be recalled. That the Imperial Government did not recall General
+Butler then and there cannot be attributed to any ignorance on their
+part of Lord Milner's extreme anxiety for adequate military
+preparations. It arose, no doubt, from the circumstance that General
+Butler was known to be favourably inclined to the Boer cause, and
+that, therefore, his removal at this juncture would have been
+represented by the friends of the Boers in England, and by the
+official leader of the Opposition, as evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's
+alleged determination to force a war upon the Transvaal. General
+Butler was allowed, in these circumstances, to remain at the Cape
+until the latter part of August, when fresh employment was found for
+him, and Lieutenant-General Forestier-Walker was appointed to the Cape
+command. How General Butler was able to reconcile the opinions which
+he had expressed to the War Office with the discharge of his duties as
+military adviser to Lord Milner during these two critical months is a
+matter which need not be discussed. The decision to retain him in the
+South African command would seem, on the face of it, to have been a
+grave administrative error. It is enough for us to record the
+undoubted facts that Lord Milner was supremely dissatisfied with the
+action of General Butler as his military adviser, and that whereas the
+High Commissioner had requested the Home Government to provide him
+with a new military adviser in June, General Butler did in fact remain
+at the Cape until the latter part of August.
+
+General Butler is reputed to be both an able man and a good soldier.
+It is interesting, therefore, to know what was his view, and to
+compare it with that of Lord Milner. In these opinions, which
+dominated General Butler during the period in question (May to August,
+1899), there was only one point in which he and Lord Milner found
+themselves at one. This was the danger of the war; that is to say, the
+seriousness of the military task which would await Great Britain in
+the event of war with the Dutch in South Africa.
+
+[Sidenote: What Lord Milner thought.]
+
+As a great deal has been written on the subject of the military
+unpreparedness of England, and it has, moreover, been frequently
+stated in this connection that Sir William Butler was the only man to
+form a just estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces,
+it is very desirable to place on record what was really in Lord
+Milner's mind at this time. He agreed with General Butler in his
+estimate of the formidable character of the Boers; but he differed
+from him in everything else. To Lord Milner's mind the situation
+presented itself primarily from a political, and not from a military
+point of view. He believed that England was bound to struggle at least
+for political equality between the British and Dutch throughout South
+Africa. He felt that, after our bad record in the past, it would be
+absolutely fatal to begin to struggle for this equality unless we were
+prepared to carry our efforts to a successful issue. He thought that
+such a claim as this for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders was one
+that admitted of only two alternatives--it must never be made, or,
+being made, it must never be abandoned. The whole weakness of our
+position in South Africa was a moral weakness. The contempt which the
+Dutch had learnt for England was writ large over the whole social and
+political fabric of South Africa. Englishmen could not look the Dutch
+in the face as equals. If, after all our previous humiliations and
+failures; after Majuba, and after the Raid, we were going to commence
+a struggle for equality--nothing more, and then not to get it, the
+shame would be too grave for any great Power to support, or for those
+who sympathised with us in South Africa to endure. We had raised the
+British party in South Africa from the dust by the stand which we had
+made against Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal. If we were going to
+retreat from that position, the discredit of our action would compel
+England to resign her claim to be paramount Power, and with the
+resignation of that claim England's rights in South Africa would
+inevitably shrink to the narrow limits of a naval base at Simon's
+Town, and a sub-tropical plantation in Natal. What was fundamental was
+not the possibility of war, but the impossibility of retreat.
+
+[Sidenote: Retreat impossible.]
+
+Lord Milner still thought it possible, though not probable, that, if
+the British Government took a perfectly strong and unwavering line,
+the Dutch would yield, not indeed everything, but something
+substantial. He also foresaw that it was possible, perhaps probable,
+that they would not yield, and that in this case a state of tension
+would be created which must end in war. His position was, therefore,
+definite and consistent from the first. As we are pursuing a policy
+from which we cannot retreat--a policy that may lead to war--it is
+wholly unjustifiable, he said, to remain unprepared, unarmed, without
+a plan, as if war were quite out of the question. And so far from
+thinking that the preparations which he urged upon the Imperial
+Government, and more especially upon General Butler, would make war
+more likely, he believed that they would make it less likely. But even
+if they did lead the Dutch to fight, it was not war but "retreat" that
+must be avoided at all costs.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+PLAYING FOR TIME
+
+
+On June 8th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons,
+that with the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, a "new
+situation" had arisen. If the Imperial Government had translated this
+remark into action, the South African War would have been less
+disastrous, less protracted, and less costly. But the same order of
+considerations which prevented the Salisbury Cabinet from recalling
+General Butler in June, caused it to withhold its sanction from the
+preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. From
+the political point of view it was held to be desirable that the
+British Government should have an absolutely good case as before the
+world--a case which would not only ensure the whole-hearted support of
+the great bulk of the nation, and the active sympathy of the over-sea
+British communities; but one that would be so strong in justice as to
+overcome, or at least mitigate, the natural repugnance with which
+international opinion regards a great and powerful state that imposes
+its will upon a small and weak people by force of arms. Above all, it
+had become a cardinal principle in Mr. Chamberlain's South African
+policy to refrain to the last moment from any step which would
+necessarily close the door to a peaceful solution of the differences
+which had arisen between the South African Republic and the Imperial
+Government.
+
+[Sidenote: Policy of Home Government.]
+
+Influenced by these considerations, the Government refused to give
+effect to the measures demanded by the military situation, as it
+existed after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, except in so
+far as these demands could be satisfied without prejudice to the
+dominating political objects which it had in view. As to the nature of
+these measures there could be no reasonable doubt. It was necessary to
+raise the British forces in the Cape Colony and Natal to a point
+sufficient for defensive purposes, and to prepare an additional
+force--an army corps--for any offensive movement against one or both
+of the Republics. And as 6,000 miles of sea separated the seat of war
+from the chief base of the army, the United Kingdom, it was obvious
+that the defensive force should be despatched at once, and the
+offensive force prepared no less speedily, in order that it might be
+held in readiness to embark at the earliest moment that its services
+were required.
+
+To Lord Milner's reiterated warnings of the last two years, there was
+now added the definite advice of Lord Wolseley and the Department of
+Military Intelligence. In a memorandum dated June 8th, 1899,[82] and
+addressed to the Secretary of State for War, the Commander-in-Chief
+advised the mobilisation in England of a force consisting of one
+complete army corps, one cavalry division, one battalion mounted
+infantry, and four infantry battalions for lines of communication; the
+collection of transport in South Africa; and the immediate initiation
+of all subsidiary arrangements necessary for conveying these
+additional troops and their equipment to the seat of war. This advice
+was disregarded; but in place of the immediate mobilisation of the
+Army Corps the Cabinet decided to increase the efficiency of the
+existing force in South Africa, and General Butler was informed of
+this decision, as we have seen, on June 21st. On July 7th,[83] Lord
+Wolseley recommended, in addition to the mobilisation of the offensive
+force--which he still deemed necessary--that "the South African
+garrisons should be strengthened by the despatch of 10,000 men at a
+very early date." Instead of adopting these measures, the Government
+confined itself to doing just the few necessary things, both for
+defence and offence, that could be done without creating any belief in
+its warlike intentions, and without involving any appreciable
+expenditure of the public funds. Undoubtedly this latter
+consideration--the desire to avoid any expenditure that might
+afterwards prove to have been unnecessary--added weight to the purely
+political argument against immediate military preparation.
+
+         [Footnote 82: Cd. 1,789.]
+
+         [Footnote 83: Cd. 1,789.]
+
+[Sidenote: Preparations delayed.]
+
+The course actually taken by the Salisbury Cabinet was this. Instead
+of the immediate mobilisation of the offensive force, Lord Wolseley
+was instructed to prepare a scheme for the "constitution,
+organisation, and mobilisation" of such a force; and to do this in
+consultation with Sir Redvers Buller, the General Officer commanding
+at Aldershot, who had been selected to lead the British forces in
+South Africa in the event of war. Instead of the immediate despatch of
+additional troops sufficient to render the South African garrisons
+capable of repelling invasion--which was what Lord Milner had
+especially desired--the actual deficiencies of the existing Cape
+garrison[84] were made good by the despatch in July of small additions
+of artillery and engineers, and by directing General Butler to provide
+the fresh transport without which even this diminutive force was
+unable to mobilise. At the same time certain special service
+officers,[85] including engineers and officers of the Army Service
+Corps, were sent out to organise the materials, locally existing, for
+the defence of the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and the
+southern districts of Rhodesia; and generally to make preliminary
+preparations for the provisioning, transport, and distribution of any
+British forces that might be despatched subsequently to the Cape
+Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 84: Three battalions, 6 guns, and a company of
+         Royal Engineers were all the troops available for the defence
+         of the Cape frontiers at this time (_i.e._ June).]
+
+         [Footnote 85: Most of these came by mail boats on July 18th
+         and 25th. Col. Baden-Powell (who was entrusted with the
+         important duty of organising a force for the defence of
+         Southern Rhodesia, and subsequently of raising the mounted
+         infantry corps which held Mafeking) arrived on the latter
+         date.]
+
+These were the utterly inadequate reinforcements sent in response to
+Lord Milner's urgent appeal, and in disregard of General Butler's
+protest that they were wholly undesirable--an opinion which was
+endorsed in England by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, when, on June 17th,
+1899, he declared that there was nothing in the South African
+situation to justify even preparations for war.
+
+During the interval between the Bloemfontein Conference and General
+Butler's recall in the latter part of August Lord Milner's position
+was one of unparalleled difficulty. The Cape and Natal garrisons were
+maintained in a state of perilous weakness by the policy of the Home
+Government. The measures to be undertaken locally for the defence of
+the colonies, which the Cabinet had sanctioned, were wholly
+insufficient in Lord Milner's opinion. And the general execution of
+these wholly insufficient local measures was left in the hands of a
+General Officer who had told the Secretary of State that he absolutely
+disapproved of them on political grounds, since the mere announcement
+of their being made would "add largely to the ferment," which he "was
+[then] endeavouring to reduce by every means." The Cape Ministry,
+with whom rested the disposal of the colonial forces, was a ministry
+placed in office by the Bond for the especial purpose of opposing
+British intervention in the Transvaal. In these circumstances it
+needed all Lord Milner's mastery of South African conditions, and all
+his tact and address, to make the relations between himself and his
+Afrikander Cabinet tolerable; and, above all, in view of the refusal
+of the Imperial Government to sanction the military preparations
+advised by the Commander-in-Chief, it required ceaseless vigilance on
+his part to prevent the acceptance of an illusory settlement which
+would have sounded the death-knell of British supremacy in South
+Africa.
+
+[Sidenote: President Krueger's proposals.]
+
+On the last day of the Conference President Krueger had put in a
+memorandum in which he expressed his intention of introducing his
+franchise scheme to the Volksraad, and his hope that the High
+Commissioner would be able to recommend this, and a further proposal
+for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, to the favourable
+consideration of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had replied that
+any such proposals would be considered on their merits; but that the
+President must not expect them to be connected in any way with the
+proceedings of the Conference, out of which, as he then declared, no
+obligation had arisen on either side.
+
+The Raad met on Friday, June 9th; and on Monday, the 12th--the day on
+which Lord Milner received the Ebden address[86]--President Krueger
+laid the draft Franchise law, containing his revised Bloemfontein
+scheme, before it. On Tuesday, 13th, Mr. Chamberlain's despatch of May
+10th, on the position of the Uitlanders and the petition to the Queen,
+was delivered to the Transvaal Government by the British Agent; and on
+Wednesday, June 14th, as we have already noticed, the Blue-book
+containing this despatch, Lord Milner's despatch of May 4th, and the
+whole story of the franchise controversy up to the Bloemfontein
+Conference, was published in England. As the conditions under which
+Lord Milner's despatch had been telegraphed to England were now
+changed, it would have been better if it had remained unpublished, and
+the stage of fighting diplomacy, reached through the failure of the
+Bloemfontein Conference, had been at once opened--and opened in
+another way. What Lord Milner had learnt at Bloemfontein was not
+merely that President Krueger was unwilling to yield, but that he was
+psychologically incapable of yielding. He had learnt, that is to say,
+not that Krueger was determined to refuse the particular reform which
+the Imperial Government demanded, but that his whole system of thought
+was irreconcilably opposed to that of any English statesman. It is the
+knowledge which can be obtained only by personal dealings with the
+Boers, and no one who has had such personal dealings can fail to
+remember the sense of hopelessness that such an experience brings with
+it. The Boer may be faithful to his own canons of morality; but his
+whole manner of life and thought is one that makes his notion of the
+obligations of truth and justice very different from that of the
+ordinary educated European. He is not devoid of the conception of
+duty, but he applies this conception in methods adapted to the narrow
+and illiberal conditions of his isolated and self-centred life.
+
+         [Footnote 86: Expressing approval of the position Lord Milner
+         had taken up at Bloemfontein. See p. 173.]
+
+As for the mediation of the Cape Afrikanders, Lord Milner estimated it
+at its real value. The Cape nationalists believed that war would
+result in disaster to their cause; the Republican nationalists did
+not. They both hated the British in an equal degree. But the
+Afrikander leaders at the Cape knew that they had the game in their
+own hands. "For goodness' sake," they said, "keep quiet until we have
+got rid of this creature, Milner; and the Salisbury Cabinet--the
+'present team so unjustly disposed to us'--is replaced by a Liberal
+Government."
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's task.]
+
+That was the meaning of their mediation--nothing more. Lord Milner
+acquiesced in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, but what he wanted
+was a polite but absolutely inflexible insistence upon the
+Bloemfontein minimum, and at the same time such military preparations
+as, in view of the clear possibility of a failure of negotiations,
+seemed to him absolutely vital. This, however, was not the course
+which the Salisbury Cabinet thought right to adopt; and the problem
+that now lay before him was to convert the illusory concessions, which
+were all that Afrikander mediation was able or even desirous to wring
+from President Krueger, into the genuine reform that the British
+Government had twice pledged itself to secure.
+
+But Lord Milner had also grasped the fact that the one issue which
+could drive a wedge into Dutch solidarity was the franchise question.
+He had determined, therefore, that nothing that transpired at the
+Bloemfontein Conference should permit President Krueger to change the
+ground of dispute from this central issue. During the negotiations
+between the Home Government and the Pretoria Executive that followed
+the Conference, and especially during the period of Mr. Hofmeyr's
+active intervention, his most necessary and pressing task was to
+prevent the Salisbury Cabinet from being "jockeyed" by Boer diplomacy
+out of the advantageous position which he had then taken up on its
+behalf. The pressure of the Hofmeyr mediation increased the difficulty
+of this task by driving President Krueger into a series of franchise
+proposals of the utmost complexity. The danger was that Mr.
+Chamberlain and his colleagues in the Cabinet, in their earnest desire
+to avoid war, might recognise some illusory measures of reform as
+satisfactory, and then, after further consideration, finding them to
+be worthless, be driven by their previous admission to make war, after
+all, not on the single issue of "equality all round," but on an issue
+that might be plausibly represented to South Africa and the world as
+the independence of the Boers.
+
+[Sidenote: The Draft Franchise Law.]
+
+The period is crowded with demonstrations, despatches, mediations,
+petitions, and incidents of all kinds. A tithe of these--disentangled
+from the Blue-books, but vitalised by a knowledge of the master facts
+that lie behind the official pen--will serve, however, to present the
+play of the mingling, conflicting, and then frankly opposing forces.
+The "formidable personalities" are all in motion. At first it seemed
+as though the whole weight of the Schreiner Cabinet, acting in
+conjunction with General Butler's political objection to military
+preparation on the part of the Imperial Government, was to be thrown
+into the scale against Lord Milner's efforts. On June 12th President
+Krueger laid the draft of his new Franchise Law before the Raad, which
+then (the 15th) adjourned, in order that the feeling of the burghers
+might be ascertained. On the 17th a great assemblage of Boers met at
+Paardekraal, and, among the warlike speeches then delivered was that
+of Judge Kock,[87] a member of the Transvaal Executive, who "dwelt
+upon the doctrine of 'what he called Afrikanderdom,' and said that he
+'regarded the Afrikanders, from the Cape to the Zambesi as one great
+family. If the Republics are lost,' he continued, 'the Afrikanders
+would lose. The independence of the country was to them a question of
+life and death. The Free State would stand by the Transvaal, even to
+the death. Not only the Free State, but also the Cape Colony.'" Nor
+was this boast without some foundation. A week before (June 10th), Mr.
+Schreiner had requested Lord Milner to inform Mr. Chamberlain that, in
+ministers' opinion, President Krueger's franchise proposal was
+"practical, reasonable, and a considerable step in the right
+direction."[88] Four days later (June 14th) he further informed the
+Governor that, in ministers' opinion, there was nothing in the
+existing situation to justify "the active interference of the Imperial
+Government in what were the internal affairs of the Transvaal."[89]
+And this expression of opinion the Prime Minister also desired Lord
+Milner, as the only constitutional medium of communication between the
+Cape Ministry and the Secretary of State, to convey to Mr.
+Chamberlain. On the day (June 10th) on which the first of these
+interviews between Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner took place, a meeting
+of five thousand persons--in Sir William Greene's words, "the largest
+and most enthusiastic ever held at Johannesburg"--passed three
+resolutions which sufficiently exhibit the extent to which the views
+of the Cape Ministry differed from those of the Transvaal British.
+After affirming the principle of equal political rights for all white
+inhabitants of South Africa, and declaring that President Krueger's
+Bloemfontein proposals were "wholly inadequate," this great meeting
+proceeded to place on record its "deep sense of obligation" to Lord
+Milner for his endeavour to secure the redress of the Uitlander
+grievances, and its willingness, in order to "support his Excellency
+in his efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement," to endorse "his very
+moderate proposals on the franchise question as the irreducible
+minimum that could be accepted."
+
+         [Footnote 87: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 88: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 89: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Action of Schreiner ministry.]
+
+In other words, the Schreiner Cabinet, immediately after the failure
+of the Conference, used its influence unreservedly to assist the
+Pretoria Executive in refusing the franchise reform put forward by the
+High Commissioner--a reform which, in the opinion of the community
+most concerned and most capable of judging of its effect, constituted
+an "irreducible minimum" only to be accepted in deference to Lord
+Milner's judgment, and in the hope of avoiding war. Mr. Schreiner's
+action on this occasion was characteristic of the blind partizanship
+of the Cape Ministry. On June 10th, when the Prime Minister pressed
+his and his colleagues' favourable view of President Krueger's
+proposals upon Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, the draft Franchise
+Law, with its intricate provisions, had not been laid before the
+Volksraad. Mr. Schreiner, therefore, had made haste to bless before
+he knew what he was blessing. And a few weeks later, as we shall
+notice, he let his zeal for the Boer oligarchy outrun his discretion
+in an even more amazing manner.
+
+In these difficult circumstances Lord Milner displayed the highest
+address in his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet. Thanks to his
+mingled tact and firmness, aided by the outspoken support which he
+received from Mr. Chamberlain, his intercourse with his ministers
+remained outwardly friendly, while at the same time he had the
+satisfaction of seeing that during the next few weeks the
+considerations of policy, which he laid before them with absolute
+frankness, appreciably modified their original attitude. He had at
+once availed himself of the one point on which he and they were in
+agreement. With reference to the first interview with Mr. Schreiner
+(June 10th), he telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary:
+
+     "In reply I told him [Mr. Schreiner] I was prepared to
+     communicate this expression of his opinion, although I strongly
+     held an opposite view, as he was aware.
+
+     "He admitted, in subsequent conversation, that the President of
+     the South African Republic's scheme could, in his opinion, be
+     improved in detail; for instance, by immediately admitting men
+     who had entered the country previous to 1890, and by making
+     optional the period of naturalisation....
+
+     "In reply, I told him that these were points of first-rate
+     importance and not of detail, especially the latter; and that,
+     since after all he seemed to agree with me more than with the
+     President of the South African Republic, he had better address
+     his advice to the latter, and not to Her Majesty's Government."
+
+And at the long and rather unpleasant interview of June 14th,
+although, as we have seen, Mr. Schreiner desired Lord Milner to inform
+Mr. Chamberlain that the Cape Ministry considered the "active
+interference" of the British Government unjustified, yet he also said
+"that he and his colleagues were agreed that there were two respects
+in which the Government of the South African Republic might better
+their franchise scheme: (1) By admitting to the full franchise at once
+persons who had entered the country before 1890; and (2) By making it
+optional to obtain the full franchise without previous naturalisation
+after seven years' residence."[90]
+
+         [Footnote 90: C. 9,415.]
+
+Mr. Chamberlain's reply (June 16th), contained a more direct
+admonition. Lord Milner was instructed to inform the Cape Ministers
+that the Government trusted that they would "use all the influence
+they could to induce the Transvaal Government to take such action as
+would relieve Her Majesty's Government from the necessity of
+considering the question of being obliged to have recourse to
+interference of such a nature."[91]
+
+         [Footnote 91: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's speech.]
+
+This was admirable backing, and precisely what Lord Milner required to
+aid him in his two-fold task of bringing both the Cape Ministry and
+the Pretoria Executive to a more reasonable frame of mind. But Mr.
+Chamberlain's next step was one of questionable utility.
+
+In his speech at Birmingham (June 26th), after reviewing the relations
+of Great Britain with the Transvaal Boers during the last twenty
+years, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the Imperial Government, although
+deeply anxious not to use force, must somehow see that things were put
+right in South Africa.
+
+     "We have tried waiting, patience, and trusting to promises which
+     are never kept," he said; "we can wait no more. It is our duty,
+     not only to the Uitlanders, but to the English throughout South
+     Africa, to the native races, and to our own prestige in that part
+     of the world, and in the world at large, to insist that the
+     Transvaal falls into line with the other states in South Africa,
+     and no longer menaces the peace and prosperity of the whole."
+
+This was the kind of speech which would have been suitable and
+effective, if the South African garrison had been 20,000 instead of
+10,000 strong, and the expeditionary force had been mobilised on
+Salisbury Plain. It was unsuitable and ineffective under the existing
+circumstances; when, that is to say, the British Government, by
+refusing to sanction the measures advised by the Commander-in-Chief,
+had elected to put themselves at a military disadvantage for the sake
+of prolonging the stage of friendly discussion and in the hope of
+gaining their point by diplomatic means. In these circumstances such
+speeches were merely food for President Krueger to use in feeding the
+enthusiasm of his burghers. What Lord Milner desired of the Home
+Government was, as we have seen, a polite but inflexible demand for
+the Bloemfontein minimum, coupled with unostentatious, but effective,
+military preparations. The Home Government, as the sequel will show,
+were driven by the unpatriotic attitude of the Liberal Opposition into
+a precisely opposite course in both these respects. Their demand was
+vague in substance, and irritating in manner; while their inadequate
+defensive preparations were more than neutralised by the loudness with
+which, in deference to the views of the Liberal Opposition, they
+proclaimed their reluctance to undertake military measures on a scale
+that would really have made an impression on the Boers.[92]
+
+         [Footnote 92: _E.g._ Mr. Balfour's statement in the House of
+         Commons that the object of the despatch of the special
+         service officers, and the small additions of engineers and
+         artillery was "to complete the existing garrison." The
+         purchase of transport, he said, had been long ago decided
+         upon.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Fischer-Hofmeyr mission.]
+
+One result which Mr. Chamberlain's speech produced was to bring Mr.
+Hofmeyr once more upon the scene. Before this date (June 26th) Mr.
+Fischer, apparently considering that the failure of the Bloemfontein
+Conference cast a reflection upon the statesmanship and influence of
+the Free State Government, had commenced a second essay in mediation.
+Early in June he had paid a visit to Capetown, where he was in close
+communication with Mr. Hofmeyr and the Cape Ministers, and had twice
+called upon the High Commissioner. He had left Capetown on the 19th
+for Bloemfontein; and then proceeded to Pretoria, which he reached on
+the 25th. At the Transvaal capital he entered into negotiations with
+the Executive, calling upon the British Agent on the 26th, and again
+on the 28th, and maintaining communication, through him, with Lord
+Milner. From Pretoria Mr. Fischer returned to Bloemfontein in company
+with Mr. Smuts and Mr. Groebler,[93] on July 1st. Here he met Mr.
+Hofmeyr, who, leaving Capetown with Mr. Herholdt, on the same day
+(July 1st), reached Bloemfontein early on the following morning.
+
+         [Footnote 93: Under State-Secretary of the Transvaal.]
+
+Mr. Hofmeyr was in Bloemfontein, because the events of the last few
+days had convinced him that the only hope of saving the
+situation--saving it, that is, from the Afrikander nationalist point
+of view--lay in prompt and energetic action on his part. On June 23rd
+Mr. Schreiner had been informed by the High Commissioner of the
+intention of the Home Government to "complete" the Cape garrison; and
+shortly afterwards the despatch of the special service officers was
+publicly announced in England. Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham
+on the 26th, cabled almost _in extenso_ to the High Commissioner, was
+communicated to the local press on the 28th. On the same evening a
+mass meeting, held in the Good Hope Hall at Capetown, declared its
+strong approval of the action of the Imperial Government on behalf of
+the British population in the Transvaal. With these signs of an
+approaching Armageddon before his eyes, Mr. Hofmeyr had overcome his
+objection to personal dealings with President Krueger, and had resolved
+to go to Pretoria to confer with the leaders of the Boer oligarchy.
+But, in order to protect himself from the risk of a useless rebuff, he
+had first arranged to meet Mr. Fischer at Bloemfontein, and obtain
+through him and President Steyn some definite assurance that his
+counsels would be treated with respect, before finally proceeding to
+the Transvaal.
+
+On Sunday, July 2nd, and in these circumstances, a conference was held
+between the Master of the Bond and Mr. Fischer and Mr. Smuts--two men
+not unworthy to represent the cause of Afrikander nationalism in their
+respective republics. As the result of their discussions, carried on
+almost uninterruptedly from the early morning until nearly midnight,
+Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr. Groebler, in the words of _Ons Land_,
+"knew precisely what had to be done, in the opinion of the Colonial
+representatives, to gain the moral support of Colonial Afrikanders and
+to lead in the direction of peace."[94]
+
+         [Footnote 94: Article on "The Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and
+         Herholdt" in _Ons Land_, of July 11th, 1899, as reproduced in
+         the _South African News_ of the same date. This account of
+         Mr. Hofmeyr's proceedings is presumed to have been published
+         with his approval. C. 9,518.]
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr at Bloemfontein.]
+
+On the following day (Monday, the 3rd) Mr. Fischer and his companions
+arrived again in Pretoria; but Mr. Hofmeyr remained at Bloemfontein,
+since he had decided not to go to the Transvaal capital, unless "he
+was assured of achieving something of importance there." Up to the
+afternoon of Tuesday (the 4th) no such assurance had been received;
+and, says _Ons Land_, "as it seemed the assurance was almost in a
+contrary direction, preparations were already made for the homeward
+journey." But a little later on in the day Mr. Hofmeyr and his
+companion "received a hint that, although their chances of success at
+Pretoria were but slight, they were not altogether hopeless." The
+facts thus far provided by _Ons Land_ must now be supplemented by a
+reference to the telegrams which fell into the hands of the British
+authorities a year later upon the occupation of Bloemfontein. From
+these documents we know that President Krueger at first telegraphed to
+President Steyn a polite refusal of Mr. Hofmeyr's mediation. This was
+followed, on Tuesday morning, by a telegram from Mr. Fischer himself,
+informing President Steyn that the Transvaal Government "would be glad
+to meet Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt, but that he could not say what
+chance there was of their mission succeeding until the Volksraad had
+been consulted." This, as we have seen, was by no means sufficient for
+Mr. Hofmeyr. But later on there came a second telegram--the telegram
+which _Ons Land_ delicately calls a "hint"--in which Mr. Fischer said
+that President Krueger "was willing to see Mr. Hofmeyr before he
+brought the matter before the Raad," and that he himself "hoped to
+obtain certain concessions from the Executive Council, with the
+members of which he was in consultation."
+
+Thus encouraged, Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt at once left
+Bloemfontein by special train, and, travelling all night, reached
+Pretoria on Wednesday, the 5th, at seven o'clock.
+
+"From the station," says _Ons Land_, "they were escorted by various
+officials and friends to the Transvaal Hotel, where rooms had been
+engaged for them as guests of the State. Even before they had taken
+breakfast they had an audience with President Krueger. On the
+invitation of His Honour they accompanied Mr. Fischer to three
+meetings of the Executive Council--two on Wednesday and one on
+Thursday. They had the opportunity, too, of meeting the greater part
+of the Volksraad members, and of conversing with them. What occurred
+on this occasion is, of course, private, and not for publication."
+
+Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt left Pretoria on Friday, the 7th, and
+reached Capetown on Monday, the 10th.
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner and the mission.]
+
+[Sidenote: Bid for "moral support".]
+
+Lord Milner did everything possible to secure the success of the
+Fischer-Hofmeyr mission. Provided President Krueger was induced to give
+the Uitlanders an appreciable share in the government of the
+Transvaal, it made no difference to the Imperial Government whether he
+did so from a desire to secure the "moral support" of the Cape
+Afrikander party, or from any other motive of political expediency.
+What was essential was that the existing franchise scheme should be so
+far improved as to become a genuine, and no longer a fictitious,
+measure of reform. On the understanding that the "mission" had no less
+an object in view--an understanding which he gained from conversation
+with Mr. Fischer himself as well as from Mr. Schreiner and Mr.
+Hofmeyr--Lord Milner placed the British Government code at the
+disposal of Mr. Fischer and the Prime Minister, and further arranged
+with the former to communicate with him (Lord Milner) through the
+British Agent at Pretoria. But Lord Milner especially impressed, alike
+upon Mr. Fischer, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. Schreiner, the necessity of
+urging President Krueger to discuss any proposed modifications in the
+Draft Law with the Imperial Government or its representatives, before
+they were submitted to the Raad. The objection to the adoption of this
+course, which, according to Mr. Fischer's statement,[95] the Pretoria
+Executive did in fact make, was their inability to "recognise the
+right of the British Government to be consulted on the franchise,
+which was an internal matter." This objection, however, as Lord Milner
+pointed out to the members of the Pretoria Executive, both directly
+through Sir William Greene,[96] and indirectly through Mr. Hofmeyr and
+Mr. Fischer, was a mere pretext. "The whole world," he said in
+effect, "knows that whatever alterations you make in the Draft
+Law--and indeed the Law itself--will be the result of the pressure
+brought to bear upon you by the British Government. That being so, to
+refuse to discuss these alterations with us privately, and in a
+friendly manner, because the franchise is an 'internal matter,' is to
+strain at a gnat while you are all the while swallowing a camel." But
+neither at this time, nor at any other period in the three months'
+negotiations, did President Krueger desire to come to an agreement with
+the British Government at the price of granting a genuine measure of
+reform. As a bid for the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, but
+without the slightest attempt to consult with the British Government
+or its representatives, he recommended to the Volksraad, on July 7th,
+certain amendments, the effect of which was to confer the franchise
+upon a very small body of Uitlanders, and that only if they succeeded
+in complying with certain cumbersome and protracted formalities.[97]
+On the following morning the Bond Press announced, with a great
+flourish of trumpets, that Mr. Hofmeyr's mission had been remarkably
+successful, and set out the amendments of "The Great Reform Act" as
+representing the fruit of his and Mr. Fischer's efforts. This was for
+the public. To Mr. Fischer, Hofmeyr himself telegraphed on his return
+journey to Capetown, that he "deplored the failure" of his mission,
+when he "thought he had reason to expect success." Mr. Schreiner, on
+the other hand, was no less ready to bless the "Hofmeyr compromise"
+than Krueger's original scheme. Upon receiving by telegram the bare
+heads of the proposed amendments, and without waiting to learn what
+practical effect they would have upon the position of the Uitlanders,
+he hastily authorised _The South African News_ to announce (July 8th)
+that the Cape Government considered the proposals of the amended law
+"adequate, satisfactory, and such as should secure a peaceful
+settlement."[98] This opinion he subsequently modified; and, at Lord
+Milner's request, he advised Mr. Fischer (July 11th) to urge his
+friends at Pretoria to delay the passage of the bill through the
+Volksraad. And Lord Milner was authorised by Mr. Chamberlain to
+instruct Sir William Greene to offer the same advice to the Transvaal
+Government, with the more precise intimation that "full particulars of
+the new scheme" ought to be furnished officially to the Imperial
+Government, if the proposals which it embodied were to form "any
+element in the settlement of the differences between the two
+Governments."[99] The High Commissioner's object was, of course, to
+reduce the area of formal negotiations, and therefore the risk of
+official friction, to its narrowest limits. But this was not President
+Krueger's object. His principle was the very opposite of that of the
+Imperial Government. They abstained from preparations for war in
+order to improve the prospect of a peaceable settlement. The force
+upon which he relied was the warlike temper of his burghers, and the
+answering enthusiasm which the spectacle of the Republic, prepared to
+defy the British Empire, would arouse among the whole Dutch population
+of South Africa. Mr. Reitz was, therefore, instructed to decline Mr.
+Chamberlain's request on the ground that "the whole matter was out of
+the hands of the Government";[100] meaning, thereby, that it had
+already been submitted to the Volksraad. This, again, was the thinnest
+of excuses, since President Krueger had never yet shown any scruple in
+modifying or withdrawing proposals already laid before the Volksraad,
+when it suited him to do so.
+
+         [Footnote 95: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 96: Then Mr. Conyngham Greene.]
+
+         [Footnote 97: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 98: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 99: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 100: C. 9,415.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Bogus Conspiracy.]
+
+[Sidenote: War fever in the Transvaal.]
+
+It may be questioned, however, whether, even at this time, the "whole
+matter" had not passed, in another and more serious sense, "out of the
+hands" both of the Pretoria Executive and the British Government. The
+political atmosphere of South Africa had become electric. The
+Uitlanders themselves cherished no illusion on the subject of
+President Krueger's proposals. Amended and re-amended, the Franchise
+Law, as the Uitlander Council then and there declared, left the
+granting of the franchise at the discretion of the Boer officials or
+the Pretoria Executive, and as such it was "a most dangerous measure,
+and apparently framed with the object of defeating the end it was
+presumed to have in view."[101] Further and convincing evidence of the
+utterly vicious and depraved character of the _personnel_ of the Boer
+administration was afforded by the proceedings arising out of the
+alleged "conspiracy" against the Republic, of which the unfortunate
+Englishman Nicholls was the innocent victim (May 18th to July
+25th).[102] In this disgraceful affair the gravest offences against
+international comity were committed; high officials, including Mr.
+Tjaart Krueger, the President's youngest son, were implicated in a
+gross and scandalous prostitution of the machinery of justice; and yet
+no apology was offered to the Imperial Government, nor any
+compensation awarded to Nicholls for the two months' imprisonment and
+continuous persecution by the agents-provocateurs, to which he had
+been subjected. The impassioned speeches delivered at the Paardekraal
+meeting was only one among many signs of the dangerous hostility to
+England and everything English that had taken possession of the
+Republic. The British residents who had petitioned the Queen were
+denounced as "revolutionaries," and threatened with the vengeance of
+the burghers. "If war breaks out," wrote _De Rand Post_,"[103] the
+Johannesburg agitators are the real instigators, and to these
+ringleaders capital punishment should be meted out." In the Volksraad
+discussion of the Franchise Law the same passionate hatred of the
+Uitlanders was manifested. "Is it the English only who have the right
+to make conditions?" asked Mr. Lombard on July 15th. "If it comes to
+be a question of war, there will be a great destruction. And who will
+be destroyed if it comes to a collision? Why, the subjects of Her
+Majesty in Johannesburg."[104]
+
+         [Footnote 101: C. 9,415.]
+
+         [Footnote 102: On May 15th, 1899--_i.e._ a fortnight before
+         the Bloemfontein Conference met--five persons alleged to be
+         British subjects were arrested on a warrant, signed by Mr.
+         Smuts as State-Attorney, on a charge of high treason. All of
+         them, except one man--Nicholls, who was innocent--were agents
+         of the secret service. The statement that the men were
+         ex-British officers, and that one of them alleged that he was
+         acting under direct instructions from the War Office, was
+         disseminated through the Press by the Transvaal Government,
+         with the object of discrediting (1) the South African League,
+         and (2) the British Government, in the eyes of the civilised
+         world. The whole of the alleged "conspiracy against the
+         independence of the Republic," thanks to the endurance of
+         Nicholls and the persistence of the Imperial authorities in
+         South Africa, was shown to be the work of the Transvaal
+         police, favoured by the negligence or political bad faith of
+         certain Government officials. The prosecution was abandoned
+         on July 25th. Mr. Duxbury, the counsel for the defence
+         retained by the British Government, in reviewing the case and
+         the proceedings, wrote (August 9th): "It seems abundantly
+         clear, from all the facts which have come to light, that the
+         whole of this disgraceful prosecution found its inception in
+         the minds of Mr. Schutte, the Commissioner of Police, and
+         Acting Chief Detective Beatty.... I must direct your
+         attention to the very grave accusation contained in Thomas
+         Dashwood Bundy's affidavit against Mr. Tjaart Krueger. This
+         gentleman is the son of President Krueger, and is the Chief of
+         the Secret Service department of this State." And of Mr.
+         Smuts he writes: "I believe he was deceived by the
+         detectives, and yet at the same time I fail to understand
+         why, in a matter of such-magnitude, he allowed himself to
+         sign warrants for the arrest of persons charged with such a
+         serious crime as high treason on the strength of an affidavit
+         signed by a detective, who, on the very day such affidavit
+         was signed, had been denounced by the Chief Justice from the
+         Bench of the High Court as a perjurer." C. 9,521 (which
+         contains a full record of the whole affair).]
+
+         [Footnote 103: The words are quoted by Mr. M. P. C. Walter,
+         the editor, in a letter of protest published in the Transvaal
+         _Leader_ of July 7th, 1899. C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 104: _Ibid._]
+
+These expressions scarcely do justice to the spirit of vindictiveness
+with which certain of the republican leaders regarded the British
+population of the Rand. On May 22nd, 1900, less than a year after the
+date of the Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Bill, and when Lord
+Roberts was advancing rapidly upon Johannesburg, a conversation took
+place with Mr. Smuts in Pretoria, which was reported in _The Times_.
+In the course of this conversation the State Attorney said, with
+reference to the proposed destruction of the mines, that "he greatly
+regretted that Johannesburg should suffer, but that the Government had
+no choice in the matter, as the popular pressure upon them was too
+great to be resisted." This determination is rightly characterised by
+Mr. Farrelly, the late legal adviser to the Government of the South
+African Republic, as the "fiendish project of wrecking the mines and
+plunging into hopeless misery for years tens of thousands of innocent
+men, women, and children." But that is not all. He has put upon
+record[105] the sinister fact that the man entrusted with the
+execution of this infamous design was Mr. Smuts himself. The mines
+were saved, therefore, not by the Boer Government, but in spite of it,
+and solely through the independent action of Dr. Krause, the
+Acting-Commandant of Johannesburg, who "arrested the leader of the
+wreckers, sent by Mr. Smuts, the day before the surrender to Lord
+Roberts."[106]
+
+         [Footnote 105: _The Settlement after the War_, p. 218.]
+
+         [Footnote 106: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Action of the British.]
+
+The British population, although it provided no such displays of
+racial passion, was in an equally determined mood. Undismayed by the
+threats of the Boers, the Uitlander Council continued calmly to
+analyse the Franchise Bill in each successive phase--an unostentatious
+but very useful service, which materially assisted Lord Milner in
+following the windings and doublings of Boer diplomacy. After the
+great meeting at Johannesburg (June 10th), the British centres in the
+Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia gave similar demonstrations of their
+confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, and their conviction of the
+justice and necessity of the five years' franchise demanded by the
+Imperial Government. On the other hand, the irritation against British
+intervention was growing daily in the Free State; and the Dutch
+Reformed Church and the Bond had organised a counter-demonstration in
+the Cape Colony. The Synod of the former, meeting on June 30th, drew
+up an address protesting that the differences between Lord Milner's
+franchise proposals and those of President Krueger were not sufficient
+to justify the "horrors of war," and requested the Governor to forward
+it to the Queen. At Capetown (July 12th) and in the Dutch districts
+throughout the Colony, Bond meetings were held at which resolutions
+were passed in favour of a "compromise" as between Lord Milner's five
+years' franchise and the scheme embodied in President Krueger's law.
+More sinister was the circumstance that the information, that a
+consignment of 500 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges, landed at Port
+Elizabeth on July 8th, had been permitted by the Cape Government to be
+forwarded through the Colony to the Free State, only came to the ears
+of the High Commissioner by an accident. In the meantime, more
+definite evidence of the almost unanimous approval of Lord Milner's
+policy by the British population in South Africa was forthcoming. In
+all three British colonies petitions to the Queen praying for justice
+to the Uitlanders, and affirming absolute confidence in Lord Milner,
+were signed. The Natal petition contained the names of three-fourths
+of the adult male population of the Colony, while the signatures to
+the joint petition of the Cape and Rhodesia had already reached a
+total of 40,500 before the end of July. In other respects the
+testimony of Natal was clear and unmistakable. In this predominantly
+English Colony identical resolutions supporting the action and policy
+of the Imperial Government, were carried unanimously in both Chambers
+of the Legislature.
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's warning.]
+
+In the middle of July the situation improved in a slight degree
+through the influence which Lord Milner had exercised upon the
+Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony. On the 14th the Cape Parliament
+met, and on this day Mr. Hofmeyr, chagrined at a suggestion for
+further support which he had received from the republican
+nationalists at Pretoria, despatched a telegram to Mr. Smuts, in which
+he, as the recognised head of the Afrikander Bond, reminded the
+members of President Krueger's Executive that the promised co-operation
+of the Cape Government with them had been definitely limited to "moral
+support." And he plainly hinted that, unless greater deference was
+shown to his advice, even this "moral support" might be withdrawn.
+
+     "The most important suggestions sent from here will apparently
+     not be adopted. The independence of the Republics is in danger.
+     As to the Colony, the utmost prospect held out was moral support.
+     The Ministry and the Bond have acted up to that. If Parliament
+     [_i.e._ the Cape Parliament] goes too strongly in the same
+     direction, there may be a change of Ministry, with Sprigg or
+     Rhodes backed by Milner. Would your interests be benefited
+     thereby? _Verb. sat. sap._"[107]
+
+         [Footnote 107: Secured by the Intelligence Department. The
+         telegrams thus referred to, in this and the following
+         chapter, have not been published in the Blue-Books. They were
+         published, however, in _The Times History of the War_. Their
+         authenticity is undoubted. Sir Gordon Sprigg had held a
+         conversation with the Governor on the 13th.]
+
+As President Krueger wanted to retain the "moral support" of the Cape
+Government for a few weeks longer, he listened to Mr. Fischer's
+advice[108] to humour their prejudices, and forthwith recommended a
+further modification of the Franchise Bill to the Volksraad. This
+final amendment, under which a uniform seven years' retrospective
+franchise was substituted for a nine years' retrospective franchise,
+alternate with a seven years' retrospective franchise taking effect
+five years after the passing of the law (_i.e._ in 1904), was accepted
+on July 18th, and the new Franchise Law was passed on the 19th and
+promulgated on the 26th. Its provisions were so obscure that it was
+accompanied by an explanatory memorandum furnished by the State
+Attorney, Mr. Smuts. But even assuming that the legal pitfalls could
+be removed, and the law, thus simplified, would be worked in the most
+liberal spirit by the officials of the Republic, President Krueger's
+proposals failed to provide the essential reform which Lord Milner had
+pledged himself and the Imperial Government to obtain. That reform was
+the immediate endowment of a substantial proportion of the British
+residents in the Transvaal with the rights of citizenship. To use his
+own words,[109] "the whole point" of his Bloemfontein proposal was "to
+put the Uitlanders in a position to fight their own battles, and so to
+avoid the necessity of pressing for the redress of specific
+grievances."
+
+         [Footnote 108: Mr. Fischer was still at Pretoria. C. 9, 415.]
+
+         [Footnote 109: C. 9,415.]
+
+No one in South Africa had any doubt as to the entire inadequacy of
+the Franchise Bill to fulfil this essential object. In the opinion of
+the Uitlander Council it was[110] "expressly designed to exclude
+rather than admit the newcomer." Sir Henry de Villiers complained[111]
+to Mr. Fischer:
+
+         [Footnote 110: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 111: On July 31st, Cd. 369.]
+
+     "Then there is the Franchise Bill, which is so obscure that the
+     State Attorney had to issue an explanatory memorandum to remove
+     the obscurities. But surely a law should be clear enough to speak
+     for itself, and no Government or court of law will be bound by
+     the State Attorney's explanations. I do not know what those
+     explanations are, but the very fact that they are required
+     condemns the Bill. That Bill certainly does not seem quite to
+     carry out the promises made to you, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr.
+     Herholdt."
+
+[Sidenote: An illusory measure.]
+
+And Lord Milner, in his final analysis of the law on July 26th,
+concludes[112] that "the Bill as it stands leaves it practically in
+the hands of the Government to enfranchise, or not to enfranchise, the
+Uitlanders as it chooses." And he then draws attention to the very
+grave consideration that if the paramount Power once accepts this
+illusory measure, it will deprive itself of any future right of
+intervention on the franchise question.
+
+         [Footnote 112: C. 9,518.]
+
+     "And the worst of it," he wrote, "is that should the Bill,
+     through a literal interpretation of its complicated provisions,
+     fail to secure the object at which it avowedly aims, no one will
+     be able to protest against the result."
+
+For one moment it seemed to the anxious warden of British interests in
+South Africa as though the Home Government might be caught in
+President Krueger's legislative net. The incident is one that well
+exhibits the tireless effort and unflinching resolution with which
+Lord Milner discharged the duties of his office.
+
+President Krueger's Bloemfontein scheme was a maze of legal pitfalls.
+What these pitfalls were the reader may learn from the analysis of the
+scheme which was published in _The Cape Times_ of June 10th, 1899.
+When the Franchise Bill was before the Volksraad this complicated
+scheme, as we have seen, was amended and re-amended; and each new
+provision was as intricate in its working as the parent scheme. It is
+obvious that nothing short of a commission of inquiry could have
+determined with certainty the manner in which the representation of
+the Uitlanders was affected by each successive amendment. While these
+changes were in progress in the Raadzaal at Pretoria--changes so
+"numerous and so rapid," as Lord Milner said,[113] that it was
+"absolutely impossible at any given moment to know what the effect of
+the scheme, as existing at that moment, was likely to be"--Lord Milner
+himself at Capetown was at one and the same time overwhelmed with
+detailed criticisms from Uitlanders, anxious that no legal pitfall or
+administrative obstacle should remain undetected, and besieged with
+cables from the Colonial Office requesting precise information upon
+any point upon which an energetic member of the House of Commons might
+have chosen to interrogate the Secretary of State. And, in addition to
+this rain of telegrams, people on the spot were constantly calling at
+Government House to ask if the High Commissioner had observed this or
+that defect or trap in clauses, the text of which he had not yet had
+time to receive, still less to read or comprehend. All this, too, was
+over and above the heavy administrative and official duties of the
+Governor and High Commissioner--duties which Lord Milner was called
+upon to perform with more than usual care, in view of the political
+ascendancy of the Dutch party in the Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 113: August 23rd, C. 9,521.]
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's assumption.]
+
+On July 13th, Lord Milner sent warning telegrams to Mr.
+Chamberlain,[114] pointing out specific defects in the Franchise Bill,
+and showing how seriously President Krueger's proposals fell short of
+the Bloemfontein minimum. Five days later the Volksraad accepted the
+final amendments. The face value of the Bill, as it now stood to be
+converted into law, was a seven years' franchise, prospective and
+retrospective. When, therefore, Mr. Chamberlain heard this same day
+(July 18th) that the Volksraad had accepted the bill in this form with
+only five dissentients, he seems to have assumed that a really
+considerable concession had been made by President Krueger at the last
+moment, and that, with the President and the Volksraad in this mood,
+still further concessions would be forthcoming. Under this impression
+he informed the House of Commons lobby correspondent of _The Times_
+that "the crisis might be regarded as at an end." His words were
+reproduced in _The Times_ on the day following (July 19th), and at
+once cabled to South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 114: C. 9,415.]
+
+It is impossible for any one who has not lived in South Africa to
+realise the sickening distrust and dread produced in the minds of the
+loyal subjects of the Crown by this statement. War they were ready to
+face. But to go back to every-day life once again bowed down with the
+shame of a moral Majuba, to meet the eyes of the Dutch once more
+aflame with the light of victory, to hear their words of insolent
+contempt--was ignominy unspeakable and unendurable. The Uitlander
+Council at once cabled an emphatic message of protest[115] to Mr.
+Chamberlain, and every loyalist that had a friend in England
+telegraphed to beg him to use all his influence to prevent the
+surrender of the Government. How near the British population in South
+Africa were to this ignominy may be gathered from the fact that on
+this day Lord Milner received a telegram in which Mr. Chamberlain
+congratulated him upon the successful issue of his efforts. Lord
+Milner's reply was one that could have left no doubt in Mr.
+Chamberlain's mind as to the gravity of the misconception under which
+he laboured. It was, of course, beyond the High Commissioner's power
+to prevent the Home Government from accepting the Franchise Bill; but
+he could at least remove the impression that he was anxious to
+participate in an act, which would have made the breach between the
+loyalists of South Africa and the mother country final and
+irrevocable.
+
+         [Footnote 115: "The Uitlander Council is keenly disappointed
+         at the _Times_' announcement that the seven years' franchise
+         is acceptable to the Imperial Government. We fear few will
+         accept the franchise on this condition, so the result is not
+         likely to abate unrest and discontent, nor redress pressing
+         grievances. Such a settlement would not even approximate to
+         the conditions obtaining in the Orange Free State and the
+         [British] colonies, and would fail to secure the recognition
+         of the principle of racial equality. We earnestly implore you
+         not to depart from the High Commissioner's five years'
+         compromise, which the Uitlanders accepted with great
+         reluctance. The absolute necessity for a satisfactory
+         settlement with an Imperial guarantee is emphasised by the
+         insincerity and bad faith persistently shown during the
+         Volksraad discussion of the Franchise Law."--C. 9,415.]
+
+[Sidenote: The relapse in England.]
+
+It is scarcely possible to believe that Mr. Chamberlain, with Lord
+Milner's telegrams before him, was himself prepared to accept
+President Krueger's illusory franchise scheme. The source of the
+weakness of the Government in the conduct of the negotiations, no less
+than in its refusal to make adequate preparations for war, is to be
+found in the inability of the mass of the people of England to
+understand how completely British power in South Africa had been
+undermined by the Afrikander nationalists during the last twenty
+years. How could the average elector know that the refusal or
+acceptance of the Volksraad Bill, differing only from the Bloemfontein
+minimum in an insignificant--as it seemed--particular of two years,
+would, in fact, make known to all European South Africa whether
+President Krueger or the British Government was master of the
+sub-continent? In view of this profound ignorance of South African
+conditions, and the consequent uncertainty of any assured support,
+even from the members of their own party, the Salisbury Cabinet may
+well have argued: "Here is something at last that we can represent as
+a genuine concession. Let us take it, and have done with this
+troublesome South African question; or leave it to the next Liberal
+Government to settle."
+
+If the Cabinet did so reason to themselves, what English statesman
+could have "cast the first stone" at them? But how profound is the
+interval between the spirit of the policy of "the man on the spot,"
+with his eyes upon the object, and the spirit of the policy of the
+island statesman with one eye upon the hustings and the other strained
+to catch an intermittent glimpse of an unfamiliar and distant Africa!
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's anxiety.]
+
+This 19th of July was a dark day for the High Commissioner. In the
+morning came Mr. Chamberlain's telegram with its ominous suggestion of
+a change for the worse in the attitude of the Home Government. And
+this change in the Cabinet was, as Lord Milner knew, only the natural
+reflection of a wider change, which had manifested itself among the
+supporters of the Government and in the country at large since the
+publication, on June 14th, of his despatch of May 4th. Private letters
+had made him aware that to men to whom Dutch ascendancy at the Cape
+and Boer tyranny in the Transvaal, Afrikander nationalism and Boer
+armaments, were meaningless expressions, his resolute advocacy of the
+Uitlanders' cause and his frank presentation of the weakness of Great
+Britain had seemed the work of a disordered imagination or a violent
+partisanship. Nor was his knowledge of the relapse in England limited
+to the warnings or protests of his private friends. _The South African
+News_, the ministerial organ, which of late had filled its columns
+with adverse criticisms taken from the London Press, this morning
+contained a bitter article on him reprinted from _Punch_, which had
+arrived by the yesterday's mail. After all, it seemed, the long
+struggle against mis-government in the Transvaal was going to end in
+failure; and the British people would once more be befooled. With such
+thoughts in his mind, Lord Milner must have found the work of making
+up the weekly despatches for the Colonial Office--for it was a
+Wednesday[116]--a wearisome and depressing task. The mail was detained
+until long past the customary hour. But before it left, in spite of
+discouragement and anxiety, Lord Milner had gathered together into a
+brief compass all the documents necessary to put Mr. Chamberlain in
+possession of every material fact relative to the new law--passed only
+on the day before--and to the proceedings of the Transvaal Executive
+and the Volksraad between the 12th and the 19th. And, in addition to
+this, he had written a fresh estimate of the Franchise Bill in its
+latest form, in which he emphasised his former verdict that the
+proposals which it contained were not such as the Uitlanders would be
+likely to accept. And in particular he pointed out that the fact of
+the final amendment being thus readily adopted by the Volksraad
+disposed of the contention, upon which President Krueger had laid so
+much stress at Bloemfontein, that his "burghers" would not permit him
+to make the concessions which the British Government required. He
+wrote:
+
+         [Footnote 116: The English outward mail-boat arrived on
+         Tuesday, and the homeward boat left on Wednesday.]
+
+     "On July 12th Her Majesty's Government requested the Government
+     of the South African Republic to give them time to consider the
+     measure and communicate their views before it was proceeded with.
+     To this the Government of the South African Republic replied, on
+     July 13th, with a polite negative, saying that 'the whole matter
+     was out of the hands of the Government, and it was no longer
+     possible for the Government to satisfy the demands of the
+     Secretary of State.' The State-Attorney informed Mr. Greene[117]
+     at the same time that 'the present proposals represented
+     absolutely the greatest concession that could be got from the
+     Volksraad, and could not be enlarged. He personally had tried
+     hard for seven years' retrospective franchise, but the Raad would
+     not hear of it, and it was only with difficulty that the present
+     proposals were obtained.' This was on the 12th, but within a week
+     the seven years' retrospective franchise had been adopted.
+     Indeed, the statement of the absolute impossibility of obtaining
+     more than a particular measure of enfranchisement from the
+     Volksraad or the burghers has been made over and over again in
+     the history of this question--never more emphatically than by the
+     President himself at Bloemfontein--and has over and over again
+     been shown to be a delusion."[118]
+
+         [Footnote 117: Sir W. Greene became a K.C.B. after the war
+         had broken out.]
+
+         [Footnote 118: C. 9,518.]
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's statement.]
+
+But this full record of the shifts and doublings of Boer diplomacy
+would not reach London for another two weeks and a half. It was
+necessary, therefore, to use the cable. Early the next morning Lord
+Milner sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, in which he warned
+the Home Government of the extreme discouragement produced among all
+who were attached to the British connection by _The Times_ statement
+of their readiness to accept the Franchise Bill. On that afternoon
+(July 20th), Mr. Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons
+in which he took up a much more satisfactory position. The Government,
+he said, were led to hope that the new law "might prove to be a basis
+of settlement on the lines laid down" by Lord Milner at the
+Bloemfontein Conference. They observed, however, that "a number of
+conditions" which might be used "to take away with one hand what had
+been given with the other" were still retained. But they--
+
+     "felt assured that the President, having accepted the principle
+     for which they had contended, would be prepared to reconsider any
+     detail of his schemes which could be shown to be a possible
+     hindrance to the full accomplishment of the objects in view, and
+     that he would not allow them to be nullified or reduced in value
+     by any subsequent alterations of the law or acts of
+     administration."
+
+That is to say, Mr. Chamberlain was no longer willing to take the bill
+at its face value, but in accordance with his determination to exhaust
+every possible resource of diplomacy before he turned to force, he
+gave President Krueger credit for a genuine desire to promote a
+peaceable settlement. A week later he formulated the method by which
+the President was to be allowed an opportunity of justifying this
+generous estimate of his intentions. In the meantime Lord Milner had
+sent lengthy telegrams to the Secretary of State on the 23rd, and
+again on the 26th, and the Salisbury Cabinet had determined to make a
+definite pronouncement of its South African policy, and to endeavour
+to arouse the country to a sense of the seriousness of the situation
+with which President Krueger's continued obduracy would bring it face
+to face. On July 27th Mr. Balfour declared, in addressing the Union of
+Conservative Associations, that--
+
+     "If endless patience, endless desire to prevent matters coming to
+     extremities, if all the resources of diplomacy, were utterly
+     ineffectual to untie the knot, other means must inevitably be
+     found by which that knot must be loosened."
+
+On the day following (July 28th) the Transvaal question was debated in
+both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Lords the Prime Minister,
+Lord Salisbury, delivered a moderate and almost sympathetic speech.
+After making all allowance for the natural apprehension experienced by
+President Krueger at the sudden inrush of population caused by the
+discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, he expressed the opinion
+that an attempt "to put the two races fairly and honestly on the same
+footing" would bring a peaceful solution of the crisis. But, he
+added--
+
+     "How long we are to consider that solution, and what patience we
+     are bound to show, these things I will not discuss. We have to
+     consider not only the feelings of the inhabitants of the
+     Transvaal, but, what is more important, the feelings of our
+     fellow-subjects.... Whatever happens, when the validity of the
+     Conventions is impeached, they belong from that time entirely to
+     history. I am quite sure that if this country has to make
+     exertions in order to secure the most elementary justice for
+     British subjects,--I am quite sure [it] will not reinstate a
+     state of things that will bring back the old difficulties in all
+     their formidable character at the next turn of the wheel. Without
+     intruding on his thoughts, I do not think President Krueger has
+     sufficiently considered this."
+
+[Sidenote: The Joint Commission.]
+
+In the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain announced that he had proposed
+to the Transvaal Government that a joint commission should be
+appointed to test the efficacy of the scheme of electoral reform
+embodied in the new Franchise Law. This proposal was set out in detail
+in a despatch already addressed to the High Commissioner, the
+substance of which had been telegraphed[119] to him on the preceding
+day (July 27th). The British Government assumed that "the concessions
+now made to the Uitlanders were intended in good faith to secure to
+them some approach to the equality which was promised in 1881"; they
+proposed that the "complicated details and questions of a technical
+nature" involved in the new law should be discussed in the first
+instance by delegates appointed by the High Commissioner and by the
+South African Republic; and if, and when, a "satisfactory agreement"
+had been reached on these points, they further proposed that all
+disputes as to the terms of the Convention should be settled by a
+"judicial authority, whose independence ... would be above suspicion,"
+and all remaining matters in respect of the political representation
+of the Uitlanders by "another personal Conference" between the High
+Commissioner and President Krueger.
+
+         [Footnote 119: C. 9,518.]
+
+Although the position which the Salisbury Cabinet had now taken up was
+one which placed them beyond the danger of accepting an illusory
+franchise scheme in lieu of an adequate measure of reform, it was not
+the course of action which was best to follow, except from the point
+of view of opening the eyes of the British public. In itself further
+delay was dangerous. It gave the Boers more time to arm, while we, for
+this very reason for which it was necessary to protract the
+negotiations, were prevented from arming vigorously. It discouraged
+our friends in South Africa, and made them even begin to doubt whether
+Great Britain "meant business." It was good policy to offer the Joint
+Inquiry, given the truth of the assumption upon which this offer was
+based--namely, that the Bill represented an honest desire on the part
+of President Krueger to provide a peaceable settlement of the Uitlander
+question. Lord Milner knew, within the limits of human intelligence,
+that this assumption was wholly unwarranted. The Home Government
+apparently did not. As the result of this difference, Lord Milner's
+policy was again deflected to the extent that two months of
+negotiation were devoted to a purely futile endeavour to persuade the
+Pretoria Executive to prove the good faith of a proposal, which was
+never intended to be anything more than a pretext for delay. And, as
+before, the injury to British interests lay in the fact that, while
+the Home Government was prevented from making any adequate use of this
+delay by its determination not to make preparations for war until war
+was in sight, the period was fully utilised by President Krueger, who
+since Bloemfontein had been resolutely hastening the arrangements
+necessary for attacking the British colonies at a given moment with
+the entire burgher forces of the two Republics.
+
+[Sidenote: Krueger urged to accept.]
+
+The offer of the Joint Inquiry was formally communicated to the
+Pretoria Executive in an eminently friendly telegram[120] from Lord
+Milner on August 1st. Efforts were made on all sides to induce
+President Krueger to accept it. Chief Justice de Villiers wrote
+strongly in this sense to Mr. Fischer,[121] and to his brother Melius,
+the Chief Justice of the Free State. Mr. Schreiner telegraphed to Mr.
+Fischer, and Mr. Hofmeyr to President Steyn, both urging that the
+influence of the Free State should be used in favour of the proposal.
+The Dutch Government advised the Republic "not to refuse the English
+proposal";[122] and further informed Dr. Leyds that, in the opinion of
+the German Government, "every approach to one of the Great Powers in
+this very critical moment will be without any results whatever, and
+very dangerous to the Republic."[123] Even the English sympathisers of
+the Boers were in favour of acceptance. Mr. Montagu White, the
+Transvaal Consul-General in London, cabled that "Courtney, Labouchere,
+both our friends, and friendly papers without exception," recommended
+this course; and that "refusal meant war and would estrange friends."
+The letter which he wrote to Mr. Reitz on the same day (August 4th),
+possesses an independent interest, as revealing the degree in which
+the friends of the Boers in England had identified themselves with the
+policy of the Afrikander party in the Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 120: C. 9,518.]
+
+         [Footnote 121: See p. 218 for this letter.]
+
+         [Footnote 122: Cd. 547.]
+
+         [Footnote 123: _Ibid._]
+
+     "The essence of friendly advice," said Mr. White,[124] "is:
+     Accept the proposal in principle, point out how difficult it will
+     be to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to statistics, etc.,
+     and how undesirable it would be to have a miscarriage of the
+     Commission. In other words: Gain as much time as you can, and
+     give the public time here to get out of the dangerous frame of
+     mind which Chamberlain's speeches have created.... Labouchere
+     said to me this morning: 'Don't, for goodness' sake, let Mr.
+     Krueger make his first mistake by refusing this; a little skilful
+     management, and he will give Master Joe another fall.' He further
+     said: 'You are such past-masters of the art of gaining time; here
+     is an opportunity; you surely haven't let your right hands lose
+     their cunning, and you ought to spin out the negotiations for
+     quite two or three months.'"
+
+         [Footnote 124: Cd. 369.]
+
+A week later (August 11th), President Krueger received a telegram[125]
+in which fifty Afrikander members of the Cape Parliament advanced the
+same argument. The acceptance of the Joint Commission, they pointed
+out, would provide a way out of a crisis "which might prove fatal to
+the best interests, not only of our Transvaal and Free State brethren,
+but also of the Afrikander party." They, therefore, begged his Honour
+to "lay their words privately" before the Executive and the Volksraad.
+
+         [Footnote 125: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+[Sidenote: Krueger resolved on war.]
+
+But President Krueger, like Lord Milner, had his eyes fixed upon the
+object. He looked beyond the Afrikander leaders to the rank and file
+of the Dutch population in the British colonies, with whom he had been
+in direct communication through his agents for many months past.[126]
+He knew that any such inquiry as Mr. Chamberlain proposed would
+expose the flagrant insincerity of the Franchise Bill. On August 2nd
+he had telegraphed to President Steyn that compliance with the Joint
+Commission was "tantamount to the destruction of the independence of
+the Republic."[127] To the Dutch Consul-General[128] he was perfectly
+frank: "Defeats such as the English had suffered in the war for
+freedom, and later under Jameson, had never been suffered by the
+Boers." His burghers were ready to "go on the _battue_ of Englishmen,"
+when he gave the word.[129]
+
+         [Footnote 126: It was known to the Intelligence Department
+         that Krueger's secret agents had been in the Cape Colony for
+         two years before the outbreak of war, and that they had
+         distributed arms in certain districts of the Colony.]
+
+         [Footnote 127: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+         [Footnote 128: Cd. 547.]
+
+         [Footnote 129: The expression "Ons wil nou Engelse schiet"
+         was actually used. See Thomas's _Origin of the Anglo-Boer War
+         Revealed_, p. 110.]
+
+[Sidenote: Fischer ceases to "mediate".]
+
+The burghers of the Free State could be counted upon with almost equal
+certainty. Mr. Fischer, a more potent influence than President Steyn,
+had by this time openly dissociated himself from the "mediation"
+policy of the Cape nationalists, and was again (August 4th to 9th) at
+Pretoria. Here he threw himself heart and soul into the work of
+completing the military preparations of the two Republics. On the 6th
+he telegraphed to President Steyn that the draft reply was prepared;
+that it "invited discussion and asked questions to gain time," and
+that, therefore, it "was not yet necessary to deliberate as to calling
+together the Volksraad" for the final decision of peace or war.
+"Military matters, especially artillery," he added, "seem to me very
+faulty. Care will be taken to make all necessary preparations."[130]
+Nor did he leave the Transvaal capital until he had settled the
+details of the invasion of Natal with General Joubert. Indeed, from
+this time onwards to the despatch of the ultimatum--a document which
+came, in its final form, from his pen--Mr. Fischer's part in the
+conduct of the negotiations was second only to that of President
+Krueger. In all he did he displayed the same reasoned determination to
+oppose British supremacy in South Africa which he has exhibited since
+the war in his control of the Bloemfontein _Friend_. Orders for the
+inspection of the commando organisation in the Free State had been
+given before Mr. Fischer had left Bloemfontein; and on his return from
+Pretoria he responded to Mr. Schreiner's urgent and continued
+representations of the desirability of inducing President Krueger to
+accept Mr. Chamberlain's offer, by a request to be informed of any
+probable movements of British forces. Mr. Schreiner's reply, that the
+Free State must ask for such information from the High Commissioner,
+caused him to apply to Mr. Hofmeyr for an explanation of the Cape
+Premier's attitude. The inquiry produced a notable analysis of Mr.
+Schreiner's position.
+
+         [Footnote 130: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+     "Hofmeyr says," Dr. Te Water telegraphed, "that whatever the
+     Premier's feelings or relations to our people are, he is at the
+     same time a minister of the Crown. As such he has on him claims
+     in two directions, of which he is acquitting himself to the best
+     of his ability. He has no control over the movement of troops.
+     You had better come and have a quiet talk. Meanwhile the Free
+     State should surely refrain from an aggressive step."[131]
+
+         [Footnote 131: Secured by the Intelligence Department.]
+
+This well-meant advice was somewhat belated. In reply to a telegram
+from President Steyn, asking whether it was true that the Imperial
+Government was going to send 1,000 men to Bethulie Bridge, Lord Milner
+replied on August 16th, that, "as a matter of fact, no despatch of
+Imperial troops to the borders of the Orange Free State was in
+contemplation." But he added that in view of the much more substantial
+reports of the "importation of large quantities of munitions of war"
+into that State and "the general arming of the burghers," it "would
+not have been unnatural, if such military preparations had been
+responded to by a defensive movement" on the part of the British
+Government.[132] Indeed, the circumstances which had led to Mr.
+Fischer's co-operation in Mr. Hofmeyr's "mediation" were rapidly
+disappearing. The Port Elizabeth Mausers and ammunition were safely
+through the Cape Colony; a further consignment of Mauser ammunition
+arrived at Delagoa Bay (August 16th) in the German steamship
+_Reichstag_ at the very time that these telegrams were passing; and
+both this and other enormous consignments were forwarded to Pretoria a
+fortnight later in spite of an abortive attempt on the part of the
+British Foreign Office to induce the Portuguese authorities to retain
+them. The possession of an adequate supply of ammunition was a matter
+of cardinal importance to which, as we have seen, President Steyn had
+drawn the attention of the Pretoria Executive nearly a month before
+the Bloemfontein Conference. It was these Mauser cartridges that were
+wanted especially, since, without them, the new arm--the splendid
+Mauser magazine rifle--must have been rejected in place of the
+inferior Martini-Henry for which the Boers had long been provided with
+an ample reserve of ammunition.
+
+         [Footnote 132: C. 9,521.]
+
+[Sidenote: Smuts-Greene negotiations.]
+
+[Sidenote: Boer diplomacy.]
+
+In the meantime the British Government was still waiting for a reply
+to its offer of a Joint Inquiry. On August 7th the Volksraad discussed
+the question, and on the 12th a despatch was written by Mr. Reitz
+refusing the offer on the ground that such a proposal was inconsistent
+with the independence of the Republic. It was held back, however,
+until September 1st; that is to say, until the Portuguese authorities
+had allowed the Transvaal ammunition to leave Lorenzo Marques. Then,
+as we shall see, it was forwarded in conjunction with a second
+despatch of September 2nd. The delay was won by a characteristic
+display of "the art of gaining time," in which, as Mr. Labouchere
+remarked, the Boers were past-masters. On the same day that Mr. Reitz
+wrote his despatch (August 12th), Mr. Smuts approached Sir William
+Greene[133] with the offer of a still further simplified seven years'
+franchise in lieu of the Joint Commission. When, however, Sir William
+Greene assured him that the British Government would not accept
+anything less than the Bloemfontein minimum, he subsequently agreed to
+an arrangement of which the main items were: A five years' franchise;
+the workable character of the new law to be secured by the submission
+of its provisions to the British Agent with a legal adviser; and
+increased representation in the Volksraad, together with the use of
+the English language. After communications had passed between Sir
+William Greene, Lord Milner, and Mr. Chamberlain, these proposals,
+with certain reservations, were formally communicated to the British
+Government by Mr. Reitz on August 19th. Two days later a second note
+was forwarded in which the offer contained in the previous note
+(August 19th) was declared to be subject to the acceptance by the
+British Government of two conditions. These conditions--an undertaking
+not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic in the future
+and a specific withdrawal of the claim of suzerainty--amounted in
+effect to a formal renunciation by Great Britain of its position as
+paramount Power in South Africa. In other words, the Pretoria
+Executive had repudiated the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir
+William Greene. Mr. Chamberlain, noticing the material variation
+between the original offer as initialled by Mr. Smuts and forwarded by
+Sir William Greene, and Mr. Reitz's note of August 19th, instructed
+Sir William Greene to obtain an explanation of the discrepancy from
+the Transvaal Government. The reply was a curt rejoinder that there
+was not "the slightest chance of an alteration or an amplification" of
+the terms of the arrangement as set out in the note of the 19th.[134]
+In these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed a reply on August
+28th, in which he accepted the original offer, and rejected the
+impossible conditions subsequently attached to it.[135] The terms of
+settlement thus proposed were in substance the same as those of the
+despatch of July 27th, with the exception that an inquiry by the
+British Agent was substituted for the Joint Commission, and the five
+years' franchise of the Smuts-Greene arrangement was accepted in lieu
+of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad law. The Transvaal
+reply was a further essay in the same useful "art of gaining time." It
+was dated September 2nd, and contained a definite withdrawal of the
+Smuts-Greene offer as embodied in the notes of August 19th and 21st,
+and a vague return to the Joint Commission.
+
+         [Footnote 133: Then Mr. Conyngham Greene. C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 134: C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 135: _Ibid._]
+
+     "Under certain conditions," wrote Mr. Reitz,[136] "this
+     Government would be glad to learn from Her Majesty's Government
+     how they propose that the Commission should be constituted, and
+     what place and time for meeting is suggested."[137]
+
+         [Footnote 136: The despatch was presented to the British
+         Agent, and telegraphed, through the High Commissioner, to the
+         Home Government. Its diplomatic ambiguity was due to Mr.
+         Fischer's influence.]
+
+         [Footnote 137: C. 9,521.]
+
+And this with the consoling promise of a "further reply" to other
+questions arising out of the despatch of July 27th, which the
+Transvaal Government had not yet been able to consider.
+
+The response to this astute document was the last effort of the
+Salisbury Cabinet to arrange a settlement upon the basis of the
+"friendly discussion" inaugurated at Bloemfontein. The British
+Government, Mr. Chamberlain wrote, had "absolutely repudiated" the
+claim, made in the notes of April 16th and May 9th, that the South
+African Republic was a "sovereign international state," and they could
+not, therefore, consider a proposal which was conditional on the
+acceptance of this view of the status of the Republic. They "could not
+now consent to go back to the proposals for which those of the note of
+August 19th were intended as a substitute," since they were "satisfied
+that the law of 1899, in which these proposals were finally embodied,
+was insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial
+representation" of the Uitlanders. They were "still prepared to accept
+the offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the note of August 19th,"
+provided that an inquiry, joint or unilateral as the Transvaal
+Government might prefer, showed that "the new scheme of representation
+would not be encumbered by conditions which would nullify the
+intention to give substantial and immediate representation to the
+Uitlanders." They assumed that "the new members of the Raad would be
+permitted to use their own language." They expressed their belief that
+"the acceptance of these terms would at once remove the tension
+between the two Governments, and would in all probability render
+unnecessary any further intervention" on the franchise question, and
+their readiness--
+
+[Sidenote: A definite demand.]
+
+     "to make immediate arrangements for a further conference between
+     the President of the South African Republic and the High
+     Commissioner to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal
+     of Arbitration, and the questions ... which were neither
+     Uitlander grievances nor questions of interpretation"
+
+of the Convention. And they added that if the reply of the Republic
+was negative or inconclusive, "they would reserve to themselves the
+right to reconsider the situation _de novo_, and to formulate their
+own proposals for a final settlement."[138]
+
+         [Footnote 138: C. 9,521.]
+
+The text of this despatch was telegraphed to Lord Milner late at night
+on September 8th. It was presented to the Transvaal Government on the
+12th, with a request that the reply might reach the British Agent not
+later than midday on the 14th. This limit of time was fixed by Sir
+William Greene on his own initiative, and it was withdrawn by Lord
+Milner's instructions, in order that the Pretoria Executive might not
+be unduly hurried. The Transvaal reply, which was delivered on the
+15th, was a refusal to accept the Smuts-Greene arrangement, re-stated
+by the British Government, as the basis of the franchise reform,
+coupled with a charge of bad faith against Sir William Greene.
+
+It was a cleverly composed document, which owed its diplomatic effect
+in no small degree to Mr. Fischer, who had revised it. It was written
+for publication, since, in Mr. Fischer's opinion, the time had come to
+write despatches which would "justify the Republic in the eyes of the
+world"; and with this end in view it contained the suggestion that the
+British Government was bent upon worrying the Pretoria Executive into
+war.
+
+     "This Government," it explains, "continues to cherish the hope
+     that Her Majesty's Government, on further consideration, will
+     feel itself free to abandon the idea of making the new proposals
+     more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions,
+     and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal
+     for a Joint Commission at first proposed by the Secretary of
+     State for the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, and
+     subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by
+     it."[139]
+
+         [Footnote 139: C. 9,530.]
+
+[Sidenote: Reinforcements sanctioned.]
+
+The British despatch of September 8th represented the united opinion
+of the Cabinet Council which had met on that day to consider the South
+African situation. In sending it, the Government also decided to raise
+the strength of the Natal and Cape forces to the total of 22,000,
+estimated by the War Office as sufficient for defensive purposes, by
+the immediate addition of 10,000 men, of whom nearly 6,000 were to be
+provided by the Indian Army.[140] The despatch itself, definite in
+contents and resolute in tone, was the sort of communication which, in
+Lord Milner's judgment, should have been forwarded to the Transvaal
+Government after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference; and the
+additional troops now ordered out were nothing more than the
+substantial reinforcements for which he had applied in June. The three
+months' negotiations had led the Salisbury Cabinet to the precise
+conclusion which Lord Milner had formed at Bloemfontein. The only hope
+of a peaceable settlement lay in a definite demand, backed by
+preparations for war. But to do this in June, and to do it in
+September, were two very different things. Assuming that diplomatic
+pressure could in any case have availed to secure the necessary
+reforms, it is obvious that, whatever prospect of success attached to
+this course of action--Policy No. 2, as Lord Milner called it--in
+June, was materially diminished in September. During the interval the
+British Government had done practically nothing to improve its
+military position. That of President Krueger had been conspicuously
+improved. He had carried the Free State with him; he had got his
+Mauser ammunition and additional artillery, and he had completed his
+arrangements for the simultaneous mobilisation of the burghers of the
+two Republics. Even now the military action of the British Government
+was confined to preparations for defence; for the order to mobilise
+the army corps was not given until the next Cabinet Council had been
+held on September 22nd. The spirit of Pretoria was very different. The
+commandos were on their way to the Natal border before the reply to
+this British despatch of September 8th was delivered to the British
+Agent. That was President Krueger's real answer--not the diplomatic
+fencing of September 15th.
+
+         [Footnote 140: The despatch of 2,000 additional troops to
+         Natal had been sanctioned on August 2nd, in response to the
+         earnest appeal of the Natal Government. Hence at this time
+         there were (roughly) 12,000 Imperial troops in South Africa.
+         It is noticeable that, although the despatch only reached
+         Lord Milner on the morning of the 9th, the _Cape Argus_ had
+         contained a telegram, giving an account of the troops warned
+         in India and England, on the evening of the 8th.]
+
+[Sidenote: Violence of the Boers.]
+
+More than this, the three months' negotiations had embittered the
+relations of the British and Dutch factions in every South African
+state to such a degree that any compromise of the sort proposed by
+Lord Milner at Bloemfontein was no longer sufficient to effect a
+settlement. The moderate measure of representation then suggested
+would have been rejected now by the Uitlanders as wholly inadequate
+for their protection, in view of the violent antipathy to them and the
+gold industry which the diplomatic struggle had evoked among all
+classes of the Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal. The particulars of
+the outrageous treatment, and still more outrageous threats, to which
+the British Uitlanders were subjected from this time onwards up to
+the ultimatum are to be found in the Blue-books. As early as the
+middle of August, when the Smuts-Greene negotiations had just been
+commenced, Mr. Monypenny, the editor of the Johannesburg _Star_, was
+warned that the Transvaal Government intended to issue a warrant for
+his arrest on a charge of high treason. This intention, postponed
+during the fortnight of delay won by these negotiations, was carried
+out on September 1st, on which day Mr. Pakeman, the editor of the
+_Transvaal Leader_, was secured, while Mr. Monypenny succeeded in
+effecting his escape. This indefensible act was followed by a
+characteristic attempt to disown it, made by Mr. Smuts, the State
+Attorney, the nature of which is sufficiently exhibited in the
+following telegram, despatched by the High Commissioner on September
+4th to the Secretary of State:
+
+     "The charge against Pakeman has been reduced to one under the
+     Press Law of 1896, and he has been admitted to bail. There have
+     been no further arrests. Greene telegraphs as follows:
+
+     "_Begins._--A statement has been published through the Press this
+     morning by the State Attorney 'that no instructions had ever been
+     issued from Pretoria for the arrest of the editors of the
+     _Leader_ or the _Star_.' The facts are as follows: On Friday
+     morning the Public Prosecutor of Johannesburg and Captain Vandam,
+     who had come over from Johannesburg to Pretoria, were interviewed
+     by the State Attorney in his office here. In the afternoon these
+     two officers returned to Johannesburg, and arrested the editor
+     of the _Leader_ the same evening, failing to capture the editor
+     of the _Star_.--_Ends._
+
+     "There is no doubt that the arrest of both editors was decided by
+     the Government and other arrests contemplated, intimidation of
+     Uitlander leaders being the object. The exodus from Johannesburg
+     is taking formidable proportions. Many refugees of all classes
+     have come to Capetown. In Natal there are an even larger number.
+     A good deal of money is being spent on relief."[141]
+
+         [Footnote 141: C. 9,521.]
+
+The violence of the Boers culminated a week before the Ultimatum
+(October 9th-11th) in the wholesale expulsion of the British subjects
+still remaining in the two Republics. Assuming that this measure was
+justifiable on military grounds, there can be no excuse for the brutal
+precipitancy with which it was enforced. It crowded the colonial ports
+with homeless and impoverished fugitives; it inflicted unnecessary
+suffering and pecuniary loss upon inoffensive and innocent
+non-combatants, both European and native; and it was accompanied in
+some instances by displays of wanton cruelty and deliberate spite
+utterly unworthy of a people of European descent.
+
+[Sidenote: Anxiety of High Commissioner.]
+
+Thus it was only when Lord Milner's foresight had been unmistakably
+confirmed by the stern logic of facts that the British Government
+ordered these 10,000 troops to South Africa, 6,000 of whom--the Indian
+contribution--arrived just in time to save Natal from being overrun by
+the Boers. The three weeks preceding the Cabinet Council of September
+8th, at which this decision was arrived at, had been a period of
+intense anxiety for the High Commissioner. With the spectacle of the
+increasing activity of England's enemies, and the increasing dismay of
+England's friends, before his eyes, his protests against the
+inactivity of the Home Government had become more urgent. In the
+middle of August he declared that he could no longer be responsible
+for the administration of South Africa unless he were provided
+immediately with another military adviser. General Forestier-Walker
+was then appointed, and after the departure of General Butler the
+Imperial Government intervened at length to check the further passage
+of munitions of war through the Colony to the Free State.[142] The
+_Norman_, the mail-boat of August 23rd in which Sir William Butler
+sailed for England, took home the masterly despatch[143] in which Lord
+Milner explained the position taken up by him at the Bloemfontein
+Conference, and showed how completely the proposals of the Transvaal
+Government differed from the spirit of the settlement which he had
+then invited President Krueger to accept. In doing so he reviewed the
+whole course of the subsequent negotiations, pointed out the insidious
+character of the last Transvaal proposal (August 19th and 21st), and
+emphatically protested against the suggestion that the Imperial
+Government should barter its rights as paramount Power for "another
+hastily framed franchise scheme," on account of its "superficial
+conformity" with what, after all, was only a single item in the long
+list of questions that must be adjusted before the peaceful progress
+of South Africa would be assured.[144] On August 28th Mr. Schreiner,
+when called to account in the Cape Parliament for having allowed, "in
+the usual course," the Mausers and ammunition for the Free State to
+pass through the Colony, made the strange declaration that in the
+event of war--
+
+         [Footnote 142: Cd. 43.]
+
+         [Footnote 143: C. 9,521.]
+
+         [Footnote 144: This despatch was received on September 8th.
+         Cd. 43.]
+
+     "he would do his very best to maintain [for the Cape Colony] the
+     position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with
+     regard to its forces and with regard to its people."
+
+Three days later (August 31st) Lord Milner sent a still more
+impressive appeal for "prompt and decisive action" on the part of the
+Home Government. The despatch, which was telegraphed, is otherwise
+significant for its account of the situation in Johannesburg:
+
+     "I am receiving representations from many quarters," he said, "to
+     urge Her Majesty's Government to terminate the state of suspense.
+     Hitherto I have hesitated to address you on the subject, lest Her
+     Majesty's Government should think me impatient. But I feel bound
+     to let you know that I am satisfied, from inquiries made in
+     various reliable quarters, that the distress is now really
+     serious. The most severe suffering is at Johannesburg. Business
+     there is at a standstill; many traders have become insolvent, and
+     others are only kept on their legs by the leniency of their
+     creditors. Even the mines, which have been less affected
+     hitherto, are now suffering, owing to the withdrawal of workmen,
+     both European and native. The crisis also affects the trading
+     centres in the Colony. In spite of this, the purport of all the
+     representations made to me is to urge prompt and decided action,
+     not to deprecate further interference on the part of Her
+     Majesty's Government. British South Africa is prepared for
+     extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in order to see the
+     vindication of British authority. It is a prolongation of the
+     negotiations, endless and indecisive of result, that is dreaded.
+     I fear seriously that there will be a strong reaction of feeling
+     against the policy of Her Majesty's Government if matters drag.
+     Please to understand that I invariably preach confidence and
+     patience--not without effect. But if I did not inform you of the
+     increasing difficulty in doing this, and of the unmistakable
+     growth of uneasiness about the present situation, and of a desire
+     to see it terminated at any cost, I should be failing in my
+     duty."[145]
+
+         [Footnote 145: C. 9,521.]
+
+[Sidenote: The crisis in South Africa.]
+
+Indeed, while in England Mr. Chamberlain was remarking (at Highbury,
+August 27th) that he "could not truly say that the crisis was passed,"
+and picturesquely complaining of President Krueger "dribbling out
+reforms like water from a squeezed sponge," every loyalist in South
+Africa knew that the time for words had gone by. On September 6th and
+7th public meetings were held respectively at Maritzburg and
+Capetown, at which resolutions were passed affirming the uselessness
+of continuing the negotiations and the necessity for the prompt action
+of the Imperial Government.
+
+Even this did not exhaust the evidence which was needed to persuade
+the Salisbury Cabinet to make effective preparations for the defence
+of the British colonies. The Cabinet Council of September 8th had
+before it, in addition to the Transvaal note of September 2nd, a
+direct and urgent request[146] for immediate reinforcements from the
+Government of Natal--the loyal colony which, as Lord Milner had
+declared, was to be defended "by the whole force of the empire."
+
+         [Footnote 146: Received on September 6th. Cd. 44.]
+
+These were the circumstances in which the Salisbury Cabinet did in
+September what Lord Milner had advised them to do in June. It is
+impossible to maintain that the British Government had gained anything
+in the way of political results comparable with the fatal loss of
+military strength incurred by the three months' delay. The over-sea
+British did not need to be taught either the justice or the necessity
+of securing citizen rights for the industrial population of the
+Transvaal. Before Lord Milner had been authorised to state that the
+petition of the Uitlanders had been favourably received by the Home
+Government, the citizens of Sydney had recorded in a public meeting
+their "sympathy with their fellow-countrymen in the Transvaal," and
+expressed their hope "that Her Majesty might be pleased to grant the
+prayer of her subjects." Queensland, Victoria, and New South Wales had
+all three offered military contingents by July 21st;[147] the other
+colonies refrained only from a desire not to embarrass the Home
+Government in its negotiations with the Transvaal. Whatever good
+effect was produced upon the public opinion of the continent of Europe
+and the United States of America by the obvious reluctance of the
+British Government to make war upon a puny enemy, was more than
+counterbalanced by the spectacle of a great Power prevented from
+employing the most elementary military precautions by a nice regard
+for the susceptibilities of its political and commercial rivals. The
+idea that the sentiment either of the world at large or of the
+over-sea British would be favourably impressed by the three months of
+futile negotiations was a sheer delusion. It was the people of England
+who had to be educated.
+
+         [Footnote 147: Cd. 18.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Manchester meeting.]
+
+How little they knew of the actual situation in South Africa, and of
+the real character of the Boers may be seen from what happened on
+September 15th. On this day a meeting was held at Manchester to
+protest against the mere idea of England having to make war upon the
+Transvaal. Lord (then Mr.) Courtney "hailed with satisfaction" the
+British despatch of September 8th, which, having been published in the
+Continental papers on the 13th, had appeared a day later (14th) in
+those of Great Britain. "It was a rebuke to the fire-eaters," he
+said, "and a rebuke most of all to one whom I must designate as a lost
+man, a lost mind--I mean Sir Alfred Milner." And Mr. John Morley, like
+Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, was convinced that there was no need of
+any preparations for war; the Transvaal Government "could not withdraw
+from the five years' franchise." The day on which these words were
+uttered was the day on which the note containing President Krueger's
+determination to "withdraw" from the five years' franchise, and his
+refusal even to consider the British offer of September 8th--hailed
+with satisfaction by his old ally, Lord Courtney--was handed to Sir
+William Greene.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE ULTIMATUM
+
+
+The British people were destined to pay a heavy penalty for the
+ignorance and irresolution that caused them to withhold, from June to
+September, the mandate without which the Government was unable to
+prepare for war. What that penalty was will be made sufficiently clear
+when we come to consider the position of grave disadvantage in which
+the British forces designated for the South African campaign were
+placed at the outbreak of the war. For the moment it is enough to
+notice that, just as the real source of the military weakness of
+England in the war was the fact that only a very small proportion of
+her adult male population had received an elementary training in arms,
+so the futility of her peace strategy must be traced to the general
+ignorance of the bitter hatred with which British supremacy was
+regarded, not only by the Boers, but also by the Dutch subjects of the
+Crown in the Cape Colony and Natal. In a world-wide and composite
+State such as the British Empire, it is, of course, natural that the
+people of one component part should be unfamiliar, in a greater or
+lesser degree, with the conditions of any other part. What makes this
+mutual unfamiliarity dangerous is the circumstance that the control of
+the foreign relations, and of the effective military and naval forces,
+of the Empire as a whole, remains exclusively in the hands of the
+people of one part--the United Kingdom. In the absence of any
+administrative body in which the over-sea Britains are represented,
+the power, thus possessed, of moulding the destiny of any one province
+of the Empire lays upon the island people the duty of informing
+themselves adequately upon the circumstances and conditions of all its
+component parts. It is obvious that the likelihood of this duty being
+efficiently performed has been diminished greatly by the extension of
+the franchise. Fortunately, however, in the case of Canada, Australia,
+and New Zealand, questions involving a decision to employ the Army or
+Navy which Great Britain maintains for the defence of the Empire have
+arisen rarely in recent years. It is in regard to India and South
+Africa that these decisions have been constantly required; and for
+half a century past each of these two countries in turn has been the
+battlefield of English parties. But while the efficiency of British
+administration has suffered in both cases by variations of policy due
+to party oscillations, infinitely greater injury has been done in
+South Africa than in India.
+
+[Sidenote: Attitude of the island people.]
+
+In respect of South Africa, while, speaking broadly, Liberal
+Governments have sought to escape from existing responsibilities, or
+to decline new ones, Conservative Governments have sought to
+discharge these responsibilities with the object of making this
+country a homogeneous and self-supporting unit of the empire. To
+persuade the nation to accept a policy which might, and probably
+would, involve it in an immediate sacrifice both of men and money, was
+plainly a more difficult task than to persuade it that no need existed
+for any such sacrifices. The "long view" of the Imperialist statesmen
+was supported in the present instance by past experience and by the
+judgment of the great majority of the British population actually
+resident in South Africa. The home English, remembering that the
+recall of Sir Bartle Frere had been followed by Majuba and the
+Retrocession, were anxious to maintain British supremacy unimpaired in
+South Africa. What kept them irresolute was the uncertainty as to
+whether this supremacy really was, or was not, in danger. Lord Milner
+had told them that the establishment of a Dutch Republic, embracing
+all South Africa, was being openly advocated, and that nothing but a
+striking proof of Great Britain's intention to remain the paramount
+Power--such as would be afforded by insisting upon the grant of equal
+rights to the British population in the Transvaal--could arrest the
+growth of the nationalist movement. He had pointed out also that the
+conversion of the Boer Republic into an arsenal of munitions of war,
+when, as in the case of Ketshwayo, there was no enemy against whom
+these arms could be turned other than Great Britain, was in itself a
+definite and unmistakable menace to British supremacy. This, moreover,
+was the deliberate and reasoned verdict of a man who had been
+commissioned, with almost universal approval, to ascertain the real
+state of affairs in South Africa. If the nation had believed Lord
+Milner in June, the British Government would have received the
+political support that would have enabled it to make the preparations
+for war in that month which, as we have seen, it was now making in
+September.
+
+[Sidenote: The Liberal opposition.]
+
+The agency which, by playing upon the ignorance of the public,
+prevented the nation from accepting at once the truth of Lord Milner's
+verdict, was the Liberal Opposition. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the
+official leader of the Liberal party, maintained throughout the three
+months in question that no reason existed for military preparation.
+Mr. Labouchere wrote, on the eve of the war: "The Boers invade Natal!
+You might just as well talk of their invading England." When Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman maintained that there was no need for the
+Government to make any military preparations, we must presume that he
+believed one of two things: either that President Krueger would yield,
+or that, if President Krueger did not yield, there was nothing in the
+condition of South Africa to make it necessary for Great Britain to
+give any proof of her ability to maintain her position as paramount
+Power by force of arms. The action of the Liberal Opposition resolves
+itself, therefore, into a declaration, on its own authority as against
+Lord Milner's, that neither the republican nor the colonial Dutch had
+any intention of making war upon Great Britain in South Africa, or any
+resources which would enable them to carry out such an intention with
+any hope of success. Now, apart from the overwhelming testimony to the
+utter falsity of this assertion which is afforded by the facts of the
+campaign, and apart from such documents as the manifestos issued by
+both Republics upon the outbreak of the war, we possess--thanks to the
+exertions of the Intelligence Department--a mass of evidence, in the
+shape of private and official correspondence, which enables us to
+learn what was actually passing in the minds of the Dutch at this
+time. On the 15th of this month of September, 1899, the meeting to
+which we have referred[148] was held at Manchester, with the object,
+not of strengthening the hands of the Government in the military
+preparations which they were making thus tardily, but of protesting
+against the very idea that there was anything in the attitude of the
+Dutch in South Africa to make war necessary. A perusal of two of these
+captured documents will enable the reader to judge for himself in what
+degree this Liberal view of the situation corresponded with the facts.
+The first is a letter written on September 25th--that is to say, ten
+days after Lord Courtney was denouncing Lord Milner as "a lost mind"
+at Manchester--by Mr. Blignaut, brother to the State Secretary of the
+Free State. It is concerned with the safe arrival in the Free State of
+a Colonial Afrikander, who has left his home in the Western Province
+of the Cape Colony to join the republican forces:
+
+         [Footnote 148: p. 251.]
+
+[Translation.]
+
+                         "KROONSTADT, ORANGE FREE STATE,
+                              "_September 25th_, 1899.
+
+    "Your wire to hand this morning, to which I
+    replied. ---- has arrived.
+
+    "I never gave the youngster credit for such plans
+    to dodge Mr. ----, and not to be trapped and
+    taken back. I think he owes his friend ---- something
+    for his advice how to proceed. As he is here
+    now, he can remain. I see myself he will never be
+    satisfied to stay there [_i.e._ in the colony] while there
+    is war going on.
+
+    "The only thing we are afraid of now is that
+    Chamberlain, with his admitted fitfulness of temper,
+    will cheat us out of the war, and consequently the
+    opportunity of annexing the Cape Colony and
+    Natal, and forming the Republican United States
+    of South Africa; for, in spite of [S. J. du Toit],
+    we have forty-six thousand fighting men who have
+    pledged themselves to die shoulder to shoulder in
+    defence of our liberty, and to secure the independence
+    of South Africa.
+
+    "Please forward ----'s luggage.
+                                   "J. N. BLIGNAUT."[149]
+
+         [Footnote 149: Cd. 420. The Blue-book points out that in the
+         original "a well-known nick-name" is used for Mr. S. J. du
+         Toit.]
+
+[Sidenote: Afrikander aspirations.]
+
+This is not an isolated or exceptional expression of opinion. It is a
+typical statement of what was in the mind of ninety-nine out of every
+hundred republican nationalists at this time. The aspirations it
+contains were proclaimed a fortnight later to the world by President
+Krueger himself in the boast that his Republic would "stagger
+humanity." They appeared in the nonchalant remarks made a few days
+later by Mr. Gregorowski, the Chief Justice of the Transvaal, in
+bidding farewell to Canon Farmer,[150] who was preparing to leave his
+cure at Pretoria in view of the certainty of war.
+
+         [Footnote 150: As reported by Reuter.]
+
+     "Is it really necessary for you to go? The war will be over in a
+     fortnight. We shall take Kimberley and Mafeking, and give the
+     English such a beating in Natal that they will sue for peace."
+
+War, then, for the Boer meant "an opportunity of annexing the Cape
+Colony and Natal, and forming the Republican United States of South
+Africa." When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley, Lord
+Courtney, Mr. James Bryce, and other Liberal leaders saw no reason why
+the British Government should make military preparations--did, in
+fact, do all in their power to induce the English people to withhold
+the support necessary to allow the British Government to make these
+preparations--there were, twelve thousand British troops in South
+Africa to oppose the "forty-six thousand fighting men who had pledged
+themselves to die shoulder to shoulder" to secure the independence,
+not of the Transvaal but of "South Africa".
+
+And what of the Dutch in the Cape Colony? Our second document will
+enlighten us on this point. It is an invitation, composed in doggerel
+rhyme, to the Boer forces to invade Griqualand West, signed by the
+chairman of a district branch of the Afrikander Bond. The date is not
+given; but as the proclamation under which Head-Commandant C. J.
+Wessels annexed the districts in question is dated November 11th,
+1899, it was obviously written during the first three or four weeks of
+the war.
+
+[Translation.]
+
+     "Dear countrymen of the Transvaal: Brothers of our religion and
+     language: Our hearts are burning for you all: when your brave men
+     fall, we pray to God night and day to help you with His might; we
+     are powerless by ourselves--the English are so angry with us that
+     they have taken away our ammunition, all our powder and
+     cartridges; if you can provide us each with a packet of ten and a
+     Mauser, you will see what we can do; Englishmen won't stand
+     before us, they will go to the devil. There are a few English
+     here, but we count them amongst the dead; for the rest we are all
+     Boers, and only wait for you to move us. Englishmen are not our
+     friends, and we will not serve under their flag; so we all shout
+     together, as Transvaal subjects, 'God save President Krueger, and
+     the Transvaal army; God save President Steyn, and all Free
+     Staters great and small!'"[151]
+
+         [Footnote 151: Cd. 420.]
+
+[Sidenote: Ignorance of Liberal leaders.]
+
+But, apart from this profound misconception of the real feeling and
+intentions of the Afrikander nationalists in South Africa, manifested
+with such disastrous effect during these critical months--June to
+September, 1899--the leaders of the Liberal Opposition otherwise
+displayed in their public utterances an ignorance of this province of
+the Empire that can only be characterised as "wanton." For what
+expression other than "wanton ignorance" can be used to describe the
+habit of mind which permits public men to make statements in direct
+conflict with the facts of South African history, as established by
+ascertainable evidence, or to state as facts allegations which proper
+inquiry would have shown to be untrue? Here again, from a mass of
+material provided by the utterances which came from the Liberal
+Opposition leaders on South African affairs, a few instances only can
+be brought to the notice of the reader, and these in the briefest form
+consistent with precision. On September 5th Mr. John Morley, speaking
+at Arbroath, stated that Sir Bartle Frere had "annexed the Transvaal."
+The present baronet, the late High Commissioner's son, called him to
+account at once; but it required three successive letters[152] to
+wring from Mr. John Morley a specific acknowledgement of his error.
+The evidence which establishes the fact that Frere did not annex the
+Transvaal is the following statement, bearing his signature and
+published in February, 1881:[153]
+
+         [Footnote 152: Published in _The Times_, September 30th,
+         1899.]
+
+         [Footnote 153: In _The Nineteenth Century_ for that month.]
+
+     "It was an act which in no way originated with me, over which I
+     had no control, and with which I was only subsequently
+     incidentally connected.... It was a great question then, as now,
+     whether the annexation was justifiable."
+
+This was on the 5th. On the 27th a letter was published in _The Times_
+in which Sir William Harcourt wrote, in respect of the suzerainty
+question:
+
+     "All further argument is now superfluous, as the matter is
+     decisively disposed of by the publication at Pretoria of Lord
+     Derby's telegram of February 27th, 1884, in which the effect of
+     the London Convention of that date was stated in the following
+     words: 'There will be the same complete independence in the
+     Transvaal as in the Orange Free State.'"
+
+In a letter written on the day following, and published in _The Times_
+of October 2nd, the writer of the present work pointed out, among
+other inaccuracies, that the words actually telegraphed by Lord Derby
+were: "same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in
+Orange Free State." That is to say, before the word "independence" the
+word "internal"--vitally important to the present issue--was inserted
+in the original, and omitted in the Boer version, from which Sir
+William Harcourt had quoted without referring to the Blue-book, Cd.
+4,036.
+
+[Sidenote: Its injurious effect.]
+
+The third instance occurred some three months later. Mr. James Bryce,
+speaking on December 14th, 1899, stated that Sir Bartle Frere "sent
+to govern the Transvaal Sir Owen Lanyon, an officer unfitted by
+training and character for so delicate and difficult a task."[154] The
+following passage, which the present writer subsequently published,
+affords precise and overwhelming evidence of the absolute untruth of
+Mr. Bryce's assertion. It appears in a letter written by Sir Bartle
+Frere on December 13th, 1878, to Mr. (now Sir) Gordon Sprigg, then
+Premier of Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 154: _The Times_, December 15th. Mr. Bryce was
+         taking the chair at the last of a series of six lectures on
+         "England in South Africa," given by the present writer in the
+         great hall of the (then) Imperial Institute.]
+
+     "The Secretary of State has nominated Lanyon to take Shepstone's
+     place whenever he leaves [_i.e._ when Lanyon leaves Kimberley,
+     where he was Administrator of Griqualand West]. This was not my
+     arrangement, and had it been left to me I think I should have
+     arranged otherwise, for while I believe Lanyon to be one of the
+     most right-minded, hardworking, and able men in South Africa, I
+     know he does not fancy the work in the Transvaal, and I think I
+     could have done better. However, it does not rest with me, and
+     all I have to do is to find a man fit to take his place when he
+     leaves."[155]
+
+         [Footnote 155: _Cornhill Magazine_, July, 1900. "The South
+         African Policy of Sir Bartle Frere." By W. Basil Worsfold.]
+
+All of these three men were of Cabinet rank. Two of them, Mr. Morley
+and Mr. Bryce, enjoyed a great and deserved reputation as men of
+letters; and their public utterances on the South African question,
+accepted in large measure on the strength of this literary
+reputation, were responsible in an appreciable degree for the distrust
+and coldness manifested by the people of the United States of America
+towards Great Britain during the first year of the war. But this is a
+consideration of secondary importance. The vital point to recognise is
+that, so long as the Empire remains without a common representative
+council, a knowledge of the conditions of the over-sea Britains must
+be considered as necessary a part of the political equipment of any
+English statesman as a knowledge of Lancashire or of Kent. After the
+war had broken out, Lord Rosebery, almost alone among Liberal
+statesmen, did something to support the Government. This distinguished
+advocate of Imperial unity and national efficiency then recommended
+the English people to educate themselves by reading Sir Percy
+FitzPatrick's _The Transvaal from Within_, and encouraged them by
+declaring his belief that England would "muddle through" this, as
+other wars. It does not seem, however, to have occurred to Lord
+Rosebery that, if he had used his undoubted influence in time to
+prevent his party from making it impossible for the Salisbury Cabinet
+to carry out in June the effective peace strategy long recommended by
+Lord Milner, the prospect of a "muddle" would have been materially
+diminished, if not altogether removed.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's proposal.]
+
+There is one other fact that cannot be overlooked in estimating the
+degree in which the Liberal leaders are answerable to the nation for
+the fatal error of postponing effective military preparations from June
+to September. After the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference Lord
+Milner, as we have seen, asked for immediate and substantial
+reinforcements. Mr. Chamberlain then approached Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman
+with a proposal that the Government should inform the Opposition leaders
+of the circumstances that made military preparations necessary, and of
+the precise measures which they might deem advisable to adopt from time
+to time, on the understanding that the Opposition, on their part, should
+refrain from raising any public discussion as to the expediency of these
+measures. The object of this proposal was, of course, to enable the
+Government to make effective preparations for war, without lessening the
+prospect of achieving a peaceful settlement by the negotiations in
+progress. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's reply to this overture was a
+refusal to make the Opposition a party to any such arrangement. If the
+Government chose to make military preparations they must do so, he said,
+entirely on their own responsibility.
+
+The significance of this refusal of Mr. Chamberlain's offer appears
+from the answer which was subsequently put forward by the Prime
+Minister, the late Lord Salisbury, to the charge of "military
+unpreparedness" brought against the British Government after the early
+disasters of the campaign. What prevented the Cabinet, according to
+the Premier, from taking the measures required by the military
+situation in June was the British system of popular government. Any
+preparations on the scale demanded by Lord Milner and Lord Wolseley
+could not have been set on foot without provoking the fullest
+discussion in Parliament and the Press. The leaders of the Opposition
+would have contested fiercely the proposals of the Government, and the
+perversion of these opportunities for discussion into an anti-war
+propaganda might have exhibited England as a country divided against
+itself. It may be questioned whether, in point of fact, the Liberal
+leaders could have done anything more calculated to injure the
+interests of their country if the Government had mobilised the army
+corps, and despatched the ten thousand defensive troops in June, than
+they did when these measures were postponed until September. But,
+however this may be, the circumstance that this proposal was made by
+Mr. Chamberlain, and refused by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, is
+noteworthy both as an indication of the spirit of lofty patriotism of
+which the Salisbury Cabinet, in spite of its initial error, was
+destined to give more than one proof in the course of the war and as
+an example of a method of escaping from the injurious results of a
+well-recognised defect in the democratic system of government--a
+method which, it is not unreasonable to hope, may be employed with
+success should the like occasion arise at any future time.
+
+This, then, was the state of affairs in England. The Opposition
+throughout the negotiations was proclaiming that war was out of the
+question, and that preparations for war were altogether unnecessary.
+The people, being ignorant of the progress which the nationalist
+movement in South Africa had made, were irresolute, and withheld from
+the Government the support without which it could not make adequate
+military preparations, except at the risk of defeat in Parliament and
+possible loss of office.
+
+[Sidenote: Objects of Afrikander policy.]
+
+What was the position in South Africa? Above all, what was the
+position of the man whose duty it was "to take all such measures and
+do all such things" as were necessary for the safety of the subjects
+of the Crown and for the maintenance of British interests? The
+ignorance of South Africa that led to the partial paralysis of the
+Government was in no sense attributable to him. The broad fact that
+the Afrikander nationalist[156] movement had made the moral supremacy
+of the Dutch complete was declared by Lord Milner, during his visit to
+England in the winter of 1898-9, to the Colonial Secretary and other
+members of the Salisbury Cabinet. His verdict that nothing but prompt
+and energetic action on the part of the Imperial Government could keep
+South Africa a part of the Empire was publicly made known (so far as
+he was concerned) in his despatch of May 4th, 1899, which was
+withheld, however, from publication until June 14th. The Bloemfontein
+Conference was a device of the Afrikander nationalists at the Cape to
+avert a military conflict between the South African Republic and Great
+Britain, which, they believed, would result not merely in the
+destruction of the Republics, but in the loss of the prospect--which
+they then enjoyed--of achieving through the existence of the Republics
+the independence of the Afrikander nation as a whole. All this Lord
+Milner made perfectly clear to Mr. Chamberlain. The illusory
+concessions embodied in President Krueger's Franchise Law were yielded
+by the Republics with the object of securing the "moral support" of
+the Cape Afrikanders in the negotiations, and thereby obtaining the
+delay which was required to complete their military preparations;
+since the Republican nationalists, unlike those of the Cape, believed
+that the independence of the Afrikander nation could be wrested from
+Great Britain by force of arms. The efforts made by the Cape
+nationalists, first to secure these concessions, and then to induce
+the republican nationalists to grant the further concessions which
+would have satisfied the British Government, were made for the same
+purpose as the Bloemfontein Conference had been arranged--namely, to
+avert a conflict which, being premature, would be disastrous to the
+nationalist cause, not only in the Republics but in the Cape Colony.
+The respective objects both of the republican and Cape nationalists
+had been divined by Lord Milner, and, therefore, immediately after the
+failure of the Conference, he had urged the Home Government to send
+reinforcements to South Africa sufficient to defend British territory
+from attack, and to check any incipient rebellion in the Cape Colony.
+The negotiations might, or might not, result in a peaceful settlement;
+but it was futile, nay more, it was dangerous, he said, for Great
+Britain to go on as though war were out of the question.
+
+         [Footnote 156: The reader is referred to p. 5 in Chap. I. for
+         the racial characteristics of the South African Dutch, and to
+         the note on p. 48 in Chap. II. for the political significance
+         of the word "Afrikander," as stated by Mr. S. J. du Toit.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's position.]
+
+This was the view of the South African situation which Lord Milner
+laid before the Home Government in June. We have seen what was done by
+them in response to these representations. Some special service
+officers were sent out to organise locally the defences of the Cape
+Colony and Rhodesia. The Cape and Natal garrisons were strengthened by
+a few very inadequate reinforcements arriving in the course of the
+next two months. General Butler was not recalled until the latter part
+of August; his successor, General Forestier-Walker, did not arrive
+until September 6th. We have traced the causes which made it
+impossible for the Imperial Government, as they conceived, to do more
+than this; and when in due course we come to consider the broad phases
+of the war, the nature of the penalty which the British Army, and the
+British nation, had to pay for the partial paralysis of the Government
+will become sufficiently apparent.
+
+The man who suffered most by all this was Lord Milner. When he asked
+for military preparations, he was told that he could not have them.
+When he asked for the removal of a military adviser with whom he was
+supremely dissatisfied, he was told that he must put up with General
+Butler for a little longer. He put up with him for two months. His
+Colonial ministers, whose advice on many points he was bound to accept
+so long as he did not dismiss them, were men placed in office by the
+Dutch subjects of the Crown for the very purpose of frustrating, by
+constitutional means, the successful intervention in the Transvaal, by
+which alone, in his opinion, British supremacy could be made a
+reality.
+
+Indeed, the odds were heavily against Lord Milner in his task of
+saving England, in spite of herself and in spite of the enemies of
+whose power she was wholly ignorant, and to whose very existence she
+remained contemptuously indifferent. To the great mass of the British
+population in South Africa, he stood for England and English justice.
+To them he seemed the representative man, for whom they had waited
+many a long year. They felt that he was fighting their battle and
+doing their work; and, making allowance for local jealousies and
+accidental partialities, they never ceased to regard him thus. This
+was his one and only source of assured support. But he was far removed
+from the active British centres: from the group of towns formed by
+the Albany settlers and their descendants in the Eastern Province, and
+from Kimberley, Durban and Maritzburg, and Johannesburg. In the Cape
+peninsula, of course, there was a considerable British population of
+professional and commercial men; but this population had been so
+closely related by business and social ties with the preponderant
+Dutch population of the Western Province that many among them
+hesitated to declare themselves openly against the Dutch party. All
+who were members of the Progressive party, from the time of the Graaf
+Reinet speech, had given unswerving support to Lord Milner's policy;
+but the strength of the influence created by years of alternate
+political co-operation with the Bond leaders may be gathered from the
+fact that even so staunch a supporter of the British connection as Sir
+James (then Mr.) Rose Innes did not publicly declare his adhesion to
+the intervention policy until after the failure of the Bloemfontein
+Conference. Moreover, the increasing political solidarity of the
+British population in the Cape Colony augmented the bitterness with
+which the few English politicians, who had remained in alliance with
+the Dutch party, regarded the man whose resolution and insight had
+penetrated and exposed the designs of the Bond.
+
+[Sidenote: Intrigues and disaffection.]
+
+It is difficult to convey any adequate impression of the atmosphere of
+suspicion and intrigue by which Lord Milner was surrounded. The Dutch
+party was in the ascendant in the Colony. The Cape Civil Service was
+tainted throughout with disaffection. Even the _personnel_ of the
+Government offices at Capetown, although it contained many excellent
+and loyal men, included also many who were disaffected or lukewarm. It
+is characteristic of the situation that during the most critical
+period of the negotiations with the Transvaal, the ministerial organ,
+_The South African News_, permitted itself to indulge, where Lord
+Milner, was concerned, not only in the bitterest criticisms but in
+outspoken personal abuse. To have abused the representative of the
+Sovereign in a British colony of which one-half of the population was
+seething with sedition, while a part had been actually armed for
+rebellion by the secret emissaries of a state with which Great Britain
+was on the verge of war, is an act which admits of only one
+interpretation. Lord Milner was to be got rid of at all costs; for the
+policy which _The South African News_ was intended to promote was that
+not of Great Britain, but of the Transvaal. The paper was directly
+inspired--it is indeed not unlikely that the articles themselves were
+written--by some of the members of the Ministry, Lord Milner's
+"constitutional advisers," whom throughout he himself treated with the
+respect to which their position entitled them.
+
+But nothing, perhaps, shows more vividly how extraordinary was the
+position in which Lord Milner found himself than the fact, which we
+have already noted, that the passage of the large consignment of 500
+Mauser rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges for the Free State, to which
+the Prime Minister's attention was "drawn specially, because it was
+large," on July 15th, was not made known to him, the Governor of the
+Cape Colony, until August 9th, and then only by accident.[157] There
+is only one explanation of this remarkable incident: the interests of
+the Dutch party were different from those of the British Government.
+The Cape Colony was only in name a British colony. Under the guise of
+constitutional forms it had attained independence--virtual, though not
+nominal. If Lord Milner had contracted the habit of Biblical quotation
+from the Afrikander leaders, he might well have quoted the words of
+the psalmist: "Many bulls have compassed me; strong bulls of Bashan
+have beset me round."[158] Even the approaches to Government House
+were watched by spies in President Krueger's pay, who carefully noted
+all who came and went. Members of the Uitlander community were the
+special subjects of this system of espionage.
+
+         [Footnote 157: See letters between Lord Milner and Mr.
+         Schreiner in Cd. 43, p. 13.]
+
+         [Footnote 158: Psalm xxii. 12.]
+
+[Sidenote: Spies round Government House.]
+
+     "When on a visit to Capetown," writes Sir Percy FitzPatrick, "I
+     called several times upon the High Commissioner, and learning, by
+     private advice, that my movements were being reported in detail
+     through the Secret Service Department, I informed Sir Alfred
+     Milner of the fact. Sir Alfred admitted that the idea of secret
+     agents in British territory and spies round or in Government
+     House was not pleasant, but expressed the hope that those things
+     should not deter those who wished to call on him, as he was there
+     as the representative of Her Majesty for the benefit of British
+     subjects, and very desirous of ascertaining for himself the facts
+     of the case."[159]
+
+         [Footnote 159: _The Transvaal from Within_, p. 287.]
+
+The Afrikander leaders in the Cape never identified themselves with
+the British cause. To them the Salisbury Cabinet was a "team most
+unjustly disposed towards us"; a team, moreover, which they earnestly,
+and not without reason, hoped might be replaced by a Liberal
+Government that would allow them undisturbed to carry forward their
+plans to full fruition. The motive of their "mediation," such as it
+was, was political expediency. It was not from any belief in the
+justice of the British claims that they endeavoured to persuade the
+republican nationalists to give way; still less from any feeling that
+England's cause was their cause. When, at length, they became really
+earnest in pressing President Krueger to grant a "colourable" measure
+of franchise reform--to use Mr. Merriman's adjective--it was for their
+own sake, and not for England's, that they worked. This motive runs
+through the whole of their correspondence; but it emerges more frankly
+in the urgent messages sent during the three days (September 12th to
+15th) in which the Transvaal reply to the British despatch of
+September 8th was being prepared. "Mind," telegraphs Mr. Hofmeyr to
+Mr. Fischer on September 13th, "war will probably have a fatal effect
+on the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Afrikander party." And
+when, from Mr. Fischer's reply, war was seen to have come in spite of
+all his counsels of prudence, the racial tie asserted itself, and he
+found consolation for his impotence in an expression of his hatred
+against England. On September 14th Mr. Hofmeyr telegraphed to
+President Steyn:
+
+     "I suppose you have seen our wires to Fischer and his replies,
+     which latter I deeply regret. The 'to be or not to be' of the
+     Transvaal, Free State, and our party at the Cape, depends upon
+     this decision. The trial is a severe one, but hardly so severe as
+     the outrageous despatches received by Brand from [Sir Philip]
+     Wodehouse and [Sir Henry] Barkly. The enemy then hoped that Brand
+     would refuse, as the Transvaal's enemy now hopes Krueger will do;
+     but Brand conceded, and saved the State. Follow Brand's example.
+     Future generations of your and my people will praise you."
+
+[Sidenote: Hofmeyr's "bitter feelings".]
+
+And on the 15th:
+
+     "You have no conception of my bitter feelings, which can hardly
+     be surpassed by that of our and your people, but the stronger my
+     feelings the more I am determined to repress them, when
+     considering questions of policy affecting the future weal or woe
+     of our people. May the Supreme Being help you, me, and them. Have
+     not seen the High Commissioner for weeks."
+
+The reply of the republican nationalists, addressed to Mr. Hofmeyr
+and forwarded through President Steyn, contains a characteristically
+distorted version of the course of the negotiations. They have made
+concession after concession, but all in vain. "However much we
+recognise and value your kind intentions," they write, "we regret that
+it is no longer possible for us to comply with the extravagant and
+brutal requests of the British Government." Thus the Pretoria
+Executive declared themselves on September 15th, 1899, to the Master
+of the Bond, when they were in the act of refusing Mr. Chamberlain's
+offer to accept a five years' franchise bill, provided it was shown by
+due inquiry to be a genuine measure of reform. Very different was the
+account of the same transaction given by Mr. Smuts, when, in urging
+the remnant of the burghers of both Republics to surrender, he said,
+on May 30th, 1902, at Vereeniging, "I am one of those who, as members
+of the Government of the South African Republic, _provoked the war
+with England_". But the passage in this document which is most useful
+to the historian is that in which the republican nationalists remind
+the Afrikander leaders at the Cape of the insincerity of their
+original "mediation." In dialectics Mr. Fischer, Mr. Smuts, and Mr.
+Reitz are quite able to hold their own with Mr. Hofmeyr, Dr. Te Water,
+and Mr. Schreiner. They have not forgotten the Cape Prime Minister's
+precipitate benediction alike of President Krueger's Bloemfontein
+scheme and of the seven years' franchise of the Volksraad proposals.
+They remember also how the "Hofmeyr compromise" was proclaimed in the
+Bond and the ministerial press as affording conclusive evidence of the
+"sweet reasonableness" of President Krueger and his Executive. And so
+they remark, "We are sorry not to be able to follow your advice; but
+we point out that you yourself let it be known that we had your whole
+approval, if we gave the present franchise as we were doing."[160]
+Here we have the kernel of the whole matter. A nine years', seven
+years', or a five years' franchise was all one to the Cape
+Nationalists, provided only that England was kept a little longer from
+claiming her position as paramount Power in South Africa. For these
+men knew, or thought they knew, that for England "a little longer"
+would be "too late."
+
+         [Footnote 160: This document was among those secured by the
+         Intelligence Department, and published in _The Times History
+         of the War_.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner and Mr. Schreiner.]
+
+It was a greater achievement to have frustrated so subtle a
+combination, directed by the astute mind of Mr. Hofmeyr--the man who
+refused to allow his passions to interfere with his policy--than to
+have prevented the British Government from falling a victim to the
+coarse duplicity of President Krueger. Tireless effort and consummate
+statesmanship alone would not have accomplished this purpose. To these
+qualities Lord Milner added a personal charm, elusive, and yet
+irresistible; and it was this "union of intellect with fascination,"
+of which Lord Rosebery had spoken,[161] that enabled him to transcend
+the infinite difficulty of his official relationship to Mr. Schreiner.
+Even so that relationship must have broken down under the strain of
+the negotiations and the war, had not Mr. Schreiner's complex
+political creed included the saving clause of allegiance to his
+sovereign. When once the British troops had begun to land Mr.
+Schreiner accepted the new situation. No longer merely the
+parliamentary head of the Dutch party and the agent of the Bond, he
+realised also his responsibility as a minister of the Crown. None the
+less there were matters of the gravest concern in which, both before
+and after the ultimatum, the Prime Minister used all the
+constitutional means at his disposal to oppose Lord Milner. When, upon
+the arrival (August 5th) of the small additions to the Cape garrison
+ordered out in June, Lord Milner determined to draw the attention of
+the Ministry to the exposed condition of the Colony, he found that the
+Prime Minister's views differed completely from his own. A few days
+later he addressed a minute to his ministers on the subject of the
+defence of Kimberley and other military questions. From this time
+onwards, in almost daily battles, Mr. Schreiner resisted the plans of
+local military preparation which Lord Milner deemed necessary for the
+protection of the Colony. His object, as he said, was to keep the Cape
+Colony out of the struggle.[162] On Friday, September 8th, when in
+London the Cabinet Council was held at which it was decided to send
+out the 10,000 troops to reinforce the South African garrison, at
+Capetown Lord Milner was engaged in a long endeavour to persuade his
+Prime Minister that it was necessary to do something for the defence
+of Kimberley.[163] Up to the very day on which the Free State
+commandos crossed the border, Mr. Schreiner relied upon the definite
+pledge given him by President Steyn that the territory of the Cape
+Colony would not be invaded; and not until that day was he undeceived.
+
+         [Footnote 161: See p. 77.]
+
+         [Footnote 162: In the House of Assembly, August 28th.]
+
+         [Footnote 163: One of the earliest measures of precaution
+         which Lord Milner desired was a plan for the defence of
+         Kimberley. But when, on June 12th, the people of Kimberley
+         requested the Government of the Colony to take steps for the
+         protection of their town, the reply which they received,
+         through the Civil Commissioner, was this: "There is no reason
+         whatever for apprehending that Kimberley is, or in any
+         contemplated event will be, in danger of attack, and Mr.
+         Schreiner is of opinion that your fears are groundless and
+         your anticipations without foundation."]
+
+[Sidenote: Schreiner and Steyn.]
+
+     "I said to the President," he declared in the Cape Parliament a
+     year later,[164] "that I would not believe he would invade south
+     of the Orange River.[165] President Steyn's reply was, 'Can you
+     give me a guarantee that no troops will come to the border?' Of
+     course, I could give no such guarantee, and I did not then
+     believe that, although such a guarantee could not be given, the
+     Free State would invade British territory with the object of
+     endeavouring to promote the establishment of one Republic in
+     South Africa, as the Prime Minister[166] has said."
+
+         [Footnote 164: September 24th, 1900.]
+
+         [Footnote 165: This was on October 11th, 1899--the day on
+         which the ultimatum expired.]
+
+         [Footnote 166: Sir Gordon Sprigg--Mr. Schreiner's Ministry
+         was replaced by a Progressive Ministry in June, 1900.]
+
+As the Boer invasion spread further into the Colony Mr. Schreiner
+receded proportionately from his original standpoint of neutrality.
+Indeed, three distinct phases in the Prime Minister's progress can be
+distinguished. In the first stage, which lasted until the actual
+invasion of the Colony by the Boer commandos, he used all his
+constitutional power to prevent the people of the Colony, British and
+Dutch alike, from being involved in the war: and it was only after a
+severe struggle that Lord Milner prevailed upon him even to call out
+the Kimberley Volunteers on October 2nd, _i.e._, a week before the
+Ultimatum. This, "the neutrality" stage, lasted up to the invasion.
+After the invasion came the second stage, in which Mr. Schreiner seems
+to have argued to himself in this manner: "As the Boers have invaded
+this colony, I, as Prime Minister, cannot refuse that the local forces
+should be called out to protect its territory." And so on October
+16th, after Vryburg had gone over to the Boers, after Kimberley had
+been cut off, and the whole country from Kimberley to Orange River was
+in the hands of the enemy, he consented to the issue of a proclamation
+calling out 2,000 volunteers for garrison duty within the Colony.[167]
+But in making this tardy concession he was careful to point out to
+Lord Milner that the British cause would lose more than it would gain.
+"I warn you," he said in effect, "that it is not to your advantage;
+because you are the weaker party. In the Cape Colony more men will
+fight for the Boers than will fight for you." The third stage in Mr.
+Schreiner's conversion was reached when, in November, 1899, the
+invading Boers had advanced to the Tembuland border, in the extreme
+east of the Colony. Then Mr. Schreiner allowed the natives to be
+called out for the defence of their own territory. In making this
+final concession the Prime Minister yielded to the logic of facts in a
+matter concerning which he had previously offered a most stubborn
+resistance to the Governor's arguments.
+
+         [Footnote 167: With this may be compared the fact that in
+         Natal the whole of the local forces were mobilised on
+         September 29th for active service. The dates upon which
+         further units of the Cape local forces were called out are as
+         follows: Uitenhage Rifles and Komgha Mounted Rifles, November
+         10th; Cape Medical Staff Corps, November 16th; and Frontier
+         Mounted Rifles, November 24th.]
+
+[Sidenote: Schreiner and local forces.]
+
+For in the discussion of the measures urged by Lord Milner as
+necessary for the protection of the Colony, the question of arming the
+natives and coloured people had necessarily arisen. The Bastards in
+the west and the Tembus in the east were known to be eager to defend
+the Queen's country against invasion. Mr. Schreiner declared that to
+arm the natives was to do violence to the central principle upon which
+the maintenance of civilisation in South Africa was based--the
+principle that the black man must never be used to fight against the
+white. Lord Milner did not question the validity of this principle;
+but he maintained--and rightly, as Mr. Schreiner admitted subsequently
+by his action in the case of the Tembu frontier--that it could not be
+applied to the case in question. "If white men," he said, "will go and
+invade the territory of the blacks, then the blacks must be armed to
+repel the invasion."
+
+The change which came over Mr. Schreiner's attitude, due, no doubt,
+partly to his gradual enlightenment as to the real aims of the
+republican nationalists, but also to the skilful use which Lord Milner
+made of that enlightenment, may be traced in the following contrasts.
+Before the Boer invasion he refused to call out the local forces of
+the Colony even for purposes of defence;[168] afterwards he not only
+sanctioned the employment of these forces in the Colony, but allowed
+them to take part in Lord Roberts' advance upon Bloemfontein and
+Pretoria. Before the invading Boers, having already possessed
+themselves of the north-eastern districts of Cape Colony, began to
+threaten the purely native territories to the south, he would not hear
+of the natives being armed for their own protection. But when the
+Boers had actually reached the borders of Tembuland he consented. In
+his advice to the Cape Government, no less than in that which he gave
+to the Home Government, Lord Milner was shown to be in the right. In
+both cases he urged an effective preparation for war. In both the
+measures which he advised were ultimately taken; but taken only when
+they had lost all their power as a means of promoting peace, and half
+of their efficacy as a contribution to the rapid and successful
+prosecution of the war. In both cases Lord Milner was able, in the
+face of unparalleled obstacles, to secure just the minimum preparation
+for war which stood between the British Empire and overwhelming
+military disaster.
+
+[Footnote 168: The Kimberley and Mafeking Volunteers were called out
+at the last moment, but actually before the war broke out; but the
+safety of both these places was imperilled by the refusal, or delay,
+of the colonial Government to supply them with guns.]
+
+We have observed the position in Great Britain, and found that the
+root cause of the impotence of the Home Government was the nation's
+ignorance of South Africa. In the Cape Colony the evil was of a
+different order. Lord Milner, although High Commissioner for South
+Africa, had within the Colony only the strictly limited powers of a
+constitutional governor. The British population were keenly alive to
+the necessity for active preparations for the defence of their
+country; were, indeed, indignant at the refusal of the Schreiner
+Cabinet to allow the local forces to be called out: but the Dutch
+party was in office, the Bond was "loyal," Mr. Schreiner was a
+minister of the Crown, and the most that the Governor could do was to
+urge upon his ministers the measures upon the execution of which he
+had no power to insist.
+
+[Sidenote: Seven years after.]
+
+The best comment upon this strange situation is that which is afforded
+by a passage in Lord Milner's speech in the House of Lords on February
+26th, 1906. Seven years have gone by, and the great proconsul has
+returned to England. He is drawn from his much-needed rest by a sudden
+danger to the country which he has kept a part of the Empire. The
+Unionist Government has fallen, and a Liberal Government has been
+placed in power. He is warning this Government of the danger of a
+premature grant of responsible government to the Orange River Colony.
+
+     "What is going to happen under responsible government? It is more
+     than probable, it is, humanly speaking, certain, that the persons
+     to whom I have referred will form a large majority, if not almost
+     the whole, of that first elected Parliament of the Orange River
+     Colony to which, from the first hour of its existence, the whole
+     legislative and executive power in that colony is to be
+     entrusted. I do not suggest that they will begin by doing
+     anything sinister. All forms will be duly observed; as why should
+     they not be? It will be perfectly possible for them, with the
+     most complete constitutional propriety, little by little to
+     reverse all that has been done, and gradually to get rid of the
+     British officials, the British teachers, the bulk of the British
+     settlers, and any offensive British taint which may cling to the
+     statute-book or the administration. I can quite understand that,
+     from the point of view of what are known as the pro-Boers, such a
+     result is eminently desirable. They thought the war was a crime,
+     the annexation a blunder, and they think to-day that the sooner
+     you can get back to the old state of things the better. I say I
+     quite understand that view, though I do not suppose it is shared
+     by His Majesty's ministers, or, at any rate, by all of them. What
+     I cannot understand is how any human being, not being a pro-Boer,
+     can regard with equanimity the prospect that the very hand which
+     drafted the ultimatum of October, 1899,[169] may within a year be
+     drafting 'Ministers' Minutes' for submission to a British
+     Governor who will have virtually no option but to obey them. What
+     will be the contents of those minutes, I wonder? As time goes on
+     it may be a proposal for dispensing with English as an official
+     language, or a proposal for the distribution to every country
+     farmer of a military rifle and so many hundred cartridges, in
+     view of threatened danger from the Basutos."
+
+         [Footnote 169: Mr. Fischer. See forward, p. 291.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Just reminiscences".]
+
+So far Lord Milner had dealt with the Orange River Colony. Then he let
+his thoughts range back to these months of his great ordeal.
+
+     "I think I can see the Governor just hesitating a little to put
+     his hand to such a document. In that case I think I can hear the
+     instant low growl of menace from Press and platform and pulpit,
+     the hints of the necessity of his recall, and the answering
+     scream from the pro-Boer Press of Britain against the ruthless
+     satrap, ignorant of constitutional usage and wholly
+     misunderstanding his own position, who dared to trample upon the
+     rights of a free people. I may be told, I know I shall be told,
+     that such notions are the wild imaginings of a disordered brain,
+     that these are theoretical possibilities having no relation to
+     fact or to probability. _My Lords, they are not imaginings. They
+     are just reminiscences._
+
+     "I know what it is to be Governor of a self-governing colony,
+     with the disaffected element in the ascendant. I was bitterly
+     attacked for not being sufficiently submissive under the
+     circumstances. Yet, even with the least submissive Governor, the
+     position is so weak that strange things happen. It was under
+     responsible government, and in the normal working of responsible
+     government, that 1,000,000 cartridges were passed through Cape
+     Colony, on the eve of the war, to arm the people who were just
+     going to attack us, and that some necessary cannon were stopped
+     from being sent to a defenceless border town,[170] which directly
+     afterwards was besieged, and which, from want of these cannon,
+     was nearly taken."[171]
+
+         [Footnote 170: Kimberley.]
+
+         [Footnote 171: _The Times_, February 27th, 1906.]
+
+Thus, six and a half years later, Lord Milner spoke of these months of
+_Sturm und Drang_ in the calm and passionless atmosphere of the House
+of Lords.
+
+From Bloemfontein to the ultimatum, the British flag in South Africa
+was stayed upon the "inflexible resolution" of one man. Two months
+later, when the army corps was all but landed, the English at the Cape
+gave speech. Then Sir David Gill's words at the St. Andrew's Day
+celebration of November 30th, 1890 came as a fresh breeze dispersing
+the miasmic humours of some low-lying, ill-drained plain.
+
+[Sidenote: What the loyalists thought.]
+
+     "In the history of the British colonies," he said, "no Governor
+     has ever been placed in greater difficulties. In spite of a
+     support of the most shamelessly feeble character, and in spite of
+     a want of understanding at home, His Excellency has not only had
+     to originate and carry out a policy, but he has had to instruct
+     the whole nation in the dangers which threatened; and the means
+     which were necessary to remove that danger.
+
+     "When His Excellency came to this colony he found it honeycombed
+     with sedition. He found a canting loyalty, which aimed at the
+     overthrow of British supremacy in this colony, and not only in
+     this colony, but in South Africa as well.... There have been a
+     mighty lot of misunderstandings in this country, a mighty lot of
+     mealy-mouthed loyalty, that did not mean loyalty at all, and a
+     mighty working to overthrow the power of Englishmen (and
+     Scotchmen) in this country--first of all to bring them into
+     contempt with the native population; secondly, to deprive them of
+     all political power; and thirdly, to deprive them of all material
+     power.... We have a minister who has gone to the front,[172] but
+     it is a remarkable fact that since that minister has gone to the
+     front the accessions of colonists to the ranks of the rebels have
+     been tenfold greater than they were before he went. It is in the
+     face of these innumerable difficulties that Sir Alfred Milner has
+     carried out his work."
+
+         [Footnote 172: Mr. J. W. Sauer. The reference is (in Lord
+         Milner's words) to Mr. Sauer's "well-meant but unsuccessful
+         mission to Dordrecht, which was immediately followed by
+         rebellion in that district." The facts, as fully disclosed a
+         year later, are these. On November 23rd, 1899, Mr. Sauer held
+         a meeting at Dordrecht to dissuade the Dutch subjects of the
+         Crown in the Wodehouse Division of the Colony from joining in
+         the rebellion. As the result of this meeting a deputation was
+         sent to the Commandant of the Boer invading-force, Olivier,
+         who was at Barkly East, desiring him not to come to
+         Dordrecht. On November 27th another meeting was held (also
+         addressed by Mr. Sauer) and a second deputation of the
+         inhabitants waited upon Olivier. The sequel is revealed in
+         the telegram despatched the following day (November 28th) by
+         the Boer Commandant to the Secretary, the War Commission,
+         Bloemfontein: "... To-day already I received the second
+         deputation from Dordrecht not to come to Dordrecht. This is
+         asked officially, but privately they say that this is also a
+         blind, and that we must come at once...." On December 2nd
+         Olivier was received with open arms at Dordrecht. It was in a
+         district where, in the Boer Commandant's words, "the
+         Afrikanders were rejoicing, and joining the commandos was
+         universal."--Cd. 420, p. 108 and p. 96; Cd. 43, p. 221; and
+         Cd. 261, p. 126.]
+
+This is how it struck a distinguished man of science, and one who was
+qualified, moreover, by a residence at the Cape which dated back to
+the days of the Zulu War, to understand the full significance of what
+was going on around him.
+
+In July and August, President Krueger was winning all along the line.
+The Home Government was kept harmless and inactive by the Franchise
+Bill; the Cape Government tied the hands of the High Commissioner;
+supplies of arms and ammunition were pouring in, the temper of the
+burghers in both republics was rising, foreign military officers and
+M. Leon of the Creuzot Works had arrived; in short, the military
+preparations of four years were consummated without let or hindrance.
+September was less exclusively favourable to the republican cause. On
+September 8th, as we have seen, the Salisbury Cabinet determined to
+send out the defensive forces for which Lord Milner had asked three
+months before. Sir William Butler had been recalled; and General
+Forestier-Walker did all in his power to carry out the measures urged,
+and in most cases actually devised, by Lord Milner for the effective
+employment of the few thousand Imperial troops at his disposal. On the
+18th and 19th the Lancashire regiment was sent up-country from
+Capetown--half to garrison Kimberley, and half to hold the bridge that
+carried the main trunk line over the Orange River on its way
+northwards to Kimberley and then past the Transvaal border to
+Rhodesia. In doing this, however, Lord Milner was careful to point out
+to President Steyn that no menace was intended to the Free State,
+which, "in case of war with the Transvaal Her Majesty's Government
+hoped would remain neutral, and the neutrality of which would be most
+strictly respected." Such excellent use was made by Lord Milner of the
+six weeks which elapsed between the recall of General Butler and the
+ultimatum (October 9th-11th), that the handful of regulars dotted down
+before the Free State border of the colony, and skilfully distributed
+at strategic points upon the railways, sufficed to keep President
+Steyn's commandos from penetrating south of the Orange River, until
+the army corps had begun to disembark at the Cape ports. On this, as
+on another occasion to be subsequently noted, it is difficult to
+withhold a tribute of admiration to the gifted personality of the man
+who, himself a civilian, could thus readily apply his unique knowledge
+of South African conditions to the uses of the art of war. At the same
+time, the promptitude and efficiency displayed by the Indian military
+authorities provided Natal, by October 8th, with a force that proved
+just--and only just--sufficient to prevent the Boer commandos from
+sweeping right through that colony down to Durban.
+
+[Sidenote: The negotiations closed.]
+
+In the meantime the negotiations, having served their purpose, were
+being brought rapidly to a conclusion by the Pretoria Executive. On
+September 15th, as we have seen, the Republic notified its refusal to
+accept the terms offered in the British despatch of the 8th; and
+before that date, as we have also noted, some of the Transvaal
+commandos had been ordered to take up their positions on the Natal
+border. On the 22nd a meeting of the Cabinet was held in London, at
+which it was decided to mobilise the army corps--a measure advised by
+Lord Wolseley in June. At the same time Lord Milner was instructed by
+telegraph to communicate to the South African Republic a despatch[173]
+in which the British Government "absolutely denied and repudiated" the
+claim of the South African Republic to be a "sovereign international
+state," and informed the Pretoria Executive that its refusal to
+entertain the offer made on September 8th--
+
+         [Footnote 173: C. 9,530.]
+
+     "coming as it did at the end of nearly four months of protracted
+     negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation extending
+     over a period of more than five years, made it useless to further
+     pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and that Her
+     Majesty's Government were now compelled to consider the situation
+     afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final
+     settlement"
+
+of the questions at issue. The result of these deliberations was to be
+communicated to Lord Milner in a later despatch.
+
+[Sidenote: The Burghers mobilised.]
+
+This note of September 22nd, together with a second communication of
+the same date, in which Mr. Chamberlain warmly repudiated the charges
+of bad faith brought against Sir William Greene, reached the Pretoria
+Executive on the 25th, and on the same day it was known that a British
+force had entrained at Ladysmith for Glencoe. On the 26th intelligence
+of so serious a nature reached Lord Milner, that he telegraphed to
+warn the Home Government that the Transvaal and Free State were likely
+to take the initiative. According to Mr. Amery,[174] an ultimatum had
+been drafted upon receipt of the British note, and telegraphed on the
+following day to President Steyn for his approval. At Bloemfontein,
+however, the document was entirely recast by Mr. Fischer. Even so, in
+its amended form, it was ready on the 27th. On that day the Free State
+Raad, after six days of secret session, determined to join the sister
+Republic in declaring war upon Great Britain, and on the 28th the
+Transvaal commandos were mobilised. The ultimatum, according to the
+same authority, would have been delivered to Sir William Greene on
+Monday, October 2nd, had not deficiencies in the Boer transport and
+commissariat arrangements made it impossible for the burgher forces to
+advance immediately upon the British troops in Natal. At the last
+moment, also, President Steyn seems to have had some misgivings. On
+September 26th, together with the draft ultimatum from Pretoria, a
+suggestive telegram from Capetown, signed "Micaiah," and bidding him
+"Read chapter xxii. 1st Book of Kings, and accept warning," had
+reached him;[175] and a few days later he received, through Mr.
+Fischer, a powerful appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers.
+
+         [Footnote 174: _Times_ correspondent and editor of _The Times
+         History of the War_. Mr. Amery arrived at the Cape in the
+         second week of September, and was at Pretoria from September
+         24th to October 13th.]
+
+         [Footnote 175: Secured by Intelligence Department.]
+
+However this may be, the few administrative acts that remained to be
+taken were quickly accomplished in both Republics. In the Transvaal
+the remnant of the British population was already in flight; the law
+courts were suspended; the control of the railways was assumed by the
+Government and, in order to protect colonial recruits from the legal
+penalties attached to rebellion, on September 29th the Executive was
+empowered by the Volksraad to confer citizen rights on all aliens
+serving in the forces of the Republic. Not content with their
+barbarous expulsion of the British population, the Governments of both
+Republics for a week before the expiry of the ultimatum treated those
+of them who still remained as though a state of war had already been
+in existence. During these last days telegrams and letters praying for
+protection against some act of violence or spoliation were constantly
+arriving at Government House. But what could the High Commissioner do?
+The Army Corps was 6,000 miles away; the 10,000 defensive troops were
+most of them still on the water. The Free State, in Mr. Fischer's
+words, "did not recognise international law, and claimed to commandeer
+all persons whatsoever" under its own. In the Transvaal, Mr. Reitz
+(after consultation with Mr. Smuts) was coolly replying to the
+British Agent's protest against the seizure of the property of British
+subjects, including L150,000 worth of bar gold, that "the property of
+private individuals of whatever nationality could be, and was being,
+commandeered to the value of L15 a head."[176] On October 2nd the
+Transvaal Raads adjourned, and on the same day President Steyn
+informed the High Commissioner that the Free State burghers had been
+summoned for commando service. An interchange of telegrams then
+ensued, of which one, despatched on October 6th, is important as
+showing how earnestly Lord Milner seconded Mr. Chamberlain's endeavour
+to keep the door open for a peaceful settlement up to the last moment.
+
+         [Footnote 176: C. 9,530.]
+
+[Sidenote: Last words.]
+
+     "I have the honour," he said, "to acknowledge Your Honour's long
+     telegram of yesterday afternoon [the 5th], the substance of which
+     I have communicated to Her Majesty's Government. There is, I
+     think, a conclusive reply to Your Honour's accusation against the
+     policy of Her Majesty's Government, but no good purpose would be
+     served by recrimination. The present position is that burgher
+     forces are assembled in very large numbers in immediate proximity
+     to the frontiers of Natal, while the British troops occupy
+     certain defensive positions well within those borders. The
+     question is whether the burgher forces will invade British
+     territory, thus closing the door to any possibility of a pacific
+     solution. I cannot believe that the South African Republic will
+     take such aggressive action, or that Your Honour would
+     countenance such a course, which there is nothing to justify.
+     Prolonged negotiations have hitherto failed to bring about a
+     satisfactory understanding, and no doubt such understanding is
+     more difficult than ever to-day, after the expulsion of British
+     subjects with great loss and suffering; but until the threatened
+     act of aggression is committed I shall not despair of peace, and
+     I feel sure that any reasonable proposal, from whatever quarter
+     proceeding, would be favourably considered by Her Majesty's
+     Government if it offered an immediate termination of present
+     tension and a prospect of permanent tranquillity."[177]
+
+         [Footnote 177: C. 9,530.]
+
+With this--practically the final communication of the British
+Government--it is instructive to compare the "last words" of the two
+other protagonists. The Pretoria Executive, true to its policy of
+playing for time, sends through Mr. Reitz two long and argumentative
+replies to the British despatches of July 27th (the Joint Commission),
+and May 10th (Mr. Chamberlain's reply to the petition to the Queen).
+The Afrikander nationalists having failed to "mediate" in Pretoria and
+Bloemfontein, consoled themselves with a final effort in the shape of
+a direct appeal to the Queen. In a petition signed by the fifty-eight
+Afrikander members of both Houses of the Cape Parliament, including,
+of course, the members of the Schreiner Cabinet, they declare their
+earnest belief that the South African Republic "is fully awakened to
+the wisdom and discretion of making liberal provision for the
+representation of the Uitlanders," and urge Her Majesty's Government
+to appoint a Joint Commission--a proposal to which the British
+Government had declared that it was impossible to return. The effect
+of this somewhat half-hearted effort was, however, on this occasion
+appreciably diminished by the fact that the nationalist petition was
+accompanied by a resolution presented by fifty-three Progressive
+members of the Cape Parliament, embodying their entire disapproval of
+the opinion put forward by the petitioners, and containing the
+assurance that Her Majesty's Government might rely upon their
+strongest support.
+
+[Sidenote: The ultimatum delivered.]
+
+The ultimatum was delivered to Sir William Greene on the afternoon of
+Monday, October 9th, and forthwith telegraphed to the High
+Commissioner at Capetown. Although it was a week behind time at
+Pretoria, its arrival was somewhat unexpected at Government House.
+Saturday and Sunday had been days of quite unusual calm. The
+Secretary, whose business it was to decode the official telegrams,
+commenced his task with but languid interest. He had decoded so many
+apparently unnecessary and inconclusive despatches of late. At first
+this seemed very much like the others. But, as he worked on, he came
+upon words that startled him to a sudden attention:
+
+     "This Government ... in the interest not only of this Republic,
+     but also of all South Africa,... feels itself called upon and
+     obliged ... to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the
+     assurance:
+
+     "(_a_) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by
+     the friendly course of arbitration, or by whatever amicable way
+     may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's
+     Government.
+
+     "(_b_) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be
+     instantly withdrawn.
+
+     "(_c_) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in
+     South Africa since June 1st, 1899, shall be removed from South
+     Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this
+     Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee upon the
+     part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities
+     against any portion of the possessions of the British Government
+     shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within
+     a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the
+     Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith,
+     be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from
+     the borders.
+
+     "(_d_) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas
+     shall not be landed in any part of South Africa.
+
+     "This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative
+     answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her
+     Majesty's Government to return such an answer before or upon
+     Wednesday, October 11th, 1899, not later than five o'clock p.m.,
+     and it desires further to add that, in the event of unexpectedly
+     no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval,
+     it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of
+     Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will
+     not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and
+     that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place
+     within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our
+     borders, the Government will be compelled to regard that also as
+     a formal declaration of war.
+
+     "I have, etc.,
+                              "F. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_."[178]
+
+         [Footnote 178: C. 9,530.]
+
+[Sidenote: An appeal to Afrikanders.]
+
+The war had come; and come in the almost incredible form of a naked
+assertion of the intention of the South African Republic to oust Great
+Britain from its position of paramount Power in South Africa. And the
+declaration of war,[179] published two days later by President Steyn,
+was no less definite. It referred to Great Britain's "unfounded claim
+to paramountcy for the whole of South Africa, and thus also over this
+State," and exhorted the burghers of the Free State to "stand up as
+one man against the oppressor and violator of right." Even greater
+frankness characterised the appeal to "Free Staters and Brother
+Afrikanders" issued by Mr. Reitz. In this document[180] not only was
+the entire Dutch population of South Africa invited to rid themselves,
+by force of arms, of British supremacy, but the statement of the Boer
+case took the form of an impeachment that covered the whole period of
+British administration. Great Britain--
+
+         [Footnote 179: Cd. 43.]
+
+         [Footnote 180: _Ibid._]
+
+     "has, ever since the birth of our nation, been the oppressor of
+     the Afrikander and the native alike.
+
+     "From Slagter's Nek to Laing's Nek, from the Pretoria Convention
+     to the Bloemfontein Conference--they have ever been the
+     treaty-breakers and robbers. The diamond fields of Kimberley and
+     the beautiful land of Natal were robbed from us, and now they
+     want the gold-fields of the Witwatersrand.
+
+     "Where is Waterboer to-day? He who had to be defended against the
+     Free State is to-day without an inch of ground. Where lies
+     Lobengula in his unknown grave to-day, and what fillibusters and
+     fortune-hunters are possessors of his country?
+
+     "Where are the native chiefs of Bechuanaland now, and who owns
+     their land?
+
+     "Read the history of South Africa, and ask yourselves: Has the
+     British Government been a blessing or a curse to this
+     sub-continent?
+
+     "Brother Afrikanders! I repeat, the day is at hand on which great
+     deeds are expected of us. WAR has broken out. What is it to be? A
+     wasted and enslaved South Africa, or--a Free, United South
+     Africa?
+
+     "Come, let us stand shoulder to shoulder and do our holy duty!
+     The Lord of Hosts will be our Leader.
+
+     "Be of good cheer.
+                                   "F. W. REITZ."
+
+That Monday night, besides repeating the ultimatum to the Home
+Government, Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the British authorities in
+Natal, Rhodesia, Basutoland, and the frontier towns.
+
+The ultimatum reached the Colonial Office at 6.45 a.m. on Tuesday. The
+reply, which was cabled to Lord Milner at 10.45 p.m. on the same day,
+was not unworthy of the occasion:
+
+[Sidenote: The British reply.]
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the
+     peremptory demands of the Government of the South African
+     Republic. You will inform the Government of the South African
+     Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the South
+     African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it
+     impossible to discuss."[181]
+
+         [Footnote 181: C. 9,530.]
+
+The High Commissioner was further desired to instruct Sir William
+Greene, in delivering the British reply, to ask for his passports.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS
+
+
+With the presentation of the Boer ultimatum the first and most
+difficult part of Lord Milner's task was accomplished. The actual
+pretensions of President Krueger and his republican confederates in the
+Free State and the Cape Colony were declared in a manner that could
+not fail to make them understood by the British people at home. The
+nationalists were unmasked. To what assurance of victory their
+military preparations had led them may be seen from the story of Mr.
+Amery's meeting with Mr. Reitz, two days before October 2nd, the
+Monday originally fixed for the delivery of the ultimatum. On the
+afternoon of this day, September 30th, Mr. Amery was walking with the
+State Secretary in Pretoria. Mr. Reitz, he tells us,[182] "suddenly
+turned round and said, 'Have you read _Treasure Island_? 'Yes.' 'Then
+you may remember the passage where they "tip the black spot" to Long
+John Silver?' 'Yes.' 'Well, I expect it will fall to my lot on Monday
+to "tip the black spot" to Long John Greene.' And hereupon the State
+Secretary cheerily detailed to his astounded listener the terms of the
+ultimatum, compliance with which might yet save the British Empire
+from war."
+
+         [Footnote 182: _Times History of the War in South Africa_,
+         vol. i., p. 360. It must be remembered that in the Transvaal
+         all telegrams had been strictly censored from the end of
+         August.]
+
+[Sidenote: Effect of the ultimatum.]
+
+Very different was the position at Capetown. Here there was no room
+either for levity or the insolence of anticipated triumph. Knowing
+what Lord Milner did--what he, of all men, had most cause to
+know--both of our unreadiness, and of the preparedness and confidence
+of the enemy, he could scarcely have looked forward to the future
+without the very gravest apprehension. None the less the ultimatum
+brought with it a certain sense of relief. The negotiations, which had
+degenerated long since into a diplomatic farce, were terminated. The
+situation had become once more clear. It has been the duty of few men
+to bear so heavy and so prolonged a burden of responsibility as that
+from which Lord Milner was thus set free. The danger that the Home
+Government, in its earnest desire for peace, might accept a settlement
+that would leave undecided the central issue of Boer or British
+supremacy in South Africa had never been wholly absent from his mind
+during the harassing negotiations that succeeded the Conference. Up to
+the very end there had been a haunting dread lest, in spite of his
+ceaseless vigilance and unstinted toil, a manifestation of British
+loyalty that would never be repeated should be coldly discouraged, and
+the nationalist movement allowed to proceed unchecked, until every
+colonist of British blood had surrendered the hope of remaining a
+citizen of the Empire for the degrading necessity of securing for
+himself and his children a tolerable position in the United States of
+South Africa by a timely alliance with the more progressive Dutch.
+From the presence of this danger Lord Milner was now relieved, since,
+as he instantly foresaw, the whip-lash of this frank appeal to force
+brought conviction where marshalled arguments were powerless to move.
+He had done what the religious enthusiasm of Livingstone, the
+political sagacity of Grey, the splendid devotion and prescience of
+Frere, and the Elizabethan statecraft of Rhodes, had failed to do. _He
+had made the Boer speak out._
+
+England was far from knowing all that these Boer aspirations meant, or
+the progress already achieved in the direction of their realisation.
+But this ignorance made the demands of the ultimatum seem the more
+insolent. To Mr. Balfour it was as though President Krueger had gone
+mad. But madness or insolence, the effect was the same. With the mass
+of the nation all hesitation, all balancing of arguments, were at an
+end. The one thing that was perceived was that any further attempt to
+treat with a people so minded would be an admission to the world that
+British supremacy had disappeared from South Africa. On this point,
+outside the narrow influence of a few professional partisans and
+peace-makers, there had never been any doubt: the only question was
+whether British supremacy was, or was not, in danger. The Boer
+challenge having resolved this question, the mind of the nation was
+made up. The army, as the instrument of its will, was called upon to
+give effect to its decision.
+
+[Sidenote: An anxious situation.]
+
+Two years and eight months elapsed between the expiration of the two
+days' grace allowed by the ultimatum and the surrender of Vereeniging.
+During the first twelve months of this period Lord Milner's
+initiative, though his position remained arduous, anxious, and
+responsible, and his activity unceasing, was necessarily subordinated
+to that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South
+Africa. But during the second period of the war--that is to say, from
+November 29th, 1900, when Lord Kitchener succeeded Lord Roberts--the
+constructive statesmanship of the High Commissioner was called forth
+in an increasing degree as the area secured for peaceable occupation
+became widened, and the problems involved in the settlement and future
+administration of the new colonies emerged into increasing prominence
+and importance. But even during the first period, when the task of the
+army was the comparatively simple one of overcoming the organised
+resistance of the Republics and subduing the rebellion in the Cape
+Colony, Lord Milner's unshaken confidence and perfect mastery of South
+African conditions proved of inestimable value.
+
+[Sidenote: Results and unpreparedness.]
+
+Five years later he described himself as an "incorrigible optimist."
+Optimist or not, at this time he harboured no illusions. He knew that
+the postponement or neglect of military preparations had left
+thousands of loyal subjects of the Crown in a position of entire
+defencelessness, and made rebellion easy for thousands of the
+disaffected Dutch. The first days of war, like the last days of peace,
+were punctuated by appeals for the troops that should have been in
+South Africa, but were in England; or for guns, rifles, and ammunition
+which Mr. Schreiner had kept idle in the colonial armouries until it
+was too late. On Friday, October 13th, he held a long and anxious
+consultation over the wires with Colonel Kekewich at Kimberley. A
+thousand rifles were wanted, and wanted instantly. The Cape Artillery
+15-pounders, reluctantly conceded at the last moment by Mr. Schreiner,
+had not come. They never came, for the next day Kimberley was cut off,
+and by Sunday morning Capetown had lost count of the border districts
+from Kimberley southward to Orange River. On this Friday the first
+definite piece of bad news reached the High Commissioner. An armoured
+train, trying to run back to Mafeking, had been captured by the Boers.
+In proportion as Lord Milner had urged the need of preparation for
+war, so now he was the first to realise how grave would be the results
+of unpreparedness. Fortunately, his comments upon the events of these
+first three months of the war have been preserved; and the record of
+what was passing in his mind from day to day reveals a burden of
+anxiety that contrasts sharply with the easy tolerance with which the
+first bad news was received in England. On Wednesday, the 18th, a week
+after the ultimatum had expired, he wrote of Natal: "We are being
+slowly surrounded, and our force unwisely split up." He was gravely
+concerned for the safety of Kimberley, and he "doubted the ability of
+Mafeking to hold out." On November 1st, the day after General Buller
+had landed at Capetown, he wrote: "Things are going from bad to worse
+to-day. In Natal the Orange Free State Boers are making a move on
+Colenso, while in the Colony they have crossed in force at Bethulie;
+and there is also some suspicion of an attack on the line between
+Orange River bridge and De Aar." On November 9th, the arrival of the
+_Rosslyn Castle_, the first of the Army Corps transports, brought a
+gleam of brightness. She was a little late, as she had been warned to
+go out of her course after leaving Las Palmas, to avoid a suspicious
+vessel. But Methuen's first engagements seemed to him to be Pyrrhic
+victories. It was "the old story of charging positions from which the
+enemy simply clears, after having shot a lot of our men." On December
+5th "alarming rumours came pouring in from all over the Colony," and
+two days later Lord Milner telegraphed to warn the Secretary of State
+that the war was now aggravated by rebellion. On Saturday, December
+16th, the day after Colenso, he wrote: "This has been a week of
+disasters, to-day being the worst of all. News was received this
+morning that Buller had been severely defeated yesterday in attempting
+to force the passage of the Tugela."
+
+It was a time when he was receiving the panic outcry for the immediate
+relief of Kimberley, in which Rhodes vented his rage at the military
+impotence to which for the moment England had allowed herself to be
+reduced in South Africa; when his councils with his ministers were
+"gloomy functions," and his Prime Minister's arguments against the
+measures which he deemed necessary for the defence of the Colony and
+the protection of the native territories had become not merely
+wearisome but embittered. His main resource lay in his intense
+activity. It was his custom, during this critical period, to begin the
+day by seeing Mr. Eliot and Mr. Price, the heads of the railways, and
+Mr. French, the Postmaster-General. In this way he received
+information of every movement of any significance that had occurred
+within the range of the railway and post-office systems during the
+preceding twenty-four hours--information which was of the highest
+utility both to him and to the military authorities. Then followed an
+endless succession of visitors, from the Prime Minister to the most
+recent newspaper correspondent out from home, and a long afternoon
+and evening of concentrated and unbroken labour upon despatches,
+proclamations, minutes, and other official documents. A short ride or
+walk was sometimes interpolated, but his days were a dead round of
+continuous occupation. "One day is so like another--crowded with work;
+all hateful, but with no very special feature," he wrote. But of
+another he says: "Worked very hard all day; the usual interviews. It
+was very difficult to take one's mind off the absorbing subject of the
+ill success of our military operations."
+
+Mr. Balfour called the insolence of the ultimatum "madness." But Lord
+Milner knew that it was no madness, but an assured belief in victory;
+a confidence founded upon long years of earnest preparation for war;
+upon the blood-ties of the most tenacious of European peoples; upon a
+Nature that spread her wings over the rough children of the veld and
+menaced their enemies with the heat and glamour of her sun, with
+famine and drought and weariness, with all the hidden dangers that
+lurked in her glittering plains and rock-strewn uplands.
+
+[Sidenote: Aspects of the war.]
+
+It is not proposed to give any detailed account of the military
+operations which led, first, to the annexation of the Boer Republics,
+and then to the actual disarmament of the entire Dutch population of
+South Africa. The most that the plan of this work permits of is to
+present the broad outlines of the war in such a manner that the
+several phases of the military conflict may be seen in true
+perspective, and the relationship between them and the administrative
+efforts of Lord Milner be correctly indicated. But it will not be
+found inconsistent with this restricted treatment to refer to certain
+conspicuous features of the war upon which contemporary discussion has
+chiefly centred, and in respect of which opinions have been pronounced
+that do not seem likely to harmonise in all cases with the results of
+a more mature judgment and a less interested inquiry.
+
+The test by which the success or failure of any given military effort
+is to be measured is, of course, the test of results. But the
+application of this test must not be embarrassed by the assumption,
+which seems to have vitiated so much otherwise admirable criticism on
+the conduct of the war in South Africa, that every action in which a
+properly equipped and wisely directed force is engaged must
+necessarily be successful: or that, if it be not successful, it
+follows, as a matter of course, that the officer in command, or one of
+his subordinates, must have committed some open and ascertainable
+violation of the principles of military science. So far is this from
+being the case, that military history is full of examples in which the
+highest merit and resolution of a commander have been nullified or
+cheated by the wanton interferences of physical nature, or by acts on
+the part of subordinates admittedly beyond the control of any human
+skill or foresight.[183]
+
+         [Footnote 183: This chapter was in type some weeks before
+         Vol. I. of the Official History of the War was published.
+         Where, however, the Official History amends or supplements
+         figures, documents, etc., given in earlier official
+         publications, the fact is mentioned in a foot-note.]
+
+[Sidenote: Delay of operations.]
+
+Any just appreciation of the events of the first year of the war must
+be based upon a clear understanding of the degree in which the
+military action of the Salisbury Cabinet fell short of the advice
+given by Lord Milner, and, in an equal degree by Lord Wolseley, the
+Commander-in-Chief. We have noticed already[184] the grave inadequacy
+of the measures of preparation for war carried out in South Africa
+between the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference and the recall of
+General Butler. On June 1st the South African garrison consisted of
+4,462 men in Cape Colony, and 5,827 men in Natal; or 10,289 men with
+24 field-guns in all.[185] On August 2nd the Government decided to
+send 2,000 additional troops to Natal, and the Indian Government was
+warned, a little later, that certain troops might be required for
+service in South Africa. In spite of Lord Milner's urgent
+representations of the danger of leaving the colonies unprotected, no
+considerable body of troops, as we have seen, was ordered out, until
+the diplomatic situation had become seriously aggravated by the
+definite failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene
+through Mr. Smuts.
+
+         [Footnote 184: See p. 191.]
+
+         [Footnote 185: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission). The Official
+         _History of the War in South Africa_ gives the total on
+         August 2nd as "not exceeding 9,940 men."]
+
+Of the 10,000 men despatched after the Cabinet meeting of September
+8th, more than half were requisitioned from the Indian Army, while the
+remainder were drawn mainly from the Mediterranean garrisons.
+
+Thus, by the beginning of the second week in October there were 22,104
+British troops in South Africa, of whom 7,400 were at the Cape and
+14,704 in Natal, and 60 field-guns.[186] But the Army Corps, the
+"striking force," was still in England. In pursuance of its
+determination to postpone to the last moment any action that could be
+represented as an attempt to force a war upon the Boers, the British
+Government had refrained from giving orders for the mobilisation of
+the offensive force until October 7th, or a fortnight after the
+Cabinet meeting of September 22nd, when its determination to
+"formulate its own proposals" was communicated to the Transvaal
+Government.[187] It was then calculated that three months must elapse
+before this force could be equipped, transported, and placed in the
+field in South Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 186: Cd. 1,789. But the Official History gives the
+         British total at the outbreak of war as 27,054 men (as
+         against over 50,000 burghers); of whom 15,811 (including
+         2,781 local troops) were in Natal, 5,221 regulars and 4,574
+         local troops were in the Cape Colony, and 1,448 men, raised
+         locally by Col. Baden-Powell, were in Mafeking and Southern
+         Rhodesia.]
+
+         [Footnote 187: But the Admiralty were given details of the
+         offensive force on September 20th. (_Official History._)]
+
+[Sidenote: No political gain.]
+
+Before recording the disastrous effects of the postponement of
+effective military preparations, from June to September, it remains to
+consider whether any political gains, sufficient to compensate for the
+loss of military strength, were secured. The policy of relying upon
+Afrikander advice failed; since, as we have seen, the admonitions of
+Sir Henry de Villiers and Mr. Hofmeyr came too late to turn President
+Krueger from an obduracy founded upon long years of military
+preparation. The over-sea British had made up their minds in June; and
+nothing occurred in the subsequent negotiations to deepen their
+conviction of the essential justice of the British cause. India was
+unmoved; indeed, the Hindu masses were slightly sympathetic, while the
+feudatory princes came forward with offers of men and treasure to the
+Government of the Queen-Empress. The attitude of the respective
+governments of France, Germany, and Russia was correct. But what
+secured this result was not any perception of the moderation of the
+British demands, or any recognition of the genuine reluctance of the
+British Government to make war, but the sight of the British Navy
+everywhere holding the seas, the rapidity and ease with which large
+bodies of troops were transported from every quarter of the British
+world, and the manner in which each reverse was met by a display of
+new and unexpected reserves of military strength.
+
+If the British Government thought that it would win the peoples of
+Continental Europe to its side by a show of hesitation to make war
+upon a weak state, the sequel proved that it had gravely misunderstood
+the conditions under which international respect is produced. Hatred
+of England rose in inverse ratio to the evidence of the justness of
+her cause. When the Boers were victorious, or seemed to be most
+capable of defying the efforts of the largest fighting force that
+Great Britain had ever put into the field; when, that is to say, it
+was most clearly demonstrated that British supremacy in South Africa
+could only have been maintained by force of arms against the
+formidable rival which had risen against it, then the wave of popular
+hatred surged highest. When the British arms prospered, the clamour
+sank; but only to rise again until it was finally allayed by the
+knowledge that the Boer resistance was at an end, and that the British
+Empire had emerged from the conflict a stronger and more united power.
+
+[Sidenote: Attitude of the United States.]
+
+The case of the United States was somewhat different. Here was an
+industrial nation like our own; and one, moreover, whose people were
+qualified alike by constitutional and legal tradition, habits of
+thought, and identity of language, to have discerned the reality of
+the reluctance displayed by the British Government to employ force
+until every resource of diplomacy and every device of statecraft had
+been exhausted, and to have drawn the conclusion that the power which
+drove the Government into war was a sense of duty, and not greed of
+territory. Moreover, there was at this time, at any rate among the
+more cultivated classes, a feeling of gratitude for the action of
+Great Britain in preventing European intervention during the
+Spanish-American war, and a genuine desire, on that ground alone, to
+show sympathy with the English people in the conflict in which they
+had become involved. In these circumstances it is somewhat strange
+that public opinion in the United States was unmistakably inclined to
+favour the Boers during almost the entire period of the war. It is
+perfectly true that the United States Government was consistently
+friendly; but this did not alter the fact that the dominant note in
+nearly all public expressions of the sentiment of the United States'
+people was one of sympathy with the Boer, and of hostility to the
+British cause. It might have been thought that, just as most
+Englishmen, in the case of the conflict between the United States and
+Spain, were prepared to assume that a nation imbued with the
+traditions and principles of the Anglo-Saxon race would not have
+undertaken to enforce its will upon a weak Power without having
+convinced itself first of the justice of its cause, so the Americans
+would have entertained an equally favourable presumption in respect of
+the people of Great Britain. That this was not done is due to a cause
+which is as significant as it is well ascertained. Making all
+allowance for the prejudice against England inevitably aroused in the
+minds of the less thoughtful members of a great democratic community,
+by the fact that her opponent was both a weak state and a republic,
+this very general refusal to accept the political morality of the
+English people as a guarantee of the justice of their action in South
+Africa suggests the presence of another and more specific influence.
+The explanation given by Americans is that the English nation was
+itself divided upon the question of the morality of the South African
+War--or, at any rate, that the public utterances that reached the
+United States were such as to convey this impression. That being so,
+they ask, Can you blame us for hesitating to adopt what was at the
+most, as we understood it, the opinion of a majority? In support of
+this view they point to the public utterances, before and after the
+war had broken out, of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. John Morley,
+and Mr. Bryce. Of these, the former was the official head of the
+Liberal Party, while the two latter were men whose literary
+achievements had made their names and personalities both familiar and
+respected in the United States. If the opinions of these public men
+were on this occasion wholly unrepresentative, why, they ask, were
+their speeches and articles unrefuted; or, at any rate, allowed to go
+forth to the world uncondemned by any clear and authoritative
+manifestation of the dissent and displeasure of their countrymen?
+
+[Sidenote: Injurious declarations.]
+
+That declarations such as these did in fact produce injurious effects
+directly calculable in human lives, in money, and in the waste and
+devastation of war, is a fact which will claim the attention of the
+reader on a subsequent occasion. They came not merely from the mouths of
+the Irish Nationalists, and of advanced Radicals such as Mr.
+Lloyd-George and Mr. John Burns, but from men of wider repute. That
+public opinion should have allowed responsible Englishmen in time of war
+to "speak and write as though they belonged to the enemy,"--whether due
+to an exaggerated regard for our traditional freedom of speech, or to a
+failure to recognise that the altered conditions produced by the
+extension and perfection of telegraphic communication, and the
+development of the Press throughout the civilised world, gave such
+utterances a value in international relations altogether different from
+that possessed (say) by similar utterances on the part of the
+anti-nationalists during the Napoleonic wars--is a circumstance that
+merits the most serious consideration. No one will deny that this
+unpatriotic form of opposition, so long as it exists, constitutes an
+ever-recurring danger to the most vital interests of the community. The
+ultimate remedy lies in the creation of a representative council of the
+Empire, and the consequent separation of questions of inter-imperial and
+foreign policy from the local and irrelevant issues of party politics.
+Until this is done, it remains to establish a mutual understanding
+under which such questions would be recognised as being outside the
+sphere of party recrimination; and for this purpose it is necessary to
+create a force of public opinion strong enough to compel the observance
+of this understanding; or, failing this, to visit its non-observance
+with political penalties commensurate to the injury inflicted.
+
+[Sidenote: The Army Corps absorbed.]
+
+The conflict which followed the expiration of the forty-eight hours
+allowed by the Boer ultimatum is in more than one respect the most
+extraordinary in the annals of war. The existence of the cable and
+telegraph made instant and continuous communication possible between
+the army in the field and the nation at home. Public opinion, informed
+by the daily records furnished by the Press, became a factor in
+determining the conduct of the war. Nor is it strange that a civilian
+population, separated by 6,000 miles from the theatre of operations,
+should have proved an injurious counsellor. The army was ordered to
+conquer a people, but forbidden to employ the methods by which alone
+it has been hitherto held that conquest is attainable. But no
+influence exercised upon the course of the war by false
+humanitarianism or political partisanship produced any results
+comparable to the original injury inflicted upon the British Army by
+the ignorance and irresolution displayed by the nation. The
+postponement of effective military preparations by the Home Government
+until the necessity for these preparations had become so plain that
+no effort of the Opposition could embarrass its action, was the _fons
+et origo_ of all subsequent disaster. The failure to mobilise the Army
+Corps in June had placed the Army in a position of disadvantage at the
+outbreak of the war, from which it never wholly recovered. The
+original striking force--the Army Corps--was not employed in its
+proper function, but absorbed, upon its arrival in South Africa, in
+the task of supporting the defensive forces. Twenty-two thousand men,
+with an Army Corps advancing upon Bloemfontein or Pretoria, would have
+sufficed to repel attacks upon the colonial frontiers, and to check
+rebellion in the Cape Colony. But twenty-two thousand men defending
+one thousand miles of frontier from a mobile force nearly twice as
+numerous with the Army Corps six thousand miles away in England, was a
+very different thing. Yet this was the situation in which the nation,
+by withholding from the Government the support necessary to enable it
+to give effect to the advice of Lord Wolseley, had elected to place
+the British Army. The plan of mobilisation, long prepared and complete
+in all particulars, worked with perfect success. Twenty Companies of
+the Army Service Corps sailed on October 6th, a day before the actual
+mobilisation order was issued. The rest of the offensive force--one
+Cavalry Division, one Army Corps, and eight battalions of lines of
+communication troops--began to be embarked on October 20th, and by
+November 17th the long succession of transports, bearing the whole of
+the men, horses, and guns of which it was composed (with the exception
+of one cavalry regiment detained by horse sickness), had sailed for
+South Africa. This was Lord Wolseley's task, and it was promptly and
+efficiently performed. The War Office was not inefficient; but the
+refusal to mobilise in June had thrown the whole scheme of the
+offensive and defensive campaign out of gear.
+
+[Sidenote: General Buller.]
+
+With the evidence of the War Commission before us, it is impossible to
+divest General Buller of a share of responsibility for the disastrous
+conditions under which the war was commenced. He was nominated to the
+South African command in June, and he was consulted upon the strength
+and composition of the force which was to be employed. On July 7th
+Lord Wolseley asked the Government, apart from the immediate
+mobilisation of the Army Corps which he still urged, to "consider
+whether we should not at a very early date send one Infantry Division
+and one Cavalry Brigade--say 10,000 men--to South Africa," adding that
+he had "no doubt as to the present necessity of strengthening our
+military position." But ten days later the despatch of this
+reinforcement of 10,000 men was "not considered urgent." Since,
+according to Lord Wolseley's minute of the proceedings of the meeting
+held at the War Office on July 18th, 1899, General Buller used the
+weight of his authority to support General Butler's opposition to Lord
+Milner's urgent request for immediate reinforcements. In reply to a
+question as to the desirability of strengthening the South African
+garrisons, he said on this occasion, that--
+
+     "he had complete confidence in Butler's ability and forethought,
+     and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons on the spot
+     did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out
+     any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our
+     position against any possible attack by the Boers on our
+     frontiers."
+
+This memorandum, Lord Wolseley added, contained not the "exact words,"
+but the "exact meaning" of what he said.[188] It was the precise
+opposite of the view which Lord Milner had laid before the Home
+Government.[189] Indeed the degree in which General Buller had
+misconceived the entire military situation in South Africa became at
+once apparent when he reached Capetown. He had come out to South
+Africa with the not unnatural idea that he was to command a definite
+British army, which was to engage a definite Boer army. When he had
+learnt from Lord Milner and others what the situation actually was, he
+is said to have gathered up his new impressions in the remark: "It
+seems to me that I have got to conquer the whole of South Africa."
+General Buller even appears to have shared the common belief of his
+fellow-countrymen at home that the Cape was a British colony not only
+in name but in fact. Nor was he prepared to abandon this belief all at
+once. He suggested to the High Commissioner that it would be possible
+to form local defence forces out of the Dutch farmers in the Colony.
+Lord Milner said that this was totally impracticable; but he added
+that he would consult Mr. Schreiner on the matter. It is needless to
+say, however, that the Prime Minister deprecated the proposal in the
+most emphatic terms.[190]
+
+         [Footnote 188: Cd. 1,789, pp. 15-17.]
+
+         [Footnote 189: Nor was the Intelligence Department less
+         urgent than Lord Milner. "In July of last year [1899],
+         earlier warnings being disregarded, a formal communication
+         was made for the consideration of the Cabinet, advising the
+         despatch of a large force fully equipped, estimated to be
+         sufficient to safeguard Natal and Cape Colony from the first
+         onrush of the Boers."--Sir John Ardagh, in _The Balfourian
+         Parliament_, 1900-1905. By Henry W. Lucy, p. 10. See also the
+         evidence of the War Commission, and the "Military Notes"
+         issued by the D. M. I. in June (1899).]
+
+         [Footnote 190: In a memorandum of November 20th (furnished to
+         Gen. Forestier-Walker) Gen. Buller, on the eve of starting
+         for Natal, gives as a first paragraph in his "appreciation of
+         the situation" the following remark: "1. Ever since I have
+         been here we have been like the man, who, with a long day's
+         work before him, overslept himself and so was late for
+         everything all day." (_Official History_, p. 209.)]
+
+The War Office scheme was designed to provide a defensive force to
+hold the colonies, and an offensive force to invade the Republics. In
+the three months that elapsed before this scheme was put into effect,
+the conditions upon which it was based had changed completely. On the
+day that Buller reached Capetown (October 31st) White, with almost the
+whole of the Natal defensive force, was shut up in Ladysmith by
+Joubert. When at length the last units of the Army Corps were landed
+(December 4th) in South Africa, Buller was at Maritzburg, organising a
+force for the relief of White; and practically the entire offensive
+force had been broken up to disengage the defensive forces, or save
+them from destruction. Buller himself had 14,000 of the Army Corps in
+Natal, and more were to follow; Methuen was taking 8,000 men for the
+relief of Kimberley; and the balance were being pushed up to
+strengthen the original defensive forces that were holding the
+railways immediately South of the Orange Free State border, and
+checking the rebellion in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony.
+Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg (December 10th), Methuen's defeat at
+Magersfontein (December 11th), and Buller's defeat at Colenso
+(December 15th) together provided ample evidence of the fact that,
+however desirable it might be to assume the offensive, a purely
+defensive _role_ must for the time be assigned to the troops then in
+South Africa; and that this state of affairs must continue until the
+arrival of very considerable reinforcements.
+
+[Sidenote: New striking force necessary.]
+
+The perception of this fact caused the Government to appoint (December
+17th) Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his Chief-of-Staff, to the
+South African command, and to prepare and despatch an entirely new
+striking force. It was this new force and not the original Army Corps
+that "marched to Pretoria," and struck the successive blows which
+enabled Lord Roberts to report to the Secretary of State for War
+(November 15th, 1900) that; "with the occupation of Komati Poort, and
+the dispersal of Commandant-General Louis Botha's army, the organised
+resistance of the two Republics might be said to have ceased." It was
+not, therefore, until Lord Roberts was able to march from Modder River
+Station (February 11th, 1900), after a month spent at the Cape in
+reorganising the transport and other preparations essential to the
+success of an army destined to advance for many hundreds of miles
+through a hostile country, that the British Army in South Africa was
+in the position in which the acceptance of Lord Wolseley's advice,
+given in June and July, 1899, would have put it upon the outbreak of
+war. Nor was the force with which Lord Roberts then advanced, 36,000
+men, more numerous than the striking force which would have been
+provided, by Lord Wolseley's scheme, had it been carried out in the
+manner in which he desired. For the business with which the scattered
+Army Corps was occupied when Lord Roberts arrived at Capetown (January
+10th, 1900)--the relief of Ladysmith and Kimberley, and the defence of
+the eastern districts of the Cape Colony from the Free State commandos
+and the colonial rebels--was work directly caused by the absence of
+the Army Corps from South Africa when the war broke out. It is not too
+much to say that the whole of the serious losses incurred by the
+British forces in South Africa from the commencement of the war up to
+the date of Lord Roberts's advance into the Free State territory,
+would have been avoided if the state of public opinion had permitted
+the Salisbury Cabinet in June to make military preparations
+commensurate with the gravity of the situation as disclosed by Lord
+Milner.
+
+[Sidenote: The regular army exhausted.]
+
+In forming an estimate of the performance of the British Army in South
+Africa, from a military point of view, it is necessary to remember the
+grave initial disadvantage in which it was placed; and that this
+initial disadvantage was due, not to the War Office, not to the
+Cabinet, but to the nation itself. The manner in which the losses thus
+caused were repaired is significant and instructive. By the end of the
+year (1899), the troops composing three divisions in excess of the
+Army Corps were either landed in South Africa or under orders to
+proceed to the seat of war. In addition to the 22,000 defensive troops
+in South Africa on October 11th, the War Office had supplied, not
+merely the 47,000 men of the Army Corps, but 85,000 men in all. But,
+having done this, it had practically reached the limit of troops
+available in the regular army for over-sea operations. By April, 1900,
+all the reserves had been used up. There remained, it is true, 103,023
+"effectives" of all ranks of the regular army in the United Kingdom on
+April 1st; but this total was composed of 37,333 "immature" troops; of
+the recruits who had joined since October 1st, 1899; of reservists
+unfit for foreign service; and of sick and wounded sent home from
+South Africa: that is to say, of men who, for one reason or another,
+were all alike unfit for service abroad.[191] Further drafts might
+have been made upon the British regulars in India; but this course was
+held to be imprudent. In plain words, the exhaustion of the regular
+army compelled the Government to avail itself more fully of the offers
+of military aid which had reached it from the colonies, and to utilise
+the militia and volunteer forces. On December 18th, 1899, the
+announcement was made that the War Office would allow twelve militia
+battalions to volunteer for service abroad, and that a considerable
+force of yeomanry and a contingent of picked men from the volunteers
+would be accepted. This appeal to the latent military resources of the
+Empire met with a ready and ample response. Throughout the whole
+course of the war the United Kingdom sent 45,566 militia, 19,856
+volunteers, and 35,520 yeomanry, with 7,273 South African
+Constabulary, and 833 Scottish Horse; the over-sea colonies (including
+305 volunteers from India) provided 30,633 men;[192] while of the
+small British population in South Africa no less than the astonishing
+total of 46,858 took part in the war.[193] In all some 200,000
+men--militia, volunteers, and irregulars--came forward to supplement
+the regular army.
+
+         [Footnote 191: Cd. 1,789.]
+
+         [Footnote 192: _Ibid._]
+
+         [Footnote 193: See returns cited by Lord Roberts in House of
+         Lords, February 27th, 1906. The irregulars _raised_ in South
+         Africa were between 50,000 and 60,000, according to the _War
+         Commission Report_.]
+
+[Sidenote: Auxiliary forces utilised.]
+
+It was mainly from the auxiliary forces and the colonial contingents,
+and not from the regular army, that the reinforcements were supplied
+which repaired the critical losses of the defensive campaign, and
+enabled the new striking force to be organised. Nor can it be said
+that the British Government failed to do all that was possible to
+retrieve its original error, when once the defeats inflicted by the
+Boer forces had awakened it to a knowledge of the real situation in
+South Africa. In his despatch of February 6th, 1900, Lord Roberts was
+able to report that, on January 31st, there was an effective fighting
+force of nearly 40,000 men in Natal and another of 60,000 in the Cape
+Colony. Mr. Chamberlain put the case for the Government at its highest
+in speaking at Birmingham on May 11th, 1900:
+
+     "Supposing that twelve months ago any man had said in public that
+     this country would be able to send out from its own shores and
+     from its own citizens an army of more than 150,000 men, fully
+     equipped, and that it would be joined by another force of more
+     than 30,000 men, voluntarily offered by our self-governing
+     colonies ... if he had said that this army, together numbering
+     200,000 men, or thereabouts, could have been provided with the
+     best commissariat, with the most admirable medical appliances and
+     stores that had ever accompanied an army--if he could have said
+     that at the same time there would have remained behind in this
+     country something like half a million of men, who although they
+     may not be equal man to man to the regulars and best-drilled
+     armies, are nevertheless capable of bearing arms to some
+     purpose--if he had said all this, he would have been laughed to
+     scorn."
+
+Moreover, the army was successful. The work which it was required to
+do was done. In order to realise the merit of its success two
+circumstances must be borne in mind: first, the enormous area of South
+Africa, and, second, the fact that practically the whole of this area,
+if we except the few considerable towns, was not only ill-provided
+with means of communication and food supplies, but inhabited by a
+population which was openly hostile, or, what was worse, secretly
+disaffected. Lord Roberts, in the course of his despatches,
+endeavoured to bring home both of these circumstances to the public in
+England.
+
+Of the area he wrote:[194]
+
+         [Footnote 194: November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.]
+
+     "The magnitude of the task which Her Majesty's Imperial troops
+     have been called upon to perform will perhaps be better realised
+     if I give the actual number of miles of the several lines of
+     communication, each one of which has had to be carefully guarded,
+     and compare with the well-known countries of Europe the enormous
+     extent of the theatre of war, from one end of which to the other
+     troops have had to be frequently moved.
+
+[Sidenote: Vastness of South Africa.]
+
+     "The areas included in the theatre of war are as follows:
+
+                                         Square Miles.
+               Cape Colony                  277,151
+               Orange River Colony           48,326
+               Transvaal                    113,640
+               Natal                         18,913
+                                           --------
+                  Total                     458,030
+                                           --------
+               Rhodesia                     750,000
+
+     "And the distances troops have had to travel are:
+
+                    By Land                  Miles.
+               Capetown to Pretoria          1,040
+               Pretoria to Komati Poort        260
+               Capetown to Kimberley           647
+               Kimberley to Mafeking           223
+               Mafeking to Pretoria            160
+               Mafeking to Beira             1,135
+               Durban to Pretoria              511
+
+     "From these tables it will be seen that, after having been
+     brought by sea 6,000 miles and more from their base in the United
+     Kingdom, the army in South Africa had to be distributed over an
+     area of greater extent than France (204,146 square miles) and
+     Germany (211,168 square miles) put together, and, if we include
+     that part of Rhodesia with which we had to do, larger than the
+     combined areas of France, Germany, and Austria (261,649 square
+     miles)."
+
+Of the nature of the country and its inhabitants he wrote:[195]
+
+         [Footnote 195: November 15th, 1900. Johannesburg.]
+
+     "And it should be remembered that over these great distances we
+     were dependent on single lines of railway for the food supply,
+     guns, ammunition, horses, transport animals, and hospital
+     equipment, in fact, all the requirements of an army in the
+     field, and that, along these lines, bridges and culverts had
+     been destroyed in many places, and rails were being constantly
+     torn up."
+
+And of the Cape Colony he wrote:[196]
+
+         [Footnote 196: February 6th, 1900. Capetown.]
+
+     "The difficulties of carrying on war in South Africa do not
+     appear to be sufficiently appreciated by the British public. In
+     an enemy's country we should know exactly how we stood; but out
+     here we have not only to defeat the enemy on the northern
+     frontier, but to maintain law and order within the colonial
+     limits. Ostensibly, the Dependency is loyal, and no doubt a large
+     number of its inhabitants are sincerely attached to the British
+     rule and strongly opposed to Boer domination. On the other hand,
+     a considerable section would prefer a republican form of
+     government, and, influenced by ties of blood and association,
+     side with the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Even the
+     public service at the Cape is not free from men whose sympathies
+     with the enemy may lead them to divulge secrets and give valuable
+     assistance to the Boer leaders in other ways."
+
+[Sidenote: The offensive campaign.]
+
+Bearing in mind that the offensive campaign dates, not from the expiry
+of the Boer ultimatum on October 11th, 1899, but from Lord Roberts's
+advance from Modder River Station on February 11th, 1900, the mere
+record of dates and events is sufficiently impressive. On February
+12th the Free State border was crossed; on the 15th Kimberley was
+relieved, on the 27th Cronje's force surrendered at Paardeberg, on the
+28th Ladysmith was relieved, and on March 13th Bloemfontein, the
+capital of the Free State, was occupied. The army again advanced
+early in May; Kroonstad was entered on the 12th; on May 24th, the
+Queen's birthday, the Free State was annexed; the Vaal was crossed on
+the 27th, Johannesburg was occupied on the 31st, and on June 5th the
+British flag was hoisted on the Raadzaal at Pretoria. In the meantime
+Mafeking had been relieved with absolute punctuality on May 17th.[197]
+On June 11th the Boers evacuated Laing's Nek and Majuba, and the Natal
+Field Force, under Buller, entered the Transvaal from the south-east.
+The next day Roberts defeated the Boers under Louis Botha at Diamond
+Hill. On July 30th Prinsloo and 4,000 burghers surrendered to Hunter;
+on August 27th the main Transvaal army, under Louis Botha, was again
+defeated at Dalmanutha, and on September 1st the Transvaal was
+annexed. On the 11th President Krueger fled the Transvaal; Komati
+Poort, the eastern frontier town on the railway line to Delagoa Bay,
+was entered on the 24th, and two days later railway communication was
+re-opened between Delagoa Bay and Pretoria.
+
+         [Footnote 197: Lord Roberts had asked Col. Baden-Powell how
+         long he could hold out at Mafeking, and then promised that
+         the relief of the town should be effected within the required
+         period.]
+
+In spite of the vast area and harassing conditions of the war, in
+spite of its own military unpreparedness, and the unexpected strength
+of the Boer attack, the Power which created the Republics had
+destroyed them within less than a twelvemonth from the day on which
+they had defied it.
+
+At this point it will be convenient to place on record certain general
+conclusions which arise out of the events and circumstances of the
+South African War, and to consider certain military criticisms which
+have been offered upon the conduct of the British Army in the field.
+
+We have seen that the initial losses of the campaign were due, not to
+any defects in the Army as a fighting force, but to the position in
+which the Army was placed by the irresolution of the nation. We have
+seen also that within less than a year of the ultimatum the capitals
+of the two Republics were occupied, and their power of "organised
+resistance" was destroyed. During this stage of the war the regular
+Army, small as it was, supplemented by selected reinforcements from
+the auxiliary services, and by the colonial contingents, sufficed to
+do the work required of it. In the second stage, when the work to be
+accomplished was nothing less than the disarmament of the entire Dutch
+population of South Africa, the character of the reinforcements
+supplied had greatly depreciated,[198] and the prolongation of the war
+was in part to be attributed to this circumstance. For the present,
+however, it will be sufficient to confine our observations to the
+period of "organised resistance."
+
+         [Footnote 198: One fighting British general stated that one
+         of the first stage force was equal to five of the men
+         supplied after the reserves had been used up in April,
+         1900.]
+
+[Sidenote: General conclusions.]
+
+The first of these conclusions is the fact that the real evil revealed
+by the South African War is not the inefficiency, or unpreparedness of
+the War Office, but the ignorance,[199] and therefore unpreparedness,
+of the country. From this unreadiness for war on the part of the
+nation as a whole there sprang two results: (1) the refusal of the
+Salisbury Cabinet to allow the War Office to make adequate military
+preparations in June, and the disregard of the advice alike of Lord
+Milner and Lord Wolseley; (2) the insufficient supply of reserves for
+the forces in the field, arising ultimately from the small percentage
+of men in the nation trained to the use of arms.
+
+         [Footnote 199: For the direct part played by the Liberal
+         leaders in the production of this ignorance, see p. 256.]
+
+The second conclusion to which we are led is that the specific result
+of the absence of effective preparations for War in June was to throw
+the War Office scheme of a fighting force out of gear. Twenty-two
+thousand defensive troops, with a striking force of fifty thousand in
+South Africa, would have proved sufficient to attain the ends of
+British policy. As it was, the Army Corps being in England when
+hostilities commenced, and not arriving in its entirety until December
+4th, the fifty thousand offensive force was absorbed in the work of
+extricating the twenty-two thousand defensive force. In other words,
+the British Army was not put in the position contemplated by Lord
+Wolseley's scheme until an entirely new fighting force had been
+organised and advanced from Modder River in the beginning of February,
+1900. This new striking force was identical in numbers with the
+original striking force, the Army Corps,[200] provided by Lord
+Wolseley's scheme.
+
+[Sidenote: Criticisms examined.]
+
+Among criticisms on the British Army in the field there are two that
+claim attention. The first of these is the allegation that military
+efficiency was sacrificed to a desire to spare life. In so far as this
+criticism is concerned with the handling of their troops by British
+commanders, it is strenuously denied that either Lord Roberts, or any
+of his subordinates, allowed a desire to spare the lives of the troops
+under their command to interfere with the successful execution of any
+military operation. The specific example of the alleged interference
+of this motive, usually cited, is the conduct of the attack upon the
+Boer position at Paardeberg. In respect of these operations the actual
+facts, as they presented themselves to the mind of Lord Roberts, are
+these. On reaching the Paardeberg position from Jacobsdal the
+Commander-in-Chief found that in the operations of the preceding day
+Lord Kitchener had lost a thousand men without gaining a single
+advantage. The position held by the Boers, although it was commanded
+by rising ground on all sides, was one which afforded admirable cover
+in repelling an attacking force. In these circumstances Lord Roberts
+decided, as an application of the principles of military science, to
+"sap up" to the Boer positions. The correctness of this decision was
+proved by the result. The moment that the Boers realised that they
+were to be given no further opportunity--such as a repetition of a
+direct attack upon their position would have afforded--of inflicting
+heavy loss on the British troops, whilst their eventual surrender was
+no less inevitable, the white flag was hoisted.
+
+         [Footnote 200: _I.e._, _less_ troops for lines of
+         communication. Lord Roberts's force was 36,000, the Army
+         Corps was 47,000.]
+
+It is denied with equal definiteness that any general feeling of the
+kind alleged existed among subordinate officers or the rank and file
+of the British troops. Where, however, the allegation of "a desire to
+spare life" has regard to the enemy and not to the British troops, the
+answer is to be found in the fact that any humanity inconsistent with
+military efficiency was apparent and not real. The comparative
+immunity enjoyed by the enemy on occasions when he was defeated is due
+to physical conditions wholly favourable to the Boers, to the
+knowledge of the country possessed by the burghers individually and
+collectively, and to the circumstance that the inhabitants of the
+country districts were, in almost all cases, ready to give them every
+possible assistance in escaping from the British. There is one
+particular statement in connection with this criticism which admits of
+absolute denial. It has been said that Lord Roberts, the
+Commander-in-Chief, received instructions from the Home Government
+directing him to spare the enemy as much as possible. This statement,
+in spite of its _prima facie_ improbability, has met with very general
+acceptance. None the less it is entirely baseless. The only
+limitations imposed by the Home Government upon Lord Roberts's
+complete freedom of action in the conduct of the military operations
+which he directed were such as arose from the difficulty experienced
+in supplying him upon all occasions with troops of the precise number
+and character required.
+
+[Sidenote: The German general staff.]
+
+The second criticism is one put forward by the German General Staff,
+forming, as it does, the only valid complaint against the professional
+merits of Lord Roberts advanced by that body. The British
+Commander-in-Chief, say these German critics, made it his object to
+"manoeuvre" the Boers out of positions instead of inflicting severe
+losses upon them. The answer to this criticism, in its general form,
+is to be found in the physical conditions of the country. On the
+occasions to which reference is made the burgher forces were found to
+be posted on high ground, behind rocks or in intrenchments, with fine
+open ground in front of them. Obviously in these circumstances what
+military science required of the commander directing the attacking
+force was to find a means of placing his own troops on equal terms
+with the enemy; and this was what Lord Roberts did. The criticism,
+however, as more precisely stated and applied to the battle of Diamond
+Hill in particular, and to the engagements fought in the course of
+Lord Roberts's advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, takes the form
+of the allegation that, while the enveloping movement on both flanks
+was executed successfully, the full result of this initial success was
+not obtained because the attack upon the Boer centre was not pressed
+home. In other words, the enemy's centre was never caught and
+destroyed by the envelopment of his flanks. This is historically true,
+and yet the German critics cannot be said to have established their
+case, for they omit to take the tactics of the Boers into
+consideration. Stated briefly, these were to hold on to a position and
+inflict such losses as they could upon the attacking troops, until the
+final assault became imminent; and then to mount their ponies and
+gallop away. Against such tactics as these, it would have been of no
+avail to push in a frontal attack with the certainty of incurring
+heavy loss, and without the chance of securing a decisive success. It
+would have been merely playing into the hands of the Boers.
+
+Under such conditions all that was possible was to demonstrate against
+the Boer centre in the hope of holding them in their position, until
+the flanking columns should have nullified their mobility by cutting
+in on their line of retreat. The Boers, however, took every precaution
+against such an eventuality; and the result was generally, as stated
+by the German critics, that the Boers were "manoeuvred" out of their
+positions. But this does not prove that the course adopted by Lord
+Roberts was wrong; it merely proves the extreme difficulty of
+inflicting a severe defeat upon an enemy who declines to risk a
+decisive action, and whose mobility gives him the power to do so. The
+course advocated by the critics would have been equally barren of
+result, while the cost in lives would have been far greater.
+
+[Sidenote: The Boers not in uniform.]
+
+It remains to notice certain definite circumstances which caused the
+British Army in South Africa to be confronted by difficulties which no
+other army has been required to face. The Boers were accorded all the
+privileges of a civilised army, although at the same time they
+violated the most essential of the conditions upon the observance of
+which these privileges are based. This condition is the wearing, by
+the forces of a belligerent, of such a uniform and distinctive dress
+as will be sufficient to enable the other belligerent to discriminate
+with facility between the combatant and non-combatant population of
+his enemy. The fact that the burgher forces were not in uniform and
+were yet accorded the privileges claimed by civilised troops, was in
+itself a circumstance that increased both the efforts required, and
+the losses incurred, by the British Army to an extent which has not as
+yet been fully realised. In the operations which Lord Roberts had
+conducted in Afghanistan it was not the organised army but the
+tribesmen that had proved difficult to overcome. The Afghan army
+retreated, or, if it stood its ground, was defeated. But the
+tribesmen who "sniped" the British troops from the mountain slopes and
+from behind stones and rocks, who assembled from all sides as rapidly
+as they melted away, constituted the real difficulty of the campaign.
+In South Africa the burgher forces were army and tribesmen alike.
+Owing to the absence of any distinctive uniform the combatant Boers
+mingled freely with the British soldiers, and went to and fro among
+the non-combatant Boer population in the towns and districts occupied
+by the British. On one day they were in the British camp as
+ox-drivers, or provision-sellers, or what not, and on the next they
+were in the burgher fighting line. A single instance will serve to
+convey an impression of the complete immunity with which not merely
+the rank and file, but commandants and generals, entered and left the
+British lines. It is believed that on one night General Louis Botha
+slept in Johannesburg close to Lord Roberts, the British
+Commander-in-Chief. The next morning he left the town in company with
+some of the British troops. And in the Natal campaign it is notorious
+that the camps of the Ladysmith relieving force were swarming with
+Boer spies whom it was impossible to detect and punish. Even in the
+besieged town itself the utmost secrecy at headquarters did not always
+avail to prevent a timely intimation of a contemplated attack from
+reaching the enemy's lines. Add to this the fact that every Boer
+farmhouse throughout South Africa was an Intelligence Depot for the
+enemy, and it is easy to understand the facility displayed by the
+mobile and ununiformed Boer forces in evading the British columns.
+
+Whether the humanity displayed by the British Government in thus
+recognising the burghers as regular belligerents, and in other
+respects, did not tend to bring about the very evil sought to be
+avoided is another question. It is quite possible to maintain that the
+comparative immunity from punishment and the disproportionate military
+success which the Boers enjoyed did in fact, by contributing to the
+prolongation of the war, ultimately produce a greater loss of life,
+and a greater amount of material suffering, than would have been
+incurred by the South African Dutch if the war had been waged with
+greater severity on the part of Great Britain. That it increased the
+cost of the war both in lives and in treasure to the British nation is
+obvious. But this is a consideration which does not affect any
+estimate of the merit or demerit displayed by the British Army in the
+field that may be formed either by British or foreign critics. In
+order to prove competency it is not necessary to show that no single
+mistake was made or that nothing that was done might not have been
+done better. No war department, no army ever has been or ever will be
+created that could come scatheless from the application of such a test
+of absolute efficiency. What we require to know is whether the same
+standard of efficiency was shown to have been attained in the War
+Office and in the Army as is required and obtained in any other branch
+of the public service, or in any successful or progressive undertaking
+conducted by private enterprise. The circumstances of the war were
+abnormal. From one point of view it was a civil war; from another it
+was a rebellion, and from a third it was a war between two rival
+military powers, each of whom desired to become supreme in South
+Africa. What the military critic has to consider is not so much how
+these circumstances arose, or whether they could have been changed or
+avoided by any political action on the part of Great Britain, but the
+degree in which the conditions imposed by them upon the British Army
+must be taken into account in applying the ordinary tests of military
+efficiency to the work which it accomplished in this particular
+campaign.
+
+[Sidenote: Difficulties of the campaign.]
+
+The nature of the difficulties presented by the vast extent of the
+theatre of war, the deficiency of means of communication, the
+imperfect cultivation of the land, the sparseness of the population
+and their hostility to the British, and the physical and climatic
+aspects of South Africa in general, have been broadly indicated in the
+passages taken from Lord Roberts's despatches. To pursue the inquiry
+further would be to travel beyond the scope of this work. That,
+however, there is nothing unusual in the fact that civilian forces,
+inspired by love of country and aided by physical conditions
+exceptionally favourable to themselves, should be able to offer a
+successful resistance to professional soldiers may be seen by a
+reference to one of the little wars of the seventeenth century. In the
+year 1690 twenty-two thousand French and Savoyard troops were sent by
+Louis XIV. to storm the Balsille--a rocky eminence _mutatis mutandis_
+the equivalent of a South African kopje--held by 350 Piedmontese
+Vaudois. Even so the besieged patriots made good their escape, and,
+owing to the sudden change in the politics of Europe brought about by
+the accession of William of Orange to the crown of England, actually
+concluded an honourable peace with their sovereign, Victor Amadeus of
+Savoy, a few days after they had been driven from the Balsille.
+Assuming that the British troops employed from first to last in the
+South African War were five times as numerous as the forces placed in
+the field by the Dutch nationalists--say 450,000 as against 90,000--we
+have here a numerical superiority which dwindles into insignificance
+beside the magnificent disproportion of the professional troops
+required to deal with a civilian force in this seventeenth-century
+struggle.[201]
+
+         [Footnote 201: Any reader desiring to learn the particulars
+         of this struggle is referred to the pages of the writer's
+         _The Valley of Light: Studies with Pen and Pencil in the
+         Vaudois Valleys of Piedmont_. (Macmillan, 1899). It may be
+         added that Napoleon manifested a keen interest in the
+         military details of the engagements between the French and
+         Savoyard troops and the Vaudois. As regards the number of
+         combatants on the Boer side. Lord Kitchener puts the total
+         (from first to last) at 95,000 (Cd. 1790, p. 13). The
+         _Official History_, however, gives, as the result of an
+         elaborate calculation, 87,365 (Vol. I. App. 4).]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY
+
+
+The direct share which Lord Milner took in the skilful disposition of
+the handful of British troops available at the outbreak of the war for
+the defence of the north-eastern frontier of the Cape Colony has been
+mentioned. The part which he played during the first period of the war
+in his relationship to the military authorities is sufficiently
+indicated by the words which appear in Lord Roberts's final despatch.
+
+     "This despatch," writes the Commander-in-Chief on April 2nd,
+     1901, "would be incomplete were I to omit to mention the benefit
+     I have derived from the unfailing support and wise counsels of
+     Sir Alfred Milner. I can only say here that I have felt it a high
+     privilege to work in close communication with one whose courage
+     never faltered however grave the responsibilities might be which
+     surrounded him, and who, notwithstanding the absorbing cares of
+     his office, seemed always able to find time for a helpful message
+     or for the tactful solution of a difficult question."
+
+That this is no conventional compliment, even in the mouth of so great
+a general as Lord Roberts, will appear from the fact that on one
+occasion--to be presently noted--Lord Milner's judgment did not
+entirely recommend itself at the moment to the Commander-in-Chief.
+
+[Sidenote: An unnatural alliance.]
+
+But such services, important as they were, are mere accidents in
+comparison with the volume of continuous and concentrated effort
+required to keep the machinery of administration available for the
+Imperial Government in a colony in which not merely the majority of
+the inhabitants, but the majority of the members of the Legislative
+Assembly, and half of the ministers of the Crown, were in more or less
+complete sympathy with the enemy. The Boer ultimatum, by making it
+impossible for the British Government to be any longer cajoled into an
+elusory settlement by Boer diplomacy, had relieved Lord Milner of a
+load of anxiety, and closed a period of unparalleled physical and
+mental strain. But it by no means brought Lord Milner's task to an
+end. The open rebellion of the Dutch subjects of the Crown,
+considerable alike in point of numbers and area, was not the most
+dangerous aspect of the state of utter disaffection, or rather
+demoralisation, to which the Cape Colony had been reduced by twenty
+years of Dutch ascendancy and nationalist propaganda. Just as before
+the ultimatum it was the influence, exercised by constitutional means,
+and ostensibly in the interests of the Imperial Government, over the
+Republics that brought the Salisbury Cabinet within measurable
+distance of diplomatic defeat; so, during the war, what was done and
+said by the Afrikander nationalists within the letter of the law
+constituted in fact the most formidable obstacle to the success of the
+British arms. If the Dutch in the Cape Colony had been left to
+themselves, their efforts to encourage the resistance of the Boers, in
+view of the rapid and effective blows struck by Lord Roberts, would
+probably have been without result. But unhappily their efforts
+stimulated the traditional sympathisers of the Boers in England to
+fresh action; and they were themselves stimulated in turn by the
+excesses of the party opposition which sprang into life again directly
+Lord Roberts's campaign had relieved the British people from any fear
+of military humiliation. Just as in the period before the war we found
+the Afrikander leaders striving to "mediate" between the Transvaal and
+the British Government; so now during the war we find them striving to
+"conciliate" the two contending parties. In both cases their aim was
+the same--to prevent the destruction of the Republics and the
+consequent ruin of the nationalist cause. As in the former case
+"mediation" was a euphemism for the diplomatic defeat of the British
+Government, so now "conciliation" is synonymous with the restoration
+of the independence of the Boers--that is, the renunciation of all
+that the British people, whether islander or colonist, had fought to
+secure. That any considerable body of Englishmen should have allowed
+themselves to become a second time the dupes of so coarse a political
+hypocrisy may well arouse surprise to-day; to a future generation it
+will seem almost incredible. The fact, however, admits of neither
+doubt nor contradiction. It is writ large in Hansard, in the
+Blue-books, and in the daily journals. The whole force of this strange
+and unnatural alliance between England's most bitter and most skilful
+enemies in South Africa and a section of her own sons at home, was
+directed against Lord Milner during the remaining years of his High
+Commissionership.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr Schreiners's attitude.]
+
+For the moment, however, the ultimatum had rendered the British people
+practically unanimous in the desire to chastise the insolence of the
+Boer, and, in the face of this determination, no opposition was
+manifested by the Afrikander Government to the free movement and
+disembarkation of the Imperial troops. The employment of the local
+forces in the defence of the colony was another matter. The Free State
+commandos crossed the Orange River on October 31st, 1899. The delay
+was not due to any regard felt by President Steyn for Mr. Schreiner,
+but solely to military considerations. On the previous day General
+Joubert had shut up Sir George White's force in Ladysmith; and there
+was, therefore, no longer any likelihood that these commandos would be
+required in Natal. The invasion of the Colony south of the Orange
+River produced, as we have noticed, a marked change in Mr. Schreiner's
+attitude; causing him finally to abandon the neutrality policy and
+recognise the necessity of employing the local volunteer forces in the
+defence of the Colony. None the less the injury inflicted upon British
+interests by the Prime Minister's attempt to keep the people of the
+Cape Colony out of the conflict was unquestionable. The ministers of
+the Crown in this British Colony had allowed arms and ammunition to go
+through to the Free State, until the Imperial authorities had
+interfered; they had refused to supply Mafeking and Kimberley with
+much-needed artillery; they had refused to call out the volunteers
+until the Colony was about to be invaded by the Free State as well as
+by the Transvaal, and even then they had delayed to supply these
+forces with Lee-Enfield rifles. These were injuries the effect of
+which could not be repaired by any subsequent co-operation with the
+representatives of the British Government. In addition to calling out
+the volunteers, Mr. Schreiner allowed the Imperial military
+authorities to take over the Cape Government railways, and he
+consented to the proclamation of martial law in those districts of the
+Colony in which the Dutch were in rebellion. But he was far from
+yielding, even now, that full and complete assistance to the Governor
+which would have been expected, as a matter of course, from the Prime
+Minister of any other British colony. On one occasion, at least,
+during this period the conflict between his views and those of Lord
+Milner became so acute that his resignation seemed to be inevitable.
+But this was not to be the end of the Afrikander Ministry. In
+proportion as Mr. Schreiner approached gradually to agreement with
+Lord Milner, so did he incur the displeasure of Mr. Hofmeyr and the
+Dutch, until (in June, 1901) the Ministry perished of internal
+dissension.
+
+A week after Lord Roberts reached Capetown (January 10th, 1900), Lord
+Milner sent home a despatch in which he tells the story of the
+rebellion in the Cape Colony. The state of the districts on the
+western border of the Republics, north of the Orange River, is
+described in the words of a reliable and unbiassed witness who has
+just arrived at Capetown from Vryburg, where he has been lately
+resident:
+
+     "All the farmers in the Vryburg, Kuruman, and Taungs districts,"
+     says this witness, "have joined the Boers, and I do not believe
+     that you will find ten loyal British subjects among the Dutch
+     community in the whole of Bechuanaland. The Field Cornets and
+     Justices of the Peace on the Dutch side have all joined ... the
+     conduct of the rebels has been unbearable."
+
+Of the position of that part of the Eastern Province of the Cape
+Colony which, lying to the south of the Free State, formed the main
+seat of the rebellion, Lord Milner himself writes:
+
+[Sidenote: Treatment of loyalists.]
+
+     "Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation of
+     Colesberg, no less than five great districts--those of Colesberg,
+     Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and Wodehouse--had gone over
+     without hesitation, and, so to speak, bodily, to the enemy.
+     Throughout that region the Landdrosts of the Orange Free State
+     had established their authority, and everywhere, in the
+     expressive words of a magistrate, British loyalists were "being
+     hunted out of town after town like sheep." In the invaded
+     districts the method of occupation has always been more or less
+     the same. The procedure is as follows:--A commando enters, the
+     Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the
+     courthouse, or market-place, and a Proclamation is read annexing
+     the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in which he
+     explains that the people must now obey the Free State laws
+     generally, though they are at present under martial law. A local
+     Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a few days
+     or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve against their
+     country. In either case they lose their property to a greater or
+     less extent. If they elect to quit they are often robbed before
+     starting or on the journey; if they stay their property and
+     themselves are commandeered.
+
+     "The number of rebels who have actually taken up arms and joined
+     the enemy during their progress throughout the five annexed
+     districts can for the present only be matter of conjecture. I
+     shall, however, be on the safe side in reckoning that during
+     November it was a number not less than the total of the invading
+     commandos, that is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the
+     invading commandos themselves a certain proportion were colonists
+     who had crossed the border before the invasion took place. And
+     the number, whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and
+     during November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee
+     from the Albert district has estimated the total number of
+     colonial Boers who have joined the enemy in the invaded
+     districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the
+     districts north of that river, to which I referred at the
+     beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less. Adding
+     to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal immediately
+     before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with the view of
+     taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the conclusion
+     that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of those now
+     fighting against us in South Africa, and probably somewhat more,
+     either are, or till quite recently were, subjects of the
+     Queen."[202]
+
+         [Footnote 202: Cd. 264 (Despatch of January 16th, 1900).]
+
+As it turned out, this eastern rebellion was kept within limits by
+General French's advance upon Colesberg, and by the skilful and
+successful cavalry operations which he subsequently carried out upon
+the Free State border; but there is abundant evidence to support the
+belief that any second reverse in the Eastern Province, such as that
+which General Gatacre suffered at Stormberg, would have proved the
+signal for a rising in the Western Province. The Bond was active; and
+the tone of the meetings held by the various branches throughout the
+Colony was as frankly hostile to the Imperial Government as it was
+sympathetic to the Republics.
+
+[Sidenote: State of western province.]
+
+The extent to which Mr. Schreiner's qualified co-operation with the
+Imperial authorities had aroused the hostility of the Bond will be
+seen from the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting of the Cape
+Distriks-bestuur, held at the office of _Ons Land_ at the end of
+January (1900). It was a small meeting, but among those present were
+Mr. Hofmeyr himself and Mr. Malan, the editor of _Ons Land_. On the
+motion of the latter, it was unanimously determined that the
+forthcoming Annual Congress of the Bond should be asked to pass a--
+
+     "resolution (_a_) giving expression of Congress's entire
+     disapproval of the policy which led to the present bloody war
+     instead of to a peaceful solution of the differences with the
+     South African Republic by means of arbitration; and (_b_) urging
+     a speedy re-establishment of peace on fair and righteous
+     conditions, as also a thorough inquiry by our Parliament into the
+     way in which, during the war, private property, the civil
+     liberties, and constitutional rights of the subject have been
+     treated."[203]
+
+         [Footnote 203: Cd. 261.]
+
+Even more significant--as evidence of the dangerous feeling of
+exaltation which possessed the Dutch at this time--was the New Year's
+exhortation of _Ons Land_, the journalistic mouthpiece of Mr. Hofmeyr.
+And Mr. Hofmeyr, it must be remembered, was not only the head of the
+_Commissie van Toezicht_, or Executive of three which controlled the
+Afrikander Bond, but the real master of the majority in the Cape
+Parliament, upon which the Schreiner Cabinet depended for its
+existence. After setting out the "mighty deeds" achieved by the
+Afrikander arms during the last three months, this bitter and
+relentless opponent of British supremacy in South Africa proceeded to
+declare that "still mightier deeds" were to be seen in the coming year
+(1900), and that the Afrikander nation, so far from being extinguished
+by the conflict with Great Britain, would be welded into one compact
+mass, and flourish more and more.
+
+Nor was this all. In the closing days of the year (1899) information
+reached the British military authorities that a plot was on foot to
+seize Capetown. The Dutch from the country districts were to assemble
+in the capital in the guise of excursionists who had come to town to
+enjoy the Christmas and New Year holidays. On New Year's Eve, the
+night reported to have been fixed for the attempt, all the military
+stations in Capetown were kept in frequent communication by telephone;
+the streets were paraded by pickets; and, in the drill-shed the
+Capetown Highlanders slept under arms. Whether any attempt of the sort
+was seriously contemplated or not, there is no question as to the fact
+that the utmost necessity for precaution was recognised by the
+military authorities at Capetown during this period, in spite of the
+security afforded by the reinforcements which the Home Government was
+pouring into the Colony. It was an old boast of the militant Dutch in
+the Cape Colony that they would find a way to prevent British troops
+from using the colonial railways to attack the Boers.[204] And when
+at length, a month after Lord Roberts had arrived, the transport
+system had been reorganised, the troops concentrated at De Aar and
+Modder River, and everything was ready for the forward movement, the
+most complete secrecy was observed as to the departure of the
+Commander-in-Chief and Lord Kitchener. Instead of leaving for the
+front with the final drafts from the Capetown station in Adderley
+Street, amid the cheering of the British population, these two
+distinguished soldiers were driven in a close carriage, on the evening
+of February 6th, from Government House to the Salt River Station,
+where they caught the ordinary passenger train for De Aar.
+
+         [Footnote 204: At the time of the Bechuanaland Expedition
+         (1884-5), when the writer was in South Africa, "a controversy
+         was seriously maintained between the two moderate Afrikander
+         journals, the _Sud Africaan_ and the _Volksblad_, on the
+         question whether the Imperial Government had, or had not, the
+         right to send troops through the Colony, without the consent
+         of the Colonial Ministry. In commenting upon this question a
+         correspondent wrote in the _Patriot_, the extreme organ of
+         the Afrikanders: 'I believe the _Volksblad_ is correct in
+         maintaining that England has that right. But if England has
+         the right to send _Rooibaatjes_ (_i.e._ British soldiers) to
+         kill my brethren in the Transvaal, then I have also the right
+         to try and prevent the same. My brother is nearer than
+         England. England can send troops, but whether they will all
+         arrive safely in Stellaland--that stands to be seen.'"--_A
+         History of South Africa_, by the writer. (Dent, 1900.)]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Robert's advance.]
+
+No one was more aware of the reality of the Dutch disaffection in the
+Colony than Lord Milner. Before Lord Roberts left Capetown for the
+front he addressed a memorandum to him, in which the attention of the
+Commander-in-Chief was drawn to certain special elements of danger in
+the whole situation in South Africa as affected by the rebellion of
+the Dutch in the Cape Colony. With reference to this memorandum Lord
+Roberts writes, in the second of his despatches (February 16th, 1900):
+
+     "Before quitting the seat of Government I received a memorandum
+     from the High Commissioner, in which Sir Alfred Milner reviewed
+     the political and military situation, and laid stress on the
+     possibility of a general rising among the disaffected Dutch
+     population, should the Cape Colony be denuded of troops for the
+     purpose of carrying on offensive operations in the Orange Free
+     State. In reply I expressed the opinion that the military
+     requirements of the case demanded an early advance into the
+     enemy's country; that such an advance, if successful, would
+     lessen the hostile pressure both on the northern frontiers of the
+     Colony and in Natal; that the relief of Kimberley had to be
+     effected before the end of February, and would set free most of
+     the troops encamped on the Modder River, and that the arrival of
+     considerable reinforcements from home, especially of Field
+     Artillery, by the 19th of February, would enable those points
+     along the frontier which were weakly held to be materially
+     strengthened. I trusted, therefore, that His Excellency's
+     apprehensions would prove groundless. No doubt a certain amount
+     of risk had to be run, but protracted inaction seemed to me to
+     involve more serious dangers than the bolder course which I have
+     decided to adopt."
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's proposal.]
+
+There cannot, of course, be any question as to the general wisdom of
+this decision. Both in this case, and again in deciding to advance
+from Bloemfontein upon Johannesburg and Pretoria, it was just by
+taking his risks--risks that would have reduced a lesser man to
+inaction--that Lord Roberts displayed the distinguishing quality of a
+great captain of war. In both cases the best defence was to attack.
+But as Lord Roberts, in this brief reference, does not indicate the
+real point of the High Commissioner's representations, it is necessary
+to state with some precision what it was that Lord Milner had actually
+in his mind. The last thing which occurred to him was to advocate any
+course that could weaken our offensive action. But the peculiarity of
+the South African political situation, which enabled even a defeated
+enemy, by detaching a very small force, to raise a new war in our
+rear, in what was nominally our country, and thus to hamper, and
+possibly altogether arrest, the forward movement, was constantly
+present to his thought. The proposal which Lord Milner desired Lord
+Roberts to adopt was that a certain minimum of mobile troops should be
+definitely set aside for the defence of the Colony, and kept there,
+whatever happened; since, in Lord Milner's opinion, it was only in
+this way that a real and effective form of defence could be made
+possible, and the number of men locked up in the passive defence of
+the railway lines greatly reduced. If this suggestion had been carried
+out, as Lord Milner intended, there would have been no second
+rebellion. What prevented Lord Roberts from adopting the High
+Commissioner's suggestion was the numerical insufficiency of the
+troops at his disposal. In order to carry the war into the enemy's
+country, he had practically to denude the Cape Colony of troops. The
+subsequent course of the war will reveal the direct and disastrous
+influence which the situation in the Cape Colony was destined to
+exercise upon the military decisions of the republican leaders--an
+influence which would have been lessened materially, if not altogether
+removed, by the creation of this permanent and mobile force. And, in
+point of fact, Lord Milner's apprehension that the rebellion might
+even now interfere with the success of the forward movement, unless
+adequate provision was made to keep it in check, received almost
+immediate confirmation. While Lord Roberts was engaged in the capture
+of Cronje's force at Paardeberg, the north-midland districts of
+Prieska, Britstown, and Carnarvon, lying to the west of the railway
+from De Aar to Orange River, broke out into rebellion. Although Lord
+Roberts at once directed certain columns to concentrate upon this new
+area of disaffection, the situation had become so serious that on
+March 8th--_i.e._, the day after Poplar Grove, and in the course of
+the rapid march upon Bloemfontein--Lord Roberts--
+
+     "desired Major-General Lord Kitchener to proceed to De Aar with
+     the object of collecting reinforcements, and of taking such steps
+     as might be necessary to punish the rebels and to prevent the
+     spread of disaffection."[205]
+
+         [Footnote 205: Despatch dated "Government House,
+         Bloemfontein, March 15th, 1900."]
+
+That is to say, the disclosure of a new centre of active rebellion in
+the Colony deprived the Commander-in-Chief of the services of Lord
+Kitchener, his Chief-of-Staff, when he was in the act of executing one
+of the most critical movements of the campaign.
+
+[Sidenote: The Boer peace overtures.]
+
+The complete revolution in the military situation produced by Lord
+Roberts's victorious advance into the Free State elicited from
+Presidents Krueger and Steyn the "peace overtures" cabled to Lord
+Salisbury on March 5th, 1900. In this characteristic document the two
+Presidents remark that--
+
+     "they consider it [their] duty solemnly to declare that this war
+     was undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the
+     threatened independence of the South African Republic, and is
+     only continued in order to secure and safeguard the incontestable
+     independence of both Republics as sovereign international states,
+     and to obtain the assurance that those of Her Majesty's subjects
+     who have taken part with [them] in this war shall suffer no harm
+     whatever in person or property."
+
+They further declare that "on these conditions, but on these
+conditions alone," they are now, as in the past, desirous of seeing
+peace re-established in South Africa; and they add considerately that
+they have refrained from making this declaration "so long as the
+advantage was always on their side," from a fear lest it "might hurt
+the feelings of honour of the British people." They conclude:
+
+     "But now that the prestige of the British Empire may be
+     considered to be assured by the capture of one of our forces by
+     Her Majesty's troops, and that we are thereby forced to evacuate
+     other positions which our forces had occupied, that difficulty is
+     over, and we can no longer hesitate clearly to inform your
+     Government and people, in the sight of the whole civilised world,
+     why we are fighting, and on what conditions we are ready to
+     restore peace."[206]
+
+         [Footnote 206: Cd. 35.]
+
+The best comment upon this grossly disingenuous document is that which
+is afforded by certain passages in Mr. Reitz's book, _A Century of
+Wrong_, which was written in anticipation of the outbreak of war and
+issued so soon as this anticipation had been realised:
+
+     "The struggle of now nearly a century," he writes in his appeal
+     to his brother Afrikanders, "hastens to an end; we are
+     approaching the last act in that great drama which is so
+     momentous for all South Africa.... The questions which present
+     themselves for solution in the approaching conflict have their
+     origin deep in the history of the past.... By its light we are
+     more clearly enabled to comprehend the truth to which our people
+     appeal as a final justification for embarking on the war now so
+     close at hand.... May the hope which glowed in our hearts during
+     1880, and which buoyed us up during that struggle, burn on
+     steadily! May it prove a beacon of light in our path, invincibly
+     moving onwards through blood and through tears, until it leads us
+     to a real union of South Africa.... Whether the result be victory
+     or death, Liberty will assuredly rise on South Africa ... just as
+     freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more
+     than a century ago. Then from Zambesi to Simon's Town it will be
+     Africa for the Afrikander."[207]
+
+         [Footnote 207: Mr. Reitz's work was translated into English
+         by Mr. W. T. Stead.]
+
+And to this may be added the following extract from a letter written
+by "one of the distinguished members of the Volksraad" who voted for
+war against Great Britain, to one of his friends, a member of the
+Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony:
+
+     "Our plan is, with God's help, to take all that is English in
+     South Africa; so, in case you true Afrikanders wish to throw off
+     the English yoke, now is the time to hoist the Vier-kleur in
+     Capetown. You can rely on us; we will push through from sea to
+     sea, and wave one flag over the whole of South Africa, under one
+     Afrikander Government, if we can reckon on our Afrikander
+     brethren."[208]
+
+         [Footnote 208: Cd. 109.]
+
+[Sidenote: The British reply.]
+
+Lord Salisbury's reply, sent from the Foreign Office on March 11th, is
+as follows:
+
+     "I have the honour to acknowledge Your Honours' telegram dated
+     the 5th of March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is
+     principally to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall
+     recognise the 'incontestable independence' of the South African
+     Republic and Orange Free State 'as sovereign international
+     states,' and to offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a
+     conclusion.
+
+     "In the beginning of October last peace existed between Her
+     Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then
+     were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some
+     months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African
+     Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for certain
+     very serious grievances under which British residents in the
+     South African Republic were suffering. In the course of these
+     negotiations the South African Republic had, to the knowledge of
+     Her Majesty's Government, made considerable armaments, and the
+     latter had, consequently, taken steps to provide corresponding
+     reinforcements to the British garrisons of Capetown and Natal. No
+     infringement of the rights guaranteed by the Conventions had up
+     to that point taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two
+     days' notice, the South African Republic, after issuing an
+     insulting ultimatum, declared war upon Her Majesty, and the
+     Orange Free State, with whom there had not even been any
+     discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were
+     immediately invaded by the two Republics, siege was laid to three
+     towns within the British frontier, a large portion of the two
+     colonies was overrun, with great destruction to property and
+     life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of
+     extensive portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those
+     dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In
+     anticipation of these operations, the South African Republic had
+     been accumulating for many years past military stores on an
+     enormous scale, which by their character could only have been
+     intended for use against Great Britain.
+
+     "Your Honours make some observations of a negative character upon
+     the object with which these preparations were made. I do not
+     think it necessary to discuss the questions you have raised. But
+     the result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy,
+     has been that the British Empire has been compelled to confront
+     an invasion which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and
+     the loss of thousands of precious lives. This great calamity has
+     been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in
+     recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two Republics.
+
+     "In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the
+     position which was given to them, and the calamities which their
+     unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions, Her
+     Majesty's Government can only answer your Honours' telegram by
+     saying that they are not prepared to assent to the independence
+     either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free
+     State."
+
+[Sidenote: Conventions to be annulled.]
+
+This reply has been cited at length for two reasons. In the first
+place it affords a concise and weighty statement of the British case
+against the Republics, and, in the second, it contains a specific and
+reasoned declaration of the central decision of the Salisbury Cabinet,
+against which the efforts both of the Dutch party in the Cape and of
+the friends of the Boers in England continued to be directed, until
+the controversy was closed by the surrender of the republican leaders
+at Vereeniging. In the Cape Colony the cry of "conciliation" was
+raised to cloak the gross appearance of a movement which was, in fact,
+a direct co-operation with the enemy. And the same specious word was
+adopted in England, so soon as the strain of the war had begun to make
+itself felt in the constituencies, as a decent flag under which the
+party opponents of the Unionist Government in general could join
+forces with the traditional friends of the Boers and other convinced
+opponents of Imperial consolidation. The decision of the Salisbury
+Cabinet not to restore the system of the Conventions, which was in
+fact the decision of the great mass of the British people both at home
+and over-sea, was not reversed. It was confirmed in the House of
+Commons by 208 votes against 52 on July 25th, 1900, and by the verdict
+of the country in the General Election which followed.[209] But the
+political agitation by which it was sought to reverse this decision
+was none the less injurious alike to the Boer and British peoples,
+since it acted as a powerful incentive to the republican leaders to
+continued struggle which, except for the illusions created by this
+agitation, they would have recognised as hopeless in itself and
+unjustified by any prospect of military success. In both cases the
+effect of the agitation was the same: the war was unnecessarily
+prolonged--intentionally by the Afrikander nationalists, and
+unintentionally by Lord (then Mr.) Courtney, Mr. Morley, Mr. Bryce,
+and other opponents in England of the annexation of the Republics.
+
+         [Footnote 209: The Unionist party was returned to power with
+         a slightly decreased majority--130 as against 150. But this
+         loss of seats was counterbalanced by the consideration that
+         it is unusual for the same Government to be entrusted with a
+         second period of office by a democratic electorate.]
+
+[Sidenote: The 'Conciliation' movement.]
+
+The Presidents had demanded the recognition of the independence of the
+Republics and a free pardon for the Cape rebels as the price of peace.
+The Afrikander nationalists at once began to co-operate with the
+Republics in the endeavour to wrest these terms from the British
+Government. Mr. Schreiner, as we have seen, had already incurred Mr.
+Hofmeyr's displeasure by allowing the Cape Government to render
+assistance to the Imperial authorities in the prosecution of the war.
+The breach thus created between the Prime Minister and Sir Richard
+(then Mr.) Solomon, on the one hand, and Dr. Te Water, Mr. Merriman,
+and Mr. Sauer, who shared the views of the Bond, on the other, was,
+rapidly widened by the "conciliation" meetings held throughout the
+Colony by the Afrikander nationalists in support of the "peace
+overtures" of the Presidents. The British population at the Cape was
+quick to realise the insidious and fatal character of the
+"conciliation" movement thus inaugurated by the Afrikander
+nationalists. The universal alarm and indignation to which it gave
+rise among the loyalists of both nationalities found expression in the
+impassioned speech which Sir James (then Mr.) Rose Innes delivered at
+the Municipal Hall of Claremont[210] on March 30th, 1900. The purpose
+of the meeting was to allow the British subjects thus assembled to
+record their approval of Lord Salisbury's reply to the Republics, and
+their conviction that "the incorporation of these States within the
+dominions of the Queen could alone secure peace, prosperity, and
+public freedom throughout South Africa." In supporting this
+resolution, Sir James Rose Innes said:
+
+         [Footnote 210: A suburb of Capetown.]
+
+     "This question of permanent peace is the key-stone of the whole
+     matter, because, I take it, we none of us want to see another war
+     of this kind. We do not want to see the misery and the suffering
+     and the loss which a war of this kind entails. We do not want to
+     see our sandy plains drenched with the best blood of England
+     again, fighting against white men in this country. We do not want
+     to see the flower of colonial manhood shot down on the plains of
+     the Orange Free State and the Karroo, and neither do we want to
+     see brave men, born in South Africa, dying in heaps, dying for
+     what we know is a hopeless ideal. Therefore we say, 'In Heaven's
+     name give us peace! Have a settlement, but make no settlement
+     which shall not be calculated, as far as human foresight can
+     provide, to secure a permanent peace.'"
+
+These were strong words, and their significance was heightened by the
+well-known independence of Sir James Innes's political outlook.
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner at Bloemfontein.]
+
+A fortnight later Lord Milner declared his mind on the same question.
+Both the occasion and the speech are of special interest. The High
+Commissioner had just returned from a fortnight at the front. On March
+19th he left Capetown in company with Sir Richard Solomon for the
+north-eastern districts of the Colony, which, having rebelled in
+November, had just been reduced to order by General Brabant and the
+"Colonial Division," when the Free State invaders had been drawn off
+by Lord Roberts's advance. After a week in the Colony, Lord Milner
+travelled on by rail to Bloemfontein, which he reached on the 27th. It
+was a stimulating and suggestive moment. He was now the guest of the
+British Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency, where, just ten months
+ago, as the guest of President Steyn, he had met Paul Krueger for the
+first time. The little Free State capital, then wrapped in its
+accustomed quietude, was now filled with the tumultuous presence of a
+great army. But, complete as was the revolution accomplished by Lord
+Roberts's advance, there were signs that the Boer was dying hard, even
+if he were not coming to life again. On the 30th a disquieting
+engagement was fought at Karree Siding, and on the 31st de Wet dealt
+his second shrewd blow at Sannah's Post.
+
+With this experience of the actualities of war, Lord Milner, leaving
+Bloemfontein on April 2nd, had returned to Capetown. On the 12th he
+was presented with an appreciative address, signed by all, except one,
+of the Nonconformist ministers of religion resident in and around
+Capetown, in which personal affection for himself and approval of his
+policy were expressed. The action of these men was altogether
+exceptional. It was justified by the circumstance that in England Lord
+Milner's policy had been subjected to the bitterest criticism in
+quarters where Nonconformist influence was predominant. Not only to
+Lord Courtney, but to other Liberal friends and associates, the High
+Commissioner had become a "lost mind." To the Afrikander nationalists
+he was "the enemy"; the efforts which had barely sufficed to keep the
+administrative machinery of a British colony at the disposal of the
+Imperial Government were represented as the unconstitutional acts of a
+tyrannical proconsul; having ruthlessly exposed the aspirations of the
+Afrikander nationalists he was now to become the destroyer of the Boer
+nation. The personal note in the address was, therefore, both
+instructive and welcome, and it elicited a response in which the charm
+of a calm and generous nature shines through an unalterable
+determination to know and do the right:
+
+     "As regards myself personally, I cannot but feel it is a great
+     source of strength at a trying time to be assured of the
+     confidence and approval of the men I see before me, and of all
+     whom they represent. You refer to my having to encounter
+     misrepresentation and antagonism. I do not wish to make too much
+     of that. I have no doubt been exposed to much criticism and some
+     abuse. There has, I sometimes think, been an exceptional display
+     of mendacity at my expense. But this is the fate of every public
+     man who is forced by circumstances into a somewhat prominent
+     position in a great crisis. And, after all, praise and blame have
+     a wonderful way of balancing one another if you only give them
+     time.
+
+     "I remember when I left England for South Africa three years ago,
+     it was amidst a chorus of eulogy so excessive that it made me
+     feel thoroughly uncomfortable. To protest would have been
+     useless: it would only have looked like affectation. So I just
+     placed the surplus praise to my credit, so to speak, as something
+     to live on in the days which I surely knew must come sooner or
+     later, if I did my duty, when I would meet with undeserved
+     censure. And certainly I have had to draw on that account rather
+     heavily during the last nine months. But there is still a balance
+     on the right side which, thanks to you and others, is now once
+     more increasing. So I cannot pose as a martyr, and, what is more
+     important, I cannot complain of any want of support. No man,
+     placed as I have been in a position of singular embarrassment,
+     exposed to bitter attacks to which he could not reply, and unable
+     to explain his conduct even to his own friends, has ever had more
+     compensation to be thankful for than I have had in the constant,
+     devoted, forbearing support and confidence of all those South
+     Africans, whether in this Colony, in Natal, or in the Republics,
+     whose sympathy is with the British Empire.
+
+[Sidenote: Never again.]
+
+     "In the concluding paragraph of your address you refer in weighty
+     and well-considered language to the conditions which you deem
+     necessary for the future peace and prosperity of South Africa,
+     and for the ultimate harmony and fusion of its white races. I can
+     only say that I entirely agree with the views expressed in that
+     paragraph. The longer the struggle lasts, the greater the
+     sacrifices which it involves, the stronger must surely be the
+     determination of all of us to achieve a settlement which will
+     render the repetition of this terrible scourge impossible. 'Never
+     again,' must be the motto of all thinking, of all humane men. It
+     is for that reason, not from any lust of conquest, not from any
+     desire to trample on a gallant, if misguided, enemy, that we
+     desire that the settlement shall be no patchwork and no
+     compromise; that it shall leave no room for misunderstanding, no
+     opportunity for intrigue, for the revival of impossible
+     ambitions, or the accumulation of enormous armaments. President
+     Krueger has said that he wants no more Conventions, and I
+     entirely agree with him. A compromise of that sort is unfair to
+     everybody. If there is one thing of which, after recent
+     experiences, I am absolutely convinced, it is that the vital
+     interests of all those who live in South Africa, of our present
+     enemies as much as of those who are on our side, demand that
+     there should not be two dissimilar and antagonistic political
+     systems in that which nature and history have irrevocably decided
+     must be one country. To agree to a compromise which would leave
+     any ambiguity on that point would not be magnanimity: it would be
+     weakness, ingratitude, and cruelty--ingratitude to the heroic
+     dead, and cruelty to the unborn generations.
+
+     "But when I say that, do not think that I wish to join in the
+     outcry, at present so prevalent, against the fine old virtue of
+     magnanimity. I believe in it as much as ever I did, and there is
+     plenty of room for it in the South Africa of to-day. We can show
+     it by a frank recognition of what is great and admirable in the
+     character of our enemies; by not maligning them as a body because
+     of the sins of the few, or perhaps even of many, individuals. We
+     can show it by not crowing excessively over our victories, and by
+     not thinking evil of every one who, for one reason or another, is
+     unable to join in our legitimate rejoicings. We can show it by
+     striving to take care that our treatment of those who have been
+     guilty of rebellion, while characterised by a just severity
+     towards the really guilty parties, should be devoid of any spirit
+     of vindictiveness, or of race-prejudice. We can show it, above
+     all, when this dire struggle is over, by proving by our acts that
+     they libelled us who said that we fought for gold or any material
+     advantage, and that the rights and privileges which we have
+     resolutely claimed for ourselves we are prepared freely to extend
+     to others, even to those who have fought against us, whenever
+     they are prepared loyally to accept them."[211]
+
+         [Footnote 211: Cd. 261.]
+
+It is the third of three critical utterances of which each is
+summarised, as it were, in a single luminous phrase. To the Cape Dutch
+he spoke at Graaf Reinet, after their own manner: "Of course you are
+loyal!" To England, on the Uitlander's behalf, he wrote: "The case for
+intervention is overwhelming." And now he gathered the whole long
+lesson of the war into the two words, "never again."
+
+[Sidenote: British policy.]
+
+A month later Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham (May 11th), made
+a general statement of the nature of the settlement upon which the
+British Government had determined. The separate existence of the
+Republics, "constantly intriguing as they had done with foreign
+nations, constantly promoting agitation and disaffection in our own
+colonies," was to be tolerated no longer; but the "individual
+liberties" of the Boers were to be preserved. After the war was over a
+period of Crown Colony government would be necessary; "but," he added,
+"as soon as it is safe and possible it will be the desire and the
+intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce these States into
+the great circle of self-governing colonies." In making this
+pronouncement Mr. Chamberlain referred in terms of just severity to
+the injurious influence which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as the
+official leader of the Liberal party, had exercised upon the
+diplomatic contest of the preceding year. At the precise period when a
+word might have been worth anything to the cause of peace, Sir Henry
+Campbell-Bannerman, he said--
+
+     "had again and again declaimed his own opinion that not only was
+     war out of the question, but that military preparations of any
+     kind were altogether unnecessary. I do not speak of the wisdom
+     which dictated such an expression of opinion," Mr. Chamberlain
+     continued, "although he repeated that statement three days before
+     the ultimatum was delivered, and a week before the invasion of
+     Natal took place. I do not speak, therefore, of his foresight.
+     But what is to be said of the patriotism of a man who is not a
+     single individual but who represents a great party by virtue of
+     his position--although he does not represent it by virtue of his
+     opinion--what is to be said of such a man who, at such a time,
+     should countermine the endeavours for peace of Her Majesty's
+     Government?"
+
+And in the same speech Mr. Chamberlain warned his fellow-countrymen
+"against the efforts which would be made by the politicians to snatch
+from them the fruits of a victory which would be won by their
+soldiers; and in particular against the campaign of misrepresentation
+which had been commenced already by Mr. Paul, the Stop-the-War
+Committee, and the other bodies which were so lavish with what they
+were pleased to call their 'accurate information.'"
+
+[Sidenote: Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman.]
+
+Had Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman seen fit to profit by the experience
+of the past, the whole of the suffering and loss of the next year and
+a half of wanton hostilities, in all human probability, would have
+been avoided. But Mr. Chamberlain's rebuke was disregarded. The
+senseless and unnatural alliance between the Afrikander nationalists
+and the Liberal Opposition was renewed. It is quite true that the
+official leader of the Opposition, in speaking at Glasgow on June 7th,
+two days after Lord Roberts had occupied Pretoria, declared that, in
+respect of the settlement, "one broad principle" must be laid down--
+
+     "the British Imperial power, which has hitherto been supreme in
+     effect in South Africa, must in future be supreme in form as well
+     as in effect, and this naturally carries with it the point which
+     is sometimes put in the foreground, namely, that there must be no
+     possibility that any such outbreak of hostilities as we have been
+     witnessing shall again occur.... The two conquered States must,
+     in some form or under some condition, become States of the
+     British Empire."
+
+But when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman proceeded to inform his audience
+how this was to be done, he used expressions which not only robbed his
+original statement of all significance as an indication of British
+unanimity, but conveyed a direct intimation to the Afrikander
+nationalists that their endeavours to frustrate the declared objects
+of the Unionist Government would receive the support and encouragement
+of the Opposition in England. His words were:
+
+     "We need have no doubt how it is to be done. By applying our
+     Liberal principles, the Liberal principles from which the
+     strength of the Empire has been derived, and on which it depends.
+     Let us apply our Liberal principles, and whether our party be in
+     a majority, or in a minority, I think that it is well in our
+     power to secure that these principles shall be applied. [The
+     General Election was imminent.] Let us restore as early as
+     possible, and let us maintain, those rights of self-government
+     which give not only life and vigour, but contentment and loyalty
+     to every colony which enjoys them...."
+
+"Liberal principles," when applied to a given administrative problem,
+as Mr. Chamberlain took occasion to point out (June 19th), meant, for
+practical purposes, the opinions which prominent members of the
+Liberal party were known to hold upon the matter in question. Lord
+(then Mr.) Courtney was for autonomy--"the re-establishment of the
+independence of the two Republics." Mr. Bryce advocated "the
+establishment of two protected States, which would have a sham
+independence of not much advantage to them for any practical or useful
+purpose, but very dangerous to us." And then there was Mr. Morley. Now
+Mr. Morley, only a week before, at Oxford (June 10th), had condemned
+not only the war, but by implication, the rejection of President
+Krueger's illusory Franchise Bill.
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. John Morley.]
+
+     "I assert," said Mr. Morley, "that the evils which have resulted
+     from the war immeasurably transcend the evils with which it was
+     proposed to deal.... I abhor the whole transaction of the war. I
+     think in many ways it is an irreparable situation. We have done
+     a great wrong--a wrong of which I believe there is scarcely any
+     Englishman living who will not bitterly repent."[212]
+
+         [Footnote 212: Mr. Morley has the doubtful merit of
+         consistency. As recently as April 27th, 1906, he alluded to
+         the South African War as "that delusive and guilty war," in
+         an address to the Eighty Club. According to _The Times_
+         report this expression was received with cheers.]
+
+With these words fresh in his memory, Mr. Chamberlain continued:
+
+     "Is Mr. Morley a Liberal? I do not know in that case what would
+     become of the new territories if his principles were applied. But
+     this I do know--that in that case you would have immediately to
+     get rid of Sir Alfred Milner, who is the one great official in
+     South Africa who has shown from the first a true grasp of the
+     situation; and you would have also to get rid of the Colonial
+     Secretary, which would not, perhaps, matter."[213]
+
+         [Footnote 213: It may perhaps be objected that some credit
+         should have been allowed to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in
+         view of the fact that a sum of L41,807,400 was voted in
+         Committee of Supply in the House of Commons for military
+         requirements, practically without discussion, within four and
+         a half hours on June 19th, 1900. This objection is answered
+         by the words used by the Duke of Devonshire on the same day:
+         "I am afraid I must tell Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman that he
+         is not likely to receive from us any recognition, either
+         effusive or otherwise, of the patriotism of his party. It is
+         quite true that, as he took credit to himself and his
+         friends, they have not offered any opposition to our demands
+         for supplies or to the military measures which it has been
+         found necessary for the Government to take; but the reason
+         for that prudent abstinence is not very far to seek. Sir
+         Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his friends knew very well that
+         any factious opposition to the granting of these supplies
+         would have brought down upon them the almost unanimous
+         condemnation of the whole people; and Sir Henry
+         Campbell-Bannerman is much too shrewd and sensible a man to
+         risk the danger of committing for his party an act of
+         political suicide."--Address to Women's Liberal Unionist
+         Association.]
+
+And so in 1900--after the Raid, after the long diplomatic conflict,
+after the sudden revelation of the military strength of the
+Republics, after the ambitions of the Afrikander nationalists had been
+unmasked, and after the Dutch subjects of the Queen had risen in
+arms--the Liberal friends of the South African Dutch set themselves to
+do again what they had done in 1880. Just as then President Krueger
+wrote,[214] on behalf of himself and his Afrikander allies, to Lord
+(then Mr.) Courtney: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere ... will be
+useful.... We have done our duty, and used all legitimate influence to
+cause the [Federation] proposals to fail"; so now these Boer
+sympathisers prepared to work hand in hand with the Afrikander
+nationalists in their endeavour to secure the "fall" of Lord Milner,
+and to cause the Annexation proposals to "fail." Happily the analogy
+ends here. Upon the "anvil" of Lord Milner the "hammers" of the
+enemies of the Empire were worn out--_Tritantur mallei, remanet
+incus_.
+
+         [Footnote 214: June 26th, 1880, C. 2,655.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT
+
+
+The correspondence forwarded to the Colonial Office during the first
+half of the year 1900 by Lord Milner, and presented to the House of
+Commons in time for the Settlement debate of July 25th, furnishes a
+complete record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement. The whole
+of this interesting and significant collection of documents is worthy of
+attention; but all that can be done here is to direct the notice of the
+reader to one or two of its more salient features--features which
+illustrate the extraordinary condition of the Cape Colony, and explain
+how the disaffection of the Dutch subjects of the Crown was to be first
+aggravated, and then used as a means of saving the independence of the
+Republics. The position taken up by the Bond at the end of January
+(1900) in view of Mr. Schreiner's gradual conversion to the side of the
+Imperial Government, is sufficiently indicated in the resolution
+prepared for submission to the annual Congress, to which reference has
+been already[215] made. It was, in effect, a condemnation not only of
+the British Government, but of the Cape Government also, in so far as it
+had co-operated with the Imperial authorities, and a determination to
+prevent the war from being carried to a logical and successful
+conclusion by the incorporation of the Boer Republics into the system of
+British South Africa. The annual Congress, at which these opinions were
+to be affirmed, was announced to be held at Somerset East, on March 8th.
+Lord Milner, however, represented to Mr. Schreiner that it was very
+undesirable that such a demonstration should take place; and, through
+Mr. Schreiner's influence, the Congress was postponed. But the Prime
+Minister, in undertaking to use his influence with the Bond to prevent a
+denunciation of the policy of the Imperial Government at so critical a
+period, expressed the hope that the loyalists on their side would
+refrain from any public demonstration of an opposite character.
+
+         [Footnote 215: See p. 349.]
+
+This abstinence from agitation, which was obviously desirable in the
+public interests at a time of intense political excitement, by no
+means suited the leaders of the Bond. _Ons Land_, in commenting upon
+the postponement of the Congress, incidentally reveals the real
+consideration which made it worth while for the Bond to promote an
+agitation of this kind. The Bond organ regrets that the Congress has
+been postponed. And why?
+
+     "It is said that the [South African] League would have held a
+     Congress had the Bond Congress been held. We have nothing to do
+     with what the League does or does not do; as a matter of fact,
+     its opinion has already been published in the Imperial
+     Blue-books. We were of opinion that it would have been the duty
+     of the Afrikander party to express itself at the Congress in
+     unmistakable terms, and resolutely, in order thereby to maintain
+     its true position and strengthen the hands of its friends in
+     England who have courageously and with self-sacrifice striven for
+     the good and just cause."[216]
+
+         [Footnote 216: Cd. 261.]
+
+This, then, was the real object of the agitation--to "strengthen the
+hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England." The writer
+of this article suggests, however, that there is still a prospect that
+the "good cause" may be promoted, after all, in the way which he
+desires.
+
+[Sidenote: Origin of the movement.]
+
+This prospect was speedily realised. With characteristic astuteness,
+the Bond leaders discovered a method by which their object could be
+achieved without exposing themselves to the reproach of "stirring up
+strife." The meetings were to be held, not as Bond meetings, but as
+"conciliation" meetings. The manner in which the machinery of the
+conciliation movement was originally set in motion will appear from
+the following telegram, which President Krueger sent to President
+Steyn, on January 20th--that is, a little more than a month before the
+Bond Congress was postponed:
+
+     "A certain E. T. Hargrove, an English journalist, about whom Dr.
+     Leyds formerly wrote that he had done much in Holland to work up
+     the peace memorial to Queen Victoria, has come here, as he says,
+     from Sauer and Merriman, who are ready to range themselves openly
+     on our side, to make propaganda in the Cape Colony, provided an
+     official declaration is given that the Republics only desire to
+     secure complete independence. He wished that I should write a
+     letter to Queen Victoria, but this I refused, and thought it
+     desirable that I should write a letter to him personally, in
+     which an answer is given to his question. He thinks that a great
+     propaganda can be made in the Cape Colony, whereby influence can
+     be brought to bear again on the English people and the world. I
+     myself do not expect much result, but think that a letter can do
+     good, and should be glad to have your opinion and observations as
+     soon as possible."[217]
+
+         [Footnote 217: Cd. 261.]
+
+This telegram, one of the many documents found at Bloemfontein upon
+its occupation by Lord Roberts, is supplemented by the further facts
+disclosed by the investigations of the Concessions Commission, that a
+sum of L1,000 was advanced to Mr. Hargrove by the manager of the
+Netherlands Railway on February 3rd, 1900, and that this loan, paid in
+specie, was "debited to the account 'Political Situation,' to be
+hereafter arranged with the Government." The purposes for which Mr.
+Hargrove secured this large sum are stated in the following question
+and answer:
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Hargrove's L1,000.]
+
+     Q. 591. "Did he ask for money to carry out this object [_i.e._ to
+     stop the war on the assurance that the Boers wanted nothing more
+     than their independence]?"
+
+     MR. J. VAN KRETSCHMAR, General Manager of the Netherlands South
+     African Railway Company: "Yes; he said he had travelling expenses
+     to defray, a lot of publications to issue, and books to be
+     written, and he asked for money for these purposes."[218]
+
+         [Footnote 218: Cd. 624. The memorandum also noted that the
+         L1,000 was "paid at request of F. W. Reitz" (the State
+         Secretary). In the Concessions Commission the following
+         letter is published:
+
+                         "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA.
+                              _7 April, 1899._
+
+         TO VAN KRETSCHMAR VAN VEEN, ESQ.,
+         DIRECTOR OF THE N.Z.A. RY. CO.
+
+         HON'D. SIR,--With reference to a letter of his Excellency the
+         Ambassador, dated 23 March last, with reference to Mr.
+         Statham and the latter's request for an assistance of L300
+         for furniture and such like, I have the honour to inform you
+         confidentially that the Executive Council has resolved to
+         grant this gentleman Statham an amount of L150. As, according
+         to previous agreement, a yearly allowance is paid to Mr.
+         Statham by your Company, I have the honour to request you
+         kindly to pay out to the said Mr. Statham the sum granted
+         him. His Excellency the Ambassador is likewise being informed
+         of this decision of the Executive Council.--I have, etc.,
+
+                                   J. W. REITZ, _State Secretary_."
+         (Q. 608.)
+
+         Mr. Statham is understood to have been a frequent contributor
+         to those Liberal journals which sympathised with the Boer
+         cause. His allowance, however, had ceased before the war
+         broke out.]
+
+Three months later President Krueger's telegram was laid before the two
+ministers whose names it contained by Mr. Schreiner, at Lord Milner's
+request, in order that they might have an opportunity of "repudiating
+or explaining the allegations affecting themselves which it
+contained." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer denied that Mr. Hargrove
+had received any authority from them to use their names "in the manner
+which he appeared to have done." And on April 19th Mr. Merriman
+himself wrote to Mr. Hargrove to ask for an explanation. To this
+letter Mr. Hargrove replied immediately:
+
+     "This is not an answer to your note of this date, but is to ask
+     you to allow me to show your note to a friend of yours and of
+     mine. As it is marked 'private' I cannot do this until I hear
+     from you. Would you be so good as to send word by the driver of
+     the cab which waits?..."
+
+In a second letter, written on the same day (April 19th), and
+presumably after he had consulted the mutual friend in question, Mr.
+Hargrove wrote:
+
+     "Knowing as you do that I never told you of my proposed trip to
+     Pretoria, that I never talked the matter over with you in any
+     shape or form, you may be sure that when I got there I did not
+     speak or make promises in your behalf. But I did mention your
+     name in this way: I told President Krueger of a conversation I had
+     had with Mr. Sauer, in which I had asked him what his attitude
+     would be in the event of the Republics offering to withdraw their
+     forces from colonial territory on the condition that their
+     independence would be recognised. Mr. Sauer's reply was that, in
+     those circumstances he would, in his personal capacity, most
+     certainly urge the acceptance of that offer, and that, although
+     he could speak for himself only, he thought it probable you would
+     do the same."
+
+Mr. Hargrove adds that the "misconception" embodied in President
+Krueger's telegram is due to the circumstance that it was probably
+"dictated in a hurry, amidst a rush of other business," and contained
+a "hasty and more or less careless account" of a "long talk"
+translated to the President by Mr. Reitz from English into Dutch.
+
+Mr. Hargrove at the same time forwarded a copy of this letter to Mr.
+Sauer. With this latter minister of the Crown he enjoyed a more
+intimate acquaintance, since, as Lord Milner points out,[219] he had
+been Mr. Sauer's travelling companion during this latter's
+"well-meant, but unsuccessful, journey to Wodehouse, which was
+immediately followed by the rebellion of that district."
+
+         [Footnote 219: In his covering despatch, Cd. 261, p. 126. For
+         the circumstances of Mr. Sauer's visit to Dordrecht on the
+         occasion mentioned see note, p. 287.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Graaf Reinet congress.]
+
+This, then, was the character of the man who travelled throughout the
+Colony, addressing meetings of the Dutch population, in order that
+"the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England might be
+strengthened." At the People's Congress, held at Graaf Reinet (May
+30th) he rose to his full stature. "The worst foes of the British
+Empire," he said,[220] "were not the Boers, but those who had set up
+the howl for annexation." And he concluded by urging his audience to
+renew their hopes, for he believed that "if they did everything in
+their power to show what was right they would win in the end." On the
+following day Mr. Hargrove was asked, in the name of the Congress, to
+continue his agitation in England. The Congress, however, did not
+propose to rely exclusively upon Mr. Hargrove's efforts. It resolved
+to send a deputation of Cape colonists "to tell the simple truth as
+they know it" to the people of Great Britain and Ireland.
+
+         [Footnote 220: As reported in _The Cape Times_, Cd. 261.]
+
+There is one other fact which is disclosed by this official
+correspondence from the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State
+which cannot be overlooked. Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer both repudiated
+absolutely President Krueger's statement that Mr. Hargrove "had come
+here [_i.e._ to Pretoria], as he says, from Sauer and Merriman." In
+view of this repudiation, it is somewhat startling to find that the
+letters covering the minutes of the conciliation meetings, forwarded
+to Lord Milner from time to time with the request that they may be
+sent on to the Colonial Office, bear the signature of Mr. Albert
+Cartwright, as honorary secretary of the Conciliation Committee of
+South Africa. Mr. Albert Cartwright was editor of _The South African
+News_--that is to say, of the journal which, as we have noticed
+before, served as the medium for the expression of the political views
+of Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. At the period in question _The South
+African News_ rendered itself notorious by circulating the absurd, but
+none the less injurious, report that General Buller and his army had
+surrendered to the Boers in Natal and agreed to return to England on
+parole; by publishing stories of imaginary Boer victories; by
+eulogising Mr. Hargrove, whose acceptance of the L1,000 from the
+Netherlands Railway it definitely denied; and by its persistent and
+vehement denunciations of Lord Milner. At a later period Mr.
+Cartwright was convicted of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and
+condemned to a term of imprisonment.[221]
+
+         [Footnote 221: See p. 477.]
+
+[Sidenote: Mischievous effects.]
+
+The situation thus brought about is described by Lord Milner in a
+passage in the despatch[222] which covers the transmission of the
+newspaper report of the People's Congress at Graaf Reinet. After
+stating that in return for Mr. Schreiner's efforts to secure the
+postponement of the Bond Congress, he had himself persuaded the
+leaders of the Progressive party to abstain from any public
+demonstration of their opinions, he writes:
+
+         [Footnote 222: Cd. 261, despatch of June 6th, 1900.]
+
+     "There was a truce of God on both sides. Then came the
+     'conciliation' movement, and the country was stirred from end to
+     end by a series of meetings much more violent and mischievous
+     than the regular Bond Congress would have been, though, of
+     course, on the same lines. The truce being thus broken, it would
+     have been useless--and, as a matter of fact, I did not
+     attempt--to restrain an expression of opinion on the other side.
+     Hence the long series of meetings held in British centres to
+     pronounce in favour of the annexation of both Republics, and to
+     give cordial support to the policy of Her Majesty's Government
+     and myself personally. On the whole, the utterances at these
+     meetings have been marked by a moderation totally absent in the
+     tone of the conciliators. But no doubt a certain number of
+     violent things have been said, and a certain amount of
+     unnecessary heat generated. I do not think, however, that those
+     [the loyalists] who have held these meetings, under extraordinary
+     provocation, are greatly to blame if this has occasionally been
+     the case."
+
+That the "conciliation" movement exercised a most injurious influence
+in a colony of which a considerable area was in rebellion or under
+martial law, and where the majority of the inhabitants were in
+sympathy with the enemy is obvious. But from the point of view of the
+Afrikander nationalists it was an intelligible and effective method of
+promoting the objects which they had in view. What is amazing is the
+part which was played in it by Englishmen, and the confident manner in
+which the promoters of the movement relied upon the political
+co-operation of the friends of the Boers in the ranks of the Liberal
+party in England. Every Afrikander who attended these meetings knew
+that he was doing his best to arouse hatred against the Englishman and
+sympathy for the Boer. The nature of the resolutions to which he gave
+his adherence left him in no doubt on this point.
+
+     "The war," said Mr. A. B. de Villiers, at the People's Congress,
+     "was the most unrighteous war that was ever pursued. The simple
+     aim was to seize the Republics. If that was persisted in,
+     Afrikanders would not rest.... Britain would efface the Republics
+     and make the people slaves. Race hatred would then be prolonged
+     from generation to generation."
+
+To publish abroad such opinions as these was obviously to invite
+rebellion in the Cape Colony, to encourage the resistance of the
+Boers, and to embarrass the British authorities, both civil and
+military, throughout South Africa. This was precisely what the
+Afrikander nationalist desired to do. But what is to be thought of the
+Englishmen who, both in the Cape Colony and in England, took part in
+this "conciliation" movement? Surely they did not desire these same
+results. Were they, then, the comrades or the dupes of the Afrikander
+nationalists? This is a question upon which the individual reader may
+be left to form his own judgment.
+
+[Sidenote: Comrades or dupes.]
+
+This much, at least, is certain. What gave the Afrikander nationalists
+the power to bring about the second invasion of the Cape Colony, and
+to inflict a year and a half of guerilla warfare upon South Africa,
+was the co-operation of these Englishmen--whether comrades or
+dupes--who opposed the annexation of the Republics. The intense
+sympathy felt by the Afrikanders for their defeated kinsmen was
+natural; but the means by which it was enflamed were artificial. Lord
+Milner himself, with his accustomed serenity of judgment, refused to
+take a "gloomy view" of the question of racial relations in the
+Colony, still less in South Africa as a whole.
+
+     "If it is true," he wrote on June 6th, "as the 'conciliators' are
+     never tired of threatening us, that race hatred will be eternal,
+     why should they make such furious efforts to keep it up at the
+     present moment? The very vehemence of their declarations that the
+     Afrikanders will never forgive, nor forget, nor acquiesce, seems
+     to me to indicate a considerable and well-justified anxiety on
+     their part lest these terrible things should, after all, happen."
+
+But while the Cape Colony was in the throes of this agitation, British
+soldiers were gallantly fighting their way to Johannesburg and
+Pretoria. During the six weeks of Lord Roberts's "prolonged and
+enforced halt" at Bloemfontein (March 13th--May 1st), and
+subsequently, while the Army was advancing upon the Transvaal,
+considerable progress was made in the work of clearing the Colony of
+the republican invaders and re-establishing British authority in the
+districts in which the Dutch had risen in rebellion. In the course of
+these operations a large number of rebels had fallen into the hands of
+the Imperial military authorities, and it was the question of the
+treatment of these colonial rebels that was destined to bring Mr.
+Schreiner into direct conflict with those of his ministers who still
+held the opinions of the Bond.
+
+[Sidenote: The punishment of rebels.]
+
+In the middle of April Lord Milner had received from Mr. Chamberlain a
+despatch containing a preliminary statement of the opinion of the Home
+Government upon the two questions of the compensation of loyalists and
+the punishment of rebels, and on April 14th he requested his ministers
+to give formal expression to their views upon the subjects to which
+Mr. Chamberlain had drawn his attention. A fortnight later Lord Milner
+reported to the Home Government the conclusions at which Mr. Schreiner
+and his fellow-ministers had arrived. Trial by jury for persons
+indicted for high treason must be abandoned, since it would be
+impossible for the Crown to obtain the necessary convictions, and a
+special tribunal must be established by statute. As regards the nature
+of the punishment to be inflicted upon the rebels, Mr. Schreiner
+wrote:
+
+     "Ministers submit that the ends of justice would be served by the
+     selection of a certain limited number of the principal offenders,
+     whose trials would mark the magnitude of their offence and whose
+     punishment, if found guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the
+     remainder, ministers believe that the interests both of sound
+     policy and of public morality would be served if Her Gracious
+     Majesty were moved to issue, as an act of grace, a Proclamation
+     of amnesty under which, upon giving proper security for their
+     good behaviour, all persons chargeable with high treason, except
+     those held for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to
+     their avocations."[223]
+
+         [Footnote 223: Cd. 264.]
+
+The substance of the Ministers' Minutes containing these conclusions,
+and the arguments by which they were supported--notably an appeal to
+the "Canadian precedent"--were telegraphed to the Home Government, and
+on May 4th Mr. Chamberlain replied, also by telegram. While the
+people of Great Britain were animated by no vindictive feeling against
+"those who had been or were in arms against Her Majesty's forces,
+whether enemies or rebels"--did, in fact, desire that all racial
+animosity should disappear in South Africa at the earliest possible
+moment after the war was over--the "sentiments of both sides" must be
+taken into consideration. The consequences which would ensue from "the
+rankling sense of injustice" that would arise if the rebels were
+actually placed in a better position after the struggle was over than
+those who had risked life and property in the determination to remain
+"loyal to their Queen and flag," would be no less serious than the bad
+results to be anticipated from any display of a revengeful policy on
+the part of the loyalists. He continued:
+
+     "Clemency to rebels is a policy which has the hearty sympathy of
+     Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an
+     obligation of duty and honour. The question is, how can these two
+     policies be harmonised? It is clear that, in the interest of
+     future peace, it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot be
+     indulged in with impunity, and above all that, if unsuccessful,
+     it is not a profitable business for the rebel. Otherwise the
+     State would be offering a premium to rebellion. The present
+     moment, therefore, while the war is still proceeding, and while
+     efforts may still be made to tempt British subjects into
+     rebellious courses, is in any case not appropriate for announcing
+     that such action may be indulged in with absolute impunity. And
+     if, as has been suggested, a great many of the Queen's rebellious
+     subjects are the mere tools of those who have deceived them, it
+     is important that these should be made aware individually that,
+     whatever their leaders may tell them, rebellion is a punishable
+     offence.
+
+[Sidenote: Clemency and justice.]
+
+     "Up to this time very lenient treatment has been meted out to
+     rebels. Although, according to the law of the Cape Colony, and
+     under martial law, the punishment of death might have been
+     inflicted, in no case has any rebel suffered the capital penalty,
+     and the vast majority have been permitted for the present to
+     return to their homes and to resume their occupations. There are
+     many degrees in the crime of rebellion. Her Majesty's Government
+     desire that in any case means shall be found for dealing
+     effectually with: (1) The ringleaders and promoters; (2) those
+     who have committed outrages or looted the property of their loyal
+     fellow-subjects; (3) those who have committed acts contrary to
+     the usages of civilised warfare, such as abuse of the white flag,
+     firing on hospitals, etc. There remain (4) those who, though not
+     guilty, of either of those offences, have openly and willingly
+     waged war against Her Majesty's forces; (5) those who confined
+     themselves to aiding Her Majesty's enemies by giving information
+     or furnishing provisions; and (6) those who can satisfactorily
+     prove that they acted under compulsion. In the opinion of Her
+     Majesty's Government a distinction ought to be, if possible,
+     drawn between these different classes.
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government recognise the difficulty of indicting
+     for high treason all who have taken part with the enemy, and they
+     would suggest, for the consideration of your ministers, the
+     expediency of investing either the Special Judicial Commission
+     which, as stated in your telegram of 28th April, is contemplated
+     by your ministers, or a separate Commission, with powers to
+     schedule the names of all persons implicated in the rebellion
+     under the various heads indicated above. It would be necessary
+     to decide beforehand how the different categories should then be
+     dealt with. As regards 1, 2, and 3, they would, of course, be
+     brought before the Judicial Commission and tried by them. Might
+     not 4 and 5 be allowed to plead guilty, and be thereupon either
+     sentenced to a fine carrying with it disfranchisement, or
+     released on recognisances, to come up for judgment when called
+     upon (this also to involve disfranchisement), while 6 might be
+     subjected to disfranchisement alone? Her Majesty's Government
+     offer these as suggestions for the consideration of your
+     ministers.
+
+     "In regard to the reasons urged by your ministers in favour of a
+     general amnesty, Her Majesty's Government would point out that
+     they are of a highly controversial character, and it is
+     impossible to discuss them fully at a moment when an indication
+     of the views of Her Majesty's Government is urgently required.
+     Her Majesty's Government would only observe that the policy which
+     they have indicated in this telegram appears to them to be one
+     not merely of justice, but of clemency, which the whole white
+     population of the Colony might well accept as satisfactory, and
+     which should not, any more than the ordinary administration of
+     justice, encourage the natives to think that the two white races
+     are permanently disunited, while with especial reference to the
+     third reason, it may be observed that the expediency of the
+     action to be taken in such cases depends upon circumstances which
+     must vary greatly according to date and locality. In Lower Canada
+     in 1837-38 there was a revolt during peace against the Queen's
+     authority, founded on grievances under constitutional conditions
+     which were recognised as unsatisfactory by the Government of the
+     day, and altered by subsequent legislation. In the Cape there has
+     been adhesion to the Queen's enemies during war by those who
+     have not even the pretext of any grievance, and who have for a
+     generation enjoyed full constitutional liberty. In Canada the
+     insurrection was never a formidable one from a military point of
+     view; in the Cape it has added very largely to the cost and
+     difficulty of the war, and has entailed danger and heavy loss to
+     Her Majesty's troops."[224]
+
+         [Footnote 224: Cd. 264.]
+
+[Sidenote: The ministry divided.]
+
+This estimate of the guilt of the Cape rebels--moderate in the light
+of British colonial history, merciful beyond dispute as judged by the
+practice of foreign States--failed to commend itself to the Afrikander
+Ministry. On May 29th, when the full text of the Cape ministers'
+minutes and enclosures had reached the Colonial Office, Lord Milner
+inquired of Mr. Chamberlain, on behalf of his ministers, whether the
+disfranchisement proposed was for life or for a period only; and
+further, whether, in view of their fuller knowledge of the
+representations of the Cape Ministry, the views of the Home Government
+were still to be accepted as those expressed in the despatch of May
+4th. To these questions Mr. Chamberlain replied, by telegram, on June
+10th, that the Government continued to hold the opinion that the
+policy already suggested should be substantially adhered to; while, as
+to the period of disfranchisement, he pointed out that--
+
+     "conviction and sentence for high treason carried with it
+     disfranchisement for life, and if the offenders were spared the
+     other and severer penalties of rebellion, justice seemed to
+     demand that they should suffer the full political penalty.
+     Disfranchisement for life did not seem to Her Majesty's
+     Government to be a very serious punishment for rebellion."
+
+[Sidenote: Mr. Schreiner resigns.]
+
+On June 11th Lord Milner was informed by Mr. Schreiner that ministers
+were hopelessly divided on the subject of the treatment of the rebels,
+and that their differences could not be composed, and on the following
+day he replied that, if he could not receive the support of a
+unanimous Cabinet to which he, as Governor, was constitutionally
+entitled, he would be compelled, in the discharge of his duty, to seek
+it elsewhere. Mr. Schreiner's resignation, which was placed in Lord
+Milner's hands on the next day, was followed by the appointment, on
+June 18th, of a Progressive Ministry with Sir Gordon Sprigg as Prime
+Minister and Sir James Rose Innes as Attorney-General. Mr. Schreiner,
+in his memorandum of June 11th, had forwarded to Lord Milner documents
+containing particulars of the individual views of the members of his
+Cabinet. Mr. Solomon, the Attorney-General, was prepared to adopt a
+policy in respect of the treatment of the rebels, and the machinery by
+which that policy was to be carried out, which appeared to him to
+involve nothing that would prevent "complete accord between Her
+Majesty's Government and this Government on the question." And in this
+view both Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Herholdt concurred. But the remaining
+members of the Cabinet were entirely opposed to any policy other than
+that of granting a general amnesty to all rebels except the "principal
+offenders," and allowing these latter to be tried by the machinery of
+justice already in existence--_i.e._ by Afrikander juries. The minutes
+which they respectively addressed to the Prime Minister were bitter
+invectives directed alike against the Home Government and Lord Milner.
+
+     "We are asked," Mr. Merriman wrote, on his own and Mr. Sauer's
+     behalf, with reference to the suggestions of the Home Government,
+     "to deal with a number of men who have, at worst, taken up arms
+     in what they, however erroneously, considered to be a righteous
+     war--a war in which they joined the Queen's enemies to resist
+     what prominent men both here and in England have repeatedly
+     spoken of as a crime.... These men, irrespective of class, we are
+     asked to put under a common political proscription, to deprive
+     them of their civil rights, and by so doing (in fact, this is the
+     main commendation of the measure to the "loyals") to deprive
+     their friends and kinsfolk, who have rendered the Colony yeoman
+     service at the most critical time, of that legitimate influence
+     which belongs to a majority. We are asked, in fact, to create a
+     class of political 'helots' in South Africa, where we are now
+     waging a bloody and costly war ostensibly for the purpose of
+     putting an end to a similar state of affairs."
+
+Of course, all this and much more might have been read at any time
+since the war began in the columns of _The South African News_, but in
+a minister's memorandum to the Prime Minister, and over the signature
+"John X. Merriman," its naked hostility arrests the mind. Dr. Te
+Water's memorandum, although much shorter than that of Mr. Merriman,
+is even more outspoken. To him, the direct representative of the
+republican nationalists in the Afrikander Cabinet, amnesty for the
+rebels is the "sound and proper policy." And naturally, since in his
+eyes the rebels themselves are--
+
+     "British subjects of Dutch extraction who, after vainly
+     endeavouring, by all possible constitutional means, to prevent
+     what they, in common with the rest of the civilised world,
+     believe to be an unjust and infamous war against their near
+     kinsmen, aided the Republics in the terrible struggle forced upon
+     them."[225]
+
+         [Footnote 225: Cd. 264.]
+
+[Sidenote: A progressive ministry.]
+
+This is vitriol-throwing, but it is none the less significant. These
+three men formed half of the six ministers to whom collectively, Lord
+Milner, as Governor of the Cape Colony, had to look for advice during
+the two critical years that the Afrikander party was in power.
+Fortunately, in his capacity of High Commissioner for South Africa, he
+was free to act without their advice, as the representative of the
+Queen. Even so, his achievement is little less than marvellous. Aided
+by Mr. Schreiner's pathetic sense of loyalty to the person of the
+sovereign, he had kept the Cape Government outwardly true to its
+allegiance. The long hours of patient remonstrance, the word-battles
+from which the Prime Minister had risen sometimes white with
+passionate resentment, had not been useless. By tact, by serenity of
+disposition, by depth of conviction, and latterly by sheer force of
+argument, Lord Milner had won Mr. Schreiner, not indeed to the side of
+England, but at least to the side of that Empire-State of which
+England was the head. With the Prime Minister went Sir Richard
+Solomon, Mr. Herholdt, and one or two of the Afrikander rank and file.
+Thus reinforced, the Progressives commanded a working majority in the
+Legislative Assembly, and the ascendancy of the Afrikander party was
+at an end.
+
+Apart from the secession of Mr. Schreiner and his immediate followers,
+the Parliamentary strength of the Afrikander party was lessened by
+another circumstance, to which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman referred
+in the debate on the South African Settlement in the House of Commons
+on July 25th. Certain members of the Cape Parliament, said the leader
+of the Liberal Opposition, had been arrested for high treason, with
+the result that the Afrikander party was deprived of their votes, and
+the balance of power between that party and the Progressive party was
+upset. And he protested against this manner of turning an Afrikander
+majority into a minority. The reply which these remarks on the part of
+this friend of the Afrikander party in England drew from the
+Government is instructive:
+
+     "May I remind the right honourable gentleman," said Mr. Balfour,
+     "that the balance of parties was disturbed by another and
+     different cause on which he has made no protest? Some members of
+     that Parliament, not sharing the views of those who are
+     imprisoned, are now fighting at the front and risking their lives
+     in the defence of the Empire. Their party is deprived of their
+     services in the Cape Parliament, and I should have thought that
+     this would have affected the right honourable gentleman much more
+     than the absence of men who, under any circumstances, must be
+     supposed to be under the darkest suspicion as to their view and
+     policy respecting the country to which they owe allegiance."
+
+The Cape Parliament met under the new Ministry in July, and the chief
+business of the session, which lasted until the middle of October, was
+the passing of the Treason Bill. On July 9th Lord Milner was able to
+inform Mr. Chamberlain (by telegram) that the Bill had been prepared,
+and to indicate the nature of its main provisions. These were: (1) An
+indemnity for acts done under martial law; (2) the establishment of a
+Special Court to try cases in which the Attorney-General might decide
+to indict any person for high treason, such cases to be tried without
+a jury; (3) the establishment of a Special Commission to "deal with
+rebels not so indicted and to punish all found guilty with
+disfranchisement for five years from the date of conviction"; and (4)
+the legalisation of the already existing Compensation Commission. In a
+despatch dated July 26th--the day after the Settlement debate in the
+House of Commons--Mr. Chamberlain replied at length to the arguments
+put forward by the Schreiner Ministry in favour of a general amnesty,
+and exposed in particular the historical inaccuracy of the appeal to
+the "Canadian precedent." At the same time he stated that Her
+Majesty's Government, while they could not be a consenting party to a
+policy condoning adhesion to the enemy in the field, had no doubt that
+"such a measure of penalty as the mass of loyal opinion in the Colony
+considered adequate would meet with their concurrence." That is to
+say, the proposal of the Home Government for disfranchisement for life
+was not pressed, but was abandoned in favour of the lenient penalty
+originally proposed by Sir Richard Solomon, independently of any
+consideration of the views of the Colonial Office, and now adopted by
+the Progressive Ministry.
+
+[Sidenote: The treason bill.]
+
+In spite of its leniency, the Treason Bill met with the violent and
+protracted resistance of the Afrikander party in the Legislative
+Assembly. The opportunity thus afforded for the delivery of fierce
+invectives against the Imperial authorities was utilised to the full,
+and the fires of disaffection lighted by the "Conciliation" meetings
+were kindled anew into the second and more disastrous conflagration
+that culminated in the proceedings of the Worcester Conference
+(December 6th). In the Cape Parliamentary Reports the picture of this
+nightmare session is to be found faithfully presented in all its ugly
+and grotesque details. Two facts will serve to show to what a degree
+the members of the Legislative Assembly of this British colony had
+identified themselves with the cause of the enemy. The first is the
+circumstance that it was a common practice of the Afrikander members
+to refer in Parliament to the military successes of the Boers with
+pride as "our" victories. The second is the fact that Mr. Sauer, only
+three months ago a minister of the Crown, declared, in opposing the
+second reading of the Bill, that "a time would come when there would
+be very few Dutchmen who would not blush when they told their children
+that they had not helped their fellow-countrymen in their hour of
+need."[226] Morally, though not legally, the Afrikander members had
+gone over to the enemy no less than the rebels who had taken up arms
+against their sovereign. This was the "loyalty" of the Bond.
+
+         [Footnote 226: _Cape Times_, August 23rd, 1900.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner visits the colonies.]
+
+The Treason Bill was promulgated, under the title of "The Indemnity
+and Special Tribunals Act, 1900," on October 12th. On the same day
+Lord Milner left Capetown for a brief visit to the Transvaal and
+Orange River Colony. The intention of the Home Government to place the
+administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies in his
+hands had been made known to him informally; and it was obviously
+desirable, therefore, that he should acquaint himself with the actual
+state of affairs as soon as possible. After a somewhat adventurous
+journey through the Orange River Colony, he reached Pretoria on the
+15th, and remained at the capital until the 22nd. He then proceeded to
+Johannesburg, where he spent the next three days (October 22nd to
+25th). At both places he made provisional arrangements, in
+consultation with Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, for the early
+establishment of so much of the machinery of civil administration as
+the exigencies of the military situation permitted. Leaving
+Johannesburg on the 25th, the High Commissioner stopped for the night
+at Kroonstad, _en route_ for Bloemfontein. On the morning following he
+woke up to find the train still motionless, since the line had been
+cut by the Boers--an almost daily occurrence at this period of the
+war. After a few hours, however, the journey was resumed; but the High
+Commissioner's train was preceded by an armoured train as far as
+Smalldeel, from which point it ran without escort to Bloemfontein,
+where he remained until November 1st. Here, in addition to making the
+necessary arrangements for the beginning of civil administration in
+the Orange River Colony, Lord Milner had the satisfaction of
+inaugurating the career of the South African Constabulary under the
+command of Major-General Baden-Powell. The departure from Bloemfontein
+was delayed for a few hours by the destruction of the span of a
+railway bridge by the Boers; but at 12 o'clock the High
+Commissioner's train, again preceded by its armoured companion, was
+able to resume its journey southwards. In the course of the following
+day (November 2nd) the English mail, going northwards from Capetown,
+was met, and among other communications which Lord Milner then
+received was the despatch of October 18th enclosing the commissions
+under which he was appointed to administer the new colonies upon Lord
+Roberts's approaching return to England.
+
+Lord Milner arrived at Capetown on November 3rd. During his three
+weeks' absence the situation in the Cape Colony had changed for the
+worse. After the Treason Bill debates the anti-British propaganda,
+still carried on under the grotesque pretence of promoting
+"conciliation," had taken a different and more sinister form. To their
+denunciation of the Home Government and its treatment of the
+Republics, the Afrikander nationalists now added slander and abuse of
+the British and colonial troops in South Africa. In order to
+understand how such calumnies were possible in the face of the
+singular humanity with which the military operations of the Imperial
+troops had been conducted, a brief reference to the course of the war
+is necessary. The change from regular to guerilla warfare initiated by
+the Boer leaders in the later months of this year (1900), and the
+consequent withdrawal of British garrisons from insecurely held
+districts both in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, were
+accompanied by the return to arms of many burghers who, on taking the
+oath of neutrality, had been allowed to resume their civil
+occupations. This breach of faith, whether voluntary or compulsory,
+compelled the British military commanders to adopt measures of greater
+severity in the operations undertaken for the reconquest of the
+revolted areas. The punishment inflicted upon the inhabitants of such
+areas, especially those adjoining the colonial border, although
+merciful in comparison with the penalties actually incurred under the
+laws of war by those who, having surrendered, resumed their arms, was
+considerably more rigorous than the treatment to which the republican
+Dutch had been originally subjected. This legitimate and necessary
+increase of severity, displayed by the British commanders in districts
+where the burghers had surrendered, and then taken up arms a second,
+or even a third time, was the sole basis of fact upon which the
+Afrikander nationalists in the Cape Colony founded the vast volume of
+imaginary outrage and inhumanity on the part of the Imperial troops
+which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was held subsequently to have
+endorsed by accusing the British Government of carrying on the war in
+South Africa by "methods of barbarism."[227]
+
+         [Footnote 227: June 14th; 1901 (Holborn Restaurant, and
+         elsewhere later). "Whatever Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman may
+         think or say, the German nation may think or say."--The
+         _Vossische Zeitung._]
+
+[Sidenote: Libels on the British troops.]
+
+The weapon now adopted for the anti-British campaign was the
+circulation through the Bond Press, Dutch and English, of accounts of
+cruel or infamous acts alleged to have been committed by British
+soldiers, and described with every detail calculated to arouse the
+passionate resentment of the colonial Dutch. There is only one way in
+which the reader can be brought to understand the wantonly false and
+wholly disgraceful character of these libels. It is to place before
+his eyes the literal translation of two examples, printed in Dutch in
+_The Worcester Advertiser_ of November 23rd, 1900; that is to say, in
+anticipation of the People's Congress, which was to be held less than
+a fortnight later (December 6th) at the little town in the Western
+Province so named. The article is headed: "Dreadful Murders
+perpetrated on Farmers, Women, and Children, near Boshoff:
+
+[Sidenote: Two examples.]
+
+     "... This unfortunate man [a Boer prisoner] left behind him his
+     dear wife and four children. One or two days after his departure
+     there came a couple of heroes in the house of the unfortunate
+     woman, locked the doors and set fire to the curtains. The woman,
+     awfully frightened by it, was in a cruel way handled by these
+     ruffians, and compelled to make known where the guns and
+     ammunition were hidden. The poor woman, surrounded by her dear
+     children (who were from time to time pushed back by these
+     soldiers), answered that she could swear before the holy God that
+     there was not a single gun or cartridge or anything of that sort
+     hidden on that farm. In the meantime the curtains were destroyed
+     by the smoke and flames to ashes. The house, at least, was not
+     attacked by the flames, but the low, mean lot put at the four
+     corners of the house a certain amount of dynamite, to destroy it
+     in this way.
+
+     "The heroic warrior and commander over a portion of the civilised
+     (?) British troops knocked with great force at the door of the
+     house--where still the poor wife and children were upon their
+     knees praying to the Heavenly Father for deliverance--saying, 'I
+     give you ten minutes' time to acquaint me and point out to me
+     where the weapons and ammunition are hidden, and if you do not
+     comply I shall make the house and all fly into the air.' The poor
+     wife fell upon her knees before the cruel man; prayed the cruel
+     man to spare her and her children, where God was her witness
+     there was nothing of the kind on the farm, neither was there
+     anything stowed away in the house.
+
+     "Standing before him, as if deprived of her senses, [was] the
+     poor wife with her four innocent children, and when the ten
+     minutes had expired house and all were blown to atoms with
+     dynamite, and [there were] laid in ruins, the bodies of the
+     deplorable five. May the good God receive their souls with
+     Him!...
+
+     "A wife of a Transvaal Boer (who is still in the field, fighting
+     for his freedom and right) was lodging with one of her relations,
+     when, two days later, after she had given birth to a baby boy,
+     she was visited by seven warriors, or so-called Tommy Atkins; the
+     young urchin was taken away from its mother by its two legs, by
+     the so-called noble British, and his head battered in against the
+     bed-post until it had breathed its last, and thereupon thrown out
+     by the door as if it was the carcase of a cat or dog. Then these
+     damn wretches began their play with this poor and weak woman, who
+     only 48 hours before was delivered of a child. The poor wife was
+     treated so low and debauched by this seven that she, after a few
+     hours, gave up the spirit, and like her child [was] murdered in
+     the most dissolute manner.... Can we longer allow that our
+     fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, relatives, yes, our
+     children, are murdered by these coward and common murderers? or
+     has not the time yet arrived to prevent this civilised nation, or
+     to punish them for their atrocities?"[228]
+
+         [Footnote 228: As translated in Blue-book, Cd. 547. Mr. de
+         Jong, the editor of the paper, was prosecuted (and convicted)
+         for the publication of this and another similar article
+         (December 28th).]
+
+On November 26th _The South African News_ published the translation of
+a letter to the Press, written by a member of the Legislative
+Assembly, in view of the same meeting:
+
+     "I am yet glad that another People's Congress will be held.
+
+     "It is our duty to speak now; it is more than time to protest, as
+     British subjects, against the extermination of defenceless women
+     and children....
+
+     "But, in Heaven's name, let the Congress be a People's Congress
+     in reality. Let no one or other stay away for one or other small
+     difficulty. Let members of Parliament, clergymen, yes, every man,
+     old or young, be present at Worcester on the 6th of December
+     next. Let them turn up in numbers. Let us use our rights as
+     British subjects in a worthy and decided manner. Let us at least
+     adopt three petitions or resolutions: (1) Praying Her Majesty,
+     our Gracious Queen, to make an end to the burning of homes and
+     the ill-treatment of helpless women and children; if not, that
+     they may be murdered at once, rather than die slowly by hunger
+     and torture; (2) a petition in which it be urged that the war
+     should be ended, and the Republics allowed to retain their
+     independence; and finally, a pledge that those who do not wish
+     to sign these petitions will no longer be supported by us in any
+     way.
+
+     "[No shopkeeper, attorney, doctor, master, or any one--no
+     victuals, meat, bread, meal, sheep, oxen, horses, vegetables,
+     fruit whatsoever will he sell to the jingoes until the wrong is
+     righted and compensated.]
+
+     "The dam is full. Our nation cannot, dare not, say with Cain, 'Am
+     I my brother's keeper?' There must be a way out for the
+     overflowing water. Disloyal deeds and talk are wrong. But if we,
+     as a nation, as one man, earnestly and decisively lay our hands
+     to the plough in a constitutional manner, and are determined, I
+     trust, through God's help, we shall--yes, we must--win."
+
+The passage placed in brackets, in which this member of the Cape
+Parliament urges that all who may refuse to sign the two "petitions"
+should be rigorously boycotted, was omitted--without any indication of
+omission--by _The South African News_. _Ons Land_, on the other hand,
+expressed approval of the letter as it stood.[229]
+
+         [Footnote 229: Cd. 547.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Worcester congress.]
+
+These were the kind of stories, and the kind of appeals, with which
+the mind of the colonial Dutch had been inflamed by the nationalist
+leaders when the Worcester Congress met. The gathering is said to have
+consisted of between 8,000 and 10,000 persons; and its promoters
+claimed that a far larger number--120,000 persons--were represented by
+the deputies sent from ninety-seven districts in the Colony. At the
+close of the meeting a deputation was appointed to lay the resolutions
+passed by the Congress before the High Commissioner, and request him
+to bring them officially to the notice of the Home Government. It was
+composed of Mr. de Villiers, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church;
+a member of the Legislative Council; the member of the Legislative
+Assembly for Worcester, and two others. This deputation was received
+by Lord Milner at Government House on December 11th, and the
+circumstances of the remarkable interview which then took place
+present a striking picture of the state of the Colony at this time,
+and of the extraordinary attitude which the mass of the Dutch
+population had assumed towards the representative of their sovereign.
+It is one of those illuminating occasions in which a whole situation
+is, as it were, gathered up into a single scene.
+
+The disloyal purpose of the deputation is heightened rather than
+concealed by the disguise of the constitutional forms in which it is
+clothed. The scarcely veiled demand for the independence of the Cape
+Colony, now put forward by the Afrikander nationalists, is as
+magnificently audacious as the ultimatum. Knowing the infamous
+character of the methods by which the agitation in favour of the Boers
+was being promoted, Lord Milner might have been excused if he had
+given way to some strong expressions of indignation. No such note,
+however, is heard in his reply. He is as dry and passionless as an
+attorney receiving his clients. Yet his words are as frank as his
+manner is composed. To these delegates he speaks the most terrible
+truths with the same freedom as he would have used, if the business of
+their errand had been a pleasant interchange of compliments, instead
+of a grim defiance that might, or might not, be converted from words
+into deeds.
+
+[Sidenote: Deputation to Lord Milner.]
+
+Lord Milner, who is accompanied only by his private secretary,
+surprises the deputation at the outset by requesting that the
+resolutions may be read forthwith in his presence. They are:
+
+     "1. We, men and women of South Africa assembled and represented
+     here, having heard the report of the people's deputation to
+     England, and having taken into earnest consideration the
+     deplorable condition into which the peoples of South Africa have
+     been plunged, and the grave dangers threatening our civilisation,
+     record our solemn conviction that the highest interest of South
+     Africa demand (1) A termination of the war now raging, with its
+     untold misery and horror, as well as the burning of houses, the
+     devastation of the country, the extermination of a white
+     nationality, and the treatment to which women and children are
+     subjected, which was bound to leave a lasting legacy of
+     bitterness and hatred, while seriously endangering the future
+     relationship between the forces of civilisation and barbarism in
+     South Africa; and (2) the retention by the Republics of their
+     independence, whereby alone the peace of South Africa can be
+     maintained.
+
+     "2. That this meeting desires a full recognition of the right of
+     the people of this Colony to settle and manage its own affairs,
+     and expresses its grave disapproval of the policy pursued and
+     adopted in this matter by the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir
+     Alfred Milner.
+
+     "3. That this Congress solemnly pledges itself to labour in a
+     constitutional way unceasingly for the attainment of the objects
+     contained in the above resolutions, and resolves to send a
+     deputation to His Excellency Sir Alfred Milner to bring these
+     resolutions officially to the notice of Her Majesty's
+     Government."
+
+These resolutions having been read, Mr. de Villiers proceeds to make
+two points. First, there will be no lasting peace in South Africa
+until the independence of the Republics is restored; unless this is
+done, race feeling will go on prevailing "for generations." And,
+second, it is the "devastation of property" and "the treatment of the
+women and children" by the British that has roused the colonial Dutch
+to assemble at the Congress. Mr. Pretorius, the member of the
+Legislative Council, then drives home both of these points by a short
+but emphatic speech, delivered in Dutch, in which he asserts that one
+of the consequences of the war will be a "never-ending irreconcilable
+racial hatred" between the British and Dutch inhabitants.[230] Lord
+Milner then rises from his chair and replies to the deputation:
+
+         [Footnote 230: It is scarcely necessary to point out that
+         this prophecy of continued racial hatred has been completely
+         falsified by events. The writer went out to South Africa a
+         second time in January, 1904, when two years had not passed
+         since the surrender of the Boers. The one thing, above all
+         others, that struck him, and every other visitor from
+         England, was the profound peace that reigned from end to end
+         of the land.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's reply.]
+
+[Sidenote: War no longer justifiable.]
+
+     "I accede to your request to bring these resolutions to the
+     notice of Her Majesty's Government. I think it is doubtful
+     whether I ought to do so, but in view of the prevailing
+     bitterness and excitement it is better to err, if one must err,
+     on the side of conciliation and fairness. And, having regard
+     especially to the fact that one of the resolutions is directed
+     against myself, I wish to avoid any appearance of a desire to
+     suppress its companions on account of it. But, having gone thus
+     far on the road of concession, I take the liberty, in no
+     unfriendly and polemical spirit, of asking you quite frankly what
+     good you think can be done by resolutions of this character? I am
+     not now referring to the resolution against myself. That is a
+     matter of very minor importance. The pith of the whole business
+     is in resolution number one, a resolution evidently framed with
+     great care by the clever men who are engineering the present
+     agitation in the Colony. Now, that resolution asks for two
+     things--a termination of the war, and the restoration of the
+     independence of the Republics. In desiring the termination of the
+     war we are all agreed, but nothing can be less conducive to the
+     attainment of that end than to encourage in those who are still
+     carrying on a hopeless resistance the idea that there is any,
+     even the remotest chance, of the policy of annexation being
+     reversed. I am not now speaking for myself. This is not a
+     question for me. I am simply directing your attention to the
+     repeatedly declared policy of Her Majesty's Government, a policy
+     just endorsed by an enormous majority of the nation, and not only
+     by the ordinary supporters of the Government, but by the bulk of
+     those ordinarily opposed to it. Moreover, that policy is approved
+     by all the great self-governing colonies of the Empire, except
+     this one, and in this one by something like half the white
+     population, and practically the whole of the native. And this
+     approving half of the white population, be it observed, embraces
+     all those who, in the recent hour of danger, when this Colony
+     itself was invaded and partially annexed, fought and suffered
+     for the cause of Queen and Empire. I ask you, is it reasonable to
+     suppose that Her Majesty's Government is going back upon a policy
+     deliberately adopted, repeatedly declared, and having this
+     overwhelming weight of popular support throughout the whole
+     Empire behind it? And if it is not, I ask you further: What is
+     more likely to lead to a termination of the war--a recognition of
+     the irrevocable nature of this policy, or the reiteration of
+     menacing protests against it? And there is another respect in
+     which I fear this resolution is little calculated to promote that
+     speedy restoration of peace which we have all at heart. I refer
+     to the tone of aggressive exaggeration which characterises its
+     allusions to the conduct of the war. No doubt the resolution is
+     mild compared with some of the speeches by which it was
+     supported, just as those speeches themselves were mild compared
+     with much that we are now too well accustomed to hear and to
+     read, in the way of misrepresentation and abuse of the British
+     Government, British statesmen, British soldiers, the British
+     people. But even the resolution, mild in comparison with such
+     excesses, is greatly lacking in that sobriety and accuracy which
+     it is so necessary for all of us to cultivate in these days of
+     bitterly inflamed passions. It really is preposterous to talk,
+     among other things, about 'the extermination of a white
+     nationality,' or to give any sort of countenance to the now fully
+     exploded calumny about the ill-treatment of women and children.
+     The war, gentlemen, has its horrors--every war has. Those horrors
+     increase as it becomes more irregular on the part of the enemy,
+     thus necessitating severer measures on the part of the Imperial
+     troops. But, having regard to the conditions, it is one of the
+     most humane wars that has ever been waged in history. It has
+     been humane, I contend, on both sides, which does not, of course,
+     mean that on both sides there have not been isolated acts
+     deserving of condemnation. Still, the general direction, the
+     general spirit on both sides, has been humane. But it is another
+     question whether the war on the side of the enemy is any longer
+     justifiable. It is certainly not morally justifiable to carry on
+     a resistance involving the loss of many lives and the destruction
+     of an immense quantity of property, when the object of that
+     resistance can no longer, by any possibility, be attained. No
+     doubt, great allowance must be made for most of the men still
+     under arms, though it is difficult to defend the conduct of their
+     leaders in deceiving them. The bulk of the men still in the field
+     are buoyed up with false hopes. They are incessantly fed with
+     lies--lies as to their own chance of success, and, still worse,
+     as to the intention of the British Government with regard to them
+     should they surrender. And for that very reason it seems all the
+     more regrettable that anything should be said or done here which
+     could help still further to mislead them, still further to
+     encourage a resistance which creates the very evils that these
+     people are fighting to escape. It is because I am sincerely
+     convinced that a resolution of this character, like the meeting
+     at which it was passed, like the whole agitation of which that
+     meeting is part, is calculated, if it has any effect at all,
+     still further to mislead the men who are engaged in carrying on
+     this hopeless struggle, that I feel bound, in sending it to Her
+     Majesty's Government, to accompany it with this expression of my
+     strong personal dissent."[231]
+
+         [Footnote 231: Cd. 547.]
+
+The comment of _Ons Land_ upon Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester
+Congress deputation was an open defiance of the Imperial authorities
+and a scarcely veiled incitement to rebellion. Mr. Advocate Malan, the
+editor, who had been elected for the Malmesbury Division upon the
+retirement of Mr. Schreiner--now rejected by the Bond--wrote:[232]
+
+         [Footnote 232: As stated in a _Central News_ telegram,
+         published in London on December 14th, 1900.]
+
+     "Sir Alfred Milner considers the request of the Afrikanders for
+     peace and justice unreasonable. The agitation has now reached the
+     end of the first period--that of pleading and petitioning. A deaf
+     ear has been turned to the cry of the Afrikanders and their
+     Church. But the battle for justice will continue from a different
+     standpoint--by mental and material powers. The path will be hard,
+     and sacrifices will be required, but the victory will be
+     glorious!"
+
+There were, of course, some voices that were raised, among both the
+republican and colonial Dutch, in favour of more moderate counsels. In
+the preceding month (November) Mr. Melius de Villiers, the late Chief
+Justice of the Free State, wrote to a Dutch Reformed minister in the
+Cape Colony to beg him to use all his influence against the efforts
+being made in the Cape Colony to encourage the Boers to continue the
+struggle. "However much I loved and valued the independence of the
+Free State," he says, "it is now absolutely certain that the struggle
+on the part of the burghers is a hopeless and useless one." And he
+then suggests that the Dutch Reformed ministers in the Cape Colony,
+instead of petitioning the Queen to grant the independence of the
+Republics, should intercede with ex-President Steyn and the Federal
+leaders and induce them to discontinue the fight. Women's Congresses
+and People's Congresses, held to denounce the barbarities perpetrated
+in the war, will avail nothing; but the Dutch Reformed Church could
+fulfil no higher mission than this genuine peace-making. "It may go
+against their grain to urge our people to yield," he adds, "but it
+seems to me a plain duty."[233] But such voices were powerless to
+counteract the effect produced upon the Boers by the demonstrations of
+hatred against the British Government, manifested by men whose minds
+had been inflamed by the infamous slanders of the Imperial troops to
+which the "conciliation" movement had given currency.
+
+         [Footnote 233: Cd. 547.]
+
+[Sidenote: Second invasion of the colony.]
+
+On the morning of December 16th, five days after he had received the
+Worcester Congress deputation, Lord Milner heard that the burgher
+forces had again crossed the Orange River between Aliwal North and
+Bethulie. Before them lay hundreds of miles of country full of food
+and horses, and inhabited by people who were in sympathy with them. On
+the 20th martial law was proclaimed in twelve additional districts. On
+the 17th of the following month the whole of the Cape Colony, with the
+exception of Capetown, Simon's Town, Wynberg, Port Elizabeth, East
+London, and the native territories, was placed under the same
+military rule. In the words of a protest subsequently addressed by the
+Burgher Peace Committee to their Afrikander brethren, the "fatal
+result of the Worcester Congress had been that the commandos had again
+entered the Cape Colony." The friends of the Boers in England, duped
+by the Afrikander nationalists, had involved England and South Africa
+in a year and a half of costly, destructive, and unnecessary war.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION
+
+
+The new year (1901) opened with a full revelation of the magnitude of
+the task which lay before the Imperial troops. Lord Roberts had
+frankly recognised that the destruction of the Governments and
+organised armies of the Republics would be followed by the more
+difficult and lengthy task of disarming the entire Boer population
+within their borders.
+
+     "Recent events have convinced me," he wrote from Pretoria on
+     October 10th, 1900, "that the permanent tranquillity of the
+     Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete
+     disarmament of the inhabitants; and, though the extent of the
+     country to be visited, and the ease with which guns, rifles, and
+     ammunition can be hidden, will render the task a difficult one,
+     its accomplishment is only a matter of time and patience."
+
+That this task proved altogether more lengthy and more arduous than
+Lord Roberts at this time expected, was due mainly, though not
+exclusively, to the same cause as that which had placed the British
+army in a position of such grave disadvantage at the outbreak of the
+war--the play of party politics in England. Lord Roberts had foreseen
+that the process of disarming the Boers would be slow and difficult;
+but he had not anticipated that the Imperial troops would be hindered
+in the accomplishment of this task by the political action of the
+friends of the Boers in England, or that the public utterances of
+prominent members of the Liberal Opposition would re-act with such
+dangerous effects upon the Afrikander nationalists that, after more
+than a year of successful military operations, the process of
+disarmament would have to be applied to the Cape Colony as well as to
+the territories of the late Republics.
+
+Looking back to the year 1900, with the events of the intervening
+period before us, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
+decision of the Boer leaders to continue the struggle was determined
+by political, and not by military considerations. More than one
+circumstance points to the fact that both the Boer generals and the
+civilian members of the Executives of the late Republics recognised
+that their position was practically hopeless from a military point of
+view.[234] And while Louis Botha, the Commandant-General of the
+Transvaal, urged his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms after the
+battle of Dalmanutha, it was President Steyn, a politician, and not a
+fighting man, who manifested the stubborn determination that was
+directly responsible for the unnecessary devastation and suffering
+which the guerilla war entailed upon the Boer people. The remote, but
+still carefully cherished possibility of foreign intervention, the
+belief that the colonial Dutch would even yet rise _en masse_, and the
+reliance upon the traditional sympathy of the Liberal party with the
+Boer aspirations for independence, were all considerations that
+contributed to the decision. But of these three influences the last
+was incomparably the most important; since it not only affected the
+disposition of the republican leaders, but, what was more, stimulated
+the Afrikander nationalists to make the efforts which brought the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony to the condition of passionate resentment
+that drew the Boer commandos, in the last month of 1900 and the
+opening months of 1901, a second time across the Orange River.
+
+         [Footnote 234: See letter of Piet de Wet to his brother
+         Christian, in Cd. 547, and correspondence between Steyn and
+         Reitz (captured by British troops), in Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: An injurious influence.]
+
+We have seen the actual origin of this most injurious influence. The
+"conciliation" movement was initiated in the Cape Colony by the
+Afrikander nationalists in concert with President Krueger, in order
+that "the hands of the friends of the Afrikander party in England
+might be strengthened." They were strengthened. We have observed the
+formation of a Conciliation Committee in England, working in close
+connection with the parent organisation, founded by Mr. Hargrove, in
+the Cape Colony; and we have noticed the declarations of Mr. Morley,
+Lord Courtney, and Mr. Bryce, in favour of the restoration of the
+internal independence of the Boers--declarations all made in
+opposition to the expressed determination of the British Government to
+incorporate the Republics into the system of the British Empire. The
+official leader of the Liberal party was less consistent. In June,
+1900, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman signified in general terms his
+recognition of the necessity of this measure. But he returned in
+October to vague expressions of sympathy with the Boers, which, after
+the general election had resulted in the return of the Unionist
+majority, took the form of a direct condemnation of the South African
+policy of the Government. In the course of the year 1901 he reiterated
+two charges with increasing vehemence. The conduct of the war was
+inhuman; and the Government, by refusing to offer any terms to the
+republican leaders inconsistent with the decision to incorporate the
+Republics into the Empire, were exacting the unnecessary humiliation
+of an unconditional surrender from a gallant foe. These injurious
+utterances at length provoked Lord Salisbury's indignant comment:
+"England is, I believe, the only country in which, during a great war,
+eminent men write and speak publicly as if they belonged to the
+enemy;" and elicited from Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith,
+Mr. Haldane, and Sir Henry Fowler, the assurance that the
+determination of the British people to "see the war through" had in no
+way weakened. But, in spite of these patriotic utterances on the part
+of the Liberal Imperialists, the fact remains that, throughout the
+whole period of the guerilla war, the Boer commandos were encouraged
+to resist the Imperial troops by the knowledge that prominent members
+of the Liberal party in England had declared themselves to be opposed
+to what they termed the "suppression" of the Boer people,[235] and
+were condemning in unmeasured terms the British military authorities
+for employing the sole methods by which the guerilla leaders could be
+encountered on equal terms, and the disarmament of the Dutch
+population could be accomplished.
+
+[Sidenote: Peace party among the Boers.]
+
+There is another element in the attitude of the burgher population at
+this critical period, a knowledge of which is essential to a correct
+understanding of the methods and conditions of the guerilla war. The
+existence among the republican Dutch of a considerable body of opinion
+in favour of submission was a circumstance of which the Imperial
+authorities were aware, and one of which they desired, naturally
+enough, to take the fullest advantage. It was known also to the
+militant Boer leaders; and it is obvious that any estimate of the
+degree in which these leaders are to be held directly responsible for
+the loss and suffering entailed by the decision to continue the war,
+will depend largely upon the manner in which they dealt with those
+members of their own community who were prepared, after Lord
+Roberts's victories, to become peaceable citizens of the British
+Empire.
+
+         [Footnote 235: "This war no longer makes a pretence of being
+         a war of defence; it is a war for gold-fields, for territory,
+         and for the suppression of two brave and noble peoples. This
+         wicked war has lost us the moral leadership of mankind."--Mr.
+         E. Robertson, M.P., June 5th, 1901.]
+
+The action of the Boer leaders in this respect is established by the
+indisputable testimony of the official documents which fell into the
+hands of the British authorities in the subsequent progress of the
+war. Every endeavour of the peace party to make itself heard was
+punished with rigorous, sometimes brutal, severity; fictitious
+reports, calculated to raise false hopes of foreign intervention, were
+circulated among the burghers in the field; and every effort was made
+to prevent a knowledge of the British Government's proposals for the
+future administration of the new colonies from reaching the rank and
+file of the burgher population. The details of this action on the part
+of the Boer leaders constitute collectively a body of evidence
+sufficient to have justified the employment of measures infinitely
+more severe than those which were in fact adopted by the British
+military authorities for the capture of the Boer commandos and the
+disarmament of the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa; and in the face
+of this evidence, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reiterated charges
+against the Government, whether of "methods of barbarism" or of
+prolonging the war by the neglect to offer reasonable terms to the
+Boers, must be held as wanton in their origin as they were injurious
+in their results.
+
+[Sidenote: Administrative changes.]
+
+The despatch of October 18th, 1900, which, as we have seen, Lord
+Milner received as he was returning from his visit to the new
+colonies, contained certain new commissions, under the terms of which
+the "prospective administration" of the Transvaal and the Orange River
+Colony was placed in his hands in succession to Lord Roberts, while at
+the same time he remained Governor of the Cape Colony and High
+Commissioner for South Africa. This combination of offices was purely
+temporary, since Her Majesty's Government (Mr. Chamberlain wrote to
+Lord Milner) "were anxious to take advantage of his unique fitness for
+the great task of inaugurating the civil government of the two new
+colonies." It was proposed therefore, that, as soon as the necessary
+legal provision could be made for establishing constitutions for the
+two new colonies, Lord Milner should be appointed as their Governor,
+with a Lieutenant-Governor for the Orange River Colony, and should
+cease to be the Governor of the Cape Colony. This new arrangement,
+which, as Mr. Chamberlain pointed out, involved the severance of the
+High Commissionership from the Governorship of the Cape Colony to
+which it had been attached for so long a period,[236] did not take
+effect, however, until the end of February, 1901, when Lord Milner
+finally left the Cape Colony for the Transvaal.
+
+         [Footnote 236: Cd. 547.]
+
+Lord Roberts relinquished the command of the British forces in South
+Africa on November 29th, 1900. The Home Government at this time
+attached great importance to the issue of a proclamation setting out
+clearly the generous terms upon which the Boers would be received into
+the empire; and, in connection with this question, Lord Milner, during
+his recent visit to Pretoria, had discussed with Lord Kitchener the
+methods by which the influence of the surrendered Boers and the more
+moderate Afrikanders, who were in favour of submission, could be
+brought to bear upon the general mass of the fighting burghers. Lord
+Milner, however, upon his return to the Cape Colony, expressed the
+opinion that the issue of a proclamation in the then existing
+circumstances would be a mistake, since it would only be regarded as a
+sign of weakness. And in support of this opinion he states, in a
+telegram of December 11th, that the cabled summary of Mr.
+Chamberlain's
+
+     "recent speech in the House of Commons, containing virtually the
+     principal points in the proposed proclamation, has been instantly
+     seized upon by the Bond leaders [in the Cape Colony] and is
+     represented by them as a sign that Her Majesty's Government is
+     wavering in its policy, and that the reaction in British public
+     opinion, which they have always relied on, is setting in."[237]
+
+         [Footnote 237: Cd. 547.]
+
+Both Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener confirmed this judgment at the
+time; and on January 28th, 1901--when de Wet was on the point of
+breaking through the British troops into the Cape Colony--the latter
+telegraphed to Lord Milner:
+
+     "When the Boers are inclined to peace, they will want, I think,
+     to discuss various questions, and when that time comes a
+     proclamation which would meet as far as possible the points
+     raised would, no doubt, be very valuable.... But just now I do
+     not think they have any idea of making peace whilst the Colony
+     question is so prominent. I have let it be known that I would be
+     glad to see an officer or meet Botha at any time if he wished to
+     do so."[238]
+
+         [Footnote 238: Cd. 547.]
+
+Three days afterwards Lord Milner received a further telegram from
+Lord Kitchener on the same subject, which he also forwarded to the
+Colonial Office:
+
+     "Ex-President Pretorius has just returned from seeing L. Botha
+     and Schalk Burger [the Commandant-General and the Acting
+     President of the South African Republic]. They stated that they
+     were fighting for their independence, and meant to continue to do
+     so to the bitter end, and would not discuss any question of
+     peace."[239]
+
+         [Footnote 239: _Ibid._]
+
+[Sidenote: Boer leaders irreconcilable.]
+
+In view of this irreconcilable attitude on the part of the Boer
+leaders, Mr. Chamberlain abandoned the proposal, and the proclamation
+was not issued until six months later, when the blockhouse system had
+been successfully initiated.
+
+But, although Lord Milner had recognised the futility of the appeal by
+proclamation, he had readily approved of Lord Kitchener's endeavour to
+make the British proposals known to the placable but terrorised
+section of the fighting burghers, through the agency of those of their
+kinsmen and friends who had surrendered. After all advances to the
+Boer leaders in the field had totally failed, "it seemed to us," Lord
+Milner reported to Mr. Chamberlain,[240]
+
+         [Footnote 240: January 12th, 1901. Cd. 547.]
+
+     "that those who had already surrendered would have means not open
+     to us of communicating with the bulk of the Boers still under
+     arms, persuading them of the hopelessness of their resistance,
+     and removing the misapprehension of our intentions, which some of
+     the commanders who were still holding out had sedulously
+     fostered."
+
+It was in these circumstances and with these objects in view that,
+after Lord Roberts's departure, the Burgher Peace Committee was formed
+at Pretoria; and it is to the address which Lord Kitchener then
+delivered (December 21st, 1900) to this Committee that we must look
+for the origin and purpose of the Burgher, or Concentration Camps.
+
+[Sidenote: Origin of the Burgher camps.]
+
+     "It having been brought to Lord Kitchener's notice," says the
+     published report, "that the principal difficulty that burghers,
+     desirous of surrendering, experienced was that they were not
+     allowed to remain in their own districts, and were afraid of the
+     penalties attached to not having adhered strictly to the oath of
+     neutrality, which they had, in most cases, been made to break by
+     the coercive measures of Boers out on commando, he wished to give
+     the burghers still in the field every opportunity of becoming
+     acquainted with the treatment he proposed now to extend to them,
+     their families, and their property.
+
+     "Instructions had been issued to form laagers for all surrendered
+     burghers, their wives, families, and stock, on the railway in
+     their own districts under military protection; and, except where
+     it was proved that a burgher had voluntarily broken his oath and
+     gone out on commando, no difference would be made between those
+     who had not taken the oath. To protect deserted women and
+     children they would also be brought into these laagers, where
+     their husbands and sons, who desired to live peacefully, could
+     freely join them.
+
+     "It was essential that the country should be thus cleared,
+     because so long as the means of subsistence remained in and on
+     the farms, so long small commandos were enabled to continue in
+     the field. In return, Lord Kitchener expected every assistance
+     from those to whom he gave protection. They must each and all
+     help to the best of their ability by influencing in every way in
+     their power those still in the field to surrender. These measures
+     would be applied gradually, and extended if they proved
+     successful. Burghers must understand that no responsibility could
+     be accepted for stock or property, except for that which they
+     brought in with them, and then only if they kept it within the
+     limits of the protection he was prepared to afford."[241]
+
+         [Footnote 241: Cd. 547.]
+
+The report of Lord Kitchener's speech from which these paragraphs are
+taken was printed in Dutch and circulated by the Burgher Peace
+Committee. It is certainly significant that a measure which was
+subsequently held up to the execration of the civilised world by the
+official leader of the Liberal party and the friends of the Boers in
+England, should have been carefully explained by Lord Kitchener to an
+audience of Boers at Pretoria, and accepted by them as a means of
+enabling the peaceably disposed burghers to escape from the compulsion
+of their leaders. In this, as in many other matters, the English
+friends of the Boers were _plus royalistes que le roi meme_.
+
+[Sidenote: Boer coercive measures.]
+
+These, then, were the means employed by the British military
+authorities to avert a needless protraction of the war. We have now to
+observe the methods by which the Boer leaders prevented their efforts
+from producing the desired result. In view of the destruction of the
+organised resistance of the Republics, Lord Roberts had made known by
+proclamation that all burghers who surrendered their arms and took the
+oath of neutrality would be allowed to return to their homes, or, if
+at home, to remain there undisturbed. This implied an intention on the
+part of the British authorities to provide such protection as would
+enable the surrendered burghers to remain in peaceable possession of
+their property. General Botha, as we have already noted, was
+personally in favour of a general surrender after the battle of
+Dalmanutha; but, when once the majority of the Boer leaders had
+decided to continue to resist the establishment of British authority
+by force of arms, it became his business to keep every fighting
+burgher in the field. Here, again, the work of the Intelligence
+Department provides us with instructive evidence of the purposes and
+acts of the enemy. In the course of the subsequent military operations
+Sir Bindon Blood captured a number of official documents in the Boer
+Government laager at Roos Senekal. One of these, referring to the
+period in question, sufficiently indicates the nature of the "coercive
+measures" to which Lord Kitchener had alluded. Under date October 6th,
+1900, General Botha gives instructions to the Boer commandant at
+Bethel to telegraph round to the Boer generals and officers certain
+military instructions, and he then adds:
+
+     "Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers from laying
+     down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do not listen to
+     this, to confiscate everything moveable or unmoveable, and also
+     to burn their houses. Get into direct communication with the
+     Standerton men, and destroy the railway line between Heidelberg
+     and Standerton, and especially derail and hold up trains. In this
+     manner we will obtain a large quantity of food."[242]
+
+         [Footnote 242: Cd. 663. See also the text of the circular
+         issued on December 2nd, 1900, by Louis Botha, as
+         Commandant-General of the Boer forces, to all military
+         officers, landdrosts, etc., giving specific instructions for
+         the punishment of surrendered burghers who refused to join
+         the commandos when called upon, and for the evasion of the
+         neutrality oath.]
+
+And, while the peaceably inclined burghers were prevented from
+surrendering by the fear of these penalties, the courage of the
+commandos was maintained by the spread of false information. Among
+these same papers found at Roos Senekal is a telegram despatched on
+November 2nd, 1900, to General Viljoen, containing a number of
+encouraging statements bearing upon the political and military
+situation, of which the three following may be taken as
+characteristic:
+
+     "October, 1900. A Congress of Delegates of the Powers was held at
+     Parijs [Paris], whereby England asked for an extension of six
+     months to carry on the war. This was refused by the powers on the
+     proposal of Holland and Austria.
+
+     "France is ready to land troops in England on the 1st November.
+
+     "Cape Colonial troops to the number of 2,500 have been sent back
+     by General Roberts, having quarrelled with the regulars. Their
+     arms were taken away and burnt. This last is official news
+     received by General Fourie."[243]
+
+         [Footnote 243: Cd. 663.]
+
+[Sidenote: "Not civilised warfare".]
+
+It was in order to counteract the effects of this system of terrorism
+and deceit, that the endeavour was made to inform the mass of the
+Boers still in arms of the actual state of affairs, both in respect of
+the hopelessness of foreign intervention and the real intentions of
+the British Government, through the agency of the Burgher Peace
+Committee. The treatment accorded to these peace emissaries is
+justifiable, possibly, by a strict interpretation of the laws of war;
+but it fixes inevitably the responsibility for the needless sufferings
+of the Boer people in the guerilla war, upon Ex-President Steyn,
+Schalk Burger, Louis Botha, Christian de Wet, and the other Boer
+leaders. On January 10th, 1901, of three agents of the Peace Committee
+taken prisoners to De Wet's laager near Lindley, one--a British
+subject--was flogged and then shot, and two, who were burghers, were
+flogged.[244] And on February 12th Meyer de Kock, the Secretary of the
+Committee, was shot.[245]
+
+         [Footnote 244: Cd. 547.]
+
+         [Footnote 245: Cd. 663. It was at this time that the utterly
+         unjustifiable and brutal murder of the coloured man, Esau,
+         took place in the invasion of the Calvinia district of the
+         Cape Colony. His sole offence was his known loyalty to the
+         British Government. "He was flogged on January 15th, 1901,
+         and kept in gaol till February 5th, when he was flogged
+         through the streets and shot outside the village by a Boer
+         named Strydom, who stated that he acted according to orders."
+         Cd. 547.]
+
+But the efforts of the Peace Committee were not altogether thrown
+away. The terrible deaths of these men, true martyrs of the Boer
+cause, evoked more than one notable protest against the insensate
+determination of Ex-President Steyn and De Wet.
+
+     "Dear Brother, ... From what I hear you are so angry with me,"
+     wrote General Piet de Wet to his brother Christian, "that you
+     have decided to kill me should you find me. May God not allow it
+     that you should have the opportunity to shed more innocent blood.
+     Enough has been shed already.... I beseech you, let us think over
+     the matter coolly for a moment, and see whether our cause is
+     really so pure and righteous that we can rely on God's
+     help."[246]
+
+         [Footnote 246: Cd. 547.]
+
+And Mr. H. A. Du Plessis, the predikant at Lindley in the Orange River
+Colony, addressed an "open letter" to the clergy of the Dutch Reformed
+Church in the Cape Colony.
+
+     "It is not civilised warfare any more on the part of the
+     burghers. They have become desperate, and as fanatics do things
+     in conflict with a Christian spirit and civilisation.... About a
+     fortnight ago, G. Mueller, one of my deacons and brother of the
+     late minister of Burghersdorp, was brutally ill-used. He had to
+     strip, and received twenty-five lashes with a stirrup leather--he
+     is not the only one--because he took letters from a member of the
+     Peace Committee to certain heads of the burgher force, in which
+     they were strongly advised to give in. At the same time Andries
+     Wessels and J. Morgendael were taken prisoners. They left
+     Kroonstad at their own request, and with the sanction of the
+     military authorities, in order to have an interview with the
+     leaders of the burgher force. Morgendael was mortally wounded by
+     Commandant Froneman without a hearing, and at the instigation of
+     General C. de Wet. He died afterwards.... In such a shameful, in
+     fact, inhuman, manner were these men treated; and for what
+     reason? Simply because they had tried to save their country and
+     people....
+
+     "The burghers are kept totally in the dark by their leaders as to
+     what the real state of affairs is. Because I wish to save them
+     from certain ruin I make this appeal to you....
+
+     "If [the burghers] knew what the true state of affairs was, a
+     large portion would long ago have come in and delivered up their
+     arms....
+
+     "Therefore, I implore you, stand still for a few moments and
+     think of the true interests of the Afrikander nation, and see if
+     you will not alter your opinion, and quench the fire of war
+     instead of feeding the flame....[247]
+
+         [Footnote 247: Cd. 547.]
+
+These letters, which were published in _The Cape Times_, formed part
+of an attempt made by the Burgher Peace Committee, "to induce some of
+the leading men in the colony, who are known to sympathise with the
+Boers, to tell the men still in the field that the hope of any
+assistance from here is a delusion." But, in thus reporting this new
+endeavour to Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Milner adds that he is not,
+himself, "very sanguine" of its success.
+
+[Sidenote: Policy of the Bond.]
+
+There was only too good ground for this opinion. The Afrikander
+nationalists of the Cape hated England no less than did the republican
+nationalists, though they feared her more. The policy which the Bond
+had adopted after the occupation of the Republics by the British
+forces was perfectly definite. Its object was to avert the final
+disaster of the war by securing the maintenance of the Republics as
+independent centres of Afrikander nationalism. In order to do this the
+Bond resolved to keep the Cape Colony in a state of smouldering
+rebellion, to encourage the continued resistance of the Boer
+commandos, and to render all the material assistance to the guerilla
+leaders and their forces that could be afforded without exposing the
+Cape Dutch to the penalties of treason. It may be doubted, however,
+whether the Bond leaders, in view of the resolute attitude of the
+loyalist population and their consistent and unfaltering support of
+Lord Milner, would have embarked upon this policy, unless they had
+calculated upon the co-operation of the Liberal Opposition in England.
+As it was, their expectations in this respect had been amply
+fulfilled, and the policy itself, as we have seen, had been admirably
+carried into effect.
+
+The second invasion of the Cape Colony began, as we have noticed, with
+the incursion of the Boers after the Worcester Congress. On December
+16th, 1900, Kruitzinger, with seven hundred, and Hertzog with twelve
+hundred men, crossed the Orange River; and by February 11th, 1901, De
+Wet, who had been "headed back" in December, had succeeded in eluding
+the British columns and entered the Colony.[248] At this moment
+success seemed to be within measurable distance both to the Bond and
+to De Wet. The point of view of the astute Afrikander statesmen is
+different from that of the guerilla leader; but each party is equally
+hopeful of the ultimate victory of the nationalist cause. Of the
+attitude of the Bond in this month of February, 1901, Mr. Kipling
+writes from Capetown:
+
+         [Footnote 248: Cd. 522.]
+
+     "Some of the extremists of the Bond are for committing themselves
+     now, fully, to the Dutch cause, De Wet and all; but some of the
+     others are hunting for some sort of side-path that will give them
+     a chance of keeping on the ground-level of the gallows, within
+     hail of a seat in the next Parliament. If De Wet wins--he is
+     assumed to be in command of several thousands, all lusting for
+     real battle, and sure of a welcome among many more thousands
+     alight with the same desire--the Bond may, of course, come out
+     flat-footedly on his side. Just at present the apricots are not
+     quite ripe enough. But the Bond has unshaken faith in the
+     Opposition, whose every word and action are quoted here, and lead
+     to more deaths on the veld. _It is assumed that His Majesty's
+     Opposition will save the Bond, and South Africa for the Bond, if
+     only the commandos make the war expensive._"[249]
+
+         [Footnote 249: The italics are Mr. Kipling's. _The Science of
+         Rebellion: a Tract for the Times_, by Rudyard Kipling.]
+
+[Sidenote: De Wet in the colony.]
+
+If this account of the attitude of the Bond stood alone, its value
+would be merely that of an _ex parte_ statement by a competent
+observer on the spot. But it does not stand alone. The accident of the
+capture of the Boer official papers at Roos Senekal, to which we have
+referred before, has provided us with a record of the thoughts which
+were in De Wet's mind at the time when Mr. Kipling's words were
+written. In a report dated "On the Veld, February 14th, 1901,"
+Commandant-General Botha is informed that "De Wet's last news is that
+the Cape Colony has risen to a man, and has already taken up arms.
+They refused to give up to the British Government. Many more are only
+waiting operations on part of De Wet to join him; and General De Wet
+concludes this report with the words: 'It is certain that the ways of
+the Lord are hidden from us, and that, after all, it seems that the
+day of a united South Africa is not far off.'"
+
+The writer of this despatch is the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the
+Orange Free State; and to his report of De Wet's success in the Cape
+Colony, he now adds an account of what is happening on the other side
+of the Orange River:
+
+     "The burghers in the Orange Free State are hopeful, and expecting
+     a happy ending. The grudge against the Britisher has now taken
+     deep root, and the women and girls are encouraging the burghers
+     to stick up to the bitter end. So that our cause now rests in the
+     union of the burghers, and, with God's help, we will accomplish
+     our end.... The enemy's plan is to starve us out, but he will
+     never do it, now we have an outlet from the Cape Colony, even if
+     we have to use force."[250]
+
+         [Footnote 250: Cd. 663.]
+
+De Wet was chased out of the Colony by the British columns on February
+28th, but smaller commandos under Kruitzinger, Fouche, Scheepers, and
+Malan remained behind. Apart from their mobility, and the persistent
+manner in which they clung to rugged and mountainous districts, the
+ability of these Boer raiders to keep the field against the Imperial
+troops must be attributed to the sympathy and material assistance
+which they received from the colonial Dutch. The actual number of
+recruits which they secured was small; but, in Lord Kitchener's
+words--
+
+     "the friendly feelings of a considerable portion of the rural
+     population assured to them at all times not only an ample food
+     supply, but also timely information of the movements of our
+     pursuing columns--two points which told heavily in their
+     favour."[251]
+
+         [Footnote 251: Cd. 605.]
+
+[Sidenote: Effect of Cape rebellion.]
+
+In view of the enormous area of the sparsely populated and difficult
+country throughout which their movements were thus facilitated, it is
+not surprising that these roaming commandos were never completely
+suppressed. Of the 21,256 men who surrendered after Vereeniging, 3,635
+were Boers and rebels, who had been, up to that time, at large in the
+Cape Colony.[252] The importance of the contribution which the
+disloyal majority of the Cape Dutch were enabled, in this manner, to
+make to the power of resistance exhibited by the Boers in the guerilla
+war has scarcely been sufficiently appreciated. As it was, a large
+body of Imperial troops, which would otherwise have been available for
+completing the conquest of the new colonies, were kept employed, not
+merely in guarding the all-important railway lines, but from time to
+time in arduous, costly, and exhausting military operations in the
+Cape Colony.[253]
+
+         [Footnote 252: Cd. 988.]
+
+         [Footnote 253: "Cape Colony is a great disappointment to me
+         ... no general rising can be expected in that quarter....
+         [But] the little contingent there has been of great help to
+         us: they have kept 50,000 troops occupied, with which
+         otherwise we should have had to reckon."--Gen. Christian de
+         Wet at the Vereeniging Conference on May 16th, 1902. App. A.
+         _The Three Years' War_, by Christian Rudolf de Wet
+         (Constable, 1902). But see forward also, p. 485, for part
+         played by British loyalists.]
+
+The value of this contribution was quite well understood by the
+Afrikander nationalists of the Cape. In Mr. Kipling's vigorous
+English, "north and south they were working for a common object--the
+manufacture of pro-Boers in England by doubling the income-tax." And
+it is in the extension of the area of the war by the establishment of
+the Boer commandos in the Cape Colony that we must find the one valid
+military consideration which underlay the failure of the peace
+negotiations between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha
+(February-April, 1901), and the final rejection of the British terms
+of surrender by the Boer leaders in June. The point is made perfectly
+plain in the official notice signed by Schalk Burger, as Acting
+President of the South African Republic, and Steyn, as President of
+the Orange Free State, which was issued to the burghers on June 20th,
+1901. After reciting that the British terms had been referred to
+"State President Krueger and the deputation in Europe," and that
+President Krueger's reply had been considered by a conference of the
+Governments of both Republics, at which Chief-Commandant C. De Wet,
+Commandant-General L. Botha, and Assistant-Commandant J. H. De la Rey
+had presented a full report, the document continues:
+
+     "And considering the good progress in our cause in the colonies,
+     where our brothers oppose the cruel injustice done to the
+     Republics more and more in depriving them of their independence,
+     considering further the invaluable personal and material
+     sacrifices they [the Colonial Dutch] have made for our cause,
+     which would all be worthless and vain with a peace whereby the
+     independence of the Republics is given up ... [it is resolved]
+     that no peace will be made ... by which our independence and
+     national existence, or the interests of our colonial brothers,
+     shall be the price paid, and that the war will be vigorously
+     prosecuted."[254]
+
+         [Footnote 254: Cd. 663.]
+
+[Sidenote: Afrikander statesmanship.]
+
+It is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the
+Afrikander nationalist leaders. The qualities of statesmanship that
+enabled a Cavour or a Bismarck to make a nation were theirs. From the
+apparent hopelessness of the position created by Lord Roberts's swift
+and overwhelming victories, they had brought round their affairs to
+the point at which they now stood. The task which confronted the
+Imperial troops was no longer to disarm the inhabitants of the
+Republics, but to disarm and subdue practically the entire Dutch
+population of South Africa. And to the military difficulties inherent
+in the accomplishment of such a task in such a country, they had added
+the opposition of political forces operating both in England and South
+Africa with scarcely less embarrassing effects. Had it been merely an
+affair of the island people and the island statesmen, the Bond might
+still have won. The courage and endurance of the Imperial troops alone
+would not have saved South Africa. The army was the instrument of the
+people, and it was for the people to make use of this instrument, or
+to withdraw it, as they chose. But the over-sea British claimed a
+voice in the settlement; and the Bond had no friends among them. The
+"younger nations" and the "man" at Capetown saved South Africa for the
+Empire.
+
+Before we proceed to consider the broad features of the military
+operations by which the disarmament of the Dutch was at length
+accomplished, a reference must be made to the account of the general
+situation in South Africa addressed by Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain
+from Capetown on February 6th, 1901. Among all the notable documents
+which he furnished to his official chief, none affords more convincing
+evidence of cool judgment, mastery of South African conditions, and
+sureness of statecraft than this. It is a letter, and not a despatch,
+and as such it contains some personal details which would not have
+found a place in more formal communications.
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's survey.]
+
+Two reasons, Lord Milner writes, have prevented him from sending for a
+long time past any general review of South African affairs. "I am
+occupied," he says, "every day that passes from morning till night by
+business, all of which is urgent, and the amount and variety of which
+you are doubtless able to judge from the communications on a great
+variety of subjects which are constantly passing between us." And in
+addition to this, he has always hoped that "some definite point would
+be reached, at which it might be possible to sum up that chapter of
+our history which contained the war, and to forecast the work of
+administrative construction which must succeed it." Now, however, it
+is useless to wait longer for a "clear and clean-cut" situation.
+Although he has not "the slightest doubt of the ultimate result," he
+foresees that the work which still lies before the Imperial troops
+will be "slower, more difficult, more harassing, and more expensive
+than was at one time anticipated."
+
+     "It is no use denying that the last half-year has been one of
+     retrogression. Seven months ago this Colony was perfectly quiet,
+     at least as far as the Orange River. The southern half of the
+     Orange River Colony was rapidly settling down, and even a
+     considerable portion of the Transvaal, notably the south-western
+     districts, seemed to have definitely accepted British authority,
+     and to rejoice at the opportunity of a return to orderly
+     government and the pursuits of peace. To-day the scene is
+     completely altered."
+
+The "increased losses to the country," due to the prolongation of the
+struggle and to the guerilla methods adopted by the Boer leaders, are
+obvious.
+
+     "The fact that the enemy are now broken up into a great number of
+     small forces, raiding in every direction, and that our troops are
+     similarly broken up in pursuit of them, makes the area of actual
+     fighting, and consequently of destruction, much wider than it
+     would be in the case of a conflict between equal numbers
+     operating in large masses. Moreover, the fight is now mainly over
+     supplies. The Boers live entirely on the country through which
+     they pass, not only taking all the food they can lay hands upon
+     on the farms--grain, forage, horses, cattle, etc., but looting
+     the small village stores for clothes, boots, coffee, sugar, etc.,
+     of all of which they are in great need. Our forces, on their
+     side, are compelled to denude the country of everything moveable,
+     in order to frustrate these tactics of the enemy. No doubt a
+     considerable amount of the stock taken by us is not wholly lost,
+     but simply removed to the refugee camps, which are now being
+     established at many points along the railway lines. But even
+     under these circumstances the loss is great, through animals
+     dying on the route, or failing to find sufficient grass to live
+     upon when collected in large numbers at the camps. Indeed, the
+     loss of crops and stock is a far more serious matter than the
+     destruction of farm buildings, of which so much has been heard."
+
+And to this loss incidental to the campaign there has been added
+recently "destruction of a wholly wanton and malicious character."
+This is the injury done to the mining plant in the outlying districts
+of the Rand by the Boer raiders, a destruction for which there is no
+possible excuse.
+
+     "It has no reason or justification in connection with military
+     operations, but is pure vandalism, and outside the scope of
+     civilised warfare.... Directly or indirectly, all South Africa,
+     including the agricultural population, owes its prosperity to the
+     mines, and, of course, especially to the mines of the Transvaal.
+     To money made in mining it is indebted for such progress, even in
+     agriculture, as it has recently made, and the same source will
+     have to be relied upon for the recuperation of agriculture after
+     the ravages of war.
+
+     "Fortunately the damage done to the mines has not been large,
+     relatively to the vast total amount of the fixed capital sunk in
+     them. The mining area is excessively difficult to guard against
+     purely predatory attacks having no military purpose, because it
+     is, so to speak, 'all length and no breadth'--one long thin line,
+     stretching across the country from east to west for many miles.
+     Still, garrisoned as Johannesburg now is, it is only possible
+     successfully to attack a few points in it. Of the raids hitherto
+     made, and they have been fairly numerous, only one has resulted
+     in any serious damage. In that instance the injury done to the
+     single mine attacked amounted to L200,000, and it is estimated
+     that the mine is put out of working for two years. This mine is
+     only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of the
+     most important. These facts may afford some indication of the
+     ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the Transvaal
+     and all South Africa, but on many European interests, if that
+     general destruction of mine works which was contemplated just
+     before our occupation of Johannesburg had been carried out.
+     However serious in some respects may have been the military
+     consequences of our rapid advance to Johannesburg, South Africa
+     owes more than is commonly recognised to that brilliant dash
+     forward, by which the vast mining apparatus, the foundation of
+     all her wealth, was saved from the ruin threatening it."
+
+[Sidenote: Material destruction.]
+
+As the result of the last six or seven months of destructive warfare,
+"a longer period of recuperation will be required than was originally
+anticipated." At the same time, Lord Milner points out that, with
+Kimberley and the Rand, the "main engines of prosperity," virtually
+undamaged, the economic consequences of the war, "though grave, do not
+appear by any means appalling."
+
+     "The country population will need a good deal of help, first to
+     preserve it from starvation, and then, probably, to supply it
+     with a certain amount of capital to make a fresh start. And the
+     great industry of the country will need some little time before
+     it is able to render any assistance. But, in a young country with
+     great recuperative powers, it will not take many years before the
+     economic ravages of the war are effaced."
+
+He then turns to consider the "moral effect" of the recrudescence of
+the war, which is, in his opinion, more serious than the mere material
+destruction of the last six months. In the middle of 1900 the feeling
+in the Orange River Colony and the western districts of the Transvaal
+was "undoubtedly pacific."
+
+     "The inhabitants were sick of the war. They were greatly
+     astonished, after all that had been dinned into them, by the fair
+     and generous treatment they received on our first occupation, and
+     it would have taken very little to make them acquiesce readily in
+     the new regime. At that time, too, the feeling in the Colony was
+     better than I have ever known it."
+
+[Sidenote: Recrudescence of the war.]
+
+If it had been possible to screen those portions of the conquered
+territories which were fast settling down to peaceful pursuits from
+the incursions of the enemy still in the field, the worst results of
+the guerilla war might have been avoided. But the "vast extent of the
+country, and the necessity of concentrating our forces for the long
+advance, first to Pretoria and then to Komati Poort," made this
+impossible. The Boer leaders raided the country already occupied, but
+now left exposed; and, encouraged by the small successes thus easily
+obtained, the commandos reappeared first in the south-east of the
+Orange River Colony, then in the south-west of the Transvaal, and
+finally in every portion of the conquered territory.
+
+Those among the burgher population who desired to submit to British
+rule now found themselves in a position of great difficulty.
+
+     "Instead of being made prisoners of war, they had been allowed to
+     remain on their farms on taking the oath of neutrality, and many
+     of them were really anxious to keep it. But they had not the
+     strength of mind, nor, from want of education, a sufficient
+     appreciation of the sacredness of the obligation which they had
+     undertaken, to resist the pressure of their old companions in
+     arms when these reappeared among them appealing to their
+     patriotism and to their fears. In a few weeks or months the very
+     men whom we had spared and treated with exceptional leniency were
+     up in arms again, justifying their breach of faith in many cases
+     by the extraordinary argument that we had not preserved them from
+     the temptation to commit it.
+
+     "The general rising at the back of our advanced forces naturally
+     led to the return of a number of our troops, and to a straggling
+     conflict not yet concluded, in which the conduct of our own
+     troops, naturally enough, was not characterised by the same
+     leniency to the enemy which marked our original conquest. We did
+     not, indeed, treat the men who had broken parole with the same
+     severity with which I believe any other nation would have
+     treated them. Entitled as we were by the universally recognised
+     rules of war to shoot the men who, having once been prisoners in
+     our hands and having been released on a distinct pledge to
+     abstain from further part in the war, had once more taken up arms
+     against us, we never in a single instance availed ourselves of
+     that right. But as our columns swept through the revolted
+     country, meeting on every hand with hostility, and even with
+     treachery, on the part of the people whom we had spared, no doubt
+     in some cases the innocent suffered with the guilty. Men who had
+     actually kept faith with us were, in some instances, made
+     prisoners of war, or saw their property destroyed, simply because
+     it was impossible to distinguish between them and the greater
+     number who had broken faith. This, no doubt, resulted in further
+     accessions to the ranks of the enemy. And this tendency was
+     augmented by the evacuation, necessary for military reasons, of a
+     number of places, such as Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, and
+     Smithfield, which we had held for months, and in which we had
+     actually established a reasonably satisfactory civil
+     administration. Latterly, something has been done to check the
+     general demoralisation, and to afford places of refuge for those
+     willing to submit, by establishing camps along the railway lines
+     to which burghers may take themselves, their families, and their
+     stock for protection. No doubt this is a very inadequate
+     substitute for the effectual defence of whole districts.
+     Consequently the camps are mostly tenanted by women and children
+     whose male relatives are, in many cases, in the field against us.
+     But, as far as it goes, it is a good measure, and there can be no
+     doubt that, whenever we succeed in striking a decisive blow at
+     any of the numerous commandos roaming about the country, a good
+     many of their less willing members will find their way to one or
+     other of these camps in order to avoid further fighting."
+
+As the guerilla warfare thus swept back over the new colonies, the
+Dutch in the Cape Colony, who at one time, about the middle of the
+preceding year (1900), had seemed disposed to acquiesce in the union
+of all South Africa under the British flag, became once more restless
+and embittered.
+
+[Sidenote: A carnival of mendacity.]
+
+     "Every act of harshness, however necessary, on the part of our
+     troops, was exaggerated and made the most of, though what
+     principally inflamed the minds of the people were alleged
+     instances of needless cruelty which never occurred. Never in my
+     life have I read of, much less experienced, such a carnival of
+     mendacity as that which accompanied the pro-Boer agitation in
+     this Colony at the end of last year. And these libels still
+     continue to make themselves felt. It is true that excitement has
+     subsided somewhat during the last two months, partly because some
+     of the worst inventions about the conduct of the British troops
+     have been exposed and utterly discredited, and partly because the
+     general introduction of martial law has tended greatly to check
+     seditious writing and speaking. But even now the general feeling
+     in most of the country districts is very bad, and the commandos
+     which invaded the Colony in December and have been roaming about
+     ever since, while they have not gained many adherents among the
+     colonial farmers, have nevertheless enjoyed the very substantial
+     aid which the sympathy of the majority of the inhabitants was
+     able to give them, in supporting themselves, obtaining fresh
+     supplies of food and horses, and evading the forces sent in
+     pursuit of them."
+
+Of the general attitude of the Cape Dutch at this time Lord Milner
+writes with the lenient judgment of complete understanding:
+
+     "I am satisfied by experience that the majority of those Dutch
+     inhabitants of the Colony who sympathise with the Republics,
+     however little they may be able to resist giving active
+     expression to that sympathy when the enemy actually appear
+     amongst them, do not desire to see their own districts invaded or
+     to find themselves personally placed in the awkward dilemma of
+     choosing between high treason and an unfriendly attitude to the
+     men of their own race from beyond the border. There are
+     extremists who would like to see the whole of the Cape Colony
+     overrun. But the bulk of the farmers, especially the substantial
+     ones, are not of this mind. They submit readily enough even to
+     stringent regulations having for their object the prevention of
+     the spread of invasion. And not a few of them are, perhaps,
+     secretly glad that the prohibition of seditious speaking and
+     writing, of political meetings, and of the free movement of
+     political firebrands through the country enables them to keep
+     quiet, without actually themselves taking a strong line against
+     the propaganda, and, to do them justice, they behave reasonably
+     well under the pass and other regulations necessary for that
+     purpose, as long as care is taken not to make these regulations
+     too irksome to them in the conduct of their business, or in their
+     daily lives.
+
+     "That there has been an invasion at all is no doubt due to the
+     weakness of some of the Dutch colonists in tolerating, or
+     supporting, the violent propaganda, which could not but lead the
+     enemy to believe that they had only to come into the Colony in
+     order to meet with general active support. But this was a
+     miscalculation on the part of the enemy, though a very pardonable
+     one. They knew the vehemence of the agitation in their favour as
+     shown by the speeches in Parliament, the series of public
+     meetings culminating in the Worcester Congress, the writings of
+     the Dutch Press, the very general wearing of the republican
+     colours, the singing of the Volkslied, and so forth, and they
+     regarded these demonstrations as meaning more than they actually
+     did. Three things were forgotten. Firstly, that a great
+     proportion of the Afrikanders in the Colony who really meant
+     business had slipped away and joined the republican ranks long
+     ago. Secondly, that the abortive rebellion of a year ago had left
+     the people of the border districts disinclined to repeat the
+     experiment of a revolt. Thirdly, that owing to the precautionary
+     measures of the Government the amount of arms and ammunition in
+     the hands of the country population throughout the greater part
+     of the Colony is not now anything like as large as it usually is,
+     and far smaller than it was a year ago."
+
+[Sidenote: British population in arms.]
+
+In these circumstances the object to be aimed at is to screen off as
+much of the country as possible from raids. But the Cape Colony is
+considerably larger in area than France and the United Kingdom put
+together; it has "an immense length of frontier that can be crossed
+anywhere," and "exceedingly primitive means of communication." The
+exclusion of mobile guerilla bands from across the frontier is,
+therefore, "something of an impossibility." There is one method, and
+one only, by which "the game of the invaders can be frustrated." It is
+to provide each district with the means of defending itself. And so a
+local defence force has been formed in all districts, with the
+exception of those--happily the least important in the Colony--in
+which the population is extremely small and the loyalists are very
+few.
+
+     "In the other districts, the response on the part of the British
+     population to the general call to arms recently made by the
+     Ministry has been better than the most sanguine expected. It was
+     always admitted, by their friends and foes alike, that the bulk
+     of the Afrikander population would never take up arms on the side
+     of the British Government in this quarrel, even for local
+     defence. The appeal was, therefore, virtually directed to the
+     British population, mostly townspeople, and to a small, but no
+     doubt very strong and courageous, minority of the Afrikanders who
+     have always been loyalists. These classes had been already
+     immensely drawn on by the Cape police, the regular volunteer
+     corps, and the numerous irregular mounted corps which had been
+     called into existence because of the war. There must have been
+     twelve thousand Cape Colonists under arms before the recent
+     appeal, and, as things are now going, we shall get as many more
+     under that appeal--a truly remarkable achievement under a purely
+     voluntary system. The fact that, if the war continues for a few
+     months longer, so large a number of the South African British
+     will be under arms (for, it must be remembered, in addition to
+     the Cape colonists we have about one thousand Rhodesians, and, I
+     should say, at least ten thousand Uitlanders) is one that cannot
+     be left out of account in considering either the present
+     imbroglio or the settlement after peace is restored.
+
+     "It is, indeed, calculated to exercise a most important and, I
+     believe, beneficial influence upon the South African politics of
+     the future. Among the principal causes of the trouble of the
+     past and present was the contempt felt by the Afrikander
+     countryman, used to riding and shooting, and generally in
+     possession of a good rifle and plenty of cartridges, for other
+     white men less habituated to arms than he was himself. That
+     feeling can hardly survive the experience of the past twelve
+     months, and especially of the last six weeks. The splendid
+     fighting of the despised Johannesburgers of the Imperial Light
+     Horse, and of the other South African Colonial Corps, has become
+     a matter of history, and the present _levee en masse_ of the
+     British people, including the townsmen, of this Colony, is proof
+     positive that when the necessity is really felt they are equal to
+     the best in courage and public spirit. In this respect the events
+     of the past few months, unfortunate as they have been in many
+     ways, have undoubtedly their brighter side. The mutual respect of
+     the two principal white races is the first condition of a healthy
+     political life in the South Africa of the future. It is possible
+     that if the extreme strain of the most recent developments of the
+     war had never been felt throughout Cape Colony, the British
+     inhabitants would never have had the opportunity of showing that
+     they were inferior to none in their willingness to bear all the
+     burdens of citizenship, including that of personal service."
+
+[Sidenote: Remember the loyalists.]
+
+And Lord Milner urges that in the future England should not forget
+that there are loyalists in South Africa as well as Boers; and that
+the loyalists are Dutch as well as British.
+
+     "The important part now played, even from the purely military
+     point of view, by the South African loyalists ought, as it seems
+     to me, to have a good effect not only in South Africa but in
+     England. The inherent vice, if I may say so, of almost all
+     public discussion of our South African difficulties is the
+     tendency to concentrate attention too exclusively on the Boers.
+     Say what we will, the controversy always seems to relapse into
+     the old ruts--it is the British Government on the one hand and
+     the Boers on the other. The question how a particular policy will
+     affect not merely our enemies, but our now equally numerous
+     friends, seems seldom to be adequately considered. And yet it
+     would seem that justice and policy alike should lead us to be as
+     eager to consider the feelings and interests, and to retain the
+     loyalty, of those who are fighting on our side, as to disarm the
+     present enmity and win the future confidence of those who are
+     fighting against us. And this principle would seem all the easier
+     to adhere to because there is really nothing which the great body
+     of the South African loyalists desire which it is not for the
+     honour and advantage of the mother country to insist upon.
+
+     "Of vindictiveness, or desire to oppress the Afrikanders, there
+     is, except in hasty utterances inevitable in the heat of the
+     conflict, which have no permanent significance, or in tirades
+     which are wholly devoid of influence, no sign whatever. The
+     attitude of almost all leading and representative men, and the
+     general trend of public feeling among the loyalists, even in the
+     intensity of the struggle, is dead against anything like racial
+     exclusiveness or domination. If this were not so it would be
+     impossible for a section of pure-bred Afrikanders, small no doubt
+     in numbers but weighty in character and position, to take the
+     strong line which they do in opposition to the views of the
+     majority of their own people, based as these are, and as they
+     know them to be, upon a misconception of our policy and
+     intentions. These men are among the most devoted adherents to the
+     Imperial cause, and would regard with more disfavour and alarm
+     than any one the failure of the British nation to carry out its
+     avowed policy in the most complete manner. They are absolutely
+     convinced that the unquestioned establishment of British
+     supremacy, and the creation of one political system from Capetown
+     to the Zambesi, is, after all that has happened, the only
+     salvation for men of their own race, as well as for others."
+
+[Sidenote: "One Country, One Flag."]
+
+And, in conclusion, he writes of the "predominant, indeed the almost
+unanimous, feeling of those South Africans who sympathise with the
+Imperial Government," that--
+
+     "they are sick to death of the war, which has brought ruin to
+     many of them, and imposed considerable sacrifices on almost all.
+     But they would rather see the war continue for an indefinite time
+     than run the risk of any compromise which would leave even the
+     remotest chance of the recurrence of so terrible a scourge in the
+     future. They are prepared to fight and suffer on in order to make
+     South Africa, indisputably and for ever, one country under one
+     flag, with one system of government, and that system the British,
+     which they believe to ensure the highest possible degree of
+     justice and freedom to men of all races."
+
+In this luminous review of what Lord Milner terms "if by no means the
+most critical, possibly the most puzzling" state of affairs since the
+outbreak of the war, it will be observed that he puts the time
+required by South Africa to recover from the economic ravages of the
+war at "not many years." In point of fact, two and a half years after
+the surrender of Vereeniging nothing remained but the scattered
+graveyards upon the veld, the empty tins still tinkling upon the wire
+fences by the railways, and an occasional blockhouse, to remind the
+traveller of the devastating struggle from which the country had so
+recently emerged. This estimate of the period of recuperation affords
+a measure of the magnitude of Lord Milner's achievement in the three
+concluding years of his administration. For the rest, we look in vain
+for any trace of bitterness, or even of partisanship, in his frank and
+penetrating analysis. It is the survey of a man who is completely
+master of the situation; who is absolutely convinced of the justice of
+the British cause; who has no illusions and no fears.
+
+[Sidenote: Feeding the enemy.]
+
+With the circumstances in which the burghers were induced by their
+leaders to continue, or renew, their resistance to the Imperial troops
+before us, both the long duration of the guerilla war, and the methods
+by which it was finally brought to a close, become easily
+intelligible. At the same time it must not be forgotten that, from a
+purely military point of view, the relapse of the conquered
+territories into war was due to the insufficiency of British troops.
+By the end of April, 1900, as we have noticed before, all the reserves
+of the regular army had been exhausted; and, in addition to this, at
+the end of twelve months' service a considerable proportion of the
+Home and over-sea auxiliaries left South Africa to return to civil
+life. Had there been a sufficient number of trained soldiers to
+occupy effectively the Boer Republics, the war would not have swept
+back through them and over their borders into the Colony. Even so, the
+actual number of British troops in South Africa under Lord Roberts's
+command would have sufficed to subjugate the Boers, had the British
+military authorities employed the severe methods of warfare to which
+any other belligerent would have had recourse under the like
+conditions--methods of merciful severity which were employed, in fact,
+by the Union forces in the civil war in America.[255] But, by the
+irony of fate, the humane methods of the British, in the absence of a
+practically unlimited supply of trained troops, made the revival of
+hostilities possible on the part of the Boers, and thereby created the
+necessity for the employment of those more rigorous, but, by
+comparison, still humane and generous methods, in respect of which the
+charge of inhumanity was brought against Great Britain by the friends
+of the Boers in England and on the continent of Europe. No one will
+maintain that it is a part of the duty of a belligerent to support the
+non-combatant population of the enemy. Yet this duty was voluntarily
+assumed throughout the war by the British military authorities, who,
+from the occupation of Bloemfontein onwards, fed the non-combatant
+Boer population as well as they fed their own troops.
+
+         [Footnote 255: _E.g._ those employed by General Sherman in
+         his march to the Sea, through Georgia, in the latter part of
+         1864.]
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Kitchener's task.]
+
+An incident that happened after the occupation of Pretoria exhibits
+the remarkable generosity of the British attitude. At a time when,
+owing to the Boer attacks upon the railway, the utmost difficulty was
+experienced in getting supplies from the thousand-miles'-distant base
+at the coast, Lord Roberts was compelled to send away a part of the
+civilian population to General Botha, and they were removed by the
+Boer Commandant-General to Barberton. That is to say, while the
+British, on the one hand, were giving part of the supplies on which
+the existence of their troops depended, to the non-combatant
+population of the enemy, the enemy, on the other hand, was doing his
+utmost to destroy the single line of railway which alone stood between
+the British Army and starvation. When, therefore, Lord Kitchener
+succeeded to the command of the British forces in South Africa
+(November 29th, 1900), he found the task of disarmament complicated by
+two factors. There was the desire of the Home Government that the war
+should be conducted upon the humane lines hitherto adopted, and there
+was also the fact that the Imperial troops were not numerous enough to
+occupy effectively the whole territory of the Republics, or, in other
+words, to do the one thing of all others necessary to make this humane
+conduct of the war consistent with military success. It was
+impossible, with the troops at his disposal, for Lord Kitchener to
+hold the enormous territory of the conquered Republics. It was
+impossible, perhaps, to support a larger force in a country so poorly
+provided with food supplies and means of communication. An
+alternative plan had to be found. This plan was to remove the horses,
+cattle, and food supplies from the areas which he was unable to
+occupy, and to transport the non-combatant inhabitants to places where
+they could be both fed and protected. And, when this had been
+done--or, more correctly, while it was in process of being done--he
+had to capture the small, mobile bodies of burghers operating over the
+whole of the unprotected area of the late Republics and the Cape
+Colony, and to collect gradually the fighting Boers, captured or
+surrendered, into the colonial or over-sea prisoners' camps.
+
+Certain districts, of which those surrounding the towns of Kimberley,
+Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and Johannesburg were the more important, had
+from the first been effectively occupied and securely held. All the
+troops at Lord Kitchener's disposal, that were not absorbed in the
+work of garrisoning these districts and maintaining the lines of
+communication, were organised into mobile columns, which were
+distributed among General Officers respectively attached to a
+particular area. In a despatch of July 8th, 1901, Lord Kitchener was
+able to report that, as the result of the recent work of these mobile
+columns, the Boers, although "still able, in case of emergency, to
+concentrate a considerable number of men," were, in his opinion,
+"unable to undertake any large scheme of operations." Apart from the
+heavy drain from prisoners captured and deaths in the field, the loss
+of their ox-waggons had seriously affected their mobility and supply
+arrangements.
+
+     "Divided up into small parties of three to four hundred men," he
+     writes, "they are scattered all over the country without plans
+     and without hope, and on the approach of our troops they
+     disperse, to reassemble in the same neighbourhood when our men
+     pass on. In this way they continue an obstinate resistance
+     without retaining anything, or defending the smallest portion of
+     this vast country."
+
+He estimates that there are not more than 13,500[256] Boers in the
+field in the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, and the Cape Colony.
+But he adds that--
+
+         [Footnote 256: This estimate was very much too small: at the
+         Vereeniging surrender, when many thousands more of Boers had
+         been captured or killed 21,256 burghers and rebels laid down
+         their arms. Cd. 988.]
+
+     "with long lines of railway to hold, every yard of which has to
+     be defended, both to secure our own civil and military supplies,
+     and, what is more important, to prevent the enemy from obtaining
+     necessaries from the capture of our trains, the employment of
+     large numbers of troops continues to be a necessity.... The Boer
+     party who declared war have quitted the field, and are now urging
+     those whom they deserted to continue a useless struggle by giving
+     lying assurances to the ignorant burghers of outside assistance,
+     and by raising absurdly deceitful hopes that Great Britain has
+     not sufficient endurance to see the matter through."[257]
+
+         [Footnote 257: Cd. 695.]
+
+But it had become evident that some more systematic effort was
+required for the capture of the commandos, unless the slow task of
+wearing down the Boer resistance was to be almost indefinitely
+protracted; and this same month of July, 1901, witnessed the extension
+of the blockhouse lines, which proved the turning-point in the
+guerilla war. The origin of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouse
+defence is described by him in his despatch of August 8th, 1901.
+
+[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.]
+
+     "Experience had shown," he writes, "that the line of defensible
+     posts, extending across the Orange River Colony, from Jacobsdal
+     to Ladybrand, constituted a considerable obstacle to the free
+     movement of the enemies' roving bands, and that the gradual
+     completion of chains of blockhouses placed at intervals of a
+     mile, sometimes less, along the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
+     railways, had obtained for our traffic a comparative security
+     which it had not previously enjoyed."[258]
+
+         [Footnote 258: Cd. 820.]
+
+In July, therefore, Lord Kitchener made arrangements for the
+construction of three additional lines of blockhouses. The first ran
+from Aliwal North westward, following the course of the Orange River, to
+Bethulie, and was continued thence alongside the railway through
+Stormberg, Rosmead, Naauwpoort, and De Aar, northward to Kimberley. The
+second commenced at Frederickstad and ran northward by the source of the
+Mooi River to Breed's Nek in the Magaliesberg, from which point it was
+connected with the British garrison at Commando Nek, and thus screened
+the western side of the Pretoria and Johannesburg area. The third,
+running from Eerste Fabriken in the north, by Springs and Heidelberg,
+southward to the Vaal River, protected the same district from attack
+upon the east. These new blockhouse lines, Lord Kitchener wrote,
+promised to be of much assistance in the future. Not only did they
+protect the British communications, and render inter-communication
+between the different portions of the Boer forces difficult, but, in the
+absence of frontiers, natural or artificial, they served as barriers
+against which the British mobile columns were able to drive bands of the
+enemy and force them to surrender. Indeed, the blockhouse lines proved
+the chief instrument of success; for with the gradual extension of the
+system, the area of active hostilities was confined in an increasing
+degree to the vast half-deserted regions through which the commandos
+roamed, and the British columns swept at intervals in pursuit of them.
+
+A month later, August 8th, Lord Kitchener reported a further step in
+advance. He had formed "some specially mobile columns for independent
+and rapid action in different parts of the country, generally at some
+distance from the operations of other troops." The commanders of these
+new mobile columns had a free hand in respect of their movements,
+since they were guided by the special intelligence, which they
+themselves collected, and not solely by information from headquarters.
+The effect produced by the development of the blockhouse system,
+combined with the greater freedom of initiative allowed to the new
+mobile columns, became apparent in the increasing number of Boers
+captured or voluntarily surrendering themselves in the month of
+August, when altogether more than two thousand of the enemy were
+accounted for.[259] On the 7th of this month the delayed[260]
+proclamation was issued, and a date--September 15th--was fixed as the
+limit within which the guerilla leaders might, by voluntarily
+surrendering, avoid certain penalties which were duly set out. In
+order to counteract the effect of this action on the part of the
+British Government, General Botha stimulated his followers to
+increased military enterprise.
+
+         [Footnote 259: There were 186 killed, 75 wounded, 1,384
+         prisoners, 529 voluntary surrenders; while 930 rifles, 90,958
+         rounds of ammunition, 1,332 waggons and carts, 13,570 horses,
+         and 65,879 cattle were captured. Cd. 820.]
+
+         [Footnote 260: See p. 420.]
+
+     "But," says Lord Kitchener, "though there has been no general
+     surrender, the device to which the Commandant-General resorted
+     for turning the thoughts of his burghers in another direction has
+     probably cost him and his cause [a heavier loss] than a simple
+     pursuance of the usual evasive tactics would have even entailed."
+
+[Sidenote: Large captures of Boers.]
+
+The precise extent of this loss is shown in the returns for September,
+which record captures and surrenders almost as numerous as those of
+the preceding month.
+
+     "It cannot be expected," Lord Kitchener adds, "even under the
+     most favourable conditions, that in the presence of the
+     ever-diminishing numbers opposing us in the field, these figures
+     can be maintained, but I feel confident that so long as any
+     resistance is continued, no exertion will be spared either by
+     officers or men of this force to carry out the task they still
+     have before them."[261]
+
+         [Footnote 261: Cd. 820. The September returns were: 170 Boers
+         killed in action, 114 wounded prisoners, 1,385 unwounded
+         prisoners, and 1,393 surrenders.]
+
+[Sidenote: The railway lines secured.]
+
+In another month a position had been reached in which it was possible for
+the work of administrative reconstruction--interrupted a year ago by the
+development of the guerilla warfare--to be resumed. At this date
+(November, 1901), the resistance of the Dutch population had been weakened
+by the loss of 53,000 fighting Boers, of whom 42,000 were in British
+custody, while the rest had been killed, wounded, or otherwise put out of
+action. In the Transvaal 14,700 square miles, and in the Orange River
+Colony 17,000 square miles of territory had been enclosed by blockhouse
+lines. A square formed roughly by lines running respectively from
+Klerksdorp to Zeerust on the west, from Zeerust to Middelburg on the
+north, from Middelburg to Standerton on the east, and from Standerton to
+Klerksdorp on the south, enclosing Pretoria and the Rand, was the
+protected area of the Transvaal. The whole of the Orange River Colony
+south of the blockhouse line, Kimberley-Winberg-Bloemfontein-Ladybrand,
+was also a protected area; and the Cape Colony, south of the main railway
+lines, was similarly screened off. But an application of what may be
+termed "the railway-cutting test" yields, perhaps, the most eloquent
+testimony both to the magnitude of the original task undertaken by the
+Imperial troops, and to the degree of success which had been obtained. In
+October, 1900, the railway lines, upon which the British troops depended
+for supplies of food and ammunition, were cut thirty-two times, or more
+than once a day. The number of times in which they were cut in the
+succeeding November was thirty; in December twenty-one; in January, 1901,
+sixteen; in February, as the result of De Wet's invasion of the Cape
+Colony, they were cut thirty times; in March eighteen; in April eighteen;
+in May twelve; in June eight; in July four; in August four; in September
+twice; and in October not at all. Still more significant of the approach
+of peace was the fact that now, for the first time, the British population
+was allowed to return to Johannesburg in any considerable numbers.[262]
+
+         [Footnote 262: In August 648 refugees returned; in November
+         the number had risen to 2,623.]
+
+It remains to consider two questions which cannot be omitted from any
+account; however brief, of the manner in which the disarmament of the
+Dutch in South Africa was effected. The first of these is the charge
+of inhumanity brought against the Imperial military authorities in
+respect of the deportation of the Boer non-combatants to the Burgher
+Camps; and the second is the actual effect produced upon the burghers
+in the field by the public denunciations of the war by members of the
+Liberal Opposition in England.
+
+[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.]
+
+In charging the British Government and Lord Kitchener with inhumanity
+in the conduct of the war, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and other friends
+of the Boer cause relied in the main upon the circumstance that a
+certain proportion of the Boer population was removed compulsorily
+from districts which the British troops were unable to occupy
+effectively, and upon the further fact that the Burgher Camps
+exhibited an unusually high rate of mortality. The necessity for the
+removal of this non-combatant population will scarcely be disputed in
+view of the methods adopted by the Boer leaders to compel the burghers
+to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops, and the fact that
+nearly every house in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, inhabited
+by the Dutch, served as an intelligence office, a recruiting depot,
+and a base of supplies for the roving commandos. Nor will it be denied
+that the responsibility for the unnecessary suffering incurred by the
+Boer people in the guerilla war rests upon those of the Boer leaders
+who formed and enforced the decision to continue the struggle, and not
+upon the British Government. The alleged "inhumanity," therefore, of
+the Imperial military authorities consists in the circumstance that,
+instead of leaving these helpless non-combatants to be supported by
+the Boer leaders, they removed them to places of security, where they
+were fed, housed, and generally maintained, in as little discomfort as
+circumstances permitted. If the lesser suffering of the Burgher Camps
+was the only alternative to greater suffering, and possibly
+starvation, on the veld, the Boers had only their own leaders to thank
+for the position in which they found themselves. The death-rate of the
+Burgher Camps was exceptionally high as compared with that of any
+ordinary European community. But the population of the camps was no
+less exceptional. It consisted of women and children, with a small
+proportion of adult males; and of all these the majority had come to
+the camps as refugees, insufficiently clothed, weakened by exposure
+and often by starvation. Obviously the death-rate of such a refugee
+community would be much higher, under the most favourable conditions,
+than that of an ordinary European town; and, in order to find a valid
+point of comparison, we must seek statistics provided by similar
+collections of refugees, brought together under the like exceptional
+circumstances. We are unable to find any such parallel case, for the
+sufficient reason that history records no other example of a nation at
+war which, at the risk of impairing the efficiency of its own forces
+in the field, has endeavoured, not merely to feed and clothe, but to
+house, nurse, and even educate the non-combatant population of its
+enemy.
+
+[Sidenote: Reduction of the death-rate.]
+
+What we do know, however, is that, of the total deaths in these camps
+of refuge, the great majority were those of infants and children.
+This is a circumstance which in itself goes far to make the excess of
+the camp death-rate apparent rather than real; since, in the first
+place, the Boer mothers, owing to their insanitary habits and
+ignorance,[263] are not accustomed to bring more than one out of every
+two children to maturity; and in the second, the rate of infant
+mortality is abnormally high, as compared with that of a given
+community as a whole, even in the most highly developed countries. The
+highest monthly death-rate was that of October, 1901, when, out of a
+population of 112,109 in all camps, there were 3,205 deaths, or 344
+per thousand per annum.[264] But of these deaths, 500 only (in round
+numbers) were those of adults, and 2,700 were those of children. That
+is to say, in this worst month we have in the refugee camps an adult
+death-rate of (roughly) 50 per thousand, as compared with a European
+death-rate varying from 16.7 in Norway to 33.2 in Hungary,[265] and a
+children's death-rate of 300 per thousand, as compared with the 208
+per thousand of the contemporary rate of infant mortality in
+thirty-three great towns of the United Kingdom, or in Birkenhead alone
+of 362 per thousand. And from this time forward the death-rate of the
+refugee camps was rapidly reduced. The reason for this reduction is
+significant. By the development of the blockhouse lines the British
+military authorities had been enabled to protect their supplies from
+the attacks of the guerilla leaders. In other words, Lord Kitchener
+was now able to defend the Boer non-combatants against the efforts
+made by their own leaders to deprive them of food and other
+necessaries of life. And ultimately the mortality in the Burgher Camps
+was reduced to a point "much below the normal rates under ordinary
+local circumstances."[266]
+
+         [Footnote 263: For the grotesque, repulsive, and even fatal
+         remedies employed by the Boer women in the treatment of their
+         children in sickness, the reader is referred to the medical
+         reports on the condition of the refugee camps published in
+         the Blue-book.]
+
+         [Footnote 264: The figures are those given by Miss Hobhouse,
+         as based upon the official returns (_The Brunt of the War_,
+         pp. 329-31).]
+
+         [Footnote 265: _I.e._ annual per 1,000 on a basis of 25 years
+         (1874-98).]
+
+         [Footnote 266: Cd. 1,163, p. 159. See also _ibid._, p. 151,
+         and p. 178. Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer
+         complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps (made by
+         Acting President Schalk Burger), is as follows:
+
+              "Numerous complaints were made to me in the early part
+              of this year (1901), by surrendered burghers, who stated
+              that after they laid down their arms their families were
+              ill-treated, and their stock and property confiscated by
+              order of the Commandant-Generals of the Transvaal and
+              Orange Free State. These acts appear to have been taken
+              in consequence of the circular dated Roos Senekal, 6th
+              November, 1900, in which the Commandant-General says:
+              'Do everything in your power to prevent the burghers
+              laying down their arms. I will be compelled, if they do
+              not listen to this, to confiscate everything movable or
+              immovable, and also to burn their houses.'
+
+              "I took occasion, at my interview with
+              Commandant-General Louis Botha (February 28th, 1901), to
+              bring this matter before him, and I told him that if he
+              continued such acts I should be forced to bring in all
+              women and children, and as much property as possible, to
+              protect them from the acts of his burghers. I further
+              inquired if he would agree to spare the farms and
+              families of neutral or surrendered burghers, in which
+              case I expressed my willingness to leave undisturbed the
+              farms and families of burghers who were on commando,
+              provided they did not actively assist their relatives.
+              The Commandant-General emphatically refused even to
+              consider any such arrangement. He said: 'I am entitled
+              by law to force every man to join, and if they do not do
+              so to confiscate their property, and leave their
+              families on the veld.' I asked him what course I could
+              pursue to protect surrendered burghers and their
+              families, and he then said, 'The only thing you can do,
+              is to send them out of the country, as if I catch them
+              they must suffer.' After this there was nothing more to
+              be said, and as military operations do not permit of the
+              protection of individuals, I had practically no choice
+              but to continue my system of bringing inhabitants of
+              certain areas into the protection of our lines. My
+              decision was conveyed to the Commandant-General in my
+              official letter, dated Pretoria, 16th April, 1901, from
+              which the following is an extract:
+
+              "'As I informed your Honour at Middelburg, owing to the
+              irregular manner in which you have conducted and
+              continue to conduct hostilities, by forcing unwilling
+              and peaceful inhabitants to join your Commandos, a
+              proceeding totally unauthorised by the recognised
+              customs of war, I have no other course open to me, and
+              am forced to take the very unpleasant and repugnant
+              steps of bringing in the women and children.
+
+              "'I have the greatest sympathy for the sufferings of
+              these poor people, which I have done my best to
+              alleviate, and it is a matter of surprise to me and to
+              the whole civilised world, that your Honour considers
+              yourself justified in still causing so much suffering to
+              the people of the Transvaal, by carrying on a hopeless
+              and useless struggle.'
+
+              "From the foregoing, it will, I believe, be perfectly
+              clear that the responsibility for the action complained
+              of by Mr. Burger (the so-styled Acting State President
+              of the Transvaal), rests rather with the
+              Commandants-General of the Transvaal and Orange Free
+              State, than with the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in
+              South Africa....
+
+              "It is not the case that every area has been cleared of
+              the families of burghers, although this might be
+              inferred from the despatch under discussion. On the
+              contrary, very large numbers of women and children are
+              still out, either in Boer Camps or on their farms, and
+              my Column Commanders have orders to leave them alone,
+              unless it is clear that they must starve if they are
+              left out upon the veld....
+
+              "Finally, I indignantly and entirely deny the
+              accusations of rough and cruel treatment of women and
+              children who were being brought in from their farms to
+              the camp. Hardships may have been sometimes inseparable
+              from the process, but the Boer women in our hands
+              themselves bear the most eloquent testimony to the
+              kindness and consideration shown to them by our soldiers
+              on all such occasions."
+
+         With this statement it is interesting to compare Sir Henry
+         Campbell-Bannerman's words at Bath, November 20th, 1901:
+
+              "Is our hypocrisy so great that we actually flatter
+              ourselves upon our great humanity, because we have saved
+              from starvation those whose danger of starvation we have
+              caused?... The hypocrisy of these excuses is almost more
+              loathsome than the cruelty itself.... We have set
+              ourselves to punish this country, to reduce it
+              apparently to ruin, because it has ventured to make war
+              against us."
+
+         Truly an extraordinary attitude for a future Prime Minister
+         of England!]
+
+The charge of prolonging the war by public declarations of sympathy
+with the enemy[267] was definitely formulated against certain members
+of the Liberal Opposition and the Irish Nationalist party by Lord St.
+Aldwyn (Sir Michael Hicks Beach), at Oldham on October 10th, 1901.
+
+         [Footnote 267: What was even worse than such declarations of
+         sympathy with the Boers was the manifestation of hostility
+         against the loyalist population of South Africa. _E.g._ Sir
+         William Harcourt (in a letter in _The Times_ of December
+         17th, 1900), wrote: "I sometimes think that those bellicose
+         gentlemen--especially those who do not fight--must
+         occasionally cast longing, lingering looks towards the times
+         before they were subsidised (_sic_) by the authors of the
+         Raid to bring about the position in which they now find
+         themselves."]
+
+[Sidenote: Why the war was prolonged.]
+
+     "The real cause of the prolongation of this war has been
+     something which, on my word, I believe could never have been seen
+     in any other country in the world. It has been the speeches in
+     Parliament of British members of the House of Commons, doing
+     everything they could against their country and in favour of her
+     enemies. It has been articles in certain journals taking
+     absolutely the same lines--I am not talking of mere attacks on
+     his Majesty's Government, or even calumnies of individual
+     ministers, that is part of the ordinary machinery of political
+     warfare, and one of the advantages of an absolutely free Press.
+     No, what I am talking of is the prominence given to the opinions
+     and sentiments of men who were called Pro-Boers, as if they
+     represented the feelings of a large section of their
+     fellow-countrymen. The invention of lies, like the alleged
+     quarrel between Lord Kitchener and the War Office, was intended
+     to damage this country in the conduct of the war, as was also the
+     wicked charges made against the humanity of our generals and our
+     soldiers in the Concentration Camps and in the field, the
+     attempts, such as I saw only the other day in one of these
+     papers, to prove that in those gallant contests at Fort
+     Itala[268] and on the borders of Natal our soldiers had not
+     repulsed their enemies, but were themselves the defeated party.
+     We here do not attach any importance to those things. We rate
+     them at their true value because we know something about their
+     authors--but what do you think is thought of them when they go
+     out to South Africa? What do the Boers and their leaders think
+     when they read the newspapers written in England which are full
+     of these things? The Boers have many faults, but they are a
+     simple and patriotic people. They never can imagine that English
+     newspapers would print these things, that English members of
+     Parliament would speak them, taking always the side of their
+     country's enemies, unless these things were true. They are
+     deceived. They greedily swallow all this as representing the
+     opinion of a great section of the public in this country, and
+     those who have said these things and those who have circulated
+     them are the parties who are guilty before God of prolonging this
+     war. There are the Irish Nationalists. Let me read to you words
+     which I heard with the greatest pain in the last session of
+     Parliament from the leader of the Irish Nationalists, a man of
+     consummate eloquence and perfect self-control. What did Mr. John
+     Redmond say? He prayed God that the resistance of the Boers might
+     be strengthened, and that South Africa might take vengeance for
+     its wrongs by separating itself from the Empire which had deluged
+     it with blood, and become a free and independent nation. We in
+     England pass over words of that sort, though I believe they would
+     not have been uttered with impunity by a member of the
+     Legislative Assembly of any other country in the world."
+
+         [Footnote 268: September 26th, 1901. See Cd. 820 for report
+         of this action.]
+
+[Sidenote: Campbell-Bannerman's reply.]
+
+Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's reply to the charge brought against him
+by Lord St. Aldwyn, and subsequently by Lord Salisbury,[269] is
+contained in the words following, which were spoken by him at
+Plymouth, on November 19th:
+
+         [Footnote 269: Letter to Miss Milner, November 11th, 1901.
+         See p. 416.]
+
+     "Now I declare, ladies and gentlemen, for myself, that from first
+     to last I have never uttered one syllable that could be twisted
+     by any ingenuity into encouragement by the Boers. No, I have
+     never even expressed ordinary pity for, or sympathy with them,
+     because I did not wish to run the risk of being misunderstood.
+     What I have done, and what I hope I shall continue to do, is to
+     denounce the stupidity of the way in which the Government were
+     dealing with the Boers."
+
+There is only one method by which the amazing effrontery of this
+denial can be sufficiently exhibited. It is to place underneath it
+quotations from speeches delivered by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
+himself at Stirling on October 25th, by Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P., at
+Galashiels on October 14th, and by Mr. E. Robertson, M.P., at Dundee
+on October 16th, as printed in the "Official Organ of the Orange Free
+State Government," dated September 21st, 1901, a copy of which was
+found in a Boer laager on the veld. The extracts selected are these:
+
+Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman:
+
+     "The whole country in the two belligerent States, outside the
+     mining towns, is a howling wilderness. The farms are burned, the
+     country is wasted. The flocks and herds are either butchered or
+     driven off; the mills are destroyed, furniture and instruments of
+     agriculture smashed. These things are what I have termed methods
+     of barbarism. I adhere to the phrase. I cannot improve upon it.
+     If these are not the methods of barbarism, what methods did
+     barbarism employ?... My belief is that the mass of the British
+     people ... do not desire to see a brave people subjugated or
+     annihilated."
+
+Mr. Thomas Shaw, M.P.:
+
+     "The war was unnecessary, and therefore unjust.... He wished he
+     could agree that we were fighting in a just cause, that we had
+     always fought according to acknowledged civilised methods; but as
+     an honest man he could not do so."
+
+Mr. Edmund Robertson, M.P.:
+
+     "The victory of the Government (at the last General Election) had
+     been the main cause of the prolongation of the war. If they had
+     been defeated their successors would have been men with a free
+     hand, and the Boers themselves might have been ready to make
+     concessions, which they would not make, and had not made, to
+     those whom they believed to be their enemies and persecutors. If
+     the Empire was to be saved, the Government must be
+     destroyed."[270]
+
+         [Footnote 270: The facts are stated in a letter published in
+         _The Times_ on March 10th, 1902.]
+
+Can any human being of ordinary intelligence believe that these
+passages, containing denunciations of the war, were circulated by
+Ex-President Steyn for any other purpose than that of encouraging the
+burghers to continue their resistance to the Imperial troops?
+
+And to this evidence may be added the protest made by "An Old
+Berliner" in _The Times_ of November 27th, 1901:
+
+[Sidenote: "Methods of barbarism".]
+
+     "What I want to impress upon your readers is the much more
+     serious and, indeed, incalculable mischief done by the public
+     utterances of responsible politicians, and, to take the most
+     pernicious example of all, by the reckless language of Sir Henry
+     Campbell-Bannerman. The words he uttered about England's methods
+     of barbarism have been used ever since as the watchwords of
+     England's detractors throughout the length and breadth of
+     Germany."[271]
+
+         [Footnote 271: See also note, p. 399 (Extract from the
+         _Vossische Zeitung_). The baseless and malevolent allegations
+         of specific acts of inhumanity or outrage on the part of
+         British soldiers, circulated by Boer sympathisers in England
+         and on the continent of Europe, have been passed over in
+         silence. For an exposure of these calumnies the reader is
+         referred to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's _The War in South
+         Africa_ (Smith, Elder). A record of the manner in which they
+         were repudiated by the Boer population in South Africa will
+         be found in Cd. 1, 163, pp. 99, 106-111, 113-121. Among those
+         who protested were German subjects, and Germans who had
+         become British subjects, resident in South Africa. Perhaps
+         the most significant of all these protests is the resolution
+         passed unanimously by the members of the Natal House of
+         Assembly, all standing: "That this House desires to repudiate
+         the false charges of inhumanity brought against His Majesty's
+         Army by a section of the inhabitants of the continent of
+         Europe and certain disloyal subjects within the British
+         Isles, and this House places on record its deliberate
+         conviction that the war in South Africa has been prosecuted
+         by His Majesty's Government and Army upon lines of humanity
+         and consideration for the enemy unparalleled in the history
+         of nations."]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+PREPARING FOR PEACE
+
+
+We have already noticed that arrangements were made in October, 1900,
+under which the High Commissionership was to be separated from the
+Governorship of the Cape Colony in order that Lord Milner might be
+free to undertake the work of administrative reconstruction in the new
+colonies. In pursuance of this decision of the Home Government, Lord
+Milner became Administrator of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony
+upon the departure of Lord Roberts (November 29th, 1900); but
+circumstances did not permit him to resign the governorship of the
+Cape Colony and remove to the Transvaal until three months later. The
+new Governor of the Cape Colony was Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, who
+was himself succeeded, as Governor of Natal, by Sir Henry E. McCallum;
+and at the same time (March 1st, 1901), Sir H. (then Major)
+Goold-Adams was appointed Deputy-Administrator of the Orange River
+Colony, where he took over the duties hitherto discharged by General
+Pretyman as Military Governor.
+
+[Sidenote: Milner in the Transvaal.]
+
+Lord Milner left Capetown to assume the administration of the new
+colonies on February 28th, 1901. The incidents of his journey
+northwards are illustrative alike of the state of South Africa at this
+time, and of the varied responsibilities of the High Commissioner.
+After three months of continuous and successful conflict with the
+forces of rebellion in the south, he was suddenly confronted with a
+situation in the north even more pregnant with the possibilities of
+disaster. This was the day on which Commandant-General Louis Botha
+entered the British lines at Middelburg to treat for peace with
+General Lord Kitchener; and many counsels of precaution sped
+northwards upon the wires as the High Commissioner's train crossed the
+plains and wound slowly up through the mountain passes that led to the
+higher levels of the Karroo plateau. March 1st, which was spent in the
+train, was the most idle day that Lord Milner had passed for many
+months. The respite was of short duration. At midnight, directly after
+the train had left De Aar junction, a long telegram from Lord
+Kitchener, giving the substance of his interview with Botha, caught
+the High Commissioner. But if peace was in the air in the north, war
+held the field in the south. From De Aar to Bloemfontein the railway
+line was astir with British troops, concentrating or dispersing, in
+pursuit of De Wet. At Bloemfontein station Lord Milner was met (March
+2nd) by Lord Kitchener, and the nature of the reply to be given to
+Botha was discussed between them. On the next morning Lord Milner's
+saloon car was attached to the Commander-in-Chief's train, and a long
+telegram was drafted and despatched to London.[272] The position which
+Lord Milner took up on this occasion, and afterwards at the final
+negotiations of Vereeniging, was that which he had himself condensed
+in the two words "never again." He was anxious for peace; no man more
+than he; but a peace upon terms that would leave South Africa with the
+remotest prospect of a return to the abnormal political conditions
+which had made the war inevitable, he regarded as a disaster to be
+avoided at all costs. This telegram despatched, the train left
+Bloemfontein, and, in spite of more than one sign of the proximity of
+the Boer raiders, it reached Pretoria without delay at 9 a.m. on March
+4th. The next ten days Lord Milner remained at the capital of the
+Transvaal, in constant communication with the Home Government on the
+subject of the peace negotiations[273] with the Boers, which
+ultimately proved abortive; but on the 9th he went over to
+Johannesburg for the day to see the house which was being prepared for
+his occupation. On the 15th he left Pretoria finally for Johannesburg.
+He was received at the station by a guard of honour furnished by the
+Rand Rifles, and, thus escorted, drove to Sunnyside, a pleasant house
+in what is now the suburb of Parktown, commanding an unbroken view
+over the veld to the Magaliesberg range beyond Pretoria; and here
+he continued to reside until he left South Africa on April 2nd, 1905.
+
+         [Footnote 272: This telegram is printed in Cd. 528.]
+
+         [Footnote 273: For the nature of these "Middelburg terms,"
+         see forward in note 2 on p. 568.]
+
+[Illustration: _By permission of the Argus Printing and Publishing
+Co., Ltd., Johannesburg._
+
+Lord Milner at Sunnyside.]
+
+[Sidenote: Affairs in the Cape colony.]
+
+From this time forward (March 15th, 1901), Lord Milner's
+administrative activity is primarily concerned with the Transvaal and
+Orange River Colony. Owing, however, to the continued resistance of
+the Boers and the extension of the area of hostilities by the second
+invasion of the Cape Colony, the administrative development of the new
+colonies was confined within the narrowest limits, until six months of
+strenuous military operations had enabled Lord Kitchener to render the
+protected areas and the railways virtually secure against the raids of
+the Boer commandos. Four out of these six months were occupied by Lord
+Milner's second visit to England (May-August, 1901). But before we
+approach this episode, and thereby resume the main current of the
+narrative, it is necessary to trace the course of events in the Cape
+Colony. With the government of the Colony once more in the hands of
+the British party, Lord Milner had been relieved of the acute and
+constant anxieties that marked his official relationship to the
+Afrikander Ministry. On the vital question of the necessity of
+establishing British authority upon terms that would make any
+repetition of the war impossible, Sir Gordon Sprigg and his ministers
+were absolutely at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government.
+Whatever differences of opinion arose subsequently between the Cape
+ministers and the Imperial authorities were differences not of
+principle but of detail. For the most part they were such as would
+have manifested themselves in any circumstances in a country where the
+civil government was compelled, by the exigencies of war, to surrender
+some of its powers to the military authority.
+
+[Sidenote: The Bond and peace.]
+
+By supporting the Treason Bill, Mr. Schreiner and Sir Richard Solomon
+had dissociated themselves from the Afrikander nationalists; and
+henceforward their influence was used unreservedly on the side of
+British supremacy.[274] On the other hand, Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer,
+as we have seen, had openly denounced the policy of the Imperial
+Government, and no less openly advocated the aims, and defended the
+methods, of the Afrikander Bond. The Bond's determination to do all in
+its power to secure the independence of the Boers, and thereby defeat
+the policy of the Imperial Government, was manifested by the abrupt
+refusal of its leaders to associate themselves with the efforts of the
+Burgher Peace Committee. Mr. P. de Wet and the other peace delegates
+who had visited the Colony in the circumstances already mentioned,
+desired the Bond to co-operate with them by informing the republican
+leaders that they must expect no military assistance from the
+Afrikander party, and by formally advising them to end the war in the
+interests of the Afrikander population. The details of the incident,
+as recorded in the Blue-book,[275] show that Mr. Theron, the President
+of the Provincial Bestuur of the Bond and a member of the Legislative
+Assembly, was at first disposed to regard the proposal of the peace
+delegates with favour. But, after expressing himself to this effect at
+Wellington, on February 15th, 1901, he went to Capetown to consult the
+Bond leaders on the matter, and, as the result of this consultation,
+he wrote to Mr. de Wet, five days later, declining to meet the peace
+delegates again, or negotiate with them, on the ground that the
+"principles of the Afrikander Bond" would be prejudiced by his
+entering into official negotiations with the deputation, whose
+official status he was unable, after inquiry, to recognise. It is
+difficult not to connect this summary treatment of the peace delegates
+by the Bond with the fact that, just at this time, General C. de Wet
+was reporting to General Louis Botha that the "Cape Colony had risen
+to a man."[276] However this may be, the wholesale manner in which the
+Afrikander Bond had identified itself in the country districts with
+the Boer invaders is sufficiently displayed by a return published six
+months later, from which it appears that, out of a total of
+thirty-three men holding official positions in the Bond organisation
+in three districts in the Cape Colony, twenty-seven were accused of
+high treason, of whom twenty-four were convicted, two absconded, and
+one was acquitted.[277]
+
+         [Footnote 274: Sir Richard Solomon was appointed legal
+         adviser to the new Transvaal Administration.]
+
+         [Footnote 275: Cd. 903.]
+
+         [Footnote 276: See p. 431.]
+
+         [Footnote 277: Cd. 903.]
+
+With the Bond in this mood, with certain districts practically
+maintaining the enemy and certain other districts constantly exposed
+to the incursions of the guerilla leaders, with a large proportion of
+the loyalist population fighting at the front, and a still larger
+number organised for local defence, and with the whole of the Colony,
+except the ports, under martial law, it was obviously impossible for
+the machinery of representative government to continue in its normal
+course.
+
+[Sidenote: Anti-British libels.]
+
+The registration of electors, which, under the provisions of the
+colonial law, was directed to take place not later than the last day
+of February, 1901, was postponed to a more convenient season. The
+existing register, while it contained the names of--it was
+estimated--ten thousand persons disfranchised, or about to be
+disfranchised, for rebellion, and of some thousands of others then in
+arms against their sovereign, failed to include persons who had
+acquired the necessary qualifications since the date of the last
+registration (1899). Apart from the unsatisfactory condition of the
+voters' lists, there were other circumstances that made it undesirable
+as well as difficult not merely to hold the elections necessary to
+fill up the nine or ten vacant seats in the Legislative Assembly, but
+even to summon Parliament. Locomotion in many parts of the Colony was
+inconvenient, and sometimes dangerous. So large a proportion of the
+members of both chambers were absent in Europe, or engaged either in
+repelling the invaders or in repressing rebellion, that the remainder,
+if assembled, would present a mere simulacrum of the actual
+legislature of the Colony. Moreover, it was necessary that no fresh
+opportunities for promoting disaffection should be provided by
+discussions in Parliament or contested elections. The "carnival of
+mendacity" which, culminating in the Worcester Congress, was mainly
+responsible for the second invasion of the Colony, had been
+inaugurated by the inflammatory speeches delivered in the last session
+of Parliament by the Afrikander members during the debates on the
+Treason Bill. The spirit of malevolence displayed at this period by
+the anti-British Press, whether printed in Dutch or in English, may be
+inferred from the list of convictions reported on April 19th by Sir W.
+Hely-Hutchinson to the Colonial Office. Mr. Albert Cartwright, editor
+of _The South African News_ (the reputed organ of Mr. Merriman and Mr.
+Sauer), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on Lord Kitchener, and
+sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment without hard labour. Mr.
+Advocate Malan, editor of _Ons Land_ (the reputed organ of Mr.
+Hofmeyr), was found guilty of a defamatory libel on General French,
+and sentenced to a similar term of imprisonment. Mr. de Jong, editor
+of _The Worcester Advertiser_, and Mr. Vosloo, editor of _Het Oosten_,
+were both convicted of the same offence as Mr. Malan, and sentenced to
+six months' imprisonment without hard labour, while the former was
+further charged with a seditious libel attributing atrocities to the
+British troops, in respect of which he was convicted and sentenced to
+a fine of L100 or two months' imprisonment.[278]
+
+         [Footnote 278: Cd. 903.]
+
+The extension of martial law in January (1901) had made such excesses,
+whether on the platform or in the Press, no longer possible. But the
+Afrikander nationalists in the ports, and especially in Capetown,
+continued to render assistance to the guerilla leaders, both by
+providing intelligence of the plans of the British military
+authorities, and by forwarding supplies of arms and ammunition, until
+the time (October 9th) when these towns were placed, like the rest of
+the Colony, under martial law.
+
+In these circumstances Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, acting on the advice of
+his ministers, prorogued the Cape Parliament from time to time, until
+the actual termination of hostilities made it possible for the
+inhabitants of the Colony to return to the normal conditions of their
+political life. As, however, the provision for the ordinary cost of
+administration made by the Colonial Parliament in its last session did
+not extend beyond June 30th, 1901, it became necessary to provide for
+the expenditure of the Colony after this date by the issue of
+Governor's warrants, under which the Treasurer-General was authorised
+to pay out funds in anticipation of legislative authority. This
+technically illegal procedure, by which the authority of the Governor
+was substituted temporarily for that of Parliament, was advised by the
+Cape ministers and sanctioned by Mr. Chamberlain. In this way
+provision was made for the financial needs of the Government; and
+when, after the war, the Cape Parliament was able to meet again, the
+necessary bills of indemnity, legalising these acts of the Governor
+and acts committed by the military authorities in the administration
+of martial law, were passed in due course.[279]
+
+         [Footnote 279: The action of Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson was not
+         without precedent. See Cd. 903, pp. 57 and 67, and p. 123,
+         _supra_.]
+
+[Sidenote: Breakdown of government.]
+
+The only alternative course was the suspension, or abrogation, of the
+Cape constitution by the Home Government. In view of the appeal for
+the suspension of the constitution made to Mr. Chamberlain a year
+later, and refused by him--an appeal which was endorsed by the
+judgment both of Lord Milner and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and supported by
+the majority of the loyalists of both nationalities--it is interesting
+to observe that petitions addressed to the Governor in June, 1901,
+reveal a considerable body of opinion in favour of the proposal at
+this date. These petitions came from the British inhabitants of the
+small towns in the Eastern Province, since, in the vigorous language
+of one of the petitioners, "it's those who live in small towns that
+feel the Bond's iron heel." And the same correspondent asserts that a
+great number of persons have been prevented from signing the petition,
+although they approve of it, by fear of the "Bond boycott," adding,
+"Some of the Bond members have already remarked, 'Now martial law is
+on we are not in it; but wait until it's removed, then it will be our
+turn.'"[280]
+
+         [Footnote 280: Cd. 903.]
+
+The collapse of the system of responsible government in the Cape
+Colony was complete. The truth upon which Lord Durham insisted in his
+famous Report on Canada, that responsible government is only possible
+where an effective majority of the inhabitants are British, was once
+more demonstrated. In the granting of supplies, the characteristic
+function of the lower chamber, the authority of the Governor was now
+substituted for that of Parliament. The endeavour to check the
+rebellion by the agency of the civil courts had been already
+abandoned. The lenient penalties of the Treason Bill had produced a
+large increase of disaffection. On April 6th, 1901, a notice was
+issued by the Attorney-General warning the public that "any act of
+treason or rebellion and any crime of a political character" committed
+after the 12th instant would be brought no longer before the Special
+Tribunals, with their mitigated penalties created by the Act of 1900,
+but dealt with by the ordinary courts, and punishable by the severe
+penalties of the common law of the Colony. But this warning of the
+Attorney-General was superseded a fortnight later (April 22nd), by a
+notice, issued by Lord Kitchener and published by the Cape
+Government, under which it was declared that--
+
+[Sidenote: The military courts.]
+
+     "All subjects of His[281] Majesty and all persons residing in the
+     Cape Colony who shall, in districts thereof in which martial law
+     prevails, be actively in arms against His Majesty, or who shall
+     directly invite others to take up arms against him, or who shall
+     actively aid or assist the enemy or commit any overt act by which
+     the safety of His Majesty's forces or subjects is endangered,
+     shall immediately on arrest be tried by court martial, convened
+     by my authority, and shall on conviction be liable to the
+     severest penalties of the law."
+
+         [Footnote 281: Queen Victoria died January 22nd, 1901.]
+
+The decision to deal with such cases by military courts was taken by
+Lord Kitchener, after consultation with Lord Milner, on the ground
+that the state of the midland and north-western districts was such
+that "only prompt and severe punishment could stop the spread of
+rebellion and prevent general anarchy."[282] The Cape Government,
+however, in assenting to the measure, stipulated that certain
+conditions should be laid down for the constitution and procedure of
+the military courts, sufficient to check the more obvious abuses to
+which such tribunals are liable. These conditions, as expressed in a
+minute of Sir James Innes, the Attorney-General, were embodied in a
+set of instructions issued by Lord Kitchener to his officers
+concurrently with the publication of the notice of April 22nd. Nor was
+this all. In view of the continued assistance known to be rendered to
+the Boer and rebel commandos by the Afrikander nationalists, martial
+law was extended, on October 9th, to the Cape ports; and on December
+2nd the British Government announced that, as the result of the
+establishment of martial law at the South African ports, no persons
+would be allowed to land in South Africa from January 1st, 1902,
+onwards without a permit, except under certain special circumstances.[283]
+
+         [Footnote 282: Cd. 983.]
+
+         [Footnote 283: Cd. 903. These measures were taken upon Lord
+         Milner's return to the Transvaal (September, 1901) after his
+         visit to England. The scandal of the almost open co-operation
+         of the Bond with the Boer leaders had become notorious, and
+         this assistance was recognised as a contributory cause to the
+         protraction of the guerilla war.]
+
+Ample evidence alike of the necessity of these measures, and of the
+_de facto_ suspension of the constitution, is provided by a Minister's
+minute of September 12th, 1901. The immediate object of the minute is
+to advise the Governor that it is impossible, in the opinion of the
+Cape Ministry, to avoid the further prorogation of Parliament; and
+this, although the Constitution Ordinance requires the Cape Parliament
+to meet "once at least every year," and cannot, therefore, be complied
+with, unless Parliament is summoned "for the despatch of business on
+or before Saturday, 12th October." In support of this decision Sir
+Gordon Sprigg and his colleagues referred to the Military Intelligence
+Report for the current month, which showed that, south of the Orange
+River, there were a dozen or more commandos, with a total of from
+1,800 to 2,000 men; while in the portion of the Colony north of the
+river there were "numerous commandos also roaming about." Then follows
+a startling revelation of the character of the men whom the Bond
+organisation had sent to Parliament:
+
+[Sidenote: Condition of Cape parliament.]
+
+     "One member of the House of Assembly," ministers write, "is
+     undergoing a term of imprisonment for seditious libel, three
+     members are awaiting their trial on the charge of high treason,
+     two seats are practically vacant by reason of the absence of the
+     members without leave during the whole of last session. Those two
+     members are alleged to have welcomed the invaders of the Colony,
+     and encouraged rebellion, and then fled to Holland, where they
+     are now living. One seat is vacant by the resignation of the
+     member, who has accepted an appointment in the Transvaal Colony.
+     Another seat is vacant on account of the death of the member,
+     another member is sending in his resignation owing to ill health,
+     which compels him to reside in Europe. In all these cases the
+     divisions concerned are either under martial law or in a state of
+     disturbance, which makes new elections impracticable.
+
+     "Besides the cases enumerated there are members who have been
+     deported from their homes on account of the seditious influences
+     which the military authorities allege they were exercising, and
+     others who are under military observation, with respect to whom
+     their attendance in Parliament must be regarded as uncertain.
+     Several members also are engaged in military operations, whose
+     attendance could not, in the present condition of the country, be
+     relied on. There are also some members who would be unable to
+     attend owing to the state of war and rebellion prevailing in the
+     districts where they reside, whose personal presence is
+     necessary for the protection of their families and property."
+
+Such a legislature, they concluded, could not be regarded as "fairly
+representing the people." Moreover--
+
+     "There is also the further consideration that the probability of
+     good resulting from the meeting of Parliament now is but small,
+     while the likelihood of evil consequences accruing from the
+     publication of speeches of a character similar to many that were
+     delivered last session is strong. The tendency of such speeches
+     would be to encourage the spirit of rebellion which unhappily
+     prevails in the Colony over a large area, and ministers regard it
+     as an imperative duty to do everything in their power to subdue
+     that rebellious spirit, and restore peace and good-will to the
+     distracted country."[284]
+
+         [Footnote 284: Cd. 903.]
+
+The necessity for the more stringent action now taken by the Imperial
+authorities was, therefore, undoubted. But here again, in placing the
+ports, the centres of commercial life, under martial law, an endeavour
+was made to render the restraints of military rule as little onerous
+as possible. A Board, consisting of three persons nominated
+respectively by the Governor, the Prime Minister, and the General
+Commanding in the Cape Colony, was created for the consideration and,
+where necessary, the redress of all complaints or grievances arising
+out of martial law in the Colony, other than pecuniary claims against
+the Government. The fact that, on the whole, martial law was
+judiciously administered is indicated by the Report of the proceedings
+of this Board, presented on December 3rd by Mr. (now Sir Lewis)
+Mitchell, who, as Manager of the Standard Bank, had been appointed
+chairman by Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson. Out of 199 cases brought before
+the Board, Mr. Mitchell writes:
+
+     "A fair number of substantial grievances have been redressed, but
+     in a majority of instances the Board have held that complainants
+     suffered through some misconduct of their own, or were deported,
+     imprisoned, or otherwise punished on reasonable grounds of
+     suspicion."[285]
+
+         [Footnote 285: Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: Loyalists defend the colony.]
+
+In all this Sir Gordon Sprigg loyally co-operated with the Imperial
+military authorities. His attitude, and that of the loyalist
+inhabitants of the Colony, may be gathered from the speech which he
+delivered at Capetown on December 1st, 1901. In this striking and
+inspiring utterance we have the companion picture to that presented in
+the minute of September 12th. Throughout there runs a note of
+justifiable pride in the military efforts of the Cape Government, and
+in the sacrifices which these efforts have entailed upon the loyalist
+population. First there was the number of troops provided. The Cape
+Government had placed, he said, 18,000 men in the field against the
+invaders and rebels; they had a defensive force of 18,000 town guards,
+of whom 3,000 were natives; and, in addition, 7,000 natives were
+under arms in the Transkei for the defence of those territories. In
+respect of this force of 18,000 men in the field, Sir Gordon Sprigg
+pointed out that such a number of men, coming from a population of
+500,000, was equivalent to a force of 1,450,000 men from the United
+Kingdom, with its population of over 40,000,000. He might have added
+that, since half of the 500,000 Europeans in the Cape Colony were
+"either actually in rebellion against the Crown or in positive
+sympathy with rebellion," the more correct equivalent force from the
+United Kingdom would have been 3,000,000 men. And as for the cost of
+maintenance, the colony provided three-fourths of the expenditure upon
+the 18,000 men in the field, while it wholly supported the town guards
+and other purely defensive forces. He then dwelt with satisfaction
+upon the fact that these local forces were now entirely controlled by
+the Cape Government, which had made itself responsible for the defence
+of no less than thirty-one districts of the Colony.
+
+     "Months ago," he said, "we pressed strongly upon the
+     Commander-in-Chief to hand over to us the colonial forces then
+     under his direction. We thought that if we got them into our
+     possession, not only defraying the cost of their maintenance, but
+     taking charge of certain parts of the Colony, we could keep those
+     districts clear of the enemy. We were continually putting that
+     view before the Commander-in-Chief, and also before the High
+     Commissioner, Lord Milner, but still the matter hung, and we had
+     communications going backwards and forwards till at last the High
+     Commissioner communicated with me, and he said, 'I think the only
+     way to come to an understanding in this matter is, if we have a
+     conference. If you could manage to meet Lord Kitchener and
+     myself, I have great hopes we should be able to arrange what you
+     desire.' I asked then if Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner could
+     come to meet me half-way, but Lord Kitchener said it was not
+     possible for him to leave Pretoria at that time, but he would be
+     only too delighted if I could come up and meet him and Lord
+     Milner upon the question. The result of that was that I went up
+     with two of my colleagues. It has been put about all over the
+     country that we were ordered by Lord Kitchener to proceed to
+     Pretoria, but, so far from that being the case, it was our
+     suggestion that we should take over the command of certain
+     portions of the country, and we went up to Pretoria to secure
+     that object. And in that we were successful, and the result of it
+     has been published very lately."[286]
+
+         [Footnote 286: Cd. 903. This was, in its essence, the
+         proposal for the systematic and effective defence of the
+         Colony, which Lord Milner had consistently advocated both
+         before and during the war--with General Butler and the Home
+         Government, with Lord Roberts at the time of the Forward
+         Movement (see p. 353), and now at the eleventh hour with Lord
+         Kitchener in support of the Cape Government.]
+
+[Sidenote: Second visit to England.]
+
+These events, revealing the slow and laborious progress of the
+Imperial troops in a South Africa rent by war from end to end, account
+sufficiently for the postponement of the work of active administrative
+reconstruction in the new colonies, to which Lord Milner owed the
+opportunity for his second visit to England. On April 3rd, 1901, he
+telegraphed a request that he might be allowed to return home at an
+early date, on leave, since he feared that, unless he had a short
+rest, he would approach the onerous duty of superintending the work of
+reconstruction with lessened efficiency. "I have now been continuously
+in harness," he said, "without a day's holiday, for more than two
+years ... and it is, undoubtedly, better for the public service, if I
+am to get such a rest at all, that I should take leave immediately
+while military operations still continue and the work of civil
+administration is necessarily curtailed, rather than when it will be
+possible to organise civil government in a more complete fashion, and
+when many important problems which are for the moment in abeyance will
+have to be dealt with." To this request Mr. Chamberlain replied that,
+although His Majesty's Government greatly regretted that it was
+necessary for Lord Milner to leave South Africa at present, they quite
+recognised that it was unavoidable that he should take the rest which
+the severe strain of the last two years had made imperative.[287] He
+was, therefore, to take leave as soon as he found it possible to do
+so.
+
+         [Footnote 287: Cd. 547.]
+
+[Sidenote: Civil affairs in new colonies.]
+
+None the less the little that could be done to develop the inchoate
+machinery of administration which marked the transition from military
+to civil order in the new colonies, was done, and done well, before
+Lord Milner left Johannesburg. On May 4th, 1901, Sir H. Gould-Adams
+was able to report that the chief departments of the administration
+of the Orange River Colony had been transferred from military to
+civil officials, and reorganised on a permanent basis. In the
+Transvaal the departments of finance, law, mines, and that of the
+Secretary to the Administration, had been organised, and were
+gradually taking over an increasing volume of administrative work from
+the military officials. Even more significant was the establishment by
+proclamation (May 8th), of a nominated Town Council for the management
+of the municipal affairs of Johannesburg, and the consequent abolition
+of the office of Military Governor, with the transfer of the
+departments hitherto controlled by him to a Government Commissioner
+and other officials of the civil administration. This step was
+rendered possible by the circumstance that a certain number of the
+principal residents, of whom twelve were nominated for service on the
+Council, had now returned to their homes. It marked the recommencement
+of the industrial life of the Rand, which had followed the permission,
+given by Lord Kitchener in April, for three mines to resume work. From
+this time forward the Uitlander refugees began to return; although, as
+we have seen,[288] it was not possible to allow the general mass of
+the inhabitants to leave the coast towns until the following November.
+And, in addition to this, Lord Milner had obtained statements of the
+views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question of the
+settlement of the new colonies. Mr. Chamberlain had attached great
+importance to this interchange of opinions; rightly holding that, in
+determining the conditions and methods of the settlement of the
+conquered territories, the British South African colonies should be
+taken into the counsels of the Imperial Government. Lord Milner had,
+therefore, submitted to the colonial Governments the draft of the
+Letters Patent, under which the system of Crown Colony government was
+to be established in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, before
+they were issued.[289] As the result of these consultations the terms
+of surrender granted to the Boers at Vereeniging, and the consequent
+administrative arrangements arising out of them, embodied decisions
+based not merely on the judgment of the Imperial Government, but on
+what was virtually the unanimous opinion of the loyal population of
+South Africa. In this, as in the crisis of the negotiations before the
+war, the loyalists found in Lord Milner their "representative man."
+
+         [Footnote 288: See p. 459.]
+
+         [Footnote 289: The Letters Patent were not issued until
+         August.]
+
+[Sidenote: Milner in England.]
+
+Lord Milner--then Sir Alfred Milner--left Capetown on May 8th, and
+reached England on the 24th. On his arrival in London he was met at
+the station by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, and immediately
+conducted to the King, who was at that time still residing at
+Marlborough House. At the end of a long audience His Majesty announced
+his intention of raising him to the peerage, the first of many marks
+of royal favour, including his elevation to the Privy Council, which
+were shown to the High Commissioner during his stay in England. The
+warm demonstrations of popular regard with which he had been welcomed
+upon his arrival in London, were followed by a luncheon given on the
+next day (Saturday, May 25th) in his honour by Mr. Chamberlain, his
+official chief. The speech elicited by this notable occasion is one in
+which a graceful humour is characteristically blended with deep
+emotion. Those who have had the good fortune to hear many of Lord
+Milner's speeches--speeches sometimes turning a page of history,
+sometimes mere incidents of official or administrative routine--know
+that they are all alike distinguished by the high quality of
+sincerity.[290] But this was an occasion upon which even adroitness of
+intellect and integrity of purpose might well have sought the shelter
+of conventional expressions. Lord Milner dispenses with any such
+protection. "In a rational world," he said, it would have seemed
+better to everybody that he, "with a big unfinished job awaiting
+him," and many of his fellow workmen unable to take the rest which
+they both deserved and needed, "should have arrived, and stayed, and
+returned in the quietest possible manner." But it was an age in which
+it "seemed impossible for many people to put a simple and natural
+interpretation on anything; and his arrival in this quiet manner would
+have been misconstrued to a degree, which would have been injurious to
+the public interests." If his "hard-begged holiday" could have been
+represented as a "veiled recall," then of course it was obvious that,
+having taken the proverbial hansom from Waterloo to his own chambers,
+this very harmless action would have been "trumpeted over two
+continents as evidence of his disgrace."
+
+         [Footnote 290: It was, in its essence, the "high seriousness
+         of absolute sincerity" that Arnold, after Aristotle, makes
+         the central attribute of poetic thought. In commenting upon a
+         speech delivered at Germiston on March 15th, 1905, the
+         Johannesburg _Star_ wrote on the day following: "Did ever a
+         High Commissioner for South Africa speak in this wise before?
+         But beneath the light words and unstudied diction there is
+         the weight and sureness of the 'inevitable' thought. A man
+         who has pursued a single task for eight years with
+         unremitting effort and unswerving devotion can afford to put
+         his mind into his words. And in all that Lord Milner says
+         there is an absolute sincerity, born of high integrity of
+         purpose and an assurance of knowledge, that compels
+         conviction. Or, rather, should we say, that makes the need of
+         conviction as unnecessary as a lamp in daylight."]
+
+     "It is hard, it is ludicrous," he continued, "that some of the
+     busiest men in the world should be obliged to occupy their time,
+     and that so many of my friends and well wishers should be put to
+     inconvenience--and on a day, too, when it would be so nice to be
+     in the country--merely in order to prove to persons with an
+     ingrained habit of self-delusion that the British Government will
+     not give up its agents in the face of the enemy, or that the
+     people of this country will not allow themselves to be bored into
+     abandoning what they have spent millions of treasure and so many
+     precious lives to obtain. All I can say is, that if it was
+     necessary (I apologise for it: I am sorry to be the centre of a
+     commotion from which no man could be constitutionally more averse
+     than myself), I can only thank you heartily for the kindness and
+     the cordiality with which the thing has been done. I feel indeed
+     that the praises which have been bestowed, the honours which
+     have been heaped on me, are beyond my deserts. But the simplest
+     thing to do under these circumstances is to try to deserve them
+     in the future. In any case I am under endless obligations. It is
+     difficult to say these things in the face of the persons
+     principally concerned, but I feel bound to take this opportunity,
+     especially in view of the remarks which have been made in certain
+     quarters, to express my deep sense of gratitude for the manner in
+     which His Majesty's Government, and especially my immediate
+     chief, have shown me great forbearance, and given me support most
+     prompt at the moment when it was most needed, without which I
+     should have been helpless indeed. And I have also to thank many
+     friends, not a few of them here present, and some not present,
+     for messages of encouragement, for kindly words of suggestion and
+     advice received at critical moments, some of which have been of
+     invaluable assistance to me, and have made an indelible
+     impression on my heart. I am afraid, if I were to refer to all my
+     benefactors, it would be like the bidding prayer--and you would
+     all lose your trains.
+
+[Sidenote: Hint from the bidding prayer.]
+
+     "But there is one hint I may take from the bidding prayer. Not
+     only in this place, but at all times and in all places, I am
+     specially bound to remember the devotion of the loyalists--the
+     Dutch loyalists, if you please, and not only the British--the
+     loyalists of South Africa. They responded to all my appeals to
+     act, and, harder still, to wait. They never lost their cheery
+     confidence in the darkest days of our misfortunes, they never
+     faltered in their fidelity to a man of whose errors and failings
+     they were necessarily more conscious than anybody else, but of
+     whose honesty of purpose they were long ago, and once for all,
+     convinced. If there is anything most gratifying to me on this
+     memorable occasion it is the encouragement which I know the
+     events of yesterday and of to-day will give to thousands of our
+     South African fellow-countrymen, like minded with us, in the
+     homes and in the camps of South Africa.
+
+     "Your Royal Highness,[291] Mr. Chamberlain, ladies, and
+     gentlemen--I am sure you will not desire me to enter into any
+     political questions to-day. More than that, I really have nothing
+     to add to what I have already said and written, I fear with
+     wearisome reiteration. It seems to me we are slowly progressing
+     towards the predestined end; latterly it has appeared as if the
+     pace was somewhat quickening, but I do not wish to make too much
+     of that or to speak with any too great confidence. However long
+     the road, it seems to me the only one to the object which we were
+     bound to pursue, and which seems now fairly in sight. What has
+     sustained me personally--if your kindness will allow me to make a
+     personal reference--what has sustained me personally on the weary
+     road is my absolute, unshakable conviction that it was the only
+     one which we could travel.
+
+         [Footnote 291: The Duke of Cambridge.]
+
+     "Peace we could have had by self-effacement. We could have had it
+     easily and comfortably on those terms. But we could not have held
+     our own by any other methods than those which we have been
+     obliged to adopt. I do not know whether I feel more inclined to
+     laugh or to cry when I have to listen for the hundredth time to
+     these dear delusions, this Utopian dogmatising that it only
+     required a little more time, a little more patience, a little
+     more tact, a little more meekness, a little more of all those
+     gentle virtues of which I know I am so conspicuously devoid, in
+     order to conciliate--to conciliate what? Panoplied hatred,
+     insensate ambition, invincible ignorance. I fully believe that
+     the time is coming--Heaven knows how we desire it to come
+     quickly--when all the qualities of the most gentle and forbearing
+     statesmanship which are possessed by any of our people will be
+     called for, and ought to be applied, in South Africa. I do not
+     say for a moment there is not great scope for them even to-day,
+     but always provided they do not mar what is essential for success
+     in the future--the conclusiveness of the final scenes of the
+     present drama."
+
+[Sidenote: Merriman and Sauer mission.]
+
+[Sidenote: Liberals and Afrikanders.]
+
+As a declaration to the British world that Lord Milner "possessed the
+unabated confidence of his sovereign and of his fellow countrymen,"
+Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon was amply justified. The protraction of the
+war was beginning to try the endurance of the nation. Mr. Sauer and
+Mr. Merriman were in England for the express purpose of discrediting
+Lord Milner, and behind these fierce political freelances was the
+astute brain of the Bond Master, Hofmeyr. They had been commissioned
+early in the year by the Afrikander nationalists to give effect to the
+resolutions of the Worcester Congress by co-operating with their
+friends in England in an agitation for the recall of the High
+Commissioner. It was said that these two ex-ministers of the Crown
+were authorised to offer an undertaking that the Bond would use its
+influence with ex-President Krueger and Mr. Fischer[292] to terminate
+the war, in exchange for the promise of "autonomy" for the Boers and
+a general armistice for the Cape rebels. However this may be, the
+delegates of the Worcester Congress made it their chief business to
+represent to the members of the Liberal party who favoured their
+cause, that the recall of Lord Milner would remove the chief obstacle
+to peace. This attempt never came within a measurable distance of
+success; but its failure was not due to any want of effort on the part
+of that section of the Liberal opposition which had been opposed to
+the annexation of the Republics, and now denounced the British
+Government and the Imperial troops for their "methods of barbarism."
+The completeness with which Lord Courtney, Mr. Bryce, Mr.
+Lloyd-George, Lord Loreburn (Sir Robert Reid), Mr. Burns, and other
+prominent members of the Liberal party identified themselves with the
+policy and action of the Afrikander Bond, is disclosed by the
+proceedings which marked the banquet given on June 5th in honour of
+Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer. Mr. Bryce, in a letter expressing his
+approbation of the object of the banquet and his regret at his
+inability to attend it, wrote: "Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer have not
+only distinguished public records, but did excellent service, for
+which the Government ought to have been grateful, in allaying passion
+and averting disturbances in Cape Colony."[293] Lord (then Mr.)
+Courtney, in proposing a vote of thanks to the guests of the evening,
+declared that the annexation of the Republics was "a wrong and a
+blunder"; adding that the Liberal policy would some day be "to temper
+annexation, if not to abrogate it." Both Mr. Merriman and Mr. Sauer
+revealed the aims of their mission with perfect frankness. The former,
+after alluding to Mr. Chamberlain's luncheon as a display of the
+"Imperial spirit of the servile senate who decreed ovations and
+triumphs to Caligula and Domitian, when they had received rebuffs from
+the ancestors both of ourselves and the heroic Dutch now struggling in
+South Africa," and characterising Lord Milner's High Commissionership
+as "a career of unmitigated and hopeless failure," proceeded to demand
+his immediate recall. To employ Lord Milner in the settlement of the
+new colonies, said Mr. Merriman, would be "a suicidal and ruinous
+policy. He was a violent partizan; his predictions never came true;
+the bursts of fustian and the frivolous utterances of his despatches
+showed an ill-balanced and ill-regulated mind, which was utterly
+unable to cope with the problem." While, as for the prospect of a
+British army ever conquering the South African Dutch, he reasserted
+the opinion which he held before the war--"Our friends they might be,
+but our subjects never."[294] Mr. Sauer, who "felt honoured by seeing
+such a gathering, and seeing in it a Gladstone[295] and a Leonard
+Courtney," was no less explicit:
+
+         [Footnote 292: These two ex-officials, representing the
+         respective Governments of the late Republics, were living in
+         Holland at this time.]
+
+         [Footnote 293: It is only fair to assume that Mr. Bryce was
+         not acquainted with the details of the Dordrecht and Hargrove
+         affairs, to which reference has been made respectively at p.
+         287 and p. 375. And, still more that he was unaware of the
+         utterly discreditable Basuto incident, with respect to which
+         General Gordon's biographer writes: "The consequence was that
+         Mr. Sauer deliberately resolved to destroy Gordon's
+         reputation as a statesman, and to ensure the triumph of his
+         own policy by an act of treachery which has never been
+         surpassed."--_The Life of Gordon_, vol. ii., p. 83. (Fisher
+         Unwin.)]
+
+         [Footnote 294: Compare the different and infinitely more
+         instructive treatment of the question of Dutch allegiance by
+         Lord Milner in his Johannesburg speech, quoted at p. 145.]
+
+         [Footnote 295: _I.e._, the Rev. Stephen Gladstone.]
+
+     "I stand here," he said, "as a representative of the Dutch
+     people, and declare that they never mean to be a subject race. If
+     they cannot get their rights by justice they will get them by
+     other means.... I am glad to go back and tell my own people how
+     many there are in this country who appreciate their devotion to
+     an ideal, and are prepared to befriend them in the hour of
+     trial."[296]
+
+         [Footnote 296: Apart from those mentioned in the text, the
+         following attended the Merriman and Sauer banquet: Mr. E.
+         Robertson, M.P. (chairman), Lord Farrer, Mr. T. Shaw, M.P.,
+         Mr. Burt, M.P., Mr. Channing, M.P., Mr. John Ellis, M.P., Mr.
+         H. J. Wilson, M.P., Sir Wilfred Lawson, Mr. Frederic
+         Harrison, and others. And among those who sent letters of
+         regret for their absence were the Marquis of Ripon, Lord
+         Hobhouse, Dr. Spence Watson, Mr. Seale-Hayne, M.P., and Lord
+         Loreburn.]
+
+A fortnight later a meeting of those who sympathised with the Boer
+cause was held in the Queen's Hall, Langham Place. The spirit of this
+notorious gathering, presided over by Mr. Labouchere, M.P., and
+attended by Mr. Merriman. Mr. Sauer, Mr. Lloyd-George, M.P., and other
+Radical members of Parliament, is sufficiently revealed by certain
+characteristic incidents which marked the proceedings. The agents of
+the meeting wore the Transvaal colours; a member of the audience who
+uncovered at the mention of King Edward was ejected; the Union Jack
+was hissed and hooted; and, while a printed form was handed round
+inviting the signatures of persons prepared to pay eight and-a-half
+guineas for a tour in Holland and the privilege of seeing ex-President
+Krueger, the name of the British sovereign was received by the audience
+with marks of evident disapprobation.
+
+[Sidenote: Agitation for Milner's recall.]
+
+The agitation for Lord Milner's recall was continued throughout the
+year. It was accompanied by a repetition, in England and on the
+continent of Europe, of the shameless calumnies upon the Imperial
+troops, which had marked the "carnival of mendacity" that led to the
+second invasion of Cape Colony. The injurious effect produced upon the
+Boers in the field by the support thus given by public men in England
+to the "continued resistance" policy of the Afrikander nationalists,
+has been already noticed, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to say
+more on this aspect of the subject. The attempt to discredit Lord
+Milner culminated in the declaration made by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
+then recognised as the official leader of the Liberal party, at
+Plymouth, on November 19th, 1901, that, unless the British Government
+changed its methods, "the whole of the Dutch population in our colonies,
+as well as in the two territories, would in all probability be
+permanently and violently alienated from us" when the war was ended. "I
+am ready to speak out to-night," he continued, "and to say what I have
+never yet said, that for my part I despair of this peril being conjured
+away so long as the present Colonial Secretary is in Downing Street and
+the present High Commissioner is at Pretoria." When the full report of
+this speech had reached the Cape, the Vigilance Committee, a body
+representing the loyalists of both nationalities, met[297] under the
+presidency of Sir Gordon Sprigg, and resolved:
+
+         [Footnote 297: December 17th, 1901.]
+
+     "That this committee views with the utmost disapproval the
+     statement of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at Plymouth, to the
+     effect that no satisfactory settlement would be arrived at in
+     South Africa so long as Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner retained
+     their present offices, and, on the contrary, emphatically affirms
+     that the retention in office of those statesmen is regarded by
+     the South African loyalists as affording the best security for a
+     settlement which will be permanent, just, and consistent with the
+     honour of the empire and the best interests of South Africa, and,
+     further, affirms that the whole tone of Sir Henry
+     Campbell-Bannerman's speech is most pernicious, and prejudicial
+     to Imperial interests in South Africa, and shows him to be
+     entirely out of sympathy with loyalist opinion in South Africa."
+
+With this prompt and uncompromising rejoinder we may take leave of an
+attempt to remove a great and devoted servant of the empire, which is
+as discreditable to the intelligence as it is to the patriotism of
+those prominent members of the Liberal party who thus lent their
+co-operation to the Afrikander nationalists. In South Africa the
+issue was simple. While Boer and rebel combined in their efforts to
+rid themselves of the man who had thwarted their ambitions, the
+loyalists closed their ranks and stood firm in his support. It is to
+the far-off Homeland that we have to turn for the spectacle of a
+nation in which gratitude to the man who upheld the flag gave place to
+sympathy for the enemy and the rebel; in which patriotism itself
+yielded to a greed of place wrapped up by sophistry in such decent
+terms as "humanity," "Liberal principles," and "conciliation."
+
+[Sidenote: Finances of the new colonies.]
+
+In the meantime Lord Milner had returned to Johannesburg. His
+"hard-begged" holiday had proved a change of occupation rather than a
+respite from work. Before he left England (August 10th), he had made
+known to the Home Government the actual condition of the infant
+administrations of the new colonies, and obtained a provision for
+their immediate wants. The Letters Patent constituting him Governor
+and Commander-in-Chief of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony had
+been passed under the Great Seal; and these and other instruments
+creating a system of Crown Colony Government, with Executive and
+Legislative Councils in both colonies, had been sent to him in
+readiness for use "whenever it might be thought expedient to bring
+them into operation."[298] And on August 6th the House of Commons had
+voted L6,500,000 as a grant in aid of the revenues of the Transvaal
+and Orange River Colony. Of this sum L1,000,000 was required for the
+purchase of fresh rolling-stock for the Imperial Military Railways,
+still placed under the direction of Sir Percy (then Colonel) Girouard,
+and L500,000 was assigned to "relief and re-settlement," an item which
+included the purchase of land and other arrangements for the
+establishment of suitable British settlers on farms in both colonies.
+The debate on the vote afforded a significant exhibition of the spirit
+of mingled pessimism and distrust in which the Liberal Opposition
+approached every aspect of the South African question. The idea of the
+Transvaal ever being able to repay this grant-in-aid out of the
+"hypothetical" development loan appeared ridiculous to Sir William
+Harcourt. "Why," asked the Liberal ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer,
+"was not the money required for the South African Constabulary put
+forward in a supplementary military vote, instead of being proposed in
+this form and, under the grant-in-aid, subject to future repayment by
+the Transvaal, in which nobody believed?"[299]
+
+         [Footnote 298: They were read and published by Lord Milner on
+         June 21st, 1902.]
+
+         [Footnote 299: It is scarcely necessary to say that the
+         entire cost of the Constabulary has been borne by the new
+         colonies; or that every penny of this grant-in-aid was paid
+         back out of the development loan raised in 1902-3.]
+
+This temporary financial assistance was of the utmost importance. Just
+as in the Cape Colony Lord Milner had seen that the Boers and
+Afrikander nationalists were to be beaten at their own game of renewed
+invasion by enabling the loyalist population to defend the Colony, so
+in the new colonies he proposed to beat the guerilla leaders at their
+game of wanton and mischievous resistance by building up a new
+prosperity faster than they could destroy the old. The conditions
+under which he worked, and the state in which he found South Africa
+when he began to engage actively in the work of reconstruction, he has
+himself described. In a despatch, written from the "High
+Commissioner's Office, Johannesburg," on November 15th, 1901, not only
+has Lord Milner placed on record the actual position of affairs in the
+new colonies at this time, but he has sketched with masterly precision
+the nature of the economic and administrative problems that awaited
+solution. The progress towards pacification won by the mobile columns
+and the blockhouse system, the dominant influence of the railways as
+the agency of transport, the condition of the Concentration Camps, and
+the degree in which our responsibility for the non-combatant and
+surrendered Boers limited our capacity to restore our own people to
+their homes, the economic exhaustion of the country, the threatened
+danger of the scarcity of native labour, and the processes and
+problems of repatriation--all these subjects are touched as by a
+master of statecraft.
+
+[Sidenote: Improved situation.]
+
+     "Without being unduly optimistic," he writes, "it is impossible
+     not to be struck by two great changes for the better in [the
+     military situation] since the time when I first took up my
+     residence in the Transvaal--just eight months ago. These are the
+     now almost absolute safety and uninterrupted working of the
+     railways and the complete pacification of certain central
+     districts. As regards the railways, I cannot illustrate the
+     contrast better than by my own experiences. In the end of last
+     year and the earlier months of this I had occasion to make
+     several journeys between Capetown and Johannesburg or Pretoria,
+     and between Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. Though most careful
+     preparations were made and every precaution taken, I was
+     frequently 'hung up' on these journeys because the line had been
+     blown up--not, I think, with any reference to my movements, but
+     in the ordinary course of affairs. Small bodies of the enemy were
+     always hovering about, and a state of extreme vigilance, not to
+     say anxiety, was observable almost everywhere along the line.
+     Since my return from England I have again traversed the country
+     from East London to Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, and from
+     Johannesburg to Durban and back, to say nothing of constant
+     journeys between this place and Pretoria. On no single occasion
+     has there been the slightest hitch or the least cause for alarm.
+     The trains have been absolutely up to time, and very good time.
+     They could not have been more regular in the most peaceful
+     country. This personal experience, in itself unimportant, is
+     typical of a general improvement. I may add, in confirmation of
+     it, that during the last two months the mail train from Capetown
+     to the north has only been late on one or two occasions, and then
+     it was a matter of hours. Six months ago it was quite a common
+     event for it to arrive a day, or a couple of days, late. I need
+     not enlarge on the far-reaching importance of the improvement
+     which these instances illustrate. Not only have the derailments,
+     often accompanied by deplorable loss of life, which were at one
+     time so common, almost entirely ceased, but, owing to more
+     regular running, and especially the resumption of night running,
+     the carrying capacity of the railways has greatly increased.
+     Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the lines themselves to meet the
+     enormous and ever-increasing extra requirements resulting from
+     the war, and the shortness of rolling-stock, not any interference
+     from the enemy, which causes us whatever difficulties--and they
+     are still considerable--we now labour under in the matter of
+     transport. When the large amount of additional rolling-stock
+     ordered for the Imperial Military Railways last summer is
+     received--and the first instalment will arrive very
+     shortly--there will be a further great and progressive
+     improvement in the conveyance of supplies and materials for the
+     troops, the civil population of the towns, and the concentration
+     camps.
+
+[Sidenote: Contraction of area of war.]
+
+     "The advance made in clearing the country is equally marked. Six
+     months ago the enemy were everywhere, outside the principal
+     towns. It is true they held nothing, but they raided wherever
+     they pleased, and, though mostly in small bodies, which made
+     little or no attempt at resistance when seriously pressed, they
+     almost invariably returned to their old haunts when the pressure
+     was over. It looked as though the process might go on
+     indefinitely. I had every opportunity of watching it, for during
+     the first two months of my residence here it was in full swing in
+     the immediate neighbourhood. There were half a dozen Boer
+     strong-holds, or rather trysting-places, quite close to Pretoria
+     and Johannesburg, and the country round was quite useless to us
+     for any purpose but that of marching through it, while the enemy
+     seemed to find no difficulty in subsisting there....
+
+     "To-day a large and important district of the Transvaal is now
+     firmly held by us. But it must not be supposed that all the rest
+     is held, or even roamed over, by the enemy. Wide districts of
+     both the new colonies are virtually derelict, except, in some
+     cases, for the native population. This is especially true of the
+     northern part of the Transvaal, which has always been a native
+     district, and where, excepting in Pietersburg and some other
+     positions held by our troops, the natives are now almost the only
+     inhabitants. Indeed, nothing is more characteristic of the latest
+     stage of the war than the contraction of Boer resistance within
+     certain wide but fairly well-defined districts, separated from
+     one another by considerable spaces. Instead of ranging
+     indifferently over the whole of the two late Republics, the enemy
+     show an increasing tendency to confine themselves to certain
+     neighbourhoods, which have always been their chief, though till
+     recently by no means their exclusive, centres of strength....
+     From time to time the commandos try to break out of these
+     districts and to extend the scene of operations. But the failure
+     of the latest of these raids--Botha's bold attempt to invade
+     Natal--shows the disadvantages under which the Boers now labour
+     in attempting to undertake distant expeditions.
+
+     "The contraction of the theatre of war is doubtless due to the
+     increased difficulty which the enemy have in obtaining horses and
+     supplies, but, above all, to the great reduction in their
+     numbers.... To wear out the resistance of the Boers still in the
+     field--not more than one-eighth, I think, of the total number of
+     burghers who have, first and last, been engaged in the
+     war[300]--may take a considerable time yet, and will almost
+     certainly involve further losses. I will not attempt to forecast
+     either the time or the cost. What seems evident is that the
+     concentration of the Boers, and the substitution of several
+     fairly well-defined small campaigns for that sort of running
+     fight all over the country which preceded them, is on the whole
+     an advantage to us, and tends to bring the end of the struggle
+     within a more measurable distance. Our great object, it seems to
+     me, should be to keep the Boers within the areas of their main
+     strength, even if such concentration makes the commandos
+     individually more dangerous and involves more desperate fighting,
+     and meanwhile to push on with might and main the settlement of
+     those parts of the country out of which they have been driven. No
+     doubt this is a difficult, and must be a gradual, process. The
+     full extent of the difficulty will appear from the sequel. But it
+     is the point to which the main efforts, of the civil authorities
+     at any rate, should be continually directed.
+
+         [Footnote 300: An under-estimate. One-fourth, or one-fifth,
+         would have been nearer the mark. See note, p. 454.]
+
+[Sidenote: The return to the Rand.]
+
+     "If the latest phase of the military situation is maintained,
+     _i.e._, if we are able to prevent the Boers from breaking back
+     into the cleared areas, or from injuring the railway lines, I can
+     see no reason why the work of settlement should not proceed at a
+     greatly quickened pace in the immediate future. The most urgent
+     point is to bring back the exiled Uitlanders to the Rand, always
+     provided that they are able to find employment when they arrive
+     there. But the basis of any general revival of industrial and
+     commercial activity on the Rand is the resumption of mining
+     operations. So far it has only been found possible to proceed
+     very slowly in this respect. The full capacity of the Rand is
+     about 6,000 stamps. The first step was taken in April last, when
+     the Commander-in-Chief agreed to allow the Chamber of Mines to
+     open three mines with 50 stamps each. Up till now permission has
+     been granted for the working of 600 stamps, but only 450 have
+     actually been started. This is slow work, but even this
+     beginning, modest as it is, has made an immense difference in
+     the aspect of Johannesburg since first I came here in March last.
+
+     "The number of people allowed to return from time to time, for
+     other than mining employments, is in proportion to the number of
+     stamps re-started. This, no doubt, is a wise principle, for
+     business generally can only expand _pari passu_ with the
+     resumption of mining. Up to the present something like 10,000
+     people have been allowed to come up, the vast majority of them
+     being refugees, though there is a small new element of civil
+     servants and civilians in the employ of the military. Assuming
+     that from 8,000 to 9,000 are refugees, this would represent about
+     one-sixth of the total number of well-accredited Uitlanders
+     registered in the books of the 'Central Registration Committee.'
+
+     "The best that can be said on the thorny subject of the return of
+     the refugees, is that latterly the rate of return has been
+     steadily increasing. Last month the military authorities allowed
+     us to grant 400 ordinary permits (this number is over and above
+     permits given to officials or persons specially required for
+     particular services to the Army or the Government). This month
+     the number has been raised to 800. I need hardly say that the
+     selection of 800 people out of something like fifty times that
+     number is an onerous and ungrateful task. South Africa simply
+     rings with complaints as to favouritism in the distribution of
+     permits. As a matter of fact, whatever mistakes have been made,
+     there has been no favouritism. I do not mean to say that a
+     certain number of people--not a large number--have not slipped
+     through or been smuggled up under false pretences. But the great
+     bulk of the permits have been allotted by the Central
+     Registration Committee, a large, capable, and most representative
+     body of the citizens of this town and neighbourhood. And they
+     have been allotted on well-defined principles, and with great
+     impartiality.... I am satisfied that no body of officials, even
+     if our officials were not already over-worked in other
+     directions, could have done the business so well.
+
+[Sidenote: Labour and transport.]
+
+     "There can, I think, be little doubt that the present rate of
+     return can be maintained, and I am not without hope that it may
+     in a short time be considerably increased. But this depends
+     entirely, for the reasons already given, on the question whether
+     the resumption of mining operations can be quickened. The
+     obstacles to such a quickening are two-fold: first, want of
+     native labour; secondly, want of trucks to bring up not only the
+     increased supplies which a larger population necessitates, but
+     also, and this is even a more serious matter, to bring up the
+     material required for their work. The latter, I need hardly say,
+     is a very heavy item, not only in the case of the mines, but in
+     the case of all those other industries, building, for instance,
+     which only need a chance in order to burst into extreme activity
+     in this place. For the Rand requires just now an increase of
+     everything--dwelling-houses, offices, roads, sewers, lighting,
+     water-supply, etc., etc. Capital would be readily forthcoming for
+     every kind of construction, and many skilled workmen are waiting
+     at the coast. But it is no use bringing up workmen to live in the
+     dearest place in the world unless they have the materials to work
+     with. The most necessary materials, however, are bulky, and the
+     carrying capacity of the railways, greatly improved as it is,
+     gives no promise of an early importation of quantities of bulky
+     material, if the other and more urgent demands upon our means of
+     transport are to be satisfied.
+
+     "As regards native labour for the mines, the greater development
+     of which is a condition of all other industrial development, the
+     difficulty is that, while natives can be found in abundance to
+     do surface work, the number of those who are willing to go
+     underground is limited. There are only certain tribes among whom
+     underground workers can be found in any great numbers, and these
+     reside mostly in Portuguese territory. As you are aware,
+     difficulties have arisen about the introduction of Portuguese
+     natives, and the matter is at present the subject of negotiations
+     between the Governor-General of Mozambique and myself. Having
+     regard to the friendly attitude of the Governor-General, I have
+     every hope that this difficulty may soon be overcome. But even
+     then we shall not be able to count on any great immediate influx
+     of labourers from Portuguese territory....
+
+[Sidenote: The concentration camps.]
+
+     "The delay in obtaining native labour would be more serious if it
+     were not for the existence of that other and still greater
+     obstacle to the rapid revival of industry here which I have
+     already dwelt on, namely, the difficulty of transport. And this
+     latter difficulty is immensely aggravated at the present time by
+     the constantly increasing requirements of the concentration
+     camps. Not only has the number of people in these camps
+     increased, with overwhelming rapidity, to an extent never
+     contemplated when they were first started, but the extreme state
+     of destitution in which many of the people arrived, and the
+     deplorable amount of sickness which has all along existed among
+     them, create a demand for a great deal more than mere primary
+     necessities, such as food and shelter, if the condition of the
+     camps is to be anything like what we should wish to see it. The
+     amount of mortality in these camps, especially amongst very young
+     children, as you are well aware, has been deplorable. I do not,
+     indeed, agree with those who think--or assert--that the mortality
+     among the Boers would have been less, if thousands of women and
+     children had been allowed to live on isolated farms in a
+     devastated country, or to roam about on the trail of the
+     commandos. Indeed, I feel confident that it would have been far
+     greater. The best proof of this is the deplorable state of
+     starvation and sickness in which great numbers of people arrived
+     at the camps, and which rendered them easy victims to the attack
+     of epidemic diseases. At the same time it is evident that the
+     ravages of disease would have been less if our means of transport
+     had allowed us to provide them on their first arrival, not only
+     with tents, rations, and necessary medicines (all of which were,
+     as a matter of fact, supplied with great promptitude), but with
+     the hundred and one appliances and comforts which are so
+     essential for the recovery of the weakly and the sick, and the
+     prevention of the spread of disease. I do not mean to say that it
+     was only want of material, due to the insuperable difficulties of
+     transport (especially at the time when the camps were first
+     started, and when railways were subject to continual
+     interruptions) from which the camps suffered. Equally serious was
+     the want of personnel; of the necessary number of doctors,
+     nurses, matrons, superintendents, etc., who were simply not to be
+     found in South Africa, severely taxed as it had already been to
+     find men and women of sufficient training and experience to look
+     after the other victims of the war. Still, the want of material
+     has been a serious item; and it is evidently a want which, as the
+     carrying capacity of the railways increases, we must do our best
+     to supply. The Ladies' Commission, of whose devoted labours in
+     visiting and inspecting the camps it is impossible to speak too
+     highly (they have been of inestimable service to the Government),
+     have handed in a considerable list of requirements, which have
+     been, and are being, supplied as fast as possible. But evidently
+     these requirements enter into competition, and most serious
+     competition, with the supply of food and materials necessary for
+     the revival even of our central industry, not to say of
+     industrial and agricultural activity elsewhere in the new
+     colonies, of which, under the circumstances, it is, for the
+     moment, unfortunately impossible to think.
+
+     "To decide between the competing demands upon the still very
+     limited amount of truckage available for civil purposes, after
+     the paramount requirements of the army have been satisfied, is
+     indeed a most difficult and delicate task. Whether we have done
+     all for the best, it is not for me to say. That any amount of
+     conscientious thought and labour has been devoted, on all hands,
+     to grappling with the problem, I can confidently assert. And I am
+     equally confident that whatever has been done, and whatever may
+     yet be done, the amount of hardship must have been and must still
+     be very great. It would be amusing, if amusement were possible in
+     the presence of so much sadness and suffering, to put side by
+     side the absolutely contradictory criticisms, all equally
+     vehement, to which our action is subjected. On the one hand is
+     the outcry against the cruelty and heartlessness manifested in
+     not making better provision for the people in the concentration
+     camps: on the other, the equally loud outcry against our
+     injustice in leaving the British refugees in idleness and poverty
+     at the coast, in order to keep the people in the concentration
+     camps supplied with every luxury and comfort. I have even
+     frequently heard the expression that we are 'spoiling' the people
+     in the Boer camps. We are, alas, not in a position to spoil
+     anybody, however much we might desire to do so....
+
+     "The pressing questions connected with the return of the refugees
+     and the maintenance of the Boers at present in the concentration
+     camps are, it is evident, only the first of a series of problems
+     of the most complicated character, which have to be solved before
+     the country can resume its normal life....
+
+[Sidenote: Re-settlement problems.]
+
+     "Even if the war were to come to an end to-morrow, it would not
+     be possible to let the people in the concentration camps go back
+     at once to their former homes. They would only starve there. The
+     country is, for the most part, a desert, and, before it can be
+     generally re-occupied, a great deal will have to be done in the
+     way of re-stocking, provision of seed, and also probably, in the
+     absence of draught animals, for the importation of steam ploughs.
+
+     "Then there are the arrangements to be made for the return of the
+     prisoners of war. Evidently these will have to wait till the
+     whole of the British refugees are brought back. The latter not
+     only have the strongest claim, but they will be immediately
+     wanted when order is restored, and will have, as soon as the
+     railway can bring up the necessary material, abundance of work,
+     whereas it may take some time before the country is fit to
+     receive the prisoners. Nevertheless, though the return of the
+     prisoners may still be far distant, there are certain measures
+     which have to be taken even now, in order that we may be able to
+     deal with the matter when the time comes.
+
+     "Altogether, the number and complexity of the tasks, embraced
+     under the general term 're-settlement,' which are either already
+     upon us or will come upon us as the country gradually quiets
+     down, are sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted. And yet the
+     tone of hopefulness among the British population who have so far
+     returned to the new colonies is very marked, especially in the
+     Transvaal. It is not incompatible with many grievances, and with
+     much grumbling at the Administration. But that was only to be
+     expected, and is of very small importance as long as people are
+     prepared to tackle the big work of reconstruction in front of
+     them in a vigorous and sanguine spirit. Nor is this hopefulness,
+     in my opinion, at all ill-founded, however gloomy may be the
+     immediate outlook.
+
+     "Terrible as have been the ravages of war and the destruction of
+     agricultural capital, a destruction which is now pretty well
+     complete, the great fact remains that the Transvaal possesses an
+     amount of mineral wealth, virtually unaffected by the war, which
+     will ensure the prosperity of South Africa for the next fifty
+     years; and other resources, both industrial and agricultural,
+     which, properly developed, should make it a rich country, humanly
+     speaking, for ever. Economically, all that is required is that a
+     very small proportion of the superabundant but exhaustible riches
+     of the mines should be devoted to developing the vast permanent
+     sources of wealth which the country possesses, and which will
+     maintain a European population twenty times as large as the
+     present, when all the gold has been dug out. No doubt it is not
+     economic measures alone which will ensure that result. A social
+     change is also necessary, viz., the introduction of fresh blood,
+     of a body of enterprising European settlers, especially on the
+     land, to reinforce the Boer population, who have been far too
+     few, and far too easy-going, to do even the remotest justice to
+     the vast natural capabilities of the soil, on which, for the most
+     part, they have done little more than squat. But then the
+     introduction of the right type of agricultural settlers, though
+     it will not come about of itself, would not seem to be a task
+     beyond the powers of statesmanship to grapple with.
+
+[Sidenote: The land settlement report.]
+
+     "This despatch has dealt so largely with questions of immediate
+     urgency, that I have left myself no time to refer to the work
+     which is being quietly done in both the new colonies to build up
+     the framework of the new Administration. I can hardly claim for
+     myself that I have been able to give to that work anything more
+     than the most general supervision, as my time is more than fully
+     occupied in dealing with matters of present urgency. But, thanks
+     to the great energy displayed by the principal officers of the
+     Administration--by Major Goold-Adams and Mr. Wilson at
+     Bloemfontein, by Mr. Fiddes, Sir Richard Solomon, and Mr. Duncan,
+     at Pretoria, and by Sir Godfrey Lagden and Mr. Wybergh here--a
+     really surprising amount of ground has been covered. Despite all
+     the difficulties and discouragements of the present time, the
+     machinery of the Government is getting rapidly into working
+     order, and, as soon as normal conditions are restored, the new
+     colonies will find themselves provided with an Administration
+     capable of dealing with the needs of a great and progressive
+     community, and with efficient and trustworthy courts of law. A
+     number of fundamental laws are being worked out, and will shortly
+     be submitted for your approval. In the Orange River Colony they
+     do not involve any great change of system, but, in the Transvaal,
+     some most important reforms are at once necessary, while an
+     immense amount of useless rubbish, which encumbered the Statute
+     Book and made it the despair of jurists, has already been
+     repealed."[301]
+
+         [Footnote 301: Cd. 903.]
+
+In spite of the disturbed condition of the country, two independent
+inquiries, each of which was concerned with matters of cardinal
+importance to the future of South Africa, were concluded before the
+second year of the war had run its course. From the report addressed
+to Mr. Chamberlain by the Land Settlement Commission, of which Mr.
+Arnold-Forster was chairman, and from that presented to Lord Milner by
+Sir William (then Mr.) Willcocks[302] on Irrigation in South Africa,
+there emerged three significant conclusions. Racial fusion, or the
+ultimate solution of the nationality difficulty, was to be found in
+the establishment of British settlers upon the land, living side by
+side with the Dutch farmers and identified with them by common
+pursuits and interests; the possibility alike of the successful
+introduction of these settlers and of the development of the hitherto
+neglected agricultural resources of South Africa depended upon the
+enlargement and improvement of the cultivable area by irrigation; and
+the only existing source of wealth capable of providing the material
+agencies for the realisation of these objects was the Witwatersrand
+gold industry. British agricultural settlers for the political,
+irrigation for the physical regeneration of South Africa--this was the
+essence of these two Reports.
+
+         [Footnote 302: Managing Director of the Daira Sania Company;
+         of the Indian and Egyptian Irrigation Services.]
+
+     "We desire to express our firm conviction," wrote the Land
+     Settlement Commissioners,[303] "that a well-considered scheme of
+     settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the
+     most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South
+     Africa. We find among those who wish to see British rule in
+     South Africa maintained and its influence for good extended, but
+     one opinion upon this subject. There even seems reason to fear
+     lest the vast expenditure of blood and treasure which has marked
+     the war should be absolutely wasted, unless some strenuous effort
+     be made to establish in the country, at the close of the war, a
+     thoroughly British population large enough to make a recurrence
+     of division and disorder impossible."
+
+         [Footnote 303: Cd. 626.]
+
+[Sidenote: The irrigation report.]
+
+Apart from its mineral development, Sir William Willcocks points
+out,[304] South Africa has remained "strangely stationary. Fifty years
+ago it was a pastoral country importing cereals and dairy produce, and
+even hay from foreign countries. It is the same to-day. Half a century
+ago it needed a farm of 5,000 acres to keep a family in decent
+comfort; to-day it needs the same farm of 5,000 acres to keep a single
+family in comfort." West of the great Drakenberg range it is an arid,
+or semi-arid, region. The reason is not so much that the rainfall is
+deficient, as that the rain comes at the wrong time, and is wasted.
+What is wanted is water-storage, with irrigation works to spread the
+water upon the land when it is needed by the farmer. Nothing short of
+the agency of the State will serve to bring about this physical
+revolution; for bad legislation must be annulled, and a great
+intercolonial system of water-husbandry, comparable to those of India
+and Egypt, must be created. Hitherto agriculture, in spite of the
+latent possibilities of the country, has scarcely been "attempted";
+for, with the exception of the extreme south-western corner of the
+Cape Colony, the "conquered territory" of the Orange River Colony, and
+the high veld of the Transvaal, the agricultural development of South
+Africa "depends entirely on irrigation."
+
+         [Footnote 304: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+But, great as was the claim of agriculture, the claim of the gold
+industry was at once more immediate and more imperative.
+
+     "Valuable as water may be for agricultural purposes," Sir William
+     Willcocks wrote, "it is a thousand times more valuable for
+     gold-washing at the Rand mines."
+
+And again:
+
+     "The prosperity and well-being of every interest, not only in the
+     Transvaal, but in South Africa generally, will depend on the
+     prosperity of the Rand, certainly for the next fifty years.
+     Though my life has been spent in the execution of irrigation
+     projects and the furtherance of agricultural prosperity, I feel
+     that, under the special conditions prevailing in South Africa,
+     the suggestion of any course other than the obvious one of first
+     putting the Rand mines on a sound footing as far as their water
+     supply is concerned, would have constituted me a bigot. Ten acres
+     of irrigable land in the Mooi or Klip river valleys, with
+     Johannesburg in the full tide of prosperity, will yield as good a
+     rent as forty acres with Johannesburg in decay."
+
+And the prosperity of the mines is not only essential in the present:
+it is to be the instrument for the development of the permanent
+resources of the Transvaal:
+
+[Sidenote: Economic importance of Rand.]
+
+     "The mineral wealth of the Transvaal is extra-ordinarily great,
+     but it is exhaustible, some say within a space of fifty years,
+     others within a space of one hundred years. It would be a
+     disaster indeed for the country if none of this wealth were
+     devoted to the development of its agriculture. Agricultural
+     development is slow, but it is permanent, and knows of no
+     exhaustion. If the companies working the gold, coal, and diamond
+     mines were by decree compelled to devote a percentage of their
+     gains to the execution of irrigation works on lines laid down by
+     the Government, they would assist in the permanent development of
+     the country and would be investing in works which, though slow to
+     give a remuneration, would, at any rate, be absolutely permanent.
+     It would thus happen, that when the mineral wealth of the country
+     had disappeared, its agricultural wealth would have been put on
+     such a solid basis that the country would not have to fall from
+     the height of prosperity to the depth of poverty."
+
+These were conclusions of so fundamental a nature that no statesman
+could afford to overlook them; and, in point of fact, Lord Milner kept
+them steadily in sight from first to last in all that he did for the
+administrative and economic reconstruction of the new colonies.
+
+Another effort of the civil administration which was carried on
+successfully during the war was the teaching of the Boer children in
+the refugee camps. The narrative of the circumstances in which the
+camp schools were first organised, of the manner in which teachers
+came forward from all parts of the empire to offer their services, and
+of the complete success which attended their efforts, was told three
+years later by Mr. E. B. Sargant, the Education Adviser to the
+Administration. The report in which the story appears not only affords
+a record unique in the annals of educational effort, but adds a
+pleasing and significant page to what is otherwise a gloomy chapter of
+the war.[305] Mr. Sargant was invited by Lord Milner to organise the
+work of educational reconstruction in the new colonies in the autumn
+of 1900. He was then travelling in Canada, in the course of a journey
+through the empire undertaken for the purpose of investigating the
+methods and conditions of education in the several British colonies;
+and he reached Capetown on November 6th, 1900. At that time the
+headquarters of the new Transvaal Administration had not been
+established in Pretoria; but in the Orange River Colony certain
+schools along the railway line and elsewhere had been opened under the
+military Government. From observations made in December in the two new
+colonies, Mr. Sargant had begun to fear that the work of educational
+reorganisation would have to be indefinitely postponed, when a visit
+to the Boer prisoners' camp at Seapoint, Capetown, gave him the idea
+from which the whole system of the camp schools was subsequently
+evolved. Here he found that a school for boys and young men had been
+provided by the prisoners themselves, but that it was destitute of
+books and of almost all the necessary appliances. Mr. Sargant's appeal
+on behalf of this school met with a ready response from the Cape
+Government. What could be done here, he thought, could be done
+elsewhere. The nearest refugee camp to Capetown was at Norval's Pont,
+on the borders of the Orange River Colony; and it was here that Mr.
+Sargant determined to make his first experiment.
+
+         [Footnote 305: This Report was issued (June 14th, 1904) from
+         the Education Adviser's Office, Johannesburg, on "The
+         Development of Education in the Transvaal and Orange River
+         Colony." It is one of the many contributions of permanent
+         value to political and economic science that mark the second
+         period of Lord Milner's Administration in South Africa.
+         _E.g._, in Appendix XXX. of this Report, the various
+         solutions of the much-vexed question of religious instruction
+         in State Schools, severally adopted by the self-governing
+         colonies of the empire, are excellently presented in tabular
+         form.]
+
+[Sidenote: Origin of the camp schools.]
+
+     "Having provided myself," Mr. Sargant says, "with several boxes
+     of school books, I left Capetown on the last day of January and
+     took up my quarters in the camp already named. The Military
+     Commandant threw himself heartily into the experiment, although
+     at that time the provision of food and shelter for each new
+     influx of refugees was a matter of great difficulty. Fortunately
+     Norval's Pont, being nearer the base of supplies than the other
+     camps, had a few marquees to spare. In two of these I opened the
+     first camp school, remaining for a fortnight as its headmaster.
+     The rest of the teachers were found in the camp itself. It was
+     apparent from the first that the school would be a success. The
+     children flocked to it, and the mothers who brought them were
+     well content with the arrangement that the religious instruction
+     should be given in Dutch and other lessons in English. Here, as
+     in several other camps which were visited later, I found that a
+     school, taught through the medium of Dutch, had already been
+     opened by some of the more serious-minded of the people. In this
+     case, an offer was made to me by the Commandant to suppress this
+     school and to send the children to my marquees. This I refused,
+     and in less than two months I had the gratification of knowing
+     that teachers and children had come voluntarily to the Government
+     school, and that the tents in which they had been taught formed
+     one of a row of six which were needed to accommodate the rapidly
+     increasing number of scholars."[306]
+
+         [Footnote 306: Report on "The Development of Education in the
+         Transvaal and Orange River Colony."]
+
+[Sidenote: Over-sea teachers.]
+
+After this initial success Mr. Sargant made arrangements, first from
+Bloemfontein, and afterwards from Pretoria, for the establishment of
+such schools in all the refugee camps; and by the end of May, 1901,
+there were 4,000 children in the camp schools, as against 3,500 in the
+town schools of the two colonies. In the following month it became
+evident that the local supply of teachers would be insufficient to
+meet the demands of the rapidly increasing schools; and Lord Milner
+devoted much of his time during his leave of absence to making
+arrangements for the introduction of a number of well-trained teachers
+from England, and subsequently from the over-sea colonies. Before
+these welcome reinforcements could arrive, however, the number of
+children in the camp schools, apart from the Government schools in the
+towns, had risen to 17,500, and the supply of South African teachers
+was exhausted. "In many cases," says Mr. Sargant, "the services of
+young men and women who had passed the sixth, fifth, and even fourth
+standard were utilised temporarily." With the new year, 1902, drafts
+of carefully chosen and well-qualified teachers from England began to
+arrive. Both the Board of Education for England and Wales and the
+Scotch Education Department took up the work of selection and
+appointment, and the co-operation of the Canadian, Australian, and New
+Zealand Governments was obtained.[307] From this time forward the
+system of the camp schools was steadily extended; and on May 31st,
+1902, the date of the Vereeniging surrender, when the attendance
+reached its highest point, more than 17,000 Boer children were being
+thus educated in the Transvaal camps, and more than 12,000 in those of
+the Orange River Colony.[308]
+
+         [Footnote 307: These imported teachers worked harmoniously
+         with the South African teachers, whether of British or Dutch
+         extraction; they filled the gap left by the Hollander
+         teachers, who had returned to Europe after the outbreak of
+         the war, and formed a valuable element in the permanent staff
+         of the Education Departments of the new colonies. In 1903
+         there were 475 of these over-sea teachers at work in the two
+         colonies, as against some 800 teachers appointed in South
+         Africa.]
+
+         [Footnote 308: Some idea of the significance of these figures
+         may be gathered from the fact that the highest number of
+         children on the rolls of the Government schools of the Orange
+         Free State was 8,157 (in the year 1898). That is to say, the
+         British Administration in the Orange River Colony was
+         educating one-third more Boer children in the camp schools
+         alone than the Free State Government had educated in time of
+         peace. Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: Administrative progress, 1901.]
+
+Apart from this unique and significant effort, the reports furnished
+by the various departmental heads to Lord Milner in December afford
+striking and sufficient evidence of the progress of the civil
+administration in both the new colonies during the year 1901. In the
+Orange River Colony the sphere of operations of the departments
+existing at the time when Sir H. Gould-Adams was appointed
+Deputy-administrator (March, 1901), had been increased, and new
+departments were being organised. A statement issued by the financial
+adviser on August 29th showed that for the period March 13th, 1900
+(the occupation of Bloemfontein) to June 30th, 1901, the "real"
+revenue and expenditure of the colony were respectively L301,800 8_s._
+and L217,974 18_s._; an excess of revenue over expenditure of L83,825
+10_s._ And during the half-year July 1st-December 31st the revenue
+collected was about one-third in excess of the actual civil
+expenditure.[309] The progress in education was remarkable. At the end
+of February, 1902, there were 13,384 children on the roll of the
+Government schools, camp and town,[310] or nearly 5,000 more than the
+greatest number at school at any one time under the Republic, and the
+reorganisation of both higher and technical instruction had been taken
+in hand. A system of local self-government had been commenced by the
+establishment of Boards of Health at Bloemfontein and in all
+districts in the protected area, while in the capital itself the Town
+Council was again at work. The Agricultural Department formed on July
+1st, 1901, had taken over a large number of sheep and cattle from the
+military authorities, and a commencement of tree-planting under an
+experienced forester had been made. The Land Board was created in
+October, with two branches concerned respectively with Settlement and
+Repatriation. The Settlement branch was occupied especially in
+procuring land suitable for agricultural purposes, and its efforts
+were so successful that by the end of April, 1902, 150 British
+settlers had been placed on farms. The Repatriation branch was engaged
+in collecting information as to the whereabouts of the absentee Boer
+landowners and their families, and the condition of their lands and
+houses; in investigating the possibility of importing fresh stock, and
+in collecting vehicles, implements, seed-corn, and the other
+necessaries which would be required to enable the Boer population,
+when repatriated, to resume their normal pursuits. Also temporary
+courts, pending the re-opening of the ordinary civil courts, had been
+established.
+
+         [Footnote 309: Cd. 1,163, p. 145. The accounts were
+         complicated by expenditure for, and refunds from, the
+         military authorities.]
+
+         [Footnote 310: This is in the Orange River Colony alone. For
+         the number of children in the _camp_ schools of both
+         colonies, as apart from the _town_ schools, see above.]
+
+In the Transvaal the work was on a larger scale. Five departments,
+those of the Secretary to the Administration (afterwards Colonial
+Secretary), the Legal Adviser (afterwards Attorney-General), the
+Controller of the Treasury (afterwards Treasurer), the Mining
+Commissioner and of the Commissioner for Native Affairs, were already
+organised. The progress achieved by the heads of these departments in
+the Transvaal, and by Sir H. Gould-Adams and Mr. Wilson in the Orange
+River Colony, formed collectively a record the merit of which was
+acknowledged by "an expression of the high appreciation of His
+Majesty's Government of the services which they had rendered in
+circumstances of exceptional difficulty."[311]
+
+         [Footnote 311: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+It is difficult to present an account of the work already done in the
+Transvaal in a form at once brief and representative. The report of
+Mr. Fiddes, the Secretary to the Administration,[312] recorded the
+progress made in education, public works, and district administration.
+Since July twenty-four new schools, of which seven were camp schools,
+eight fee-paying schools, and nine free town schools, had been opened,
+and 169 teachers were employed in the town schools, and 173 in the
+camp schools, opened by the Administration. The public buildings,
+including the hospitals and asylums at Johannesburg and Pretoria, the
+post offices and the seventeen prisons administered by the department,
+were being maintained and, where necessary, restored. In Johannesburg,
+as we have seen, a Town Council had been established, but Pretoria was
+still administered by a Military Governor, who controlled a temporary
+Town Board and the police. The Administration, however, was empowered
+by proclamation No. 28 of 1901 to appoint Boards of Health in places
+where no municipality existed, and it was expected that Pretoria would
+be endowed, before long, with the same municipal privileges as
+Johannesburg.
+
+         [Footnote 312: Dated December 12th, 1901.]
+
+[Sidenote: Legislative reforms.]
+
+The volume of work handled in the Legal Adviser's office formed a
+remarkable testimony to the energy and capacity of Sir Richard
+Solomon. Resident magistrates' courts had been established in twelve
+districts; temporary courts were being held in Pretoria and
+Johannesburg; the offices of the Registrar of Deeds and of the Orphan
+Master, and the Patent Office, were reorganised; and an ordinance
+creating a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and five
+Puisne Judges, was drafted ready to be brought into operation so soon
+as circumstances permitted. The chaotic Statute Book of the late
+Republic had been overhauled. A large number of laws, some obsolete,
+some impliedly repealed, but still appearing on the Statute Book, and
+others unsuited to the new _regime_, had been repealed by
+proclamation; and at the same time many ordinances dealing with
+matters of fundamental importance had been prepared for submission to
+the future Legislative Council at the first opportunity.
+
+The report of Mr. Duncan, the Controller of the Treasury, showed that
+the revenue actually being collected, mainly from the customs, the
+Post Office, mining and trading licences, and native passes, would
+provide for the ordinary expenditure of the civil administration. And,
+in point of fact, when the accounts were made up at the end of the
+first financial year of the new colonies (July 1st, 1901-June 30th,
+1902) it was found that the Orange River Colony had a balance in hand
+of L231,000, while in the Transvaal the expenditure on civil
+administration[313] had been covered by the revenue, which had assumed
+already the respectable figure of L1,393,000.
+
+The Departments of Mines and Native Affairs had been reorganised, and
+the work done by Mr. Wybergh and Sir Godfrey Lagden respectively in
+these departments, in co-operation with Sir Richard Solomon, had
+produced the administrative reforms immediately required to regulate
+the employment of native labourers in the mines. By proclamations
+amending or repealing existing laws and making fresh provisions where
+necessary the native had been protected against oppression and robbery
+at the hands of unscrupulous labour-agents, and the liquor traffic,
+the chief cause of his insubordination and incapacity, had been
+effectively repressed. Considerations of public security made the
+maintenance of the "pass" system necessary, but modifications were
+introduced into the working of the system sufficient to protect the
+educated native from unnecessary humiliation and the native labourer
+from excessive punishment. In addition to this departmental work two
+commissions had been appointed by Lord Milner to investigate two
+matters of direct and immediate concern to the gold industry. The
+first of these, over which Sir Richard Solomon presided, was engaged
+in reviewing the existing gold laws, with a view to the introduction
+of new legislation embodying such modifications as the best local
+experience and the financial interests of the colony might require.
+The second was employed in formulating measures necessary to provide
+both the mines and the community of the Rand with a water-supply that
+would be at once permanent and economic.
+
+         [Footnote 313: Excluding expenditure on the South African
+         Constabulary and relief and re-settlement, and certain other
+         charges. Cd. 1,163.]
+
+[Sidenote: The Johannesburg police.]
+
+There remain certain special features of the administrative
+reconstruction accomplished in 1901 that merit attention, as showing
+the degree in which Lord Milner kept in view the fundamental
+necessities of the situation revealed by the Land Settlement and
+Irrigation Reports to which reference has been made above. As part of
+the work of the Law Department, the Johannesburg Municipal Police had
+been organised and placed under the control of Mr. Showers, the late
+head of the Calcutta Police.
+
+     "This fine body," Lord Milner wrote, "consists mainly of picked
+     men from the Army Reserve, including many old soldiers of the
+     Guards, and others who have fought in the war. The men are
+     dressed like London policemen, but carry rifles. This odd-looking
+     equipment is characteristic of the double nature of their duties.
+     On the one hand they do the work of ordinary town police, and
+     exhibit in that characteristic the same efficiency and civility
+     as their London prototypes. On the other hand, they have played
+     an important part in assisting the military and the Rand Rifles
+     in the defence of the long line, fifty miles in extent of towns
+     and mining villages which constitute the Rand district. Latterly,
+     since the enemy have been quite driven out of this part of the
+     country, the military portion of their duties is diminishing in
+     importance, though the danger of small raids on outlying portions
+     of the Rand by parties coming from a distance is not yet wholly
+     removed. On the other hand, with the return of the civil
+     population, their work as police proper is greatly on the
+     increase. In their struggle with the illicit liquor dealers, one
+     of the most difficult of their duties, they have so far met with
+     a great measure of success."[314]
+
+         [Footnote 314: Cd. 903.]
+
+[Sidenote: South African constabulary.]
+
+Just as here, in the case of the Johannesburg police, so in the
+formation of the South African Constabulary and in the reorganisation
+of the railways, Lord Milner had determined that no opportunity of
+adding to the permanent British population of the two colonies should
+be lost. The South African Constabulary was formed in October, 1900,
+by General Baden-Powell, mainly on the lines of the Canadian
+North-West police, for the protection of the settled population in the
+new colonies. Since July, 1901, however, when it had been called out
+for military service, this force, at the time some 9,000 strong, had
+been employed as part of the army under the direction of the
+Commander-in-Chief, although its organisation, finance, and internal
+discipline were dealt with by the High Commissioner. The men recruited
+for the Constabulary were of British birth, and every endeavour was
+made in the selection of recruits to secure persons who were adapted
+by pursuits and character to become permanent and useful colonists. It
+is interesting to note that a body of 500 burgher police, consisting
+of former burghers of the Orange Free State, and placed under the
+colonel commanding the Orange Colony division, had been associated
+with the Constabulary during the time that they were thus serving with
+the troops. Nor is it necessary to point out that the military
+experience, the knowledge of the country, and acquaintance with the
+life of the veld which the Constabulary gained at this period, largely
+contributed to the efficiency which they displayed afterwards in the
+discharge of their regular duties.
+
+But of all the reconstructive work accomplished in this year of
+continuous and harassing warfare, the reorganisation of the railways
+was perhaps the most essential and the most successful in its
+immediate results. Although the railways of the two new colonies
+remained entirely under the control of the military authorities, their
+future importance to the civil administration was so great that, as
+Lord Milner wrote,[315] "questions affecting their organisation and
+development naturally claimed his constant attention." And this all
+the more, since Sir Percy Girouard, the Director of Military
+Railways, had been chosen by the Home Government to undertake the
+management of the joint railway system of the two colonies so soon as
+it was handed over to the civil authorities. The work accomplished
+included the repair of the damage inflicted by the enemy, the increase
+and improvement of the rolling-stock, the reorganisation of the staff
+of European employees, and the construction of new lines required for
+the industrial development of the country. Apart from 102 engines and
+984 trucks, the Boers had destroyed many pumping-stations and station
+buildings, 385 spans of bridges and culverts, and 25 miles of line.
+These injuries to the "plant" of the railways were repaired "in an
+absolutely permanent manner," and orders had been placed in August for
+60 engines and 1,200 trucks over and above those required to replace
+the rolling-stock destroyed by the enemy.[316] As the staff employed
+in the time of the Republics had been "actively engaged on the side of
+the enemy, and were animated by an exceedingly anti-British
+spirit,"[317] they had to be almost entirely replaced.
+
+         [Footnote 315: December 14th, 1901. Cd. 903.]
+
+         [Footnote 316: The new rolling-stock was paid for out of the
+         grant-in-aid voted in August, 1901. The first of the new
+         lines constructed was that from Bloemfontein to Basutoland,
+         opening up the rich agricultural land known as the "conquered
+         territory" on the Basuto border in the Orange River Colony,
+         where many of the new British settlers had been established.]
+
+         [Footnote 317: The completeness with which the Netherlands
+         Railway Company had identified itself with the Government of
+         the South African Republic is well expressed in the reply of
+         Mr. Van Kretchmar, the General Manager of the N.Z.A.S.M., to
+         a question put to him by the Transvaal Concessions
+         Commissioners: "We considered that the interests of the
+         Republic were our interests" (Q. 612). Many of these railway
+         employees were, of course, imported Hollanders.]
+
+[Sidenote: Reorganisation of railways.]
+
+     "But," Lord Milner continues, "the many difficulties incidental
+     to the organisation of a large new staff, unaccustomed to work
+     with one another, are being successfully overcome, and business
+     is carried on with a smoothness which gives no indication of the
+     internal revolution so recently effected. The new railway staff
+     comprises some 4,000 men of British race, including 1,500
+     Reservists or Irregulars who had fought in the war, and who, with
+     other newcomers, form a permanent addition to the British
+     population of South Africa."
+
+Thanks to the blockhouse system, supplemented where necessary by
+armoured trains, the mail trains from the ports to Johannesburg were
+running almost as rapidly and as safely as in time of peace. But the
+demands of the military traffic were so enormous that opportunities
+for ordinary traffic were still rigorously restricted.
+
+     "Military requirements in food supplies, remounts and munitions
+     of war," Lord Milner wrote, "represented 29,000 tons weekly from
+     the ports; while the movements of men and horses to and fro over
+     the [then] huge theatre of war were as constant as they were
+     sudden."
+
+None the less the civil traffic was increasing. While in August only
+684 refugees had returned, in November the number had risen to 2,623;
+and while in August the tonnage of civil supplies forwarded to
+Bloemfontein and the Transvaal was 4,612, in November it was 8,522.
+This result, moreover, had been obtained with the old rolling-stock,
+and a much more rapid progress was anticipated in the future, since
+the additional rolling-stock had already begun to arrive. And in
+anticipation of this increased rate of progress, the Commander-in-Chief
+had
+
+     "now seen his way to allow the mines to start 400 fresh stamps
+     per month, as against an average of under 100 in previous months,
+     and had also consented to the grant of 1,600 permits a month
+     (representing about 4,000 persons) for return to the Transvaal."
+
+In addition to the repair and reorganisation of the lines running to
+the coast, the Transvaal collieries had been re-opened and the coal
+traffic had been resumed. Not only had progress been made in stocking
+the mines with coal, timber, and machinery, preparatory to the full
+resumption of working activity, but the large unemployed native
+population found in Johannesburg at the time of Lord Milner's arrival
+had been utilised for the construction of a new and much-needed coal
+line, which ran for thirteen miles along the Rand.
+
+     "This short line," Lord Milner wrote, "would have no less than
+     thirty to forty miles of sidings leading from it to every
+     important mine, and securing direct delivery of about 1,000,000
+     tons of coal per annum, as well as of a large tonnage of general
+     stores."
+
+[Sidenote: Development by railways.]
+
+And then follows a statement of the part to be played by railway
+construction in the policy of material development, which was pursued
+with such determination by Lord Milner after the restoration of peace.
+
+     "It seems almost superfluous to argue the case for further
+     railway development in South Africa, and especially in the new
+     colonies. The richest agricultural districts of both colonies are
+     far removed from markets. The through lines to the coast from the
+     great centres of industry will be choked with traffic. Both to
+     stimulate agriculture and to facilitate the operations of
+     commerce, additional lines and relief lines will be urgently
+     required. Moreover, if the construction of the most necessary of
+     these is undertaken as fast as the districts through which they
+     pass are pacified, employment will be provided for large numbers
+     of persons who would otherwise be idle and dependent on
+     Government for relief, as well as for many newcomers, who will be
+     a valuable addition to the population of the country. If there is
+     one enterprise which is certain to be thoroughly popular with the
+     old population, it is this. The one thing which the Boers will
+     thoroughly appreciate will be railways bringing their richest
+     land into touch with the best markets. And the British population
+     will be equally in favour of such a course."[318]
+
+         [Footnote 318: Cd. 903.]
+
+Thus, six months before Vereeniging, and less than three months after
+Lord Milner's return from England, the "big unfinished job" was well
+in hand.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING
+
+
+[Sidenote: The gold industry re-started.]
+
+With the beginning of the year 1902, the question of the ultimate
+submission of the Boers had become a matter of months, or even weeks.
+The guerilla leaders had been beaten at their own game. In spite of
+the extension of the area of the war, the terrorising of the peaceably
+inclined burghers, the co-operation of the Afrikander nationalists,
+and the encouragement derived from Boer sympathisers in England, the
+most important districts of the Transvaal and half of the Orange River
+Colony were being restored to the pursuits of peace. The great
+industry of South Africa was re-established, and agriculture was not
+only resumed but even developing upon more enlightened principles
+within the protected areas of the two colonies; while in the Orange
+River Colony 150 new British settlers had been planted upon farms
+before the terms of the Vereeniging surrender were signed. The story
+of this steady progress is told by the mere items in the monthly
+records furnished by Lord Milner to the Home Government. The gold
+industry of the Rand recommenced in May, 1901, when, with permission
+to set 150 stamps at work, 7,439 oz. of gold were won. Up to
+November, when, as we have seen, the military situation for the first
+time permitted any considerable body of refugees to return, progress
+was slow; but in this month the output amounted to 32,000 oz. in round
+numbers. In December the number of stamps working had risen to 953,
+and the output to 52,897 oz. Henceforward the advance was rapid and
+sustained. In the remaining five months of the war (January to May,
+1902), the number of stamps at work rose to 2,095, the monthly output
+to 138,600 oz., of the value of L600,000, and 30,000 additional
+British refugees had been brought back to their homes on the Rand, in
+view of the increasing certainty of employment afforded by the
+expanding gold industry. Thus, before the surrender of the Boer forces
+in the field, half of the British population had been restored to the
+Transvaal, and the gold industry had been so far re-established that
+its production had reached one-third of the highest annual rate
+attained before the war broke out. Nor must it be forgotten that
+during these last months the conditions of the refugee camps were
+being steadily improved, until, as already noted, the death-rate was
+ultimately reduced below the normal.
+
+The Home Government had been unprepared for the military struggle
+precipitated by the ultimatum; Lord Milner was determined that, so far
+as his efforts could avail, it should not be unprepared for the
+economic conflict for which peace would be the signal. In a despatch
+of January 25th, 1902, he urged once more upon Mr. Chamberlain the
+importance of settling British colonists upon the land, and pressed
+for a "decision on the main issues" raised by this question.
+
+[Sidenote: Land settlement.]
+
+     "This subject has for long occupied my attention," he wrote,
+     "and, in a tentative way, a good deal has been done. But we have
+     reached a point where little more progress can be made without a
+     decision on the main issues. The question is, whether British
+     colonisation is to be undertaken on a large and effective scale,
+     under Government control and with Government assistance, or to be
+     left to take care of itself, with whatever little help and
+     sympathy an Administration, devoid of any general plan, and with
+     no special funds devoted to the particular purpose, can give
+     it.... The principal consideration is the necessity of avoiding a
+     sharp contrast and antagonism in the character and sentiments of
+     the population between the country districts and the towns. If we
+     do nothing, we shall be confronted, sooner or later, with an
+     industrial urban population, rapidly increasing, and almost
+     wholly British in sentiment, and, on the other hand, a rural
+     population, wholly Dutch, agriculturally unprogressive. It is not
+     possible to contemplate such a state of affairs without grave
+     misgivings. We shall have to reinstate the bulk of our prisoners
+     upon their farms, and provide them with the means of starting
+     life anew, but unless we at the same time introduce some new
+     element we may be simply laying up the material for further
+     trouble. The land will remain as neglected, the attitude of the
+     rural population as unprogressive, and as much out of sympathy
+     with British ideas as ever.... To satisfy these demands, it is
+     clear that no small and makeshift scheme will suffice. Land
+     settlement must be undertaken on a large scale; otherwise,
+     however useful, it will be _politically_ unimportant.
+
+     "The time is fast approaching when it will be absolutely
+     necessary to raise loans for both new colonies to meet expenses
+     arising immediately out of the war. I wish to place on record my
+     profound conviction that unless, in raising these loans, we
+     provide a substantial sum for the purchase of land and the
+     settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity
+     will be lost which will never recur, and the neglect of which
+     will have the most prejudicial effect on the future peace and
+     prosperity of South Africa. I do not, indeed, ask that these
+     first loans should include a sum as large as may ultimately be
+     required if land settlement is to assume the proportions which I
+     contemplate. But, if our first considerable undertakings in this
+     line are proving themselves successful, I foresee no difficulty
+     in obtaining more money later on, should we require it. What I do
+     fear is a check now, when we ought to be in a position to seize
+     every possible opportunity of getting hold of land suitable to
+     our purpose, and of retaining in the country such men as we want
+     to put on it. If we lose the next year or two we lose the game,
+     and without that power of acting promptly, which a ready command
+     of money alone can give, we shall begin to throw away
+     opportunities from this moment at which I am writing onwards.
+
+     "What I want to put plainly to His Majesty's Government are these
+     two questions: (1) Are we to be allowed to go on purchasing good
+     land, by voluntary agreement wherever possible, but compulsorily,
+     if necessary? And, assuming this question to be answered in the
+     affirmative, (2) what amount shall we be able to dispose of for
+     this purpose in the immediate future?"[319]
+
+         [Footnote 319: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+It had been arranged during Lord Milner's last visit to England that
+the large expenditure inevitably arising out of the economic
+reconstruction and future development of the new colonies, should be
+provided by a loan secured upon their assets and revenues. The
+purposes for which this immediate outlay was especially required were
+the acquisition of the existing railways and the construction of new
+lines, land settlement, the repatriation of the Boers, and the
+compensation of loyalists for war losses both in the new colonies and
+in the Cape and Natal. Lord Milner now proposed that the Home
+Government should decide to appropriate, out of the funds to be thus
+raised, a sum of L3,000,000 to land settlement, and that of this sum
+L2,000,000 should be spent in the Transvaal and L1,000,000 in the
+Orange Colony. The "development" loan, as it was called, was not
+issued until after Mr. Chamberlain's visit to South Africa in the
+(South African) summer of 1902-3; but Lord Milner's proposal was
+approved in principle, and he was enabled to employ the limited
+resources at his disposal in the purchase of blocks of land suitable
+for the purposes of agriculture in both colonies.
+
+Apart from the progress thus achieved in this matter of supreme
+importance, as Lord Milner deemed it, to the future of South Africa,
+the preparation of the administrative machinery, the _materiel_ of
+transport, and the supplies of all kinds required for the repatriation
+of the Boers, was pushed forward with increasing activity. At the same
+time certain other administrative questions were brought by him to the
+consideration of the Home Government during these months (January to
+May, 1902), with the result that the ink was scarcely dry upon the
+Treaty of Surrender before he was able to ask for, and obtain,
+decisions upon them.
+
+[Sidenote: On the eve of peace.]
+
+The telegrams which passed between Lord Milner and the Colonial Office
+on these matters, during the weeks immediately preceding and following
+the Vereeniging surrender, are significant. Beside the clear thrust of
+Lord Milner's calculated energy, Mr. Chamberlain's efforts to keep
+pace with the needs of the situation sink into comparative inertia. On
+April 18th Lord Milner telegraphs the particulars of the 10 per cent.
+tax which he proposes to levy on the net produce of the mining
+industry. The rate is high--twice as high as the gold tax under the
+Republic--and will yield an annual revenue of L500,000 or L600,000 on
+a basis of the present normal production of the mines; but he believes
+that it will be "accepted without serious opposition, if it is imposed
+while the industry is rapidly advancing." And he expresses the hope
+that the explanation which he has furnished will be "sufficient to
+show the principles" of the tax, and that he may publicly announce the
+decision on this matter of such general economic importance at once.
+Mr. Chamberlain, however, requires further information; and we find
+Lord Milner telegraphing on June 2nd: "I trust you will now agree to
+the tax on the profits of gold mines; I am anxious to publish the
+Proclamation in next Friday's _Gazette_." And to this Mr. Chamberlain
+replies on June 4th, "I agree to the imposition of a 10 per cent. tax
+on the profits of gold mines." On June 2nd, that is, two days after
+the terms of surrender have been signed at Pretoria, Lord Milner sends
+a "most urgent" telegram on the immediate financial position:
+
+     "The departments are still very busy with the estimates of the
+     new colonies and Constabulary. They are rather late this year,
+     but that was quite unavoidable. The result promises to be good.
+     We can pay for all normal expenditure and the 6,000 South African
+     Constabulary out of revenue. But, as you know, there is nothing
+     provided for the various extraordinary items which have been
+     hitherto financed out of the L500,000 grant for relief and
+     re-settlement. In all my estimates I have relied on a loan for
+     this. As I understand, the loan is deferred. As the L500,000 is
+     nearly exhausted, and it would be disastrous if land settlement,
+     which latter is at last making good progress, were stopped,
+     especially at this juncture, I would ask for immediate authority
+     to spend another L500,000 on these purposes. This is independent
+     of the amounts which will be required under the last clause of
+     the Terms of Surrender, about which I will address you
+     immediately. I earnestly hope that there may be no delay in
+     acceding to this request. The work to be got through in the
+     immediate future is so enormous that, unless we can get the
+     fundamental questions of finance settled promptly, a breakdown
+     is inevitable. It would be a great relief to my mind to feel that
+     services already started and working well were provided for at
+     least for some months ahead, before I plunge into the new and
+     heavy job of restoring the Boer population, which will require
+     all my attention in the immediate future."[320]
+
+         [Footnote 320: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+Mr. Chamberlain's reply comes on June 18th:
+
+     "You may incur expenditure up to L500,000 more for relief and
+     re-settlement, pending the issue of the loan."
+
+On June 10th Lord Milner telegraphs an outline scheme for repatriating
+the Boers. "As time presses," he concludes, "I am going ahead on these
+lines; but I am anxious to know that they have your general approval."
+The reply, dated June 18th, is: "The proposals are approved generally.
+Send by post a report on the details of the arrangement and the
+persons appointed." At the same time Lord Milner has been pressing for
+a decision on the question of land settlement. He has sent a despatch
+on May 9th containing full particulars of the terms upon which it is
+proposed to offer and to suitable applicants; and he now telegraphs,
+on June 20th:
+
+[Sidenote: "It is vital to make a start".]
+
+     "If you could agree generally to the terms in my despatch, I
+     would immediately deal with some of the most pressing cases on
+     those lines. The terms may be improved upon later; meanwhile it
+     is vital to make a start."
+
+There is land available, and there are men available--over-sea
+colonists, and yeomen with a knowledge of agriculture, who have fought
+in the war, and have, therefore, a first claim to be considered. But
+these desirable settlers cannot afford to wait in a country like South
+Africa, where the cost of living is abnormally high, without a
+definite prospect of employment.
+
+     "Unless something is done at once," he says, "there will be
+     bitter complaint. [The Transvaal] Government is already being
+     severely, though unjustly, criticised for the delay."
+
+This is answered by Mr. Chamberlain's telegram of July 7th, in which
+he "concurs generally" in Lord Milner's proposals, and leaves him
+"full discretion to deal with the details of the scheme, which it is
+not possible to criticise effectively" in London.
+
+In a telegram of June 21st we get the announcement of the formal
+initiation of Crown Colony government:
+
+     "I have this day read and published the Letters Patent," Lord
+     Milner says, "constituting the Government of the Transvaal, and
+     my Commission; and I have taken the prescribed oath."
+
+And on July 3rd he suggests that an announcement should be made at
+once of the intention of the Home Government to enlarge the
+Legislative Councils of both colonies by the admission of a
+non-official element:
+
+[Sidenote: Colonists and the settlement.]
+
+     "I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would
+     be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to
+     the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present
+     improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new
+     colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of
+     public business."
+
+To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief
+telegram of July 7th.[321]
+
+         [Footnote 321: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the
+spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the cumbrous
+wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of
+the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of
+Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the
+tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after
+the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new
+colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever
+previously attained."[322] The story of this "tremendous effort," with
+its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved
+for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part
+which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the
+republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South
+Africa.
+
+         [Footnote 322: At Johannesburg, March 31st, 1905. From _The
+         Star_ report.]
+
+Before we approach the actual circumstances which accompanied the
+surrender of the Boer forces in the field, it is necessary to recall
+the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of the new
+colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and the
+Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the preceding
+year (1901). In these communications--the origin of which has been
+mentioned previously[323]--the significance attached by loyalist
+opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily left
+undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncements of the general policy
+of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape ministers,
+while recognising that full representative self-government should be
+conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the necessity of
+maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until "such time as it
+was certain that representative institutions could be established, due
+regard being had to the paramount necessity of maintaining and
+strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in question." And as,
+in their opinion, "this consummation would be ultimately assured and
+materially strengthened by a large influx of immigrants favourably
+disposed to British rule," they expressed the hope that "no time would
+be lost after the conclusion of the war in putting into effect a large
+scheme of land settlement." More than this, with the object-lesson of
+the actual breakdown of representative government in their own Colony
+before their eyes, they added a recommendation that this British
+immigration should not be confined to the new colonies, but that a
+portion of the funds to be provided by the Imperial Government for
+this purpose should be allocated to the Cape Colony.
+
+         [Footnote 323: See p. 489.]
+
+[Sidenote: The language question.]
+
+In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the
+settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in
+particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion
+of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of
+British government in the former Republics would afford. The
+settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated
+as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal
+administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before
+intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to
+crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore,
+insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the
+predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support
+of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the
+"Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so
+called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from
+"the Dutch language used in public offices and official documents." No
+one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth
+of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education
+sufficient to qualify him for the public services, or for a
+professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second
+language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less
+difficult--probably more difficult--to him than to learn English, the
+desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English
+becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical
+convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making
+English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority
+to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the
+language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a
+matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South
+Africa.
+
+     "The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa
+     generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance
+     of the English language. The language question has done more,
+     probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke
+     racial animosity."
+
+They, therefore, recommend that--
+
+     "English should be the official and predominant language in the
+     higher courts, and in the public service--combined with such
+     concessions in favour of Dutch as justice, convenience, and
+     circumstances may require. Dutch interpreters should be attached
+     to all courts and to the principal public offices, and their
+     services should be available free of charge, in civil as well as
+     in criminal cases. English should be the medium of instruction in
+     all secondary schools, and in all standards in primary schools
+     situated in English districts, and in the higher standards in all
+     other primary schools. Dutch should be the medium of instruction
+     meanwhile in the lower forms in the Dutch districts, and it
+     should be taught in all schools where there is a reasonable
+     demand for it."[324]
+
+         [Footnote 324: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+On the question of disarmament they wrote:
+
+     "In order to secure complete pacification, disarmament is
+     necessary. Re-armament should not be allowed until both the new
+     colonies are considered fit for self-government, and even then
+     the carrying of arms and the issuing of ammunition should be
+     contingent on the taking of the oath of allegiance."
+
+[Sidenote: The native question.]
+
+On the subject of the treatment of the natives in the new colonies,
+the remarks of the Natal ministers are weighty and pertinent.
+
+     "For a long while," they wrote, "the natives cannot be given
+     political rights. The grant of such rights would have the effect
+     of alienating the sympathy of English and Dutch alike, and would
+     materially prejudice the good government of the new colonies, and
+     be provocative of racial bitterness. In the meantime the natives
+     should be taught habits of steady industry.
+
+     "Officers appointed over the natives should be acquainted with
+     their language and customs.
+
+     "The assumption in England that colonists are unjust and brutal
+     to the natives has worked great harm, and both Dutch and English
+     have suffered from its influence.
+
+     "A native policy out of sympathy with colonial views is likely,
+     owing to the past history of South Africa, to arouse so strong a
+     feeling that even the just rights of natives would be
+     disregarded. It is essential, in the interests of the natives
+     themselves, generally, that the Home Government should work in
+     accord with colonial sentiments as a whole, and the great
+     influence of a colonial minister in sympathy with colonists will
+     secure far more reforms than will any attempt to over-rule local
+     feeling."[325]
+
+         [Footnote 325: Cd. 1,163.]
+
+As one of certain immediately practicable steps in the direction of
+South African unity, the Natal Ministry advocated "reciprocity" in the
+learned professions and the Civil Services of the several colonies. To
+effect this purpose they recommended that uniform tests of
+professional qualifications should be adopted throughout South Africa,
+and that public officers should be allowed to proceed from the civil
+service of one colony to that of another, their separate periods of
+service counting as continuous "for pension and other purposes." They
+also put forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of
+the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal. The justice of this
+claim, in so far as it referred to a portion of Zululand wrongfully
+annexed by the Transvaal Boers, was recognised by the Imperial
+Government, and the district in question was transferred to Natal on
+the termination of the war.
+
+As High Commissioner, Lord Milner was bound to prevent the grant of
+any terms to the Boers inconsistent with the future maintenance of
+British supremacy in South Africa, now re-established at so great a
+cost. As the representative man of the British in South Africa, he
+was no less bound to see that the terms of surrender contained no
+concessions to the separatist aspirations of the Boer people
+calculated to form an obstacle to the future administrative union of
+the South African colonies. With this two-fold responsibility laid
+upon him, it is not surprising that his view both of what might be
+conceded safely to the Boer leaders, and of how it might be conceded,
+was somewhat different from that of the Commander-in-Chief. That the
+Boers themselves were conscious of being likely to get more favourable
+terms from Lord Kitchener than from the High Commissioner, is apparent
+from the anxiety which they displayed to deal exclusively with the
+former. In this object, however, they were entirely unsuccessful,
+since the Home Government indicated from the first their desire that
+Lord Milner should be present at the meetings for negotiation; and in
+the end the terms of surrender were drafted by him with the assistance
+of Sir Richard Solomon, the legal adviser to the Transvaal
+Administration.
+
+[Sidenote: The peace negotiations.]
+
+The actual circumstances in which the Vereeniging negotiations
+originated were these. Early in the year 1902, when, as we have seen,
+the ultimate success of the military operations directed by Lord
+Kitchener was assured, the Netherlands Government communicated their
+readiness to mediate between the British Government and the
+Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State,
+with a view to the termination of hostilities. To this offer the
+British Government replied that, while they were sincerely desirous of
+terminating the war, the only persons whom they could recognise as
+competent to negotiate for peace were the leaders of the Boer forces
+in the field. Lord Kitchener was directed, however, to forward a copy
+of the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments
+to the Boer leaders. In acknowledging this communication Mr. Schalk
+Burger, as acting President of the South African Republic, informed
+Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to treat for peace, but that
+before doing so he wished to see President Steyn. He, therefore, asked
+for a safe-conduct through the British lines and back to effect this
+purpose. On March 13th, 1902, the Home Government authorised Lord
+Kitchener to grant this request, if "he and Lord Milner agreed in
+thinking it desirable." As the result of the consultation between
+Schalk Burger and Steyn, a conference of the Free State and Transvaal
+leaders was held at Klerksdorp, at which it was decided, on April
+10th, to request the British Commander-in-Chief to receive
+representatives of the Boers personally, "time and place to be
+appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals."
+The approval of the Home Government having been obtained, President
+Steyn, Mr. Schalk Burger, and Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey
+met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 12th, at Pretoria. The
+proposals which the Boer representatives then put forward were wholly
+inadmissible. Nevertheless, Lord Kitchener telegraphed them to London
+with the remark:
+
+     "I have assured [the Boer representatives] that His Majesty's
+     Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain the
+     independence of the Republics, as this would do, and that they
+     must expect a refusal."
+
+[Sidenote: Independence refused.]
+
+On the day following the British Government replied that they could
+not
+
+     "entertain any proposals which were based upon the former
+     independence of the Republics, which had been formally annexed to
+     the British Crown."
+
+Upon learning this reply President Steyn and his colleagues took up
+the position that they were not competent to surrender the
+independence of their country, since only the "people," meaning
+thereby the burghers still in the field, could do this. They asked,
+therefore, for an armistice to enable them to consult the burghers.
+This request was refused on the ground that no basis of agreement had,
+as yet, been reached. The Boer representatives then asked that the
+British Government should state the "terms which they were prepared to
+grant, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence"; while they on
+their side undertook to refer these terms to the people, "without any
+expression of approval or disapproval." In answer to this proposal
+Lord Kitchener was authorised to refer the Boer representatives to the
+offer made by him to General Botha at Middelburg twelve months
+before.
+
+     "We have received," telegraphed the Secretary for War on April
+     16th, "with considerable surprise the message from the Boer
+     leaders contained in your telegram of 14th April.
+
+     "The meeting was arranged at their request, and they must have
+     been aware of our repeated declarations that we could not
+     entertain any proposals based on the renewed independence of the
+     two South African States. We were, therefore, entitled to assume
+     that the Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of
+     independence, and would propose terms of surrender for the forces
+     still in the field.
+
+     "They now state that they are constitutionally incompetent to
+     discuss terms which do not include a restoration of independence,
+     but request us to inform them what conditions would be granted
+     if, after submitting the matter to their followers, they were to
+     relinquish the demand for independence.
+
+     "This does not seem to us to be a satisfactory method of
+     proceeding, or one best adapted to secure, at the earliest
+     moment, a cessation of the hostilities which have involved the
+     loss of so much life and treasure.
+
+     "We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to
+     spare the effusion of further blood, and to hasten the
+     restoration of peace and prosperity to the countries afflicted by
+     the war; and you and Lord Milner are therefore authorised to
+     refer the Boer leaders to the offer made by you to General Botha
+     more than twelve months ago,[326] and to inform them that,
+     although the subsequent great reduction in the strength of the
+     forces opposed to us, and the additional sacrifice thrown upon us
+     by the refusal of that offer would justify us in imposing far
+     more onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the hope of a
+     permanent peace and reconciliation, to accept a general surrender
+     on the lines of that offer, but with such modifications in detail
+     as may be agreed upon mutually.
+
+     "You are also authorised to discuss such modifications with them,
+     and to submit the result for our approval.
+
+     "Communicate this to the High Commissioner."[327]
+
+         [Footnote 326: For these, the "Middelburg" or "Botha" terms,
+         see above, p. 471, and forward; p. 568, note 2.]
+
+         [Footnote 327: Cd. 1,096.]
+
+[Sidenote: Consulting the Burghers.]
+
+Upon learning the contents of this telegram, the Boer representatives
+put forward the request that their "deputation" in Europe, Mr. Abraham
+Fischer, Mr. Cornelius Wessels, and Mr. Wolmarans,[328] might be
+allowed to return to South Africa to take part in the negotiations,
+and again asked for an armistice while the return of the deputation
+and the subsequent meetings of the burghers were taking place. Both
+these requests were refused on military grounds; but Lord Kitchener
+was willing to grant facilities to the Boer leaders to consult the
+burghers, and arrangements were made in the course of the next two
+days (April 17th-19th) for representatives of the Boer commandos in
+the field--exclusive of those in the Cape Colony--to be elected, and
+meet at Vereeniging, a small town on the Vaal near the border of the
+two colonies, on May 13th or 15th. During the month that followed,
+every possible assistance was rendered by the Commander-in-Chief to
+the Boer leaders with the object of enabling them to carry out these
+arrangements. Safe-conducts, under flags of truce, and passes for
+their officers and messengers, were freely granted; and the localities
+chosen for the commando assemblies, the places and dates of which had
+been notified to Lord Kitchener before the Boer representatives left
+Pretoria, were "scrupulously avoided" by the British troops. In spite,
+however, of the restrictions imposed upon the activity of the forces
+under his command, Lord Kitchener was able to report, on June 1st,
+that "good progress" had been made in the work of the campaign up to
+the actual cessation of hostilities.[329]
+
+         [Footnote 328: This deputation was despatched in March, 1900,
+         to "win the sympathy of the nations," in De Wet's words.]
+
+         [Footnote 329: Cd. 986.]
+
+The sixty Boer representatives--two for each commando--thus assembled
+at Vereeniging appointed, on May 18th, a special commission to treat
+for peace. The commissioners, who included Commandant-Generals Louis
+Botha and Christian De Wet, Generals Hertzog, De la Rey and Smuts, and
+President Steyn, Acting President Schalk Burger, and other
+civilians,[330] proceeded at once to Pretoria, where, on May 19th,
+they met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner in conference, and put forward
+the following three proposals as a basis of negotiation:
+
+         [Footnote 330: A full list of the names is to be found in the
+         Draft Terms of Surrender at p. 564.]
+
+[Sidenote: The terms drafted.]
+
+     "(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards
+     foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under
+     British supervision. (3) We are prepared to surrender a part of
+     our territory."
+
+What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's
+telegram to the Secretary for War:
+
+     "Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for
+     negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid
+     down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion,
+     nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the
+     afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner
+     proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the
+     burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of
+     objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner
+     should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as
+     possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.[331] They
+     will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for
+     the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the
+     draft document."[332]
+
+         [Footnote 331: These were the "Middelburg terms" of a year
+         ago. See note 2, p. 568.]
+
+         [Footnote 332: Cd. 1,096.]
+
+The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is
+to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between
+May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness
+on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they
+allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction
+to"[333] the Middelburg terms; admit that there is a "fundamental
+difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their own may be
+accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;[334] and finally
+maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"[335] to the Middelburg
+terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.[336] To all this Lord
+Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take your
+proposal into consideration."
+
+         [Footnote 333: Smuts.]
+
+         [Footnote 334: Hertzog.]
+
+         [Footnote 335: De Wet.]
+
+         [Footnote 336: Botha.]
+
+[Sidenote: Payment of Boer war debts.]
+
+On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in
+consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the
+Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State
+High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the
+negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur;
+but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the
+the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military
+and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The
+Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by
+their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be
+recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments
+for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner,
+on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very
+unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets
+of the Republican Governments, all liabilities existing at the time
+when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay for
+expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a war
+against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, utterly
+indefensible. The British people, he said--
+
+     "would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of
+     hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the
+     people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much
+     smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during
+     the war."
+
+As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and
+receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing,
+with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home
+Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the
+Middelburg terms.
+
+This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the
+clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately
+became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a
+compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite
+sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course
+of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make
+a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government
+followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant--L3,000,000--and in
+rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this sum should be
+devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued by
+them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be
+submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to
+be appointed to distribute the L3,000,000 grant.
+
+The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in
+the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the
+Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful
+general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and
+anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and
+arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping
+military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army
+or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted
+statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South
+Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and
+interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are
+being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is
+exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the
+actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once
+accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of
+surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to
+an agreement, it will be the _English_ document which will be wired to
+England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, and which
+will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not necessary to
+place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the British
+Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a particular
+matter, he replies:
+
+     "As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain
+     promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to
+     which a reference may be made later should appear in it.
+     Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should
+     appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to
+     clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible
+     misunderstanding."
+
+[Sidenote: Lord Milner's vigilance.]
+
+And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You
+must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid
+before His Majesty's Government." And, to prevent any possible
+misconstruction of Lord Kitchener's statement, "there is a pledge that
+the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly
+considered," he says:
+
+     "Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am
+     convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this
+     document must contain everything about which there is anything in
+     the form of a pledge."
+
+And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he
+draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language
+to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been "completely
+annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement should be
+signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the document, or its
+terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal."
+
+The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord
+Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated,
+unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer
+commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months
+of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of
+their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion
+and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new
+agreement." As it was, Lord Milner's faultless precision during the
+whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home
+Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer
+"delegates."
+
+     "It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr.
+     Chamberlain,[337] "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of
+     this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at
+     Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those
+     occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by
+     His Majesty's Government."
+
+         [Footnote 337: Mr. Chamberlain to Generals Botha, De Wet, and
+         De la Rey, August 28th, 1902. Cd. 1,284.]
+
+[Sidenote: Approval of Home Government.]
+
+At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement
+was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain
+informed Lord Milner by telegram that the Cabinet approved of the
+submission of this document with certain minor alterations, and with
+the new clause dealing with the grant of L3,000,000, to the Assembly
+at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be inflicted
+upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed in
+private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener and
+Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had been
+settled by communications which had passed between Lord Milner and Mr.
+Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The reason for
+this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner, while they
+objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made part of
+the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless quite
+willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which it
+was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of
+Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the
+statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their
+respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on
+May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His
+Majesty's Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of
+further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to
+the assembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The
+Boer commissioners left at 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day
+for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of Surrender were
+submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher representatives.
+One other point had been raised and settled between Lord Milner and
+the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August 7th, 1901,
+certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of
+confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that
+in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly
+dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could
+not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government
+concurred.
+
+The text of the document submitted to the burgher representatives at
+Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows:
+
+     "_Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces
+     in the Field, approved by His Majesty's Government._
+
+     "His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord
+     Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T.
+     Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and
+     Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange
+     Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis
+     Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the
+     Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their
+     respective burghers desirous to terminate the present
+     hostilities, agree on the following articles:
+
+[Sidenote: The surrender agreement.]
+
+     "1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their
+     arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in
+     their possession or under their control, and desist from any
+     further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King Edward
+     VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The manner
+     and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord
+     Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant
+     Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.
+
+     "2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal
+     or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present
+     outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring
+     their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King
+     Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as
+     transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence
+     ensured.
+
+     "3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be
+     deprived of their personal liberty or their property.
+
+     "4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any
+     of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in
+     connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this
+     clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of
+     war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the
+     Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial
+     immediately after the close of hostilities.
+
+     "5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the
+     Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the
+     children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when
+     necessary for the better and more effectual administration of
+     justice.
+
+     "6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and
+     Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their
+     protection, on taking out a licence according to law.
+
+     "7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River
+     Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil
+     government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative
+     institutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced.
+
+     "8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will
+     not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.
+
+     "9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the
+     Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the
+     war.
+
+     "10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the
+     local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each
+     district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the
+     presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of
+     assisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and
+     supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide
+     themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed,
+     stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their
+     normal occupation.
+
+     "His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these
+     Commissions a sum of L3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will
+     allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African
+     Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the
+     late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a
+     Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government,
+     and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to
+     have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they
+     will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of
+     war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally
+     given.
+
+     "In addition to the above-named free grant of L3,000,000, His
+     Majesty's Government will be prepared to make advances on loan
+     for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and
+     afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent.
+     interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit
+     of this clause."[338]
+
+         [Footnote 338: Cd. 1,096. President Steyn was too ill to sign
+         the Agreement, and De Wet signed first of the Free State
+         representatives. He was declared President, in the place of
+         Steyn, at Vereeniging on the 29th.]
+
+[Sidenote: Punishment of rebels.]
+
+To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of
+the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer
+commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of
+Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner.
+
+     "His Majesty's Government must place it on record that the
+     treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion
+     and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be
+     determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the
+     laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have
+     joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that
+     part of the British Empire to which they belong.
+
+     "His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape Government
+     that the following are their views as to the terms which should
+     be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the
+     field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th
+     April, 1901:
+
+     "With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon
+     surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document before the
+     resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes
+     place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the
+     punishment to be awarded to them, provided they shall not have
+     been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the usages of
+     civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be entitled for
+     life[339] to be registered as voters or to vote at any
+     Parliamentary Divisional Council, or municipal election. With
+     reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape
+     Colony and all other persons holding an official position under
+     the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of
+     commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for
+     high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such
+     special court as may be hereafter constituted by law, the
+     punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the
+     court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of
+     death be inflicted.
+
+     "The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt
+     with according to the law of the Colony."[340]
+
+         [Footnote 339: This was reduced to a period of five years.]
+
+         [Footnote 340: Cd. 1,096. As compared with the Middelburg
+         terms, the terms accepted at Vereeniging were slightly less
+         favourable to the Boers in respect of permission to possess
+         arms, and the use of the Dutch language; but the monetary
+         assistance promised to the repatriated burghers was more
+         generous. The free grant was raised from one million to three
+         millions, and the advances on loan were offered for the first
+         two years free of interest, and subsequently at only three
+         per cent. The greater destruction of property consequent upon
+         the prolongation of the war made this increased assistance
+         necessary and reasonable. It is noticeable, however, that
+         Lord Milner, alike in the Middelburg and Vereeniging
+         negotiations, although he was opposed to any payment of the
+         costs incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on the war,
+         was prepared to go even farther than the Home Government in
+         the direction of a generous treatment of the Boers in all
+         other matters that concerned their material prosperity.
+
+         One variation as between the Middelburg and Vereeniging terms
+         is noticeable in view of the statement, made in the House of
+         Commons by the present (1906) Under-Secretary for the
+         Colonies (Mr. Winston Churchill), that the use of the word
+         "natives" in clause viii. of the Terms of Surrender prevented
+         the introduction of any legislation affecting the _status_ of
+         Asiatics and "coloured persons" in the new colonies prior to
+         the establishment of self-government. This assertion was
+         based upon the contention that the word "natives" is
+         understood by the Boers to indicate the "native of any
+         country other than those of the European inhabitants of South
+         Africa." The actual text of the corresponding clause in the
+         Middelburg terms (Lord Kitchener's despatch of March 20th,
+         1901, in Cd. 528) is as follows: "As regards the extension of
+         the franchise to the Kafirs in the Transvaal and Orange River
+         Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government
+         to give such franchise before representative government is
+         granted to these colonies, and if then given it will be so
+         limited as to secure the just predominance of the white
+         races. The legal position of coloured persons will, however,
+         be similar to that which they hold in Cape Colony." Apart
+         from the fact that the Boers were debarred by Lord Milner's
+         specific statements either from going behind the English text
+         of the Vereeniging Terms of Surrender, or from "explaining
+         [the Vereeniging Terms] by anything in the Middelburg
+         proposal," it is difficult to see how this Middelburg clause
+         could have raised any presumption in the minds of the Boer
+         commissioners that the English word "native" was intended to
+         include not only the Kafirs (of which word it is a loose
+         equivalent, since the dark-skinned native of the Bantu
+         tribes, or the Kafir, has practically ousted the aboriginal
+         yellow-skinned natives of South Africa--the Bushmen and
+         Hottentots), but the "coloured people," or half-castes.
+
+         Lord Milner himself declared in the House of Lords (July
+         31st, 1906) with reference to Mr. Churchill's statement that
+         the question had not been raised, to the best of his belief,
+         by the Boer commissioners; and that in any case there was
+         nothing in the Vereeniging Agreement to prevent the Crown
+         Colony administration of the new colonies from legislating in
+         respect of "coloured persons." [And _a fortiori_ in respect
+         of British Indians.] His words were: "The English text of the
+         treaty says 'natives' and does not say 'coloured people.' I
+         think that in the Dutch version the word 'naturellen' was
+         used. I venture to say that nobody familiar with the common
+         use of language in South Africa would hold either that
+         'natives' included coloured people, some of whom very much
+         more resemble whites than natives, or that 'naturellen'
+         included 'kleurlingen,' which is the universally accepted
+         Dutch word in South Africa for coloured people."]
+
+[Sidenote: The last debates.]
+
+[Sidenote: Accepting the inevitable.]
+
+With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final
+stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still
+required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly
+at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the
+morning of the 29th the delegates assembled in the tent provided by
+the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of
+the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners
+on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting
+President of the South African Republic, then announced that the
+meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses
+should be taken--to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or
+to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting,
+and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in
+questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various
+Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding
+between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the
+Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the
+delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually
+proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on
+the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so
+much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in
+the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria
+convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of
+accepting the British terms, each of them was anxious, individually,
+to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the
+surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible
+from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour
+should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the
+question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the
+delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the
+Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted
+discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the
+afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the
+limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long
+debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke
+more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments
+used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering
+that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he
+said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of
+indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be
+continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the
+form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the
+substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice
+the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From
+this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words
+of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute--for every man was
+preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement." Then
+a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the
+commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6
+votes.
+
+         [Footnote 341: The minutes of the final meetings of the
+         commando representatives--as also those of the earlier
+         meetings of May 15th to 17th--have been published by General
+         Christian de Wet in _The Three Years' War_.]
+
+After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution
+constituting a committee[342] to collect funds for the destitute Boers
+was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the
+decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to
+sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.
+
+         [Footnote 342: Three of the members of this committee,
+         Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to
+         proceed to Europe for the purposes of this appeal.]
+
+Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to
+Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on
+administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going
+on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the
+telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the
+Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was
+just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought
+the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner
+and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former
+British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here,
+at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10
+o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender Agreement
+was signed.[343]
+
+         [Footnote 343: The actual surrender of the arms in the
+         possession of the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out
+         with admirable promptitude. Three weeks after the agreement
+         had been signed Lord Kitchener was able, in a final despatch
+         from Capetown on June 23rd, to record his "high appreciation
+         of the unflagging energy and unfailing tact" with which
+         Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet had
+         facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed
+         to receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and
+         Orange River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in
+         the Cape Colony less expeditious in surrendering to General
+         French. In all 21,226 burghers and colonial rebels, of whom
+         11,166 were in the Transvaal, 6,455 in the Orange River
+         Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down their arms. Lord
+         Kitchener's last words (despatches of June 21st and 23rd),
+         addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the
+         Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic
+         utterances. His message to the former was:
+
+              "I find it difficult in the short space at my disposal
+              to acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South
+              Africa to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand,
+              Canada, Cape Colony, and Natal. I will only say here
+              that no request of mine was ever refused by any of these
+              Governments, and that their consideration and generosity
+              were only equalled by the character and quality of the
+              troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that
+              country."
+
+         And of the troops, which under his command had successfully
+         accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he
+         wrote:
+
+              "The protracted struggle which has for so long caused
+              suffering to South Africa has at length terminated, and
+              I should fail to do justice to my own feelings if at
+              this moment I neglected to bear testimony to the
+              patience, tenacity, and heroism which has been displayed
+              by all ranks of His Majesty's forces, Imperial and
+              Colonial, during the whole course of the war. Nothing
+              but the qualities of bravery and endurance in our troops
+              could have overcome the difficulties of this campaign,
+              or have finally enabled the empire to reap the fruits of
+              all its sacrifices."]
+
+[Sidenote: Admissions of the Boer leaders.]
+
+The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at
+Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the
+hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer
+sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people
+abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war
+in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of aggression
+forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the enemies of
+England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
+wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the enemy. Very different
+is the account of the origin of the war, which Acting President
+Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow countrymen in this day
+of truth-telling.
+
+     "Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he
+     said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon.
+     We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we
+     under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon
+     our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the
+     possibility of defeat."
+
+And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and
+one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded
+by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war;
+I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this
+"although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts,
+State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general
+of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as
+members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the
+war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, since in
+the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies himself
+would have found no occasion for departing from the truth.
+
+[Sidenote: The Burgher camps.]
+
+No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now
+that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that
+the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they
+regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of
+barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more
+Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought
+the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General
+de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war,
+said:
+
+     "I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That
+     is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I
+     think also we might meet the emergency in this way--a part of the
+     men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the
+     women, and then they could take the women with them to the
+     English in the towns."
+
+But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any
+longer carrying this plan into effect.
+
+     "When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of
+     provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot
+     without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then
+     well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too
+     thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English
+     protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our
+     greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man
+     answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to
+     the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women
+     now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how
+     can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to
+     give up liberty for their sakes?"
+
+And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said:
+
+     "If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision
+     for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every
+     kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has
+     caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get
+     them into the townships, but later on this became impossible,
+     because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the
+     idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending
+     the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable,
+     because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and
+     the men still on commando were not so closely related to these
+     families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them."
+
+Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the
+efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected
+areas.
+
+[Sidenote: The blockhouse system.]
+
+     "A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We
+     could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the
+     enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different
+     aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by
+     day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos."
+
+And again--
+
+     "There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have
+     managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have
+     been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the
+     British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But
+     things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after
+     district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory.
+     In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its
+     forces upon us."
+
+To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of
+again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony.
+
+     "Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season
+     of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed.
+     How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that
+     they can only go _op-een-stap_?"[344]
+
+         [Footnote 344: An onomatopoeic expression for the step of a
+         tired horse.]
+
+Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct
+evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers,
+and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led
+them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May
+30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of
+the English Government "may not be very advantageous to us, but
+nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position." And
+Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the
+document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to
+stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is
+because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a
+tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it.
+What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and
+the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the
+continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief
+description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,[345] he
+writes:
+
+         [Footnote 345: _The Three Years' War._]
+
+     "There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes
+     or No. It was an ultimatum--this proposal of England. What were
+     we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination."
+
+[Sidenote: Boer claim to independence.]
+
+Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the
+question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the
+moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the
+British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their
+minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives
+agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the
+sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming
+their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History may well ask,
+On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical standard,[346] the
+Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the administrative
+autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged by the laws of
+war,[347] they had been saved from the alternatives of physical
+annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic generosity of
+the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant population. From a
+constitutional point of view, the presence of Article IV.[348] in the
+London Convention was in itself sufficient to refute the claim of the
+republic to be a "sovereign international state."
+
+         [Footnote 346: [The Transvaal Government]--"or rather the
+         President and his advisers--committed the fatal mistake of
+         trying to maintain a government which was at the same time
+         undemocratic and incompetent.... An exclusive government may
+         be pardoned if it is efficient; an inefficient government, if
+         it rests upon the people. But a government which is both
+         inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under
+         which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of
+         government which the Transvaal attempted to maintain. They
+         ought, therefore, to have either extended their franchise or
+         reformed their administration" (Bryce, _Impressions of South
+         Africa_, 2nd Ed., 1900). Mr. Bryce is not likely to have been
+         unduly severe. "The political sin of the Transvaal against
+         the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of detail--of
+         less or more--but was fundamental in its denial of elementary
+         political right." And again: In the Transvaal "an armed
+         minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the
+         taxes, denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the
+         money extorted" (Captain Mahan, _The Merits of the Transvaal
+         Dispute_, 1900 [included in _The Problem of Asia_]). To
+         these, perhaps, I may be permitted to add the following words
+         spoken by myself in 1894--more than a year before the
+         Raid--and published in 1895 (_South Africa: a Study,
+         etc._):--"The Boer has still to justify his possession of
+         these ample pastures, these rich and fertile valleys, and
+         these stores of gold and of coal. If he can enlarge his mind,
+         if he can reform existing abuses, if he can expand an archaic
+         system of government and render it sufficiently elastic to
+         meet the requirements of an enlarged population and important
+         and increasing industries--well and good. If not, let the
+         Boer beware; for he will place himself in conflict with the
+         intelligence and the progress of South Africa. _Then_ the
+         Boer system will be condemned by a higher authority than the
+         Colonial Office or the opinion of England; and from the high
+         court of Nature--a court from which no appeal lies--the
+         inexorable decree will go forth: 'Cut it down; why cumbereth
+         it the ground?'"]
+
+         [Footnote 347: See admissions of the Boer Generals quoted
+         _supra_.]
+
+         [Footnote 348: "The South African Republic will conclude no
+         treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the
+         Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward
+         or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved
+         by Her Majesty the Queen." Captain Mahan writes: "In refusing
+         the Transvaal that independence in foreign relations which
+         would enable other states to hold it directly accountable,
+         Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that
+         foreigners should be so treated as to give no just cause for
+         reclamations.... Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate
+         control of foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose
+         not to permit interference in the Transvaal by a foreign
+         Power, was responsible for conditions of wrong to foreign
+         citizens within its borders. She had surrendered the right to
+         interfere, as suzerain, with internal affairs; but she had
+         not relieved herself, as by a grant of full independence and
+         sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility for
+         injury due to internal maladministration, any more than the
+         United States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy [in
+         the case of the Italian citizens lynched at New Orleans] by
+         the state sovereignty of Louisiana" (_Ibid._). And, says the
+         same writer, _a fortiori_ was Great Britain justified in
+         interfering on behalf of her own subjects.]
+
+[Sidenote: Effect of surrender terms.]
+
+Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by
+the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question
+whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating
+at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which,
+as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been
+deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually
+pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms
+actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the
+British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement of
+the country, and left it to them to decide at what time, and by what
+stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies. The two
+respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight
+dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess
+rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language
+in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions
+are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound
+policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain
+districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small
+number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated
+homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous
+and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The
+refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves
+with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional
+Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy
+responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an
+altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police.
+At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in
+such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under
+the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient
+remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system--a
+system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition of arms by
+the natives in South Africa--the number of rifles possessed by the
+Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government;
+while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege
+of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to
+British rule would form an additional safeguard.
+
+In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of
+course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of
+English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South
+Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have
+resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of
+the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have
+retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these
+circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination
+of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the
+material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was
+the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new
+administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free
+trade in language"--that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond,
+the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the
+convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of
+administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these
+concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full
+self-government would not be granted to either of the new colonies
+until a British or loyalist majority was assured.
+
+[Sidenote: Free initiative secured.]
+
+But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their
+immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete
+freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for
+the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative
+reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task--at once more
+congenial and more especially his own--was discharged is a matter that
+must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of
+the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the
+review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  "Acting Chief-Commandant" of the Orange Free State, The, his report
+    of De Wet's success in Cape Colony, 431, 432.
+  Administrative reconstruction, 397, 458, 489, 523 _et seq._
+  Africa. _See_ South Africa.
+  Afrikander Bond, The, 46;
+    programme of, 50 _et seq._;
+    its sphere of action, 55;
+    its power in Cape Colony, 55;
+    its origin, 56;
+    its purpose, 56 to 58, 106;
+    its first congress, 59;
+    its "programme of principles," 59;
+    its change of policy, 60;
+    members returned to it by the Cape Parliament, 60, 483;
+    meets at Bloemfontein, 63;
+    adopts the Hofmeyr programme, 64;
+    its manner of reuniting European communities in S. Africa, 65;
+    its first openly avowed aim, 66;
+    falls back on the policy of 1881, 69;
+    its influence in the Cape Legislature, 70, 93, 121, 122, 141;
+    its attempts to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, 94, 95;
+    the parliamentary chief and the real leader of, 97;
+    Lord Milner's remonstrance to the Dutch of Cape Colony, 84, 91, 92, 98;
+    the sum and substance of its policy, 106, 107, 119;
+    address to Lord Milner from the Graaf Reinet branch, 108;
+    Lord Milner's reply, 109 to 113;
+    Sir Gordon Sprigg's defiance of, 116;
+    the funds of, 118;
+    its domination, 150;
+    nature of its "mediation" with Pres. Krueger, 162, 169, 195, 274, 276;
+    demonstrations organised by, 215;
+    the completeness with which it had undermined British power, 223;
+    its view of the Salisbury Cabinet, 274;
+    its activity, 348;
+    its attitude at the end of January, 1900, 373;
+    annual congress at Somerset East, 374;
+    its policy after the occupation of the Republics, 429;
+    its attitude in February, 1901, 430;
+    the qualities of its leaders, 435;
+    its leaders decline to associate themselves with the efforts of the
+      Burgher Peace Committee, 474;
+    its identification with the Boer invaders, 475;
+    the character of the men it sent to Parliament, 483.
+  "Afrikanderdom," the doctrine of, 197.
+  Afrikander nationalists, The, 48 (note), 267;
+    the creed of, 48 _et seq._, 119;
+    their plan of a united S. Africa, 70;
+    Mr. Chamberlain's hope of winning their support, 73;
+    strength of their forces, 74, 96, 104;
+    their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
+    uneasiness of, 113;
+    dominate S. Africa, 126;
+    their motives with regard to the Bloemfontein Conference, 157;
+    their direct appeal to the Queen, 294;
+    unmasked, 300;
+    their speech and action during the war, 343;
+    they co-operate with the two Republics with a view to pressing their
+      "peace overtures" on the British Government, 360, 361;
+    their "conciliation" meetings, 361, 382;
+    renewal of their alliance with the Liberal Opposition, 369;
+    their objects, 382, 383;
+    their opposition to the Treason Bill, 395;
+    their references to Boer successes, 396;
+    they slander the British troops, 398;
+    their hatred of England, 429;
+    assistance rendered by them to the guerilla leaders, 478;
+    their commission to Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 495.
+  "Afrikander party" The, the friends of in England, 375, 379.
+  Agricultural Department, The, formation of in Orange River Colony, 525.
+  Agriculture, The development of in new colonies, 536.
+  "Albany" settlers, The, 15, 271.
+  Albert, 346.
+  _Albert Times, The_, 120.
+  Aliens Expulsion and Immigration Laws, The, Mr. Chamberlain's demand for
+      the repeal of, 81;
+    repeal and amendment of, 82, 88, 94.
+  Aliwal North, 346, 411, 455.
+  Amershof, Mr. Justice, 103.
+  Amery, Mr., 291, 300.
+  Amphitheatre Meeting, The, 131.
+  Anti-British Press, The, 68, 166, 205 to 207, 225, 272, 349, 374, 380,
+    391, 403, 409, 477.
+  Ardagh, Sir John, 319 (note).
+  Arms, The surrender of, 573;
+    the possession of, 581.
+  Army Corps, The, the order to mobilise, 244, 317, 318;
+    arrival of, 305, 321, 331.
+  Arnold-Forster, H. O., 516.
+  Asquith, H. H., his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 92, 99;
+    his utterances, 416.
+  Attorney-General, The (Cape), notice issued by as to acts of treason,
+      480.
+
+
+  Baden-Powell, Colonel, afterwards General, 191 (note), 329 (note), 397,
+      530.
+  Balfour, A. J., 203 (note), 228, 302, 307.
+  _Balfourian Parliament, The_, 319 (note).
+  Balliol Scholars, 76 (note).
+  Bantu, The, 11, 12, 25.
+  Barberton, 452.
+  Barkly East, 346.
+  Barkly, Sir Henry, 275.
+  Bastards, The, 281.
+  Basuto incident, The, 496 (note).
+  Basutoland, 83;
+    British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298;
+    construction of the railway to from Bloemfontein, 532 (note).
+  Beaconsfield, Lord, 24.
+  Bechuanaland Expedition, The, 350 (note).
+  Bechuanaland, 83;
+    the administration of the European population of, 35;
+    the Transvaal's attempt to secure, 64, 74, 93;
+    the Dutch community in, 346.
+  Bechuanas, the employment of as indentured labourers, 117.
+  Beechranger Hottentots, The, 2, 4.
+  Belgrave, Lord (now Duke of Westminster), 167.
+  Berry, Dr. (now Sir) Wm., 124 (note).
+  Bethulie Bridge, 411, 455;
+    alleged movement of British troops to, 236.
+  Bezuidenhout, the Boer, 11.
+  Blignaut, J. N., letter from, 258.
+  Blockhouse system, The, area inclosed by, 458;
+    effect produced by, 456, 457;
+    efficiency of, 576;
+    extension of, 455;
+    its help to the railways, 533.
+  Bloemfontein, Meeting of the Afrikander Bond at, 63;
+    opening of the railway at, 67;
+    seizure of correspondence at, 156, 162, 206, 376;
+    the occupation of, 328, 363, 384;
+    visit of Lord Milner to, 397;
+    the effective occupation of the district round, 453;
+    discussion at of the question of peace between Lords Milner and
+      Kitchener, 471;
+    civil administration in, 524;
+    construction of the railway to Basutoland, 532 (note).
+  Bloemfontein Conference, The, 268;
+    proposed, 140;
+    agreed to by President Krueger, 153;
+    negotiations leading up to, 151 to 165;
+    meeting of, 167, 168;
+    the discussion at a closing of, 168, 172;
+    the result of, 172;
+    the four months which followed, 174.
+  Bloemfontein Convention, The, 17, 87 (note);
+    Sir G. Grey's criticism of, 19.
+  _Bloemfontein Express, The_, 50, 54, 63, 67.
+  Blood, Sir Bindon, 425.
+  Bodley, J. E. C., statement by, 76 (note).
+  Boer Administration, The, depraved character of, 212.
+  Boer Army, The, 336, 337, 340 (note).
+  Boer aspirations, The, 302.
+  Boer children, Teaching of during the war, 519 to 523.
+  Boer Peace commissioners, The, their tortuous diplomacy, 526;
+    the "Terms of Surrender" communicated to them, 563;
+    their departure from Pretoria, 569.
+  Boer deputation in Europe, The, 555.
+  Boer emigrants, The, 19.
+  Boer leaders, The, their decision to continue the struggle, 414, 417,
+      418, 424 _et seq._;
+    their disingenuousness, 557;
+    penalties to which they were liable, 564;
+    they treat for peace, 552, 555 _et seq._
+  Boer raiders, The, 438.
+  Boer revolt of 1880-81, The, 31.
+  Boer Republics, The (_see also_ Orange Free State and Transvaal),
+      creation of, 17, 19;
+    scheme for their union with the British colonies, 24.
+  Boer spies, 337.
+  Boer, vernacular, The, 547.
+  Boers, The, the (3rd) Duke of Portland's despatch relating to their
+      treatment, 9;
+    their dealings with the natives, 11;
+    the grant of self-government to, 29;
+    their resistance to British arms 48;
+    their bitterness against Lord Milner, 80;
+    their military forces, 181, 340 (note),
+      without uniform, 336;
+    personal dealings with, 194, 195;
+    their friends in England, 232, 414, 424, 573;
+    breaches of faith by, 399;
+    their losses up to November, 1901, 458;
+    final surrender of, 573 (note).
+  Bond, The. _See_ Afrikander Bond.
+  Bond Press, The, 209.
+  Booy the Hottentot, 11.
+  Borckenhagen the German, 49, 50, 66.
+  Botha, Louis, 564;
+    dispersal of his army, 322;
+    defeat of at Diamond Hill, 329;
+    defeat of at Dalmanutha, 329;
+    in Johannesburg, 337;
+    urges his fellow-burghers to lay down their arms, 414, 424;
+    his determination to fight on, 421;
+    circular issued by him, 425 (note);
+    his responsibility for the suffering of the Boers during the guerilla
+      war, 427;
+    failure of the negotiations with Lord Kitchener, 434;
+    stimulates his followers, 457;
+    treats for peace, 471, 552, 554;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556;
+    letter to him from Mr. Chamberlain as to the re-opening of the
+      discussion after the surrender of Vereeniging, 562;
+    advocates submission, 571, 577;
+    Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact and energy after signing the
+      treaty of peace, 573 (note);
+    his views on the position of the Boer women and children during the
+      later stages of the war, 575;
+    his testimony to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's blockhouse system,
+      576;
+    his admission as to the impossibility of again raising a revolt in Cape
+      Colony, 577.
+  "Botha" terms, The, 471, 554.
+  Bower, Sir Graham, 41.
+  Brand, President, 28, 275;
+    discourages the Afrikander Bond, 55;
+    the role played by him in 1881, 153.
+  Brebner J., 564.
+  Breed's Nek, 455.
+  British Administration, the failure of in S. Africa, 1, 22;
+    distrust of by the British in S. Africa, 37;
+    the Bond and, 65;
+    its impotency, 69;
+    efficiency of impaired by English party politics, 254.
+  British and Dutch factions, The, bitterness of, 244.
+  British Army, The, in Cape Colony and Natal, 189, 325;
+    disadvantage in which it was placed, 253;
+    its performance in S. Africa, 323;
+    the number of effectives available, 323;
+    its difficulties, 330 _et seq._;
+    the slander of, 398, 499.
+  British colonists, the settlement of on the land, 538.
+  British Government, representatives of at the Cape, 7;
+    its treatment of the natives and Dutch in S. Africa, 8.
+  British Navy, The, the offer of an annual contribution to the cost of,
+      95;
+    holds the seas, 311.
+  British party, A, the creation of, 150.
+  British policy in S. Africa, 9 _et seq._;
+    up to 1897, 69.
+  British population in Cape Colony, The, 107, 115, 127;
+    effect of the Redistribution Bill on, 125;
+    their approval of Lord Milner's policy, 216;
+    their dismay at the Imperial Government's reception of the seven years'
+      franchise law, 222;
+    their support of Lord Milner, 270;
+    numbers which took part in the war, 324.
+  British settlers in the country, 61.
+  Britstown, 354.
+  _Brunt of The War, The_, 462 (note).
+  Bryce, James, The Rt. Hon. M.P., attitude and public utterances of, 259,
+      314, 360, 415, 496;
+    misstatement by, 263;
+    the "settlement" advocated by him, 370;
+    his view of the Transvaal Government, 579 (note).
+  Buller, General Sir Redvers, 191;
+    defeat of, 306;
+    his responsibility for the early disasters, 318, 319;
+    his misconception of the state of affairs, 319, 320;
+    at Maritzburg, 321;
+    forces at his disposal, 321;
+    false report of surrender to the Boers, 380.
+  Bundy, Thomas Dashwood, 212 (note).
+  Bunu, the affair of, 89 (note).
+  Burger, Schalk, 89, 101, 159, 564;
+    denounced by Krueger, 100;
+    attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
+    his determination to fight on, 421;
+    his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers in the guerilla war,
+      427;
+    his official notice of June 20th, 1901, 434;
+    his complaint against the system of the Burgher Camps, 463 (note);
+    announces to Lord Kitchener that he is prepared to treat for peace,
+      552;
+    granted a safe-conduct through the British lines to consult Mr. Steyn,
+      552;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556;
+    calls upon the meeting to decide upon continuing the war or not, 570;
+    his account of the origin of the war, 574;
+    his reasons for treating for peace, 578.
+  Burgher Camps, deportation of Boer non-combatants to, 459;
+    high rate of mortality in, 460 to 463;
+    Lord Kitchener's reply to the official Boer complaint against the
+      camps, 463 (note);
+    condition of, 503, 505, 513;
+    establishment of schools in, 519 to 523;
+    views of the Boers on, 575.
+  Burgher meetings, The, the minutes of, 560 _et seq._
+  Burgher Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423;
+    its efforts, 427, 429;
+    treatment of its agents, 427 to 429;
+    Bond leaders hold aloof from, 474.
+  Burghersdorp, The theological seminary of, 120.
+  Burns, John, 315, 496.
+  Burt, Thomas, 498 (note).
+  Butler, General Sir William, refuses to transmit a petition for
+      protection from the British residents in the Transvaal, 131, 176;
+    his sympathy with the views of Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 174, 184;
+    his views of a war, 174, 175, 179;
+    his view of the Uitlander grievances, 175;
+    the friction between him and Lord Milner, 175, 176;
+    his view of the attitude of the British inhabitants of S. Africa, 177;
+    his action during the crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of war,
+      180;
+    requested to furnish a scheme of defence, 180, 181;
+    his scheme, 181 to 183;
+    his evidence before the War Commission, 175 (note), 181 to 183;
+    his failure to endorse Lord Milner's request for immediate
+      reinforcements, 183, 319;
+    his withdrawal from the command at the Cape, 184, 247, 269, 289;
+    his only point of agreement with Lord Milner, 185;
+    his estimate of the military strength of the burgher forces, 185;
+    is informed of the Cabinet's decision as to reinforcements, 190.
+
+
+  Caledon, Lord, one of the first measures as Governor of the Cape, 10.
+  Cambridge, The Duke of, 494 (note).
+  Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, his public utterances on the war, 192,
+      252, 256, 259, 314, 367, 368, 399, 416, 418, 574;
+    his treatment of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal as to preparations for war,
+      265, 266;
+    his attitude in Committee of Supply, 371 (note);
+    his remarks in the debate on the S. African Settlement, 393;
+    his charges of inhumanity against the Government and Lord Kitchener,
+      460, 464 (note);
+    his reply to the charge brought against him by Sir M. Hicks-Beach, 466,
+      467;
+    his speech at Stirling on October 25th, 1901, 467;
+    his declaration at Plymouth, 499.
+  "Canadian Precedent," The, 385.
+  Cape Colony, The, an incident in the settlement of the Dutch E. India Co.
+      at, 2;
+    isolation of at the end of the 18th century, 6;
+    the task of governing, 6;
+    the old European population in, 7;
+    representatives of the British Government at, 7;
+    the temporary British occupation of in 1795-1803, 8;
+    population of at the time of the permanent British occupation, 10;
+    Franco-Dutch population in, 11;
+    the "Albany Settlers" in, 15;
+    the emancipation of slaves in, 15;
+    disintegrating influences at work in, 28;
+    transfer to the British Government, 51;
+    the sphere of action of the Afrikander Bond, 55;
+    conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Transvaal, 64;
+    speech of Cecil Rhodes on March 12th, 1898, 67;
+    anti-British sentiment of the Dutch leaders in, 91;
+    the political situation at the time of Lord Milner's arrival, 93;
+    division of parties in, 97;
+    aspirations of the Dutch in, 105;
+    the leaders of Dutch opinion in, 106;
+    public meetings in, 131;
+    nationalists of, 142, 195;
+    the vote for responsible government in, 147;
+    creation of a British party in, 151;
+    the garrison in, 191;
+    demonstrations in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, 215;
+    petition from to the Queen, 216;
+    the British forces in, 243;
+    the Boer aspiration to annex, 258, 259;
+    organisation of the defences of, 269, 278;
+    the British population of, 271;
+    only in name a British colony, 273;
+    alarming rumours from, 305;
+    rebellion of the Dutch in, 341 to 372;
+    proclamation of martial law, 345, 411;
+    Lord Milner's despatch dealing with the rebellion, 346;
+    disclosure of a new centre of rebellion, 354, 355;
+    the second invasion of, 383, 430;
+    racial relations in, 383;
+    clearing it of the republican invaders, 384;
+    the situation in November, 1900, 398;
+    De Wet enters, 430;
+    is chased out, 432;
+    the area to be protected, 445;
+    response of the British population to arms, 446;
+    numbers of Boers in the field in, 454;
+    screened off by blockhouses, 458;
+    the course of events in, 473;
+    collapse of the system of responsible government in, 478 to 480;
+    the Government stipulates for certain conditions as to the procedure
+      of military courts, 481;
+    number of troops placed by the Government of in the field, 485, 486;
+    treatment of rebels in, 563, 567.
+  _Cape Argus, The_, 243 (note).
+  Cape Boys, The, the ill-treatment of, 89 (note).
+  Cape Civil Service, The, disaffection of, 272.
+  Cape Distriks-bestuur, The, 349.
+  Cape electoral system, The, 115, 116.
+  Cape garrison, The, 191, 204, 278.
+  Cape local forces, The, 281 (note).
+  Cape Ministry, The (_see also_ Schreiner Cabinet and Sprigg), its views
+      as to its duties and powers in case of a war, 164;
+    and the Bond, 193;
+    attitude of, 198;
+    "moral support of," 217;
+    its views upon the settlement of the new colonies, 546.
+  Cape nationalists, The, 167, 268.
+  Cape Parliament, The, Afrikander Bond influence in, 60, 70, 393;
+    Progressive majority in, 393;
+    prorogation of, 478, 482.
+  Cape Parliamentary Reports, 395.
+  _Cape Times, The_, 48 (note), 220, 379 (note);
+    report of J. X. Merriman's speech in, 62;
+    its reported interview with Cecil Rhodes, 114;
+    its views on the Redistribution Bill, 117.
+  Capetown, mass meeting at, 204, 250;
+    alleged plot to seize, 350.
+  _Carisbrook Castle, The S.S._, 132 (note).
+  Carnarvon, 354.
+  Carnarvon, Lord, his scheme of federal union, 27.
+  "Carnival of Mendacity," The, 477.
+  Cartwright, Albert, 380, 381, 477.
+  _Cecil Rhodes_, Vindex's, 68 (note).
+  _Century of Wrong, A_, Mr. Reitz's, 356.
+  Cetewayo, destruction of a British regiment by one of his _impis_ 17;
+    his organisation of the Zulus, 25.
+  Chaka, 25.
+  Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, 40, 41, 45, 72;
+    his inquiry of Lord Rosmead as to the Jameson raid, 42;
+    his active sympathy with the Uitlanders, 47;
+    his policy, 72, 73, 125;
+    his choice of Lord Milner as High Commissioner, 75, 77;
+    his despatch of March 6th 1897, 81;
+    accusation against, 82;
+    asserts Great Britain's suzerainty over the Transvaal, 126 (note);
+    his intimation to the Pretoria Executive as to the dynamite contract,
+      130;
+    accepts the suggestion of a conference at Bloemfontein, and decides
+      to postpone the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the
+      Uitlanders, 140;
+    a question put by him to Mr. Philip Schreiner, 146;
+    authorises Lord Milner to attend the Bloemfontein Conference, 155;
+    his despatch of May 10th, 1899, 155, 194;
+    agrees with the line proposed to be taken by Lord Milner at the
+      Bloemfontein Conference, 157;
+    his alleged determination to force a war on the Transvaal, 184;
+    his declaration in the House of Commons on the failure of the
+      Bloemfontein Conference, 188;
+    his desire to avoid war, 196;
+    the support given by him to Lord Milner, 200;
+    his speech of June 26th, 1899, at Birmingham, 202, 204;
+    urges delay in passing the limited Franchise Bill, 210;
+    believes the crisis to be at an end, 221;
+    prepared to accept Krueger's illusory Franchise Law, 222;
+    statement by him in the House of Commons on the new franchise law, 227;
+    proposes to the Transvaal a joint commission, 229;
+    his action after the repudiation by the Pretoria Executive of the
+      arrangement made between Mr. Smuts and Sir Wm. Greene, 238, 239;
+    he repudiates the claim made by the S. African Republic to be a
+      sovereign international state, 240;
+    his despatch of September 8th, 1899, 240, 241;
+    his speech at Highbury on August 27th, 249;
+    his proposal to Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman as to preparations for war,
+      265, 266;
+    repudiates the charges of bad faith brought against Sir Wm. Greene,
+      290;
+    his anxiety for a peaceful settlement, 293;
+    his statement at Birmingham, on May 11th, 1900, as to the number of the
+      forces in S. Africa, 325;
+    his statement at Birmingham of the nature of the settlement the
+      Government had determined on, 367;
+    sends a despatch to Lord Milner on the subjects of compensation of
+      loyalists and punishment of rebels, 384;
+    his reply to the views of the Schreiner Cabinet on the questions, 386;
+    his views upon the disfranchisement of the rebels, 389;
+    replies to the arguments of the Schreiner Ministry
+      in favour of a general amnesty, 395;
+    his speech containing the chief points in the proposed proclamation to
+      the fighting burghers, 420;
+    abandons the proposal, 421;
+    sanctions the issue of Governor's warrants at the Cape, 479;
+    refuses an appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479;
+    assents to Lord Milner's application for leave, 488;
+    importance attached by him to the views of the Cape and Natal
+      Governments on the question of the settlement of the new colonies,
+      489, 490;
+    receives Lord Milner, 490, 491;
+    report presented to him by the Land Settlement Commission, 516;
+    agrees to a tax on the mining industry, 542;
+    his reply to Lord Milner's telegram on the financial position, 543;
+    concurs in Lord Milner's proposals for land settlement, 544;
+    approves Lord Milner's suggestion as to the enlargement of the
+      Legislative Councils, 545;
+    declines to re-open the discussion after the signature of the
+      Vereeniging surrender, 562.
+  Channing, M.P., Mr., 489 (note).
+  Chartered Company, The, 36, 66, 83.
+  Churchill, Winston, Mr., his statement on the use of the word "natives"
+    in the "Terms of Surrender," 568 (note).
+  Civil Administration, the establishment of, in the new colonies, 397,
+      519;
+    its progress, 489, 524.
+  Claremont, speech of Sir J. Rose Innes at, 361, 362.
+  Cloete, Judge, his opinion of Lord Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's
+    frontier policy, 14.
+  "Closer Union," the policy of, 49, 70.
+  "Coercive measures," Boer, 425.
+  Colenso, 306, 321;
+    a result of the defeat at, 8;
+    the Free State Boers moving on, 305.
+  Colesberg, 346, 348.
+  Colonial Conference, The, of 1897, 95.
+  Colonial Office, The, the administration of, 23;
+    a leakage from, 153.
+  Colonial questions, the study of, 24;
+    necessity of, 254.
+  Colonial rebels, The, penalties to be inflicted on, 563, 567;
+    surrenders of, 573 (note).
+  Colonies, The, offers of military aid from, 251, 324.
+  Commando Nek, 455.
+  _Commissie Van Toezicht, The_, 349.
+  Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, The, the report of, 97.
+  Concentration Camps. _See_ Burgher Camps.
+  Concessions Commission, The, 376, 377 (note).
+  "Conciliation," movement, The, 343, 359, 361, 373 to 412;
+    Lord Milner's record of the origin of the movement, 373;
+    injurious influence of the movement on the Colony, 381;
+    the Englishmen who took part in, 383;
+    the initiation of, 375, 415.
+  Conciliation Committee, The, in England, 415.
+  Conservative Governments, 255.
+  Conventions, The, Sir George Grey on, 19;
+    Lord Milner on, 86, 87 (note), 358, 360.
+  _Cornhill Magazine, The_, 263 (note).
+  _Coronation of King Edward VII._, J. E. C. Bodley's, 76 (note).
+  Courtney, Leonard (now Lord), his public utterances on the war, 232,
+      251, 257 to 259, 360, 363, 496, 497;
+    advocates the autonomy of the Republics, 370, 415;
+    letter to him from President Krueger, 372.
+  Cronje, surrenders at Paardeberg, 328.
+  Cronwright-Schreiner, Mrs., 146.
+  Crown Colony Government, formal initiation of, 490, 501, 544.
+  Customs Union, The, 36.
+
+
+  _Daily Chronicle, The_, a statement in as to the crisis in S. Africa,
+    154.
+  Dalmanutha, defeat of Louis Botha at, 329, 414.
+  Davies, "Karri," Major W. D., 88.
+  De Aar, 305, 354, 455.
+  De Jong, Mr., 402 (note), 477.
+  De Kock, Meyer, shot, 427.
+  Delagoa Bay, The proposed railway line to, 29;
+    its purchase recommended by Sir Bartle Frere, 29;
+    appearance of a British squadron at, 82;
+    consignment of ammunition to, 236;
+    railway communication with Pretoria re-opened, 329.
+  De la Rey, J. H., 434, 552, 556, 562 (note), 564;
+    Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note).
+  _De Patriot_, 48, 50 (note), 56, 57, 63.
+  _De Rand Post_, 213.
+  Derby, Lord, publication of his telegram of Feb. 27th, 1884, 262.
+  _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, 54, 57 (note), 58.
+  De Villiers, A. B., 382, 404, 406.
+  De Villiers, Melius, 160, 232;
+    advocates a cessation of hostilities, 401.
+  De Villiers, Sir Henry, 28, 95 (note), 102;
+    his letter of May 21st, 1899, to Pres. Steyn, 159;
+    his visit to Pretoria in 1899, 159, 160;
+    his complaint of the obscurity of the new franchise law, 218, 219;
+    his letter to Mr. Fischer urging Pres. Krueger's acceptance of the joint
+      inquiry, 232, 311;
+    his appeal to Pres. Steyn not to declare war, 292.
+  "Development Loan," The, 540.
+  Devonshire, The Duke of, comment on Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's attitude
+    in Committee of Supply, 371 (note).
+  De Wet, Christian, 420, 434, 562 (note), 564, 575;
+    his blow at Sannah's Post, 363;
+    his responsibility for the sufferings of the Boers during the guerilla
+      war, 427, 428;
+    his laager near Lindley, 427;
+    enters Cape Colony, 430, 577;
+    chased out of it, 432;
+    his _Three Years' War_, 433 (note);
+    the pursuit of, 471;
+    his report to L. Botha on the rising in the Cape, 475;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552, 556;
+    signs the Vereeniging Agreement, 567 (note);
+    advocates a continuance of the war, 571, 578;
+    Lord Kitchener's appreciation of his tact, 573 (note).
+  De Wet, Piet, protests against the treatment of the agents of the Peace
+      Committee, 427;
+    desires the Afrikander leaders to associate themselves with the Burgher
+      Peace Committee, 474.
+  De Wet, Sir Jacobus, 82.
+  Diamond Hill, defeat of the Boers at, 329.
+  Diamond Jubilee, The, celebration of on the Rand, 86, 90.
+  Diamond Mines, The, earnings of, 23;
+    Mr. Merriman's association with, 149.
+  Diamonds, The discovery of, 23.
+  Disarmament, The operation of, 413 to 469;
+    views of the Natal Ministry on, 549.
+  Dodd, Mr., arrest of, 131.
+  Doornkop, The surrender of Dr. Jameson's troopers at, 68 (note).
+  Dordrecht affair, The, 496 (note).
+  Downing Street, The impossibility of governing S. Africa from, 1, 22,
+      34, 35;
+    Mr. Chamberlain and, 47.
+  Doyle, Sir A. Conan, his _War in South Africa_, 469 (note).
+  Duncan, Mr., 515, 527.
+  Du Plessis, H. A., his protest against the treatment of the Boers who
+    were in favour of peace, 428.
+  Durban, 271.
+  D'Urban, Sir Benjamin, the reversal of his frontier policy, 12 to 15.
+  Durham, Lord, his report on Canada, 480.
+  Dutch, The, their first conflict with the natives of S. Africa, 3.
+  Dutch, The Cape, rebellion of, 341 to 372;
+    the aggravation and use of their disaffection, 373;
+    disarmament of, 413 to 469;
+    their sympathy with the Boer raiders, 432, 433;
+    their restlessness and embitterment, 443;
+    their general attitude, 444.
+  Dutch East India Company, The, an incident in their settlement at the
+      Cape, 2;
+    a century and a half of their government, 5;
+    the corner stone of their policy, 5;
+    their instructions to Van Riebeck, 5, 9.
+  Dutch language, The, the use of, 565, 581.
+  Dutch party, The, interests of, 273.
+  Dutch Press, The, the nationalist propaganda of, 69, 106, 107, 119.
+  Dutch Reformed Church, The, 120, 215, 410, 411, 428.
+  Dutch Republic, A, The establishment of, 255, 356, 357.
+  Dutch South African, The, the original stock from which they are
+      descended, 5;
+    their essential unity, 24;
+    Lord Milner's anxiety to see their best side, 90;
+    anti-British sentiment of, 91, 104;
+    their moral conquest of Cape Colony, 107.
+  Dutch, The republican, 17, 19, 28, 36;
+    conditions under which they were incorporated into the system of
+      British S. Africa, 545.
+  Dutch vote, The, 150.
+  Du Toit, Rev. S. J., 50 (note), 54;
+    his articles in _De Patriot_, 56;
+    rejected by the Bond, 58;
+    reference to him in J. N. Blignaut's letter, 258.
+  Duxbury, Mr., 212 (note).
+  Dynamite Contract, The, 130.
+
+
+  Ebden, Mr. Alfred, 173.
+  Edgar, Tom Jackson, 130, 131 (note), 132, 175.
+  Educational reconstruction, The work of, 519 to 523.
+  Eerste Fabriken, 456.
+  Eighty Club, The, an address to by Mr. Morley, 371 (note).
+  Eliot, Mr., 306.
+  Ellis, M.P., John, 498 (note).
+  Emigrant Farmers, The, 15 to 17.
+  England, The military unpreparedness of, 185;
+    ignorance of the situation in S. Africa, 251, 253, 283, 316, 323, 331;
+    hatred of, 312.
+  _England in Egypt_, 76.
+  English language, The, war against, 58.
+  English State Church, The, Afrikander view of, 53.
+  "Equal rights for all white men," The policy of, 1, 32.
+  Esau, brutal murder of, 427 (note).
+
+
+  Farelly, Mr., 126 (note), 214.
+  Farmer, Canon, 259.
+  "Farmers' Protection Association, The," 59, 60.
+  Farrer, Lord, 498 (note).
+  Faure, Pieter (now Sir), 93, 105.
+  Fiddes, G. V., 167, 515;
+    his report on the work of the departments of education, public works,
+      and district administration, 526.
+  Fischer, Abraham, 126 (note), 161, 203, 204, 210, 239 (note);
+    acts as interpreter at the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
+    his advice to Krueger, 217;
+    in constant communication with Mr. Schreiner, 217 (note);
+    dissociates himself from the "mediation" policy of the Cape
+      nationalists, 234;
+    works at the completion of the military preparations of the Republics,
+      234;
+    revises the Boer reply to the British despatch of Sept. 8th, 1899, 242;
+    recasts the ultimatum, 291;
+    attempt to influence him to terminate the war, 495.
+  Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, The, 203 to 210, 236, 275, 555.
+  Fish River, The, grants of land beyond, 13.
+  FitzPatrick, Sir Percy, 264, 273.
+  _Five Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers_, 16 (note).
+  Forestier-Walker, Lieut.-General, appointed to the Cape command, 184,
+      247, 269;
+    military measures of, 288.
+  Fouche, 432.
+  Fowler, Sir Henry, 416.
+  Franchise for the Uitlanders, The five years', 37, 156, 157, 170, 172,
+      238;
+    conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238.
+  Franchise Law, The, 209 _et seq._;
+    the Volksraad discussion on, 213;
+    demonstrations upon, 215;
+    Krueger recommends a further modification of, 217;
+    the new law passed, 218;
+    obscurity of its provisions, 218 to 220;
+    flagrant insincerity of, 234;
+    Mr. Smuts offers a simplified seven years', subsequently a five years'
+      franchise in lieu of the proposed joint inquiry, 237, 238;
+    conditions attached to the proposed new franchise, 238;
+    the Home Government kept inactive by, 288.
+  France, The attitude of, 311.
+  Franco-Dutch population at the Cape, The, 11;
+    secession of part of, 17.
+  Fraser, Edmund, difficult position of, 175.
+  Fraser, J. G., his opposition to the policy of "closer union," 49;
+    beaten for the Presidential election, 70.
+  Free State Dutch, The, 18.
+  Frederickstad, 455.
+  French, General, his advance on Colesberg, 348;
+    libel on, 477;
+    surrenders of rebels to, 573 (note).
+  French, Mr., 306.
+  Frere, (the late) Sir Bartle, 24, 25, 261;
+    his diagnosis of the S. African situation, 26;
+    his difference with the Beaconsfield Cabinet, 26;
+    his recall, 27;
+    the vindication of his statesmanship, 27;
+    his knowledge of S. African conditions, 28;
+    drafts a scheme of administrative reform, 28;
+    his private memo, written from the Cape in 1879, 29;
+    events following his recall, 34, 255;
+    letter from to Sir Gordon Sprigg, 263.
+  Frere, Sir Bartle, and Mr. John Morley, 261.
+  _Friend, The_ (Bloemfontein), 235.
+  Froneman, Commandant, 428.
+
+
+  Gatacre, General, defeat at Stormberg, 321, 348.
+  German Emperor, The, telegram of, 71.
+  German General Staff, The, reply to its criticism, 334.
+  German Government, The, action of, 37, 232;
+    attitude of, 311.
+  German Marines at Delagoa Bay, 39 (note).
+  Germiston, Lord Milner's speech at, 491 (note).
+  Gill, Sir David, his words, 286.
+  Girouard, Sir Percy, 502, 532.
+  Gladstone, Rev. Stephen, 498.
+  Gladstone, W. E., S. African policy of, 26, 31.
+  Glencoe, British force despatched to, 291.
+  Glenelg, Lord (_see_ also Grant), Cloete's opinion of his despatch
+    reversing Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy, 14.
+  Gold Industry, The, Commissions on, 529;
+    resumption of, 536.
+  Goodenough, General, his schemes for the defence of the British
+    colonies, 180.
+  Goold-Adams, Major Sir H., 470, 488, 515, 524, 526.
+  Government House, watched by spies, 273.
+  Governor's warrants, 478.
+  Graaf Reinet, first congress of the Afrikander Bond at, 59;
+    Lord Milner's speech at, 84, 91, 92, 98, 99, 107, 115, 367;
+    opening of the railway at, 108;
+    the people's congress at, 379, 381.
+  Grahamstown, 61.
+  Graham, T. Lynedoch, 116 (note).
+  Grant, Charles (aft. Lord Glenelg), his reversal of Sir Benjamin
+    D'Urban's frontier policy, 12 _et seq._
+  Greene, Sir Wm. Conyngham, 82, 127, 131 (note), 198, 210, 226 (note),
+    237, 238, 241, 242, 252, 290, 295, 299, 310.
+  Gregorowski, Chief Justice, 103, 259.
+  Grey, Sir Edward, 416.
+  Grey, Sir George, neglect of his advice by the Home Government 18;
+    his exposure of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions, 19;
+    his despatch to Sir E. B. Lytton, 19;
+    is charged with "direct disobedience," 20, 22;
+    recalled and reinstated, 20;
+    attitude of the Home Government towards, 21.
+  Griqualand West, the discovery of diamonds in, 23;
+    an invitation to the Boers to invade, 260.
+  Groebler, Mr., 204, 205.
+  Guerilla warfare, commencement of, 398;
+    Pres. Steyn's responsibility for, 414, 415;
+    methods and conditions of, 417;
+    responsibility for sufferings of the Boers during, 426, 427;
+    increased losses, to the country due to, 437;
+    methods by which it was brought to a close, 450, 575.
+
+
+  Haldane, Mr., 416.
+  _Handelsblad_, The Amsterdam, an article in, 50.
+  Harcourt, Sir William, 75, 76, 502;
+    his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 78;
+    his misstatement on the Suzerainty question, 262;
+    his manifestation of hostility to the loyalist population of South
+      Africa, 464 (note);
+    his financial miscalculations, 502.
+  Hargrove, E. T., 375 to 380, 415, 496 (note).
+  Harrison, Frederic, 498 (note).
+  "Harry" the Hottentot chief, 3.
+  Heany, Captain, 40, 42, 43.
+  Heidelberg, 456.
+  Hely-Hutchinson, Sir Walter, 470;
+    prorogues the Cape Parliament, 478, 479 (note).
+  Herholdt, A. J., 150, 204;
+    joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142;
+    his mission, 205 (note), 207;
+    his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 390, 393.
+  _Het Oosten_, 477.
+  Het Volk, 55 (note).
+  Hertzog, General, 564, 572;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 558;
+    crosses the Orange River, 430.
+  High Commissioner for S. Africa, The, decreasing power of, 36;
+    severance of the office from the governorship of the Cape, 419, 470.
+  "High Court Crisis," The, 102, 103.
+  _History of the War in South Africa, The Official_, vol. i. 309 (note)
+    _et seq._
+  _History of the War in South Africa, The Times'_, 217 (note), 300 (note),
+    309 (note), 340 (note), 351 (note).
+  Hobhouse, Lord, 498 (note).
+  Hobhouse, Miss, 462 (note).
+  "Hofmeyr Compromise, The," 277.
+  Hofmeyr, J. H., 55;
+    the influence of, 60;
+    adoption of his programme by the Bond, 64;
+    his alliance with Rhodes, 65;
+    dictates Lord Rosmead's policy, 70;
+    his attitude towards the offer of a contribution to the cost of the
+      British Navy, 95;
+    the real leader of the Bond party, 97, 116, 117;
+    his action to prevent the publication of Lord Milner's despatch on the
+      petition of the Uitlanders, 140;
+    asks Lord Milner to meet Krueger in conference, 140, 153;
+    his methods for paralysing British administration, 140, 141;
+    his motives, 147;
+    approaches Lord Milner as to meeting Pres. Krueger at Bloemfontein, 154,
+      156;
+    his anxiety to prevent decisive action of the Imperial Government, 158;
+    his absence from the Bloemfontein Conference, 167;
+    the pressure of his "mediation," 196;
+    in close communication with Abraham Fischer, 203;
+    confers with Messrs. Fischer and Smuts at Bloemfontein, 205;
+    goes to Pretoria, 207;
+    the failure of his mission, 209;
+    his relations with the republican nationalists, 216, 217;
+    urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry, 232, 311;
+    his view of Mr. Schreiner's position as Premier of the Cape, 235;
+    his opinion of the result of war, 275;
+    his telegram of Sept. 14th to Pres. Steyn, 275;
+    his displeasure at the Schreiner Cabinet, 346, 361;
+    at a meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur, 349.
+  Hottentots, The, 2 to 5, 9, 10.
+  House of Commons, The, debate in on the S. African settlement, 393.
+  Hunter, General, Sir A., Prinsloo surrenders to, 329.
+
+
+  "Imperial factor, The," 40;
+    the elimination of, 34, 85.
+  Imperial Light Horse, The, 179, 447.
+  Imperial military authorities, The, charges brought against, 459.
+  Imperial military railways, The, 502, 505.
+  Imperial spirit, The, 21, 24.
+  Imperial troops, The, calumnies on, 398, 499;
+    insufficiency of, 452, 453;
+    the task of, 435, 452, 487.
+  Impossible position, An, 128.
+  _Impressions of South Africa_, By J. Bryce, extract from, 579 (note).
+  Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act, The, 396.
+  "Independence," the Boer claim to, 578.
+  India, The feudatory princes of, 311.
+  Indian Army, The, troops from for S. Africa, 243, 310.
+  Indian military authorities, The, promptitude displayed by, 289.
+  Industrial Commission, The, anticipation of good results from, 105;
+    impartiality of, 89;
+    treatment of its Report, 99 to 101.
+  Industrial corporations, growth of, 36.
+  Innes, Sir James, 118 (note), 125, 271, 361, 362;
+    becomes Attorney-General, 390;
+    notice issued by him as to treason, 480, 481.
+  Intelligence Department, The, the work of, 177, 180, 190, 217 (note),
+    233, 234 (notes), 257, 277 (note), 292 (note), 319 (note), 425.
+  Inter-State Conference, An, proposal of, 153.
+  Irish Nationalist party, The, 465.
+  Irrigation, report of Sir W. Willcocks on, 516, 529.
+  Isandlhwana, the military disaster of, 17, 26.
+
+
+  Jameson, Dr., 38 _et seq._;
+    his disregard of the Reformers' message and of Rhodes's telegram, 43.
+  Jameson Raid, The, 33, 37, 41;
+    its effect on the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance, 68;
+    object of, 38 to 44;
+    Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into, 82;
+    political forces set in motion by, 93;
+    results of, 69, 71.
+  Janssen, David, the murder of, 2, 3.
+  Johannesburg, 439;
+    Lord Milner's farewell speech at, 129, 145;
+    the second Reform movement at, 132;
+    enthusiastic meeting at, 198, 199, 215;
+    march of Lord Roberts on, 214;
+    exodus from, 246;
+    situation in, 248;
+    occupation of, 329;
+    Lord Roberts's decision to advance on, 352;
+    arrangements for the civil administration of, 397;
+    effective occupation of the district round, 453;
+    British population allowed to return to, 459;
+    Lord Milner's reception at, 472;
+    establishment of a Town Council for, 489;
+    abolition of the office of Military Governor, 489;
+    the public buildings at, 526;
+    organisation of municipal police in, 529.
+  Johannesburg insurrection, The, 41.
+  Johannesburg mines, The, project of wrecking, 214.
+  Johannesburg Reformers, The, 88 (note).
+  _Johannesburg Star, The_, 145 (note), 245;
+    extract from, 491 (note).
+  Johannesburgers, The, splendid fighting of, 447.
+  _John Bull & Co._, Max O'Rell's, 43 (note).
+  Joint Inquiry, The, proposed, 229, 231;
+    refused by the Volksraad, 237.
+  Joubert, General, 101, 235, 320, 344.
+  Jubilee despatch, Lord Milner's, 90 to 92, 99, 104, 107.
+
+
+  Kafir, invasion of 1834-5, The, 15.
+  Kafirs, British policy towards, 12 _et seq._
+  Kafir wars, The, 17.
+  Karree Siding, 363.
+  Kei River, The, the Kafir's line of, 13.
+  Kekewich, Colonel, calls for arms, 304.
+  Kitchener, Lord, 303;
+    appointed Chief of the Staff to Lord Roberts, 321;
+    his losses before Paardeberg, 332;
+    instructed to proceed to De Aar, 354;
+    reduces to order the north-midland districts of the Cape, 362;
+    defamatory libel on, 381;
+    agrees with Lord Milner's views as to the proposed proclamation to
+      the burghers, 420, 421;
+    his address to the Burgher Peace Committee, 422;
+    failure of his peace negotiations with L. Botha, 434;
+    his accession to the command, 452;
+    the troops at his disposal, 453;
+    origin of his system of blockhouse defence, 455;
+    his expectations of the blockhouse lines, 456;
+    reports the creation of mobile columns, 456;
+    his reply to the official Boer complaint against the system of Burgher
+      Camps, 463 (note);
+    discusses with Lord Milner the nature of the reply to Botha's overtures
+      for peace, 471;
+    instructions to his officers as to procedure in military courts, 481;
+    permits the mines to re-open, 489;
+    differs from Lord Milner's views of the terms of the surrender, 551,
+      560;
+    directed to put forward a copy of the correspondence between the
+      British and Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders, 552;
+    assures the Boer leaders that no terms will be granted maintaining the
+      independence of the Republics, 553;
+    is authorised to refer the leaders to the offer made to General Botha
+      at Middelburg, 554;
+    refuses the terms of the Boer peace commissioners, 557;
+    announces "peace" to Lord Milner, 572;
+    records his appreciation of the energy and tact displayed after the
+      signing of the peace treaty by Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and
+      C. De Wet, 573;
+    his last words addressed to the Colonial Governments and the Secretary
+      of State for War, 573 (note);
+    the efficiency of his blockhouse system, 576.
+  Kimberley, 259, 271, 286 (note), 455;
+    the diamond industry at, 23;
+    plans for the defence of, 178, 278, 279;
+    Lancashire Regiment sent to, 288;
+    is cut off, 304, 305;
+    relief of, 328;
+    effective occupation of the district of, 453.
+  Kimberley, The Earl of, 27.
+  Kimberley Volunteers, The, 280, 282 (note).
+  Kipling, Rudyard, on the attitude of the Bond 430, 434.
+  Klerksdorp, 458;
+    conference at, 552.
+  Kock, Judge, warlike speech of at Paardekraal, 197.
+  Komati Poort, the occupation of, 322, 329.
+  Kotze, Chief Justice, the dismissal of, 102, 103;
+    indignation caused by, 116.
+  Krause, Dr., 214.
+  Kretschmar, J. Van, 377, 533 (note).
+  Krogh, General, 564.
+  Kroonstad entered, 329.
+  Krueger, Paul, 84 to 86;
+    his letter to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney on Sir Bartle Frere's recall, 27;
+    his allusion to Germany at the German Club at Pretoria, 38;
+    supplies arms to adherents of the nationalist cause, 71;
+    invited to visit England, 72;
+    calls for the appointment of the Industrial Commission, 89, 99;
+    uncompromising attitude of, 89;
+    denounces Schalk Burger, 100;
+    elected President of the South African Republic for the fourth time,
+      101;
+    dismisses Chief Justice Kotze, 102, 103;
+    his determination to increase the disabilities of the Uitlanders, 103;
+    signs a treaty of alliance with the Orange Free State, 104;
+    his attitude in 1898, 114;
+    subsidises the Bond, 118;
+    claims independence for the South African Republic, 126 (note);
+    consents to meet Lord Milner at Bloemfontein, 153;
+    his retrogressive policy, 160;
+    meets Lord Milner, 168;
+    his appearance at the Conference, 171;
+    his motive in attending it, 172;
+    the possibility of his declaring war, 183;
+    expresses his intention of introducing his franchise scheme to the
+      Volksraad, 193;
+    the scheme laid before the Volksraad, 194, 197;
+    his incapacity to yield, 194;
+    complexity of his franchise proposals, 196;
+    his bid for the "moral support," of the Cape Ministry, 209;
+    grants a limited franchise, 209;
+    his object in doing so, 210, 211;
+    wishes to retain the "moral support" of the Cape Ministry, 217;
+    recommends to the Volksraad a further modification of the Franchise
+      Bill, 217;
+    inadequacy of his franchise law, 218;
+    hastens arrangements for war, 231;
+    his secret agents 233 (note);
+    urged by Afrikander Members of Cape Parliament to accept the offered
+      joint inquiry, 233;
+    opposition to it, 234;
+    strength of his military position, 244;
+    his note refusing to consider the British offer of September 8th handed
+      to Sir Wm. Greene, 252;
+    his boast, 259;
+    the illusory concessions embodied in his franchise law, 268;
+    spies in his pay, 273;
+    his coarse duplicity, 277;
+    winning all along the line, 288;
+    flees the Transvaal, 329;
+    his "peace overtures," 355;
+    his letter to Mr. Courtney, 372;
+    his telegram to Pres. Steyn shortly before the Bond Congress at
+      Somerset East was postponed, 375, 377;
+    attempt to influence him to terminate the war, 495.
+  Krueger, Tjaart, 212 (note), 213.
+  Kruegersdorp, arrival of Dr. Jameson at, 44.
+  Kruitzinger, crosses the Orange River, 430, 432.
+
+
+  Labouchere, Henry, 232, 233, 237, 256, 498.
+  Ladies' Commission, The, 511.
+  Ladysmith, British force entrained at, 291;
+    Sir G. White shut up in, 320, 344;
+    spies in the camp of the relieving force, 337.
+  Lagden, Sir Godfrey, 515, 528.
+  Laing's Nek, evacuated by the Boers, 329.
+  Lancashire Regiment, The, sent to garrison Kimberley, 288.
+  Land settlement, proposed loan for, 540, 543, 544.
+  Land Settlement Commission, The, 516, 529.
+  Langlaate Estate, The, 149.
+  Lanyon, Sir Owen, 263.
+  Lawson, Sir Wilfred, 498 (note).
+  _Leader, The Transvaal_, 213 (note), 245.
+  Legal Adviser's office, The, work of, 527.
+  Legislative Councils of the new colonies, The, enlargement of, 544.
+  Leon, M., 288.
+  Leonard, J. W., 61, 93.
+  Lewis, Mrs., 144.
+  Leyds, Dr., 50 (note), 232, 375;
+    communication opened with European Powers through, 103, 104;
+    despatched to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary of the South African
+      Republic, 125.
+  Liberal Opposition leaders, The, attitude and public utterances of, 143,
+      167, 192, 203, 252, 257, 259, 261, 264 to 266, 314, 367, 368, 371
+      (note), 399, 414, 424, 430, 431, 460, 496, 502;
+    their desire to escape from responsibility, 254;
+    renewal of their alliance with the Afrikander nationalists, 369, 496;
+    representations of the delegates of the Worcester Congress to, 496.
+  Liberal Party, The, mandate to, 25;
+    friends of the Boers in the ranks of, 382, 417, 573.
+    _See also_ Bryce, Burns, Campbell-Bannerman, Courtney, Labouchere,
+       Lloyd-George, Morley, etc.
+  _Life of Gordon, The_, 497 (note).
+  _Lifetime in South Africa, A_, 16 (note).
+  Limpopo River, The, 36.
+  Lindley, De Wet's laager at, 427.
+  Lloyd-George, Mr., 315, 496, 498.
+  Loch, Lord, 36, 37;
+    retirement of, 74.
+  Lombard, Mr., 213.
+  London Convention (1884), The, 31, 87 (note), 262;
+    a violation of, 81;
+    Article IV. in, 580.
+  _Lord Milner and South Africa_, 166 (note).
+  Loreburn, Lord, his attitude during the war, 496.
+  Lorenzo Marques, Transvaal ammunition despatched from, 237.
+  Loyalists, The compensation of, 384.
+  Lucas, General, 564.
+  Lytton, Sir E. B., 20, 21 (notes).
+
+
+  McCallum, Sir Henry E., 470.
+  Mafeking, 259;
+    the role played by, 179 (note);
+    capture of an armoured train outside, 304;
+    relief of, 329.
+  Mafeking Volunteers, The, 282 (note).
+  Magaliesberg, The, 455.
+  Magersfontein, 321;
+    a result of the defeat at, 8.
+  Majuba Hill, the British defeat at, 43, 186, 255;
+    evacuated by the Boers, 329.
+  Malan, Commandant, 432.
+  Malan, Mr., 349, 410, 477.
+  Manchester, meeting at, 251, 257.
+  Maritzburg, 271, 321;
+    public meeting at, 249, 250.
+  Martial law, declaration of in additional districts, 411, 478, 482;
+    its administration, 484, 485.
+  Martial Law Board, The, 484, 485.
+  Massingham, Mr., 154 (note).
+  _Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, The_, Captain Mahan's, 579 (note).
+  Merriman, J. X. 61, 69, 93, 97;
+    report of his Grahamstown speech in the _Cape Times_, 62;
+    his letter of March 11th, 1898, to President Steyn, 114;
+    joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142;
+    his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond, 143,
+      144, 148;
+    his association with the Diamond Mines at Kimberley, 149;
+    his partisanship, 149;
+    his desire to induce President Krueger to grant a "colourable measure
+      of reform," 151, 152;
+    sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,
+      152;
+    his appeal to Mr. Fischer, 161;
+    his breach with Mr. Schreiner, 361;
+    his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics, 376 to 378;
+    repudiation of Pres. Krueger's statement as to his intimacy with Mr.
+      Hargrove, 380; his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 391;
+    his denunciation of the policy of the Home Government, 391, 474;
+    purpose of his visit to England, 495;
+    banquet in his honour, 496;
+    his frankness as to his mission, 497;
+    his attack on Lord Milner, 497;
+    attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall, 498.
+  Methuen, Lord, his engagements, 305; forces at his disposal, 321.
+  Meyer, J. L., his views on the war, 574.
+  Middelburg, 458.
+  Middelburg Terms, The, 471, 554, 557 (note), 558, 559, 561, 562, 568
+    (note).
+  Military criticisms on the war, 330 _et seq._
+  "Military Notes," estimate in of Boer forces, 181 (note).
+  Military preparations, delay in making, 242, 243, 246, 250, 279, 288,
+    290, 309 to 311, 316.
+  Military railways, The, 502, 532.
+  Milner, Viscount, pre-eminence of his administration in South Africa, 32;
+    the state of affairs he was called on to deal with, 33;
+    the political situation on his arrival in South Africa, 69;
+    the choice of him as High Commissioner, 75;
+    his official career, 75;
+    his assistance to Sir William Harcourt, 75, 76;
+    banquet to him, 77;
+    extract from his speech at the banquet, 78;
+    affection of those associated with him, 78, 79;
+    his resolution, 79, 219;
+    bitterness of Afrikanders and Boers against, 80;
+    his profound knowledge of the needs of South Africa, 80;
+    efforts of the Liberal party to revoke the final arrangements of his
+      administration, 81;
+    his arrival in South Africa, 81;
+    the policy of, 82;
+    travels through Cape Colony, etc., 83;
+    his speech at Graaf Reinet, 84, 91, 92, 98, 99, 107, 115;
+    his official duties, 84;
+    his position in regard to the Transvaal Government, 84, 85;
+    his anxiety to arrange matters by a friendly discussion with President
+      Krueger, 85, 86, 88;
+    confidence shown him by the British population, 86 (note);
+    his policy with regard to the Conventions, 87;
+    his anxiety to see the best side of the Dutch in the Cape, 90 to 92;
+    travels round Cape Colony, 104;
+    conciliatory utterances of, 105;
+    his reply to the address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander
+      Bond, 109 to 113;
+    the position taken up by him towards the Cape Dutch, 114;
+    his impartiality, 122;
+    visits England, 127;
+    his grasp of the situation, 127;
+    urges the British Government to put an end to an impossible position,
+      128;
+    his farewell speech at Johannesburg, 128, 145;
+    endorses the petition of the Uitlanders, 131;
+    his intention to make public in England his despatch on the position of
+      the Uitlanders, 139;
+    asked to meet Pres. Krueger in conference, 140;
+    warns Mr. Schreiner of the gravity of the situation, 140;
+    postponement of the publication of his despatch, 140;
+    difficulty of his position, 142;
+    sounded by Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Merriman as to the possibility of an
+      inter-state Conference, 152;
+    his despatch of May 4th, 1899, telegraphed, 153;
+    approached by Mr. Hofmeyr as to meeting Pres. Krueger at Bloemfontein,
+      154;
+    issue of his despatch of May 4th, 1899, 156, 169, 194;
+    consults Mr. Chamberlain as to the "line" he should take at the
+      Conference, 156, 157;
+    his view of Pres. Krueger's acceptance of a conference, 159;
+    meets Pres. Krueger at Bloemfontein, 167;
+    his staff, 167;
+    his reception at Bloemfontein, 168 (note);
+    his embarrassing position, 169, 192;
+    the compromise offered by him, 170;
+    his "inflexibility," 170;
+    his motive in attending the Conference, 171;
+    address presented to him on his return from it to Capetown, 172, 173;
+    essence of his reply to the address, 173;
+    origin of his disagreement with General Butler, 175, 176;
+    his desire for preparations for war, 178, 183, 186, 269, 309, 331;
+    his only point of agreement with General Butler, 185;
+    his reiterated warnings, 189;
+    inadequate reinforcements sent in response to his appeal, 191, 192;
+    acquiesces in the negotiations after Bloemfontein, 195;
+    his relations with the Schreiner Cabinet, 198 to 201;
+    support given him by Mr. Chamberlain, 200, 201;
+    his interviews with Mr. Schreiner, 200, 201;
+    assists the Fischer-Hofmeyr Mission, 207, 208;
+    urges delay in passing the Franchise Bill through the Volksraad, 210;
+    demonstrations of confidence in his statesmanship, 215;
+    his influence with the Afrikander leaders, 216;
+    his opinion of the new franchise law, 219, 220;
+    points out to Mr. Chamberlain defects in the law, 221;
+    prevents surrender of Home Government, 222 _et seq._;
+    his resolute advocacy of the Uitlanders' cause, 224;
+    bitter attack on him in _Punch_, 225;
+    his despatch protesting against the readiness of the Government to
+      accept the new franchise law, 225 to 229;
+    further deflection of his policy, 231;
+    conveys to the Pretoria Executive the offer of a joint inquiry, 231;
+    withdraws the limit placed by Sir Wm. Greene upon the time of the reply
+      from the Boer Government to the British Government's despatch of
+      September 8th, 1899, 241;
+    the compromise proposed by him at Bloemfontein, 244;
+    his anxiety, 247;
+    asks for another military adviser, 247;
+    his despatch explaining his position at the Bloemfontein Conference,
+      247;
+    appeals for prompt action, 248;
+    Mr. (now Lord) Courtney's attack on Lord Milner, 252, 257, 258;
+    warns the English people of the advocacy of a Dutch Republic in South
+      Africa, 255;
+    makes known to the Government the state of affairs, 267;
+    his colonial ministers, 270;
+    support given him by the British population in South Africa, 270;
+    atmosphere of intrigue by which he was surrounded, 271;
+    abuse of him by the _South African News_, 272, 380, 381;
+    passage of war material to the Orange Free State brought to his notice
+      accidentally, 273;
+    his personal charm, 277;
+    his efforts to persuade Mr. Schreiner of the necessity of providing for
+      the defence of Kimberley, 278, 279;
+    his advice to the Cape and Home Governments, 282, 283;
+    his limited powers, 283;
+    a passage in his speech in the House of Lords on February 26th, 1906,
+      283;
+    defensive measures devised by him, 288;
+    his use of the time elapsing between the recall of General Butler and
+      the ultimatum 289;
+    instructed to repudiate the claim of the South African Republic to be
+      a sovereign international state, 290;
+    his anxiety to attain a peaceful settlement, 293;
+    receives the ultimatum, 295;
+    warns the British authorities in Natal, Rhodesia, and Basutoland, 298;
+    the call upon his constructive statesmanship, 303;
+    consults Mr. Schreiner upon the feasibility of carrying out Sir Redvers
+      Buller's suggestion to form local defences out of Dutch farmers, 320;
+    his relationship with the military authorities, 341;
+    alliance against him, 343, 344;
+    scant help afforded him by Mr. Schreiner, 345;
+    his despatch telling the story of the rebellion in the Cape, 346;
+    addresses a memorandum to Lord Roberts on the rebellion in Cape Colony,
+      351, 352;
+    his view as to the defence of the Cape, 353;
+    visits the north-midland districts of the Cape, 362;
+    arrives at Bloemfontein, 363;
+    receives an appreciative address at Capetown, 363;
+    his reply to the address, 364;
+    his record of the origin of the "conciliation" movement, 373;
+    his representation to Mr. Schreiner as to the proposed Bond congress at
+      Somerset East, 374;
+    his despatch covering the newspaper report of the People's Congress at
+      Graaf Reinet, 381;
+    his view of racial relations in Cape Colony, 383;
+    receives a despatch from Mr. Chamberlain on the questions of the
+      compensation of loyalists and the punishment of rebels, 384;
+    inquires as to the Home Government's views upon the disfranchisement
+      of the rebels, 389;
+    bitter invectives against him of members of the Schreiner Cabinet, 391;
+    wins over Mr. Schreiner to the side of the Empire-State, 393;
+    indicates to Mr. Chamberlain the nature of the Treason Bill, 394;
+    pays a brief visit to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, 396;
+    makes arrangements for the civil administration of Pretoria and
+      Johannesburg, 397;
+    his journey to Bloemfontein, 397;
+    inaugurates the South African Constabulary, 397;
+    receives the commissions under which he is appointed to administer
+      the new colonies, 398, 419, 470, 501;
+    receives a deputation from the Worcester Congress, 404;
+    his reply, 406;
+    his final departure from the Cape to the Transvaal, 419;
+    his objection to issuing a proclamation to the fighting burghers at
+      the close of 1900, 420;
+    approves of Lord Kitchener's proposals, 421;
+    his account to Mr. Chamberlain of the situation on February 6th, 1901,
+      436;
+    leaves Capetown to assume administration of the new colonies, 470;
+    incidents of his journey, 471;
+    discusses with Lord Kitchener the nature of the reply to Botha's
+      overtures for peace, 471;
+    the position taken up by him, 472;
+    at Pretoria, 472;
+    the sphere of his administrative activity, 473;
+    his second visit to England, 473, 487, 490;
+    endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479;
+    issues a notice as to acts of treason, 480, 481;
+    obtains the views of the Cape and Natal Governments on the question
+      of the settlement of the new colonies, 489;
+    his reception on his second return to England, 490;
+    his audience with the King, 490;
+    marks of royal favour shown to him, 490, 491;
+    his speech at a luncheon given in his honour, 492;
+    agitation for his recall, 499;
+    returns to Johannesburg, 501;
+    his despatch describing affairs in November, 1901, 503;
+    invites Mr. E. B. Sargant to organise the work of educational
+      reconstruction, 520;
+    appoints commissions on the gold industry, 529;
+    his attention to the reorganisation of the railways, 532;
+    urges the settlement of British colonists on the land, 538;
+    proposes a loan for land settlement, 540;
+    his tireless energy, 541, 545;
+    his proposed tax on the mining industry, 541;
+    his telegram on the immediate financial position, 542;
+    his repatriation scheme, 543;
+    presses for a decision on the land settlement question, 543;
+    differs from Lord Kitchener's views upon the terms of the surrender,
+      551, 560;
+    drafts the terms of the surrender, 551, 558;
+    refuses the terms of the Boer Peace Commissioners, 557;
+    his care as to the English text of the Vereeniging surrender, 560, 561;
+    England's debt to him, 562;
+    summoned to Pretoria for the signing of the treaty of peace, 572.
+  Mines Department, The, reorganisation of, 528.
+  Mines, The, the project of wrecking, 214;
+    permitted to re-open, 489, 507;
+    native labour for, 509;
+    their prosperity, 518.
+  Mining plant, injury to by Boer raiders, 438.
+  Mining industry, Lord Milner's proposed 10 per cent, tax on, 541.
+  Missionaries, The, work of, 18.
+  Mitchell, Sir Lewis, 485.
+  Mobile columns, The creation of, 456.
+  Modder River, Station, 322, 328.
+  Monypenny, Mr., attempt to arrest, 245.
+  Mooi River, The, 455.
+  Morgendael, J., 428.
+  Morley, John, misstatement by, 261;
+    his attitude and public utterances on the war, 252, 259, 263, 314,
+      360, 370, 371 (note), 415.
+  Mueller, E. B. Iwan, letter in the possession of, 166;
+    his _Lord Milner and South Africa_, 166 (note).
+  Mueller, G., 428.
+  Municipal police, Organisation of, 529.
+
+
+  Naauwpoort, 455.
+  Namaqualand, The election for, 121.
+  Napier, Sir George, his evidence before the House of Commons on Lord
+    Glenelg's reversal of Sir B. D'Urban's frontier policy, 14.
+  Natal, 51;
+    a menace to, 26;
+    public meetings in, 131, 215;
+    petition from to the Queen, 216;
+    the invasion of, 235;
+    the British forces in, 243, 246, 269;
+    Boer aspiration to annex, 258, 259;
+    mobilisation of the local forces in, 280 (note);
+    Transvaal commando sent to the border, 290;
+    the British authorities in, warned by Lord Milner, 298;
+    treatment of the rebels in, 563, 567, 568.
+  Natal Ministry, The, views of on the settlement of the new colonies,
+      547 to 550;
+    views of on disarmament and the treatment of the natives, 549;
+    advocates "reciprocity" in the learned professions and civil services
+      of the several colonies, 550;
+    puts forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of
+      the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal, 550;
+    its view as to the treatment of the rebels, 568.
+  Nationalist movement, in South Africa, The, 48 _et seq._
+  National Union, The, 41.
+  Native Affairs, The Department of, in the Transvaal, 528.
+  Natives, The, the question of arming, 281;
+    the question of the franchise for, 566;
+    the treatment of, 549.
+  Navy Contribution Bill, The, 96;
+    second reading of, 125 (note).
+  Netherlands Government, The, 232;
+    offer mediation, 551.
+  Netherlands Railway, The, 376 to 381, 532 (note).
+  New South Wales, offers a military contingent, 251.
+  Nicholls incident, The, 212, 213.
+  Nicholson, Colonel, 179.
+  _Nineteenth Century, The_, 261 (note);
+    article by Sir Bartle Frere in, 29 (note).
+  Non-interference, the principle of, 10, 12.
+  _Norman, The S.S._, 247.
+  Norval's Pont, 521.
+
+
+  Olivier, Commandant, 287 (note), 564.
+  _Ons Land_, its paean of triumph over the surrender of Jameson's troopers,
+      68 (note);
+    its reproof of Sir Pieter Faure, 105;
+    its anti-British policy, 106;
+    its indictment of the Sprigg Ministry, 117;
+    its presentation of the objects of the Afrikander party, 119;
+    its article on the Mission of Messrs. Hofmeyr and Herholdt, 205 to 207;
+    meeting of the Cape Distriks-bestuur at the offices of, 348, 349;
+    its New Year exhortation, 349;
+    its comment on the postponement of the Bond Congress at Somerset East,
+      374;
+    its approval of the slanders on British troops, 403;
+    its comment on Lord Milner's reply to the Worcester Congress, 409;
+    libels General French, 477.
+  Orange Free State, The, mineral wealth of, 54;
+    relations of the Imperial Government to, 87 (note);
+    its treaty of alliance with the Transvaal, 104, 125;
+    irritation in against British intervention, 215;
+    ammunition sent to, 216, 247, 273, 286;
+    alleged movement of British troops to the border of, 236;
+    the danger of a premature grant of responsible government to, 284;
+    decides to declare war, 291;
+    Lord Roberts enters, 328;
+    annexation of, 329;
+    invades south of Orange River, 344;
+    the Landdrosts of, 347;
+    the "Acting Chief-Commandant" of, 432;
+    area enclosed by blockhouse lines, 458;
+    the number of scholars on the school rolls, 523 (note).
+  Orange River, The, 455.
+  Orange River Colony, Lord Milner arranges for the civil administration
+      of, 397;
+    reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.E. of, 441;
+    numbers of Boers in the field in, 454;
+    progress of civil administration in, 489, 524;
+    issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of, 490, 501,
+      544;
+    grant in aid of the revenue of, 501;
+    number of scholars on the school rolls, 523, 524;
+    revenue of, 528;
+    farm settlers in, 536;
+    the settlement of, 546;
+    military administration in, 566;
+    taxation of landed property in, 566.
+  _Oranjie Unie_, The, 55 (note).
+  _Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed, The_, 49, 54 (note), 234 to
+    236 (notes).
+
+
+  Paardeberg, conduct of the attack on, 332;
+    surrender of Cronje at, 328, 354.
+  Paardekraal, great assemblage of Boers at, 197;
+    speeches delivered at, 213.
+  Pakeman, Mr., arrest of, 245.
+  "Pass" system, The, 528.
+  Paul, H., 368.
+  Peace, Preparing for, 470 to 535.
+  Peace commissioners, The Boer, 556.
+  Peace Committee, The, 412, 422, 423;
+    treatment of agents of, 427 to 429;
+    its efforts, 427, 429.
+  Permits, The establishment of, 482.
+  Poplar Grove, 354.
+  Port Elizabeth, Ammunition landed at, 216, 236.
+  Portland, The (3rd) Duke of, his despatch referring to the treatment of
+    the Boers, 9
+  Pretoria, The British flag hoisted over the Raadzaal of, 167 (note), 329;
+    war preparations at, 234, 235, 244;
+    ammunition sent to, 236;
+    railway communication with Delagoa Bay re-opened, 329;
+    Lord Roberts's decision to advance on, 352;
+    his occupation of, 369;
+    Lord Milner makes arrangements for the civil administration, 397;
+    Burgher Peace Committee formed at, 412, 422;
+    effective occupation of the district round, 453;
+    Lord Milner at, 472;
+    the public buildings at, 526;
+    meeting between the Boer leaders and Lords Milner and Kitchener at,
+      552, 556.
+  Pretoria Convention, The, 31, 87 (note).
+  Pretoria Executive, The, attitude of, 82, 88, 89;
+    Mr. Chamberlain's communication to on the dynamite contract, 130;
+    its attempt to buy off the capitalists, 131, 152;
+    its committal to a policy of defiance, 158;
+    its negotiations with the Home Government after the Bloemfontein
+      Conference, 196, 199;
+    its lack of good faith, 231;
+    repudiates the arrangement made by Mr. Smuts with Sir Wm. Greene, 238,
+      239, 242;
+    charges Sir Wm. Greene with bad faith, 242;
+    its declaration of September 15th, 1899, to Mr. Hofmeyr, 276;
+    brings negotiations to a conclusion, 289;
+    its replies to the British despatches of July 27th and May 10th, 294.
+  Pretorius, Mr., 406, 421.
+  Pretyman, General, 470.
+  Price, Mr., 306.
+  Prieska, 354.
+  Prinsloo, Commandant, surrender of, 329.
+  Pro-Boers, The manufacture of, 434, 443.
+  Proclamation to the fighting burghers, The proposed, 420.
+  "Programme of Principles," The Afrikander Bond, 59.
+  Progressive Cabinet, A, formation of, 280 (note), 390.
+  Progressive Party, The, 97, 98, 116, 118;
+    the funds of; 118;
+    their strength in the Cape Parliament, 121, 122, 393;
+    led by Sir Gordon Sprigg, 125;
+    their support of Lord Milner, 271;
+    resolution presented to the Home Government by, 295.
+  _Punch_, 225.
+
+
+  Queen's Hall, Pro-Boer meeting in, 498.
+  Queensland, offers a military contingent, 251.
+
+
+  Raad, The, meeting of, 193.
+  Racial fusion, The problem of, 516.
+  Railway lines, The cutting of, 459.
+  Railways, The, the reorganisation of, 530, 535.
+  Rand, The, 36, 518;
+    agitation on for reform, 131;
+    recommencement of the industrial life of, 489, 507, 536.
+  Rebels, The, treatment of, 384 to 391, 563, 567, 568;
+    their disfranchisement, 388, 389;
+    surrenders of, 573 (note).
+  "Reciprocity" between the civil services of the several colonies, 550.
+  Redistribution Bill, The, introduction of, 116;
+    second reading of, 117, 118;
+    its effect on the British population, 125.
+  Reform Committee, The, 39;
+    their message to Dr. Jameson, 40;
+    alteration of their plans, 41, 42.
+  Refugees, The return of, 489, 507, 508, 512, 533.
+  Registration of electors, The, postponed, 476.
+  _Reichstag, The S.S._, 236.
+  Reinforcements, The, character of, 330.
+  Reitz, F. W., 50, 144, 159, 294, 564;
+    his policy of "closer union," 49;
+    takes Dr. Leyds's place as State Secretary, 126;
+    asserts the Sovereignty of the Transvaal, 127 (note);
+    his reply to Mr. Chamberlain's communication on the dynamite contract,
+      130;
+    instructed to decline Mr. Chamberlain's request for delay in passing
+      the Franchise Bill, 211;
+    his despatch refusing the preferred joint inquiry, 237;
+    communicates to the British Government Mr. Smut's new proposals for
+      a five years' franchise, 238;
+    his despatch repudiating the Smuts-Greene arrangement, 239;
+    his appeal to "Free Staters and Brother Afrikanders," 297;
+    Mr. Amery's meeting with him, 300;
+    his book, _A Century of Wrong_, 356;
+    a letter of his published by the Concessions Commission, 377 (note).
+  Repatriation scheme, Lord Milner's, 543.
+  Republican nationalists, The, 259, 275, 282;
+    their hatred of England, 429.
+  Republican United States of South Africa, The, 258, 259.
+  Republics, The, military preparations of, 166, 167, 178, 234;
+    expulsion of British subjects from, 246;
+    manifestoes issued by upon the outbreak of war, 257;
+    their treatment of British residents on the declaration of war, 292;
+    fall of, 329;
+    the British case against, 357 to 359.
+  Reserves, Insufficient supply of, 323, 331.
+  Retrocession, The, 255.
+  Rhodes, Cecil, 34, 35, 83;
+    his scheme of commercial federation, 38, 39;
+    his comment on Dr. Jameson's Raid, 40;
+    actual cause of the failure of his plan, 45;
+    his methods, 46;
+    his alliance with the Afrikander Bond, 46;
+    his alliance with J. H. Hofmeyr, 65;
+    an incident in his political career, 66;
+    his speech of March 12th, 1898, 67;
+    recognised by the Bond as its enemy, 68;
+    his resignation, 93, 96;
+    his return to political life, 97;
+    the actual chief of the Progressives, 117;
+    opposed at Barkly West, 118 (note);
+    returned for both Barkly West and Namaqualand, 121;
+    his tactics after the election following upon Sir Gordon Sprigg's
+      dissolution of Parliament, 122, 123;
+    his interview with Lord Milner, 124 (note); his anger at the impotence
+      of England, 306;
+    endorses the appeal for the suspension of the Cape constitution, 479.
+  Rhodesia, 84, 192;
+    demonstration in of confidence in Lord Milner's statesmanship, 215;
+    petition from to the Queen, 216;
+    organisation of the defences of, 269;
+    warned by Lord Milner, 298.
+  Ripon, The Marquess of, 37, 498 (note).
+  Roberts, Lord, 329 (note);
+    a result of his occupation of Bloemfontein, 156;
+    appointed to the South African command, 321;
+    strength of his force, 322, 332 (note);
+    his despatches, 326 to 328, 339, 341, 352;
+    his tactics at Paardeberg, 332, 333;
+    his alleged instructions from the Government, 333;
+    a reply to criticism of German General Staff upon his strategy, 334;
+    his campaign, 343;
+    his decision to advance on Johannesburg and Pretoria, 352;
+    his qualities as a captain of war, 353;
+    why he did not carry out Lord Milner's suggestion as to the defence of
+      the Cape, 353;
+    his occupation of Pretoria, 369;
+    his enforced halt at Bloemfontein, 384;
+    his approaching return to England, 398;
+    his recognition of the difficulty of the task of disarmament, 413;
+    relinquishes command of the forces in South Africa, 419;
+    agrees with Lord Milner's views on the proposed proclamation to the
+      burghers, 420;
+    his proclamation, 424;
+    his victories, 435;
+    sends some of the civilian population to L. Botha, 452.
+  Robertson, Edmund, M.P., 417, 498 (note);
+    his speech at Dundee on Oct. 16th, 1901, 467, 468.
+  Robinson, J. B., 149.
+  Robinson, Sir John, his view of the reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's
+    frontier policy, 16.
+  Roos Senekal, capture of documents at, 425, 426, 431;
+    circular issued at, 463 (note).
+  Rosebery Lord, his appreciation of Lord Milner, 77, 278;
+    his support of the Government, 264, 416.
+  Rosmead, 455.
+  Rosmead, Lord, 36, 39;
+    his action, 45;
+    his response to Mr. Chamberlain's counsels, 46;
+    his policy, 70;
+    his attitude at Pretoria, 72;
+    intimates his wish to retire, 74;
+    his resistance to the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize
+      Bechuanaland, 74;
+    retires, 75;
+    his promise to obtain reasonable reforms from. President Krueger,
+      88 (note).
+  _Rosslyn Castle, The S.S._, 305.
+  Russia, attitude of, 311.
+
+
+  St. Aldwyn, Lord, his charge against members of the Liberal Opposition
+    and the Irish Nationalists, 465.
+  Salisbury, The (late) Marquess of, 75;
+    sympathetic speech of on the Transvaal question, 228, 229;
+    his answer to the charge of "military unpreparedness," 265;
+    receives "peace overtures," 355;
+    his reply, 357;
+    his indignant comment on the attitude of the Liberal leaders, 416;
+    his charge against Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, 466;
+    receives Lord Milner, 490.
+  Salisbury Cabinet, The, reluctance of to push matters to an extremity,
+      176, 188;
+    its disregard of Lord Wolseley's advice, 177, 188, 189, 190;
+    its decision as to reinforcements, 190, 191;
+    the course it decided to adopt, 196;
+    its weakness, 223, 224;
+    determines to make a definite announcement of its South African
+      policy; 228;
+    position taken up by it, 230;
+    its last effort to come to a friendly understanding, 240;
+    its despatch of Sept, 8th, 1899, 241, 242;
+    decides to raise the strength of the Natal and Cape forces, 242,
+      243, 246, 250, 279, 288;
+    its reluctance to make war, 251;
+    patriotism of, 266;
+    Afrikander leaders' view of, 274;
+    decides to mobilise an army corps, 290;
+    its military action, 309, 310, 331;
+    its alleged instructions to Lord Roberts, 333, 334;
+    its decision as to the Conventions, 360.
+  Sand River Convention, The, 17;
+    Sir George Grey's exposure of, 19.
+  Sannah's Post, 363.
+  Sargant, E. B., his story of the educational efforts during the war,
+    520 to 523.
+  Sauer, Hans, 97.
+  Sauer, J. W., joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124, 142;
+    his sympathy with the Boers, 149;
+    his mission to Dordrecht, 287 (note), 379 (note);
+    his breach with Mr. Schreiner, 361;
+    his offer to range himself on the side of the Republics, 376, 377;
+    his intimacy with Mr. Hargrove, 379;
+    his repudiation of Pres. Krueger's statement as to his connection with
+      Mr. Hargrove, 380;
+    his declaration when opposing the second reading of the Treason Bill,
+      396, 474;
+    purpose of his visit to England, 495;
+    banquet in his honour, 496;
+    his frankness as to his mission, 497;
+    attends the meeting at the Queen's Hall, 498.
+  Scheepers, 432.
+  Schreiner Cabinet, The, 96, 124, 141, 150;
+    the Bond Members of, 142;
+    its desire to prevent British intervention, 150;
+    its "planks," 158;
+    the Te Water correspondence, 162 to 166;
+    its opinion of Pres. Krueger's franchise proposals, 198;
+    uses its influence to assist the Pretoria Executive in refusing the
+      franchise reform put forward by Lord Milner, 199;
+    its refusal to call out the local forces, 280 to 283, 345;
+    refuses aid to Mafeking and Kimberley, 345;
+    its demise, 346, 390;
+    individual views of the members on the treatment of the rebels, 390.
+  Schreiner-Bond coalition, The, 98.
+  Schreiner, Olive, 144.
+  Schreiner, Philip, adopted as the parliamentary leader by the Bond, 97;
+    moves a vote of "no confidence" in the Sprigg Ministry, 118;
+    his electoral utterances, 118;
+    forms a ministry, 124;
+    warned by Lord Milner of the gravity of the situation, 140;
+    his blind partisanship for the Transvaal, 142, 147;
+    his relationship to Lord Milner, 143;
+    his history, 144;
+    his regard for the British Empire, 145;
+    his reply to a question of Mr. Chamberlain's, 146;
+    his instinctive sympathy with the Afrikander nationalists, 146;
+    sounds Lord Milner as to the possibility of an inter-state Conference,
+      152;
+    receives warning telegrams from England, 153, 154;
+    writes a confidential letter to President Steyn, 154;
+    the influence which he used with the Transvaal Government, 155;
+    his view of Krueger's acceptance of a conference, 158;
+    his solicitude to attend the Bloemfontein Conference, 167;
+    his partisanship on the question of the franchise, 198, 199;
+    informed of the Home Governments' intention to "complete" the Cape
+      Garrison, 204;
+    his view of the grant of a limited franchise to the Uitlanders, 210;
+    urges the acceptance of the proposed joint inquiry, 232, 235;
+    his position, 235;
+    his declaration as to the attitude he would assume in the event of
+      war, 248;
+    his knowledge of the Port Elizabeth ammunition for the Free State,
+      273;
+    his benediction of Pres. Krueger's Bloemfontein scheme and of the
+      Volksraad's proposals, 276;
+    his complex political creed, 278;
+    his resistance to Lord Milner's plans of local military preparation,
+      278;
+    recedes from his standpoint of neutrality, 280, 344, 345, 373;
+    is prevailed on to call out the Kimberley volunteers, 280;
+    his final concession, 281;
+    fails to provide Kimberley with arms, 304;
+    consents to the proclamation of martial law, 345;
+    scant help afforded by him to Lord Milner, 345;
+    his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 361, 474;
+    uses his influence for the postponement of the Bond Congress at
+      Somerset East, 374;
+    is brought into conflict with the Bond members of his Cabinet, 384;
+    his views upon the nature of the punishment to be inflicted on rebels,
+      385, 390;
+    his sense of loyalty to the person of the Sovereign, 392;
+    his support of the Treason Bill, 474.
+  Schreiner, Theophilus, 144.
+  Schutte, Mr., 212 (note).
+  _Science of Rebellion, The_, 431 (note).
+  Seale-Hayne, M.P., Mr., 498 (note).
+  Select Committee on British South Africa, The proceedings of, extract
+    from, 146.
+  _Settlement after the War, The_, 214 (note).
+  Settlement of the new colonies, The, the question of, 489, 564 _et seq._
+  Seventeen, The Chamber of, 3, 4, 5.
+  Shaw, M.P., Thomas, 498 (note);
+    his speech at Galashiels on October 14th, 1901, 467, 468.
+  Sherman, General, 451 (note).
+  Showers, Mr., 529.
+  Silberbauer, Mr., 167.
+  Simon's Bay, 57.
+  Slaghter's Nek, the "rebellion" of, 11.
+  Slaves, The emancipation of in Cape Colony, 15.
+  Smalldeel, 397.
+  Smartt, Dr., 116 (note).
+  Smuts, J. C., 152, 159, 204, 212 (note), 572;
+    appointed State Attorney, 126;
+    attends the Bloemfontein Conference, 168;
+    report in _The Times_ of a conversation with, 214;
+    is entrusted with the projected destruction of the mines, 214;
+    furnishes an explanatory memorandum of the new franchise law, 218;
+    offers Sir William Greene a simplified seven years' franchise in lieu
+      of a joint inquiry, 237, 238;
+    his attempt to disown the arrest of Mr. Pakeman, 245;
+    his words at Vereeniging on May 30th, 1902, 276;
+    failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene through
+      him, 309, 310;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 558;
+    his suggestion as to a "formal clause" in the draft Vereeniging
+      agreement, 561;
+    his responsibility for the origin of the war, 574.
+  Solomon, Saul, 147.
+  Solomon, Sir R., 118 (note);
+    accepts office under the Schreiner Ministry as Attorney-General, 124,
+      142;
+    his motives in associating himself with the objects of the Bond, 144,
+      147, 148;
+    his distrust of Rhodes, 148;
+    his breach with Dr. Te Water and Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, 361, 474;
+    visits the north-midland districts of the Cape with Lord Milner, 362;
+    his views as to the treatment of the rebels, 390, 393, 395;
+    his support of the Treason Bill, 474;
+    appointed Legal Adviser to the New Transvaal administration, 474
+      (note);
+    help afforded by him to Lord Milner, 515;
+    his energy and capacity, 527;
+    presides over a commission on the gold industry, 529;
+    assists Lord Milner in the draft of the terms of the Vereeniging
+      surrender, 551, 558.
+  Somerset East, Annual Congress at, 374.
+  South Africa, failure of British administration in, 1;
+    population of European descent in, 5;
+    British treatment of the natives and Dutch in, 8 _et seq._;
+    the first effort to introduce a large British population, 15;
+    public interest in, 23;
+    ultimate control of British policy in, 24;
+    the decision of cardinal questions dealing with its administration, 34;
+    the Dutch population of, 43, 46, 49, 98, 105;
+    Dutch view of the nationalist movement in, 49;
+    before and after the Jameson Raid, 68;
+    as Lord Milner found it, 69;
+    attempts to secure the reunion of under the British flag, 69;
+    the British cause in, 71;
+    reinforcement of the British garrison in, 94;
+    aspirations of the Dutch in, 105;
+    despondency of the British population, 107;
+    result of the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference on the British
+      population, 172;
+    moral weakness of England's position in, 186;
+    approval of Lord Milner's policy by the British population, 216;
+    dismay of the British population as the Imperial Governments' reported
+      acceptance of the franchise law, 222;
+    performance of the British Army in, 323;
+    numbers of the British Army in on April 1st, 1900, 323;
+    numbers of the British population in who served, 324;
+    the task of subduing the entire Dutch population of, 435;
+    loyalists in, 447, 448;
+    the manifestation of hostility against the loyalist population of,
+      464 (note).
+  _South Africa: A Study, etc._, 579 (note).
+  South African Constabulary, inauguration of, 397, 530;
+    expenses of, 502;
+    composition of, 531.
+  South African Garrison, The, 178, 190, 309, 310.
+  South African League, The, 96, 133, 212 (note), 374.
+  South African Nationality, The, the creation of, 58.
+  _South African News, The_, 225, 380;
+    its abuse of Lord Milner, 272, 391, 477;
+    its charge against British soldiers, 402.
+  South African Republics, The attempt to bring them into a federal system
+      under the British Crown, 69;
+    their relations with the British Government, 81;
+    their military preparations, 166, 167, 178, 181.
+  South African Settlement, The, debate on in the House of Commons, 393.
+  South African Unity, The goal of, 65, 66, 69.
+  South African War, The Great, events which culminated in, 25, 188.
+  South Central Africa, 36.
+  Sprigg, Sir Gordon, 70, 280 (note);
+    his Ministry, 93, 94, 96, 97, 124, 217 (note);
+    his regard for British interests, 94;
+    his relations with Cecil Rhodes, 94;
+    the attempt to prevent him from attending the Colonial Conference of
+      1897, 94, 95;
+    resolves to bring forward a Redistribution Bill, 116;
+    appeals to the electorate, 118;
+    defeat of his Ministry, 124;
+    leads the Progressives in opposition, 125;
+    becomes Premier, 390;
+    is at one with Lord Milner and the Home Government, 473, 485;
+    his view as to the prorogation of Parliament, 482;
+    his loyal co-operations with the Imperial authorities, 485;
+    replies to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 500.
+  Springs, 456.
+  Standerton, 458.
+  _Star, The_ (Johannesburg), 145 (note), 245, 491 (note).
+  Statham, Mr., 377 (note).
+  Stead, W. T., 75, 357 (note).
+  Steenekamp, Mrs. Anna E., 16 (note).
+  Steyn, Marthinus, 70, 564;
+    his agency in the matter of the Bloemfontein Conference, 140;
+    Mr. Merriman's letter to him with reference to "a colourable measure
+      of reform" in the Transvaal, 152;
+    accepts the role of peace-maker, 153;
+    asks the Cape Premier to ascertain Lord Milner's willingness to meet
+      Pres. Krueger, 154, 155;
+    formal acceptance of his invitation to the Bloemfontein Conference,
+      156;
+    his replies to Dr. Te Water's letters, 162;
+    his willingness to take part in the Conference, 168;
+    his evening reception on the opening day of the Conference, 171;
+    inquires as to movements of British troops, 236;
+    his pledge that Cape Colony should not be invaded, 279;
+    his commandos, 289;
+    the ultimatum submitted for his approval, 291;
+    his misgivings, 291;
+    receives an appeal for peace from Sir Henry de Villiers, 292;
+    declares war, 295;
+    his "peace overtures," 355;
+    his responsibility for the guerilla war, 414, 415, 427;
+    circulates utterances of the leaders of the Liberal Opposition, 468;
+    consults with Schalk Burger as to peace, 552;
+    meets Lords Milner and Kitchener at Pretoria, 552;
+    his negotiations, 553;
+    appointed a peace commissioner, 556, 564;
+    his inability to sign the agreement, 567 (note).
+  Stop-the-war Committee, The, 368.
+  Stormberg, 321, 348, 455;
+    a result of the defeat at, 8.
+  _Story of an African Farm, The_, 144.
+  Strydom, the Boer, 427 (note).
+  _Studenten Blad_, The, of the Theological Seminary of Burghersdorp, 120.
+  _Sud Africaan_, The, 351 (note).
+  Sunnyside, 472.
+  Swaziland border, The, the question of, 89 (note).
+  Swaziland Convention, The, 87 (note).
+  Sydney, Public meeting at, 250.
+  Symons, General, 319.
+
+
+  "Taal," The, preservation of, 547.
+  Tembuland border, The, advance of the Boers to, 281;
+    Mr. Schreiner's action with reference to, 281, 282.
+  Tembus, The, 281.
+  "Terms of Surrender," The, communicated to the Boer Commissioners, 563;
+    the draft agreement of, 564.
+  Terrorism and deceit, A system of, 425, 426.
+  Te Water, Dr., 93, 94, 142, 150, 154, 235;
+    resignation of, 95, 116;
+    joins the Schreiner Cabinet, 124;
+    his faithfulness to the Bond, 162, 163;
+    advocates amnesty for the rebels, 392.
+  Te Water Correspondence, The, 156, 162 to 166.
+  Theron, T. P., 64;
+    opposes the Redistribution Bill, 117;
+    declines to meet the peace delegates, 475.
+  Thomas, C. H., 49.
+  _Three Years War, The_, 433 (note), 570 (note);
+    extract from, 578.
+  _Times, The_, 261 (note);
+    report of a conversation with Mr. Smuts, 214;
+    reproduces Mr. Chamberlain's conversation with its correspondent, 221,
+      227;
+    letter of Sir Wm. Harcourt to, 262;
+    report of a speech by Mr. Morley, 371 (note);
+    protest in of "an old Berliner," 468.
+  Transkei, The, 486.
+  Transvaal, The, Sir Bartle Frere's visit to in 1879, 28;
+    restoration of the Boer Republic in, 30, 31, 34;
+    the English of, 42, 43;
+    mineral wealth of, 54;
+    the Afrikander Bond in, 55;
+    conflict of its commercial interests with those of the Cape, 64;
+    attempts to secure Bechuanaland, 64;
+    position of the British population in, 71;
+    race oligarchy in, 84;
+    more hopeful situation in, 99;
+    the position in Feb., 1898, 103;
+    the question of reform in, 105, 106, 107;
+    unprogressiveness of, 112;
+    progress of armament in, 125, 158, 255;
+    its communications with the paramount power, 126;
+    reliance of on the Orange Free State, 128;
+    the position of British residents in, 130, 173;
+    presentation of the petition of the British residents, 131;
+    our stand against Dutch tyranny in, 186;
+    alleged conspiracy against, 212;
+    Mr. Morley's statement as to the annexation of, 261;
+    commandos ordered to take up their position on the Natal border, 290;
+    flight of the British population from, 292;
+    entered by the Natal Field Force, 329;
+    annexation of, 329;
+    reappearance of the Boer commandos in the S.W. of, 441;
+    numbers of Boers in the field in, 454;
+    area enclosed by blockhouse lines, 458;
+    progress of civil administration in, 489, 525;
+    issue of letters patent for the Crown Colony Government of, 490, 501,
+      544;
+    grant in aid of the revenues of, 501;
+    area held, 505, 506;
+    mineral wealth of unaffected by the war, 514;
+    extent of its mineral wealth, 519;
+    number of children educated in the camps in, 523;
+    the revenue of, 528;
+    the settlement of, 546;
+    military administration in, 566;
+    taxation of landed property in, 566.
+  _Transvaal from Within, The_, 131 (note), 264, 274 (note).
+  Transvaal question, The, debated in both Houses of Parliament, 228.
+  Treason Bill, The, 394 to 398;
+    the support given to it by Mr. Schreiner and Sir R. Solomon, 474;
+    the debates on, 477;
+    the lenient penalties of, 480.
+  Tugela, The, General Buller's attempt to force the passage, 306.
+
+
+  Uitlander Council, The, 211, 215;
+    its view of the new franchise law, 218;
+    its disappointment with the announcement that the law is acceptable to
+      the Imperial Government, 222 (note).
+  Uitlanders, The, a five years' franchise advocated for, 37;
+    the enfranchisement of, 38;
+    their "admitted grievances," 72;
+    confirmation of their complaints, 89;
+    Krueger's determination to increase their disabilities, 103;
+    their petition, 131;
+    postponement of the publication of Lord Milner's despatch dealing with
+      their grievances, 140;
+    formal acceptance of, 155, 157;
+    General Butler's view of their grievances, 175;
+    their claim for enfranchisement, 185;
+    granted a limited franchise, 209;
+    their view of the measure, 211;
+    petitions to the Queen for justice to, 216;
+    their detailed criticism of the new franchise law, 220;
+    the British Government's view of the concessions made to them, 229,
+      230;
+    outrageous treatment of, 244, 245;
+    espionage on, 273;
+    their return, 489, 507, 508, 512.
+  Ultimatum, The, 246, 253 to 299;
+    the day on which it expired, 279 (note);
+    submitted to Pres. Steyn for his approval, 291;
+    recast by Mr. Fischer, 291;
+    delay in presenting, 291;
+    delivered to Sir Wm. Greene, 295;
+    reaches Lord Milner, 295;
+    reaches the Colonial Office, 298;
+    reply of Her Majesty's Government, 298;
+    its effect on Lord Milner, 342;
+    its effect on the British people, 344.
+  Unionist leaders, The, and Lord Milner's administration, 81.
+  Union Jack, The, hissed, 499.
+  United States of America, The, attitude of towards Great Britain during
+    the war, 264, 312, 313, 314.
+  Upington Ministry, The, 60.
+  Upington, Sir Thomas, 93;
+    resignation of, 116 (note).
+
+
+  Vaal River, The, 456.
+  Valley of Light, The, 340 (note).
+  Vandam, Captain, 245.
+  Van Riebeck, Commander, The diary of, 2, 3;
+    the Dutch E. India Co's instructions to as to the treatment of natives
+      in S. Africa, 5, 9.
+  Vereeniging, 555, 556;
+    Mr. Smuts's words at on May 30th, 1902, 276;
+    the surrender of, 303, 359, 433, 454 (note), 536 to 583;
+    two and a half years after, 449;
+    signing of the Terms of Surrender, 542;
+    difference between Lord Milner's and Lord Kitchener's views as to the
+      Terms of Surrender, 551;
+    circumstances under which the negotiations originated, 551 _et seq._;
+    the three proposals put forward by the Boer leaders, 556;
+    Article X, of the Terms of Surrender, 559;
+    Mr. Smuts's suggestion as to a "formal clause," 561;
+    the draft agreement telegraphed to England, 562;
+    its wording, 564;
+    the signature of, 567, 573;
+    its terms compared with the Middelburg terms, 568 (note);
+    acceptation of the British terms, 571, 572;
+    generosity of the terms, 580;
+    leniency of the terms, 581;
+    immediate effect of the terms, 583.
+  Victoria, offers a military contingent, 251.
+  Victoria, Queen, presentation of the second petition to, 131, 194;
+    petitions to for justice to the Uitlanders, 216;
+    proposed letter to from Krueger, 376;
+    death of, 481 (note).
+  Vigilance Committee, The, 500.
+  Viljoen, General, a telegram to, 426.
+  _Volksblad_, The, 351 (note).
+  Volksraad, The, discusses the question of accepting the joint inquiry,
+      237;
+    refuses it, 237.
+  Vosloo, Mr., 477.
+  _Vossische Zeitung_, The, 399 (note), 469 (note).
+  Vryburg division, the return of representatives for, 121.
+  Vryburg, goes over to the Boers, 280.
+
+
+  Walrond, M. S. O., 167.
+  Walter, M. P. C., 213 (note).
+  War Commission, The, 318, 319 (note), 324 (note);
+    General Sir Wm. Butler's evidence before, 175 (note), 181 to 183.
+  War, Declaration of, 297;
+    the first days of, 304;
+    the conduct of, 316;
+    area of the country over which it was waged, 326, 339;
+    difficulties of carrying on, 328;
+    general conclusions arising from the events, and military criticisms
+      on, 330 _et seq._;
+    the unnecessary prolongation of, 360;
+    economic consequences of, 439;
+    moral effect of its recrudescence, 440;
+    method of waging it, 450 to 453.
+  _War in South Africa, The Official History of_, vol. i. p. 309 (note)
+    _et seq._
+  _War in South Africa, The_, Sir Conan Doyle's, 469 (note).
+  War Office, The, efficiency of, 339.
+  Watson, Dr. Spence, 498 (note).
+  Webb, Mr., arrest of, 131.
+  Wessels, Andries, 428.
+  Wessels, C. J., 260, 555.
+  White, Montagu, 232.
+  White, Sir George, shut up in Ladysmith, 320, 344.
+  Willcocks, Sir William, his report on irrigation, 516 to 518.
+  Williams, Colonel Hanbury, 167.
+  Willoughby, Sir John, 44.
+  Wilson, H. F. C., 515, 526.
+  Wilson, M.P., H. J., 498 (note).
+  Witwatersrand Gold Mines, The, 25, 31, 36.
+  Witwatersrand, The, Krueger raises the Vier-kleur on, 31.
+  Wodehouse, 346, 379.
+  Wodehouse, Sir Philip, 275.
+  Wolmarans, A. D., 168, 555.
+  Wolseley, Lord, his advice to the Salisbury Cabinet, 177, 188, 190, 309,
+      322, 331;
+    his task, 317, 318.
+  Woolls-Sampson, Col. Sir Aubrey, 88;
+    forms the Imperial Light Horse, 179.
+  _Worcester Advertiser, The_, 477;
+    its charge against British soldiers, 400.
+  Worcester Conference, The, 395, 403, 477;
+    the resolutions of, 405, 495;
+    a fatal result of, 412;
+    representations of its delegates to the Liberal party, 496.
+  Wybergh, Mr., 515, 528.
+  Wylant, the 'Sick-Comforter,' 3.
+
+
+  Zeerust, 458.
+  _Zuid Africaan_, The, articles in, 63.
+  Zulus, The, military power of, 25, 26.
+  Zululand, a portion of transferred to Natal, 550.
+
+
+_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, by
+W. Basil Worsfold
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA ***
+
+***** This file should be named 26490.txt or 26490.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        http://www.gutenberg.org/2/6/4/9/26490/
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